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## Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism

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Phillip Darby and A. J. Paolini\*

A. F. Davies once observed that the state of an intellectual discipline, like that of a distant nation, may sometimes be read off from its alliances.<sup>1</sup> Here we suggest a corollary proposition that the state of a discipline may be read off from its postures of diplomatic isolationism. Recent developments in the humanities and social sciences have involved critiques of the foundational assumptions of old disciplines and the establishment of new configurations of knowledge, directed to different purposes. Occasionally, these developments occur at the interstices of well-recognized disciplinary domains, as with the new historicism situated between the study of history and English. In such cases, there are likely to be pressures for some kind of engagement between scholars in both disciplines and between old and new bodies of knowledge. Mostly, however, the new formations have come into being not by negotiating an intermediate space between two established disciplines, but by opening up new areas of enquiry and developing discourses of a distinctive kind. In these circumstances, there is much less likelihood that there will be meeting points between old and new, and chances are that each will insist on its own space and cling to its own language, methodology, and publishing outlets.

Such is the case, we argue, with international relations and postcolonialism. Our basic theme is that in a period of increasing specialization in the humanities involving a proliferation of disciplinary studies, new discourses need to be positioned in relation to tradi-

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tional ones. It is only when the points of contact and the zones of separate interest have been plotted that we can begin to appraise the continuing relevance of the old configurations of knowledge and the claims of the new to be at the "cutting edge." The point has a special salience in the present context because both international relations and postcolonialism have been self-referential to an unusual degree.

Given the need to situate the two discourses in relation to each other, this paper addresses three areas, which taken together landscape much of the relevant terrain. First, we review the geneologies of both discourses with the aim of tracing their present trajectories and bringing out their discursive presuppositions. Second, we examine certain sites of engagement where the two discourses might have been expected to have intersected. The fact that they have not calls for interrogation. Third, exploring key differences in the approaches of international relations and of postcolonialism, we go on to argue that a dialogue between the two discourses would be mutually provoking and therefore enriching.

Before beginning our analysis proper, there is the prior issue of whether international relations and postcolonialism have sufficient shared reference points to be situated in relation to each other. At this stage, they have hardly begun even to eye each other across the disciplinary gulf, so we will be examining potential areas of commonality or conflict rather than connections already made. More than this, our concerns relate only to a part of each discourse, namely that which bears upon the North-South encounter in either its historical or contemporary manifestation. However, questions are necessarily raised about the relationship between that part and the discourse as a whole. In the case of international relations, account must be taken of how the approach to the international system and to the maintenance of order in world politics conditions thinking about the North-South encounter. In the case of postcolonialism, there is a need to recognize that the treatment of the Third World's relations with the West or the North is driven by the desire to re-vision the cultural politics of Third World societies. Of course, there is a good deal of artificiality in attempting to separate the play of international politics at the center (the old East-West conflict) from that on the North-South axis, or the external environment from the internal. This contention is at the heart of postcolonialism, and it is fundamental to its challenge to established modes of thinking. For the moment, we can simply say that our engagement is with the major part of postcolonialism—because the understanding of the Third World as dependent and subordinate underwrites the discourse—

whereas it is with a minor part of international relations—because the colonial world and its successor states have been seen as marginal to world politics.

There is one other preliminary point to be made. It is apparent that within both international relations and postcolonialism there has been a substantial measure of disagreement about appropriate objects of study and how they should be pursued. It might even be contended, on the basis of the heterogeneity of concerns in international relations and the various metamorphoses of postcolonialism, that neither has sufficient internal solidity to be ranged against the other. What needs to be established in both cases, therefore, is either the existence of an agreed core or at least some consensus about what constitutes the central issues. There is also the contention that a disciplinary study cuts a channel of commonality for itself through its use of language, concepts, and the very process of contestation. With these considerations in mind, it is necessary to briefly review the genealogy of both discourses.

Until recently, international relations has been largely isolated both from other disciplines and from broader interdisciplinary debates in political and social theory. The exceptions, although notable, have been quite rare: Lasswell's use of psychology to explain insecurity in world politics; Marxist and neo-Marxist critiques of aspects of international relations (for example, its influence on the dependency school); and the work of sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (again obvious in the dependency debates). Preoccupied with its myths of origin and confident about its historical point of departure, international relations has been reluctant to explore its position in relation to other areas of scholarship.

A large part of the intellectual isolation of international relations can be attributed to the dominant role played by the so-called realist school. International relations has been self-enclosed precisely because realism has carried so much before it in defining the proper parameters of study. Having cemented the idea of the basically anarchical nature of state relations as the defining feature of world politics, realism has been successful in delineating both the form and content of the discipline. Power, order, states—the key ingredients of the realist paradigm—have dominated the larger international relations agenda.

Realist closure and the general lack of self-reflexivity in international relations have come under increasing challenge over the last few years. Ecological imperatives have generated concerns about the inadequacies of thinking anchored in the primacy of state interests.

There is a rapidly growing literature on gender and the need to overhaul ideas about power and statehood in the light of feminist perspectives. Perhaps even more significant is the emergence of the so-called "third debate," wherein ideas influenced by postmodern or poststructural theorists have been employed to question the whole basis of the discipline. In many respects, this "postpositivist" movement<sup>2</sup> represents the first genuine attempt from within international relations to critically interrogate the assumptions, frameworks, and concerns of the discipline—so much so that Yosef Lapid views the enterprise as constituting a "discipline-defining debate."<sup>3</sup> The writings of Richard Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, Michael Shapiro, James Der Derian, Robert Cox, Simon Dalby, and many others have encouraged a deliberate questioning of the epistemological premises of the discipline, with the result that in some quarters attention has turned to issues of representation, discourse, textuality/narrative, and culture. What is at issue, therefore, is the very manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed. Undoubtedly this represents a significant break with tradition, yet it would seem at this stage that postpositivism has had a strictly limited impact on the discipline as a whole. Nevertheless, unlike previous challenges and debates, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it will not so readily be reincorporated or appropriated by the mainstream. Nor, judging by the interests and publications of an increasing number of international relations scholars, will it be so easily ignored. It may be, of course, that instead of changing the nature of international relations as a disciplinary study, the effect of the rethinking now taking place will be to establish a new discourse so that we will have both traditional and postpositivist international relations running their separate courses.

