When Life Itself is War: 
On the Urbanization of Military 
and Security Doctrine 

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Abstract

It is now well established that both the ‘war on terror’ and its offshoots have been conspicuously marked by overwhelmingly urban discourses, materialities and practices. Deliberately transdisciplinary, synthetical and polemical in scope, this article seeks to demonstrate that new ideologies of permanent and boundless war are radically intensifying the militarization of urban life in the contemporary period. The article delineates the ways in which contemporary processes of militarization — which surround what I label the ‘new military urbanism’ — raise fundamental questions for critical urban scholarship because of the ways in which they work to normalize the permanent targeting of everyday urban sites, circulations and populations. Focusing primarily on US security and military doctrine, culture and technology, this article explores the new military urbanism’s five interrelated foundations in detail, namely: the urbanization of military and security doctrine; the links between militarized control technologies and digitized urban life; the cultural performances of militarized media consumption; the emerging urban political economies of the ‘security’ industries; and the new state spaces of violence. Following the elaboration of each of these themes, the article concludes by identifying ways forward for critical urban research in exposing and confronting the normalization of the new military urbanism.

Introduction: the new military urbanism

‘Political struggles are not fought on the surface of geography but through its very fabric/ation.’

Pile (2000: 263)

‘Today, wars are fought not in trenches and fields, but in living rooms, schools and supermarkets’.

Barakat (1998: 11)

In an earlier article (Graham, 2005), I began to explore the ways in which both the ‘war on terror’ and its offshoots have been conspicuously marked by overwhelmingly urban discourses, materialities and practices. Building on this work, and drawing on research recently completed for a book project (Graham, 2010), in what follows I develop an

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argument — deliberately transdisciplinary, synthetical and polemical in scope — which seeks to demonstrate that new ideologies of permanent and boundless war are radically intensifying the militarization of urban life in the contemporary period.

It is important to stress at the outset that such processes of urban militarization do not constitute a simple clean break with the past. Rather, they add contemporary twists to longstanding militaristic and urban transformations — political, cultural and economic. Together, these serve to normalize war and preparations for war as central elements of the material, political–economic and cultural constitution of cities and urban life. Michael Geyer (1989: 79) defines the militarization process as ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’.

Militarization processes are inevitably complex, diverse and multidimensional; they link to urban sites, cultures, representations, state spaces and political economies in myriad ways (for a review, see Graham, 2004). Their key constituents, however, are as old as war itself. These have invariably centred on the social construction of powerful imagined division between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of a nation, city or other geographic area, and the orchestrated demonization of enemies and enemy places beyond such boundaries. Practices of militarization also invariably rely on the normalization of military paradigms of thought, action and policy; (attempts at) the aggressive disciplining of bodies, places and identities seen not to befit the often masculinized notions of nation, citizenship or body (and the connections between them); and the deployment of wide ranges of propagandist material which romanticizes or sanitizes violence as a means of righteous revenge or achieving some God-given purpose. Above all, militarization and war involve attempts to forge powerful new links between cultures, states, technologies and citizenship. Invariably, these work as means to orchestrate the rapid creative–destruction of inherited geographies, political economies, technologies and cultures, either deliberately or unintentionally.

In what follows, I attempt to delineate the ways in which contemporary processes of militarization raise fundamental questions for critical urban scholarship because of the ways in which they work to permanently target everyday urban sites, circulations and populations. Indeed, I believe that such thinking is now so dominant within contemporary state security and military thinking that it is necessary to talk of a ‘new military urbanism’. This I define as the emerging constellation of military and security doctrine and practice which posits that the key ‘security’ challenges of our age now centre on the everyday sites, spaces and circulations of cities. As I will demonstrate below, the new military urbanism gains its power because of the ways in which such doctrine and practice increasingly fuses with the wider circuits of visual-technological popular culture, political economy and state practice. As such, it plays a crucial role in forging dynamics whereby political power centres less on sovereign, territorial and disciplinary configurations, and more on the biopolitical arrangements of life within highly urbanized, mobile and digitally mediated societies (Foucault, 2003; 2007).

In what follows, I focus primarily on how the doctrines, cultures and technologies sustained by US military and security complexes are playing a central role in constituting the new military urbanism. My purpose in the current paper is twofold. Firstly, I seek to provoke critical urban scholarship to engage with the contemporary nature of militarization and its central role in shaping contemporary cities more deeply than has thus far been the case. Secondly, I want to delineate precisely what is ‘new’ about the new military urbanism as a way of understanding the complex linkages between contemporary cities, contemporary warfare and the politics of security. I attempt to achieve these two goals by exploring what I argue are the new military urbanism’s five interrelated foundations. These are: the urbanization of military and security doctrine; the links between militarized control technologies and digitized urban life; the cultural performances of militarized media consumption; the emerging urban political economies of the ‘security’ industries; and the new state spaces of violence.
Battlespace: the urbanization of military and security doctrine

‘The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken cities of our world.’

Peters (1996)

The first key feature of the new military urbanism is the way it normalizes new imaginations of political violence and a whole spectrum of ambient threats to ‘security’ which centre on the everyday sites, spaces, populations and circulations of cities. As part of the defence of what Julian Reid calls ‘logistical societies’ — societies where biopolitical threats emerge from the very central systems, flows and networks sustaining contemporary urban life — warfare within liberal modernity increasingly centres on securitizing and targeting the prosaic architectures and circulations of the city (see Reid, 2006; Dillon and Reid, 2009).

Driving the military targeting of the everyday sites, circulations and processes of urban life across the world is a new constellation of military doctrine and theory. In this, the spectre of state versus state military conflict is seen to be in radical retreat. Instead, the new doctrine is centred upon the idea that a wide spectrum of global insurgencies now operates across social, technical, political, cultural and financial networks, straddling transnational scales. These are deemed to provide existential threats to Western societies through themselves targeting or exploiting everyday urban sites, infrastructures and control technologies that sustain contemporary cities. Such lurking threats are deemed by security and military theorists to camouflage themselves within the ‘clutter’ of cities at home and abroad for concealment against traditional forms of military targeting. This, the argument goes, necessitates a radical ratcheting up of techniques of tracking, surveillance and targeting centred on both the architectures of circulation and mobility — infrastructures — and the spaces of everyday urban life.

