

can supplement one another. I assert analytical completeness only for the crisis tendencies and not, of course, for the list of explanatory arguments, which I would like to discuss briefly Below.

<i>Crisis Tendencies</i>	<i>Proposed Explanations</i>
Economic Crisis	a) the state apparatus acts as unconscious, nature like executive organ of the law of value; b) the state apparatus acts as planning agent of united "monopoly capital."
Rationality Crisis	destruction of administrative rationality occurs through c) opposed interests of individual capitalists; d) the production (necessary for continued existence) of structures foreign to the system.
Legitimation Crisis	e) systematic limits; f) unintended side effects (politicization) of administrative interventions in the cultural tradition;
Motivation Crisis	g) erosion of traditions important for continued existence; h) overloading through universalistic value-systems ("new" needs).

Chapter 4. Theorems of Economic Crisis

Even in liberal capitalism the market did not assume the functions of social integration alone. The class relationship could assume the unpolitical form of the relation of wage labor to capital only when the general prerequisites for the continued existence of capitalist production were fulfilled by the state. Only state functions that supplement, but are not subject to, the market mechanism make possible unpolitical domination through private appropriation of socially produced surplus value. Capital formation takes place in a situation of unlimited competition. However, the supporting conditions of this competition—the social foundations of the production of surplus value—cannot themselves be reproduced by capitalist means. They require a state that confronts individual capitalists as a non-capitalist in order to carry through vicariously the "collective-

capitalist will" absent in the competitive sphere. With respect to its non-capitalist means, the state *limits* capitalist production; with respect to its function, it *serves* to maintain it in existence. Only insofar as the state *supplements* the economy can it be *instrumental* for it.¹

This conception has also been applied to the state apparatus in advanced capitalism.² According to this thesis, of course, the state cannot limit itself today to fulfilling general conditions of production. It must also intervene in the reproduction process itself—that is, it must create conditions for utilizing fallow capital, improve the use value of capital, curb externalized costs and consequences of capitalist production, adjust disproportionalities that restrict growth, regulate the overall economic cycle through social, tax, and business policies, etc. But state interventions are nonetheless actions, although instrumental for capital realization, of a non-capitalist who vicariously asserts the collective-capitalist will.

According to *the orthodox position*, the advanced-capitalist state remains an "ideal collective capitalist" (Engels) insofar as it in no way suspends the nature-like development of anarchical commodity production. It limits capitalist production but does not control it like a collective-capitalist planning authority. In contrast to the liberal-capitalist state, the interventionist state is, to be sure, implicated in the process of reproduction. It not only secures the general conditions of production, but itself becomes a kind of executive organ of the law of value. Government activity does not suspend the spontaneous working of the law of value but is rather subject to it. Hence, in the long run, administrative activity must even intensify economic crisis.³ Even the class struggle, which can lead to legal regulations in the interest of wage labor (as Marx showed in his example of contemporary legislation for the protection of labor), remains a "moment of the movement of capital."⁴

In this view, the substitution of governmental functions for market functions does not in fact alter the unconscious character of the overall economic process, as can be seen in the strict limitations imposed on state manipulation. The state cannot intervene substantially in the property structure without setting off an "investment strike"; nor can it avoid, in the long run, cyclical disturbances of the accumulation process, that is, endogenously produced stagna-

lion tendencies; nor can it even control crisis substitutes, that is, chronic deficits in the public budget and inflation.

The *general objection* to this view is that the question, whether—and if so how—the class structure has changed, can be answered only empirically. It cannot be determined in advance at the analytic level. Absolutizing the conceptual strategy of value theory deprives the economic theory of crisis of a possible empirical test. Even Marx could only ground his claim to have grasped the crisis-ridden pattern of development of the social system as a whole (including political disputes and the functions of the state apparatus) by means of an economic analysis of the laws of motion of capital formation, by pointing out that the exercise of class domination had assumed the unpolitical form of the exchange of wage labor for capital. However, this improbable constellation has changed, and socially integrative functions of maintaining legitimacy can no longer be fulfilled through system-integrative functions of the market and decrepit remains of pre-capitalist traditions. They must again pass over into the political system. Government activity now pursues the declared goal of steering the system so as to avoid crises, and, consequently, the class relationship has lost its unpolitical form. For these reasons, class structure *must* be maintained in struggles over the administratively mediated distribution of increases in the social product. Thus the class structure can now be directly affected by political disputes as well. Under these conditions, economic processes can no longer be conceived immanently as movements of a self-regulating economic system. The law of value can express the double character of exchange processes (as steering processes and exploitation) only when conditions, approximately met in liberal capitalism, allow class domination to be exercised unpolitically. How, and to what extent, power is exercised and exploitation secured through economic processes depends today on concrete power constellations that are no longer *predetermined* by an autonomously effective mechanism of the labor market. Today the state has to fulfill functions that can be neither explained with reference to prerequisites of the continued existence of the mode of production, nor derived from the immanent movement of capital. This movement is no longer realized through a market mechanism that can be comprehended in the theory of

value, but is a result of the still effective economic driving forces and a political countercontrol in which a *displacement of the relations of production* finds expression.

In order to be able to grasp this displacement more precisely, it is meaningful to distinguish four categories of governmental activity as it relates to imperatives of the economic system.

- In order to *constitute* the mode of production and to maintain it, the prerequisites of continued existence must be realized. The state secures the system of civil law with the core institutions of property and of freedom of contract; it protects the market system from self-destructive side effects (for example, through introduction of the normal working day, anti-trust legislation, and stabilization of the currency); it fulfills the prerequisites of production in the economy as a whole (such as education, transportation, and communication); it promotes the capability of the domestic economy for international competition (for example, through trade and tariff policies); and it reproduces itself through military preservation of national integrity abroad and paramilitary suppression of enemies of the system at home.
- The accumulation process of capital requires adaptation of the legal system to new forms of business organization, competition, financing, etc. (for example, through creating new legal arrangements in banking and business law and manipulating the tax system). In doing so the state limits itself to *market-completing* adaptations to a process whose dynamic it does not influence. Thus the social principle of organization, as well as the class structure, remain unaffected.
- These actions are to be distinguished from the *market-replacing* actions of the state. The latter do not simply take into account legally economic states of affairs that have arisen independently but, *in reaction to the weaknesses of the economic driving forces*, make possible the continuance of an accumulation process no longer left to its own dynamic. Such actions thereby create new economic states of affairs, whether through creating and improving chances

for investment (governmental demand for unproductive commodities) or through altered forms of production of surplus value (governmental organization of scientific-technical progress, occupational qualification of labor forces, etc.). In both cases, the principle of organization is affected, as can be seen in the rise of a public sector foreign to the system.

—Finally, the state *compensates* for dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process that have elicited *politically effective reactions* on the part of individual capital groupings, organized labor, or other organized groups. Thus, on the one hand, the state takes charge of the externalized consequences of private enterprise (for example, ecological damage) or it secures the survival capacity of endangered sectors (for example, mining and agriculture) through structural policy measures. On the other hand, it enacts regulations and interventions demanded by unions and reformist parties with the aim of improving the social situation of the dependent workers. (Historically such interventions begin with the right of labor to organize and extend through improvements in wages, working conditions, and social welfare to educational, health, and transportation policies.) The beginnings of the state expenditures classified today as "social expenses" and "social consumption"⁵ can be traced back, in large part, to politically achieved demands of organized labor.⁸

Governmental activity in the last two categories is typical of organized capitalism. The proposed analytical distinction is difficult to draw empirically in many cases because the advanced-capitalist state manages the tasks in the first two categories as well. And it does so to a considerably greater extent and, naturally, with the same techniques employed in managing tasks that have recently accrued to it. Thus, monetary policy is today an essential part of a state's global planning, although the securing of international commerce in currency and capital, and the reaction to it, belong to the actions that constitute the mode of production. The criteria of demarcation are not the extent and the technique of governmental

activity, but its functions. The liberal-capitalist state takes action, if our model is correct, in order to secure the prerequisites for the continued existence of the mode of production and—as a supplement to the market mechanism—to satisfy the needs of the accumulation process controlled by the market. To be sure, the advanced-capitalist state also does precisely this, to an even greater extent and with more efficient techniques. But it can fulfill these tasks only, and only insofar as, it simultaneously fills functional gaps in the market, intervenes in the process of accumulation, and compensates for its politically intolerable consequences. In actions of this kind, reaction formations to the changes in class structure—that is, *other* constellations of power—are realized. As a consequence, the principle of societal organization, which rests ultimately on the institutionalization of an unorganized labor market, is also affected.

Three developments, above all, are characteristic of the change in the relations of production in advanced capitalism: (a) an altered form of the production of surplus value, which affects the principle of societal organization; (b) a quasi-political wage structure, which expresses a class compromise; and (c) the growing need for legitimation of the political system, which brings into play demands oriented to use values (demands that in certain circumstances are in competition with the needs of capital realization).

Re: a) The rise of a public sector is, among other things, an indication that the state looks after the production of collective commodities, which it makes available at a saving for private use in the form of the material and immaterial infrastructure.⁷ In performing this function, the state improves the use value of individual capitals, for collective commodities serve to heighten the productivity of labor. In terms of the theory of value, this fact is expressed in the cheapening of constant capital and a rise in the rate of surplus value.⁸ Governmental organization of the educational system, which raises the productivity of human labor through qualification, has the same effect.⁹ These governmental functions alter the form of production of surplus value.¹⁰ After the raising of *absolute* surplus value through physical force, lengthening the working day, recruiting underpaid labor forces (women, children),

etc. had run up against natural boundaries (even in liberal capitalism, as the introduction of a normal working day shows), the raising of *relative* surplus value first took the form of utilizing *existing or externally generated* inventions and information for the development of the technical and human forces of production. Only with governmental organization of scientific-technical progress and a systematically managed expansion of the system of continuing education does the production of information, technologies, organizations, and qualifications that heighten productivity become a component of the production process itself. Reflexive labor, that is, labor applied to itself with the aim of increasing the productivity of labor, could be regarded at first as a collective natural commodity. Today it is internalized in the economic cycle. For the state (or private enterprise) now expends capital to purchase the *indirectly productive* labor power of scientists, engineers, teachers, etc. and to transform the products of their labor into cost-cutting commodities of the category referred to.¹¹ If one holds fast to a dogmatic conceptual strategy and conceives of reflexive labor as unproductive labor (in the Marxian sense), the specific function of this labor for the realization process is overlooked. Reflexive labor is not productive in the sense of the direct production of surplus value. But it is also not unproductive; for then it would have no net effect on the production of surplus value. Marx saw precisely "that, even with a given magnitude of functioning capital, the labor power, the science, and the land (by which are to be understood, economically, all conditions of labor furnished by Nature independently of man), embodied in it, form *elastic powers* of capital, allowing it, within certain limits, a field of action independent of its own magnitude." ^u But he was able to treat "science," like "land," as a free collective commodity without having to consider the reflexive labor expended in its production as a peculiar factor of production. The variable capital that is paid out as income for reflexive labor is indirectly productively invested, as it systematically alters conditions under which surplus value can be appropriated from productive labor. Thus, it indirectly contributes to production of more surplus value. This reflection shows, firstly, that the classical fundamental categories of the theory of value are insufficient for the analysis of governmental policy in education,

technology, and science. It also shows that it is an empirical question whether the new form of production of surplus value can compensate for the tendential fall in the rate of profit, that is, whether it can work against economic crisis.¹³

