

S A S K I A S A S S E N

GLOBALIZATION
AND ITS
DISCONTENTS

THE NEW PRESS
NEW YORK

© 1998 by Saskia Sassen. Page ix constitutes an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form, without written permission from the publisher.

ISBN 1-56584-395-9

Published in the United States by The New Press, New York
Distributed by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York

The New Press was established in 1990 as a not-for-profit alternative to the large, commercial publishing houses currently dominating the book publishing industry. The New Press operates in the public interest rather than for private gain, and is committed to publishing, in innovative ways, works of educational, cultural, and community value that might not be considered sufficiently profitable. The New Press's editorial offices are located at the City University of New York.

Printed in the United States of America

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Permissions

ix

Foreword

xi

Preface

xvii

1. Introduction:

Whose City Is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims

xix

SECTION I

PEOPLE ON THE RUN

3

2. The De Facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy

5

3. America's Immigration "Problem"

31

4. Economic Internationalization:

The New Migration in Japan and the United States

55

SECTION II

WOMEN UNDER FIRE

79

5. Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy

81

6. Notes on the Incorporation of Third World Women into Wage Labor Through Immigration and Offshore Production

111

SECTION III

BAD SERVICE

135

7. Service Employment Regimes and the New Inequality

137

8. The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regulations	155
--	-----

SECTION IV

OUT OF SPACE

175

9. Electronic Space and Power	177
-------------------------------	-----

177

10. The State and the Global City: Notes Toward a Conception of Place-Centered Governance	195
--	-----

195

Bibliography

219

Index

243

NOTES ON THE INCORPORATION OF THIRD
WORLD WOMEN INTO WAGE LABOR THROUGH
IMMIGRATION AND OFFSHORE PRODUCTION¹

The focus is on the growth of export production in Third World countries and on the massive increase in Third World immigration to the United States. Both have taken place over the last fifteen years and both contain as one constitutive trait: the incorporation of Third World women into wage employment on a scale that can be seen as representing a new phase in the history of women. The article posits that there is a systemic relation between this globalization and feminization of wage labor.

Immigration and offshore production have evolved into mechanisms for the massive incorporation of Third World women into wage labor. While there is excellent scholarship on both the employment of women in offshore production in less developed countries and the employment of immigrant women in developed countries, these two trends have rarely been seen as related. Yet there are a number of systemic links. Immigration and offshore production are ways of securing a low-wage labor force and of fighting the demands of organized workers in developed countries. They also represent a sort of functional equivalence: that is, productive facilities that cannot be shifted offshore and have to be performed where the demand is, for example, restaurants and hospitals, can use immigrant labor while facilities that can be shifted abroad can use low-wage labor in less developed countries. There is yet another, more basic connection, and one more difficult to describe. The same set of processes that have promoted the location of plants and offices abroad also have contrib-

uted to a large supply of low wage jobs in the United States for which immigrant workers are a desirable labor supply.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND FEMALE MIGRATION

The expansion of export manufacturing and export agriculture in LDCs (less developed countries), both of which are inseparably related with direct foreign investment from the highly industrialized countries (Burbach and Flynn 1979; Tinker and Bramsen 1976; UNIDO 1979; 1980), has mobilized new segments of the population into regional and long distance migrations. The mechanisms inducing migration are quite different in the case of export manufacturing from those in commercial agriculture. In the latter there is a direct displacement of small farmers who are left without, or with severely reduced, means of subsistence (George 1977; NACLA 1978; Burbach and Flynn 1980). In export manufacturing, the fragmentary evidence suggests that the disruption of traditional work structures and the corresponding migration inducements are mediated by a massive recruitment of young women into the new industrial zones (see Sassen 1988). What has made this recruitment effect significant is the locational concentration of export manufacturing in a few countries or regions of countries (UNIDO 1980; OECD 1980; ILO 1982; Lim 1980; Grossman 1981; Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Safa 1981).

Women have a distinct place in each of these developments. Export agriculture has led, in certain areas, to male emigration and to what Elsa Chaney (1980) has called the feminization of small-holder farming; in others, to the proletarianization of women who were once independent producers (Boserup 1970; Nelson 1974; Dauber and Cain 1981; Petritsch 1981). The particular socioeconomic and cultural configurations that contribute to these diverse patterns have received considerable attention in the anthropological and general development literature but space limitations make it impossible to cite the numerous case studies. Overall, the data for the 1950s and 1960s show the prevalence of female rural to urban migration in Latin America and of male rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration in Asia and Africa (Chaney 1984; Nelson 1974; Herrick 1971; Byerlee 1972; Orlandsky and Dubrovsky 1978; Petritsch 1981). This divergent pattern has been explained in part by the lesser role of women in agriculture in Latin America as compared with Africa and Asia (Boserup 1970).

