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INTRODUCTION

RACIAL NATIONS

Nancy P. Appelbaum,
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We want it to be written into the Constitution that we indígenas are Mexican but that we have different cultures and traditions. Before 1994, being an indígena meant . . . abuse and humiliation, but now, as a result of our struggle, being an indígena is raising your head up high, with pride. This great Mexico that we have today is thanks to our forebears.

Queremos que quede escrito en la Constitución que los indígenas somos mexicanos pero tenemos diferencias de cultura y tradiciones. Antes de 1994, ser indígena era . . . maltrato y humillación, pero ahora con nuestra lucha ser indígena es ver con la cara arriba y con orgullo. El gran México que hoy tenemos es gracias a nuestros antepasados.

COMANDANTE MOISÉS, Tzeltal member of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, 2 December 2000

Ever since eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century colonial subjects conceived of creating independent republics out of highly stratified and diverse colonial societies, tensions between sameness and difference and between equality and hierarchy have shaped Latin American nation building. Elite and popular classes have argued about whether inclusion in the nation requires homogenization. Does equality among citizens necessitate merging distinct racial identi-
ties? Can the assertion of difference be made compatible with equality? When does difference interfere with a common citizenship? When does it reaffirm inequality and hierarchy? When does it overcome humiliation and generate pride? Must discourses of racial mixing always imply the reassertion of a dominant culture that is European or white? Answers to these questions have varied according to who has asked them, when, and why.

This book explores the historical roots of popular and elite expressions of race and national identity in postindependence Latin America. In this introductory essay, we argue that national identities have been constructed in racial terms and that definitions of race have been shaped by processes of nation building. The historical account we provide here rejects a priori definitions of both race and nation and posits that neither construct has been stable or universal. Diverse actors have ignored, expressed, appropriated, and transformed racial difference. Apprehensions of national identity have been equally varied. National or racial difference has sometimes reinforced discrimination and sometimes undermined it. Efforts to transcend difference have likewise functioned ambiguously.

Local, national, and transnational contexts—including North Atlantic imperialism and ingrained hierarchies of gender, class, and region—have patterned the articulations of race and nation. Thus, rather than taking the nation as a given unit of analysis or engaging in teleological accounts of the nation-building process, this essay looks at the transnational and local practices through which national identity has been constructed. We show that race has been central to gendered and sexualized constructions of nationhood and to the inscription of national territories in space.1

In order to recognize existing forms of racial identification without reifying them, this essay differentiates between race as a contingent historical phenomenon that has varied over time and space, and race as an analytical category. To minimize slippage between the two uses, we reserve the word “race” to mark phenomena that were identified as such by contemporaries. We define “racialization” as the process of marking human differences according to hierarchical discourses grounded in colonial encounters and their national legacies.2 The meanings of race over time and space in postcolonial Latin America constitute the subject of our historical analysis; racialization is our conceptual tool.

Differentiating in this way allows us to stress the ubiquity of both race and racialization while highlighting the specific contexts that have shaped racial thinking and practice. We do not assume that race has always and everywhere made reference to biology, heredity, appearance, or intrinsic bodily differences,
but instead we look at how historical actors themselves deployed the term. In addition, we acknowledge that systems of racial classification have coexisted and overlapped. Because scholarly understandings of race have been part of racialization, rather than simply descriptions of it, we examine academic debates in tandem with other elite and popular views. As we suggest below, this approach allows us to move beyond still prevalent debates about whether or not racial discrimination exists in Latin America and beyond mechanistic contrasts of U.S. and Latin American racial systems. Instead, we ask how ideas regarding race have changed over time and how racial ideas have constructed dichotomies between North and South (as well as between and within Latin American nations).

Below, we begin by discussing elite racial ideology, which has been the primary focus of existing scholarship on race in Latin America. Next, we highlight the specific contributions of this volume. We discuss the spatial dynamics of race and nation, racial categorization, the formation of national identities, the gendering of nation-building and racial projects, and the relation between elite and popular understandings of race and nation. Further study of these issues will, we hope, allow scholars and activists to overcome simplistic dichotomies and to imagine integration without homogenization, and difference without hierarchy.

ELITE VISIONS OF RACE AND NATION

Elite racial discourse developed in response to metropolitan and local influences. In this section, drawing on conventional periodizations, we trace that development across four relatively distinct periods. Although the section stresses the political and economic contexts in which elites’ ideas regarding race took shape, we do not assume that these factors were the only determinants of their racial practices. Nor should our attention to ruling classes and leading intellectuals be taken to imply that popular actors were unimportant. Elite practices developed in dialogue and conflict with popular mobilizations, which are examined at length in the final section of this essay. Moreover, our periodization should not be taken to suggest radical disjunction. Each of the four periods was marked by continuities in definitions of race and nation, while various and contradictory discourses of racialized nationhood overlapped and blended. The timing and context of change also varied by country and region. The trajectories of Brazil and Cuba diverged especially sharply from regional patterns, since both outlawed slavery and became republics only in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. This periodization should consequently be understood as fluid and the racial discourses of each moment as contested.

During the first moment, early-nineteenth-century liberal patriots faced the challenges of creating citizens out of colonial subjects and forging national communities from colonial societies marked by stark social divisions. Racial boundaries established in the colonial era had reaffirmed the exclusion of non-Europeans from the high spheres of economic and political power. Rural Indians, generally considered to be outside Spanish society, not only were subject to special taxes but also retained a degree of local political autonomy. Especially in the late colonial era, however, racial demarcations were far from rigid, and those outside European circles could ascend the social ladder by adopting European mores and/or acquiring wealth.4

Pro-independence elites revamped the racial divisions created under colonial rule, even as they drew on classical liberalism to reject imperial hierarchies and assert sovereignty and democracy. Liberalism presumed an unmarked, raceless, even genderless individual, yet nineteenth-century liberals on both sides of the Atlantic described the ideal qualities of citizens and nations in implicitly racialized and gendered terms.5 Latin American liberal patriots, most of them members of the white colonial Creole upper class or descended from it, associated the traits of the proper citizen—literacy, property ownership, and individual autonomy—with whiteness and masculinity. Only properly cultured and educated men were deemed to have “civic virtue”; only they were capable of self-government; and only they accrued equal rights. Those men who did not conform to citizen norms—slaves, Indians, and the propertyless—were generally deemed to be dependent and excluded from full citizenship. Women, too, were denied full rights because they presumably lacked autonomy. Yet while certain leaders sought to permanently exclude women and non-elite men from participation in the nation, others insisted that, through training, uncivilized and dependent men could be made into virtuous citizens.6 Still, when those in subordinate positions pushed too strongly for inclusion—either by seeking individual mobility or by mobilizing collectively—they were often contained through mechanisms of outright exclusion, including the restriction of suffrage.7

Liberal independence leader Simón Bolívar saw racial “diversity” as a central impediment to “perfect” democracy. For Bolívar, the lack of virtue of Venezuela’s mixed-race population counseled against an overly representative democracy, and he advocated a strong executive and hereditary peerage. Central to his argument was the premise that all people were not in fact equal, and that the long oppressed and racially mixed population needed education before it could
enjoy full citizen rights. Twenty years later, Argentine liberal Domingo F. Sarmiento argued more strongly for the intrinsic incapacity of the nation’s nonwhite inhabitants. For Sarmiento, the forging of a civilized nation implied the absolute negation of the barbaric colonial past forged by both Spaniard and Indian. To make Argentina anew, he proposed national instruction, the creation of a landowning yeoman farmer class, and European immigration. He also called for the extermination of those who could not be educated, especially indigenous peoples of the pampas. He thus emulated the more “advanced” United States, with its independent farmers and policy of warfare toward native populations.

In contrast to liberals such as Sarmiento, nineteenth-century conservatives harked back to the colonial period, sought to restore the privileges of the Church and landed elites, and affirmed difference and hierarchy. Liberals excoriated conservative caudillos—military strongmen who practiced personalist forms of politics—as being backward, brutal, and barbarous and hence obstacles to the progress of the nation. Recent scholarship has shown that conservative nation-making was often racially inclusive, though not egalitarian. In Argentina, for example, Juan Manuel de Rosas forged ties with mestizo gauchos (cowboys), incorporated Afro-Argentines into the military, and wove aspects of Afro-Argentine culture into patriotic rituals. In Guatemala, Rafael Carrera took power with popular ladino and Mayan support, though he did not articulate a Guatemalan national identity in culturally Mayan terms. Rosas eventually abandoned Afro-Argentines, however, and destroyed the gaucho way of life by helping privatize the pampas. Carrera similarly supported the privatization and sale of indigenous lands in areas with commercial agricultural potential. Yet in contrast to liberals, who saw sameness as a precondition for inclusion within the nation, conservatives created racialized forms of subordinate inclusion, even as they emphasized caste divisions over common citizenship.

During a second moment, as countries emerged out of the economic and political disorder that had characterized the early republics, late-nineteenth-century governments sought to maintain the social and labor order that they considered fundamental to national economic progress. Commodity exports rose dramatically, slavery ended, and proletarianization spread. Elites experimented with various forms of coercion to overcome popular reticence toward wage labor, often arguing that particular races were especially apt for certain types of work. With the expansion of plantations and commercial agriculture, indigenous communal landholdings came under renewed attack. The southern frontiers of Argentina and Chile were finally, and brutally, conquered.
Across Latin America, authorities sought to repopulate their nations by encouraging the immigration of presumably cultured and hardworking Europeans.\textsuperscript{13}

Many intellectuals now conceptualized their nations as racially heterogeneous, without abandoning the whitened civilization ideal of nationhood first articulated by liberal leaders of the independence era. National leaders promoted education as well as immigration to turn a racially and culturally mixed population into one that was hardworking, progressive, and cultured in the way posited by the normative whitened definition of citizenship. But though elites advocated a process of cultural homogenization that, given prevalent cultural definitions of race, implied racial whitening, they maintained the racial distinctions that undergirded efforts to stratify and control labor and that justified regional hierarchies within their respective nations.

In addition, national leaders increased their efforts to understand, categorize, and control their populations. Intellectuals borrowed frequently if selectively from the new currents of racial science emerging in Europe, avidly reading Gustave LeBon, Cesare Lombroso, Hippolyte Taine, Count Arthur de Gobineau, and Herbert Spencer.\textsuperscript{14} Thus armed with the legitimizing shield of modern science, they used the resources of expanding central states to measure, count, classify—and then improve—national populations. In the neo-Lamarckian version of eugenic science prevalent in Latin America, environmental conditions shaped heredity. As a result, elites sought racial rehabilitation not only through the control of reproduction championed by eugenicists in the United States but also through control of the social milieu. Authorities implemented hygiene and sanitation campaigns, taught housekeeping and puericulture (the science of conception, pregnancy, and childrearing), and sought to fortify citizens’ bodies and brains through recreation and education. By uplifting their fellow citizens, they insisted, they would improve their national stock and compete with more advanced nations.\textsuperscript{15} Even abolitionist arguments against slavery were often framed in these terms; slavery and blackness were both associated with backward social conditions that had to be overcome to ensure national progress.\textsuperscript{16}

In a third moment, increasingly populist national projects emerged. Popular mobilization in the Cuban independence struggles of the late nineteenth century, the Mexican Revolution of 1910–20, and new peasant and urban working-class movements throughout Latin America, along with fledgling feminist movements, pressured elites to formulate more inclusive national projects. In the aftermath of World War I, and more coherently from the beginning of the 1930s depression, the economic doctrine of import-substitution stressed pro-
duction for the domestic market and national self-sufficiency. As populist politicians of the mid-twentieth century tried to rally capitalists and workers (and sometimes peasants) behind industrialization, they used unifying discourses of racial similarity and national harmony to buttress cross-class and cross-gender alliances. The idea that nations were cohesive races responded to popular pressure by offering a more expansive conception of citizenship. It also countered the pervasive power of the United States by positing a united national community.

