Proximization
The pragmatics of symbolic distance crossing

Piotr Cap
Proximization
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by Piotr Cap
Proximization
The pragmatics of symbolic distance crossing

Piotr Cap
University of Lodz

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Piotr Cap
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

“On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale”.

(G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003; three weeks before attacking Iraq)

In his recent (January 21, 2013) Second Inaugural Address, a speech broadcast live to an unprecedented number of over 100 countries worldwide, the US President Barack Obama devotes the following passage to security issues:

Our citizens seared by the memory of those we have lost from the beginning of this millenium, know too well the price that is paid for liberty. The knowledge of their sacrifice will keep us forever vigilant against those who would do us harm. We will defend our people, and uphold our values through strength of arms, and the rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully. Not because we are naive about the dangers we are facing, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear (...). America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe. And we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crises abroad. For no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom (...)[To act] not out of mere charity, but because global peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes; tolerance and opportunity, human dignity and justice. Decisions are upon us and we cannot afford delay. We must act.

It does not, apparently, take much time, effort, nor a complex linguistic methodology, to try and interpret Obama’s argument. The central line of the argument is that American security depends on global security; thus, it is in the interest of America to actively engage in international peace-keeping, managing (whether “peacefully” or “through strength of arms”) any “crises” possibly far from the US borders. To force this line, Obama sets up frequent text connections between the US home stage and the international arena (“America will remain the anchor … in every corner of the globe”; “our capacity to manage crises abroad”; “because
our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf”; “global peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes”), concluding not only “vigilance”, but mainly prompt action (“we cannot afford delay”) are necessary to fend off security threats. The threats are depicted as at the same time current (“the dangers we are facing”) and continuing (“those who would do us harm”), which implies they will be growing, if disregarded. The growth of the foreign crises and threats, finishes the scenario, might mean another “price to pay” at home, as the analogy in the opening sentence indicates.

Why would I start the present book from this admittedly brief, non-technical, non-formal, and quite superficial “analysis”, a commentary in fact?

There are several reasons, but one stands out. The fact that the main strategy in the text – justifying preventive action against an external threat able to grow – can be identified, albeit superficially, but at a glance and without yet engaging sophisticated methodological tools, gives reasons to believe it must be pervasive in political discourse. Apparently beyond as well, in fact anywhere where we use language to describe the surrounding reality as increasingly threatening, in order to justify intervention to stop the threat before it materializes on our doorstep. Consider a seemingly far-fetched example, the homophobic voices in some of the contemporary European (anti-)gay discourses. Opposing certain civil rights of homosexual groups – the right to marry, the right to inherit after the partner, etc. – they often engage the same alert-to-outside/alien-threat strategy. Returning to the US scene, note that the largely ceremonial character of the inaugural speech does not particularly favor or facilitate policy announcements, but the strategy is still identifiable, as are at least the simplest of its language builders. This all creates a temptation to look for more (political) discourse data involving the strategy, and if such data are found, to construct a theory providing tools to turn the initially impressionistic descriptions into fully-fledged formal analyses. If we subscribe to (numerous) views reflecting originally Aristotle’s idea that in fact most of our communication is “political” (in the sense that both state politics and a bulk of human everyday communication involve negotiating individual social perceptions to become socially shared perceptions legitimating consequently common decisions), then such a search and the theory-building will eventually produce a theory whose primary application may be (and will be) to political/public discourse in terms of the language of state politicians and other prominent actors in the public discourse space, but whose ultimate ambition will be to inspire further studies towards a theory of communication in general. This micro-macro connection, reflecting the view of political discourse analysis as necessarily invoking complex issues of communication at practically all levels of social interaction, as one of the broadest windows to our linguistic behavior in general terms, will be acknowledged more formally several times in the present book. It is my
dedication to this view that defines the stance of the book and underlies its goals, which I now start describing in detail.

1.1 Project overview

This book is an attempt to construct and advance a theory that brings together a host of issues that have to do with the speaker-imposed construal of distance and proximity in discourse, especially state political discourse, on which extensive territory the theory is conceived. Most of these issues, hitherto approached separately in literature, can be defined in cognitive-sociopragmatic terms: what speaker intentions are realized and what goals pursued, in forced conceptualizations of events as “remote” or “close” to the speaker and her addressee? What interpersonal and/or ideological benefits could be at stake? Are there any set rules or strategies, embedded in general cognitive principles, which define what language patterns are best used to enact such construals?

In the present book I develop proximization theory to account for these questions. In its broadest and most general sense, proximization is a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs (including “distant”, i.e. adversarial, ideological mind-sets) as directly, increasingly and negatively consequential to the speaker and her addressee. Projecting the distant entities as gradually encroaching upon the speaker-addresssee territory (both physical and ideological), the speaker may attempt a variety of goals, but the goals I will be mainly preoccupied with involve legitimization of actions and policies the speaker proposes to neutralize the growing impact of the negative, “foreign”, “alien”, “antagonistic”, entities.

Although most examples throughout the book come from the domain of state political discourse and thus “the speaker” becomes “the political speaker”, etc., “political discourse” must not be considered (in its restricted sense of the “language of politicians”) the only field offering data to illustrate the mechanism of proximization. There are several reasons. First, proximization theory, as advanced in this book, draws in many ways from work on models which target not only political discourse in their application.1 Second, the project’s ambition is to show that proximization theory, through its core ability to account for shifting conditions of temporally extensive contexts, can be a model capturing multifarious phenomena and rules of social interaction in the vast space of interlocking public discourses, including institutional and new media genres. This could, as has

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been mentioned, pave the way for further work on proximization as a candidate for a theory of communication. Finally, the envisaged contribution of proximization theory to the dialogue between its different conceptual elements (cognitive, pragmatic, etc. – see argument in the section on theoretical implications below), relies to a notable extent on data available beyond contexts traditionally defined as “political”.2

Notwithstanding these remarks and the possible long-term contributions of proximization, the starting rationale for adding proximization to an already rich inventory of theories in cognitive linguistics, pragmatics, and critical linguistics is its explanatory power in state political discourse, and particularly in state interventionist legitimization discourse. I present details of this rationale in Chapter 3 (see chapter overview below). Meanwhile, we might note that such an orientation is quite in line with the core idea of proximization: the construed vision of a foreign entity encroaching upon a home territory of the speaker and her audience prompts issues of preventive response and its justification. The language corpus I work with reflects such issues: the book analyzes patterns of evolution of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric in the last decade (years 2001–2010). The analysis is, as can be anticipated from the above sketch, multidisciplinary, drawing upon and at the same time informing, frameworks in cognitive linguistics, pragmatics and critical studies. Such an approach involves reconciliation of theoretical, methodological and empirical foci and findings of some recent works within the above frameworks, a last-decade set of studies which have dealt with the concept (rather than “theory” as yet) of proximization explicitly, or have undertaken research tasks addressing conceptually similar phenomena of distance construals in discourse. A brief survey of these contributions is given in the next section while an extensive account follows in Chapter 2.

1.2 A brief history of proximization

Proximization is, as has been mentioned, a fairly new notion in linguistics.3 The verbal forms “proximise”, “proximising” (i.e. bringing [conceptually] closer; the spelling reflects the original), are first found in Chilton (2004), while the nominal

\[2. \text{ For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between (contemporary studies in) “political” vs. “public” discourse, see e.g. Introduction in Okulska and Cap (2010). In the present book, the political/public distinction is amply discussed in Chapters 3 and 7.}\

\[3. \text{ The term “proximization” also occurs, rather marginally, in macroeconomics (particularly in relation to policies on sustainability), and in econometry. I find its meanings/functions there too distant from the linguistic approach to merit a discussion.}\]
term “proximization” was originally proposed by Cap (2005), who also first used it to mark an organized, strategic deployment of cognitive-pragmatic construals of/in (originally, political) discourse. Ever since, proximization has developed into a cognitive-linguistic, pragmatic, as well as a critical discourse analytic concept which accounts for the symbolic construal of relations between entities within the Discourse Space (DS) (cf. Chilton 2005a) – most notably, the symbolic shifts whereby the peripheral elements of the DS are construed as the central ones, members of the “deictic center” (Chilton 2005a; Cap 2006) of the Space. The explanatory power of proximization has been utilized within a number of different theoretical frameworks and thematic domains. Chilton (2005a, 2010) relates to it in his cognitive-linguistic Discourse Space Theory; Cap (2006, 2008, 2010ab) makes it a theoretical premise for several case studies of the Iraq war rhetoric; in a similar vein, Hart (2010) incorporates it (as a coercive strategy) in his multidisciplinary approach to metaphoric construals of the speaker-external threat. Proximization, both as a construct and a methodological tool, operates across diverse research domains, though most commonly in state political discourses: crisis construction (triggered by the construed impact of the DS peripheral elements on its central elements) and the war rhetoric (Chovanec 2010; Okulska and Cap 2010), the (anti-)immigration discourse (Hart 2010), political party representation (Cienki, Kaal and Maks 2010), and construction of national memory (Filardo Llamas 2010). There have also been studies of proximization in works at the intersection of political genres. In the most comprehensive one, Dunmire (2011) looks at proximization patterns in a US foreign policy document (the 2002 National Security Strategy articulating the “[G. W.] Bush Doctrine”) and how they were followed in speeches enacting the Doctrine. Finally, an interesting approach to proximization has been demonstrated in Kopytowska’s (2009, 2010) attempts to trace proximization effects at the meta-level of mediatized discourse, involving seeing the Discourse Space not only as a speaker-addressee territory, but also as a mediated environment in which the apparently “peripheral” news content is portrayed as deictically close to the news audience which occupies the center of the DS.

As all these “rocks” pile up fast, two questions begin to emerge. The first has to do directly with the concept of proximization and its descriptive-theoretical potential: could the various manifestations and applications of proximization make up an integrated theory, and if so, what would be the explanatory power and range of such a theory considering the conceptual and methodological tools available and the foundations laid to date. The second question draws from the

4. Since recently, Chilton has been referring to his model as “Deictic Space Theory” (cf. Chilton 2011ab and the discussion in Section 2.2).
multiplicity of disciplines and domains that must be addressed in order to handle the first question: could such a theoretical trip disclose any deficits within the fields scrutinized? Could work towards proximization theory reveal/prove any problems with, say, capturing indirectness in cognitive linguistics or applying quantitative methods in socio-pragmatics? These two questions define two sets of goals of this book. I refer to them below as, respectively, “direct” and “indirect” goals.

1.3 Direct goals

Although, as we have seen, research involving proximization has a relatively short history, manifold approaches have accumulated that merit evaluation in terms of, viz. above, “[what] conceptual and methodological tools [are] available and [what] foundations [have been] laid to date”, in the service of building up proximization theory. Following the evaluation, the most promising and productive of the existing approaches must be chosen to process further data illustrating the mechanism of proximization in such a way that new domains where proximization operates could be identified and systematized, thus “feeding” and endorsing the arising theory. This procedure is captured in the following four steps which mark the direct goals of the present book, i.e.:

i. to bring together the different strands of research where proximization occurs as a concept and/or a methodological/descriptive tool, and assess them in terms of their explanatory power and the potential residing in the particular orientations (cognitive-linguistic, pragmatic, critical discourse analytic, etc.) to contribute to further work on proximization as a theory;

ii. to abstract a research domain (legitimization of interventionist discourse) that proves the most relevant regarding the current descriptive potential of proximization as well as the most fruitful in the way of providing significant amounts of diverse data endorsing the rationale for developing proximization theory;

iii. to construct from the existing fragmentary theoretical/empirical accounts of proximization, a consistent, fully-fledged, integrated model able to account for the research domain chosen (legitimization of interventionist discourse), with a view to more extensive applications;

iv. to corroborate the feasibility of the model in a quantitative-qualitative study of a type of political discourse whose inherent characteristics such as length of the discourse performance and dependence on the changing extralinguistic context, make the model demonstrate potential to reach beyond “the political” and handle discourses within the general area of public (institutionalized, mediatized) communication.
To accomplish (iv), the application of proximization theory in the “empirical” part of the book (Chapters 5 and 6; see chapter overview) will be, as was mentioned in 1.1, to the diachronic development and evolution of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric in the last decade (years 2001–2010). The fourth goal involves thus a “by-contribution”, to scholarship within areas of political and social sciences, especially those recognizing benefits of structured, quantitative-qualitative input from linguistics.

1.4 Theoretical environment and theoretical implications as indirect goals

The present book applies a cognitive-pragmatic methodology (aided, bottom-up, by corpus tools and controlled, top-down, by a critical perspective) to investigate widely appealing and socially consequential, political phenomena (ideology-enactment/enforcement, legitimization, persuasion, mystification, manipulation, etc.) which have thus far been addressed within frameworks too distant (or considered such) from one another to yield coherent and well documented (especially at lexico-grammatical levels) research results. The book’s aim is therefore to account for the mechanism of proximization in such a way that it invites new forms of dialogue among cognitive, pragmatic, critical and corpus approaches to (political) discourse analysis, transforming the observable similarities, overlaps and complementarities into interdisciplinary sets of methods that could be further applied in discourse analysis of political/public communication. This goal requires that the novel theoretical and empirical claims the book advances in respect to proximization, respond to more general theoretical deficits that can be spotted in the particular fields such as cognitive linguistics, pragmatics, critical discourse analysis, etc.

The spatial-temporal-axiological proximization model proposed in the book subsumes a strategic deployment of set amounts of lexico-grammatical choices, derived from cognitive categories of space, time and value, which fit current demands of dynamic, temporally-extensive, context. As such, the model naturally invites and relies on an interdisciplinary research program, involving cognitive, pragmatic, critical and corpus-based approaches. Ideally for such a program,

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5. Sociopolitical literature has quite frequently pointed to (though less often, used) the potential of esp. discourse studies, to contribute quantitatively verifiable and qualitatively interpretable data and thus enhance “scientific rigor” in political and social sciences. An excellent example of such a “synergy at work”, including also a historical sketch, is Political Economy, Linguistics and Culture: Crossing Bridges, edited by Juergen Backhaus (2008). See also Baker et al. (2008); Bondi (2007); Conboy (2006); Kovács and Wodak (2003).
these approaches/disciplines should compare with regard to a number of analytic tools and mind-sets such as commitment to introspection, empirical verification, qualitative postulates, quantitative endorsement, the research social mission, or the universality of application of research results. This is however not the case as differences abound. Cognitive Linguistics (CL), despite its eclecticism (Talmy 2006), may be offering the most evidence-based set of tools (aside from corpus linguistics which is, to many, more of a tool itself than a “discipline”; Stubbs 1997, 2001), for a bulk of its central claims are borne out by data from neuroscience and experimental psychology (Gibbs et al. 2004; Gibbs 2006; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Levinson 2003; Rohrer 2005). But, contrary to pragmatics, it does not have e.g. a systematic theory of indirect meaning, nor does it fulfill – contra e.g. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), among the many “critical” approaches – a social mission or imperative. Pragmatics, while contributing important foci on issues of communicative intention, effect, utterance and discourse context, implicature and inference, etc., has only recently adopted quantitative and experimental methods (Garrett and Harnish 2009; Breheny 2011; etc.), and only some of these studies are conducted with a view to accounting for social and sociopolitical dimensions of discourse (Wodak 2007; Baker et al. 2008; Romero-Trillo 2008). Critical linguistics (nowadays mostly practiced under the label of CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis); cf. multiple classic works by Fairclough, Kress, van Dijk, Wodak, Hodge; among others) has been, to date, the least organized and empirically-verifiable approach (objections range from Fowler (1985, 1996), over Widdowson (2004) and Chilton (2005b), to Hart (2010)), though it cannot be denied its advantageous (especially for the current project) commitment to the view of discourse as social action, as a means whereby socio-political environment (often broadly demarcated, another advantage) is reflected and constituted.

Given these cross-disciplinary differences and the apparent incongruities, realization of the direct goals of the book (see (i)–(iv)) simply must entail making more general diagnostic statements and constructive suggestions for integrating the cognitive-pragmatic-critical-corpus strands into a linguistic research schema as coherent as the existing overlaps and similarities allow; without that, the whole architecture of the proximization model as a three-tier, cognitive-pragmatic-lexico-grammatical edifice, is called into question in the first place. Such suggestions are voiced, first, in those parts of the book that directly compare various theoretical and empirical approaches to proximization (Chapter 2). Second, they emerge from the book’s structure and argument, in all these parts where particular analyses explicitly address or comment on the cognitive, pragmatic and lexico-grammatical ingredients they involve. Thus, even the parts with explicitly empirical orientation (for instance Chapter 6), are not completely devoid of theoretical considerations as the latter are prompted by the often unique character of
consecutively approached sets of data which entail “on-the-spot” comments on how effectively the different-level components of the proximization model (cognitive, pragmatic, lexical) respond to the new data.

The part of the model that is hoped to be the most innovative (in terms of its input into the interdisciplinary dialogue) and at the same time the most missing from other works trying to reconcile cognitive vs. pragmatic, as well as cognitive vs. critical, methodologies (Wilson 1990; Weiss and Wodak 2003; Fairclough 2003; Fetzer and Lauerbach 2007; van Dijk 1998, 2002, 2008, 2009; Chilton 2004; Evans and Chilton 2010; Hart 2010; Duszak 2002) is the account of the lexico-grammatical data. Lexico-grammatical choices are of key importance to proximization model since they help establish the deictic center, the deictic periphery, and thus help impose, in the service of socio-political legitimation, symbolic construals whereby the peripheral entities cross the distance in discourse space to permeate the deictic center. The model's account of lexico-grammatical patterns and how they respond to the changing extra-linguistic context within an extensive period of time draws on a number of cross-disciplinary premises. It follows the cognitive view of Discourse Space in terms of its “offline”, static, pre-existing, experientially-grounded organization and, further, its “online” dynamics of new meaning construction through conceptualization (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Langacker 2002; Chilton 2004; Evans and Green 2006). It aligns at places with cognitive metaphorical schemas; most notably those of state or political entities functioning as containers (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Gibbs 2005; etc.). Further, the model sets linguistic representations of mental representations and mappings to work pragmatically to accomplish goals which the dynamic nature of social and political context redefines the more the longer timeframe of legitimation is accounted for. Here we arrive at the biggest promise behind the model's treatment of lexico-grammatical choices. Not only does it merge, as has been sketched, the cognitive, pragmatic and social theoretical (critical) inputs, but it does so with the aim to capture time spans so extensive as to see the ratios of choices reflecting the spatial, temporal and axiological categories continually change and, as a result, reveal the shifting status of the “anchorage” dimensions of space, time and value – which is probably where the direct and indirect goals of the book most visibly meet. In accounting for the systematic pattern of these changes, the model assigns extra importance to the “axiological choices” (responsible for redressing the arising deficits in the use of spatially-grounded items), which is another original proposal the book advances (that is, showing ways to break down the “abstract” axiological groundwork into “tangible” lexico-grammatical constituents; cf. Cap 2010b). The credibility of this proposal relies, as anything that has to do with the identification and counts of lexico-grammatical choices of whichever type, on engagement of corpus techniques, hence their implementation in Chapters 5 and 6.
It would be unjust to say that the interdisciplinary dialogue this book promotes (as its “indirect” goal) has not been encouraged, in the thematic field the book explores and the theoretical fields it draws from – another thing is, however, to what extent such a dialogue was conducted, how large were the data investigated, and how rigorous or systematic, were the methods. Van Dijk’s (mainly 1993, 1995; but also 2008, 2009) theory of social cognitions recognizes the embodiment in the minds of individuals of socially shared mental structures (attitudes, ideologies, etc.), postulating they get acquired, used and changed through texts. O’Halloran (2003, 2005) observes recent developments in CDA have seen a dynamic space created for interdisciplinary work combining text analysis with socio-cultural and socio-political analysis. Many metaphor analysts have been working at the intersection of cognitive, critical and corpus approaches, thus building up the framework of Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004; Musolff 2004; Zinken 2007; Semino 2008; Hart 2010). One should applaud attempts of some of these metaphor studies (Charteris-Black 2004; Musolff 2004) to provide qualitative hypotheses with quantitative verifications, though the scope of inquiry has been rather limited – in terms of the nature and the amount of data analyzed. Conversely, in works of a'la van Dijk or O’Halloran, the scope of proposals is vast, but the methods remain very much qualitative (see also Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2008), and anytime they get a quantitative bent, the study’s length and focus inevitably shrink, as in Baker et al. (2008). In contrast to these works, the present project conveys an explicit message that such concessions are not inevitable.

The space I have devoted to discussing theoretical implications of this book, its “indirect goals”, should not overshadow the more obvious empirical advantages following from the domain the proximization model is applied to in the book. The present project is, viz. “goal (iv)” in Section 1.3, the first book-length, systematic, model-based diachronic account of “the whole” of the US administration’s anti-terrorist rhetoric practiced (mostly in the service of legitimization of near-term policies) since “war-on-terror” was announced on the night of the 9/11 attacks, until the end of that turbulent decade. The description of how anti-terrorist rhetoric has been evolving in the context of momentous social, geopolitical, as well as warfare, developments (e.g. the WMD intelligence failure in Iraq) is addressed to not only “linguists” (such as (political) discourse analysts, cognitive linguists, pragmaticians, rhetoricians, the “critical community”, etc.), but also those

6. Hodges (2011) is a project in some ways similar to the present book. However, his analysis of the post-9/11 anti-terrorist rhetoric, involving presidential speeches, the US media discourse, and focus group interviews of the American public, does not propose a uniform theoretical model to handle these heterogeneous sets of data.
working in social and political sciences (notably social psychologists), including the heterogeneous group of political language practitioners: speechwriters, journalists, media and political commentators, and more.

1.5 Chapter overview

Chapter 2 introduces and defines the concept of proximization from the perspective of the cognitive, pragmatic and critical approaches that have evolved in the past few years (cf. Section 1.2, “A brief history of proximization”, above). I scrutinize each of these approaches in terms of the breadth of scope, explanatory power, and the potential to contribute to further development of proximization theory. I contrast the works which describe the concept of proximization as attached to one principal orientation (e.g. cognitive-linguistic, in Chilton) and handle it instrumentally to advance other theories, with those which recognize proximization’s potential to straddle the conceptual boundaries to become an independent (however interdisciplinary) theory in linguistics. Discussing contributions by especially Chilton, Cap, Hart and Dunmire, and embedding the discussion in issues of interdisciplinary dialogue, I conclude that sufficient evidence has accumulated to propose that proximization be more thoroughly investigated, as a candidate for a cognitive-pragmatic-critical theory of symbolic organization and construals of/in socio-political, public discourse space. I further conclude that the approach that is currently the most promising in the way of providing more theoretical and empirical evidence and large yet structured data for such investigations is Cap’s legitimization approach focusing, in its thematic bent, on political interventionist discourse.

The task of Chapter 3 is to document the validity of the postulate made at the end of Chapter 2, the claim that studies in political legitimization (in interventionist discourse) seem the most productive to endorse the methodological and theoretical potential of proximization. I argue that political legitimization processes, which often involve organized sets of strategies responsible for positive self-presentation and continual enactment of leadership, are usually characterized by substantial length and a variety of methods that need to be used to maintain the legitimization stance over time. The often unstable geopolitical contexts of interventionist discourses are a special challenge since they require these methods to be able to respond to extra-linguistic developments at virtually any time within the global legitimization process; thus, the methods must be strategically organized to ensure maximal promptness and flexibility of responses. This makes legitimization of interventionist discourse an excellent terrain of investigation by a theoretical apparatus such as proximization. That is because
proximization provides necessary interdisciplinary tools to study the constancy of the macro function of the political/public speaker’s performance within a timeframe of considerable length and density/diversity of events construed by the addressee as personally consequential. I include a number of examples to show how different linguistic enactments of proximization can handle the different critical moments within the legitimization timeframe. Most examples draw from the language of the Iraq war but some illustrate legitimization processes outside the direct context of the war-on-terror (in, for instance, anti-immigration discourse). The point is to make a preliminary statement on the envisaged universality of proximization theory and to give a foretaste of the discussion – in Chapter 7 – of its possible further applications.

Chapter 4 formally presents the conceptual framework of the proximization model to be applied, in Chapters 5 and 6, in an integrated, qualitative-quantitative analysis of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric 2001–2010. I define the three aspects of proximization, spatial, temporal, and axiological, which constitute the cognitive architecture of the model, paving the way for a pragmatic, context-determined deployment of the lexico-grammatical “bricks”, the corpus material assigned (in Chapter 5) to the categories of space, time, and value. I describe spatial proximization as a forced construal of physical threat exerted in an increasingly salient way by an apparently peripheral member of the DS, upon the DS central elements (i.e. the speaker and her direct audience). Temporal proximization is described as a construal of the envisaged conflict as not only imminent, but also momentous and historic and thus needing immediate response and unique preventive measures. Finally, axiological proximization is defined as a forced construal of a gathering ideological clash between the “home values” of the DS central entities and the alien and antagonistic values which could one day materialize within the speaker’s and the addressee’s home territory. Altogether, the three aspects or strategies of proximization contribute to the continual narrowing of the symbolic distance between the entities/values in discourse space and their negative impact on the speaker and her direct addressee. As such, they constitute legitimization devices: political discourse addressees will not legitimize the political leader’s pre-emptive actions against the “gathering threat” unless they perceive the threat as personally consequential. These general remarks are voiced in the final parts of the chapter, which concludes with two qualitative hypotheses. The first is that the STA model’s composition allows application to timeframes even longer and more complex than e.g. the Iraq war. The second is that the three strategies could be considered – ultimately, when the supporting lexico-grammatical material is brought into the picture – in terms of functional variables compensating, mutually, for any context-motivated drops in the individual representations within the timeframe analyzed.
Chapter 5 describes the methodology of the empirical task of the book, a diachronic account of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric validating the two hypotheses about the STA model above. It presents three typological frameworks, spatial, temporal, and axiological, reflecting the functions of the three proximization strategies. Each of the frameworks comprises a set number of categories which include the key lemmas and grammatical patterns responsible for the enactment of a given strategy. The chapter describes what corpus is categorized in the frameworks, how frequency counts of the key lexico-grammatical constructs are derived from the categories and which periods in the 2001–2010 decade are compared in terms of the counts to demonstrate the continuity of the overall proximization (and thus, legitimization) formula, despite the changing input from the individual strategies. The corpus includes c. 400 texts of the 2001–2010 US presidential speeches and remarks. It is divided into four sub-corpora: (1) Sep. 11, 2001 – Oct. 31, 2003; (2) Nov. 1, 2003 – Jun. 30, 2004; (3) Jul. 1, 2004 – Jan. 19, 2009; (4) Jan. 20, 2009 – Dec. 31, 2010. Each of the sub-corpora reveals different configurations of proximization strategies.

Chapter 6 interprets, comparatively and diachronically, the quantitative data provided in Chapter 5. I discuss the frequency counts in the four sub-corpora to prove the presence of different proximization strategies in the four periods. I claim these changes reveal a context-determined evolution of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric in the years 2001–2010. It is shown that the rhetoric of the first period is dominated by spatial and temporal proximization. Assuming the presence of a clear, direct, tangible threat, the rhetoric seeks an ultra-fast and unequivocal legitimization of, first, the retaliatory action in Afghanistan and, later, the pre-emptive war on Iraq. The second period is marked by axiological proximization, redefining the case for the Iraq war, foregrounding the stable ideological rationale for the intervention, and downplaying its pre-emptive character. The third period sees a growing salience of temporal proximization, which is re-applied to re-enact strong leadership based on rational judgment and competence in the assessment of the past and the present, and the visualization of the future. The fourth period, under the rule of the Obama government, reveals the most balanced and in sum rather moderate input from all the three proximization strategies, among which axiological and temporal proximization appear relatively the most salient. The qualitative interpretation of the quantitative data making up the four sub-corpora validates the two hypotheses put forward at the end of Chapter 4. The STA model seems indeed well-suited to account for the 2001–2010 decade of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric in terms of an organized, continual, and systematic legitimization pattern, involving different and flexible inputs from the three proximization strategies, applied in diverse ratios and configurations to respond to the particular needs of the current moment.
Chapter 7 considers further empirical applications of the STA proximization model. In its first part, I give specimens of four public space discourses, which, however differing in thematic, locational, and cultural terms, reveal enough similarity at the conceptual level to be accounted for in terms of the STA model. The first three are Anglo-Saxon discourses, marking domains widely explored within the current CDA paradigm: health, environment, and modern technology. The fourth is a non-Anglo-Saxon discourse, representing the Polish parliamentary arena. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that the application of the STA model to these discourses promises further empirical extensions, assuming extra theoretical tools are implemented, and revisions made regarding the concepts of the in-out distinction, interventionist discourse, legitimization, and discourse space. I claim that in order for the STA model to represent “a cognitive-pragmatic-critical theory of symbolic organization and construals of/in socio-political, public discourse space” (Chapter 2’s promise), its internal structure may need a modification (appropriating, for instance, more insights from conceptual-critical metaphor approaches) and its current scope will need further extension along the lines proposed in the chapter. I conclude that while proximization theory as advanced in the book may need theoretical refinements/additions and many more empirical tests, its main functional orientation – the pragmatics of symbolic distance crossing – is likely to remain legitimization since the very mechanism of the proximization shifts almost always involves the addressee’s recognition of personal as well as socio-political consequentiality of the events construed – which in turn constitutes a legitimization premise.
CHAPTER 2

Proximization as a (linguistic) concept

“Political discourse in particular might well have a distinctive tendency to invoke spatial representations … bound up with the close-remote system.” (Chilton 2004)

2.1 Introduction

The task of this chapter is to discuss major works, theories and models involving the concept of proximization, as well as the ways it has been worked on, utilized or just addressed over the past couple of years (cf. Section 1.2). My specific aim is to assess these works in terms of a contribution they could make to the development of an integrated proximization theory; to show which ideas prompt such a development and which potentially hinder it. This entails that I scrutinize the particular approaches (primarily Chilton, Cap, Hart and Dunmire, plus – collectively – a number of less theoretically minded approaches) for their breadth of scope, explanatory power and, crucially, the ability to engage (viz. Section 1.4) in an interdisciplinary dialogue necessary for the sound functioning of the arising theory. Except Section 2.7 the chapter is structured chronologically – to give the best picture possible, of the step-by-step development of proximization as a linguistic concept. Since all research subsuming proximization is relatively young, researchers – an actively cooperating circle of analysts¹ – borrow from one another or relate to previous findings very consistently and accurately, while at the same time adding up their own insights. Notwithstanding this apparent harmony, differences in approach abound; for some analysts proximization is a “tool” to help advance other, “bigger” theories, and for some it has the makings of a theory itself. I systematize these differences and give a general account of the most promising paths in the summary part of the chapter; though, naturally, many evaluative comments are also made “in passing” as we move around the particular theories and authors.

¹. Cf. the workshop “Perspectives on proximization: Recognizing boundaries, building bridges” held during the 42nd Poznań Linguistic Meeting (May 2011; http://ifa.amu.edu.pl/plm/2011/PLM2011_Workshop_sessions) as an example.
2.2 Paul Chilton: From “representational proximising” in “geopolitical spaces” to Deictic Space Theory

There would not be any attempt such as the present one, to propose proximisation “theory”, but for the work of Paul Chilton. The aspects of Chilton’s research relevant to the current proposal can be categorized in two groups: (i) an attempt (2004) to provide a cognitive linguistic (at the level of representation) yet critically minded (at the level of interpretation), visual model of spatial, temporal and modal conceptualizations in (political) discourse;² (ii) a much more formalized, cognitive scientific attempt (2005a, 2010, 2011ab) to utilize concepts from the 3-dimensional coordinate and vector geometry, to address some classic questions in Linguistics as a discipline, in the area of lexis and grammatical constructions (first within sentences, but with a view to the description of discourse).

2.2.1 The 2004 approach: 3-d positioning and representations of the Kosovo war

In Chilton (2004: 57ff.) a central claim is made that in processing any discourse people “position” other entities in their “world” (Fauconnier 1985; Werth 1999) by “positioning” these entities in relation to themselves along three axes, space, time and modality. The deictic center (the Self, i.e. I, we, etc.) is the origin of the three dimensions. Other entities (arguments of predicates, from a grammatical standpoint) and processes (predicates) “exist” relative to ontological spaces defined by their coordinates on the space (s), time (t) and modality (m) axes (see Figure 1). This makes it possible, Chilton argues, to conceptualize the ongoing kaleidoscope of ontological configurations activated by text.

On Chilton’s (2004) view, the space axis s includes spatial deictic expressions, e.g. pronouns. The speaker (Self, which may be I or a we-group) is at here. The entities indexed by 2nd- and 3rd-person pronouns are “situated” along s, some nearer to, some more remote from Self and thus close to “Other”. Chilton acknowledges analytic limitations: we cannot actually measure the “distances” from Self; his idea is that people tend to place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the self, using background assumptions and indexical cues. He makes no attempt, however, to explain how these indexical cues and linguistic material in general could be used strategically by a discourse producer (e.g. political speaker) to have the addressee construe the entities’ shifts (especially “inward” shifts construed through the use of verb phrases – “the revolution is getting closer”, etc.)

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² Rather impressionistic, as will be claimed.
from their principal location on s (VPs are in fact missing from Chilton’s s axis). I will consider it, later in the chapter, a major problem and an unrealized potential of Chilton’s theory. Meanwhile, let us note that Chilton’s s also locates entities that have metaphoric social distance, such as “near relations” or “remote connection”.

On the t axis, the origin is the time of speaking, “surrounded”, as Chilton (2004:58) puts it, “by an area that counts as ‘now’”. Since time has a conceptualization in terms of motion through space (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; etc.), relative distance to or from Self, events which carry a time of happening as part of their conceptualization, can be located as “near” or “distant”, e.g. “the time to act has arrived” or “we are still a long way from the accomplishment of our mission”. Importantly, in his account of the t axis, Chilton paves the way for the study of historical analogy as a means of proximization. He says, “for political discourse (...) time periods can be of considerable importance – history, and which parts are ‘close’ to the ‘us’ is central to national ideologies (...)” (: 59). Again, however, there is little elaboration at the level of what lexico-grammatical choices or categories in political discourse are or could be employed systematically for the best rhetorical effects of equaling the “past” with the “now”.

Chilton’s m (modality) axis involves several strands. Following the assumption that all modality can be conceptualized, like space and time, in terms of remoteness (viz. “remotely possible”, “far from the truth”), it involves epistemic and deontic modality scales, and – since deontic meaning is tied with the speaker’s belief systems about morality, legality, power, authority, etc. (see e.g. Saeed 1997) –

3. That is, “construed time”. Expect an in-depth discussion of “construed" vs. “real” time in Chapter 4 and later. As will be shown, proximization involves linguistic expressions of construed, rather than real, time.
also the “right-wrong” scale where legally or morally “wrong” actions or states are located as distant from Self. Given all this, the $m$ axis seems the most problematic when it comes to representation and proximization of entities assigned to it. Take a “real-life” example. A political speaker could get her mandate to act by claiming that, otherwise, a negative thing “must happen” – in which case proximizing the event logically reflects and draws on, the conception of *must* located close to the *deictic center*. But this logic is clearly inconsistent with another way in which the political speaker could solicit legitimization of her preventive response, namely by invoking the closeness of legally and morally “wrong”, ideologically antagonistic entities – which are however defined as distant from the deictic center. So, while the speaker’s alternative move seems another perfectly logical act of proximization *in practice*, it at the same time reveals problems with the theoretical design of the $m$ axis, at least as a possible “avenue” for the construed movement of proximized entities in the direction of the deictic center. The actual discourse cases such as above show that the “epistemic modality distance” and the “ideological distance” may have a completely different “length”, which puts a question mark over any possible generalizations regarding the mechanism of proximization along the $m$ axis.4

This controversy brings us to the natural question: how does Chilton’s (2004) 3-d representational model work in practice? Chilton (2004) provides answers based, among others, on his analysis of the discourse of the Kosovo war (1998–1999), especially the Clinton administration attempts to justify the NATO military actions to end the war. Below I report, at necessary length, on one such analysis. Following this report is a preliminary evaluation part, which assesses the usability of the model and the way it subsumes the proximization mechanism. Further assessment is given, as has been indicated, towards the end of the section (2.2), and then in the last part of the chapter, which gives a comparative account of all the approaches and theories presented.

Chilton (2004: 142ff.) works with the following text, an excerpt from President Clinton’s TV address to the American nation on March 24, 1999:5, 6

(25) Ending this [Kosovo] tragedy is a moral imperative. (26) It is also important to America’s national interest. (27) Take a look at this map. (28) Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both the Western and Orthodox branches of

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4. Note the absence of a separate modality module or framework in the model proposed in the present book (see also Section 2.3.1 below).

5. The day the NATO intervention in Kosovo began.

6. I have saved the original numbering of the sentences (25–41).
Christianity. (29) To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. (30) And all around Kosovo there are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges – countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. (31) All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious division. (32) Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. (33) World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. (34) In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. (35) Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die. (36) We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. (37) The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either. (38) And let's not forget what happened – innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries; a quarter of a million people killed, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they were. (39) Two million Bosnians became refugees. (40) This was genocide in the heart of Europe – not in 1945, but in 1995. (41) Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve.

Chilton's analysis can be described as follows. At the intersection point (the origin) of the three axes (see Figure 2 below; numbers refer to the sentences or ((30′)–(31′)) sentence parts responsible for a particular conceptual operation) is “this map” (President Clinton is seen pointing to a visual aid). The map itself does not represent an objective reality (though it may be taken to do so by viewers); its task is to launch a reality space to be specified by the verbal commentary. An important presupposition obtains: addressees must, in order to interpret the unfolding text as coherent, infer that (27) and the following sentences are intended to motivate (26) (that national interests are at stake) and (25) (that action is a moral imperative). On that presupposition, sentences (28), (29) and (30) can be regarded as setting up a “map representation” space. This is, Chilton (: 143) notes, “a conventional pragmatic function, by which cartographic images are taken to represent objective reality spaces (cf. Fauconnier 1985: 3–34)” . “This map” in the studio (or “in” the viewer’s (addressee's) area) represents a conceptual space that is mutually understood as remote (viz. “there” in (31)), but which the map presented “here” and “now” brings into conceptual closeness (thus “proximizing” Kosovo). In the process of defining the map’s conceptual projection space the addressee is prompted, Chilton argues, by the modal “could” (30′) “… countries that could be overwhelmed by a large new wave of refugees from Kosovo”, to launch a space
at the possibility point of \( m \)\(^7 \) and in the near future zone of \( t \). This is not part of the televised map picture; it is part of the conceptual “picture” produced by the discourse. The proximization of the Kosovo space and its entities is crucial for the transition to (31) which expresses a generalized likelihood of a major military conflict and thus threat to American interests. In (31), the positioning of the (31’) embedded clause (“… who has done nothing since the Cold War but start new wars and pour gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious divisions”) as syntactic and intonational focus furthers this likelihood by metaphor: the “flames of divisions” (refugees fleeing from Kosovo) will cause a major “fire” in the region as they “meet” with (more) “gasoline”.

I have indicated before that Chilton’s (2004) work involves important (however largely unsupported at the level of lexis) insights in historical analogy as a possible means of proximization along the \( t \) axis. In the analysis of Clinton’s speech, Chilton notes that the geopolitical and historical space is extended “backwards”, metonymically, by reference to the spatial location “Sarajevo” (32). Kosovo is linked to Sarajevo (“the capital of neighboring Bosnia”), and Sarajevo is linked

\(^7\) Chilton actually writes: “end” [of \( m \)], but that seems to me a mere oversight; the endpoint of \( m \) is, in his model, irrealis.
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metonymically to World War I, and World War I to World War II and the Holocaust. The links can be considered metonymic since the relation between Kosovo, Sarajevo and WWI is one of conceptual “contiguity” in a geopolitical/historical-knowledge frame. “Sarajevo” is used to evoke the whole WWI frame, and “this region” (33) is used in the same metonymic fashion to evoke the WWII and Holocaust frames. These discursively linked frames form the basis for two sets of generalizations: (31) relating to the geographical space conceptualized “around” Kosovo, and (34)–(35) relating to the flashback historical space conceptualized in connection with Sarajevo. These generalizations, Chilton concludes, are used in turn as the basis for (36) and its elaboration in (37)–(41), which, finally, yield analogy between Bosnia (and by inference the other wars mentioned) and Kosovo.

Altogether, Chilton’s (2004) work offers some excellent conceptual premises for the development of proximization theory. First of all, it recognizes the fundamental role of distance from Self (deictic center) in representing and conceptualizing entities and events in (political) discourse. Obvious as this property may seem, it is a crucial prerequisite for any proximization, i.e. any linguistic way of construing distant objects and happenings as close to the deictic center shared by the speaker and her addressee. Second, it acknowledges that the distance is relative and that it is symbolically represented through discourse. This, in turn, makes possible further explorations in how the symbolic representations can be evoked strategically, for pragmatic effects. Third, Chilton shows that distance involves a number of mutually interactive dimensions (spatial, temporal and modal, in his model), which make mental representations of entities and events arise from a combined activation of different cognitive domains. Accordingly, proximization as a mechanism of “distance crossing”, must also draw from different cognitive categories, for some common general purpose. Chilton gives a sense of what one such purpose in real-life political discourse might be: his account of Clinton’s speech is labeled, generally, as “justifying war” (: 152). Naturally, this is a very tentative proposal which needs quantitative lexico-grammatical endorsement – as does a number of other critically minded proposals Chilton advances, for instance the idea that “flashback historical spaces” (see above) serve mainly to set up analogies whose job is to conflate the past with the present.

Note that in political discourse (and especially e.g. foreign policy discourse) the reality or realities pictured in mental representations often could not be actually present for the speaker and her addressee. The speaker thus has to do a lot of discursive work to enable, or induce the addressee to establish a representation, relative to Self. This makes political discourse a primary terrain for symbolic discourse operations (such as proximization) that take for granted the point where Self is located, i.e. deictic center.
This last remark brings up the question of “weaknesses” of Chilton’s (2004) model; perhaps not so much its “objective” weaknesses, as the points that seem left unattended from the specific perspective of strategic, pragmalinguistically imposed construals of distance and proximity in discourse – i.e., proximization.

