Agonizing over engagement: SEA and the “death of environmentalism” debates

Judy Brown a,*, Jesse Dillard b,c,d

a School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand
b Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom
c Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
d Portland State University, Portland, United States

ABSTRACT

Social and environmental accounting (SEA) is currently going through a period of critical self-analysis. Fundamental questions are being raised about how SEA should be defined, who should be doing the defining, and if, how and whom it should engage. We attempt to enrich these debates by drawing on the political philosophy of agonistic pluralism and a set of debates about engagement within the environmental movement – “the death of environmentalism” debates. We set forth the “Death” debates and, in doing so, contextualize and theorize the contested nature of SEA engagement using agonistic pluralism. In contrast to consensually oriented approaches to SEA, the desired outcome is not necessarily resolution of ideological differences but to imagine, develop, and support democratic processes wherein these differences can be recognized and engaged. We construe the “Death” debates as illustrative of the contestable practical and political issues facing both SEA and progressive social movements generally, demonstrating the range of deliberations necessary in contemplating effective engagement programs. The SEA community, and civil society groups, can benefit from the more overtly political perspective provided by agonistic pluralism. By surfacing and engaging with various antagonisms in this wider civic sphere, SEA can more effectively respond to, and move beyond, traditional politically conservative, managerialist discourses.

© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction

In recent years, many have raised challenging questions about social and environmental accounting (SEA) research and practice. As Bebbington et al. (2007b, p. 358) observe, “there are disagreements about what work needs doing, who to work with in order to achieve change, and how engagements (if they are to be undertaken) should be conducted”. Some take a more “technical/professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing tools, models, and metrics for use by business and policymakers. At the other end of the spectrum, others advocate an overtly political approach along the lines of a social professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing tools, models, and metrics for use by business and to achieve change, and how engagements (if they are to be undertaken) should be conducted”. Some take a more “technical/professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing tools, models, and metrics for use by business and policymakers. At the other end of the spectrum, others advocate an overtly political approach along the lines of a social professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing tools, models, and metrics for use by business and to achieve change, and how engagements (if they are to be undertaken) should be conducted”. Some take a more “technical/professional” approach to engagement, focusing on developing tools, models, and metrics for use by business and
definitions of the term “social change” vary. For some, “social change” is equated with political change, such as the overthrow of dictatorial regimes or the implementation of democratic processes. For others, “social change” refers to more incremental, less radical forms of progress, such as increased awareness and activism surrounding environmental issues. These varied definitions reflect the complex nature of “social change” and the different perspectives of those involved in the SEA movement.

The activities engaged in by many of those who identify themselves with “SEA projects” have been largely technical, developing new decision-making models and performance reports sometimes in partnership with government and business organizations. Politics, if acknowledged at all, are generally consensual. These initiatives, while important in taking SEA outside the academy, have encountered significant challenges in terms of promoting far-reaching change in organizational and social practices. The write-ups of these collaborative experiments generally close with a call for patience, arguing that social change is necessarily slow and incremental (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2007b, p. 369; Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010, p. 843). Apparent “failures” and “disappointments” in SEA interventions are often attributed to factors such as institutional inertia, communication lapses, lack of knowledge of “best practice” reporting and/or a lack of time and resources.6 Scholars at the critical end of the spectrum, by contrast, view win-win approaches as politically naive and favour a more adversarial approach linked to contemporary social struggles and social movements.7 Faced with its perceived inability to achieve progressive social change, some commentators are calling for the “end of SEA” as we know it. Recent calls for the “renewal” of SEA range from concerns such as those expressed by Gray et al. (2009, p. 545) that “social accounting is losing its energy and revolutionary zeal” and Owen (2008, p. 254) lamenting that “the apparent failure of SEA research to influence practice does raise serious questions as to whether our efforts amount to nothing more than ‘chronicles of wasted time’”, through to Spence et al.’s (2010) pleas for the jettisoning of SEA’s current “cargo” (including key concepts such as accountability).8 These contending perspectives have a lengthy pedigree in both the SEA and critical accounting literatures.

While the debates within and across different constituencies in SEA are not new, they still tend to be somewhat inward-looking and limited in terms of the wider dialogues to which they connect. In particular, little explicit attention has been given to various progressive communities (e.g. civil rights, labor, feminist, gay and lesbian, and green movements) that have long grappled with similar issues.9 Scholarship and praxis in these communities draw from extensive experience with social change initiatives. As such, they offer potential insights into linking the democratizing potential of broader social movements with SEA.10 Because of its close relationship with SEA, the larger environmental movement provides an obvious area to consider. In the following discussion, we focus on Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a,b, 2007) calls for the “death of environmentalism” so that engagement might be revitalized, and related academic and activist debates.

The “Death” debates have received much attention within and outside academia, though not yet in accounting. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005a) and their followers – collectively referred to as “the reapers”11 – claim that mainstream environmentalism is not capable of dealing with the current challenges of sustainability and needs to be “radically reconceptualized” and “updated into something more relevant”. Their analysis has brought spirited challenges from both the more conservative and radical arms of the environmental movement (academics and practitioners); with strong parallels to many of the discussions currently taking place within SEA.

---

4 See Adams and McNicholas (2007), Bebbington (2007), Gray and Bebbington (2001), Perez et al. (2007), Burritt and Schaltegger (2010).
5 For example, see Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, pp. 337–339) for discussion of concerns regarding “managerial capture” and Archel et al. (2011) for an example of capture within a policy setting context.
6 See Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007), Adams and McNicholas (2007); see also Aras and Crowther (2009, p. 286) pointing to SEA as a natural process of maturation as firms “understand the benefits of greater disclosure”.
8 Indeed, in relying on politically conservative theories such as legitimacy and stakeholder theory, Spence et al. (2010) query whether SEA ever really displayed “revolutionary zeal”.
9 This point is noted, but not developed, in Bebbington et al. (2007b, p. 358).
10 See Brown (2009), Cooper et al. (2005), Neu et al. (2001), Owen (2008), Shenkin and Coulson (2007), Spence (2009), Spence et al. (2010). Further, we contend that contemplating “on the ground” social activists’ perspectives can complement and enrich SEA research that draws on the work of Bourdieu, Freire, Bakhtin, Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe and other social theorists (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2007b; Brown, 2009; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence, 2009).
11 So labelled for their grim diagnosis of mainstream environmentalism and calls for its “death”. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005a) stress that, while intending to be provocative, they never claimed existing environmental organizations should “close their doors”. Rather “what needs to die is a particular conception of what environmentalism is and how environmental advocacy and campaigns are organized and run” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005a).
Our primary purpose is twofold. First, we articulate the “Death” debates and, in drawing attention to the heterogeneity evidenced in these debates, contextualize the contested nature of SEA. Second, we reflect on SEA-civil society engagements in light of these debates, utilizing an approach based on the political philosophy of agonistic pluralism (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012; Brown and Dillard, forthcoming). In contrast to the consensually oriented approaches evident in most SEA theory and practice, this approach seeks to explicitly recognize and engage contestations among groups with divergent ideological perspectives in the interests of fostering progressive social change. We argue that mainstream and SEA accountants have largely downplayed and/or under-theorized contingency and conflict and their implications for SEA-civil society engagement. They typically ignore these aspects or deny them in various depoliticizing moves.12 Agonistic pluralism, by contrast, views these features as enduring, if not ineradicable, dimensions of the social world (Mouffe, 2005, p. 17) that provide “conditions of possibility” for progressive social transformations. As such, we argue that agonistic pluralism offers a promising basis for a new (re)energized SEA and a means of forging links between SEA-civil society discourses. Following Gray et al. (2009) and others, a key aim is to propose new imaginings that help (re)build SEA as a “critical” intervention.

The discussion is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider three main themes in the “Death” debates on engagement, namely contestation over mainstream environmentalism’s alleged: (i) technocratic approach to issues, knowledge, and politics; (ii) failure to articulate comprehensive views, alternative values and inspiring visions; and (iii) failure to build effective progressive alliances and public support. We outline issues raised and solutions proposed by the “reapers”, consider counter-critiques provided by their critics,13 and draw attention to connections with SEA debates. In Section 3 we reflect on SEA-civil society engagement in light of the “Death” debates. Employing an agonistic pluralism lens, we address: (i) the need for heterodox voices of engagement; (ii) the tensions between consensus building and adversarialism; and (iii) the issue of theorizing adversarialism. Within the context of agonistic pluralism, we consider SEA and its relationships with other interested groups as well as critical accountants, and provide examples of how we might begin to theorize adversarialism within an SEA context. Section 4 provides some concluding comments.