Re: *b*) In the monopolistic sector, by means of a coalition between business associations and unions, the price of the commodity known as labor power is quasi-politically negotiated. In these "labor markets" the mechanism of competition is replaced by the compromises between organizations to which the state has delegated legitimate power. This erosion of the mechanism of the labor market has, of course, economic consequences (such as shifting the increase in factor-costs to the price of the product). But these are really consequences of the suspension of an unpolitical class relationship. Through the system of "political" wages, negotiated on the basis of wage scales, it has been possible—above all in the capital- and growth-intensive sectors of the economy—to mitigate the opposition between wage labor and capital and to bring about a partial class compromise. From a Marxian point of view, it is also possible, in principle, to analyze price setting in organized markets, within the framework of the theory of value—a good can be sold above its value. But here the price of the commodity labor power is the unit of measure in the value calculation. Quasi-political price setting in the labor market cannot, therefore, be treated in an analogous way. For it determines, in turn, through the average wage level, the quantity of value against which deviations of labor power sold above value must be measured. We know of no standard for the costs of the reproduction of labor power that is independent of cultural norms; nor does Marx start from such a standard.¹⁵ Of course, one can again hold fast to a dogmatic conceptual strategy and equate by definition the average wage with the costs of the reproduction of labor power. But in so doing one prejudices at the analytical level the (no doubt) empirically substantial question of whether the class struggle, organized politically and through unionization, has perhaps had a stabilizing effect only because it has been successful in an economic sense and has visibly altered the rate of exploitation to the advantage of the best organized parts of the working class.

Re: c) Finally, the relations of production are altered because the replacement of exchange relations by administrative power is linked to a condition in which legitimate power must be available for administrative planning. Functions that have accrued to the state apparatus in advanced capitalism and extension of administratively processed social matters increase the need for legitimation. There is no question here of some mysterious magnitude; the need for legitimation arises from evident functional conditions of an administrative system that steps into functional gaps in the market. Considering the context of bourgeois revolutions, it is understandable that liberal capitalism was constituted in the form of bourgeois democracy. Because it was, the growing need for legitimation must be satisfied by means of political democracy (based on universal suffrage). Once again, a dogmatic conceptual strategy, which admits bourgeois democracy only as a superstructure of capitalist class domination, misses the specific problem. To the extent that *the* state no longer represents merely the superstructure of an unpolitical class relationship, the formally democratic means for procuring legitimation prove to be peculiarly restrictive. That is, in these circumstances, the administrative system is forced to meet use value-oriented demands with available means of control. *As* long as the capitalist economic system begot of itself a viable ideology, a comparable legitimation problem (which sets restrictive conditions to the solution of the problem of capital realization) could not arise.

New legitimation problems cannot be subsumed under a too generalized imperative of self-maintenance, as they cannot be solved without regard to the satisfaction of legitimate needs—that is, to the distribution of use values—while the interests of capital realization prohibit precisely this consideration. Legitimation problems cannot be reduced to problems of capital realization. Because a class compromise has been made the foundation of reproduction, the state apparatus *must* fulfill its tasks in the economic system under the limiting condition that mass loyalty be simultaneously secured within the framework of a formal democracy and in accord with ruling universalistic value systems. These pressures of legitimation can be mitigated only through structures of a depoliticized public realm. A structurally secured civil privatism becomes necessary for continued existence because there are no functional

equivalents for it. Hence, there arises a new level of susceptibility to crisis that cannot be grasped from the orthodox position.

A *revisionist version* is contained in the economic crisis theory of leading economists of the German Democratic Republic. The theory of state-monopolistic capitalism¹⁶ is not subject to the aforementioned objections because it proceeds from the assumption that the unplanned, nature-like development of the capitalist process of reproduction has been replaced by state-monopolistic planning; the spontaneous working of economic laws is replaced by centralized steering of the production apparatus. The high degree to which production is socialized brings about a convergence between individual interests of large corporations and the collective-capitalist interest in maintaining the system. This convergence develops furthermore as the continued existence of the system is threatened externally by competing post-capitalist societies and internally by forces that transcend the system. Thus, a collective-capitalist interest takes shape, which the united monopolies consciously pursue with the aid of the state apparatus. To this new stage of consciousness there supposedly corresponds a capitalist planning that guarantees the production of surplus value in such a way that it partially frees investment decisions from the market mechanism. The alleged union of the power of the monopolies with that of the state apparatus is described in terms of an agency theory. The societal control center is allegedly subordinated to the collective-capitalist interest in the sense that a (in itself progressive) form of organization for controlling production remains tied to the goal of capital realization. The open repoliticizing of the class relationship, on the other hand, renders state-monopolistic rule susceptible to political pressures that democratic forces (in the form of a popular front) can exercise. The theory of state-monopolistic capitalism also begins with the principle that the fundamental contradiction of capitalist production is not averted but is sharpened in the new form of organization. However, the economic crisis now takes on a directly political form.

Two objections have been made to this theory.¹⁷ First, the assumption that the state apparatus can actively plan, put forward, and carry through a central economic strategy, in whoever's interest, cannot be empirically verified. The theory of state-monop-

olistic capitalism fails to appreciate (as do Western technocratic theories) the limits of administrative planning in advanced capitalism. The form of motion of planning bureaucracies is reactive avoidance of crisis. The various bureaucracies are, moreover, incompletely coordinated and, because of their deficient capacity for perceiving and planning, dependent on the influence of their clients.¹⁸ It is precisely this deficient rationality of governmental administration that guarantees the success of organized special interests. Contradictions among the interests of individual capitalists, between individual interests and the collective-capitalist interest, and finally, between interests specific to the system and generalizable interests, are displaced into the state apparatus.

Second, the assumption that the state acts as the agent of the united monopolists cannot be supported empirically. The theory of state-monopolistic capitalism overestimates (in the same way as Western elitist theories do) the significance of personal contacts and direct regulation of transactions. Investigations into the recruitment, composition, and interaction of various power elites cannot adequately explain the functional connections between economic and administrative systems.¹⁹ The systems-theoretic model developed by Offe and his collaborators seems to me more suitable. It distinguishes between the structure of an administrative system, on the one hand, and the processes of conflict resolution and consensus formation, of decision and implementation, on the other. In doing so, Offe conceives "structure" as a set of sedimented selection rules that prejudice what is recognized as a matter requiring regulation, what is thematized, what—with what priority and by which means—is actually publicly regulated, etc. The relatively stable administrative patterns of helping and hindering are objectively functional for capital realization, that is, they are independent of the professed intentions of the administration. They can be explained with the aid of selection rules that predetermine the consideration or suppression of problems, themes, arguments, and interests.⁸⁰

Chapter 5. Theorems of Rationality Crisis

The mode of functioning of the advanced-capitalist state can be adequately conceived neither through the model of an unconsciously acting executive organ of economic laws that are still spontaneously effective, nor through the model of an agent of the united monopoly capitalists that acts according to plan. Involved as it is in the production process, the state has altered the determinants of the realization process itself. On the basis of a class compromise, the administrative system gains a limited planning capacity, which can be used, within the framework of a formally democratic procurement of legitimation, for purposes of reactive crisis avoidance. In this situation, the collective-capitalist interest in system maintenance is in competition, on the one hand, with the contradictory interests of the individual capital groupings and, on the other, with the generalizable interests, oriented to use values, of various population groups. The crisis cycle, distributed over time and defused of its social consequences, is replaced by inflation and a permanent crisis in public finances. Whether this replacement phenomenon indicates a successful mastery of economic crisis or only its temporary displacement into the political system is an empirical question. In the final analysis, the answer depends on whether capital expended so as to be only indirectly productive does attain an increase in the productivity of labor, and on whether the distribution of the growth in productivity in line with functional requirements of the system is sufficient to guarantee mass loyalty and, simultaneously, keep the accumulation process moving.

The government budget is burdened with the common costs of a more-and-more-socialized production. It bears the costs of imperialistic market strategies and the costs of demand for unproductive commodities (armaments and space travel). It bears the infrastructural costs directly related to production (transportation and communication systems, scientific-technical progress, vocational training). It bears the costs of social consumption indirectly related to production (housing construction, transportation, health care, leisure, education, social security). It bears the costs of social welfare, especially unemployment. And, finally, it bears the externalized costs of environmental strain arising from private produc-

tion. In the end, these expenditures have to be financed through taxes. The state apparatus is, therefore, faced simultaneously with two tasks. On the one hand, it is supposed to raise the requisite amount of taxes by skimming off profits and income and to use the available taxes so rationally that crisis-ridden disturbances of growth can be avoided. On the other hand, the selective raising of taxes, the discernible pattern of priorities in their use, and the administrative performances themselves must be so constituted that the need for legitimation can be satisfied as it arises. If the state fails in the former task, there is a deficit in administrative rationality. If it fails in the latter task, a deficit in legitimation results. (See Chapter 6, below.)

A rationality deficit can arise because contradictory steering imperatives, which cause the unplanned, nature-like development of an anarchistic commodity production and its crisis-ridden growth, are then operative within the administrative system. Evidence for this modified-anarchy thesis has been supplied by Hirsch, among others, using examples from the administration of science.¹ The thesis has a certain descriptive value, for it is possible to show that the authorities, with little informational and planning capacity and insufficient coordination among themselves, are dependent on the flow of information from their clients. They are thus unable to preserve the distance from them necessary for independent decisions. Individual sectors of the economy can, as it were, privatize parts of the public administration, thus displacing the competition between individual social interests into the state apparatus. The crisis theorem is based now on the reflection that growing socialization of production still adjusted to private ends brings with it unfulfillable—because paradoxical—demands on the state apparatus. On the one hand, the state is supposed to act as a collective capitalist. On the other hand, competing individual capitals cannot form or carry through a collective will as long as freedom of investment is not eliminated. Thus arise the mutually contradictory imperatives of expanding the planning capacity of the state with the aim of a collective-capitalist planning and, yet, blocking precisely this expansion, which would threaten the continued existence of capitalism. Thus the state apparatus vacillates between expected intervention and forced renunciation of

intervention, between becoming independent of its clients in a way that threatens the system and subordinating itself to their particular interests. Rationality deficits are the unavoidable result of a snare of relations into which the advanced-capitalist state fumbles and in which its contradictory activities must become more and more muddled.²

I shall mention three of the objections that have been made to this argument.