It is good deal more difficult to map the nature of what has loosely become known as the "postcolonial discourse." It has tended to define itself by a process of expansion and, some critics would argue, by a nebulous tendency to carry too much before it because it floats so freely across many disciplines and concerns. Unlike the closure of international relations, postcolonialism has made a virtue out of changing ground and being open-ended. Despite being a comparatively young discourse, it has displayed a concern with its shifting frames of reference. This latter preoccupation is not surprising given the overtly deconstructionist stance of much postcolonial theory: a Derridean focus on one's own position within a particular discourse or "textual practice" (that is, the process of reading or engaging with a particular text) is usually taken for granted.

The discourse of postcolonialism had its origins in the study of the fiction of excolonial countries and in the push to discern commonalities both in content and in form. Initially directed to writing within the British Commonwealth, the project broadened out to survey the literature of the Third World as a whole. From such beginnings, essentially of a comparative nature and located within a single discipline, there has been a remarkable expansion in scope and methodological reach, so much so that John McClure and Aamir Mufti in their introduction to a special issue of *Social Text* argue that in postcolonialism we are witnessing the emergence of a “new discourse of global cultural relations.”<sup>4</sup> While elements of such expansiveness can be seen on the part of individual writers, we need to be more circumspect about characterizing the discourse as a whole in such ambitious terms. To this point, what has driven postcolonialism, and thus what constitutes the core of the discourse, is a focus on the relations of domination and resistance and the effect they have had on identity, in, through, and beyond the colonial encounter. Whatever the lubricious nature of the term, the prefix “post” is testament to the fact that the problems that lie at the heart of the colonizer-colonized relationship are seen to persist beyond colonialism and are relevant today to what Wole Soyinka has characterized as the “process of self-apprehension” in the Third World.<sup>5</sup>

In this respect, literature has come to play a less pivotal role, having been dislodged by more generalized concerns about the Eurocentrism of Western scholarship and the nature of identity in the non-European world. Tied to this development has been the greater prominence given to “Third World” intellectuals such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Equally important, what is characterised as “colonialism” is not merely the experience of Western imperialism in the non-European world, which ended at some particular juncture in history. Rather, colonialism has come to signify a continuing set of practices that are seen to prescribe relations between the West and the Third World beyond the independence of the former colonies. The importance of reinterpreting the colonial experience is relevant to contemporary identity. In the process of resistance, the “native voice” is repositioned and empowered. This is seen as instrumental in overcoming an enduring position of otherness and subordination. Not only does the “empire write back,” as the title of an early postcolonial collection argues,<sup>6</sup> but postcolonialism challenges continuing “orientalist” representations. In this sense, just as Said’s orientalist thesis has a more general application, so too does the colonialist characterization in postcolonialism.

A review written in 1987 by Benita Parry captures something of the changing nature of postcolonialism in that she does not use the prefix “post” in her analyses of writers such as Gayatri and Bhabha.<sup>7</sup> This indicates both how recent the currency of postcolonialism is and its chameleon character.

The expansion of postcolonialism has had much to do with the alliances it has entered into, particularly with European social theory. Aside from the initial Commonwealth literature/literary criticism phase, we can locate two further overlapping but nevertheless distinct movements in postcolonialism. The concern with resistance and recovery marks the second image of postcolonialism, and the engagement with ideas of ambivalence and hybridity derived from contemporary social theory characterize the third movement that has now come to dominate the postcolonial discourse.

Framing the second movement are the works of Third World scholars such as Albert Memmi, Octavio Mannoni, and especially Frantz Fanon, who utilized Freudian and other psychoanalytic perspectives to focus on the colonizer-colonized relationship and posited the necessity of resistance and rejection. In particular, the need to recover precolonial culture, language, and identity in a process of resistance to colonization not only influenced radical nationalist movements, but defined the later approach of writers such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o and the Nigerian critic, Chinweizu. Edward Said, although deriving some inspiration from Foucault,<sup>8</sup> was clearly influenced by the Fanonian need to subvert dominant Eurocentric characterizations. It should be noted, however, that the call for resistance does not always go hand in hand with claims of precolonial authenticity—at least not in Said. Although clearly oppositional in his stance toward Western imperialism or orientalism, Said in a recent interview rejects notions of ethnic particularity and a homogeneous return to Islam as realistic solutions. Like Bhabha, he instead accepts the “migratory quality of experience.”<sup>9</sup> Despite the need to distinguish between the call for resistance and the need to recover some pure identity, there is a lingering tension in Said’s claims about the point of resistance. In an earlier analysis, Said described the revisionist postcolonial effort to reclaim histories and cultures from imperialism as “entering the various world discourses on an equal footing.”<sup>10</sup> Elsewhere, he argues that postcolonial writers “hear their past within them” as “urgently reinterpretable and redeployable experiences in which the formerly silent native speaks and acts on territory taken back from the colonialist.”<sup>11</sup> The belief in resistance and recovery, in unproblematically restoring or indeed discovering the native voice/identity, marks a dis-

tinct tendency in postcolonialism. Arun Mukherjee points to this tendency as prevalent in the writings of many postcolonial critics such as Stephen Slemon, Helen Tiffen, and Diana Brydon, in which a concern with a “discursive resistance to colonialist power” (Slemon and Tiffen) or a “retrieval or creation of an independent identity” (Tiffen) distinguish their analyses of Third World literature.<sup>12</sup> A further feature of this second movement is its Manichean, self versus other frame of reference, which characterizes the colonizer-colonized relationship very much in terms of polar opposites. Said is an example here, as is Abdul Jan Mohamed’s work on African literature. Notwithstanding the poststructural influence on both these writers, the Manichean nature of their perspectives distinguishes them from other more consciously postmodern theorists as Spivak and Bhabha.

A parallel movement has occurred in Indian historiography, in which “subaltern studies” have attempted to rewrite a history that it sees as dominated by both a colonialist and bourgeoisie-nationalist elitism. Seeking to contest the ideological nature of this historiography—for instance, the Cambridge History series—writers in this massive endeavor have given voice to the so-called “subaltern,” who has resisted elite domination throughout history. Dipesh Chakrabarty has defined “subalternity” as the “composite culture of resistance to and acceptance of dominance and hierarchy.”<sup>13</sup> Ranajit Guha has argued that the Cambridge historians have “wished away the phenomenon of resistance,” and that without a recognition of the subaltern’s role, historiography perpetuates a serious misrepresentation of power relations under colonialism.<sup>14</sup> Thus, although distinct from postcolonialism per se, the revisionism of subaltern studies mirrors that of the broader postcolonial movement: in subverting the mental and intellectual categories of Eurocentric scholarship, it seeks to uncover a more authentic indigenous history.

