The International and Transnational Dimensions of Democracy in the Americas

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Since the onset of the so-called third wave of democratic transitions and the end of the Cold War, Latin America has experienced a proliferation of international and transnational pro-democracy activity by state, intergovernmental, and nonstate actors. This has given rise to a situation where the outcomes of "domestic" processes of political change are increasingly shaped by a host of transnational and international actors.

For example, in Haiti, on February 29, 2004, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted after months of growing rebel activity. This act occurred with the alleged complicity of the Bush administration. A loose transnational network of advocates in favor of restoring Aristide to power formed quickly. It included supporters of Aristide's party Fanmi Lavalas in Haiti, African American members of the U.S. Congress, members of the overseas Haitian diaspora, and leftist groups in North America and Europe. It could also potentially be understood to include sympathetic governments like those of Jamaica and South Africa and the multilateral organization of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). This loose network faced another powerful transnational network opposed to Aristide that included local economic elites in Haiti, other
members of the Haitian diaspora abroad, significant elements within the U.S. government and the Republican Party, and the governments of France and Canada. Between these actors, the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and a peace-keeping force led by Brazil participated actively to restore order and to organize elections after Aristide's departure. Ultimately, Aristide did not return, and after several postponements, elections were held in early 2006.

In Venezuela, after an aborted coup attempt against Hugo Chávez in April 2002, a trilateral mission comprised of the Organization of American States, the Carter Center, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) convened to facilitate a democratic dialogue between the Chávez government and the opposition umbrella organization Coordinadora Democrática. Both pro-government and pro-opposition factions in Venezuela rallied a range of other supporters from outside the country in their efforts to overcome the political crisis. Those outside actors included the international media, the U.S. government, the Cuban government, a binationa! multipartisan group of Venezuelan and U.S. congressional members called the Boston Group, and a group of representatives of interested states (Brazil, the United States, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain) convened by the OAS secretary-general under the moniker "The Group of Friends." The transformed debate about how to move the Venezuelan political situation forward stretched out over a two-year period. After a long and bumpy mediation process, the trilateral OAS-Carter Center-UNDP mission furnished technical assistance and monitored the August 2004 presidential recall referendum, which confirmed Chávez's mandate.

In Nicaragua in 2005, embattled President Enrique Bolaños turned to the U.S. government and the OAS for assistance in countering the efforts of an unexpected alliance between political figures from opposite sides of the political spectrum: former Liberal president Arnoldo Alemán and former Sandinista president Daniel Ortega. These two influential actors had conspired in an attempt to curb executive powers, reinterpret the Constitution, and end Bolaños's presidency before he had completed a full term in office. With the consent of the Bolaños government, in June 2005 the OAS invoked the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC; see appendix B). As a first step, it authorized a special diplomatic mission led by the OAS secretary-general José Miguel Insulza to promote dialogue between the rival elites. Insulza sub-

quentl stepped Dante Caputo, former Argentine foreign minister, to facilitate the process. Concurrently, a new transnational nonstate actor comprised of former presidents, prime ministers, senior government officials, and their advisers called the Friends of the Democratic Charter undertook several behind-the-scenes fact-finding visits in support of an internationally mediated solution to the crisis. By October 2005 a political compromise was forged that defused the crisis and allowed Bolaños to serve out the remainder of his term.

The lesson of cases like Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua is that we cannot rightly characterize such moments of political crisis and change in the Americas as purely domestic processes. As we argue in this volume, however, even in extreme cases of outside influence such as Haiti, neither are these processes wholly internationally driven. The contributions in this volume stress that international and transnational phenomena are integral to understanding democratization in places undergoing transition, the preservation of democracy in places that have already adopted democratic institutions, and the persistence of democratic deficits in some arenas.

Understanding the Dimensions of Democratization

A tradition of comparative politics scholarship on democratization accords a marginal role to international factors in the analysis of transitions to democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Zee and Stepes 1999). In the concluding volume of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter (1986, 59) state that "domestic factors play a predominant role in the transition." Yet scholars now notice a qualitative shift in international relations and the regional democratization problematic, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This shift is noticeable in terms of both overall international engagement in democratization processes and the degree of influence that international actors appear to have over outcomes (Prisheim 1994; Lutz and Sikkink 2001, 286). Karen Remmer (1995, 288), comparing democracy promotion in Haiti, El Salvador, Chile, and Peru in the early 1990s, writes: "From a historical perspective, what stands out about the contemporary situation is less the conditioning impact of domestic forces than the extraordinary capacity of outside actors to shift the political momentum in the direction of democratic options and to maintain that momentum through time in the face of apparently insuperable obstacles and repeated setbacks."

The increase in international engagement in and influence over domestic
democratization processes, now widely documented (Goldman and Douglas 1998; Carothers 1999; Cox, Berhegyi, and Inoguchi 2002; Halperin and Galic 2006; Pevehouse 2005; Cooper and Legler 2006) demands a new set of analytical tools for understanding the mechanics of democratization. To begin, we
must recognize that the debate has moved beyond assertions about the relative weight and primacy of domestic versus international variables in democratization. Grugel (1999a, 157) has proposed that just as the boundaries between "internal" and "external" are increasingly blurred, it is no longer useful to separate domestic from international factors in our explanations of democratization. In Remmer's words (1996, 289), "the key theoretical issue is not the relative importance of domestic as opposed to international variables but, rather, varying patterns of interaction across time and space." Whitehead, once
practically a "nativist" himself, concurs: "it may be artificial to dichotomize the analysis into domestic and international elements. Although there will always be some purely domestic and some exclusively international factors involved, most of the analysis will contain a tangle of both elements. In the
contemporary world there is no such thing as democratization in one country, and perhaps there never was" (Whitehead 1996, 24).

We propose that the traditional dichotomy between "domestic" and "international" factors, reinforced by the artificial separation between comparative politics and international relations, is often analytically inaccurate and misleading, particularly when applied to contemporary democratization processes in the Americas. Contemporary scholarship that blends comparative politics and international relations scholarship pushes our study in the direction of a trichotomy with overlapping categories: domestic, international, and transnational. A key insight has to do with the problematization of the interna
tional. Whereas "international" once served as a catchall category for all actors and influences emanating from beyond a country's borders, it is now increasingly confined in meaning to the realm of states and their foreign affairs, as in a traditional realist conception. Meanwhile, the idea of transnational politics as distinct from the domestic or international has become an increasingly important area of inquiry (Risse-Kappen 1995; O'Brien et al. 2000; Tharrow 2003, 2005; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; H. P. Schmitt 2004).

What do we mean by transnational? In the simplest sense, Keohane and Nye (1977, xii–xvi) define transnational relations as "regular interactions across boundaries when at least one actor is non-state." This definition helps differentiate transnational from interstate relations; however, it is so broad as to include virtually all other kinds of cross-border human activity (Risse 2002, 255).

For our purposes, the term transnational requires greater specification. It emphasizes the role of non-state actors in international relations, but in our view it does not diminish the importance of states. States engage in transnational politics just as nonstate actors; do not they are enmeshed in transnational politics just as nonstate actors are.

Our transnational approach pays particular attention to the role of norms and ideas in politics. It recognizes that regional norms of democracy are socially constructed, and their construction is not contained within the borders of individual states. They are defined through formal, relatively bounded processes, such as the periodic summits of the Americas in which the thirty-four heads of state and government from the hemisphere meet to discuss issues of mutual interest, and also through relatively unbounded practices, such as the transnational cybercommunications and support network that grew up around the Zapatista movement in Chiapas in Mexico from 1994 onward (Olsen 2003).

Furthermore, we consider democratization to be transnational in that it plays out in a spatial context that is not confined within the boundaries of the democratizing state in question. Political change is fueled by what occurs in key political centers such as Washington, D.C., at regional and multilateral meetings, even within the quasi-national dimension of the Internet. Following the path-breaking work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) on transnational advocacy, there is increasing recognition that political change can often be generated by domestic opponents of intransigent governments when they extend their struggle for democracy and human rights abroad.

In summary, the contributors to this volume view democracy in the Americas as a process that is best characterized as transnational, and not dichotomized as domestic or international. When we speak of the transnational dimensions of democracy in the Americas, we are referring to the cross-border actions of networks of state, multilateral, and nonstate actors, the transnational development of regional democracy norms, and the transnational spatial context in which democratic practices are established.

Beyond Sovereignty: Emerging Democratization Issues in the New Millennium

In 1996 Tom Farer published a pioneering edited volume entitled Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas. In this text, Farer and a collection of notable authors considered the dynamics of the

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democratic wave that swept Latin America between 1978 and the mid-1990s. It was the first systematic attempt to examine the interplay between domestic and international actors in processes of democratization in the Americas. The authors concluded that external actors played a significant role in the regional shift from authoritarian government to electoral democracy and that the participation of international actors in domestic political processes increased markedly during this time (Farer 1995a). Farer's contention is that these dual phenomena—the increased international role in fostering democratic transitions and increased acceptance of such a role—resulted in the shrinking of state sovereignty.

Now, a decade since the publication of the Farer volume, two important sets of changes have occurred that warrant a new, updated treatment of the subject. First, the empirical record has changed. While there are some continuities, the current regional democratization problem is markedly different from the situation that prevailed in the mid-1990s. During the 1990s, the threat of coups d'état was a prime concern for still young democracies as evidenced by the illegal seizure of power in Haiti in 1991 and attempted coups in Venezuela in 1992 and Paraguay in 1995. The OAS was prompted to send the Santiago Commitment to Democracy in 1995 and create Resolution 1080 (see appendix A) to respond to coups. The advent of the self-coup or autogolpe, evidenced in Peru (1992) and Guatemala (1993), created a new worry for governments and multilateral organizations in the region. Analysis in the Farer volume reflected a general optimism regarding the prospects for global democracy in the period following the Cold War, highlighting innovation in international responses to the coups and self-coups of the early 1990s.

By the end of the decade, however, authoritarian backsliding by democratically elected leaders had joined coups and self-coups as a widespread threat to democracy. The dismantling of Peruvian democracy under the twice democratically elected president Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) and his security chief Vladimiro Montesinos stands out as a particularly illustrative case of authoritarian regression. Guillermo O'Donnell (1994) calls this phenomenon "delegative democracy," wherein incumbent elected presidents maintain their popular legitimacy through vertical accountability (elections), while simultaneously eroding horizontal accountability by circumventing legislatures, ruling instead through presidential decrees and compromising the autonomy of the judiciary by stacking courts with hand-picked appointees. In a similar vein, various authors point to the emergence in the Americas of "electoral authoritarism" (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schmitter 2005). The problem of authoritarian backsliding catalyzed the OAS to create the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001 and forced scholars to question carefully the evaluations of the dynamic democratic promotion.

Popular discontent with the quality of third-wave democracy in the region surfaced in the 1990s. Scholars began to employ the term "low-intensity democracy" to describe situations in which elections occurred with regularity and relative fairness, but popular citizenship was limited (Gills, Nocera, and Wilson 1993; Robinson 1996). By the end of the decade, surveys across the region confirmed that Latin American citizens perceived that democracy (as it had taken hold in their countries) and democratically elected political elites had consistently failed to deliver desired benefits to their constituents. Marta Lagos (2003, 167), examining data from Latinobaròmetro public opinion surveys for the period from 1998 to 2003, found that, although a majority expressed support for democracy in theory, around 60 percent of Latin American citizens were "dissatisfied with the way their democracies work." In 2004 a comprehensive United Nations Development Program study again found startlingly low levels of citizen satisfaction with existing democracy throughout the region (UNDP 2004).

This popular discontent has found expression in the form of yet another potential threat to stable democratic rule, that of mass citizen protests called "civil society coups" (Encarnación 2006) or "impeachment coups" (Boniface in this volume). These mass outpourings of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions have helped topple elected leaders in Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2000, 2005), and Venezuela (2002). On one level, these are potentially unconstitutional and therefore antidemocratic means to advance democracy. They often present real threats for democratic governance when they are connected with the antidemocratic machinations of military officers or legislatures or when they are accompanied by political violence. On another level, however, they are distinct from classic military coups in that they often express popular efforts to exercise effective citizenship in countries where profound crises of representation and ineffective, corrupt, and often racist political institutions exist. As we take pains to qualify in various chapters in this volume (Boniface, Levits, McCoy), these actions are not wholly undemocratic, especially because they are important expressions of citizenship and citizens' political rights. Not surprisingly, the paradoxical nature of uncivil civil society, potentially both democratic and...
undemocratic, presents a real dilemma for efforts by the international community to defend democracy.