2. The “death of environmentalism” debates: the reapers, their critics and links to SEA

We have become convinced that modern environmentalism, with all of its unexamined assumptions, outdated concepts and exhausted strategies, must die so that something new can live (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 10)

Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a, 2007) proclamations of the “Death” of environmentalism and their proposed solutions have sparked vigorous and wide-ranging debate within and outside academia. While the environmental movement is “generally larger, stronger, better funded, and more knowledgeable than ever before” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 69) moving from the “fringes” to the mainstream, with growing memberships and relatively broad support, it seems ill-equipped to deal with contemporary challenges. For example in the United States, Meyer (2005a, p. 69) observes that nothing was accomplished during the Clinton-Gore or Bush eras to compare with “such landmark victories as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act, which a much more inchoate movement won a generation ago”. While public support may be relatively high, it is also “quite shallow” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 69), and most significant indicators of social and environmental health continue to head “in the wrong direction” (Werbach, 2004, p. 3). The lack of recent success stems from outmoded concepts, methods, ways of framing issues, and modes of engagement (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, 2005a,b, 2007). For example, the environmental movement has been “strategically disadvantaged when confronted with value based, longer range, and more carefully framed hard-right advocacy” (Pope, 2004) manifested in the dominance of “business case” and “ecological modernist” framings (cf. O’Dwyer, 2003; Brown and Fraser, 2006; Spence, 2007; Owen, 2008; Gray et al., 2009; Lehman, 2010).

Shellenberger and Nordhaus and their supporters argue that broad-based support and effective engagement are hampered by three main interrelated problems: framing issues, knowledge, and politics in a narrow, technocratic way; proposing solutions that fail to articulate comprehensive views, incorporate alternative values, and inspire compelling visions of the future; and presenting a political program that fails to conceptualize and build effective progressive alliances and public support necessary to achieve long-term social change. SEA faces similar issues.14 We consider each of these issues in terms of the reapers’ critiques and proposed solutions as well as the criticisms others have raised concerning both.15 These

---

12 The more critical arm of SEA provides an important exception (e.g. Spence, 2007, 2009; Spence et al., 2010; Archel et al., 2009; Tinker and Gray, 2003).
13 We focus on criticisms from the environmental justice movement and critical democratic theory which we consider have particular pertinence to SEA.
14 See, e.g., Gray’s (2006a, pp. 803–804) observations regarding “managerialist, business-as(-almost)-usual” SEA approaches that place a heavy reliance on “existing mechanisms, assumptions and pre-conceptions” in the form of positivistic metrics, tools and research methods.
15 We also consider these proposals through the critique presented by the environmental justice movement, facilitating a more critical pluralistic perspective. The environmental justice movement is a grassroots movement concerned with linkages between environmental issues and broader social and economic injustices. It emerged in the mid-1980s when a network of neighborhood activists, led mainly by women and minority groups from poor communities, began resisting local environmental hazards (e.g. toxic dumping) (Meyer, 2005a, pp. 70–71). The movement has much longer historical roots in the 1960s civil rights movement (Gelobter et al., 2005). A pivotal event was the 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. For further background, see the Environmental Justice Resource Center, http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/.
debates provide a map of the contested terrain of engagement. \footnote{And, like any map, we should emphasize that we do not purport to cover everything. In making a start on trying to plot “the broad territory”, we hope to encourage others to highlight areas that we have missed.} We also link these contending perspectives to related positions in SEA.

2.1. Technocratic approach to engagement

A technocratic perspective is premised on the 17th century Enlightenment view that facts and values are separable and that “if you just tell people the facts, they will reason to the right conclusion – since reason is universal” (Pinker and Lakoff, 2007, p. 66). According to Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005b), environmentalists formulate engagement strategy assuming they can “win” concessions and overcome ideological and corporate opposition by using sound scientific evidence to prove “the truth” (e.g. about anthropocentric climate change). “The facts” will precipitate change (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31). Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 13) describe this as a form of literal-sclerosis. Such a position is analogous to SEA’s fixation on disclosure, a problem we might diagnose as disclosure-sclerosis. The presumption is that by making transparent (disclosing) the actions of corporations, reason will lead us to the “right” conclusion. \footnote{See, for example, Gray et al. (1997, p. 329): “social accounting . . . is emancipatory in that its aim is to redress power asymmetries between organizations and their stakeholders through the reporting of information . . . The project seeks to enhance the democratic virtues of transparency and accountability . . . through (admittedly under-specified) assumptions that an informed demos is thereby empowered in its decision making and action to seek more benign organizational activity. Similarly, the production of social accounts is assumed to have an information inductance effect on the part of organizational managers that will encourage more ethically desirable forms of activity”. See also Gray (2006b), expressing scepticism in relation to voluntarist reporting of organizational activity.} Not only are such engagement strategies naive in that they ignore the entrenched nature of ideological frames, the powerful vested interests involved and psychological fears associated with fundamental change, \footnote{See, for example, Glynos and Howarth (2007, pp. 133ff) for discussion of the complex relation between social, political and fantasmatic logics and their roles in explaining the emergence and reproduction of social practices. We are not saying that disclosure is not important, but it needs to be theorized differently.} they also have been “politically disastrous” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31).

A consequence of a technocratic discourse of engagement is to invest considerable energy in reducing complex, interrelated problems into discrete policy issues and devising separate solutions (e.g. pollution controls, fuel efficiency standards). In developing operational reporting regimes, SEA also risks providing reductionist and discrete representations that disguise complex and antagonistic interrelationships and obscure “their context and their web of connections” (Werbach, 2004, p. 8). The failure to articulate a “big picture” view limits the movement, and related reporting regimes, in its ability to address complex issues such as climate change and social justice (Gauna, 2008, pp. 458–459) and too often focuses on “effects rather than causes” (Orr, 2005, p. 993).\footnote{Ironically, it is conservatives who have been most successful in recognizing that “everything is connected” (Meyer, 2005b). Conservative think tanks, academics and politicians have made concerted efforts to build “their power through setting the terms of the debate” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 11).}

Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ (2004, 2005a, 2007) response to these flaws stresses the importance of a politically neutral approach to environmentalism. Notions that issues such as climate change and social justice can somehow be dealt with as “above politics” are fantasies (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A31). The facts alone are not enough. \footnote{See Lakoff (2004) and also Dietz et al. (2005) for an extended discussion on the various ways values are invoked in environmental attitudes and decision-making. For more on the implications and value of an ideologically open approach to sustainability assessment, see Söderbaum (2007), Brown (2009) and Söderbaum and Brown (2010).} While the development of technology in the form of new metrics, measures and techniques (e.g. to evaluate success) is an important aspect of the environmental movement’s work, these need to be better understood in terms of how they link to particular political and values-based narratives (Werbach, 2004; also see Lehman, 2010 for discussion and critique of market mechanisms and related SEA derivatives).

The reapers argue that hierarchical “binary thinking” that relies on top-down governance techniques and draws stark boundaries between “humans” and “the environment” be replaced with framings that emphasize interconnectedness (Werbach, 2004, p. 16). If humans are conceptualized as part of the environment, it becomes more difficult to see how some human issues (e.g. clean air, toxic waste) are labelled as “environmental” while others (e.g. homeless people, good jobs) are not (Werbach, 2004, p. 8). This requires finding a way of naming “the world without separating ourselves from it” (Werbach, 2004, p. 16).

Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 12) also highlight the importance of problematizing traditional analytical boundaries constructed to demarcate “environmental” from other issues that result from the fragmentation of complex problems into seemingly unrelated technical ones. For example, they charge that “treating global warming as an ‘environmental’ problem and framing its solutions as technical” lies “at the heart of the movement’s political failings” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, p. A29). Rather than defining global warming as a problem of “too much carbon” calling for technical solutions that reduce emissions (e.g. cap and trade policies), it might be more expansively reframed around: trade policies that undermine environmental protections; overpopulation; the influence of money in American politics; and/ or poverty (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 14). Doing so highlights not only that global warming has many causes but also that “the solutions we dream up depend on how we structure the problem” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 14).
The responses of other activist communities such as the environmental justice movement provide further insights into the issues surrounding engagement. Generally, the criticisms relate to critical pluralism reflected in the lack of recognition or engagement with other social groups, social activists, and economic and social issues. These other groups recognize the need to connect facts and values and are supportive of drawing attention to the "politics of framing". However, they question Shellenberger and Nordhaus' (2004, 2005a,b, 2007) conceptualization of environmentalism and "the environment" makes little attempt to acknowledge or understand different strands of environmentalism (e.g. environmental justice advocates, preservationists, eco-spiritualists) and associated discourses. They thus arguably fall prey to a reductionist perspective, albeit at a different level, that assumes "a unity of perspectives about "core progressive values"" (Brulle and Jenkins, 2006, p. 84). This is analogous to the way some writers have tried to articulate "the social accounting project" as if there was a single homogeneous SEA community (cf. Gray et al., 2009).

The reapers alleged atomistic perspective follows from Shellenberger and Nordhaus' (2004) unwillingness to adequately consult either the international environmental movements or their histories. Dunlap (2006) observes that the reapers not only ignore "the vibrant environmental justice movement and grassroots environmentalism of all types in the United States" (p. 89), they "also completely ignore vital environmental movements in other nations, both rich... and poor. ... as well as the growing degree of transnational environmental activism... and its links to the broader antiglobalization movement" (p. 100); criticisms that can also justly be made of SEA. Many of these groups have been providing critiques of mainstream environmentalism for years and have long-standing traditions of environmentalist activism.

