

The Dynamics of Partisan Identification When Party Brands Change: The Case of the Workers Party in Brazil

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What happens to partisanship when a party undergoes rapid and visible elite-led changes that dilute its traditional brand? We address scholarly debates on the stability of mass partisanship by analyzing the consequences of the major brand change (marked by policy moderation and scandal) experienced by the leftist Brazilian Workers Party (PT) between 2002 and 2006. Analyzing a survey panel with interviews spanning this period, we find that many Brazilian citizens alternated between *petismo* and independence but rarely crossed party lines. They switched, we demonstrate, in response to political events. While the PT's brand dilution drove away some traditional *petistas*, we observe two other dynamics: the rise of a new brand associated with the successful incumbent president (Lula) attracted new adherents, and amid this instability, a core of *petistas* stood by their party. Our findings suggest that scholarship on partisanship has established a false dichotomy between stability and instability.

A political party's "brand" is the package of issue positions, organizational structures, constituencies, leadership styles, and alliances that shape its public image. In standard accounts, sustaining a brand is crucial if a party is to create a large pool of supporters, since voters identify with and evaluate not just the party name but the party's ideas, leaders, and mode of governing (Lupu 2013, 2014). In consolidated democracies, parties have relatively persistent brands. Issue positions and support coalitions change over the course of decades rather than election cycles, resulting in relatively high rates of mass partisan identification (Converse

1969). By contrast, in new democracies party brands can change much more quickly, and several have experienced the collapse of major parties and, in some instances, entire party systems (Morgan 2011).

If we place all cases on a continuum, scholars have studied the endpoints at the expense of the middle. We know a lot about the nature of partisan identification in advanced democracies (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and in contexts of party collapse (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012), but we know much less about intermediate cases. This article focuses on this largely overlooked middle scenario: What

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Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the *JOP* Dataverse (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop>). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683609>. Data collection procedures for this project were reviewed and deemed exempt in 2002 by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University of Houston and the Institutional Review Board at University of Pittsburgh (#0201123). Financial support for this research was provided by a National Science Foundation grant (SES #0137088) and the Andrew Mellon Professorship of Comparative Politics at the University of Pittsburgh.

The Journal of Politics, volume 78, number 1. Published online October 28, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/683609>
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happens to mass identification when a party undergoes rapid and highly visible changes to its image and, despite the brand “dilution,” survives?

We approach these questions using partisanship in Brazil, specifically the case of the left-of-center Brazilian Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* [PT]) between 2002 and 2006. In this brief period the PT underwent a rapid change in its public image that was induced by policy moderation and scandal. These elite-level shifts provide valuable methodological purchase for addressing what is perhaps the central theoretical question in scholarship on mass partisanship: Is partisanship an unswerving identity—in which case PT sympathizers (*petistas*) should have stood pat with their party despite its makeover—or is it the sum of ongoing evaluations—in which case many traditional *petistas* should have abandoned the party while it attracted a new breed of supporter?

We analyze a panel survey with interviews spanning the four years in which the most important aspects of PT brand dilution occurred. We find that mass identification with the PT shares a major feature—bounded partisanship—with developed democracies. Over time, many citizens shift between political independence and sympathy for the PT, but few ever cross party lines. We show that this instability is not, as some would argue, meaningless measurement error; rather, it is purposive change in political orientations caused by the PT’s shifting brand. Traditional PT sympathizers did respond to policy moderation but not in a Downsian fashion, as party-system scholars would generally expect. Instead, it was moderates, not leftists, who were the most likely to leave the party. Many traditional *petistas* also left the party out of disgust with corruption revelations, but by 2006 the party was able to rebound to its former rates of mass partisanship by drawing in new partisans (disproportionately from the young and the poor) via a reformed and emerging brand—one linked to the leadership success of PT incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Amid all of this flux, we also provide evidence that a large minority of declared *petistas*—as many as 40% at any given time—were “identity *petistas*” who maintained their loyalty to the party even amid the brand dilution. In the end, we find evidence for both theoretical camps, suggesting that scholars of partisanship have set up a false dichotomy.

DEBATES ON THE NATURE OF MASS PARTISANSHIP

Traditionally, research on the nature of mass partisanship has featured two main schools of thought and two competing predictions about citizen responses to sudden changes in a party’s brand. The partisanship-as-identity school sees partisan identification (party ID) as a social group sense of

belonging, akin to one’s religious, ethnic, class, or racial identity (Campbell et al. 1960). Individuals develop a sense of connectedness to a party during early adult socialization, an identity that becomes enduring and largely impervious to ongoing political events. In other words, party ID in adulthood is exogenous, a virtual “unmoved mover” that provides a biased lens through which citizens observe and interpret the political world. Thus, the identity camp predicts “party persuasion” (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Tupcu 2011) in response to a brand change: because of adherents’ partisan biases, they uncritically accept its rebranding efforts and adopt its new issue positions while holding steadfast to their loyalties.

In contrast, the partisanship-as-evaluation camp views individuals’ partisan attachments as less stable and ultimately as the result of ongoing assessments of events. Most famously, Fiorina (1981) dubs partisanship as the “running tally” of evaluations of different parties’ performances in office. Downsian approaches add policy positioning to this formulation, expecting voters to respond to a party’s shift in the issue space by changing allegiances based on their newfound relative distances to the various competitors (Downs 1957; Franklin and Jackson 1983). An alternative approach to issue positioning predicts dealignment in response to moves in the issue space—that is, partisans move to independence in reaction to watered down, obfuscated brands (Lupu 2014). Regardless, scholars in the partisanship-as-evaluation camp conceptualize party ID as endogenous to parties’ platforms and performance, predicting that voters engage in “partisan switching” (Adams et al. 2011) after a brand change.

A key to understanding the difference between the two camps lies in seeing how they treat the “bounded partisanship” phenomenon that characterizes mass partisanship in many advanced democracies. In repeated interviews, respondents tend to switch between identity for one party and independence but not between identity for different parties (Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). Advocates of the identity camp interpret this temporal instability as measurement error that can be removed to reveal stable, substantive identities lurking beneath, whereas supporters of the evaluation camp interpret this as substantive change driven by shifting assessments of politicians and political events.