There is disagreement on this aspect. Several recent studies suggest that the contribution of women to agriculture in Latin America has been underestimated because of deficiencies in data gathering (Rechini de Lattes and Wainerman 1979). The absence of opportunities for paid employment in rural areas is probably a key factor inducing the greater female rural-to-urban migration (Orlansky and Dubrovsky 1978).

The large-scale development of export manufacturing in certain regions introduces a new variable into the inquiry. The available evidence strongly documents the overwhelming presence of women among production workers in export manufacturing (Lim 1980; Safa 1981; Gross 1979; Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Multinational Monitor 1982; UNIDO 1980; Pacific Resource Center 1979; Salaff 1981; Wong 1980; Cho 1984; Arrigo 1980). Further, there is a high incidence of manufacturing jobs among women in countries or regions within countries where export manufacturing is a key sector of the economy. In these cases we can see a growing incidence of manufacturing jobs and, frequently, a declining share of service jobs among women, a trend that diverges from what has been typical in highly industrialized countries and from what has been the case in Third World countries over the last two decades. For example, in Taiwan, only 13.2 percent of women held manufacturing jobs (including transport) in 1965; by 1977, this share had risen to thirty-four percent (Arrigo 1980, 26).

It is worth noting, for example, that in a rather developed state such as Singapore, the largest single concentration of women workers in the late 1950s was in services. By 1978, it was in production and related jobs. Though in absolute numbers the service sector has increased, its percentage of all jobs declined from 34.7 percent in 1957 to 14.9 percent in 1978, a function of the quintupling of production jobs, which accounted for almost thirty-six percent of all jobs in 1978 (Wong 1980, 9). This is clearly a result of the expansion of export production. The conjunction of the weight of this type of production and the distinct employment patterns it promotes have generated an additional pattern that contrasts with what is typical in highly developed countries: there is no bimodality in the age composition of women workers. The labor force participation rates of women twenty to twenty-four years old are very high yet there is (as of yet) no resurgence in participation among women aged forty and over (Wong 1980, 8).

This new pattern diverges significantly from what most of the lit-

erature on female migration in the Third World found to be the case in the 1950s, 1960s, and well into the 1970s. The general pattern found was that most women migrants to cities became employed in domestic service and in informal sector activities (Boserup 1970; Schmink 1982; Delaunoy 1975; Shah and Smith 1981; Orlansky and Dubrovsky 1978; Recchini de Lattes and Wainerman 1982; Youssef 1974; Jelin 1979). Further, the evidence points to a displacement of women from manufacturing as the branches typically employing women become modernized, more capital intensive and operate on larger scales of production. (Petritsch 1981; Dauber and Cain 1981; Tinker and Bramsen 1976; Boulding 1980; Parra Sandoval 1975; Institute of Social Studies 1980; Ahmad and Jenkins 1980; Caughman and Thiam 1980). The same pattern is evident in the development of heavy industry: as the latter becomes an increasingly significant component of a given region's or country's manufacturing sector, the share of jobs held by women in this sector declines; for example, the share of women in manufacturing in Brazil declined from 18.6 percent to 11 percent from 1950 to 1970 (Schmink 1982, 6).

The prevalence of women in export manufacturing and the high incidence of manufacturing jobs among women in countries where this type of production is prominent raises a number of questions as to the nature of this development. One element in the explanation is the marked concentration of electronics, garments, textiles, toys, and footwear in export manufacturing—that is, industries that have traditionally employed women. Indeed, the expansion of these industries is beginning to result in changes in the sex composition of rural-to-urban migration streams in areas of Asia and the Caribbean where males used to be prevalent (World Bank Staff 1975; Standing 1975; Arriago 1980; Kelly 1984). For example, Standing (1975) notes a tendency to substitution of male labor within the nonagricultural sector in Jamaica over the last two decades, with the share of women in manufacturing going from twenty-three to twenty-four percent in the early 1950s to thirty-five percent in 1973 (Standing 1975, 1).

These trends point to the need for certain distinctions. First, the distinction between so-called traditional and modern forms of manufacturing shows women to have experienced declines in their share of jobs as an industry modernizes. However, if we consider the developments in the new industrial zones, perhaps a better formulation would be one that distinguishes between labor-intensive and capital-

intensive forms of production. This would allow for the incorporation of both the earlier instances of female employment in certain industries and contemporary cases as diverse as electronics and garments. Further, it overcomes the inadequacy of conceiving of certain industries, notably garments, and certain forms of organization of work, notably sweatshops and industrial homework, as pertaining to the traditional, nonmodern sector, a notion that can easily be read to mean that these forms will become increasingly insignificant as modernization takes place. The growth of labor-intensive manufacturing plants in several Third World countries, as well as the growing use of sweatshops and industrial homework via subcontracting both in the Third World and in highly industrialized countries, all point to the viability of these forms in "modern" contexts. In some instances they would seem to be integral to the functioning of advanced capitalism in the current historical phase (Sassen 1988; see also chap. 7 here). This reading of current developments carries considerable implications for an analysis of women's participation in waged employment. While earlier trends suggested both a tendency toward "modernization" in industry and a corresponding displacement of women from manufacturing, these new trends point to growing participation.