From an environmental justice perspective, Cohen (2006, p. 76) charges that Shellenberger and Nordhaus', as well as the mainstream environmental movement’s, “historic disinclination to talk about distributional questions” renders both unable to deal with the implications of, for example, globalization. Issues need to be explored across race, ethnic, social class, gender, age, geographic and other lines, recognizing "that the roots of our ecological crisis and the roots of our social inequities and injustices are deeply intertwined" (Smith, 2005). Environmental issues differentially impact ethnic minorities, poor communities and less developed countries, making race and class analysis and distributional issues central to research and practice agendas. Highlighting that not all people are situated equally brings a focus on "who benefits?" (e.g. from a "green economy") and "who bears the burdens?" (e.g. of toxic wastes) and the socio-economic needs of vulnerable groups (Gauna, 2008, p. 463). Questions of self-determination (e.g. in indigenous communities) and participation and democratic governance, or "who says and decides?" also become key. While social and critical accountants have similarly pointed to the banality of mainstream accounting – and some SEA - frameworks from the perspective of subaltern communities in the developed and developing worlds except as a way of rationalizing and imposing neo-liberal reforms (Neu, 2001; Rahaman et al., 2004; Belal and Owen, 2007; Graham, 2009; Molisa et al., 2012), such questions are absent from most SEA work.

2.2. Failure to articulate a viable and comprehensive political vision

Because of the narrow and atomistic nature of the dominant technocratic basis for engagement and policy formulation, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 6) claim that the environmental movement has failed to articulate a viable and comprehensive political vision. This overly pragmatic and incremental approach tends to focus on short-term policy pay-offs (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 25) rather than on developing broader values-based political programs. Comprehensive programs are eschewed in favor of politically realistic and feasible initiatives (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, p. 24), a position analogous to the "pragmatists" within SEA who advocate focusing on convincing the people "in charge" that "change is for the best" (Adams and Whelan, 2009, p. 126).

A preoccupation with realpolitik means the "issues affecting the disorganized and disenfranchised" are not well-represented and "big structural problems and imbalances of power" are not addressed (Schmitt, 2005). Thus, there is a tendency to celebrate small legislative or policy victories without considering the implications for facilitating broader neo-conservative trends that put whole regulatory frameworks at risk (Schmitt, 2005). One example is in the area of labor law where policymakers have sought to water down union demands by relying on voluntarist approaches, and hard-won

21 Kysar (2008, p. 2046) notes the irony of presenting such a monolithic view, musing why Shellenberger and Nordhaus failed to follow their own advice of "pluralizing singular categories".

22 Shellenberger and Nordhaus' (2004) critique was based on interviews with 25 "top leaders, thinkers and funders" (p. 5) from the mainstream environmental movement. Blain (2005), an environmental justice activist, in asking "ain’t I an environmentalist?" observes that: "The Death of Environmentalism" should be called "The Death of Elite, White, American Environmentalism" … That the DOE interviews and recommendations only focused on white, American male-led environmentalism meant that the fatal flaws of that part of the environmental movement infected the critique itself." See also Gelobter et al. (2005) noting that many environmental activists from poor and coloured communities "would rather not stand on the shoulders of certain early conservation heroes".

23 Gauna (2008, p. 462), for example, points to a hard-hitting letter sent by environmental justice advocates to leaders of the ten largest environmental NGOs in 1990 (reprinted in Rechtschaffen et al., 2009, pp. 22–24).

24 See Belal and Owen (2007) on the ways in which managerialist SEA privileges the perspectives and interests of Western developed nations over those of lesser developed nations.
legislative provisions have been interpreted by judicial bodies through conservative frames that remain wedded to notions of managerial prerogative.25

What is needed is a new politics of engagement based on core values and an understanding of how these values can be framed in building a more inclusive, visionary and inspirational agenda (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2004, 2005b, 2007). This involves “creating a new language, a new set of strategic initiatives, a new set of institutions, and a new metric for evaluating our success” (Werbach, 2004, p. 16); at the same time, recognizing the contingency and instability of meaning and interpretation within the “cultural space available for framing and reframing policy disputes” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2055). Applied to SEA, these suggestions are consistent with Gray’s (2002a) call for the imagining of new accountings, other possible worlds, and ways of doing things, and Brown’s (2009) reflections on sustaining and transforming subjectivities through counter-accounts and dialogic interaction. The key here is recognition of the highly political nature of language and framing and the fluid nature of preferences, aspirations and interests, without also forgetting structural constraints (Brown, 2009).

Their critics claim that the reapers’ “viable and comprehensive political solution” is itself too narrow and grounded in traditional, privileged ways of thinking, heavily influenced by the incrementalist, rationalist and positivist perspectives that eschew and ignore alternative engagement strategies adopted by various social movements and “noninstitutional” organizations (Zelezy and Bailey, 2006; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). These include, inter alia, initiatives based on place-based environmentalism, direct protest action and mass mobilization, new media technologies, rights-based advocacy, legal and pension fund activism,26 public ecology, and post-positivist conceptions of science (Gelobter et al., 2005; Kysar, 2008; Luke, 2005; Pope, 2004).

Concerning reframing, Brulle and Jenkins (2006, p. 82) and environmental justice activists, in common with critical accountants, highlight that cultural reframing without addressing structural impediments is “logically flawed”, undermining the democratic values Shellenberger and Nordhaus “purport to champion” (Brulle and Jenkins, 2006, p. 85):

Their entire analysis is premised on changing cultural beliefs without addressing political and economic change. Social reality is defined simply in terms of how we perceive reality. If we just get the right frames out there, it will create political consensus, and the progressive alliance can then take power. However comforting this idea might sound, it is a form of linguistic mysticism that assumes that social institutions can be transformed by cultural redefinition alone. . . .[T]he rise of the right is also based on increased concentration of social power, both in the economy generally and in the mass media. Pouring new rhetoric into the same socioeconomic system will accomplish little. . . . The structure of power has to be changed as part of the process, and any rhetorical strategy that promises to be effective must link its rhetoric to a broader political strategy that includes grassroots organizing at its base (Brulle and Jenkins, 2006, p. 84, emphasis in original).

In failing to adequately address the need for structural change, the reapers effectively advocate “the same kind of arrogant elitism” they ostensibly wish to overturn (Cohen, 2006, p. 79) and ignore the importance of political mobilization and struggle in challenging entrenched power relations. Brulle and Jenkins (2006, p. 85) observe that Shellenberger and Nordhaus do not adequately address how “change in worldviews will be organized or who will get to define core progressive values” but than treated as “mass opinion to be manipulated” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2046). We are left with a...
will not induce a collective nightmare” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2046). If key factors for success are marketing budgets and cognitive knowledge, Kysar (2008, p. 2071) asks “why should environmentalists be more successful than the beneficiaries of the status quo, who will likely invest mightily, and successfully, in its preservation?” 28 A key fear for Kysar is that we are “left not with a politics, but a pornography of possibility, in which virtually any policy aim could be packaged and marketed to activate virtually any cultural worldview” (Kysar, 2008, p. 2073).

Gauna (2008, p. 469) cautions against the idea of “banishing the technocrats” from progressive movements. Social movements also require technical resources. For example, scientific rationalism has helped establish global warming as an “obvious and unavoidable issue” (Little, 2005a). Gauna (2008, p. 469) suggests that “far from being a central failure of the conventional environmental movement, the focus on the technicalities of pollution control, risk, and resource management is perhaps its greatest contribution”. What needs to go are “entrenched notions of privilege” that see conventional environmental NGOs as the main player (Gauna, 2008, p. 469). According to this perspective, technicians are still important but as part of a much larger project, which also requires connections with grassroots movements and other alliances.

Connecting facts and values in developing an effective political program requires a major rethink of the politics behind “neutral” accounting technologies. For example, we need to problematize current understandings of the “reporting entity” and techniques such as risk analysis and discounting that systematically discriminate against specific groups and/or future generations (Bebbington et al., 2007a; Hanlon, 2010). Along with Hopwood (2009, p. 434), we do not see a “post-calculative society” as either particularly feasible or desirable, but the policy needs to understand the linkages between the socio-political and the technical, supported by accountants that put the public (or rather multiple publics) back into “public interest” (cf. Burawoy’s 2004 calls for public sociologies; see also Carter and Toms, 2010, pp. 179–180).

2.3. Failure to build effective political capacity through progressive alliances and public support

Narrowly defined problems result in narrow solutions that appeal to a narrow constituency. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 2007) charge that environmentalists often miss opportunities for building political capacity through effective progressive alliances (e.g. with unions, civil rights groups, industry, civil society) necessary to accomplish long-term social change objectives. This criticism addresses engagement at two interrelated levels. The first concerns engagement with the progressive community in order to form capacity building alliances, and the second concerns engagement with the broader community required for the implementation of a political program.

The reapers charge that the environmental movement has become “increasingly isolated” and ultimately a “self-replicating (and stubbornly homogenous) community” (Prakash, 2005) with “its own experts, its own professionals, its own lobbyists, its own lawyers, its own funders, its own mailing lists and its journalistic beat” (Werbach, 2004, p. 17). As a result, policies are often formulated in isolation from developments in the wider progressive community. Similar but disconnected programs constrain and divide available resources, and fragmentation prevents different constituencies from forming critical alliances. The policies do not connect sufficiently with the values, concerns and aspirations of ordinary citizens, and thereby fail to enrol them as allies.

Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005b, p. A29) suggest the failure to form alliances arises from a failure to understand the wider public or frame issues in a way that is meaningful for laypeople. For example, the reapers question the framing of climate change issues as threats, crises and disasters as a strategy for gaining public support. They maintain that the environmental movement has relied too much on fear and negativity and a “politics of limits” rather than one of possibility in attempting to build political support (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2007).

The reapers charge that single issue politics be subordinated to broad-based coalition-building around shared values and interrelated causes in order to advance social change objectives. Such a perspective would inject “vision and values into contested political space” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus, 2005b, pp. A30–A31) and frame issues in a way that is consistent with the ideologies of progressive communities, rather than being drawn into conservative narratives. Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, p. 26) argue that injecting new frames and “big ideas into contested political spaces” can help to (re)define debate by challenging the status quo, putting opponents on the defensive, attracting allies and building political momentum. Specifically, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a, 2007) favour reorienting policy proposals around investments in clean energy technologies that would benefit multiple constituencies rather than policies of cuts and restrictions. They seek to frame the “new energy economy” not merely as an “environmental solution” or “technical fix”, but as part of an overall vision for creating jobs and promoting improved health and living standards globally.

Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 2005a,b; 2007) have been criticized for emphasizing politically conservative third-way strategies (e.g. investments in public-private partnerships) as the basis for their more inclusive “environmental

---

28 For discussion of the key role funding has played in right-wing politics through networks of conservative foundations, think tanks, university programs and media outlets, see People for the American Way Foundation (1996). See also Ward (2005) on how funder-imposed constraints have undermined critical research (e.g. through a focus on narrowly defined policy perspectives and problem statements, incremental and technology-oriented solutions). Ward (2005) notes that it is ironic that Shellenberger and Nordhaus were not more critical of funders given that their critique of mainstream environmentalism “is a letter-perfect description of the conditions that attach to virtually every environmental foundation request for proposal”.

politics” (Cohen, 2006, p. 80; Zelezny and Bailey, 2006). In focusing on devising win-win solutions based on public-private partnerships, differences and conflicts are glossed over. The reapers do not seem to recognize the value of other social movements’ experience in building broad-based networks and alliances (e.g., across environmentalists, labor, business leaders, ethic investors, faith-based communities, academics, policymakers) and working collaboratively for social change. For example, the environmental justice movement stresses the need for respectful alliances that appreciate not only people’s commonalities but also the diversity of their standpoints. They have sought to encourage a more multi-issue and multi-perspectival approach to political participation articulated around a much broader definition of “the ‘environment’ as the place where people live, work, play, learn, and worship” (Gauna, 2008, p. 466). In recognition of the importance of language and (re)framing, this provides “a different way of thinking and talking about the environment” with humans and urban landscapes firmly drawn back “into the picture” (Pastor, 2005, p. 3).

The expert-driven process advocated by Shellenberger and Nordhaus is inadequate in building broad-based engagement and support. In order to develop a more inclusive coalition, the role of scientific and policy experts and managers must be challenged and increased confidence shown in the ability of ordinary citizens to address concerns that affect them and with which they are familiar (Meyer, 2005b). “It is not enough for the elite… to examine what they can do differently while maintaining their position of power. They need to be open to options that require them to interrogate their own position of privilege and to share power” (Gauna, 2008, p. 463). This entails recognizing and building the social capacity necessary for democratic governance, community organizing, collective action, and empowerment.29

With respect to issues such as climate change, Gauna (2008, p. 466) suggests that the definition of “environment” needs to be extended “to include considerations of climate justice, ecological resources of global significance, and protection of biodiversity”. Any reconceptualization needs to be able to link “longer-term distributional impacts of climate change to the more immediate problems currently facing vulnerable communities, such as natural resource depletion, pollution, and the lack of access to emergency response services” (Gauna, 2008, p. 467). This requires a careful unpacking of distributional implications at local, national and international levels and across time and space. Consistent with Shellenberger and Nordhaus, such efforts reflect a commitment to identify and invest in large ideas and “big fights” that support deep social change and “intersections in progressive politics that... allow [people] to come together in radically new ways” (Gelobter et al., 2005). However, Gauna (2008) stresses that building transformative alliances is hard work and “requires an examination of privilege, diversity, interdependency, and distributional concerns” (p. 458). To be transformative, new environmentalism must not “simply replicate old forms of domination with a few new players” (p. 470) but seriously address differences in people’s perspectives, geographies and histories.

Shellenberger and Nordhaus seem to implicitly assume a deliberative model of politics – one that relies on “inclusive public deliberation... geared to reaching consensus decisions” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 97). Deliberative political visions are “relatively smooth” based on the idea “that social complexity is manageable” and asymmetric power relations can be neutralized given appropriate processes and rational communication that allow diverse viewpoints “to be heard and adjudicated” (Kapoor, 2008, pp. 103–105). As such they tend to gloss over, ignore and erase difference.

Deliberative political models are somewhat – and arguably dangerously – idealistic. Consensus-oriented models of politics tend “to simplify community, to represent it in uni-dimensional ways” which “makes the attainment of results easier” but risks socio-economic elites imposing their perspectives (Kapoor, 2008, p. 105; Archel et al., 2011). We envision a messier reality characterized by ongoing ideological contestation between plural social groups. Agonistic pluralism advocates a decentred participatory politics that facilitates the expression of difference, rather than asking that people overcome their particularities. It embraces a democratic vision that is open but nonetheless critical (Kapoor, 2008, p. 104; see also Brown and Dillard, forthcoming). As such, it is sceptical of universalizing narratives and top-down views of politics centred on State agencies or business-led self-regulation, privileging approaches that engage multiple publics with conflicting ideological perspectives. New social movements and civic networks cutting across various social spheres offer a way to counter monologic discourse and politics, giving voice to currently marginalized groups.30 We consider this to be a view of politics and engagement that offers much to SEA.

The “Death” debates provide a context for deliberations and debates within SEA. They help articulate the heterodox issues and constituencies that should be recognized and included in the SEA dialogue and community. This is especially the case given SEA’s professed aim to contest the monologism of mainstream accounting: in particular, the privileging of shareholder and business perspectives (Gray, 2006a; Brown, 2009). Both the reapers and their critics are concerned about the limits of technocratic approaches to environmentalism and both groups seek to promote more participatory forms of democratic politics that move beyond the priorities of established elites. Moreover, the various antagonisms identified in the “Death” debates highlight issues and perspectives that have received little attention in SEA literature. In the next section, we reflect on SEA–civil society engagement in light of the “Death” debates, utilizing agonistic pluralism as a way of theorizing political relations in this highly contested terrain.

29 As Pastor (2005, p. 1) frames it, “there is as much beauty in [a] group of people… and their struggle for social justice as there is in the kind of pristine landscape that comes to mind when we generally think about the environment”.

30 This does not assume that all social movements are “benign and ‘progressive’”; some are recognized as “co-opted by the state and... internally undemocratic” (Kapoor, 2008, pp. 108–109).
3. “Agonizing” over engagement

SEA is concerned with bringing about progressive change through the development and implementation of effective engagement strategies within a decidedly politically contested domain. As noted earlier to effectively foster progressive change, SEA needs to employ a political theory that recognizes and facilitates (anti)agonistic contestation among the heterodox groups and creates institutional and personal spaces of possibility through which new, or previously obscured, alternatives emerge. We propose a polylogic\textsuperscript{31} approach to engagement based on an agonistic model of democratic participation (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012; Brown and Dillard, forthcoming).\textsuperscript{32} This approach seeks to engage divergent socio-political perspectives, surface the unavoidable values and assumptions associated with different accounts and underline the power relations that structure “dialogue” opportunities. Such a perspective involves an understanding of SEA that is much broader than formal organization-centric reports and recognizes the need for multiple engagements between different actors across various political spaces. In addition, we seek to resensitize SEA to its critical and pluralistic roots (Gray, 2002a; O’Dwyer, 2005) by advocating a version of pluralism that is less “politically quiet” than earlier SEA versions.

In this section, we consider implications for SEA that follow from our review and analysis of the “Death” debates. We propose that SEA needs to recognize a current privileging of technocratic reasoning and solutions that gives the appearance of transcending politics, obscuring the political forces and powerful interests striving to maintain a monologic status quo. In response, we propose that SEA needs a more inclusive perspective that includes consideration of, and support for, heterodox interested groups’ values, visions, views, and voices in the face of prevailing power asymmetries. We argue that such heterodoxy requires that SEA engagement strategy incorporate both consensus and dissensus through (ant)agonistic political relations across its different constituencies in order to develop and implement pluralistic democratic processes that can help articulate and operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda. We contend that agonistic political theory offers a fruitful way of assisting SEA to begin to theorise how differences would be allowed to flourish yet avoiding its destructive, and distracting inclinations.

