

- in danger," nor were "any of the American residents on the island" harmed. "As see, it was all because the White House wanted the country to forget about the tragedy in Beirut." (Tip O'Neill, *Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O'Neill* [New York: Random House, 1987], 365-367).
78. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, 2:1521.
  79. *Ibid.*, 1520.
  80. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 2:1419, 1589.
  81. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 344.
  82. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984*, 2:1638.
  83. Woodward, *Veil*, 336; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 448; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984*, 2:1186.
  84. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1984*, 2:1416.
  85. *Ibid.*, 2:1637.
  86. Kryzaneck, "The Grenada Invasion," 58; Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theater," 647; Goldman and Fuller, *Quest for the Presidency: 1984*, 23.
  87. Payne et al., *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, 165; Goldman and Fuller, *Quest for the Presidency: 1984*, 21.
  88. Goldman and Fuller, *Quest for the Presidency: 1984*, 21; Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theater," 647.

## Chapter Eight. Panama, 1989

1. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 1:1722-1723.
  2. Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 181-182; Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 53. According to von Hippel, "In Panama there was no threat. Only one American had been killed prior to the intervention. This was the worst U.S.-Panamanian incident in twenty-five years, despite the large U.S. presence. This low incidence rate could be replicated in only a handful of very small American towns, and was completely out of kilter with most American cities" (*ibid.*, 47).
  3. Margaret E. Scranton, *The Noriega Years: U.S.-Panamanian Relations, 1981-1990* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 7; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 1st ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 275; *New York Times*, 10 April 1992, A1; Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega* (New York: Putnam's, 1990), chap. 12; John Dinges, *Our Man in Panama: The Shred Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega* (New York: Random House, 1990), xxi, 316; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 182.
  4. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, 1st ed., 290; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 2, 67, 75-76, chaps. 8-9; Kevin Buckley, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chap. 10; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, chaps. 1, 10; *Newsweek*, 8 January 1990, 26. As Thomas Carothers writes, "The notion that a burning desire to bring democracy to Panama pushed the Bush administration to military action is groundless. The U.S. government managed to live with a nondemocratic government in Panama for decades before it turned against Noriega. . . . And the Bush administration was obviously able to live with nondemocratic governments in other countries of
- importance to the United States. . . . Restoring democracy was not a major motivation in and of itself" (*In the Name of Democracy*, 182).
5. Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, 49, 53-54; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 181; *Newsweek*, 1 January 1990, 21.
  6. Except where otherwise noted, the following overview of Noriega's rise to power is drawn from Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chaps. 3-8, 12, and Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, chaps. 2-7.
  7. Quoted in Haynes Johnson, *Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan Years* (New York: Norton, 1991), 265.
  8. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 194-195; Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Viking, 1990), 480; Luis E. Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess: The Drugs, the Canal, and Why America Invaded* (Berkeley, CA: Video-Books, 1995), 648.
  9. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 28, 48, 50-51, 58, 80-82, 90-91, 95; John Weeks and Phil Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1991), 47; Mark Perry, *Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA* (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 110-112.
  10. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 157-167; Guillermo de St. Malo Arias and Godfrey Harris, *The Panamanian Problem: How the Reagan and Bush Administrations Dealt with the Noriega Regime* (Los Angeles: Americas Group, 1993), 93; Stephen Roskamm Shalom, *Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention after the Cold War* (Boston: South End Press, 1993), 180-181; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 80, 91; Perry, *Eclipse*, 114.
  11. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 87, 95-98, 108-109, 120-121, 158, 243; *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 January 1990, 18, and 9 November 1990, 7. Kempe, drawing on U.S. intelligence sources, reported that Noriega received payments from at least ten foreign intelligence services, including those of the United States, England, France, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, Israel, and Taiwan (Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 119, 281). According to former U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica Frank McNeil, Noriega "never met an intelligence service he couldn't con" (Frank McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America* [New York: Scribner's, 1988], 226).
  12. Buckley, *Panama*, 147-148; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 48; Perry, *Eclipse*, 110.
  13. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chap. 12; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 203-204; Colin Powell (with Joseph E. Persico), *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 628. According to Weeks and Gunson, Noriega appointed as Panama's chief liaison officer to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency a man who "also acted as an intermediary between the general and the Medellín cartel" (*Panama: Made in the USA*, 52).
  14. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 112, 122, 158; Powell, *My American Journey*, 628; Persico, *Casey*, 479; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 234; Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 8; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 12, 84; McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America*, 237; Johnson, *Sleepwalking through History*, 273.
  15. Janet Westrick, "Empire by Invitation: Operation 'Just Cause' and Panamanian Manipulation of U.S. Foreign Policy" (master's thesis, Ohio University, Department of History, 1997), chaps. 2-3; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 319; Richard L. Millett, "The Failure of Panama's Internal Opposition, 1987-1989," in *Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama: Implications for U.S. Policy*, ed. Eva Loser (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), 31; *New York Times*, 19 February 1989, I15.
  16. Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 138, 145, 158; Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 57-61.



