Consolidating Dictatorship:
The United States and the Pinochet Regime

A documented case can be made for the proposition that the current regime in Chile is militaristic, fascist, tyrannical and murderous.
—Internal State Department Dissent Memo, February 1974

In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here.... We want to help, not undermine you.
—Henry Kissinger speaking privately to Augusto Pinochet, June 8, 1976

The USG wishes to make clear its desire to cooperate with the military Junta and to assist in any appropriate way,” states a classified cable from the White House Situation Room dated September 13, 1973. “We welcome General Pinochet’s expression of Junta desire for strengthening ties between Chile and U.S.” (Doc 1) With that secret message, the Nixon administration officially embraced the bloody coup d’état in Chile. The White House directed Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to convey this position to Pinochet “at earliest possible opportunity.” Davis cabled back the next day: “Pinochet expressed most sincere appreciation and said he would like to keep privately in touch.”

Publicly, the White House portrayed its posture towards the coup as one of neutrality: “We took the decision that we would not say anything that indicated either support or opposition—that we would avoid what we had done in Brazil in 1964 where we rushed out by recognizing the government,” Kissinger explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearing as secretary of state on September 17. But privately, according to the declassified cable traffic, U.S. officials were assuring Chile’s military rulers of Washington’s full endorsement of their violent move to
take power. With bodies overflowing from morgues, domestic and international condemnation of the bloodshed, strong criticism from the U.S. Congress, and widespread charges of covert U.S. involvement in the coup, the Nixon White House decided to cover up its warm welcome and avoid open identification with Chile's new military regime.

Initially, the Nixon administration communicated with Pinochet through an embassy intermediary, the U.S. MilGroup officer, Col. Carlos Urrutia. At midday on September 12, Urrutia secretly met with Pinochet and received a briefing on the status of mopping-up operations, and the Junta's political plans, as well as Chile's need for U.S. economic and military assistance. The two also discussed the "delicacy of matter of contact" and a delay in Washington's formal recognition of the new regime. Urrutia then reported their conversation back to Ambassador Davis. Pinochet, as Davis cabled the White House Situation Room, "showed understanding and was relaxed about the matter of recognition and volunteered that obviously we should not be the first to recognize."

Indeed, Washington waited two weeks until more than a dozen other nations had formally recognized the military Junta before quietly extending recognition to the Pinochet regime on September 24. "We strongly believe domestic and international considerations make this very brief delay highly advisable in overall interest of new GOC [government of Chile] as in our own," a cable from Kissinger and his NSC deputy Brent Scowcroft explained to Davis as he prepared for a furtive "nonofficial" meeting with the regime's foreign minister one week after the coup. "In the meantime, we want GOC to know of our strongest desire to cooperate closely and establish firm basis for cordial and most constructive relationship." [Doc 2]

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, close cooperation took the form of behind-the-scenes diplomatic support, as well as a sympathetic stance on aid useful for continuing acts of repression. On September 14, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations strongly recommended that the new Chilean government dispatch a "representative of stature, presence and alertness to New York without delay" to present a persuasive justification for the overthrow of Allende and counter harsh criticism leveled by the Soviets and Cubans. U.S. officials at the UN worked closely with Chilean diplomats to cast the coup in the most positive light. Back in Santiago, Ambassador Davis lobbied members of the new Junta on "enlisting" the help of the Christian Democrats "with this problem of foreign image." This idea eventually led to a tour of Latin America and Europe by prominent members of Chile's Christian Democratic Party to present a public justification for the coup—a tour secretly financed by the CIA.

On September 15, the U.S. air force attaché was approached by the head of logistics for the Chilean air force who requested the U.S. immediately provide 1,000 flares to be used "for illumination purposes in military operations against extremist groups," as well as 1,000 steel helmets for soldiers. "I believe it is advisable to accommodate this request—discreetly if possible," Ambassador Davis cabled Washington. In another cable the same day, he argued that providing the equipment would be a key signal of support: "The new Chilean government is obviously operating under great strains, and is counting friends in this moment. Negative from us could have serious repercussions and set pattern of attitudes we should probably be willing to take some risks to avoid." Two weeks later, Davis alerted the State Department that the Chilean military had requested a U.S. "detention center advisor" and needed technical support as well as portable tents and housing as they scouting new locations for the eventual transfer of thousands of prisoners from the National Stadium. The ambassador recognized that "sending of advisor to aid in establishment of detention camps provides obvious political problems," but he recommended Washington send temporary housing equipment without specifying its usage. "Dept. may wish to consider feasibility of material assistance in form of tents, blankets etc.," Davis recommended, "which need not be publicity and specifically earmarked for prisoners."

From the outset, Washington confronted the political pressures of aligning U.S. foreign policy with a ruthless regime. As major media outlets such as the New York Times reported death tolls in the thousands, Nixon administration officials faced increasingly tough questioning from both the press and Congress. "In some of these Congressional hearings, I've been asked: 'How many people have been killed? Is it true the rumors that we hear? ' " Assistant Secretary Kubisch confided to Kissinger during an October 1 staff meeting. But the new secretary of state made his position clear. The U.S. would not defend atrocities by the new regime, but "we should not support moves against them by seeming to dissociate ourselves from the Chileans." As he admonished: "I think we should understand our policy—that however unpleasant they act, this government is better for us than Allende was." [Doc 3]

Helping the Regime Consolidate: Overt Assistance

The Nixon administration mobilized quickly to help the Chilean military consolidate its rule. Within one day of the coup, the WSAG—an interagency task force known as the Washington Special Actions Group—met to begin preparing assessments on "anticipated short, medium and long term Chilean assistance requirements," according to a secret/NODIS briefing memorandum prepared for Kissinger. The CIA immediately began gather-
ing intelligence on Chile's currency reserves and debt obligations. Within a week of the coup, action programs were readied on meeting Chile's economic, monetary, and military necessities. On September 20, Kissinger chaired a meeting of the WSAG where the decision was made to instruct Ambassador Davis “to talk to the Junta...to inform them of our goodwill...of our intention to recognize and when; when the emergency food supplies will be delivered; and authorizing the Ambassador to discuss, with Junta, Chile’s middle and long-term economic needs.” (Doc 3)

Almost overnight, Washington reopened the spigot of bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to Santiago. In every category of direct and indirect bilateral and multilateral economic and military assistance to Chile, U.S. aid rose dramatically following the coup—marking the end of the “invisible blockade” Nixon and Kissinger had used to undermine the Allende government. “It is quite apparent that Chile is going to need considerable aid,” Assistant Secretary Kubisch declared to Congress on September 29, “and if it adopts a sensible government, I would expect that aid to be given.”

On October 6, the U.S. Department of Agriculture granted the Pinochet regime $2.4 million in commodity credits for the purchase of wheat to help alleviate food shortages—credits that had been previously denied to the Allende government; in November, another such credit was authorized. “On November 14, we announced our second CCC credit to Chile—$2.4 million for feed corn,” Kissinger’s aide informed him—in a secret situation report attached to the classified memorandum, “Chilean Executions,” alerting him to hundreds of murders by the regime during its first weeks in power.

Those commodity credits were supplemented by dramatic allocations from AID’s Food for Peace Program—known as PL 480 Title 1 and 2. During the first three years of the military government, Chile received $12.2 million in Food for Peace grants, as compared to $14.7 million during the three years before the coup. Pinochet’s Chile not only received far greater amounts of U.S. assistance than the Allende government; the military regime obtained remarkable preferential treatment over all other countries in Latin America. In fiscal years 1975 and 1976, Chile received 80 percent of all Title I Food for Peace assistance to Latin America, even though the country contained only 3 percent of the region's population. “On PL 480, I understand Chile is getting two-thirds of the total for Latin America,” Kissinger told Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal during a September 29, 1975 meeting. During the same time period, Chile received over $800 million from AID in housing guarantees, compared to only $4 million of such grants AID dispersed among the rest of Central and South America.

Freed from U.S. obstruction at the multilateral lending institutions, the World Bank and the IDB both reopened their loans programs in Chile. IDB loans between 1971 and 1973 totaled $11.6 million. During the first three years of Pinochet’s rule, that figure rose to $237.8 million. The World Bank, which had provided zero credit to the Allende government, authorized $66.5 million from 1974 to 1976. When Pinochet’s ambassador to Washington, Manuel Trucco, complained to Kissinger and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs William Rogers that “with the World Bank we are experiencing certain delays,” Rogers assured him that Chile “should have no problem. We are leaning hard on the bureaucracy.”

The multilateral bank loans obtained with U.S. pressure totaled “hundreds of millions,” Ambassador David Popper wrote to Rogers in late July 1975. In addition, there was “the hundreds of millions we have saved for Chile through our part in debt rescheduling arrangements.” Having actively discouraged any debt negotiations during Allende the United States encouraged repeated rescheduling under Pinochet. “We spearheaded the Paris Club debt rescheduling,” noted one secret memo sent to Rogers. In 1975, the U.S. agreed to reschedule nearly $100 million Chile owed to U.S. banks.

U.S. policy was to “maintain and strengthen” the new Pinochet regime, according to declassified State Department records. Indeed, Washington’s largesse allowed the Junta to quickly overcome the food shortages that had plagued Chile during Allende, stabilize the economy, and curry favor with the middle and upper classes—all of which contributed to its consolidation of power. The United States had provided “absolutely vital assistance to the Chileans,” Ambassador Popper noted in a major policy review paper in July 1975. “The Chileans are fully aware of it, and are quick to express their appreciation.”

Washington’s economic largesse freed up foreign exchange for the acquisition of armaments. Once in power, the Chilean military went on a buying binge, reaching agreement with the U.S. to expedite delivery of arms ordered before the coup and on more than $100 million in new weapons and spare parts. The Chileans sought M-60 tanks and F-5 supersonic fighter aircraft, as well as complex air defense systems, TOW missiles, and various types of munitions. They also ordered equipment that could be directly deployed for repression—armored personnel carriers, recoilless rifles, jeeps, trucks, antiaircraft gear, and communication systems. The Chileans requested, but were forced to withdraw, an application for $12 million in foreign military sales credits for “counterinsurgency gear to outfit twenty-three special counterinsurgency ‘basic units.’” But on December 28, 1975, the State Department began authorizing export licenses for commercial sale of lethal equipment, including 2,500 M-16 rifles, 1,600 submachine guns, and 2.2 million rounds of ammunition that the Chilean’s paid for with cash. Within three years of taking
power, Pinochet’s Chile had established itself as the fifth largest customer in the world—behind such major-league buyers as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran—of U.S. military hardware."

Helping the Regime Consolidate: Covert Assistance

Clandestine U.S. support also helped Pinochet establish his violent grip on power. The CIA’s Santiago Station, with many connections to the military and civilian groups now behind the Junta, was well-situated to offer critical aid; covert action projects being run against Chile’s elected government prior to September 11, could be extended and reconfigured to contribute to consolidation of the new military regime. In the aftermath of September 11, the CIA initiated what cables referred to as an “effort to make new govt strong and effective.” That included amending covert political and propaganda operations, and developing new “agents of influence” and assets within Chile’s post-coup power structures. The Station also established close relations with Pinochet’s new security services, providing organizational training and support for DINA after it began operations in late 1973.

At the time of the coup, the Santiago Station was heavily staffed with numerous veteran officers and a roster of new agents sent in the late summer of 1973. They included: Chief of Station Raymond Warren, who lived at 952 America Vespucio St., and operated under the cover of embassy political officer; deputy COS Donald Winters, who also posed as an embassy officer and resided at 1775 Tobalaba; and John Devine, an operative who handled the CIA’s media and propaganda operations in Chile. Two other CIA agents, John Hall and James Anderson, operated as vice-consuls in the consulate, where, incredibly, they handled cases of U.S. citizens disappeared, detained, and abused by the Chilean military following the coup.

In the aftermath of September 11, the CIA Station quickly offered material assistance to the regime. But the barrage of accusations of Agency involvement in the military takeover prompted Langley headquarters to delay direct aid. “Regret [deleted] has already discussed this matter with Junta,” Western Hemisphere Division chief David Atlee Phillips cabled Santiago on October 3. “Agency operational activities in Chile are now prime target for Congressional investigations and we expect questioning to continue for some time, especially in view of increasing news coverage hostile to the repressive measures being adopted by Junta.” The CIA, Phillips added, “must provide honest answers to questions regarding current OPS activities and thus cannot assist Junta.”