Another new threat to democracy is exemplified by events in Ecuador (2004–5) and Nicaragua (2005). In each of these cases, under conditions of divided government with severe executive-legislative gridlock, powerful legislative alliances intentionally sought to weaken presidents for questionable ends, contributing to a governability crisis. International actors interested in promoting democracy have found the task of developing mechanisms to address the problems of authoritarian backsliding, impeachment coups, and antidemocratic presidential-legislative conflict to be complex and challenging.

The second important change since the publication of the Farer text has to do with theoretical developments that facilitate a greater understanding of the phenomena studied in Beyond Sovereignty. The constructivist project in international relations has given us a new appreciation for the role of ideas in processes of political change. A constructivist perspective recognizes that democratization struggles occur on two interconnected planes, the political and the ideational. Accordingly, the limits of the possible for international and transnational actors in democratization are shaped not only by resource availability, strategic self-interests, and other political motivations. They are also conditioned by ideas about democracy and democracy promotion, such as the norm constructs of sovereignty, multilateralism, and democracy. The constructivist project, also called normative by some authors in the volume, highlights the ways in which actors resolve apparent differences or tensions among established norms of nonintervention, human rights, and citizenship, as well as the interests that these norms underpin. Norms, understood here as standards of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity (Krasner 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), have an important role in shaping the behavior of the full spectrum of actors in the democratic promotion field.

The chapters in this volume all reflect the idea that transnational democratization politics takes place on two interconnected levels. Actors advance tangible, immediate political agendas in their struggles while engaging simultaneously in normative, symbolic, and identity politics. Not all purposive action, though, is best categorized as normative. Sometimes the relevant players in transnational democracy activism act as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) by struggling to convince other actors of the high moral purpose of their cause; at other times the players act in a self-interested, power-maximizing way. Put differently, there is a dialectic between strategic constraints and motivations and norm-based action and advocacy on the part of these actors. The interplay between actions that are normatively grounded and those that are self-interested and strategic is touched on in every chapter.

To understand contemporary political change in the Americas, we have adopted a two-pronged approach that draws on the constructivist tradition. First, our analysis is agency driven. Each chapter asks which domestic, international, and transnational actors are acting, when and how they act, and what outcomes their actions produce. It is a conscious effort to move beyond earlier comparative democratization studies that attributed agency to domestic actors and treated international variables, including international and transnational actors, largely as background conditions (as structure or environment). By contrast, we see networks of states, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, often transnational in their expertise, as a crucial part of the democratization picture. A prime target for transnational agency resides in the definition and evolution of regional norms in the areas of democracy, human rights, multilateralism, and sovereignty.

Second, we seek to be conscious of what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002, 302), call methodological nationalism, that is, “the assumption that the nation-state is a natural social and political form of the modern world.” Similarly, Agnew (1994, 92) calls this the “territorial trap.” In a manner that parallels the consolidation of nation-states historically, social scientists have tended to encapsulate their analysis in nation-states. This leads to an artificial dichotomization between domestic and international and, accordingly, the invisibility of influences that span or permeate borders.

At the same time, our analysis does not assume that transnationalization necessarily diminishes the importance of states. Although recent transnational analyses have focused heavily on nongovernment actors, we also want to acknowledge the state as a transnational actor. It is not just nongovernmental actors that transnationalize their struggles. The state is not a passive target of transnational activism or norm entrepreneurship; it can and does engage in transnational politics. As the chapters in this volume show, states and state agencies “work” the international community as skillfully as transnational activists, sometimes more so. States can also be norm entrepreneurs, projecting their new democratic values through their foreign policy positions. Thus, while we seek to
avoid methodological nationalism, our analysis does not negate the continued importance of the national political domain or of interstate relations; rather, we attempt to trace how these political forms intersect with transnational ones.

Transnational Democracy Promotion: Core Questions

Evaluating the role of international and transnational actors in contemporary democratization processes in the Americas raises a set of core questions. First, how effective have international and transnational actors been at promoting and defending democracy in the Americas? Against the optimism that seemed to pervade research on the democratizing influence of international (and transnational) actors during the 1990s, impasse has been one of the principal themes emerging in the new millennium. The international community has so far found it very difficult to prevent political crises from occurring, to intervene in a timely and effective manner in defense of democracy, and to stay on the ground in the aftermath of crises long enough to help strengthen democratic institutions and processes. Nor have transnational democracy promoters significantly narrowed the sovereign prerogatives of governments between elections. This observation, of course, contrasts with Pareto's (1996a) assertion that the Americas were moving "beyond sovereignty." The international community has had great difficulty in converting the noble principles contained in the Inter-American Democratic Charter into practice. The impasse is born out by the series of governance crises in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Second, what type of democracy is being promoted by international and transnational actors? In the 1990s, the democracy project was aimed at constructing political institutions and achieving elite support for democratic procedures. The international community as well as many scholars focused on the problematic of democratic consolidation, which was, quoting Linz and Stepan (1996, 5), when democracy became "the only game in town" (particularly as regards elites). In contrast, an important theme in the new millennium is the struggle for the extension of citizenship beyond its existing narrow elitist confines (Crolle 1999). Yet, as the contributions to this volume underline, international and transnational actors have had a disappointing track record in terms of promoting expanded citizenship and democracy that is more meaningful to its citizens. The chapters assembled here highlight how geopolitical, normative, and political economy constraints limit the very type of democracy that can be promoted on the ground by these actors. A key challenge for would-be democracy promoters is the growing disconnect between the more narrow and elitist conception of procedural democracy or "electoralism" (Schmitter and Karl 1999) that the OAS and the inter-American system is able to promote and defend under the rubric of "representative democracy" and what citizens mean by democracy, which often embodies broader substantive notions of equality and effective representation.

There is a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy across much of the Americas. Citizens are frustrated with the disappointing performance of their elected officials and with public institutions in general. Their dissatisfaction often extends to international actors such as the United States or the OAS, as evidenced recently in Haiti and Ecuador. As they take to the streets in "civil society" or "impeachment" coups, or vote for anestablissement candidates such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela or Evo Morales of Bolivia, they in effect seek to redefine democracy along lines that have more meaning for them. Their actions highlight a tension between both procedural and substantive definitions of democracy and elitist and popular understandings of democracy. The ideal of representative democracy also faces a potential challenge on a regional scale as evidenced by the active international diplomacy of Hugo Chávez. The Venezuelan president has repeatedly attacked representative democracy for its alleged elitist bent and organic links with capitalism, holding up the ideal of direct or participatory democracy as the desired alternative. The discursive struggle between Chávez and his allies in the region and the proponents of representative democracy in the Inter-American system highlights the social construction of the meaning of democratization and the contested nature of the term.

Thus, in this volume we studiously avoid imposing a single definition of democracy and instead emphasize the socially constructed and disputed nature of the term. In asking what type of democracy is being promoted, we seek to determine how the interactions of real domestic, international, and transnational actors shape both debates about democracy and practices on the ground.

Finally, how transnational are contemporary democratization processes in Latin America? In terms of agency, there has certainly been no dearth of transnational activism in the Americas over the past decade, from the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico, to the downfall of Fujimori in Peru, to the struggles of the indigenous poor in Ecuador and Bolivia. Nonstate actors from across the region actively participated in the elaboration of the IADC in 2001. The
Friends of the Democratic Charter, a network of former high-ranking elected officials, bureaucrats, and academics from across the region, continues to press OAS member states to strengthen the IADC. Nongovernmental organizations from the North such as the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute have cooperated with the OAS in observing multiple elections. South-South cooperation has also expanded on the electoral front through a growing regional network of civic organizations including Peru’s Transparencia, Chile’s Participio, and Mexico’s Alianza Cívica (Levin in this volume).

We must recognize, however, that increased transnational pro-democracy activity in current politics does not necessarily translate into lasting or powerful influence on political change. While nongovernmental actors have rightly been acknowledged for their important roles as norm entrepreneurs or whistleblowers, they tend to be resource poor and therefore must rely on states and multilateral organizations for crucial symbolic and material support. Accordingly, the impact of transnational actors may be uneven, diffuse, or episodic. By extension, the current cachet of transnational analysis, with its emphasis on cross-border civil society networks, should not distract us from the very real, continued importance of more conventional state and intergovernmental actors and their influence on democratization. This position is illustrated in our examination of the role of the United States, Canada, and Brazil, as well as in the analysis of the 2004-5 crisis in Ecuador (Shaw, Major, Burges and Daudelin, and Levin in this volume). Certainly we must explore the interdependence, albeit asymmetrical, among nongovernmental, state, and intergovernmental actors engaged in transnational politics.

Does democratization become truly a transnational phenomenon in a spatial sense? The multiple transnational linkages among agents of political change have clouded the distinction between domestic and international. Yet at the same time a paradox exists: we generally observe transnational means being used for what are fundamentally parochial, idiosyncratic, and national ends: Haitian democracy, Bolivian democracy, Mexican democracy. Transnationalism may blur borders but it does not erase them.

Organization of the Volume

Our volume is divided into four parts. The first part examines the role of the OAS and regional powers in the promotion of democracy in the Americas. In chapter 2, Darren Hawkins and Carolyn Shaw describe an ongoing trend of legalization of democratic principles within the OAS, as captured in such instruments of international law as Resolution 1421, the Washington Protocol, the Declaration of Quebec City, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. They ask why states legalize measures that compromise state sovereignty. They consider four hypotheses and conclude that “U.S. hegemony and the self-interests of new democracies are necessary but not sufficient conditions” as they “must be accompanied by low fears of unilateral intervention and strong background democracy norms in order to produce results.” Furthermore, they argue that the OAS is less transnationalized than it may appear—the OAS still remains relatively difficult for nongovernmental actors to reach or to influence.

Building on the theoretical analysis of Hawkins and Shaw, chapter 3, by Dexter Boniface, takes a look at how the increased legalization of democracy norms has translated into on-the-ground activity. Boniface’s chapter details the OAS’s ongoing challenge of converting its democracy-related principles into practice. In a survey of nineteen democratic crises in the region, Boniface finds that the OAS has been fairly consistent in utilizing its legal instruments to condemn severe democratic ruptures such as coups and autogolpes. However, the OAS has been more hesitant to act in less severe democratic breaches such as irregular presidential resignations, electoral controversies, and constitutional crises, which are often defended by member states as being sovereign practices outside the scope of international intervention.

In chapter 4, Carolyn Shaw traces the historical evolution of U.S. efforts to promote democracy from 1945 to the present. She argues that democratic principles and norms have competed with (and generally lost out to) other strategic priorities in the making of U.S. foreign policy, with the reality of the U.S. commitment to democracy often falling far short of the rhetoric. She demonstrates the ways in which U.S. democracy promotion policy has been inconsistent, “selective,” or contradictory and concludes, ultimately, that “U.S. influence in the region was largely detrimental to the democratization process.” Shaw suggests that the United States could improve upon its historical record by adopting the role of “enabler,” abandoning unilateral strategies and in favor of cooperation with like-minded actors at both the domestic and international levels.

In contrast, Flavio Major in chapter 5 highlights the way Canada has assumed a principled, activist agenda in Inter-American affairs since it joined the OAS in 1950. Notably, Canada has succeeded in developing an “autonomous foreign policy” distinct from that of the United States, projecting a role for
itself as democracy's new champion. Furthermore, she makes the implicit case that Canada is one source of expanding transnationalism in the democracy promotion arena, in that it engages both states and civil society actors in its actions. At the same time, Major notes that Canada's actions have sometimes fallen short of its ideals. For example, Canada has not formally endorsed a series of international human rights mechanisms and has resisted attempts to strengthen the IADRC. Canada has also been criticized for promoting a narrow, procedural definition of democracy with limited attention to human rights and socioeconomic issues. In particular, Major considers the question of whether Canada's response to the Haitian crisis of 2004 was adequate. Major attributes some of Canada's shortcomings to its political culture and to lack of coordination among agencies of the state.

