in danger,” nor were “any of the American residents on the island” harmed. “As
see, it was all because the White House wanted the country to forget about the
tragedy in Beirut.” (Tip O’Neill, Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip
79. Ibid., 1520.
80. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984 (Washing-
81. Shultz, Tumult and Triumph, 344.
83. Woodward, Feil, 336; Cannon, President Reagan, 448; Public Papers of the Presidents
85. Ibid., 2:1637.
86. Kryzanek, “The Grenada Invasion,” 58; Kenworthy, “Grenada as Theater,” 647;
Goldman and Fuller, Quest for the Presidency: 1984, 23.
87. Payne et al., Grenada: Revolution and Invasion, 165; Goldman and Fuller, Quest for
88. Goldman and Fuller, Quest for the Presidency: 1984, 21; Kenworthy, “Grenada as
Theater,” 647.

Chapter Eight, Panama, 1989

1. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989 (Washington,
2. Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the
Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 181–182; Karin von Hippi-
el, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post–Cold War World (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 53. According to von Hippel, “In Panama there
was no threat. Only one American had been killed prior to the intervention. This was the
worst U.S.–Panamanian incident in twenty-five years, despite the large U.S. presence. This
low incidence rate could be replicated in only a handful of very small American towns, and
was completely out of kilter with most American cities” (ibid., 47).
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 7; Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of
New York Times, 10 April 1992, A1; Frederick Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator: America’s
Bungled Affair with Noriega (New York: Putnam’s, 1990), chap. 12; John Dinges, Our Man in
Panama: The Shreded Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York: Random House,
1990), xii, 316; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 182.
4. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 1st ed., 290; Scarton, The Noriega Years, 2, 67, 75–76,
89, 91, 164–166; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, chap. 10; Dinges, Our Man in Panama,
chaps. 8–9; Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991),
chaps. 1, 10; Newsweek, 8 January 1990, 26. As Thomas Carothers writes, “The notion that
a burning desire to bring democracy to Panama pushed the Bush administration to military
action is groundless. The U.S. government managed to live with a nondemocratic govern-
ment in Panama for decades before it turned against Noriega. . . . And the Bush administra-
tion was obviously able to live with nondemocratic governments in other countries of
importance to the United States. . . . Restoring democracy was not a major motivation in
and of itself” (In the Name of Democracy, 182).
5. Von Hippel, Democracy by Force, 49, 53–54; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy,
181; Newsweek, 1 January 1990, 21.
6. Except where otherwise noted, the following overview of Noriega’s rise to power is
drawn from Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, chaps. 3–8, 12, and Dinges, Our Man in
Panama, chaps. 2–7.
7. Quoted in Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan
8. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 194–195; Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS
to the CIA (New York: Viking, 1990), 480; Luis E. Murillo, The Noriega Mess: The Drugs,
9. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 28, 48, 50–51, 58, 80–82, 90–91, 95; John Weeks and
112.
10. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 157–167; Guillermo de St. Malo Arias and Godfrey
Harris, The Panamanian Problem: How the Reagan and Bush Administrations Deal with the
Noriega Regime (Los Angeles: Americas Group, 1993), 93; Stephen Roskamm Shalom,
Imperial Abihs: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention after the Cold War (Boston: South End Press,
1993), 180–181; Scarton, The Noriega Years, 80, 91; Perry, Eclipse, 114.
11. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 87, 95–98, 108–109, 120–121, 158, 243; Christian
intelligence sources, reported that Noriega received payments from at least ten foreign in-
telligence services, including those of the United States, England, France, Cuba, Nicaragua,
Libya, Israel, and Taiwan (Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 119, 281). According to former U.S.
ambassador to Costa Rica Frank McNeil, Noriega “never met an intelligence service he
couldn’t con” (Frank McNeil, War and Peace in Central America [New York: Scribner’s,
1988], 226).
12. Buckley, Panama, 147–148; Weeks and Gunson, Panama: Made in the USA, 48;
Perry, Eclipse, 110.
13. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, chap. 12; Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 203–204;
Colin Powell (with Joseph E. Persico), My American Journey (New York: Random House,
1995), 628. According to Weeks and Gunson, Noriega appointed as Panama’s chief liaison
officer to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency a man who “also acted as an intermediary be-
tween the general and the Medellin cartel” (Panama: Made in the USA, 52).
14. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 112, 122, 158; Powell, My American Journey, 628;
Persico, Casey, 479; Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 234; Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth,
and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington
Books, 1991), 8; Scarton, The Noriega Years, 12, 84; McNeil, War and Peace in Central
America, 237; Johnson, Sleepwalking through History, 273.
15. Janet Westrick, “Empire by Invitation: Operation ‘Just Cause’ and Panamanian Man-
ipulation of U.S. Foreign Policy” (master’s thesis, Ohio University, Department of His-
tory, 1997), chaps. 2–3; Dinges, Our Man in Panama, 319; Richard L. Millett, “The Failure of
Panama’s Internal Opposition, 1987–1989,” in Conflict Resolution and Democratization in
Panama: Implications for U.S. Policy, ed. Eva Loser (Washington, DC: Center for Stra-


21. Dingess, Our Man in Panama, 242; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 170; Scratchon, The Noriega Years, 92–93.


27. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 179, 224; Martha L. Cottam, Images & Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 162; Dingess, Our Man in Panama, 244.