3.1. Heterodox voices of engagement\textsuperscript{33}

In Section 2, we identified political complexities and antagonisms at several levels that seem unlikely to be overcome, at least in the foreseeable future. Shellenberger and Nordhaus and their critics have provided valuable critiques of technocratic approaches to environmentalism that resonate with calls for polylogic approaches to SEA engagement. Taken collectively, the “Death” debates provide a nuanced appreciation of different ideological perspectives and their implications for the types of changes sought and ways of pursuing social change. These include not only the perspectives of academics, but also social activists and other “people on the ground”. To date, where SEA researchers acknowledge ideological diversity, they largely focus on commonly made distinctions between “shallow/weak” (light green, technocratic, anthropocentric) and “deep/strong” (dark green) environmentalism (see, e.g., Bebbington, 2001; Aras and Crowther, 2009, p. 282). The “Death” debates illustrate that such an approach does not do justice to the range of discourses available to social actors (Meyer, 2005a, p. 72).

The “Death” debates illustrate the complex political nature of social and environmental issues that some have attempted to specify as problems with technical solutions. Technological rationality is reflected in the proposition that accounting reports neutral facts to decision makers (Solomons, 1991). While SEA commentators are generally more sensitive to the political and ideological bias in accounting reports, implicitly or explicitly, the SEA templates proposed (e.g., GRI, carbon reporting) claim their legitimacy by reporting neutral, objective “facts” for decision makers.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, both the mainstream and SEA communities deal inadequately with the diverse political dimensions and possibilities. This depoliticization arguably amounts to “a conceit – a form of false consciousness that compounds the impulse to enforce a moral orthodoxy by enabling its agents to deny (to themselves even more than to others) that this is exactly what they

\textsuperscript{31}Brown (2009) uses the term “dialogic” rather than “polylogic”, but following Dillard and Roslender (2011) we favour the latter on the basis that it encourages the recognition of many different perspectives (logics).

\textsuperscript{32}Following Mouffe, we conceptualize agonism as a form of antagonism, used to denote the idea of “friendly enemies” that share a basic agreement to engage in a democratic fashion. As such, we do not envisage agonism overcoming antagonisms. Rather we emphasize that there are different types of antagonism. For example, as we elaborate later, environmentalists and labor interests may have divergent viewpoints but still build a common political alliance against neoliberalism. Relations between a labor-environmental alliance and neoliberal interests would entail a “fuller” version of antagonism than those within the alliance. Agonistic pluralism, while recognizing an important place for various forms of protest action in democratic political relations, resiles from full-blown antagonism in the sense of violence (and, even here, we note there are usually “rules of war” that bring some sociality into the “relation”). Agonistic pluralists also emphasize that “we’s” and “they’s” may change as a result of (ant)agonistic encounters, for example where political struggles lead people to new social logics such as we have witnessed over time with respect to the civil rights and women’s movements (albeit that these struggles are ongoing).

\textsuperscript{33}Actively embracing heterodox voices may be characterized as “relativist”. With Rorty (1991), we resist this term as implying clear cut Platonic dualisms between objectivity and subjectivity. We are not saying that different positions are arbitrary in an “anything goes” sense – rather that they are genuinely contestable.

\textsuperscript{34}For example, advocates of full cost accounting have emphasized the value of developing a common monetary metric “to ‘get the prices right’” (Bebbington et al., 2001, p. 8, emphasis in original).
are doing” (Kahan, 2007, p. 118, emphasis in original). SEA protagonists “inevitably take sides in social conflict and...‘responsible’ [actors]...strive to ensure that their choice is a socially well-informed one’” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29).

We eschew the idea, as did Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ critics, that there is some “third way” where we can avoid choosing camps (cf. Mouffe, 1998, p. 23). The construction of distinct political identities is a key aspect of transformative social change. Recognizing the complexity of the contemporary political terrain, we encourage SEA to multiply the differentiated consensual and adversarial perspectives it is capable of engaging.

A vibrant SEA “requires real debate about possible alternatives”; one that identifies adversaries and provides alternatives to the dominant order informed by different political values (Mouffe, 1998, pp. 13–14). In the contemporary era of global capitalism, this is arguably a complex multidisciplinary and “local to global” project that requires engagement across a wide range of political spaces. There is a need to foster heterodox democratic subjectivities that are able to confront the tough conflict-based issues, which may involve polarising debates. For example at one level, SEA is pitted against the traditional accounting establishment just as the environmental movement is pitted against conservative elements of the business, government and policy communities. At another level, antagonisms exist within SEA between the business case advocates, pragmatic interventionists, and critical revolutionaries (e.g., Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2007b; Cooper et al., 2005; Everett and Neu, 2000; Owen, 2008; Spence et al., 2010).

Within SEA, differences exist in terms of visions and values and ways of translating these into concrete policies as well as in the forms of engagement favored. These entail varied conceptualizations of social change processes and different implicit or explicit criteria for evaluating success and failure. For example, “business as usual” approaches have a relatively narrow focus akin to mainstream environmentalism. If proponents of this perspective accept the presence of systemic problems at all, they tend to assume that adequate feedback mechanisms exist and that solutions can be found within the current system. Conceptualizing “the environment” as an economic asset and working with market remedies such as “green consumers” and “green jobs” provide a claimed apolitical response to the environmental agenda, preserving the ideological system of consumer capitalism. Proponents have a politically consensual view of social change, mediated through an ideology of utility-maximizing market mechanisms.

The more radical elements of SEA argue that approaches based on these eco-modernist ideologies represent a futile attempt to sustain the (unsustainable) status quo, claiming that those who work “with business” dilute more radical agendas. Rather than working as “handmaidens to business” or with an “inside the beltway” mentality, they advocate closer links with social movements and grassroots organizations. One strategy is to emphasize the connectedness among the various interested groups with regards to such comprehensive issues as global warming, biodiversity, toxic pollution, or genetically modified organisms and other policy issues (Meyer, 2005a, p. 72). As a result, the debates can and should be opened to wider audiences, providing “greater space for heterodox voices” (Meyer, 2005b), connecting the environmental movement with the real and everyday concerns and aspirations of underrepresented groups by giving them a voice in the agenda setting debates. Having an agenda responsive to the needs of a diverse polity provides “greater voice to class and race issues, urban issues, and regional and local issues” (Grist editorial, 2005). While some have recognized the importance of such questions, SEA needs to consciously and conspicuously incorporate them into its agenda, by for example, focusing on the value of “local knowledge” and the benefits of participatory approaches at the community and wider levels. At the same time, the challenges associated with achieving effective public participation given existing power imbalances in society would be recognized.

While there may be a need to, at times, educate people, making “them aware of the problem that we already understand” (Meyer, 2005a, p. 73, emphasis in original), heterodox engagement requires that learning across leaders, experts and lay

---

35 Kahan (2007) terms this concept “cognitive illiberalism”.

36 As Spence et al. (2010, p. 85) explain it, in a civil society context: “Who we are ‘against’ exactly and what we are ‘for’ is something that gets articulated as the ‘people’ begins to emerge and does not remain stable... What is needed is to show the political imagination to engage with actors other than simply other members of the [Social Accounting/Social and Environmental Reporting] cargo cult... Moreover, any attempts at engagement must go further than simply organisational management and connect with activists, social movements and other grass roots actors in their own realm. Then we might just be able to witness the death of the ‘death of politics’ and contribute in some small part to the birth of an age where everything becomes political”. Unlike Spence et al. (2010, p. 79), we are not convinced that accountability is “of no real significance to social movements”. Rather we see SEA’s task here as elaborating understandings of accountability that encompass social movement perspectives (see also Shenkin and Coulson, 2007).

37 See also Mouffe (1998) for critique of the notion of “radical centre” politics without adversaries. Also, as Adams and McNicholas (2007, p. 386) observe, substantive change is “a profound psychological dynamic process, involving painful unlearning and difficult relearning” and necessarily involves “emotional stir up”. “Different perspectives and backgrounds” can facilitate the “unfreezing” of perceptions (Adams and McNicholas, 2007, p. 392). This insight must be taken further than just involving different “team members” within organizations (e.g. from different functional divisions) or the stakeholders managements choose to engage (Archel et al., 2011).

38 See also Dey (2007) on the political struggle in Traidcraft over the meaning of “fair trade” and the role of SEA in enabling a move from “behaving like a charity” towards “commercial Christianity”. If these differences in ideological perspectives had been teased out earlier, Dey may have been less surprised by the “unexpected consequences” of this particular SEA intervention and/or better equipped to counter it.

39 The phrase “Inside the Beltway” is used to denote concerns that the environmental movement has been overly “professionalized”, with leaders too focused on working with policymakers and politicians in central Governments. As such, it is argued, the movement’s leaders have become socialized into an overly polite and compromised form of reformist politics based on discussion among elites. The public, in turn, increasingly disconnect from participation in civil society. See Dowie (1995) for an extended discussion of these issues.