Although the concern with resistance can be seen across the postcolonial discourse, the emphasis on recovery and opposition is particular to the range of writers and perspectives just described. A third movement is less sanguine about any prospect of recovery and indeed proceeds from a less totally oppositional standpoint. It is in this body of writing that the influence of deconstructive and postmodern theories is most clear. The work of Homi Bhabha, in particular, views the colonial encounter as inherently ambivalent for both the postcolonial subject and the West. Utilizing many of Derrida’s ideas, Bhabha sees categories of otherness and difference as imbued with an inevitable ambivalence due to the hybrid and syncretic nature of postcolonial societies: “The place of difference and otherness, or the



space of the adversarial . . . is never entirely on the outside or implacably oppositional."<sup>15</sup> The subjects of colonial discourse are seen as involved in splitting, doubling projection, mimicry; what is disavowed is repeated as something different, a hybrid.<sup>16</sup> Gayatri Spivak argues similarly: "I am critical of the binary opposition coloniser/colonised. I try to examine the heterogeneity of 'colonial power' and to disclose the complicity of the two poles of that opposition as it constitutes the disciplinary enclave of the critique of imperialism."<sup>17</sup> Spivak extends her focus to gender and the position of subaltern women. What both Bhabha and Spivak effectively do, via narrative and textual deconstruction, is to reposition the colonial and postcolonial relationship along less essentialist lines, highlighting a more heterogeneous and syncretic dynamic. This is also true of Caribbean postcolonial writing and theorizing which, deploying the idea of "creolization" in culture and literature, is seen by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffen as being "the crucible of the most extensive and challenging postcolonial literary theory."<sup>18</sup>

Postmodernism pervades this third movement of postcolonialism. The focus on the particular and the marginal, the heterogeneity of meaning and narrative, the questioning of Eurocentric positivism and universalism, the ambiguity toward modernity, the critique of Western individualism, and the interest in constructions of self and other—all bear the trademarks of recent critical social theory. Not surprisingly, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffen argue that these concerns "clearly function as the conditions of the development of postcolonial theory in its contemporary form and as the determinants of much of its present nature and content."<sup>19</sup>

These same intellectual accents have also framed much of the third debate in international relations, although their overall effect on this discipline has been much less sweeping. Still, a narrow bridge between postcolonialism and international relations has been constructed upon which similar interests in culture, identity, representation, and narrative can traverse. The two movements described here can be seen as overlapping and propelled by the same underlying dynamic of resistance, whether it be to specific instances of colonial power and representation, or to the Eurocentric nature of scholarship in general. Although it is necessary to keep in mind the points of difference between the two movements, it is valid to cast postcolonialism as the more all-inclusive enterprise. The nub of postcolonialism can be seen as oppositional and redemptive. Despite the refinements of Bhabha and Spivak, there is a conscious privileging of the Third World and of marginality as proper foci of study.

Postcolonialism seeks to reclaim the moral and emotional high-ground in its interrogation of Western modernity. Whether it be the Third World intellectual or writer in Western academe, or the subaltern or native voice—however fractured and hybrid it has become—the impetus is on the margin as the key repository of a radical and subversive political standpoint. It is precisely because of this privileging of marginality that so much energy can be invested in determining who can speak. Within this alternate space, postcolonialism has tended to be all-embracing and, ironically, it has acted to “colonize” and refashion aspects of scholarship previously the domain of Western academe, such as literature, history, and social theory. Ideas about the emotional stance and radical space cleared by postcolonialism will be explored in a later part of this paper.

The foregoing survey makes plain the differences in background and approach between these two disciplinary discourses. The task now is to enquire into potential issues of commonality and points of contact. Apart from the postmodern link, the two discourses might have been expected to have crossed paths in several areas relating to the North-South encounter. That they have not—at least in any sustained way—calls for some examination of how these areas have been tackled or why they have been bypassed within both discourses. Three issues stand out: imperialism, orientalism, and culture. What is remarkable about these three issues is the lack of dialogue between theorists of international relations and theorists of postcolonialism. If there is a scope for connection, it has not been on terms that are mutually recognized. Let us consider why.

The second expansion of Europe, its causes and consequences, has attracted remarkably little interest on the part of international relations scholars. This neglect has left its mark on the course and concerns of the discipline. Indeed, it is by no means fanciful to suggest that had the discipline directed its attention to the phenomenon, and had it taken account of the developments in imperial historiography, international relations might have taken a substantially different trajectory. As the discipline stands now, imperialism receives cursory treatment in the standard texts as a historical category, reaching back almost unchanging to classical times. Essentially it is depicted as a system for the augmentation of power. Often there is some consideration of its “economic roots,” although the relationship between power and economics is seldom pursued in any depth. For much of the postwar period, analyses of imperialism were then put into service to explain the rise of the Cold War or the operation of the central balance. What is absent is any sustained attempt to explore the

workings of nineteenth-century imperialism, which might have led to rethinking the international politics of the Third World or to a recognition of the significance of cultural factors in world politics.

The root of the problem was that Asia, Africa, and other non-European territories were seen to be outside the civilized world. The European states acquired title and ruled in their own right. Hence, imperial relations were not international relations and they fell outside the proper concerns of the discipline. It was thus left to other fields of study to grapple with the processes that played such a large part in determining the future of the peoples, societies, and states that now constitute more than two-thirds of the world; processes, one might add, which had far-reaching reverberations within Europe itself.

In many respects the processes of nineteenth-century imperialism would not have been to the taste of mainstream international relations in any case both because they breached the distinction between the external and the internal and because they invoked issues of what we would now call cultural politics. But it is precisely because these processes jarred with the prevailing disciplinary norms that they had within them the capacity to generate rethinking. In any event, it was not until 1984, with the publication of *The Expansion of International Society*, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, that a belated step was taken in the right direction.<sup>20</sup> Although a patchy work, this volume proclaimed the transformation of the international system from a society fashioned in Europe and dominated by Europeans into the global society of today, and it attempted to consider why this had occurred and what its consequences might be.

In the case of postcolonialism, the question of imperialism has, of course, been fundamental to the agenda throughout. For the most part, the dynamics of expansion have been incidental to the concern with its consequences—consequences for subject peoples and more generally for global society—and how we should think about it. Earlier, when postcolonialism took its cue from Commonwealth literature, the perspective was firsthand: imperial overlordship experienced by its subjects, or objects as the discourse mainly put it. Chinua Achebe summed up the position of many of his contemporaries when, confronted with the argument that he overemphasized the colonial experience, he asserted: “It’s the most important single thing that has happened to us, after the slave trade.”<sup>21</sup> More recently, that experience has been refracted through the lens of social theory with the result that more is imputed than directly felt and the level of analysis has moved from the micro to the macro.