17. Buckley, *Panama*, 110; Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 64, 69–77; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 241. Early in 1985, Eisenmann began circulating copies of *La Prensa Digest*, a condensed English-language version of *La Prensa*, to some 350 U.S. lawmakers, journalists, and think tanks in the hope that accurate information about the Panamanians' plight under Noriega would stimulate a U.S. policy shift (Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 66–68).
18. Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 126–139, 176–177, "The Panama Debate," in Loser, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama*, 9; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 134–136, 174–184, 190–195, 210–222, 237–238, 240–241; Buckley, *Panama*, 21–28, 42–43, 47–48; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 85–86, 96–97.
19. Buckley, *Panama*, 53; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 177–178.
20. *New York Times*, 12 June 1986, 1; Buckley, *Panama*, 54; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 177–178; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 92–93.
21. Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 242; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 170; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 92.
22. Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 254–255, 276–279; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 175, 179–180; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 97; George Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega: The Noriega Challenge to George Bush's Credibility and the 1989 Invasion of Panama" (master's thesis, Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 2000), 154, 160.
23. Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 259–266; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 106–109; Buckley, *Panama*, 68–77, 80–85; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 207–214; Michael L. Conruff, *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 156–157; Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 79–80; Public Broadcasting System (PBS), *MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour*, "Panama," 18 June 1987.
24. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 214–220; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 111; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 269–270; Buckley, *Panama*, 85–88; letter, Roberto Eisenmann to Janet Westrick, 21 June 1997, copy in possession of author. Of Lewis, Robert Pastor writes: "No Latin American has understood the U.S. political process better or has used his influence more effectively in Washington" (Robert Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992], 10).
25. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 118–119, 127–128; Buckley, *Panama*, 99–108, 110–111, 114–117; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 290–292; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 647–648.
26. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 95.
27. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 179, 224; Martha L. Cottam, *Images & Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 162; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 244.
28. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 105. So appreciative were Casey and North of Noriega's services that in the summer of 1986 they went so far as to put the Panamanian dictator in contact with the U.S. public-relations firm International Business Communications "to help him improve his image in the United States and at home" (Kempe, "The Panama Debate," 7; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 254).
29. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 222–223; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 270; Buckley, *Panama*, 88–89; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 112; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 171.
30. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 224; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 114, 126–127; *Washington Post*, 14 January 1990, A1; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 288.
31. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chap. 14; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 172–173, 177.

32. Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 643; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 296; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 147; *New York Times*, 25 March 1988, 18; George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 1057.
33. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 137–140, 147; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 306–308; Buckley, *Panama*, 135–136.
34. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chap. 18; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 149–152; Buckley, *Panama*, 140–145; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 174–175.
35. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 333, 335; Perry, *Eclipse*, 113; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 708; Buckley, *Panama*, 147.
36. Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 708, 710; Steve C. Ropp, "The Bush Administration and the Invasion of Panama: Explaining the Choice and Timing of the Military Option," in *United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge*, ed. John D. Martz (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 92; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 313, 336.
37. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 336; Buckley, *Panama*, 152–154; Perry, *Eclipse*, 131; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 709 (emphasis in original sources). Perry writes that "in order for Bush not to have known of Noriega's drug ties, [he would] have had to be nearly comatose during the ten years that preceded Noriega's . . . indictment."
38. Buckley, *Panama*, 117; Anthony King and Giles Alston, "Good Government and the Politics of High Exposure," in *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals*, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), 269; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 169–170; *New York Times*, 20 May 1988, A1; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 78; Ropp, "The Bush Administration and the Invasion of Panama," 92.
39. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1051–1052, 1062–1066, 1071; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 309–310, 312–313; Kempe, "The Panama Debate," 14; Buckley, *Panama*, 154–156; James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995), 179; *New York Times*, 20 May 1988, A1.
40. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1062, 1067, 1072, 1074.
41. Buckley, *Panama*, 156; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 337; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1070–1071; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 708.
42. Buckley, *Panama*, 155–156; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 313–314, 337; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 175.
43. Buckley, *Panama*, 169; Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 56.
44. Donnelly et al., *Operation Just Cause*, 35–36; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 333, 335; Buckley, *Panama*, 156, 162–163. According to one Reagan administration official, "When negotiations broke down, there was a conscious decision by the political staff of the White House to remove Panama from the agenda" (quoted in Cottam, *Images & Intervention*, 155).
45. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 156; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 177; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 719; *New York Times*, 26 December 1989, A11.
46. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 180; Buckley, *Panama*, 168.
47. Buckley, *Panama*, 169–170; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1989*, 1:506; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 204; *Washington Post*, 30 April 1989, A32, quoted in Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 205.
48. Buckley, *Panama*, chap. 10; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 350–362; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 158–164; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 206–210.
49. Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 180; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989*, 1:533, 547–548; Buckley, *Panama*, 183–184; Kempe, *Di-*



- vancing the Dictator, 362, 365; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 166. The Chaney quote is from PBS, *MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour*, 11 May 1989.
50. Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, *Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 71.
51. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1989*, 1:533-534, 547-548, 701-702, 2:1031; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 178.
52. Duffy and Goodgame, *Marching in Place*, 133; Herbert S. Parmet, *George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 238, 309; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 178; Conniff, *Panama and the United States*, 162; Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 100.
53. Robert D. Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 352-357; St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 227-231; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 183-202; Conniff, *Panama and the United States*, 162-163; *Time*, 15 May 1989, 22-23; *New York Times*, 21 May 1989, sec. 4, 1; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 81.
54. Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 190-191; Conniff, *Panama and the United States*, 163; von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, 35.
55. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, chap. 21; Buckley, *Panama*, chaps. 12-13; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 185-191; Woodward, *The Commanders*, chap. 11; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, chap. 41.
56. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 192; Buckley, *Panama*, 206, 209; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 97; Westrick, "Empire by Invitation," 104; Harold Molineu, *U.S. Policy toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 247. In the aftermath of the October coup attempt, Noriega announced "a catchy new slogan": "Bullets for my enemies, beatings for the indecisive, and money for my friends" (Buckley, *Panama*, 210; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 192).
57. Parmet, *George Bush*, 413; Buckley, *Panama*, 212; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 751; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 189; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 386; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 100; *New York Times*, 8 October 1989, 16.
58. Woodward, *The Commanders*, 100; Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 186-187.
59. *New York Times*, 8 October 1989, sec. 4, 20; St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 241; *Newsweek*, 16 October 1989, 26; Ropp, "The Bush Administration and the Invasion of Panama," 100-101 (citing *Human Events*, 14 October 1989, 3). "Sir, how about Panama?" a reporter asked the president three days after the failed coup. "Simply put, a lot of critics say you blew it. Your administration blew it on Panama" (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush, 1989*, 2:1315).
60. St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 241; *Washington Post*, 6 October 1989, A31; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 100, 102-103; *New York Times*, 9 October 1989, A17.
61. *Washington Post*, 22 October 1989, C4; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 191.
62. Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 224-225, quoting the *Washington Post*, 6 October 1989, A33, and the *New York Times*, 6 October 1989, A1, A11. In *The Politics of Diplomacy*, former Secretary of State Baker writes: "It is an understatement to say that administration decision making was less than crisp" (186).
63. *Washington Post*, 11 October 1989, A23, as quoted in Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 225.
64. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 187; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 185; *Newsweek*, 16 October 1989, 30; St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 226; Howard J.

Wiarda, "From Reagan to Bush: Continuity and Change in U.S. Latin American Policy," in Martz, ed., *United States Policy in Latin America*, 39; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 102. Susan G. Horwitz writes that "the political backlash" that followed the coup "was one of the most difficult moments of Bush's presidency" (Susan G. Horwitz, "Indications and Warning Factors," in *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama*, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990], 55).