Unfortunately, methodological problems exist in how both sides treat this observed instability. Scholars in the partisanship-as-identity camp who interpret individual-level temporal instability as mere measurement error stack the deck in their favor by treating this error in isolation. For example, Green et al. (2002) argue that changes in expressed partisanship in panel data are not indicative of true preference change but are an artifact of survey respondents struggling to map their underlying stable identities on to aca-

demically constructed questionnaires. To correct this, they calculate “disattenuated” correlations between repeated measures of partisanship, summarizing the covariance between two latent variables that are stripped of measurement error. They report extremely high intertemporal correlations in partisanship (between $+0.88$ and $+0.99$) in the United States and Western Europe, and they take this as evidence that partisan identities are truly unchanging.¹ However, this approach largely assumes that observed changes in individual-level party ID are measurement noise, since it does not test if these changes are correlated with meaningful covariates such as issue positions and economic evaluations. In the presence of bounded partisanship, one would observe high intertemporal disattenuated correlations since individuals rarely cross party lines, but the instability may be far from meaningless (Zuckerman et al. 2007, 30).²

We argue that a better approach for interpreting longitudinal instability in party ID—and for advancing the debate—is (1) to include tests of nomological or predictive validity (Elkins 2000) and (2) to look to designs incorporating exogenous variation in potential covariates of partisanship. On the first point, if response instability is truly just measurement noise, then changes in party ID should not be associated with plausible individual-level correlates of party ID. If instability does move meaningfully with ebbs and flows in political evaluations, it is highly suggestive that more than just random fluctuations are at play. On the second point—the question of incorporating exogenous variation in potential covariates—we acknowledge that the presence of covariation between party ID and other meaningful variables does not settle the matter. For example, the individual-level correlation between changes in retrospective economic evaluations and changes in party ID could be interpreted as supporting the evaluation camp—with party switching occurring due to changing economic circumstances—or the identity one—with partisan persuasion occurring as respondents interpret economic health through lenses that are biased for or against the incumbent.

Methodologically, then, what is needed to resolve this causal identification problem is a sudden shock to a party’s brand.³ The shock provides the exogenous variation in eval-

uative content (e.g., issue positions, governing styles) that the partisanship-as-evaluation camp presumes to be the basis of mass partisanship. Evidence that citizens shift their political evaluations and then their partisanship in response to the shock would lend convincing support to the evaluation model. In contrast, if most citizens stand pat despite the change, then partisanship as identity is supported. The literature has largely ignored this methodological approach because such shocks are hard to come by, not to mention the fact that one needs longitudinal survey data measuring partisanship and its potential covariates both before and after the shock (Slothus 2010). Changes in party brands occur only gradually in established democracies (Kitschelt 1994), and, perhaps as a result, scholarly work on these countries has tended to overlook the impact of elite-level change on partisanship per se, instead focusing on voting behavior or perceived party positioning (Adams 2012). By contrast, in new democracies, rapid changes in party brands are often followed by collapse (Lupu 2014; Morgan 2011). Given these requirements, Brazil’s Workers Party is an ideal case.

THE CASE OF THE PT, 2002 TO 2006

A study of the PT is important in its own right because it is the largest party in the world’s fourth biggest democracy. Since 2003, the PT has held the presidency and (with the exception of the 2007–11 term) the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It also boasts the largest pool of mass sympathizers in Latin America. To provide a telling comparison, between 2002 and 2014 there were roughly as many PT sympathizers in Brazil (as a share of the population) as Republican identifiers in the United States (Samuels and Zucco 2014a)—a striking fact given the differences in fragmentation and age between these two party systems.

Background to a brand change

Even more important than these idiographic reasons, the PT’s recent history provides a unique opportunity to study the empirical implications of theories of partisanship. The PT underwent a major change in its brand, and it did so without falling prey to party collapse—a common phenomenon in Latin America. Most of the change in its brand occurred from 2002 to 2006, a period that encompassed its first four years in government and that was bookended by the beginning of its first successful presidential campaign (2002) and its reelection (2006).

Before 2002, the PT had the most well-defined and distinctive party brand in Brazil (Lupu forthcoming). It was the

1. McCann and Lawson (2003) estimate similarly sized correlations for the Mexican electorate.

2. Green et al. (2002) test for covariance between party ID and evaluations (reporting none) only after stripping partisanship of its observed instability and after instrumenting evaluations with their lags. They never test if observed changes in evaluations covary with observed changes in party ID.

3. Experiments that randomly manipulate brands are also useful (Lupu 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2015), but our approach carries ad-

vantages for external validity, meaning we can more confidently reach conclusions about real-world parties and partisans.

most programmatic and farthest left of Brazil's major parties, consistently espousing a socialist vision in a deeply fragmented party system whose centrist and rightist elites had, by 2000, approved various market-friendly policies. Along with the charisma of its three-time presidential nominee Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (losing in 1989, 1994, and 1998), the PT's electoral appeal was largely based on its policy stances and on its linkages to left-leaning civil society organizations, including the progressive Catholic church, the rural landless sector, and urban organized labor (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004; Keck 1992). As part of its ideological purity, the PT avoided alliances with centrist and rightist parties, nearly all of which were clientelistic and nonprogrammatic in orientation (Ames 2001; Desposato 2006). The PT also credibly touted itself as the party of clean government—a reputation forged through the party's scattered but relatively scandal-free mayoral and gubernatorial administrations.

Brand dilution

By 2006 virtually all of these aspects of the PT party brand had melted away; the party had become “an integral part of the political mainstream” (Hunter 2010, 200). This shift occurred in two general areas, which we conceptualize as two distinct “shocks” to the party's brand. The first was a revamp of its ideological profile. Starting in the 2002 electoral campaign, Lula positioned himself as an economic moderate, allegedly to reassure foreign investors and make himself more electable.⁴ Early in that year's campaign he released his famous “Letter to the Brazilian people,” a document in which he promised to uphold various aspects of economic orthodoxy. Once in office, Lula (2003–11) hewed to the macroeconomic policy of his centrist predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003). Most strikingly, he pushed through the legislature a constitutional reform of the country's public and private pension systems that was modeled on Cardoso's proposals (the very proposals the PT in opposition had vehemently rejected). The PT's newfound alliances with several centrist and even rightist political parties reinforced its more moderate profile. Finally, many of its former civil society allies abandoned the party out of disgust with its failure to promote radical progressive change (Hochstetler 2008).

The second—and certainly less intentional—area of brand dilution occurred with respect to the PT's clean image. The PT's reputation as the “standard bearer of ethics in politics” (Hunter 2010, 148) imploded in mid-2005 with the revela-

tion of the *mensalão* scandal. Intense media investigation unveiled a scheme orchestrated by PT leaders—including several members of Lula's inner circle—in which dozens of federal legislators were paid to join allied parties or side with the government in roll-call votes. The scandal dominated Brazilian news for months and deeply tarnished the image of the PT as the party of clean government (2010, 168).