The question of why the explosion of writing about orientalism in the past decade and a half has had so little effect in international relations probes deeply into the discipline. Here we may take the neglect of Edward Said's *Orientalism* as emblematic. Said's book is perhaps neither as original nor as revelatory as is often assumed,<sup>22</sup> yet its impact was little less than extraordinary. It was taken up in several different disciplines; it spawned new causes and ways of reading; arguably, it launched its own scholarly project. Yet not only did it fail to dent the casings of international relations, it received only occasional mention in the literature.

The explanation must begin with Said's disciplinary background and theoretical stance. Said, a professor of English and comparative literature, wrote *Orientalism*<sup>23</sup> as a "counter-history of the European literary tradition,"<sup>24</sup> which broadened out to a cultural critique of forms of Western domination in the "Orient." Thus, while the themes of the book are grounded in ideas about power relations, the framework is literary and cultural. This, in itself, is justification enough to have it ruled out of court in traditional international relations. More than this, the main body of Said's literary and cultural material was drawn from the annals of British and French imperialism. If one of Said's objectives was to point to the contemporary hold of orientalist ideas, it was the history of how these ideas were developed that engaged most of his attention. The ambience of nineteenth-century imperialism would hardly have recommended the project to international relations, and still less because the surface politics of the narrative was studded with figures such as Gertrude Bell, Sir Richard Burton, and Lord Cromer. The third part of the book, entitled "Orientalism Now," might have been expected to elicit more interest, but, despite its title, in large part it retraces earlier themes. Only the fourth subsection, headed "The Latest Phase," takes up aspects of the US experience, but this pertains mostly to Islam and breaks little new ground. Said himself refers to it as "a new eccentricity in Orientalism, where indeed my use of the word itself is anomalous."<sup>25</sup>

There is one other aspect that needs to be flagged at this point: the expansive and consciously theoretical notions of power employed by Said. These stand in sharp contrast to the tradition in international relations, which has not been concerned to interrogate the concept of power beyond a statist affirmation of its centrality to the "national interest." We will return to this issue at a later stage, but, put bluntly, in the mainstream of the discipline there is little recognition of knowledge and representation as forms of power. Yet even at the mar-

gins of international relations, where the old orthodoxies are under challenge, Said's work has not been taken up. There is, for example, no citation of *Orientalism* anywhere in the postmodern collection of readings edited by Der Derian and Shapiro—an intriguing omission given the book's focus on power as knowledge and representation.<sup>26</sup> The notable exception here is R. B. J. Walker, who began to address Said in one of his early essays, reprinted in *Culture, Ideology and World Order*.<sup>27</sup> The only comparable literature in international relations that picks up some of these issues is the work on images and (mis)perceptions in conflict resolution and peace research by people such as Elise and Kenneth Boulding, Harold Issacs, and Ole Holsti. The treatment here, however innovative at the time, now appears essentially traditional.

When it comes to our third issue—the status accorded to culture—again we find a gulf between the two discourses. Whereas postcolonialism has defined itself in terms of culture, international relations has articulated its concerns in a way that pushes culture to the periphery. In large part, the explanation of the latter follows from the centrality of the state and the hold of realism in the discipline. Culture has been seen as subsumed by the state and hence lying outside the domain of international politics. A less obvious explanation for the neglect of culture of international relations is the very difficulty of the concept itself. Raymond Williams, in his *Keywords*,<sup>28</sup> has highlighted the complex and complicated nature of “culture.” It has been used in several distinct intellectual disciplines with various senses. This “complex of sense” makes it difficult, according to Williams, to agree on one meaning.<sup>29</sup> The confused nature of the word “culture” and the many debates surrounding the concept could be seen as one of the reasons culture has been neglected in international relations, which tends to feel more comfortable with “hard,” concrete terms such as the state and order. In this respect, culture has perhaps been perceived as suspiciously loose and too imprecise for analysis.<sup>30</sup>

Yet the increasing significance of culture for the study of politics has meant that the internal/external demarcation has become tenuous. Faced with the explosion of such cultural phenomena as Islamic fundamentalism and “ethnic cleansing,” international relations has had to concede the importance of the internal to an understanding of international politics. Culture can no longer be swept under the carpet, nor can the traditional lines of analysis be adhered to with the same confidence. However, where concessions have been made, for the most part they have been reactive and inserted within the old ref-

erential frames. It may be that where there has been an attempt to address the cultural realm, as in Bull and Watson<sup>31</sup>, the understanding of culture has been of a significantly different cast from its use in other disciplines. Thus, for example, in emphasizing the shared political culture of certain societies of states, Hedley Bull has only touched the tip of the iceberg so far as culture goes.

Bull notwithstanding, there have been attempts in international relations to address the cultural realm.<sup>32</sup> Ali Mazrui confronts international relations head-on by claiming that "culture is at the heart of the nature of power in International Relations."<sup>33</sup> Mazrui sees ideology, political economy, and technology as deeply rooted in the cultural realm, and views the North-South divide as an increasingly cultural one. Cultural identity is held to be an issue of increased significance in the contemporary world—so much so that, according to Mazrui, we may be witnessing the "gradual unravelling of identities based on the state, a declining of identities based on political ideology—and the revival of identities based on culture."<sup>34</sup> Peter Worsley's earlier account of world development makes similar claims.<sup>35</sup> The internationalization of culture—youth cults, religious revivalism, consumerism, feminism—are seen as "powerful evidence that a sense of common identity and a shared culture can give rise to social movements that quickly transcend the boundaries of any particular society."<sup>36</sup> Both Mazrui and Worsley thus see culture as a key determinant of political and economic processes. Even the generally econocentric Immanuel Wallerstein has shifted ground to view culture as "the key ideological battleground" of the opposing interests within the modern world capitalist system.<sup>37</sup>

These attempts to engage culture seemingly amount to a respectable interest on the part of international relations, and it is instructive to consider the intellectual background of the three writers discussed. Wallerstein is a sociologist, and the essay cited above was published in a collection of sociological articles on nationalism, globalization, and modernity. Mazrui has always cut a distinctive path in international relations, and his concerns have had more to do with the problems of Third World justice and identity than with mainstream issues. Worsley, similarly, has been steeped in the problems of development and dependency in the Third World. We thus see that many of the perspectives that have enlivened the discipline have come from outside it and draw on different source material. Something similar may be said of R. B. J Walker. Certainly he has married a consideration of culture with the issues of order, power, and states, but his bearings have been taken from broader analyses of

modernity.<sup>38</sup> Without belaboring the point, such an analysis is very much the exception. Walker himself recognizes as much: "This kind of literature . . . has emerged largely on the margins of International Relations as an institutionalized discipline. It remains obscure, even alien to those whose training has been primarily within the positivistic, realist, or policy-oriented mainstreams."<sup>39</sup>

