**NO. 70**

1948

The Menace of Communism

The Delegates to the Ninth International Conference of American States

While the main achievement of the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá in 1948 was the adoption of the charter of the new Organization of American States (Document No. 60), one of the most important documents to emerge from that meeting reflected the growing concern of the United States with the spread of communism. The security threat attributed to Soviet and later Chinese aggression increasingly shaped U.S. foreign policy interests as the Cold War got under way in the late 1940s. Resolution 32, reprinted in full below, was the first official U.S.-Latin American expression of anticommunism. The first U.S.-sponsored draft was amended by


Latin American delegates to include a condemnation not just of communism but also of "any other totalitarian doctrine."

**Resolution 32. The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America**

Whereas:

In order to safeguard peace and maintain mutual respect among states, the present world situation requires that urgent measures be taken, to prescribe the tactics of totalitarian domination that are irreconcilable with the tradition of the American Nations, and to prevent serving international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine from seeking to distort the true and the free will of the peoples of this continent;

The Republics Represented at the Ninth International Conference of American States

Declare:

That, by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, which rests upon two undeniable postulates: the dignity of man as an individual and the sovereignty of the nation as a state,

Reiterate:

1. The faith that the peoples of the New World have placed in the ideal and in the reality of democracy, under the protection of which they shall achieve social justice, offering to all increasingly broader opportunities to enjoy the spiritual and material benefits that are the guarantee of civilization and the heritage of mankind;

2. In the name of international law, interference by any foreign power, or by any political organization serving the interests of a foreign power, in the public life of the nations of the American continent,

And resolve:

1. To reaffirm their decision to maintain and further an effective social and economic policy for the purpose of raising the standard of living of their peoples and their conviction that only under a system founded upon a guarantee of the essential freedoms and rights of the individual is it possible to attain this goal.

2. To condemn the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine.

3. To adopt, within their respective territories and in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent activities directed, assisted or instigated by foreign governments, organizations or individuals tending to overthrow their institutions by violence, to foment disorder in their domestic political life or to
disturb, by means of pressure, subversive propaganda, threats or by any other means, the free and sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their democratic aspirations.

4. To proceed with a full exchange of information concerning any of the aforementioned activities that are carried on within their respective jurisdictions.

NO. 71
1950
A Realist Views Latin America
George F. Kennan

George F. Kennan was the U.S. State Department’s leading expert on the Soviet Union when he sent his famous “long telegram” to the State Department from his post in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in February 1946. Kennan warned that Washington’s wartime ally was power-hungry and insecure and that the United States would have to be ready to firmly resist the Kremlin’s expansionist impulses. In an unsigned article in Foreign Affairs the following year, Kennan publicly presented his so-called “realist” view of U.S.-Soviet relations: his prescription for a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” became the U.S. Cold War policy of containment. Just before resigning from the State Department in 1950 to join the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, Kennan made his first and only trip to Latin America for the State Department. Excerpted below is the secret, thirty-five page report he submitted to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson on March 29, 1950.

Mr. Secretary:

Below are some views about Latin America as a problem in United States foreign policy, as these things appear to me at the conclusion of a visit to some of the

Latin American countries… Our relationship to Latin America occupies a vitally important place in our effort to achieve, within the non-communist world in general, a system of international relationships, political and economic, reasonably adequate to the demands of this post-war era, and henceforth qualified to serve as a rebuttal of the Russian challenge to our right to exist as a great and leading world power….

If the countries of Latin America should come to be generally dominated by an outlook which views our country as the root of all evil and sees salvation only in the destruction of our national power, I doubt very much whether our general political program in other parts of the non-communist world could be successful….

While there are some fairly common and serious misunderstandings as to the nature of the importance to us of Latin America in the event of war with the Soviet Union, there is no question of that importance itself. This is only in minor degree a question of bases, since Latin America offers little in this respect which could be of serious interest to the Russian adversary in the light of existing military realities. It is also no longer, to the degree that it once was, a problem of the defense of the Panama Canal and of assuring the fusion of our naval power in the two oceans, although that is still important. Finally, it is definitely not a question of the possible mobilization of Latin American military strength against us. In these days, when apprehensions of Soviet military expansion assume such fantastic forms, we could do well to remember that not even the Russians can create military strength where the essential components of that strength, in manpower, in industrial background and in native leadership are lacking.

The military significance to us of the Latin American countries lies today rather in the extent to which we may be dependent upon them for materials essential to the prosecution of a war, and more importantly in the extent to which the attitudes of the Latin American peoples may influence the general political trend in the international community….

It seems to me unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin America.

As for nature, one is struck at once with the way in which South America is the reverse of our own North American continent from the standpoint of its merits as a human habitat….

Against this unfavorable geographical background, which would have yielded only to the most progressive and happy of human approaches, humanity superimposed a series of events unfortunate and tragic almost beyond anything ever known in human history….