Instead, the CIA focused on helping the Junta improve its bloody image abroad, and popularity at home. On September 19, Ambassador Davis app-

proved a Station request to finance the purchase of what David Atlee Phillips described as a “small network” of media outlets that would be instrumental “in mounting a propaganda campaign to popularize the Junta’s programs.” Two CIA collaborators helped the Junta draft a White Book of the Change of Government in Chile—a public relations publication that was widely distributed to the press and political figures in the United States and other nations. And the CIA continued to covertly underwrite its most important asset, the El Mercurio newspaper empire, as it became the leading voice of pro-regime propaganda in Chile, regularly maximizing the military’s “reforms” while minimized reporting on repression.

Prior to the coup, the CIA’s fiscal year 1974 propaganda project budget for Chile, authorized what the CIA called “a steady barrage of antigovernment criticism” against Allende to exploit “every possible point of friction.” That budget approved covert funding for El Mercurio and its “propaganda mechanisms” through April 1974. Following the coup, however, the Santiago Station and the Western Hemisphere division determined an extension was necessary—a “high” additional subsidy through the end of June to allow the military regime’s key oracle a smooth transition off the clandestine U.S. dole. Covert funding was “essential to maintaining the trust and continued collaboration of the [assets] and through them, to maintain our capability for influencing the Junta and molding Chilean public opinion,” according to a staff report opposing a deadline for terminating the propaganda project. This project had not only “played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup,” David Atlee Phillips reminded his superiors in a January 9, 1974 memorandum, it was essential to advance national and international propaganda efforts in support of the Pinochet regime. “Since the coup, these media outlets have supported the new military government,” he wrote:

They have tried to present the Junta in the most positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists in Chile to obtain facts about the local situation... The project is therefore essential in enabling the Station to mold Chilean public opinion in support of the new government. (Doc 4)

Faced with State Department pressure to wrap up its pre-coup covert projects, the CIA’s Western Hemisphere division sought—and obtained—an additional $176,000 to “give this multifaceted propaganda mechanism the opportunity to locate alternative funding sources,” and assure that CIA propaganda assets had an incentive to continue working with the Station. The additional funds helped cushion the blow for Agustin Edwards’s media empire as years of covert U.S. financing were finally phased out. In late February 1974,
agents from the CIA Station met with El Mercurio representatives and informed them that post-coup circumstances “made it impossible for us to continue to subsidize [deleted] media outlets and that we wished to divest ourselves of any responsibility for them.” The Chileans were told that at the end of the fiscal year, “all subsidy support . . . would cease.” For these long-standing Chilean media assets, the CIA Station chief reported back in a secret March 1, 1974 cable to Phillips, “this news came as a shock and disappointment.”

Through its political action programs, the CIA also covertly promoted the image of the new regime. In October 1973, the Station secretly financed an international tour by a group of prominent Christian Democrats to justify the military overthrow. The trip, which lasted more than a month, included party leaders such as Enrique Krauss, Pedro Jesus Rodriguez, Juan de Dios Carmona, and Juan Hamilton. The party arrived at a plan for sending a ‘truth squad’ to a number of Latin American and European capitals to explain the background of the Chilean military coup and the PDC’s association with, and support of, the Junta in this situation,” the CIA’s directorate of operations advised in a secret memorandum for the Kissinger-chaired 40 Committee. “Unfortunately, the PDC has not had the time to recover from the financial drought of the Allende period; therefore,” according to the CIA memo, covert funding was necessary.

Post-coup covert support for the Christian Democrats, and other political action projects became subject to a lengthy, and rather extraordinary debate among high-ranking U.S. officials in the CIA and Department of State. At the time of the coup, only $13,000 of the $1 million in covert funds authorized on August 20 by the 40 Committee for political-action operations had been dispensed by the Santiago Station; initially, the CIA and Ambassador Davis believed they still had authority to distribute the rest—even after the events of September 11. But in Washington, CIA and State Department officials determined that the August 20 authorization was “dead letter.” The “situation has changed so drastically since August 20 Committee approval that we must start anew,” as Langley headquarters cables the CIA Station on September 21. Ongoing projects would be reviewed and reconsidered and post-coup expenditures would have to be approved again by the 40 Committee. In early October, the CIA presented its first appeal for “Initial Post-Coup Support” to the 40 Committee. (Doc 5)

On October 15, the 40 Committee did approve interim funding for the propaganda projects to improve the Junta’s image. The CIA then moved to renew and amend the subsidies for the political parties it had supported to bring down Allende. On December 26, the Agency proposed to reconfigure the FY 1974 budget to support the National Party—described as “the government’s party”—to $580,666. The PN, according to the CIA proposal, “feels that if it succeeds in becoming the government’s standard-bearer it will not need further U.S. Government financial support.”

The CIA also proposed to renew covert funding for the Partido Democrata-Cristiano, including payments promised before the coup, along with a clandestine subsidy—“surge funding”—to allow the near-bankrupt party to pay its bills in the year following the coup. In late November, the Agency sought to adjust the FY 1974 budget for the PDC political-action program to $645,150 and requested $160,000 to underwrite the party from December 1973 through April 1974. Facing State Department resistance to continuing political-action projects in Chile, several weeks later the CIA submitted a secret/sensitive proposal for the 40 Committee titled “Request for [$160,000] for Chilean Christian Democratic Party,” asking for at least three months’ worth of financing, and a “terminal payment” that would allow the Christian Democrat Party to meet its payroll in early 1974 and wean itself away from twelve long years of covert U.S. support.

The debate over this $160,000 proposal at the highest levels of Kissinger’s State Department reflected U.S. determination to back a brutal military regime over even minimal support for the party that had represented Washington’s greatest hope for Chilean democracy since John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Now that Allende was dead, the rationale for covert action to “preserve Chile’s democratic institutions” no longer seemed important to U.S. policy makers—even as the regime that overthrew him was systematically dismantling those very institutions.

Only one State Department official—a Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyst named James Gardner, who served as a liaison to the CIA on covert operations—seemed to grasp the stark hypocrisy in the U.S. posture. “A documented case can be made for the proposition that the current regime in Chile is militaristic, fascist, tyrannical and murderous,” Gardner wrote in a February 1974 secret memo in an effort to convince his superiors at INR to support covert assistance to the PDC in Chile:

At the same time I think a case can be made for the proposition that the PDC is a sturdily democratic political organization, perhaps the only one in Latin America. The financial cost we are asked to pay to make it perhaps possible for this party to survive is small . . . . The projected assistance would seek only to strengthen an element in Chilean society that might be able to moderate the excesses of this regime. I cannot really believe that our acceptance of the Junta must involve passive identification with its more grotesque aberrations.

Gardner cited a historical reason as well:
With the exception of our past aid to democratic elements in Chile, I am unfamiliar with any case in which our [cover] intervention has had any effect but to favor conservative or reactionary elements. We have never worked against the right, no matter how extreme it has been. If we refuse to assist the PDC in Chile . . . we will have preserved unbroken a record in which I would take some pleasure in seeing at least one flaw, especially if our interests were thereby served.41

Other U.S. officials endorsed minimal covert assistance to the PDC, but for different reasons. At a meeting with the CIA in November 1973, Deputy Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman took the position that a covert subsidy would enable the PDC to support the new regime, but "should be extended with the clear understanding that after such and such a date the party would be over." If aid were terminated now, he conceded, "we would be causing ourselves trouble, for it would look as if we had been interested simply in knocking off Allende." The CIA, for its part, advanced the cogent position that support the PDC was necessary for it to compete politically against leftist parties if and when Pinochet returned power to civilian rule. Otherwise, an abrupt cessation of U.S. Government financial support would strain the PDC's already depleted resources before it had a chance to find alternative sources," the CIA noted, "and, probably of greater import, would adversely affect the U.S. Government's relationship with the party."42 And Ambassador Popper weighed in with the argument that support for the Christian Democrats was a way to help the Junta. Covert funding, he cabled "would assist in influencing the PDC in the direction of strengthening its policy of maintaining correct relations with the Junta, support of constructive Junta goals, and avoiding at all costs an open break with the government."43

But Kissinger's top aides worried that Pinochet would view as an insult any CIA covert support for political forces that the regime intended to suppress. For the first time in more than a decade of massive covert intervention, U.S. officials voiced concern that Washington could be accused of "meddling" in Chile's internal affairs. At a November 23 ARA-CIA meeting, Assistant Secretary Kubisch voiced his opposition "in principle" to covert political operations, particularly since "we now have a different situation in Chile." The secret meeting minutes recorded his position:

The question now was whether, given the abrupt change in Chile and in the security situation there, it was really essential to fine tune a political situation simply to be a moderating influence and to help the opposition stay alive. He found it difficult to see a persuasive case that we should do so. His feelings were sharpened by the problems that seemed to be emerging between the Junta and the PDC, and by the fact that the Secretary had made it clear that the change in regime in Chile was much in our interest and that we should do all we could to help the Junta succeed. In view of the Secretary's remarks, he would not be comfortable recommending assistance to any element in Chile that was not completely identified with the Junta. (Doc 6)

What would happen if the Junta discovered that the U.S. was still clandestinely supporting democratic parties? According to Kubisch, "they naturally would ask what the hell we were doing," he told his colleagues on November 23. "If we could say our program had ended with the overthrow of Allende," he concluded, "our position would be sound." In a cable from CIA headquarters to Santiago reporting on the meeting, CIA officials complained that Kubisch "kept raising serious problem specter if Junta discovered we were funding PDC," and requested that the Station send "any new or particularly compelling arguments in favor of proposal since we will obviously need best possible ammunition."

Without resolution, the internal debate between the CIA and the State Department over secret funding for the Christian Democrats extended well into the spring of 1974. On April 4, the head of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, William Hyland, wrote a memorandum opposing what he called "a messy affair . . . driven by bureaucratic-clandestine momentum." Kissinger should be told, Hyland argued, that any payments to the PDC would be "exposing ourselves to Congressional reactions for continued 'meddling' in Chile." Moreover, he added, "I don't quite understand why we continue to support a political party that is, in effect, in opposition to the government, which I presume we now support." After former Chilean president Eduardo Frei raised the sensitive issue of the covert funding with Ambassador Popper during an April 18 meeting, however, the embassy sent a special cable—through CIA channels—appealing for reimbursement of funds the PDC had spent "during the climactic days of the civilian opposition struggle against the Allende Government." Popper argued that "it is in our interest to maintain a minimally satisfactory relationship with the PDC, and to avoid the imputation of bad faith. We have been put on notice," he added, "that our failure to meet the [deleted] obligation will result in deterioration of our present contacts."44

The ambassador's advocacy led to a compromise: Since the CIA had pledged financing to the PDC before the coup and the party had made commitments based on that pledge, the CIA would make a final, secret payment—adjusted for inflation—to cover pre-coup PDC commitments made between July 1 and September 10. If asked by the U.S. Congress or the Chilean Junta,
U.S. officials could then claim no clandestine political operations following the coup. “With the understanding that it would mark the end of our covert assistance to the PDC, I believe we should approve the payment of the [$50,000],” Assistant Secretary Kubisch recommended to Kissinger’s deputy, Joseph Sisco, on May 7. In a June 11 SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY action memorandum titled “Termination of the Chile Account”—marked “outside system” to hide it from the NSC bureaucracy—Kissinger’s office approved the “State/CIA compromise” for clandestine commitments made before the coup in Chile. (Doc 7) On June 24, the 40 Committee authorized this final payment.53

Officially, the CIA’s twelve-year covert action program to underwrite the Christian Democrats ended on June 30, 1974, with the CIA implementing “liquidation plans” to close down safe houses, bank accounts, and other covert mechanisms of this funding operation. So too did the clandestine operations in support of other political parties such as Partido Nacional, the Democratic Radical Party, and the Radical Party of the Left. By the end of June, the Agency had also formally terminated its “covert action propaganda activity” built around El Mercurio—considered to be its most successful and influential covert action project in Chile in support of the military takeover.