Brazil's somewhat ambivalent role in regional democracy dynamics is considered by Sean Burges and Jean Dauletin. In chapter 6, they seek to determine if Brazil's foreign policy regarding democratization is predominantly norm driven (fitting a constructivist hypothesis) or based on self-interest (fitting a realist hypothesis). Using an innovative survey of Brazilian responses to crises in the Americas, they observe that Brazil has intervened on behalf of democracy most actively only where strong Brazilian interests were at stake. In contrast to recent writing on the spread of democratic norms in the Americas (Boniface 2002), their findings suggest that sovereignty and narrowly defined strategic interests continue to trump any democratic norms as determinants of Brazil's reactions to democratic crises.

The second part of the book provides two distinctively focused evaluations of a key mainstay of democracy promotion, international election monitoring. In chapter 7 Arturo Santa-Cruz examines the impact of election monitoring on the shared normative understanding of sovereignty in the Americas, while in chapter 8 Sharan Leen takes on the more pragmatic question of whether international election monitoring has improved electoral accountability. Santa-Cruz seeks to explain the emergence of a new global norm in the form of international election monitoring, a practice that originated in the Western Hemisphere. To explain this new practice (and its attendant modification of the existing sovereignty norm of nonintervention), he argues that conventional interest-based theories are inadequate and that a constructivist and transnational approach is required. More specifically, he asserts that the emergence of international election monitoring cannot be explained without reference to the unique normative structure of the Americas, the so-called Western Hemisphere idea, which was conducive to the emergence of this new practice and norm.

Leen maps the evolution of election monitoring activities in the region with attention to the role of different types of actors. She argues that election monitoring has evolved from a largely symbolic exercise into an institutionalized and meaningful mechanism that can validate or even invalidate elections. This occurred because of the participation of a range of state and nonstate actors (transnationalization) and because of their use of information politics, such as public reporting of election practices by grass-roots election observers. Leen also outlines some inherent limitations to the monitoring exercise. Specifically, Leen notes that while domestic election monitoring organizations can gain prestige and resources through their international ties, they can also sacrifice credibility, sometimes simultaneously. Similarly, international organizations may lose credibility depending on the domestic company they keep.

The third part of the book provides detailed analyses of three "crisis cases" that exemplify the new threats to democracy and the ways in which international and transnational actors involved in the collective defense of democracy have responded. The first case is that of the Haitian crisis that culminated in 2004 with the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In chapter 9, David Goldblatt provides a much-needed look at the role of subregional organizations in democracy assistance through a study of the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) involvement in Haiti. He documents how in the Haitian case, where the UN and OAS have struggled to support democracy, CARICOM has tried to carve out a separate space for subregional multilateral influence. His main argument is that CARICOM's reaction to the Haitian crisis, particularly following Aristide's departure, was decidedly more assertive than that of the OAS and considers whether this case can be taken as an example of effective subregional defense of democracy.

Thomas Legler takes on the case of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez in chapter 10. He argues that the international community's efforts to defend democracy during Venezuela's political crisis of 2002-4 had decidedly mixed results. On the one hand, the OAS and its partners, the Carter Center and the UNDP, helped prevent political violence or civil war and facilitated the 2004 recall referendum that decisively renewed Chávez's popular mandate. On the other hand, as so often in the past, the OAS was unable to help prevent the crisis or to stay engaged on the ground to strengthen Venezuelan democracy in the longer run. Legler also identifies some worrisome unintended consequences of
international pro-democracy efforts. Following international mediation efforts to support representative democracy in Venezuela, Chávez emerged in a stronger position to advocate his own brand of direct or participatory democracy. In short, Chávez not only represents a potential threat to democracy in Venezuela but by 2006 had also solidified a reputation as the region's most vocal opponent of representative democracy. Legler attributes the OAS's uneven performance to the inherent limits of its preferred mode of soft intervention.

In chapter 11, Barry Levitt focuses on the OAS's efforts to defend democracy in Ecuador, a country marred by persistent democratic instability. Levitt's chapter provides a detailed analysis of Ecuador's recent chain of political crises that toppled three elected presidents. In analyzing the Ecuadorian case, he also examines the more general difficulty of marshaling an international response to the problem of impeachment coups. He finds the OAS's performance to be rather lackluster. Echoing the analysis of Burges and Daudelin on Brazil, Levitt argues that the Ecuadorian case illustrates that OAS efforts are hampered because the national interests and domestic politics of member states determine their foreign policies much more than any collective, principled commitment to uphold democracy.

The volume concludes with two critical assessments of the practice of democracy promotion in the Americas. In chapter 12, Yasmine Shamsie questions whether the international community's democracy promotion efforts in the Americas can succeed when combined with a consistent emphasis on neoliberal market reforms. Using Haiti and Guatemala as illustrative cases, Shamsie argues that both market reforms mandated by international financial institutions and free-trade agreements produce economic winners and losers in a way that exacerbates income inequality and poverty, fostering uneven citizenship. Moreover, she argues, the constraints of the new global economy often preclude the range of policy options available to elected leaders, thus darkening the notion of choice implied by democracy. In other words, neoliberal economic reforms such as trade and investment liberalization create dual, competing constituencies for governments: the national electorate and international investors. Where the state is more beholden to capital than to its citizens, the result is a "low-intensity" democracy that does little to address the deeper structural economic problems that often plague developing countries. The simultaneous promotion of representative democracy and market reforms in places like Haiti and Guatemala has therefore led to low voter turnout and even to the collapse of democratic institutions.

Jennifer McCoy's contribution in chapter 13 closes the volume with a critical look at the track record of international and transnational efforts to promote democracy in the Americas from 1990 to 2005. Consistent with the emphasis on agency found in this volume, she documents how international and transnational responses to political crises have varied according to five different domestic originators of those crises: military actors, incumbent elected leaders, intergovernmental conflict, armed nonstate actors, and unarned nonstate actors. She finds patterns of strong and effective defense of democracy in responding to more traditional types of crisis but persistently lagging in responding to the newest types of crises: "civil society" or "impeachment" coups and constitutional crises born of intergovernmental clashes. McCoy offers some reflections on the tasks ahead if international and transnational actors are to be effective in promoting and preserving democracy. She advocates an important role for transnational actors, in the form of international nongovernmental organizations, to strengthen the efforts of states and intergovernmental organizations to defend democracy.

Our collective examination reveals the complexity of democracy promotion in the Americas, involving power struggle and the clash of ideas as well as the actions and interests of multiple domestic, international, and transnational actors. If we cannot accurately characterize contemporary political transitions as purely, or even predominantly, domestic processes, we also find abundant evidence that reports of the demise of sovereignty have been greatly exaggerated. The authors of this volume are engaged in an ongoing debate on this score. On one side, Hawkins and Shaw, Major, Santos-Cruz, Lerner, Shamsie, and McCoy demonstrate clear elements of the transnationalization of political change in the Americas. On the opposite side, Shaw, Burges and Daudelin, and Levitt assert the continued primacy of the domestic determinants of democratization and the self-interests of states, despite the pretense of transnational activity. Between the two extremes, authors such as Bouïafa, Legler, and Goldberg acknowledge both the transnational character of democratization as well as the limits of promoting democracy from outside. Certainly our chapters underline the merits of considering the specifics of each individual democratization case. Just as the authors in this volume come from diverse scholarly traditions, in the end we hope our contributions and the debate among them constitute a modest step toward a necessary integration of the fields of comparative politics and international relations in the study of promoting democracy in the Americas.
NOTES

1. A "statist" asserts the primacy of domestic over international causality in explaining democratization. The statist notion was coined by Philippe C. Schmitter (2000, 27).


3. On self-coups, see Cameron (1998), and on the multilateral response, see Cooper and Legler (2000) and Legler (2003).


5. For a review of the key assumptions motivating constructivist theories, see Cheeke (1998).

6. For important pioneering normative analyses in the Latin American context, see Hawkins (2002) and Zucman (2002).

Part I / The Role of the OAS and Regional Powers
The OAS and Legalizing Norms of Democracy

Darren Hawkins and Carolyn M. Shaw

On September 11, 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter, declaring that "the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it."1 The charter specified numerous elements of representative democracy, including citizen participation, the rule of law, free and fair elections, separation of powers, a pluralistic system of political parties, government transparency, responsible public administration, the supremacy of civilian authority, and even a balanced and fair system for election campaign finance (see appendix B). Moreover, the charter endowed the OAS with the authority to suspend member states experiencing an "unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.

Twenty, or even ten, years previously, such a charter had been unimaginable. In 1985, as enthusiasm for democracy spread throughout the region, American states amended the OAS Charter to declare that one of the organization's essential purposes was "to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention."2 The language left democracy undefined (and thus largely empty of meaning) and paradoxically
insisted on nonintervention. Even earlier, in the late 1950s, an effort to create something like the charter was opposed by an unlikely coalition: the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, all of whom supported the 1960 charter (OAS 1963).

What accounts for the strengthening of multilateral democracy commitments in the OAS? Who are the key actors propelling the process and under what conditions has it occurred? This change poses a difficult puzzle because states who value their sovereignty are unlikely to empower others to judge their domestic political institutions. While most international rules govern relations between states, international agreements on democracy, such as the Democratic Charter, seek to regulate relations between a state and its citizens. States have been reluctant to create strong international rules on most issues; they should be even more reticent when it comes to issues that so directly concern leaders’ political power. Moreover, the OAS seems an especially unlikely place for multilateral democracy commitments to develop. The organization has been marked historically by mistrust between the United States and many Latin American states. Latin American countries have been wary of international rules that would facilitate U.S. intervention, and the United States has been concerned about rules that would bind its own hands unnecessarily.

We begin this chapter by arguing that the charter and other developments to advance democracy in the OAS are examples of a broader global phenomenon known as legalization (Goldstein et al., 2004). The term refers to increasing the level of obligations, precision, and third-party delegation in international rules. We argue that since 1990 the OAS has legalized democracy to moderate levels. We then evaluate a series of four explanations for this phenomenon: U.S. hegemonic power, the self-interests of new democracies, threats posed by U.S. interventionists, behavior, and the strength of regional democracy norms. Throughout, we examine the most significant events in the legalization of democracy in the 1990s and discuss them in relation to earlier periods in inter-American history, recent events in 2003, and other regions of the world where states have not engaged in legalization.

We find that legalization of democracy is quite difficult to achieve and occurred in the Americas due to a confluence of strong state interests and important regional conditions. In particular, we find that U.S. hegemony and the self-interests of new democracies are necessary but not sufficient conditions. These means and motives must be accompanied by low fears of un-
lateral intervention and strong background democracy norms in order to produce results. These findings largely support the overall theoretical framework advanced in this volume, though with one cautionary note. In particular, the findings suggest that a variety of state actors are essential to explain democratic change, thus affirming an actor-oriented approach that goes well beyond explanations focusing on U.S. hegemony. In fact, rather than aiding the legalization of democracy, U.S. behavior can easily undermine it through interventionist tendencies. At the same time, as the editors point out, these actors interact within an important normative structure supportive of democracy. This normative structure constitutes an important condition for successful democratic change. The cautionary note is that transnational and interstate actors are not as relevant in this case as in some of the others in this volume, suggesting, perhaps, that the OAS still remains relatively difficult for nonstate actors to reach or to influence.

Legalization in Theory and Practice

Conceptualizing Legalization

Legalization constitutes one form of institutional change and can be defined as a process in which institutional rules become more obligatory and precise and in which institutional actors receive more delegated authority to interpret, monitor, and implement those rules (Goldstein et al., 2000, 337). In the spirit of theoretical clarity, we define obligation, precision, and delegation in substantially the same way as the International Organization special issue on legalization. “Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior otherwise is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often ‘domestic law as well’” (Abbott et al., 2000, 40). The notion of an obligatory international institution runs directly counter to the common assumption that states jealously guard their sovereignty and that the international arena is characterized by anarchy. The desirability of such obligatory rules is a theoretical debate at least as old as Grotius and Weyart. The apparent increase in the number of obligatory institutions in recent years (the European Union broadly, the European Central Bank, the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court)
has renewed scholarly interest in the concept. As usual, however, theories have lagged behind real-world developments.

Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe (Abbott et al. 2000: 40). In turn, delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. In the international arena, individual states often delegate to a collective body of states. In the European Union, for example, states allow a number of policy issues to be decided by qualified majority votes in collective deliberations in the Council of Ministers. While the council is not a "third party," states have still wielded their sovereign authority to a collective of other states that can determine domestic policies. Such a step constitutes partial delegation. Stronger acts of delegation would include independent third parties like the European Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court. Despite a long-standing scholarly interest, there have been few explanations of international organization autonomy. Rather than consider particular characteristics such as obligation and delegation, scholars have focused on the existence of institutions themselves. More broadly, they have moved past the debate on whether institutions matter to explain variation in the nature of those institutions and the conditions in which they matter. This chapter forms part of that broader effort.

**Legitimization of Democracy in the OAS**

Analysis of OAS documents suggests that legitimization of the democracy norm has increased across each of the three analytical components of the concept in the past sixty years, although it has proceeded in fits and starts and has sometimes stalled. Democracy has been a principle of the inter-American system for many years, but legitimization did not begin until 1990. During the 1990s, legitimization of democracy moved from low to moderate levels through amendment of the OAS Charter and by the creation of new mechanisms to promote and protect democracy. Since the late 1990s, however, further legitimization has slowed considerably despite the efforts of some states.

The original OAS Charter (1948) broke new ground internationally by declaring that American solidarity was based on "the effective exercise of representative democracy" (Article 1). This principle, however, lacked precision and delegation, with no authority given to any OAS organ for oversight. While the charter was legally binding, the democratic norm was simply "affirmed" as a "principle," and thus was not strongly obligatory—an observation confirmed by long experience with brutal authoritarian rule in multiple countries in subsequent years.

One of the first steps to increase the legitimization of democratic principles in the hemisphere was the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). In 1990 the OAS General Assembly established the UPD to provide advisory services and technical assistance to member states in order to democratize and strengthen their political institutions and democratic processes. Remaining the Department for the Promotion of Democracy (DPD), in recent years the DPD has become a key source of support for the efforts made by member states to defend, consolidate, and advance democracy. It has monitored more than seventy elections since its establishment and regularly provides support to the OAS bodies in their deliberations on strengthening and preserving democracy. Although the creation of the UPD did not affect levels of pressures by states, the UPD's generation, dissemination, and exchange of information on democratic political systems has made the concept of democracy in the region more precise. The creation of the UPD also signaled a slight increase in delegation even though the unit does not engage in electoral observations except by invitation from a member state. OAS organs often rely on the technical expertise of the UPD for their work in order to strengthen and preserve democracy.

A second step to legitimize democracy came shortly after the creation of the UPD. In June 1990, in Santiago, Chile, the General Assembly passed Resolution 55/10 creating automatic procedures for convening the Permanent Council in the event of a democratic crisis. The council would examine the situation and then convene either a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or a special session of the General Assembly. The resolution authorized states to adopt any decisions deemed appropriate in accordance with the Charter and international law, in response to the threat of democracy. Resolution 55/10 slightly increased levels of obligation, precision, and delegation within the OAS by instructing the secretary-general to call for immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to address a democratic crisis and by vaguely identifying the scope of such a crisis. The resolution specified that the Permanent Council should be convened in the event of a "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government." These were conditions that resulted in the resolution being invoked four times in the 1990s in response to events in...

At the same meeting in Santiago in 1991, the General Assembly also approved the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System,” which reiterated states’ commitment to democracy. The commitment noted that the “effective exercise, consolidation, and improvement” of democratic government is a “shared priority” of member states. States declared their determination to strengthen “representative democracy,” recognizing it as “an expression of the legitimate and free manifestation of the will of the people.” Members were determined to “adopt efficacious, timely, and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of representative democracy, in keeping with the Charter.”

In December 1992 member states took their most dramatic step to legitimize democracy by amending the OAS Charter through the Washington Protocol, which went into effect in September 1993. The protocol added a provision authorizing suspension from the OAS of any government that had seized power by force. Such a suspension would require a two-thirds vote of member states in the General Assembly. The amendment was widely supported, with only Mexico voting against it. As an amendment to the charter, the measure imposes the highest possible level of obligation on ratifying states. The protocol also increased the level of precision, especially by laying out clear and specific procedures to be followed when democratic governments are overthrown by force. States did not delegate to an autonomous third party but rather to a subset of states by empowering two-thirds of them with the ability to suspend member states from participation in the OAS. Many states clearly saw this as increasing the powers of the OAS to intervene in domestic politics; in fact, this was the basis of Mexico’s opposition to the amendment. In a formal declaration, Mexico insisted that “it is unacceptable to give to regional organizations supranational powers and instruments for intervening in the internal affairs of our states” (OAS 1993a, 55).

Since the enactment of the Washington Protocol states have made less progress on legitimizing the democracy norm. In September 2001 the General Assembly approved the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which mostly reinforced existing OAS instruments for the active defense of representative democracy. While the charter substantially advanced the specificity of the democracy norm, it increased the level of delegation and obligation only minimally. In addition to granting the peoples of the Americas a right to democracy and specifying what democracy means the charter broadens the conditions under which a member state can be suspended from the OAS by a two-thirds vote: whereas the Washington Protocol authorizes suspension only if a democratic government is overthrown by force, the charter includes an “unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order” (Article 21). Despite obligation than the OAS Charter and Protocols. At the same time, it repeated that it has a fairly high level of obligation despite its status as a resolution. States have invoked the charter in responding to problems in Haiti, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

Since then, states have not further advanced legalization. In early June 2003 the OAS considered a proposal to create a new committee to receive civil society input on the quality of democracy and make recommendations for action. Rather than substantially increasing state obligations and the level of delegation, however, the Declaration of Florida (OAS 2003a), adopted at the end of the thirty-fifth session of the OAS General Assembly, instructed the secretary-general to present proposals to the Permanent Council, after joint consultation, that would promote initiatives for gradual and balanced cooperation on democracy promotion. The council, in turn, was instructed to consider initiatives in the area of representative democracy. At the same time, states also emphasized respect for the principle of nonintervention and the right of self-determination, principles largely absent from the Democratic Charter. Although the secretary-general may revisit the issue of legalization, the document specifies no obligations and little if any delegation of authority. It is mostly a reaffirmation of the Democratic Charter and other preexisting pro-democracy measures.

Explaining Legalization: Four Possibilities

U.S. Power

To account for increasing legalization, one hypothesis is perhaps the most common in inter-American studies: U.S. preferences and hegemony, defined as a preponderance of power, shape the behavior of the OAS and member states (P.H. Smith 2000). This argument ties into a realist view of the world in which powerful states create international institutions to serve their purposes.
The Role of the OAS and Regional Powers

(Mearsheimer 1994–95). While the extent of U.S. hegemony in Latin America is often a matter of heated debate, most measures suggest that the variation is less noticeable than the consistency. The U.S. share of GDP in the Western Hemisphere from 1960 to 2004 has varied from a high of 86.46 percent in 1960 to a low of 80.24 percent in 1980. During these years, the United States experienced a steady if very gradual decline in its share of GDP. After 1980, it experienced a fairly steady ascent until 2003, when it stood at 83.03 percent. We conclude that U.S. hegemony has not changed much in the past fifty years.

U.S. preferences, in contrast, appear to have changed dramatically. In the 1990s the United States opposed efforts to legitimize democracy, declaring that “because of the structure of its Federal Government, [it] does not find it possible to enter into multilateral conventions with respect to the effective exercise of representative democracy” (OAS 1985, 26–28). The logical connection between federalism and multilateral conventions is unclear; what is self-evident is that the United States sought to avoid any international agreements on democracy that might affect it. That attitude changed in the early 1990s when the United States pushed hard for the Washington Protocol, even lending its name to the accord. The United States was also a primary supporter of the Democratic Charter.

But U.S. power is not always a useful explanation of legalization. In May and June 2005, when the United States pressed for further legalization in the Declaration of Florida, it was opposed by nearly every other country in the Western Hemisphere. The draft U.S. proposal called on the Permanent Council to routinely assess any situation that might affect a state’s democratic process. A significant broadening of the Democratic Charter (2002b). It also called for establishing a new committee that would ensure “that civil society organizations can present their views and advice to the OAS on a systematic and regular basis,” again a significant step forward from the vague rhetoric welcoming civil society views. The final draft, however, authorized the secretary-general only to consult with the Permanent Council and then to devise proposals for “gradual initiatives for cooperation, as appropriate” and barely mentioned civil society’s input. Even these measures were watered down by a phrase calling for respect for the principle of nonintervention and the right of self-determination, two concepts that were absent from the operative part of the draft resolution.

The proposal failed despite President Bush’s appearance at the General Assembly to exhort states to cooperate to preserve the gains from democracy and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s call for the OAS to act on the pledge of the Democratic Charter and for governments that fail to meet democratic standards to “be accountable to the OAS.” Rice insisted that the democracy norm must be enforced by the Permanent Council and “repeatedly called on the organization to allow citizens groups with concerns about their country to testify.”

In the case of the Florida Declaration, U.S. power may have discouraged support among the Latin American states. As one senior OAS official put it, U.S. officials “don’t realize that they are like an elephant entering a bazaar—the minute they come in, everybody runs for cover.” The United States failed to sway anyone except Panama and Colombia on this issue. Nearly every other country in the region opposed the proposal, including Chile—generally a good U.S. ally and home state of the secretary-general of the OAS, who supported the measure.

Lock-In: Newly Established Democracies

The wave of democratization that swept Latin America in the 1980s and into the early 1990s offers an intuitively promising explanation for the rise of democratization in the OAS (Paris and Peceny 2002, 236). This hypothesis, closely related to a liberal theoretical perspective, suggests that the leaders of new and unstable democracies will seek to shore up their authority against domestic challengers by creating commitments to international institutions that can help protect their fragile democracies (Moravcsik 2000). At first glance, this “lock-in” explanation helps make sense of Resolution 1980, the Washington Protocol, and subsequent OAS actions resulting from these mechanisms. A wide variety of Latin American countries, including some of the largest and most influential, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, made transitions to democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s. Almost all faced serious threats from domestic actors with more authoritarian preferences.

Evidence for the lock-in argument, though generally positive, is mixed. News reports suggest that a group of Andean countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela—led the effort to approve Resolution 1980 in 1993. Although three of these were relatively recent democracies, Venezuela and Colombia were established democracies. The following year, Argentina, a new democracy, took the lead in proposing the Washington Protocol (OAS 1992b). Interviews with diplomats confirm the impression that new democracies were especially interested in international protection. "Look, I am part of an entire generation that came into adulthood under a military regime,"
said Heraldo Muñoz, Chile’s delegate to the OAS. “We have established democracies out of our own traumatic experiences. We are tired of internal war. So you’ve got to try to set up some kind of mechanism to protect these democracies.” By the same token, Mexico was also the only country to vote against the Washington Protocol when the OAS adopted it, and Mexico was one of the most notably nondemocratic countries in Latin America in 1992 (OAS 1992a).

Furthermore, a widely used measure for democracy—known as Polity—provides firm evidence for the lock-in argument by demonstrating that a wave of new democracies appeared in Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Using the Polity data, there were four new or newly strengthened democracies in 1990, nine in 1995, eleven in 1990, and nine in 1995. This measure is somewhat conservative because some democracies undoubtedly remained under threat from authoritarian sectors for longer than ten years, but the data only count the first ten years. Even more impressive is the correlation between the low number of new democracies in 2003 and the failure to legalize democracy further, thus helping explain Latin America’s lack of interest in the U.S. proposal in Florida. By our measure, there were only four new democracies left in the Americas in 2003, the last year for which data are available, and probably none in 2005. These results suggest that states lacked any interest in legalizing democracy further.