40 However, the engagement strategy of working with other social movements and grassroots organizations is complicated by the fact that such movements themselves are not a homogenous group, with some seeking to work collaboratively and others advocating a more adversarial approach in their relationships with “the establishment” (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007).
people must always be multi-directional.\textsuperscript{41} This involves recognizing that different strands of environmentalism are not necessarily in harmony with one another. There is no “social consensus about... the ‘correct’ human stewardship relationship” (\textsuperscript{42} Tarlock, \textit{p. 223}) and new relationships and perspectives have to be imagined and “created not recognized” (\textsuperscript{43} Tarlock, \textit{p. 223}). Such a position extends existing SEA proposals for dialogic engagement by enabling them to embrace antagonisms (cf. \textit{Bebbington et al., 2007b}, p. \textit{364} relying on different groups uncovering “the common ground between them” before “dialogic engagements can begin”).

Following Dunlap (\textit{p. 100}),\textsuperscript{44} we propose that SEA can more vigorously and effectively pursue the “basic ecological principle [of] supporting diversity” and recognize the need for the heterodox voices of “a diverse range of researchers, practitioners, and activists” to contribute to expanded debates and new imaginings. Attempts to increase the heterodox voices require giving greater visibility to currently marginalized voices through various forms of shadow and counter-accountings. These offer much potential in terms of pluralizing the field and taking debates into the civil society sphere (e.g. \textit{Carter and Toms, 2010; Dey, 2003; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence, 2009}). They provide a way of talking/accounting back to neo-conservative elites by introducing concepts of conflictual knowledge that can be used both adversarially and to build progressive alliances (see further below). We contend that it is this plurality of socially situated actors, their relationships, (ant)agonisms and discursive interactions that provides the highest potential for transformative social change (\textit{Brown, 2009, pp. 322–323}). Next, we suggest that effective progressive alliances and public support can best be built by recognizing and embracing (ant)agonistic relationships among the interested constituencies.

3.2. Consensus building or adversarialism?

SEA commentators are keenly aware of the ideological splits between divergent groups interested in sustainability and related issues. \textit{Brown (2009)} and \textit{Dillard and Brown (2012)} propose that agonistic pluralism be applied as a means for theorizing the political antagonisms evident within SEA in order to work with others in the wider polity to foster more pluralistic institutions and spaces that encourage debate within and across different communities; to help ourselves and others (e.g. students, NGOs, lay communities) find their own place within these debates; to provide a fertile context wherein new alternatives may emerge; and to prevent cooption of the discourse by dominant interests.

3.2.1. Outside – SEA and interested groups

The “Death” debates were possible only because the participants (NGO leaders, funders, academics, and activists) were prepared to reflect on their perspectives regarding social change and engagement and participate in open, spirited debate.\textsuperscript{45} The SEA community arguably needs to be an active participant and facilitator. While there have been promising moves in this direction (e.g. the “St Andrews Summit” on the future of the Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR)),\textsuperscript{46} they have been relatively private fora. Discussion within the SEA community, while important, is not enough. SEA needs to broaden debate and engage with wider academic and community networks at various levels. This requires making broader connections with “fellow-travellers” in other academic communities (e.g. critical management studies, heterodox economics, interpretivist policy studies, political theory, critical geography) and with social movements (e.g. the environmental justice movement, labor unions, eco-feminists, indigenous communities).

The voices of stakeholders, subaltern communities and social activists – and their resistances to managerialist perspectives – rarely receive sustained attention. As Spence \textit{et al.} (\textit{2010}) highlight, SEA has remained remarkably detached from other social science literatures and political struggles in civil society; seemingly preferring an “apolitical” approach somewhat at odds with its professed social change agenda. With an engagement focus on organizational level fieldwork, SEA too often remains silent about wider structural constraints and macro-level power relations (Spence et al., 2010; Archel et al., 2011). This vastly underplays the extent to which liberal democracies are structured by social divisions (e.g. class, gender and ethnic conflicts) and how these play out at individual, organizational, national and supranational levels.

New fora for coalition-building (e.g. multidisciplinary action research, Web-based initiatives) potentially provide valuable spaces for debates and discussions across a diverse range of groups. Within this context, we need to re-think the role of SEA academics and their relations to engagement (Neu \textit{et al., 2001; Cooper \textit{et al., 2005; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007}). The potential of emerging researchers (and students) to contribute to these endeavours is worthy of special consideration in that they are arguably often more willing to work with new ideas and forge new relations and directions (Laine, 2006).\textsuperscript{47} The environmental justice movement, for example, emphasizes the importance of actively fostering new leadership able to work...
across a broad range of issues and engage diverse constituencies. SEA researchers, in our view, need to not only use their “research findings to inform the next generation of managers through our teaching” (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007, p. 338) but also educate students as citizens, and assist civil society organizations with their own forms of engagement. While sympathetic to Adams and Petrella’s (2010) calls for greater university–business–civil society collaborations over new educational curriculum to foster “responsible leadership”, we contend that it is important not to lose sight of fundamentally different conceptualizations of the means and ends of such leadership. The input of more “radical” academics and activists would, for example, help to surface social contradictions and structural inequalities that are often erased in mainstream discourse (Molisa et al., 2012). As such it would arguably provide “the emotional stir up/unfreezing” and “cognitive dissonance” that can assist in fostering fundamental change (Adams and McNicholas, 2007; Adams and Whelan, 2009). Rather than a process of consensual rational argumentation, we would argue that fundamental change requires something akin to a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) – a process which SEA has yet to address in depth (but see Bebbington et al., 2007b; Brown, 2009, for discussion of the transformative possibilities of dialogic engagement and the ways identities may be reshaped as new alternatives emerge in dialogic interaction).

3.2.2. Inside – SEA and critical accountants

SEA and critical accountants have often drawn bold lines around adversarial versus collaborative approaches to engagement. For example, critical accountants seek to develop oppositional spaces outside the mainstream and pressure decision makers through confrontation and taking the offensive. Their emphasis is on developing dialectical awareness of, and support for, social conflicts and struggles, highlighting accounting’s role as an ideological weapon (e.g. Tinker et al., 1991; Arnold and Hammond, 1994; Cooper et al., 2005; Spence, 2009; Carter and Toms, 2010; Hanlon, 2010). Critical accountants argue that those promoting “partnership” approaches with business are at serious risk of being co-opted due to their under-estimation of the explicit and implicit effects of unequal power relationships (Archel et al., 2011). Thus, where some “deep greens” see framing SEA issues and engagement in monetary terms as having subversive “Trojan horse” potential to bring SEA values into the mainstream (Gray, 1992), others warn that business case capture may effectively keep the Trojans “inside the horse” (Spence, 2007, p. 875). Progress occurs as new alternatives emerge out of this conflict and debate, not necessarily as a result of a resolution. Awareness of this expanded alternative set also reduces the risks of cooption, by making it more difficult for dominant hegemonic interests to “impose” their realities.

Some critical accountants are sceptical that SEA – as conceptualized within reformist politics – could ever pose a serious threat to capitalist relations (Puxty, 1991; Cooper, 1992; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence et al., 2010). Social accountants, by contrast, privilege reformist traditions of social change (e.g. Gray et al., 1991; Gray, 1992; Bebbington et al., 1994; Bebbington, 1997; Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007). Focusing on engagements with organizations and policymakers, they seek to distance themselves from “extremists” and provide “advice and suggestions” that are “enabling in a practical [rather than disruptive] sense” (Bebbington, 1997, p. 371). Refusing to “get involved” in the name of resisting managerial capture is viewed as “an abdication of responsibility [with] judgement… then always exercised by others” (Bebbington and Gray, 2001, p. 583, citing Bronner, 1994).

Reminiscent of the “Death” debates, some object to the “conflict-based” notion of capture itself on the grounds that it implies ownership rights over SEA and “confines reason to some academic elite who pin all their hopes on some future revolution” (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007, p. 338); see also Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010, p. 831 accusing those following the critical path of watching “the funeral pyre smouldering”). To reformists, critical theory too often appears to be a “purely intellectual” and negative exercise (Bokeno, 2003, p. 604). Even when praxis is attempted, critical theorists are charged with talking at people rather than with people (Adams and Larrinaga-González, 2007, p. 342) and their conflict orientation is seen to needlessly antagonize those who might otherwise be sympathetic (Gray et al., 1991). We believe there is validity in both positions, and agonistic pluralism would advocate processes whereby debate between these groups would be facilitated, not ameliorated. Contrary to more consensually oriented deliberative approaches, we would emphasize that the ability to problematize and “disrupt” the status quo is a core democratic value (Norval, 2007).

As noted in our introduction, at least some areas of SEA now enjoy symbiotic relations with critical theorists (Gray, 2002b, p. 377; Tinker and Gray, 2003), with writers acknowledging the need to develop SEA’s theoretical base and to become more politically aware. We encourage more (ant)agonistic political relations between these two groups (and their equivalent communities in the wider polity), in accordance with our view that social and political transformation involves a combination of “inside” and “outside” perspectives. Agonistic pluralism conceptualizes politics “as a ‘mixed-game,’ i.e., in part collaborative and in part conflictual” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 756). Too much diversity can be problematic, for example, the oft-noted fracturing of the Left. At the same time, disagreement and lack of consensus should not be regarded as signs of failure or betrayal. To the
contrary, learning to engage difference can not only “yield better mutual understanding . . . and the agreement to disagree” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 108), but also help in building progressive alliances across different social movements and resisting neoliberal ideologies that posit an already existing harmony of interests between dominant and subordinate groups. Conflicts can be “fruitful and educative”, with different perspectives bringing out limits in others (Kapoor, 2008, p. 98) and allowing debate over what “the good life” and the “pursuit of happiness” means (cf. Adams and Whelan, 2009). Again, these debates provide the possibility for new alternatives to emerge, enhancing the opportunities to challenge dominant discourses.