a) Since the fundamental contradiction of capitalism is displaced from the economic into the administrative system, the terms in which it can possibly be resolved also change. In the economic system, contradictions are expressed directly in relations between quantities of values and indirectly in the social consequences of capital loss (bankruptcy) and deprivation of the means of subsistence (unemployment). In the administrative system, contradictions are expressed in irrational decisions and in the social consequences of administrative failure, that is, in disorganization of areas of life. Bankruptcy and unemployment mark unambiguously recognizable thresholds of risk for the non-fulfillment of functions. The disorganization of areas of life moves, in contrasts, along a continuum. And it is difficult to say where the thresholds of tolerance lie and to what extent the perception of what is still tolerated—and of what is already experienced as intolerable—can be adapted to an increasingly disorganized environment.

b) Even more important is the fact that in the economic system, the rules of strategic action, like the dimensions of gain and loss, are set. The medium of exchange does not permit conflict resolution by way of a constant, mutual adaptation of action orientations; the controlling principle of maximization of gain is not disposable. The administrative system, in contrast, enters into compromise-oriented negotiations with the sectors of society on which it depends. "Bargaining" is applied under pressure to the reciprocal adaptation of structures of expectation and value systems. The reactive manner in which avoidance strategies operate expresses the limited maneuvering capability of the state apparatus. The state *can* make visible to its negotiating partners how the generalizable interests of the population differ from organized individual interests as well as from the collective-capitalist interest in the continued existence of the

system. However, the use of legitimate power requires *taking into consideration a legitimation gradient* between *different* domains of interest; but such a gradient cannot exist within an exchange system legitimated as a whole.

c) Finally, crisis tendencies cannot assert themselves through collective administrative action unconsciously in the same way as they can through the particularized behavior of individual market participants. That is, for the medium of the exercise of power, the distinction between unplanned, nature-like processes and planning is no longer sharp, as it is for strategic games in which the intentional following of rules can have unintended side effects. Instead, *crisis avoidance is thematized* as the goal of action. For the character of decision processes lying in the twilight zone between unplanned, nature-like development and development according to plan, the distinctive mode of justification is that which the administrative system and its negotiating partners follow. Demanded or desired administrative action is justified in each case by a systemic rationality projected from action perspectives,³ that is, by functional control performances for fictive goal functions that—since none of the participants runs the system—no one can fulfill. Political compromises do not form, as do the decisions of economic choice in the market-controlled system, a nature-like context woven from purposive-rational individual actions. Thus there exists no *logically necessary* incompatibility between interests in global capitalist planning and freedom of investment, need for planning and renunciation of intervention, and independence of the state apparatus and dependency on individual interests. The possibility that the administrative system might open a compromise path between competing claims that would allow a sufficient amount of organizational rationality, cannot be excluded from the start on logical grounds.

Taking these objections into account, one can, of course, attempt to construct a second stage of unplanned, nature-like development for the administrative system. The different variants of bureaucratically independent capitalist planning⁴ are also distinguishable from the type of democratic planning coupled to democratic will-formation in the quantity of unanticipated problems that result from each

and that must be worked out, case by case, in an *ad hoc* manner. These problems can become so concentrated that in the end even recourse to the resource of time no longer offers a way out. The crisis theorem could be reformulated as follows: this form of *secondary unconsciousness* builds a façade behind which the state apparatus must withdraw in order to minimize the costs that arise from compensations to dispossessed victims of the accumulation process. Even today capitalist growth takes place by way of concentration of enterprises and by centralization and shifting of capital ownership,⁵ which make the expropriation and redistribution of capital a normal occurrence. Precisely this normality becomes problematic to the extent that the state lays claim to the role of a responsible planning authority that those affected can burden with their losses and that they can confront with demands for compensation and prevention. The effectiveness of this mechanism is reflected, for example, in structural policy. To the extent that economic resources are not sufficient to sustain fully capitalist victims of capitalist growth, there arises the dilemma of either immunizing the state against such claims or crippling the process of growth. The first alternative leads to a new aporia. In order to guarantee the continuation of the accumulation process, the state must assume ever clearer planning functions. But these must not be recognizable as administrative performances for which the state is accountable, because it would otherwise be liable for compensations, which retard accumulation. In this form, the theorem of the rationality crisis remains, to be sure, dependent on empirical assumptions about economic bottlenecks in capitalist growth.

One must also take into account that an exponentially rising need for planning creates bottlenecks not specific to the system. Long-term planning in complex societies confronts every administrative system—not only the advanced-capitalist—with structural difficulties that F. W. Scharpf has subjected to clear-sighted analysis in several works.⁸ I am inclined to assume that not *every* incrementalism—that is, every type of planning limited to middle-range horizons and sensitive to external impulses—*eo ipso* reflects the rationality deficit of an overloaded administration. One can, in any event, adduce logical grounds for the limits to the rationality of

an avoidance activity that has to investigate the *compromisibility* of interests without being able beforehand to bring up for public discussion the generalizability of these interests. The advanced-capitalist limitation on rationality consists in the structural inadmissibility of that type of planning which, following H. Funke, could be designated as democratic incrementalism.⁷

Another argument for the unavoidable development of rationality deficits in administrative planning is from an original reflection of C. Offe. Offe designates three tendencies that provide evidence that propagation of elements hostile to the system is systematically inevitable. They concern the spread of patterns of orientation that make it difficult to sustain behavioral control conforming to the system.*

First, the boundary conditions under which strategic business decisions are made are altered in the organized markets of the public and monopoly sectors. Large corporations have such a broad temporal and material range of alternatives in which to arrive at their decisions that an investment *policy* (which requires additional premises for its foundation) takes the place of rational choice determined by external data. Higher management must therefore adopt political patterns of evaluation and decision, instead of action *strategies fixed a priori*.

Moreover, in connection with the functions of the public sector, there arise occupational spheres in which abstract labor is increasingly replaced by concrete labor, that *is*, labor oriented to use values. This is true even of those employed in the bureaucracies entrusted with planning tasks. It is true of public service sectors (transportation, health care, housing, leisure). It is true of the scientific and educational systems, and of research and technological development. *Radical professionalism* is an indication that professional work in such areas can be detached from privatistic career patterns and market mechanisms and can be oriented to concrete goals.

Finally, the inactive proportion of the population, which does not reproduce itself through the labor market, grows *vis-à-vis* the active population, which receives income. The former includes schoolchildren and students, the unemployed, those living on annuities, welfare recipients, non-professionalized housewives, the sick, and

the criminal. These groups too may develop orientation patterns like those that arise in contexts of concrete labor.

These "foreign bodies" in the capitalist employment system proliferate to the extent that production is socialized; and they have a restrictive effect on administrative planning. Taking into consideration the investment freedom of private enterprise, capitalist planning makes use of global steering, which influences its addressees through altering external facts. The parameters it can alter in conformity with the system—namely, interest rates, taxes, subsidies, business commissions, secondary distribution of income, etc.—are as a rule monetary values. It is precisely these values that lose their steering effect as abstract orientations to exchange value become weaker. The problematic consequences of a socialization of production, speeded up through state intervention, therefore destroy the conditions for application of important instruments of state intervention itself. This argument does not, of course, have the force of a logical contradiction.

The three aforementioned tendencies support the view that the process of accumulation takes place through media other than that of exchange. However, the political quality the once-market-rational decisions now take on, the politicization of certain occupational orientations, and the socialization—unconnected with the market—of those who do not receive income, do not, *per se*, have to narrow the maneuvering space of the administration. Even participation can, with certain precautions, be more functional for the carrying through of administrative planning than behavioral reactions controlled by external stimuli.⁹ To the extent that these developments actually lead to crisis-related bottlenecks, it is a question, not of deficits in planning rationality, but of consequences of unadapted motivational situations. The administration is not able to motivate its partners to cooperate. Roughly speaking, advanced capitalism need not suffer damages when the means of control through external stimulation fail in certain behavioral spheres in which they previously functioned. But it does fall into difficulties when the administrative system can no longer take on planning functions important for continued existence because control, by whatever means, over planning-related areas of behavior, has in general slipped from its grasp. But this prediction cannot be

inferred from a withering of rationality in administration but, at best, from a withering of motivations necessary to the system. See Chapter 7 below.)

Chapter 6'. Theorems of Legitimation Crisis

The concept of the rationality crisis is modeled after that of the economic crisis. According to that concept, contradictory steering imperatives assert themselves through the purposive-rational actions not of market-participants but of members of the administration; they manifest themselves in contradictions that directly threaten system integration and thus endanger social integration.

We have seen that an economic system crisis can be counted on only as long as political disputes (class struggles) maintain and do not change institutional boundary conditions of capitalist production (for example, the Chartist movement and introduction of the normal working day). To the extent that the class relationship has itself been repoliticized and the state has taken over market-replacing as well as market-supplementing tasks (and made possible a "more elastic" form of production of surplus value), class domination can no longer take the anonymous form of the law of value. Instead, it now depends on factual constellations of power whether, and how, production of surplus value can be guaranteed through the public sector, and how the terms of the class compromise look. With this development, crisis tendencies shift, of course, from the economic into the administrative system. Indeed, the self-containment of exchange processes, mediated only through the market, is destroyed. But after the liberal-capitalist spell of commodity production is broken (and all participants have become, more or less, good practitioners of value theory), the unplanned, nature-like development of economic processes can re-establish itself, at least in secondary form, in the political system. The state must preserve for itself a residue of unconsciousness in order that there accrue to it from its planning functions no responsibilities that it cannot honor without overdrawing its accounts. Thus, economic crisis

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tendencies continue on the plateau of raising, and expending in a purposive-rational way, the requisite fiscal means.

But, if we do not wish to fall back on theorems of economic crisis, governmental activity can find a *necessary* limit only in available legitimations. As long as motivations remain tied to norms requiring justification, the introduction of legitimate power into the reproduction process means that the "fundamental contradiction" can break out in a questioning, rich in practical consequences, of the norms that still underlie administrative action. And such questioning will break out if the corresponding themes, problems, and arguments are not spared through sufficiently sedimented pre-determinations. Because the economic crisis has been intercepted and transformed into a systematic overloading of the public budget, it has put off the mantle of a natural fate of society. If governmental crisis management fails, it lags behind programmatic demands *that it has placed on itself*. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimation. Thus, the scope for action contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to be drastically expanded.

Underlying this crisis theorem is the general reflection that a social identity determined indirectly, through the capability of securing-system integration, is constantly vulnerable on the basis of class structures. For the problematic consequences of the processed and transformed fundamental contradiction of social production for non-generalizable interests are concentrated, as O'Connor tries to show, in the focal region of the stratified raising and particularistic employment of the scarce quantities of taxes that a policy of crisis avoidance exhausts and overdraws. On the one hand, administrative and fiscal filtering of economically conditioned crisis tendencies makes the fronts of repeatedly fragmented class oppositions less comprehensible. The class compromise weakens the organizational capacity of the latently continuing classes. On the other hand, scattered secondary conflicts also become more palpable, because they do not appear as objective systemic crises, but directly provoke questions of legitimation. This explains the functional necessity of making the administrative system, as far as possible, independent of the legitimating system.