28. Scratchon, The Noriega Years, 105. So appreciative were Casey and North of Noriega’s services in that the summer of 1986 they went so far as to put the Panamanian dictator in contact with the U.S. public-relations firm International Business Communications “to help him improve his image in the United States and at home” (Kempe, “The Panama Debacle,” 7; Dingess, Our Man in Panama, 254).

29. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 222–223; Dingess, Our Man in Panama, 270; Buckley, Panama, 88–89; Scratchon, The Noriega Years, 112; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 171.


31. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, chap. 14; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 172–173, 177.


33. Scratchon, The Noriega Years, 137–140, 147; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 306–308; Buckley, Panama, 135–136.

34. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, chap. 18; Scratchon, The Noriega Years, 149–152; Buckley, Panama, 140–145; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 174–175.

35. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 333, 335; Perry, Eclipse, 113; Murillo, The Noriega Mess, 708; Buckley, Panama, 147.


37. Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 336; Buckley, Panama, 152–154; Perry, Eclipse, 131; Murillo, The Noriega Mess, 709 (emphasis in original sources). Perry writes that “in order for Bush not to have known of Noriega’s drug ties, [he would] have had to be nearly comatose during the ten years that preceded Noriega’s ... indictment.”


40. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1062, 1067, 1072, 1074.

41. Buckley, Panama, 156; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 337; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1070–1071; Murillo, The Noriega Mess, 708.

42. Buckley, Panama, 155–156; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 313–314, 337; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 175.


44. Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 35–36; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 333, 335; Buckley, Panama, 156, 162–163. According to one Reagan administration official, “When negotiations broke down, there was a conscious decision by the political staff of the White House to remove Panama from the agenda” (quoted in Cottam, Images & Intervention, 155).


49. Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 180; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989, 1:533, 547–548; Buckley, Panama, 183–184; Kempe, Di-


52. Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place, 133; Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997), 238, 309; Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 178; Conniff, Panama and the United States, 162; Westrick, “Empire by Invitation,” 100.


59. Scraton, The Noriega Years, 192; Buckley, Panama, 212; Murillo, The Noriega Mess, 751; Parmet, George Bush, 413; Buckley, Panama, 212; Murillo, The Noriega Mess, 751; Scraton, The Noriega Years, 189; Kempe, Divorcing the Dictator, 386; Woodward, The Commanders, 100; New York Times, 8 October 1989, 16.


69. In Marching in Place, Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame write that “contrary to their public rhetoric, Bush and his top aides were keenly sensitive to opinion surveys and news coverage . . . Bush and [White House chief of staff] John Sununu frequently consulted a chart entitled ‘Comparative Presidential Job Approval,’ which showed Bush’s polls ratings month by month on a line, alongside lines that tracked the ratings of Presidents Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Nixon.” National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told Duffy and Goodgame that Bush was “constantly popping into Press Secretary [Martin] Fitzwater’s office after a major presidential speech or action or (more likely) reaction to ask ‘How are the overnight, Martin?’—meaning ‘How is it playing?’” (75, 77). In the aftermath of the coup embarrassment, Admiral William Crowe, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that a U.S. invasion was a question of “when” rather than “if” (von Hippel, Democracy by Force, 33).

70. Quayle, Standing Firm, 142; Stiner quoted in Donnelly et al., Operation Just Cause, 61; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 187. One administration official later characterized Bush’s post-coup determination to launch an invasion “a decision in search of an excuse” (Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 1st ed., 273).


Conclusion


6. Several of the leftist leaders who became targets of U.S. intervention traveled to Washington, DC, in ontensable efforts to reduce discord—or more likely—to neutralize U.S. suspicions while they consolidated their revolutions at home. Fidel Castro visited the U.S. capital in April 1959 to offer assurances to U.S. officials and the U.S. public that he was not a communist. Cheddi Jagan arrived in October 1961 to solicit large-scale U.S. economic assistance for British Guiana. A high-level Sandinista delegation headed by Daniel Ortega requested, and received, a White House meeting with President Carter in September 1979 to discuss future relations between the two countries. Maurice Bishop traveled to DC in June 1983 in an attempt to reduce the rapidly escalating tensions in U.S.-Grenadian relations. None of these visits, however, allayed U.S. doubts about the ideological and international leanings of the visitors or prevented eventual intervention. At the time of Castro’s visit, the Eisenhower administration was prepared to co-opt the Cuban revolutionary with S. foreign aid, but Fidel chose to maintain his international independence during the trip by refusing to make any aid requests. The announcement a month later of the revolution’s agrarian-reform program, together with the anti-U.S. invective that continued to pervade Castro’s public rhetoric, effectively derailed any subsequent prospects for harmonious relations. (See Richard E. Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961 [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985], 34–36, and Chapter 2 above.) Jagan’s U.S. visit ended disastrously when the Guianese leader’s suspicion-raising comments about Marxism led President Kennedy to conclude that intervention was warranted. (See Chapter 3 above.) In response to Daniel Ortega’s blunt demands for “unconditional” U.S. economic assistance, Carter expressed a willingness to increase U.S. aid to Nicaragua in return for the Sandinistas’ commitment to democracy, human rights, international nonalignment, and noninterference in the internal affairs of their Central American neighbors. Subsequent U.S. aid disbursements—and prospects for a civil relationship—ended when the Sandinistas proved unwilling to terminate their covert support for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in neighboring El Salvador (Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repeat: The United States and Nicaragua [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987], 206–207, 223–228). Reagan administration representatives responded to Bishop’s assurances that Grenada posed no threat to U.S. national security by informing him that actions spoke louder than words and that improved relations would come only after Grenada had distanced itself from the Soviet Union and Cuba. In