65. St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 226-227.

66. Dan Quayle, *Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 142; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 11; Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy*, 181; Buckley, *Panama*, 220, 222; Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 316; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 100-101. Vice President Quayle admits that "the administration . . . often paid too much attention to the press," and that "late in the first year of the administration," Noriega was the "specific nagging issue driving 'The Wimp Factor'" (141). In *Marching in Place*, Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame write that "contrary to their public rhetoric, Bush and his top aides were keenly sensitive to opinion surveys and news coverage. . . . Bush and [White House chief of staff John] Sununu frequently consulted a chart entitled 'Comparative Presidential Job Approval,' which showed Bush's poll ratings month by month on a line, alongside lines that tracked the ratings of Presidents Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Nixon." National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told Duffy and Goodgame that Bush was "constantly popping into Press Secretary [Marlin] Fitzwater's office after a major presidential speech or action or (more likely) reaction to ask 'How are the overnights, Marlin?'—meaning 'How is it playing?'" (75, 77). In the aftermath of the coup embarrassment, Admiral William Crowe, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that a U.S. invasion was a question of "when" rather than "if" (von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, 33).

67. Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 142; Stiner quoted in Donnelly et al., *Operation Just Cause*, 61; Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 187. One administration official later characterized Bush's postcoup determination to launch an invasion "a decision in search of an excuse" (Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, 1st ed., 273).

68. Buckley, *Panama*, 223; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 15; Kempe, "The Panama Debate," 17; Independent Commission of Inquiry on "Just Cause" (Boston: Panama, *The U.S. Invasion of Panama: The Truth Behind Operation 'Just Cause'*) (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 24; Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) report, quoted in Eldon Kenworthy, "Panama as Media Event," *LASA Forum* (newsletter of the Latin American Studies Association), 21, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 15; Donnelly et al., *Operation Just Cause*, 49-50; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 111, 116; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 38-39, 196, 200.

69. Duffy and Goodgame, *Marching in Place*, 189; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 188-190; Pfaff quoted in St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 243; Gephardt quoted in David Mervin, *George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 172.

70. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 4-8, 24-27, 40-41, 87.

71. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 34; Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 190-194, 254-256; Charles William Maynes, "Coping With the '90s," *Foreign Policy* 74 (Spring 1989): 42-43, as quoted in Kourous, "Bush v. Noriega," 193-194; Perry, *Eclipse*, 273-274; Powell, *My*



*American Journey*, 644; *New York Times*, 21 December 1989, A31; Donnelly et al., *Operation Just Cause*, 96–97. According to Bush presidential historian John Robert Greene, James Baker later stated “that one of the most important results of the Panama invasion was to show the world that the United States was not afraid to act unilaterally (‘the surest test of a great power’)” (John Robert Greene, *The Presidency of George Bush* [Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000], 106).

72. Buckley, *Panama*, 225–226; St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 245–246; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 197. The Bush administration subsequently justified the U.S. invasion in part by using these Panamanian pronouncements as evidence that Noriega’s government had declared war on the United States (Buckley, *Panama*, 231). Noriega tells a different story. In *America’s Prisoner: The Memoirs of Manuel Noriega* (New York: Random House, 1997), he writes that on December 15, 1989, “I said that a state of war existed because we were under siege, but it was not a declaration of war. . . . We were living in a state of war—with constant provocation by the Americans, constant threats. . . . My words were twisted by the Bush administration, which was looking for as much justification as it could find to invade Panama. . . . The speech was seized upon by the United States, which made the absurd claim that I was declaring war” (167).

73. Buckley, *Panama*, 226–229; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 198–200; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 8–10; St. Malo and Harris, *The Panamanian Problem*, 246–248; John G. Roos, “Did President Bush Jump the Gun in Ordering the Invasion of Panama?” *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1992, 10–14; Murrillo, *The Noriega Mess*, 771–772; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 16. According to Bob Woodward, the JCS staff at the Pentagon knew “that the Paz incident wasn’t a clear-cut incident of unprovoked PDF aggression—the car had sped away from a legitimate roadblock, lending an element of ambiguity” (Woodward, *The Commanders*, 132). Brent Scowcroft also later characterized the Paz killing and abuse of the Navy couple as “the excuse” for the invasion (Greene, *The Presidency of George Bush*, 105).

74. Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 10–24, 398–417; Buckley, *Panama*, 229–232, 238–254; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 300–314; *New York Times*, 10 April 1992, A1, 11 July 1992, A1.