These two brand-diluting trends notwithstanding, it is crucial to add that they may have been counterbalanced by the construction of a new PT brand around *lulismo*, the charisma and governance successes of the incumbent president.⁵ During Lula's first term, the economy boomed, income inequality declined, and the popular *Bolsa Família* antipoverty program expanded. By 2006, Lula, whose involvement in the *mensalão* bribery as it occurred has always been murky, had managed to distance his public image from the party and successfully run for reelection. In doing so, he won the support of millions of poor voters who had voted against him in 2002 (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008).

Consequences for mass partisanship

The consequences of these party brand changes for mass *petismo* (i.e., identification with the PT) are not straightforward or well understood. Initial scholarship on the matter applied Downsian principles of party switching (and thus partisanship as evaluation), concluding that it was the party's leftmost ideologues who departed in disgust at PT moderation and corruption (Hochstetler 2008; Veiga 2007). The 2006 presidential election seemed to provide some preliminary evidence of this: two left-leaning candidates (Heloísa Helena and Cristovam Buarque) who had defected from the PT because of its ideological and ethical shifts during Lula's first term collectively garnered almost 10% of the first-round vote, ostensibly attracting this pool of disaffected leftists. Meanwhile, the party's move rightward may have, again in Downsian fashion, attracted more moderate ideological voters to the partisan fold, as evidenced by Lula's new constituency in the 2006 election (Singer 2012).

Recent research, however, provides a different twist on a story of partisanship as evaluation. The creation of new partisan loyalties is about more than proper repositioning and rebranding—it also requires substantial time to pass under a stable party image: “Parties cannot effortlessly relocate their appeal in the political issue space; they are constrained by the need to preserve their reputation and credibility in the

4. Debate exists over whether the PT's moderation began in 2002 (Baker 2009, 187; Power and Zucco 2012, 7) or the mid-1990s (Samuels 2004). For our purposes, what matters is the noncontroversial fact that a rightward shift did occur after the beginning of 2002.

5. Singer (2012) refers to *lulismo* as both a personalist bond with Lula and as an ideology. Throughout this article, we use the term to refer strictly to the personalist element, meaning positive orientations toward Lula the person and his performance in office.

eyes of electoral constituencies” (Kitschelt et al. 2010, 28; see also Karreth, Polk, and Allen 2012). This literature suggests that elite-level shifts yield dealigning effects in the short term, confusing voters of all stripes because of the watered-down brand (Lupu 2014; Roberts 2013). If so, then the PT brand changes would have pushed many mass *petistas* to independence while failing to immediately create new adherents because the brand was now unclear and in flux. Indeed, much scholarship views *lulismo* as a nonpartisan phenomenon that attracted new voters to Lula but not to the party (Holzhacker and Balbachevsky 2007; Hunter and Power 2007; Rennó and Cabello 2010). Macropartisanship trends from rolling cross-sectional surveys of nationally representative samples, depicted in figure 1, provide partial evidence of this: Rates of *petismo* fell by a quarter in 2005.

A third alternative, inspired by the partisanship-as-identity camp, predicts little movement in response to brand dilution. By 2002, many of the PT’s sympathizers were activists and avid supporters (Samuels 2006), presumably the type that would commit with blind loyalty to the party regardless of its moderation and unscrupulous activities. Party persuasion would occur among loyalists, as they would update their issue attitudes to match the party’s new stances. As partial evidence, note in figure 1 that the rate of mass *petismo* never went below a floor of 15%, perhaps signifying the presence of a large pool of stable PT identifiers.

As a final alternative, consider the possibility that the PT brand dilution went largely unnoticed by citizens and was

thus of little consequence for mass partisanship. Evidence of elite-mass linkages in Europe shows this to be a common response to partisan change: “there is only weak and inconsistent empirical evidence that citizens in multiparty systems systematically react to parties’ policy shifts” (Adams 2012, 412; Adams et al. 2011).

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In Brazil’s nascent-democracy, young party-system context, many citizens can only learn about parties and develop new sympathies from ongoing evaluations of politician behavior and political events. We expect that this necessitates a major role for partisanship as evaluation (Domínguez and McCann 1996; Greene 2011). We also expect the PT’s changing brand to have yielded more of a dealigning effect on many of its traditional supporters than a Downsian one. Evidence from other Latin American countries shows this effect to be common (Lupu 2014), and while there were new and old left-party alternatives at the ballot box in 2006, these alternatives themselves lacked a long-standing, viable brand for former *petistas* to rally around. The ugliness of the *mensalão* scandal also surely had dealigning effects on traditional *petistas* beyond the standard negativity of most corruption stories, since it ran so counter to the PT’s clean-government image (Rennó 2011). At the same time, the PT was building a new, credible brand around the successes of the incumbent president. In contrast to previous scholarship, we suspect that *lulismo* was part of a new *petista* image, and that it contributed to the rebuilding of a new pool of mass sympathizers in the wake of the negative aspects of brand change.

These arguments for partisan change notwithstanding, we also expect to find that a nonnegligible share of *petistas* were stable partisans who were impervious to the party’s changing brand. By 2002, the PT was known for its programmatic orientation and its well-organized grassroots structure—party traits that facilitate the construction of a loyal base. Some scholars of advanced democracies have moved away from the dichotomous, either/or notion of partisanship; they have moved toward one that stresses heterogeneity within an electorate, differentiating blind from critical loyalists and univalent from ambivalent partisans (Jackson and Kollman 2011; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012). Evidence of a genetic basis to partisan strength supports this approach (Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009). We would thus be surprised to find nearly all *petistas* reacting to the brand change by abandoning the party.

What sociodemographic traits are associated with change and stability in party ID? Drawing on the literature on Brazilian politics and on mass partisanship more broadly, we expect two important patterns. First, if *lulismo* did contrib-




Figure 1. Rates of mass partisanship in Brazil, 2002–6. Source: Datafolha, compiled in Samuels and Zucco (2014a).

ute to a new PT brand and the reconstruction of a critical mass of partisans by 2006, then we should find that members of the lower classes—crucial to Lula’s new voting constituency—were more likely to become *petistas*. Second, research on mass partisanship tends to find that the young have more volatile partisan identities.

DATA: THE 2002–6 TWO-CITY BRAZILIAN PANEL STUDY

In studies of Brazilian partisanship, scholars tend to analyze (at best) multiple repeated cross-sectional surveys (Carreirao 2008; Samuels 2006). Unfortunately, this approach leaves crucial questions unanswered. For example, it can demonstrate that the collective body of declared *petistas* has changed through time (e.g., become more moderate), but it cannot reveal what individual-level movements caused that collective change to occur (Samuels 2008; Veiga 2007). We propose panel data as a solution. Ideally, we would analyze panel data from a nationwide sample, but no such data exist for the period under study. We thus turn to the two-city Brazilian panel project (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006).