The key concept driving the current ‘transformation’ in military thinking and practice is the shift from ‘battlefield’ to ‘battlespace’. This concept is crucial because it basically sustains what Phil Agre (2001) has called ‘a conception of military matters that includes absolutely everything’. Nothing lies outside the multidimensional and multiscale concept of battlespace, temporally or geographically. Battlespace has no front and no back, no start and no end; it is ‘deep, high, wide, and simultaneous: there is no longer a front or a rear’ (Blackmore, 2005). The concept of battlespace thus encompasses everything from the molecular scales of genetic engineering and nanotechnology, through the everyday sites, spaces and experiences of city life, to the planetary spheres of inner and outer space or the internet’s globe-straddling ‘cyberspace’. The focus of mobilization is thus no longer focused within delimited geographical or temporal spaces of ‘symmetrical’ state versus state warfare. Instead, it becomes increasingly unbound in time and space. Thus, state power seeks to target ‘asymmetric’ non-state forces and movements to the point where contemporary ‘warfare’ becomes effectively ‘coterminous... with the space of civil society itself’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 128).

With wars and battle no longer declared or finished, temporalities of war threaten to extend indefinitely. ‘War is back and seemingly forever’ (Deer, 2007: 1). No wonder Pentagon gurus convinced George Bush to replace the idea of the ‘war on terror’ with the new ‘big idea’ of the ‘long war’ in 2004 (McIntyre, 2004). All too easily, such a discourse slips into a world where life itself is war (Agre, 2001). Indeed, many military theorists now speak of a new (fourth) generation of asymmetric warfare in which nothing is ever outside the ‘battlespace’ (for a good example, see Hammes, 2006). This new ‘generation’ of war is based, they argue, on ‘unconventional’ wars, ‘asymmetric’ struggles, ‘global insurgencies’ and ‘low intensity conflicts’, which pit high-tech state militaries against informal fighters or mobilized civilians. Military theorist Thomas Hammes (2006: 3) for
example argues that, in the twenty-first century, so-called ‘fourth generation’ warfare will dominate global security politics, rooted in the concept that ‘superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power’. Using such doctrine, US commanders in Baghdad have emphasized the need to coordinate the entire ‘battlespace’ of the city, addressing civilian infrastructure, the shattered economy and cultural awareness, as well as ‘the controlled application of violence’, in order to try and secure the city (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005).

Intrinsically anti-urban, such paradigms quickly transpose the prosaic social acts that together forge cosmopolitan urban life into existential societal threats. For example, US military theorist William Lind, radically extending the US ‘culture wars’ debates of the 1980s and 1990s, and swallowing whole Samuel Huntingdon’s (1998) ‘clash of civilizations’ binary, has even argued that acts of urban immigration must now be understood as acts of ‘warfare’. ‘In Fourth Generation war’, writes Lind (2004), ‘invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army’. Under what he calls the ‘poisonous ideology of multiculturalism’, Lind (ibid.) argues that immigrants within Western nations can now launch ‘a homegrown variety of Fourth Generation war, which is by far the most dangerous kind’.

Here we confront the realities of what the Center for Immigration Studies has called the ‘weaponization’ of immigration (Cato, 2008). Such new imaginations of warfare provide a powerful example of what happens when all aspects of human life are rendered as nothing but war; nations are imagined in narrow ethno-nationalist ways and diasporic cities emerge as mere cultural pollutants (See Cowen, 2007). ‘The road from national genus to a totalized cosmology of the sacred nation’, writes Arjun Appadurai (2006: 4), ‘and further to ethnic purity and cleansing, is relatively direct’.

Crucially, the emerging body of urban military doctrine thus works to radically blur the traditional separation of peace and war, military and civil spheres, local and global scales, and the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of nations. On the one hand, then, a wide variety of Western military theorists now concur that that ‘modern urban combat operations will become one of the primary challenges of the 21st century’ (DIRC, 1997: 11). As US theorist of urban warfare Keith Dickson (2002: 4) puts it, the increasing perception within Western militaries is that ‘for Western military forces, asymmetric warfare in urban areas will be the greatest challenge of this century... The city will be the strategic high ground — whoever controls it will dictate the course of future events in the world’.

On the other hand, the US military’s search for new doctrines to deal with the perceived urbanization of war, organized violence and security explicitly recognizes the similarities when dealing with ‘urbanized terrain’ at home and abroad. Whilst the various warlords, gangs, militias and insurgents operating throughout the burgeoning informal urban areas of the global South (see Souza, 2009) are widely imagined by Western military theorists to represent the key military challenges of the twenty-first century, dense labyrinthine cities everywhere — both at home and abroad — are imagined together as key future battlespaces. ‘Despite the geographic differences’, writes Maryann Lawlor (2007) in the military magazine Signal, key personnel at the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia have engaged in massive war games and simulations (such as the exercise named ‘Urban Resolve’), and in so doing ‘identified several key concerns common to both areas’. These involve the difficulty of separating ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’ from the urban civilian population; the high densities of infrastructure; the way cities interrupt old-style military surveillance and targeting systems; and the complex three-dimensional nature of urban battlespace.

Through such an analytical lens, the LA riots of 1992, various attempts to securitize urban cores for major sports events or political summits, the militarized responses to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, and the challenges of ‘homeland security’ in US cities, have all blurred together to be perceived as ‘urban’ or ‘low-intensity’ operations or moments of ‘irregular warfare’, in common with episodes of counterinsurgency warfare taking place on the streets of Baghdad (see Boyle, 2005). Indeed, the paradigms
underpinning the new military urbanism allow transnational social movements and mobilizations against state oppression or the devastating effects of market fundamentalism, ecological crises and neoliberalization — for example, the Zapatistas or environmental and global justice campaigners — to be tackled as forms of ‘netwar’, equivalent to the radical and murderous Islamism of Al Qaeda (see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). Post-operational ‘lessons learned’ reports drawn up after military deployments to contain the Los Angeles riots in 1992, credited ‘the “success” of the mission to the fact that “the enemy” — the local population — was easy to outmaneuver given their simple battle tactics and strategies’ (cited in Cowen, 2007: 1).