Evidence drawn from earlier time periods in the Americas suggests, however, that important limitations on the lock-in argument. A key group of new or newly strengthened democracies emerged in Latin America in the late 1950s, including (using Polity data) Uruguay, Panama, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. The undercounting of new democracies here is undoubtedly more severe than in the early 1990s because the threats to democracy were so much greater. For example, Ecuador and Brazil, both new democracies in the late 1950s, lost their democracies in the early 1960s and were under threat in the late 1950s, yet they are not counted by our standards. Argentina did not quite make it out of the negative, authoritarian, range in the late 1950s according to Polity, yet most observers of the period classify it as relatively democratic. Certainly the subjective perspective of the time—when the bar was lower for being considered a democracy—was that Argentina was a struggling democracy in the late 1950s.

As lock-in theory would predict, some of these new democracies attempted to legalize democracy. Contrary to expectations, they failed to make much progress, and some new or threatened democracies strongly opposed the effort. At a meeting of foreign ministers in August 1959, the OAS adopted the “Declaration of Santiago,” which declared that the existence of antidemocratic regimes constitutes a violation of OAS principles and a danger to peace (OAS 1965.4). Yet this nonbinding resolution was not obligatory. At the urging of Venezuela, a new democracy, the OAS also appointed a committee at that meeting to draft a procedure that would determine whether states were complying with their democratic obligations (OAS 1965). The resulting draft convention, from December 12, 1959, laid out the characteristics of democracy and required individual governments and the OAS to take a variety of actions against nondemocratic governments, principally the nonrecognition of governments seizing power from democracies (OAS 1965). Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the United States all issued strong written objections, claiming that the draft convention violated the OAS Charter and the United Nations Charter (OAS 1965). Of these, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were all new, newly improved, or struggling democracies at the time, yet they saw little value in an international agreement. We explore their opposition in greater detail in the next section.

Proponents did not give up, repeatedly placing the issue on the OAS’s agenda over the next few years. Significantly, those proponents were not always new democracies. For example, the Dominican Republic and Honduras (both authoritarian regimes), Venezuela (new democracy), and Costa Rica (established democracy) requested a meeting in August 1962 to discuss how states should react to coups (Muñoz 1998.5–6). It is difficult to understand the motivation for this failed effort, unless it is seen as an effort to head off U.S. intervention in the region. In November 1965 the Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio finally adopted a week resolution, whose general irrelevance is partially revealed by its title, “Informal Procedure on Recognition of De Facto Governments.” The resolution recommended that governments consult with one another after the overthrow of democracy in one state and that individual governments decide for themselves whether to recognize a new government that has taken power by force (Muñoz 1998.6).

Sovereignty Costs

Our third hypothesis suggests that the stronger the interventionist threats from the United States are, the less the opportunity for legalization will be because states will see too many costs to sovereignty. Historically, fear of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that would give the United States a pre-
text to intervene runs extremely deep in Latin America (P. H. Smith 2000). Since their independence in the 1820s Latin American states have attempted to fashion international rules that would constrain U.S. interventionism and have opposed international rules that might facilitate it. During the Cold War, unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America produced substantial fear and resentment from countries in the region. The 1954 U.S.-sponsored coup against a relatively democratic government in Guatemala emphasized that no one was exempt from U.S. efforts (Parish and Peceny 2003, 33).

A close reading of the documentary evidence from the effort to legalize democracy in the late 1950s and early 1960s confirms that Latin American states frequently cited sovereignty concerns when expressing their opposition. Although no state invoked the fear of U.S. intervention publicly, it was not far below the surface in state comments. The Dominican Republic, for example, objected to legalization by arguing that the proposal would permit “direct intervention in both the internal and external affairs” of states, in direct contradiction to the OAS Charter (OAS 1965, 13–14). Even more significantly, the three new democracies to oppose legalization also cited sovereignty concerns. Brazil, less than four years away from a coup that would dismantle its struggling democracy, claimed that “recognition is an act of sovereignty that permits no limitations.” As a result, the draft convention “breaches principles of international law that are fundamental to the American system” (OAS 1965, 21). Chile refused even to review a draft text proposing legalization, arguing that such an analysis would be “superfluous” because the draft contravened the OAS Charter (OAS 1965, 24). Argentina simply cited a decision by the Inter-American Juridical Council, which concluded that collective action in the defense of democracy violated nonintervention principles in the charter (OAS 1965, 21).

Soon after the end of the Cold War, however, the United States signaled radically different intentions by cooperating with multilateral institutions before using military force, the most dramatic example being U.S. cooperation with the UN Security Council prior to the first Gulf War. No less striking, especially for a Latin American audience, were the patient U.S. efforts to work with first the OAS and then the Security Council to resolve the crisis in Haiti from 1991 to 1994. The amount of time that passed before the United States finally utilized force was itself a strong indication of its preferences and intentions. Over the course of nearly four years, the United States sought and received the OAS’s blessing for diplomatic and economic sanctions on Haiti.

When it looked like force would be necessary, the OAS passed a resolution deferring to the UN Security Council, which then authorized the use of force. Although Latin American states could not bring themselves to authorize military intervention, the fact that they failed to oppose it and in fact immediately welcomed the change when it occurred constitutes strong evidence that they did not feel threatened by U.S. actions. As a result, states rarely cited sovereignty concerns in the 1990s when dealing with the same issues and even with the same types of penalties: diplomatic isolation and suspension from the OAS. The United States even sought to “find ways of increasing the leverage” of the OAS and to advance law as the basis of action (OAS 1992b, 340), and Latin American states still responded positively. Argentina proposed the Washington Protocol, and its delegate could now state categorically that international decisions on democracy are “perfectly consistent” with the principle of nonintervention (OAS 1992c, 92). Brazil, the most skeptical of the old foes to legalization, declared its willingness to entertain proposals that maintained the balance between nonintervention and the promotion of democracy (OAS 1992b, 339). Despite consistently promoting a single-state veto throughout the negotiations, Brazil ultimately accepted the protocol.

Either states valued sovereignty less in the 1990s or they felt their sovereignty was less threatened in the 1990s. The first is possible, but the second is more likely. In fact, several states explicitly invoked the end of the Cold War as a reason to endorse legalization because they had been freed from traditional security concerns. Chile’s ambassador, who was one of the most important proponents, opened his lengthy seventeen-page defense of the Washington Protocol by citing the opportunities provided by the historical moment. “The end of the Cold War has facilitated the promotion and defense of democracy in the region by removing the ideological and strategic connotations attached to it for many years. In other words, the perception today is that representative democracy can be defended here in the hemisphere without running the risk of being trapped in the logic of the East-West confrontation” (OAS 1992c, 285).

The Argentine delegate argued the point more succinctly. “For years the impact of the east-west conflict significantly undermined the regional Organization’s commitment to democracy by subverting democratic institutions to the fight against communists” (OAS 1992c, 187).

After 2001 the United States once again changed course and signaled new intentions. In 2002 the United States was widely perceived as tacitly backing a
coup that toppled the president of Venezuela before other countries acted to help return him to power. Then in early 2004 the OAS brokered a political compromise in Haiti that would have retained its president in office amid mounting political and social crises, but a few days later the United States acted, unilaterally in the view of many Latin American countries, to help push him out of office and install the opposition in power. By acting in these ways, the United States signaled preferences for unilateral intervention in Latin America.

It is little wonder, then, that Venezuela and Haiti were so often mentioned by diplomats and analysts as the discussion unfolded on the U.S. proposal. Most Latin American states care little for the governments of these countries, who are officially democratic but in practice quite authoritarian, yet they fear U.S. meddling more. During the Florida negotiations, Venezuela argued that it was the target of the United States, which wanted to turn the OAS into its policeman. As a result, other Latin American diplomats emphasized the language of nonintervention and self-determination in their comments. The ambassador from Argentina argued that “no one can be sure that in the future they would not be seated and judged by this committee in one year, two years, three years. Every country has its problems. But I can tell you one thing: the most powerful countries will never be there.”  

Mexico echoed these concerns by declaring that, “in principle, we are not in agreement with any tutelage from anybody.”  

Likewise, foreign ministers from the fourteen Caribbean island members expressed their opposition by claiming that a combination of the U.S. government and civil society groups helped oust the Haitian president in 2004, an action that they have repeatedly condemned.

Norms

Our final hypothesis suggests that the normative structures within which states interact account for their behavior by informing their interests and creating behavioral possibilities where none would otherwise exist (Santa-Cruz 2005). In other words, before states can act to protect democracy, they must first understand the concept of democracy in similar ways and value it abstractly—a theoretical perspective known as constructivism (Finnemore 1996). Consistent with this view is the OAS’s legalization of democracy in the 1990s; it did not create an entirely new norm but rather built on a strong tradition of multilateral democratic discourse and norms stretching back to the early 1990s (Munoz 1998). The first multilateral agreement to promote democracy in the Americas dates to the 1907 Conference in Washington, whose participants consisted of the United States and Central American states (Drake 1991, 11–12). Their commitment not to recognize any Central American government that did not arise from free elections was designed to serve U.S. interests, but it nevertheless marked the advent of a multilateral discourse endorsing democracy. This discourse gained more widespread support in 1996 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. In the light of trouble brewing in Europe, Latin American states made reference to “the existence of a common democracy throughout America” as the basis for the “political defense” of the hemisphere (Atkins 1997, 122). For the first time, Latin American states endorsed democracy as a “common cause” (Munoz 1998, 3).

After World War II, American states expanded and systematized their commitments to representative democracy, thereby creating a clear, specific regional norm (Atkins 1997, 123; Munoz 1998, 3–5). A variety of states picked up shrined those values in postwar international documents. A Mexico City conference in 1945 declared that American states could not conceive of “life without freedom” (Munoz 1998, 4). Significantly, states then endorsed a democratic norm in the central security treaty for the Americas, the 1962 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which states that peace is “founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms... and on the repeated violations throughout the Cold War, but norm violations do not necessarily mean that the norm ceases to exist. In fact, American states reiterated their commitment to the democracy norm in a number of OAS declarations in 1959, 1962, 1965, and 1980. Behavior consistent with the democracy norm was irregular until 1959, when the average Polity score climbed into the positive (nonauthoritarian) range for the first time, remaining there until 1965. It then dropped to positive levels again in 1982, gained strength in 1989 when it hit an average of 5 (moderately democratic), and strengthened still more in 1994 when it leveled off at 7 (fully democratic, though with a few restrictions), where it has since remained.

The strength of the democracy norm in the Americas is shown into sharp relief when contrasted with the absence of democracy norms in other regions of the world. The Charter for the Organization of African Unity, adopted in
Summary and Analysis

The most important finding to emerge from our analysis is that neither strong state interests in locking in democracy nor hegemonic U.S. power has been sufficient to legalize democracy in the Americas. An important set of new democracies attempted legalization in the 1990s yet failed. The United States, as a strong regional hegemon as ever, attempted further legalization in 2005, yet failed.

In both cases, process-tracing evidence suggests that the factor most closely correlated with opposition is the fear of intervention. In the 1990s the United States opposed legalization, but so did many Latin American countries, whose representatives expressed concerns about undermining sovereignty. In 2005 Latin American states may have seen diminished benefits from legalization of democracy, but their opposition was driven more clearly by concerns about undermining sovereignty. The United States adopted unilateralist stances toward intervention during the Cold War and after September 11, and Latin American states responded by strongly citing sovereignty concerns during those two periods.

What then produces legalization? The evidence suggests it is a relatively rare event that requires a confluence of factors. Diminished fear of intervention is not itself sufficient to drive legalization forward. States must also be motivated by some positive gain from legalization. Both hegemonic pressure and the desire to lock in democratic gains were present in the 1990s, and so it is impossible to decide which was more important.

Cross-regional comparison suggests that democracy norms also seem to play a role. As with many kinds of norms, that role is not noticed until analysts examine a part of the world where the norm does not exist. Other regions in the world enjoyed a surge of new democracies after the Cold War, but none legalized democracy in international institutions. Why not? None of them faced a strong regional hegemon with unilateralist interventionist tendencies. Indeed, the absence of a well-established norm of democracy seems the most likely stumbling block preventing legalization in other regions, whereas the presence of the norm appears to have facilitated legalization in the Americas.