This end is served by the separation of instrumental functions of the administration from expressive symbols that release an unspecific readiness to follow. Familiar strategies of this kind are the personalization of substantive issues, the symbolic use of hearings, expert judgments, juridical incantations, and also the advertising techniques (copied from oligopolistic competition) that at once confirm and exploit existing structures of prejudice and that garnish certain contents positively, others negatively, through appeals to feeling, stimulation of unconscious motives,¹ etc. The public realm [*Öffentlichkeit*], set up for effective legitimation, has above all the function of directing attention to topical areas—that is, of pushing *other* themes, problems, and arguments below the threshold of attention and, thereby, of withholding them from opinion-formation. The political system takes over tasks of ideology planning (Luhmann). In so doing, maneuvering room is, to be sure, narrowly limited, for the cultural system is peculiarly resistant to administrative control. *There is no administrative production of meaning.* Commercial production and administrative planning of symbols exhausts the normative force of counterfactual validity claims. The procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen through.

Cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable, conditions of reproduction. They remain "living" as long as they take shape in an unplanned, nature-like manner, or are shaped with hermeneutic consciousness. (Whereby hermeneutics, as the scholarly interpretation and application of tradition, has the peculiarity of breaking down the nature-like character of tradition as it is handed on and, nevertheless, of retaining it at a reflective level.)* The critical appropriation of tradition destroys this nature-like character in discourse. (Whereby the peculiarity of critique consists in its double function³: to dissolve analytically, or in a critique of ideology, validity claims that cannot be discursively redeemed; but, at the same time, to release the semantic potentials of the tradition.) * To this extent, critique is no less a form of appropriating tradition than hermeneutics. In both cases appropriated cultural contents retain their imperative force, that is, they guarantee the continuity of a history through which individuals and groups can identify with themselves and with one another. A cultural tradition loses

precisely this force as soon as it is objectivistically prepared and strategically employed. In both cases conditions for the reproduction of cultural traditions are damaged, and the tradition is undermined. This can be seen in the museum-effect of a hedonistic historicism, as well as in the wear and tear that results from the exploitation of cultural contents for administrative or market purposes. Apparently, traditions can retain legitimizing force only as long as they are not torn out of interpretive systems that guarantee continuity and identity.

The structural dissimilarity between areas of administrative action and areas of cultural tradition constitutes, then, a systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation. Of course, a crisis argument can be constructed from this only in connection with the broader point that the expansion of state activity produces the side effect of a disproportionate increase in the need for legitimation. I consider a disproportionate increase probable, not only because the expansion of administratively processed matters makes necessary mass loyalty for new functions of state activity, but because the boundaries of the political system *vis-à-vis* the cultural system shift as a result of this expansion. In this situation, cultural affairs that were taken for granted, and that were previously boundary conditions for the political system, fall into the administrative planning area. Thus, traditions withheld from the public problematic, and all the more from practical discourses, are thematized. An example of such direct administrative processing of cultural tradition is educational planning, especially curriculum planning. Whereas school administrations formerly merely had to codify a canon that had taken shape in an unplanned, nature-like manner, present curriculum *planning* is based on the premise that traditional patterns could as well be otherwise. Administrative planning produces a universal pressure for legitimation in a sphere that was once distinguished precisely for its power of self-legitimation.⁵ Other examples of the indirect perturbation of matters taken culturally for granted can be found in regional and city planning (private ownership of land), in planning the health system ("classless hospital"), and, finally, in family planning and marriage laws (which relax sexual taboos and lower the thresholds of emancipation). The end effect is a consciousness

of the contingency, not only of the *contents* of tradition, but also of the techniques of tradition, that is, of socialization. Formal schooling is competing with family upbringing as early as at the pre-school age. The problematization of childrearing routines can be seen in the popular pedagogical [*volkspädagogischen*] tasks that schools are assuming through parental rights and individual consultations, as well as in the pedagogical-psychological, scientific journalism on the subject.⁹

At every level, administrative planning produces unintended unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken the justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of their nature-like course of development. Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of validity claims can succeed only through discourse. The stirring up of cultural affairs that are taken for granted thus furthers the politicization of areas of life previously assigned to the private sphere. But this development signifies danger for the civil privatism that is secured informally through the structures of the public realm. Efforts at participation and the plethora of alternative models—especially in cultural spheres such as school and university, press, church, theater, publishing, etc.—are indicators of this danger, as is the increasing number of citizens' initiatives.⁷

Demands for, and attempts at, participatory planning can also be explained in this context. Because administrative planning increasingly affects the cultural system—that is, the deep-seated representations of norms and values of those affected—and renders traditional attitudes uncertain, the threshold of acceptability changes. In order to carry through innovations in the planning process, the administration experiments with the participation of those affected. Of course, the functions of participation in governmental planning are ambivalent.⁸ Gray areas arise in which it is not clear whether the need for conflict regulation is increased or decreased by participation. The more planners place themselves under the pressure of consensus-formation in the planning process, the more likely is a strain that goes back to two contrary motives: excessive demands resulting from legitimation claims that the administration cannot satisfy under conditions of an asymmetrical class compromise; and conservative resistance to planning, which

contracts the horizon of planning and lowers the decree of innovation possible. Socio-psychologically viewed, both motives can be integrated into the same antagonistic interpretive pattern. Thus, analytically separable types of opposition can be represented by the same group. For this reason, laying claim to the "labor power of participation" (Nasehold) is an extreme and, for the administration, risky means of meeting legitimation deficits.

These arguments lend support to the assertion that advanced-capitalist societies fall into legitimation difficulties. But are they sufficient to establish the insolubility of legitimation problems, that is, do they lead necessarily to the prediction of a legitimation crisis? Even if the state apparatus were to succeed in raising the productivity of labor and in distributing gains in productivity in such a way that an economic growth free of crises (if not disturbances) were guaranteed, growth would still be achieved in accord with priorities that take shape as a function, not of generalizable interests of the population, but of private goals of profit maximization. The patterns of priorities that Galbraith analyzed from the point of view of "private wealth versus public poverty" ⁹ result from a class structure that is, as usual, kept latent. In the final analysis, *this class structure* is the source of the legitimation deficit.

We have seen now that the state cannot simply take over the cultural system, and that expansion of the areas of state planning actually makes problematic matters that were formerly culturally taken for granted. "Meaning" is a scarce resource and is becoming ever scarcer. Consequently, expectations oriented to use values—that is, expectations monitored by success—are rising in the civil public. The rising level of demand is proportional to the growing need for legitimation. The fiscally siphoned-off resource "value" must take the place of the scanty resource "meaning." Missing legitimation must be offset by rewards conforming to the system. A legitimation crisis arises as soon as the demands for such rewards rise faster than the available quantity of value, or when expectations arise that cannot be satisfied with such rewards.

But why should not the levels of demand keep within the boundaries of the operating capacity of the political-economic system? It could, after all, be that the rate of the rise in level of

demand is such that it forces on the steering and maintenance systems precisely those processes of adaptation and learning possible within the limits of the existing mode of production. The obvious post-war development of advanced-capitalist societies supports the view that this has already occurred.¹⁰ As long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a widespread, technocratic common consciousness (which, in case of doubt, makes inalterable system restraints responsible for bottlenecks) can maintain a sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs *do not have to* culminate in a crisis.

Offe and his collaborators question whether the form of procur-ing legitimation does not make it necessary for competing parties to outbid one another in their programs and thereby raise the expectations of the population ever higher and higher. This could result in an unavoidable gap between the level of pretension and the level of success, which would lead to disappointments among the voting public." The competitive democratic form of legitimation would then generate costs that it could not cover. Assuming that this argument could be sufficiently verified empirically, we would still have to explain why formal democracy has to be retained at all in advanced-capitalist societies. If one considers only the functional conditions of the administrative system, it could as well be replaced by variants: a conservative-authoritarian welfare state that reduces political participation of citizens to a harmless level; or a fascist-authoritarian state that holds the population by the bit at a relatively high level of permanent mobilization without having to overdraw its account through welfare-state measures. Both variants are, in the long run, obviously less compatible with developed capitalism than the constitution of a mass democracy with government by parties, for the socio-cultural system produces demands that cannot be met in authoritarian systems.

This reflection supports my thesis that only a rigid socio-cultural system, incapable of being randomly functionalized for the needs of the administrative system, could explain a sharpening of legitimation difficulties into a legitimation crisis. A legitimation crisis can be predicted only if expectations that cannot be fulfilled either with the available quantity of value or, generally, with rewards conforming to the system are systematically produced. A legitimation

crisis then, must be based on a motivation crisis—that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system on the other.

Chapter 7. Theorims of Motivation Crisis

I speak of a motivation crisis when the socio-cultural system changes in such a way that its output becomes dysfunctional for the state and for the system of social labor. The most important motivation contributed by the socio-cultural system in advanced-capitalist societies consists of syndromes of civil and familial-vocational privatism. Civil privatism here denotes an interest in the steering and maintenance [*Versorgung*] performances of the administrative system but little participation in the legitimizing process, albeit participation appropriate to institutionally provided opportunities (high-output orientation versus low-input orientation). Civil privatism thus corresponds to the structures of a depoliticized public realm. Familial-vocational privatism complements civil privatism. It consists in a family orientation with developed interests in consumption and leisure on the one hand, and in a career orientation suitable to status competition on the other. This privatism thus corresponds to the structures of educational and occupational systems that are regulated by competition through achievement.

Both patterns of motivation are important to the continued existence of the political and economic systems. To defend the statement that these patterns of orientation are being systematically destroyed, we must assume the burden of proof for two independent theses. First, we must demonstrate the erosion of traditions in the context of which these attitudes were previously produced. Second, we must show that there are no functional equivalents for the spent traditions, for they are precluded by the logic of development of normative structures. In coordinating motivational patterns with stable traditional cultural patterns. I start with the oversimplified assumption that attitudinal syndromes typical of a



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\c*ri to Introduction

1. A number of the important contributions are collected in T. W. Adorno, *et al.* *Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie* (Neuwied, 1969); cf. Habermas, *Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 1970).
2. K. O. Apel, *et al.*, *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt, 1971).
3. J. Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (Frankfurt, 1971).
4. Many of the relevant publications appeared in the volumes mentioned in notes 2. and 3. above. Available in English are "On Systematically Distorted Communication" and "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," in *Inquiry*, 13 (1970): 205-18, 360-75; the Introduction to *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973), pp. 1-40; and the Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*, in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (1973): 157-89- Cf. also T. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (1973): 135-56-
5. Lichtheim, *From Marx to Hegel* (New York, 1971), pp. 175-76. The lines quoted originally appeared in a review of Habermas' *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Frankfurt, 1968), which appeared in the *Tones Literary Supplement*, June 5,
6. The Institute's progress report of April 1974, mentions, among others, projects on development and underdevelopment, economic crisis tendencies, political-administrative systems, alternatives in science, and potentials for conflict and withdrawal among youth.
7. Most of Horkheimer's essays are collected in *Kritische Theorie*, Alfred Schmidt, ed. 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1968). A number of these appear in English translation in *Critical Theory* (New York, 1973). In what follows I shall be referring primarily to "Traditional and Critical Theory" (TCT) and "Zum Problem der Wahrheit" (VW). Several of Marcuse's *Zeitschrift* essays are collected in *Kultur und Gesellschaft, I* (Frankfurt, 1965). These have appeared in English translation in *Negations* (Boston, 1968).
8. Cf. R. Bubner, "Was ist kritische Theorie?" in *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, pp. 160-209; M. Theunissen, *Gesellschaft und Geschichte: Zur Kritik der kritischen Theorie* (Berlin, 1969).
9. Adorno, Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947); English translation, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972).
10. Cf. Marcuse's "The Affirmative Character of Culture," in *Negations*, pp. 88-133.
11. "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*," in *Theory and Practice*, pp. 142-69; "Technology and Science as Ideology," in