In a capsule, Chilton’s (2004) model can be described as a theory of general and relatively “fixed” conceptual organization of entities in (political) discourse space. Its aim is to show how people’s mental representations are positioned with respect to three cognitive dimensions; it is clearly not to show how people are made to establish representations that would suit the accomplishment of the discourse goals pursued by the (political) speaker. The latter aim would have to involve more lexico-grammatical input, a systematic account of quantifiable lexico-grammatical items responsible for locating entities and events at different (measurable) distances from the deictic center. A qualitative analysis of these items’ counts could then uncover regularities defining the speaker’s pragmatic goals, especially within larger timeframes. It could turn out, for instance, that at one point it is atrocities in Kosovo (the modal dimension) that serve as the major premise for the intervention, but at another point the justification is based on the projected geographical closeness of the conflict (the spatial dimension). Chilton’s model does not, however, supply quantifiable linguistic input to allow such an analysis; its assignment of meanings to particular zones on the three axes is not based on quantitative salience, nor is it based, in fact, on any linguistically verifiable evidence or criteria.

Consequently, Chilton’s (2004) conception of “proximizing” is mostly organizational and representational, in the sense that it merely recognizes discourse roles of certain words and expressions carrying “proximizing” meanings which are, as if, definitionally assigned a position on one of the three axes. This position is static insofar as its pragmatic input in the unfolding discourse is concerned. For instance, a “could” will keep proximizing possibility along the $m$ axis, an “Other” entity (arbitrarily distinguished because of the lack of defining criteria at the lexical level) will keep proximizing (its) physical impact along the $s$ axis, and a “here and now” mention of a consequential past event will usually serve to conflate the past with the present, along the $t$ axis. The three proximizations will operate with a relatively stable intensity. Chilton’s approach does not allow for a different salience of these proximizations, mutual compensations, one taking over from another in the realization of the discourse social goals, etc. – all of which could be triggered by the changing requirements of the geopolitical context. The reason is that it simply does not propose language tools to define different degrees of distance from the deictic center and thus handle different intensities of
lexically-realized proximization in actual discourse.\textsuperscript{9, 10} This is rather unfortunate because any “discourse” which carries a macro goal (such as long-term justification) often has to react strategically, through changes in its lexical and textual manifestations, to the dynamically changing extralinguistic context, and “political discourse” is a prototypical area where such changes occur and thus need accounting for. However, such an account would require a stronger pragmatic (especially macro-pragmatic) orientation, which Chilton’s (2004) model, anchored in classic premises of Cognitive Linguistics, does not possess; it clearly prioritizes issues of abstract general representation over issues of specific construal operations in the service of specific socio-political goals. As such, it somewhat endorses Verhagen’s (2007: 49) skepticism concerning “a substantial amount of arbitrariness” behind any classificatory systems in CL of language forms reflecting different conceptualizations. Verhagen’s view seems, incidentally, a voice of disappointment at insufficient contact, in general terms, between Cognitive Linguistics, Pragmatics and critical linguistic approaches. Indeed, while CL’s central notion of construal (the same situation/event can be conceptualized in different ways) could sit extremely well within socio-pragmatic and critical discourse analytic focus on ideology, power, etc., and their enactment/enforcement through language, attempts to classify “construal operations” (Langacker 1987, 1991, 2002, 2008; Croft and Cruse 2004) from the function perspective of socio-political goals they perform have been rare.

2.2.2 Discourse Space Theory or Deictic Space Theory?

Has Chilton, since 2004, become aware of these limitations? Intriguingly enough, his 2004–2011 research in aspects of the 3-d representation of mental processing and positioning in communication, reveals a gradual departure from the term “discourse”. In fact, “discourse” remains the discussion hub until approximately

\textsuperscript{9}. See, again, a sample problem with the \textit{m} axis. Would the proximization effect depend on (i) how much ideologically “threatening” is the “remote” entity (recall the morality/legality scale), or (ii) how many times is that entity evoked in the speaker's discourse, construing the entity as “close” to the addressee? Conceivably, only (ii) could possibly be “measured”.

\textsuperscript{10}. Proximization cannot be performed in discourse without its verbal component, which is responsible for enacting construals of remote entities as close to the deictic center. Chilton (Figure 2) is reluctant to acknowledge that; his organization of discourse space is based, primarily, on entities that are expressed through nominal phrases and pronouns (which is one of the reasons why I consider it “static” – see above). Despite the name (“Events located on spatial, temporal and modal axes”), Figure 2 does not really specify where e.g. verb phrases (predicating the “events”) should be located.
2009, after which “deixis” seems to take over, at least as far as terminology is concerned. This is reflected in the labels Chilton himself uses (2011) to characterize his 2004–2011 work; he refers to his 2004 model as “Discourse Space Theory” and to the later (especially 2010–2011) developments, as “Deictic Space Theory”. At the same time, however, his recent work makes us believe, viz. below, that most of the original conceptual apparatus has not changed. Why, then, the terminological change, one might ask?

I take this change as an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that Chilton’s (2004–2011) theory is not yet suited to handle some complex phenomena in discourse. By these “complex phenomena” I mean, primarily, pragmatic features of macro-discourses. Macro-discourses are, like genres, pragmatically flexible macrostructures: they involve strategic adjustment of certain amounts of linguistic material to realize (or rather, keep realizing, over a substantial time period) the speaker’s macro-goal (such as the Clinton administration’s goal to justify the NATO’s mission in Kosovo). Chilton’s (2004–2011) theoretical proposals, as has been indicated, do not provide tools to capture such variations since they have, in short, no serious quantitative-empirical bent. Proximization is a good case in point. Much as it arises, conceptually, from the premises of the 2004 model, it is at the same time constrained by this model; its capacity to account for space shifts in terms of speaker’s adjustments of lexical configurations is hindered by the model’s abstract, idealized, representational nature.

Accordingly, Chilton’s (especially 2010, 2011a, b) Deictic Space Theory operates, mostly/initially, at sentence level, trying to incorporate and account for the lexico-grammatical ingredient from there. The core of the 2004 model remains: deixis is recognized as fundamental to language structure and processing, three kinds of deixis define a conceptual reality space, conceptualization of entities and actions in the space occurs relative to three “axes” which intersect at deictic origin where S (speaker) is located. There are a few modifications. The s axis is now a conceptual distance axis, as well as an “ideological” axis; it marks both physical distance of entities indicated by sentence referents and, potentially, degrees of “sympathy” of the speaker, as Chilton puts it. At the remote end of this new, d, axis, are usually entities which constitute, syntactically, the focus of the reference chain. The m axis is, then, “only” epistemic; it reflects the speaker’s degree of commitment to the reality of her proposition. Finally, simplified “who does what to whom relations” are simplified vector relations (marked by arrows).

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11. An observation shared by the majority of genre theorists; cf. Bazerman (1988); Bhatia (1993); Gruber and Muntigl (2005); Martin and Rose (2008); among others.

Chapter 2. Proximization as a (linguistic) concept

Within this schema, a primarily sentence-level model, the crucial issue of “embedded conceptual realities ($R'$)” or “embedded worlds” (represented through the transformation of axes) is, arguably, much better elucidated. Figure 3 is a representation of a “belief world” expressed in (1) Mary believes John broke the vase yesterday. The representation in Figure 3 is thus, under the new terminology, a “Deictic Space Model (DSM)” for (1). There are two ways to proceed, Chilton claims. One is micro-textual; we try and build a series of DSMs for the consecutive sentences/clauses that make up a text. The other is macro-textual; the goal is to build a DSM or DSMs summarizing the basic conceptual structure underlying a text (and possibly, “discourse”).

While Chilton (2011a, b) gives examples of macro-textual DSMs, I do not comment on them here. I consider them a hard-to-explain return to the aspirations of the 2004 model, which has not been upgraded – at text/discourse level – with regard to the problems raised in 2.2.1. I do not believe they offer any extra explanatory power compared to, for instance, representations such as captured in Figure 2.

I applaud, however, the micro-textual agenda, even though it seems to offer less in the way of accounting for proximization shifts, which are essentially a discourse phenomenon. Indeed, in the micro-textual strand of the 2010–2011 DST there are no direct benefits for proximization theory. There are, nonetheless, very

Figure 3. “Mary believes John broke the vase yesterday” (adapted from Chilton 2011a)
important implications. A clause by clause DSM is impossible to build, Chilton claims, without a *systematic* identification of classes of discourse referents (NPs) *assignable to d* axis (emphasis mine). Nor can it be built without a *systematic* identification of classes of relations modeled as vectors (VPs). Both classes should include, Chilton argues, only *major* referents or relations, if space shifts observed at sentence level are to qualify as representative at text level. I read these postulates (Chilton does not, or has not yet, illustrate(d) them) as an acknowledgment of the necessity of having quantifiable linguistic material contribute to the model (whether DST or any model that has to do with a symbolic representation of distance and proximity). Since, as I have argued before, it is lexico-grammatical salience that lies at the core of proximization as a construal operation forced *through discourse*, proximization theory must not ignore this acknowledgement even if it follows, like in Chilton, from essentially (or initially) sentence-level considerations. As will be documented in the next section, my own work on proximization (2005–) has demonstrated an increasingly greater awareness of that.

2.3 Piotr Cap: Proximization for legitimization; in search of quantifiable evidence

Evidently enough, Chilton’s research is not centered around proximization as such; it rather subsumes proximization (“representational proximizing”, in Chilton’s [2004: 153] own words) in the service of advancing Discourse/Deictic Space Theory. DST is, as has been mentioned, an essentially cognitive-linguistic (or even cognitive-grammatical, in its 2010–2011 bent) framework. Proximization, as an element of this framework, must thus follow its orientation, design and explanatory aspirations. In that respect, DST can be described as a successful theory of *organization* of discourse/deictic space. Proximization fits in with the model only as far as its *existence* as a conceptual phenomenon is concerned; there is no way DST could account for proximization in terms of its input in the realization of socio-political discourse goals defined by the dynamic social environment.

In contrast, my research, in which proximization is more of an “end” than a “means”, is heavily pragmatic, i.e. it keeps raising questions of specific discourse goals a strategic enactment of proximization is supposed to accomplish. This pragmatic commitment does not, in any way, break contact with issues of

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13. Since many of the ideas reported on in this section become foundations of the proximization model proposed later in the book, I only provide a sketchy account of my work. It should be read primarily as an “expose” of what general conceptual tenets proximization theory must not ignore and what general components the proximization model must possess.
representation addressed in Chilton. That would be counter-productive, since proximization theory needs abstraction of language forms from cognitive categories (such as space or time) in the first place, so as to propose directions in which those forms could be applied, in (socio-political) discourse space. Interdisciplinarity of the pragmatic approach does not stop here; in addition to the “upward” (Beaugrande 1997; van Dijk 2008) cognitive connection, there is also a “downward” link, to actual configurations of lexico-grammatical forms performing proximization, and to changes in these configurations which occur relative to (extralinguistic, social, geopolitical) context. Since measuring these changes involves word counts, we also need corpus approach in the picture. Such a picture will not of course be complete but for a “critical” issue, of social consequentiality (Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2009) of proximization theory. Thus, the pragmatic mind-set makes us eventually engage in a highly interdisciplinary research enterprise, an agenda which is step-by-step followed in my 2005– work on proximization.

This “step-by-step” research agenda has involved, mostly, an increasingly greater awareness of the need to appropriate tools from disciplines (or methodologies) other than or beyond the “traditional” pragmatics, especially quantitative methods. Below follows a necessarily synthetic account of how this awareness has formed over the years. It inevitably ties in with the question of how legitimization has been recognized as the social goal defining/controlling the deployment of proximization strategies.

2.3.1 The conceptual and “qualitative” stage

Cap (2005, 2006) are first in my 2005–2010 series of studies in symbolic representations evoked in the discourse of the Iraq war (2003–2004) and as such they provide some pilot war-on-terror data and its preliminary interpretation. More importantly for the current sketch, they provide representative answers to how the model proposed in the present book started, how it was inspired by Chilton’s work, and what observations were made that had some aspects of the 2005–2006 analyses, and most aspects of later studies, depart from that work. In terms of the conceptual organization of the discourse space, Cap (2005, 2006) recognizes (and keeps this premise in later research) three dimensions, spatial, temporal, and axiological. The spatial dimension involves physical entities conceptualized in different and variable degrees of geographical and geopolitical distance from deictic center. The temporal dimension involves, in principle, points in time when

14. See discussion in Section 1.4.
past or anticipated actions by entities construed in the spatial dimension took, or will take, place. The axiological dimension involves beliefs and values of, again, entities construed in the spatial dimension. Compared to Chilton’s Discourse/Deictic Space Theory, the most significant differences are the following. No separate modal dimension is recognized since epistemic modality is considered part of all predication, which is the domain of the spatio-temporal dimension, in the sense that events, actions, are construed as co-ordinated movements, in time, of spatially grounded entities (an NP/VP interface, at lexico-grammatical level). The temporal dimension, while mainly the domain of “real time”, allows, at lexical level, for “extra” markers, of construed time. As of 2005–2006, there is however no suggestion how these markers could be (more or less) systematically abstracted – and there will not be any such proposal, until Chapter 5 of the present book. Last but not least, there is a postulate for an independent axiological dimension, “independent” in the sense of not being conflated with another dimension, as in the 2010–2011 DST. This postulate (crucial for the further development of the proximization model, as will turn out) follows from an empirical observation. Proximization rhetorical effects (for instance the effect of soliciting legitimization of preventive response to the impact of proximized antagonistic entities (see Chapter 1)) build up over time, their speed and ultimate force depending on whether the impact is construed as “physical”, or (just/primarily) “ideological” (at least for the moment the conceptualization takes place). Examples (2) and (3) illustrate, respectively, the discourse enforcement of these two construals:

(2) The [WMD] dangers must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and our cities.

(G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003; adapted from Cap 2006: 3)

(3) By advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.

(G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003; adapted from Cap 2006: 109)

15. An example of “lexical marker of construed time” is A in “A September morning.” It profiles a dated moment of time to have the phrase apply to timeframes beyond that moment/date. Expect a detailed discussion of the phrase, a favorite of Bush’s anti-terrorist rhetoric, in Chapters 4 and 5.

(2) and (3) are two different appeals for legitimization of the Iraq war. The first involves the 9/11 analogy based, specific construal of the concrete physical consequences of ignoring another (“again”) gathering threat. The second involves a more complex rationale and a more elaborate proximization pattern. No immediate physical impact is construed; instead, the speaker outlines a relatively “distant” ideological background (“dictatorship”, “radicalism” in the “greater Middle East”) for a possible future threat and leaves addressees with a spectrum of “particularized” construals as regards imminence of that threat (i.e. how fast, given the background, the threat could materialize).

The physical(spatial)-axiological interface is one of the cornerstone properties of the model proposed in this book and, as such, will be discussed much more extensively in later chapters. For now, examples (2)–(3) can be taken as a proof that socio-political legitimization (especially legitimization of preventive/pre-emptive policies in interventionist discourse) is usually pursued in temporally extensive and thus unstable contexts, which necessitate changes in the use of specific proximization strategies. The strategy in (2) is implemented in a starting context which recognizes WMD as the main legitimization premise, while the strategy in (3) operates in a new, “updated” context. It is implemented in view of the absence of the initial premise (no WMD have been found in Iraq) and responds to the need for a new premise.

This is, in a capsule, where a qualitative analysis, drawing upon the concept of proximization as a three-dimensional mechanism for the enforced construal of distance and proximity, can take us – and it is not far enough. We do not get to know, first, which of the strategies in time periods represented by (2) and (3) was more densely applied. We do not get to know an exact moment when the switch to the new premise (and thus the new strategy) occurred. Finally, we never know if there were any overlaps in terms of implementation of the two strategies. To answer such questions, at theory level, we need a systematic quantitative account

17. The war started as the US and the coalition troops entered Iraq on March 19, 2003, to – as was repetitively stressed at the beginning of the Iraqi campaign – “disarm the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein”, “rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction” and “break Saddam Hussein’s terrorist connections”. The symbolic end of the war (though by no means an end to warfare and violence in the region) was June 30, 2004, which marked, following the downfall of Hussein’s regime, the delegation of selected executive powers to the new interim government of Iraq.

18. The analogy to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

19. See Chapter 3 for the discussion of subtle differences in definitions of “preventive” vs. “pre-emptive”, for definition(s) of “interventionist discourse”, etc. In the current discussion, it is sufficient to take these terms in their commonsensical/everyday meanings.
of linguistic choices responsible for the enactment of the particular proximization strategy. This account must involve, (i) the identification of lexico-grammatical categories reflecting each of the three dimensions of proximization (spatial, temporal, axiological), (ii) the assignment in these categories of lexico-grammatical items from the corpus of texts filling up the global discourse timeframe (such as e.g. the timeframe of the Iraq war) involving sub-frames (temporal and functional), (iii) a quantitative analysis of the manifestation of different proximization strategies in the different sub-frames. Only then do we receive a reliable picture of how legitimization is realized over time; furthermore, only then can we recognize the full potential of legitimization as an empirical territory to corroborate the explanatory power of proximization as a theory of political/public discourse space.

2.3.2 The “qualitative-quantitative” stage

The first attempts to realize the agenda in (i)–(iii) are my 2008–2010 works, which, in their thematic orientation, continue to address aspects of the US legitimization of the Iraq war. In Cap (2008) I make a pre-proposal for the spatial framework of proximization, a set of categories involving, primarily, lexico-grammatical markers of entities construed as “home” (or “inside-the-deictic-center”, IDC) elements of the Discourse Space, markers of entities construed as “distant/foreign = antagonistic” (“outside-the-deictic-center”, ODC) elements of the DS, finally, markers of “movement” of ODCs in the direction of IDCs. The three kinds of the lexico-grammatical markers are, respectively, NPs (e.g. “we”, “our country”, “innocent people”), NPs (e.g. “Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “terrorists”), and VPs (e.g. “have set their course to confront us”). Investigating a corpus of texts covering the March 2003 – June 2004 timeframe of the Iraq war, I (2008) observe a gradual decline in the number of ODC markers, a corresponding increase in the number of IDC markers, and – as the war goes on – a decline in the number of VP-based construals of the ODC physical movement/impact. My (2008) conclusion is, in a nutshell, that the disqualification of the initial premise for war (WMD, see above e.g. fn. 17) has made ineffective appeals for legitimization based on the construal of a possible physical/spatial impact, and has created a need to redefine the rationale (thus making space for another proximization pattern). In Cap (2008) I postulate insights in the axiological aspects of the pro-war rhetoric as a possible alternative.

Accordingly, in Cap (2010a, b) I provide the axiological framework of proximization, with the yet modest task to make members of its component categories (I skip an elaboration here; see Section 1.5 and Chapters 4–5) yield lexical counts that could, possibly, answer the question of compensation for the declining counts
of the second and third category markers within the spatial framework. It seems that such a compensation is indeed the case. While the rhetoric of the beginning of the Iraq war features relatively few instances of axiologically-loaded lexical items (for example “freedom”, “democracy” vs. “dictatorship”, “extremism”), as well as discourse forms which turn the adversarial concepts into material threats, the later rhetoric is heavily dependent on such items and forms. For example (cf. Cap 2010b: 404), “radicalism”, as a marker of antagonistic ideology encroaching upon the “home” deictic territory, appears 27 times in the March–November 2003 sub-corpus, and 71 times in the December 2003 – June 2004 sub-corpus, the two corpora hardly differing in size. I thus claim (Cap 2010a, b) that, for the upkeep of legitimization of preventive measures at a continual high, the construal of foreign impact as axiological/ideological, i.e. **axiological proximization**, could be a feasible alternative when geopolitical context makes premises for spatial proximization disappear. There are of course, as I have mentioned and we will see, many nuances which go beyond this rather simplistic observation, and generally, beyond the necessarily synthetic account that is given here.

Altogether, the research in proximization presented in Cap (2008, 2010a, b) shows an increasingly greater awareness of the necessity to resort to quantifiable data. The consecutive “qualitative” conclusions (e.g. the question of a possible compensation for the diminishing “spatial input”) prompt the consecutive theoretical upgrades and additions serving to handle further amounts of data (e.g. the data captured in the axiological framework). There are, at the same time, important issues that have been unanswered, thus motivating the present book. In terms of the points (i)–(iii) above, there is, first of all, the issue of validity of the spatial and axiological frameworks for discourses whose timeframes are longer and contents more thematically varied than the discourse of the Iraq war. This ties in with the essence of legitimization as a macro-goal: over a long period of time, legitimization is rarely based on one continuing, stable discourse strategy; more likely, there are several strategies which get more or less salient relative to the demands of the context (see Chapter 3). Since any such changes can be observed at the “bottom-most” lexico-grammatical level, the validity of the particular proximization frameworks involving lexico-grammatical material seems to be the greater, the more temporal sub-frames are identified in which statistically significant lexical rises and drops occur. While in Cap (2008, 2010a, b) only two sub-frames are identified (the “WMD” and “post-WMD” frames) covering in total the period of less than 1.5 years, the present book identifies four, which make up the global timeframe of 10 years.

Another issue that has not been resolved is the status (and the design) of the temporal proximization framework. The 2008–2010 works recognize and document the need for such an independent framework (suffice it to say that
proximization often involves historical analogies which rely on the construal of past realities as present or near future realities), but nonetheless fail to propose relevant categories and key member items. This follows from the observation that a bulk of temporal proximization shifts employs “markers” of construed (rather than “real”) time, which do not (unlike markers of e.g. spatial proximization) belong to grammatically sanctioned categories/sets of language expressions.

Finally, all the three frameworks and their category members are yet to receive a more formalized scrutiny by means of corpus linguistic methods. The research in Cap (2005–2010) draws upon corpora, but rarely engages with corpus tools. The pilot studies in the rhetoric of the Iraq war rely, mostly, on raw data and involve few normalized counts. This might work (providing that the corpora compared are similar in size) for relatively small-scale discourses, but must be (viz. Chapter 5 of this book) reconsidered for more extensive and more complex macro-discourses.

2.4 Christopher Hart: Proximization and/within coercion, predication, metaphor

Hart (2010) advances a model for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which draws on two areas of cognitive science, Cognitive Linguistics and Evolutionary Psychology, to provide a novel approach to analyzing (anti-)immigration discourse. The model traces contemporary socio-political prejudices (and thus prejudice and exclusionary discourses) back to early mental mechanisms that evolved as adaptations designed to protect human populations against the threats posed by “alternative coalitional groups” (Hart 2010: 54; Pinker 1997; Schaller and Neuberg 2008). These threats may no longer exist in reality, but the evolved psychology persists when the threats are perceived to exist. Individuals tend to respond zealously to the scantest of information suggesting only the slightest hint of harm (Haselton 2007). Specific harm-avoidance cognitive modules are thus activated when threats associated with the antagonistic “out-group” are ideologically constructed through discourse. The activation of the modules is a pre-requisite for a concrete socio-political behavior, such as justification of the neutralization of the external threat.

If the modules are activated through the organized deployment of discourse strategies (referential and predicational strategies, reference to topoi, etc. – see

20. A notable exception is Cap (2011), a very recent piece of research, which, in a way, responds to responses to my 2005–2010 studies, and thus has not been included in the current sketch lest the chronological picture of the work on/subsuming proximization be disrupted.
Chapter 2. Proximization as a (linguistic) concept

below), we have to do, Hart (2010) claims, with cognitive and emotive *coercion*, an intention to affect the beliefs, emotions and behaviors of others in such a way that suits one’s own interests (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997; Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Cosmides and Tooby 2000). Cognitive coercion is essentially propositional and involves producing “cognitive effects” (modification of mental representations; cf. e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995) in discourse recipients, whose knowledge (in the form of cognitive frames and image schemas) is activated and updated by the consecutive text instances in the unfolding discourse. Emotive coercion is related to what Aristotle referred to as pathos – appeal based on emotion. Emotive effects follow on from cognitive effects; they can be understood as the activation of emotion programs in response to certain modified representations (Cosmides and Tooby 2000).

Coercion involves, as has been indicated, referential and – crucially – predicational strategies. According to Hart (2010: 65), successful referential and predicational strategies achieve cognitive effects insofar as they can construct new representations but also in that they reinforce existing ones. Referential strategies, for example, achieve cognitive effects by reproducing dichotomous cognitive representations of an in-group versus an out-group – or of deictically-central and deictically-peripheral entities, in Chilton’s and Cap’s terms. Predicational strategies achieve cognitive effects by reproducing cognitive associations between the out-group and negative or threat-connoting cues.

Predicational strategies are of utmost relevance to issues of symbolic distancing in discourse since they frame people, objects, events, processes and states of affairs in *gradable* terms of quality, quantity, space, time, etc. Hart (2010) points to the following syntactic, semantic and pragmatic resources which are available to speakers to realize predicational strategies:

- adjectives, prepositional phrases and relative clauses that ascribe particular qualities to people;
- numerals and quantifiers that ascribe particular quantities to people;
- verbs and nominalizations that (…) describe actions and events in particular ways and ascribe to people particular qualities and quantities;
- implicatures and presuppositions which force particular inferences;
- nouns that carry particular connotations with regard to their referents.21 (: 66)

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21. Hart (2010: 66) argues, with good reason, that referential expressions, such as nouns, may simultaneously realize referential and predicational strategies (see also Reisigl and Wodak 2001).
Hart’s (2010) study acknowledges a close connection between predicational strategies and social topoi, i.e. standard argumentation schemas which represent the common-sense reasoning typical for specific issues in the public space (van Eemeren et al. 1996; van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2001). Within these topoi, predications function as “first premises”, initiating arguments built in such a way that discourse addressees can infer the “obvious conclusions” justifying exclusionary socio-political practices. For instance, the topos of displacement involves the premise that “the out-group will eventually outnumber and/or dominate the in-group and will get privileged access to limited socio-economic resources over and above the in-group”, while the topos of burden involves the premise that “the out-group need to be supported by the in-group” (Hart 2010: 67).

A bulk of predicational strategies Hart (2010) works with are embedded in metaphoric utterances. This seems to me a productive focus. Metaphors are well suited to realize predicational strategies, as elements of the target domain are predicated as possessing particular qualities, quantities and relations from the source domain. Furthermore, metaphors may be coercive as they achieve cognitive, emotive and perlocutionary effects. Crucially, metaphors are intimately bound with affect. Charteris-Black (2004: 11) argues that the effectiveness of metaphor in realizing persuasive goals has to do with its potential for “moving us”, “activating unconscious emotional associations”, “activating threat-avoidance programs” (cf. also de Landtsheer and de Vrij 2004), which all, in the long run, create a social reality where a metaphor is seen as a guide for action, a social practice/policy that follows the conclusion enforced by the topos in which the metaphoric predication operates.

That said, we can move to proximization. Where does Hart (2010) locate it, amongst coercion, reference, predication, topos, metaphor? On Hart’s (:83ff.) view, proximization is an instrument of emotive coercion which presupposes coercive referential strategies and is contained in particular predications, especially those being metaphoric premises of topoi. As will be argued, this interdisciplin-ary approach appropriates/reflects most of Cap’s (2008, 2010a, b) findings at the conceptual level, but points, at the level of application, to metaphoric discourse as the terrain where proximization surfaces most visibly and is based on the most stable/definable lexico-grammatical input.

Hart (2010), like Cap (2008, 2010a, b), puts lexico-grammatical choices in categories which should make possible the interpretation of counts in terms of proximization intensity and effects. He adopts Cap’s (2008) three principal

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22. In the summary section of this chapter.

23. It will be argued, below, that Hart’s approach is largely unsuccessful in that respect.
categories of the spatial framework (see 2.3.2 above) and adds another three: VPs of location conceptualized as indicators of ODCs already inside the deictic center or on the edge of it; Adverbial phrases (APs) expressing notions of time and frequency conceptualized as indicators that situations/events are occurring, have just occurred, are about to occur or regularly reoccur; Tense aspects taken as indicators that situations/events are occurring, have just occurred, are about to occur or regularly reoccur (Hart 2010: 85). He illustrates the extended framework going over a number of short excerpts from the British press (anti-)immigration discourse. Here is one such mini-analysis:

(4) **Asylum-seekers are flooding into Britain at the rate of one every four minutes,** it was revealed yesterday. (*The Sun*, 30 Nov. 2002)²⁴

28 [see fn. 24] consists of the following phrase structure: the NP ‘asylum seekers’, the VP ‘are flooding into Britain’, which contains the NP ‘Britain’, and the AP ‘at the rate of one every four minutes’. We find both spatial and temporal proximisation strategies in (28). Spatial proximisation is realised as asylum seekers are conceptualised as an element outside the deictic centre which is moving ‘into Britain’, the deictic centre, and thus approaching the text-consumer who is inside the deictic centre. Temporal proximisation is realised in the present progressive form of the VP, which indicates that the process is happening at the time of the discourse event, and reinforced by the AP which indicates the rapidly recurring rate at which the process continues to happen. (28) in fact represents a canonical construction realising representational strategies in media discourse on immigration as depicted in Table 4.3.²⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Predication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>are flooding into Britain at the rate of one every four minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hart 2010:86)

In line with Hart’s (2010) theoretical positioning of proximization, we should perhaps add that the representation in (28)/(4) involves a metaphoric predicational strategy which inscribes into the topos of displacement, emotively coercing the

²⁴ Boldface and spelling original. Example number (28) in original.

²⁵ Numbering original.
addressee to work out the conclusion that adequate preventive measures should be put in place.

Clearly enough, Hart’s approach makes proximization analytically subordinate to a number of concepts: predication, topos, reference, etc. Or, to put it better, it reinforces such a status, in order to sanction/legitimate a couple of simplifications. Notwithstanding the rise in the number of its component categories, Hart’s proximization framework is, as a whole, apparently “universal”: it “serves” both spatial and temporal proximization. This seems as much a methodological flaw as a self-imposed limitation. Combining two different types of proximization, spatial and temporal, in one single framework (open to contain, presumably, also the “action-prompting” axiological markers as the three “extra” categories recognize differences in the probability of occurrence), Hart virtually gives up on the possibility of studying quantitative changes, over time, in the deployment of different proximization strategies. The explanatory power of the framework is further constrained by the fact that no information is provided regarding which of the framework’s categories are lexically and grammatically involved, and to what extent, in which of the strategies. It is indeed surprising to see such problems in a model (however intentionally modest and subordinate to other description models) applied to a discourse so temporally extensive and revealing so many macro-structural complexities and functional variations as (anti-)immigration discourse.

Despite these methodological objections, Hart’s (2010) research can be considered an important contribution to proximization theory at empirical level. His study of metaphoric expressions in the British (anti-)immigration discourse can be used to show that the “ultimate” proximization model and its component frameworks must not ignore lexicogrammatical items which (viz. “flooding”) engage in metaphoric relations which intensify the emotive appeal of proximization and thus proximization’s perlocutionary effects (Charteris-Black 2006). While proximization and metaphorization are, as two symbolic construal operations or mechanisms, not conceptually synonymous, their enactments in discourse recognize a number of common premises. For instance, discourse on immigration and asylum recruits the “container” schema (Johnson 1987) to conceptualize the country, and reinforces a vantage-point-interior perspective (Chilton 1996), which, to the discourse addressees, means inclusion, ownership and (right to) protection from external threats (Chilton 1996). In that sense, the “container” is similar to “deictic center”; they both evoke the “self/other” or the “IDC/ODC” dichotomy. Notably, metaphor studies working with this dichotomy have been

26. Recall the analysis of (3) in Section 2.3.1.

27. See Chapters 3 and 7 for an extensive discussion.
successful in collecting a large body of lexical evidence for the underlying container schema (from Lakoff and Johnson 1980, to Tyler and Evans 2003), a material that could well be appropriated in the proximization model and the particular frameworks (see Chapter 5). There are for instance standard items that have to do with spatial containment (“in”, “inside”), items which involve movement towards/into a containing space (“into”), or more situation-specific items that have to do with the potential vulnerability or exposure of the “container” to external threats, such as “vulnerable borders”, “creaky gates” or “open doors” [to terrorism]. All these are, amongst others, promising candidates for the assignment in particular categories of the proximization frameworks. A rhetorical aspect of such an application is that the metaphoric expressions subsuming these items are usually accepted more readily by the addressee than alternative non-metaphoric expressions are, since metaphors address conventionalized, hardly disputed schemas (MacCormack 1985). Altogether then, research in metaphor goes a long way towards providing the proximization model with a much desired lexico-grammatical input and thus an important element of empirical support for proximization as a phenomenon manifested in stable and systematic linguistic configurations.

Closely linked with Hart’s empirical commitment to metaphor is the other not-to-be-missed advantage his (2010) work offers with regard to the development of proximization theory. Hart’s embedding of proximization in superordinate issues of coercion, representation, topos, predication, etc. may be imposing objective limits on his own theoretical account of proximization (and I have argued it does, though also because of Hart’s thematic scope), but it still points to a vast array of concepts and disciplines proximization could potentially draw upon should it be the main focus of attention – as is the case in the present book. They include, most significantly, integrated insights from cognitive science, evolutionary studies, anthropology, and of course critical discourse studies. Possibly, as will be shown in later chapters, these disciplines could draw their own benefits from the work on proximization. Among all approaches to proximization scrutinized in the present chapter, Hart’s (2010) study invites issues of interdisciplinarity in one of the most natural ways.

2.5 Patricia Dunmire: Proximization across political genres

Dunmire’s (2011) research corroborates a crucial characteristic of proximization as a macro-structural and macro-discursive phenomenon: proximization continues to operate “across” (political) genres. That is, proximization can be implemented in
a sequence of different generic forms which enact, over a macro-period of time, the same pragmatic macro-goal of the (political) speaker. The micro- or sub-frames of the macro-period may reveal salience of different proximization strategies, but global proximization effects (e.g. legitimization effect) are not lost as the speaker moves from one genre to another.

As part of her research on projecting the future in post-Cold War political discourse in the United States, Dunmire (2011) analyzes proximization patterns in a US foreign policy document – the 2002 National Security Strategy articulating the “[G. W.] Bush Doctrine” – and how they were followed in policy speeches enacting the document (the Doctrine). Both genres, Dunmire claims, are engaged in the realization of the same macro-goal of the Bush Doctrine with regard to the national security strategy: “redefining the notion of preemption” and, consequently, “lowering the threshold for military action” against an “imminent threat” (Dunmire 2011: 56; Burns and Ansin 2004; Kirk 2003). Since “preemption” has been, to previous administrations, a “matter of practice” rather than an element explicitly incorporated in any policy document (Burns and Ansin 2004), Dunmire’s (2011) innovative focus and analysis merit not only theoretical, but also empirically-minded description and evaluation.

In her analysis of proximization, Dunmire relies conceptually on most of Cap’s (2005–2010) findings (Section 2.3 above), discussing both axiological and spatio-temporal aspects of the proximization mechanism. She demonstrates that NSS02, as an instance of “anticipatory discourse” (Scollon and Scollon 2000) performing a policy-making genre, is dominated by patterns of axiological proximization. At the same time, G. W. Bush’s speeches that follow up on the NSS02 document carry, Dunmire argues, mostly spatio-temporal patterns (involving direct fear appeals). This reflects and corroborates Cap’s (2008, 2010a, b) postulates about likely changes in proximization strategies which happen within the timeframe of temporally extensive discourses (cf. Section 2.3). The important additional element that Dunmire (2011) points to is that the macro-function (e.g. legitimization) realized during these extensive timeframes subsumes not only different proximization strategies (which change in response to geopolitical contextual conditions), but may also subsume different genres which incorporate their “favorite”, “most natural” strategies. The consequential (and very interesting) hypothesis that lies implicit in Dunmire’s argument is that axiological proximization might be a frequent predicational characteristic of the policy document (at least in cases or domains similar to the one Dunmire deals with, i.e. interventionist discourses soliciting legitimization), and spatial proximization (containing a

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29. Henceforth “NSS02”.
temporal component) might be a typical property of oral genres filling up the ideological “template” provided by the “governance” (Fairclough 2003) document genre. Naturally, it remains to be seen how far such a generalization could possibly extend, but should it work to some point at least, we would receive an extra rule determining changes in the salience of different proximization strategies within the macro-discursive functional structure.

Dunmire (2011) does not lose sight of the importance of lexico-grammatical evidence for her claims. For instance, she documents the prevalence of axiological proximization in NSS02 by quoting a huge number of IDC- and ODC-related “ideological” items, many of which, she claims, were dropped in later speeches, along with the respective predicational markers (usually verb phrases) of the IDC-ODC ideological conflict. Dunmire's sample items include:

i. (for IDC actors) liberty; forces of liberty; freedom; democracy; free enterprise; basic human rights; political and economic freedom; free and open societies; domestic stability and international order; cultural advancement; balance of power that favors peace; dignity; equality; rule of law; religious and ethnic tolerance; possibility to expand liberty, etc.

ii. (for ODC actors) totalitarian; regimes; politically motivated violence; terrorism akin to slavery; dictatorship; crossroads of radicalism and technology; resisting human dignity, etc. (Dunmire 2011: 71)

Note that some of the ODC-related choices Dunmire points to (e.g. “crossroads of radicalism and technology”) are potentially cornerstone elements of axiological discourses which turn the apparently remote ideological dangers into tangible physical threats, a mechanism I have indicated in 2.3.1, which will be discussed thoroughly later in the book, from Chapter 4 on.

There are also other (lexico-grammatical) areas where Dunmire (2011) contributes to the linguistic side of proximization. In her analysis of G. W. Bush’s speeches drawing upon the NSS02 strategic precepts to legitimize the Iraq war, Dunmire looks at nominalizations, and the impact they have on the transitivitiy structure of the text, on the representation of agents, actions and processes. The key nominal she works with is “threat”, an item which can be considered one of the cornerstone lemmas enacting spatial and temporal proximization (Cap 2008, 2010a, b). Quoting excerpts such as “Today in Iraq we see a gathering threat whose outlines are clearly defined and whose consequences are […] deadly”, Dunmire describes threat as an active participant in the Discourse Space (Chilton 2004). The abstraction “threat”, she argues, engages in actions and processes that would typically be associated with animate actors, thereby obscuring the agentive
dimension of field. Field, in turn, is structured not in terms of Iraq/Hussein taking specific actions at specific times but in terms of a reified process that is “gathering [against us]” and “whose consequences are deadly”. As in NSS02, Dunmire (2011:96) points out, this elision and displacement of agency is necessary given that Saddam Hussein was not, in fact, making explicit threats against the US or its allies; as such, there was no agentive role for him to play in these statements. Thus, Dunmire concludes, the nominal “threat” is – among many other strategic nominalizations, we might add – a condensation of propositions through which the administration projects its vision of actions Iraq could take at some point in the future. It does not mean, however, that Iraq/Hussein are completely absent from the current scene. In Lemke’s (1998) words, abstract nominals such as “threat” “are often meant to be […] ’expanded’ by the reader into [a variety of] implied propositions” which can be interpreted differently by different addressees depending on their (geopolitical) location and context.

Dunmire’s (2011) discussion of “threat” and other nominalizations (including other fear-evoking items such as “danger”, but also less directly appealing “ideological” items such as “radicalism”, “extremism”, etc.) is important at a number of levels. First, it points towards selected lexico-grammatical items as possible, or even the “best-fitting”, “bricks” in the proximization frameworks. This is a much-desired reply to the need for building/expanding the linguistic arsenal of proximization – one of the most pressing issues signaled throughout this chapter. Second, it proves the “descriptive vs. projective” fuzziness of certain lexical choices, thus indirectly sanctioning some inevitable concessions regarding the assignment of linguistic material to any strictly demarcated frameworks or framework categories. Third, in its focus on conflation of the present and the future (which does not disregard the past-present conflation, either), it paves the way, conceptually, for the temporal proximization framework. Such a framework may be destined to display internal heterogeneity at lexico-grammatical levels but is nonetheless necessary to demonstrate, in the best way possible, the linguistic resources used for the conflation(s). All these issues, as well as the issue of the genre-proximization strategy relation, will resurface as we advance the proximization model with the construction of the three “target” frameworks in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

30. In the Hallidayan SFL sense; see e.g. Halliday and Martin (1993).
Chapter 2. Proximization as a (linguistic) concept

2.6 Other approaches

The works discussed in Sections 2.2–5 make for a sound, even if heterogeneous, conceptual input towards the development of proximization theory. I will elaborate on the different aspects of this input in the summary section of the chapter. Meanwhile, let us note that since 2005 there have been several less theoretically oriented applications of the concept of proximization, within a number of different thematic/generic domains. As the target aspiration of proximization theory is to account for symbolic construals of distance and proximity in – recall Chapter 1 – the vast space of (often interlocking) multiple public discourses, these applications, however usually small-scale, must not be brushed aside. They indicate a potential universality of the theory and thus some of them merit discussion.

Filardo Llamas (2010) incorporates proximization in her analysis of 1999–2007 Irish Republican Army statements, which, all made after the 1998 Peace Agreement, represent an intriguing mix of “old/adversarial” and “new/conciliatory” discourses. Filardo Llamas shows that the construction of the Irish national memory, which underlies both types, can serve dichotomous, “antagonistic” representations, as well as representations of a new future order based on cooperation and recognition of common socio-political goals. Proximization is at play in both processes as historical flashbacks are used universally to conflate the past with the present – though with a view to different rhetorical stances (which mix and overlap in virtually all of the IRA statements studied by Filardo Llamas). The “adversarial” stance is established when the proximization link is set between past negative actions of the British and selected elements of the current context which are construed as threateningly similar to the past context in which the actions took place. The “conciliatory” stance is established when the current IRA actions are construed as directly following from some of the precepts of the Proclamation of Easter 1916, in which ideals of peace and social and (inter)national harmony are highlighted and emphasized at the expense of numerous more radical tones.

Cienki, Kaal and Maks (2010) investigate the 2003–2009 Dutch election manifestos of three major parties occupying distant points on the political spectrum: the Green-Left (far-left/progressive), Christian Democrats (center) and Party for Freedom (far-right/conservative). Using Chilton’s 2004 version of the DST model (cf. Section 2.2.1 above), they analyze each party’s representation of the issue of immigration into the Netherlands. Their method involves tagging spatial, temporal, and deontic expressions and clustering them in various degrees of proximity to the deictic center (DC), on the assumption that more salient (frequent)

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31. As far as linguistic theory, which this book is anchored in, is concerned. Kopytowska’s approach (see below) marks an interesting semiotic (theoretical) direction.
terms are “located” closer to the DC. They do not however list criteria whereby the terms/expressions are classed and assigned to the three dimensions. As such, their study seems to bridge “early Chilton’s” conceptual framework with Hart’s (2010; Section 2.4) empirical focus and the view of proximization as a coercive predication device. At the same time it reveals/reflects most of the methodological problems observed in Cap (2005, 2006; Section 2.3).