Agnostic democrats look for broad progressive coalitions based on commonalities in ideological perspectives. This may include forging loose “unlikely alliances” or “novel partnerships” with those that would normally be regarded as adversaries (Cohen, 2006, p. 75) on some issues (e.g. tempered radicals and militant activists; Republicans with strong conservationist beliefs) and “employing a continuum of strategies to help effect social change, ranging from subtle quiet tactics to organizing collective action” (Ball, 2007, p. 762). Such approaches recognize that the world is “a complex and nonlinear system in which small interventions can have huge impact” (Schmitt, 2005). Different groups are free to return to the offensive in areas of disagreement. As Little (2005b) explains, the goal is not “to create frictionless coalitions but constructive controversy” and to “compel opponents . . . to justify their positions” and thereby push debates further. Thus, in (ant)agonistic politics, traditional distinctions in critical theory between “reform” and “revolution” become blurred (Brown, 2009, p. 323).

3.3. Theorizing adversarialism

We contend that agonistic pluralism helps theorize empirical settings in a way that fosters engagement beyond the “business case”. Here we draw on Archel et al.’s (2011) empirical study of government-led CSR initiatives in Spain to briefly illustrate how overt and latent antagonisms might be surfaced and, potentially, constructively engaged in attempts to transform the status quo. Archel et al.’s (2011) study illustrates the imposition of dominant business discourse through “dialogue” and “stakeholder engagement” processes. Diverse engagement processes were in place and a variety of ideological perspectives were initially evident, but over the life of the project, discursive diversity disappeared as it was progressively “filtered through various stakeholder dialogue processes” directed toward gaining consensus and “re-emerged advocating voluntarism and business-as-usual” (Archel et al., 2011, p. 328) as evidenced by the CSR reporting requirements, or lack thereof, that favored the dominant elites (business). Some groups offering more radical alternatives withdrew from the process early on recognizing the futility of wielding any influence and not wishing to validate what they perceived as a flawed process, while others showed signs of being co-opted by the process itself and began to (re)frame their positions in accordance with the “logic” of the dominant discourse.

Agnostic pluralism and the associated SEAs (e.g. counter-accountings) recognize that dialogue is itself highly political and that antagonisms, collective identifications and passions are all important elements in democratic politics (see also Brown and Dillard, forthcoming). As discussed earlier, an SEA that fosters pluralism by providing visibility to hegemonies and counter-hegemonies and recognizes the value of political relations that embrace ongoing tension between consensus and conflict provides a promising avenue for progressive change. This perspective contrasts with extant SEA literature that generally downplays difference, conflict and dissent and is more likely to be framed from a business rather than civil society perspective as evidenced by the dominance of the “business case” approach to SEA. The antithesis of consensus-based, business dominated “stakeholder engagement” discourses, agonistic pluralism facilitates polylogics by highlighting conflict and fostering oppositional communities. A progressive pluralistic, democratic politics needs to nurture the institutional and non-institutional settings necessary to effectively articulate and operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda. These must recognize the benefit of both consensus and dissensus through (ant)agonistic relationships among interested groups. The tenets of agonistic pluralism help in theorizing how to move toward polylogic engagement, without glossing over the significant challenges this entails.

Briefly, Brown (2009, pp. 324–328) proposes eight critical dialogic principles derived from agonistic pluralism that, if applied, might have partially mitigated, or at least shed light on, the business capture.

51 These principles are as follows: recognize multiple ideological orientations; avoid monetary reductionism; be open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations; enable non-expert accessibility; ensure effective participatory processes; highlight extant power relationships; recognize the transformative potential of dialogic accounting; and resist new forms of monologism.

50 See also Spence et al. (2010, p. 78) noting that both reform and revolution lead in different ways to the “death of politics”.

49 “The tempered radical is non-revolutionary and works incrementally to create change” and, inter alia, looks for “the potential for change in commonplace situations and seemingly mundane actions” (Ball, 2007, pp. 762–763).

48 “The good life” and the “pursuit of happiness” means (cf. Adams and Whelan, 2009). Again, these debates provide the possibility for new alternatives to emerge, enhancing the opportunities to challenge dominant discourses.

51 These principles are as follows: recognize multiple ideological orientations; avoid monetary reductionism; be open about the subjective and contestable nature of calculations; enable non-expert accessibility; ensure effective participatory processes; highlight extant power relationships; recognize the transformative potential of dialogic accounting; and resist new forms of monologism.
of inputs to neo-liberal cost benefit analysis would be recognized and various counter-accounts (including alternative quantitative representations, qualitative and visual data) provided by what Archel et al. (2011) refer to as “heretic” groups. There would be explicit and multiple processes to enable and ensure that non-experts have access to the deliberations, both discursively and intellectually. This can be facilitated by forging “chains of equivalence” among groups contesting particular forms of subordination (e.g. labor, indigenous peoples, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, and race) with care taken not to gloss over differences and to resist any “temptation for one group to ‘absorb’ the other” (Brown, 2009, p. 334). Purcell (2009, p. 159) points to the example of the anti-globalization movement which has:

involved a range of groups (e.g. labor, environmentalists, anti-third-world debt, human rights in China, etc.) that shared an equivalent opposition to the globalization of neoliberalism. Their concerns were in many ways disparate (outsourcing of jobs, sea turtles, rediscovering jubilee obligations, the occupation of Tibet, etc.), but they strategically defined themselves as equivalent and acted together to oppose the WTO and other institutions committed to neoliberalization. … Each member of the coalition achieved much more than they could have alone, but they did not have to dissolve into a large and uniform collective to do it. While they did not achieve the end of neoliberal hegemony, they certainly succeeded in identifying it and calling it into question.

Institutional and non-institutional processes should help ensure effective participation spaces and processes. At the institutional level, this requires broader structural change, for example, the establishment of legislative rights to information and participation, with civil society groups aware that this will involve conscious political mobilization (Dannin, 2006). Equally, if not more importantly, counter-hegemonic groups need to develop oppositional communities – separate spaces outside existing institutions where they can explore and advance alternative understandings that contest existing exclusions, especially ones perceived as unimportant, inchoate, illegitimate or unimaginable from dominant perspectives (Kohn, 2000, p. 424). The aim here is not “permanent balkanization, but rather a temporary retreat to a protected space in which it is possible to explore and test genuinely alternative ways of framing collective problems” (Kohn, 2000, p. 425). This is key in developing the kind of resignifying that Archel et al. (2011, p. 341), in our view, rightly recognize as vital in efforts to resist voluntarist, consensually oriented understandings of CSR and to establish new signifiers less likely to float to business positions. In the absence of an institutional environment conducive to the expression and implementation of genuine alternatives, counter-hegemonic movements arguably would rationalize exercise their right not to participate in corporate and State-initiated stakeholder “dialogue”. Lastly, there must be a resistance to establishing new forms of monologism that, however well-intentioned, aim to guide people to new universalistic answers that, in our view, unrealistically and ill-advisedly imply an “end to politics”.

It may be argued that mainstream business/accounting adheres to democratic values in that it accepts the legitimacy of stakeholder engagement. Archel et al.’s (2011) findings show that when implemented within and filtered through prevailing dominant “business case” institutional processes, embracing stakeholder engagement legitimates business interests’ hegemonic position (i.e. shareholder wealth maximization). In these conditions, power elites do not find it particularly confronting to at least listen to “heretic” discourses; indeed, by doing so, they may help to legitimate their own “business case” approach as the “consensual” outcome of dialogue. The fundamental norms of neoliberal practices (e.g. questioning of the shareholder wealth maximization norm) are thus never seriously questioned. Application of Brown’s (2009) principles would require recognition of legitimate contestation over both the fundamental norms that underpin our institutions (e.g. efficiency, social justice, accountability) and how they are or should be interpreted, prioritized and put into practice. Here, again, we see the fostering of oppositional communities that can build the social capital to help map out alternatives and experiment with innovative counter-accountings and practices as key. The social movements and communicative planning literatures provide examples of agonistic approaches that can be applied at the local level. The following is an example of a river cleanup project that illustrates these principles in operation:

a coalition of environmental, neighborhood, Native American, small business, and environmental justice groups [DRCC] has come together to advocate for greater popular empowerment. … The cleanup is being overseen by a… neoliberal governance arrangement: a public–private partnership (PPP) among major polluters has been given wide authority to study, plan, and carry out the cleanup. While the PPP’s agenda is diverse, at its base is a vision of the river as a waterway and its banks as marketable property. The watershed … must meet the needs of the economy. The DRCC brings together groups with quite disparate interests. But they share an equivalent opposition to the PPP’s waterway/property vision; they see the watershed instead as inhabited, by residents, by native tribes, by fish and wildlife. The diverse elements of the DRCC have … consciously constructed together an equivalent vision for the river. They see that vision to be irreducibly different from that of the PPP, and … they understand their relations with the PPP to be agonistic. That is, they see the PPP as an adversary with whom they must struggle, not a partner with whom to build a cooperative solution through communicative action. I don’t mean they never cooperate, never communicate, and always protest. They use a range of political practices. Rather I mean in the big picture they believe they want something fundamentally different from the PPP. While there may be ample room for negotiation and strategic compromise along the way, in the long term an inhabited watershed is very different from and in many ways incompatible with an owned watershed. Currently, the PPP’s owned-watershed vision is hegemonic. The river is seen as first and foremost as a waterway that serves the needs of the economy. The DRCC struggles agonistically to supplant that hegemonic vision with a counter-hegemonic vision of the river as inhabited… While they have not yet
transformed the relations of power that govern Superfund cleanups, they have been able to make promising inroads: to exploit existing opportunities (and invent new ones) to call into question neoliberal governance structures and values, and to significantly empower non-owner interests to advance a distinctly different idea of what the watershed should be (Purcell, 2009, pp. 159–160, emphasis in original).