With the Pinochet regime firmly in place, the CIA then reconfigured its role in Chile. The Santiago Station’s “operational and budgetary emphasis shifted from covert action operations to one which was predominantly non-CIA oriented,” as internal CIA records described the transformation after the coup. By the summer of 1974, the CIA’s operations focused on “liaison relationships” with Chile’s security services, particularly the secret police force—the Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA.

The CIA and DINA

“After the coup, the CIA renewed liaison relations with the Chilean government’s security and intelligence forces,” noted the Church Committee in its report, Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973. For more than two decades, that oblique sentence constituted the only official recognition of CIA support for DINA and the other intelligence units responsible for repression during the initial years of the regime. In its own September 2000 report, Covert Activities in Chile, the CIA slightly expanded the description of its “liaisons” with the Pinochet regime. “The CIA offered these services assistance in internal organization and training to combat subversion and terrorism from abroad.” Covert assistance, as one intelligence officer elaborated, consisted of manuals, technical support, organizational methodology, and facility blueprints.54 But covert ties to DINA extended beyond such basic assistance.

The CIA regards its “liaison” relations with foreign intelligence services among its most sacred of secrets; the details of its support for DINA remain highly classified. But it is clear that the CIA helped DINA become the dominant force it became during the early years of the dictatorship. Shortly after DINA was created, CIA Station chief Ray Warren promised Colonel Contreras planning, training, and organizational support.55 To demonstrate the CIA’s high-level commitment, the legendary deputy director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Vernon Walters, arrived in Santiago to confer with Pinochet over CIA assistance. Pinochet told Walters that he had hand-picked Contreras to lead [DINA].” Contreras then received an invitation to come to Washington in the early spring of 1974.

On March 4, the CIA hosted a lengthy lunch meeting between Contreras, Walters, and officers of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere division. A report on the session sent to the CIA Station Santiago totaled three pages recording the various elements of collaboration the CIA could supply; but years later the Agency would only declassify one paragraph in which CIA officials stressed to Contreras that they would provide training and support, but not for “any activities which might be construed as ‘internal political repression.’” (Doc 8) In August of 1974, according to Contreras, a team of eight CIA specialists arrived in Santiago to train DINA officers. How long they stayed, and the substance of their training mission remains top secret.

The CIA assisted DINA even though officials understood the distinction between support for fighting external subversion and internal repression to be a false one. In documents reviewed by the Church Committee but never declassified, Agency officials acknowledged that “while most of CIA’s support to the various Chilean forces would be designed to assist them in controlling subversion from abroad, the support could be adaptable to the control of internal subversion as well.”56 More than once, U.S. officials raised the specter of DINA’s escalating human rights atrocities and expressed concerns that the CIA could be accused of contributing to DINA’s repression. “The policy community and CIA,” the Agency’s own review, Covert Activities in Chile, determined, “recognized that the relationships opened the CIA to possible identification with the liaison services’ internal operations involving human rights abuses but determined that the contact was necessary for CIA’s mission.”

In pursuit of that “mission,” CIA agents maintained close communications with Contreras while he was DINA chieflain between 1974 and 1977. The Agency characterized this relationship as “correct” but “not cordial and smooth.” But State Department and embassy officials interpreted his relations...
with the CIA differently. According to U.S. embassy political officer John Tipton, the Agency and DINIA “were in a close relationship”—particularly after a new Station chief, Stuart Burton, arrived in the spring of 1974 to replace Ray Warren. “Burton and Contras used to go on Sunday picnics together with their families,” Tipton told journalist Lucy Komisar in an interview. The closeness of their relations, he remembered, “permeated the whole CIA Station.” In Washington, the memoranda from the State Department’s Chile desk also noted the close ties between Contras and Deputy Director Gen. Walters. “Colonel Manuel Contras considers himself a bosom buddy of the general,” the desk officer reported.

Pinochet and Contras utilized these ties whenever they could. When the political controversy over Pinochet’s human rights record escalated in July 1975 after the regime abruptly cancelled the visit of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), Pinochet authorized Contras to approach chief of Station Burton for permission to meet with CIA deputy director Vernon Walters in Washington, D.C. The message Contras conveyed was that “General Pinochet wishes that Gen. Walters receive an emissary for the purpose of learning Chile’s position on the human rights issue for passage to Secretary Kissinger,” a cable from Burton to headquarters noted. The trip would have to be top secret; as Ambassador Popper told Burton “if there were publicity, [it] could be counterproductive:

[Amb. Popper] recognizes value in maintaining good relations with President Pinochet, who should not be led to believe we are rebuffing his efforts to communicate with us. Therefore, thinks it would be worthwhile if General Walters could give Contras a little time to allow latter to unburden himself on human rights and, thus, let leadership let off steam. (Doc 9)

Secretary Kissinger was briefed that “the investigator,” as aides referred to Contras, intended to travel to Washington. At the White House, Kissinger’s national security deputy, Brent Scowcroft, signed off on the visit. On the Saturday morning of July 5, Contras secretly met with Walters at a CIA office at Fort Myer in Arlington, Virginia. He provided the CIA deputy director with a DINIA dossier on the five members of the UNHRC purporting to demonstrate that they were “definitely leftists and biased in their views,” according to one debriefing of the meeting, and said he “wanted senior members of the United States government to know this.” In a subsequent memo to Scowcroft reporting on Contras’s visit, Walters noted that Pinochet had sought “understanding” for the decision to block the UNHRC, as well as a pledge “of U.S. support against any effort in the United Nations to expel Chile.” Perhaps more importantly, Walters reported that Contras raised the issue of how to circumvent Congressional sanctions on U.S. military equipment: “Chileans know they cannot get direct aid because of Congressional opposition. Wonder if there is any way they could get it indirectly via Spain, Brazil, or the Republic of Korea.”

Contras spent another four days in the States before returning to Santiago on July 9—much to the relief of State Department officials. In the CIA-ARA meeting on July 11, Assistant Secretary Rogers expressed his concern that the DINIA chieftain had been noticed attending a Washington dinner party. Contras, Rogers declared, was “notorious” for his repression; his mission to meet with the CIA deputy director “would be dynamic if it came out.”

Yet only several weeks later, this “notorious” individual was back in Washington, meeting again with General Walters, and running diplomatic and political interference for the Pinochet regime against the international and congressional chorus of condemnation on the regime’s human rights record. On August 23, Contras traveled to New York to confer with Chile’s UN mission, ostensibly to brief them on Pinochet’s strategy for defusing the uproar over the human rights commission, and to quietly lobby Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to come to Chile or send a select delegation in place of the working group. The main purpose of the meetings in New York, it appeared however, was to consult on the advisability of Pinochet traveling to the UN to defend Chile himself.

On August 24, Contras returned to Washington. He met first with the State Department’s Chile desk officer, Rudy Fimbres, and assured him that the regime soon would liberalize its internal security practices. According to a four-page memon of the meeting, Contras argued that the Pinochet regime was simply misunderstood. “He recognized Chile’s image abroad was negative,” Fimbres reported. “While much of this was the result of Communist activity, he thought there were sincere and moderate leaders in the U.S. who had not had a chance to appreciate the positive accomplishments of the Pinochet government.” On Fimbres’s recommendation Contras met with the office of one of Pinochet’s leading critics, Rep. Donald Fraser. “There is no torture,” he told them, “and there wasn’t much before.”

On August 25, Contras again met with General Walters—this time at Langley headquarters for lunch. “The luncheon will be essentially for protocol purposes,” a memo to DCI William Colby stated. “Private discussions will be held between the DDCI and Colonel Contras after lunch when Colonel Contras will explain recent measures taken by the Chilean Government to improve its image on the civil rights issue [deleted].” Before the meeting, CIA and State Department officials met to discuss “Col-
CIA Scandals and Investigations

On July 14 and 15, 1975, around the same time CIA headquarters and the Santiago Station were placing Manuel Contreras on their covert payroll, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby was called to testify in closed session before a special Senate panel—the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, led by Senator Frank Church. Colby was questioned extensively about former President Nixon’s orders to foment a coup in Chile in 1970, Track II, and the assassination of General René Schneider. His responses—Colby denied the CIA was involved in an assassination plot, but admitted it had attempted to foster a coup in Chile—were promptly leaked to the New York Times. “It was all very discouraging,” the CIA’s liaison to ARA, George Lauder told Assistant Secretary Rogers about the disclosures. “The CIA had to protect its sources.” More importantly, Rogers angrily responded, the State Department “had to protect the (expletive deleted) hemisphere. A price would be paid for the leak. The CIA had got out of the assassination charges by saying it had taken part in a coup attempt.” From a diplomatic perspective, Rogers continued, “the confession of having planned a coup d’état had been almost as bad as an assassination. Diplomatically it was terribly damaging. It was the most explicit admission yet.”

This was the second time Colby’s secret testimony about Chile had created a major uproar when his revelations spilled into the press. On April 22, 1974, the CIA director appeared in executive session before the House Armed Services Committee for a briefing on clandestine operations the CIA had conducted in Chile between 1970–1973. “The Agency activities in Chile,” Colby indicated according to a summary of his testimony, “were viewed as a prototype, or laboratory experiment; to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in efforts to discredit and bring down a government.”

Such admissions appeared to significantly contradict sworn denials by high-ranking officials, among them Kissinger and former DCI Richard Helms, that the CIA had attempted to undermine Allende. When Massachusetts Representative Michael Harrington read a classified transcript in July, he realized that U.S. officials had grossly deceived Congress during the ITT-CIA hearings the year before. He immediately contacted the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-
tions, J. William Fulbright and Frank Church, but they were reluctant to revisit the Chile scandal. The congressmen “asked what I thought he should do,” Church’s staff director Jerome Levinson recalled in an unpublished memoir. Levinson recommended that Harrington “give it one more try through established channels. I suggested he send a letter to Fulbright detailing the basis for his concerns and requesting a special inquiry.” Harrington took that advice. Congress and the American people, he concluded in his letter summarizing Colby’s testimony, “have a right to learn what was done in our name in Chile.”

A copy of Harrington’s letter, of course, landed on Levinson’s desk. In a report to Senator Church, stamped CONFIDENTIAL, Levinson summarized Colby’s revelations:

(a) the Nixon administration authorized more than $8 million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 “in an effort to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern,” and (b) that all these activities were specifically authorized by the Fifty Committee, the Interdepartmental Group, chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger, which authorizes CIA clandestine activities. The goal of the clandestine activities was to “destabilize” the Allende government; it was considered a “test of using heavy cash payments to bring down a government viewed as antagonistic to the U.S.”

Colby’s testimony, Levinson argued, provided key evidence of lying by high U.S. officials during several Congressional hearings in 1973. “It appears that Secretary of State Kissinger deceived the [Foreign Relations] Committee during the course of his confirmation hearing with respect to the extent and object of the CIA’s activities in Chile,” Levinson wrote. Richard Helms “committed perjury.”

Levinson took one additional step to call attention to the revelations in Colby’s still-secret testimony. In early September, after lunch with Seymour Hersh at Jean-Pierre’s, a swanky French restaurant in downtown Washington, D.C., he quietly provided a copy of the Harrington letter to the intrepid New York Times investigative reporter. The leak set in motion the biggest scandal on covert operations ever to hit the intelligence community.

On September 8, 1974, the New York Times published Hersh’s front-page story, CIA CHIEF TELLS HOUSE OF 8 MILLION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALLENDE IN ’70–’73. The article detailed both the Chile operations and their cover-up by Nixon administration officials. Gerald Ford, who had assumed the presidency only six weeks earlier, read the article and discussed it with Kissinger the following morning. “I saw the Chile story,” Ford said. “Are there any repercussions?” According to a secret-sensitive memorandum of conversation, Kissinger responded: “Not really.”

In fact, the story and a series of follow-ups written by Hersh, had significant repercussions—for the Ford administration, Kissinger, the CIA, and the conduct of covert operations abroad. Hersh’s revelations on Chile, coupled with further disclosures of CIA involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders, and “Operation Chaos,” a domestic spying and disruption program against antivirar groups, set off a major political scandal. The scandal, in turn, led to the first major congressional inquiry into abuses of executive branch power, the misconduct of the intelligence community and the presidential use of clandestine warfare as a foreign policy weapon. Following the scandals of Watergate and the collapse of Saigon, as Kissinger would concede in his memoir, Years of Renewal, the Hersh articles “had the effect of a burning match in a gasoline depot.”