Why do states legalize issues like democracy in international institutions, thereby yielding some of their sovereignty? Many analysts have viewed the OAS and its associated rules through the lens of U.S. power. As Peter H. Smith...
(2000, 8) argues, in view of U.S. regional hegemony, "the study of US-Latin American relations becomes a meditation on the character and conduct of the United States." While we do not dispute the pervasive reality of U.S. power, such power clearly has limits, as illustrated by U.S. efforts in Florida in 2005. Alternatively, the most obvious answer is that new democratic states wanted to protect their gains by legalizing democracy internationally. Yet this explanation too is incomplete, as illustrated by the difficulties faced when new democracies pushed legalization in the 1990s.

In both cases, the benefits to be derived from legalization, founded on the costs of heralding the United States new legal tools with which it might justify unilateral interventionism. While international rules do not provide U.S. behavior, Latin American states clearly felt compelled to support the concept of sovereignty during the Cold War but also more recently during the War on Terror.

These results suggest that stronger international protection for democracy is a rare event and one that is difficult to achieve. States still guard their sovereignty in this issue area. Both power and strong motives are insufficient to produce legalization. Either or both of these factors must coexist with few fears of unilateral intervention and robust norms of democracy. These conditions suggest that further legalization of democracy is unlikely anywhere in the world. While the United States clearly desires to establish stronger international norms of domestic democracy, it may paradoxically be undermining this effort by its willingness to intervene in unilateral ways to accomplish this goal.

NOTES
3. To operationalize obligation, precision, and delegation, we adopted the rules and guidelines laid out in detail by Abbott et al. (2000, 166–18).
4. Historical information and documents about the UPD, now part of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs, are available at www.ddpa.oas.org/main.htm.
5. Resolution 1060 is reprinted in appendix A. This and all other OAS documents related to democracy cited here are available at www.ddpa.oas.org/about/documents-related.htm.
6. The United States also made an attempt at legalization in 1999—though it had much lower visibility and apparently lower levels of effort—but likewise failed. See Associated Press, "U.S. seeks proposal aimed at helping democracies in new hemisphere," June 8, 1999.
14. Marshall and Jagger (2002). Using the measure's range of 0 to 100, we classify a state as a new democracy for ten years after it attains a positive score of 50 or more in a single year.
15. The analysis in this paragraph draws on news reports and conversations with some OAS officials.
The OAS's Mixed Record

Dexter S. Boniface

The international defense of democracy in the Americas has become an urgent issue. On June 6, 2003, Bolivian president Carlos Mesa, besieged by massive street protests, became the eighth Latin American president since 2000 to resign or be ousted before finishing his term.1 Mesa's resignation occurred just as the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly was meeting in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to discuss how the organization could best promote and defend democracy. The meeting itself was generally viewed as a setback for the extension of the organization's democracy promotion efforts—an ambitious proposal from the United States to create a new, permanent committee to monitor the state of democracy in the region was rejected by most of the Latin American states.2 What, then, can the OAS contribute to sustaining or possibly deepening democracy in the region?

The preamble of the Charter of the OAS is explicit about a commitment to representative democracy as "an indispensible condition for the stability, peace and development of the [Western Hemisphere] region" (OAS 1997). Yet during the Cold War the OAS failed to develop a consistent policy regarding the promotion of democracy in the hemisphere. For example, the organization excluded Cuba but not the authoritarian military regimes of South America. At a meeting in Santiago, Chile, in June 1991, however, the OAS renewed its pledge to protect democracy in the region and, through the adoption of Resolution 1080 and a variety of complementary measures, established the institutional mechanisms for doing so. These measures have proved to be more than rhetorical gestures: Resolution 1080 (see appendix A) was invoked in relation to the 1991 coup in Haiti, autogolpe (or "self-coup") in Guatemala in 1992 and 1993, and the civil-military crisis in Paraguay in 1996. In each of these four cases, OAS action proved to be an important (if not sufficient) instrument in the maintenance and/or restoration of democracy. In short, OAS action in the early 1990s offered confirmation of the existence of a vigorous international regime for the defense of democratic rule in the hemisphere.3

Following a successful experience in the first half of the 1990s, however, the OAS has since been faced with more pernicious obstacles to democratic stability in the region, whether among the smaller countries of the region (e.g., the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and—again—Haiti and Paraguay) or the intermediate powers (e.g., Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). To discern how deep and consequential the organization's normative commitment to democracy is, this chapter examines OAS action (and inaction) in response to democratic crises in Latin America from 1991 to the present. Utilizing both qualitative and quantitative data, the chapter seeks to answer three key questions: First, when (and how) is the OAS most likely to intervene on behalf of democracy? For example, has the OAS consistently responded to clear democratic interruptions such as coups and autogolpes? Second, what explains why the OAS takes action in some cases and not others? And, finally, what impact has intervention had on democratic quality and sustainability in the region?

Ascertaining the depth of the OAS's commitment to democracy is important for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the defense of democracy by the OAS challenges the fundamental principle of state sovereignty, implying that governments are not free to act as they please in terms of their internal affairs.4 Second, a consensus-based commitment to democracy begs the question of whether the OAS continues to be dominated by the United States (as it was during the Cold War) or whether its actions now reflect a true multilateral consensus among member states. Last but not least, an analysis of the OAS is important in a very practical sense; within the past several years, not only has Latin America witnessed coups or coup attempts in Paraguay (2000), Ecuador...
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ability of the OAS to promote democracy has been challenged by the changing nature (and frequency) of domestic threats to democracy themselves. One particularly disturbing on-the-ground trend is a rash of what I term "impeachment coups"—illegal (and often violent) acts by a disloyal opposition that unseat elected presidents and effect a quasi-legal transfer of power to a constitutionally designated successor. Examples can be found in countries as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The blending of illegality and constitutionality in these crises is a particular challenge for the OAS because they combine both democratic and antidemocratic practices. This challenge is made all the more daunting by the very real possibility that those who seek to undermine democratic governments in the region (whether from within or from without) have increasingly learned to "cloak" their undemocratic activities under constitutional banners in order to shield themselves from international criticism. This possibility, in turn, highlights the necessity of examining the interaction among global, organizational, and domestic-level processes in studying the behavior of the OAS.

Lastly, as regards the impact that intervention has had on democratic quality and sustainability in the region, I conclude that OAS actions have had an immediate but short-lived positive impact. In short, a dispassionate summary of OAS practice might be as follows: it is a relatively weak organization doing an imperfect job of promoting a rather limited notion of representative democracy. Yet, in spite of all its weaknesses, the OAS still makes a contribution to the promotion of democracy that would be impossible without it.

This chapter is organized into three sections. First, I briefly review the main mechanisms developed by the OAS to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere and review the literature addressing the defense of democracy regime since 1991. Second, I outline a set of systematic criteria for assessing when the OAS is most likely to intervene in response to democratic crises. Third, I analyze the behavior of the OAS in response to democratic crises since 1991 and assess the impact intervention has had on democratic quality and sustainability in the region.

The Evolution of the Inter-American Defense of Democracy Regime since 1990

Beginning in 1990, the OAS created a number of mechanisms designed to institutionalize more firmly the organization's commitment to democracy (see table 3.1). In 1990 it first created a new administrative arm, the Unit for the
Promotion of Democracy (UPD), to develop programs reinforcing the hemispheric trend toward democracy (since renamed the Department for the Promotion of Democracy or DPD). 12

Second, in June 1991, following on the heels of the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the OAS issued a landmark declaration in support of democracy and, through the adoption of Resolution 1080, created an automatic mechanism to respond to democratic crises in the region, especially illegal seizures of power. In particular, Resolution 1080 pledges the OAS secretary-general to convene an immediate emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council following any “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process,” a phrase meant to apply, in particular, to coups (OAS 1991). The Permanent Council then examines the situation and recommends whether a special meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or of the General Assembly is warranted, all within ten days of the democratic interruption.

Third, in amending the charter through the adoption of the Washington Protocol (1992), the organization furthermore established that the General Assembly could, with a two-thirds vote, suspend any member state from the OAS in the event that “its democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force” (OAS 1992d). 13

Fourth and finally, with the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC; see appendix B) on September 11, 2001, the OAS broadened its conception of what constitutes a democratic crisis to include any “unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime,” a phrase meant to apply specifically to the undemocratic actions of elected officials (OAS 2004a). Beyond this, the IADC outlined a broad definition of what constitutes representative democracy (Articles 3 and 4) and provided new provisions (found in Articles 17 and 30) that enable member states to invite OAS mediation when a democratic crisis appears to be developing. The new IADC, thus, can be considered an extension of Resolution 1080, superseding its mandate and potentially widening its scope. 14

Scholarly assessments of the Inter-American defense of democracy regime have varied considerably. Reflecting on the OAS’s response to democratic crises in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993), Heraldo Muñoz (1998, 1) found evidence to support the claim that the “right to democracy” in the Americas had evolved from a moral prescription to an international legal obligation. 15 Yet, on the other hand, Richard Bloomfield concluded that “the cases of Haiti and Peru demonstrate [that] the Santiago mechanism is no guarantee that an elected constitutional government, once overthrown, will be restored” (1994, 167, emphasis added). Debates regarding the efficacy of the democracy regime have continued since 1993, as the OAS has confronted a continuation of, and arguably an increase in, democratic crises in the region—from among the smaller countries of the Caribbean, Central America, and the Andes to the larger, intermediate powers. This chapter seeks to make a further contribution to the debate by analyzing the OAS’s response to every major democratic crisis in Latin America since 1991.

An Assessment of Democratic Crises: Determining the Relevant Cases

In order to assess the OAS’s commitment to democracy, we must identify what qualifies—under the OAS rubric—as a democratic crisis and then evaluate whether the OAS has taken action, commensurate with its legal, procedural
commitments as specified in OAS doctrine (see Table 3). First, we can briefly review both the qualitative and quantitative assessments of democracy in Latin America since 1993. Larry Diamond (1996, 61) concluded in 1996 that, "since 1975, despite commonplace North American conceptions of the contrary, Latin America has not made any significant progress toward greater democracy." A look at more recent data available from Freedom House reveals that this assessment is still generally valid. The Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties in Latin America is alive but not well. As of 2004, only a handful of countries in the region—Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama, Argentina, and Brazil—meet the criteria for "liberal democracy" or "democracy" that Diamond identifies. Today, most of the countries of Latin America match Diamond's labels of "semi-democratic," "near democracy," and the few that do have a combined score of 5 or 6 appear to be entirely viable and viable regimes. Finally, a significant majority of countries persist in the least democratic categories of "semidemocracy" (Venezuela), "semi-competitive authoritarianism" (Guatemala and Colombia), and varying degrees of authoritarian rule (Haiti and Cuba).

Despite their utility, existing datasets do not necessarily tell us anything about the nature of democratic crises in Latin America, and much less how we can predict it. But to understand the nature of the OAS response, we must look at its formal legal obligations. What, then, constitutes a democratic crisis as defined by OAS protocols? Certainly a military coup is not a new development in Latin America. However, the OAS has invoked Resolution 1080 in response to four cases: the 1991 coup in Haiti, autogolpe (or "self-coup") in Peru (1992) and Guatemala (1993), and the civil-military crisis in Paraguay in 1998, which entailed credible threat of a military coup. In addition, Article 20 of the Democratic Charter was invoked—although not without controversy—in response to the coup against President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002. The OAS practice, in short, makes plain that, at minimum, "examples of democratic crises ("interruptions") or "alterations") would include successful coups that unseat elected presidents, self-coups by unseated elected presidents that nullify legislative and judicial checks and balances, and civil-military crises in which there is a credible threat of a military coup. Indeed, the OAS mandate following the Cold War clearly envisioned coups as the primary threat to democracy in Latin America. Failed coup attempts, on the other hand, do not appear to have occurred (by OAS practice) to constitute a "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process," because the OAS did not invoke Resolution 1080 (or the IADC) in response to such attempts in Venezuela (twice in 1992), Paraguay (2000), and Haiti (2001). This does not mean that such episodes should be excluded from an empirical analysis of OAS behavior (in fact, each case provoked a direct response by the OAS) but rather that they do not appear to be part of the OAS's envisioned mandate of Resolution 1080 and the IADC.