- Towards a Rational Society* (Boston, 1970), pp. 81-122; *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, 1971).
12. *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, p. 220.
 13. For the relevant publications, see note 4. above.
 14. "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?*, pp. 101-41; p. 120.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
 16. "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective," Appendix to *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 301-17.
 17. "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen, 1973), pp. 211-65; p. 218. I have translated *begründen* here and in the text of the book as "justify." This has, perhaps, connotations in English that it need not have in German, as Karl Popper and his followers have equated justification with deductive proof and attacked it as an unattainable goal even for the natural sciences. But, as will be seen in Part III, Chapter 2 of the present volume, Habermas rejects this identification. As he employs the term, *Begründung* is a matter of providing good grounds or reasons (*Cründe*) for a claim; it is a pragmatic rather than a syntactical notion.
 18. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-40.
 19. I have translated *rational motivieren* here and in the text as "provide rational grounds for," since "motivate" has predominantly psychological connotations in English, whereas *motivieren* can also be used in the sense of *begründen*.
 20. "Wahrheitstheorien," p. 258.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
 22. *Writings of the Young Man on Philosophy and Society*, L. Easton and K. Cuddat, eds. (Garden City, New York, 1967), p. 400.
 23. Maurice Dobb, ed. (New York, 1970), pp. 20-21.
 24. Cf. J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Chaps. 2 and 3; cf. also A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971) and "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections on the 'Linguistic Turn' in Critical Theory," in *Philosophy and Social Theory*, (State University of New York at Stony Brook *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I (1974), pp. 75-101.
 25. J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, p. 112.
 26. *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 181; cited in Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston, 1973), p. 57.
 27. Jay, *ibid.*, p. 57.
 28. Cf. especially *Knowledge and Human Interests* and "Technology and Science as Ideology."
 29. Cf. *Knowledge and Human Interests* and *Introduction to Theory and Practice*.
 30. Cf. *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* and Appendix to *Knowledge and Human Interests*.
 31. Cf. "Technology and Science as Ideology."
 32. *Introduction to Theory and Practice*, p. 12.
 33. *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?*, pp. 27off.

Notes to Preface:

1. The working papers of The Max Planck Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt are referred to in the Notes as Manuscript MPIL.
2. See also my "Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (1973): 157-9.

*Notes to Part I**Chapter 1*

1. C. Offe, "Spätkapitalismus—Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung," in *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 76*.
2. K. Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949).
3. H. P. Dreitzel, ed., *Sozialer Wandel* (Neuwied, 1967); L. Sklair, 77n? *Sociology of Progress* (London, 1970).
4. R. Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise* (Freiburg, 1961); J. Habermas, *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973), p. 212ff.
5. J. Zeleny, *Die Wissenschaftslogik und das Kapital* (Frankfurt, 1968); H. Reichelt, *Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei K. Marx* (Frankfurt, 1970); M. Mauke, *Die Klassentheorie von Marx und Engels* (Frankfurt, 1970); M. Codelier, "System, Structure and Contradiction in Capital," 77k *Socialist Register* 1967, London 1967.
6. M. Jänicke, ed., *Herrschaft und Krise* (Opladen, 1973), especially the contributions of Jänicke, K. W. Deutsch and W. Wagner.
7. [Translator's Note] Following the usage of Niklas Luhmann (currently the most influential German systems theorist) Habermas typically uses the verb *bestehen* and its derivatives in phrases referring to problems of structural continuity in self-regulating systems. Thus, for instance, he speaks of the *Bestandserhaltung des Systems* (here translated as the "continued existence of the system"), *bestandswichtige Strukturen* ("structures important for continued existence"), and *den Bestand sozialer Systeme* ("the persistence of social systems"). For an explication of this and other systems-theoretic terminology see the Habermas-Luhmann debate in *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (Frankfurt, 1971). Luhmann there characterizes the *Bestandsproblem* in terms of the "permanence," "survival," and "stability" of systems, and distinguishes from it problems of evolutionary change and advancement (p. 22). Habermas relates this to a distinction between process—"the performances of a system"—and structure—"the persistence of a system" (pp. 152—53). In the English literature on systems theory, problems of continuity and survival are frequently discussed as problems of "systems maintenance." Because of the variety of syntactical settings in which Habermas employs *Bestand*, I have found it more convenient to use "continued existence," "persistence," and, less frequently, "structural

continuity," which also appear in the English literature. For a general discussion of the systems approach see *Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist*, Walter Buckley, ed. (Chicago, 1968).

8. J. Habermas, N. Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (hereafter *Sozialtechnologie?*) (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 147[^].
9. [Translator's Note] In his discussion of systems theory, Habermas frequently employs the terms *Sollzustand* and *Sollwerte*. Following Parsons—who, with Luhmann, is one of the principle sources and targets of Habermas's discussion—I have rendered the former as "goal state." This refers, of course, to the preferred state that a self-regulating system tends to achieve, and once achieved to maintain, across a wide range of environmental and internal variations. The translation of *Sollwerte* is less obvious as there is, to my knowledge, no standard corresponding English phrase. The state description of a given system involves a specification of the values of the variables characterizing that system. The goal state of a self-regulating system can then be described in terms of those values of the state variables which the system tends to achieve *or* maintain. {For a general discussion see R. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), p. gaff.) In his earlier discussion of Parsons (*Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 164?), Habermas introduced the term *Kontrollwerte* in discussing Parsons's version of what is involved in describing the state of a system. Parsons wrote:

The four exigencies to which a system of action is subject are those of "goal attainment,** "adaptation," "integration" and "pattern maintenance." These are dimensions of a space in the sense that a state of the system or of its units' relation to each other may be described, relative to satisfactory points of reference, as "farther along" or less far along on each of these dimensions; a change of state may be described in terms of increases or decreases in the values of each of these variables. ("An Approach to Psychological Theory in Terms of the Theory of Action," in *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, 7 vols. S. Koch, ed. (New York, 1959), 3:631.)

The *Kontrollwerte* then are those values of the variables in the four dimensions that characterize the goal state of the system. To avoid repetition of the cumbersome phrase: "the values of the state variables characteristic of the goal state of a system," I have consistently rendered *Sollwerte* as "goal values." One final complication should be mentioned here. Parsons also uses the term "values" to refer to the cultural values institutionalized in a society. (See, for example, "An Outline of the Social System," in *Theories of Society*, 2 vols. (New York, 1961), 1:30-79). Values in this sense are also relevant to the orientation of a social system for they are "the normative patterns defining, in universalistic terms, the pattern of desirable orientation for the system as a whole" (p. 44). Habermas considers it a fundamental error of Parsons that he supposes the goal values and the cultural values of a social system to be "given." He argues that

the goal states of social systems cannot be ascertained in the same way as those of servomechanical or biological systems. Their goal values are not "given";

they can at best be "found" by way of a political formation of the will. But that would be possible only if one presupposes a general and public discussion by the members of the society based on available information about the given conditions of reproduction of the system. Then a relative agreement could be brought about on a value system that included the objective goal values previously withdrawn from the knowledge and will of the citizens. In such a communication, previously recognized cultural values could not function only as standards; cultural values would themselves be drawn into the discussion, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, pp. 176-77.

- ' 10. This concept of anomie was developed in social-scientific literature from Durkheim to Merton and in the investigations of anomie, in particular criminal behavior which have issued from Merton's work. For a summary, see T. Moser, *Jugendkriminalität und Gesellschaftstruktur* (Frankfurt, 1970).
11. [Translator's Note] The German term is *Steuerungsproblemen*. Where Habermas employs *Steuerung* and compounds thereof, Anglo-American authors use both control and steering, often interchangeably. I have done likewise.
12. P. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966).
13. Phenomenology (A. Schütz) and socio-cybernetic «*désigné*» conceptual strategies that stylize one or the other of these two aspects. In social-scientific functionalism, attempts have been made to take into account the double aspect of society and to connect the paradigms of life-world and system. (In the *Working Papers* Parsons attempts to connect systems theory and action theory at the categorial level; Etzioni conceives control capacity and consensus formation as two system dimensions; Luhmann gives the phenomenologically introduced, fundamental concept of meaning a systems-theoretic reformulation.) These attempts are instructive for the problem of a suitable conceptualization of social systems, but they do not solve it because the structures of intersubjectivity have not yet been sufficiently examined and the constituents of social systems have not yet been grasped precisely enough.
14. [Translator's Note] The German term is *Kontingenzspielraum*. For an elucidation of this concept see Habermas and Luhmann, *Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* According to Luhmann, "the social contingency of meaningful experience is nothing other than an aspect of that boundless world complexity which must be reduced through the formation of systems." From the point of view of systems theory, then, "the social contingency of the world" must be "redefined in terms of complexity" (p. 11). "Complexity," in turn, is a "measure of the number of events and states in the world (world complexity) or of the number of states of a system (intrinsic complexity). With their stabilized

- boundaries, systems form and maintain islands of lesser complexity; the order of a system is less probable than that of its environment . . . Its intrinsic complexity must be sufficient to make possible system-maintaining reactions to changes in the environment that affect the system" (pp. 147-48).
15. In what follows, I shall include in "socio-cultural system" the cultural tradition (cultural value systems), as well as the institutions that give these traditions normative power through processes of socialization and professionalization.
 16. C. Offe, "Krise und Krisenmanagement," in Jänicke, *Herrschaft und Krise*, p. 197ff.
 17. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, pp. 22iff., 239fr. Luhmann has since developed his theory of communications media as an independent theory *along side of* systems theory and evolution theory.
 18. D. Lockwood, "Social Integration and System Integration," in C. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change* (London, 1964), p. 244ff. This approach has been further developed by Gerhard Brandt.
 19. H. M. Baumgartner, *Kontinuität und Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 1972).
 20. K. Eder, "Komplexität, Evolution und Geschichte," in F. Maciejewski, ed., *Supplement I to Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?* (Frankfurt, 1973). P-9ff-

Part I, Chapter 2

1. I shall develop this thesis in the framework of a theory of communicative competence. Z. Cf. my "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 142ff.
3. I am not claiming that the history of science can be adequately explained by regulators internal to the scientific system. Compare the suggestive theses of G. Böhme, W. van den Daele, and W. Krohn, "Alternativen in der Wissenschaft," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* (1972): 302ff.; and "Finalisierung der Wissenschaft," *ibid.* (1973).
4. R. Döbert, G. Nunner, "Konflikt und Rückzugspotentiale in spätkapitalistischen Gesellschaften," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* (1973), pp. 301-25; R. Döbert, *Die methodologische Bedeutung von Evolutionstheorien für den sozialwissenschaftlichen Funktionalismus—diskutiert am Beispiel der Evolution von Religionsystemen* (diss., Phil., University of Frankfurt, 1973); cf. also the interesting construction of N. Luhmann, *Religion—System und Sozialisation* (Neuwied, »973). P- »5ff-
5. On the concept of developmental logic in cognitive developmental psychology see L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization," in D. A. Goslin, ed., *Handbook of Socialization* (Chicago, 1969). P 347Ä-
6. K. Eder, *Mechanismen der sozialen Evolution* (Manuscript, MPIL).
7. A. Mitscherlich, *Krankheit ah Konflikt*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1966/67); K. Brede, *Sozioanalyse psychosomatischer Störungen* (Frankfurt, 1972).