The uproar over Hersh’s September 8 article was immediate. Senate and House leaders denounced the executive branch for misconduct abroad and gross deception at home. Amidst a barrage of criticism, Ford convened his cabinet to discuss what he called “the Chile deal” and defend the CIA. “We need a CIA and we need covert operations,” Ford told his top advisors before calling on Kissinger to “give the details.” In his briefing, Kissinger claimed that the U.S. was only defending democracy. He omitted any discussion of Track II and mendaciously denied that the U.S. had waged an economic destabilization campaign against Allende. “There might have been proclivity for economic warfare,” he said, “but the issue never came up. What happened was the result of [Allende’s] mismanagement and his nationalization and expropriations.” Decisions relating to Chile “were made in accordance with the law,” Ford asserted. “I wanted you all to have the story.” (Doc 11)

That was the position the president took publicly. In a historic press conference on September 16 (devoted largely to his controversial pardon of Richard Nixon) Ford became the first U.S. president to acknowledge, and defend, covert operations against a democratically elected government—operations designed to be “plausibly denied.” Is it the policy of your administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other democracies?, a reporter asked the president. “I think this is a very important question,” President Ford responded:

Now in this particular case, as I understand it, and there is no doubt in my mind, our government had no involvement whatsoever in the Allende coup. To my knowledge, nobody has charged that. The facts are we had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself.

In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being
made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press, and to destroy opposition political parties.

The effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties.

I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest.

CIA officials knew the president’s statements were inaccurate, and alerted the White House. In a subsequent “eyes only” memorandum, White House counsel Jack Marsh advised Ford that his response was “not fully consistent with the facts because all of the facts had not been made known to you.”

Presidential spin on the Chile operations did nothing to halt public and congressional outrage over revelations of CIA misconduct. In early January, when CBS news correspondent Daniel Schorr broke the story of CIA efforts to assassinate foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, and René Schneider, the intelligence scandal escalated dramatically. “What is happening is worse than in the days of McCarthy,” Kissinger complained to Ford in an emergency meeting early Saturday morning on January 4. “Helms said all these stories are just the tip of the iceberg. If they come out blood will flow,” Kissinger advised. “The Chilean thing,” he continued referring to the Schneider killing, “that is not in any report. That is sort of blackmail on me.”

At the January 4 meeting, Ford and his advisors agreed that he would announce the creation of a blue-ribbon Commission on CIA Activities, to be chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller—as a way to head off the threat of an independent Congressional inquiry. But on January 27, the Senate voted 82–4 to establish a special Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, which subsequently became known as the Church Committee. On February 19, the House also voted to initiate a panel of inquiry into “CIA transgressions,” headed by New York Representative Otis Pike.

The Ford administration saw these investigations, in Kissinger’s words, as “an assault on the intelligence community” and “the substance of American foreign policy” in the turbulent mid-1970s. “After all the country had been through,” he wrote in his memoirs, “a full scale public investigation into the entire range of the nation’s intelligence activities was a worrisome prospect in the existing morbid atmosphere.” At the State Department, Assistant Secretary Rogers recommended against “official acknowledgement” of covert operations against Allende, which would “destroy people and institutions im-

portant to Chile and to us” as well as damage respect for the United States in the entire hemisphere. In a secret memo to Kissinger, Rogers voiced his opposition to covert action as “bad principle and bad practice” but warned: “we should expect the gravest consequences to our Latin American relations for years to come if these matters are now to be laid bare.”

Led by Kissinger, the Ford administration adopted a policy of strategic stonewalling with the Congressional panels. U.S. officials disdainfully resisted cooperation with the Pike Committee staff, who Colby characterized as a “ragtag, immature, and publicity seeking . . . bunch of children who were out to seize the most sensational high ground they could.” Kissinger claimed executive privilege on State Department documents. When informed that the Committees were seeking cable traffic relating to Chile dated between 1964 and 1970 Kissinger told his aides “no,” according to a secret transcript of his July 14, 1975, staff meeting. “We have to tell the committee straight out that we’re not going to—?,” one deputy asked. “No,” Kissinger replied. “You shift it to the White House and let the White House refuse it—and I’ll see to it that the White House refuses it.” At one point, the Pike Committee issued three contempt-of-Congress citations against the secretary of state for refusing to turn over records.

The House inquiry was plagued by controversy and conflict; the Senate Committee met with greater success. For several months, the White House, CIA, and State Department delayed response to multiple requests for records, claiming to be understaffed. In truth, “the White House told us not to cooperate,” Colby would remember. “They just didn’t want to turn over documents.” Eventually the committee staff worked out an agreement over access to censored versions of CIA records and the White House turned over some, but not all, of the thousands of documents needed for the Senate investigation. This transition “from intransigence to cooperation,” as Church’s staff officer, Loch Johnson, described it, “moved with the pace of a glacier.”

As the Church Committee inquiry culminated in the fall of 1975, the White House took further steps to obstruct its work, and protect and conceal the controversial covert history the Senate investigation had uncovered. On October 31, President Ford sent a strongly worded letter to all members of the committee demanding that their report on five assassination plots—in Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Chile—remain classified to protect national security; and the administration began a concerted lobbying effort in the Senate to block release of the report. The next day, Ford initiated a secret presidential order to oppose the select committee’s plans to hold an open hearing on covert operations in Chile on the grounds that it would “establish a precedent that would be seized on by the Congress
in the future to hold additional open hearings on covert action," and "would have a shattering effect on the willingness of foreign political parties and individuals to cooperate with the U.S. in the future on such operations."  

The Church Committee managed to circumvent these executive branch roadblocks. On November 20, after an acrimonious and unresolved debate in a rare closed session of the Senate over approving the committee's findings, Senator Church simply released Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders to the press. At the time, the report represented the most comprehensive exposé of the dark and seamy side of U.S. foreign policy operations ever published. On December 4, the committee released a second, dramatic case study, Covert Action in Chile, 1965-1973, detailing a decade of clandestine CIA intervention to control Chilean politics, prevent Allende from becoming president, and undermine his government after he was elected.

Finally, over White House and CIA objections, the committee did convene the first public hearing ever held on covert operations. The hearings focused on Chile as an "example of the full range of covert action," Senator Church explained in his opening remarks, which "permits the committee, the Senate, and the country to debate and decide the merits of future use of covert action as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy." The select committee had taken "this unusual step," Senator Church noted, "because the committee believes the American people must know and be able to judge what was undertaken by their government in Chile. The nature and extent of the American role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Chilean government are matters for deep and continuing public concern," he concluded. "This record must be set straight."  

The Chile Syndrome

The scandal over covert operations to undermine Chilean democracy, coupled with the Nixon-Ford administration's embrace of Pinochet's violent regime, contributed to a dramatic national reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy. For the first time, CIA intervention became subject to public debate over the propriety of such practices—a debate that would endure and influence U.S. operations in countries from Angola to Nicaragua to Iraq in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Moreover, Pinochet's atrocities with Washington's ongoing assistance, mobilized church and solidarity groups who transformed human rights into a movement, and a potent political issue on Capitol Hill.

The "Chile syndrome"—supplementing the Vietnam syndrome of national reticence to U.S. military intervention in distant lands—reflected growing public demand that U.S. foreign policy return to the moral precepts of American society. "The issue [of Chile] arose in America at the worst possible time," Kissinger would complain in his memoirs. "In the aftermath of Vietnam and during Watergate, the idea that we had to earn the right to conduct foreign policy by moral purity—that we could prevail through righteousness rather than power—had an inevitable attraction."  

In spite of Kissinger's objections—indeed, because of them—Chile became the battleground for the first major fight between the executive branch and Congress over human rights and U.S. foreign policy. Between 1974 and 1976, Congress passed a wave of precedent-setting human rights legislation in an effort to directly or indirectly block the Ford administration's support for Pinochet—laws that institutionalized human rights as a component of U.S. bilateral relations with other nations. In the House of Representatives, a number of congressmen, among them Donald Fraser, who chaired the first hearings on human rights issues, Michael Harrington, Tom Harkin, Toby Moffett, and George Miller, took the lead in exposing Chilean atrocities, while sponsoring pioneering laws to penalize Pinochet, and other governments that violated the rights of their citizens. The Senate, led by Edward Kennedy, James Abourezk, and George McGovern, repeatedly called Kissinger and his aides to task for their support for the regime, and moved to curtail both economic and military assistance to Chile.

Senator Kennedy must be credited with being the most outspoken congressional critic of Pinochet and U.S. assistance to his regime. Soon after the coup, Kennedy condemned the continued silence of the government of the United States which has not issued a single public expression of remorse over the military coup which toppled a democratically elected government, or over the deaths, beatings, brutality, and repression which have occurred in that land.

Kennedy convened the first Senate hearings on Chile only seventeen days after the coup took place. On October 2, 1973, he offered a "sense of Congress" resolution urging the president to "deny economic or military assistance, other than humanitarian aid, until he finds that the Government of Chile is protecting the human rights of all individuals, Chilean and foreign." In December 1974, Kennedy successfully obtained a $85 million cap on economic aid to Chile in the foreign assistance appropriations bill, which the Ford administration simply ignored; at the same time, Kennedy also sponsored the first limits on U.S. military aid and training to the Chilean Junta. In July 1976, Congress passed the far more comprehensive Kennedy amendment, banning all military assistance, credits, and cash sales of weapons to
Chile—marking the first time Congress had terminated military aid to another government because of human rights abuses.

Congress also passed the “Harkin amendment”-model legislation tying U.S. economic assistance to the human rights record of other governments. The amendment, attached to the 1975 International Development and Food Assistance Act, was sponsored by then Iowa Congressman—now Senator—Tom Harkin. The new law mandated a cutoff of economic assistance to any country that engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. Chile was the original target of the bill, recalls Joseph Eldridge of the Washington Office on Latin America, who along with Edward Snyder of the Friends Committee on National Legislation drafted its language. The Ford administration ignored this law also, but the Harkin amendment established human rights as a legal criterion in U.S. foreign policy.

Congressionally imposed restrictions hampered U.S.-Chilean relations, creating consternation in both Washington and Santiago. “The United States will one day understand that Chile is a true friend, probably the best, and perhaps the only true friend in the Hemisphere,” Pinochet complained to Ambassador Popper after Congress passed the first restrictions on military assistance. “Chile is a better friend of the United States than the U.S. is of Chile.” The sanctions on military acquisitions hurt the Junta’s reputation with younger officers; moreover, the regime’s growing international isolation threatened its economic relations with the Western world. As the Pinochet regime came under increasing international criticism and pressure, it cast about for a way to improve its despotic image in the United States while continuing its repression. Pinochet initiated a covert propaganda and lobbying operation in the United States.

The regime’s main effort to influence the media and Congress was conducted through an illicit, and illegal, program—most likely run by DINA. This campaign, organized by a fictitious “public committee” called the American-Chilian Council (ACC) between March 1975 and December 1978, was the brainchild of prominent conservative columnist William Buckley, and a veteran lobbyist for right-wing causes, Marvin Liebman. “For the sake of future Chilean-American relations, it is vital that Chile’s case be put forward to the American people,” Liebman wrote in a secret letter to Buckley after both were approached by Chile’s UN ambassador for help. “The one way of doing this—as I know from many years of experience—is by a carefully planned program of international propaganda, and, when required, the mobilization of public action.”

The ACC’s propaganda program consisted of paying an unregistered lobbyist, L. Francis Bouchey, to “counter communist charges about human rights abuses in Chile”; publishing a series of pamphlets designed to portray

the Allende government as an agent of the USSR, and a biweekly information review on Chile to key congressional offices, interest groups, and policy actors; and financing trips by conservative pundits to Santiago.

Private donations from concerned U.S. citizens paid for these activities—or so the ACC claimed in its literature. In fact, the Pinochet regime was the “true foreign principal,” according to Justice Department records, funneling hundreds of thousands of dollars secretly through an agent in Chile’s United Nations mission in New York to Marvin Liebman’s Madison Ave. office to underwrite the ACC’s operations. The U.S. Justice Department eventually shut down these operations, charging that Liebman was acting as an unregistered foreign agent for Pinochet. The ACC, according to the Justice Department, was engaged in a secret and illegal propaganda campaign aimed at making congressmen, journalists, academics and the American public more sympathetic to Chile’s military dictatorship.