However, this growing participation is posited on certain forms of organization of the work process, forms which generate low-wage jobs where workers' empowerment is often difficult. This raises a question about female migrants as a social category and at this point a second set of distinctions needs to be considered. As Orlansky and Dubrovsky (1978, 6) posit, female migrants are characterized by a double disadvantage, one of sex and one of class. Certainly the little evidence available on remuneration shows women migrants to have the lowest wage expectations (Standing 1975) and actual pay. To this we should add the evidence described earlier on the absence of opportunities for women migrants to be employed in the "modern" sector and their prevalence in domestic service and in informal activities. What emerges clearly is that a large share of women migrants constitute a certain kind of labor. Singer (1974) argues that the employment of women migrants in domestic service in the Third World represents a vehicle for the reproduction of a labor reserve that can be seen as the equivalent of the welfare state in highly industrialized societies. The evidence points to women's exits and re-entries into this type of employment and supports this argument. Domestic

service can be seen as providing a livelihood and means for integration into an urban situation. The movement out of domestic service employment and the magnitude of this movement will depend on the characteristics of the job supply (Marshall 1976). It would seem that in the case of export manufacturing the reserve-status stage becomes unnecessary because of the accelerated growth in labor demand. At the same time, we need more empirical studies examining what the employment options are for the women who are fired or resign from manufacturing jobs. Does domestic service—at least in certain locations—become one of the few alternatives and does it, then, function, as a privatized mechanism for social reproduction and maintenance of a labor reserve?

The category of female migrants consists, thus, of several concrete components ranging from reserve status conditions to full participation in waged employment. The key is the systemic link between the formation of various components of this category in particular historico-geographic configurations and broader processes of social change, such as the development of commercial agriculture or the new export-led industrialization. Migrations do not just happen: they are one outcome or one systemic tendency in a more general dynamic of change. The internal transformation of the category is similarly linked, with broader processes of social change. (Some aspects of this change are developed in the preceding chapter here.)

The migrations of young women into the new industrial zones are linked with basic economic transformations in the world economy that assume concrete forms in particular locations. Some aspects of this articulation are quite evident, such as the massive redeployment of labor-intensive segments of production to Third World locations, which has generated a large demand for workers. Others are much less so and require further empirical and conceptual elaboration. One of these aspects is the question as to a possible systemic link between this accelerated growth of export manufacturing and the new immigration to the United States, much of it consisting of women originating in countries that have been the central sites for export manufacturing. This kind of analytic effort would further develop the category of female migrant and incorporate it into a theoretical space that seeks to capture central features of the current phase of world capitalist development.

The coexistence of high employment growth and high emigration

in the main countries of origin of the new immigration to the United States is theoretically unsettling. The push factors traditionally used to explain domestic or international migration, most importantly lack of economic growth, are insufficient. In fact, according to most of these there should have been a decline, if anything, in the levels of emigration. Export industries tend to be highly labor intensive, this being precisely one of the rationales for locating factories in low-wage countries. The job creation impact is further accentuated by high concentrations of export manufacturing in certain areas, because of the need for access to transportation abroad and the more cost-effective development of necessary infrastructure and servicing.²

Thus the question is, how did a situation of general employment growth contain conditions for promoting emigration? Answering such a question requires a detailed examination of the characteristics of this type of industrial growth, its employment effects, and the cultural-ideological impact on the people it touches. We need to specify the links between the objective conditions represented by rapid, mostly export-led industrialization and emigration, particularly migration to the United States. The evidence clearly documents the existence of industrialization and of immigration into the United States. What is necessary is for conceptual and empirical elaboration of the linkage between these two processes. Because the analysis from which this article is derived is complex, is based on several distinct bodies of data, and at times must rely on inference, there follows a brief description of the main steps involved in the conceptual and empirical elaboration of the links between industrialization and emigration. For each of these steps there is brief discussion of the main findings relevant to an analysis of migration in the major Asian and Caribbean sending countries. These findings represent, in principle, one of several possible outcomes in an examination of the relation between industrialization and migration. (For a full exposition of the analytical framework and a re-elaboration of the available evidence see Sassen 1988.)

First, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the new industrial growth in less developed countries and to place it in the context of the overall economic organization of a country. A good part of the growth in these countries can only be accounted for by the growth in exports. Access to the world market is a must given fairly limited internal markets. The development of a world market for these coun-

tries is intimately linked to a significant growth in direct foreign investment (Tinker and Bramsen 1976; UNIDO 1980; ILO 1960; OECD 1980; 1981; NACLA 1977; see also Pineda-Ofreneo 1982). One distinctive trait about industrial growth in the major new immigrant-sending countries is the weight of export production. While this is a particularly strong trend in the Asian and Caribbean countries, it is also present in Mexico and Colombia, two countries with rather developed industrial economies and large internal markets.

Second, it is necessary to examine the employment effects of these patterns of growth. Export agriculture requires a large supply of low-wage workers at crucial periods of the production cycle. Export-oriented plants are often concentrated for reasons having to do with servicing and transportation, a fact which may tend to accentuate the labor-demand impact. Finally, large agglomerations of firms producing for export generate a range of additional jobs, from the packaging for shipment abroad to the construction and operation of airports and harbors.

Third, it is necessary to examine how these labor needs are met. Both export agriculture and export manufacturing have mobilized large numbers of people into wage labor. The large-scale development of commercial agriculture in Latin America and the Caribbean contributed to the creation of a rural wage labor supply through the displacement of subsistence farmers and small producers. This displacement was also central in promoting rural unemployment and migrations to the cities. On the other hand, because it is highly labor intensive, export manufacturing could have conceivably solved the unemployment problem, particularly among prime aged males. Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that it has drawn new segments of the population into the labor force: mostly young women who under conditions of more gradual industrialization would not have entered the labor force in so massive and sudden a way (Lim 1980; Safa 1981; Gross 1979; Fernandez-Kelly 1983; UNIDO 1980).

Fourth, it is necessary to examine the migration impact, if any, associated with this job creation and labor recruitment. (See UNIDO 1979.) Precisely because of the significant job-creation effect of export-manufacturing and its concentration in a few areas, the extent and impact of the mobilization of young women into the labor force have been considerable. This effect has been further accentuated by the high turnover rates resulting from the employment practices in the

plants and the mental and physical fatigue associated with these jobs. A hypothesis that emerges from these patterns is that in areas where there has been a large development of new industrial zones, the large mobilization of women into the labor force has contributed to the disruption of unwaged work structures in communities of origin: the young men are left without mates and partners, the households are left without a key labor factor (but see also, Salaff on the case of Hong Kong 1981).

One could further posit that the disruption of unwaged work structures resulting from an extremely high incidence of young female emigration has increased the pool of unemployed. It may have stimulated the departure of men and women who may not have planned on doing so. At the same time, the high turnover rates in the new industrial zones and the pronounced preference by employers for young women has contributed to high turnover and growing unemployment among women. Incipient Westernization among zone workers and the disruption of traditional work structures combine to minimize the possibilities of returning to communities of origin. In sum, these developments can be seen as having induced the formation of a pool of migrant workers. We need research on each one of these aspects.

Fifth, it is necessary to examine whether these conditions could promote the emergence of emigration as an option actually felt by individuals, particularly migration to the United States. At this point the fact of a strong foreign presence becomes significant. It is not only the concentration of foreign investment in a few areas. It is also the fact that it dominates the new industrial zones objectively and culturally, thereby creating linkages to the countries where the capital originates. Of interest here is the evidence showing that recent migrants have a higher propensity to move again (Morrison 1967; Land 1969; see also Grasmuck 1982), which would suggest that migrants to the new industrial zones will tend to be available subjectively for yet another move. Also of interest is the evidence pointing to the weight of economic incentives in migration (Brigg 1973 reviews the literature on this subject; Standing 1975; Harris and Todaro 1970; Cohen and Sassen-Koob 1982). The familiar image of America as a land of opportunity can operate as a strong pull factor, possibly strengthened by the aura of dynamic growth in the new industrial zones populated with U.S. firms and producing for export to the U.S. market.

Finally, the strong presence of foreign firms facilitates access to

information and a sense of familiarity with the potential destination, both aspects found to be important in migration studies (World Bank Staff 1975, 22–23). Indeed, distance is found to be a major deterrent in many studies on migration. Contracts and information about the destination location can overcome it partly. Thus, the migration from South Asian and Caribbean Basin countries to the United States over the last two decades can be seen as a case where the powerful deterrent effect of distance is overcome by the various factors discussed here, from the imagery about the land of promise to the objective linkages represented by employment in U.S. firms located in the Third World. In this context, the liberalization of U.S. immigration policy after 1965 can be seen as the other side of the processes that have built the structural and subjective linkages with several Third World countries. In brief, I am positing that the distinctive traits of export manufacturing—notably its locational concentration, labor intensity, and use of young, mostly first-time entrants into waged employment—make it into one of these processes for structural and subjective linking (Sassen 1988; 1984a,b).