Latin American intellectuals embraced an anti-imperialist position that inverted North Atlantic assertions of the inferiority of Latin American populations. In Cuba, José Martí and his generation of Cuban nationalists attempted to mobilize both ex-slaves and former slave masters against Spain by defining the Cuban nation as “raceless” and hence inclusive of all Cubans. Later, the negritude movement inspired an artistic avant-garde to embrace Cuba’s black origins as a source of national difference from the United States and Europe. Early-twentieth-century theorists in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and elsewhere—such as Gilberto Freyre, Manuel Gamio, José Vasconcelos, and Uriel García—repudiated the theory that Latin Americans were degenerate hybrids, articulating discourses of mestizaje that instead stressed the benefits of racial mixing. Some even argued for a positive eugenics—a healthy cross-breeding. Vasconcelos maintained that Latin American miscegenation was sparking the creation of a beautiful transnational “Cosmic Race.” In casting the mestizo as the modern racial ideal, he and other Mexican intellectuals challenged the prevalent coupling of whiteness with modernity and citizenship. Brazilian intellectuals similarly described their nation in inclusive and explicitly antiracist terms as a “racial democracy.” Meanwhile, indigenistas (intellectuals who exalted the Indian, or indígena) trumpeted the purity and beauty of native peoples, positing indigenous civilizations as the basis of national cultures and arguing that indígenas’ advancement was crucial to national progress.

The “cult of the mestizo” thus emerged at the same time as indigenismo. Some thinkers considered the “pure” Indian to be superior to the mestizo, as in Peru where indigenistas urged that indigenous peoples avoid diluting noble Indian blood through racial mixing. Others believed that the Indian would ultimately disappear into the “bronze race.” Indigenismo was not necessarily incompatible with a discourse of mestizaje, and especially in Mexico some prominent “mestizophiles” were also indigenistas. But even those who idealized Indians and promoted indigenous rituals and languages still worked within racialized paradigms that ascribed inherent biological and cultural characteris-
tics to each race. Moreover, promoters of both *mestizaje* and *indigenismo* were fundamentally concerned with preparing Indians for citizenship by integrating, educating, and modernizing them.²¹

During the fourth moment of nation building, after World War II and the Holocaust, scientists and politicians largely abandoned the explicit terminology of race. They did not, however, abandon the assumptions that underlay racial thinking. “Ethnicity” became a more acceptable term for what had previously been referred to as race, but the term “ethnic” was used mainly to describe groups—especially Indians—who did not conform to a racialized national norm, generally coded as either mestizo or white.²² The shift toward ethnicity did not displace the reifying equation of culture, place, and human biology.

Moreover, the doctrines of modernization and development that arose in the 1950s and 1960s replicated the civilizational discourse of earlier eras. Social scholarship on the family patterns and gender mores of urban residents and on the landholding and consumption patterns of rural people promulgated an implicitly white, elite, and North Atlantic norm. Marxist scholars did not escape this developmental paradigm. For instance, Brazil’s Florestan Fernandes subsumed Afro-Brazilians in a class project that would supposedly modernize them, erase the dysfunctions caused by the historical legacies of slavery, and promote the progress of Brazil as a whole.²³ The early Cuban Revolution took a similar stance toward Afro-Cubans.

In this fourth period, social movements increasingly questioned assumptions of racial fraternity and democracy and asserted difference. Decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean occurred simultaneously with mobilizations in the United States for racial equality and ethnic autonomy, such as the Chicano, American Indian, civil rights, and Black Power movements, which often described their differences as national as well as racial. The pan–Latin American indigenous rights movement burgeoned in the last quarter of the twentieth century, culminating in the 1992 Quincentenary, when Afro–Latin Americans protested alongside indigenous peoples.

Revisionist scholars, too, participated in this demystification. As early as the 1950s, the São Paulo school of Brazilian social scientists, to which Fernandes belonged, documented widespread patterns of racial inequality.²⁴ Historians of slavery dispelled myths of slaveowner paternalism and magnanimity.²⁵ Studies of Cuba showed that extreme racial violence against blacks was not limited to the United States.²⁶ Scholars of ethnicity in Mesoamerica and the Andes em-
phasized the pernicious effects of the dismemberment of corporate indigenous communities in the name of progress, accentuating the problematic aspects of what Jeffrey Gould referred to in Nicaragua as the “myth of mestizaje.” Revisions argued that doctrines of racial democracy, racial fraternity, and mestizaje were insidious myths that masked racial discrimination and stymied civil rights movements in Latin America.

The revisionist critiques have aroused the ire of intellectuals who have criticized North American academics for imposing a North American obsession with race over class identity and for applying U.S. racial categories to much more fluid Latin American realities. Important revisionist works by George Reid Andrews and Aline Helg, for example, have been called into question for lumping people of African descent into one racial category and downplaying the significance of the intermediary category of mulatto in Latin American history. A polemic has thus emerged around issues such as whether racial democracy is or is not a myth, whether mestizaje is or is not ethnocide, and whether Latin America is less racist or more racist than the United States. These questions have given rise to important research. Such debates, however, reproduce the racial dilemmas that have plagued North Atlantic thinkers and Latin American elites since the time of the independence wars, asking if, how, and why Latin American nations differ from those in Europe and the United States. Like Vasconcelos and Freyre, some scholars promote a nationalist reassertion of Latin American difference. Others emphasize similarities. Neither question the categorization of regions according to their racial characteristics. From this perspective, the United States and Latin America appear as unified wholes.

As we note below, the best new work on race and nation in Latin America moves beyond these debates by advancing a processual and contextual understanding of nation building and race-making. This volume draws on and deepens that scholarship by furthering our understanding of spatialization, racial categorization, nationalism, and gender. It also demonstrates how the elite theories outlined above were constructed through interactions with definitions of race and nation that came “from below.” By examining the racial construction of nations and the diversity of racial formations within nations, this volume reframes discussions of racial and national similarities and differences. Our use of the concept of racialization, and our insistence on the variety of meanings that have been attributed to the term “race,” allow us to focus on why different articulations arose, while noting the continuities that have made race and the racialization of national identities so pervasive.
RACE AND SPACE

Rather than taking boundaries for granted and comparing the racial characteristics of discrete national territories, this book foregrounds how race and nation have been conjointly constructed and projected in spatial terms. Spatial boundaries, we suggest, have been constructed by racialized ideas of progress and modernity. As noted above, Latin American elites often sought to become more like the North, yet at other times they inverted this equation by asserting the superiority of the South’s mestizo populations and racial democracies. But whether they accepted or confronted assumptions of the North’s superiority, they drew distinctions between the racial order of their own nations and those of allegedly more modern, “whiter” nations. Rather than debate the accuracy of these reified distinctions, this volume attempts to understand how they constructed and naturalized relations of power by embedding them in space.

Aims McGuinness’s essay traces how the very term “Latin America” emerged out of racialized transnational encounters. During the California gold rush of the late 1840s and 1850s, New Granada’s (present-day Colombia’s) province of Panama became an important international transit route. As migrants from the United States flooded the isthmus, they became involved in racially charged conflicts with local residents. Some New Granadan intellectuals countered the disruptive presence of the U.S. “Saxon race” by forging an oppositional “Latin American” racial-cum-geographical identity.

This volume also builds on Latin Americanist writing on the mutually constituting relation between regions, localities, and national states to examine how race relations and racialized idioms have framed discussions of sameness and difference within as well as between and among nations. Regional differences, Latin American scholarship has shown, were racialized. Those regions that have been marked off as black and Indian (such as northeastern Brazil, highland Peru, or southern Mexico) have been labeled backward in relation to more modern, whiter regions (such as southern Brazil, coastal Peru, or northern Mexico). Regions identified as black or Indian, such as the Caribbean coast of Central America, have not been considered fully part of the nation.

Barbara Weinstein’s essay shows that the São Paulo elite’s assertion of regional pride was often couched in the racialized discourse of modernization. Prominent Paulistas presented their region as the motor of the Brazilian economy, asserting that its advanced industrial infrastructure would pull the entire Brazilian nation upward. In their view, São Paulo stood metonymically for the modern whitened nation as a whole and against the “black” Northeast. The
Paulistas’ opposition to the regime of Getúlio Vargas, which culminated in a 1932 regionalist uprising, drew on these racialized identities. While Vargas asserted a more populist, Freyrian, racially mixed vision of the nation, Paulista elites envisioned a modern nation that was implicitly whiter. Similarly, the Sonorans described in Gerardo Rénique’s essay insisted on the superiority of their northern “blanco-criollo” regional type over the mestizo type of Mexico’s center-south. In the years following the Mexican Revolution of 1910, these racialized regional identities bolstered Sonorans’ successful bids to consolidate their power over the central government.

Though racialized regional differences could provoke conflict and even violence, and though nation-state formation at times involved the imposition of homogeneity, regionalism was not always antithetical to nation building. Especially in the early years of the republics, when national leaders actively attempted to create unity out of geographical difference, intellectuals paradoxically emphasized racial and spatial heterogeneity within the national territory. Mid-nineteenth-century intellectuals, often sponsored by their national governments, explored and mapped their territories and classified peoples and other natural species. The resulting geographical treatises and natural histories, along with costumbrista novels and illustrations, produced images of each nation-state as internally divided into separate races, regions, climates, and cultural practices. Intellectuals reified the cultural and geographic boundaries that marked off unified regions within the nation and naturalized hierarchy by embedding it in racially differentiated landscapes. Yet they also projected their nations as the aggregates of regional components. In pointing to these racialized regional dynamics, we follow Peter Wade and others in arguing that nation building was not simply a homogenizing process based on the eradication of difference—though at times it functioned in that way.

Race thus constructed space. At the same time, space constructed race: racial distinctions were created and reinforced through allusions to how place determined or shaped the racial characteristics of individuals and groups. Late-colonial efforts to identify the flora and fauna of the American territories had developed simultaneously with the construction of Creole identities that emphasized the racial differences between denizens of the Americas and peninsular-born Europeans. Nineteenth-century geographical expeditions continued that enterprise and portrayed the environmental characteristics of specific locales as shaping the races that inhabited them. When the term “race” appeared in the resulting treatises, it could indicate the broad human races (Ethiopian/Black, Mongolian/Asian, Caucasian/White, American/Indian, and
Malay) laid out by Enlightenment thinkers or refer to specific nations, subnational regions, localities, or kin groups. Such varied usages, which could express overlapping as well as contradictory forms of identity, would continue in Latin America throughout the postcolonial era.