The two-city study conducted repeated interviews from 2002 to 2006 in a pair of mid-sized cities: Juiz de Fora in the state of Minas Gerais and Caxias do Sul in Rio Grande do Sul. Juiz de Fora resembles the personalized patterns common throughout Brazil. Local power tends to be held by the clientelist nonleft, and the elite left is not well organized (although in the 2002 and 2006 elections, Lula polled well in the city). In contrast, Caxias has a long history of mutual distaste and polarization between left and nonleft parties. A well-organized left (mostly the PT) is counterbalanced by a less fragmented nonleft, which tends to congregate in a PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*) that is to the right of its national presence. In the end, the value of the two-city data for this study is that the panel interviews spanned the crucial period of PT brand change, although we demonstrate in the appendix (available online) that important and relevant patterns that are present in nationwide cross-sectional surveys are present in the two-city data.⁶

Six waves of interviews and reinterviews occurred between March 2002 and November 2006, with roughly 2,500 interviewees per city in the first wave and about 1,000 fresh respondents added in each of waves 2 and 3. (Please see the appendix for information on sampling, panel retention, and weighting to address attrition.) Figure 2 depicts the timing of the waves (just below the *x*-axis) and some of the era’s

6. The survey was conducted in two cities to enable measurement of rarely analyzed features of voters’ social contexts. We do use some of these below, but they are not central to our argument.

most relevant political events (just above the *x*-axis). Two of the waves—waves 3 and 6—were election waves that occurred between the first and second rounds of the 2002 and 2006 national elections, respectively. Two others—waves 1 and 4—occurred during periods of normal (i.e., no active campaign) political intensity. Waves 2 and 5 were preelectoral waves that occurred during campaigns, although in wave 2 partisan identification was only asked of the 913 fresh respondents.

Figure 2 also plots average mass perceptions of Lula. These provide convincing evidence that the change in the PT’s brand did occur, and they soundly dismiss the possibility that elite-level shifts went unnoticed by an inattentive electorate. The survey asked respondents to place Lula on a 5-point ideological scale (“Placement of Lula in ideological space”) and on a three-issue series of 5-point policy space dimensions (“Placement of Lula in issue space”). The figure shows the averages and 95% confidence intervals of these placements with black markers (scaled to the left *y*-axis).⁷ (Question wordings and indices are described in the appendix.) Between March of 2002 and July 2006, the mean placement of Lula in the issue space moved almost a full point rightward, nearly a quarter of the entire range. Citizens also saw Lula as moving a half-point rightward on the ideological scale over his first 18 months in office. Figure 2 also shows how the *mensalão* scandal led to a major reshaping of the PT’s clean image. We made an index of “Perceptions of Lula’s corruptness” from three survey items, and the means and confidence intervals are plotted in bold (scaled to the right *y*-axis). After the scandal’s break, the mean perception of Lula’s corruptness jumped by nearly one standard deviation. All told, the two-city data span several crucial elite-level political events that contributed to a genuine change—in voters’ minds—in the PT’s brand.

CROSS-TABULATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP DYNAMICS

We measure partisanship with the following question: “Do you sympathize (*simpatiza*) with a political party?” If respondents answered “yes,” they were asked to name the party. If “no,” they were labeled as independents.⁸ Although

7. Placements of Lula are a good proxy for placements of the PT. In the nationally representative Brazilian National Election Studies, the correlations between these two variables were +.62 in 2002 and +.83 in 2006. Also, mean placements of both moved rightward during this time.

8. This “sympathy” wording is identical to that used by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. Scholars of mass partisanship outside the United States are far from unanimous on how to word survey queries of party ID. Wordings that ask respondents to report their partisan “sympathy,” “preference,” “closeness,” “inclination,” or “identity” (to name a few) have all been used. Fortunately, Baker and Renno (2015) show, using




Figure 2. Timing of political events, panel waves, and perceptions of Lula. SD = standard deviation. Source: Two-City Brazilian Panel Study

we are primarily interested in the PT, we define five partisan categories: “*petistas*, *pemedebistas*” (PMDB sympathizers), “*tucanos*” (PSDB [*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*] sympathizers), “other partisans,” and “independents.” The PT and PMDB are the only parties with a mass base that consistently exceeds 5% (both in our two cities and nationwide), but we also report figures for the PSDB, the third largest party by number of mass partisans.

Tables 1 and 2 present cross-tabulations of party ID at wave *t* with party ID at wave *t*−1 for the four adjacent pairs of waves and for each city. The results of primary interest appear in the leftmost column of percentages (labeled “PT”) in each table: these columns show the distribution of partisan identities among those who were *petistas* in the earlier wave. Several of the percentages in other columns are relevant as well. The main diagonal (indicating no change in party ID) is set in bold in each table to improve readability.

results from a survey experiment conducted in Brazil, that wording choice has little effect on observed, individual-level (1) rates of intertemporal partisan stability and (2) correlations between partisanship and other relevant political evaluations. (See the appendix and Baker and Renno [2015] for more details.) Wording does affect marginal distributions of reported partisanship, but this poses a problem only if one tries to draw substantive conclusions from mean differences across differently worded items—something we do not do in this article. To sum, our choice of the sympathy wording over other possibilities is largely inconsequential for our substantive conclusions.

Both tables confirm a relatively high degree of individual-level instability in Brazilian partisan identification. Of those who declared themselves PT identifiers, between 42.3% and 82.8% remained *petistas* in the subsequent wave. The length of time between waves somewhat accounts for the difference in percentages. Of those who sympathized with the PT at any given time, between 67% and 83% reexpressed this sympathy when queried a few months later, whereas about half (ranging from 42% to 53%) did so if queried between a year or two later. These numbers, especially when taking into account the even higher rates of instability among the other parties (tables 1, 2), confirm Brazil’s high rate of mass partisan instability compared to older democracies. For example, 77% to 86% of major-party sympathizers in Germany and Britain, respectively, maintain their identities over a one-year period (Zuckerman et al. 2007, 41–43). Figure 3 plots the rate of retention among *petistas* between every possible pair of waves (i.e., all adjacent and nonadjacent waves) as a function of the time gap between the waves. The figure shows that percentages of stability seemingly approach an asymptote in the high-30s (in Juiz de Fora) to mid-40s (in Caxias). We interpret this as evidence that roughly two-fifths of declared *petistas* at any given time were stable “identity *petistas*”; even amid all of the brand change, they stood by their party.