Finally, in Kopytowska’s (2009, 2010) research, proximization is studied innovatively at the “meta” level of mediatized discourse. Approaching Discourse Space (DS) not only as a speaker-addressee territory, but also as a (news) media environment, Kopytowska looks at how the apparently “peripheral” or “marginal” news content is portrayed as deictically close to the news audience which occupies the center of the Space. This involves linking the mechanism of linguistically-enacted proximization to the general semiotic properties of the TV broadcasting medium, such as immediacy, “liveness”, “viewability”, “co-presence” and “pseudo-companionship” (Robinson 2005, etc.). In Kopytowska (2009, 2010) such a link is established for the analysis of the CNN news reporting on Africa. Apart from the lexical manifestations of proximization, the analysis concentrates on visual techniques such as close-ups and zooming-in as well as camera angles and point-of-view shots (Zhou 2005). It is pre-postulated that proximization is a potentially multimodal phenomenon, conceptually tied with general principles and conditions for message acceptability and attractivity.

2.7 Approaches to proximization versus traditional accounts of deixis and perspective

Apparently, all of the approaches discussed involve notions such as Discourse Space, deictic center or deictic periphery, the concepts which lie at the heart of a number of traditional (and continually seminal) accounts of deixis, perspective, and perspective-taking (from Levinson 1983; Levelt 1989; to Simpson 1993 and Sandig 1996; to Ensink and Sauer 2003 and Levinson 2004). This raises the natural question why the classical theories have not been discussed. A quick answer might be that they never work with the concept, let alone mention the very term “proximization”. But this seemingly simple answer needs some elaboration.

The issue is, in a capsule, what deixis “can do” in discourse, what deictic expressions contribute as their primary function. On the traditional views, deixis is primarily a technical necessity for the possible interpretability of communication

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32. For reasons of space, I will not discuss the obvious connection of these works (especially the first four) to “deixis-classics” such as Buehler (1934) or Bar-Hillel (1954).
in the first place. It is not – also – an instrument (or a component thereof) for legitimization, persuasion or social coercion, as proximization approaches would see it. For instance, Levelt’s (1989) “thinking for speaking” model, subsuming the consecutive stages of conceptualization, formulation and articulation, locates deixis at the medium stage/level of coding the visual scene (“perspective-taking”) in a closed set of spatial expressions abstracted from a finite repository of lexical choices available to the speaker in a given language. Similar orthodox views are presented in Levinson’s (1983) seminal publication, where deixis is considered, first and foremost, critical for human ability to learn and communicate in a language, on which premise the existence of set numbers of “obligatory” deictic expressions in different languages is postulated.

Within the proximization approaches, deixis can go beyond its “primary” status of a formal tool for the coding of elements of context to make all communication possible. The condition obtains, however, that the concept of deixis is not reduced to a finite repository of “deictic expressions”, but rather expanded to cover the bigger lexico-grammatical phrases and discourse expressions which the “conventional” deictic markers (for instance pronominals) get part of as the speaker constructs complex discourse forms to meet the changing contextual conditions. Then, the “component” deictic markers can truly partake in (forced) conceptual shifts. This new approach is visible already in Chilton (2004), but the most lucid example seems the third category of Cap’s (2008) spatial proximiza- tion framework (see 2.3.1 above; recall specifically the expression “[they] ‘have set their course to confront us’”), which sets traditional deictic expressions such as personal pronouns to work pragmatically together with the other components of the superordinate VP. The latter acquires, then, a deictic status, in the sense that on top of conventionally denoting static DS entities (marked by pronominals), it also helps index a more challenging element of context, their movement, which establishes the target perspective construed by the speaker. Of course, on this view there is hardly any question of a possible finite set of such superordinate discourse structures, nor their ultimate typology (the structures are simply too rich in language form, they involve too many words, to put it bluntly), but what we receive in return is a plausible, illuminating account of how deixis truly enters the pragmatic dimension of discourse, how it can contribute to macro forms which occur, by the speaker’s strategic choice, in smaller or bigger numbers depending on what is currently best to timely respond to the changing contextual conditions. Intriguingly, this view is not completely in conflict with at least some of the post-2000 accounts of deixis, even if they continue to avoid discussions of any specific situations or mechanisms (such as proximization) where deictic expressions assist in construing shifts of perspective, for legitimization or coercion purposes. For example, the “late Levinson” (2004) admits “[deaxis] is a much more pervasive
feature of language than [has been] normally recognized" and “we are far from understanding the boundaries of the phenomenon (...), nor do we have an ultimate typology of deictic expression” (:97–101; emphasis mine). The way to struggle with these complexities and deficits is, Levinson (2004) claims, to “simply” go on to conduct more empirical studies, in more languages, but also in more discourse domains and genres in a given language. Finally, Levinson’s (2004) argument embeds deixis, considered in terms of individual lexical choices, in a much broader, potentially infinite, set of complex indexical expressions, serving the demands of the dynamic context. Altogether, this account clearly encourages research such as within the proximization paradigm, where “traditional” deictic markers combine with (many) other lexico-grammatical choices to make up coherent structures indexing (rather than “deictically” “pointing to”) context in the sense of, at the same time, coding and making a response to it. The target of such a research is, as Levinson (2004) has signposted, theoretical and methodological, since once indexical discourse structures are identified within a discourse domain (such as e.g. state legitimation discourse), they are classed (as in the STA model in this book) with a view to applying the class members to the analysis of further discourse domains and genres. Providing the application is successful, this is precisely how the proximization model can be imagined to grow in the future, to change its status from a theory of political/public discourse to a theory of communication (recall the argument at the beginning of Chapter 1).

Finally, although this chapter has not elaborated on that, the proximization approaches to the DS arrangement subsume several important findings of the mainstream accounts of perspective-taking, most notably the view that perspective-taking almost always involves the speaker’s act of evaluation, which becomes a forced shared representation once the act is “felicitously” recognized by the addressee (cf. for instance Sandig 1996; Ensink and Sauer 2003; etc.). Especially Chilton’s and Cap’s accounts of the forced “proximization shifts” and the resulting shared representations make the relation quite obvious, but the link will become even clearer as we get to the design of the STA “axiological framework” in Chapter 4.

2.8 Summary

In this chapter I have discussed the most prominent works and analyses involving the concept of proximization. These works are grounded in different disciplines and approaches. With a simplification, Chilton’s approach can be described as essentially cognitive linguistic, Cap’s as pragmatic, Hart’s as critical-cognitive-psychological, and Dunmire’s as discourse analytic based on insights from SFL, CDA
and genre theory. This diversity is a clear advantage for proximization theory as each of the approaches contributes its research focus and “favorite” research tools, which capture proximization phenomena at different levels of formation and manifestation. Chilton’s work outlines the original organization of the Discourse Space and as such invites research in symbolic construals of any changes in this organization. Cap’s pilot analyses of the discourse of the Iraq war have shown that the DS construals can be enforced strategically/pragmatically for certain social and political effects. This line has been followed by Dunmire, who has also identified a possible link between different categories of construals (spatially or axiologically oriented) and the linguistic generic forms enacting these construals. Hart, in turn, has offered a cognitive-evolutionary explanation of why symbolically construed changes in the organization of the DS (e.g. dichotomous representations) should be effective and what linguistic material (metaphor, on his view) should be examined critically to uncover and demystify the construal operations.

At the same time, the focus of the individual works discussed has pointed to existing limitations in the explanatory power of the respective approaches and disciplines, while their “combined” focus has indicated a potential of interdisciplinary research in proximization for overcoming some of these limitations. For instance, Chilton’s account of proximization has suggested that Cognitive Linguistics may need Pragmatics, as well as Corpus Linguistics, to document the validity of different conceptual representations and configurations at functional and lexico-grammatical levels. It has thus paved the way for pragmatic and corpus studies in proximization to objectivize these representations. At the same time – and consistently with the later accounts – proximization has been identified as a candidate for an interdisciplinary, cognitive-pragmatic-critical theory subsuming corpus methods.

Cap’s studies, being in many ways a response to Chilton’s research, have recognized Pragmatics as a discipline/perspective\(^ {33}\) best suited to coordinate the agenda of such a theory. On the one hand, Pragmatics accounts for a functional deployment of linguistic choices reflecting different cognitive dimensions and the mental representations which originate from them. On the other, it makes contact with discourse analytic approaches that use quantitative methods which tag these choices to endorse the function postulated. Furthermore, at empirical level, Pragmatics acknowledges the “macro” and the “micro” dimensions, both

\(^{33}\) It is beyond the scope of this book to join in the decades-long debate over which of the two terms is more appropriate (see e.g. Bublitz and Norrick 2011, for an overview). I use them quite interchangeably and my use of the term “discipline” does not presuppose any set/finite catalogue of objects of analysis. This should be clear, anyway, from my positioning of pragmatics as a hub where cognitive, critical and corpus inputs in proximization theory meet.
temporal and functional. As such, it constitutes an excellent theoretical handle on the inherent variability of proximization phenomena, such as differences in proximization strategies which depend on the shifting conditions of the dynamically evolving context.

Virtually all of the works discussed in this chapter have related proximization – more or less explicitly – to the issue of legitimization. Legitimization, as a complex and temporally extensive socio-political process, connects quite naturally with proximization as a symbolic macro-strategy comprising micro-strategies, and with Pragmatics as a perspective focusing on macro and micro social goals. This observation defines the stance and scope of the rest of the book, as well as the focus of the next chapter. In what follows, I argue that proximization theory can be best advanced through the focus on legitimization, initially in “interventionist discourse”, but with a view to other applications. I also claim that studies in socio-political legitimization elucidate exceptionally well the interdisciplinary grounding of proximization, and the role of Pragmatics as an apparatus able to bring together and structure the different inputs in the arising theory.34

34. The terms “[proximization] theory” and “[proximization] model” are not synonymous. Proximization theory is a conceptual proposal, while proximization model is a research schema reflecting this proposal. Proximization theory involves a conceptual input from different disciplines (CL, pragmatics, CDA), while proximization model involves use of this joint input in the analysis of language data. Some terms (“cognitive”, “pragmatic”) are thus associated with both the theory and the model, but some others are not. For instance, although proximization theory is driven by a critical mission, there are conceivably no “tangible” manifestations of such a mission that could also contribute to the model, the way for instance lexical choices do.
CHAPTER 3

Proximization and legitimization

“Speech … serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is the sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household and a state”.

(Aristotle, Politics; emphasis P. C.)

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has defined proximization as a symbolic construal operation involving conceptualization of peripheral entities of the Discourse Space (DS) as encroaching upon the center of the DS. Proximization is a strategic operation, i.e. it is enforced by the political speaker in the service of socio-political goals. We have seen from Chapter 2 that temporally extensive geopolitical contexts often redefine these goals, to which proximization responds by adjustments in the salience of its component strategies. The task of the present chapter is to show that this regularity can be best spotted in political/public legitimization discourse, whose inherent characteristics (length, macro-functional stability, micro-functional variability, etc.) make it the primary empirical field to investigate the explanatory power of proximization as a candidate theory to account for complex issues of organization and construals of/in the DS.

The chapter unfolds as follows. It starts with an account of legitimization as a complex and heterogeneous notion, involving conceptual as well as linguistic aspects which can be approached from a number of perspectives: political and social scientific, cognitive, sociopsychological, evolutionary-psychological, political linguistic (including text and corpus linguistic), pragmatic, and critical discourse analytic. Each of these perspectives endorses a connection between legitimization, legitimization discourse, and proximization. The essence of this connection is the input of proximization in maintaining the constancy of legitimization in the face of geopolitical contextual changes and developments. It will be demonstrated that some of the perspectives (for instance, the speech act pragmatic perspective) set up a direct link between legitimization, legitimization discourse and the
linguistic side of proximization, while some others establish an indirect (though equally important) relation. The latter (for example, the socio-psychological perspective) highlight those aspects of legitimization (e.g. addressee’s consistency in belief) which, in order to be considered relative to proximization’s linguistic arsenal, first need to undergo a “linguistic profiling”, so to say, a kind of classing with respect to “standard” political linguistic, pragmatic, and discourse analytic concepts (e.g. speech acts, evidentiality markers, markers of coherence, etc.). I argue that any aspect of legitimization recognized by the multidisciplinary and multi-level conglomerate of perspectives as listed above is potentially realizable in discourse and thus can be potentially strengthened through the engagement of lexico-grammatical forms enforcing proximization.

I then move to those linguistic manifestations of political legitimization which make the most natural and the most productive contact with proximization, i.e. those which most “eagerly” subsume or incorporate proximization strategies to help enact legitimization goals, especially the goals of interventionist discourses – which I describe as primary venues for proximization operations. Drawing mainly upon the data from the discourse of the war-on-terror, I discuss concepts/forms/formulas such as assertion, implicature, evidentiality, internal and external coherence, source-tagging, etc. I show that political legitimization processes and discourses, which involve organized sets of such concepts, forms and formulas responsible for continual positive self-presentation and continual enactment of leadership resistant to crisis moments which tend to occur in extensive time periods, make ample and multi-dimensional use of proximization, thus illustrating its mechanism extremely well. The prominent status of proximization strategies in public space discourses as complex yet widespread as political legitimization discourses, and the apparently universal nature of evidence these discourses produce regarding the broad explanatory power of proximization as a theory, warrant, I conclude, further attempts to apply the concept of proximization more widely, exploring proximization effects within the general domain of public communication space.

The last part of the chapter gives a specimen of such an attempt, by focusing on two discourses thematically different from the rhetoric of the war-on-terror. Analyzing examples of the anti-immigration journalistic discourse in Britain, as well as examples of the discourse of anti-tobacco campaigns in the USA, I point to the existence of proximization operations conceptually similar to those

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1. Operations which assist in the legitimization of preventive, as well as pre-emptive policies. I explain subtle differences between the two terms (cf. Bacevich 2010) at that very part of the chapter, as it is “interventionist discourse” more than any other kind of legitimization discourse that elucidates them with maximal accuracy.
encountered in state political discourse. I discuss this similarity at a number of levels: the coercion level involving alerting the addressee to an imminent threat requiring approval of an immediate preventive (or pre-emptive) response, the DS organization level involving the positioning of the speaker and the addressee in the deictic center “opposite” an external threat entity conceptualized as moving from the periphery of the DS in the direction of the center, the linguistic level involving, in all the discourses, a consistent use of lexis associated with physical impact triggered by “animate” entities, etc. The presence of these similarities and analogies indicates, I suggest, a potential universality of proximization theory, at least within the domain of legitimization of public policies. Having gone over the principal body of this book’s data (the 2001–2010 US anti-terrorist discourse) in Chapters 4–6, I return to this postulate in Chapter 7, looking at further, more thematically and locationally varied public discourses (see chapter description in 1.5).

3.2 Legitimization: A multi-level phenomenon

The quote from Aristotle which opens this chapter indicates a two-tier organization of human socio-political awareness and behavior. On the one hand, people have been endowed with an ability to structure their cognitive experience in terms of dichotomous representations of good and evil, right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable, etc. On the other hand, they have been endowed with the faculty of language, which makes possible evoking or reinforcing various dichotomous representations in accordance with speakers’ goals. The central goal involves getting others to “share a common view” on what is good-evil, right-wrong, acceptable-unacceptable; and consequently, on how to secure the “right”, “good”, “useful”, “acceptable”, “just”, against a possible intrusion, in the life of a society, of the “wrong”, “evil”, “harmful”, etc. 

2. The discourse of anti-tobacco campaigns often entails metaphoric redefinition of the deictic center in terms of a “human body container”, which is affected by “external, harmful” nicotine impact. In fact, similar construals, i.e. construals of the deictic center as a “container”, underlie much of the anti-immigration discourse (see Section 2.4; see also Hart 2010; Charteris-Black 2006) – though not the whole or an overwhelming proportion of it, as Hart’s (2010) study would suggest. A significant part of the British anti-immigration discourse is based upon proximization but is not at all metaphoric, which I aim to demonstrate here, in the last part of the present chapter. This explains why, as part of the plan to extend the applicability of proximization, I have chosen to re-address the discourse investigated originally by Hart (2010) – to use the occasion to revisit some of his claims.
The heterogeneous essence of legitimization lies precisely in the duality salient in Aristotle’s words. Legitimization can be defined, in the most commonly approved sense, as an enactment of the speaker’s socio-political right to be obeyed3 (Habermas 1981; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992; Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Origgi and Sperber 2000; Sperber 2000; Cap 2006, 2010a; Chilton 2004; Bednarek 2006a, b; Van Leeuwen 2007; among others). As such, it subsumes both “linguistic” and “non-linguistic” aspects. The research on legitimization has proceeded accordingly; some of the work focuses primarily on issues of cognitive representation and the grounding of legitimation effects in psychological and evolutionary predispositions (Section 3.2.1), and some makes a more direct reference to concrete language/discourse patterns (e.g. specific speech acts) geared towards these predispositions (Section 3.2.2). Both strands are important for even the essentially “non-linguistic” strand could well be complemented – as we will see – by insights from discourse analysis, many involving proximization.

3.1 Perspectives from cognitive science, socio-political theory and social psychology

Most of these approaches have their lens on the issue of credibility of the speaker. This includes an enactment of credibility for a new legitimization case, maintaining credibility notwithstanding contextual developments which might undermine it, and, significantly, a re-enactment of credibility after it has been damaged/lost for a time. The socio-psychological approach yields two classic yet continually prominent theories which are relevant for each of the three situations. The latitude of acceptance theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961; Kiesler, Collins and Miller 1969; Jowett and O’Donnell 1992) posits that the best credibility (hence legitimation) effects can be expected if the speaker produces her message in line with the psychological, social, political, cultural, religious, etc., predispositions

3. On this definition, legitimation is grounded in a(n) (implicit) claim on the part of the speaker to inhabit a particular social and/or political role and to possess a particular authority. The possession of authority, usually accompanied by the asserted absence thereof in the audience but primarily in the adversary, provides rationale for listing reasons to be obeyed. The strategies used for listing such reasons, whether overtly or by implication, often overlap with proximization related strategies. They include the awareness and/or the assertion of the addressee’s wants and needs, reinforcement of indisputable ideological axioms, claims to leadership based on the ability to “predict and control the future” (Dunmire 2011), positive self-presentation, negative other-presentation, blaming/marginalizing/excluding the adversary, undermining the morality/legality/rationality of the adversary, and more.
of the addressee (Jowett and O'Donnell 1992). However, since a full compliance is almost never possible, it is essential that a novel message is at least tentatively or partly acceptable; then, its acceptability and the speaker's credibility tend to increase over time. This is where the other theory enters the picture, as the increase depends on human drive towards consistency in belief (Festinger 1957). The consistency theory says, in short, that people possess the need for “homeostasis”, a psychological-mental stability state which does not tolerate “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger 1957) caused by inconsistencies in their beliefs or judgments, especially regarding the same or similar issues. Consequently, whenever faced with a message producing a potential conflict with the existing ideological/psychological/moral groundwork, people will go to great lengths trying to see any positive aspects/parts of the message so it could be internalized as element of the groundwork. Naturally, the precondition obtains that the message is not entirely rejectable from the very beginning; at least some aspects or parts of it must be congruent with the addressee's predispositions. We will see that, at linguistic-pragmatic level, the job of setting up this crucial “first connection” is often delegated to assertions, comprising, in many cases, proximization strategies.

Credibility is also at the heart of cognitive-evolutionary proposals and hypotheses (see Axelrod 1984; Cosmides 1989; Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Origgi and Sperber 2000; Sperber 2000) concerning the so-called “cheater detection module”. The cheater detection module has been originally (Axelrod 1984; Cosmides 1989) considered a logico-rhetorical device which has evolved in human cognition to resist acts of deception, through the checking of speaker’s coherence. This basic characterization has by now undergone several modifications, the most important of which involve seeing the module not only as addressee’s defense mechanism, but also as speaker’s persuasion tool. In Sperber’s (2000: 136) words, for addressees the module is “a means to filter communicated information”, but for speakers it is “a means to penetrate the filters of others”. In this communicative “arms race”, legitimization strategies can be taken as manifestations and applications, through strategic displays of coherence, of the speaker’s logico-rhetorical module, in the service of neutralizing the operation of the same module in the addressee. The research in the operation of the cheater detection module does not directly prescribe any set linguistic forms/formulas whereby “the penetration of others’ filters” is “objectively” best accomplished, but again (viz. the consistency theory above), it is possible to envisage the most promising “gambits”. As will be

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4. Festinger’s classic theory has been continually influential for more than 50 years now. Nevertheless, several interesting improvements/additions have been proposed – see e.g. Aronson (1969); Zimbardo and Leippe (1991); Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999); Tavris and Aronson (2007); Cooper (2007).
discussed later in the chapter, they include formulas similar to consistency-builders such as claims to truth and assertions of evidence and authority, but also some more complex discourse sequences involving structured series of conversational implicatures and other inference patterns.

Last but not least, the present section must re-address Chilton's (2004) work. I have argued in Chapter 2 that Chilton's (2004) research, anchored in tenets of Cognitive Science and Cognitive Linguistics, is linguistic only to an extent; in many cases the claims stop at conceptual level. This however does not detract from their relevance and validity as a political scientific (as opposed to strictly political linguistic) input. Despite the fact that limited lexico-grammatical evidence is offered (recall the discussion in 2.2), the theoretical contribution Chilton (2004) makes to the understanding of politics, political communication and their legitimization aspects remains huge and undeniable.

Most notably, Chilton (2004: 199) claims that political actors seem to feel a strong pressure to legitimate their actions or proposals for action in terms of oppositions between right and wrong. On this account, virtually all political interaction/communication operates indexically, with a view to enacting political affiliations and distinctions. The distinctions are embedded in mental representations which political actors continually enforce, negotiate and (re)define through language, to maximize the number of shared representations. This, of course, implicitly endorses a crucial role in legitimization discourse of referring expressions and, in general, any expressions which help political actors/speakers maintain “continuities” of binary mental models, models in which political entities exist along with their roles as “assigned” (permanently or temporarily) by the actors/speakers. Chilton (2004) is, as has been argued, himself rather unwilling to discuss these linguistic aspects at lexical micro-levels, but his theoretical postulates are immensely helpful in demarcating areas for such discussions (of deixis, modality, metaphor, etc.). Finally, Chilton’s (2004) commitment to spatial cognition as the main factor in creating political representations corroborates the multi-level character of legitimization as a major goal served by the enforcement of these representations. From the anthropological and evolutionary perspectives, the claim that political representations and communication (and thus, legitimization) draw upon spatial cognition involves the suggestion that territoriality is an intrinsic part of the socio-political instinct. From the psychological and neurological perspectives, it involves the fact that humans have complex sensory-motor systems and the ability to construct and store topographic maps. Altogether then, Chilton’s (2004) research not only signposts promising paths to transform political theoretical ideas into a linguistic agenda for studying legitimization as a central political goal and process, but also proves the usability of relevant
multidisciplinary tools. In the latter, it seems to add to all of the approaches addressed earlier in this section.

### 3.2.2 Perspectives from linguistic pragmatics, text linguistics and critical discourse studies

Compared to the theories discussed in 3.2.1, these perspectives often involve more concrete pragmalinguistic and lexical forms whereby legitimization is best performed. As such – viz. examples in Section 3.3 following – they will also make a more direct contact with specific proximization strategies responsible for the accomplishment of global legitimization effects. Despite these differences, there is an important similarity: both groups recognize credibility as a cornerstone prerequisite for legitimization.

Within linguistic pragmatics, credibility issues have been amply investigated in terms of the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of speech acts, most commonly the act of *assertion*. Assertions are helpful in establishing speaker’s credibility due to several content features and pragmalinguistic patterns, including predication of facts, reference to undeniable and/or historically accepted ideological groundworks, expression of (ideological) “common ground” uniting the speaker and the addressee, expression of beliefs (often implying actions) being currently in line with the addressee’s predispositions (cf. the consistency theory in 3.2.1), etc. Assertions hardly perform their credibility job individually; they tend to come in groups or sequences which are collectively responsible for enacting credibility that is needed to legitimize actions/policies. In terms of speech act typology, we can call this mechanism an “assertion-directive link” (Cap 2002), which involves sanctioning controversial future acts based on trust in the speaker which has developed in response to her (thus far) uncontroversial rhetoric. Interestingly, the mechanism in question may operate already within the assertoric sequence itself (i.e. prior to issuing a directive) as the component assertions often vary in their individual acceptability. They are then structured from the most obviously accepted to those which are less readily acceptable (or just hard to verify

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5. See overviews in e.g. McDowell (1998); Jary (2010). My use of the term *assertion* is rather liberal; it acknowledges the general agreement that “assertions express beliefs” and keeps away from the philosophical dispute whether assertoric acts are only those whose interpretation is a matter of belief attribution (as Searle, Grice, Sperber and Wilson, Bach and Harnish, etc., have claimed) or perhaps only (or also) those whose interpretation seems just a matter of acquiring information about the world (the “perception-by-proxy” view advocated by Dummett or Millikan). I take both the former and the latter as assertions, and I claim they possess similar powers of creating representations which help the speaker establish her credibility.
and thus “suspicious”); that way, the former pave the way for success of the latter. Examples are numerous; before we look at the war-on-terror data in Section 3.3, let us note generally that much of the anti-terrorist rhetoric, especially right after the 9/11 attacks, has involved strong assertions of “past negligence” or “inaction” following the UN anti-terrorist diplomatic resolutions. These widely appealing, indisputable facts have been successfully asserted as “lessons”, “of the past” and “for the future”, legitimizing the subsequent pro-war, “prevention” stance (Silberstein 2004). One can see from such examples and from the above discussion in general, that assertion is a concept which often has to do with macro-functional and macro-temporal aspects of discourse. As such, it will be highly relevant to our account of proximization as legitimization-enhancing mechanism.

The “directive” segment in the assertion-directive pattern involves another pragmatic concept and pragma-rhetorical tool, implicature (Grice 1975, 1989; then Levinson 2000; Horn 2004; Bach 2006; among many others), whose legitimization rhetorical power lies in the capacity to launch a vast spectrum of possible meanings interpreted differently by different addressees in accordance with their different pre-expectations, wants and needs. Since, “by definition”, any such inferences can be effectively cancelled in a prospective discourse (e.g. by adding more and/or contradictory content), implicature emerges as a device for prescribing and legitimizing actions in a current reality, as well as for redefining and re-legitimizing them for an “updated” reality, in which the addressee's knowledge or priorities change as a result of contextual developments. The complex process where political speaker monitors the current needs of the addressee, enforcing or cancelling inferences accordingly, reflects the operation of her (i.e. speaker's, not addressee's) cheater detection module: the speaker is constantly sensitive to whether her original message or legitimization pattern are still coherent and still work with the addressee, or there is already a need to alter the rhetoric. An

6. See e.g. Huang’s (2011) excellent overview. I use “implicature” in the sense of “conversation-al implicature” as described by Grice, but of course this can no longer mean any commitment to viewing implicature as a solely “conversational” phenomenon. What I want to signal is a relative lack of relevance of conventional implicature (e.g. Potts 2005), to the study of legitimization discourse. Further distinctions, such as between “generalized” and “particularized” conversational implicatures, etc., are also irrelevant to the current discussion.

7. Viz. Sperber’s (2000) research in 3.2.1. This evolutionary-psychological-linguistic connection is precisely what I meant, at the beginning of this chapter, by “linguistic profiling” of essentially “non-linguistic” concepts. The same can be said of the connection between the latitude of acceptance and consistency theories (cf. again 3.2.1), and assertion. A preliminary conclusion goes as follows. If proximization can be documented as already present in the linguistic legitimization formulas, it can be postulated as a linguistic potential of the controlling “non-linguistic” theories in which the formulas originate.
example of such a turning point in the US anti-terrorist discourse is the moment (around November 2003) when the world learned there were no WMD in Iraq. This meant that the Bush administration had to find a completely new legitimization premise for the Iraq war, yet without making nonsense of the original premise. How implicature was deployed to that latter effect can be seen, at a glance, from the “programs for WMD” phrase, which the White House coined towards the end of 2003. The phrase forces two apparently disparate inferences simultaneously: one seeing WMD as a “product” (viz. original premise), the other seeing it as a mere “conception”.

Implicature forms are plentiful in Bush’s rhetoric of the Iraq war, especially around the said turning point of November 2003. Then, we encounter a massive number of phrases such as “WMD-related”, “pursue WMD”, “advance the WMD capacity”, “consolidate the WMD-targeted efforts”, “advance the WMD mind-set”, etc. Set among many (even) more gobbledygook-sounding expressions, they all force dyadic inferences similar to those imposed by the “programs for WMD” phrase. As such, they lift much of the responsibility for the past (February–March 2003) direct assertions (“possess WMD”, “have WMD”, etc.).

In amply using implicature forms for legitimization-saving purposes, especially with respect to the WMD status in Iraq, Bush proves to be mindful of the prominent place of implicature in US presidents’ legitimization discourse in general. Since a central property of implicature, cancellability, is crucially involved in the design and development of long-term legitimization of the entire Iraq war (Chapter 6 will show that, in a sense, much of Bush’s legitimization discourse after November 2003 is one complex “macro-cancellation” of the initial war rationale), it seems explanatory to make a digression and recall a classic example of how efficiently implicature cancellation has worked for an earlier president.

The case in point is Richard Nixon and the evolution of his rhetoric throughout the Watergate affair. In his 1972 bid for presidential office, Nixon defeated Democratic candidate George McGovern by one of the widest margins on record. But within a few months, his administration was already facing allegations implicating some of Nixon’s close associates in the break-in at the offices of the Democratic National Committee during the 1972 campaign. The break-in was soon traced to members of CREEP, the Committee to Re-elect the President (Nixon), many of whom became later White House officials. As a result of the investigation, several had to resign, charged with directly instigating the break-in, or covering up the affair. Nixon first tried to avoid any explicit comment on his own alleged involvement altogether, but when the courts urged him to yield tape recordings suggesting he might indeed have tried to divert the investigation, he decided to make the following statement (A):
(A) No-one presently employed in the White House participated in any way in the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters.

This first on-record act of denial, made at a White House press conference on September 3, 1973 (shortly before the special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox was fired in the famous “Saturday night massacre”), triggered a multitude of interpretations (see Aitken 1993 for an extensive review and comments), speculating on the (implied) meaning of “presently” in the statement. Was Nixon just denying involvement with no implication attached? Was he trying to incriminate those of the CREEP members who never made it to the White House? Was he trying to suggest that, although there might have been – to use his own words – “crooks” in his administration before, he had already got rid of them himself? This last interpretation seemed the most popular both in the media and among the American people (Aitken 1993), setting Nixon in a somewhat better political stead for another couple of weeks. But soon, after Archibald Cox's dismissal, more doubts arose, making Nixon aware his original defense line was no longer effective. Thus, to counter the growing public disappointment with the White House release of information “in dribs and drabs” (Aitken 1993), he made a one-time attempt to come clean completely. At a press conference in late October 1973 he repeated the initial denial words (A) and added more:

(B) No-one presently employed in the White House participated in any way in the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, nor indeed anyone who has ever worked in the White House.

The function of implied information in Nixon's Watergate rhetoric, in both the September declaration and the October follow-up, is remarkable. Willing to keep the aura of legitimate leadership constant, but at the same time aware of the changing moods and expectations of his audience, Nixon effectively cancels the September implicature by providing more content in the October declaration. In so doing, he opens up a brand new channel for further speculation, though this time no “implicature trigger” (such as “presently” in (A)) is explicitly provided. Nixon's rhetoric in A-B and, generally, throughout the Watergate affair is that of monitoring the expectations of the addressee and releasing just as much of the demanded information as is currently necessary to maintain the aura of credibility and the stance of legitimization of further leadership.

Though rhetorical gambits could not possibly save Nixon from eventually giving up the office – the weight of charges had to prevail – Nixon's use of implicature has been ever since one of the most followed blueprints for US presidential legitimization discourse aiming to keep long-range legitimization effects constant.
in the face of (uncomfortable) contextual shifts (Aitken 1993). As will be discussed in Sections 3.3.1–2 below (and, more extensively, in Chapters 4–5), George W. Bush’s rhetoric is an example of a skillful use of this blueprint.

Meanwhile, we complete the theoretical goals of the current section. Credibility and legitimization issues have also been addressed by text and corpus linguistics, as well as by critical studies, especially in the area of internal and external coherence of texts (Hart 2010: 92–94). As far as internal coherence (or grammatical cohesion, in Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) terms) is concerned, studies such as Gough and Talbot (1996) indicate that legitimization (of assertions) is greatly enhanced by the use of logical terms (“and”, “or”, “if”, etc.) and items marking inferential relationships (“therefore”, “since”, “nevertheless”, etc.). These terms are considered adaptive devices for persuasion, facilitating acceptance of ideational information and, often, “cueing ideological assumptions” (Fairclough 1989: 109). Regarding external coherence, the relation is even clearer as many scholars have dealt with evidentiality (linguistic marking of evidence) as a source of reliability of assertions. Let us take an example from the domain of print news media, where evidentiality is, for obvious reasons, particularly apparent. In a corpus textual analysis, Bednarek (2006a) identifies four specified bases of knowledge used as evidence in British newspaper reportage: (i) Perception; (ii) General Knowledge; (iii) Proof; (iv) Obviousness. These bases of knowledge legitimize assertions in different ways, drawing upon different types of evidence. Perception provides directly attested sensory evidence, whose existence is indicated in discourse by phrases such as “it appears that”, “visibly” or “(…) reveals (that)”. The evidence is construed as acquired directly via visual perception or as something made available to see. Evidence from General Knowledge is “marked as based on what is regarded as part of the communal epistemic background” (Bednarek 2006a: 640) and the most typical markers include phrases like “widely held [view(s), opinion(s)]”, “everybody knows (it/that)”, etc. As Hart (2010: 96) observes, this form of legitimation corresponds with what Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 105) refer to as “conformity authorization”, which rests on the ad populum fallacy that something is true if everyone believes it. Proof is expressed in markers such as (independent) “research”, “results”, “statistics”, etc., which “show”, “indicate” or “reveal” facts; as such, Proof often overlaps with Perception. Finally, Obviousness provides evidence from “facts of life” – in Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999: 105) terms – self-evident propositions modified by markers such as “obviously” or “clearly”. Here we encounter another typological overlap since e.g. “clearly” belongs, essentially, to the semantic domain of perception (viz. “see clearly”). The use of “clearly” as a modifier within the category of Obviousness points to the underlying presence
of metaphor **Facts are Visible**, which connects the domains of knowledge and perception.

Lastly, as several critical-applied studies have shown, legitimization in/of assertions benefits a lot from “source-tagging”, a judgment attribution strategy whereby an antecedent authorial voice is invoked (“(...) experts warned that (...)”; “(...) specialist think tank established that (...)”) to communicate particularly sensitive or potentially controversial information (Groom 2000; Hunston 2000). The credibility of the assertion rises as a result, as does the credibility of any subsequent discourse drawing upon the initial legitimization effect (cf. the assertion-directive pattern above). The catalogue of lexico-grammatical devices identified as potential source tag producers is impressive (Hunston and Thompson 2000); as such it corroborates the claim made at the beginning of this section, that research in legitimization involves, equally, human cognitive, socio-psychological, evolutionary and political predispositions (the “macro” level), and the vast arsenal of linguistic choices used to address these predispositions (the “micro” level).

### 3.3 Legitimization through proximization, proximization for legitimization

Though differing in their disciplinary grounding, focus and scope of inquiry, the approaches described in the previous section converge on a number of observations, which define the central characteristics of political legitimization. First, legitimization is a process that occurs within a macro-temporal frame, which almost always involves sub-frames where different legitimization strategies are pursued in accordance with current contextual needs. Political speakers diagnose current predispositions and expectations of their addressees and structure their messages within the “latitudes of acceptance” accordingly, making sure pragmatic and rhetorical features of these messages will allow for modifications. Thus for example, as the “cheater-detection module” operates, assertion of an ideological belief may get replaced by assertion of a material threat, an implicature may have to be built to redefine a rationale for action, a directive may substitute assertion to better/faster respond to a moment of crisis, more evidentials and source tags may have to be included to raise credibility, and so on. Second, legitimization involves coercion, which in turn involves more or less explicit, fear appeals. Fear appeals are, again, a macro-temporal phenomenon, in the sense that they never disappear from speaker’s rhetorical arsenal, though naturally different sub-frames of the legitimization process have them work with different intensity. All of the
perspectives discussed in Section 3.2 involve fear appeals in one way or another. For instance, in socio-psychological terms, a fear appeal (followed by the prescription of a preventive action) occurs as speaker’s reaction to context in which a material threat is clearly visible to both the speaker and the addressee, thus defining the addressee’s predispositions, i.e. expectations of policies aimed at neutralizing the threat.

In view of the above, legitimization and legitimization discourses are a natural terrain for proximization operations to surface; moreover, studies in legitimization discourses go a long way towards corroborating the explanatory power of proximization as a theory. Recall that proximization is a theory that draws on canonical cognitive/conceptual organization of the Discourse Space, but recognizes a strategic role of language to force construals of changes in that canonical organization, in the service of socio-political goals. This makes for some parallels between proximization and legitimization – despite obvious conceptual differences. The most notable parallel has to do, to quote from Chapter 1, with “the constancy of the macro function of the (...) speaker’s performance within a timeframe of considerable length and density/diversity of events construed by the addressee as personally consequential”. This characterization marks on the one hand the focal scope of legitimization and, on the other, the legitimizing function of proximization, which is responsible for the unstopping enforcement of the “personally consequential” construals in contexts continually evolving as a result of the “density/diversity of events”.

It is time to see in practice how proximization operates in regard to the legitimization concepts/forms/formulas identified in Section 3.2. Since proximization is, notwithstanding its anchoring, a linguistic theory, and only some of the legitimization strategies discussed reveal a direct connection to language, an intriguing question emerges (viz. fn. 7) over a possible reflection, in proximization micro-strategies, of the socio-psychological, cognitive-evolutionary, etc., aspects of legitimization. This of course does not detract from our primary intention to cover the more obvious, pragmalinguistic links, whose analysis will fill up most of the study below.
3.3.1 A sample analysis

In the study that follows I look at substantial parts of G. W. Bush’s speech at the American Enterprise Institute which was delivered on February 26, 2003. Given its themes, as well as time – only three weeks before the first US and coalition troops entered Iraq on March 19 – the speech has been considered (e.g. Silberstein 2004) a manifesto of the Iraq war. Its goal has been to list direct reasons for the intervention, while also locating the operation in the global context of the war-on-terror declared by Bush on the night of the 9/11/2001 attacks.

Providing the rationale for war, Bush had to confront a socio-psychological problem faced by most of his White House predecessors: how to legitimate the US involvement in military action in a far-away place, among a far-away people, of whom the American people knew little. His AEI speech is remarkable in its consistent continuity of attempts to overcome this reluctance. Bush’s rhetoric is heavily based on proximization, whose spatio-temporal and axiological strategies are enacted in various pragmalinguistic patterns (viz. 3.2.2 above), the latter reflecting and drawing from more general conceptual premises for legitimization (viz. 3.2.1):

(1) We are facing a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. (...) On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale. As a result, we must look at security in a new way, because our country is a battlefield in the first war of the 21st century. (...) We learned a lesson: the dangers of our time must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and our cities. And we will not allow the flames of hatred and violence in the affairs of men. (...) The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. (...) Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to our people and to all free people. (...) My job is to protect the American people. When it comes to our security and freedom,
we really don't need anybody's permission. (…) We've tried diplomacy for 12 years. It hasn't worked. Saddam Hussein hasn't disarmed, he's armed. Today the goal is to remove the Iraqi regime and to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. (…) The liberation of millions is the fulfillment of America’s founding promise. The objectives we've set in this war are worthy of America, worthy of all the acts of heroism and generosity that have come before.

In a nutshell, the AEI speech states that there are WMD in Iraq and that, given historical context and experience, ideological characteristics of the adversary as opposed to American values and national legacy, and Bush’s obligations as ruling US president, there is a case for legitimate military intervention. This complex picture involves historical flashbacks, as well as descriptions of the current situation, which both involve proximization strategies. These strategies operate at two interrelated levels, which can be described as “diachronic” and “synchronic”. At the diachronic level, Bush evokes ideological representations of the remote past, which are “proximized” to underline the continuity and steadfastness of purpose, thus linking with and sanctioning current actions as acts of faithfulness to long-accepted principles and values. An example is the final part in (1), “The liberation is (…) promise. The objectives (…) have come before”, which launches a temporal analogy “axis” that connects a past reference point (the founding of America) with the present point, creating a common conceptual space for both the proximized historical “acts of heroism” and the current and/or prospective acts construed as their “follow-ups”. This kind of legitimization, performed by mostly temporal and axiological proximization (originally past values become the “here and now” premises for action\(^\text{11}\)), draws upon the socio-psychological predispositions of the US addressee (and, in many ways, of the “Western world” addressee generally), and the “latitude of acceptance” (cf. 3.2.1) is targeted by “assertoric sequences” (cf. 3.2.2). The assertions reveal different degrees of acceptability, from being indisputably acceptable (“My job is (…)”; “The liberation of millions (…)”) to being acceptable due to credibility developed progressively (cf. 3.2.2) within “fact-belief series” (“We’ve tried diplomacy for 12 years (…) he's armed”), but none of them is inconsistent with the key predispositions.