Finally, the US military’s focus on military operations within the domestic urban sphere of the ‘homeland’ has strengthened dramatically since the start of the so-called ‘war on terror’ (see Canestaro, 2003). This process allows the US military to overcome traditional legal obstacles to deployment in the US itself (Canestaro, 2003). It allows the tactics and lessons of planning and designing ‘Green Zone’ urban bases in the hearts of Baghdad and other cities to be imported domestically as the template for implanting analogous ‘security zones’ around financial and government districts in New York and other major US cities (see Nemeth, 2009). Finally, it means that high-tech targeting practices employing unmanned drones and organized satellite surveillance programmes, previously limited to the permanent targeting of spaces beyond the nation’s boundaries to (purportedly) make the nation safe, are also starting to colonize the domestic urban spaces of the nation (see Gorman, 2008).

Significantly, the emergence of the new military urbanism works to compound longstanding trends towards punitive criminology and revanchist urban policy that have marked processes of urban neoliberalization in many Western and global South nations (see Smith, 2002; Wacquant, 2008). The US response to the devastation of the largely African-American city of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in November 1995 provides a paradigmatic example (Graham, 2006). For a brief period, some US Army officers articulated their highly militarized responses to the Katrina disaster in New Orleans as an attempt to ‘take back’ New Orleans from African-American ‘insurgencies’ (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). In this case, rather than a massive humanitarian response treating the victims as citizens requiring immediate help, a largely military operation was (eventually) organized. Such a response merely reinforced the idea that the internal geographies of the US are the sites of state-backed wars against racialized and biopolitically disposable others as much as external actors (Giroux, 2006). This operation treated those abandoned in the central city as a threat and a military objective to be contained, targeted and addressed in order to protect the property of the normalized and largely white suburban and exurban populations who had escaped in their own cars (Giroux, 2006). In the process, African-American citizens of the city were rendered refugees in their own country. As Robert Stam and Ella Shohat (2007: 167) argue, ‘Katrina not only ripped the roofs off Gulf Coast houses but also ripped the façade off “the national security state” ’.

Together, these blurring processes thus sust ain the imagination of all cities everywhere as key battlespaces requiring permanent targeting and mobilization within limitless imaginations of war. In the process, they threaten to fundamentally challenge accepted notions of citizenship, law and the distinction between a liberal ‘inside’ of the nation, controlled through policing, and an illiberal ‘outside’ where a nation’s military forces are deployed (Bigo and Anastassia, 2006; Cowen and Smith, 2009). Instead of such (inevitably precarious and contradictory) binaries, we are rapidly moving towards a context where, as Jeremy Packer (2006: 378) puts it, ‘citizens and non-citizens alike are now treated as an always present threat. In this sense, all are imagined as combatants and all terrain the site of battle’. The proliferation of anticipatory profiling and targeting systems, as we shall see in the next section, increasingly uses computer algorithms to define deviance, and hence threat, from the mass circulations and populations of the city, in advance of civil or criminal offences being proven (see Amoore, 2009).
The new military urbanism’s second foundation is the fusing and blurring of civilian and military applications of control, surveillance, communications, simulation and targeting technologies. This is not surprising given that control technologies with military origins are now fundamental bases for virtually all acts of digitally mediated urban life and consumption in advanced industrial cities, and that commercial modifications of such technologies are in turn being widely re-appropriated by the military.

With physical urban fortifications long forgotten or turned into tourist sites, contemporary architectures of (attempted) urban control now blend digital sensors into built space and physical infrastructure. Indeed, the new military urbanism rests on claims that contemporary cities are now, in Paul’s Virilio’s (1991) term, ‘overexposed’ to a wide range of ambient, mobile and transnational security threats. These include, to name but a few, mobile pathogens, malign computer code, financial crashes, ‘illegal’ migration, transnational terrorism, state infrastructural warfare and the environmental extremes triggered by climate change.

The permeability of contemporary cities to such malign circulations means that systems of (attempted) electronic control — stretched out to match the transnational geographies of such flows — become the new strategic architectures of city life. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1992) famously termed contemporary societies ‘societies of control’. Because networked electronic control and surveillance devices are now distributed through society, Deleuze argued that everyday urban life is now modulated by a sense of ever-present tracking, scrutiny and electronic calculation. This builds up profiles, analyses patterns of behaviour and mobility, and increasingly — because memory is now digitized — never forgets. Thus, circulations and movements between different spaces and sites within cities or nations often entail a parallel movement of what sociologists call the ‘data subject’ or ‘statistical person’ — the package of electronic tracks and histories amassed on a subject or object as a means of judging legitimacy, rights, profitability or degree of threat.

In control societies, then, (attempted) social control increasingly works through complex technological systems stretched across both temporal and geographical zones. These work constantly in the (‘calculative’) background as a ubiquitous computerized matrix of (increasingly) interlinked devices: ATM cards and financial databases; GPS transponders, barcodes and chains of global satellites; radio frequency chips and biometric identifiers; mobile computers, phones and e-commerce sites; and an extending universe of sensors built into streets, homes, cars, infrastructures and even bodies.

Such control technologies increasingly blur into the background of urban environments, urban infrastructures and urban life. In a sense, indeed, they become the city as they are layered over and through everyday urban landscapes, bringing into being radically new styles of movement, interaction, consumption and politics. Examples include new means of mobility (congestion charging, smart highways, budget airline travel), customized consumption (personalized Amazon.com pages) or ‘swarming’ social movements (social networking, smart and flash mobs, etc.).

Strikingly, discussions about ‘homeland security’ and the high-tech transformation of asymmetric war also centre prominently on the purported need to use these very technologies of high-tech surveillance, data mining and computerized algorithms to try and continually track, identify and ‘target’ threatening others within the mass of ‘clutter’ provided by our rapidly urbanizing and increasingly mobile world (Amoore, 2009). The technological architectures of consumption and mobility thus merge further into those
used to organize and prosecute a full spectrum of political violence (from profiling to killing). When one looks at the links between cities and post-second world war military history, the connection is actually far from surprising. Gerfried Stocker (1998: 132) notes that ‘there is no sphere of civilian life in which the saying “war is the father of all things” has such unchallenged validity as it does in the field of digital information technology’.

More than this, the new military urbanism has actually been the foundry of the new control technologies (see Virilio, 1989). After the second world war, military command and control strategies known as C3I — command, control, communications and information — dominated Cold War notions of war fighting and strategic deterrence. They also colonized the minutiae of modernizing urban life, especially in Western nations. ‘No part of the world went untouched by C3I’, writes Ryan Bishop (2004: 61), and ‘it delineates the organizational, economic, technological and spatial systems that derive from, rely on, and perpetuate military strategy’.