DEFINING RACE

In the eighteenth century the German naturalist J. F. Blumenbach divided humanity into the five distinct varieties mentioned above. Today, scholars generally reject such biologically determinist theories of human difference and insist that race is a social construct. They have not, however, fully moved beyond Blumenbach’s racial typology. Nor have they abandoned the idea that race refers to visible attributes grounded in biological differences. In contrast, we argue here that racial categorization has not operated exclusively through biologically determinist scientific discourses. It is a mistake to assume, based on present understandings of race, that alternative past usages of the word “race” were not actually about race at all. This, then, is the second major contribution of our approach: we provide a historical account of racial categorization, demonstrating how criteria for racial classification have shifted over time. Following authors Robert Young, Marisol de la Cadena, Nancy Stepan, Ann Stoler, and Matthew Jacobsen, among others, we contend that systems of racial classifications have drawn as often on cultural as biological criteria. Racial difference has been defined according to notions such as civilization, honor, and education that have been manifested in dress, language, and religion as well as body type. Moreover, like Jacobsen, we stress how various, sometimes even incompatible definitions of race have coexisted. In Latin America, scientists drew simultaneously on neo-Lamarckian systems of racial classification, premised on the overriding influence of the environment, and on notions of race grounded in immutable bodily differences. In fact, early-twentieth-century scientists confounded environment and heredity by positing that “racial poisons” such as syphilis, tuberculosis, and alcohol could modify the genes and make progeny degenerate.

Alexandra Stern’s essay in this book highlights the diverse conceptualizations of race at play in twentieth-century Mexico. Stern chronicles how, during the post–World War II era, “biotypology” eclipsed “mestizophilia” within Mexican scientific circles. With the rise of a version of Mendelian genetics that stressed the randomness of individual inheritance, eugenicists turned to biotypology, a science based on the measurements of physiognomic, mental, and behavioral
characteristics. But though they largely discarded race as a scientific category, racialization continued. Biotypologists retained many aspects of prevailing racial theories, including an emphasis on the hereditary bodily manifestations of cultural differences. Their statistical comparisons of norms and averages, moreover, were based on Eurocentric assumptions regarding statistically “normal” body types.

In pointing to the variety of systems of racial categorization, this book shows that race has been more pervasive, resilient, and malleable than recognized by previous scholarship. Clearly, racial thinking in Latin America predated the new scientific racism of the late nineteenth century and persisted after the discrediting of racial science in the postwar era. The new scientific racism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented a rearticulation of older ideas and new insights rather than a radical departure from earlier racial thinking. Neo-Lamarckians, for instance, harked back to early republican efforts to typologize and understand the environment in order to specify difference, and biologically determinist eugenicists built on colonial definitions of race based in inheritance, lineage, and bloodlines.

In addition, we show that Latin Americans did not import European racial theories wholesale but instead interpreted those theories through local racial ideologies. Stern examines how Mexican intellectuals appropriated transnational scientific ideas. Rénique suggests that Sonoran migrants to California brought anti-Chinese theories back with them to Mexico and then used them for nationally and regionally specific ends. These insights regarding racial thinking lead us to challenge scholarship that posits hard boundaries between U.S. and Latin American practices of racial differentiation. That scholarship, we believe, has missed how racial conceptions have overlapped and changed over time. It has also focused too much on whether or not Latin American populations conform to U.S. racial classifications, thus failing to take adequate stock of how transnational processes—including scientific and cultural exchange, travel, commerce, migration, and imperialist military incursions—have shaped racialization in both North and South.

**NATIONALISMS AND RACIAL DISCOURSE**

Similarly, scholarship on nationalism has often missed the historically specific ways in which national communities have been defined and how diverse definitions of the nation have been mobilized by different actors. Our third contribution, then, is to point to the multiple imaginings of national community.
National belonging has often been understood as based in shared cultures rooted in common histories, or in shared lineages. National identity, moreover, has sometimes been seen as the teleological outcome of evolution, as an organic maturation, or as the result of social engineering. The nation has also been conceived of as a community united through a shared racial identification or by the homogenizing influence of a shared territory.\(^{43}\)

References to national races, such as the “raza Chilena” or the “New Granadan race,” were common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the relation of these national races to the presumably distinct races that inhabited each national territory varied.\(^{44}\) For instance, immigrants, blacks, and Indians were often construed as being outside the nation.\(^{45}\) As Réunique notes in his contribution to this volume, certain politicians and intellectuals defined the early-twentieth-century Mexican nation as mestizo in opposition to the contaminating influence of Chinese immigrants. The Chilean nation was often defined in opposition to the “barbarous” Mapuche Indians. At the same time, as new scholarship on Chile is showing, experts thought that the survival and reproduction of the Chilean national race depended on assimilating the previously excluded working classes. The nation’s poorer inhabitants could implicitly whiten their racial stock and contribute to national progress through education, hard work, proper nutrition, and health care. In other contexts, racialized notions of nationhood worked neither through exclusion nor assimilation but instead accommodated hierarchy and difference. One could be at once a member of the “raza Mexicana” and of the “raza Sonora.” Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to Brazil were ultimately, if unevenly, accepted as Arab-Brazilians.\(^{46}\)

Nationalism was often anti-imperialist yet mimetic, imitating the presumably white and modern nations of the North Atlantic. McGuinness suggests that elite intellectuals, when faced with the U.S. presence in the Isthmus of Panama, employed a discourse of anti-Yankee nationalism and transnational Latin unity to unite elites and popular classes. Still, they excluded Antillean blacks. Lillian Guerra argues in her contribution to this volume that the conservative leaders who headed Cuba’s first republican government sought to make Cuba more like the United States by sponsoring European immigration.

As we argue more fully below, ideals of nation were mobilized by different individuals and groups for different ends—as were ideals of transnational and subnational community. As Guerra highlights, not all Cubans shared a whitened vision of the nation. Liberal elites advocated racial fraternity and a race-blind nation. Afro-Cuban veterans and striking workers invoked the same
principles as the liberals in their bids to abolish discrimination and improve their social condition. But in Cuba as elsewhere, popular groups sometimes stressed racial difference in their bids for inclusion. It was perhaps because of these insistent popular pressures, as well as because of their own need for a subordinate workforce, that elites developed models of nationhood that permitted a degree of difference and hierarchy even as they sought to create a national community of shared interests. The ambiguities of mestizaje and racial democracy—which could at once imply a whitened homogeneity, a true mixture, or a coexistence of difference—are best understood in the context of these plural definitions of nationhood.

GENDERING RACE AND NATION

The fourth main contribution of this volume is to note how gender and sexuality shaped racialized conceptions of nation. As the essays by Rénique, Sueann Caulfield, and Anne Macpherson demonstrate, elites often linked political authority to masculine authority and racial eugenics to the control of sexuality and reproduction. In so doing, they bound private and public realms metaphorically and used that association to justify public regulation of sexual and domestic relations. Central to these regulatory efforts were revamped colonial conceptions of honor, nineteenth-century gender norms, and the sciences of hygiene and eugenics.

Intellectuals and statesmen invoked gender allegorically and metonymically, asserting national belonging or citizenship through familial and sexual metaphors that likened the nation to a family and the bonds of citizenship to the magnetic pull of sexual desire. Three common and overlapping metaphors of the nation were those of heterosexual coupling, racial fraternity, and filial pact. The erotic coupling of lovers from different racial, regional, or class backgrounds in nineteenth-century fiction, as Doris Sommer has shown, legitimated and naturalized the political community of the nation, with desire subverting difference. Still, the metaphor of nation as product of a unifying heterosexual embrace projected the patriarchal power of the family onto the nation. National romances legitimated and promoted race and class hierarchy, portraying subordinate groups as not only racially “other” but also as the feminized dependents of elite patriarchs. Metaphors of nation were thus marked by the tension between the leveling effects of heterosexual desire and the equation of sexual difference with cultural and racial hierarchy. Gilberto Freyre’s claim that Brazilian racial democracy emerged out of the affective ties forged in
sexual relationships between white men and women of color can be seen as an effort to resolve that tension. But while Freyre focused on how those ties underscored a consensual national order, his national myth could also be read as reinscribing racial hierarchy by equating it with gender hierarchy (and vice versa).

Gendered tropes of nation also referred more explicitly to relations among men. Especially in the nineteenth century, when civil and international wars plagued the region’s fledgling nations, national belonging was often portrayed as a brotherhood shaped in the fraternal embrace of battle. For example, the founding trope of Cuban nationality, like the Belizean national myth discussed by Macpherson in this volume, excluded women. Cuban nationality allegedly originated in militarized homosociality among men that transcended race. Middle-class leaders in late-nineteenth-century Belize (at the time the colony of British Honduras) similarly portrayed their embryonic nation as emerging out of slaves’ loyalty to their masters in the eighteenth-century battles in which Britain repulsed Spanish attacks on the colony. Yet, given the hierarchies implicit in the military, this gendered construction of nationality structured racial hierarchies among men, turning “fraternity” into something less than horizontal. Moreover, father-and-son metaphors for the nation not only provided a language of mutual obligation but also reinforced paternalistic relations between political leaders cast as father figures and their humble “sons.”

Hierarchical relationships among men were partially rooted in differential control over women’s labor and sexuality. Men’s ability to protect the sexual virtue of their women dependents affected their status vis-à-vis other men and their stature within the polity. The male-headed household, as the basis for men’s citizenship, underscored women’s roles as objects of contention. Whitened father figures’ full citizen rights were affirmed, sons’ poverty and difficulties in maintaining family headship were racialized, and elite male experts’ public authority over junior men’s women was legitimated. Men in subordinate positions did not reject the notion that their stature and citizen rights should be gauged by their sexual control over wives and daughters. Rather, they asserted their masculine propriety, honor, citizen virtue, and implicitly their whiteness, by affirming their ability to control the sexual and reproductive labor of “their” women.

The presumed relation between family and nation led to concrete prescriptions regarding gender and sexuality. Both eugenicists and indigenistas sought to restrict interracial sex in order to maintain racial purity and strengthen their nations. The Sonorans described by Rénique alleged that if Chinese immi-
grant men “mated” with Sonoran women, their degenerate children would precipitate the decline of their region and of Mexico as a whole. Sonoran elites championed chastity on the part of women and portrayed women who associated with Chinese men as promiscuous, uncivilized traitors to the nation.

In other contexts, references to racial purity were more oblique, but the link between women’s virtue and the racial regeneration of the nation persisted. Hygienists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries worried about producing sickly, inferior children and advocated premarital chastity and marital fidelity to prevent the spread of the sexually transmitted diseases that would lead to racial decline. In repudiating promiscuity, these medical experts reinforced the assumption that men—whether national leaders or male family members—needed to protect women sexually while also avoiding diseases that threatened the nation’s moral integrity, racial vigor, and biological and demographic strength. The teaching of domestic economy and puericulture, both of which drew on Lamarckian eugenics, made women’s domestic and childrearing activities crucial to the future of the nation.53

Prescriptions for proper sexual and domestic conduct thus persistently associated virtue with whiteness. Politicians and experts cast dissolute, uncultured, and degenerate men who failed to protect their wives and daughters as subordinate citizens with fewer rights. Prostitutes and other presumably promiscuous women were also deemed second- or third-rate citizens and were routinely and sternly policed. And although first-wave feminists contested women’s subordinate status, they did not fundamentally challenge these racialized notions of virtuous womanhood and manhood.

**POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF RACE AND NATION**

As should be evident from our discussion above, this book contributes to an account of how subordinated peoples have participated in the transnational, national, regional, and local production of race and nation. For conceptual as well as methodological reasons, historians have found it difficult to uncover popular views regarding race. Conceptually, much recent scholarship has viewed race as an elite construct and a tool of domination. For this scholarship, issues of how, why, and if subordinate groups have understood race, or how their actions have contributed to shaping elite racial ideology, have been at best secondary. Methodologically, too, the elite-authored texts with which historians have for the most part worked have made it notoriously difficult for historical scholarship to discern subaltern motivations.54
This volume builds upon the recent historiography on “everyday forms of state formation” in Latin America to foreground popular concepts of race and their emergence in dialogue with elite racial constructs. The state formation literature has used Antonio Gramsci’s insights regarding the mutually constituting nature of state and civil society and the role of a shared cultural “common sense” in political mobilization to understand how elite and subordinated groups have, in negotiation with one another, built and transformed states and national projects. Historical transformation, from this viewpoint, has come about not as a result of popular mobilization or elite programs but precisely in the interaction of the two. Ideals of citizenship and nationhood have not been simply tools of oppression but negotiated frameworks or contested terrains on which the transformative, dialogic routines and rituals of rule took place. The essays in this book, together with several recently published studies, expand on the state formation approach by showing how contests over the definition of communities, regions, and the nation, including the conflicts over labor, land, and voting that have figured so prominently in the historiography of Latin America, have been racialized. Like recent volumes on the cultural encounters of imperialism, our book brings the international dimension back into play while writing against reified dichotomies like popular/elite and local/foreign.

By illuminating how racial ideology pervaded popular discourse, several of the essays in this collection question the notion that ideals of mestizo, raceless, or even whitened nationhood were simply mystifying, elite-imposed myths that cemented oligarchic domination. The authors show instead how subaltern groups used racial discourse to their own ends. Popular groups could stress difference, and even their own inferiority, but could also cast aside pejorative identities such as indio altogether and assume more advantageous identities, such as mestizo or white. Subordinate peoples could also insist on the need for education and the material resources that might allow them to progress and become modern. Popular groups could demand education and material progress to defend particular identities or project their particular identities as part of a universal, shared, national character.

Overall, people of varying status used racial discourse, participating selectively in the institutions and the discursive fields of the state. Sarah Chambers’s essay illustrates how members of indigenous groups in and around the provincial capital of Arequipa, Peru, discarded the identity of Indian. During the early republic, when indigenous identity helped guarantee access to land, many Arequipeños adopted the label “Indian.” But once the national state overturned
the laws protecting indigenous lands, native peoples increasingly adopted the label “Spanish” or “white” to avoid tribute payments. Moreover, as Chambers argues elsewhere, the regional Arequipa elite had long accepted a broad and fluid definition of white in part because it helped incorporate popular classes into an alliance against Lima during the civil wars following independence.\(^5\)

The indigenous communities of Cauca, Colombia, studied by James Sanders, used racist nineteenth-century liberal discourses equating progress and whiteness and contrasted their own civilized industriousness to the ostensible savagery of both Afro-Colombians and lowland Amazon Indians. While sharing a hierarchical racial discourse with the elite, the Cauca Indians neither fused into a homogeneous national culture nor accepted elite ideologies in their entirety. Instead, they affirmed their place as Indians within the nation. Because opposing elite factions of liberals and conservatives sought to forge political alliances with Indians, the latter found it possible to negotiate the meanings of race and citizenship and successfully preserve communal lands and autonomy. While the Indians’ strategy did not contest normative ideals, it did destabilize the equation of all Indians with backwardness.\(^6\)

Focusing on domestic relations and everyday life, Sueann Caulfield’s contribution to this volume contends that the urban working classes of twentieth-century Rio de Janeiro framed their experiences within the nationalist discourse of racial democracy even as they practiced racial discrimination in their choices of sexual and marital partners. Caulfield analyzes trial documents of sexual crimes in Rio de Janeiro to show that while ordinary Brazilians practiced considerable racial endogamy—a practice at odds with the ideology of racial democracy—they did not explain their desire for or resistance to certain partners in terms of race. Caulfield concludes that working-class Brazilians did value whiteness over blackness, but in a context of social mixing and a shared culture in which people were not explicitly defined primarily by race. Thus, in their daily lives they inhabited and continually reenacted the contradictions of Brazil’s presumed racial democracy.\(^7\)

Recent research on late colonial and early republican Cuba, including Guerra’s contribution to this book, suggests that the discourse of racial fraternity and a “raceless” Cuba served Afro-Cubans as a potent tool for gaining greater equality. Alejandro de la Fuente has argued that the ideal of racial fraternity was both empowering and disempowering. Black and mulatto Cubans could and did use the discourse of a raceless nation to gain inclusion in the new political system and patronage networks in newly independent Cuba.\(^8\) Guerra shows that popular and elite visions of the nation, even when framed in
similar discourses of racial equality, often diverged in their particulars. Popular veterans of the independence wars based their claim to citizenship on their participation and sacrifice in creating a nation that they believed would include them. But while rejecting racial hierarchy and state-sanctioned racial identification in favor of the label “citizen,” not all jettisoned racial identities. Rather, they adopted a variety of strategies. Those Afro-Cuban political leaders who feared that Afro-Cuban demands and mobilizations could conjure white fears of a race war used discourses of “racelessness” to discourage autonomous Afro-Cuban organizing. Some Afro-Cuban politicians even trumpeted the superiority of mulattos over whites and suggested that Afro-Cubans could gain equality only by acquiring education and culture. But others insisted both on autonomous Afro-Cuban political and cultural expressions and on Afro-Cubans’ rights and responsibilities as citizens.

These insights regarding the diverse popular appropriations of nationalism are supported by studies of popular religiosity. As various authors have pointed out, popular groups’ religious manifestations—which combined the recuperated elements of European, African, and/or indigenous traditions—could strengthen popular autonomy, despite their substantial convergence with orthodox practices. In many cases, hybrid popular religions functioned to reaffirm nationalist projects, as in Mexico’s Hidalgo revolt, where popular classes marched for independence from Spain under the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe, who represented Mexico’s indigenous and Spanish heritage.62

As several essays in this collection reveal, the interplay between popular and elite conceptions of race and nation was shaped by U.S. imperialism. McGuinness argues that elite invocations of a Latin race in early-nineteenth-century Panama responded not just to elite concerns, but also to popular classes’ vocal rejection of North American racial arrogance, which they experienced on a daily basis. Guerra suggests that allegations regarding the divisiveness and anti-national character of Afro-Cuban demands were compounded by the threat of U.S. intervention. Macpherson argues that the Belizean middle class’s awareness of the U.S. intervention against popular rebellion in Cuba, along with fears of black working-class mobilization, led them to intensify their adherence to British imperial racial norms and deny their mixed-race heritage. Elite and middle-class racial formulations thus emerged in dialogue with both imperial territorial expansion and popular groups’ reaction to that expansion.

These explorations of popular racial discourse inevitably raise the questions of how and if historians can apprehend popular convictions. The petitions and court testimony that historians often use to reconstruct popular attitudes are
mediated by legal discourse. These documents likely exaggerate popular convergence with elite ideas and provide an overly instrumental view of popular discourse. Yet to the extent that subaltern actions outside the courtroom and outside the immediate jurisdiction of political elites do not contradict testimony and petition, the insights gleaned from these documents can be used as a point of departure for the investigation of popular views regarding race. Moreover, it may be wrong to see popular actions that take place at a distance from elites and state institutions as authentic while characterizing those that take place in more proximate negotiation as shallow or instrumentally performative. Ultimately, to show how popular understandings of race operated and to see their effects on elite discourse, we need to conceptualize identity in a way that takes seriously the multiple and specific contexts in which it was enacted rather than taking popular resistance and opposition to elites for granted.

In the end, such an understanding of identity and nation formation may also allow us to move beyond the reified categories prevalent in scholarly analyses of the relation between race and nation. Thus, to say that elite formulations, such as the doctrine of racial democracy, were not simply pernicious myths is not to say that they were egalitarian, or that they meant the same thing to all social classes and racial groups, or even that they were similarly interpreted by the same person in different contexts. Doctrines of racial mixing or amalgamation, for instance, could be discourses of heterogeneity but could also devalue African and indigenous cultures and justify the alienation of communal lands. In defining and organizing their nations as composed of distinct regions and races, Latin American elite intellectuals did not overcome their own desires for whitening and homogenization. Efforts by elites to create inclusive nations have often been driven by their desire to maintain their own privilege and undergirded by racialized understanding of citizenship and nationhood. But ultimately, these processes were rent with conflict and negotiation between elite and subaltern actors.

CONCLUSION

In today’s world of increasingly globalized neoliberalism, national and racial identities are once again being conjointly reconfigured. Along with pressures to transform the role of the nation-state has come a resurgence of ethnic and racial movements within and across national borders. Like the Zapatista militant quoted at the start of this essay, many Latin Americans of indigenous and African descent are now revalorizing their ethnic and racial identities. Many are
putting forward the notion of a multicultural nation, asserting their right to both autonomy and participation in a national community. As this essay has made clear, these ideas have historical antecedents, even if the context in which they are being articulated is novel.

In response to resurgent ethnic and racial movements, scholars in the United States and Latin America have renewed their attention to race. This book is part of a reinvigorated scholarly interest in this topic evident throughout the Americas. Given that intellectual debates regarding race have historically influenced both state policies and social movements, one might ask how current scholarship participates in the reconfiguration of racial politics and identities. The concept of racialization, with its insistence on the connections between discourses of progress and race, might, for instance, reinforce hierarchies and discrimination by emphasizing racial divisions. It might also foreclose alternative narratives of progress by tying notions of development and improvement too firmly to difference and to the history of colonialism and its hierarchies. Ultimately, however, we see this kind of criticism as misguided. As the historical studies in this book demonstrate, the affirmation of race—like the affirmation of nation—may bolster political and economic inequalities and can lead to violence. But racial and national identities may also serve those committed to overturning inequality and injustice.

NOTES


33. On the racialized relationship between regions and nations, see Ana María Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico’s Northern Frontier* (Tuc-


37. In other instances, the indigenous cultures of specific regions were made to represent the diverse racial heritage of the nation, as when Mexicans attempted to showcase their uniqueness at the world’s fairs or, more recently, when Mexico has spotlighted its “authentic” tourist attractions. See Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, *Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), and Poole, “Cultural Diversity and Racial Unity.”


Press, 2001); Derek Williams, “Indians on the Verge”; Safford, “Race, Integration, and Progress.”


42. On Brazilian scientists’ participation in racialized international theories of medicine, see Peard, Race, Place, and Medicine; Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, O espetáculo das raças: Cientistas, instituições e questão racial no Brasil, 1870–1930 (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993); Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics.”


44. Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises; Safford, “Race, Integration, and Progress.”


49. Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba.


52. On these issues, see also Ann Laura Stoler, “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia,” in Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire, 198–237.


56. Recent books that incorporate race into analyses of nation-state formation include Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens; Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba; Findlay, Imposing Decency; Gould, To Die in This Way; Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala; Mark Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).

58. Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens*.

59. See also Dawson, “Our Noble Race.”


The Paulistas constituted a blatant aberration within the race and the nation. São Paulo had become too great for Brazil. ... Brazil had not yet become a civilization, [whereas] São Paulo was a European Christian civilization, with the mentality, the climate, the cosmopolitanism, the resources of a European Christian civilization.

Mário de Andrade, “Guerra de São Paulo”

The standard narrative of postcolonial Brazilian history portrays the consolidation of the centralizing state under Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s as effectively suppressing the robust regional identities that were salient features of Brazilian politics and culture during the first century of independence. According to this chronicle of nation-state formation, under the new, postfederalist order, regional political oligarchies subordinated themselves to the hegemony of the central state and local economic elites gradually articulated their interests to a project for national economic integration. And Brazilians of every region and social class adopted racial democracy as the hegemonic discourse on national identity, in place of the ideology of whitening that had dominated racial thinking during the Old Republic (1889–1930). The concept of racial democracy, as defined by its main intellectual architect, Gilberto Freyre, imagined a nation
based on the harmonious fusion of European, African, and Indian cultures in a single nationality that, despite the “principal” role played by Brazilians of European descent, rejected racial discrimination and valorized non-European cultural traditions. In short, according to this view, the Vargas regime not only managed to centralize the political and economic systems but also promoted a homogeneous national identity that transcended regional variation and custom.