In any given wave then, about 60% of declared *petistas* were the more flexible type: “occasional *petistas*.” The first

Table 1. Dynamics of Partisan Identification in Juiz de Fora, 2006 to 2006

| | | PID in March 2002 (Wave 1) | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in October 2002 (Wave 3) | PT | 82.8 | 31.9 | 31.9 | 24.0 | 26.7 | 41.6 |
| | PMDB | .7 | 22.8 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 1.9 | 5.0 |
| | PSDB | .4 | 3.4 | 29.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
| | Other party | 2.9 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 27.3 | 4.0 | 5.1 |
| | Independent | 13.2 | 38.1 | 26.8 | 42.9 | 65.4 | 45.7 |
| | Row % | 25.1 | 15.4 | 3.2 | 5.6 | 50.7 | <i>N</i> = 1,704 |
| | | PID in October 2002 (Wave 3) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in May 2004 (Wave 4) | PT | 42.3 | 8.0 | 3.0 | 7.7 | 6.2 | 21.3 |
| | PMDB | 6.5 | 57.0 | 13.2 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 9.8 |
| | PSDB | 2.3 | 8.4 | 59.4 | 7.9 | 3.3 | 4.7 |
| | Other party | 6.8 | 2.5 | 6.6 | 30.1 | 3.1 | 6.0 |
| | Independent | 42.2 | 24.2 | 17.9 | 46.9 | 80.0 | 58.1 |
| | Row % | 41.7 | 5.4 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 45.6 | <i>N</i> = 1,378 |
| | | PID in May 2004 (Wave 4) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in July 2006 (Wave 5) | PT | 53.1 | 17.1 | 8.5 | 24.6 | 7.1 | 19.2 |
| | PMDB | 3.0 | 36.6 | 8.1 | 7.8 | 4.4 | 7.7 |
| | PSDB | 3.2 | 6.9 | 38.6 | 4.3 | 3.4 | 5.6 |
| | Other party | 2.5 | 1.0 | 3.5 | 21.7 | 1.9 | 3.1 |
| | Independent | 38.3 | 38.4 | 41.3 | 41.7 | 83.1 | 64.3 |
| | Row % | 21.7 | 10.2 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 57.3 | <i>N</i> = 960 |
| | | PID in July 2006 (Wave 5) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in October 2006 (Wave 6) | PT | 66.9 | 10.4 | 6.6 | 25.5 | 10.6 | 21.8 |
| | PMDB | 3.1 | 45.6 | 9.0 | 3.9 | 1.8 | 6.2 |
| | PSDB | 1.5 | 7.3 | 51.9 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 5.4 |
| | Other party | 5.3 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 40.3 | 2.4 | 4.4 |
| | Independent | 23.3 | 33.9 | 30.4 | 27.3 | 83.1 | 62.2 |
| | Row % | 19.5 | 8.3 | 5.9 | 3.6 | 62.7 | <i>N</i> = 802 |

Note. PID = Party identification; PMDB = *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*; PSDB = *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*; PT = *Partido dos Trabalhadores*. Main diagonal entries (indicative of no change in party ID) are set in bold. Source: Two-City Brazilian Panel Study.

Table 2. Dynamics of Partisan Identification in Caxias do Sul, 2002 to 2006

| | | PID in March 2002 (Wave 1) | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in October 2002 (Wave 3) | PT | 72.6 | 6.6 | 12.0 | 6.2 | 9.7 | 24.2 |
| | PMDB | 2.1 | 59.4 | 27.4 | 13.3 | 10.0 | 17.1 |
| | PSDB | .0 | 2.1 | 23.8 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 1.6 |
| | Other party | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 36.7 | 3.6 | 5.4 |
| | Independent | 22.7 | 29.3 | 34.0 | 40.0 | 75.7 | 51.7 |
| | Row % | 24.3 | 17.3 | 1.7 | 6.7 | 50.1 | N = 1,537 |
| | | PID in October 2002 (Wave 3) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in May 2004 (Wave 4) | PT | 54.9 | 1.5 | 4.1 | 9.3 | 5.2 | 16.6 |
| | PMDB | 5.6 | 61.8 | 10.2 | 15.8 | 7.3 | 16.9 |
| | PSDB | .0 | 3.1 | 20.3 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| | Other party | 2.5 | 2.0 | 19.2 | 43.6 | 3.3 | 5.1 |
| | Independent | 37.1 | 31.6 | 46.2 | 29.1 | 83.0 | 59.8 |
| | Row % | 24.0 | 17.6 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 52.1 | N = 1,221 |
| | | PID in May 2004 (Wave 4) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in July 2006 (Wave 5) | PT | 52.1 | 3.6 | .0 | 11.6 | 8.3 | 15.0 |
| | PMDB | 2.3 | 66.5 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 17.5 |
| | PSDB | 1.4 | 1.4 | 38.6 | .0 | 1.1 | 1.8 |
| | Other Party | 3.4 | 2.4 | 7.8 | 41.7 | 1.0 | 4.1 |
| | Independent | 40.8 | 26.1 | 46.4 | 38.4 | 81.5 | 61.7 |
| | Row % | 17.2 | 17.7 | 1.7 | 5.6 | 57.8 | N = 913 |
| | | PID in July 2006 (Wave 5) | | | | | |
| | | PT | PMDB | PSDB | Other Party | Independent | Column % |
| PID in October 2006 (Wave 6) | PT | 70.0 | 5.1 | .0 | 2.6 | 8.3 | 16.4 |
| | PMDB | 3.8 | 61.4 | 14.1 | 7.8 | 6.6 | 15.6 |
| | PSDB | 1.0 | 5.8 | 66.3 | 8.3 | 2.7 | 4.3 |
| | Other Party | .9 | 1.5 | 14.4 | 57.3 | 2.1 | 4.4 |
| | Independent | 24.4 | 26.3 | 5.2 | 23.9 | 80.3 | 59.3 |
| | Row % | 14.6 | 16.8 | 1.7 | 4.3 | 62.6 | N = 878 |

Note. PID = Party identification; PMDB = *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*; PSDB = *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*; PT = *Partido dos Trabalhadores*. Main diagonal entries (indicative of no change in party ID) are set in bold. Source: Two-City Brazilian Panel Study.




Figure 3. Partisan stability among *petistas* through time: observed and smoothed values. Each line is fitted values from an OLS regression. Source: Two-City Brazilian Panel Study.

columns of each cross-tabulation in tables 1 and 2 show that these individuals moved in a pattern of bounded partisanship reminiscent of that observed in advanced industrial contexts. The modal outcome for those who were PT sympathizers in the earlier wave is always stability, but the second largest category by far is independence. Of those who moved from *petismo* at t to something else at $t+1$, between 70% and 85% became independents. In other words, rarely did individuals who expressed *petismo* in the past switch to sympathy with a competing party, but a majority did move to independence at some point.