Since the start of the Cold War, for example, it has been common for the US to devote over 80% of all its expenditure on technological research and development to ‘defence’ (Mesnard y Méndez, 2002). Technologies like the internet, virtual reality, jet travel, data mining, closed-circuit TV, rocketry, remote control, microwaves, radar, global positioning, networked computers, wireless communication, satellite surveillance, containerization and logistics — which together now provide the basis for all aspects of everyday urban life — were thus all forged in the latter half of the twentieth century as part of the elaboration of systems of military control (see De Landa, 1992).

Considered thus, ‘this “insignia of the military” . . . manifests itself in a myriad of ways in global urban sites . . . The global city would not be a global city, as we have come to understand the phenomenon, without being deeply embedded in these processes’ (Bishop, 2004: 61). Whilst the relationship between commercial and military control and information technologies has always been a complex two-way affair, it is important to be mindful that the very technological architectures of contemporary urban life, through the crucial nexus of the new military urbanism, simultaneously bring into being the imperial geographies of empire.

The explosive recent growth of GPS applications is a salient example here (Kaplan, 2006). Since the US military first deployed GPS to support the ‘precision’ killing of the 1991 Gulf War, GPS has been partially declassified and opened up to a widening universe of commercial, governmental and civilian applications. GPS has become the basis for civilian mobility and navigation, a ubiquitous consumer technology used in PDAs, watches, cars, and a widening array of geolocation services. GPS has been used to reorganize agriculture, transportation, navigation, logistics, municipal government, law enforcement, border security, computer gaming and leisure activities. But few bother to consider the ways in which military and imperial power infuse every GPS application. Every civilian use of GPS, for example, is based on US Air Force atomic clocks and geostationary satellites used to continually kill as part of the permanent, distanced ‘war on terror.’

With a suite of surveillance and control technologies now established to try and pre-empt and anticipate consumption as well as risk, Bottomley and Moore (2007: 181) write that ‘the production of knowledge [is] no longer intended to secrete and clarify what can be known, but rather to “clarify what cannot be known” ’. The city is thus increasingly ‘defined by the military goal of being able to know the enemy even before the enemy is aware of himself as such’ (ibid.). The overarching feature of the new, militarized, surveillance push, regardless of whether its ‘targets’ are located in Manhattan or Baghdad, London or Fallujah, is an attempt to build systems of technological vision in which computer code itself, along with databases of real or imagined ‘targets’, is delegated with the agency of tracking and identifying ‘abnormal’ ‘targets’ from the background ‘normality’ or ‘clutter’ of a homeland or war-zone city (Amoore, 2009). This shift represents a process of profound militarization because the social identification of people within civilian law enforcement is complemented or even replaced by the machinic seeing of ‘targets’. ‘While civilian images are embedded in processes of
identification based on reflection’, writes media theorist Crandall (1999), ‘militarised perspectives collapse identification processes into “Id-ing” — a one-way channel of identification in which a conduit, a database, and a body are aligned and calibrated’.

Spectacles of urban war: militarized visual culture

‘The enduring attraction of war is this: even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living.’

Hedges (2003: 3)

The third foundation for the new military urbanism is the way in which it — and its wars — are performed and consumed overwhelmingly as visual, discursive and urban spectacles through the spaces of electronic imagery. The vast majority of participants, at least in the cities of the West, are far removed from any real likelihood of either military deployment or violent targeting. They have to rely on complex circuits of electronic imaging, on TV, the internet and in video games and films for their participation. The new military urbanism’s wars — geared towards the idea that permanent and pre-emptive mobilization is necessary to sustain public safety — increasingly ‘take the form of mediatized mechanisms and are ordered as massive intrusions into visual culture, which are conflated with, and substitute for, the actual materiality and practices of the public sphere’ (Feldman, 2004: 334).

As the 9/11 attacks demonstrate, of course, insurgents and terrorists are themselves well versed in carefully organizing their violence with extraordinary urban media spectacles in mind. These centre on delivering spectacles of apocalyptic urban annihilation, which bear uncanny resemblance to the well-versed tropes of Hollywood disaster movies, but are delivered live, in real time, in real places, to real bodies (Boal et al., 2005). The 9/11 attacks for example were, writes Mike Davis (2002: 5), ‘organised as epic horror cinema with meticulous attention to the mise-en-scène... The hijacked planes were aimed precisely at the vulnerable border between fantasy and reality’. As a result, ‘thousands of people who turned on their televisions on 9/11 were convinced that the cataclysm was just a broadcast, a hoax. They thought they were watching rushes from the latest Bruce Willis film’ (ibid.). Indeed, a common response to those events was that ‘it was just like watching a movie!’ — Hollywood dramatic tradition relies heavily on both the spectacular demise of cities and the collapse of towering buildings. As the archetypal modern metropolis, the history of New York in particular can actually be told through the histories of imaginations of its demise in films, comics, video games and novels (see Page, 2008).

Warfare and the military urbanism sustaining it now achieve (precarious) legitimacy and consent through these visual and electronic circuits. At the same time, the divisions between military simulation, information warfare, news and entertainment are becoming so blurred as to be increasingly meaningless. Together, in the US at least, they now fuse into a fuzzy world of mutually reinforcing ‘militainment’ (Burston, 2003). Thus, the military employs Hollywood’s finest to merge their digital simulations for training directly into mass-market video games. Closing the circle, it then uses video game consoles to model the control stations for the unmanned drones used to patrol the streets of Baghdad or undertake extrajudicial assassinations and targeted killings.

The US military, meanwhile, ‘mobilizes science fiction writers and other futurologists to plan for the wars of tomorrow just as they consciously recruit video-game playing adolescents to fight the same conflict’ on weapons whose controls directly now mimic those of Playstations (Gray, 1997: 190). The profusion of digital video sensors in turn...
provides an almost infinite range of material to mine for reality TV shows like *Police!Camera!Action!* These feed voyeuristic and eroticized experiences of urban violence for the citizenry. In short, ‘the 2003 War in Iraq was the first war to emerge in the electronic informational space as a fully coordinated “media spectacle”, complete with embedded reporters, interactive websites, and 3D models and maps all at the ready’ (Jordan, 2007: 278).