THE NEW LABOR DEMAND: CONDITIONS
FOR THE ABSORPTION OF IMMIGRANT WOMEN

The technical transformation of the work process underlying the re-deployment of manufacturing and office jobs to less developed areas has also reshaped the job supply in the developed areas. Further, the spatial dispersion of plants and offices has created a need for an expanded, centralized management and servicing apparatus located mostly in highly developed areas. Both of these processes together with the overall shift to a service economy have directly and indirectly, created a significant increase in the supply of low-wage jobs, particularly female-typed jobs, in highly developed countries.

Today, as in the past, the immigration of women is not simply a function of kinship. There are objective conditions that create a demand for female workers given the sex-typing of jobs and the lower wages paid to women. The shift to services and the technically induced downgrading of many jobs have generated an expansion in types of jobs associated with women workers. Taking some liberty with the term, one could argue that there has been not only a growing female labor force participation, but also a feminization of the job

supply. The feminization of the job supply in conjunction with the growing politicization of native women may well create a growing demand for immigrant women.

Here I will focus on the general increase in the supply of low-wage jobs and on the particular configuration these trends assume in major cities, these being the main recipient areas of the new immigration.

At the national level the general trends shaping the job supply have brought about a greater inequality in the income distribution of workers over the last decade. The shift to a service economy is generally recognized to result in a greater share of low-wage jobs than is the case with an economy dominated by a strong manufacturing sector (Singelmann 1978; Bluestone, Harrison, Gorham 1984). Second, some of the fastest-growing service industries are characterized by a larger than average concentration of low-wage and high-income jobs, which means we can expect an even stronger polarization (Stanback and Noyelle 1982). Third, there has been what I call a downgrading of the manufacturing sector; major new industries, notably in high technology, have large shares of low-wage jobs in production and assembly while several of the older industries have undergone a social reorganization of the work process characterized by a growth in non-union plants and rapid growth of sweatshops and industrial homework (NY State Department of Labor 1979; 1980; 1982a; 1982b; Sassen 1981a; 1981b; Balmori 1983; Morales 1983; Marshall 1983; Benamou 1985). Fourth, the technological transformation of the work process, in part underlying the above trends, has further added to polarization by either upgrading or downgrading a vast array of middle-income jobs: mechanization and computerization have transferred skills to machines and have shifted certain operations from the workplace to the computer room or designer's studio.

This polarization is evident when we compare 1970 and 1980 census data on earnings. The two highest earnings classes increased their total share from thirty-two percent to thirty-seven percent while the two lowest classes increased their share from thirty-two to 38.5 percent. Correspondingly the two middle-earnings classes reduced their share by eleven percent. When we control for sex these trends are even more pronounced in the case of women. Thus, while forty-two percent of all women as compared to 34.4 percent of all men held jobs in the two lowest earnings classes in 1970, this share had increased to fifty-two percent for women and only to 35.7 percent for the men by

1980. Men and women lost about equal shares in the two middle-income strata. And all the gains in the two highest income strata were obtained by men, while women actually lost some representation (see Table 5.1).

All these trends are operating in the major cities that have received most of the immigrants. Indeed, for several reasons I should expect these trends to be even more intense in such cities (Sassen 1984a). First, the locational concentration of major new growth sectors in such cities entails a disproportionate concentration of industries with highly polarized income distributions. The data on earnings classes show that almost half of all workers in the producer services are in the next to lowest earnings class compared with seventeen percent in manufacturing (Stanback et al., 1981). The producer services are the economic core of such cities as New York and Los Angeles, and one of the most dynamic sectors in the economy as a whole.

There also is an indirect creation of low-wage jobs associated with a polarized income distribution. It takes place in the sphere of social reproduction as indicated by consumption. The expansion of the high-income workforce in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms has led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere (Sassen 1981b) high-income gentrification is labor intensive. This contrasts with the typical middle-class suburb, which represents a capital intensive process—tract housing, road and highway construction, dependence on private automobile or commuter trains, heavy reliance on appliances and household equipment of all sorts, large shopping malls with self-service operations. High-income gentrification replaces much of this capital intensity with workers directly and indirectly. Behind the gourmet food stores and speciality boutiques that have replaced the self-service supermarket and department store lies a very different organization of work. Similarly, high-income residences in the city depend to a much larger extent on hired maintenance staff than the middle-class suburban home with its heavy input of family labor and of machinery, epitomized by the ever-running lawn mower.