An additional consideration is whether major election failures or constitutional crises constitute an "interruption" or "alteration" of a democratic regime. These urgent situations do not appear to have been contemplated by the Santiago Declaration of 1991. However, in adopting the Democratic Charter in 2001, which broadened the scope of crises (beyond the narrow definition of Resolution 1080) to include any "unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime," the OAS seemed to be opening itself to this possibility—while also giving itself the flexibility to determine on a case-by-case basis when such action "seriously impairs the democratic order." In summary, we can conclude that OAS practice prioritizes coups as the primary threat to democracy and treats coup attempts, major election failures, and constitutional crises as second-order threats, to be handled largely on a case-by-case basis—contingent on how gravely they threaten the democratic order.

Beyond looking at OAS practice, we can develop a set of reasonably objective empirical standards to determine whether a given event qualifies as a "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process" (Resolution 1080) or an "unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state" (IADC, Articles 19 and 20). Ultimately, given the limitations of current datasets (i.e., the inexistence of any comprehensive and up-to-date datasets on democratic crises), the assessment will have to be largely qualitative. Nevertheless, a few tentative insights might be gleaned from a survey of the available qualitative data. As a starting point, it is useful to examine the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2004). The EDI disaggregates the concept of democracy into four components, allowing for precise and rank-ordered comparisons of democracy along several dimensions and in a language that can be easily paired with OAS protocols. For the immediate post-Cold War period (1992–2002), the EDI reveals a tenth instance (in a sample
of eighteen countries) in which Latin American countries experienced a decline in their ELDI score from one year to the next: Argentina (2001), Ecuador (1997 and 2000), Guatemala (1993), Nicaragua (2001), Paraguay (1999), Peru (1992 and 2000), the Dominican Republic (1994), and Venezuela (2002). Of course, these cases differed in both substance and severity. Two cases, the Dominican Republic (1994) and Peru (2000), correspond to major election irregularities that had a determinative impact on the outcome of the election results. One other case, Nicaragua (2001), was downgraded by virtue of an observed decline in the freedom of elections, namely efforts by the two leading parties to exclude smaller parties. The remaining cases of democratic decline represent examples of irregularities with respect to displacement and replacement of elected officials. Significantly, the UNDP dataset ranks these cases in terms of their relative severity: the autogolpe in Peru (1992) is considered the most significant deviation, followed by the crises in Paraguay (1999), Venezuela (2002), Ecuador (2000), Guatemala (1993), and, less severely perhaps, Ecuador (1997) and Argentina (2001). In summary, although the UNDP dataset is somewhat limited in terms of spatial and geographical coverage, it nevertheless provides an excellent foundation for an inventory of the major democratic crises since 1990.

Examining the Freedom House data is also useful. For example, it is reasonable to insist that any instance of a country in the Americas passing from a "free" to a "partly free" rating into the "not free" category of the Freedom House dataset would constitute a democratic crisis. This ignominious distinction would include Haiti in 1991–93 (the military junta) and Haiti in 2000–2004 (democratic breakdown under Aristide). In addition to these clear-cut cases, we might also propose (as a simple and tentative heuristic) that any sharp decline in political freedom (a 2-point drop in the Freedom House data over a one-year period) would constitute a democratic crisis. This would include Venezuela (1993 and 1999), Chile (1998), and Argentina (2001). Allowing for a two-year period of decline (admittedly a less robust measure for a "sudden" crisis) would additionally qualify Colombia (1994–95), the Dominican Republic (1993–94), Trinidad and Tobago (2000–2001), and Bolivia (2002–3)—corresponding, respectively, to the corruption scandal under President Samper in Colombia, failed elections under President Bolaño in the Dominican Republic, the constitutional crisis in Trinidad and Tobago, and the fall of Bolivia’s government under Gonzalo "Goico" Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.

Before turning to the specifics of the OAS's role in the region, it is useful to reflect on the broader \[\ldots\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cries</th>
<th>Did the OAS Invoke Its Primary Democratic Instrument?</th>
<th>OAS and Regional Response (and Relevant Documents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic, 1994 (failed elections)</td>
<td>No (Resolution 01/94 contemplated by some US, policy makers)</td>
<td>Report by OAS electoral observers of serious electoral irregularities (CP/RES. 882/04); offer by OAS observation mission to mediate; 2005 referendum; No significant response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador, 1997 (removal of president by constitutionally dubious procedure)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela, 1999–2004 (failed elections and constitutional crisis)</td>
<td>No (by 2001 crisis, see Table 3.3)</td>
<td>Observation and endorsement of elections in 1999 and 2000; high-level trip with UN observers; endorsement of the recall referendum in August 2004 (CP/RES. 869/04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti, 2000–2005 (flawed elections and democratic breakdown)</td>
<td>No (in 2002, Resolution 01/02 contemplated by some US, policy makers; on 2004 crisis, see Table 3.3)</td>
<td>Report by OAS electoral observers of serious electoral irregularities in 2000; high-level mission sent to mediate the electoral and growing social political crisis (CP/RES. 772/00); 264/00, 855/00, 882/04, AG/RES. 1540/03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru, 2000 (failed elections)</td>
<td>No (Resolution 01/02 contemplated by some OAS member states)</td>
<td>Report by OAS electoral observers of serious electoral irregularities (AG/DOCS. 996/03); high-level mission sent to Peru to facilitate national dialogue (AG/RES. 1575); No significant response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 2001 (civil disorder and presidential resignation)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago, 2000–2005 (constitutional crisis)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia, 2005 (civil disorder and presidential resignation)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Expression of regret regarding the political crisis which resulted in Carlos Mesa's resignation; offer of OAS mediation to the government of Bolivia (AG/DEC. 47/05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Table 3.6, Continued**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cries</th>
<th>Did the OAS Invoke Its Primary Democratic Instrument?</th>
<th>OAS and Regional Response (and Relevant Documents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua, 2004–2005 (constitutional crisis)</td>
<td>Yes! IADC (Article 19) invoked in 2005 by Nicaraguan government</td>
<td>High-level mission sent to establish dialogue and support democratic institutions (AG/DEC. 43/05); report issued by the Permanent Council in support of Nicaraguan democracy and President Enrique Bolívar (CP/RES. 834/05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OAS documents are abbreviated by their common three- or four-digit description and followed by their report number. AG = General Assembly; CP = Permanent Council; DOC = declaration; RES = resolution.
Evaluating the Pattern of Crisis and Intervention

Having determined the relevant cases of unconstitutional interruptions and alterations since 1991, we can now turn to our primary task: analyzing the OAS response. Has the OAS consistently invoked its primary democracy instruments, Resolution 1080 and the IADC, in response to democratic crises in the post-Cold War era? The evidence is decidedly mixed: some threats to democracy, such as military coups and martial law, have elicited a strong response from the OAS, whereas others, such as electoral and constitutional irregularities, have elicited a more passive reaction. The defense of democracy regimes in the Americas remains uneven.

The OAS response has been fairly (though not entirely) consistent with respect to condemning the most egregious cases of democratic interruption in the region, such as coups and martial law (see table 3.2). The invocation of Resolution 1080 and the IADC in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela, in turn, became the basis for sustained diplomatic pressure by the OAS against illegal seizures of power. In the case of Haiti in 1991, for example, the use of Resolution 1080 set in motion a process that led to a series of escalating sanctions that ended with a U.S.-led military intervention to restore the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power in 1994. Indeed, in marked contrast with the Cold War period, classic coups d'état have now become effectively proscribed as a legitimate means of domestic political change. Even in the narrow realm of opposing coups and martial law, however, some qualifications are in order, particularly with respect to the cases of Venezuela (2002) and, equally significant, Ecuador (2000).

In the case of Venezuela, where a coup in April 2002 temporarily unseated elected president Hugo Chávez, what stands out about the OAS response is not the (appropriate) invocation of the IADC but rather the delayed response of the United States—which, in its failure to immediately condemn the coup, appeared to endorse it. The muted response by the United States, in turn, lends itself to at least two possible interpretations. On a positive note, the process revealed the independence of the regional powers of Latin America as well as Canada to take principled action—even against the interests of the United States, which harbored a pronounced hostility toward the left-wing Chávez government. Far more negatively, however, the episode revealed that the United States, particularly under George W. Bush's administration, had become unreliable in its defense of democracy against illegal seizures of power in the region. To be sure, the response of the Bush administration quickly damaged the hard-fought credibility that had been earned by the United States in its consistent support for democracy in the region during the preceding decade, specifically under the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations (Valenzuela 2002).

The response of the OAS to the coup in Ecuador in January 2000 also demands further explanation. Indeed, the failure of the OAS to invoke Resolution 1080 in response to the coup is a conspicuous case of OAS nonintervention because it involved a successful coup against a democratically elected government, that of Jamil Mahuad, who was ousted from power by a coalition of military and indigenous groups. It is all the more surprising as a case of countries had much to lose by invoking Resolution 1080 against Ecuador. Nevertheless, in practical terms, the mere threat of invoking sanctions in Ecuador proved sufficient in bringing about an end to the short-lived junta that seized power on January 21. The United States, for example, warned the Ecuadorian military that it would confront international isolation if the junta stayed in power (Bimenus 2002). Similarly, the OAS Permanent Council issued Resolution 765 (2225/00) making explicit reference to Resolution 1080 and giving “decisive support” to President Mahuad. With the threat of sanctions looming, the junta opted for an interesting compromise: in an attempt to restore some semblance of constitutional order, power was handed over to Mahuad's successor as vice president, Gustavo Noboa. In seeming contradiction of Resolution 1080, the OAS accepted this practical compromise—lending its support to Noboa's government in Permanent Council Resolution 784 (2325/00) in spite of the fact that his (albeit unpopular) predecessor had been ousted illegally. Although a semblance of constitutional order had been preserved in Ecuador, the "unfortunate events of January 21" represented a potentially dangerous precedent.

Ultimately, I argue, the crisis in Ecuador in 2000 prefigured a series of what I term "impeachment coups," or illegal (and often violent) acts by a disloyal opposition that unseat elected presidents and effect a quasi-legal transfer of power to a constitutionally designated successor. In different manifestations (and often with quite different implications for democracy), this new form of crisis spread quickly from Ecuador in 2000 to Argentina in 2001 and Bolivia in 2003, and it revisited both Ecuador and Bolivia in 2005.

The case of Haiti in February 2004 represents yet another type of challenge.
In failing to invoke the IADC in response to an armed rebellion and the gathering coup threat in early 2004, the OAS (again) appeared to condone the illegal overthrow of an elected (though unpopular and at times autocratic) president, without questioning the nature of Aristide's departure from power, the organization moved to try to ensure that a legal (or quasi-legal) constitutional successor be appointed to take his place. 41 In ambiguous near-coup crises such as these, the OAS must be sure not to confuse legal ends with illegal means; the use of street violence to unseat elected presidents is a disastrous substitute for the constitutional process of impeachment. Indeed, the tendency of the OAS to recognize and grant legitimacy to the successors of such crises is likely to encourage future conspirators.

Having examined the fairly consistent (though problematic) response of the OAS to the relatively clear-cut cases of coups and autogolpes in the region, we now turn to how the OAS has responded to the more ambiguous or, in some cases, less severe cases of authoritarian regression in the region. In vivid contrast to its response to coups and autogolpes, the OAS response with respect to near-coup crises (table 3.3) and electoral and constitutional irregularities (table 3.4) has been fairly (though not entirely) consistent in not invoking its primary legal instruments—in spite of the fact that the adoption of the IADC in September 2001 provided increasing scope for such intervention in the more recent cases. 42 Nevertheless, the failure of the OAS to invoke Resolution 1080 or the IADC in these crises should not be equated with complete inaction. For example, with respect to the most glaring cases of electoral irregularities in the region—the Dominican Republic in 1994, Peru in 2000, and Haiti in 2000—the OAS adopted a critical posture in its electoral observation reports and, in each case, played a critical role in attempting to mitigate social conflict after the election, in particular through the deployment of high-level missions, a technique that has been used in responding to several other crisis cases as well. 42

In the case of Nicaragua, moreover, the OAS has even registered its capacity for taking precautionary measures to safeguard democracy, in this case following President Enrique Bolaños’s rather exceptional request for OAS mediation under the auspices of Article 38 of the IADC—the only time other than the case of Paraguay in 1996 that either Resolution 1080 or the IADC has been invoked before a coup occurred.