At the “synchronic” level, much denser with relevant lexical and pragmatic material, historical flashbacks are not completely abandoned, but they involve

\(^\text{11.}\) Keep in mind, viz. fn. 8, this is a necessarily simplistic definition. Axiological proximization often (if not mainly) involves the adversary (cf. Section 2.3.2); antagonistic values are “dormant” triggers for a possible impact. See Chapter 1 and Section 2.3, but mostly Chapters 4–6, where fully-fledged definitions and rigorous distinctions between spatial, temporal, and axiological kinds of proximization, involving “IDC/ODC” terminologies and other formalizations, are proposed and followed.
near history and the main legitimization premise is not (continuing) ideological commitments, but direct physical threats looming over the country ("a battle-field", in Bush's words) and requiring a swift and strong pre-emptive response. The “default” proximization strategy operating at the synchronic level is spatial proximization (often featuring a temporal component), whose task is to evoke fears of imminence of the threat, which might be "external" apparently, but could materialize within the US borders virtually anytime. The lexico-grammatical carriers of the spatial proximization include such items and phrases as "secret and far away", “all free people”, “stable and free nations”, “Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction”, etc., which build up dichotomous, “good vs. evil” representations of the in-group (America, Western democratic world) and the out-group (Saddam Hussein, Iraqi regime, terrorists), located at a relative distance from each other. This geographical and geopolitical distance is symbolically construed as shrinking, as, on the one hand, the out-group entities cross the DS towards its center and, on the other, the DS center (in-group) entities declare a reaction. The out-group shift is enacted by forced inference and metaphorization. The inference involves an analogy to 9/11 ("On a September morning (...)"), whereby the current event stage is construed as facing another physical impact, whose (“current”) consequences are scrupulously described (“before we see them [flames] again in our skies and our cities”). As can be noticed, this fear appeal is strengthened by the Fire metaphor, which adds to the imminence and the speed of the impact. The in-group “shift” is much less symbolic; it involves declaration of a pre-emptive move to neutralize the threat (“must be confronted actively and forcefully before…”, “we will not allow the flames…”, “When it comes to our security and freedom, we really don’t need anybody’s permission”).

While all spatial proximization in the text draws upon the presumed WMD presence in Iraq – and its potential availability to terrorists for acts far more destructive than the 9/11 attacks – Bush does not disregard the possibility of having to resort to an alternative rationale for war in the future. Consequently, the speech contains “supporting” ideological premises, however tied to the principal premise. An example is “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder”, which counts as an instance of axiological proximization. This ideological argument is not synonymous with Bush’s proximization of remote history we have seen before

12. Cf. Section 2.3.2.
13. Cf. 3.2.1 above for Chilton’s (2004) view on the role of forced dichotomous representations in legitimation.
14. By inference, see below.
(see also fn. 11), as its current line subsumes acts of the adversary rather than his/ America’s own acts. As such it demonstrates a more “typical” axiological proximi-
ization where initially ideological conflict turns, over time, into a physical clash. Notably, in its ideological-physical duality it forces a whole spectrum of specula-
tions over whether a current threat is “still” ideological or “already” physical. As any interpretation defines a reaction, the axiological proximization as described above is essentially an implicature-based mechanism to respond to the operation of the cheater-detection module (3.2.1). The speaker can force an interpretation upon the addressee (if further relevant content is provided), but also check (and later counter) the addressee’s unforced interpretation (if no such content is imme-
diately provided), deciding, eventually, on a “legitimate” course of action which she has “coherently” outlined.

Speaking of the latter, that is issues of logical connectivity and evidence (cf. 3.2.2), one must conclude that the AEI text contains a relatively moderate number of logical terms and markers of inferential relationships; furthermore, the text is not too rich in explicit or specific, source tags. This seems to be a direct conse-
quence of the “WMD factor”: the very strong fear appeals provide for legitimiza-
tion of response anyway. However, items/phrases such as “As a result, we must look at security in a new way, because (…), “must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them (…); or “The world has a clear interest in (…), be-
cause (…)”, do contribute to the legitimization of the respective assertions, most of which (all of the three above) perform proximization strategies. Similarly, “The world has a clear interest in (…)” is an instance of legitimization through evidentiality (Perception, Obviousness) and the proximization-oriented reference to “America’s founding promise” involves implicit source-tagging. Altogether then, even these moderately represented internal/external coherence ploys belong to (conclude, in fact) the conceptual-linguistic continuum which has been postu-
lated as typifying the “legitimization through proximization, proximization for legitimization” process captured in this section’s title.

3.3.2 Maintaining the (AEI) legitimization: Changes in proximization strategies

I said at the beginning of this chapter that political legitimization pursued in/for temporally extensive contexts often entails redefinition of the initial legitimiza-
tion premises and coercion patterns, and that proximization, in its functional linguistic flexibility, is exceptionally well suited to enact these redefinitions in discourse – which in turn corroborates a considerable applicability as well as ex-
planatory range of proximization as a theory. The legitimization accomplished
in the AEI speech and how the unfolding geopolitical context has put it to test is a case in point, providing a lucid illustration for these claims. Recall from the previous subsection that although Bush has made the “WMD factor” the central premise for the Iraq war, he has left half-open an “emergency door” to be able to reach for an alternative rationale. Come October/November 2003 (the mere eight months into the Iraq war), and Bush’s pro-war rhetoric adopts (or rather has to adopt) such an emergency alternative rationale, as it is evident (to all political players worldwide) there have never been weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, at least not in the ready-to-use product sense. This is reflected in a swift change from strong fear appeals (enacted, chiefly, by spatial proximization of the “direct threat”), to a more subtle ideological argument for legitimization, involving predominantly axiological proximization. The following quote from G.W. Bush’s Whitehall Palace address of November 19 is a good illustration:

(2) By advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people. By struggling for justice in Iraq, Burma, in Sudan, and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. Had we failed to act, the dictator’s programs for weapons of mass destruction would continue to this day. Had we failed to act, Iraq’s torture chambers would still be filled with victims, terrified and innocent. (...) For all who love freedom and peace, the world without Saddam Hussein’s regime is a better and safer place.

The now dominant axiological proximization involves a dense concentration of ideological and value-oriented lexical items (e.g. “freedom”, “justice”, “stability”, “progress”, “peace” vs. “dictatorship”, “radicalism”) as well as of items/phrases indicating the human dimension of the conflict (“misery”, “suffering people”, “terrified victims” vs. “the world” [being] “a better and safer place”). All of these lexico-grammatical forms serve to build, as in the case of the AEI address, dichotomous representations of the DS “home” and “peripheral/adversarial” entities, which the latter could encroach upon the “home territory” of the DS central entities. In contrast to the AEI speech, however, the entities (both central and peripheral) are construed in abstract, rather than physical, “tangible” terms, as respective lexical items are not explicitly (though sometimes inferentially) attributed to concrete parties. Compare combinations such as e.g. “all free people”, “stable and free nations”, [terrorist] “flames of hatred”, etc., in the AEI address, with the stand-alone

15. Compare the brief account of the “programs for WMD” phrase in 3.2.2 above.
16. See also example (3) in Section 2.3.1.
positions and a global meaning and reference of “dictatorship” and “radicalism”, in the Whitehall speech. Apparently, proximization in the Whitehall speech is mainly the proximization of antagonistic values, and not so much of physical entities as embodiments of these values.\(^\text{17}\) The consequences for maintaining legitimization stance which began with the AEI address are enormous. First, there is no longer a commitment to a material threat posed by a physical entity. Second, the relief of this commitment does not completely disqualify the original WMD premise as antagonistic “peripheral” values do have a capacity to materialize in the DS center (“... a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people”, or recall “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder”, from the AEI speech). Third, as the nature of ideological values is such that they are considered global or widely adhered to, socio-ideological argument helps extend the spectrum of the US engagement (“Burma”, “Sudan”, “Zimbabwe”), which in turn forces the construal of failure to detect WMD in Iraq as an unlucky incident among other successful operations, and not as something that could ultimately ruin the US credibility (though the very switch to the ideological stance and axiological proximization seem to betray Bush’s belief that some/much of the credibility did get damaged and there is a pressing need to restore it). Add to these general factors the power of legitimization ploys in specific pragmalinguistic constructs (“programs for weapons of mass destruction” (see fn. 15), the enumeration of the “new” foreign fields of engagement (cf. above), the always-effective appeals for solidarity in compassion (“terrified victims” in “torture chambers”)) and there are reasons to conclude that the fall 2003 change to essentially axiological rhetoric (subsuming axiological proximization) has contributed a lot towards saving credibility and thus maintaining legitimization of not only the Iraq war, but the later anti-terrorist campaigns and policies as well. We will see, especially in Chapter 6, how different periods in the 2001–2010 decade have posed different context related legitimization challenges and which proximization strategies have been adopted (and in what proportions) to best answer these challenges. Still, while not detracting from all later arrangements and adjustments, the flexible interplay of spatial and axiological proximization (both aided by temporal projections) in the early stages of the US anti-terrorist policy rhetoric has been, credibility- and legitimization-wise, very important.

\(^{17}\) Compare the initial sketch of formal differences between spatial and axiological proximization in Section 2.3.2.
3.3.3 Interventionist discourses

One of the main reasons why the analyses in 3.3.1–2 are apparently successful in elucidating the relation between proximization and legitimization is that the respective texts are, like arguably most of the 2001–2010 anti-terrorist rhetoric, prime instances of interventionist discourse.\(^{18}\) Interventionist discourse can be considered a state governance discourse whose function is to sanction and enact policies aimed at neutralizing, whether legislatively or by force, often military force, external threats to the society or a socio-political group (including the global international community) which the political actor/speaker represents (or aspires to represent) and rules over or otherwise “leads” (or usurps a moral right to do so). As such, interventionist discourse involves frequent appeals for legitimization and thus is a natural venue for proximization symbolic operations. The salience of proximization in interventionist discourse is readily describable in analysis, since the discourse context is usually extensive and unstable, and thus the flexibility of proximization strategies applied to handle the contextual changes can be accounted for with maximal efficacy and in due detail – which in turn helps credibility and reliability of proximization as a theory.

If we take the US anti-terrorist rhetoric as an example of interventionist discourse, a discourse sanctioning a response to an external threat, we mustn’t fail to address a controversy underlying two concept words permanently associated with that (and earlier) rhetoric and the kind of the response, “preventive” vs. “pre-emptive” (Bacevich 2010). While most of the last decade US anti-terrorist policies have sought legitimization in following the precepts of the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS02; see Section 2.5), a document which sanctioned the “pre-emptive” posture of immediate military reaction, including outside the US

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18. Surprisingly, use of the term “interventionist discourse” in political scientific and political linguistic research is rare as regards the domain of state intervention to contain an external threat by neutralizing the capacity of the threatening entity (notable exceptions are Keyes 2005; and Kaplan and Kristol 2003). Note that this description includes, both, threats to home entities posed by actors/entities in foreign states, and threats posed, again to home entities, but by other home entities/phenomena (see the discussion of anti-tobacco campaigns in Section 3.4). It does not include acts of state interventionism in economy, which assume long-range benefits for the target entity (i.e. economy) and are as such outside the scope of this book (though, ironically, these acts are amply discussed and theorized upon in literature). The apparent underrepresentation of the term “interventionist discourse” within the domain of state intervention as described at the beginning strikes me as unfortunate, since interventionist discourse, understood that way, seems nowadays a relatively stabilized, macro-structural political genre (cf. fn. 11 in Chapter 2), which is now further proved by the systemic operation of its underlying proximization formulas.
borders, to any “clear and present danger to the US” (Kirk 2003; Dunmire 2011), a bulk of these policies should have been merely “preventive”. Given the absence of obvious threats throughout most of the decade, they should have involved essentially internal and truly self-defensive solutions adopted on the domestic, rather than international, arena (Bacevich 2010). However, in reality the US has mostly acted “pre-emptively” and, accordingly, its discourse has shown preference for the adjective “pre-emptive”, and not “preventive”, though a certain interchangeability of these two terms can be observed as well, especially under the Bush administration. Given all these politico-terminological intricacies, I have shown a similarly liberal attitude thus far in the book, but now that a clarification has been provided I adopt “pre-emptive” as the principal term.

If proximization is salient in interventionist discourses and the latter include (viz. fn. 18) not only the kinds immediately similar to the discourse scrutinized in this book, it seems in the interest of proximization theory to check, at least tentatively, its applicability to the general public space discourses whose themes are different from those of the anti-terrorist rhetoric. To make this extension of scope as swift as possible, I first pre-examine a discourse close to the common conception of the “political”, and then a discourse that can be considered “social”, rather than strictly “political”. What follows is a short working analysis only, but since its results turn out promising, I go on to apply proximization to other public space discourses in Chapter 7.

3.4 Beyond the war-on-terror

Hart (2010: 10) suggests that proximization strategies can be noticed in many instances of the anti-immigration journalistic discourse in the modern Britain. This is definitely true and proven by numerous examples, including the following:

(3) Mr. Blair admitted more needs to be done to stop the rising tide of illegal entrants. *(The Sun; April 23, 2005)*

(4) Britain is facing a nightly tidal wave of asylum seekers from Cherbourg, France’s second biggest port. *(Sunday Telegraph; August 25, 2002)*

(5) Gibraltar is standing firm against tide of immigrants. *(The Express; April 13, 2006)*

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19. Cf. Section 2.4 and fn. 2 in the present chapter.
(6) People will welcome that essential step to stem the unsustainable flow of immigrants from the continent to this country. (*Hansard*; January 29, 2002)

(7) A further 100,000 Iraqi refugees will probably try to reach Britain (...). (*Daily Mail*; February 2, 2003)

(8) Investigators believe as many as 400,000 illegal immigrants could be reaching the UK each year. (*Daily Mail*; February 7, 2002)

(9) We can't keep letting asylum seekers into our country when our own population is struggling to make ends meet. (*The Sun*; March 5, 2003)

(10) For as long as these lenient conditions continue, large numbers of illegal immigrants will continue to arrive on our doorstep. (*Daily Mail*; May 9, 2003)

(11) Asylum seekers are still at the gates. (*Sunday Times*; December 8, 2002)

(12) We're all set to take on Saddam but can't halt the invaders to our shores; Britain gives up fight on asylum. (*The Express*; January 29, 2003)

(13) Officials in the frontline of the battle against illegal immigration have to consider around 50 cases every day. (*Daily Mail*; December 14, 2005)

It is difficult, however, to agree with Hart’s further argument (2010: 83ff.), which gives an impression as if most (if not all) of this discourse was at the same time essentially metaphoric. Remember that proximization, to be recognized as such (cf. Sections 1.1, 2.3.2, etc.), must involve at least: the presence of an inside-the-deictic-center (IDC, “in-group”) entity, the presence of an outside-the-deictic-center (ODC, “out-group”) entity, and, crucially, an indication of a negative impact of the ODC entity upon the IDC entity. The metaphorization in the British anti-immigration discourse rarely engages all of these factors at once; it is usually the case that only a part of the proximization structure is metaphoric. For instance, examples (3)–(6) involve metaphorization of the movement/impact part (“rising tide”, “tidal wave”, “unsustainable flow”), but reveal no metaphorization of the dichotomous IDC-ODC entities; in fact in (3) there is no explicit marker of the IDC party – the identification relies on metonymy. Conversely, in (11)–(13) it is the IDC party and its borders (or the borders of its activity) that is metaphorized (“the gates”, “our shores”, “the frontline”), while markers of the ODC-IDC impact are non-metaphoric (“are at” in (11), a rather feeble “impact” marker anyway) or apparently non-existent (13), the exception being the “invaders” metaphor in (12). Lastly, in examples (7)–(10) the proximization pattern does not seem to

20. One could argue these formulas (especially (7)–(9)) do not fully live up to the core conception of proximization as a *symbolic* discourse operation. I acknowledge such an objection to a point (there could well be degrees of the proximization “prototype resemblance” – an
involve any metaphor at all, except the construal of the in-group (IDC) territory as a house in (10) (“our doorstep”). Thus, to say that proximization strategies in the British anti-immigration discourse tie in with metaphorization, or even have a marked tendency to do so, seems an exaggeration. This does not however detract from the observation that proximization underlies much of this discourse as such, whether metaphoric or not, and that the principal function of proximization continues to be soliciting legitimization of (new) pre-emptive policies (“Mr. Blair admitted more needs to be done (…)”, “People will welcome that essential step (…)”, “We can’t keep letting (…)”, “For as long as these lenient conditions continue (…)”). It is a very important observation, as it pre-postulates an extension of the empirical field of the current proximization model, offering preliminary evidence for its more universal applicability in public communication space.

The other discourse I want to tackle in this, for the time being, somewhat digressive sketch is the language of anti-tobacco campaigns in the United States. The US anti-tobacco discourse has a long history and includes now a seemingly infinite number of spoken, written and e-genres, from state acts, formal legislation proposals and medical bodies’ declarations, to quasi-medical street advertising and online forums.\(^{21}\) The proximization patterns occurring in these genres and sub-genres vary in structure and intensity of appeal, but there are common points, which the following two texts capture quite well:

(14) Tobacco kills, and people who market it are terrorists. The bomb is ticking. Will we respond? If we don’t, who will? Awareness is not enough; only strategic action will change the course of human events. The industry is increasingly spending money to target all, but especially the most vulnerable cells of our society: children, minorities, and American citizens who had immigrated to our country from the third world (…). We need to more aggressively fight tobacco marketing. This is an issue of social justice. Predatory marketing by the tobacco industry must be actively opposed.

(Statement of (and at) the American Cancer Society (Conference); April 20, 2008)

intriguing issue, which I however do not raise in this book). True, they force construals which can be described as relatively “objective” and fitting the “reality”, in which the events depicted “really” happen. Yet, representations of these “real” events are assisted in terms of appeal, by “symbolic” means. For instance, the progressive in (8)–(9) sets up a symbolic linear pathway for an “uninterrupted traffic” between the periphery and the center and thus “accelerates” the “real” speed of impact. At the same time, the modality in (7) enacts a symbolic representation in the sense that it forces upon the in-group addressee a future which subsumes an infinite number of visions, to be decided by the out-group (the adversary). Some of these visions will turn real for the addressee but some will remain a matter of her speculation, a “virtual world” so to say.

\(^{21}\) See e.g. Grandpre et al. (2009).
(15) Secondhand smoke could penetrate your body in no time at all. The moment you inhale your lungs and blood become affected, transmitting toxicants all over your brain, heart, stomach (…), your neural, respiratory, cardiovascular (…) systems. Toxicity grows every second you are exposed, increasing the chances of cancer, stroke, heart attack (…), affecting reproductive capacity in both males and females (…). Until all forms of public smoking are banned state-wide in California, your life is at a continual risk.

(Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), California branch, internet release on dangers of passive smoking; July 29, 2009)

Both (14) and (15) reveal the presence of proximization operations conceptually similar to those in “political” interventionist discourse, except that the response whose legitimization is sought is less within the capacity of the speaker (alone) and, viz. esp. (14), more within the capacity of the addressee and the speaker (or the addressee and the speaker and possibly the government as the third party, conflated with the “broad public” addressee through common reference). A related thing is that at places (15) anti-tobacco discourse makes it more vague (than the “political” interventionist discourse) who exactly is expected to act. I return to these issues in a moment. First, let us note that, at the DS basic organization level, the speaker and the addressee (IDCs) are duly positioned in the deictic center, facing an external threat entity construed as moving from the apparent periphery of the DS in the direction of the DS center. Now, as has been signaled, despite the stability of this principal proximization arrangement, there are differences or variabilities in reference and the attribution of agency, some of which could trigger vagueness. The addressee in (14) seems more able to deliver or help deliver a response (“Will we respond? If we don’t, who will?”) – perhaps because the “we” is inclusive and refers both to the fellow Society members as expert voices of the broad public, and the government as representatives of the public – than a direct addressee in (15) does, who might not possess legislative powers. That fact makes (15) problematic in terms of the attribution of agency that follows from direct address and explicit reference: while we do get an indication of who is to react legislatively, State of California, SoC is not a direct addressee and hardly a discourse-grammatical referent. Less vagueness can be observed as regards the ODC entities, which are proximized to negatively affect the DS central entities (IDCs). In (15) the ODC entity is simply “secondhand smoke”, which is construed as animate, almost “intelligent” in fact. This not only maximizes the speed and force of the impact, but also marks its “strategic” character, which involves a step-by-step assumption of full control over the body. Speaking of “the body”, we must return briefly to the problem of vagueness underlying the construal of IDCs – in (15) IDCs can be persons exposed to secondhand smoke within their social space,
but also their organs, exposed to the smoke within the bodies, conceptualized as “containers” similar to social spaces. This “onion structure” of the DS central entities in (15) does not detract from their general status as “central”, it rather helps elucidate problems (viz. above) with their collective agency, which can be easily attributed to people, but not to their organs. In (14) the ODC entity is again the smoke (tobacco) and, by causal attribution, the “tobacco industry”, “people who market it”. In contrast to (15), there is no vagueness here resulting from the IDC internal clusivity levels.

At the level of lexis responsible for the discourse enactment of proximization there are fewer controversies. In both (14) and (15) strongly appealing lexicogrammatical forms are used (“Tobacco kills, and people who market it are terrorists. The bomb is ticking”, “(…) to target all, but especially the most vulnerable cells of our society (…)”, “Predatory marketing (…)”, “(…) could penetrate (…) in no time at all. The moment you inhale your (…) become affected, transmitting (…) all over (…)”, “Toxicity grows every second (…)”, “(…) cancer, stroke (…)”, “(…) life is at continual risk”), to indicate the ODC “evil” power, capacity and unpredictability such as necessary to force construals of the continuing possibility/probability of an unexpected, ultra-fast and ultimately devastating impact (note an intriguing metaphor of terrorist attacks). At the coercion level, analogies to state-political interventionist discourse are equally clear. The texts work consistently towards legitimization of the adoption of anti-tobacco policies, though there are – as has been pointed out – differences as regards who is primarily referred to, who is directly responsible, and who has the necessary tools. The similarities at the coercion and lexicogrammatical levels seem to offset these altogether small disanalogies at the DS organization level, stemming mostly from the IDC variability. Thus, the anti-tobacco discourse, as well as the anti-immigration discourse looked at earlier, appear to warrant further explorations in further legitimization interventionist discourses subsuming proximization strategies. Such studies are necessary for a theory whose aspiration is not only to be interdisciplinary in terms of design (“cognitive-pragmatic”), but also to be inter-generic in terms of its (“critical”) application in different discourse domains. The envisaged range of these domains reflects Aristotle’s broad conception of the “socio-political” I have referred to in Section 3.2, or, among contemporary thinkers, for instance Gardenfors’s anthropologically grounded conception of most human communication being political in the sense of engaging language to force visions in the interest of cooperative reaction (Gardenfors 2002). Thus, as has been indicated, discourses to test for a possible existence of proximization operations are,

22. Recall also the argument starting Chapter 1.
in the long run, all those where the speaker attempts to establish a common view on what is good-evil, acceptable-unacceptable, etc., and consequently, on the best course of (re)action to secure the “right”, “good”, against a possible invasion of the “wrong”, “evil”, which emerge in the proximity of the speaker’s in-group. As I have argued in Chapter 1, this massive empirical challenge (producing, potentially, a theory of communication) cannot be met in a single book, but I try to make an initial step by, first, consolidating the proximization model to handle an already extensive territory of state political discourse (in the next three chapters), and then going beyond that territory in Chapter 7. Thus at the moment, the current tentative model of proximization will be formalized, and its components more precisely defined/demarcated, and finally, tested in a quantitative-qualitative discourse analysis. The formalization starts in the next chapter.

On Gardenfors’s (2002: 5ff) seminal argument, forms of human action that could be called “politics” include equally “a state leader depicting a security threat that must be answered by common action requiring sacrifice in the interest of future well-being of the state”, and “a village chief convincing inhabitants they should cooperate in digging a common well to prevent effects of oncoming drought season”. Both acts involve activation of meta-representations of “detached” “negative” stimuli prompting cooperative behavior in line with the goals defined by the speaker. Recognizing (and documenting) the core role of human universal ability to metarepresent things, especially negative stimuli or states of affairs, in alerting people to action, Gardenfors’s argument virtually defines the range and the agenda of research in construals such as proximization. The research must start at the level of a discourse domain (e.g. state politics, where linguistic markers of proximization are relatively easy to identify), but always with a view to a (seemingly infinite) number of other domains and genres, not necessarily “political” in the everyday sense of the word. Logically enough, there is no “final point” where such a research could possibly stop, claiming it has produced an “ultimate” theory of social communication which has exhausted all empirical input. This is obvious from even a brief look at how quickly contemporary discourse domains are colonized by new genres and, conversely, how the genres themselves can change or multiply after entering a new domain (Cap and Okulska 2013).
CHAPTER 4

Conceptual structure of the (S)patial-(T)emporal-(A)xiological model of proximization

“Do you deal with a threat once you see it?”
(G. W. Bush, reflecting on his orders to attack Iraq in March 2003)

4.1 Introduction

The objective of the previous chapters has been – to put it as synthetically as possible – to demonstrate that proximization is an important conceptual and discourse phenomenon, whose importance is best observed in political/public interventionist discourse. Chapter 2 has shown that although proximization operations can be viewed from multiple disciplinary perspectives (cognitive, pragmatic, critical linguistic, etc.), for maximal explanatory power they should be approached from an interdisciplinary perspective. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 combined have shown that although the general discourse functions of proximization are relatively stable and associated with socio-political legitimization, there is still a whole complex network of inner connections between the constitutive elements of proximization which is activated to carry out these functions in changing contextual conditions. Informal as the phrase may sound, the message of the present book thus far is exactly this: “proximization is worth building a theory around” – which endorses the intriguing complexities.

The methodological and empirical observations from the previous chapters, in which proximization was addressed as a concept rather than a theory as yet, do not finish their job at the above conclusion point. From now on, they pave the way for the proximization theoretical model to be developed in the rest of the book. In this chapter I revisit the central components of the model – spatial, temporal, axiological – proposing formal definitions demarcating each of the three domains for the later (Chapters 5 and 6) assignment of the relevant lexico-grammatical material. In so doing I move towards an essentially micro-textual perspective, providing organized sets of examples of the most salient/frequent lexical builders of spatial, temporal and axiological proximization. This is to give the first idea,
as far as the existing limitations allow, of the standard/stable lexico-grammatical patterns performing the three types of proximization, and thus ensure a smooth transition to Chapter 5, where these patterns are systematically captured in lexico-grammatical framework categories (cf. chapter overview in 1.5). The penultimate set of examples (axiological proximization taking over from spatial and temporal proximization, in 4.4.1) targets the central issue behind the theory as a whole: it points to systemic, context-bound functional compensations occurring between the three proximization strategies.

The growing micro-textual focus means that the chapter contains more examples than the previous chapters; most of them (though not all) come from the timeframe of the Iraq war. A number of examples show “subtypes” of a given proximization strategy: for instance spatial proximization could be enforced based on the functional prominence of its nominal or verbal components, making up, in different ratios and configurations, different aspects of the ODC impact (see 4.2.1–3 below). I argue (and continue this argument in Chapter 5) that some of these subtypes have in fact yielded the particular categories in the lexico-grammatical frameworks proposed for the three types of proximization.

4.2 Spatial proximization

Spatial proximization is a forced construal of the Discourse Space (DS) peripheral entities encroaching physically upon the DS central entities located in the deictic center of the Space. Within the STA model, the central entities are called IDCs (“inside-the-deictic-center”), while the peripheral entities are referred to as ODCs (“outside-the-deictic-center”). The center-periphery distinction involves primarily a geographical and geopolitical distance, but also an ideological distance. The IDCs are the political/public speaker and her direct audience, who share positive values (i.e. recognized as such by the IDCs). The ODCs are conceptualized as embodiments of negative values, which the latter prompt the physical impact of ODCs upon IDCs.

As a strategic construal operation, spatial proximization always forces the vision of a physically destructive character of the ODCs’ impact. It construes the impact as imminent and inevitable, unless there is an immediate pre-emptive action from the IDC camp. Typically, it conflates the growing threat with an actual disastrous occurrence in the past, which serves to endorse the current scenario envisaged by the speaker. Involving strong fear appeals, spatial proximization is ideally suited to solicit addressee’s legitimization of speaker’s (pre-emptive) policies in the fastest way possible.
Within the 2001–2010 period of the US anti-terrorist discourse, spatial proximization is best observed at times when the speaker (the US president) seeks an immediate approval of a military retaliatory or pre-emptive strike delivered in quick response to a terrorist action (the bombing of Afghanistan a few days after the 9/11 attacks, the increased number of raids on the alleged terrorist harbors in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq following the Madrid 2004 train attacks and the London Underground 2005 suicide bombings), or in response to a “perceived” growth in terrorist or terrorism supporting activities (the intervention in Iraq in March 2003 to disarm Saddam Hussein and break his alleged links to Al-Qaeda). The pre-emptive strike on Iraq was preceded by the US ultimatum urging Saddam to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. A fragment of the ultimatum follows in (1):

(1) The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other. (…) The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.

(G. W. Bush, March 17, 2003)

The mechanism of the spatial proximization in (1) consists in the gradual narrowing of the physical distance between IDCs and ODCs, which is symbolically construed through the use of specific lexical forms, many of which are representative of the entire 2001–2010 period. The IDC elements involve lexical items and phrases such as “United States”, “other nations”, “innocent people”, “our country”, and “we”. The inclusion of the apparently remote entities (“other nations”) as members of the deictic center occurs through the implication of common position in respect to the envisaged ODC threat (“kill (…) innocent people in our country, or any other”) and some further common characterizations (“innocent”, [committed to] “safety”) enhancing the shared geopolitical identity. The ODC elements involve “Iraq”, “terrorists”, and “their stated ambitions”. Again, these elements are symbolically conflated to make up a clearly demarcated camp. The conflation arises, inferentially, from the presumption of lasting and active cooperation (“(…) with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could (…)”), and, textually, as a result of syntactic proximity of “Iraq” and “the terrorists” (this arrangement is a stable characteristic of the entire Iraq war discourse). The relative distance between ODCs and IDCs is shrinking as the ODC elements aim to “fulfill their stated ambitions” and physically invade the IDC home territory (“kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of
innocent people in our country”) while the IDC elements are and, notably, have been, inert (“drifting along”). It is important to see that the speaker construes the IDC inertia as a past-until-present cumulative phenomenon. This not only proximizes the current threat as one that had time to grow and could materialize any time now, but also strengthens the coercive appeal of the near future pre-emptive policies (“(…) set a course toward safety”), which are evaluated and legitimized against the current negative situation.

Example (1) shows that spatial proximization benefits from a temporal component,¹ which involves a historical flashback (Chilton 2004; Tenbrink 2007; Zinken 2010) assisting the credibility of the future vision depicted by the speaker. The flashback historical space (cf. Chilton’s study of the Kosovo discourse in 2.2.1) subsumes the ODC-IDC arrangement prior to the 9/11 attacks, which is construed as analogous to the current arrangement. The key lexical phrase in (1) setting up the past space is “the day of horror”, which can be read as synonymous with “a September morning”, a phrase that emerges as central to the US post-9/11 anti-terrorist rhetoric as a whole.² The function of “the day of horror” is not just to have the audience recall the events of “the day” as such, but also revisit the entire conceptual and belief frame surrounding it, including mainly the under-appreciation of the ODC threat, as well as the tragic consequences. The analogy to 9/11 salient in the phrase is another stable characteristic of the Iraq war discourse, involving a set of default pragma-linguistic and lexical patterns used to enact it. In example (1) they include, apart from the implied reference to 9/11 itself, three core descriptions: (i) of the current (“(…) chemical, biological (…)”) as well as developing (“(…) one day, nuclear (…)”) capacity of ODCs, (ii) of the commitment to direct that capacity against IDCs (“(…) stated ambitions (…)”), and (iii) of the inevitability and imminence of the ODC impact (viz. the expression “(…) drifting along toward tragedy (…)”, representing a forced inference from the combination of (i) and (ii)). These patterns and the component lexical choices make up a virtual scenario which is identical with the flashback real scenario, except the final part. In this sense, the “real” scenario evoked in the analogy is an evidentiality macro-structure providing instances of (past) proofs and (past) perception based evidence, as well as forcing conclusions from the general knowledge (cf. Section 3.2.2). In (1), the perception proof extends into the present, by virtue of a Facts are Visible metaphor (“The danger [Fact: using chemical, etc., weapons, terrorists could kill] is clear (…)”). Arguably, at a more general level,

1. Why I do not use the term “temporal proximization” (yet), will be made clear in Section 4.3.

2. Recall its accounts in the previous chapters and see the discussion of the markers of construed time in the next section on temporal proximization.
Chapter 4. Conceptual structure of the STA model of proximization

the 9/11 analogy could also be considered the “first premise” in the complex topos of the post-2001 anti-terrorist interventionism, as its role in prompting “obvious conclusions” (van Eemeren et al. 1996; van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2001; see also Section 2.4) cannot be underestimated.

Forced inferences of a physical catastrophe resulting from a possible disregard for the “gathering” ODC threat are among the most prominent features of spatial proximization; they function as “destination paths” that the speaker construes for the addressee, only to stop the latter from reaching (or rather finding herself at) the disastrous destination at the very last moment. This means that the emotive appeal of the “direct [physical] threat” must be kept at a continual high; otherwise the addressee might not appreciate how far the “destination” is and what the “destination point” really brings.

However, one of the features of spatial proximization is that its numerous “threat building bricks” (the IDC and ODC dichotomous characterizations, the dynamics of the ODC activity, the means available to ODCs to successfully invade the IDC territory, the (passive) attitude of IDCs, the presence of a past event or events endorsing the future scenario through analogy, etc.) never contribute in identical proportions in all cases of the spatial proximization discourse. Spatial proximization is thus enacted incrementally in discursive chains, in which the different kinds of pragmalinguistic patterns and lexi-co-grammatical forms responsible for the threat construal reveal different degrees of functional salience and emotive appeal. As can be imagined, it takes the space of at least one text (a president’s speech, in our case) to see all of them work together with their full force. It is however at the sentence level that they can be best demarcated and defined in terms of the kind and range of contribution they make.

4.2.1 Threat construal through the ODC characterization

In the entire 2001–2010 decade of the US anti-terrorist discourse, instances in which physical threat to IDCs is construed based on, predominantly, a strikingly negative characterization of the ODC agents are so plentiful that it seems legitimate to consider them a valid subtype of spatial proximization. There is of course a number of ways in which the “negative” perception is enforced. Much of the job is done lexically through the use of single-word nominal agents functioning as direct embodiments and carriers of “evil” values. As such, single nouns like “terrorists,” “extremists” or “radicals” (including countries conceptualized as their “harbors”, e.g. “Iraq” AD2003) are among the most natural and frequent choices. In the discourse of the early Iraq war, a prototypical case of spatial proximization, they clearly outnumber the “less frightening” choices, such as “adversaries,”
“opponents”, “antagonists”. However, frequently enough, the picture gets more complex as the ODC threatening posture is to be inferred from an interplay of both lexical markers and mostly extralinguistic premises or presuppositions:

(2) Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes.  
(G. W. Bush, March 8, 2003)

(3) Iraq provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists who would willingly deliver weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries.  
(G. W. Bush, March 10, 2003)

(4) On this very day 15 years ago the dictator of Iraq launched a chemical weapons attack on the village of Halabja, killing thousands of people without mercy or without shame.  
(G. W. Bush, March 16, 2003)

(5) I shall repeat: we must not permit his [Saddam’s] crimes reach across the world.  
(G. W. Bush, March 16, 2003)

(6) We have learned a lesson: dictatorships and regimes are the cradle of murder ideologies.  
(G. W. Bush, April 24, 2003)

(7) Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.  
(G. W. Bush, April 24, 2003)

Although examples (2)–(7) come from different speeches, they represent a coherent inference pattern which could as well occur within a single speech. The essence of this pattern is the conceptual extension of the central threat-generating ODC (terrorists) to cover further enemy parties, so their past and present actions, as well as values, can be attributed to that central ODC. The aim is to develop the negative construal of “terrorists” beyond the direct and immediate associations such as the memories of the 9/11 attacks, which, however strong as regards the actual events, might not be strong enough with respect to the geopolitical and, mainly, ideological reasons.

In (2)–(7) these reasons are defined in terms of natural – if not innate then certainly “developmental” (the “cradle” metaphor in (6)) – predispositions for producing mass conflict and destruction notwithstanding the human costs (the comparison in (7)). It is however only in (3) that the evil predispositions are ascribed directly to “terrorists” (who kill “willingly” on a massive scale). In all other cases, they are attributed either to Iraq/Saddam ((2), (4), (5)) or to vaguely defined antagonistic entities or groups of entities ((6), (7)). This duality serves two different, though related, purposes. First, bringing up Saddam’s atrocities (4) specifies the

3. Technically, this simultaneously increases the number of ODCs (or rather the key lemmas marking the ODCs) which can be captured in quantitative analysis (cf. Chapter 5).
kind and the range of crimes terrorist organizations, which his regime nurtures as ally groups (3), are capable of. At the same time, his axiological posture (“without mercy”, “without shame”) adds, through conflation, to the terrorists’ evil posture. Second, the vague attribution of evil ideologies to “dictatorships”, “regimes” or even “shadowy networks of individuals” in (6)–(7) extends the spectrum of harbors of the IDC-threatening values and the ensuing acts: while an attack may come from Iraq, it may come from virtually anywhere where the nurture of violence is part of ideology and state rule. The extension means that the construal of the ODC camp involves an array of negative characteristics as vast as the addressee’s geopolitical awareness and association capacity allow. The more links can be found globally like the link between Saddam’s “murder ideology”, the homicidal enactments of this ideology in Iraq, and, crucially, Iraq’s connections to terrorism as a vehicle for exporting it abroad, the bigger the arsenal of the negative ODC characterizations (following the assessment of (the motives for) the particular acts, such as the Halabja annihilation) that can be accessed and projected on “terrorists” as the principal ODC entity. Prompts for such a search are especially visible in (3), (5) and (6), where Bush assumes an explicitly global stance, but there is also an intriguing prompt in (2), where the addressee is asked to recall the past international conflicts involving Iraq, presumably the wars against Iran, Kuwait, the Kurdistan, and the atrocities there. Altogether, the indirect attribution to “terrorists”, the main ODC party, of negative ideological postures and acts by other parties even remotely associated with terrorist activities greatly enhances the aura of threat, as the latter is conceptualized not only in terms of an individual physical manifestation (however devastating, like 9/11) lacking clearly recognized, defined or understood reasons, but also in more complex terms: as a precisely diagnosed and fully appreciated continual danger resulting from an external ideological antagonism and the “hate mind-sets” (Stenvall 2007; Dunmire 2011) which are quite as “deadly” as, in the long run, their materializations.

4.2.2 Threat construal through the ODC impact speed

4.2.1 has been, in a sense, a foretaste of numerous problematic issues underlying the build-up of a proximization model that would give due attention to the kind and contents of its lexico-grammatical categories. If there is perhaps no fully objective and finite set of lexical choices reflecting spatial proximization as

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4. A CNN poll conducted on September 30, 2001 among a representative group of 1,000 New Yorkers saw “I don’t know” as the most frequent answer to the question “Why was America attacked on 9/11?” (cf. Silberstein 2004).
regards its ODC characterization and many of these choices acquire the desired senses only when properly contextualized at the micro level of single utterances or short stretches of discourse, then similar or even greater limitations must exist at the meso level of spatial proximization as an accumulation of these micro senses, and, finally, at the macro level of proximization “as a whole”, relying on an integrated input from all the three proximization strategies, (s)patial, (t)emporal and (a)xiological. I will address these concerns towards the end of the chapter, as we draw nearer the construction of the STA lexico-grammatical frameworks in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, we focus on two aspects of spatial proximization, which complement the aspect of the negative ODC characterization; the first one concerns the aura of threat instilled in the addressee as a result of the construal of the ODC impact as not only inevitable (given there is no pre-emptive action from the IDC camp), but also, and mainly, fast. Of course, the presence of this aspect does not entail a complete absence of another, such as the negative ODC characterization just mentioned. The relation should rather be viewed in terms of temporary functional prominence: the different aspects or components of spatial proximization may take over from one another in enacting their global function\(^5\) (the construal of a physical threat) and the lexical means change as a result.

The threat construal based upon the ODC envisaged impact speed involves several groups of such means, which are perhaps a bit better demarcated than was the case with the builders of the ODC characterization in 4.2.1. The leading role can be ascribed to *metaphoric constructions*, subsuming both nominal and verbal phrases. The prominence of metaphor in this particular kind/aspect of spatial proximization should be no surprise: we have observed in Chapter 2 (Hart 2010; Charteris-Black 2006; etc.) that metaphoric expressions often recruit “container schemas” conceptually similar to deictic spaces and the dynamics of impact upon the container to quickly penetrate its space is a core condition on the effectiveness of such a metaphoric construal as a whole. Though the metaphors in examples (8)–(11) only presuppose the container/deictic space (America), the lexical material involved makes them contribute a lot to the dynamics, speed, as well as range of the impact:

(8) (…) the dangers of our time must be confronted (…) before we see them again in our skies and our cities (…) we will not allow the flames of hatred and violence in the affairs of men.  
(G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003)

(9) Their [terrorists’] hate and envy could set aflame not only our country but the whole world.  
(G. W. Bush, April 10, 2003)

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5. Note this micro-level analogy to the general functioning of proximization as a legitimization macrostrategy involving sub-strategies of spatial, temporal and axiological proximization.
(10) I can see a blaze of the gathering threat.  
(G. W. Bush, April 20, 2003)

(11) Free nations do not sit and wait, leaving enemies to plot to burn down the civilization of peace.  
(G. W. Bush, June 6, 2003)

The metaphoric expressions in (8)–(11) presuppose a common conceptual relation, Threat is Fire, which is the most frequent metaphoric relation occurring in the entire 2001–2010 period of the anti-terrorist discourse. Structuring the external threat in terms of fire has a number of specific advantages for the construal of the ODC impact, adding to the general advantages of metaphor use, such as raising the credibility and affect of the predication (Landtsheer and de Vrij 2004). The central benefits involve the construal of the growing speed, the extensive range, the unpredictability of the impact direction(s), the low chance of containment, and the ultimately destructive result. Among the examples quoted, the speed is most strongly enacted in (10), where the noun “blaze” gives fire the physical speed of light. Notably, the fire as such is construed in a rather complex manner. It is construed (inferentially, via the light attribute) from the same item, “blaze”, at the sentence level, as well as intertextually from the salience of the concept of fire in the other metaphors, such as in (8), (9) and (11). The pace of the fire is further construed as growing (“gathering threat”), which enhances the fear appeal.

As the metaphors in (8), (9), (11) contain clearer attributes of fire (“flames”, “burn”), which make its speed a more direct (even if ultimately weaker) construal, they offer more data for the related construals of range, destruction, etc. These can be considered “auxiliary” to the principal conceptualization of speed, the most natural premise on which to build an appeal for an immediate reaction. Accordingly, all (8), (9) and (11) evoke globality (“in the affairs of men”, “not only our country but the whole world”, “the civilization of peace”), (9) includes an epistemic modality marker (“could”) and (8) a temporally unspecific presupposition of impact (“before we see them”), which together evoke unpredictability, and (11) evokes the ultimately catastrophic result (“burn down”). While all of these construals make a primary contribution to spatial proximization, let us note the input of some of them in axiological proximization as well: in (8) and (9) the agency of the metaphorized impact lies with the ideological or belief entities (“hatred”, “envy”).