In recent decades there has been a flood of books and articles excoriating the concept of racial democracy as a myth that obscures the continuing discrimination suffered by people of color in Brazil, or as an official discourse that has been a major impediment to movements in favor of racial equality and social justice. Such studies have been tremendously valuable for contemporary Brazilian political struggles but often have the defect of shading into a functionalist fallacy that treats racial democracy as a concept that emerges for the sole purpose of obscuring racial discrimination and absolving elites of any guilt for racial inequality. To be sure, this aspect of the discourse certainly helps to explain its enduring popularity among powerful segments of Brazilian society, but it hardly addresses how and why racial democracy emerged as a compelling element of national identity in the first place (with an appeal that went well beyond self-serving elites), and it does not consider the historical circumstances (and competing racial discourses) that produced Freyre’s work and allowed his ideas to flourish.

Again, the assumption has long been that the discourse of racial democracy, whatever its flaws and limitations, superseded and displaced previous discourses on race and served to further homogenize national identity. In this essay, however, I will argue that there continued to be a plurality of discourses about race and its place in Brazilian national identity, and that these were intimately connected to regional identities that persisted well beyond the Vargas years. Crucial to the continued deployment of regional (cum national) identity was the construction of racial difference on the basis of regional origins, with images of modernity and economic progress, tradition and backwardness being tightly interwoven with representations of race. Indeed, in a “racially democratic” nation where explicit discussion of race was increasingly frowned upon, regional identity could conveniently stand in for notions of blackness and whiteness. More specifically, I contend that regional identity in the state of São Paulo—Paulista identity—became associated in Brazilian culture not only with industry, modernity, and economic progress, but also with whiteness and a particular narrative of Brazilian history that marginalized the role of Afro-Brazilians in the construction of the nation. Furthermore, this identity has
continued to inform debates over citizenship and political inclusion into the twenty-first century.

There are many different ways to explore the relationship between race and regionalism in Brazil, but no moment seems more fortuitous for this purpose than the period from 1931 to 1932, which saw escalating tension between São Paulo and the newly installed Vargas regime, culminating in a three-month, full-scale civil war between an insurgent state government and federal forces. The Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932 was a crucial moment for considering what it meant to be Paulista, how this related to being Brazilian, and what this implied for other regional identities. Though São Paulo’s defeat sounded the death knell for the regionally based political machines of the Old Republic, its enduring position as the dominant economic center of the Brazilian nation allowed a particular, racialized construction of Paulista identity to survive and thrive long after the Constitutionalist forces laid down their arms.

In the case of São Paulo, the variety of regionalism in question is a version that emerges together with the very uneven spread of modernity and capitalist development, a process that is particularly conspicuous in Brazil. The discursive basis for regionalism in this version is the aggressive assertion of regional distinctiveness as equivalent to superiority, usually accompanied by the claim that the region in question is disproportionately responsible for the greatness and sustenance of the nation. Such movements may couch their resentments and demands in fiscal and political terms, but their critique of the status quo usually rests on the implicit claim that the region’s (and by extension, the nation’s) prosperity is a consequence of its population’s superior cultural attributes, an argument that can easily lend itself to racialist ideologies. Unlike the more familiar regional discourses that position their cause as a movement of the excluded or the oppressed, those writers, intellectuals, and politicians who constructed the identity of São Paulo within the Brazilian nation typically regarded their home region as culturally and economically superior, as the vanguard of progress and civilization, while the rest of the nation served as the “other,” in a cultural relationship reminiscent of that between colonizer and colonized.

In crafting this discourse of regional superiority, Paulistas drew upon racialized assumptions about modernity and civilization shared by elites throughout Brazilian society—after all, Brazil had the dubious distinction of being the very last slaveholding power in the hemisphere, only abolishing slavery in 1888. The postemancipation decades coincided with the global heyday of scientific racism and saw considerable concern among a wide variety of Brazilian intellectuals
and statesmen to promote their nation as modern and honorable through a process of whitening. But such notions gained particular currency in São Paulo. There, burgeoning state revenues from the coffee boom allowed the government to subsidize massive European immigration and foster favorable conditions for industrialization. These same policies consigned former slaves, whose backbreaking toil had made the state’s prosperity possible, to an increasingly marginal position in Paulista social and economic life and cast aspersions on the capabilities of Brazilians from other regions. Despite the declining prestige of biological or scientific racism by the 1920s, certain “immutable” characteristics would continue to be attributed to Brazilians according to their region of origin, both in elite and popular culture. Even as discourses of civilization, modernity, and progress replaced earlier preoccupations with race mixture and degeneration, notions of difference based on race (broadly construed), far from fading, flourished in new discursive contexts.

REGIONAL INEQUALITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL HEGEMONY

Historians have traditionally assumed that regionalism and nationalism are antithetical tendencies, but Brazil’s Old Republic provides a compelling historical example of a period that witnessed both resurgent regionalism and emergent nationalism. Prasenjit Duara, writing about turn-of-the-century China, does contend that regionalism and nationalism flourished in tandem, but he is primarily concerned with regions struggling to retain an autonomous identity against the threat of marginalization or homogenization represented by the dominant centralizing forces. In the case of São Paulo, we are discussing regional elites who exercised considerable political dominance at the federal level—a dominance they energetically sought to “naturalize” through a set of discursive and narrative strategies, especially once Vargas’s ascendance threatened to disturb the existing configuration of power.

Nevertheless, Paulista politicians (and the state’s formidable armed guard, the Força Pública) did not immediately respond to Vargas’s 1930 seizure of power with alarm. Given rising nationalist sentiment, intensifying criticism of the republican system, and the various crises of the 1920s (including military revolts and the stock market crash), Paulista responses to Vargas’s “Revolution of 1930” ranged from cautious neutrality to enthusiastic support. In return they expected him to reaffirm São Paulo’s special position within the Brazil federation by appointing a civilian Paulista as interventor (interim governor) and speedily calling a new constituent assembly. Instead Vargas appointed the
northeastern-born “lieutenant” (*tenente*) João Alberto Lins de Barros as *interventor* and designated Miguel Costa, an even more radical *tenente*, as head of the state police. These appointments immediately provoked manifestations of discontent within the Paulista political elites, but factionalism within the regional political leadership hobbled initial attempts to defy the Vargas regime. Increasingly incensed by the dictatorship’s “humiliation” of São Paulo, in early 1932 the two major state political factions unified against Vargas, and the movement began to assume broader dimensions, including mass protests in favor of a return to constitutional order. In hopes of avoiding a direct confrontation, Vargas finally appointed a civilian Paulista, Pedro de Toledo, as *interventor* but failed to remove the widely despised Miguel Costa and refused to allow Toledo to appoint a Paulista cabinet. The Paulista Constitutionalists (so named due to their demand for a constituent assembly) responded with the seizure of the state government on 23 May, though not yet a full-fledged armed revolt. Meanwhile, disgruntled (anti-*tenente*) military officials sided with São Paulo, as did the state’s Força Pública. This led, on 9 July, to a declaration of war against the central government. For the next eighty-three days “loyal” state troops and a handful of regular army soldiers, as well as a large number of poorly trained and ill-equipped Paulista volunteers, engaged in a lopsided struggle with federal troops. In early October, officials of the Força Pública, regarding the situation as hopeless, negotiated a settlement with the central government, forcing an end to the conflict.\footnote{15}

The official (*getulista*) interpretation of the uprising dismissed the revolution of 1932 as nothing more than a rearguard or restorationist action by the Paulista oligarchy to recover the power and privileges it lost with the rise of Getúlio Vargas (whose regime represented the inevitable march of the nation toward centralization and unification).\footnote{16} By and large, historians have reproduced this official story, even though it does not even coincide with the basic empirical evidence in several respects. For example, among the key instigators of the revolt were members of the Partido Democrático—a party that had been intensely critical of the state machine and strongly supportive of Vargas when he first seized power.\footnote{17} Furthermore, far from positioning themselves as the bulwark of tradition against the tide of radical change, the Paulistas based their claims to national leadership on the modernity of São Paulo compared to the rest of Brazil. It was precisely the alleged “backwardness” of the pro-Vargas regions that the Paulista leadership publicly decried.

Finally, the notion of the revolution as a rearguard action engineered by the Paulista oligarchy explains neither the enormous outpouring of regionalist
enthusiasm in the course of the Constitutionalist campaign nor the massive popular support for the movement at various moments in the struggle. I am also assuming, in the vein of the “new political history,” that political language and action are what give meaning to a particular movement—in contrast to an older, Marxian approach that seeks to uncover the “real” class or sectoral interests underlying a political conflict. To be sure, there were elite factions that sought to advance their economic interests by promoting rebellion, but that hardly explains why or, more important, how the uprising occurred, and the meaning it had for those who participated.∞∫

As one would expect, the Constitutionalist campaign and the revolution of 1932 produced a torrent of literature, polemics, poetry, posters, music, and artifacts as Paulistas sought to delineate and clarify their regional (cum national) identity and justify their claims to national dominance. Regional struggle against the central government provided a hothouse environment for the cultivation of representations and discourses of regional identity. But these narratives and images of Paulista superiority did not spring full-blown into the political arena with the onset of the Constitutionalist campaign (just as they did not disappear once the revolt suffered defeat). Rather, leaders and supporters of the movement could draw upon nearly six decades of speeches, essays, and iconography to advance their claims to regional greatness.∞Ω

The material bases for these claims have been thoroughly elaborated in the Brazilian historiography and will only be briefly reviewed here. By the 1870s, with coffee prices booming, the major center of export production (and slave labor) shifted to the province of São Paulo, which, during the final decade of the Empire (1879–89), made a transition from an economic backwater, with a sleepy capital city, to the wealthiest province in Brazil, crisscrossed by railroads and thriving plantations and home to Latin America’s fastest-growing urban center. During the 1890s hundreds of thousands of European immigrants streamed into São Paulo to replace the emancipated slaves on the coffee fazendas, and by the early decades of the twentieth century, São Paulo had begun the transition to an industrial economy.²⁰ Indeed, by the 1930s São Paulo was an aspirant to the title of the most important manufacturing center in all of Latin America.²¹ Moreover, by then São Paulo no longer lagged far behind Rio de Janeiro as a center of erudite culture. The 1920s saw the flamboyant debut of the Paulista modernists—an audacious assortment of avant-garde writers and artists who touted their home region as the apotheosis of Brazilian modernity, even as they raised critical questions about contemporary urban life.²² In light of these multiple developments, it required little ideological work for Paulista
intellectuals to portray their native province as fortune’s favorite. By the 1920s elites throughout Brazil grudgingly recognized São Paulo as the home of the nation’s most prosperous industrial and agrarian economies and its most innovative cultural trends.  