Shrill and bellicose, the commercial news media meanwhile appropriate their own digital simulations of the cities and spaces to be targeted by imperial war. They provide a 24/7 world of war and infotainment which eroticizes high-tech weaponry whilst making death curiously invisible (Thussu, 2003). In the US, especially, commercial news content in the run-up the 2003 invasion of Iraq was skewed massively towards pro-war arguments. Material was pre-selected and approved by Pentagon officials resident within each TV studio. What James Der Derian (2003) calls ‘a techno-aesthetic’ was orchestrated between sets, images, maps, simulations and footage. ‘When the war premiered’, he writes (using the term deliberately), ‘the television studios introduced new sets that mimicked the command and control centers of the military (FOX News actually referred to its own, without a trace of Strangelovian irony, as the “War Room”)

In parallel, Der Derian notes that ‘computer-generated graphics of the Iraq battlespace were created by the same defense industries (like Evans and Sutherland and Analytical Graphics) and commercial satellite firms (like Space Imaging and Digital Globe) that supply the US military’ (ibid.). Finally, the technophile eroticities of weaponry filled the screens. ‘The networks showcased a veritable *Jane’s Defense Review* of weapon-systems, providing ‘virtual views’ of Iraq and military hardware that are practically indistinguishable from target acquisition displays’ (ibid.). These various blurrings and fusions are symptoms of the broader emergence of what Der Derian (2001) earlier called the ‘Military–Industrial–Media–Entertainment network’ in the concoction of events and the manipulation of news.

‘Battle simulations, news, and interactive games exist within an increasingly unified space’, writes Jordan Crandall (2004: 15). ‘With military-news-entertainment systems, simulations jostle with realities to become the foundation for war. They help combine media spectatorship and combat, viewing and fighting’ (ibid.). In the process, the domestic home — the main site of this continuous performance of electronic screening — becomes a militarized site for the enactment of both symbolic and real violence against far-off others on a potentially 24/7 basis. Such others, of course, can exist at a variety of geographic distances from the ‘home’ screen and its surrounding security architectures. Similar logics operate upon the racialized others of the downtown ghetto and the racialized bodies of Arab cities.

The multiple circuits of ‘civilian’ media are thus fully inscribed into all the latest variations on military doctrine as perhaps the most important of all elements of contemporary ‘battlespace’. Indeed, military theorists now commonly describe TV and the internet as ‘virtual weapons’ within the crucial domains of ‘information warfare’ (see Johnson, 2007). They also bemoan the way ‘asymmetric’ struggles like the second Palestinian Intifada actually gain massive global political credibility because they lead to the broadcasting of images of Palestinian children confronting Israeli tanks with stones (Hammes, 2006).

The informational or psychological aspects of all US military operations are now central to military planning. Consider the 2003 ‘shock and awe’ pyrotechnics, with ordnance devastating targets symbolizing the Hussein regime (and nearby Iraqi civilians), a safe yet camera-friendly distance away from the serried ranks of journalists lined up in a nearby hotel. Or the press conferences filled with images from missiles’ cameras, ‘precisely’ hitting their targets, that were such a feature of the 1991 Gulf War. Recall, too, that the Pentagon banned the circulation of images of US war dead returning home, and explicitly discussed the need to completely fabricate news stories to launch into global visual and media circuits (Der Derian, 2002). Finally, consider that violent
force was used against media providers who had the temerity to show images of Baghdad’s dead civilians killed by US forces. Thus, Al Jazeera’s offices in both Kabul and Baghdad were bombed by US forces, killing one journalist (Parks, 2007).

Meanwhile, military action movies and right-wing TV news stations like Fox News have been turned, through increasingly direct Pentagon intervention, into extended ads for the US military or the ‘war on terror’ and its offshoots (Robb, 2004). In effect, ‘the military [took] over the television studios’ (Der Derian, 2003). Through their public affairs offices located within TV studios:

retired general and flag officers exercised full spectrum dominance on cable and network TV as well as on commercial and public radio. The new public affairs officers of the military–industrial–media–entertainment network included Clark and Sheppard on CNN, Nash and Hawley on ABC, Kerman and Ralston on CBS, McCaffrey and Meigs on NBC, and Olstrom and Scales on NPR. Fox News alone had enough ex-military to stage their own Veterans’ Day parade (ibid.).

Crucially, though, the very digital circuits of imagery organized so successfully to propagandize the war in Iraq have also contributed to its undoing. The global circulation of the tourist-style digital images of the Abu Ghraib torturers, for example, provided a massive boost to all those working to oppose the war, and provided iconic images of torture to those who suspected widespread brutality within the US system of incarceration without trial. Efforts by the US military ‘information operations’ campaigns to buy up relevant satellite imaging during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have not prevented systems like Google Earth being widely used by anti-war activists, urban terrorists and Iraqi insurgencies alike. In addition, mobile phone video cameras allowed bystanders to reveal the regular killings of Iraqi civilians by the private military corporation Blackwater. Finally, there is also growing evidence (as seen during the attacks on Mumbai by the Lashkar-e-Taiba group in November 2008 for example) that non-state insurgents and terrorists are now able to utilize sophisticated technologies like GPS and Google Earth in planning and undertaking their own attacks against urban civil societies (see Bratton, 2009).

‘Security’ and political economy

As the everyday spaces and systems of urban everyday life are colonized by militarized control technologies, and notions of policing and war, domestic and foreign, peace and war blur together, so the new military urbanism’s fourth pillar is constituted: a massive boom in a convergent industrial complex encompassing sectors such as security, surveillance, academia, military technology, prisons, electronic entertainment and corrections. These fusing industries work to exploit the cross-fertilization and blurring between the traditional military imperatives of war external to the state, and those of policing internal to it, within the broader apparatus of Der Derian’s (2001) Military–Industrial–Media–Entertainment network.

The proliferation of wars sustaining permanent mobilization and pre-emptive ubiquitous surveillance within and beyond territorial borders means that the imperative of ‘security’ now ‘imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity’ (Agamben, 2002: 1). Georgio Agamben argues that ‘what used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation’ (ibid.).