8. H. Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch* (Berlin, 1928).
9. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 155?.
10. Thus, in the systems theories of social development of K. W. Deutsch (*The Nerves of Government* [New York, 1963]) and A. Etzioni (*The Active Society* [New York, 1968]), concepts of learning rightly play a central role in the analysis; of course, these concepts are too narrow to encompass discursive learning.
11. J. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schuh* (Pfullingen, 1973), pp. 211-65. O'Connell's discourse, see S. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, 1964); and P. Edwards, *Logic of Moral Discourse* (New York, 1955).
12. J. Habermas, "Wozu noch Philosophie?" in *Philosophisch-politische Profile* (Frankfurt, 1971), English translation. *Social Research*, vol. 40, 1974.
13. On this concept compare N. Luhmann, "Wirtschaft als soziales Problem," in *Soziologische Aufklärung* (Opladen, 1970), p. 226ff.

Part I, Chapter 3.

1. [Translator's Note] Habermas uses the term *vorhochkultureU* to designate social formations that do not generally meet the criteria of civilizations (*Hochkulturen*). (For a brief characterization of these criteria see *Toward a Rational Society*, Boston, 1970, p. 94ff.) Included in the class of "pre-civilizations" are the more primitive societies characteristic of the "long initial phase until the end of the Mesolithic period," as well as the "first settled cultures based on the domestication of animals and the cultivation of plants" (*Toward a Rational Society*, p. 114). There is, to my knowledge, no exactly corresponding term in English anthropological literature. "Pre-civilization" seems unnecessarily cumbersome. The characteristics of such societies stressed by Habermas in what follows are those generally associated with "primitive" societies. I have therefore, with Habermas' agreement, employed this more usual terminology.
2. D. Bell, "The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of an Idea," in *Survey* (1971): 102ff.
3. T. Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966); G. Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York, 1966); Sahlins, *Service, Evolution and Culture* (Ann Arbor, 1968); further literature in Eder, *Mechanismen der sozialen Evolution*.
4. [Translator's Note] For an elucidation of the concept of instrumental action see Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, pp. 91-94 and *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, 1971).
5. C. Levi-Strauss, *77»« Savage Mind* (Chicago, 1966).
6. R. L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," *Science* (1970): 733ff.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 736ff.
8. [Translator's Note] *Herrschaft*, literally 'lordship,' can be employed with various nuances in German social thought and has, for this reason, no adequate English equivalent. Parsons translates the term as "imperative co-ordination"

and "authority" in his edition of Weber's *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York, 1947), p. 152(1., 3426°. This translation reflects Parson's interpretation of Weber's position on value-neutrality in social science. Whatever the merits of his case (see G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds., *Economy and Society*, 3 vols., New York, 1968, for a critique of his translation), Habermas certainly wishes to retain the valuational nuances associated with the term. Thus, "domination" seems the more appropriate translation in many contexts. I have used both "authority" and "domination," and less frequently "rule," according to the context.

9. I am using the expression "private" here, not in the sense of modern bourgeois civil law [*Privatrechts*], but in the sense of a "privileged" disposition.
10. [Translator's Note] Unfortunately, there is no English equivalent for the important term *Naturwüchsigkeit*. The suffix *-wüchsig* (from *wachsen*, to grow) means literally "growing." *Naturwüchsig* is used by critical theorists to refer to structures that develop spontaneously, without reflection or plan. It is employed by way of contrast to consciously directed processes, to structures that are the result of human will and determination. I have translated *Naturwüchsigkeit* here—somewhat awkwardly—as "unplanned, nature-like development."
11. Compare the historical studies of the concept by M. Riedel, *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1969); see also his *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat bei Hegel* (Neuwied, 1970).
12. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Köln, 1956), p. 1034fr.; English translation edited by C. Roth, C. Wittich, *Economy and Society*, 3 vols., (New York, 1968).
13. Cf. also N. Luhmann, "Knappheit, Geld und die bürgerliche Gesellschaft," in *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft*, Bd. 23 (1972), p. 186ff.
14. This is a model that is intended to characterize the zenith of a very complex historical process of development. On the systematic history of capitalism, the best total presentation is still that of M. Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London, 1947).
15. On the concepts "interest-guided" versus "value-oriented" cf. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 251fr.
16. O. Brunner, "Das Zeitalter der Ideologien," in *Neue Wege zur Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1956); K. Lenk, ed., *Ideologie* (Neuwied, 1961).

Part I, Chapter 4

1. Cf. my "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz."
2. H. Püot attempts a similar reconstruction of "dialectic" in "Jürgen Habermas's Empirically Falsified Philosophy of History," in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London/New York, 1975)-
3. J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, 1971), esp. p. 187fr.
4. H. Neuendorff, *Der Begriff des Interesses* (Frankfurt, 1973).
5. Today Adorno's works are exemplary for a critique of culture that constantly

refers back to a critique of commodity fetishism; see T. V. Adorno, "Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft," in *Prismen* (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 11ff.; English trans., *Prisms* (London, 1967). 6. S. Tsuru, *Has Capitalism Changed?* (Tokyo, 1961).

Notes to Part II

Chapter 1

1. See, for example, B. E. Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution: Seventeen Eighty-Nine to Eighteen Forty-Eight* (New York, 1962).
2. St. Hymer, "Multinationale Konzerne und das Gesetz der ungleichen Entwicklung" and J. O'Connor, "Die Bedeutung des ökonomischen Imperialismus," both in D. Senghaas, ed., *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt* (Frankfurt, 1972)-
3. M. D. Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York, 1963); A. Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (London, 1965); P. K. Crosser, *State Capitalism in the Economy of the U.S.* (New York, 1960); J. Calbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston, 1967); M. Weidenbaum, *The Modern Public Sector* (New York, 1969); and S. Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism* (New York, 1970).
4. J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York, 1973). O'Connor's three-sector model is developed with America in mind; presumably, it would have to be modified for the Federal Republic and other European countries. Cf. the reflections on this in U. Rodel, *Zusammenfassung kritischer Argumente zum Status der Werttheorie und zur Möglichkeit einer werttheoretischen Krisentheorie* (Manuscript, MPIL).
5. (Translator's Note) *Bildung*, generally "formation," can also be used more narrowly to connote processes of overall spiritual development or their completion, that is, "education," "cultivation." Jeremy Shapiro renders *Willensbildung*—literally "will-formation"—as "decision-making," while noting that it "emphasizes the process (of deliberation and discourse) through which a decision was 'formed,' not the moment at which it was 'made.'" (*Toward a Rational Society*, Boston, 1971, "Translator's Preface," p. vii.) Since one of the principal concerns of the present work is the elucidation and defense of a model of discursive formation of will, I have found it advisable to use the more literal renditions "will-formation" and "formation of the will."
6. On the functionalist concept of the procurement of legitimation, see T. Parsons, "Voting and Equilibrium of the American Political System," in E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Clencoe, 1959), 111.
7. Compare my introduction to J. Habermas, L. v. Friedeburg, Ch. Oehler, F. Wetz, *Student und Politik* (Neuwied, 1961); and J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Neuwied, 1962).
8. J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society* (Boston, 1971), p. 102.

9. J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3rd. ed., (New York, 1950)-
10. For example, Rathenau, Berle and Means.
- U.C. Offe, "Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen," in Kress and Senghaas, eds., *Politikwissenschaft* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 155ff.; English translation, "Political Authority and Class Structure—An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," in *International Journal of Sociology* (Spring, 1972), pp. 73-108.
12. J. Strachey, *Contemporary Capitalism* (New York, 1956).
13. J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.
14. W. Vogt, "Eine Theorie der ökonomischen Stagnation," in *Leviathan*, H. 2 (1973)-
15. C. Offe, "Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen."
16. N. Luhmann, "Knappheit, Geld und bürgerliche Gesellschaft," *op. cit.*
17. U. Rodel, *Zusammenfassung kritischer Argumente*.

Part II, Chapter 2

1. J. Galtung, "Eine strukturelle Theorie des Imperialismus" in D. Senghaas, ed., *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt* (Frankfurt, 1972); also F. Fröbel, J. Heinrichs, O. Kreye, O. Sunkel, "Kapital und Arbeitskraft," in *Leviathan*, 4 (»973) P- 4*9ff-». D. L. Meadows, D. H. Meadows, *Limits to Growth* (New York, 1972).
3. K. M. Meyer-Abich, "Die ökologische Grenze des Wirtschaftswachstums," in *Umschau* 72 (1972), H. 20, p. 645s.
4. Cf. below. Part III, Chapter 5.
5. N. Luhmann, "Soziologie des politischen Systems," in *Soziologische Aufklärung* (Opladen, 1970), p. 170.
6. C. F. v. Weizsäcker, ed., *Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung* (München, 1971), introduction.

Part II, Chapter 3

1. Cf. E. Mandel, *Der Spätkapitalismus* (Frankfurt, 1972).
2. J. Hirsch, *Wissenschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt und politisches System* (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 248s.
3. C. Offe, "Tauschverhältnis und politische Steuerung," in *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 27ff.
4. H. Marcuse develops this thesis in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972).
5. R. Döbert, *Die methodologische Bedeutung von Evolutionstheorien, toc. cit.*

Part II, Chapter 4

1. Marx developed this conception in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963). Cf. also N. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in *New Left Review* (1969), p. 678.
2. W. Müller, Ch. Neusüss, "Die Sozialstaatsillusion," in *SOP0* (1970), p. 4ft.; E.