Among the other parties, sympathy for the PMDB in Caxias—where politics is more programmatic—also exhibited bounded partisanship. Only 6%–11% of *pemedebistas* in Caxias in a given wave transited to another party in the next one, and rates of stability approximate those of the PT. By contrast, for individuals who, at some point, declared sympathy for the PMDB in Juiz de Fora or the PSDB (in either city), the borders between parties were far more porous.

Not to be overlooked in this evidence for bounded partisanship is the fact that, in any given pair of consecutive waves, between 33% and 52% of respondents sat out this churn entirely, refusing to dabble at all with party ID.⁹ This is

9. In a nationwide panel survey (BEPS 2010), the corresponding figures range from 44% to 50%.

a large number of stable independents, larger than the corresponding figures of 30% in Germany, 24% in the United Kingdom (Zuckerman et al. 2007, 42), and 10%–15% in the United States (Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008, 26). It is, however, smaller than the percentages of independents in any given cross-section and thus the percentages that are often used to judge Brazilians as largely apartisan (Mainwaring 1999). In other words, the churn of bounded partisanship involves a majority of Brazilians: more respondents than not express party ID at least once during any given months-long time interval.

In sum, bounded partisanship characterizes mass partisanship for parties not just in old democracies but for programmatic parties in new ones as well. (Please see Samuels and Zucco [2014b] and the appendix for nationwide evidence of the same in Brazil.) Still, are the occasional *petistas* moving from independence to *petismo* in a random pattern, indicative of measurement error? Or are they responding to events? We address these questions below.

MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ESTIMATES

As in tables 1 and 2, we seek to exploit the benefits of panel data by looking at changes in partisan sympathy between the four available adjacent waves (1 and 3, 3 and 4, 4 and 5, 5 and 6). To that end, table 3 shows estimates from a series of transition models in which our dependent variable is *pe-*

tista, the binary indicator of PT sympathy introduced previously. A transition model can be thought of as a switching probit regression model in which coefficients are estimated separately for $y_{t-1} = 1$ and $y_{t-1} = 0$ (Hillygus and Jackman 2003). In our case, each model estimates one set of coefficients for respondents who were *petistas* in the earlier ($t-1$) wave and another set for those who were not *petistas* in the $t-1$ wave. Estimating two sets of coefficients in this way allows us to illustrate clearly which factors drove away or retained *petistas* and which factors created or repelled potential new ones. Coefficients with a positive sign in the “Wave $t-1$ *petistas*” columns are positively correlated with stable PT partisanship, whereas coefficients with a positive sign in the “Wave $t-1$ non-*petistas*” columns are positively correlated with instability and movement into *petismo*. Of particular interest is whether the effect of political events was muted among $t-1$ *petistas*, which would support partisanship as identity.

Besides including the lagged DV, we also include both contemporaneous (t) and lagged ($t-1$) measures of all independent variables (DeBoef and Keele 2008). Our models are thus specified as standard autoregressive distributed lag models: The coefficients on independent variables indexed by t (and emphasized in bold in table 3) estimate the impact of a change in that variable on change in party ID, whereas the coefficients on variables indexed by $t-1$ estimate the impact of the level of that variable at $t-1$ on change in party ID.

For each of the four contiguous wave pairings, we estimated two transition models. As independent variables, one set of models (1 through 4) contained strictly attitudes and opinions. These are measures intended to capture the effect of the brand change and other political evaluations. The other set of specifications (5 through 8) incorporated respondent traits—demographics and social network composition—to determine what kinds of individuals switched or stayed.¹⁰ We pool both cities to increase statistical power.

Independent variables

As independent variables, we include two of the indices of PT brand perception introduced in figure 2: “Perceptions of Lula’s corruptness” (higher values denote more corruptness) and “Placement of Lula in issue space” (higher values

denote a more pro-market view). In table 3 we denote these as “brand change treatments” since they are linked to exogenous (elite-led) shocks, although they are of course not randomly assigned treatments. To determine the issue preferences of switchers and stayers, we include “Placement of self in issue space,” which is respondents’ self-placement in the same issue space. Another set of variables captures evaluations of Lula: “Lula’s personal traits” (an index calculated from three questions, with higher values signifying more favorable perceptions of Lula’s traits), and “Presidential approval of Lula” (a single question, with higher values denoting more favorable evaluations of the government). Lastly, we include an index of “Retrospective economic evaluations” constructed from two survey items (higher values signify more positive economic evaluations).

We also include a series of covariates tapping demographics and aspects of respondents’ social environments. To test hypotheses raised above, we include socioeconomic status (SES) and age. For these two variables, we are interested in the effects of their levels and not their changes. In other words, we are more interested in whether the poor and young were more likely to switch as opposed to whether the (relatively minimal) changes in SES and age that occurred between any two paired waves led to shifts in partisanship. We thus include only $t-1$ values on these items. We also include “Political awareness.” Finally, the survey also contained items that tap political preferences in respondents’ social networks. We take advantage of these rarely measured items to control for “Support for” and “Opposition to the PT in the discussant network.”

Results

The initial results presented previously showed a large number of occasional *petistas* churning in and out of the party around a core of stable identity *petistas*. Were the occasional *petistas* responding to events, or were their moves largely random (indicative of measurement error)? Table 3 shows significant evidence that citizens responded to events.

Model 1 provides one example, revealing that wave-1 *petistas* responded negatively to Lula’s moderation during the 2002 election campaign. The first coefficient in the first column is negatively signed and statistically significant, meaning wave-1 *petistas* who perceived Lula’s rightward shift were less likely to remain *petistas* around election day. This departure of many traditional *petistas* followed a dealigning—not a Downsian—logic; it was those *petistas* who began the campaign on the center and right of the issue space who were less likely to remain or become *petistas*, not those on the left (as the Downsian model predicts). This is indicated by the negative and statistically significant signs on “Placement of self

10. Scholars are often inclined to include the latter with the former in saturated “garbage can” models, but controlling for attitudes in a model with demographics changes the nature of the question being asked (Achen 2005). For example, we are interested in whether poor people were more likely to switch than rich people—not whether poor people, net of their political evaluations, were more likely to switch.