Since Paulista regionalism would later be equated with separatism by many of its opponents, it is important to note that the foregoing conception of Paulista superiority was, in a sense, the very opposite of separatism—it conflated the Brazilian nation as a whole with São Paulo. At the same time, the Paulista construction of Brazilian national identity, which attributed virtually all historical agency and all national progress and modernity to São Paulo, was hardly more inclusive than a separatist program. Not only was this a regional cum national identity, it was one that relegated most of the other regions of Brazil to the status of pre-modern or insufficiently civilized “other.” Thus, even a self-proclaimed antiracist nationalist like Antonio Baptista Pereira declared that São Paulo would always be in the “forefront” of Brazil’s march to modernity, and that his home region was “the Apostle of the Peoples. . . . It is São Paulo that takes up the burden of the long crusades, to teach Brazil the meaning of Brazilianness [brasilidade], to show Brazil the path to a Greater Brazil [Brasil-Maior].” As Tânia de Luca aptly notes, the Paulistas spoke of national greatness in entirely regional terms. During the 1932 revolution, a popular slogan—“Tudo por São Paulo! Tudo pelo Brasil! [Everything for São Paulo! Everything for Brazil!]”—neatly encapsulated this inclination.

Both São Paulo’s political dominance under the federalist Old Republic and its dramatic economic growth during those years contributed to the metonymic image of São Paulo as “o Brasil que deu certo”—the successful Brazil. But neither political power nor economic success can be treated as self-evident bases for identity formation; they do not, in and of themselves, provide the raw materials for the construction of a regional identity with widespread popular appeal. Indeed, compared to other regionalisms, Paulista identity is relatively thin in the cultural domain, in part because a regionalist movement inspired by rapid economic progress and claims to modernity is unlikely to boast of a rich lode of folklore or traditions (invented or otherwise). São Paulo would seem to be, on the whole, remarkably poor in those performative aspects of regionalism that Pierre Bourdieu cites as crucial to the cultivation of regional loyalties. There is one exception: Paulista intellectuals, principally historians, can be credited with the successful construction of a foundational myth of origin—one that positioned São Paulo not only as crucial to the formation of the Brazilian nation, but also as qualitatively different from the rest of that nation.
In this historical narrative, the Brazil beyond São Paulo’s borders appears as fundamentally backward, weighed down by a colonial legacy of declining Portuguese power, unenlightened monarchy, and plantation slavery. In contrast, São Paulo’s idiosyncratic colonial past supposedly explained the region’s singular aptitude for, and receptivity to, modernity. The foundational myth for this cultural representation was the saga of the *bandeirante*.

Briefly, the *bandeiras* were bands of men who had their home base in São Paulo, from which they organized long-distance expeditions to explore the Brazilian interior during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, mainly in search of precious minerals to mine and Indians to enslave. In the “Black Legend” writings of Spanish missionaries, the *bandeirante* is a cruel and unsavory character, but in the hands of early-twentieth-century Paulista publicists, he is recast as a proto-capitalist entrepreneur. In contrast to the parasitical, decadent, and tradition-bound sugar planter of the colonial Northeast, the *bandeirante* is enterprising and risk-taking. Moreover, it was the *bandeirantes*, by intrepidly exploring the farthest reaches of the Brazilian interior, who guaranteed the capacious boundaries of the future Brazilian nation (and thereby established its one unimpeachable claim to greatness).

What these self-congratulatory paeans to São Paulo’s exceptionalism routinely suppressed was the rather crucial “interlude” of plantation slavery. Indeed, one could read popular and scholarly accounts of São Paulo’s history and entirely miss the fact that the region, for several decades in the second half of the nineteenth century, had been the home of Brazil’s most important slave-plantation economy. When acknowledged at all, this inconvenient fact was trumped with the claim that Paulista planters displayed a progressive disposition that made them reluctant to rely on slaves and eager to adopt new technologies. Not only was the Paulista planter *not* a typical slavocrat, but he even played a crucial role in abolishing slavery and modernizing agriculture. As for slavery’s “stain” on São Paulo’s population, noted folklorist Dalmo Belfort de Mattos consoled his readers with the assurance that people of color only briefly and temporarily became a majority during the first phase of the coffee boom. “This soon passed. Mortality and mixture gradually eliminated the African *excess*.”

The success of the *bandeirante* saga, and its role in the construction of regional identity, could hardly be exaggerated. Virtually every piece of poetry or polemic from the period of the Constitutionalist campaign makes some reference to the Paulistas’ *bandeirante* forebears. Portraits of Fernão Dias, Domingos Jorge Velho, and other historic *bandeirantes* graced the banknotes i-
sued by the short-lived revolutionary government, and bandeirantes hovered in the background on recruitment posters issued by the volunteer militias. And beginning in the 1930s, the povo bandeirante became a widely accepted synonym for the povo paulista (Paulista populace). In short, the bandeirologistas had created a highly successful “fictive ethnicity,” based on a “master narrative of discent,” to use Prasenjit Duara’s apt phrase.33

**THE DISCOURSE OF PAULISTA SUPERIORITY AND THE 1932 REVOLUTION**

The remainder of this article will focus primarily on the 1932 Constitutionalist campaign and civil war. During this historical episode, regional leaders forged particularly heated defenses of Paulista superiority and unusually derogatory depictions of Brazilians from other regions, making explicit the assumptions that might remain implicit in “normal times.” Drawing liberally on social Darwinist theories about the suitability of different races for progress and modernity, as well as on apparently contradictory historical theories about stages of civilization, Paulista journalists and intellectuals celebrated the civic virtues of the regional population, which they routinely attributed to its more “civilized” character. In speech after speech and essay after essay, Paulistas extolled the civic and moral fiber of the povo bandeirante, the civilized and cultured character of the Paulista people, and the direct association between their region’s “stage of civilization” and their concern for the rule of law.

What of the rest of Brazil? How did Paulista regionalist discourse construct its “other” within the Brazilian nation? This typically varied according to the political proposals of the individual or group, though certain assumptions informed political discourse across the spectrum of political factions. The handful of Paulistas who openly advocated separatism in 1932 did not hesitate to construct every other region of Brazil as vastly inferior to the state of São Paulo, and in the most derogatory of terms. Conversely, most of the Constitutionalist leadership maintained hopes of receiving support from anti-Vargas factions in Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Paraná, and Rio Grande do Sul and therefore had to represent these regions in a more favorable light; they might be inferior to São Paulo, but the tendency among “moderates” was to emphasize their shared concern for the rule of law and the maintenance of order.34 What, then, was the common nemesis? It was the North/Northeast of Brazil, which would be consistently portrayed as a backward land populated mainly by primitive or degenerate peoples.

Indeed, one of the most striking features of Paulista discourse during this
period is the increasing identification of Vargas’s regime with the impoverished and largely nonwhite regions of northern/northeastern Brazil—despite the fact that Vargas and many of his closest advisors were from the far south of Brazil. The bases for this identification varied, but several prominent writers claimed that only peoples who had reached the “industrial” stage of civilization felt the need for the rule of law; agrarian/pastoral societies such as those of the Northeast had a natural affinity for arbitrary, authoritarian rule. And the federal troops that “invaded” São Paulo were consistently described as having been recruited from among the semisavage inhabitants of the northeastern backlands. Through this process of representation, the Paulistas heightened the cultured, civilized character of their own campaign while situating Vargas’s forces in the camp of the backward, the uncivilized, and the “darker” elements of Brazilian society—according to Mário de Andrade, during the 1932 campaign Paulistas would jokingly refer to the Vargas regime as the “dictanegra.”

Perhaps no account expresses this process of “othering” better than Vivaldo Coaracy’s description of the “occupying forces” that entered São Paulo city upon the state’s surrender: “They were soldiers of a strange sort, who seemed to belong to another race, short, yellow-skinned, with prominent cheekbones and slanted eyes. Many of them had teeth filed to a point. All carried in their dark eyes, mixed together with astonishment at the sight of the superb city, a glint of menace and provocation.” Another striking expression of the Paulistas’ contempt for the “intruders” in their midst is the comment by Paulo Duarte, a leader of the Democratic Party, that nordestinos “act the same role as those Negroes in Dakar, top hat on their heads and [bare] feet on the floor, who are convinced that they hold the high position of ‘French citizen.’”

Some contemporary accounts of the war even contained eerie echoes of Euclides da Cunha’s Os sertões, his renowned chronicle of the 1896 conflict between members of a millenarian community in the backlands of Bahia and republican troops. It is the quintessential examination of the struggle between the “two Brazils”: the civilized and increasingly Europeanized nation of the littoral and the backward, racially mixed, and religion-soaked society of the interior. During the brief phase of armed struggle in 1932, Paulista war correspondents and combatants were reluctant to admit that the Constitutionalist forces were at a severe technical and material disadvantage, since such an admission would have belied the notion of São Paulo as by far the most technologically advanced and materially prosperous region of Brazil. Instead, they preferred to lay the blame upon the thousands of nortistas who “fanatically” hurled their bodies against Paulista troops and overwhelmed the Constitu-
tionalist forces with their sheer numbers. This scenario of rational, modern soldiers pitted against mindless barbarians is very much the struggle that da Cunha chronicled in his account of Canudos, but this time it was the self-anointed “forces of civilization” that suffered defeat. 39

WHITENESS, MODERNITY, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF PAULISTA IDENTITY

In the section below, I will offer some specific examples of the different ways in which Paulista identity was explicitly or implicitly racialized in the context of regionally based political struggles for national power. 40 Before I begin this discussion of racialized imaginings of Paulista (and Brazilian) identity, however, I should clarify what I mean by this. By no means am I arguing that the participants in the Constitutionalist Revolution were exclusively white and middle class. The Paulista forces included a sizable Legião Negra (Black Legion), and many of the municipal battalions, judging from photographs, included men of color. Rather, I am arguing at the level of representation, and there, I would contend, the Paulista is unimpeachably white and middle class. As C. R. Cameron, the U.S. Consul-General to São Paulo during the 1932 rebellion, observed: “São Paulo . . . has an extraordinary morale engendered by twenty months of humiliation and the realization that it is fighting for its political position, its white man’s culture, and the wealth, the lives, and the homes of its citizens.” 41

The key point I want to make about the material that follows is that, despite the variation in degrees of explicitness about racial difference, all leading participants in the Constitutionalist Revolution justified their rebellion against the federal government with allusions to São Paulo’s superiority—a position that could only be sustained with reference to racialized understandings of the evolution of the Brazilian nation. There were, to be sure, variations in language and rhetoric, as well as adjustments for reasons of political expediency, but it is far more striking to see the considerable overlap in the arguments tendered by a leading member of the supposedly “progressive” Democratic Party, Paulo Duarte, and an openly racist stalwart of the Paulista Republican Party, Alfredo Ellis Júnior, when they compared Paulistas to other Brazilians. I should also stress that the examples cited below come almost entirely from elite or intellectual sources with privileged access to the press and publication. Among the “rank and file,” views on race and regional identity did not always echo those of the leadership. However, I would argue that those who engaged in this struggle had to adopt a certain “script” about Paulista superiority (and non-Paulista
inferiority) that severely circumscribed the discursive positions that could be publicly expressed on issues of race, class, or gender.42

The small but noisy group of Paulistas who openly advocated separatism—what we might call nation building by other means—could, for obvious reasons, employ the most nakedly racist imagery. Predictably, the separatists expressed their strongest animus toward northerners or northeasterners; again,
given the severe poverty and economic decadence (now dubbed “backwardness”) of that region, as well as its largely nonwhite population, it provided the perfect foil for claims about São Paulo’s vast superiority. In their short-lived newspaper, *O Separatista*, the separatists often resorted to degrading caricature and racist humor to lampoon Brazilians of northeastern origin (for example, “playfully” claiming that the Paulistas were planning to erect a monument to the murderous northeastern bandit, Lampião, in gratitude for his role in reducing the number of *nordestinos*). But in their moments of greatest despair, the separatists dropped the tattered veil of cordiality altogether and resorted to the most explicit forms of racial demagoguery, as they did in a manifesto issued after the October defeat that urged Paulistas to pursue secession and seek to be a “small nation” rather than continue as “mere associates of an unviable homeland, dominated by mestizos who have the souls of slaves, and who are but one step removed from their ancestors whose bodies were enslaved both here and in Africa.” The manifesto went on to describe these rapacious invaders as “sons of the slave quarters and misery, victims of destructive climates, encrusted with the grossest ignorance, a people who are losing human form, such is the physical degeneration that ravages them.” And it ends by denouncing the “mestizos born of slaves, the foul offspring of the slave quarters, who now wish to enslave you.”