A different type of organization of work is present both in the retail and in the production phase. High-income gentrification generates a demand for goods and services that are typically not mass-produced

Distribution of Total U.S. Labor Force* Among Earnings Classes, 1970 and 1980

Earning Classes*

Distribution of Total U.S. Labor Force %

1970

1980

	1970		1980	
	Total	Female	Male	Total
1.60 and above	11.3	7.5	9.4	12.9
1.59 to 1.50	20.9	18.6	18.9	24.2
1.29 to 1.00	18.9	21.5	23.1	12.8
.99 to .70	16.9	10.5	14.3	11.7
.69 to .40	22.8	15.5	15.4	25.2
.59 and below	9.2	28.4	19.0	15.3
				38.5
				55.4

Source: Based on U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982. *Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1980*. (Current Population Reports: Series P-60, No. 152); and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, *Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1970*.

Notes: *Civilian workers 14 years and over by total money earnings.
*Earnings classes are derived from the application of 1975 average earnings for each major occupation within each industry group. A basic assumption is that the relative income at 1975 levels for each occupational-industrial subgroup is constant—in this case from 1970 to 1980. I followed the method used by Stauback and Noyelle (1982) in their comparison of 1960 and 1975 earnings for industry-occupational cells. The total earnings distribution obtained is then divided into quintiles. The major industry groups are Manufacturing, Construction, Distributive Services, Retail, Producer Services, Consumer Services, Nonprofit Services (Health and Education), Public Administration. Not included are Agriculture, Fisheries and Mining. The major occupational groups are Professional, Technical, Manager, Office Clerical, Nonoffice Clerical, Sales, Craft Workers, Operatives, Service Workers, Laborers.

or sold through mass outlets. Customized production, small runs, speciality items, fine food dishes are generally produced through labor-intensive methods and sold through small, full-service outlets. Subcontracting part of this production to low-cost operations, be they sweatshops or households, is common.

Second, there is a proliferation of small, low-cost service operations made possible by the massive concentration of people in such cities in addition to a large daily inflow of nonresident workers and of tourists. The ratio between the number of these service operations and the resident population is most probably significantly higher than in an average city or town. Further, the large concentration of people in major cities will tend to create intense inducements to open up such operations as well as intense competition and marginal returns. Under such conditions the cost of labor is crucial and hence the likelihood of a high concentration of low-wage jobs. The overall outcome for the job supply and the range of firms involved in this production and delivery is rather different from that characterizing the large department stores and super markets which tend to buy from mass producers often located at great distances from the retail outlets. Mass production and mass distribution outlets facilitate unionization both in production and in sales. The changing organization of work creates conditions that make immigrants a desirable labor supply.

Third, for these same reasons together with other components of demand, the relative size of the downgraded manufacturing sector will tend to be larger in larger cities (although such a downgraded manufacturing sector may not necessarily be present in *every* urban environment). The expansion of a downgraded manufacturing sector in major cities is the result of several concrete developments besides the more general processes of social and technical transformation cited earlier. First, labor-intensive industries were differentially affected by capital flight from the cities. In the case of New York's garment industry, the largest employer in the city's manufacturing sector, the bigger shops with mechanized branches, specialized shops, and the industry's marketing and design operations have remained in the city. (See Table 5.2) It is worth noting that the garment industry in Los Angeles added 80,000 jobs from 1970 to 1980, a fact often overlooked in analyses of that region as a high-tech center. Further, the changing structure of consumption has also affected the garment industry (Sassen 1984); the greater demand for specialty items and limited-edition

Table 2

Low Wage, Unskilled Jobs, Likely to Employ Immigrants:
Select Service Industries, New York City, 1978^a

	<u>Employment in Select Service Industries</u>			
	Finance, Insurance Real Estate ^b	Business Services ^c	Other Service Industries ^d	Total
Managers, Professionals and Technical	104,460	65,800	140,600	310,860
Services				
Low-Wage Jobs	30,520	52,430	40,900	123,850
Total	36,980	54,950	83,520	175,450
Maintenance				
Low-Wage Jobs	9,150	1,980	19,590	30,720
Total	12,700	15,880	45,510	74,090
Clerical				
Low-Wage Jobs	1,420	5,020	3,450	3,890
Total	201,630	102,140	80,710	384,480
Sales	23,980	10,180	4,490	38,560
Total all Occupations	379,660	248,950	354,830	983,440
Total Low-Wage Jobs ^e (N)	41,090	59,430	63,940	164,460
% of Total	10.8%	23.9%	18.9%	16.7%

Source: Based on New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, *Occupational Employment Statistics: Services, New York State, April-June, 1978, 1980*, and New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, *Occupational Employment Statistics: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, New York State, May-June 1978, 1979*.