As the phrase “gathering threat” in (10) demonstrates, representations of the ODC impact speed can be coded in expressions structured grammatically within the progressive imperfective aspect. The progressive is, like metaphorization, a relatively stable characteristic of spatial proximization that construes a fast ODC impact. The expressions may or may not involve metaphor, though the latter often appears when the impact is construed through verbs of the DS-inward
movement, such as “come” (13), or verbal modifiers marking an increase in “size” (“growing”, (14)) of the external threat:

(12) Evidence indicates that our enemies are seeking weapons of mass destruction and they are doing so with great determination.  
     (G. W. Bush, December 14, 2002)

(13) Next generations will judge harshly those who saw this danger coming and failed to act.  
     (G. W. Bush, December 14, 2002)

(14) The safety of the American people depends on ending this direct and growing threat.  
     (G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003)

(15) He [Saddam Hussein] had been running programs [for WMD].  
     (G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003)

With regard to its grammatical and discourse function, the progressive imperfective represents actions as “unbounded”, incomplete and without explicitly indicated endpoints (Bybee and Fleischman 1995). It thus helps construe the present moment as durative, that is continuing on into the future unless intervened upon. Crucially in our case, it can make the continuity salient in the progressive imperfective phrases be read as a steady deep commitment of the agent, who shows “great determination”, to use a quote from (12), to progress fast. In (12)–(15), this dedication, to progress quickly with the WMD programs, translates inferentially into the fast application of the results of these programs, which can be anticipated as catastrophic. The dedication premise is best spotted in (12) and (15) (“are seeking weapons (…), “are doing so with great determination”, “had been running programs”), while the devastating consequences are entailments of (13) and (14) (“this danger coming”, “direct and growing threat”), which take for granted the successful completion of the WMD programs. Construing the threat as an animate agent (“danger coming”) helps the speed of the materialization of the commitment-result-application scenario in its own way, as it provides the threat with “human” antagonistic traits (such as for instance hate, viz. ex. (9) above). As underlying the “mental posture” of the “human”, they can swiftly prompt “his” invasive behavior.

Finally, the ODC impact speed is construed spatio-temporally on the presumption of lasting and event-dynamic physical confrontation, which started in the past and whose nature makes it bound to continue for at least some time into the future. As the presumption sets up a temporal line linking the past with the future, the clash becomes automatically the matter of the present, as part of that line. This means, by inference, that the ODCs must have been swift enough, to have already entered the IDC camp. Such a construal involves, as can be imagined, an application of the well-known 9/11 analogy, but unlike in all the cases
analyzed thus far, the analogy must contain explicit lexico-grammatical markers of the current warfare state:

(16) September the 11th should say to the American people that we are now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction could be deployed here at home.  
    (G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003)

(17) So long as there is a terrorist network like Al-Qaeda, and others willing to fund them, finance them, equip them, we are at war.  
    (G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003)

In (16)–(17) these markers are “we are now a battlefield” and “we are at war”, respectively. Compared to the other instantiations of the 9/11 analogy (e.g. in (1)), the two phrases do not anticipate an act of warfare, they recognize the warfare as an act itself. This is best seen from the use of “now” in the battlefield phrase. But for the “now”, “battlefield” would typically be construed as a spatio-temporal container for a series of actions/operations occurring within a space of time. In (17), however, it is assigned a point-in-time status and thus an axiological value of the kind normally ascribed to individual actions. Such an arrangement has important repercussions since it facilitates legitimization of response policy. As the warfare is evaluated negatively and it is clear who is responsible (“(…) Al-Qaeda, and others willing to fund them (…)”), and, crucially, the warfare is conceptualized in terms of an act, a counter-act against the responsible acquires the status of a (legitimate) reaction, rather than an independent or unprovoked, action.

4.2.3 Threat construal through the ODC impact consequences

Spatial proximization relies a lot on the use of lexical forms indicating tangible consequences of the ODC impact. This is consistent with the functional characterization of proximization in general. As we have observed in the previous chapters, proximization is a strategy naturally geared to legitimization, and legitimization effects are usually the greatest when the impact of the ODC entities is construed as maximally consequential for the IDCs. Accordingly, the US anti-terrorist discourse features a number of constructs which evoke (i) the globality of the terrorist threat, (ii) the massive range of a terrorist strike, (iii) the massive human toll of such a strike. These constructs involve, in contrast to many other builders of spatial proximization, a well-defined set of lexical choices, which engage in recurrent inference patterns:

(18) The world now knows the full evil and capability of international terrorism which menaces the whole of the democratic world.  
    (G. W. Bush, September 11, 2001)
(19) Today in Iraq we see a gathering threat whose outlines are clearly defined and whose consequences are far more deadly.  (G. W. Bush, October 7, 2002)

(20) In one year or five years the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied several times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are the strongest.  (G. W. Bush, October 7, 2002)

(21) On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale (...) We learned a lesson: the dangers of our time must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and our cities (...) Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to our people and to all free people (...) A threat to all must be answered by all.  (G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003)

(22) Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this [WMD] danger will be removed.  (G. W. Bush, March 17, 2003)

(23) [Since 9/11] The killing has continued in Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Riyadh, Mombasa, Jerusalem, Istanbul, and Baghdad (...) The terrorists continue to plot their cowardly acts against America and the civilized world.  (G. W. Bush, November 3, 2003)

The globality of the terrorist threat is typically accomplished by the inclusion of as many entities as possible in the IDC camp, which extends the possible range of the ODC impact and thus increases its consequences. The inclusion may involve enumeration of the particular areas or countries, as in (23), but more often it involves the expression of common ideological values, such as democracy (18), freedom ((20), (21)), or commitment to globally accepted forms of civilization (23). The lexical phrases expressing these values include a number of items which present them as worldwide and universal. The most numerous of such items are quantifiers, such as “all” ((20), (21)) and its variants (for instance “the whole”, in (18)), whose contribution is mainly lexical and overtly referential, but there are also other accompanying items, e.g. “world” ((18), (23)), “nations” ((20), and (18), by inference from “international”), and “people” (21), which operate beyond the mere lexical reference, forcing a conceptual extension of the geopolitical territory where the IDC values apply.

Furthermore, examples (18) and (20) demonstrate that the construal of consequences of the ODC impact involves stressing the disastrous capacity of the ODCs to deliver a strike, which capacity has been positively verified in earlier ODC acts, that is terrorist attacks, both within and outside the US. Hence Bush’s elaboration on the inflicted areas in (23), as well as, again, frequent 9/11 flashbacks
Evoking these images allows Bush to further the construal of catastrophic consequences of a future terrorist strike by lexical descriptions originally pertaining to the past tragic events. Thus, strongly appealing words and phrases (“murder”, “deadly”) indicating mass homicide can be used legitimately as builders of vision of an unprecedented (note the apocalyptic “the day of horror” phrase) act of physical destruction.

As has been mentioned, the construal of the ODC impact consequences involves a relatively stable selection and arrangement of lexico-grammatical choices. In fact, many/most of them can be seen or readily inferred from the very first example, (18), which, coming from a September the 11th, 2001 evening speech, illustrates the beginnings of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric. The other aspects/kinds/constituents of spatial proximization are however much more conceptually complex and linguistically heterogeneous. In many cases they elucidate the tendency of spatial proximization to invite temporal and axiological elements, which prompts the question whether spatial proximization is in any way “primary” or “superordinate” with respect to the other proximization strategies – however complex they might be in their own composition, like temporal proximization. This question will be handled in the last part of the chapter. Meanwhile, we focus on temporal and axiological proximization, respectively.

4.3 Temporal proximization

Temporal proximization is, in a general sense, a forced construal of “now”, the speaker’s present, as the central point and event frame on the time “axis”. Of course, this has only little to do with the “now” frame located, in “real time” terms, “centrally between” the past and the future frames. Were it the only criterion, no strategic “construal” of the centrality of “now” would be needed in the first place. The centrality of “now” means, rather, the momentousness of the present defined, on the one hand, by known events of the past, and, on the other, by envisaged events of the future, especially the near future. On this proviso, temporal proximization can be defined in a more detailed technical way, as a symbolic “compression” of the time axis, and a partial conflation of the three time frames, involving two simultaneous conceptual shifts. One is the past-to-present shift, which accommodates construals of the past events and actions, mainly those instigated/performed by the ODC entities, informing the speaker’s present context, in the interest of her own current actions. The information is validated by analogies holding between the past and the present context arrangements. The other is the future-to-present shift, which involves construals of the near future ODC
actions stemming directly from the present context, a collection of premises updated by the premises construed from the past events. The two shifts endorse the speaker’s “now” as, retrospectively, the moment to “take stock” of the past to develop a sound rationale for action and, prospectively, the moment to start or decide on starting the action, to preempt the near future ODC action. As such, they compress the time axis to create a small and short-lasting present temporal frame in which to seek an immediate, maximally effective legitimization (Figure 1).

What is the input of temporal proximization in the symbolic representation of changes in the basic center-periphery DS arrangement, and how is it reflected in the anti-terrorist discourse? The issue is complicated enough, and we will not receive a candidate answer without a case study. Note that temporal proximization involves symbolic discourse representation of entities which are construed, rather than “real”, as such. We have observed in 4.2 that the symbolic nature of spatial proximization lies in a pragmatic/strategic discourse construal of a physical “movement” of the ODC entities in the direction of the deictic center and its elements, the IDCs. The movement is construed and symbolic, but the entities (Iraq, Saddam, terrorists, etc.) can be described as physical and possessing stable and “objective” linguistic denotations. In contrast, temporal proximization is a symbolic operation not only as regards the DS-inward movement (the two shifts centralizing the present), but also as regards the proximized entities, i.e. “the past” and “the future”. This has serious repercussions for tracing the enactment of temporal proximization at lexical levels, since the past and the future do not possess stable linguistic denotations “as a whole”, but only insofar as the particular events occurring in the two frames are concerned. Thus any “measurement” of the salience of temporal proximization entails that we look, selectively and subjectively, at the lexico-grammatical constructs making up the discourse of/about the past and the future, abstracting those stretches (rather than the individual linguistic items) which seem the most potent in terms of symbolizing “the whole past” or “the whole future” shifts.

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6. “‘Existing’, as if, as ‘part of the present’”, Dunmire (2011) would say.
Another problem and a further constraint on the temporal proximization linguistic framework to be proposed in the next chapter, is the inevitable overlap of its possible lexico-grammatical and discourse realizations with those of the spatial proximization. As time is construed in terms of motion through space (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987), events always carry a time of happening as part of their conceptualization. We have thus seen, in 4.2, an important time element in the “9/11 analogy”, which is otherwise construed spatially, for deeper appeal and faster legitimation effects. The question is whether such conceptual (and, eventually, linguistic) overlaps detract from temporal proximization as a valid contributor to the overall proximization pattern as an intrinsically compensatory mechanism. It is whether the change in temporal proximization’s own salience (and not the salience of the combined spatio-temporal formulas), providing the salience markers can be abstracted, would really necessitate a change in the salience of another proximization strategy. I will attempt to respond to this question by taking a closer look at the “a September morning” phrase, constituting, as has been said several times already, the linguistic core of the 9/11 analogy in the 2001–2010 US anti-terrorist discourse. The goal is to arrive at an answer which will not only endorse the rationale for having temporal proximization as a component of the STA model at the conceptual level, but also – and mainly – argue for a systematic study of discourse forms other than “a September morning” as candidate markers of the temporal periphery-center shifts captured in Figure 1.

4.3.1 “A September morning”

We have dealt with this anti-terrorist discourse flagship phrase most recently in example (21), which I repeat as (24) below:

(24) On a September morning, threats that had gathered for years, in secret and far away, led to murder in our country on a massive scale (...) We learned a lesson: the dangers of our time must be confronted actively and forcefully, before we see them again in our skies and our cities (...) Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to our people and to all free people (...) A threat to all must be answered by all.

(G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003)

Although, as we have observed, many of the lexical items and phrases in (24[21]) engage in predominantly spatial construals, the phrase “a September morning” can be considered an epitome of temporal proximization. This is because of its structure, which, albeit far from being syntactically elaborate, ideally represents temporal proximization’s reliance on two kinds of linguistic markers, of real time
(RT) and construed time (CT) – I will postulate that the latter ones do exist. In addition, it well represents (discourse implications of) the relation between RT and CT. In short, the essence of this relation is that RT, made up of instants dating consecutive events, needs CT and its “markers”, to define the meaning of an RT instant and thus of the corresponding event. This claim, which I elaborate on below, is eventually of critical importance to specifying, however approximately, the most typical/frequent discourse builders of temporal proximization; it sets the direction which the search should take.

In “a September morning”, RT is explicitly coded by the “September morning”, which chunk dates, by virtue of inference, the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It also helps recall details of these real events, which make up an arsenal of images of physical actions that can be projected, through a forced construal, upon a time frame different than the speaker’s past frame to which the RT instant belongs. This target time frame can be, most expectedly, the relative future frame following the moment of speaking (February 26, 2003), but also any or both of the sub-frames of the past frame, one linking the infinite past with the RT 9/11 instant, the other linking that instant with the speaking RT instant, i.e. February 26, 2003. Altogether, we arrive at three temporal frames, two past (sub-frames PF1, PF2) and one future (FF), each or some or all of which could be subject to the projection (Figure 2).

The representation in Figure 2 is representation of a potential: it shows what temporal frames are “available” for the 9/11 projection. This is how far the interpretation of “September morning” as an RT coding phrase can get us. The enactment of the projection depends on “a”, which, as a marker of indefiniteness, forces a construal of the “September morning” events as “fitting into” one, two or all three of the frames. Which of the construals is the most likely cannot be postulated on the basis of the “a September morning” phrase alone; we need clues from a broader context. Since Bush’s discourse of the Iraq war is a discourse that stresses a virtually unbounded continuity of the terrorist threat, we might assume that the projection applies to all of the three frames, thus covering the entire length

![Figure 2. “September morning”: two RT instants dividing the time axis into three temporal frames](image-url)
of the time axis. The message from “a September morning” reads then as follows: what happened on 9/11/2001 could have occurred anytime before 9/11/2001, it could have (re-)occurred anytime between 9/11/2001 and 2/26/2003, the “now”, and it could (re-)occur anytime in the future that extends from the now. This makes the meaning of the phrase a semantic blend: the meaning is, in Evans’s (2003) or Jaszczolt’s (2009) words, simultaneously forensic, epideictic and deliberative, that is past, present and future oriented. Such a semantic meaning defines the pragmatic function of the phrase: just as the terrorist attacks could have happened unexpectedly, and did happen, in the past, they could happen anytime now; therefore, an immediate pre-emptive action is necessary.

The “a” in “a September morning” can be described as a marker of construed time (CT). It forces the construal of the “September morning” events as virtually “durative” and, in so doing, symbolically conflates the past and future frames, centralizing the “now”. This is in line with a number of classic, as well as contemporary, accounts of the RT-CT relation in general. CT, as was frequently argued, “offsets” the RT “deficit” of the imperceptibility of all events at one time. Accordingly, as we have seen, a CT marker (“a”) can give an RT instant (“September morning”) a meaning that both reflects and activates such a complex durative perception.

Our analysis of the “a September morning” phrase may have been short – the phrase is short in the first place – but the conclusions go a long way. If the essence of proximization is a forced and subjective (though socially shared) construal of reality (and not objectivization of reality) and RT has shown to have little to do with creating symbolic representations through discourse, then temporal proximization cannot rely on RT discourse markers, like “September morning”, alone. Conversely, it must primarily employ CT markers, those language items or forms, which, like the “a”, have the potential to engage, under specific context conditions, in symbolic operations that “make sense” of the accompanying RT expressions.

The idea going back to at least McTaggart (1908), if not Aristotle (1928, transl.).

The phrase “a September morning”, while amply used on the eve of the Iraq war, occurs rarely in the later, 2004 discourse, to resurface again from 2005 on. A similar tendency can be observed with regard to other “indefinite” references to 9/11, used, like “a September morning”, for symbolic shifts and timeframe conflations. Over the same period(s), other proximization strategies, especially axiological proximization, become less or more salient as well. Depending on the current salience of the temporal shifts, their lexical realizations decrease (when the shifts are salient) or increase (when they are less so). This seems to support the conception of temporal proximization as, indeed (viz. above), a “valid contributor to the overall proximization pattern as an intrinsically compensatory mechanism”.

Husserl (1928); Heidegger (1953); Evans (2003); Jaszczolt (2009); among many others.
denoting events evoking momentousness of the “now”. Thus, as a pre-requisite for a quantitative analysis of temporal proximization (Chapter 5), we must try and identify as many of discourse forms as possible involving regular manifestations of the “CT+RT” pattern outlined.

4.3.2 Towards more quantifiable markers

In the US anti-terrorist discourse, the CT/RT interface is best observed in discourse forms involving nominalizations (especially “threat” and “danger”), modal auxiliaries (especially “can” and “could”), and specific tense patterns (most notably combinations of the simple past tense and the present perfect aspect, as well as combinations of the perfective aspect with the infinitive). Furthermore, it can be observed, though to a much lesser extent, in complex multi-sentential sequences making use of the interrogative mood (or the interrogative stance) and evidential elements, to depict the contrast between the “privileged future” (the future favored and pursued by the speaker) and the “alternative”, “oppositional future” (the future disqualified by the speaker; cf. Kress 1995; Wodak 2000; Dunmire 2011). In most of these discourse forms and sequences, the CT/RT interface is more explicitly the matter of the future-to-present shift than of the other, past-to-present shift. This seems hardly surprising given that the speaker seeks legitimation of her current/future policies or actions, which is accomplished, primarily, through centralizing the current/future threat, and only secondarily by evoking the past representations. The latter, however responsible for the credibility of the current/future scenario, do not contribute to the scenario as much as the current premises do. In this sense, out of the two proximization shifts captured in Figure 1 above, the future-to-present shift has the upper hand in terms of the amount of its symbolic discourse representation, though, as the analysis of the “a September morning” phrase has shown, the past-to-present shift should not be underappreciated; it occurs simultaneously as well. Consider these examples:

(25) America will identify and act against the emerging WMD threats before they are fully formed. (G. W. Bush, September 12, 2002)

(26) Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. (G. W. Bush, April 24, 2003)

(27) It used to be that we could think (…) that oceans would protect us. September the 11th has changed the strategic thinking, as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. (G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003)
(28) Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against them. (G. W. Bush, December 14, 2005)

(29) Some have argued that we should wait and that’s an option. In my view, it’s the riskiest of all options because the longer we wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become. We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I am convinced that is hope against all evidence (…) The inspectors concluded that Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles, far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other nations in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members work and live. We’ve also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.

(G. W. Bush, October 7, 2002)

In (25), the phrase “before [WMD] are fully formed” denotes threatening events in a future RT instant, which are presupposed to occur unless there is a pre-emptive action. The explicit lexical coding of the presupposition (“before”) helps construe the negative scenario in terms of its development, yet the scenario remains vague as regards the precise time when it might be completed. As a result it is equally unclear when to act pre-emptively against the scenario. To ensure the maximal flexibility, “threats” is used as a CT modifier for the “before they are fully formed” phrase. “Threats”, as a nominalization, conflates the present and the future; it represents an objectified entity that exists at the present moment and presages an ominous future (cf. Graham 2001). It thus extends the future RT instant “containing” the threatening events to cover both the future and the “now” frames. In so doing, “threats”, albeit vague as such, makes – ironically – “more precise” an answer when to expect the threatening events to happen: they can happen anytime. This kind of construal, involving strategic vagueness, is a prerequisite for a flexible response: since the threat could materialize at any moment, any moment “from now on” is legitimate to act pre-emptively.

In (26), the centralization of the “now” as the moment to start or decide on starting the pre-emptive action is, like in (25), also mostly the matter of the future-to-present shift, though we should keep in mind an earlier observation, that the present context is constantly informed by events from the past frame. In (26) they are implicit in the description “shadowy networks of individuals”, which makes the addressee recall how the 9/11 attacks were masterminded, coordinated and conducted. Regarding our main focus, the CT/RT interface involves “now” as an RT instant dating the moment of speaking, and “can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores” as a CT phrase indicating, by virtue of the modal auxiliary
“can”, the subjectively construed time span in which to expect an external (“to our shores”) impact. Since “can” (which can thus be called a CT marker) contains, in Fleischman’s (1982: 88) words, “the already present seeds of the future situation”, it conflates, as in (25), the future and the present realities. Compared to the CT/RT arrangement in (25), (26) makes the present, the “now”, even more rhetorically appealing. The “now” is construed as an exceptionally small temporal frame in which to assess the past and the current premises, in order to take or decide on a pre-emptive action (recall the description of Figure 1 above). This is because the “now” is, in (26), marked lexically (as well), which naturally makes it the central/focal point of the time span construed from the “can” phrase.

Compared to (25)–(26), in (27)–(28) the bi-directional (i.e. past-to-present and future-to-present) proximization shifts are apparently more symmetrical, as there is a bigger amount of the symbolic discourse representation of the past-to-present shift. In (27) the shift involves: first, the use of an RT marker (“September the 11th”) defining an RT instant whose events render the US past posture (“we could think [in the past] that oceans would protect us”) inadequate to the needs of the current situation; second, a projection of these events upon temporal frames following the RT instant – as in (24) above. While in (24) the projection is accomplished by the use of a grammatical marker of indefiniteness, (27) employs, to the same effect, a specific tense pattern. Central to this pattern is the contrastive use of the simple past (“It used to be that”) and the present perfect (“[9/11] has changed”). The pattern enacts the representation of a clean break from the safe past and, crucially, a predefined, continually threatening future extending infinitely from the past RT instant. The infiniteness and the “stability” (in terms of the threat level) of such a future makes it an excellent venue for the projection: as in (24), any moment in the future can see the events from the past RT instant re-occur, there are no indications of any “better” or “worse” moments which could help plan a (re-)action, therefore it is best to act immediately. This inference would not be possible but for the coding of the starting point of the future frame in the present perfect, which helps construe a prospective timeframe as “decided” and therefore conceptually uniform (Comrie 1976). In this sense, (27) employs the present perfect phrase as a CT item “making sense” of the RT instant and its events in terms of defining the infinite length of the timeframe in which the events could possibly re-occur, as well as removing any clues as to the precise moment of such a re-occurrence. A similar CT marking status can be ascribed to the combination of the perfective aspect and the infinitive in (28), where the infinitive (“to penetrate”) forces the construal of current or future potentiality immanent in the “decided”, that is recognized and acknowledged, nature of the current threatening arrangement (“terrorists are organized”). The interesting difference is, though, that the very perfective (“are organized”) is at the same time an RT marker, that
of the S’s speaking time. This conceptual and functional duality of the “terrorists are organized” phrase adds to the momentousness and, ultimately, centralization of the “now”, as the present RT instant is provided with extra salience compared to any of the prospective RT instants filling up the future frame evoked by the infinitive. Consequently, in legitimization terms, it is the “now” that should see a justified pre-emptive action, rather than any moment in the future frame. Further on this note, we might add the following general remark. Within the 2001–2010 period of the US anti-terrorist discourse, the RT/CT marker lexical identicalness resulting in the increased centralization of the speaker’s present – the increased operation of temporal proximization, in other words – tends to occur at times when there is a clear adversary that can be referred to simultaneously with regard to the real negative actions in the present or a near past (for which an RT marker is needed) and the construed negative actions in the future (for which a CT marker is needed). Such is exactly the context of (28), which includes, in more or less explicit terms, the near past contextual input (the London bombings of July 7, 2005), the present input (an intelligence update Bush had received earlier during the day when the speech was given (December 14, 2005)), and the future construed input.

Finally, in (29) temporal proximization relies not so much on a particular RT/CT interface, as on the “competition” between two scenarios construed as parallel extensions of the present. It is enacted in a quasi-dialogic discourse stretch, in which Bush presents two conflicting views of the future, one of which can be described as “privileged” and the other as “oppositional” (Dunmire 2011). The privileged future is a future that is highly probable and thus requiring a posture the speaker “favors” over the posture that could be assumed to handle the oppositional future, which is unlikely. In Bush’s argument in (29), the oppositional, “we could wait and hope” view holds that there is no imminent threat and, consequently, no pre-emptive measures are necessary. This view is presented as contradictory to the evidence and as such is contrasted with Bush’s privileged view, which is shown as informed, knowledge-based and, altogether, rational. The privileged view holds that an immediate pre-emptive action is absolutely necessary, thus centralizing the present as a timeframe in which to start or decide on starting the action. It should be noted that this kind of temporal proximization involves the ample use of recurring sets of evidentiality markers (for instance the proof and perception markers, cf. Section 3.2) and as such provides relatively stable lexico-grammatical data to enter the temporal proximization linguistic framework. In (29), examples of these data include “evidence”, “concluded”, “discovered”, “intelligence”, all of which are lexical items repetitively used in complex patterns (very often “interrogative stance” patterns such as Bush’s argument in (29)) mapping out future visions determining current postures and policies.
4.4 Axiological proximization

One might feel it is unnecessary to re-address axiological proximization in a separate section as this concept has been tackled several times already. True, we should have by now a rough idea of what axiological proximization is, at least in general terms. The STA proximization model we advance is a functional compensatory one, and, for a preliminary description it has been useful to refer to axiological constructs as they seem a natural device to keep up the legitimization stance when other means cannot be used. This, however, has not brought us close enough to defining axiological proximization as such, nor to defining its possible types, and, most importantly, its candidate lexico-grammatical markers. For that sake, we now adopt a more “micro” approach.

To turn the earlier remarks into a definition, we might posit the following. Axiological proximization is a forced construal of a gathering ideological conflict between the “home values” of the DS central entities, IDCs, and the “alien”, antagonistic values of the ODCs, which occupy the conceptual periphery of the DS. The IDC-ODC conflict either will, or (at least) may, lead to a physical clash, that is the materialization of the ODC ideological threat within the IDC space. The above epistemic difference – the higher or lower impact probability – marks two quite distinct kinds of axiological proximization. The first kind, involving a high probability, is the axiological proximization functioning relatively independently of the other proximization strategies and often compensating – legitimization-wise – for the absence of these strategies. The second kind, involving a lower probability (or simply a probability less explicitly expressed) is the axiological proximization co-working with the other strategies, spatial and temporal. The two kinds differ markedly regarding the linguistic underpinnings, especially the forms that force a symbolic connection between ideology and the ideology enactment, which the latter may or may not involve a physical manifestation. Consequently, they also differ as regards the threshold for a pre-emptive action they set up.

4.4.1 Axiological proximization with high and explicit impact probability

As has been said, this kind of axiological proximization aims to compensate for the absence of construals forced by spatial/temporal proximization. In the US anti-terrorist discourse, such a need arises in contexts when premises for the latter are missing or have been disqualified. The prototypical case within the 2001–2010 timeframe is the collapse of the WMD premise for going to war in Iraq, a loss incurred shortly after the intervention. A few months after the March 2003 strike it becomes evident that there are/were no WMD in Iraq; consequently,
axiological proximization has to take over from spatial and temporal proximization as an independent strategy to save legitimization of the US engagement. From then on, the rationale for war is based not on the existence of imminent physical threat (viz. spatial proximization), but the existence of an ideological background for such a threat to develop and, ultimately, materialize in the form of physical impact within the US:

(30) The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them. It is the growing radicalism and extremism of these dictatorships. This evil might not have reached us yet but it is in plain sight, as plain as the horror sight of the collapsing towers.

(G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003)

(31) The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom and democracy do not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of the towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life.

(G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003)

These diligently structured texts are epitome examples of the strategy in question, the setting up of an explicit discursive connection between the existence of the external negative values, their threatening ability to inspire concrete physical actions, and, finally, the likely occurrence of these actions within the speaker and her audience’s home territory. In (30) this connection is established, remarkably enough, within a single sentence – the third one – though of course the preceding two sentences make a contextual contribution. Most importantly, the second sentence expresses the ODC adversarial values (“radicalism and extremism”), which the third sentence refers to anaphorically (“This evil”). This explicit reference is the starting point for a syntactic structure which involves two scripts occurring in a linear sequence. The first of these scripts can be called a “remote possibility script”. It initiates the link between the ODC antagonistic values (“This evil”) and their potential for materialization, but it does not yet see the materialization as an existing or imminent threat (“might not have reached us yet”). The imminence is construed only as we move further along the sequence, to reach the “actual occurrence script”. This script involves, first, the epistemic modality change (“might” vs. “is” [in plain sight]), whereby the initially remote scenario is turned into a close possibility. Second, it involves explicit markers of consequences of the envisaged impact (“collapsing towers”), which are concretized by the analogy to real events (9/11) of the past. Altogether, the two scripts include the total of four lexico-grammatical markers, which make the sequence progress from an indication of a threatening but seemingly “distant” ideology, to a physically destructive
materialization of this ideology in the IDC camp. These markers are, to repeat, a nominal phrase expressing the ODC values (“This evil”), a verbal phrase expressing remote possibility of impact (“might not have reached us yet”), a verbal phrase turning the remote possibility into a near vision (“but it is in plain sight”), and, finally, a nominal phrase marking the actual impact (“collapsing towers”). Note that the progress from the third marker to the fourth one, and thus the final inference, involves the conceptualization of the ideological threat in terms of both abstract and physical entity, a dual construal assisted by metaphor – one cannot get a “sight” of “evil” literally. This shows relevance of research in metaphor such as Hart’s (2010; cf. Chapter 2), to axiological proximization as a symbolic construal operation linking the “abstract” with the “physical”.

In (31), the link involves two sentences; the “ideology” part of the sequence occurs in the second sentence of the text, and the “materialization” part comes up in the third. The remote possibility script includes, again, nominal markers of the antagonistic ODC values and postures (“stagnation and anger and violence”), plus a phrase indicating a possible spread of these values beyond the (ODC) camp of origin (“for export”). The actual occurrence script, which involves practically all of the lexico-grammatical material in the third sentence, evokes an inference pattern which makes the IDC territory the most likely venue for the enactment of the “exported” values. This construal is forced, as in (30), through analogy (“as we saw”) to the current situation, which is pictured to resemble the 9/11 reality.

Though in (31) the linguistic markers of axiological proximization may be less clearly demarcated than in (30), a tentative finding from these two examples is that the axiological proximization subsuming high and explicit impact probability may be employing, surprisingly enough, a relatively well defined set of lexico-grammatical items. The four markers making up the linear pattern in (30) are a promising proof. The function of these items goes beyond construing a threat based on the expression of a threatening ODC ideology; some forms (for instance the modality switch or the sight metaphor in (30)) go on to force concrete visions of the ideology physical enactment. Since the latter requires a precisely constructed discourse sequence that makes the abstract-physical

10. As such, axiological proximization compares positively to descriptive and typological models within other accounts of perspective involving acts of evaluation, most notably the Appraisal Theory (Martin and Rose 2003; Martin and White 2005; etc.). Despite its steadfast commitment to the linguistic side of evaluation, the Appraisal Theory is, by its proponents own admission, still far from defining sets of lexical resources to apply recursively within a discourse domain in order to keep consistent the positioning of the text with respect to different aspects or expressions of the speaker’s evaluation (such as residing in the general categories of “attitude”, “engagement” and “graduation”, on Martin and White’s 2005 approach). I develop this argument in the account of the STA’s axiological framework in Chapter 5.
connection, the spectrum of the items that could be used as possible components of the sequence is relatively narrow. This is a clear advantage for the build-up of the axiological proximization framework in Chapter 5. We are also mostly in the clear where (in the corpus) to look for forms such as in (30)–(31). As will be discussed in the next two chapters, within the 2001–2010 period of the US anti-terrorist discourse such meticulously built sequential structures are particularly salient in G. W. Bush’s “post-WMD” rhetoric of the Iraq war, where axiological proximization prevails as a compensatory (and thus independent) proximization strategy.

4.4.2 Axiological proximization with low(er) and implicit impact probability

This kind of axiological proximization does not perform a compensatory function; it is enacted, most of the time, as accompaniment to the other proximization strategies, spatial and temporal. It does not subsume explicit textual markers of the connection between the ODC threatening ideology and a possible materialization of this ideology within the IDC territory, but only the markers of the IDC-ODC opposing ideological postures. The construal of any physical impact by ODCs is thus the matter of elaborate inference from the mere existence of the IDC-ODC ideological conflict, and in some cases it gets questionable whether such an inference is valid, given the absence of concrete lexical forms transforming the ODC values into tangible threats. As a result, this type of axiological proximization can hardly be used for swift legitimization (or back-legitimization, as in (30)–(31) above) of a specific pre-emptive action, such as the US intervention in Iraq. Much rather, it adds to the stance of constant preparedness to confront an external threat, which the latter is construed as “routinely present” at all times. Within the 2001–2010 corpus, such a stance characterizes the rhetoric of “late Bush” and then Obama. Examples from the Obama discourse are particularly lucid:

(32) We are making progress in our core mission to fight extremism and radicalism around the world. We must never lose sight of that goal. That’s the principal threat to all free people. (B. Obama, October 6, 2009)

(33) We know that success against Al-Qaeda goes beyond destroying their network – it is about the future that we want to build. That’s why we are putting forward a positive vision of American leadership around the world – one where we lead by example, and engage nations and peoples on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect. (B. Obama, October 6, 2009)

(34) We have to redouble our efforts in the face of a threat that persists. We draw strength from the values that we hold dear. We must keep our eye fixed on
the world we seek to build – one that defeats our adversaries by promoting dignity, opportunity and justice.  
(B. Obama, October 6, 2009)

(35) Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of radicalism and hatred.  
(B. Obama, January 20, 2009)

(36) The time has come to understand that power alone cannot protect us. Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions (…) Our security emanates from the justness of our cause.  
(B. Obama, January 20, 2009)

There is a reason why these examples do not come in chronological order: the first example, (32), makes perhaps the most direct contrast with the instances of axiological proximization discussed in the earlier section ((30)–(31)). Intriguingly enough, (32) repeats many of the lexical items we have seen in (30) (“threat”, “radicalism”, “extremism”, “sight”), but the textual as well as functional relations in which these items engage in (32) make Obama's message very much different from Bush's message in (30). Most obviously, there is no longer any explicit indication of how the “extremism and radicalism” could actually encroach upon the home (America’s) territory. The two adversarial values are operating globally (“around the world”), continually (it takes steadfastness of purpose (“we must never (...”) rather than an ad hoc response to fight them), and the threat they pose is simultaneously a set-level and unspecific one. It is in fact difficult to determine, from the syntactic arrangements, whether “the principal threat” is more the matter of the existence of the antagonistic ideology (the ODC domain), or a possible negligence in the pursuit of the preventive mission (the IDC domain), or both. This vagueness makes even harder the recognition of any way or ways in which the threat could possibly materialize. Note that the “sight” metaphor, which in (30) targets the ODC values making them, via analogy, an ideological trigger for physical actions, is now fully assigned to the IDC domain: it involves not only the IDC agent (as in (30)), but also the IDC target (“that goal”). Considering this and the earlier factors, the argument in (32) does not offer an explicit relation between the ideological threat and its physical manifestation; it might be that there is, altogether, too much focus on the IDC actions and too little on the envisaged ODC actions, to enforce such a relation.

The remaining examples, (33)–(36), seem to endorse this observation. Looking at the pronominal choices and the semantic roles assigned, an IDC entity marker (“we”, “our”, “us”) is only twice – in (36) – the semantic patient (“us”, “our security”), but even then the agent role is delegated to the same camp (IDC) entity (“[our] power”, “our cause”, respectively). At the same time, (33)–(35) include a staggering total of 10 IDC agents, most of which (9) take the pronominal “we”
form. In contrast, throughout (33)–(36), there is no ODC entity performing the semantic agent role, at least in formal terms (Dowty 1991). Whenever there are ODC entities (“their [Al-Qaeda] network” in (33); “a threat that persists” in (34); “our adversaries” in (34); “a far reaching network of radicalism and hatred” in (35)), they are either assigned the patient role explicitly (“their [Al-Qaeda] network” in (33); “our adversaries” in (34)), or they become “static agents” following a precise verbal choice (“a threat that persists” in (34)), or, at best, their possible agency has to be worked out inferentially, from constructs which imply action reciprocity, like “war” in (35).

The kind of axiological proximization captured in (32)–(36) is thus a strategy that relies, above all, upon an extensive and lucid panorama of the IDC values, and upon a comparatively moderate presentation of the ODC values, which the latter could become triggers for impact only if there is a serious negligence in the enactment of values on the part of the IDCs. This is reflected in the use of abstract lexical terms marking values responsible for the protection of the IDC camp, as in (34) (“(…) defeats our adversaries by promoting dignity, opportunity and justice”). Such a strategy sets the threshold for a pre-emptive action relatively high, as there is no explicit link established that would endow the ODC ideology with an agentive capacity. Establishing any such link is, as has been indicated, the matter of complex inference. This does not mean however that argument of the kind illustrated in (32)–(36) is ineffective in terms of legitimization. While it might not be a most workable tool to solicit an immediate approval of short-term policy acts, it helps set up a potentially long-lasting aura of personal credibility the speaker might need to enforce, step-by-step, more global solutions. In that sense, (32)–(36) exemplify the kind of rhetoric Obama has been using to redefine, over time, most of the precepts of the NSS02 doctrine of preemption followed under the Bush administration (cf. Section 2.5; see also Dunmire 2011; Burns and Ansin 2004; Kirk 2003). The use of the “softer” kind of axiological proximization has been one of the main tools, though one should also acknowledge the role of temporal proximization, which seems to perform an extra function in the Obama discourse. In addition to centralizing the “now” as a frame in which to decide on a possible action or response, temporal proximization makes it, as in (33), (34), (36) above, a point from which to outline a knowledge-based, informed vision of a future that is mostly “controllable”. This is a temporal proximization that is a bit different from its Bush’s “variant” – a brief comeback to Section 4.3 will show that only one of the six examples there, (29), conforms to the present description. Overall, the functional alliance of axiological and temporal proximization in the Obama discourse endorses an important defining feature of the “axiological proximization with low(er) and implicit impact probability” as postulated at the outset: this kind does not occur independently of the other proximization types.
4.5 Conclusions

My aim in this chapter has been to endorse the rationale for the STA proximization model at the micro linguistic level. It has been to demonstrate that there are enough organized lexico-grammatical data to corroborate the tripartite composition of the model and the definitions proposed for each of the component proximization strategies, and to demonstrate that a lot of these data come in linguistically distinctive patterns which (or some of which, at least) make candidate categories for the three proximization frameworks to be presented in Chapter 5. In that sense, the final output of the present chapter is a set of “instructions”, points to bear in mind when composing the frameworks and then assigning specific linguistic material into the particular lexical and/or grammatical classes, as a pre-requisite for quantitative research. The following is a list of such points. It is quite synthetic for the time being, as the points related to each of the three domains underlying the model, spatial, temporal, and axiological, will be developed, in Chapter 5, as introductions to the corresponding frameworks.

1. Spatial, temporal and axiological construals, forced by strategic deployment of lexical and grammatical choices, can all contribute to legitimization. The degree of each of the three contributions tends to change relative to the evolving geopolitical context of the legitimization macro-frame. For instance, spatial construals are typically forced when there is a tangible/physical ODC threat, axiological construals are forced when there is ideological background that may allow such a physical threat to develop, and temporal construals are forced, for example, when there is a need to enhance the threat appeal through the construal of its imminence and thus a necessity to react promptly, in the “now” frame. This endorses all of the three proximization strategies as valid components of the STA model; the data from the Iraq war have shown that temporally extensive contexts are likely to create, eventually, all of the situational conditions above, though of course not at the same time.

2. The latter observation invites two hypotheses. First, the composition of the STA model allows (even encourages) its application to timeframes of antiterrorist discourse longer than the Iraq war frame. The longer the timeframe, the bigger the likelihood of further contextual changes needing a response through the changes in the salience of a given proximization strategy. Second, the three strategies can thus be considered functional variables whose presence or absence depends on the presence or absence of the type-specific language forms. A success of these two hypotheses depends upon the building of the three frameworks, spatial, temporal, and axiological, with strong
attention to lexico-grammatical distinctness of the component categories and category members.

3. The present chapter has shown that this might not always be possible. There are items, both lexical and grammatical, which help enact more than one kind of proximization. For instance, “threat” or “danger” could force all of the three proximization construals, spatial, temporal and axiological, though not at the same time within the legitimization macroframe. This means that “threat” and “danger” (and similarly vague items) can be assigned to more than one framework, in which case each category where their many discourse instances are assigned should possess, in addition to the general typological criteria (e.g. “nouns and noun phrases expressing abstract notions conceptualized as anticipations of potential contact between ODCs and IDCs”; Cap 2010a, b), a relevant sub-criterion. That sub-criterion would define discourse contexts allowing inclusion of a given instance into the framework.

4. There exist significant asymmetries as regards the number of “ingredients” of a given proximization strategy motivated by the number of conceptual and situational factors which is markedly different in different strategies. These factors could be, to recall the mechanism of spatial proximization, the IDC and ODC disparate characterizations, the dynamics of the ODC activity, the means available to ODCs to successfully invade the IDC territory, the attitude of IDCs, or the presence of a past event or events endorsing the future scenario through analogy. Some of these ingredients could well perform the general function of the strategy without much assistance from the remaining elements. For instance, spatial proximization could be forced almost solely by the negative ODC characterization and with only a marginal input from the other elements, as long as the negative ODC characterization is “threatening enough”. This point should be borne in mind as a prelude to a more general one. Spatial proximization subsumes, altogether, more of the ingredients (cf. 4.2.1–3) than any other proximization strategy. The spatial proximization framework must reflect this, in the number and kind of its categories, so the assigned forms and the counts from the framework reflect the conceptual range of the spatial domain.

5. Assuming the dominance of spatial proximization with respect to the number of its components/elements (or “ingredients”, as I called them), there appears a question of whether the absence or underrepresentation of spatial proximization at some point or points within the legitimization timeframe could be compensated by the presence of lexical items from another proximization framework, involving fewer categories and fewer lexico-grammatical forms as possible builders of the compensatory discourse. The question is, in
other words, whether claims to the existence of such a functional compensatory relation are analytically sound. The issue becomes even more complex considering the benefits spatial proximization derives, in terms of its function to solicit legitimization via direct fear appeals, from the accompanying non-spatial or partly-spatial construals, such as for instance temporal analogies (cf. Section 4.2).