The contrast with postcolonialism could not be starker. Where international relations has ignored culture, or at most grudgingly conceded it a minor role, postcolonialism has elevated culture to an extraordinary degree. Although the understanding of culture has changed as the discourse has evolved, culture has been at the heart of postcolonialism from the outset. In the first phase of postcolonialism, culture was grounded in the literary context and understood very much in terms of the clash of values engendered by the colonial encounter. Following postcolonialism's move away from specific texts to a more generalized account of domination and resistance between North and South, culture has attained larger explanatory significations. It has come to encapsulate the very site of struggle and difference between the so-called margin and the center; the pivot upon which an emergent postcolonial identity develops. On one view, however, culture has been overdone. In its attempt to be at the cutting edge of academic discourse, postcolonialism can be accused of having overstretched the analytical utility of culture. Yet such a perspective underplays the significance of the cultural reorientation; it is precisely through culture that postcolonialism mounts a fundamental challenge to the epistemological bases of established regimes of thinking such as international relations. In this respect its effect has been overwhelmingly positive.

To this point, the burden of our analysis has been to suggest that international relations and postcolonialism pass like ships in the night. We have highlighted possible intersections and potential sites of engagement, the idea being that both discourses might be enriched through a process of cross-fertilization. Such enrichment would follow partly from the very fact of difference. We now want to direct attention to three key areas of difference in which engagement might have real significance, not only for each discourse but more generally for our broader concern with approaches to the North-South divide. The first relates to power and representation, the second to modernity, and the third to emotional commitment and radicalism. In the process of contestation and comparison, the hope is that we can get a better handle on understanding issues such as power and modernity as they bear upon the relationship between the

North and South. Both discourses have distinct strengths and weaknesses and bring different perspectives to bear on the issues at hand. In seeking a dialogue and making assessments about what we might learn from their differences, we can begin to bridge the discourses to their mutual benefit.

The first sphere of difference identified between postcolonialism and international relations concerns the relations of power and domination between North and South. As is evident from our earlier remarks, each discourse employs a distinctive understanding of the processes at work. Power has been a fixation of international relations from the outset, yet it has been understood in unproblematic terms. It has been seen to reside mostly in the military and economic spheres, and the key referents—capability, threat, and force—have been approached one-dimensionally. One needs only to read the twin concepts used interchangeably with power in postcolonialism—representation and knowledge—to realize how differently this discourse conceives the nature of power. In broad terms, postcolonialism, often invoking Foucault's view of the power/knowledge nexus, views power as operating at the very point of textual representation and the construction of language and discourse; that is, the way in which we frame events and phenomena around us necessarily carries relations of power that serve dominant interests. In short, representation structures relations between the West and the Third World very much in favor of the former. In international relations, although there has been some limited recognition of the power of ideas and rhetoric (in conflict resolution, for example), there has been no significance attached to the power of representation. Indeed, the play of ideas and language, through morality or ideology, has been surgically removed from a consideration of power relations. They are seen as smoke-screens for underlying interests, or as dangerously subjective elements that distract from the rational pursuit of power. Either way, they are treated as fairly insignificant to a proper understanding of international politics.

The reference points of each discourse, and in particular their significance for an understanding of how relations of power affect the Third World, are worth exploring before undertaking a more comparative analysis. The reference points of international relations are relatively easy to locate. Power is related to interests and possessed by states, most of all by great powers. It is knowable and basically linear in the way it effects behavior and relations. Outcomes of the exercise of power are often zero-sum. For a Morgenthau, the pursuit of power is the highest possible virtue in world politics. For a rationalist such



as Bull, the pursuit of power is necessary for establishing order, upon which other goals such as justice and human rights may be attained. Power is thus invested with varying degrees of moral significance.

Given that power is directly related to capability and resources, great powers are able to yield dominance over lesser ones and are usually able to get their way. In this framework, because of its chronic instability and the lack of significant leverage vis-à-vis resources, the Third World is mostly assigned a subordinate role. The exceptions, such as the oil-producing Arab nations (members of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), are obvious and readily explained. Even so, as the fate of Kuwait attests, such power is tenuous. Where a major power fails to achieve its ends, as with the United States in Vietnam, the means are rarely to blame; rather, miscalculation, lack of will, poor strategy, and even perhaps a small concession to misperception are offered as explanations. The scenario for the Third World is bleak, to say the least. Because power is seen to work in the way outlined by realism, the Third World is marginalized and on the "back burner." Such conceptions have led some writers, such as Ali Mazrui, to dispute that the North-South struggle is solely about power, as traditionally defined; as far as the states of the Third World are concerned, justice and human rights are the primary objectives. Thus, the argument runs, the South acts differently from the West.<sup>40</sup> This type of argument is notable for two reasons. First, it concedes that the West does pursue power and the maximization of national interests, and thus affirms the realist paradigm. Second, it is mostly dismissed out of hand in mainstream international relations as a romanticization of Third World motives and methods.

In summary, the pursuit of power is invested with coherence, clarity, and logic, and it is ensconced in a state-centric straitjacket. The neat, enclosed conceptions and analyses advanced do little to capture the more complex nature of power relations. Yet one can concede a certain utility in the emphasis on the obvious material bases of power that postcolonialism tends to overlook in its attention to less visible manifestations of dominance. It at least reminds us, however incidentally to the focus on great powers, of the very real disparities in capabilities and resources that continue to structure North-South relations and need to be navigated.

Postcolonialism, by contrast, is little concerned with notions of the national interest, state power, or capability. Its key reference points are power as representation, or power as knowledge. These are primarily discursive practices that inevitably work to bolster the ascen-

dency and interests of the West. The focus is not so much on the operational aspects or properties of power, as in international relations, but on how it both enables and is enabled by the control over ideas, information, and communication. The ability to interpret and represent phenomena within the Western framework of understanding and interests is taken to be the ultimate expression of power. It is believed to tell us more about relations of domination between North and South than the traditional measures used in international relations. From Fanon to Jan Mohamed to Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and "reality" in the Third World. Concepts such as "progress," "civilized," and "modern" powerfully shape the non-European world.