The result is an ever-broadening landscape of ‘security’ blending commercial, military and security practices with increasingly fearful cultures of civilian mobility, citizenship and consumption. These fusions are manifest in a proliferation of digital passage-points, superimposed upon, through and within the architectural and
geographical spaces of cities and systems of cities. These continually seek to link databases of past traffic and behaviour into normative judgements of rights to presence or access based on anticipations of future risk. As philosopher William Connolly (2005: 54) suggests:

Airport surveillance, internet filters, passport tracking devices, legal detention without criminal charges, security interment camps, secret trials, ‘free speech zones’, DNA profiles, border walls and fences, erosion of the line between internal security and external military action — these security activities resonate together, engendering a national security machine that pushes numerous issues outside the range of legitimate dissent and mobilizes the populace to support new security and surveillance practices against underspecified enemies.

It is no accident that security–industrial complexes blossom in parallel with the diffusion of market fundamentalist notions of organizing social, economic and political life or widening social mobilizations against these. The hyper-inequalities and urban militarization and securitization sustained by urban neoliberalization are mutually reinforcing. In a discussion of the US’s response to the Katrina disaster, for example, Henry Giroux (2006: 172) points out that the normalization of market fundamentalism in US culture has made it much more ‘difficult to translate private woes into social issues and collective action or to insist on a language of the public good’. He argues that ‘the evisceration of all notions of sociality’ in this case has led to ‘a sense of total abandonment, resulting in fear, anxiety, and insecurity over one’s future’ (ibid.).

Added to this, Giroux (ibid.) argues that ‘the presence of the racialized poor, their needs, and vulnerabilities — now visible — becomes unbearable’. Rather than address the causes of poverty or insecurity, however, political responses now invariably ‘focus on shoring up a diminished sense of safety, carefully nurtured by a renewed faith in all things military’ (ibid.). Also crucial is the effective looting of state budgets for post-disaster assistance and reconstruction by cabals of predatory lobbyists intimately linked to both governments and the burgeoning array of private military and security corporations (see Klinenberg and Frank, 2005).

Given such a context, it is not surprising that, amidst a global financial crash, market growth in security services and technologies remains extremely strong. ‘International expenditure on homeland security now surpasses established enterprises like movie-making and the music industry in annual revenues’ (The Economic Times, 2007). Homeland Security Research Corporation (2007) points out that ‘the worldwide “total defense” outlay (military, intelligence community, and Homeland Security/ Homeland Defense) is forecasted to grow by approximately 50%, from $1,400 billion in 2006 to $2,054 billion by 2015’. By 2005, US defence expenditure alone had reached US $420 billion a year. By 2010, the US defence budget (including extra spending on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars) had reached US $664 billion (US Government, 2010).

Unfortunately, very little high-quality critical urban research exists on the complex transnational political economy of what the OECD (2004) calls the ‘new security economy’ (although see Bisley, 2004 for a rare example). It is clear, though, that the production and research and development aspects of the global security surge are overwhelmingly constituted within the world’s key technopolitan urban centres and centred on the world’s leading high-tech corporate universities. As in the Cold War, beyond the surface polish of digital utopianism that dominates the representation of places like Silicon Valley, the Washington Beltway, Tel Aviv and Cambridge, Massachusetts, these technopolitan complexes are the foundries of global securitization and militarization. Unlike their Cold War contemporaries, however (see Markusen et al., 1991), contemporary economic geographers are yet to map out these geographical political economies of the new security surge.
It is equally clear that the transnational organized coalitions between governments and corporate interests that are driving the global security surge are coalescing and operating well beyond the democratic scrutiny of national democracies. ‘Growth in the industry is assured by massive government contracts and generous subsidies for homeland security research and development’ (Hayes and Tasse, 2007). Crucial here is the argument that radical extensions in the extent and reach of national and supranational surveillance systems might be fuelled by the dictates of industrial policy rather than the need to mobilize against purported security threats. Statewatch’s Ben Hayes (2006: 3), for example, argues that the EU’s efforts to establish its continent-wide Security Research Programme are best described as ‘“Big Brother” meets market fundamentalism’. Its massive high-tech development and supply contracts are organized by a cabal of ‘EU officials and Europe’s biggest arms and IT companies’ (ibid.). As in the US, moreover, EU security policy as well as research is heavily influenced by massive lobbying from the main corporate security operations (many of which are recently privatized state operations). Rather than the ethics of massive securitization, the prime EU concern has been how European industries could muscle in on booming global markets. The main concern here is to allow EU corporations to take a bigger slice of booming global markets for a ‘myriad of local and global surveillance systems; the introduction of biometric identifiers; RFID, electronic tagging and satellite monitoring; “less-lethal weapons”; paramilitary equipment for public order and crisis management; and the militarization of border controls’ (ibid.). Thus we face the possibility of urban securitization as a shop window for industrial policy within burgeoning ‘security’ marketplaces. This logic operates most powerfully during the temporary urban securitization operations which surround major political summits and sporting events.

Urbicidal wars: state, space, violence

‘The fate of empires is very often sealed by the interaction of war and debt.’

Gray (2008: 31)

Finally, and following on neatly from such arguments, the new military urbanism rests fundamentally on the changing powers of states to attempt the violent reconfiguration, or even erasure, of cities and urban spaces. This operates either as a means to allay purported threats, or as way of clearing new space for the exigencies of global-city formation, neoliberal production, or as urban tabula rasa necessary for the most profitable bubbles of real estate speculation. Central here are widespread invocations of exception and emergency in justifying such violent assaults, often against (demonized and fictionalized) urban, racial or class enemies (Mbembe, 2003: 16).

Such states of exception are called into being both to constitute the geographies of permanent violence that sustain the neoliberal economy, and to create what Achille Mbembe (2003: 16) calls ‘death worlds’ — spaces like Palestine where vast populations are forced to live the lives of the living dead. Both work to support broader geographies of accumulation through dispossession which, whilst as old as colonialism, have been especially central to neoliberal globalization (Banerjee, 2006). Here we confront further aspects of the complex political economies of the new military urbanism and their central integration into what Naomi Klein (2007) has diagnosed as a tendency within contemporary neoliberal capitalism to engineer, or profit from, catastrophic ‘natural’ or political-economic shocks. In short, at issue here is the character of what, following the work of Neil Brenner (2004), we might call the new state spaces of war and violence, and their relationships with political violence and geographies of dispossession in the current period.
Citing the systematic Israeli bulldozing of homes and towns in Palestine, similar erasures of hotbeds of resistance like Fallujah in Iraq, and the widespread erasure of informal settlements across the globe — as city authorities entrepreneurially reorganize urban spaces to be ‘global’ — Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer (2006: 23), drawing on Frantz Fanon’s (1963) classic critiques of the violences intrinsic to Western colonial power, point ‘to an ominously normalized reality experienced by the “damned of the earth” after the “end of history”’. This, they argue, has summoned a new keyword in urban studies and allied disciplines: urbicide (see Graham, 2004).