6. There seems to be no clear answer to this question. A “no” answer would mean that, for instance, the loss of the “spatial” WMD premise for the Iraq war could never be considered as offset by axiological proximization because, under the STA model, the latter involves, altogether, fewer categories and fewer quantifiable lexico-grammatical items and discourse forms than spatial proximization. Conversely, though, some of these forms, such as the “remote-actual scripts” (4.4.1), could be claimed to have the upper hand over the spatial forms in qualitative terms, i.e. in terms of producing more extensive and long-lasting perlocutionary effects. The conclusion that emerges as the most productive despite the limitations, is that the design of the axiological framework must simply never lose sight of these forms as members of the framework, so there is at least some kind of documentable symmetry between the two strategies.

7. It has become evident by now that all of the frameworks will be “fortunate” to include categories covering, to some extent at least, relatively recurrent, lexically stable and predictable material (recall recurrent metaphors defining the ODC impact speed (4.2.2, spatial proximization), a set collection of lexical choices depicting the ODC impact consequences (4.2.3, spatial), those of CT markers which can be traced within specific grammatical patterns (4.3.2, temporal proximization), finally, the remote possibility – actual occurrence formula (4.4.1, axiological proximization)). This is an advantage in view of quantitative research, for which the frameworks are a pre-requisite. But they will also have to find a way to include those items which are the wider context and inference products, i.e. whose meanings are not purely denotational but have been arrived at by the scrutiny of extensive discourse contexts, which cannot possibly enter the framework, to “explain” why a given item belongs. This is the case with, e.g., “a September morning”, as its analysis in 4.3.1 seems to prove. An extra responsibility is thus posed on the frameworks to offer again, like in point 3 above, more criteria to provide such an explanation.
CHAPTER 5

The STA model and the 2001–2010 decade of the anti-terrorist discourse

Methodology and data

“From my perspective, the problem with lexical counts is that most meanings in language are not realised lexically. It would be good to find a way to solve this problem”. (Paul Chilton in p.c., June 2011)

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has postulated that spatial proximization, temporal proximization and axiological proximization are, conceptually, valid components of the STA proximization model, developed to handle temporally extensive legitimization discourses characteristic of ongoing contextual changes. It has also posited that although macro-temporal legitimization relies, eventually, on the collective input from all of the three proximization strategies, its consecutive sub-frames often see asymmetries in the salience of the individual inputs forced by the current geopolitical context. In order for these hypotheses to be verified, the STA architecture needs a bottom-level device suited to process significant amounts of concrete, quantifiable linguistic data, to reflect and explain the asymmetries. Only then can the STA become an attested model.

The device I aim to propose in this chapter (Section 5.2) is three lexico-grammatical frameworks, “spatial”, “temporal”, and “axiological”, reflecting the functions of the three strategies of proximization as defined in Chapter 4. Each of the frameworks comprises a set number of categories which include the key lemmas, grammatical relations and discourse patterns responsible for the enactment of a given strategy. The categories are informed by the findings regarding the conceptual elements of each strategy, the “ingredients” that I have identified in Chapter 4. At the same time, they follow the typological observations (and reflect the constraints) captured in Chapter 4’s Conclusion. In the following discussion, each of the frameworks is introduced with reference to these observations.
The frameworks are filled in with linguistic material, which comes from a 2001–2010 corpus of the US presidential *speeches and remarks* concerning anti-terrorist policies and actions. First (still in Section 5.2), I scrutinize the corpus in a general manner, describing the candidate lemmas, lexico-grammatical relations and discourse patterns, as well as specifying the quantitative threshold they have to make in order to be included in the frameworks. Even though, as has been argued in Chapter 4, the amounts of the material engaging in spatial, temporal and axiological construals are quite different, the threshold must be the same for each of the three strategies, to allow legitimate cross-framework comparisons. Based on the threshold, I assign into the frameworks the most representative language forms, which thus qualify for further analysis. Second (already in Section 5.3), I define the corpus in detailed terms, to propose its division into four sub-corpora involving different configurations of the three proximization strategies (and the corresponding language forms) in four consecutive temporal sub-frames (“periods”) making up the entire 2001–2010 legitimization macro-frame. It is at that point that the three frameworks are ready to include not only the key lemmas, etc., as such, but also their actual counts. This is because the counts – in the four consecutive periods – can now yield quantitative regularities possessing explanatory power as regards shifts in the proximization strategies and their possible reasons.

Accordingly, in Section 5.4, I present the counts from the three frameworks’ categories across the four periods: (1) Sep. 11, 2001 – Oct. 31, 2003 (observable salience of spatial and temporal proximization); (2) Nov. 1, 2003 – Jun. 30, 2004 (extreme salience of axiological proximization); (3) Jul. 1, 2004 – Jan. 19, 2009 (“return” to temporal proximization); (4) Jan. 20, 2009 – Dec. 31, 2010 (the most balanced and, altogether, moderate input from all three proximization strategies). To offset cross-period differences in the number of language forms qualified for analysis, the counts (individual, combined for a category, and, importantly, combined for a framework) are not given in the form of raw data, but as frequency percentages normalized per 1000 words. In Section 5.5, I summarize the most intriguing of the quantitative changes across the periods, thus paving the way for a qualitative account of these shifts and the emerging compensatory patterns in Chapter 6.

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1. Especially when pronominal substitutes are taken into account.
5.2 Three frameworks of proximization

5.2.1 The spatial proximization framework

In Chapter 4 spatial proximization has been defined as a forced construal of the Discourse Space (DS) peripheral entities (ODCs) encroaching physically upon the DS central entities (IDCs) located in the deictic center of the Space. We have seen from the analysis that spatial proximization always forces the vision of a destructive character of the ODCs’ impact, and that an entity central to that vision is threat, which is construed in “tangible”, physical terms. The analysis has demonstrated that such a construal of threat involves several aspects, among which the ODC negative characterization, the fastness of the ODC impact, and the range of the disastrous consequences of that impact, stand out as the most important. These typological observations, subsuming a number of more specific findings collected at the lexical, as well as grammatical and discourse levels, serve as a basis for the spatial proximization framework.

First of all, since spatial proximization presupposes the existence in the DS of two kinds of entities, central and apparently peripheral, both construed in physical terms, we need two categories accommodating linguistic items denoting these entities. These categories can be defined as follows:

1. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements of the deictic center of the DS (IDCs)
2. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements outside the deictic center of the DS (ODCs)

As can be expected from this kind of classification, any gains in generality are proportionate to losses in precision. There are thus specifications and provisos that must be made. In both categories, many of the member items are simply single-word nominals (“USA”/“extremists”) or syntactically compact nominal phrases (“our people”/“terrorist organizations”) denoting the IDCs and ODCs as physical entities, as well as embodiments and carriers of positive (IDC) and negative (ODC) values. Such denotations of the ODC entities make the latter a strong and direct threat to the IDC entities, thus (2) is a category in which the “elements” mean in fact “threatening elements”. It includes not only the explicitly appealing items such as “terrorists organizations”, but also the items (e.g. “foreign dictatorships”) which become “threatening” through association with the “terrorists” as the principal ODC entity. As we have seen in 4.2.1, this association may take a considerable sentence/text space, so in that regard the “NPs” in the category description is a necessary simplification. It indeed covers the ODCs as the general
criterion reads, but the construal of the threatening posture of these ODCs may need going beyond the noun phrase.

One could argue that, if spatial proximization subsumes negative ODC description that is processed as a primary pre-requisite for the construal of the ODC impact, we might not need an IDC-oriented category such as (1), at all. This is not true, for several reasons. Most importantly, counts from the first category are needed to compare them with counts from the second category, to determine any dominance of the latter. Such a dominance means, as long as conclusions from counts from the other categories (see below) are supportive, that spatial proximization operates and it operates strongly. We have seen from the analyses in Chapter 4 that the most appealing instances of spatial proximization involve ample representation of the ODC entities, since these entities function as direct instigators of the physical impact. Just recall the observation (Section 4.4.2) that the Obama discourse moves away from spatial proximization through the replacement of ODC agents with IDC agents. All these factors and observations sanction the existence of category (1) as primarily a reference class, but we should also acknowledge a more general rationale. Category (1) includes items which, together with category (2) items, denote entities that are basic members of the DS, occupying the endpoints of the conceptual trajectory linking the DS center with its periphery. One cannot account for the conceptual inward shifts if the destination is not marked symbolically through linguistic means.

That said, we can move on to the third category. Since spatial proximization has the ODC entities (category (2)) “invade” the deictic center where the IDC entities (category (1)) are located, we need a category accommodating markers of the symbolic movement between the DS periphery and the center. Quite obviously, such markers must involve primarily verbal forms. Thus, category (3) reads as follows:

(3) Verb phrases (VPs) of motion and directionality construed as markers of movement of ODCs towards the deictic center

In Cap (2008) this definition ends with “and vice versa”, meaning that the general construal of the threat of the ODC-IDC clash could involve sub-construals of not only the ODC invasive movement, but also the IDC inert movement, both contributing to the confrontation. Indeed, the rhetoric of the eve of the Iraq war, the main object of the 2008 study, includes expressions such as “we are drifting toward tragedy”, etc., which help proximization effects by making the IDCs static and thus an easy target for the ODC impact. The number of such expressions

beyond the timeframe in question is however much smaller; they would not be able to make the statistical threshold (see below) to be included in the analysis of spatial proximization within the entire 10-year period under scrutiny in the present book. It also seems to me, in retrospect, that their inclusion in the 2008 framework has not quite followed the controlling definition of proximization as involving the construed activity of the ODC, rather than the IDC, entities. In the current form, category (3) will include the VPs marking, explicitly, only the ODC movement, as in “[terrorists] have set their course toward confrontation”, etc.

The three categories above can be said to define the “canonical” structure of spatial proximization: the markers of DS-central (“home”) and DS-peripheral (“foreign”) entities are all there, as are the markers of negative impact of the foreign entities upon the home entities. There are however more lexico-grammatical builders of spatial proximization that need to be accounted for. Chapter 4 has shown that while spatial proximization always forces construals of physically destructive impact, the construals differ with regard to “how far” the destructive scenario goes; whether it includes “just” the anticipation and then the invasion part or perhaps also the vision of the effects/consequences. Accordingly, we add to the framework the “extra” three categories:

(4) Verb phrases (VPs) of action construed as markers of impact of ODCs upon IDCs
(5) Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as anticipations of impact of ODCs upon IDCs
(6) Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as effects of impact of ODCs upon IDCs

The categories (4)–(6) will include lexical items such as “destroy”, “threat”, and “catastrophe”, respectively. Note that while threat as a notion is central to the design of all of the categories in the framework, “threat” as a language item cannot formally contribute to its canonical part. This does not however detract from the significance of studying the quantitative value of “threat” in the corpus, as its explicit mention in the text strengthens the appeal of the default proximization arrangement, especially the appeal of the ODC DS-inward shift captured in the third category. This is in line with the property of spatial proximization signaled in Chapter 4: while spatial proximization is, altogether, a strategy engaging potentially the biggest amount of lexico-grammatical material, it is rarely the case that “all” of this material is engaged at the same time. To put it in terms of the framework categories – it is rarely the case that a spatial proximization text instant

engages member items of all of the six classes. Much rather, as has been said in Section 4.2, spatial proximization is enacted incrementally in discursive chains.

We have in this way completed enumeration of the categories making up the spatial proximization framework. The framework is provided in its full form in Table 1. In what follows (5.2.1.1), I will show which of the language forms (nominal and verbal phrases) from the 2001–2010 corpus have turned, within the particular categories, the most frequent carriers of spatial proximization, thus qualifying for further analysis.

5.2.1.1 Category assignment of spatial proximization items
The spatial proximization items identified below (Table 2) have been abstracted, same as the forthcoming (5.2.2.1; 5.2.3.1) temporal and axiological items, from a 2001–2010 corpus of the US presidential speeches and remarks on the US anti-terrorist policies and actions. The corpus, compiled in January 2011 from texts published at http://www.whitehouse.gov, comprises the total of 402 addresses by, first, George W. Bush (325 texts) and then his successor, Barack Obama (77 texts). The 402 texts, containing altogether 601,856 words, span the period from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2010. It should be noted that the number of texts, 402, albeit huge, does not include all of the instances of the speeches and remarks made between 2001–2010. It only includes those matching at least two of the following three issue tags: “defense”, “foreign policy”, “homeland security”. The filtering of the website data by these tags was necessary to leave aside thematically irrelevant texts.

In order to be included in the framework as representative members of the particular categories, the items have had to make a keyness frequency threshold. The threshold has been set at 0.1%, a value obtaining, later, for the temporal and axiological frameworks as well. This means that Table 2 includes only the items whose individual (that is, “square-bracket”; see below) frequency average is not
### Table 2. Key lexico-grammatical items of the spatial proximization framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Key items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements of the deictic center of the DS (IDCs))</td>
<td>[“USA”, “United States”, “America”; [“American people”, “Americans”, “our people/nation/country/society”]; [“free people/nations/countries/societies/world”]; [“democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (Noun phrases (NPs) construed as elements outside the deictic center of the DS (ODCs))</td>
<td>[“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”]; [“Iraqi regime/dictatorship”; [“terrorists”]; [“terrorist organizations/networks”, “Al-Qaeda”]; [“extremists/radicals”]; [“foreign regimes/dictatorships”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (Verb phrases (VPs) of motion and directionality construed as markers of movement of ODCs towards the deictic center)</td>
<td>[“are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD”]; [“might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC”]; [“expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”]; [“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (Verb phrases (VPs) of action construed as markers of impact of ODCs upon IDCs)</td>
<td>[“destroy an IDC”]; [“set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as anticipations of impact of ODCs upon IDCs)</td>
<td>[“threat”]; [“danger”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. (Noun phrases (NPs) denoting abstract concepts construed as effects of impact of ODCs upon IDCs)</td>
<td>[“catastrophe”]; [“tragedy”]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

smaller than 1 occurrence per 1000 words in the corpus, or, in terms of raw numbers, whose count in the entire corpus is not smaller than 602 (601,856/1000).

The space between the square brackets contains, apart from individual items as in categories 5 and 6, groups of items that are considered conceptually or referentially synonymous and are thus meant to give, instead of individual counts, a

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4. “Iraq” is only counted when it denotes Saddam Hussein’s regime, including retrospective references to that regime. I leave out cases when, mostly after the war, Iraq is referred to as a potential ally as well as all cases in the corpus when “Iraq” stands for the people of Iraq. Altogether, the referential vagueness of “Iraq” proves that most of the counts – within the entire 2001–2010 corpus – have to be done manually.

5. Denoting state geopolitical entities, not values.

6. In Svartvik’s (1992) or Coulthard’s (1994) sense.
combined normalized count that makes the 0.1% threshold for analysis (as does, for instance, a combined count of all the discourse instances of [“USA”, “United States”, “America”] in category 1). The items separated by slashes (e.g. “people/nations/countries/societies/world” in category 1) can make their own combinations with a relevant head item (like “free”), all of which count towards the square bracket group total count. This means that possible quantifiable combinations are for example “democratic countries” or “democratic world” in category 1, “are determined to seek WMD” or “are determined to acquire WMD” or “intend to seek WMD”, etc. in category 3 – and so on. Since at places it is impossible to list precisely all the single-word collocates of an item which sanction its inclusion, some of the categories (3, 4) feature extra information (in italics) describing, in a necessarily synthetic manner, a general lexico-grammatical context that must obtain in order for that item to count. For instance, in category 3 “expand/grow” counts only if any of the lemmas occurs with an explicit textual reference to a phrase indicating the ODC military power targeted against an IDC entity. Likewise, in 4 the item “destroy” counts only if its sentence object is a category 1 member. Thus, the words in italics – unlike all other words included in Table 2 – are not actual discourse items, they just provide context descriptions, mostly when the context cannot be marked explicitly by concrete language forms. Finally, the square bracket counts include pronominal substitutes for the respective nouns and nominal phrases. Thus, they include, among other items, person deixis such as “we”, “he”, “it” or “they” (viz. especially categories 1 and 2 of the framework).

Altogether, the key lexico-grammatical items of the spatial proximization framework seem to reflect well the core elements of spatial proximization as determined in the micro-analysis of examples in Chapter 4: the negative characterization of ODC entities threatening IDC entities, the fastness of a possible/probable ODC impact, and the range of the disastrous consequences of that impact. The first of these elements, the negative ODC characterization, is mostly the domain of the category 2 items and, since the latter grow in their negative appeal through juxtaposition, also the category 1 items. The fastness of the ODC impact is construed mostly by items captured in categories 3, 4 and 5. Finally, the devastating consequences of the ODC impact are construed mainly by frequent repetitions in the text of the two items included in the sixth category. Of course, such a neat “division of labor” is an idealization as there are functional overlaps across the categories, let alone cases of (inevitable, it seems) arbitrariness as regards inclusion of some of their member items. For instance, the construal of the ODC impact speed, while mostly forced by items in categories 3–5, may well involve the...
category 2 items, especially those whose extremely negative appeal evokes fear of imminent physical threat. On the same note, the construal of catastrophic effects of the impact cannot rely on the category 6 items alone, as their meaning changes depending on which other items (especially the category 3 items) occur in their textual vicinity (for instance, a phrase involving “WMD” considerably strengthens the construal). Regarding the typological arbitrariness, note in turn that, for instance, “threat” (as a lexical item) often appears as part of the context tagged “in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”, in category 3.

These relativities do not however detract from the spatial proximization framework at the level of its general function, i.e. the function of a device to deliver quantitative evidence of spatial construals of the external impact, forced in the interest of legitimization of pre-emptive responses. This is because, as has been mentioned before, documenting the intensity of spatial proximization at a given moment within the legitimization timeframe depends, primarily, on (i) a summative framework account, and only secondarily on an account of how much the (ii) particular categories or (iii) the particular items contribute. The latter input (ii)–(iii) is of course very important for elucidating the various aspects and nuances of the general interpretation based on the summative data – hence the provision of counts at all the three levels in Section 5.4 below – but we shall see in Chapter 6 (cf. chapter description in 1.5) that for that purpose the categories of the spatial framework appear clear-cut enough.

5.2.2 The temporal proximization framework

In 4.3 I have defined temporal proximization as a forced construal of “now” (the speaker’s present) as the central time frame of the time axis in which to use premises of the past and the present, as well as anticipations of the future, to decide on an immediate action to preempt a very near future ODC action. Since on this definition temporal proximization involves a symbolic compression of the time axis as a result of two conceptual shifts, past-to-present and future-to-present, the temporal proximization framework requires linguistic instruments to conflate the envisaged events of the future with the actual events of the past. I have argued that the most promising candidates seem structured combinations of “real time” (RT) lexico-grammatical markers and “construed time” (CT) lexico-grammatical markers, in which the RT markers denote events as happening at dated points in time, while the CT markers “fit” these points (and the events), by analogy and other means, into preferred temporal frames. It should be remembered that the RT markers do not only denote actual past events, but can also describe or presuppose future point-in-time events, which the CT markers turn into durative
phenomena. They are “durative” in the sense that they can be construed as occurring anytime between the now and the infinite future. In fact, the frames where the construed events “occur” needn’t be only the future frames, as legitimization rhetorical factors might suggest. The analysis of the “A September morning” phrase in 4.3.1 has shown that the “A”, as a CT marker, profiles the meaning of the “September morning” (an RT marker) to create not only a yet unrealized future possibility, but equally a past possibility remaining unrealized in most of the past frame. It has also shown – as have the other examples analyzed – that CT markers, crucial for temporal proximization operations, are a heterogeneous class, which is apparently not governed by any grammar-based typology. The most salient of the CT markers, readily engaging in combinations with the RT markers, have proved to be, or reside in, indefinite descriptions, nominalizations, modal auxiliaries, and certain tense and aspectual patterns. The role of these forms in enacting temporal proximization must thus be reflected in the design of the particular categories of the temporal proximization framework.

The first category of the framework reflects the paramount importance of the markers of indefiniteness (such as “A” in the “A September morning” phrase) in construing real time actual events as events that could have occurred before they did, or, crucially, as events that can re-occur at any moment following the speaking time. This characterization makes the first category read synthetically as follows:

(1) Noun phrases (NPs) involving indefinite descriptions construing ODC actual impact acts in alternative temporal frames

Category 1 is thus a category including phrases, some of which constituents denote or make an explicit reference to actual terrorist acts, such as, overwhelmingly, the 9/11 WTC attacks, but also the Madrid 2004 train attacks or the London 2005 bombings. This of course makes its member items possess a considerable rhetorical appeal, which helps a swift centralization of the now frame as the frame to act pre-emptively against the “tangible” threat salient in the analogies. A similar characteristic applies to category 2, which involves a specific pattern of grammatical tenses:

(2) Discourse forms involving contrastive use of the simple past and the present perfect construing threatening future extending infinitely from a past instant

This is, of course, another quite synthetic description, in which “a past instant” subsumes an ODC invasive act. A sample item of category 2 can be found in example (27) analyzed in the previous chapter: “It used to be that we could think that oceans would protect us. September the 11th has changed the strategic thinking
for how to protect our country” (G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003). The tense pattern in (27) merges representation of the safe past (the simple past contribution) with representation of the continually threatening future (the present perfect contribution). The merger point is located in the past and marked, again, by the past tense, which, as has been said, denotes an actual terrorist act. In that particular example the tense sequence applied extends over two consecutive sentences, each involving a different tense, but this will be no hard-and-fast rule for the inclusion of other items as long as the simple past – present perfect discourse sequence is coherent enough to perform the function assigned by the category.

The remaining categories of the temporal proximization framework will include items that stress the momentousness of the present by other means than an explicit, lexically-coded reference to a past actual ODC act serving the past vs. now/future analogy purposes. This is not to say that the potential for setting up the analogy disappears completely, as the alternative formulas construe the very near future virtual realities which frequently resemble the reality arrangements holding at the time of the past ODC acts, especially the 9/11 attacks. There is however, altogether, more lexical, grammatical and discourse material that involves elaborate inference. Category 3 covers the part that has to do with inferences from nominalizations. The definition of the category describes the proximization function of the nominalizations as well as sketches the linguistic context that must obtain so this function could be realized:

(3) Noun phrases (NPs) involving nominalizations construing presupposition of conditions for ODC impact to arise anytime in the future

Again, before we discuss this category with respect to all of the member items qualified for analysis, we might want to go back to Chapter 4 for a sample that gives sense of the general membership principles. Recall, then, example (25): “America will identify and act against the emerging WMD threats before they are fully formed” (G. W. Bush, September 12, 2002). The nominalization “threats” construes the presupposed state (the WMD full operational capacity) as a state which does not extend from one specified point in time, but rather from any of the potentially infinite collection of such points in the future. As a result, since there is really no knowing “how far” into the future lies the actual point when the ODC impact capacity is reached, a pre-emptive action is announced, and its legitimation solicited, in the now frame. The interplay of the nominalization and the presupposition which the former profiles in (25) (and in category 3 generally), is an excellent illustration of how construed time items can turn real time events (such as the ODC’s accomplishment of the WMD capacity) into apparently dative phenomena, “covering” a substantial length of the time axis.
A similar (though not identical) illustration is provided by the fourth category, which contains different lexico-grammatical constructs, namely:

(4) Verb phrases (VPs) involving modal auxiliaries construing conditions for ODC impact as existing continually between the now and the infinite future

The modal auxiliaries in this category will be mainly “can” and “could”, and the now will be explicitly coded as a point-in-time – rather than a frame – by adverbials of time such as “now” or “at this moment”, as in “(...) terrorists can now inflict mass pain and suffering (...)” (G. W. Bush, April 24, 2003). This arrangement is also, as in category 3, “durative”, but unlike there the threat period is clearly bounded on the starting side. The explicitness of the boundary adds to the fear appeal salient in the arrangement: the addressee crosses the boundary to enter the threat period right at the moment the latter is declared.

Category 5, the last one in the temporal framework subsumes:

(5) Discourse forms involving parallel contrastive construals of oppositional and privileged futures extending from the now

As we have seen from the previous chapter, the privileged future is a future that, presupposing an ODC threat to the IDC camp, involves the IDC active (pre-emptive) posture the speaker favors over a passive posture (oppositional future), which does not recognize such a threat. Since building up the contrast requires a quasi-dialogue and thus a considerable text space, category 5 will include, as quantifiable items, the longest stretches of language forms among all of the categories of the framework. This will entail, as we shall see in the section that follows, some typological problems and classificatory concessions. But before we get to these issues, let us recap the temporal proximization framework in its full form (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Temporal proximization framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Noun phrases (NPs) involving indefinite descriptions construing ODC actual impact acts in alternative temporal frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Discourse forms involving contrastive use of the simple past and the present perfect construing threatening future extending infinitely from a past instant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Noun phrases (NPs) involving nominalizations construing presupposition of conditions for ODC impact to arise anytime in the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Verb phrases (VPs) involving modal auxiliaries construing conditions for ODC impact as existing continually between the now and the infinite future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Discourse forms involving parallel contrastive construals of oppositional and privileged futures extending from the now</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.2.1 Category assignment of temporal proximization items

Table 4 below includes the temporal proximization items whose frequency in the 2001–2010 corpus makes, analogously to the spatial framework, the threshold of 0.1%. Recall that, given the total size of the corpus (cf. the description in 5.2.1.1 above), this translates into the total count of at least 602 occurrences (601,856/1000) in the 402 texts analyzed. Any item whose characterization follows the criteria of the temporal proximization framework but whose count in the entire corpus is lower than 602 does not qualify for further analysis and hence does not appear in Table 4.

The threshold of 0.1% applied to the temporal framework makes the number of items that qualify smaller than the number qualifying in the spatial framework. This follows from the fact that, as has been observed in Chapter 4, the amount of linguistic material engaging in temporal proximization is, generally, smaller than the amount of the material responsible for performing spatial proximization. Although the limited number of temporal items abstracted from the corpus (note, below, that the temporal framework includes only selected pronominal substitutes for its NP items) might raise doubts about the general salience and the validity of temporal proximization as a functional compensatory mechanism, the analyses in the previous chapter seem to disperse such doubts. As proven by the language forms captured in, for instance, the first category of the temporal proximization framework, the “deficit” of the relatively limited representation of temporal items is usually offset by the high pragmatic (perlocutionary) appeal of these items (see also Chapter 4, fn. 8).

The notation remains consistent throughout all of the three proximization frameworks. Accordingly, the temporal framework uses, just like the spatial framework as well as the forthcoming axiological framework, square brackets to demarcate the item whose count must reach the 0.1% threshold set. The item that counts for the threshold is thus, collectively, all the language pattern(s) captured within one pair of the square brackets. It could be a single word or a single phrase (like “a September morning”) or, much more likely, all possible combinations of the self-standing and the “slash” items, which add up toward the square bracket count.

Looking at the assignment of the temporal items, virtually all of the categories call for further context specifications or more general comments. The first category prompts questions such as which, exactly, are the indefinite description parts, which words mark the ODC actual impact acts, and how the indefinite descriptions are constructed and deployed to make the construed invasions colonize the temporal frames different from the ones in which the actual impact acts occurred. The answer moves us back to the issues of the construed (CT) vs. real
Table 4. Key lexico-grammatical and discourse items of the temporal proximization framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Key items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (Noun phrases (NPs) involving indefinite descriptions construing ODC</td>
<td>&quot;[&quot;a September morning&quot;]; [&quot;a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]; [&quot;a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]; [&quot;a/train/underground/tube ride/journey to work&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual impact acts in alternative temporal frames)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (Discourse forms involving contrastive use of the simple past and the</td>
<td>[&quot;Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]; [&quot;It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]; [&quot;In the past/for centuries/long ago America’s/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present perfect construing threatening future extending infinitely from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a past instant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (Noun phrases (NPs) involving nominalizations construing presupposition</td>
<td>[&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed / before it/they materializes/materialize / before it/they appears/appear / before it is too late&quot;]; [&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of conditions for ODC impact to arise anytime in the future)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (Verb phrases (VPs) involving modal auxiliaries construing conditions</td>
<td>[&quot;Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs&quot;]; [&quot;Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for ODC impact as existing continually between the now and the infinite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>future)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (Discourse forms involving parallel contrastive construals of oppositional</td>
<td>[&quot;Some IDCs think/believe America/we can wait. The US government think/believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat&quot;]; [&quot;Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and privileged futures extending from the now)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. This is the only first category item referring to a different impact act than the 9/11 attacks. The square bracket includes words used in the description of both the Madrid 2004 train
time (RT) event markers. The ODC impact acts, while not mentioned per se, are marked by temporal (e.g. “September”) and/or locative (e.g. “Manhattan”, “train”) expressions, which set up, in their sentential contexts (e.g. “The sunny skies of a clear September morning on the Manhattan Island were suddenly covered by clouds of dust (…); G. W. Bush, March 23, 2007), explicit references to concrete events that happened at real points in time. How are they made indefinite, then? The temporal and the locative nominal expressions, together with their modifiers (“clear”, “sunny”, “busy”), are primarily markers of daily realities and daily routine events, whose continuity makes them “indefinite”. Thus, even when the markers are used for reference to developments that cannot be described as “routine events” as such, viz. 9/11, they still project on these events part of their primary function. As a result, the often horrifying single RT events of the past can be construed in terms of recurrent (“routine”) sequences potentially occurring in the alternative, both past and present, frames. Because of their original RT designation, it would be difficult to call such markers “proper” CT markers. The CT markers in category 1 are “a” and “another”, which force – more directly than the RT markers above – the construal of indefiniteness, potentiality and uncontrolled recurrence of the RT events.

The other categories need more methodological comments. While the first category accommodates mostly fixed lexico-grammatical material, categories 2–5 include, as well, a relatively large number of contextual elaborations which are provided, in italics, to sketch the conditions of membership of the particular inside-the-bracket items. For instance, in the third category the nominalizations “threat/threats/danger/dangers” only count when preceded by phrases containing predicates of the future IDC actions targeted against the “threat(s)”. The contextual elaborations are thus, like in the spatial framework, not actual corpus expressions but rather conceptual paradigms defining lexico-grammatical relations, or embeddings, of the (non-italicized) corpus items. Compared to the spatial framework, such definitions may be less precise, but this limitation seems inevitable given the design of the temporal framework. Namely, to properly reflect the attacks and the London 2005 bombings. It also contains a general context specification (in italics). Combining the references to two different events is a reflection of pilot observations from the post-2005 part of the corpus: both George W. Bush and Barack Obama have almost always referred to the Madrid and the London attacks as one act: a follow-up on the 9/11 attacks. The combined count is also a necessity since neither the Madrid count nor the London count would make the threshold on their own. It seems that Bush’s and Obama’s references are too important to be brushed aside that way.

9. See Section 4.3. Here, I refer to the theory only as much as is needed to characterize the contents of the first category.
mechanism of temporal proximization, the framework must include categories which involve not only NP and VP items, but also – viz. categories 2, 5 – broader discourse forms. There is, reasonably, little way in which to overcome the vagueness resulting from the length and variability of such formulas. For example, the second discourse form of the fifth category, [“Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat”], includes four contextual elaborations, each of which subsumes a different number of “fillers” (for example, Some IDCs will have more than The US government”) and some of which require more interpretation than others when identifying the fillers (viz. pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat, a “horizontal” syntagmatic formula subsuming several “vertical” paradigms). Without going into excessive detail, this asymmetry may result, in the long run, in some arbitrariness of the category assignment of the quantifiable square bracket items, since their inclusion depends on the bracket total count, which in turn depends on the recognition of the different inside-the-bracket configurations as valid to add to the count. The temporal framework recognizes as valid any-to-any match of the context fillers, providing that, first, each can be observed in the corpus, and second, the “fixed” items (“ask why America/we (…) think/believe”) are present in each combination.

Finally, a word is due regarding the treatment of pronominal substitutes for nominal phrases. Unlike in the spatial framework, they are either already included in the categories (as in 2, 3, 5) or they do not count. There are two reasons for this difference. First, compared to the spatial framework, the temporal framework includes fewer NPs in the capacity of category descriptors and thus the pronominal substitutes can be provided explicitly, like in category 3. Second, in many cases the substitution would detract from the proximization function of the nominal as the original CT/RT pattern responsible for enacting that function would cease to exist. Consider, for instance, the item “a clear September Tuesday” in the first category: were it replaced by “it”, the construed unpredictability and closeness of the threat residing in the analogy would disappear. Therefore, such substitution cases, even if occurring in the corpus, must not be counted.

In sum, all the five categories of the temporal framework follow the general idea and mechanism of temporal proximization: the symbolic compression of the time axis to make the ODC threat simultaneously a continual and a current phenomenon, and thus mobilize the IDC resources in the now frame. Different categories realize that goal through different language patterns, some contributing material serving the compression of the entire axis (category 1), and some forcing mostly the future-to-now shift (e.g. category 3). The fifth category makes also a contribution on top of its basic proximization input. The items in
the fifth category do not only build up fear appeals prompting an immediate pre-emptive action, but also partake in legitimizing that action by constructing the speaker’s “mastery of the future” (Dunmire 2011). They map out future possibilities based on evidence, and direct them into a defined number of speaker-controlled channels, thus enhancing the speaker’s personal rationality and credibility (Chouliaraki 2007).

5.2.3 The axiological proximization framework

The axiological proximization framework is, analogously to the two other frameworks, a formalized abstraction reflecting conclusions from the empirical investigation of axiological proximization operations, which we studied in Chapter 4. As such, it follows the conception of axiological proximization as a forced construal of a growing ODC-IDC ideological conflict which, in time, may lead to a physical clash. The axiological framework reflects mainly those of the proximization operations which force a very high likelihood of the ODC-IDC clash (cf. Section 4.4.1). This is because, as we have observed, other instances of axiological proximization (cf. Section 4.4.2) cannot perform legitimization compensatory function, crucial to the design of the STA model as a whole.

Since axiological proximization works with values assigned to the opposing (center vs. periphery) physical entities of the Discourse Space (IDCs vs. ODCs), the first two categories of the axiological framework resemble their counterparts in the spatial framework. However, instead of setting up a spatial opposition, they express a corresponding ideological opposition:

1. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as IDC positive values or value sets (ideologies)
2. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as ODC negative values or value sets (ideologies)

Defined as above, both categories invite relatively well demarcated phrases or, in many cases, single-word nominals, for instance “freedom”, “democracy” (in category 1), or “dictatorship”, “radicalism” (category 2). The juxtaposition of the IDC-positive and the ODC-negative values is a pre-requisite for the construal of the latter as threatening in terms of prompting the ODC physical impact. The symbolic move from the ideological premise to the physical act is the essence of “axiological proximization”, corroborating its status as a proximization strategy. As such, it determines the third, final and most important category of the framework:
Discourse forms no longer than one sentence or two consecutive sentences involving linear arrangement of lexico-grammatical phrases construing materialization in the IDC space of the ODC negative ideologies

This description is, despite the length, a synthetic one, and needs elaboration – first, to clarify the mechanism of the symbolic move, or shift, it subsumes; second, to give an idea of what kind of language forms enact the shift and thus qualify in the category. Let us now comment on the shift in conceptual terms, leaving issues of how it is enacted linguistically for the next section. Category 3 involves a complex sequence scenario consisting of two parts. These parts can be described as “abstract-ideological” and “concrete-physical”, respectively. Under the scenario, the “ideological” part, mapping out a rather distant and abstract vision of conflict between the IDC values and the ODC antagonistic values, unfolds to link with the other, “physical” part, which transforms the ODC ideological antagonism into a concrete, physical threat. Crucial to this transformation is a progressively occurring change in the conflict probability levels: the ideological part subsumes a remote possibility of the IDC/ODC conflict, while the physical part turns that possibility into a high probability. This symbolic progression explains why the description of the third category includes the “linear arrangement” phrase. The phrase also refers, as will be shown in the next section, to an arrangement at the level of specific lexico-grammatical forms forcing the progression scenario.

As has been mentioned in Chapter 4 (recall footnote 10), the axiological framework of proximization begs a comparison with models developed within other accounts of perspective involving acts of evaluation, especially the Appraisal Theory as proposed by Martin and Rose (2003) and Martin and White (2005) (to skip some relatively less influential elaborations and additions). There are, apparently, several points of direct contact: a common focus on specific, categorizable linguistic resources whereby the speaker defines different ideological positions along the self-other trajectory, or a recognition of importance of corpus methods in providing sound data proving that a particular position can be maintained consistently, over a substantial time period, through strategic use of recurrent lexical choices. And perhaps most significantly, a common view that instances of ideological descriptions and evaluations do not occur in set grammatical categories, nor do they come in universally defined lengths of text. In fact, on the Appraisal Theory, that last point reads extreme: any word, word group or even a text passage can be singled out as an instance of evaluation and one evaluative domain can accommodate noun phrases, as well as verb phrases, etc. Accordingly, the Appraisal analysis is highly text-dependent (text-speculative, one might say) and thus essentially interpretive. For instance, in the sentence “These are great heroes, whom I admire”, the evaluative domain of attitude can be described to include just
one component (the whole sentence), two components (e.g. “great heroes” + “I admire”), or three components (“great” for the so-called force, “heroes” for value judgment, “I admire” for affect), all interpretation depending on what the macro context seems to suggest and what explanatory benefits can be expected in each case. This “liberality” of the Appraisal Theory has helped it to work out a considerable number of categories and sub-categories (I have quoted (italicized) only four of them above) holding, potentially, all the linguistic resources available for evaluation (at least in the English language). However, on the other hand, it has allowed only random lexico-grammatical items to enter the categories; thus far, none of the main categories (attitude, engagement, graduation) nor the subcategories (e.g. affect for enacting attitude, attribution for enacting engagement, focus for graduation, etc., etc.) has been able to close its membership list. The latter seems like an unrealistic task anyway, given the Appraisal Theory has relied, from the very outset, on empirical input from “all language”, rather than a starting, individual discourse domain, on which complete lexico-grammatical account further accounts, of other domains, could be built. In comparison, the axiological proximization model may be initially restricted in the scope of its starting domain (positive ideological evaluation of the state-political self and negative evaluation of the state-political other, construing a threat from the other to legitimize a pre-emptive response), but, in return, its categories fill in with lexico-grammatical items in a more organized manner. This creates prospects for eventually approaching the end of the list, though of course – first – within the starting domain, as the agenda for all proximization research prescribes (recall e.g. the argument closing Chapter 3).

Summing up this subsection, there are – only – three categories of the axiological framework (see Table 5). That will not detract, though, from the importance of axiological proximization as a legitimization and legitimization-sustaining strategy, especially in contexts featuring rapid or unpredictable developments.

**Table 5. Axiological proximization framework**

1. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as IDC positive values or value sets (ideologies)
2. Noun phrases (NPs) construed as ODC negative values or value sets (ideologies)
3. Discourse forms involving linear arrangement of lexico-grammatical phrases construing materialization in the IDC space of the ODC negative ideologies

**5.2.3.1 Category assignment of axiological proximization items**

Table 6 includes the axiological proximization items whose frequency in the 2001–2010 corpus makes, same as the spatial and temporal frequencies, the threshold of 0.1% (at least 1 occurrence per 1000 words in the corpus, at least 602 occurrences in the entire word count of the corpus). Analogously to the temporal framework
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(5.2.2), the number of items that qualify is altogether (i.e. per framework) smaller than the number qualifying in the spatial framework (5.2.1). This relative underrepresentation possesses, again, little functional consequences as the legitimization compensatory potential of most of the axiological items (especially the formula captured in the third category) has shown to be huge.

There is little need to comment on the items in the first two categories; the notation and the membership principles have not changed compared to the spatial and temporal frameworks. Suffice it to say that counts from both categories include also pronominal substitutes for the respective nouns and nominal phrases. There is however a clear need to comment on the third category as, technically speaking, its contents are, for the first time, no actual language items but instead four lexico-grammatical paradigms, which lay down strict functional criteria for possible membership of specified linguistic items in the paradigms and thus in the category. This resembles, to some extent, some of the temporal framework cases (for instance, category 5) where contextual elaborations or classes of context take, as part of the description of their category, more space than the actual

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10. The axiological framework items ["dictatorship"], ["political regime"], ["military regime"], denote values, not state geopolitical entities. Compare fn. 5.

Table 6. Key lexico-grammatical and discourse items of the axiological proximization framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Key items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (Noun phrases (NPs) construed as IDC positive values or value sets (ideologies))</td>
<td>[“freedom/liberty”]; [“democracy”]; [“equality”]; [“peace”]; [“justice”]; [“progress”]; [“prosperity”]; [“economic freedom/liberty”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (Noun phrases (NPs) construed as ODC negative values or value sets (ideologies))</td>
<td>[“radicalism”]; [“extremism”]; [“terrorism”]; [“dictatorship”]; [“political regime”]; [“military regime”]10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (Discourse forms no longer than one sentence or two consecutive sentences involving linear arrangement of lexico-grammatical phrases construing materialization in the IDC space of the ODC negative ideologies)</td>
<td>[“(1) NP denoting ODC value(s) followed by or combined with (2) VP denoting a remote possibility of the ODC-IDC conflict followed by (3) VP denoting a close probability of the ODC-IDC conflict followed by or combined with (4) NP denoting physical consequences of the ODC-IDC conflict”]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
corpus items. In the current case, the situation is even more extreme: the third category defines *only classes of items*, and all the four-part linear sequences derived from the class membership of the items make up *only one total count*, which is simultaneously the category count.