- Airvater, "Zu einigen Problemen des Staatsinterventionismus," in Jänicke, ed., *Herrschaft und Krise*, p. 170ff.
3. Altvater, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
 4. Müller, Neusüss, *op. cit.*
 5. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.
 6. The analytical distinctions proposed here have arisen out of discussions with Sigrid Meuschel.
 7. P. Mattick, *Marx and Keynes* (Boston, 1969), p. 1288, 1888.; V. Rodel, *Forschungsprioritäten und technologische Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 3*ff.
 8. On this point, most recently, H. Hollander, *Das Gesetz des tendenziellen Falhs der Profitrate* (Regensburg, 1972), Diskussionsbeiträge zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft.
 9. E. Airvater, F. Huisjens, eds., *Materialien zur Politischen Ökonomie des Ausbildungssektors* (Erlangen, 1971).
 10. A. Sohn-Rethel, *Die ökonomische Doppelnatur des Spätkapitalismus* (Neuwied, 1972), traces the altered production of surplus value to changes in the structure of production and wages.
 11. O'Connor distinguishes absolute, relative, and "indirect" production of surplus value.
 12. *Capital*, 3 vols. (International Publishers: New York, 1967), 1:609.
 13. V. Rodel, *Zusammenfassung kritischer Argumente*.
 14. R. Hilferding introduced this expression.
 15. Man speaks of the historical and moral element in the determination of the value of the commodity "labor power"; *Capital*, 1:165.
 16. Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften of the Zentralkomitee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, ed., *Imperialismus heute* (Berlin, 1965); R. Cundel, H. Heining, F. Hess, K. Zieschang, *Zur Theorie des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus* (Berlin, 1967).
 17. M. Wirth, *Kapitalismustheorie in der DDR* (Frankfurt, 1973).
 18. J. Hirsch, "Funktionsveränderungen der Staatsverwaltung in sozialistischen Industriegesellschaften," in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (1969), p. »soff.
 19. C. Offe. "Massenherrschaft und politisches System. Die Selektivität politischer Institutionen," in *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 66ff.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 78ff.

Part II, Chapter 5

1. J. Hirsch, *Wissenschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt*, p. 248?.
2. C. Offe speaks of a "political dilemma of technocracy."
3. This is a consequence of the penetration of systems-theoretic language into the self-understanding of the state administration.
4. St. Cohen, *Modern Capitalist Planning* (Cambridge, 1969).

5. H. Arndt, *Die Konzentration der westdeutschen Wirtschaft* (Pfullingen, 1966); J. Hufschmid, *Die Politik des Kapitals* (Frankfurt, 1970); G. Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution* (New York, 1962).
6. F. W. Scharpf, "Planung als politischer Prozess," in *Die Verwaltung* (1971); and "Komplexität als Schranke der politischen Planung," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Sonderheft 4 (iQ72), 168ff.
7. R. Funke, *Exkura über Planungsrationaliät* (Manuscript, MPIL) and *Organisationsstrukturen planender Verwaltung* (Diss., University of Darmstadt, 1973).
8. C. Offe, "Tauschverhältnis und politische Steuerung," p. 27ft.
9. F. Naschold, *Organisation und Demokratie* (Stuttgart, 1969); "Komplexität und Demokratie," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (1968), p. 4948; see Luhmann's critique and Naschold's reply in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (1969), pp. 3248., 3x68.; see also S. and W. Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status quo* (Frankfurt, 1972)-

Part II, Chapter 6

1. M. Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Chicago, 1964) and *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago, 1971).
2. H. C. Cadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen, 1969).
3. A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971), p. 4iff.
4. J. Habermas, "Bewusstmachende oder rettende Kritik?," in *Zur Aktualität Walter Benjamins* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 173fr.
5. In the Federal Republic the discussion was touched off by S. B. Robinsohn, *Bildungsreform als Revision des Curriculum* (Neuwied, 1967).
6. U. Oevermann develops interesting arguments in a manuscript on the research strategy of the Institut für Bildungsforschung (Berlin, 1970).
7. H. E. Bahr, ed., *Politisierung des Aütags* (Neuwied, 1972); Offe, "Bürgerinitiativen," in *Strukturprobleme*, p. 153ft.
8. R. Mayntz, "Funktionen der Beteiligung bei öffentlicher Planung," in *Demokratie und Verwaltung* (Berlin, 1972), p. 34 iff.
- g. On this point see H. P. Widmaier, *Machtstrukturen bn Wohlfahrtsstaat*, Regensburger Diskussionsbeiträge zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (1973).
10. Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism*.
11. Offe, "Krisen und Krisenmanagement," p. 220.

Part II, Chapter 7

1. J. Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, p. 2908.
2. The failure of the "basic personality approach" in cultural anthropology shows that simple transmission assumptions are incorrect. A plausible model of socialization is contained in the project proposal of Oevermann, Krippner, and Krappmann, "Elternhaus und Schule" (Manuscript, Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin).
3. A correspondence between normative and motivational structures is most likely

- for the ontogenetic levels of moral consciousness. Cf. L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization," in D. Coslin, ed., *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Chicago, 196g), p. 397ff-
4. Habermas, "Natural Law and Revolution," in *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973), p. ^{81ff}-
 5. G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, 1965).
 6. On the historical background of this category see C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (London and New York, 1962).
 7. M. Müller, H. Bredekamp, et al., *Autonomie der Kunst* (Frankfurt, 1972).
 8. H. Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972).
 9. D. Kisler, ed., *Mai Weber* (München, 1972); W. Schluchter, *Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft* (München, 1972), p. 2366F.
 10. R. Dobert, G. Nunner, *Konflikt- und Rückzugspotentiale*.
 11. G. Nunner-Winkler, *Chancengleichheit und individuelle Förderung* (Stuttgart, 1971)-
 12. D. Härtung, R. Nuthmann, W. C. Winterhager, *Politologen im Beruf* (Stuttgart, 1970); W. Armbruster, H. J. Bodenhöfer, H. J. Härtung, R. Nuthmann, "Expansion und Innovation," Manuscript, Institut für Bildungsforschung (Berlin, 1972).
 13. C. Ofle, *Leistungsprinzip und industrielle Arbeit* (Frankfurt, 1970).
 14. See Part II, Chapter 5.
 15. R. Bendix, *Der Glaube an die Wissenschaft* (Konstanz, 1971).
 16. J. Mittelstrass, *Das praktische Fundament der Wissenschaft* (Konstanz, 1972).
 17. A. Hauser, *The Social History of Art*, 4 vols. (New York, 1957).
 18. D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," *Public Interest* (Fall 1970): i6ff.
 19. K. Keniston, *Youth and Dissent* (New York, 1971), p. 3875.
 20. R. Dobert, G. Nunner, *Konflikt- und Rückzugspotentiale toc. cit.*
 - ai. K. Keniston, *Young Radicals* (New York, 1968).
 22. R. Dobert, G. Nunner, *Konflikt- und Rückzugspotentiale*; O. Negt and A. Kluge attempt a theoretically ambitious interpretation of the experiential content of the student revolts in *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt, 1972).

Notes to Part III

Chapter 1

1. M. Weber, "The Types of Legitimate Domination," in *Economy and Society*, G. Roth, C. Wittich, eds., 3 vols. (New York, 1968), i:212ff.
- i. M. Weber, *ibid.*, 3:953.
3. G. Lenski, *Power and Privilege* p. 43fr.
4. M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1:214.

5. Ibid., p. 213.
6. Ibid., 3:953.
7. Ibid., 1:217ff., 3 956ff.
8. Ch. Siara, *Bürgerliches Formalrecht bei Max Weber*, Diplomarbeit (Frankfurt, 1968).
9. Luhmann, "So/oloçir des politischen Systems," p. 167.
10. N. Luhmann, "Positives Recht und Ideologie," in *Soziologische Aufklärung* (Opladen, 1970), p. 180.
11. N. Luhmann, *Legitimation durch Verfahren* (Neuwied, 1969), p. 51.
12. Ibid., p. 139.
13. Ibid., p. 240.
14. "Structures reduce the extreme complexity of the world to a much narrowed and simplified domain of expectations which are presupposed as premises of behavior and normally not themselves questioned. They are always based, therefore, on *deceptions* . . . especially about the actual action-potential of men, and for this reason they must be arranged so as to take account of disappointments." Ibid., p. 23.iff.
15. [Translator's Note] For Weber's dis^n^tion between *zuxckrational* ("purposive-rational," that is, means-ends oriented) and *wentu>c*-d* ("rationally oriented to value," that is, to the realization of certain values) see his discussion of "The Types of Social Action," in *Economy and Society*, vol. 1.
16. J. Winckelmann, *Legitimität und Legalität m Max Weben Herrschaftssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1952), p. 75ff.
17. Ibid., p. 7iff.
18. K. Jaspers, *Max Weber* (Oldenburg, 1932); English trans, in *Three Essays: Leonardo, Descartes, Max Weber* (New York, 1964). Compare W. J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik* (Tübingen, 195g), p. 418. "If Winckelmann wants to show that there are in Weber's theory of democratic authority so-called 'immanent limits to legitimation' of a value-oriented nature, then this is simply a misinterpretation."
19. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 243ft

Part III, Chapter 2

1. K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1950), vol. 1, chap. 5, "Nature and Convention." * L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven, 1950); D. H. Monro, *Empiricism and Ethics* (Cambridge, 1967).
3. R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford, 1952).
4. K. H. Ilting, "Anerkennung," in *Probleme der Ethik* (Freiburg, 1972).
5. H. Albert, *Traktat über kritische Vernunft* (Tübingen, 1968), chap. 3, p. 55g. J. Mittelstrass (*Das praktische Fundament der Wissenschaft*, p. 18) is certainly correct in remarking that the trilemma of Popper and Albert results from the ungrounded equation of deductive justification [*Begründung*] with justification in general. K. O. Apel, *Dos Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft*, vol. II of

Transformation der Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1973), p. 405/?.. distinguishes deductive from transcendental justification and traces the unredeemable of critical rationalism to a characteristic neglect of the pragmatic dimension of argumentation.

Under the presupposition of abstracting from the pragmatic dimension of signs there is no human *subject* of argumentation and therefore also no possibility of a reflection on the conditions of possibility of argumentation which are *always presupposed by us*. Instead, there is the infinite hierarchy of m^w-languages, meta-theories, etc., in which the *reflective competence* of man as the *subject of argumentation* is simultaneously made perceptible and concealed . . . And yet we know very well that our *reflective competence*—more precisely, the self-reflection of the human subject of thought operations, which is bracketed out *a priori* at the level of syntactic-semantic systems—is hidden behind the aporia of infinite regress and makes possible, for example, something like an undeckability *proof* in the sense of Apel. In other words, precisely in the confirmation that the subjective conditions of possibility of argumentation *cannot be objectivated* in a syntactic-semantic *model* of argumentation is expressed the self-reflective knowledge of the transcendental-pragmatic subject of argumentation (p. 406ff).