Defined as political violence intentionally designed to erase or ‘kill’ cities, urbicidal violence can involve the ethno-nationalist targeting of spaces of cosmopolitan mixing (as in the Balkans in the 1990s) (Coward, 2009); the systematic devastation of the means of modern urban living (as with the de-electrification of Iraq in 1991, the 2006–08 siege of Gaza or the 2006 attack on Lebanon); or the simple erasure of those demonized people and places that are cast out as unmodern, barbarian, unclean, pathological or subhuman (as with Robert Mugabe’s bulldozing of hundreds of thousands of shanty dwellings on the edge of Harare in 2005) (see Graham, 2003; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007; Coward, 2009).

The phenomenon is an extremely common — although often overlooked — feature in global South urban areas, where political and economic elites attempt to cast their spaces as putative ‘global cities’ — to be the ‘next Shanghai’ — as a legitimation of predatory planning as violent erasure (on predatory planning following the Katrina disaster in New Orleans, see Nagel and Nagel, 2007). The super-modern accoutrements of highways, malls, airports, office blocks, leisure parks, sports stadia and luxury condo complexes tend inevitably to be deemed more ‘global’ than the dilapidated, self-made and ‘illegal’ shanty districts which house the urban poor. A recent global survey by the United Nations Habitat Programme (2007: xi) found that, between 2000 and 2002, 6.7 million people were forcibly evicted from informal settlements in 60 countries, compared to 4.2 million in the previous two years. Fritz Fanon’s (1963) words are as relevant here as ever: ‘the business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands the much bigger business of plunder’.

To Goonewardena and Kipfer (2006), the proliferation of urbicidal violence in the contemporary period reflects the shift to a world where the politics of the city, and of urban life, are inevitably absolutely central to the production and constitution of social relations. In a majority-urban world, they write, ‘the struggle for the city . . . coincides more and more with the struggle for a social order’ (ibid. 28). With global urbanization intensifying (it is estimated that 75% of the global population will inhabit urban areas by 2050), this coincidence can only become starker.

Architectural and urban theory thus emerge as key sites in imperial, neoliberal, corporate or military attempts to produce or reorganize urban space (as well as in a wide spectrum of resistances to such processes). Strange appropriations are emerging here. Eyal Weizman (2005), for example, has shown how certain Israeli generals have appropriated the radical post-structural writings of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to fashion new military doctrine for taking and controlling the labyrinthine spaces of Palestinian refugee camps. Here, as a result, ‘contemporary urban warfare’, Weizman (ibid.: 74) writes, ‘plays itself out within a constructed, real or imaginary architecture, and through the destruction, construction, reorganization, and subversion of space’. Such new Israeli military operations, forging paths through the linked walls of entire Palestinian towns, thus seek to ‘create operational “space as if it had no borders”, neutralizing the advantages accorded by urban terrain to opponents of occupation’ (Goonewardena and Kipfer, 2006: 28).

It is startling, too, that many of the emerging urban warfare techniques of state militaries — which Goonewardena and Kipfer label colonization without occupation — are actually imitations of the great twentieth century urban resistances against state militaries. ‘This non-linear, poly-nucleated and anti-hierarchical strategy of combat in urban areas’, Goonewardena and Kipfer (2006: 29) point out, ‘in fact plagiarises the
tactics of the defenders of the Paris Commune, Stalingrad and the Kasbahs of Algiers, Jenin and Nablus’.

Added to this, we must also emphasize the role of techniques of the new urban militarism and urbicidal violence in disciplining or displacing dissent and resistance within the metropolitan heartlands of global capitalism, processes that reach their peaks during major urban WTO, G8, IMF and G20 summits. We must recognize the way these discursive and material techniques erase or deligitimize those urban claims and spaces that stand in the way of increasingly ‘predatory’ forms of urban planning (see Nagel, n.d.), clearing the way for new super-modern infrastructures, production centres or urban consumption and tourist enclaves. And we must address how the new military urbanism, blurring as it does into the authoritarian turn in criminology, penology and social policy, tries to control or incarcerate the unruly populations of the postcolonial metropolis (as in what have been termed the ‘internal colonies’ of the French banlieues; see Dikeç, 2007).

Beyond all this, though, as we have already noted, we must not forget the ways in which global processes of securitization, militarization, disinvestment and erasure provide vital sustenance to the economies of metropolitan heartlands themselves (Keil, 2007). Although it has been curiously ignored by the voluminous research on the new economic centrality of global cities, it is crucial to stress that such sites are at the very centre of a world where ‘the military-industrial establishments of corporate capitalism, led by the US . . . produce “life-killing commodities” as the most profitable part of global trade’ (Mesnard y Méndez, 2002). Global cities organize and fix financial flows, shape uneven geographic development, and draw off surpluses towards dominant corporate sectors and globalized socio-economic elites integrated closely with national and international states. With their stock markets, technopoles, arms fairs, high-tech ‘clusters’ and state weapons and security research labs, such cities are literally the ‘brains’ sustaining the highly militarized forms of globalization that have so characterized the neoliberal period. They also house the production aspects of the military–industrial–security–surveillance complex and are fringed by ‘garrison’ cities whose economies are dominated by deployed militaries and private industrial corporations.

The new military urbanism’s wars thus now operate to fuel capital accumulation through the global city system. Increasingly, this is based on new forms of ‘primitive accumulation’ (Harvey, 2003). Such a process relies on the way resource and oil wars stimulate high rates of return (especially for the petro-chemical complex), rather than the use of military contracts to provide Keynesian stimulation to the economy (as in the late twentieth century) (Bichler et al., 2004). Contemporary city-building can thus be seen, at least in part, as an accumulation strategy in a far more intense way than at any previous moment. Militarization, massive reconstructive reinvestment and a supposed humanitarian agenda (bombs dropped alongside care packages on Kabul) all feed into this strategy of city building (Smith, 2007). Military destruction or forcible appropriation can thus act as rapid agents of creative destruction. This in turn provides major opportunities for privatization and gentrification, and the appropriation of assets through global-city stock markets.