Human Rights: The Internal Debate

While the Pinochet regime illegally lobbied Congress, the Ford administration adopted an obsevero-pero-no-cumple—obey but don’t comply—posture toward economic and military aid restrictions. The administration ignored the FY 1975 ceiling of $25 million to Chile and sent over $112 million in food, materials, and credits; to exceed the cap the following year, AID lawyers provided policy makers with a contorted redefinition of the phrase made available in the FY 1976 legislation. The administration also chose to ignore the intent of the Harkin amendment. “The Department of State believes a serious question exists as to whether Chile is a country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights,” Kissinger wrote to Congressman Fraser in April 1976, despite dozens of memos and reports from his aides on the Pinochet regime’s systematic, ongoing atrocities.

Inside the executive branch, Secretary Kissinger personally led the effort to circumvent congressional restrictions and sustain aid to the Junta. In a December 3, 1974 meeting at the White House, he broached the issue directly with President Ford. “If we cut off arms, the military government will fall. They are lousy, but we just can’t do things like this.” On December 20, Kissinger again raised the issue with the president. “The Chilean aid cut is disastrous,” as notes taken by White House aide Brent Scowcroft recorded Kissinger’s argument. “I want to do everything possible to get arms for Chile.”

In meeting after meeting with his staff, Kissinger forcefully made the same point. Throughout December 1974, as Senator Kennedy’s first effort to curtail U.S. military assistance to the Junta advanced through Congress, Kissin-
ger berated his deputies for capitulating to the legislative branch, being soft on the human rights issue, and undermining the future of U.S. foreign policy. “Kennedy has the ball and is going to try and run with it,” one aide, Carl Maw, informed the secretary on December 3. “The whole thing is on this silly human rights question.” Kissinger responded: “If we don’t stand with what our interest is, and if every time we get tackled we get compromised or call something a compromise, that’s the same as yielding and we are in deep trouble.” On December 20, he angrily reminded his aides: “We’ve got to go to the mat on things of national interest. What else are we here for? You can’t throw a country to Kennedy just because it satisfies some ego trip that he’s got.” The Kissinger lecture continued: “My position is that I don’t yield to Congress on matters of principle . . . I don’t tolerate the Department making these concessions.”

In the highly revealing secret transcripts of his daily briefing with his assistant secretaries and regional officers, the secretary of state underscored several themes: first, that the Pinochet regime was being unfairly penalized. During the December 3 staff meeting, Kissinger repeatedly challenged Assistant Secretary Rogers on this point:

Secretary Kissinger: I’d like to know whether the human rights problem in Chile is that much worse than in other countries in Latin America or whether their primary crime is to have replaced Allende and whether people are now getting penalized, having gotten rid of an anti-American government. Is it worse than in other Latin American countries?

Mr. Rogers: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the consequences could be very serious, if we cut them off from military aide.

Kissinger returned again to this argument several minutes later:

Secretary Kissinger: The worse crime of this government is that it’s pro-American in the eyes of many of these supporters of these cutoffs. Is this government worse than the Allende government? Is human rights more severely threatened by this government than Allende?

Mr. Rogers: Well, I can’t say that, Mr. Secretary. In terms of freedom of association, Allende didn’t close down the opposition party. In terms of freedom of the press, Allende didn’t close down all the newspapers.

Kissinger also argued, repeatedly, that cutting off arms to Chile’s military regime might lead it to collapse, be overthrown, or worse, seek to acquire weapons from China or the Middle East. “Am I wrong that this sort of thing is likely to finish off that government,” he asked during his December 3 meeting. “And if the army winds up totally demoralized, that will affect amongst those out of office the whole future of politics. If it becomes clear that the army can [n]ever move again, the left will become immeasurably strengthened; am I wrong?”

On December 20 he snapped at Rogers: “You know the only possible outcome of this can be an extreme left-wing government in Chile or driving the Chilean government sort of toward the Arabs . . . or the Chinese.”

But his greatest concern was that if Congress succeeded in Chile, it would be emboldened to apply human rights criteria to other nations. “If it happens in Chile, now,” Kissinger complained during a December 23 meeting with his key deputies, “then it will be Korea next year. There isn’t going to be any end to it. And . . . we are going to wind up in an unbelievable precarious position, in which no country can afford to tie up with us.” This was the “fundamental problem,” Kissinger said. “It is a problem of the whole foreign policy that is being pulled apart, pulling out thread by thread, under one pretext or another. And it is an absurd argument to say Chile doesn’t make a difference . . . .”

To William D. Rogers fell the unenviable task of explaining the political realities of the human rights movement to Kissinger. When the secretary denounced the legislated cuts in military aid to Chile as “insane,” Rogers shared this assessment:

It is insane. But Mr. Secretary, it does reflect an extraordinary strong feeling amongst the Congress, as you well know. You can go to the mat on it now if you want to. And I predict you will have a hell of a fight on your hands come January. . . . There are a lot of Democrats on the Hill this coming session who want to go the mat on the issue of human rights and want to make a fight about it. It is very hard to make a national interest argument on Chile. . . . [T]he human rights issue has caught the imagination up on the Hill, as you well know, Mr. Secretary, and amongst the American people.

“My diagnosis of the reason they stuck it [to] the department in this case,” Rogers continued, “is that they didn’t think we were sincere on the human rights issue.”

Indeed, the Ford administration’s approach to Congress and the Chilean regime demonstrated an abysmal lack of sincerity on human rights. Rather than diplomatically employ the human rights legislation to press the Chileans to halt abuses, the administration appeared to commiserate with the Chileans. “The executive branch, from President Ford down, ha[s] consistently opposed restrictive legislation with regard to Chile,” Ambassador Popper told
Pinochet in January 1975. "Both the Department of State and the embassy had exerted every effort to assist Chile in this area" and "we would work to change the restrictive legislation." In his closed meetings with Chilean officials, Kissinger seemed to spend more time disparaging his staff's concerns for human rights than criticizing the regime for its atrocities. "I read the briefing paper for this meeting and it was nothing but Human Rights," Kissinger confided privately to Chilean foreign minister Patricio Carvajal during one meeting in 1975. "The State Department is made up of people who have a vocation for the ministry. Because there are not enough churches for them, they went into the Department of State." During another meeting Kissinger told Carvajal, "I hold the strong view that human rights are not appropriate in a foreign policy context." Washington, Kissinger stated, "did not intend to harass Chile on this matter." A growing number of mid-level State Department officials recognized the folly of Kissinger's attitude towards Pinochet's atrocities. Washington's embrace of the regime had not only failed to ease repression in Chile; it was costly to U.S. national interests, creating divisions with Western allies, jeopardizing Congressional cooperation on other foreign assistance programs, and damaging America's moral leadership in the Third World. Befriending Pinochet had become a major liability. A defense of human rights, these officers argued, should be elevated to a prime objective of U.S. foreign policy, and a primary U.S. national interest. Increasingly, these officials made their voices heard in a heated internal debate over changing course in Chile. The diverging positions in this debate became evident during the drafting of the Embassy's Country Analysis and Strategy Paper on Chile. The report, signed by Ambassador Popper and submitted on May 18, 1975, reflected Kissinger's position: "United States interest can best be served by maintaining and strengthening the present government in Chile. In conventional political and economic terms it is after all a highly friendly government." On human rights, Popper wrote, the U.S. would make its "preferences" known, and "encourage" and "offer incentives" for the military to end abuses. But the CASP report rejected "direct pressure tactics" which Popper submitted, would contribute to the "siege mentality" in the regime. Ambassador Popper's position prompted a near mutiny within the embassy. Four embassy officers—senior political officer John Tipton, political officers Robert Steven and Michael Lyons, and labor attaché Arthur Nixon—drafted and signed a five-page "dissent" to the CASP report titled "U.S. Policy Toward Chile—An Alternative." In the first clear internal challenge to Kissinger's positive posture toward Pinochet, these embassy officers argued that "this policy of friendly persuasion has not worked" and proposed "a course of action, including tangible measures, which has the best chance of furthering U.S. interests while at the same time causing real changes in the GOC's behavior." The human rights issue, according to their cogent critique, was paramount in U.S.-Chilean relations.

In Chile at this time, it is and should be the dominant factor. There are no other U.S. interests in Chile, individually or collectively, which outweigh it. Further, the cost to the U.S. of continued identification as the principal supporter of the present GOC significantly outweighs the benefits received.

To continue our present support for the GOC in the face of its continued serious human rights violations is to squander Executive Branch capital and credibility with Congress over a relatively unimportant issue when much more important ones are at stake. Further, by acting as a GOC advocate and protector in international fora and in representations to other governments we are expending our influence and effectiveness with our traditional friends and world allies over an issue of relatively little vital importance to us.

In an explicit rejection of Ambassador Popper and Kissinger's position, the embassy officers recommended: "that it should be U.S. policy to inform the GOC that we will take no new initiatives to assist Chile politically, economically, or militarily unless and until its human rights practices have reached an acceptable standard." In a series of interagency group meetings on future relations with the Pinochet regime, the Kissinger-Popper position prevailed. But there was still "disarray in Chile policy," as NSC aide Stephen Low titled a memorandum to Kissinger's White House deputy General Scowcroft. Increasingly, the political fallout of ongoing assistance to the regime was affecting other bureaus and agencies in the State Department and Pentagon, adding to internal bureaucratic opposition. Pinochet's abrupt cancellation of the United Nations Human Rights Committee Working Group—a transparent attempt to cover up its atrocities—on July 5, strengthened the hand of critics of U.S. policy toward Chile, including those inside the U.S. government. Through the summer and fall of 1975, the internal debate continued, with the division among policy makers, diplomats, and desk officers growing more strident.

As the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs prepared for a major meeting about Chile in July, Ambassador Popper submitted a defense of the status quo—a twenty-six-page overview of "The Situation in Chile and the Prospects for U.S. Policy," framing the options of carrot vs. stick on the human rights issue. The human rights issue, he implied, had received more attention than warranted; in terms of U.S. national interests, Popper suggested, the
human rights problem "is secondary, achieving its present importance principally because of its effect on our maneuverability in other areas." The ambassador opposed a high-level démarche to the regime and argued that the U.S. should simply "continue our general stance of disapproval."

At the Policy Planning office in ARA, Popper's arguments inspired analyst Richard Bloomfield to draft one of the bluntest and most candid documents ever written by an official on U.S. policy and human rights in Chile. "How would the Junta ever get the impression the USG 'disapproves'?" he asked in a two-page paper to Assistant Secretary Rogers. (Doc.) "As the old saying goes, actions speak louder than words." In his memorandum, Bloomfield listed U.S. actions in support of the regime:

- We are solicitous about Chile's debt problem and deploy our diplomacy to promote a debt rescheduling.
- We use our influence in the IFIS [International Financial Institutions] to assure that Chilean loans are not held up.
- We vote against or abstain on resolutions in international organizations that condemn the GOC's human rights record.
- We assure the GOC that we want to sell it arms and that we regret congressional restrictions.

Bloomfield rejected the premise, put forth by Popper and Kissinger, that without U.S. backing the Pinochet regime would fall and some type of hostile leftist government would reemerge. "The need to 'live with' the absence of human rights in Chile in order to prevent the re-emergence of a hostile government is, in my mind, a distinctly secondary consideration," he wrote. "The self-inflicted wounds to U.S. policy, however, were primary considerations. Both domestically and internationally, Washington's support for Pinochet had so damaged the image of the United States government as to undermine the credibility of the U.S. government. "In the eyes of the world at large, we are closely associated with this Junta, ergo with fascists and torturers," Bloomfield asserted. "It is one more reason why much of the youth of the country is alienated from their government and its foreign policy. Chile is just the latest example for a lot of people in this country of the United States not being true to its values."