Despite their explicit use of racist imagery, even the separatists did not adhere exclusively to classic notions of “scientific” racism. They, too, drew upon widely held views about stages of civilization, arguing that the Amazon was still at the hunting and gathering stage and the Northeast was still pastoral or agricultural, while only São Paulo had entered the “industrial age,” which set it apart from the rest of Brazil. Even the scurrilous manifesto cited above, with its references to the effects of slavery, climate, disease, and misery, did not wholly rely upon the conventional tenets of biological racism to denigrate Brazilians of other regional origins. Unencumbered by the need to curry favor with potential allies from other regions, the small separatist faction could produce the most extreme version of a racialized discourse, but I would maintain that there was considerable overlap (in both directions) between the rhetoric of this group and other, ostensibly more moderate factions supporting the 1932 revolution. Even those Paulistas who seemingly rejected racially determinist ideologies, preferring cultural or economic explanations of São Paulo’s “difference,” often employed the discourse of civilization and progress in such a way as to implicitly racialize the conflict between São Paulo and the central government.
Many Paulistas who advocated regional autonomy and a loose confederation of Brazilian states—self-rule stopping just short of actual secession—proffered arguments that amounted to a more discreet version of separatist discourse. Most prominent within the autonomist faction was Alfredo Ellis Júnior, a well-known historian and Republican politician. In his *Confederação ou separação?*, published in early 1932, Ellis emphasized two themes: the ethnic “divergence” of the various regions of Brazil, and the extremely uneven development of these regions. Both features, he argued, had become much more pronounced since the abolition of slavery and the transition from monarchy to republic, as immigration further whitened São Paulo, and his home state emerged as by far the wealthiest in the nation.

Ellis, unlike some of his more temperate colleagues in the movement, never shrank from deploying explicitly racialized “evidence” and arguments. For example, while acknowledging that all Brazilian regions had some mixture of races, he claimed that São Paulo was 85 percent “pure white,” while Bahia was only 33 percent. He then claimed that such racial “divergences” automatically translated into weak national ties: “It would be pure sentimental lyricism if we were to regard as brothers of a *dolico-louro* from Rio Grande do Sul, of a *brachy-moreno* from S. Paulo, or of a *dolico-moreno* from Minas, a *platycephalo amon-goilado* from Sergipe or Ceará, or a *negro* from Pernambuco.”

None of the above is especially surprising, given Ellis’s intellectual background as a historian whose work on the *bandeirantes* helped construct the legend of a “race of giants” on the Paulista plateau. However, most of Ellis’s arguments are not directly derived from racial categories but instead rely on much more “mainstream” notions of São Paulo as culturally, civically, and economically superior. Indeed, the majority of the book cited consists of economic arguments in favor of Paulista autonomy in the face of Vargas’s centralizing thrust, with particular emphasis (amply illustrated by dozens of tables) on São Paulo’s massive contribution to the federal treasury. Thus, as his argument unfolds, the *explicitly* racialist elements fade, but they reemerge in the context of a language of stages of civilization, a concept that Ellis imbues with a range of cultural and political implications. Thus, in *A nossa guerra*, Ellis contends that the *nortistas* support the Vargas dictatorship because their stage of civilization/economic development makes a “constitutional regime” unnecessary: “These small states, that have a much more backward level of civilization, much less economic development, etc., do not have the same needs [as São Paulo].”

The modernist poet Menotti del Picchia, in his *A Revolução Paulista*, played a
similar refrain. A prominent nationalist figure among modernist writers in São Paulo during the 1920s (most of whom eagerly supported the Paulista revolt), Menotti insisted that the 1932 movement was an expression of the “cultural revolution” that began with Modern Art Week in 1922. Despite, or perhaps because of, his nationalist sympathies, Menotti argued for federalism and regional autonomy, offering as his justification “the ethnic heterogeneity of the Brazilian populations, their historical experiences as a people, and the differences in their economic and industrial levels.” And he goes on to argue, in the same vein as Ellis, that “there is no nation [on earth] as unequal as the Brazilian nation.” Consistently linking levels of economic development with political culture, Menotti claims that São Paulo’s stage of economic progress makes its inhabitants especially fearful of a dictatorship that can disturb order and industry. Moreover, among Brazilians, only the Paulistas are sufficiently “cultos” (cultured) to object to dictatorship. Again echoing Ellis, he contends that most other regions of Brazil, being predominantly rural and pre-industrial, are perfectly content with a dictatorial regime: the rule of law is only attractive to societies (such as São Paulo) that are “cultured and policed.”

On this same theme, Vivaldo Coaracy argued that São Paulo, because of its unique character, “based on a robust and hardy individualism,” was alone among the regions of Brazil in denouncing the dictatorship: “What has made São Paulo exceptional within the Union was its economic determination . . . the spirit of initiative it aroused in reaction against the compulsory routinism of the colonial era, the accumulation of traditions, that entire web [of habits] that constitutes the living foundation of History. São Paulo became different. And because it is different, it is misunderstood. This is why São Paulo stands alone!” Elsewhere Coaracy (like Ellis) emphasized the geography of Brazilian racial diversity as a major explanatory factor of the nation’s uneven evolution. In other words, Paulista intellectuals and politicians did not necessarily forsake a racialist discourse when they shifted to the language of “stages of civilization.” Even Mário de Andrade, today celebrated as one of the most critical and insightful of the modernist writers with respect to racism, claimed that São Paulo was “too great for Brazil” and derided the federal troops who came to “kill Paulistas” as akin to primitive Indian tribes.

Again, these types of arguments and this sort of language were by no means confined to the writings of a handful of Paulista intellectuals. In virtually every daily newspaper, in popular magazines, in radio addresses, in leaflets and flyers, even in private letters and diaries, one encounters not only claims to São Paulo’s superiority and grandeur, but also assertions about the inferiority and
Recruiting poster. “They Await You to Complete the Battalion. Enlist.” The initials “MMDC” refer to the first four Paulista men killed in conflict. With the São Paulo state and Brazilian flags in the background, these volunteers represent the São Paulo ethnic “type” and imply a homogeneity not reflected in the actual ranks. From Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo, São Paulo, 1932 (facsimile collection, organized by Ana Maria de Almeida Camargo, 1982).
barbarity of Brazilians from other regions. An excellent example is the description from the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* of the Vargas government’s efforts to crush the Constitutionalist Revolution: “Against the youth of São Paulo, against the students, the doctors, the lawyers, the engineers, the merchants, the landowners, the men of industry and intelligence, [the government is] throwing a band of thugs [*jagunçada*] gathered and herded together in the backlands. . . . Against a civilized people, they hurl battalions of hoodlums.”

Similarly, a headline in *A Gazeta* informed São Paulo’s citizenry that “The Dictatorship Makes Use of Fanatical Jagunços against the Conscious Army of Liberty.”

Perhaps even more telling is a secondhand narrative of an unusual encounter between Paulista soldiers and federal forces. During an impromptu cease-fire, according to the Paulista soldier’s account, he and his companions engaged in a poignant conversation with their fellow Brazilians from Rio Grande do Sul in which both sides expressed regret at having to “fight against brothers.” But the idyll ended when an “ungainly mulatto northerner [*um nortista mulato e desengonçado*]” intruded himself into the conversation and began threatening the Paulistas. In other words, despite the war there was a natural solidarity between white, middle-class Brazilians from two different states, but the fly in the ointment was the nonwhite northerner whose backwardness and ignorance translated into irrational hostility and envy toward the Paulistas.

Paulistas eager to enlist support from other regions and to combat the opposition’s “lies” about São Paulo’s separatist ambitions insisted that Constitutionalism was a self-sacrificing movement “formed in the spirit of *brasilidade*” to redeem Brazil from an oppressive dictatorship. Accordingly, the “revolutionary” *Jornal das Trincheiras* (Journal of the Trenches) initially portrayed Paulista identity as transcending regional boundaries. Due to the uprising the meaning of the term “Paulista” “had broadened, expanded, widened and extended to include in its purview more than just a simple designation of an accident of birth”; rather, it had become a category that included all those who “think like São Paulo.”

This message of transcendent *paulistinidade* did find some resonance among groups beyond the boundaries of São Paulo—particularly aspiring middle-class professionals in the law and medical schools of Brazil’s urban centers. But the charges of separatism proved difficult to shake precisely because even those factions of the Paulista movement that claimed the greatest devotion to *brasilidade* could not convey a sense of horizontal solidarity with the rest of the nation. Despite some earnest efforts, the *Jornal das Trincheiras* could not
sustain this pose: as defeats piled up and the war neared its conclusion, the newspaper resorted to more inflammatory rhetoric, including a front-page article that defined the war as a struggle between two different ideas of civilization, “not to say between civilization and barbarism.”

RACE, REGIONAL IDENTITIES, AND DISCOURSES OF DEMOCRACY

The limited resonance of Constitutionalist discourse beyond state lines is hardly surprising given its emphasis on how superior and how distinctive São Paulo was compared to the rest of Brazil (indicating the limits of an overtly regionalist effort to reimagine the nation). Thus Paulistas could deride as ridiculous anti-Constitutionalist claims that São Paulo was trying to turn the other regions of Brazil into its economic colonies, but there was nevertheless something distinctly “colonial” about the way São Paulo positioned the rest of Brazil, especially the poorer areas of the Northeast, depicted as politically immature, economically underdeveloped, and culturally backward.

This set of attitudes helps to explain an initially puzzling silence in Constitutionalist discourse. One might expect a movement that was rallying people against a dictatorship to make extensive use of the term “democracy,” a word that even in the early 1930s was widely regarded as expressing the antithesis of dictatorship. And yet there were remarkably few references to the need for democratization in the writings and speeches of the movement. There were uncountable references to the need for a constitution, for the restoration of order and the rule of law, but for the most part the Paulistas were silent on the matter of democracy. On the rare occasions when the issue did appear, it was likely to be called into question. Thus we have the unusually blunt assertion by Vivaldo Coaracy, who, in O caso de São Paulo, wrote: “The difference in their evolutionary rhythms unavoidably establishes a hierarchy among the Brazilian States. . . . Democracy proclaims civil equality for all citizens and tends to concede them political equality. But it is incapable of creating natural equality.”

From this perspective, we can appreciate more fully the political vacuum that existed in Brazil during the early 1930s as far as democracy is concerned, with Vargas edging toward an authoritarian/populist appeal to the popular classes and the supposedly liberal Paulista middle class identifying with a hierarchical and noninclusive notion of political rights. Ironically, under these circumstances, it was the dictator Vargas and his allies, not the “liberal constitutionalists” of São Paulo, who were more likely to favor an eventual transition to a broad-based democratic politics. Paulista regionalism cum nationalism, so in-
tensely identified with the white middle and upper classes in São Paulo, had little capacity for sustained popular mobilization, making democratization an implicit challenge to Paulista dominance. Both before and during the Constitutionalist campaign, the Paulista elites cited the inhabitants of Brazil’s less “advanced” regions as impediments to the formation of a coherent and progressive national culture. But I would argue that it was precisely the Paulistas’ insistence on a hierarchy (rather than a diversity) of regional identities that formed the greatest impediment to a more progressive and democratic national culture in the early 1930s.