Conclusions

In bringing together an unusually broad spread of literatures and debates as a way of helping to reveal the urban dimensions of contemporary security and military doctrine, technology and practices, this article has sought to connect usually disparate debates. In the process, by means of its primary focus on the case of the United States, it has demonstrated how new discourses and practices of war and securitization increasingly work to problematize urban life per se. Crucially, this occurs in telescopic ways which intimately link cities of metropolitan and capitalist heartlands with those on colonial frontiers and peripheries. Such two-way linkages between metropole and colony — what
Michel Foucault (2003: 103) termed ‘boomerang effects’ — whilst often obscured, play a central role in cementing the norms, discourses, imaginative geographies and technoscientific arrangements of the new military urbanism in place (Graham, 2009). In the above discussions we have explored several such linkages in detail: the ways in which contemporary discourses and practices of war and securitization centre powerfully on technophiliac dreams of anticipation and omniscience; how they work to try and colonize fast-converging cultures of digital media; how they lead to the pervasive installation of new security technologies; and how they bring into being new political economies of state political violence.

It is clear that the challenges of excavating and exposing these linkages further should be a task to which critical urban research addresses itself. To help such a process along, our remaining job here is to consider the contribution that the current analysis makes towards identifying key challenges for future work in critical urban research on the intersections of cities, security and militarization. Three particular challenges emerge here.

Firstly, it is clear that the new military urbanism gains much of its power from the ways in which key exemplars of militarization and securitization emerge as mobile norms to be imitated and applied more generally, both between metropole and colony, and centre and periphery, and within more pervasive shifts towards securitization. Thus, for example, Israeli expertise and security technology for targeting civilian populations is increasingly being diffused globally along borders, during sporting events or political summits, or as part of broader attempts to securitize urban spaces and infrastructural circulations (Graham, 2010). Meanwhile, major attempts are being made by the US Department of Homeland Security to normalize US systems for attempting to securitize ports, airports, and electronic communications and financial systems across transnational systems of circulation. Little is yet known, however, about the detailed policy processes through which certain norms emerge as mobile exemplars within and through the burgeoning transnational political economies that sustain the new military urbanism. Much more detailed comparative work is particularly required to expose how mobile events like political summits and global sports events act as particularly important moments within such processes of mobile exemplification.

Secondly, whilst this article has primarily addressed the extremely important role of US military and security cultures, doctrines and technologies in sustaining the new military urbanism, much work needs to be done to satisfactorily understand how the contemporary trends towards the securitization of cities are refracted through different national security and military cultures and the various urban political and legal traditions. Beyond the crucial importance of the mobile exemplars, transnational discourses and political economies highlighted above, care needs to be taken not to over-generalize from US, Israeli or any other experience within the still variegated national and urban political landscapes that constitute global neoliberal urbanism. Critical comparative work is thus urgently required to explore how the build-up of transnationally organized policing, securitization and counterinsurgency warfare — and their norms and exemplars — intersect with persistent differences, path dependencies and, not least, limits and resistances in the ways in which national and local security and military organizations address urban spaces and circulations.

Thirdly, the perspective deployed in this article suggests that there are major conceptual and theoretical opportunities to be explored when debates about the intersections of cities and security range across questions as diverse as the urban political economies of security industries, the discursive targeting of cities within electronic visual culture, the urban ‘surveillance surge’ and the proliferation of urbicidal violence. Such an analytical breadth helps to reveal the powerful ways in which discourses demonizing cities as intrinsically pathological and insecure spaces necessitating violent state reaction work simultaneously across multiple circuits and political economies. To further develop such work, however, there is a need to build on the latest theorizations of the biopolitics of warfare, circulation, mobility and securitization within liberal societies.
(see Reid, 2006; Dillon and Reid, 2009). Specifically, such conceptually sophisticated but empirically disengaged political theory needs to be linked much more closely to debates in critical urban research about the specific processes whereby urban spaces, sites, infrastructures and circulations are securitized and militarized.

Discussions about biopolitics and security need in particular to be much more fully grounded in the context of rampant urbanization, the growth of transnationally organized urban regions, the insecurities generated by neoliberal globalization, and the militarization of many civil law enforcement regimes. Necessary here is the challenge of showing how the reconstitution of urban sites and spaces, far from being mere geographic backdrops to the elaboration of biopolitical regimes of war and securitization, actually work powerfully to help constitute such highly contradictory regimes. ‘The city [is] not just the site’, writes Eyal Weizman (2005: 53), ‘but the very medium of warfare — a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux’.

Finally, in building up a robust and critical body of work addressing the multiple circuits which together consolidate the new military urbanism, it will also become much clearer how social and political mobilizations of various sorts and at various scales — including those from within militaries and security complexes themselves — can best expose, obstruct, resist and challenge the entrenching and diffusing norms, discourses and technoscientific arrangements at the heart of the new military urbanism. This is a particularly pivotal challenge given the tendency across a widening series of urban sites and events to increasingly portray and imagine cities as little but key battlespaces — urban sites requiring permanent and profitable lockdown and targeting within worlds of boundless, ambient and mobile threat.

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Résumé

Il est désormais établi que la ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ et ses ramifications ont été visiblement marquées par une vague de pratiques, de productions matérielles et de discours urbains. D’une portée délibérément transdisciplinaire, synthétique et polémique, cet article montre que les nouvelles idéologies de guerre permanente sans frontières renforcent profondément la militarisation de la vie urbaine contemporaine. Les processus de militarisation contemporains (entourant ce qui est baptisé ici ‘le nouvel urbanisme militaire’) soulèvent des questions fondamentales pour la recherche urbaine critique, du fait qu’ils contribuent à normaliser la prise pour cible des populations, flux et sites urbains ordinaires. S’attachant surtout à la doctrine, la culture et la technologie militaires et sécuritaires américaines, une analyse détaille les cinq fondements en interrelation de ce nouvel urbanisme militaire: l’urbanisation de la doctrine militaro-sécuritaire; les liens entre technologies de contrôle militarisées et vie urbaine numérisée; les spectacles culturels consommés via les médias militarisés; les économies politiques urbaines naissantes des ‘industries de la sécurité’; les nouveaux espaces de violence nationaux. Une fois ces différents thèmes développés, la conclusion vient proposer des axes d’études urbaines critiques à travers l’exposé et la remise en cause de la normalisation propre au nouvel urbanisme militaire.