Table 3. Sources of Dynamics in Partisan Identification in Two Brazilian Cities, 2002–6: Binary Probit Regression Results

| Among: | Wave 3 (October 2002) | | Wave 4 (May 2004) | | Wave 5 (July 2006) | | Wave 6 (October 2006) | |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Wave 1 | Wave 1 | Wave 3 | Wave 3 | Wave 4 | Wave 4 | Wave 5 | Wave 5 |
| | <i>Petistas</i> | Non- <i>Petistas</i> | <i>Petistas</i> | Non- <i>Petistas</i> | <i>Petistas</i> | Non- <i>Petistas</i> | <i>Petistas</i> | Non- <i>Petistas</i> |
| Model number | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | | | | |
| Brand change treatments | | | | | | | | |
| Placement of Lula in issue space _{<i>t</i>} | -.143* (.071) | -.049 (.055) | -.103 (.054) | -.036 (.078) | .013 (.047) | -.059 (.102) | .091 (.056) | |
| Placement of Lula in issue space _{<i>t-1</i>} | -.205* (.062) | -.073 (.065) | .045 (.058) | -.093 (.100) | -.089 (.055) | .018 (.086) | -.057 (.046) | |
| Perceptions of Lula's corruptness _{<i>t</i>} | | | | -.390* (.112) | -.235* (.072) | -.419* (.131) | -.274* (.078) | |
| Perceptions of Lula's corruptness _{<i>t-1</i>} | | | | .019 (.133) | -.150 (.090) | .092 (.130) | .022 (.078) | |
| Other variables | | | | | | | | |
| Placement of self in issue space _{<i>t</i>} | .002 (.075) | -.089 (.053) | -.104 (.058) | -.048 (.075) | .004 (.049) | .026 (.116) | .005 (.058) | |
| Placement of self in issue space _{<i>t-1</i>} | -.218* (.069) | -.004 (.064) | -.089 (.060) | .012 (.086) | -.080 (.053) | .056 (.100) | -.084 (.053) | |
| Lula's personal traits _{<i>t</i>} | .445* (.085) | .527* (.043) | .200* (.058) | -.061 (.125) | -.016 (.079) | .220 (.164) | .265* (.087) | |
| Lula's personal traits _{<i>t-1</i>} | -.021 (.077) | .014 (.071) | .156* (.063) | .012 (.129) | -.055 (.073) | -.167 (.154) | -.121 (.081) | |
| Presidential approval of Lula _{<i>t</i>} | | | | .603* (.135) | .398* (.087) | .148 (.135) | .321* (.097) | |
| Presidential approval of Lula _{<i>t-1</i>} | | | | -.100 (.134) | .033 (.077) | .162 (.152) | .057 (.081) | |
| Retrospective econ. evaluations _{<i>t</i>} | -.078 (.069) | .049 (.044) | .230* (.072) | .047 (.108) | .097 (.069) | .126 (.135) | .028 (.086) | |
| Retrospective econ. evaluations _{<i>t-1</i>} | .083 (.071) | -.053 (.043) | .027 (.060) | -.033 (.100) | -.014 (.067) | -.027 (.130) | .052 (.073) | |
| Juiz de Fora | .152 (.113) | .534* (.073) | .089 (.112) | -.119 (.155) | -.144 (.106) | -.251 (.178) | -.189 (.116) | |
| <i>Petista</i> _{<i>t-1</i>} | 2.801 (.398) | 2.114* (.483) | | | 1.334 (.855) | | 1.523 (.874) | |

| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| SES _{<i>t-1</i>} | -.003 (.152) | .069 (.078) | -.025 (.115) | .179 (.181) |
| Age _{<i>t-1</i>} | -.134 (.152) | -.198 (.115) | .224 (.181) | -.064 (.246) |
| Political awareness _{<i>t-1</i>} | .152* (.076) | .191* (.053) | .015 (.082) | .144 (.093) |
| Support for PT in discussant network _{<i>t</i>} | .083* (.042) | .154* (.026) | | .137 (.063) |
| Support for PT in discussant network _{<i>t-1</i>} | .114* (.047) | .171* (.035) | | .083 (.063) |
| Opposition to PT in discussant network _{<i>t</i>} | -.112* (.044) | -.077* (.027) | | -.358* (.059) |
| Opposition to PT in discussant network _{<i>t-1</i>} | .027 (.042) | -.051* (.024) | | .111 (.121) |
| Juiz de Fora | .317* (.115) | -.379* (.093) | .029 (.135) | -.164 (.171) |
| <i>Petista</i> _{<i>t-1</i>} | 1.662* (.675) | 1.848 (.661) | .175 (.873) | 1.852 (1.198) |
| <i>N</i> | (793) | (862) | (363) | (283) |

Note. Entries are probit coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are averages over five multiply imputed data sets (Royston 2004). (Missing values of the dependent variable and were not imputed. Panel dropouts are also not imputed, although observations are weighted by their probability of attrition.) Intercepts are not shown to save space. PT = Workers Party.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed. Coefficients set in bold are the impact of a change in the independent variable on a change in party ID.

in issue space ($t-1$)” for both groups in model 1.¹¹ Also counter to Downsian expectations, Lula’s move rightward did not create new *petistas* out of centrist former non-*petistas*, as indicated by the statistically insignificant—and substantively small—coefficient on “Placement of Lula in the issue space (t)” among wave-1 non-*petistas*. In sum, it does appear that Lula was punished by some long-standing *petistas* for diluting the brand, but counter to Downsian conventional wisdom, the findings suggest that it was the more moderate *petistas* who departed—hard left *petistas* stayed with their party. Meanwhile, Lula’s ideological move toward the center did little to attract new partisans.

Lula did attract new voters to the partisan fold during his successful 2002 campaign, but it was not with his newfound policy position. Instead, model 1 suggests that it was a positive surge in evaluations of Lula’s personal traits (culminating in his election victory) that produced this effect. The mean of Lula’s personal traits improved by one-third of a standard deviation from wave 1 to wave 3. The coefficients for “Lula’s personal traits” at time t , which quantify the effect of a change in these perceptions on a change in partisanship, are positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient for wave 1 *petistas* (.445) is statistically indistinguishable from that for wave 1 non-*petistas* (.527), meaning that Lula’s surge in popularity was just as important for keeping *petistas* in their party as it was for attracting new voters to the party. This helps to reconcile the loss of some traditional *petistas*, repelled by policy moderation, with the trends of figure 1 which showed that rates of *petismo* actually increased from the beginning to the end of 2002. Using predicted probabilities, we estimate that aggregate *petismo* jumped by an estimated 4 percentage points (20% of the wave 1 total) by election time 2002 because of improved Lula perceptions. These beneficial effects of *lulismo* for *petismo*, as shown by the significance of the two coefficients on this variable in model 2, continued through 2004.