75. Westrick, “Empire by Invitation,” 106–107; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 203; Buckley, *Panama*, 234.

76. Buckley, *Panama*, 230; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, 11–12; Dinges, *Our Man in Panama*, 308; Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 202–203; *New York Times*, 21 December 1989, A31; Independent Commission of Inquiry on the U.S. Invasion of Panama, *The U.S. Invasion of Panama*, 26, 28; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 9–10; Woodward, *The Commanders*, 152.

77. Scranton, *The Noriega Years*, 208, 223–224; Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator*, xxviii–xxviii; Weeks and Gunson, *Panama: Made in the USA*, 104; *Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 1994, A1.

78. Kourouos, “Bush v. Noriega,” 269.

79. *Ibid.*, 10, 230, 235, 269; Conniff, *Panama and the United States*, 162; Perry, *Eclipse*, 294; Parmet, *George Bush*, 419; *Wall Street Journal*, 21 December 1989, A20; Powell, *An American Journey*, 658; *New York Times*, 21 December 1989, A1, as quoted in Kourouos, “Bush v. Noriega,” 251; Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, “After Panama, Goodbye to the Bush Wimp Image,” *Boston Globe*, 6 January 1990, 19, quoted in Parmet, *George Bush*, 419.

80. *Boston Globe*, 22 December 1989, 3.

## Conclusion

1. Fredrick Pike, “Corporatism and Latin American–United States Relations,” in *The New Corporatism: Social–Political Structures in the Iberian World*, ed. Fredrick Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame, IN, and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 139.

2. WGBH (Boston), “The Yankee Years,” Public Broadcasting System (PBS) documentary, *Crisis in Central America*, pt. 1, produced in association with the Blackwell Corporation (Wilmette, IL: Films Incorporated, 1985), videorecording.

3. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic, 2005), 72; Robert Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 212.

4. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way*, 121.

5. Alan McPherson, “Misled by Himself: What the Johnson Tapes Reveal about the Dominican Intervention of 1965,” *Latin American Research Review* 38, no. 2 (2003): 127–128.

6. Several of the leftist leaders who became targets of U.S. intervention traveled to Washington, DC, in ostensible efforts to reduce discord or—more likely—to neutralize U.S. suspicions while they consolidated their revolutions at home. Fidel Castro visited the U.S. capital in April 1959 to offer assurances to U.S. officials and the U.S. public that he was not a communist. Cheddi Jagan arrived in October 1961 to solicit large-scale U.S. economic assistance for British Guiana. A high-level Sandinista delegation headed by Daniel Ortega requested, and received, a White House meeting with President Carter in September 1979 to discuss future relations between the two countries. Maurice Bishop traveled to DC in June 1983 in an attempt to reduce the rapidly escalating tensions in U.S.–Grenadian relations. None of these visits, however, allayed U.S. doubts about the ideological and international leanings of the visitors or prevented eventual intervention. At the time of Castro’s visit, the Eisenhower administration was prepared to co-opt the Cuban revolutionary with U.S. foreign aid, but Fidel chose to maintain his international independence during the trip by refusing to make any aid requests. The announcement a month later of the revolution’s agrarian-reform program, together with the anti-U.S. invective that continued to pervade Castro’s public rhetoric, effectively derailed any subsequent prospects for harmonious relations. (See Richard E. Welch, *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959–1961* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985], 34–36; and Chapter 2 above.) Jagan’s U.S. visit ended disastrously when the Guianese leader’s suspicion-raising comments about Marxism led President Kennedy to conclude that intervention was warranted. (See Chapter 3 above.) In response to Daniel Ortega’s blunt demands for “unconditional” U.S. economic assistance, Carter expressed a willingness to increase U.S. aid to Nicaragua in return for the Sandinistas’ commitment to democracy, human rights, international nonalignment, and noninterference in the internal affairs of their Central American neighbors. Subsequent U.S. aid disbursements—and prospects for a civil relationship—ended when the Sandinistas proved unwilling to terminate their covert support for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in neighboring El Salvador (Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987], 206–207, 223–228). Reagan administration representatives responded to Bishop’s assurances that Grenada posed no threat to U.S. national security by informing him that actions spoke louder than words and that improved relations would come only after Grenada had distanced itself from the Soviet Union and Cuba. In