Notes: ^aThis is derived from a survey by the New York State Department of Labor (1980, 1979). The sample was drawn from establishments (only those covered by New York State Unemployment Insurance Law) in select service industries. Excluded from the sample were the following service industries: educational services (SIC 82), private households (SIC 88), and the hospitals industry subgroups (SIC 806). Private households and hospitals contain significant numbers of low-wage jobs known to be held by immigrants. Also excluded from the sample were establishments and activities which include significant numbers of low-wage jobs known to employ immigrants, notably, restaurants.

^bSIC codes 61-65.

^cSIC codes 73, 81.

^dSIC codes 70, 72, 75-80, 83, 84, 86, 89.

^eThe jobs identified as low-wage are only a segment of all low-wage jobs. They are those that lack language proficiency requirements, are not part of a well-defined advancement ladder and are not usually part of a highly unionized occupation.

garments has promoted the expansion of small shops and industrial homework in cities because small runs and vicinity to design centers are important locational constraints. A parallel argument can be made for other industries, notably furniture, furs, and footwear. Also immigrant-owned plants have rapidly grown in number in view of easy access to cheap labor and, most importantly, a growing demand for their products in the immigrant communities and in cities at large.

The expansion of the low-wage job supply contains conditions for the absorption of immigrants. It coincides with a pronounced increase in the overall numbers of immigrants, both women and men. Slightly over half of all immigrants legally admitted during the 1960s and 1970s were women. While the share of women in total immigration remained constant, their numbers increased markedly, going from one million in the decade of the 1950s, to over two million in the 1970s (see Tables 3 and 4). This may or may not contradict the common view that most undocumented workers are men insofar as the census would inevitably fail to count those who may have been in the country in the intercensal periods and left before 1980.

Although immigrant women's participation rate in the labor force is generally lower than that of immigrant men and native women, their occupational concentration is far more pronounced. If we consider the five states in which most immigrants are living (New York, California, Texas, Florida, and Illinois) the sharpest difference in occupational distribution is between native and immigrant women in operative jobs; only about eight percent of native compared with twenty to twenty-five percent of immigrant women held operative jobs according to the 1980 census (Bach and Tienda 1984). Nowhere does the occupational distribution of men contain this large a divergence between natives and immigrants. Probably the second largest difference is in clerical jobs: thirty-seven to forty percent of native women held such jobs in 1980, compared with twenty-five to thirty percent of immigrant women.

About half of all immigrant women are concentrated in two occupations, operative and services. There are variations by nationality. Nearly seventy percent of all Hispanics in the five states that accounted for most immigrants held operative, service, or laborer jobs. The figure for Asians who arrived during the 1970s was forty percent (Bach and Tienda 1984, 13-14). The figure for all women workers in the United States holding these types of jobs was twenty-nine percent

Immigrants Admitted by Sex, 1951-1979 (in thousands)

	1951	1961	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1971	1979
Number Admitted	2,515	3,322	370.5	384.7	400.1	394.9	386.2	398.6	462.3	601.4	460.3	3,962	3,962
Men	859	1,488	172.5	179.7	186.3	184.5	180.7	184.9	216.4	286.4	219.5	1,859	1,859
Women	1,014	1,834	197.9	204.9	213.7	210.3	205.5	213.8	245.9	315.1	240.8	2,103	2,103

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Annual Report* (various years).

Table 4

Estimates of Illegal Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by Sex and Period of Entry for
All Foreign-Born Persons and Persons Born in Mexico
(population in thousands)

Period of Entry	All countries		Mexico		All other countries	
	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female
	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female

(U.S. Department of Commerce 1983). The incidence of low-wage jobs among Asians may be growing, pointing to the possibility of a new phase in Asian migration after the earlier phase dominated by middle-class origins and high levels of education. At the other extreme, fewer immigrant women than native women hold professional jobs: the share among the first was nine to ten percent, among the second, fourteen to sixteen percent.

The evidence by industry shows a similarly high concentration in certain sectors. The share of immigrant women in transformative industries (garment, textiles, and food, principally) ranged from twenty-four to thirty-four percent, which was about ten to fifteen percent higher than that of native women. The second largest single concentration was in the five main social services, where from twenty-two to twenty-seven percent of all immigrant women in the five main states can be found. A significantly higher share of native women are in this grouping, ranging from thirty-two to thirty-seven percent. The differences between native and immigrant women are less pronounced in the other industry groups. From twenty-three to thirty percent of immigrant women are in the producer and distributive services, a share slightly lower than that of native women. These services are a key component in the economies of large cities (Stanback and Noyelle 1982; Sassen 1984), suggesting the possibility of an interaction effect between demand and supply factors—that is, a growing demand for low-wage female workers in these expanding sectors alongside a growing supply of immigrant women workers.