The other exogenous shock to mass perceptions was the *mensalão* scandal. The evidence in table 3 demonstrates that the *mensalão* also shaped Brazilian partisanship. In model 3 (whose $t-1$ and t waves straddled the scandal’s break), the contemporaneous coefficients on “Perceptions of Lula’s Corruptness” are all negatively signed and statistically significant. In addition, they are larger in magnitude among $t-1$ *petistas* than among $t-1$ non-*petistas*, suggesting that *petistas* were not impervious to the scandal as a partisanship-

as-identity vision would predict. Given the huge, nearly one-standard-deviation-upward trend in this variable between waves 4 and 5 (see fig. 2), the predicted probabilities of our model estimate the *mensalão* to have lowered aggregate *petismo* by about 5 percentage points (or a whopping one-quarter of the wave 4 total). The scandal reduced the probability that wave 4 *petistas* stayed with the party (from .52 to .39 for a voter with an average profile on the independent variables), and it also reduced the probability that wave 4 non-*petistas* churned into the party (from .10 to .07) in wave 5. A further effect occurred through presidential approval, which also trended downward between waves 4 and 5 and which—according to the model—exerted a huge effect on partisanship among wave 4 *petistas* and non-*petistas*. Again, there is no evidence that $t-1$ *petistas* were less responsive to changes in presidential approval; if anything they were more responsive.

Still, recall from figure 1 that this decline in the share of *petistas* was ephemeral. It rebounded to pre-*mensalão* levels by the time of Lula’s reelection. The resilience here was again due to the effect of *lulismo*. Presidential approval, perceptions of Lula’s personal traits, and perceptions of Lula’s corruptness all improved between waves 5 and 6. All of these variables were statistically significant (model 4) in shaping the probability that non-*petistas* would become *petistas*. During Lula’s second term, *lulismo* had clearly become a primary element of the PT’s new brand, which helped the party reconstruct a mass base of nearly 25% of the electorate.

What kinds of individuals were doing the switching and staying? The estimates demonstrate that identity change was, as expected, largely the domain of the poor and the young. Between waves 1 and 3, young people and persons of low SES who were not *petistas* in March 2002 were more likely to become *petistas* by October 2002 (model 5). An equivalent pattern held between waves 3 and 4 (model 6), and low SES non-*petistas* were also more likely than high SES ones to become *petistas* between 2004 and mid-2006 (model 7). Simply put, Lula’s presidency encouraged the poor and the young to switch to PT sympathy.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To advance debates over the nature of mass partisanship, we have focused on a young party system, leveraging temporal data that span transformative political events. We find strong evidence in Brazil of partisanship as evaluation. In response to multiple shocks to the PT’s brand that occurred between 2002 and 2006, Brazilians updated their partisanship. Many *petistas* abandoned their party in response to its moderation in 2002 and the news of its ugly involvement in a corruption scandal in 2005. That said, these individuals

11. In contrast, Lula’s move in ideological space during his first year and a half in office did not produce a corresponding change in partisanship. Elite shifts are thus more meaningful when they occur during campaigns, a time when citizens are at their most attentive (Claassen 2011).

did not respond as Downsians, since it was moderate *petistas* who were the most likely to depart, seemingly in frustration with the newfound murkiness of the party's diluting brand. Moreover, upon departing, former *petistas* tended to encamp as independents and not as partisans of a PT competitor—something reminiscent of the patterns of bounded partisanship observed in older democracies. As for individuals who began the era as non-*petistas*, many of them (as early as 2002) became *petistas* because of their enthusiasm for the party's standard-bearer, a case—contrary to the conventional wisdom—of *lulismo* contributing to the reconstruction of *petismo*.¹² At the same time, we note that this dynamism in mass partisanship occurred around a core of identity *petistas* (about 40% of all *petistas* at any given time) who stuck with their party through thick and thin.

Bounded instability—responsive to political events—exists around a core of stability. We thus conclude that the dichotomy of partisanship as evaluation versus partisanship as identity is a false one, at least to the extent that previous scholars have used these labels to characterize entire electorates. Millions of Brazilians changed their partisanship in response to elite-initiated changes in the country's largest party, but millions of others did not, most importantly the roughly 10% of citizens who were stable *petistas*. These findings thus stand in partial confirmation of the literature on the importance of stable party brands for constructing mass partisanship in new democracies (Lupu 2014). Clearly, the dilution of the PT's brand via moderation and scandal did dealign some traditional supporters. At the same time, a large minority did stand by their party. Moreover, the PT was able to attract a pool of new supporters more quickly than this party-brand perspective would predict, building on the strength of a new image oriented around the administrative and personal successes of the incumbent president.

How well do our findings and argument on Brazil generalize to other contexts? Like any country, Brazil's political system has several unique traits that might incline scholars to hesitate before generalizing from it to other countries. As a young party system, partisanship in Brazil is probably more labile than partisanship in older party systems. Even the leading proponents of partisanship as identity in old democracies suggest that their viewpoint may not travel well to newer systems: "The psychological processes of self-categorization and group evaluation are . . . most apparent in established

party systems, in which parties have cultivated symbols and group imagery" (Green et al. 2002, 13). Furthermore, Brazil's lower-house electoral system (open-list proportional representation) is notorious for its candidate-centric, highly fragmented elections (Ames 2001; Mainwaring 1999). In Brazil, the degree of volatility and prevalence of partisanship as evaluation are probably above the mean for all democracies.

That said, loyalty to the programmatic PT did exhibit the pattern of bounded partisanship that is present in European and U.S. systems, albeit at a faster rate of churn. Moreover, party brand changes—and subsequent shifts in aggregate rates of mass partisanship—are common in Latin America (Lupu 2014; Stokes 2001), suggesting that our findings have relevance beyond Brazil. Ultimately, because of Brazil's distinctiveness (not to mention that of the two cities in our sampling frame), a more definitive understanding of the generalizability of our results must await further findings. We welcome future research that assesses individual-level partisan change and stability in Latin America and other third-wave democracies.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank David Samuels and Cesar Zucco for sharing their data. For constructive comments and assistance on earlier drafts, we thank James Adams, Donald Green, Ken Kollman, Sandra Ley, Noam Lupu, Jana Morgan, David Samuels, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and the Institutions Program of the Institute for Behavioral Sciences at CU-Boulder (Jennifer Bair, Carew Boulding, David Bearce, Joseph Jupille, Moonhawk Kim, Nelson Montenegro, James Scarritt, Sarah Sokhey, and Jaroslav Tir). We are also very appreciative of the comments from Lanny Martin and the anonymous reviewers. Any errors remain our own responsibility.

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12. That the new brand was heavily oriented around a person who, by 2010, was legally barred from reelection suggests that the PT's new partisan base may have been fragile. Indeed, according to the Datafolha time series, only 9% of the electorate self-declared as *petistas* in early 2015, following four years under Lula's less popular PT successor, Dilma Rousseff.

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