The reluctance of the OAS to invoke its primary democratic instruments directly in response to electoral and constitutional irregularities (table 3.4) is perhaps not that surprising. On the one hand, it is only since September 2001 that the IADC has established a formal mandate for the OAS to intervene in “altercations” of a constitutional regime. Moreover, the IADC stipulates in Articles 19 and 20 that, in order to merit application of the charter, an alteration must be one “that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state,” a phrase infused with ambiguity, because it is not clear what types of altercations might be considered serious threats to democracy. No doubt this ambiguity is intentional because, perhaps more than any other aspect of the IADC, it directly challenges the sovereign right of individual governments to rule as they see fit. And whereas the elected presidents of Latin America may see coups as a realistic threat to their rule, they may also view alterations such as ballot-stuffing or court-stacking as a convenient expedient to maintain their rule. Indeed, the application of the IADC to “constitutional alterations” in Haiti (2004) and Ecuador (2005) occurred only retroactively—that is, after the elected president was overridden. And in Nicaragua its application occurred only at the request of a besieged government. In short, the IADC has never been invoked by the OAS against a sitting president. Thus, the OAS’s response to democratic crises in Latin America has varied according to the nature of the crisis itself and the challenges particular crises pose for issues of state sovereignty.

Finally, let me respond to the question of whether the OAS has had any constructive impact where it has intervened. The Freedom House data reveal, ultimately, that in the few cases where the OAS has taken some form of action, it has generally had an immediate and positive but short-lived impact. 45 In its initial impact, for example, the Haitian case (post-1994) could be counted as a successful intervention (democracy was, after all, restored); however, any gains in democratic consolidation were lost by 2000 and continued to deteriorate thereafter. In Peru, OAS action appears to have curbed the worst excesses of Fujimori but had no subsequent impact on the quality of democracy in Peru (until a corruption scandal forced the three-term president out of power). Still, the OAS (which had monitored six Peruvian elections in nine years) likely contributed to Fujimori’s ouster, which, after it was over, enabled Peru to become “free” by Freedom House standards; however limited, Peru is perhaps the closest thing to a successful case of OAS intervention. 46 On the other hand, Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela have followed paths of negligible and/or zero improvement (all were partly free before the OAS interventions...
The OAS's Mixed Record

Commonwealth, which recently suspended Zimbabwe from participation, affords it no other example, perhaps more comparable to the OAS's in terms of its membership composition. See Commonwealth (2003). On the Commonwealth, see also Klotz (1999, 55-72).

5. For an extended analysis of the issue of whether membership in international organizations promotes democracy, see especially Pevehouse (2002b; 2002c). See also Halperin and Lemmon (1998).


7. On the inability of the OAS budget to keep up with its expanding mandates, see especially Graham (2005).

8. On the notion of the quality of democracy, see Diamond and Morlino (2004).

9. As used here, impeachment coups are similar but not equivalent to what Omar D. El-Hilli (2003, 38-39) describes (in reference to Venezuela's coup in 2002) as a "civil society coup" or "the bundling of governing cities by extrastitutional means by such actors as the business community, organized labor, religious, changing nature (and frequency) of threats to democracy themselves. Peace-stimulating, we might conclude that the OAS is a relatively weak organization doing an imperfect and inconsistent job of promoting a rather limited notion of representative democracy. For all its weaknesses, however, the OAS has made a positive contribution to democracy promotion efforts in the Americas, particularly in its (generally) unified condemnation of coups, autogolpes, and egregious election failures.

10. The organization is best known for the role it has played in monitoring elections in the hemisphere; for example, the IUPC played a critical role in denouncing electoral irregularities during Peru's 2000 presidential election.

11. See also the contributions in the Farber volume (1996a) and Boniface (1992).

12. The quantitative reflections are based on data available from Freedom House (1996c; 2003; 2003a) for 1972-2004, as well as Hammar (2002b; 2002c) for both periods. Following Lacy (2003), and in the interest of measurability and comparability, I treat all analyses to countries with populations of 1 million people or more (this excludes, among others, the countries of Belize and Guyana).

13. According to Diamond's regime typology, countries are ranked by adding their Freedom House scores for "political rights" and "civil liberties"; the lower the score, the more "democratic" the country. Those countries with a combined score of a see
classified as "liberal democracies" while those with a score of 3–4 are "democracies," see Diamond (1996, 15–38). My classifications are based on these criteria using data from Freedom House (2000a; 2001b; 2002). These data, it must be stressed, are used primarily for heuristic or illustrative purposes; for a methodological critique of the Freedom House data, see Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán (2001) and Monck and Verkuilen (2002). For an alternative assessment, see UNDP (2004).

28. Guillermo O'Donnell in his writings on "Delegative Democracy" (1994) and the "Fictions about Consolidation" (1995) was among the first scholars to draw attention to the remarkable institutionalization and stability of Latin America's anti-democratic regimes; see also the discussion by Carethers (2001) and the ensuing debate in the Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 4 (2002).

29. Data from the UNDP. Discussed in greater detail later, points a decidedly more optimistic picture of Latin American democracy since the end of the Cold War.

30. By this standard, a democratic crisis has taken place when the OAS invokes its formal legal instruments, Resolution 1441 and the IADCI. Of course, an analysis of such interventions may leave out democratic crises to which the OAS did not respond, a form of selection bias. For this reason, OAS practice is used here merely as a point of departure. Furthermore, there are many informal practices available to the OAS for responding to democratic crises that do not entail invoking Resolution 1441 or the IADCI.


32. Article 20 was also referenced (retroactively) in an OAS resolution criticizing Aristide's less-than-democratic rule in Haiti, though it was never invoked while he was in power. In May and June 2001, one of the so-called prescrputive clauses of the charter (Article 20) was invoked by the OAS at the request of the governments of Ecuador and Nicaragua in response to democratic crises in each country. In contrast to Articles 19 and 20, Article 18 is designed to lend OAS support to member states before a crisis threatens the democratic order.

33. The qualification in Articles 19 and 20 of the charter that an "unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime" must "seriously" impair the democratic order introduces tremendous ambiguity into the application of the charter. On this and other ambiguities, see especially Cameron (2001). Furthermore, the lack of explicit description of serious alterations of the constitution is compounded by the practical problem of the OAS determining what is and is not constitutional in a given member state.

34. According to the UN data, and specifically component II of the EGI (free elections), these are the only two cases for the 1990–2002 period in which significant electoral irregularities occurred that had a determinative impact on the outcome. They differ, from legitimacy (in terms of openness) observed in countries such as Colombia, Guatemala, and Paraguay (the UNDP dataset does not register any irregularities in Venezuela, though some observers rejected the results of the May 2000 election there). The dataset excludes Haiti, where some election irregularities were certainly flawed.

35. Other irregularities were registered by the UNDP in component III of the EGI (free elections), but no other case registers a decline from one year to the next for the period 1990–2002 except Peru (1992 and 2000).

36. The scores for component IV (electoral public officers) range from a low of 0 and a high of 4 (and allow a plus/minus adjustment). The exact scores are as follows: Peru: 1992 (4); Paraguay, 1999 (3); Venezuela, 2002 (3–5); Ecuador, 2000 (3); Guatemala, 1999 (3); and Argentina, 2002 (4–5).

37. At the time of writing, data were unavailable for 2004. Furthermore, the 2004 election crises, in part, to check the consistency of the multiple studies, such as Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago, among others, data available and also expand coverage to countries not included in the UNDP dataset. The key cases of Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago, among others, are discussed in more detail later.

38. The OAS's criteria for electoral support included a "scientific" evaluation of the practices followed by the OAS and the IADCI. In general, the two cases included in the dataset (1994–97) are described as "authoritarian" during authoritarianism for all of the 1990s.

39. The United Nations did not support the elected government (see OAS resolutions, AG/RES. 787, 1990, on the occasion of the announcement of the results of the election); hence the OAS did not take any action during the period.

40. The authors also identify many "failed" elections besides, most notably in Haiti (2000). See Harvey and Mckay (2000).

41. Some cases were excluded based on my own professional judgment. For example, the Freedom House dataset does not count as elections in Venezuela (1992), Chile (1999), and Colombia (1994–95) are inconsistent with the UNDP and other data, countries with fewer than 10 million inhabitants, such as Belize, were also excluded.

42. The case of Ecuador in 2004–5 encompasses two separate but related democratic crises. The first crisis occurred in late 2003 when President Lucio Gutierrez and his congressional allies took provocative measures to stack the country's judiciary with his political followers. The second crisis occurred in April 2005 when Gutierrez was removed from the presidency by a controversial congressional vote (see Levitt in this volume).

43. The scores in tables 3–2–3 are based on an exhaustive review of primary and secondary sources on the OAS and, in particular, archival materials available online at the OAS Web site, www.oas.org.

44. On the democratic crises in the Andes, see Shifter (2003) and Mainwaring (2000).

45. Data and income classifications are from the World Bank (2003).

46. On the relationship between per capita income levels and democratic sustainability, see Przeworski et al. (1999) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997).


48. After the juntas stepped down from power, Ecuadorians hurriedly began refer-

49. The OAS's criteria for electoral support included a "scientific" evaluation of the practices followed by the OAS and the IADCI.
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41. On the Haitian crisis, see especially O'Neill (2004); Shamsie (2004); Wucker (2004); Erikson (2005); and Goldberg (in this volume). Regarding accusations that the events of February 2004 amounted to a coup, see Marquis (2004) and Economist (2004).

42. It is worth reiterating that under Articles 19 and 20 of the IACD, such crises would have to "seriously" impair "the democratic order in a member state" for the OAS to take action. Under Articles 19 and 20 of the Democratic Charter, the OAS may also take action to prevent a minor or potential crisis from getting worse—but only with the prior consent of the host government. This is a potential obstacle to OAS action because elected leaders who find themselves under threat may be reluctant (for reasons of political survival) to acknowledge that their rule is in jeopardy.

43. The deployment of high-level missions and political mediation is a particularly novel (and arguably quite effective) form of "intervention" in the OAS repertoire of action, and has been employed, in addition to the cases indicated already, in the aftermath of the coup against Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 and the collapse of the Gutiérrez government in Ecuador in 2005. For a detailed analysis of this new form of OAS intervention, see Cooper and Legler (2005, 2006).

44. My findings are thus consistent with previous analyses of the limited ability of international organizations to effect positive democratic change. See, for example, Isaac (1995); Remmer (1996); and Levitsky and Way (2002).

45. The OAS contribution to democratization in Peru is discussed in detail in Legler (2009).

CHAPTER FOUR

The United States
Rhetoric and Reality

Carolyn M. Shaw

During its occupation of [the country], the United States did attempt to develop the semblance of constitutional government and made numerous improvements in the areas of health, public works, and bureaucratic administration. But these efforts did little to satisfy the [people], who grew increasingly rebellious and contemptuous of the U.S. presence in their country. Contrary to [the president's] ideals, the [people] did not see the United States as providing them with an opportunity to develop democracy, but rather as a powerful neighbor instituting a new form of colonialism.

KRYZANKE 1996

Given events in Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003, this excerpt could be a description of conditions in Iraq. The quotation, however, describes conditions dating back to the U.S. occupation of Haiti in 1915 ordered by President Woodrow Wilson and could accurately be applied to other cases during the past century. The United States has had a tradition of "promoting democracy" in Latin America and around the world for many years and still uses this rhetoric today to justify actions being taken in the war on terrorism. Although promoting democratic institutions in both Afghanistan and Iraq has followed the overthrow of the existing authoritarian regimes, militarized intervention is just one of a variety of strategies that the United States has adopted historically to promote democracy. Justifications for U.S. involvement in the Western Hemisphere have always been controversial and Latin American states have often struggled to prevent unwanted U.S. interference in the region.

A lack of consistency has marked U.S. democracy promotion policy in the Western Hemisphere in recent years. The United States served as a key sponsor