This approach is exemplified in Timothy Mitchell's application of the orientalist thesis to colonial Egypt in the nineteenth century. In *Colonising Egypt*, Mitchell refers to colonial power as the ability of the metropole to "enframe" Egypt; that is, to order and make it legible so as to circumscribe and exclude those elements not amenable to Western sensibilities and, close behind, to Western interests.<sup>41</sup> Mitchell argues that "modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly increased power of representation, a power that made possible an unprecedented fixing and policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power of portraying what lay 'outside.'" Power is determined not so much by the obvious resource disparities between Britain and Egypt, but by the ability of the colonial order to establish an absolute boundary between the West and the non-West, the modern and the past, order and disorder, self and other.<sup>42</sup> The Foucauldian shadow is obvious here: dominant representations create "regimes of truth," which tend to exclude and marginalize while at the same time "normalizing" that which was previously threatening. Akin to Marx's owners of the means of production, postcolonialism locates power in the control over the means of representation.

The type of representational power just described is only one part of the (post)colonial encounter. Although the West is able to normalize the non-West, such relations of dominance necessarily call forth resistance. This is the flip side of the power dynamic in postcolonialism: although marginalized and dominated, the other fights back. To return to Mitchell, the colonizing process never fully succeeds because regions of resistance and voices of rejection are produced.<sup>43</sup> These are celebrated precisely because they offer hope; domination is never total. This serves as an important contrast to international relations, in which, short of the extreme of revolution, the prospects of weaker powers or actors are decidedly meager. As in

every zero-sum conflict, the loser loses absolutely. In postcolonialism, the dominated can always carve out a space for meaningful dissent.

Postcolonialism thus moves away from a mere instrumental view of power and holds out the prospect of resistance for the marginalized peoples of the Third World. In this respect, it provides an important corrective to the narrow understanding of power in international relations, which leaves little space for other actors. It also directs attention to the level of textuality as significant in shaping power relations. Postcolonialism articulates the possibility of resistance at levels other than the state; that is, cultural and local, which hardly figure in international relations. In this way, it seeks to be an empowering discourse for the South, although how far it actually addresses the concerns of Third World peoples is another matter.

The emphasis on the textual and representational envisions other problems. Whereas international relations can be rightly admonished for giving scant attention to the power of ideas and knowledge, postcolonialism at times pushes the argument too far. There is a certain ease with which representation is taken to equal, or more specifically to serve, power. Representation is usually taken to be functional to the attainment of metropolitan power and interests. Yet, surely certain representations can be profoundly counterproductive. The US experience in Vietnam is a case in point. The type of "enframing" of Egypt that Mitchell describes can also be held to be corrosive of imperial interests. Indeed, Mitchell admits as much by pointing to the inevitable resistance that takes place. In other words, rather than being simply a contribution to domination, representations often can be viewed as sources of weakness. A particular representational framework can run counter to perceived interests. Knowledge can be based on quite irrational or misguided premises; Bhabha often reminds us that colonialism was shot through with fantasy and desire. The assumptions of Western reason and progress, often taken to be the discursive tools of domination of the South, can prove to be dysfunctional.

The issue also arises of how one escapes the type of representational power that produces "orientalism" in the first place. What strategies are available to the Third World? Given that representation is tied to information and communication, and given the obviously unequal access to technology, it is difficult to envisage how the Third World might go about implementing a new representational regime. One recalls the almost forgotten push for a new information order in the 1970s as recognition of the very real material considerations involved here. It begs the question of whether a counternarrative, typi-

fied by postcolonialism, is sufficient in itself to refashion asymmetrical relations of power. This brings to the fore other questions concerning resistance. What is the exact relationship between resistance and domination? The two are seen to coexist in postcolonialism. Yet the significance of the resistance outlined is questionable, given the obvious persistence of Western hegemony. In other words, is resistance simply appropriated?

This dilemma can be illustrated with reference to the interesting work undertaken by James Scott on the “weapons of the weak.” The unavoidable conclusion drawn from the various techniques of “hidden” resistance lauded by Scott (foot-dragging, rumor, folktales) is that they end up only marginally affecting relations of dominance.<sup>44</sup> Overall, one is left with the impression that postcolonialism exaggerates both Western dominance and Third World resistance. In the case of the former, the irony of the representational focus is that, as in international relations, power is taken to possess a certain coherence and logic in the way it is able to effortlessly dominate the Third World. In the latter, it is not clear how effective resistance actually is.

Our second category of difference flows from the relationships of the two discourses to modernity. In outline, international relations is the dutiful child of modernity whereas postcolonialism is in large part a revolt against it. It must be said that the idea of modernity, and even more the formulation increasingly favored to catch its political operationalization—“the modernity project”—is understood in a very expansive fashion. Nevertheless, for all its analytical looseness, it brings to our attention the breadth of the processes of thought spawned by the European Enlightenment, which were taken to be universal and thereby escaped questioning. As a result, our awareness is enhanced by the cultural specificity of many Western articles of faith and by their rootedness in a particular moment of time.

The exposure of the relativity and contestability of so much established thought is of major potential significance to both international relations and postcolonialism. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to claim that there are few issues in either discourse that are beyond modernity’s problematizing reach. It is our contention, however, that neither discourse has faced up to the challenges involved. In ways reflective of their respective disciplinary predisposition, each has responded to modernity according to its own lights: international relations by ignoring it, and postcolonialism by turning it to the purposes of resistance. Let us consider each discourse in turn, noting its general orientation to modernity and then commenting on the im-

plications of modernity for two issues of particular relevance to the future of the Third World, the nation-state and development.

Despite the critiques of its postmodernist wing, international relations as a whole has been little disturbed by the wash from the debate about modernity. That the mainstream scarcely feels it necessary to respond to postmodernist criticisms is testament enough to the continuing sustenance provided by the discipline's intellectual inheritance. Although there exists disagreement about what should be done, it would be difficult to deny that in many important respects the discipline was shaped by the interests and ideals of the Enlightenment, and that ever since it has been deeply involved in the global elaboration of Western reason and modernity. Nor is there likely to be much dissent from the proposition that modernity is deeply implicated in the nation-state and development projects. John Ruggie has demonstrated how the idea of the nation-state, tied as it is to an exclusive form of territoriality, was a construct of European thought in the space-time frame initiated by the Renaissance and that it represented a break with what went before or existed elsewhere.<sup>45</sup> Development did not fully emerge until the nineteenth century, and it drew on the doctrine of progress. Shaped within the crucible of imperial trusteeship and internationalized by the mandate system of the League of Nations, it did not fully flower in international relations until after World War II with the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program.