Kissinger and Pinochet

Growing public, congressional, and internal department pressure led to a bizarre and unexpected scene—Henry Kissinger giving a major international address on human rights in Santiago, Chile. His now famous June 1976 trip was part of a Latin American tour, a priority of his assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, William D. Rogers. Initially, it had been scheduled for February 1975, but the demands of the secretary's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East forced a two-month postponement; then, in April the collapse of Saigon and chaotic end of the Vietnam War led to the cancellation of the planned trip. A year later, when the Organization of American States (OAS) scheduled its general assembly meeting in Santiago for June 1976, Kissinger agreed to attend. His high-profile visit, as Rogers understood, could meet several goals at once: calling attention to the Latin American region; mollifying Latin American governments who felt ignored, and addressing congressional skepticism about the State Department's interest in human rights.

At the top of the OAS agenda was the new, and highly critical, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report on the Pinochet regime's atrocities. "The right of physical liberty of the person... continues to be frequently ignored by the Government of Chile," the ICHR report stated. "While decrees are being issued for the purpose of tranquilizing or confusing world opinion, the practice of arbitrary jailing and persecutions and tortures continue up to the present." Kissinger did not intend to focus his participation at the OAS on the human rights issue, but Assistant Secretary Rogers and the embassy convinced him that there was no way to avoid it. "For the Secretary to come to Chile without raising the human rights issue would generate criticism on a scale that effectively closes out the non-involvement option," deputy chief of mission Thomas Boyett said in Washington on April 21. Moreover, Boyett argued: "no U.S. official of the Secretary's stature has visited Chile since the coup, nor does another visit at such a level appear likely during the present GOC's tenure. The Secretary will be listened to, and his visit offers the best opportunity we are likely to have to obtain significant improvements of human rights practices in Chile." For that reason, the embassy recommended Kissinger hold a private meeting with Pinochet.

In terms of diplomatic strategy, Ambassador Popper's office counseled that only a direct, tough, message on human rights would get through. "Pinochet is so narrow-minded and convinced of his righteousness that it takes sledgehammer blows to all his attention to some unpleasant facts of life," Boyett noted. "Pinochet's anti-communism is evangelical and self-righteous," Ambassador David Popper reiterated in an biographic, "about-the-man" cable intended to introduce Kissinger to the psychology of the individual he would face. "The traditional norms of diplomatic phraseology can be lost on the president. He needs direct treatment, and clear and specific statements. If we deal in platitudes Pinochet will never understand what is bothering us nor react to our recommendations."
In preparation for the meeting, two weeks before the trip Assistant Secretary Rogers provided the key briefing paper—"Overall Objectives for Your Visit to Santiago"—to Kissinger. "When you do see [Pinochet]," Rogers submitted, "your objectives will be to make clear that:"

- The problem of human rights in Chile is central, not only to the Congress and the public but for our relations as a whole.
- We are well aware that there is an international propaganda campaign, and we discount it.
- But the problem . . . is not propaganda; a "public relations" response will not work.
- Basic steps to improve human rights practices would be in Chile's own interest and in ours.

The task, Rogers continued was "to convince the Chileans of the rudimentary facts of life, which they have not accepted from anyone else but may believe from you." Kissinger needed to make Pinochet understand that "only basic change in human-rights practices is likely to block efforts to:"

- Embargo the military pipeline.
- Prohibit future military sales.
- Reduce or cut off concessional wheat sales and housing guarantees.
- Cut off loans by international banks.

Similar to Franco's Spain in the 1940s, Chile had become "a symbol of right-wing tyranny," Rogers advised the secretary. "Like it or not, we are identified with the regime's origins and hence charged with some responsibility for its actions. This acccents our strong interest in getting the GOC to pursue acceptable human-rights practices."50

In his memoirs, Years of Renewal, Kissinger described how he followed this advice, pushing the themes of democracy and human rights at a noontime meeting on June 8 in General Pinochet's presidential office. "A considerable amount of time in my dialogue with Pinochet was devoted to human rights," Kissinger recounted. "I outlined the main points of my speech to the OAS," he wrote. Quoting what he had told Pinochet, Kissinger continued: "Pinochet needed to understand that human rights were a problem which complicates our relationships . . . I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the General Assembly. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I wanted you to understand my position. We want to deal in moral persuasion, not legal sanctions."50

But Kissinger's public account is in sharp contrast with the text of the secret memorandum of conversation with Pinochet that reveals no effort at "moral persuasion," no mention of democracy, and only minimal concern expressed on human rights. As the declassified transcript indicates, Kissinger's intent was to brief Pinochet in advance on the speech and let him know that it was intended to appease the U.S. Congress rather than directed at Chile. "I can do no less without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions," Kissinger told Pinochet after outlining several points in the speech. (Doc. 14) But he stressed: "The speech is not aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going communist." (Emphasis added.)

In his selective rendition in Years of Renewal, Kissinger noted Pinochet's complaint that the United States "had a punitive system for its friends." "I returned to my underlying theme that any major help from us would realistically depend on progress on human rights," Kissinger wrote of his response. In fact, according to the secret transcript, Kissinger responded by commiserating with Pinochet over Congressional pressures on human rights and reassuring him of Washington's support. "There is merit to what you say. It is a curious time. It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet Nam and Watergate," Kissinger confided to Pinochet. "We welcomed the overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position."

Kissinger did briefly raise the human rights issue, in the context of removing "the weapons in the arms of our enemies"—a reference to the U.S. Congress. "It would really help if you would let us know the measures you are taking in the human rights field," he said, immediately adding: "None of this is said with the hope of undermining your government. I want you to succeed. And I want to retain the possibility of aid."

The urging of the secretary's top aides to press the Chileans for "basic changes" in their human rights practices went unheeded. Moreover, throughout the meeting, Kissinger ignored the embassy's warning not to cloud his limited message on human rights with platitudes. "In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here," Kissinger told Pinochet at the outset. "We wish your government well." And toward the end of their conversation, he reiterated the Ford administration's support for Chile's military regime: "We want to help, not undermine you. You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende."

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING**

**September 20, 1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time and Place:</th>
<th>3:05 p.m. - 3:49 p.m., White House Situation Room</th>
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<td>Subject:</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Participants:</td>
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<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Henry A. Kissinger (Treasury)</td>
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<td>William Porter (State)</td>
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<td>Robert Hilf (V/Adm. Ray Peet)</td>
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<td>Adm. John F. Weinertle (JCS)</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>William Nelson (Director)</td>
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**SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS**

It was agreed that:

1. recognition of the new government would be announced on Monday, 24 September 1973;
2. Ambassador Davis is to talk to the junta on Friday, September 31, to inform them of our goodwill, our intention to recognize in the next few days, and about the delivery of medical supplies;
3. a cable will be sent to Ambassador Davis telling him of our intention to recognize and when; when the emergency food supplies will be delivered; and authorizing the Ambassador to discuss, with the junta, Chile's middle- and long-term economic needs;
4. an economic team would not be sent to Chile until the junta requests one;
5. the Chile Working Group will continue in operation.

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**SECRET**

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Associate Deputy Director for Operations

**VIA:** [Redacted]

**SUBJECT:** Project Request for Amendment No. 1 for FY 1974

1. [Redacted], the Santiago Station's propaganda project, was renewed for FY 1974 for [Redacted] on 4 April 1973. The project, which used a variety of propaganda mechanisms to inform the Chilean and foreign public of the Allende government's efforts to impose a Marxist totalitarian government, played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of 11 September 1973. Prior to the coup the project's media outlets maintained a steady barrage of anti-government criticism, exploiting every possible point of friction between the government and the opposition, and emphasizing the problems and conflicts which were developing between the government and the armed forces. Since the coup, these media outlets have supported the new military government. They have tried to present the junta in the most positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists in Chile to obtain accurate news about the local situation.

2. As a result of the overthrow of the Allende government, the project operation has had to adapt to the new situation, and has undergone some important changes. It was mutually agreed with the [Redacted] to terminate a number of activities.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Chile — Initial Post-Coup Support

1. Operational Summary

The Santiago Station was informed on 21 September 1973 that new 40 Committee approval would have to be obtained for political action operations in Chile under the new military government.

At the request of the Ambassador and the Station, the 40 Committee approved the proposal on 20 August 1973, which approved funding for both the new government and the existing political groups.

On receipt of this approval, the Station requested a long-range political action proposal now being drafted by the Station in coordination with Ambassador Davis. The funds requested will enable purchase of funds that can be used to fund the travel of a "PAC truth squad" which is now touring Latin America and Europe to explain the PAC's decision to support the new Chilean Government. Detailed information on these requests is contained in the Attachment to the 40 Committee memorandum.

2. Security

Risks are considered minimal.

3. Coordination

This proposal has been coordinated with Ambassador Nathan Davis and has his approval.

4. Cost

The requested is available within the Western Hemisphere Division budget for FY 1974.

CONCUR:

David A. Plotkin
Western Hemisphere Division

Release of the attached memorandum to the members of the 40 Committee is authorized:

Deputy Director for Operations
Director of Central Intelligence

Tec's 1973

Date

Executive Secretary
CIA Management Committee
EXCISE

INR/DCI - Mr. William McAfee
FROM
INR/DDC - James R. Gardner
SUBJECT
ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting, 23 November 1973

TO
INR/DDC - Mr. William McAfee
FROM
INR/DDC - James R. Gardner
SUBJECT
ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting, 23 November 1973

PARTICIPANTS: ARA - Messrs. Kubisch, Shaudemann and Dowler (for latter half of meeting); CIA — and
INR/DDC - James R. Gardner

Chile

Most of the discussion centered around the CIA proposal for giving covert assistance to the Chilean PDC and private sector organizations. The proposal was for a loan of which a portion would go to the PDC for training and another portion for contingencies. The purpose of this assistance, as explained in the CIA memorandum of proposal and by Mr. Shaudemann, was to help the PDC and elements in the private sector bridge the radical change in the situation brought about by the junta's overthrow of Allende.

Mr. Shaudemann said that in his view the rationale for extending assistance was a negative but real one. If we held off now we could be causing ourselves trouble, for it would be known that we had not been interested in knocking off Allende. There was no question in his mind that a most important objective was for us to get out of political action in Chile once and for all. But the proposed program was a minimum one for a minimum time. He felt it should be extended with the clear understanding that after such a date the party would be over.

Mr. Shaudemann said that one problem was that reflected in the claim of the PDC that, if there were no PDC activity, the only ones that would benefit would be the Communists, since they would continue to operate and would continue to receive money.

Mr. Shaudemann commented that this claim presumed a condition in Chile that was unlikely; that is, one in which the military would tolerate political activity by the Communists. Nonetheless, without

the help of the PDC it was quite possible that the junta would not be able to perform as an effective government, especially in the economic sphere. It needed the help of talented members of the PDC, although not necessarily that of the PDC itself. But a PDC break with the junta, because of the effect it might have on individual dispositions to cooperate, could mean a breakdown in the effectiveness of the new government.

Mr. Kubisch said that, as we know, he was in principle opposed to covert political operations:

(1) The political action possibilities available to us through CIA represented a means of influencing events and an instrument for action that should be used only if there were need.

(2) Given the evolution of events in the South American region in the last 25 years, and the increasing polarization in the region of contending political elements, and the history of our involvement in covert political and military action, we had to be extremely careful about using this instrument. In his view, we should employ it with the greatest reluctance and only when no other and better means were available. The damage to the US and to the USG were it to become known that we were engaged in covert operations could be very great, and across the board, in today's world. We have been hurt by publicity about covert programs. Therefore his initial stance would be one of strong scepticism when proposals for covert political action were raised. His preference was for none whatever in the hemisphere. It would be good if we could go for years without resorting to them, if such restraint would do us no harm. Therefore he would recommend use of such programs only if there were no other way to accomplish a vitally important end.

(3) He nevertheless wished to consider the present proposal carefully. The importance of Chile and the view of important US officials who were concurring in the proposal commended to us our most careful attention. But his first reaction was clearly negative.