Counter-hegemonic movements do not aim to eliminate power but rather to reclaim it “through political mobilization” (Purcell, 2009, p. 160). Against neoliberal conceptions “of property rights and rights to accumulation”, they construct and assert divergent demands, namely “to inhabit urban space, to maximize use-value rather than exchange value, and to play a central role in decision-making” (Purcell, 2009, p. 160). As Purcell (2009, p. 160) observes “such movements, though nascent, are proliferating”. They are finding creative ways of resisting neoliberalism and help to illustrate that other worlds are possible (Purcell, 2009; see also Cooper, 2001 discussing the importance of oppositional communities that both map and act out new possible social pathways). We consider there is significant potential for the SEA community to join with academics and groups developing agonistic practices in communicative planning, development studies and political theory (e.g., see Bond, 2011; Hillier, 2002; Kapoor, 2008; Purcell, 2009). SEA has much to learn from these endeavours in trying to create more democratic and just societies and, equally, polylogic approaches to accounting offer much in helping to foster counter-hegemonic movements and agonistic political relations.52

4. Closing comments

SEA, and the environmental movement in general, is currently going through a period of critical self-analysis. As part of this debate, challenging questions have been raised about how SEA should be defined, who should be doing the defining, and what its agenda should be. Should managerilist forms of SEA engagement be classified as “real” SEA?53 Can we speak of an “SEA project” or “community”? What, if any, values or objectives unite those who work in this area? Should we describe ourselves primarily in disciplinary terms (e.g. as a field of study) or in terms of our politics (e.g., as a movement)? Why does SEA matter? What, if anything, has it achieved? How should we define and/or measure “success” and over what time frame? With whom should we engage to achieve change? How should we react to methodological and/or political diversity? Should we strive for more cohesion and unity of purpose? Or embrace pluralism and heterodoxy?

The “Death” debates strongly resonate with the current contestable terrain of SEA (and progressive social movements in general) and, as such, represent the context and content of the political space associated with programs for engagement The problems, proposed solutions, and criticisms discussed above suggest a diverse array of contestable issues and interested constituencies. While the impossibility of an accounting that transcends values and politics is recognized in SEA, the relevance and influence of contestèd values and ideologies in developing and understanding SEA has not been fully appreciated. We submit that SEA has much to gain from engaging with the interrelations of the social, environmental, and economic domains in a more critically pluralistic fashion. Doing so requires, inter alia, the re-evaluation and extension of traditional boundaries of what constitutes the environment and engagement, and giving greater visibility to the contested politics inextricably bound up with technical practices such as accounting. Integrating the social and political with the technical in a way that respects our diversity as socio-political beings requires active engagement among experts, business, policymakers, social movements and citizens. While a number of SEA researchers to date have initiated dialogue with business groups and policy elites, we see a pressing need to also engage social movements to formulate positions and accounting that move beyond the business case for SEA. Moreover, rather than positing social movements as a relatively homogenous group with common information needs, the “Death” debates highlight important distinctions between those operating in collaborative and adversarial modes. Adversarial NGOs, for example, might have greater call for various forms of counter-accounting and oppositional analysis.

In keeping with a commitment to agonistic praxis (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Brown, 2012; Dillard and Yuthas, 2011; Brown and Dillard, forthcoming), our analysis has identified some of the issues that motivate tensions between the more pragmatic and critical arms of the SEA field (and social movements more generally). We propose agonistic pluralism as a basis for developing engagement strategies and programs when interacting with groups with diverse views, values, and visions. We acknowledge that this approach brings with it a host of difficulties and, as yet, unanswered issues – in particular those surrounding the need to develop more polylogic understandings of SEA and the requisite supporting ethics and information systems (see Brown, 2009; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Dillard and Yuthas, 2011 for some starting

52 The value of dialogic accounting has recently been recognized in the communicative planning literature. Hillier and Healey (2010, p. 387) advocate “consideration of the concept of dialogic accounting. . . Such accounting is not concerned with discovery of an ‘infallible truth’, but rather with discussing actors’ values and priorities in ‘democratic’ processes of decision making. . . Who gets to discuss these values and priorities in what type of ‘democratic’ setting, however, poses yet another ethical issue”.

53 The “boundaries” of SEA research are highly political. For example, decisions to exclude “accounting and labor relations” literature in many SEA reviews have arguably helped to privilege the “environmental” in “social and environmental accounting”. From the perspective of progressive politics, it is difficult to understand why this work (and, even more so, critical accounting) is excluded from social accounting “as the universe of all possible accountings” (see Gray, 2002a, pp. 692 and 694 where Gray calls for more attention to the labor context), while managerialist SEA that relies on “the functionalist toolbox” or “professional accounting orthodoxy” is often treated as “real SEA” (Gray, 2002a, p. 693). This perhaps goes some way to explaining why researchers themselves are divided over whether they even want to be counted as SEA researchers, with many academics of a more critical bent preferring to eschew the SEA label (Gray et al., 2009, p. 567; see also Owen, 2008, pp. 240–242 for discussion of the politics of defining SEA research).
thoughts). However, here we would emphasize that ideas regarding critical pluralistic praxis are gaining increasing currency in many other disciplines and provide a substantial and, as yet, largely untapped resource for developing “critical” SEA.

While social change may reasonably be argued to involve some combination of working both “within” and “outside” the system, in collaborative and combative ways, it is acknowledged that many will find the pluralistic approach proposed here too “messy” and challenge it as bringing its own serious political risks. Letting “different worldviews bloom” may seem unduly relativistic, even nihilistic to some (cf. Kysar, 2008, p. 2074ff). We have given our reasons for concluding otherwise, but in the spirit of agonistic pluralism, we welcome further debate on this and other issues raised. It is hoped that these ideas will help stimulate empirical projects that explore polyvocality while retaining a critical edge (see Aras et al., 2007; see also Goi, 2005; Huijer, 2005; Purcell, 2009; McClymont, 2011 for cognate work in other disciplines). In the interests of reactivating “the political” and what is being called an ailing civic sphere (O’Leary, 1985; Cooper et al., 2005; Lehman, 2001, 2010; Spence et al., 2010), it is our contention that SEA engagement debates need to take place not just among academics, and political, business or NGO “leaders”, but also in the wider communities to which we all belong. In this sense, we present this discussion as one strand of a much larger set of conversations among “friendly enemies” (cf. Brown, 2009, p. 321). Our overall aim is not to suggest that we have “the answers”, but rather to promote dialogue and debate among various groups with an interest in conceptualizing and undertaking meaningful engagements. Notwithstanding our differences over the wisdom of an organizational-centred approach, we wholeheartedly agree with Adams and Larrinaga-González (2007, p. 349) that SEA has barely scratched the surface of the potentialities of engagement research. We hope that our discussion helps to open up new possibilities that enable SEA to effectively respond to, and move beyond, traditional politically conservative, managerialist approaches to sustainability. We seek to provide food for thought not just for constituencies already strongly aligned with particular political positions but also those who are relative newcomers to the debates.

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund for supporting this research as part of a funded project on “Dialogic Accounting: the Challenge of Taking Multiple Perspectives Seriously”, Contract No. VUU1011. Many thanks also to the anonymous referees and participants at the 11th Essex Conference in Critical Political Theory, 15–17 June 2011, University of Essex, Colchester, UK and at the Critical Perspectives in Accounting Conference, 10–12 July 2011, Florida, US for their helpful feedback on earlier iterations of this paper.

References


Blain L. An environmental-justice advocate insists he’s not dead yet. Grist IR 2005 http://www.grist.org/member/1441. (31.05.05).


Hillery J, Healey P. The Ashgate research companion to planning theory. Surrey: Ashgate; 2010.


Poppe C. Response to ‘the Death of Environmentalism’: there is something different about global warming,. Sierra Club; 2004 In: http://www.sierracub.org/pressroom/messages/2004december_poppe.asp.

Prakash S. The things that matter. Life After Death, Four emerging environmental leaders discuss the future of their field. Grist 2005 In: http://www.grist.org/article/elp. (22.02.05).