It is possible that the contemporary processes working toward the fragmentation of states and the problems associated with revisioning the European Community will force rethinking within international relations about the nation-state in the context of modernity. As yet, however, the process has barely begun. There is even less likelihood that, within the discipline, development will be prised from its modernist anchorings. The pattern is now well established that the more imaginative critiques and reorientations of development thinking take place in development studies, and there is no reason to expect that the center of gravity of the development debate will shift back to conventional international relations.

In a number of basic respects, postcolonialism is a discourse about modernity critically received. Modernity is revealed as one of the faces shown by European imperialism and its successors, neocolonialism and globalization. Its disabling effects are presented as a rationale for Third World doctrines of resistance. In varying degrees, it underpins the case for the retrieval of traditional culture and the allure of precolonial values. From the early days when postcolonialism

was the edited voice of Third World fiction, the threat posed by the modern to national autonomy and the sense of self-worth led writers to challenge its appropriateness to Afro-Asia, or at least to emphasize its costs. Later, when postcolonialism came to draw heavily on European critical thought, a new note of negativity was inherited from postmodernism. Thus, throughout time, postcolonialism's main thrust has been deeply skeptical about modernity and, for the most part, oppositional to it.

Yet postcolonialism is not immune from the needs of contemporary life. The idea of the modern has an attraction as well as a repugnance. It holds out the promise of material betterment; it still hints at futures liberated from the oppressions of the past. Ashis Nandy captures something of this dilemma when he writes of the love-hate, identification-counteridentification dynamic at the heart of India's mediation of the West and modernity.<sup>46</sup> Nandy argues for the impossibility of rejecting the effects of three hundred years of colonialism: "The absolute rejection of the West is also the rejection of the basic configuration of the Indian traditions."<sup>47</sup> The self cannot be rigidly defined or separated from the "nonself." This, according to Nandy, is part of India's postcolonial "strategy for survival."<sup>48</sup>

The result of such ambivalence is often a nominal endorsement of the idea of the modern, at least in relation to economic development, but an insistence that it not be a Western version, that it grow from indigenous roots. A character in B. Kojo Laing's *Search Sweet Country* puts it this way: "Let's have a little machine life, yes; but I hate the type that we see in other lands."<sup>49</sup> In this novel the author wrestles with how the modern might coexist with the traditional, but more usually, both in postcolonial fiction and theory, having made a gesture toward the modern the writer returns to an oppositional stance. Ngugi wa Thiong'o's recent fiction illustrates the pattern clearly. In *Matigari*, for example, there is no serious attempt to envisage the place of the modern in the new Kenya; nor is there any clear distinction between Westernization and modernization.<sup>50</sup>

When we turn to postcolonialism and the nation-state, it is necessary to distinguish between state and nation and to recognize that the discourse has more to say about the latter than the former. In terms of its general orientation and political bearing, postcolonialism's relationship to the state is adversarial. The modern state is an alien construct imposed upon Asia and Africa and therefore to be resisted in the interest of making alternative futures possible. This is the thrust of much recent postcolonial theory. But the discourse is less clear-cut than this would suggest. Consider, for example, the strategy of ap-

appropriation, which implies that the state can be redirected to new purposes. As far as the nation is concerned, postcolonialism reinvigorates the category in the hope that it can serve as a vehicle for the recovery of national identity and the articulation of a new politics. At least potentially, the nation is positioned in opposition to both modernity and the state as it now exists, but the ramifications of such thinking remain to be worked through and there are dissenting voices. In contrast to international relations, then, postcolonialism acknowledges no over-arching category that brings together the government unit with the sense of national being, and by implication it is hostile to the very idea. In this respect, therefore, postcolonialism implicitly challenges one of the fundamental tenets of international relations.

This brings us to the third significant area of difference between the two discourses, that of disciplinary politics. Essentially what we are concerned with here is the question of political leaning and the issue of emotional commitment. It is our contention that in both respects the two discourses are at opposite poles; international relations constitutes part of the rearguard of the old formations of knowledge whereas postcolonialism is representative of the new. It is instructive to compare the starting points of the two discourses in this respect. International relations begins at the center in several senses. Born in Europe, it crossed the Atlantic after World War II, and was then extended to the South, but with remarkably little modification in light of the different circumstances it encountered. The concern throughout was with the center with the great powers, the global balance, and the framework of international order. This was written into both the League of Nations and the United Nations and it permeates almost every aspect of realist thought. Hence international relations was and is the discourse of those who hold power. Its development was to a very large extent tied to where the major decisions were taken, both in terms of states (the United States after World War II) and in terms of areas of specialized attention (strategic studies, decisionmaking, and the study of great powers). The paradigms of the center thus became the staple of the periphery. Models of deterrence derived from the superpower conflict worked this way downward in the hierarchy of conflict. Morgenthau's classic text was widely translated and repeatedly reissued, and still today structures teaching in the discipline throughout much of the Third World.

A. P. Thornton once wrote that "power is neither used nor witnessed without emotion."<sup>51</sup> To all intents and purposes, international relations proceeds on the opposite tack. In particular, there is the

long-standing attempt of the mainstream to divorce values and morality from the warp and weave of the discipline. This reached its most extreme form in Morgenthau's enunciation of the science of international politics. Although not consciously articulated, a similar cast of mind informs much of the scholarly work in the field, especially in strategic studies. Yet for all the emphasis on political detachment—on the need to keep the ground rules free of partisan contamination—the discipline privileges the dominant by tying together the interests of great powers and the stability of the system. Hedley Bull may well be right that there can be no justice without order, but order as it has traditionally been conceived in international politics is of a very particular kind.

Postcolonialism made its entry into academe as the voice of the dispossessed. It was the discourse of those who had been stripped of their authority, culture, and history. Hence the first objective was self-recovery. Over time, this led to a widening concern because the self could not be tackled in isolation: it was necessary to move out and challenge the center. Resistance thus became the central theme in the treatment of Third World literatures, and various ancillary notions such as subversion and appropriation took their place alongside it. The fictional texts elevated to the canon were mostly selected on the basis of their oppositional stance. Subaltern studies followed a broadly similar trajectory with its concern to recover Indian resistance and in the process to marginalize Europe, with the difference that its objects were set out in declaratory fashion at the outset. In postcolonialism's most recent formulation there has been a rather different privileging of the experience of the marginalized. In turning to the testimony of those who have been displaced, exiled, and subjugated, there is the expectation that we will "learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking."<sup>52</sup> The very experience of rejection thus becomes an enabling one, and the lessons it teaches are relevant not simply to the dispossessed but to the possessed as well.