Considering that the third category includes, in this way, only one quantifiable “square bracket” “item”, how come that this item can make the 0.1% threshold in the corpus? To answer that question we need to appreciate how very many variants – all of which add to the count – are possible within the item’s, i.e. the discourse form’s ((NP+VP)+(VP+NP)) internal structure; how very many items may in fact be able to enter each of the four phraseological paradigms. Let us recall the flagship expression of Bush’s axiological rhetoric in late 2003, “This evil [radicalism and extremism] might not have reached us yet but it is in plain sight, as plain as the horror sight of the collapsing towers” (G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003), treating it as a real-life prototypical instance of the third category discourse formula. The starting NP is “this evil [radicalism and extremism]”, but its role in the formula, the recognition of the existence of an antagonistic or evil ideology can potentially be played by another ODC value marker, including the markers captured in the second category. The adjacent VP is “might not have reached us yet”, but the VP paradigm allows, along the same lines, any verbal phrase marking remoteness of the ODC-IDC ideological conflict. For instance, in many texts in the corpus, this function is accomplished not by a modal auxiliary (like here), but by the use of the present progressive combined with a marker of distant location: “(1) NP is growing there”, “(1) NP is gathering in Iraq”, “(1) NP is developing there for export”. Moving on, the second VP in our prototypical discourse form is “is in plain sight”, but again, the functional paradigm is broad, including possible alternatives such as “is on our doorstep”, “is at our gates” or “is at our shores”. The alternatives are often metaphorical expressions, following, as we have seen from e.g. Hart (2010) or Charteris-Black (2006) the conception of country as a house or, more generally, a “container”. Finally, depicting physical consequences of the ODC-IDC conflict need not necessarily engage the 9/11 analogy; in fact toward the end of the 2001–2010 decade this ploy gives way to more straightforward visualizations, such as “We live in the nuclear age, when foreign threats can cross the oceans and set our land on fire within minutes” (B. Obama, October 6, 2009). Altogether, the possible variants of the discourse form considerably increase this item’s total count (and thus the category count), though of course, in the corpus, some of paradigm “fillers” do not collocate and therefore do not appear with some other fillers of the other paradigms. When this happens and they (have to) occur on their own (often for grammatical reasons) instead of being a part of the four-part structure, they do not qualify into the count. However, when they do qualify, the total count also includes the structures involving their pronominal substitutes.
5.3 The corpus and the sub-corpora

The counts of the key linguistic items performing the three proximization strategies come, as has been mentioned before, from a 601,856-word corpus of the US presidential speeches and remarks on the US anti-terrorist policies and actions. Compiled in January 2011, the corpus spans the period from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2010, providing a diachronic view of the evolution of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric across three terms of presidency (two terms of George W. Bush and one – unfinished – term of Barack Obama.

The corpus includes the total of 402 texts, downloaded from the White House website http://www.whitehouse.gov. Among the 402 texts, 325 are Bush’s, while the remaining 77 come already from his successor’s term. The corpus includes only the speeches and remarks matching at least two of the three issue tags: defense, foreign policy, homeland security. As I have indicated, such filtering of the website data was meant to exclude thematically irrelevant texts.

My earlier studies (Cap 2006, 2008, 2010a, b, 2011) have shown that the continuity of legitimization of the American anti-terrorist policies and actions within the 2001–2010 corpus timeframe has seen moments of strategic change in the use of the particular proximization strategies. There are, it seems, three most important moments, reflecting geopolitical, military, as well as institutional or procedural developments. They are, in chronological order, the late 2003 collapse of the WMD premise for going to war in Iraq, the re-establishment of the US administration’s credibility following the creation of the democratic government of Iraq in mid-2004, and a redefinition of the US foreign policy by the Obama government. This invites breaking down the corpus (henceforth referred to as “main corpus”) into sub-corpora to prove the existence of different proximization configurations in the periods before and after each of the transitions.

Accordingly, we identify the following four periods defining four sub-corpora of texts:

- “Period One (P1)”, September 11, 2001 – October 31, 2003;
- “Period Two (P2)”, November 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004;
- “Period Three (P3)”, July 1, 2004 – January 19, 2009;
- “Period Four (P4)”, January 20, 2009 – December 31, 2010

Pilot lexical counts from these periods (Cap 2010a and unpublished research) indicate that the legitimization rhetoric of Period One is dominated by items performing spatial and temporal proximization. Period Two reveals the salience of axiological proximization, which becomes less salient in Period Three, when temporal proximization takes over. Finally, Period Four sees relatively moderate
contributions from each of the strategies, among which axiological-temporal prox-
imization seems the most salient. These pilot findings will now (Section 5.4 below and Chapter 6) be verified against the full counts from each of the four sub-cor-
pora. The P1 sub-corpus contains 98 texts (120,888 words), the P2 70 texts (97,550 words), the P3 157 texts (293,095 words), and the P4, the Obama sub-corpus, 77 texts (90,323 words).

Each of the sub-corpora includes a number of texts that have made head-
lines in press reports on issues of international terrorism, anti-terrorist policies, and more general issues of the US state security as a whole. These texts are, for instance, George W. Bush’s September 11 Anniversary Address (September 11, 2002), War Message (March 19, 2003), Defending the War Address (July 12, 2004), The War on Terror at Home and Abroad Address (January 23, 2006), etc., or Barack Obama’s Ending the War in Iraq (February 27, 2009) and Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq (August 31, 2010), to name but a few. Although widely circulating in the US media, they do not seem to reveal any extra or more legitimization strategies compared to the rest of texts. As such, they are not explicitly marked in the quantitative analysis that follows, though some of them will be referred to by name in Chapter 6, when we interpret the counts and draw qualitative conclusions.

5.4 Counts from the proximization frameworks

This section provides counts of the key lexico-grammatical and discourse form items included (cf. Tables 2, 4, 6) in the spatial, temporal, and axiological frame-
works. The counts from each framework are given in Tables 7, 8, 9, respectively. In each case, the counts are presented with respect to the four periods, P1–P4, as described above. The P1–P4 individual figures indicate percentage frequen-
cies in 1000 words of each of the 4 sub-corpora. These individual figures yield, altogether, three types of counts, reflecting the three calibers of objects of analysis (item, category, framework). The P1–P4 figures are provided, respectively, in the four columns following the column which names the key items. The right-most column gives the total counts of each item and each category, as well as the over-
all framework count, in the main corpus. The spectrum of possible quantitative observations is thus extensive, involving multiple lines and planes of comparison emergent from many counts as well as many count types captured in the tables. That said, given the variety and multiplicity of the data included, the tables cannot afford to repeat category descriptions.

Note that the discussion of counts presented in the three consecutive tables covering, each, a different proximization strategy, has its focus primarily on the
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frameworks and their efficiency to provide structured quantitative data that could be compared across the periods. Although such a focus cannot completely exclude individual cross-period observations of the behavior of individual items, Sections 5.4.1–3 do not have the last descriptive word as regards, in general terms, the changing size of the contribution from each strategy in every consecutive period and, consequently, the evolution of the entire legitimization pattern within the main corpus ten-year span. This task, involving repackaging of the data into four sets capturing, side-by-side, spatial, temporal, and axiological counts across the four periods, is left to Chapter 6.

5.4.1 Counts from the spatial framework

The spatial counts follow in Table 7 below.

The counts from the spatial framework seem to prove correct the design of the framework as a reflection of the mechanism of spatial proximization. The highest main corpus totals appear in the categories defining the “canonical” structure of spatial proximization, i.e. categories 1, 2 and 3. The main corpus total in category 2 (5.11) prevails over the total in category 1 (4.25), which suggests that the linguistic enactment of spatial proximization is indeed mostly the matter of the ODC markers. This is because the ODC markers denote entities which, in the spatial proximization architecture, are prime instigators of the DS symbolic periphery-center shift which forces the threatening construal of an external physical impact upon the DS central entities, the IDCs. The difference between the two totals would in fact be bigger but for the 5.51 count of the IDC items in the second period, which can be explained when we look beyond the spatial domain. As will be further demonstrated in the cross-period accounts of shifts in the salience of the three proximization strategies, the contextual requirements of the second period are such that the legitimization pattern needs to engage more markers of IDC entities, to build up axiological argument redefining the P1 stance. At the descriptive level we could say that the G. W. Bush government need to construct a pattern of rhetoric compensating for the loss of the WMD premise for the earlier rhetoric, and the axiological proximization pattern, involving a broader and more stable framework or vision of the ODC-IDC conflict, is the best candidate. This entails however that the Bush administration redefine their set of linguistic choices to incorporate items which denote global values, like “freedom”, “justice”, or “peace”, which are at stake. Since the agents responsible for the defense of such values are IDC entities (category 1), the P2 discourse must include a large number of items marking these entities.
Table 7. Counts of the key spatial proximization items in sub-corpora P1–P4 and in main corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>“[“USA”, “United States”, “America”]”</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“American people”, “Americans”, “our people/nation/country/society”]</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“free people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>“[“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”]”</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorists”]</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Iraqi regime/dictatorship”]</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorist organizations/networks”, “Al-Qaeda”]</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“extremists/radicals”]</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“foreign regimes/dictatorships”]</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>“[are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD]”</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>“[destroy an IDC]”</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values]”</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>“[threat]”</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[danger]”</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>“[tragedy]”</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“[catastrophe]”</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
<td>21.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The discussion of the 5.51 count case suggests that our current principal task, studying the efficiency of the spatial framework to offer structured quantitative data which invite cross-framework and cross-period comparisons (such as the P1–P2 spatial-axiological comparison above) should best concentrate on category totals in the main corpus, with due attention paid to the item totals (in the main corpus) as arithmetic components of the former. This means, primarily, going down, line by line and category by category, across the six categories, and only secondarily or “in passing”, looking across the periods.

Accordingly, we continue with category 1. The main corpus total of the category, 4.25, should be attributed, mostly, to the high proportion of items denoting entities being the direct target of the ODC impact, such as “USA”, “America” or “American people”. The counts of these most geographically central IDCs clearly outnumber the counts of the items marking the more broadly demarcated entities (“free nations”, “democratic countries”, etc.) deriving their IDC status on ideological, rather than locational, grounds. This warrants a more general note, that spatial proximization is indeed a strategy that builds on the conceptualization of events as personally consequential, a construal in which the major role is played by individualized fear appeals. The plentiful references to “Americans” or “American people” appear to work, legitimization-wise, way more quickly and better than the less sharply focused references, to “free people” or “democratic world”, even though it is obvious that the former are part of the latter. As far as the personalization of fear appeals is concerned, the first category findings mirror the hallmarks of the evolutionary and psychological theories (especially Festinger’s consistency theory) discussed in Chapter 3. These findings must not be questioned by a temporary (P2) rise in the representation of the broadly demarcated IDCs (“free nations”, etc.). As has been mentioned before, the US discourse in Period Two needs such an ad hoc extension of scope for a very specific reason. This reason is to depict the Iraqi operation in terms of one in the otherwise successful series of ideologically motivated, global operations, and thus downplay the WMD intelligence failure in Iraq as a negligible exception case.

The first thing to comment on with respect to the second category is, again, its main corpus total, which looks massive (5.11, translating into no fewer than 51 items per 1000 words corpus-wide). We have already observed that such a high density of ODC markers reflects the essence of spatial proximization as a mechanism governed mainly by the ODC symbolic movement. The threatening activity of the ODCs is best construed in discourse when references are made, if available, to specific parties or agents which pose the most concrete or direct threat at a given moment. This explains, for the most part, the salience of the first two items, [“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”] (count 1.68) and [“terrorists”] (count 1.80), determining the category’s high total. One might perhaps argue that
“terrorists” is not necessarily a specific entity, but, although the table cannot demonstrate it explicitly, it is made specific through conflation. Namely, almost anytime “Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, etc., appear in a sentence, that sentence includes also a reference to “terrorists”. At places, the items are even used interchangeably. As a result, the Iraqi threat is construed as a terrorist threat and vice versa. Of course, such a conflation pattern ceases to exist once Iraq gets liberated (which also means that, from then on, fewer instances of the lemma “Iraq” can qualify as ODCs in the first place\(^\text{11}^\).) In P3 and P4, there is a considerable asymmetry between the random and overall scarce references to Iraq (dropping as low as 0.46 in Period Four) and the continuing references to terrorist groups. At one point (P3), we even observe what seems like a return to the fear appeal rhetoric: after the P2 fall, the count of “terrorists” rises to 1.89. This can be attributed to the fact that in P3 the Bush administration recover from the loss of credibility incurred in the late P1 (the WMD intelligence failure) and thus restart mapping out visions which, again, involve threats of physical impact. These visions do not however need to engage (or rather re-engage) the 9/11 analogy, a cornerstone ploy in P1.

The concept of direct physical threat, involving the anticipated impact of ODCs on IDC elements, brings us to considerations of the relative distance between the two domains, a conceptual coordinate defined linguistically by verb phrases (VPs). That way, we move on to the third category. Since the success of spatial proximization depends on the construal of, eventually, a devastating physical clash of ODC and IDC elements, the most numerous items in the category should be those stating, first, resources, and second, intention ODCs possess to invade IDCs. Our table counts corroborate this prediction. All the four items of the third category reveal similar total counts in the main corpus (ranging from 0.44 to 0.53), but none of them can be said to define either the resources or the intention only. Rather, there are different ratios and thus compensation patterns: what an item lacks in the way of expressing resources is compensated in its focus on intention, and vice versa. For instance, the first item, [“are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD”], gives a very strong indication of the ODC resources (“WMD”), but the intention to apply these resources against IDCs is marked only indirectly; in fact, it needs inference from the phrase’s context. Conversely, the fourth item, [“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”], does not explicitly define any resources, but instead signals a very strong intention on the part of the ODCs. This much can be said from the framework theoretical perspective. The third category prompts further, more descriptively minded observations (such as for example the sharp decline in the number of the first two items in P2), but we shall leave these till the next chapter.

\(^{11}\) Compare footnote 4 above.
Meanwhile, we go on to discuss, collectively, categories 4–6. The items in these categories help elaborate on and make more precise the ODC impact scenario generated through the interplay of the items in categories 1–3. In addition, the fifth category items, [“threat”] and [“danger”], serve as explicit linguistic articulations of the threat salient in that interplay. In general, as categories 4–6 do not belong to the canonical proximization arrangement (cf. Section 5.2.1 above), none of their items has to accompany, at all times, the items in categories 1–3. When they do, however, the overall proximization effect gets strengthened considerably, as many of the “auxiliary” items enter in recurrent functional patterns together with the “default” items. For instance, [“destroy”] (category 4) makes an important addition to the impact scenario whenever the scenario includes (emphasis on) the accumulation of the ODC resources (see above) as a pre-requisite for ODC impact. The P1–P4 counts of [“destroy”] thus behave relative to the counts of the first two items in the third category: they are sky-high in P1 (1.85), and suffer a dramatic fall later on. Another item whose counts mirror in a way the behavior of third category items is [“catastrophe”] (category 6). Commonly found in phrases denoting WMD attacks (unlike, by the way, [“tragedy”], possessing much broader connotations and many more collocates), it is a natural discourse contextual accompaniment to, again, the first two items of the third category. Accordingly, like [“destroy”], it is salient in P1 (0.21), while barely making the framework threshold of 0.10 in P4.

One should not underappreciate the 0.55 total of [“threat”] in the main corpus. As has been said, “threat” as a language item in the US anti-terrorist discourse is a conclusion word, so to say, and in that sense its role is absolutely vital. It brings together all the conceptual ingredients of the construal forced by the (spatial) proximization strategy and gives them a common “name”. This, however, does not mean that these ingredients are not “threatening” as such, that is by the very virtue of what kind of reality they presuppose, how they make it unfold and to what final – even if “threat” is not used lexically along the way. Recall that the core elements of spatial proximization evoking the aura of threat are (cf. 5.2.1) the negative characterization of ODCs, the fastness of the ODC impact, and the vast range of the impact consequences, and that all the three can be construed without using the material captured in the fifth category, to which [“threat”] belongs. Though in fact, (even) as a language item, [“threat”] seems a very powerful choice given its stability in representation across the periods. Note that if we leave aside P1 (an obviously high count due to the WMD factor), the changes throughout P2–P4 are minimal and the P4 “Obama” figure, 0.41, is actually bigger than an earlier “Bush” figure (0.39 in P2). This cannot be said of all the other major builders of spatial proximization involving, like [“threat”], a direct fear appeal so characteristic of the Bush rhetoric. For instance, in category 3, crucial to the construction of fear
based on imminence of the ODC impact, all of the P4 counts are lower, and the last two markedly, than their P2 counterparts. Let alone the drop of the other item in the fifth category: unlike [“threat”], [“danger”] goes down considerably in P4 as compared to P2. These observations suggest that, notwithstanding the 2008 change in the White House, the US anti-terrorist rhetoric, having recognized in P1 substantial legitimization benefits in producing discourse involving both the construal of threat as a concept and the use of “threat” as a language item, has been reluctant to change that initial preference later on, even after the original premises (WMD, Iraq) lost their significance.

Altogether, the framework count corpus-wide, 14.01, reveals a supreme role of spatial construals in the US anti-terrorist discourse as a whole. The figure means that per every 1000 words in the main corpus there are no fewer than 140 instances of the quantifiable items listed in the six categories of the spatial framework. The high density of spatial proximization items appears yet more staggering if we convert normalized counts into a raw word-count. Then, in the entire corpus of 601,856 words we find as many as 84,252 spatial items (!)

The P1–P4 total counts, given in the last line of the table, point to which periods have seen, overall, higher or lower presence of the spatial proximization strategy. As such, they invite issues of extralinguistic contextual characteristics of the periods as determinants of that presence. They also prompt the crucial issue of how the other proximization strategies operate in the face of the striking lexical “losses” (P1 vs. P2, P1–P3 vs. P4) and not so striking but yet existing “gains” (P2–P3) across the periods. A few hints have been given in this section, but the main qualitative discussion, involving period-by-period comparisons of the input of the three strategies, follows in Chapter 6. Until then, we continue to organize the quantitative data to make such a discussion possible.

5.4.2 Counts from the temporal framework

The temporal counts are presented in Table 8.

Compared to the spatial proximization framework, the temporal framework reveals much less variation in the quantitative contribution made by the items in the particular categories. Recall that, in the spatial framework, category 2 makes the main corpus total of 5.11, while category 6 makes the total of 0.71. Thus, the contribution of category 2 is over 7 times higher than that of category 6. There are no differences of that caliber in the temporal framework. Category 1, making the biggest contribution, reveals the main corpus total of 1.20, which is “only” 3 times higher than the input of category 5, which makes the smallest contribution (0.40). This allows a claim that, unlike the spatial proximization framework, the
Table 8. Counts of the key temporal proximization items in sub-corpora P1–P4 and in main corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[“a September morning”]</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work”]</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.63</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.52</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.95</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.20</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“In the past/for centuries/long ago America’s/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations”]</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed / before it/they materialize/materialize/before it/they appears/appear / before it is too late”]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance”]</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.67</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.27</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.37</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
temporal framework does not seem to possess a canonical part responsible for most of the proximization operations. The overall input of temporal proximization in the strategy of proximization as a whole draws on a relatively balanced set of components. It is also, quantitatively, a much smaller input than that of spatial proximization, but, as has been said, this disproportion results often from the sheer length of the temporal proximization language forms qualified as “quantifiable items”, and is mostly compensated by strong perlocutionary effects these items bring about in discourse.

The first two categories of the temporal framework have, overall, the biggest share in the main corpus count, which is no surprise given that items in these categories make (except for the last item in category 2) an explicit reference to actual terrorist acts. In so doing, they constitute the most effective tools to solicit the prompt, “here-and-now” legitimization of pre-emptive actions needed to neutralize the threats emerging from the enforced analogies. In category 1, references to time in the first two items (as in our epitome example, “a September morning”) seem to work exceptionally well, warranting higher counts than references to place (“New York”, “Manhattan”). The first two items also demonstrate, apart from the high counts overall (0.48 and 0.33 respectively), the highest degree of variation across the periods. This goes not only for their own category (1), but also in respect to most of the items in the other categories. The variation

Table 8. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.</th>
<th>[“Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs“]</th>
<th>0.47</th>
<th>0.15</th>
<th>0.32</th>
<th>0.21</th>
<th>0.27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time”]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“Some IDCs think/believe America/we can wait. The US government think/believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
seems to corroborate, viz. above, the importance of such items as [“a September morning”], “a sunny September Tuesday”, “a busy September workday”, etc., as major players in proximization construals, even though they remain in quantitative minority to spatial proximization items. The sharp falls and rises of the temporal items mirror, namely, the consequentiality of the use of these items to realization of the discourse goals in a given period. The last item in category 1, ["a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work"], needs a separate comment. Denoting the Madrid 2004 train attacks and the London 2005 bombings, it is the only item in the entire framework involving ODC acts other than those perpetrated or planned directly against America, the principal IDC. As such, its main corpus total, 0.20, is notable, and the figure reads even more significant given that the item could not appear in P1.

In comparison with the first category, category 2 reveals a far more equal main corpus representation of the particular items, but here, in turn, the three items differ with regard to what broad legitimization concepts they involve or address, to enact temporal proximization. The first two items express, again, strong fear appeals based on reference to the 9/11 attacks. Unlike the indefiniteness formulas captured in category 1, the specific pattern of tenses used here does not allow a retrospective projection of threat (i.e. a suggestion that the 9/11 terrorist acts could have re-occurred already and the fact that they did not is only the matter of luck), but this only adds to the strength of the prospective projection. Thus, the two items go a long way toward building a fear-based rhetoric, which explains why they behave similar to the first category items as regards the cross-period differences (note for instance that the degree of the P2 fall is comparable in the first two items of both categories). No such extreme variation can be seen in the case of the third item of the second category. The reason is that, unlike the first two, the third item does not partake in a legitimization based (primarily) on fear appeals. The legitimization power of the third item, ["In the past/ (…) Now (…) terrorist organizations"], lies, rather, in the globality of vision and the ensuing aura of competence and credibility it ascribes to the speaker. Since the need for such a kind of legitimization is relatively constant across the four periods, the item is able to reach the main corpus count comparable to the first two items, even though it is only P2 where it beats them along the way.

The items in the remaining categories do not involve, at least at the lexical level, actual terrorist acts and, consequently, their counts are lower than the counts from categories 1 and 2. Category 3 has the second smallest main corpus count, 0.49, in the entire framework, but note that the items in that category engage the lemmas “threat” and “danger”, which make, as well, a contribution to another framework (spatial). Thus, the main corpus counts of both of the items, 0.27 and 0.22 respectively, are notable, indicating an important pragmatic function of
forced inferences from nominalizations occurring in presuppositional syntactic or broader embeddings. These inferences, as the first item finely demonstrates, are in fact inferences which, instead of enhancing the addressee’s knowledge, detract from it. Instead of getting to know when to expect ODC impact, the addressee gets to know s/he will never know, and even if part of that “knowledge” is that the impact might not take place at all, the threat is arguably much stronger and prompting a faster response than, ironically, a threat of a fully predictable impact (a “real threat”, we might say). This explains why, at the lexical level, the “before”, as the main building block of the presupposition, is so amply used in the American anti-terrorist rhetoric, regardless of the administration.

The counts from category 4 re-invite the issue of the difference between legitimation sought in the rhetoric of fear, and legitimization solicited (also/mainly) by the enactment of the speaker’s competence, rationality of assessment, globality of vision, etc. The two kinds of the speaker’s call for legitimization are reflected, respectively, in the first and the second item of the category. Interestingly, the two items do not include any markedly different lexico-grammatical material; the difference in the kind of call follows, rather, from the different syntactic arrangements involving disparate theme/rheme functional structures. Theory aside, one can say that the first item has its contents focus on “what the enemy can do” and thus builds up a fear appeal, while the second item links that focus with a focus on “what the times can bring”, which extends the scope of reality that underlies the predication. As a result, the second item enacts the speaker’s globality of vision and assessment much more strongly than the first item. A direct but still somewhat paradoxical consequence of the construal of the second item in broad terms of the speaker’s competence is that such a construal detracts from the item’s commitment to the truth of the proposition it expresses. As fear appeal is no longer the most salient psychological and pragmatic function, the proposition employed to construct the appeal (“…terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time”) loses its salience as well. How the US administration benefit from this kind of rhetorical safety can be seen from the counts of the second item in P3 and P4. Reaching the values of 0.51 and 0.36, respectively, they far outnumber the P3–P4 counts of the first item, as the use of the second item in P3–P4 discourse runs lesser risk of evoking associations with the discourse premises of P1, which can no longer be exploited.

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12. We have observed in Chapter 3 that, in fact, all theories of legitimization involve fear appeals in one way or another.

13. The argument subsumes classical functional approaches to sentence information structure, such as Halliday and Hasan (1976) and Givón (1983).
The speaker’s rationality, geopolitical competence and, generally, leadership traits, are perhaps best coded in the two items in category 5, and, were it not for the parts expressing the firm intention to undertake pre-emptive action (such as *The US government* think/believe *pre-emptive action is necessary*, in the second item), the main corpus counts of both items would probably be higher. However, as especially the P2 context, but in general, the entire time span following P1, makes declaring such an intention problematic (there is no “direct” threat that could make a premise for the action), the representation of the two items in the main ten-year corpus is mostly the reflection of their representation in P1. Given this, the two main corpus counts (0.20 and 0.20) should not be underappreciated. Another reason why both totals are notable is that the composition of the two items includes several context specification sites (cf. 5.2.2.1 above), which define, each in its own but usually rigorous way, what “fillers” are allowed so an item, as a whole, could count. For instance, the site *pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat* can only subsume lexical expressions closely synonymous with *evidence* (e.g. “proof”), brushing aside the more remote synonyms (e.g. “indication”). The fact that there are many such sites in the two items (three in the first, four in the second) makes the items and the formulas they involve quite sophisticated and unique.

The temporal framework total count, 3.43 (c. 34 instances per every 1000 words in the main corpus), may not impress as such, especially in comparison with the spatial framework, but there are other reasons which make instances of temporal proximization important in the proximization strategy as a whole. Skipping the issues of length of the quantifiable items and their high pragmatic appeal, both of which have been raised several times, let us return to a remark that has been thus far a one-time digression. The counts from the temporal framework reveal extremely sharp cross-period drops, as well as increases. Their fluctuation across the four periods, 5.16–1.63–5.35–2.94, to quote the P1–P4 framework totals, is in fact more salient than the fluctuation of the spatial counts. This implies a high consequentiality of the use of temporal items to the pursuit of different discourse goals in different periods, some of them being legitimization-saving goals, like in the third period inviting/demanding a return to the rhetoric of evidence-based rationality and premeditation. In Chapter 6 we shall take these observations to make up the first premise to consider temporal proximization as not only a “static” component strategy, but also a “dynamic” strategy, which, notwithstanding its own limited representation, could still compensate for temporary under-representation of the other strategies of the STA model. Before then, we discuss counts from the axiological framework, with a view to finding more structured data suggesting functional compensations among the STA strategies.
### 5.4.3 Counts from the axiological framework

The axiological counts are presented in Table 9.

**Table 9. Counts of the key axiological proximization items in sub-corpora P1–P4 and in main corpus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>(“freedom/liberty”)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“democracy”]</td>
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<td>[“peace”]</td>
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<td>[“justice”]</td>
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<td>[“progress”]</td>
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<td>[“economic freedom/liberty”]</td>
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<td>6.01</td>
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<td>[“military regime”]</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.34</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>3.26</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2) VP denoting a remote possibility of the ODC-IDC conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) VP denoting a close probability of the ODC-IDC conflict</td>
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<td></td>
<td>followed by or combined with</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(4) VP denoting physical consequences of the ODC-IDC conflict”]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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</table>

**FRAMEWORK TOTAL**

8.16 12.15 8.42 8.18 9.07
We have observed earlier that the design of the axiological framework resembles that of the spatial framework, at least as far as categories 1–2 are concerned. Of course, the axiological categories subsume values, not physical entities, but otherwise both frameworks launch the IDC-ODC opposition expressed in specific lexical choices. Interestingly, while the first two categories of the spatial framework reveal dominance of the ODC counts, the corresponding axiological categories demonstrate the opposite: the ODC counts are in minority to the IDC counts. The current difference, 5.17 (IDC) vs. 3.26 (ODC), is even bigger than the difference – in favor of ODCs – observed in the spatial framework. This proves, as we have expected, that the core condition for axiological proximization to work is an extensive ideological self-description of the IDC entities. Only when the home values are elucidated and construed as indisputably “positive” ones, can the external different values be construed, automatically, as “negative” values that must be opposed, rejected, or even confronted.

The counts from the first category show that the lexical backbone of the construction of the IDC ideology are the items [“freedom/liberty”] and [“democracy”]. Reaching the main corpus counts of 1.89 and 1.61, respectively, they are by far the most numerous items of the entire framework. They also make the biggest contribution to the P2 general increase in the number of axiological items, aiming to make up for the corresponding decrease in the spatial and temporal items. As such, they reveal the most lexically explicit role in safeguarding the continuity of legitimization against the contextual challenges. That role is apparently played by all the items in the first category except [“peace”], which is the only item whose P1 count (0.35) prevails over the P2 count (0.29). The reason is that in P1 [“peace”] is construed in a twofold manner. On the one hand it expresses a universal value, but on the other indicates situation-specific aims underlying concrete operations, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Thus, as the situation-specific construal is important in P1 (and less important in P2), the P1 count holds the upper hand.

While the P1–P4 representation of most of the items in category 1 is, notwithstanding the P2 rise, relatively stable, the last three items, [“progress”], [“prosperity”] and [“economic freedom/liberty”] seem to make up a group of its own – their counts consistently increase in P4. This is because the rhetoric of P4, the “Obama period”, recognizes ODC threat to not only human or civic values in general, but also to specific economic values. The Obama rhetoric puts the threat to these IDC values on a par with any other “ODC threats” that need IDC’s response. Speaking of P4 and the Obama discourse, we might add a more general remark. The inclusion of economic values in the IDC ideological mind-set seems to indicate Obama’s comparatively little interest in making his axiological argument instrumentally usable for the sole purpose of an ad hoc rhetorical shift, such as Bush’s P2 switch to an ideological rationale for the Iraq war, leaving behind the invalid
Chapter 5. The STA model and the anti-terrorist discourse: Methodology and data

WMD rationale. Compared to the other values of the mind-set, economic values are not, arguably, perfect subjects in proximization construals aimed at a fast and unconditional response sanctioning immediate IDC action.

In category 2, the most important items marking the ODC values are [“dictatorship”], [“radicalism”], [“extremism”] and of course [“terrorism”], though the very high frequency of the [“terrorism”] item has, again, a twofold reason. Similar to the [“peace”] case, “terrorism” as a concept is construed in both ideological and situation-specific, spatial/physical terms. In other words, it is conceptualized both as an abstract value and a materialization of this value. In that sense its meaning partly resembles the meaning of “threat”, which is simultaneously descriptive and projective (cf. Section 2.5 and Dunmire 2011). Since, especially in P1, the spatial/physical construal of “terrorism” warrants substantial legitimization benefits, the representation of the item is high accordingly. The P1 high count of [“terrorism”] affects in turn its main corpus count (0.75), making it prevail over the other main corpus counts in the category. As for the category’s last two items, [“political regime”] and [“military regime”], their comparatively low count can be attributed to the fact that the “regime” part evokes direct associations with the regime of Saddam Hussein in the pre-war Iraq. Effective then, they contribute less and less in the way of legitimization of the anti-terrorist discourse in its post-2004 stages (P3–P4). Finally, except [“terrorism”], all the counts in category 2 demonstrate, similar to the first category counts, a consistent rise in P2, which invites more focus on P2 as apparently the most promising period for the diachronic cross-framework analysis.

That promise gets strengthened by the count(s) from the third category, which, albeit containing just one “item”, is conclusive to the design and validity of the entire framework – as a formal theoretical construct reflecting the mechanism of axiological proximization and a descriptive tool shedding light on the possible discourse functions of the language forms it includes. We have been at the theoretical level, with examples, several times throughout, so let us now focus strictly on the item’s counts, the main corpus count as well as the P1–P4 variation. For a structure that complex and lexico-grammatically elaborate the main corpus count is striking already; it means more than six occurrences of the entire four-part structure per every 1000 words. Note that the structure as such will contain quite a number of words. For instance, the sequence “If the Middle East remains a place where freedom and democracy do not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of the towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life”14 contains as

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many as fifty. Such lengthy instances of the structure making up the item further increase its visibility in discourse. Consequently, the effectiveness of the construal of an apparently remote ideological conflict in terms of an imminent physical threat rises as well.

If the main corpus count is called “striking”, what word to use to describe the item’s P1–P4 variation, and its P1–P2 increase in particular? The count in P2, 1.80, is 9 times (!) higher than the P1 count. Moving on, the count in P4, 0.11, is nearly 18 times (!) lower than the P2 count. While the P2–P4 difference can perhaps be put down to the vast amount of time spanning the two periods and the different rhetorical characteristics of the two speakers (the discourse form in the third category seems the rhetorical imprint of the Bush administration), how do we account for such an unprecedented change across P1–P2, the time of less than three years, seeing the same government? None of the cross-period changes observed in the spatial and temporal frameworks has come anywhere close to the degree of the P1–P2 rise in the third category of the axiological framework. If no explanation can be found in the length of time, nor in the speaker’s predispositions, one must look for other reasons. These could only be, it seems, extremely abrupt twists in geopolitical context, necessitating an immediate redefinition of the speaker’s rhetoric. I have indicated before that such twists indeed occurred, in late 2003, as the Bush administration lost their WMD premise for going to war in Iraq. We will take this postulate as the starting point to discuss the many other nuances of the P2 anti-terrorist rhetoric in the next chapter. Before then, let us note from the framework theoretical perspective, that the counts from the third category not only endorse the completeness of the framework in line with the general mechanism of proximization (the arrangement whereby the ODC values are set against the IDC entities finds a solid quantitative representation in discourse), but also, together with the other counts in the framework, provide intriguing candidate data to prove the compensatory character of the STA model as a whole. Suffice it to say, for the time being, that the highest in-period framework count (12.15), much influenced by the corresponding in-period third category count (1.80), is found in P2 when both spatial and temporal counts go down.

5.5 Conclusion

The three frameworks seem to respond positively to the tasks defined at the beginning of this chapter. They provide a data-based, organized proof of the existence of spatial, temporal and axiological proximization operations in the US anti-terrorist rhetoric 2001–2010, a temporally extensive legitimization discourse undergoing frequent linguistic modifications as a result of equally frequent changes in
the contextual conditions. The counts from the frameworks point to a strategic character of these modifications, which apparently aim at redefining the rhetoric to follow the demands of a given context, to keep legitimization at a continual high. While the orientation of this chapter has been mainly methodological, I have tentatively discussed the most intriguing redefinitions as well as their possible reasons: the P1–P2 decline in spatial proximization following the loss of the WMD argument, the P1–P2 increase in axiological proximization aimed to restructure the rhetoric along ideological lines, the P3 rise in temporal proximization reflecting the attempt to solicit legitimization based on the speaker’s rationality and premeditation, etc. In so doing, I have addressed the potential the counts from the three frameworks show in the way of disclosing functional compensatory patterns underlying most of these changes. This potential will be elaborated on, in Chapter 6, in a descriptively minded diachronic analysis.

In the motto lines opening this chapter Paul Chilton observes that “most meanings in language are not realised lexically”, which poses a “problem with lexical counts”. Obviously enough, in constructing the frameworks I have been forced to grapple with this concern. To put it more radically: without facing it and offering a way out, there would be no chance to make STA an attested model in the first place. I am not going to argue that one could code meanings into language at the level of single words as isolated signifiers. It would simply be irrational to believe that one can brush aside linguistic indeterminacy and, consequently, the degrees and varieties of implicitness quite as easily. Still, the frameworks have shown that some of the macro meanings (the meaning of “them” encroaching upon “us” physically, the meaning of “them” revealing values confronting the “us” values) could perhaps be defined as relatively stable constellations of relatively fixed, well demarcated language forms engaging in regular interaction patterns – such as the interaction between the forms of the “canonical part” of the spatial framework or between the forms making up the four-part axiological formula. This is to say that, at the macro level, some global meanings could be expressedlexically in an incremental fashion, involving large agglomerations of form. Such are the three proximization meanings, the narrowings of the spatial, temporal and axiological distance, all of which involve a repetitive use of set patterns of lexico-grammatical items. The discussion in this chapter has shown that these items can be configured to perform discourse functions and that the degree of their performance can be measured.
Chapter 6

The STA model and the 2001–2010 decade of the anti-terrorist discourse

Discussion

"Americans will persevere (...) We won't stoop to the level of these zealot, terrorist pigs (...). And we won't kill children and mothers (...). I just hope Bush will do whatever is necessary to get rid of this terrorist vermin".

(An eyewitness of WTC attacks, speaking live on Aaron Brown's CNN night edition, September 11, 2001)

6.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to test the STA proximization model in a critical discourse analytic, diachronically organized study of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric 2001–2010. This task draws upon the theoretical design of the model as developed throughout Chapters 2–5, and involves the data and the methodology presented in Chapter 5. While in Chapter 5 the data have been used to corroborate the logic of the three proximization frameworks as theoretical constructs, the current focus is primarily descriptive. Thus, in what follows we repackage the data into four diachronically structured sets, reflecting the four periods (P1–P4) of the US anti-terrorist discourse in the 2001–2010 decade. Then we (re-)interpret the representation of the spatial, temporal and axiological language forms period-by-period, looking, in each of the periods, at the share of the three kinds of forms in the macro strategy of proximization. As a result, we receive a picture of the evolution of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric as an example of a temporally extensive interventionist discourse continually adjusting its pragmalinguistic input to sustain legitimization challenged by changes in the geopolitical context. The STA’s ability to account for these adjustments in terms of lexically documented functional compensatory patterns involving the S, T and A variables is considered the central argument for a possible extension of the empirical scope of the model.

To reflect its diachronic descriptive focus, the chapter is organized in four parts (Sections 6.2–5), covering, respectively, the four periods P1–P4. Each part
follows the same discussion line. We start with a thorough description of the geopolitical context of the period, motivating the use of a given proximization strategy or a combination of strategies. Then, we investigate the response to the context as evidenced by the lexico-grammatical counts derived from the frameworks constructed in Chapter 5. The counts are given, like in Chapter 5, at three levels (item, category, framework). In contrast to Chapter 5, the counts are now provided across the frameworks, to determine the proportion of the spatial, temporal and axiological items and discuss its contextual reasons as well as rhetorical consequences. To elucidate the salience of the particular items, the counts are shown in relation to the main corpus count. Finally, we present some of the most frequent items, or the items otherwise important to the operation of the period’s dominant strategy or strategies, in discourse examples. In this last move, we resume the micro-textual perspective of Chapter 4, so the “dry-data” results of the quantitative analysis clearly reflect in “real-life” discourse forms.


6.2.1 Context

I take as the beginning of P1 G. W. Bush’s prime-time television address on the evening of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the speech, Bush recognizes the attacks as “terrorist acts” and announces a worldwide campaign (“War-on-Terror”) to bring the perpetrators of the attacks to justice and to secure America and the rest of the “civilized world” against any future terrorist threats. P1 goes on for about 25 months, in which time the Bush administration follow, both home and abroad, hardline anti-terrorist policies (written in 2002 into the “National Security Strategy of the United States”, sanctioning pre-emptive war as a means to fight terrorism). P1 includes two major anti-terrorist military operations. One is “Operation Enduring Freedom”, launched in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, with the stated goals (G. W. Bush, October 6, 2001) “of dismantling the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, capturing its leader Osama bin Laden, breaking the support for bin Laden from the Taliban government of Afghanistan, and ending Al-Qaeda’s use of Afghanistan as a base” (where, as is believed, the 9/11 attacks were masterminded). The other is “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, which starts on March 19, 2003, “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people” (G. W. Bush, March 20, 2003). While the war in Iraq finds its symbolic end in mid-2004 as the US pass on most executive powers to the Iraqi new interim government, the hard battle against a widespread Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (and, since 2011,
in the neighboring Pakistan) continues until today, making the Afghan opera-
tion the United States’ longest running war. From the today’s perspective P1 can
be said to finish relatively quickly, in the fall of 2003. I take as its end the end of
October 2003, the last month when the Bush administration use the (alleged)
possession of weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime as a premise for
going to war in Iraq.

The pursuit in P1 of the hardline anti-terrorist policies, involving fast reaction
measures (as in Afghanistan, which many have called an essentially retaliatory
case (Harvey 2005; Sherman and Nardin 2006)) as well as planned pre-emptive
responses (in Iraq), takes place in the social context which shows, somewhat
surprisingly, much reluctance to engage in direct combat operations, even those
where the main target are perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. This can be seen in the
quote I am using as the motto of the present chapter. The words of the eyewitness
do not give license to wage a war against terrorists at the cost of the innocent;
thus, realistically, they do not sanction a war at all. At the same time, though, they
express an unequivocal support for the government to do “whatever is necessary”
to eradicate terrorism. This apparent contradiction is quite characteristic of the
social attitudes in America in P1 (cf. Silberstein 2004). To explain it, and then to
explain how it influences the P1 rhetoric, we need to look at the complexity of
reasons why there is, from the very beginning, such a reluctance to legitimize the
military anti-terrorist operations.

First, as evident from the quote, there is reluctance on moral grounds. Many
Americans, especially in academic/intellectual circles, do not approve of direct
military actions, claiming they constitute little more than a plain revenge (Harvey
2005). In November 2001, ACTA, a governmental watchdog group to monitor
higher education publishes a report listing hundreds of examples of intellectu-
als’ appeals to “resist calls for revenge or retaliation” (Silberstein 2004). Many of
these appeals seem to find understanding with a broad public, who expect other
measures than (only) military action. The Gallup polls conducted in the first few
months following the 9/11 attacks demonstrate that only about 50% of Americans
support the war operation in Afghanistan if the pursuit of political and intelligence
operations aimed at “extraditing the terrorists to stand trial” is given as alternative
(Jhally and Earp 2004). There is even a question over the appropriateness of the
term “war on terror” itself. The ACTA report cites objections, on the grounds that
the term dignifies terrorist acts and simultaneously degrades the US by implying a
war with terrorists involves the same means on both sides (Silberstein 2004). Later
on, as the US prepare to launch the Iraqi campaign, these moral concerns only

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1. American Council of Trustees and Alumni.
grow as there is no longer a direct enemy of the bin Laden kind, the memories of 9/11 get more distant, the evidence of Iraq possessing weapons that could impact the United States is wobbly, and the links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda are unclear.