Mr. Kubisch then referred to the help that we had given to anti-Allende elements in the 1970 election and said that whatever it was we had done, we had done it to oppose Allende and we had not achieved our objectives. Our interests in Chile as a result of the 1970 elections came under direct and material threat. We now have a different situation in Chile. While it was understandable that we felt it necessary to oppose Allende in 1970, and to help his opposition once he was in office, the question now was whether, given the abrupt change in Chile and in the security situation there, it was really essential to fine tune a political situation simply to be a moderating influence and to help the opposition stay alive. He found it difficult to see a persuasive case that we should do so. His feelings was sharpened by the problems that seemed to be
emerging between the Junta and the PDC, and by the fact that the Secretary had made it clear that the change in regime in Chile was very much in our interest and that we should do all we could to help the Junta succeed. In view of the Secretary's remarks, he would not be comfortable recommending assistance to any element in Chile that was not completely identified with the Junta. It was not essential to the success of the Junta that the PDC survive as an entity. He mentioned in this regard the situation in Mexico and Brazil.

Mr. Shlaudeman said that the case of the PDC in Chile was to be distinguished from Brazil and Mexico since the PDC was a real party with a real base, and it was the only real surviving element in the political system. What we were talking about in this proposal was help only in a transitional term. It was perhaps correct to say that the survival of the PDC as a party was not important -- but what was important was that we not give the impression that we had no problems with a right wing dictatorship and that we had no interest in the survival of democracy in Chile after all that we had said over the years. He therefore still felt it would be best to tell the PDC that we would finance it for three to five months, but that we were getting out of this kind of activity for good in very short order, that it was up to the PDC to put its house in order.

Mr. Shlaudeman said he was talking only about assistance to the PDC, he was against that part of the proposal that had to do with assistance to

Mr. Shlaudeman said that in his view, based on what he knew of the operations in Chile, the security risk would be minimal. The reaction of the Junta if it found out about our assistance to the PDC would not be great if our aid went to the more conservative wing of the party and not to that represented by Toddé. Six to seven months from now, he said, the reaction would probably be somewhat sharper.

Mr. Kubisch asked what would happen if in January or February the Junta found out that we had made money available to the PDC. They naturally would ask what the hell we were doing, were we still intervening in Chile; still meddling? If we could say that our program had ended with the overthrow of Allende, our position would be sound, but if, on the other hand, we had to say that we had given a little to help the PDC over a transitional period, wouldn't the reaction be bad?

Mr. Shlaudeman said he really didn't think it would be.

Mr. Kubisch said that when Allende had been president, it was possible to make a case that his opposition should be supported. Now, however, the situation was much different, the right wing was in control. Were we perhaps not saying simply that the situation had gone too far, or the other way for our taste? In gross terms, when a major threat to US interest was involved, we should use means to correct the condition, no matter how extreme they might be. This was not such a case. Just because we did not like a government was no reason to intervene in their countries. He himself didn't like the Junta but he could not see it as a serious, extreme threat to our interests.

Mr. Shlaudeman said he agreed, but said that he was worried about the effects of a drastic, immediate cut off right now, especially since we had been saying every since 1962 that our primary interest in Chile was the survival of democracy.

Mr. Kubisch responded that Chilean democracy had taken the country close to disaster. He felt that, attractive as an orderly disengagement would have been, the present circumstances did not make this the preferred option. There were a lot of things that we favored abroad, that we thought were good things, but simply because we felt that way was no reason to use covert action to see them realized, unless, as he had said before, our interests were actually gravely threatened.

Mr. Kubisch concluded the discussion by saying that he wished to think about the matter a little more, even though he saw little prospect that his mind would change. It was agreed that Mr. Shlaudeman would speak to Ambassador Davis if the latter might advance any considerations that had not been given sufficient attention.
MEMORANDUM

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
11 June 1974

OUTSIDE SYSTEM
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: ROB ROY RATLIFF
SUBJECT: Termination of the Chile Account

Last August the 40 Committee approved a $1 million covert action program for Chile, but it never got started because less than a month later a coup changed the picture completely. This January, CIA submitted a request for $1 million to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and provide the party operating funds for three months while the Agency sorted things out and determined if additional aid were warranted (TAB A).

Defense and JCS 40 Committee principals promptly approved the proposal, but State wrestled with it and after lengthy deliberation, including consultation with our Ambassador, State voted to approve compensation for commitments made before the coup up to $1 million. CIA participated in State's deliberations and says this is an acceptable resolution. These funds are available in CIA's budget for the current fiscal year which ends 30 June.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the State/CIA compromise authorising payment to the PDC of not more than $1 million for commitments made before the coup in Chile.

APPROVE [ ] DISAPPROVE [ ] OTHER [ ]

Attachment: TAB A

Concur:
Stephen Lovett
Richard Kennedy

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

[Redacted text]

Approved for Release
July 2000
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda Visit to Headquarters

1. This memorandum will confirm arrangements made for the visit to Headquarters on 15 August of Col. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, Chief of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA).

2. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence plans to host a luncheon at Agency Headquarters for Col. Contreras Sepúlveda on 15 August. The luncheon will be essentially for protocol purposes. Private discussions will be held between the DCI and Col. Contreras Sepúlveda after lunch when Col. Contreras Sepúlveda will explain recent measures taken by the Chilean Government to improve its image on the civil rights issue.

Approved for Release
July 2000
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting, September 17, 1974 - 11:00 a.m.

President: A number of news stories have appeared, and I commented last night on the Chile deal. It is my judgment, and I think that of every President, that these considerations are the national interest of the United States. We need a CIA and we need covert operations. This has been done since 1945.

Henry, could you give the details.

Kissinger: There are three aspects of the problem: What is the 40 Committee? What was the Chile situation? What did we do, overtly and covertly?

Kissinger: We face over the world threats to democratic institutions and we need covert action to deal with them. By their nature, we don't talk about these. So how do we deal with the leaks? Britain is certainly a democracy, yet it is a British paper couldn't print this stuff.

Every President has instituted safeguards. The 40 Committee has existed all this time. Most projects are checked with the American Embassy involved. Projects are circulated, and if they are minor, they are signed off and go to the President for approval. The Assistant to the President doesn't decide; he presides as the representative of the President. If there is disagreement -- which happens rarely -- or if they are major matters, there is a meeting, and either a meeting is held or an options paper goes to the President. After six months there is automatic review of each program. The chairmen of the relevant committees are briefed.

Covert operations are those which can't be done in any other way. If they are leaked, we cannot conduct this policy. Not much is being done, but what is, is being done because they are important and can't be done in any other way.

SECRET

On Chile, the procedures were very regular, following those established under Truman.

One can argue that Allende wouldn't have won if we hadn't reduced the old levels under Kennedy and Johnson.

What was the situation in Chile? In Chile, elections are won either by a popular majority or if there is no majority, an election in the Parliament. Allende got only 35% of the vote, and then proceeded to try to turn it into an irreversible dictatorial regime. On his left he had a group led from Cuba which accused him of not being extreme enough. This required that he concentrate on anti-U.S. policies.

The effort of the 40 Committee was not to overthrow Allende but to preserve the democratic system for the 1976 elections. There was one famous newspaper they tried to pull out of business, and they tried to throttle the opposition. Is this destabilizing? Sure, to a dictator.

The coup was produced by Allende's attempt to turn the regime into a Communist dictatorship, and the military eventually rebelled.

Kissinger: Last, there is the claim we waged economic warfare against Allende.

President Nixon did say we should be careful about aid to him, but the fact is that Allende nationalized American companies and defaulted on the obligations to give compensation. We did the minimum possible. We didn't give any new aid but continued what was in the pipeline, and PL 480, IDB loans, and humanitarian programs. The World Bank cut them off because they were in default.

We did the same thing. There might have been proclivity for economic warfare, but the issue never came up. What happened was the result of his mismanagement and his nationalization and expropriation. Besides, we were cutting down on Chile before 1970. He actually got more in multilateral aid than Frei.

Remember, he was an opponent of the U.S., and one can ask why shouldn't we oppose him?

President: I wanted you all to have the story. The decisions made were in accordance with the law. I think it is essential for the government to carry out certain covert activities. We will continue to carry them out.
Why an alternative proposal?

In last year’s CASP (FY 75-76), this Mission concluded that it was in the U.S. interest to support the GOC, but recognized that human rights might be a problem. The recommended and approved policy was to try privately and quietly to persuade the GOC to improve its human rights practices, without threatening or imposing sanctions. This policy of friendly persuasion has not worked, and the GOC has not significantly modified its human rights practices.

Meanwhile, Congress, a substantial portion of U.S. public opinion, and the majority of the “free world” nations and international organizations have increasingly come to regard the GOC as an international pariah, largely because of its human rights practices. Some punitive actions have already been taken (e.g. the Congressional ban on military assistance to the GOC), and others are threatened (e.g. refusal by some countries to renegotiate the GOC’s foreign debt).

Yet this year’s CASP fails to take into account either the past failure of our efforts or the new situation. The key human rights recommendation is no different in any respect than the FY 75-76 CASP. There is no reason to believe that persuasion alone will be any more successful than it has been in the last year. Nowhere in the CASP is the recommendation further defined in terms of specific tools and concrete actions.

The alternative discussed below argues basically that the cost to the United States of continued support of the GOC now outweighs the benefits obtained therefrom. It proposes a course of action, including tangible measures, which has the best chance of furthering U.S. interests while at the same time causing real changes in the GOC’s behavior.

Premises

1. As the FY 76-77 CASP now states, the military area and will be in control of Chile for at least the length of the CASP period. Withdrawal of U.S. political, economic, and military support will not cause the GOC to fall during the CASP period, nor most probably for the remainder of this decade.
2. The military leaders of Chile have lost their best chance to build a new and better society which they envision. In the political area, the military have failed to build a consensus, to broaden their political base, or to establish an authoritarian government intent on the will and its ideas. In the social area, in spite of a concern for the well-being of their fellow citizens and especially for the problems of the disadvantaged, few concrete developments have taken place. In the economic area the thrust of their policies has been endorsed by many observers as having the potential for eventually achieving a strong and healthy economy, but the social cost large segments of the population.

3. Yet the military government still remains sufficiently flexible and non-ideological to be able to change course and recoup some of its lost opportunities if it were motivated to do so.

4. At least in the human rights area, however, and probably others as well, as the CARP states, the GOC "will continue doing what it is doing, i.e. failing to make U.S. support for the GOC, as proposed in the CARP, in the overall U.S. interest now and throughout the period. The basic premise of this paper is that it is not acceptable."

Recommendation:

That it should be U.S. policy to inform the GOC that we will take no new initiatives to assist Chile politically, economically, or militarily unless and until its human rights practices have reached an acceptable standard. It should be made clear that existing commitments will be honored and that economic and military assistance presently in the pipeline will be delivered. It should also be made clear that the GOC's human rights practices shall be deemed

"acceptable" only when there is a reasonable consensus to this effect of such impartial international bodies concerned with human rights, as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the OAS Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Commission. Further, that this policy decision be publicly reported to the Congress in accordance with Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and Section 46 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

Reasons for Recommendation

1. As noted earlier, there is no reason to believe that persuasion in and of itself, as advocated in the CARP, will be any more successful in modifying GOC behavior than it has been in the past, even with the addition of the Congressional/Imposed ban on military assistance as a bargaining chip.

2. On the other hand, an immediate cutoff of all U.S. support, including pipeline assistance, and an immediate move to a "cool and correct" relationship with the GOC in lines along the lines of U.S./Chile relations during the Allende period could produce shock and confusion and increase the chances of GOC leaders withdrawing into an unproductive siege mentality.

3. The above recommendation is a more measured approach and provides the GOC time to react in an orderly fashion, continuing to provide pipeline aid and other U.S. assistance is continuing.

4. It also provides the most effective incentive to the GOC to improve its human rights behavior and to make other desirable changes in its practices, especially in the area of establishing a more open society and reviving democratic political institutions.

5. U.S. foreign policy spokesmen have stated that the human rights question is only one factor in U.S. relations with any given country. In Chile at this time, it is and should be the dominant factor. There are no other U.S. interests in Chile, individually or collectively, which outweigh it. Further, the cost to the U.S. of continued identification as the principal supporter of the present GOC significantly outweighs the benefits received. This point requires further elaboration.
UNCLASSIFIED

July 11, 1975

TO: ARA: Mr. William D. Rogers
    APA: Ambassador Hewson Ryan

FROM: ARA/PLC: Richard J. Bloomfield

SUBJ: Ambassador Popper's Policy Paper.