There is, however, a problem when we attempt to relate the discourse back to the North-South conflict and especially to the situation of the South. The oppositional stance to the centrality of the West does not appear to have much purchase on the structures of division between North and South. Moreover, there is a feeling that postcolonialism's concerns relate more to current debates within Western academe than to the situation of the Third World dispossessed. Two lines of thought offer some elaboration and explanation. First, postcolonialism is best understood as a new political sensibility and as such it is not readily translated into a program for North-South



action. The problem is compounded by the rejection of established boundaries and the lack of an agreed agenda. It is of the nature of the discourse that the essay is favored over the full-length study and that the points at issue are set by the process of contestation. Second, postcolonialism is able to hold high the torch of radicalism precisely because it distances itself from mainstream economic and political material. If account were taken of work done in the old humanities, postcolonialism's radical edge might not have the same sharpness, but the discourse would bear more directly on the problems of the Third World.

There is, however, another view, and by extension it bears on the whole question of the relationship between postcolonialism and international relations. What we have drawn attention to in terms of postcolonialism's easy radicalism, its ostensible disregard of the structural determinants of North-South relations, and even its seeming distance from the material aspirations of Afro-Asian peoples, are perhaps manifestations of the nature of the discourse itself. Postcolonialism provokes and challenges precisely because it is not held back by the constraints of disciplinary orthodoxy. It has been the fundamental contention of this paper that there should be an engagement between postcolonialism and international relations; that each approach would benefit from being situated in relation to the other; that the opening up of differences would spark rethinking and perhaps suggest new avenues of enquiry.

This does not mean, however, that postcolonialism and international relations should be approached in the same manner or be expected to yield the same kind of contribution. Dialogue should proceed on terms that acknowledge that the two have different strengths that are intrinsic to their intellectual formations. In the case of postcolonialism this would involve recognition that its imaginative and critical capacities are tied to its free-floating character. The challenge it presents to international relations is not only about its neglect of the Third World and about the way its construction of international politics distorts thinking about the Third World, but to the very epistemological basis of the discipline and its implication in a global design to serve Western interests. This is a challenge that needs to be advanced and debated.

But if postcolonialism is conceded a more ecumenical status, in programmatic terms it cannot stand alone. That is to say, postcolonialism cannot of itself be the principal repository of scholarly understanding of the North-South relationship and the architect of Third World futures. Here international relations has a leavening

role to play, and any notion that it should be left to its traditional concerns and its established ways of thinking needs to be resisted. Whatever its inadequacies, international relations grasps many of the obvious levers of power, and it acknowledges some of the basic impediments to the processes of global change.

### Notes

1. A.F. Davies, "Political and Literary Criticism—Some Resemblances," *Melbourne Journal of Politics* 1 (1968–69), p. 19.
2. Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 20 no. 2 (Summer 1991), p. 169.
3. Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 no. 3, (September 1989), pp. 236–237.
4. John McClure and Aamir Mufti, "Introduction," *Social Text* 31/32 (1992), p. 3.
5. Wole Soyinka, *Myth, Literature and the African World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. xi.
6. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).
7. Benita Parry, "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse," *Oxford Literary Review*, 9, nos. 1–2 (1987), pp. 27–59.
8. In a recent interview, Said makes clear that he was influenced by the first part of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, but that aside from this, "found very little in his work . . . to help in resisting the kinds of administrative and disciplinary pressures that he described so well in the first part. So I completely lost interest in his work. The later stuff on the subject I just found very weak, and to my way of thinking, uninteresting." Gramsci looms larger in Said's thinking on power, indicating a more traditionally Marxist influence rather than a decidedly poststructural one. See Edward Said, *Radical Philosophy* 63 (Spring 1993), p. 25.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
10. Edward Said, "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors," *Critical Inquiry* 15 (Winter 1990), p. 219.
11. Edward Said, "Intellectuals in the Post-Colonial World," *Salmagundi*, nos. 70–71 (Spring-Summer 1986), p. 55.
12. Arun P. Mukherjee, "The Exclusions of Postcolonial Theory and Mulk Raj Anand's Untouchable: A Case Study," *Ariel* 22, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 29.
13. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Invitation to a Dialogue," in Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies IV* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 376.
14. Ranajit Guha, "Dominance Without Hegemony and its Historiography," in Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies VI* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 299.

15. Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (Autumn 1985), p. 152.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
17. Gayatri C. Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," in Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies VI* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 5.
18. Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffen, note 6, pp. 145–154.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
20. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
21. From "An Interview with Chinua Achebe," *Times Literary Supplement*, Feb. 26, 1982, p. 209.
22. For example, many, although certainly not all, of its themes were anticipated in a discussion between Arnold Toynbee and Raghavan Iyer during a UNESCO radio program in April 1959, reproduced in Raghavan Iyer, ed., *The Glass Curtain Between Asia and Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 329–349.
23. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
24. Said, note 8, p. 23.
25. Said, note 23, p. 291.
26. James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989).
27. R. B. J. Walker "East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders," in R. B. J. Walker, ed., *Culture, Ideology and World Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 17.
28. Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana, 1976).
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–80.
30. This point has been made by Jongsuk Chay in the preface of his edited *Culture and International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. xi. In that book, R. B. J. Walker argues similarly: "No doubt those who like their concepts to be precisely and operationally defined may find culture to be frustratingly vague and tendentious. They are likely to be perplexed by the variety of meanings given to it." R. B. J. Walker, "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations," in Jongsuk Chay, ed., *Culture and International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 7.
31. Bull and Watson, note 20.
32. Aside from the writers covered in this paper, Walker has identified others who have attempted to treat culture as a serious aspect of international relations: F. S. C. Northop, Adda Bozeman's work on cultural difference in history, Hedley Bull and R. J. Vincent on the international system as a form of political "community" with shared values and culture, and Richard Falk and other normative world order theorists. Yet, with the exception of Bozeman and Northop, whose focus is historical, most of these treat culture largely as an adjunct to their broader concerns.
33. Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics* (London: Heinemann, 1990), p. 8.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

35. Peter Worsley, *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984).
36. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
37. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System," in Mike Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990), p. 39.
38. R. B. J. Walker, "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity," *Alternatives* 11, no. 4 (October 1986), p. 495.
39. Walker, note 30, p. 8.
40. Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), chap. 8.
41. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 33.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168, 171.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
44. See James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); and James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).
45. John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174.
46. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 87.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
49. B. Kojo Laing, *Search Sweet Country* (London: Heinemann, 1986), p. 188.
50. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Matigari* (Oxford: Heinemann, 1987).
51. A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies* (London: Macmillan, 1966; first published 1959), p. xiv.
52. Homi K. Bhabha, "Freedom's Basis in the Indeterminate," *October* 61 (Summer 1992), p. 47.