6. Aih.-rt, *Traktat über kritische Vernunft*, p. 78.
7. J. Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, 1929).
8. S. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument*; on Peirce see K. O. Apel, "Von Kant zu Peirce. Die semiotische Transformation der Transzendentalen Logik," in *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2:1576*.
9. J. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien."
10. R. Crice, *The Grounds of Moral Judgement* (Cambridge, 1967). U. K. Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958); M. C. Singer, *Generalization in Ethics* (London, 1963).
12. P. Lorenzen, *Normative Logic and Ethics* (Mannheim, 1969); "Srientismus versus Dialektik," in *Festschrift für Cadamer* (Tübingen, 1970), 1:57ff.; O. Schwemmer, *Philosophie der Praxis* (Frankfurt, 1971); S. Blasche and O. Schwemmer, "Methode und Dialektik," in M. Riedel, ed., *Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie I*, (Freiburg, 1972), p. 457ff.
13. P. Lorenzen, *Normative Logic and Ethics*, p. 74.
14. O. Schwemmer, *Philosophie der Praxis*, p. 194.
15. Cited from manuscript; soon to appear in a volume on practical philosophy edited by F. Kambartel for the *Theorie-Diskussion* series, Suhrkamp Verlag.
16. Cf. also K. O. Apel, "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Ethik," in *Transformation der Philosophie*, 2:358?. In this fascinating essay, in which Apel summarizes his large-scale attempt at reconstruction, the fundamental assumption of communicative ethics is developed: "with the presupposition of intersubjective consensus the search for truth must also anticipate the

morality of an ideal communication community." (p. 405) Even with Apel there arises, to be sure, a residual decisionistic problematic.

Whoever poses the—in my opinion, quite meaningful—question of the justification of the moral principle already *takes part* in the discussion. And one can "make him aware"—quite in the manner proposed by Lorenzen and Schwemmer of a reconstruction of reason—of what he has "already" accepted, and that he should accept this principle through intentional affirmation as the *condition of the possibility and of the validity of argumentation*. Whoever does not comprehend or accept this withdraws from the discussion. But anyone who does not participate in the discussion cannot pose the question of the justification of fundamental ethical principles. Thus, it is *meaningless* to talk of the meaninglessness of his question and to recommend to him a valiant decision to believe." (pp. 420-21)

That "intentional affirmation" can, however, only be stylized to an intentional act as long as one disregards the fact that discourses are not only contingently, but systematically admitted into a life-context whose peculiarly fragile *facticity* consists in the recognition of discursive-validity claims. Anyone who does not participate, or is not ready to participate in argumentation stands nevertheless "already" in contexts of *communicative action*. In doing so, he has already naively recognized the validity claims—however counterfactually raised—that are contained in speech acts and that can be redeemed only discursively. Otherwise he would have had to detach himself from the communicatively established language game of everyday practice. The *fundamental* error of methodological solipsism extends to the assumption of the possibility not only of monological *thought*, but also of monological *action*. It is absurd to imagine that a subject capable of speech and action could permanently realize the limit case of communicative action, that is, the monological role of acting (instrumentally and strategically, without losing his identity. The socio-cultural form of life of communicatively socialized individuals produces the "transcendental illusion" of pure communicative action in every interaction context and, at the same time, it structurally refers every interaction context to the possibility of an ideal speech situation in which the validity claims accepted in action can be tested discursively. (Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 136s.) If one understands the communication community *in the first place* as a community of interaction and not of argumentation, as action and not as discourse, then the relation—important from the perspective of emancipation—of the "real" to the "ideal" communication community (Apel, "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft," p. 42ff.) can also be examined from the point of view of idealizations of pure communicative action (cf. my introduction to the English edition of *Theory and Practice*, Boston, 1973, p. iff., and my "Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (1973): p.

Part III, Chapter j

1. H. Schelsky, "Mehr Demokratie oder mehr Freiheit?," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jan. 20, 1973, p. 7.
2. J. Habermas, "Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik," in *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 120S.
3. P. Lorenzen, "Szientismus versus Dialektik."
4. J. Habermas, "Einige Bemerkungen zum Problem der Begründung von Werturteilen," in *Verhandlungen des g. Deutschen Kongress für Philosophie* (Meisenheim, 1972), p. 86ff.
5. C. Offe, "Klassenherrschaft und politisches System," p. 85.
6. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 2S4B.
7. Compare the abovementioned dissertation of R. Döbert; also C. Schmid, "N. Luhmanns funktional-strukturelle Systemtheorie," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (1970), p. 186ff.
8. J. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, p. 74fr.

Part III, Chapter 4

1. P. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (New York, 1967), p. 22ff.
2. On this point compare the anthropological investigations of Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism* (London, 1964), *Structural Anthropology* (New York, 1963), *The Raw and the Cooked: An Introduction to a Science of Mythology I* (New York, 1970), and *From Honey to Ashes: An Introduction to a Science of Mythology II* (New York, 1973).
3. Cf. T. Rendtorff, *Theorie des Christentums* (Gütersloh, 1972), p. 66ff.
4. C. F. von Weizsäcker, *Die Einheit der Natur* (Stuttgart, 1971).
5. F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (New York, 1967), Preface, p. 4.
6. F. Nietzsche, *Werke*, K. Schlecht[^] ed., Bd. III, p. 480.
7. Habermas, "Natural Law and Révolution," in *Theory and Practice*, p. 82fr.
8. P. Bachrach, *Die Theorie der demokratischen Eliteherrschaft* (Frankfurt, 1967).
9. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
10. M. Landmann, *Au Ende des Individuums* (Stuttgart, 1971).
- U.A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, pp. 130-31. (I have retranslated the lines quoted in the text T. McC.)
- it. H. Schelsky, "Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation," in *Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit* (Dusseldorf, 1965), p. 468.
13. H. Schelsky, *Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie* (Düsseldorf, 1959), p. 96ff.
14. H. Schelsky, "Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation," p. 471.
15. H. Schelsky, "Ist Dauerreflexion institutionalisierbar?,"* in *Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit*, p. 250».
16. T. W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt, 1951), p. 25iff. (English translation, E. Jephcott, *Minima Moralia* [London, 1974]).
17. B. Willms, "Revolution oder Protest," p. 11, and "System und Subjekt," in *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?*, Supplement I.
18. T. W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 109.

19. L. S. Feuer, "What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept," in M. Stein, A. Vidich, eds., *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); cf. also the work of K. Kenniston, R. D. Laing, G. Sykes, and the literature on anomie, "urban problems," identity problems, etc.
20. A. Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York, 1968), p. 618.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 619.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 633s.

Part III, Chapter 5

1. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 293.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 326ff.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
4. *Ibid.*
5. W. D. Narr, C. Offe, *Wohlfahrtsstaat und Massenloyalität* (Köln, 1973), Introduction.
6. Habermas and Luhmann, *Sozialtechnologie?*, p. 3<x>ff.
7. Luhmann, "Komplexität und Demokratie," p. 316.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
9. N. Luhmann, "Politikbegriffe und die 'Politisierung' der Verwaltung," in *Demokratie und Verwaltung* (Berlin, 1972), p. 221.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
11. Luhmann, "Komplexität und Demokratie," p. 319.
12. N. Luhmann, *Politische Planung* (Opladen, 1971), Preface.
13. L. C. Cawthrop, *Administrative Politics and Social Change* (New York 1971); Ronge and Schmiege, eds., *Politische Planung in Theorie und Praxis* (München, 1972), Introduction; cf. also his *Restriktionen politischer Planung* (Dissertation, Bremen, 1972), esp. chaps. 1 and 5.
14. Luhmann, "Politikbegriffe und die 'Politisierung' der Verwaltung," p. 225.
15. Cawthrop, *Administrative Politics*, p. 42ff.
16. Luhmann, "Politikbegriffe," p. 225; "Selbstthematisierungen des Gesellschafts systems," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* (1973), p. 21ff.
17. F. Naschold, "Zur Politik und Ökonomie der Planung," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 4* (1972), p. 138.
18. N. Luhmann, "Politikbegriffe," p. 224.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 2278.
20. A. Gehlen, "Über Kristallisation," in *Studien zur Anthropologie* (Neuwied, »963), P- 3" ff-
21. F. Naschold, "Politik und Ökonomie," p. 43.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
23. Scharpf, "Komplexität als Schranke der politischen Planung," p. 169.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
25. M. Fester, "Vorstudien zu einer Theorie kommunikativer Planung," *ARCH* (i9/°).P-43ff-
26. R. Mayntz, ed., *Bürokratische Organisation (Kola, 1968)*, and *Formalisierte Modelle in der Soziologie* (Neuwied, 1967).

27. Etzioni. *The Active Society*, p. 622ff.
28. See above. Part I.
29. M. Fester, "Vorstudien zu einer Theorie kommunikativer Planung," p. 67ff.; cf. also the results of an investigation by the Battelle-Institut: BMBW, *Methoden der Prioritätenbestimmung I* (Bonn, 1971).

Part III, Chapter 6 I. Offe has developed experimental reflections on a theory of actionism.

The problem for a theory of the state that wants to prove the class character of political domination consists thus in the fact that it cannot at all be earned through *as a theory*, as an objectivating presentation of state functions and their relation to interests. Only the practice of class struggle redeems its cognitive claim . . . this limitation of the theoretical cognitive power is not conditioned by the inadequacy of its methods but by the structure of its object. The latter *evades* its class-theoretic elucidation. Simplifying, one can say that political domination in capitalist industrial societies is the method of class domination which *does not reveal itself* as such. OSe, *Strukturprobleme*, pp. 90-91.

Offe starts, from the thesis that the class character of the state, which he asserts, is not at all accessible to objectivating knowledge. In my opinion, we do not need to share this premise, since the model—introduced above—of suppressed but generalizable interests can indeed be applied to a reconstruction of non-decisional, selection rules, and latency phenomena. Even if we had to share Offe's premises, his argumentation would remain inconsistent. Let us assume that the goal of removing a class structure could be grounded from the following point of view:

- a practice that can justify itself is an independent, that is, rational practice;
- the condition for a justifiable practice is rational wherever political consequences can result from actions;
- hence, it is rational to desire the transformation of a social system that can advance normative-validity claims only counterfactually, that is, that cannot justify its practice because it structurally suppresses generalizable interests.

// the class character of our system of domination were, as Offe states, not recognizable, revolutionary action would be able to base itself at best on conjectures that turn out, retrospectively, to be true or false. As long as class character is not recognized, political action cannot be justified on the basis of generalizable interests; it remains an irrational practice. An irrational practice (whatever goals it may claim for itself) cannot be singled out from any other given practice (even from an avowedly fascist one) *with grounds*. Indeed, in so far as such a practice is carried through with will and consciousness, it

contradicts *the* (and precisely the) only justifications that can be laid claim to for the transformation of a class structure.

Such considerations need hinder no one from accepting a decisionistic action pattern—often enough there is no alternative. But in that case one acts subjectively and, in weighing the risks, *can* know that the political consequences of this action are only calculable in moral terms. Even then one must still presuppose a trust in the power of practical reason. Indeed, even one who doubts practical reason *itself* could know that he is not only acting subjectively but is also placing his action outside of the domain of argumentation in general. But then a *theory* of actionism is also superfluous. The execution of an action has to be sufficient unto itself. *Unjustifiable* hopes that are tied to the success of an action can add nothing to it. It must, rather, be done for its own sake, beyond argumentation. It is a matter of indifference how much rhetoric one employs to call it forth as an empirical event.