This hierarchical structure, moreover, rested on racialized concepts. While most of the exponents and chroniclers of the 1932 revolution did not resort to explicitly racist ideas in defining regional character, key elements in the construction of Paulista identity—the tropes of civilization and modernity—easily lent themselves to a racialized discourse without requiring explicit reference to race or color. In every context São Paulo was presented not only as the most prosperous, but also the most civilized, the most cultured, and the most modern. And this mode of representation depended upon a sharp contrast with other regions of Brazil, especially the Northeast, with its largely nonwhite and impoverished population figured as backward, illiterate, and semicivilized.

As Paul Gilroy argues in *The Black Atlantic*, in a world where modernity is so routinely linked with European culture, to whiteness, it is difficult to deploy this concept in racially neutral terms. Some scholars of racial ideologies have tended to draw a sharp distinction between biological and cultural racism, with the latter typically seen as less pernicious than the “true” racism based on notions of biological difference. But I think this particular historical episode in São Paulo provides us with abundant examples of the considerable slippage from one racist language to another, and the way in which a racist discourse based on historical processes and cultural inclinations can be both more flexible and more durable.

Paulista claims of superiority, of course, would not go unanswered. Given the considerable competition for national power unleashed by the revolution of 1930, the moment became an auspicious one for competing regional interests to construct a national identity that was an overt challenge to the Paulistas’ racial exclusivism. Again, without ignoring the flaws and defects of the notion of racial democracy, it is worth recognizing that, in this particular historical context, the discourse of racial democracy imagined a much more inclusive version of the Brazilian national community than the one offered by Paulista intellectuals. It may have been a nationalist discourse that occluded ongoing racial
discrimination and discouraged militancy around identities of color but, in contrast to the Paulista vision of the nation, it did not expunge non-European ethnicities from Brazil’s colonial or postcolonial history or imagine a nation where whiteness was the only guarantor of modernity and progress.

It is also significant that Gilberto Freyre, the main architect of the concept of racial democracy, was writing not from some abstract supraregional space, but from the immediate context of northeastern regionalism, and with the conscious objective of rehabilitating his home region’s cultural position in the Brazilian nation. For Freyre, as for the Paulista intellectuals, imagining national identity did not require rejecting regional loyalties; rather, regional identities provided the raw materials to craft national identities. The difference is that Freyre’s regionalism produced a vision of the nation that would resonate with both elite and popular aspirations in a way that the Paulistas’ explicitly racist, exclusionary, and hierarchical vision could not.

NOTES

I have discussed the issue of race and regional identity with so many colleagues, both in the United States and in Brazil, that it would be impossible to recognize everyone whose ideas are somehow reflected in this article. But I would like to thank the editors of this volume for their particularly constructive criticisms. I am also grateful for the comments I received from the students and faculty at the Latin American Studies Centers at Princeton University and the University of Michigan, where I presented an earlier version of this article.


and Brazilian identity, see Renato Ortiz, *Cultura brasileira e identidade nacional* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985). On the ideology of whitening, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974; reprint, with a new preface and bibliography, Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 [page citations are to the 1974 edition]). The line between Freyre’s thought and the idea of whitening is sometimes blurry (see Skidmore, *Black into White*, 192). Freyre himself argued that the African was “disappearing” from Brazilian society, but as in discourses of *mestizaje*, his emphasis was on “amalgamation,” not marginalization or dilution through immigration, and he did not eagerly promote the extinction of all Africanisms from Brazilian culture. Gilberto Freyre, *Brazil: An Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945).


4. According to Carlos Hasenbalg (cited in Twine, *Racism in a Racial Democracy*, 6), “Freyre created the most formidable ideological weapon against anti-racist activists.” Was this Freyre’s intent? That seems unlikely given the minor role of antiracist activists in Brazil when his work first appeared in the 1930s. But he made little subsequent effort to prevent his work from being used by apologists for Portuguese colonialism or Brazilian authoritarianism.

5. We are starting to see a shift toward less denunciatory and more nuanced approaches to racial democracy, including works that emphasize its multiple discursive uses (rather than dismissing it as a “myth”). See Howard Winant, “Rethinking Race in Brazil,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 173–92, and Sueann Caulfield’s essay in this volume.


11. Skidmore, Black into White, chaps. 2–3.

12. George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888–1988 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), chap. 3. Andrews notes that enthusiasm for immigration declined in the 1920s, as nationalism and distaste for anarchist agitation intensified. Accompanying this decline in enthusiasm was a campaign to valorize the “national” worker, but the latter was still constructed in highly racialized and often demeaning terms.


16. Burns’s account of the revolt (A History of Brazil, 352) is a textbook example of this interpretation: “The significance of the revolt was readily discernible in its limited geographic and popular appeal. . . . More than anything else, the rebellion seemed to be a rearguard action by the Paulista oligarchy who looked to the past and desired a restoration of their former privileges and power, and the government treated it as such. Federal forces converged on the capital of São Paulo, and after three months of siege and desultory fighting, the revolt collapsed.”

17. Prado, A democracia ilustrada, 97–99.


21. Heightening the sense of São Paulo’s singular trajectory was the stagnation or decline of such regions as Minas Gerais, the interior of Rio de Janeiro, and the Northeast. The diffusion of record-keeping and statistical methods also created a representational context within which one could quickly and dramatically visualize São Paulo’s “superi-


25. In other words, these regions would always be at a more distant (and therefore inferior) point in history than São Paulo. For a provocative discussion of what she calls both “the imperial idea of linear time” and “panoptic time,” see Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 9–11, 36–42.


28. For example, as part of its 1954 quatrcentennial celebrations, the city of São Paulo staged what a magazine based in Rio called “the biggest folkloric procession ever held in Latin America,” but almost all of the presentations were “imported” from other regions of Brazil. Indeed, according to this magazine, “the majority of that highly varied presentation constituted a complete novelty for the Paulista.” *O Mundo Ilustrado*, no. 84 (8 Sept. 1954): 25.


32. Dalmo Belfort de Mattos, “A influência negra na alma paulista,” *Paulistânia*, no. 3
(Oct. 1939), unpaginated, emphasis mine. He also claimed that São Paulo’s white to
nonwhite ratio during the colonial period was 3 to 1, a statistic that seems little more than
a racist’s wishful thinking.

33. Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and
When,” in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 151–74, emphasis in original. Duara invents
the word “discent” to express both descent and dissent. The phrase “fictive ethnicity” comes
from Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Eley and Suny, Becom-
ing National, 132–49.

34. Some important Paulista political figures, however, found it difficult to suppress
their contempt for other regions. See Paulo Duarte, Que é que há? (São Paulo: n.p., 1931),
38–39.


36. Mário de Andrade, “Guerra de São Paulo,” unpublished manuscript, Coleção Mário
de Andrade, Caixa 1, Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, Universidade de São Paulo.

37. Vivaldo Coaracy, A sala da capela (São Paulo: Livraria José Olympio, 1933), 14. The
images Coaracy evokes here are an interesting pastiche: teeth sharpening was a practice
associated with sertanejos of African descent, but the other features (short, yellow, oblique
eyes) seem more reminiscent of the derogatory stereotypes associated with the Japanese
troops that had recently (1931–32) occupied Manchuria.

38. Duarte, Que é que há?, 257–58.

39. By the end of Os sertões, da Cunha himself exhibited little certainty on the question
of who the forces of civilization might be, but that aspect of his masterwork tended to get
lost in the remembering. (The English-language version is titled Rebellion in the Backlands
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944]). Some Paulista writers in 1932 echoed da
Cunha’s grudging admiration for the sertanejo but always depicted the backlander’s cour-
age as the mindless bravery of a semiprimitive man. See “Viva o sertão!,” Folha da Noite, 15
Sept. 1932, 2. Some journalists actually claimed that federal troops had been recruited
from the Canudos region, as well as from the Contestado, site of another major mille-
narian rebellion—in other words, the government was deliberately recruiting “mindless

40. In an intriguing article on the depreciation of citizenship in a “relational universe,”
Roberto da Matta argues that no Brazilian aspires to be a mere citizen, since this implies
equality devoid of privileged treatment. Roberto da Matta, “The Quest for Citizenship in
a Relational Universe,” in State and Society in Brazil: Continuity and Change, ed. John D.
Wirth, Edson de Oliveira Nunes, and Thomas E. Bogenschield (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1987), 307–35. His argument considers only individual behavior structured by
relations of patronage and clientele. I would argue that there are, simultaneously, notions
of hierarchy that situate certain collectivities within the Brazilian nation as more privi-
leged than others—more deserving of full citizenship.

41. C. R. Cameron to Walter C. Thurston [Chargé, Rio de Janeiro], São Paulo Political
42. I explore the discursive limits of women’s emancipation during this campaign in “Inventing A Mulher Paulista: Politics and the Gendering of Brazilian Regional Identities in the 1932 São Paulo Revolution” (unpublished manuscript). Peter Wade’s Afterword in this volume correctly notes that constructions of Paulista whiteness would be considerably “nuanced by the everyday realities of Paulista life,” but I chose to focus on the level of representation because I believe that this is where the terms of debate were set (though not fixed), and that nobody escaped these discursive boundaries; having agreed to kill and die for the “causa paulista,” participants had little room to contest its dominant representations. For a discussion of “civilization” as a trope that structured hegemonic and oppositional discourses, see Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

43. Duarte, Que é que há?, 257–58.
44. “Paulista, não te desanimes,” Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (hereafter AESP), Coleção Rev. de 1932, Pasta 357, Doc. 673.
45. São Paulo, 1932, AESP, facsimile collection. This was a variation of the well-known image of São Paulo as the “locomotiva” pulling a dilapidated train of empty boxcars.
47. Baptista Pereira, Pelo Brasil maior, 347.
51. Ibid., x.
52. Ibid., 26–27.
53. Vivaldo Coaracy, O caso de São Paulo (São Paulo: Editora Ferraz, 1932), 135. Interestingly enough, Coaracy was not a native Paulista.
54. See the chapter “Os dois brasis,” in Vivaldo Coaracy, Problemas nacionaes (São Paulo: n.p., 1930).
56. Andrade, “Guerra de São Paulo.” This is all the more striking since Andrade himself was of mixed-race background.
59. AESP, Col. Rev. de 1932, Pasta 378, Doc. 1587, 9–10. Note that the “racial” identity of the *nordestino* in the Paulista gaze was quite unstable. The “racial type” deprecatingly referred to as “cabeça chata” could be vaguely described as a mixture of Portuguese, Indian, and African, whereas in other contexts *nortistas* are referred to as “negro” or “mulato.”
68. Again, we no longer need to focus all our energies on debunking the “myth” of racial democracy; we can now consider the meanings and circulation of this discourse, both among elites and the popular classes. For a stimulating discussion along these lines, see Sueann Caulfield, *In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth-Century Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), chap. 5, and her essay in this volume. On Gilberto Freyre, regionalism, and national identity, see Hermano Vianna, *The Mystery of Samba: Popular Music and National Identity in Brazil*, ed. and trans. John Charles Chasteen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 40–42.