These trends tend to be confirmed by localized studies. For example, using the data from the Fordham University Survey of Colombians and Dominicans in New York City, Castro (1982) found that the incidence of blue-collar jobs among Colombian women in New York City was significantly higher than that among native women in the U.S. and than that among women in Colombia. Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982) similarly found a very high incidence of women in blue-collar jobs; of all Hispanics in the survey holding blue-collar jobs, almost forty-one percent were women. This is a high figure compared with that for the United States as a whole, where women are one-sixth of all blue-collar workers (U.S. Department of Commerce 1983) (see Table 5.5).

The expansion of a downgraded manufacturing sector, be it the garment sweatshops in New York city or the high-tech production

Table 5
Occupational Distribution by National Origin and Sex,
Queens (NYC), 1980
(percentages)

	Colombian	Puerto Rican	Other Hispanics	All Hispanics
<u>White Collar, Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	44.4	28.6	41.7	37.0
Female	55.6	71.4	58.3	63.0
<u>Blue Collar, Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	62.5	66.7	55.2	59.2
Female	37.5	33.4	44.8	40.8
<u>Services, Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Male	44.4	25.0	43.5	36.5
Female	55.6	75.0	56.5	63.5

Source: Cohen and Sassen-Koob (1982).

plants in the Los Angeles region, can be seen to generate a demand for low-wage women workers. Immigrant women have clearly emerged as a labor supply for these kinds of jobs. It is well known that the garment, furs, and footwear sweatshops rely heavily on immigrant women. The employment of immigrant women in California's high-tech production and assembly operations has been well documented (Solorzano 1983).

Similarly, the expansion of low-wage service jobs, particularly pronounced in major cities for reasons discussed above, generates a demand for low-wage workers. Also in this case immigrant women can be seen as a desirable labor supply. Even more so than in the case of the downgraded manufacturing sector, many of these jobs have been historically and/or culturally typed as women's jobs.

There is, then, a correspondence between the kinds of jobs that are growing in the economy generally, and in major cities particularly, and the composition of immigration—largely from low-wage countries and with a majority of women. This correspondence does not necessarily entail the actual employment of immigrant women in such jobs. However, the available evidence on immigrant women shows them to be disproportionately concentrated in operative and service jobs and disproportionately located in certain states, notably New York and California, and then especially in major cities.

CONCLUSION

The expanded incorporation of Third World women into wage labor is a global process that assumes specific forms in different locations. These forms and locations may seem unrelated and disparate. I examined two instances of this incorporation and the possibility of a systemic relation between them. The two instances are: 1) the recruitment of women into the new manufacturing and service jobs generated by export-led manufacturing in several Caribbean and Asian countries; for a number of reasons this type of industrialization has drawn mostly young women without much prior wage-laboring experience; 2) the employment of immigrant women in highly industrialized countries, particularly in major cities which have undergone basic economic restructuring; waged employment represents for many immigrant women a first labor market experience, but it is increasingly becoming the continuation of patterns already initiated in countries of origin, among which, possibly, the recruitment of women into export manufacturing in the main immigrant-sending countries.

The study of women migrants has typically focused on their family situation and responsibilities and on how gender is affected by the migration to a highly industrialized country. I sought to add another variable by linking female immigration to basic processes in the current phase of the capitalist world economy. Global processes of economic restructuring are one element in the current phase of Third World women's domestic and international migration. Although many of these women may have become domestic or international migrants as a function of their husbands or families' migration, the more fundamental processes are the ones promoting the formation of a supply of women migrants and a demand for this type of labor. Some of the conditions that have promoted the formation of a supply of migrant women in Third World countries are one expression of the broader process of economic restructuring occurring at the global level. The particular expression in this case is the shift of plants and offices to Third World countries. Similarly with conditions that have promoted a demand for immigrant women in large cities within the United States. The particular expression in this case is the general shift to a service economy, the downgrading of manufacturing—partly to keep it competitive with overseas plants—and the direct and indi-

rect demand for low-wage labor generated by the expansion of management and control functions centered in these large cities and necessary for the regulation of the global economy. All of these trends are contributing toward informalization in various sectors of the economy of large cities in highly developed countries. Further, the feminization of the job supply and the need to secure a politically adequate labor supply combine to create a demand for the type of worker represented by immigrant women. This suggests that gender cannot be considered in isolation of these structural arrangements and that gender alone is insufficient to specify the conditions of migrant women whether within their countries of origin or outside.

NOTES

- 1 This chapter is derived from the author's *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow* (Cambridge University Press, 1988). Neither the larger project nor this chapter could have been carried out without the outstanding research assistance of Soon Kyoung Cho.