The Ambassador characterizes our present stance as one of "disapproval" (p. 20 and p. 21). But the image is otherwise, at least as far as the Executive Branch is concerned:

- We are solicitous about Chile's debt problem and deploy our diplomacy to promote a debt rescheduling.
- We use our influence in the IFIS to assure that Chilean loans are not held up.
- We vote against or abstain on resolutions in international organizations that condemn the GOC's human rights record.
- We assure the GOC that we want to sell it arms and that we regret Congressional restrictions.

How would the Junta ever get the impression that the GOC "disapproves"? As the old saying goes, actions speak louder than words.

The Ambassador says that any stronger signs of our (read Executive Branch) disapproval would not improve the human rights situation (which I am willing to concede). Conclusion: We must provide economic and military assistance; in fact by page 25, we are worrying about our responsibilities for making the Junta's economic program a success. Why? Because "preventing the re-emergence of a Chilean Government essentially hostile to us (p. 22) is our chief interest and the human rights problem is secondary."

This argument overlooks the possibility that the human rights problem in Chile may not be "secondary" but may be a major U.S. interest in the present domestic and international context. In the minds of the world at

large, we are closely associated with this junta, ergo with fascists and torturers. This is the way it is perceived by a vocal and increasingly numerous element in Congress whose support we need for other aspects of our Latin American policy (e.g., Panama) and, indeed, for our foreign policy in general. It is one more reason why much of the youth of the country is alienated from their government and its foreign policy. Chile is just the latest example for a lot of people in this country of the United States not being true to its values.

This is not the emotionalism of a bleeding heart. The Secretary himself has said that no foreign policy will be successful if it is carried in the minds of a few and the hearts of none. Our current Chile policy comes perilously close to fitting that description.

The need to "live with" the absence of human rights in Chile in order to prevent the re-emergence of a hostile government is not to my mind, a distinctly secondary consideration. We survived a hostile government in Chile in the recent past. It is really a bizarre world when the globe's greatest superpower has to worry about the hostility of the dagger-pointed-at-the-heart-of-

Antarctica.

The specific objectives in human rights that Ambassador Popper sets out on page 21 are fine. The problem is that we will not achieve them without turning the screws harder and taking the risks that entails.

cc: Ambassador Popper
c/o Mr. Xarkashian: ARA/DG

ARA/PLC: RJBloomfield: ahm
7/11/75 X29492

UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 8, 1976
TIME: 12:00 noon
PLACE: Santiago, Chile
(President Pinochet’s Office)

SUBJECT: U.S.-Chilean Relations

PARTICIPANTS:
Chile
Augusto Pinochet, President
Patricio Carvajal, Foreign Minister
Manuel Trucco, Ambassador to United States
Ricardo Claro, OAS/CA Conference Coordinator for Chilean Government

United States
The Secretary
William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Anthony Hervas (Interpreter)

DISTRIBUTION:

The Secretary: This is a beautiful building. The conference is well organized. Are you meeting with all the delegations?

Pinochet: Yes. Two or three a day. I want to tell you we are grateful that you have come to the conference.

The Secretary: It is an honor. I was touched by the popular reception when I arrived. I have a strong feeling of friendship in Chile.

Pinochet: This is a country of warm-hearted people, who love liberty. This is the reason they did not accept Communism when the Communists attempted to take over the country. It is a long struggle we are a part of. It is a further stage of the same conflict which erupted into the Spanish Civil War. And we note the fact that though the Spaniards tried to stop Communism 40 years ago, it is springing up again in Spain.

The Secretary: We had the Spanish King recently, and I discussed that very issue with him.

Pinochet: I have always been against Communism. During the Viet-Nam War, I met with some of your military and made clear to them my anti-Communism, and told them I hoped they could bring about its defeat.

The Secretary: In Viet-Nam, we defeated ourselves through our internal divisions. There is a worldwide propaganda campaign by the Communists.

Pinochet: Chile is suffering from that propaganda effort. Unfortunately, we do not have the millions needed for counter-propaganda.

The Secretary: I must say your spokesman (Sergio Diez) was very effective in this morning’s General Assembly session in explaining your position. In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here. I think that the previous government was headed toward Communism. We wish your government well. At the same time, we face massive domestic problems, in all branches of the government, especially Congress, but also in the Executive, over the issue of human rights. As you know, Congress is now debating further restraints on aid to Chile. We are opposed. But basically we don’t want to intervene in your domestic affairs. We can’t be precise in our proposals about what you should do. But there is a problem which complicates our relationships and the efforts of those who are friends.
Chile. I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in the General Assembly. I delayed my statement until I could talk to you. I wanted you to understand my position. We want to deal in moral persuasion, not by legal sanctions. It is for this reason that we oppose the Kennedy Amendment.

In my statement, I will treat human rights in general terms, and human rights in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report on Chile of the OAS Human Rights Commission. I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the result of congressional action. I will add that I hope you will shortly remove those obstacles.

I will also call attention to the Cuba report and to the hypocrisy of some who call attention to human rights as a means of intervening in governments. I can do no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist. But we have a practical problem we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will undermine our relationship.

It would really help if you would let us know the measures you are taking in the human rights field. None of this is said with the hope of undermining your government. I want you to succeed and I want to retain the possibility of aid.

Pinochet:

The Secretary:

Pinochet:

If we defeat the Kennedy amendment, -- I don't know if you listen in on my phone, but if you do you have just heard me issue instructions to Washington to make an all-out effort to do just that -- if we defeat it, we will deliver the F-5E's as we agreed to do. We hold up for a while in others to avoid providing additional ammunition to our enemies.

We are returning to institutionalization step by step. But we are constantly being attacked by the Christian Democrats. They have a strong voice in Washington. Not the people in the Pentagon, but they do get through to Congress. Gabriel Valdez has access. Also Letelier.

I have not seen a Christian Democrat for years.

Also Mr. Tomicki, and others I don't recall. Letelier has access to the Congress. We know they are giving false information. You see, we have no experience in government. We are worried about our image. In a few days we will publish the constitutional article on human rights, and also another setting up the Council of State. There are a number of efforts we are making to move to institutionalization. In the economic area, we have paid our debts, after the renegotiation. We are paying $700 million in debts with interest this year. We have made land reforms. And we are taking other constitutional measures. We have freed most detained prisoners. There have been 60 more just recently. In September 11, 1974, I challenged the Soviets to set free their prisoners. But they haven't done so, while we have only 400 people who are now detained. On international relations, we are doing well. In the case of Bolivia, we have extended our good will. It all depends now on Peru.

Pinochet:

SUYKUY/NOBLE
The Secretary: I have the impression that Peru is not very sympathetic.

Pinochet: You are right. Peru does not wish to see the idea proposed.

The Secretary: Peru told me they would get no port out of the arrangement.

Pinochet: Peru is arming. Peru is trying to buy a carrier from the British for $160 million. It is also building four torpedo boats in Europe. Peru is breaking the arms balance in the South Pacific. It has 600 tanks from the Soviet Union. We are doing what we can to sustain ourselves in case of an emergency.

The Secretary: What are you doing?

Pinochet: We are largely modifying old armaments, fixing junked units. We are a people with energy. We have no Indians.

The Secretary: I gather Chile generally wins its wars.

Pinochet: We have never lost a war. We are a proud people. On the human rights front, we are slowly making progress. We are now down to 400. We have freed more. And we are also changing some sentences so that the prisoners can be eligible for leaving.

The Secretary: If you could group the releases, instead of 20 a week, have a bigger program of releases, that would be better for the psychological impact of the releases. What I mean is not that you should delay, but that you should group the releases. But, to return to the military aid question, I really don't know how it will go tomorrow in the Senate.

Trucco: The Buchanan amendment is workable.

The Secretary: I repeat that if the House version succeeds, then we will send the planes.
The Secretary: (after a pause) We would not like to see a conflict. Much depends on who begins it.

Pinochet: The question is really how to prevent the beginning.

The Secretary: The American people would ask who is advancing on whom.

Pinochet: But you know what’s going on here. You see it with your satellites.

The Secretary: Well, I can assure you that if you take Lima, you will have little U.S. support.

Pinochet: We did it once, a hundred years ago. It would be difficult now, in view of the present balance of forces.

The Secretary: If Peru attacked, this would be a serious matter for a country armed with Soviet equipment. It would be serious. Clearly we would oppose it diplomatically. But it all depends, beyond that. It is not easy to generate support for U.S. military action these days.

Pinochet: We must fight with our own arms.

The Secretary: I distinguish between preferences and probabilities. It depends how it happens. If there is naked aggression, that means greater, more general resistance.

Pinochet: Assume the worst, that is to say, that Chile is the aggressor. Peru defends itself, and then attacks us. What happens?

The Secretary: It’s not that easy. We will know who the aggressor is. If you are not the aggressor, then you will have support. But aggression does not resolve international disputes. Each side can stage an incident. But generally we will know who the aggressor is.

Carvalal: In the case of Bolivia, if we give Bolivia some territory, Bolivian territory might be guaranteed by the American states.

The Secretary: I have supported Bolivia in its aspirations to the sea, but de la Flor is not happy about it.

Carvalal: If we gave some territory to Bolivia, and then permitted Peru to use the port, Peru would get everything it needs.

The Secretary: It is my feeling Peru will not accept.

Pinochet: I am concerned very much by the Peruvian situation. Circumstances might produce aggression by Peru. Why are they buying tanks? They have heavy artillery, 155’s. Peru is more inclined to Russia than the U.S. Russia supports their people 100%. We are behind you. You are the leader. But you have a punitive system for your friends.

The Secretary: There is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in the U.S.

Pinochet: We solved the problem of the large transnational enterprises. We renegotiated the expropriations, and demonstrated our good faith by making prompt payments on the indebtedness.

The Secretary: It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet-Nam and Watergate. We have to wait until the elections. We welcomed the overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position. On foreign aggression, it would be a grave situation if one were attacked. That would constitute a direct threat to the Inter-American system.

Carvalal: There is massive Cuban influence in Peru. Many Cubans are there. The Peruvians may...
be pushed. And what happens to the thousands of Cuban soldiers now in Africa, when they are no longer needed there.'

The Secretary: If there are Cuban troops involved in a Peruvian attack, then the problem is easy. We will not permit a Cuban military force of 5,000 Cubans in Peru.

Carvajal: They now have a system, where the Peruvians enter in groups of 20, but the Peruvians registry registers only 1.

The Secretary: The Cubans are not good soldiers.

Carvajal: But there is the danger of irresponsible attack.

Claro: I have sources in Peru. There is, I am told, a real chance that Cuba could airlift troops to Peru.

The Secretary: This would change the situation, and the question then is easy. We will not permit Cuba another military adventure. A war between Peru and Chile would be a complex thing, but a war between Cuba and Chile or others, we would not be indifferent.

Claro: Your planners were down here in 1974. They did not believe that there was a threat. The Soviets use Cuba for aggression, I argued. Angola has since confirmed this.

The Secretary: We will not tolerate another Cuban military move. After the election, we will have massive trouble if they are not out of Angola. Secondly, I also feel stronger that we can’t accept coexistence and ideological subversion. We have the conditions now for a more realistic policy. It would help you if you had more human rights progress, which could be announced in packages. The most important are the constitutional guarantees. The precise numbers of prisoners is subordinate. Right to habeas corpus is also important. And if you could give us advanced information of your human rights efforts, we could use this. As to the Christian Democrats, we are not using them. I haven’t seen one since 1969. We want to remove the weapons in the arms of our enemies. It is a phenomenon that we deal with special severity our friends. I want to see our relations and friendship improve. I encouraged the OAS to have its General Assembly here. I knew it would add prestige to Chile. I came for that reason. We have suggestions. We want to help, not undermine you. You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende. Otherwise Chile would have followed Cuba. Then there would have been no human rights or a Human Rights Commission.

Trucco: We provided the General Assembly the answers to some of the Secretary’s suggestions. What will be missing will be our explanation of the coming constitutional acts.

The Secretary: Can you do those while the OAS is here?

Pinochet: We have wanted to avoid doing anything while the OAS is here, since it then looks as though we did it to dampen OAS pressure. We might be able to in 30 days.

The Secretary: If we can, we are prepared to say we have the impression that the constitutional act is helpful.

Pinochet: I discussed it in my inaugural speech.