The legitimization of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in P1 faces other challenges, too. Lazar and Lazar (2004) note that some of the American public, including some of the media (and a considerable part of the international community), are concerned that the US may be using the occasion to construct the vision of all Islamic countries (or even Islam as such) as a “new” or “alternative” enemy – social, political, ideological – in the world after the downfall of Soviet communist empire. American socio-political culture, goes the argument, has always required an enemy to supply the inverse image of the American values – “enunciating the enemy” has proven essential to the creation and maintenance of social order of the US (: 227). How this concern is expressed by the media and contained by the US government can be seen on the example of the White House briefing on September 26, 2001. Underlying the reporter’s questions, it clearly determines Bush’s replies, which are strategically direct and succinct:

(1) REPORTER: “Do you consider bin Laden a religious leader or a political leader?”
   PRESIDENT G. W. BUSH: “I consider bin Laden an evil man”
   REPORTER: “But does he have political goals?”
   PRESIDENT G. W. BUSH: “He has got evil goals”

In this exchange, Bush gives Osama bin Laden a plain label, “evil”, to avoid going any deeper in the potentially uncomfortable complexities of the political, historical, cultural and religious interpretations of the 9/11 attacks and, crucially, the US response. The aim is to dismiss, as swiftly as possible, an idea that the war in Afghanistan might be a war on another culture, ideology or political system (Chang and Mehan 2006).

There is also a concern that going to war will mean increased security measures at home, infringing on civil liberties. While in the fall of 2001 this concern is mostly anticipatory, on the eve of the Iraq war in 2003 Americans have already experienced the consequences of the Patriot Act (passed Oct. 25, 2001 as a means to “Unite and Strengthen America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”)2) and many believe they “threaten the fundamental constitutional rights of people who have absolutely nothing to do with terrorism” (Silberstein 2004: 169). Some of the media go even further: they accuse

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Bush of “hijacking the Constitution”, fuelling more than (as of February 2003) 160 resolutions across the country which demand rolling back the Patriot Act and stopping preparations for the intervention in Iraq (Sherman and Nardin 2006).

Finally, P1 sees much reluctance that involves the costs of the anti-terrorist direct combat operations. The debate is not only over the immediately obvious (and the most appealing) human costs (we now know that, only in P1, more than 4,000 US soldiers lost their lives in Afghanistan and Iraq) but also economic costs. As of September 2001 and March 2003, the costs of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are estimated at, respectively, $4.4 billion and $6.7 billion a month (!) (Silberstein 2004). This poses a question whether the US can afford the “War-on-Terror” in the first place. In April 2003, the Bush administration respond to the economic concerns by encouraging increased personal spendings:

(2) Our economy is growing (…) but it’s not growing fast enough. Therefore, I sent the Congress a package that will encourage, in this time of the war on terror, economic vitality and job growth, a package that starts with this concept: that we need more demand for goods and services so our people can find work, they can spend money (…) and our international commitments can be sustained. (G. W. Bush, April 24, 2003)

Around that time, the TIME magazine will be referring to such appeals as calls to perform “the patriotic duty of splurging”. How do the US government, in P1, overcome the multiple attitudes of reluctance to wage the “War-on-Terror”? How do they get the mandate to do the “whatever is necessary” to fight terrorism, minimizing the moral, political, socio-ideological, economic, etc., objections?

6.2.2 Response to context: “Direct threats” and “coming dangers”

Given the P1 context, the Bush administration are into a lot of discursive work to win support for the anti-terrorist policies and actions. The first results of this work are present, already, in the discourse paving the way for the Afghan operation, a pattern of rhetoric that emerges only hours after the 9/11 attacks:

(3) Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts, right here, on the American soil. (…) Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings,

but they cannot touch the foundation of America. (...) Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s response plans. I have directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. America has stood down enemies before, and will do so this time and in the future.

(G. W. Bush, September 11, 2001; emphasis mine)

In this address, Bush declares the full commitment of his government to trace and find the perpetrators of the attacks, construing the mission as an enactment of the government’s duty to keep protecting the US citizens and their civil liberties, the “foundation of America”. This declaration, as such, does not go however much beyond what is expected at the moment: Americans expect a firm expression of the government’s leadership, they need reassurance and they receive it. None of these make, by themselves, Bush’s 9/11 speech special in the way of defining a discourse strategy able to handle the communication of anti-terrorist policies in the long run. But there is, at the same time, a consistent argument emerging that will make a cornerstone long-term contribution. At the very beginning of the address, Bush indicates that the attacks took place “on the American soil”. The message is clear: unlike in the past, when America was going to foreign wars (like in Korea, Vietnam or, recently, Kosovo), the present war has come home. At the end of the speech, Bush implies that the threat, of having to face enemies within the country’s borders, may continue into the future. These two messages go a long way toward shaping the US anti-terrorist rhetoric not only in P1, but in fact throughout the whole 2001–2010 decade.

While the discourse of the Afghan operation in 2001 shows only the first building bricks of the anti-terrorist rhetoric, the later discourse of the Iraq war shows a fully-fledged pattern, which lends itself to a whole spectrum of generalizations. The crucial premises identified in Bush’s 9/11 address are kept, but in 2002–2003 the US administration develop a new asset, the (alleged) possession of weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime and the (alleged) connections of the regime to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. Emerging from all these factors is

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5. This premise is constructed, 2002–2003, from largely unorganized, often inconsistent and, most of the time, indirect evidence, such as for instance the British intelligence December 2002 information that “Iraq is seeking significant quantities of uranium from Niger” (G. W. Bush, January 20, 2003). The Bush administration use the “evidence” to construct discourse that immediately concludes from it. The conclusions are presented in a plain, direct and threatening manner, thus preventing the audience from focusing for too long on the nature of the evidence as such. For instance, the assertion above is followed by the formula: “This clearly shows that Iraq is a threat of extreme urgency, it is a nuclear threat” (compare the discussion of the pragmatics of evidential markers in Chapter 3).
the following scenario: Iraq possesses WMD, Iraq has terrorist connections, Iraq provides terrorists with WMD access, terrorists use the WMD to attack the US. The consequences are conceivably far more catastrophic than the consequences of the 9/11 attacks. The likelihood of the terrorist strike is high already, and it gets higher every day as the “War-on-Terror” goes on. The likelihood that the Iraqi regime supply terrorists with WMD access is high as well, given Saddam's history of the sponsorship of international terrorism (“he has funded suicide bombers into Israel”, repeats Bush a few times in P1).

This conceptual scenario is deftly coded in a complex linguistic pattern subsuming a specific context-determined proximization strategy. As the contextual premises of P1 involve a physical threat (WMD) which could materialize within the US borders practically anytime (terrorists want to strike before the US dismantle their networks in the Middle East), the Bush administration construct a discourse that forces the construal of the imminence of the external impact which can only be stopped if the US attack (in Iraq) first. This vision is reflected in the lexico-grammatical choices, as well as longer stretches of text. We first look, in what follows, at the main lexico-grammatical choices, aka “key items”, the data we have identified in the previous chapter to endorse the three proximization frameworks. Unlike there, we now (Table 1) only concentrate on the P1 sub-corpus data, showing the input of the three kinds of items, spatial, temporal and axiological, in the overall proximization pattern. The main corpus counts are provided for reference, to better elucidate the salience of the particular kinds of items.

The comparison of the spatial, temporal and axiological counts in Table 1 confirms that P1's rhetoric is dominated by the spatial and temporal proximization strategies, which are followed to force construals of imminent physical threat that needs a prompt response. Given that most of the P1 data cover the months when the Afghan operation is well under way and the Bush administration prepare themselves for the Iraqi operation, we can define the threat as one that comes primarily from Iraq, that is from Saddam's alleged possession of WMD and his alleged connections to terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda. On the same grounds, we can define the response as a pre-emptive response. In sum, in most of the P1 discourse spatial and temporal proximization serve to solicit, first, an immediate legitimization of the pre-emptive strike on Iraq, and second, legitimization of the unfaltering military engagement in Iraq as the war goes on.

The salience of spatial and temporal proximization in P1 is best evidenced by the P1 total counts, especially in relation to the corresponding main corpus totals, which give a general 2001–2010 view. The P1 total from the spatial framework, 21.16, is staggering. It is about 1.5 times bigger than the spatial framework main corpus total, which the latter, at 14.01, already beats the main corpus totals of the other frameworks. The data are even more telling when we drop the percentages.
Table 1. Counts of the key spatial, temporal and axiological proximization items in P1 and in main corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[“USA”, “United States”, “America”]</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“American people”, “Americans”, “our people/nation/country/society”]</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“free people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”]</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorists”]</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Iraqi regime/dictatorship”]</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorist organizations/networks”, “Al-Qaeda”]</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“extremists/radicals”]</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“foreign regimes/dictatorships”]</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD”]</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[“destroy an IDC”]</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values”]</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“threat”]</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“danger”]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[“tragedy”]</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“catastrophe”]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
<td>21.16</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. (continued)

Counts from the temporal framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[&quot;a September morning&quot;]</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work&quot;]</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.63</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.20</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[&quot;Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;In the past/for centuries/long ago America's/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations&quot;]</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed / before it/they materializes/materialize/before it/they appears/appear/before it is too late&quot;]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance&quot;]</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.67</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[&quot;Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/ at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs&quot;]</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time&quot;]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.51</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[&quot;Some IDCs think/believe America/we can wait. The US government think/believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat&quot;]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat&quot;]</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.43</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Chapter 5 we have observed that the 14.01 total means that in every 1000 words of the main corpus one can find 140 instances of the spatial proximization items. Given (only) that, we have called “supreme” the role spatial proximization plays in the US anti-terrorist discourse 2001–2010 in general. Now, let us add that in P1, a period where the contextual factors require that the picture of the external physical threat is maximally clear and fearful, the representation is at the level of

Table 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counts from the axiological framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. [“freedom/liberty”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“democracy”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“equality”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“peace”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“justice”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“progress”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“prosperity”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“economic freedom/liberty”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. [“dictatorship”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“radicalism”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“extremism”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“terrorism”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“political regime”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“military regime”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. [“(1) NP denoting ODC value(s) followed by or combined with (2) VP denoting a remote possibility of the ODC-IDC conflict followed by (3) VP denoting a close probability of the ODC-IDC conflict followed by or combined with (4) NP denoting physical consequences of the ODC-IDC conflict”]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
211 (!) instances, per every 1000 words\(^6\) again. Evidently, the Bush administration launch the “War-on-Terror” aware of the effectiveness of fear appeals involving direct, “tangible” dangers.

The P1 total count from the temporal framework is comparatively smaller – we have been over the reasons why there must be fewer quantifiable temporal items in general – but it is a whole way bigger than the main corpus total count. The ratio, 5.16 to 3.43, is in fact close to the corresponding ratio in the spatial framework, and far bigger than the 8.16/9.07 ratio in the axiological framework. This means that, in P1, the use of the spatial and temporal items is equally consequential in conceptual terms, though of course the very quantitative prevalence of the spatial items renders the role of the temporal ones in some sense auxiliary to the overall proximization strategy of the period. We will see this relation later in the examples involving the most numerous (or otherwise important) of the Table 1 items.

Which items or item categories determine the spatial, or spatio-temporal, superiority? The very general answer would be “all”, as, when we look at the spatial and temporal frameworks, the P1 counts are almost always bigger than the main corpus counts. There are however more particular points to make. In the spatial framework, the main contribution comes from items in category 2, the ODC items. The category 2 total (9.71) is almost twice as high as the main corpus total (5.11). This confirms the central role of the ODC agents in forcing construals of threat in spatial/physical terms. The P1 discourse of the Bush administration recognizes that role, assigning most of the job to specific ODC agents, such as “Iraq”, “Saddam”, “terrorists” or “Al-Qaeda”. The items involving these lemmas reveal the highest P1 counts (as well as the main corpus counts) in the category. The threat is thus concretized, which adds to its appeal.

As construing fear appeals needs markers of the symbolic movement of the ODC entities in the direction of the home entities, the IDCs, there is also a significant contribution from all items in category 3, and from those items in the remaining categories 4–6 which best construe the particular “stages” of the ODC-IDC physical clash (involving visions and summaries of the ODC intentions (cf. “destroy an IDC”, “threat”), as well as visions of the ODC actual impact (cf. “catastrophe”). The highest P1 counts in the third category are of the items which make explicit the existence and mobilization of the ODC resources to deliver impact. The resources referred to are of course WMD, whose existence/development is stated directly in the first two items and subsumed by the third. The presence of

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\(^6\) Of the P1 sub-corpus.
the WMD element also explains the high P1 count of “destroy” in the fourth category, a lemma connoting acts of physical destruction.

In sum, the items in the spatial framework contributing the most to the P1 proximization pattern are those denoting and concretizing the external threatening entities and the source of the threat as such, and those marking the ominous narrowing of the distance between these entities and the home entities. Arising from all these elements is the scenario of the external physical impact, of the kind we have discussed several lines above. But how do the Bush administration make sure such a scenario is credible enough to be accepted by the addressee? That job, ensuring credibility with the public (a reluctant public, as we have seen from the context section) is assigned to the discourse involving, on top of spatial proximization, also temporal proximization.

For best credibility and thus legitimization effects, the temporal proximization in P1 relies mostly on discourse items and forms which denote or otherwise refer to the actual terrorist acts in the past. These forms are captured in categories 1–2 of the temporal framework and, as can be seen at a glance, their P1 counts are among the highest in the entire framework (except the last item in the first category, which refers to the Madrid and London attacks, happening after P1). The central reference frame and event are of course the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks. As we have observed in the previous chapter, there is a whole spectrum of ways in which they are used to force the “9/11 analogy”, an inference pattern whereby the past acts endorse the current threat. What is common to all these ways is that the inference detracts from, rather than adds to, the knowledge when to expect further terrorist acts. As a result, the threat is kept at a continual high and the threshold for a pre-emptive action is lowered.

Speaking of “threat” as a lemma, it is worth underlining that it occurs in both the spatial framework (category 5) and the temporal framework, in which latter it is part of the items in the third category. In both cases, the P1 counts involving “threat” are high, far higher than the corresponding main corpus counts. Add to that the aura of threat as a concept emerging from the symbolic construal operations and we have determined the essence of Bush’s stance of response to the demands of the P1 context. The context requires an ultra-strong message of the “coming danger” and that requirement is fully met in discourse. It also requires a strong message of the government’s competence to handle the threat and the discourse responds as well. The forms in categories 4–5 of the temporal framework and their P1 counts are the best proof.

The case of “threat” invites the issue of the strategic collaboration of spatial and temporal language forms, in enacting the complex spatio-temporal proximization pattern characteristic of P1. We have seen from the counts that the “division of labor” is fairly well established, as is the relation of mutual complementation,
but do we get any evidence of these in actual text samples revealing a consistent cooperation of the items/forms performing the two strategies? Consider these examples:

(4) The WMD$_{S3T3}$ dangers$_{S3T3}$ will be removed, before$_{T3}$ we$_{s1}$ see them$_{s3}$ one day, on another Manhattan morning$_{T1}$.

(G. W. Bush, February 16, 2003)

(5) Our country is a battlefield in the first war of the 21st century. (...) Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to our people and to all free people (...) Today, terrorists can strike at any moment.

(G. W. Bush, February 26, 2003)

(6) The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country.

(G. W. Bush, March 17, 2003)

(7) Saddam Hussein has a long history of terrible crimes. Today, (...) Iraq provides funding to terrorists who could use weapons of mass destruction against America and other democratic countries.

(G. W. Bush, January 22, 2003)

(8) We have learned a lesson from that sunny day: foreign regimes breed horror and tragedy all around the free world.

(G. W. Bush, March 9, 2003)

(9) Free nations do not sit and wait, leaving enemies to plot to burn down the civilization of peace (...) These radicals and extremists will be stopped.

(G. W. Bush, June 6, 2003)

(10) Evidence we have shows that Hussein is seeking weapons of mass destruction and he is determined to acquire them.

(G. W. Bush, December 3, 2002)

(11) That Tuesday morning should say to the American people that we are now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction could be deployed here at home (...), that now the consequence will be a catastrophe.

(G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003)

(12) It used to be that we could think (...) that oceans would protect us. September the 11th has changed the strategic thinking (...) for how to protect our country.

(G. W. Bush, March 6, 2003)

(13) Some think we can wait. I don't. Our intelligence concluded that Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a range of hundreds of miles, far enough to strike more than 100,000 Americans in the region.

(G. W. Bush, October 1, 2002)

To best illustrate the combined operation of the strategies, the examples use boldface to mark the component lemmas, phrases as well as the full “square-bracket” items performing spatial proximization, and italics to mark those performing temporal proximization. Altogether, all of the words marked come from the
relevant categories of the spatial and temporal frameworks. Some of them are the lemmas explicitly appearing in the categories (e.g. “dangers”, “WMD”, “terrorists” or “Iraq”) and some others (e.g. most of the words in (13)) are lexical “fillers of the conceptual paradigm” as defined in Chapter 5. Example (4) has been provided with formal annotations to elucidate the convention. Starting from the left, “WMD” appears in the third category of the spatial framework and the third category of the temporal framework, hence the “S3T3” index. “Dangers” is a key item in the fifth category of the spatial framework, as well as a component lemma of an item in the third category of the temporal framework. “Will be removed, before” belongs, again, to the third category of the temporal framework. “We” and “them” (meaning the “dangers”) are pronominal substitutes of lemmas appearing respectively in categories 1 and 5 of the spatial framework. Finally, “another Manhattan morning” is a component phrase of an item in the first category of the temporal framework. There are thus, as should be clear from the design of the two frameworks, lemmas and phrases which appear in both. These words are put, accordingly, in italicized boldface, like “dangers” and “WMD” in example (4). In the interest of readability, the remaining examples, (5)–(13), do not bear the annotations specifying the categories to which the particular lemmas, phrases and key items belong.

In general, all of the examples, especially the parts marked, give a proof of consistent realization of the external physical impact scenario (the task of spatial proximization), and of organized efforts, legitimization-wise, to win credibility of the scenario with the US home audience (the task of both spatial and temporal proximization). Iraq’s possession/development of WMD is stated in (5), (6), (10) and inferable from (the discourse context of) (4), (7), (11) and (13). Iraq’s terrorist connections, resulting in easy access to WMD by terrorist groups, are described in (7) and indicated in (5) and (6). The probability of WMD attacks against the US, the direct premise for legitimization of a pre-emptive response takes, understandably, most of the space: it is stated in (4), (5), (6), (7), (11) and (13) and implied, in one way or another, in virtually all the other examples. Many of the examples, e.g. (6), (8), (9), (11), give a sense of the catastrophic range and consequences of the attacks.

The construction of the terrorist impact scenario is, as has been mentioned, the domain of spatial proximization items. Most of these items (“WMD”, “terrorists”, “regimes”, “burn down”, “catastrophe”) are appealing in their own right, but the functional relations in which they engage are sometimes not immediately obvious and appealing in cause-and-effect terms. Thus, the discourse involving such relations may not be immediately plausible and effective. In fact, it is precisely the high appeal load of the spatial items and the highly consequential nature of the reality changes they construe that lead to addressee’s caution in judging whether
the relations (such as the probability of WMD attacks inferred from Saddam’s willingness to sponsor terrorists) are legitimate. To overcome this caution the P1 discourse needs a device that can strengthen the inference relations and, as a result, endorse the impact scenario. The examples above show that the device, temporal proximization, has been implemented with every effort to make it work effectively. First, in many cases ((4), (5), (8), (11), (12)) the 9/11 analogy is evoked to equate the September 2001 reality with the current War-on-Terror reality and thus sanction the continuity of the terrorist threat. Often ((4), (11)), the analogy occurs side-by-side with indications of the new bigger threat (WMD), to make the inferences as swift as possible. Second, there are historical flashbacks, as in (8), which validate the current threat on account of Saddam’s “history of terrible crimes” that makes him a natural ally of terrorist groups. Third, there are temporal proximization forms that force the centrality of the moment by formal grammatical means, such as the contrastive use of tenses in (12) or the use of the modal auxiliaries in (6) and (7). All these ways in which the present is centralized to solicit the approval of a pre-emptive response are also ways to underscore the speaker’s leadership competence. In evoking past events, linking them with the current context, and anticipating the future based on the past and present premises, Bush demonstrates rationality and vision required of him as president. This is a very important feature of Bush’s P1 discourse. Yet it should not overshadow its principal function, legitimization of the anti-terrorist policies and military operations, against the tough conditions of the P1 political and social context. The lexico-grammatical data captured in the frameworks and the textual manifestation of that data in examples (4)–(13) show that the discourse of P1 seeks the legitimization in a combined use of spatial and temporal proximization. The combination involves, primarily, a hard-hitting, physical visualization of a likely re-occurrence (in the near future) of terrorist attacks, whose reasons remain unchanged but whose consequences are bound to be more catastrophic given the WMD element.

6.3 Period Two (P2): November 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004

6.3.1 Context

In P2 there is no longer a context for such hard-hitting construals. October 2003 is the last month when the Bush administration refer to WMD as a premise, or at least the main premise, for going to war in Iraq. Bush’s speeches are no longer

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7. Cf. Section 5.2.2.
built around the “direct threats” and “coming dangers”. The political and war intelligence developments, and the resulting attitudes in the American public cease to license this kind of discourse.

We have seen that, already in P1, there is much public reluctance to approve policies involving direct combat operations, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. In P2, this reluctance only grows. Some of the reasons, like war costs, lack of authorization of the Iraqi operation by the UN or increasing dissent over the effects of the Patriot Act, continue from P1, but on top of these, there are newly emerging reasons.

First and foremost, the wobbly evidence of Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction eventually collapses. Since at the same time Saddam’s connections to Al-Qaeda continue to be unclear, the perception of the Iraq war as the “central front of the war on terror” (G.W. Bush, April 19, 2003) is called into question. This in turn calls into question the entire anti-terrorist campaign, which, given the intelligence failure in Iraq, seems a hit-or-miss venture. The WMD intelligence blunder is indisputable and broadly consequential, to not only legitimization of the Iraq war and the War-on-Terror as a whole, but also legitimacy of Bush’s leadership in broad terms.

The intelligence failure is documented by a number of post-invasion inspections and reports. In fall 2003, Joseph Wilson, a respected American diplomat is commissioned by the Congress to investigate the contention that Iraq sought uranium for nuclear weapons in Niger. Wilson’s report concludes the contention “had no substance” (Ricks 2006; Wright 2007). The same conclusion comes from Scott Ritter, a former weapons inspector for the UN, who claims that WMD programs were abandoned already in 2000, following the UN 1997–2000 sanctions on collecting radioactive material (Ricks 2006). In October 2003, US-led international team of inspectors agree that Iraq had indeed abandoned the programs though intended to resume if the sanctions were lifted (Wright 2007). The growing number of such opinions and reports make the US Senate commission Senator Carl Levin to prepare a comprehensive report on the Iraq war rationale. The report gets published on October 21, 2004, but many of its findings are revealed much earlier, producing massive criticism of the Iraq war. Levin not only confirms there were no WMD in Iraq, but goes on to discredit the alleged links between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, thus discrediting the entire original rationale for the invasion. His findings are a major blow to the Bush administration, who are accused of not only poor judgment, but also various acts of manipulation and deception. Levin suggests that much “evidence” of the links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist groups was actually fabricated by the former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith (Ricks 2006).
The P2 growing dissent over the Iraq war is fuelled by several other factors. Though not directly related to military intelligence matters, many of them play a role in the dwindling support for the Bush administration. A significant part of the public are concerned about the prolonged lack of UN authorization of the war, affecting the US international relations, such as the important relations with France and Germany (Zucchino 2004). Many find plausible voices such as Brent Scowcroft’s (a Republican, Chairman of President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the time!)8 claiming the US military engagement in Iraq destabilizes the region, increasing the probability of further terrorist attacks against America (Ricks 2006). In February 2004 John Kerry, the Democratic candidate in the upcoming presidential election speaks of “G.W. Bush’s regime” and changes the name of the Iraqi operation (“Operation Iraqi Freedom”) to “Operation Iraqi Liberation” – “OIL” – to point to the “real” cause of the war. These attitudes are echoed in the US media, even those formerly supporting the war. On August 15, 2003 the editors of The New York Times apologize for their coverage of Saddam's alleged weapons programs, acknowledging that “we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining President Bush’s claims as new evidence emerged – or failed to emerge”. Even more consequentially to the further legitimization of the Iraq war and the War-on-Terror as a whole, they are echoed in the polls. The series of 9 monthly polls conducted as a part of the Program on International Policy at the University of Maryland shows that in September 2003 65% Americans believe Iraq never had WMD (22% in March 2003) and 57% are confident it never had links to Al-Qaeda and was not involved in the 9/11 attacks (38% in March 2003). The October 6–8, 2003 Gallup Poll question “In view of what is known now about the WMD presence in Iraq, was the war a mistake?” is answered “Yes” by 68% Americans, compared to 30% positive replies to a similar question back in April 2003.9 Finally, the September 19–21, 2003 Gallup question “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as President?” is answered “disapprove” by 47% Americans, compared to (only) 32% negative replies to the same question in March 2003.10 The September result sums up in a way all the growing problems the Bush government will have to face with the defense of the Iraqi operation, the sustainment of legitimization of the War-on-Terror (in Iraq and beyond), and last but not least, the defense of their own credible image as

8. Later assisting Obama in choosing his national security team.
the administration able to rule the country throughout turbulent foreign developments, accompanied by accumulating economic troubles at home.

6.3.2 Response to context: Preventing growth of “evil values for export”

The P2 discourse of the Bush administration shows that the US government are aware of the gravity of the contextual developments and make efforts to adjust their anti-terrorist rhetoric, especially the Iraq war rhetoric, to meet the new challenges. The particular emphasis is put, as can be expected, on redefining the rationale for the March 2003 intervention, though without admitting fault with the intervention as such. This seems a logical move since the US public criticize the legality of the war based on the current premises, rather than object to having to go to war if there is indeed a legitimate premise. Such attitudes can be seen from, for instance, the October 2003 Gallup poll (cf. above). In response to these attitudes, the Bush government construct a rhetoric that downplays (though not eliminates) the role of the WMD element and, most of all, gives the Iraq war a new, broadly ideological, dimension. These two moves are obviously related, as dropping the WMD premise means a departure from the “direct threat” rhetoric in general. That in turn means a need for a “compensatory” rhetoric construing the external threat in different terms, which, under the context, can only be ideological terms. In P2, there is still much space for building the ideological rationale, since its potential was only partly exploited in P1.

The emerging emphasis on the ideological premises for the Iraq war (and thus for the War-on-Terror as a whole) is very well visible in the P2 discourse, in both lexical choices and longer textual configurations subsuming these choices. The change in construal of the external threat relies on mainly axiological proximization, which, as the data in Table 2 demonstrate, takes over from the spatial and temporal proximization.

The P2 salience of axiological proximization is immediately visible from its P2 framework count (12.15), which is not only about 1.5 times higher than the corresponding P1 count (8.16; cf. Table 1), but also substantially higher than the main corpus count (9.07). At the same time, among the three framework counts in P2, it is the only one that rises from P1. Both the spatial and the temporal framework counts, 13.07 and 1.63 respectively, suffer major drops between the two periods, falling consequently below their main corpus counts (14.01 and 3.43). This general decline in spatio-temporal language forms, accompanied by the concurrent increase in the axiological forms is, given the context to which the latter forms respond, the most obvious reason to claim that P2 is a period where the construction of axiological rhetoric is a strategic move to redefine the original P1 rhetoric.
Table 2. Counts of the key spatial, temporal and axiological proximization items in P2 and in main corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Main corpus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[&quot;USA&quot;, “United States”, “America&quot;]</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;American people&quot;, “Americans”, “our people/nation/country/society”]</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“free people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.25</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”]</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorists”]</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Iraqi regime/dictatorship”]</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorist organizations/networks”, “Al-Qaeda”]</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;extremists/radicals&quot;]</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“foreign regimes/dictatorships”]</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD”]</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.94</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[“destroy an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values”]</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.85</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.23</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“threat”]</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“danger”]</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.77</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[“tragedy”]</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“catastrophe”]</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.71</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.01</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[“a September morning”]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work”]</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“In the past/for centuries/long ago America’s/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations”]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed/before it/they materializes/materialize/before it/they appears/appear/before it is too late”]</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance”]</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[“Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/ at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs”]</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time”]</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“Some IDCs think/believe America/we can wait. The US government think/ believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While virtually all the axiological counts in P2 are higher than the P1 counts, as well as the main corpus counts, the greatest increases can be observed in category 1, containing items that define the home values, such as “freedom”, “liberty” or “justice”. Underrepresented in P1, they now make a core contribution to the new stance of the Bush government. First, they serve to extend the spectrum of the US anti-terrorist campaign, in both territorial and ideological terms:
By advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people. By struggling for justice in Iraq, Burma, in Sudan, and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. (G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003)

Embedding the Iraqi operation in a broad, worldwide campaign against “dictatorship” and “radicalism”, Bush not only gives the Iraq war a deeply ideological dimension, but also enacts a more pressing goal. He forces a construal of the war as an instance of multiple operations and engagements, which – as can be inferred further – entail incidental wrong judgments and actions. That in turn paves the way for construing the WMD intelligence failure in Iraq as an isolated mishap, not detracting from the overall rightness of the cause.

Second, the items denoting the home values serve to establish an ideological frame of reference to judge, and eventually reject, the external negative values. The P2 discourse forces the attitude of rejection of the external values as a prerequisite to build more complex forms which construe these values as growing and, at one point, endangering the home entities in largely physical terms:

If the Middle East remains a place where freedom and democracy do not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. (G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003)

We comment on the P2 function and frequency of such remarkable formulas in a moment. Before then, let us observe that the highest counts of the first category items are those of “freedom/liberty” (2.35) and “democracy” (1.92), which both reveal the biggest P1–P2 rise, as well as the greatest quantitative advantage over the corresponding P1 through P4 main corpus counts. The inclusion of these axiological items in the P2 discourse involves the inclusion of entities that are characterized by them, hence the relatively high count of the first category items in the spatial framework, despite the declining role of spatial proximization as a whole. Overall, the P2 functions of the “home” (IDC) axiological items make their category count (6.01) higher than the count of the “external” (ODC) items (4.34), even though it is ODCs, as physical entities, that actually deliver the impact. This confirms the intricate nature of the “impact” in the P2 discourse. It may be

11. Though the P2 count of category 2 items is, as such, higher than their main corpus count, 3.26. Returning to the prevalence of category 1 items, note further that their impressive 6.01 count is reached without much input from the last three items, “progress”, “prosperity” and “economic freedom/liberty”. Evoking predominantly economic connotations, they are apparently unable to make a significant contribution to the P2 redefinition of Bush’s rhetoric in broad terms (see also Section 5.4.3).
exerted, as in P1, by concrete parties performing acts construed in spatial terms, but its reasons lie not in the possession of specific resources (like WMD in P1), but rather in the presence of evil values which colonize the geopolitical space, motivating the acts. We thus move to the discourse forms captured in the third category of the axiological framework:

(16)  *If the Middle East remains a place where freedom and democracy do not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of the towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life.*  

(G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003, emphasis mine)

(17)  *This evil [radicalism and extremism] might not have reached us yet but it is in plain sight, as plain as the horror sight of the collapsing towers.*  

(G. W. Bush, November 19, 2003, emphasis mine)

We have been over these examples earlier, concluding they represent formulas that, in short, turn the ODC “ideological threat” (the italicized part) into the “physical threat” (the boldface part). Dropping now the technicalities of this transition, let us observe that P2 assigns such structures a very specific role to play, which is at no other time quite as crucial. Highlighting the growth of the “evil ideologies”, Bush makes them the prime “adversary” in his campaign to advance positive values as the best safeguards of the terrorism-free world. This move is a logical response to the constraints of the P2 context, which no longer legitimize handling the terrorist threat by force alone. But at the same time Bush does not completely disqualify his original rationale, since the physical threat is still in the picture, except it is no longer viewed as “direct” and requiring an immediate military reaction. Altogether, the formulas in question combine the old and the new premises for the War-on-Terror in such a way that both seem legitimate in principle, and whichever premise is found plausible at a given time depends on the individual judgment made in specific contextual conditions. As the conditions will always foreground one premise and background another depending on the current level of terrorist activity, Bush’s P2 discourse does not close doors for the return to the original P1 argument, should the need arise.

Given the rhetorical power of the above structures, no wonder that their presence in P2 is widespread, to use a modest term. In fact, their 1.80 count, having risen nine times from P1, is now about three times higher than their main corpus count. In raw numbers, we speak of representation at the level of 18 (!) occurrences per every 1000 words in P2. These impressive figures would not however be reached but for the fact that the third category forms involve a number of

12. Cf. Section 4.4.1.
ideologically oriented items which widely appear in P2 in their own right, such as “freedom”, “democracy”, “radicalism”, “extremism”, “political regime” or “military regime”. Actually, the counts of the last two (0.57 and 0.56) demonstrate, comparatively, the greatest quantitative advantage over the respective main corpus counts (0.35 and 0.31). The reason is that “political regime” or “military regime” both make an excellent job denoting the “cradle” of the “ideologies of hate and murder”, in Bush’s words:

(18) In the history of the world political and military regimes have always been the cradle of the ideologies of hate and murder. (G. W. Bush, January 27, 2004)

The observations thus far document the salience of axiological proximization in P2. To prove that this salience compensates for the declining role of the spatial and temporal proximization, we need to look at what happens to the spatio-temporal counts, and which ones in particular, as the axiological counts rise. Of course, except the items in the first category of the spatial framework (involved in axiological construals), almost all of the remaining counts, in both frameworks, go down. The largest falls in the spatial framework are the falls in the second category, whose P2 total count (3.74) is now about three times lower than the former P1 count (9.71), and about 1.5 times lower than the main corpus count (5.11). Within the temporal framework, the steepest declines can be seen in the counts of the first two items of category 1, the first two items of category 2 and both of the items in category 5. Why have these items or categories been affected the most? The second category falls in the spatial framework reflect the diminishing role of the WMD element – there is no longer a need to construe a network of specific agents posing the “direct threat”. Also, as Saddam Hussein gets captured by the US forces on December 14, 2003, references to Iraq as an enemy party, an ODC, cease to work in the way of legitimization of the engagement. The declines in the temporal framework follow up on the spatial falls, in the general sense that if there is no WMD premise, the 9/11 analogy, involving mostly temporal operations (performed by items/forms in categories 1, 2, 5), loses its appeal. The drops in the fifth category are in a way a summary case: they reflect the lack of evidence sanctioning the entire scenario of the envisaged terrorist impact.

There are a few exceptions (other than concerning the items in the first category of the spatial framework) that need a comment. The declines in the third category of the temporal framework are relatively smaller than in the remaining categories, because the third category items conceptualize the WMD threat as only emerging, which is in partial accordance with the requirements of the P2 context. In fact, a related kind of construal is forced by the following phrase, which often appears in P2:
(19) We have successfully stopped Saddam’s programs for weapons of mass destruction. (G. W. Bush, January 15, 2004, emphasis mine)

The phrase programs for weapons of mass destruction is an instance of implicature, which, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, forces a spectrum of interpretations by different addressees according to their individual pre-expectations, wants and needs. In this very case, following the insertion of the “programs for”, WMD are construed simultaneously as a “product” (a P1 interpretation) and a (remote) “idea” or “conception” (an interpretation better in line with the P2 context). As in any implicature, either interpretation can be cancelled subsequently, which confirms the earlier claim that Bush’s P2 discourse is much more open to the possibility of further redefinitions than his P1 rhetoric. It is as if, in the course of P2, the Bush government get aware that, in Hodges and Nilep’s (2007: 13) words, “what language creates, language can dislodge and build anew”.

In the spatial framework, a notable exception is found in the fourth category, where the count of the second item, denoting the external impact in metaphoric terms, actually rises in P2. This might be put down to the “abstract tone” of the expressions subsumed by the item, which paint a picture far less “tangible” than, for instance, the picture forced by the first item in the category. Note, also, the disparity in the counts of the two items in the fifth category. While the count of “threat”, an item directly involved in physical construals, decreases, the count of “danger”, imposing both physical and ideological construals, remains comparatively unchanged. Again, there are discourse proofs, for instance:

(20) The greatest dangers of our time are evil ambitions of tyrants and dictators around the world. (G. W. Bush, March 15, 2004)

The P2 discourse of the Bush administration is perhaps the finest example of response to contextual developments in the entire decade of the anti-terrorist rhetoric. The assumption of ideological argument, subsuming axiological proximization, goes a long way toward recovery of positive image, credibility and, consequently, further legitimization of anti-terrorist policies and actions. While the post-2004 context may not allow a full return to many once effective means such as fear appeals, it certainly allows, as we find out below, a return to language presupposing a strong leadership and plausibility of visions.

6.4.1 Context

Legitimization of anti-terrorist policies in P3 means, essentially, further legitimation of the “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Launched in Afghanistan immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the operation has subsequently grown to involve a vast spectrum of military and non-military actions in many regions and countries of the world. In P3 its main front remains Afghanistan (and the neighboring Pakistan), but there are several newly emerging sites, including mainly the Philippines, Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia, where the US follow the OEF original goals, to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist cells and to track and capture Osama bin Laden. Of course, the Iraqi engagement continues in P3 as well, irrespective of successful formation of Iraq’s sovereign (interim\textsuperscript{13}) government at the end of June 2004.

P3 brings a number of developments, both positive and negative or just tragic, which are a factor in legitimization of such wide-scope operations and engagements. First, as has been mentioned, the end of June 2004 sees the formation of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Following the first post-war democratic elections (January 30, 2005), Iyad Allawi’s government is replaced, on May 3, 2005, by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). As the ITG gets officially recognized by the United Nations, the Arab League and the majority of countries worldwide, a considerable part of the American public, including the media, start to back-legitimize the 2003 intervention, claiming the positive effects of the war have largely offset its wrong direct rationale (Sheehan 2008). One thing that is particularly emphasized is that the official recognition of the Iraqi Transitional Government by the Arab League should result in a decline in acts of violence perpetrated by Islamic radicals (Sheehan 2008). It takes little time for the Bush administration to reiterate these voices and add a conclusion: “The success of our mission in Iraq has marked the end of a curvy road which we covered not without errors and not without costs. But that historic moment [the launching of the ITG] has proven our cause was just and the course right” (G. W. Bush, May 20, 2005).

Just as the situation in Iraq is showing the first signs of stabilization (though fighting insurgency groups will continue into the next decade), terrorist acts hit two of the US closest War on Terror allies. On the morning of March 11, 2004, three days before Spanish general elections, a series of bomb explosions on Madrid trains kills 191 commuters. 16 months later, on July 7, 2005, coordinated

\textsuperscript{13} Termed that way until Iraq’s parliamentary elections take place in January 2005.
suicide bombings kill 52 passengers aboard London underground trains and a city bus. The London attacks happen the day after London gets selected to host the 2012 Summer Olympics. The Spanish and the British judiciaries determine the attacks in Madrid and London have been directed by Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cells. Many of the US media react by recalling Bush’s 2004 election campaign warnings about a continuing terrorist threat to “Western democracies” (G. W. Bush, February 23, 2004; see also Kuypers 2006).

Bush’s visions earn further credibility as, simultaneously, a number of terrorist plots get stopped at home, by the US federal agencies acting frequently in cooperation with foreign governments. Such thwarted attacks include the 2004 “financial buildings plot” targeting the International Monetary Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington, the 2004 “Columbus shopping mall plot”, the 2006 “Sears Tower plot”, and the 2007 “JFK International Airport plot”. The timely dismantlement of these plots lifts some of the criticism of the Patriot Act (Atran 2010), which, by the end of the second term of the Bush administration, has brought charges against more than 900 suspects, resulting in over 500 convictions. It is believed (Atran 2010) that, in combination with the P3 international developments, this slightly better perception of the Patriot Act in America has been a factor in Bush’s laborious recovery of the image of competence in rational judgment so much damaged by the WMD intelligence failure in Iraq.

6.4.2 Response to context: Back to (the vision of) the future

The P3 discourse of the Bush administration is, again, a fine response to contextual changes. As a number of international and domestic developments happen according to plans (progress in Iraq, effects of the Patriot Act) or reflect predictions, including warnings (viz. worldwide terrorist acts), the administration feel they have regained, to some extent at least, the political and moral right to outline visions to legitimize both long-term and near future policies. This means, at discourse level, a return to temporal proximization, forcing threatening construals of the future, as well as of the past, in such a way that there is a swift mobilization of resources for a prompt reaction, should the need arise. Although P3 does not bring any developments documenting the existence of a direct threat to America, at least not of the kind visualized on the eve of the Iraq war, the Bush administration take

14. There are several other terrorist acts in P3 whose toll compares to the Madrid and London tolls. They include, chronologically, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, the 2007 suicide attacks in Algiers, the coordinated shootings and bombings in Mumbai again (in 2008), and the 2008 Islamabad Marriott Hotel attacks. None of these acts is however traced to Al-Qaeda, nor to any other global terrorist network.
acts such as the Madrid and London attacks to be examples of “a continuing threat that needs to be reckoned with” (G. W. Bush, September 11, 2005). This is not a full comeback to the rhetoric of fear we have observed in P1 as the US can no longer be construed as the only/main terrorist target. Still, the Madrid and London attacks, coupled with the other terrorist acts mentioned above, are sufficient premises to re-construct some of the P1 threatening analogies involving, again, the ominous presence of antagonistic entities. Consequently, the P3 temporal proximization is relatively often assisted by spatial proximization, especially when there is an increase in the global terrorist activity. Such a tendency cannot be seen from the P3 proximization counts, but we will easily notice it in discourse examples. We start, however, with the counts (Table 3).

The P3 prominence of temporal proximization is seen from a number of comparisons. Most notably, its P3 framework total, 5.35, is almost 1.6 times higher than the corresponding main corpus total (3.43). As such, it beats not only the P2 framework total (1.63, cf. Table 2), but also the P1 total (5.16, cf. Table 1). The latter comparison is intriguing, given the role of the temporal proximization items in forcing construals of the “direct threat” in P1 (cf. Section 6.2). It is even more intriguing considering that the P3 context does not sanction fear appeals quite as dramatic as allowed by the P1 context.

To respond to the puzzle, let us recall the P3 context has temporal proximization work in the service of two goals. One is the construction (or rather the re-construction) of a spatio-temporal arrangement under which the US face an external threat. Given the current premises, this goal is now somewhat smaller and less pressing compared to the similar goals temporal proximization helps enact in P1. The other goal is the (re-)enactment of strong and legitimate leadership based on a rational, competent judgment, and the ability to “control the future” by outlining future visions and directing them into “fully controllable channels” (Dunmire 2011). Under the P3 context, this second goal is much bigger and far more pressing compared to the similar legitimization goals of temporal proximization in P1. In sum, the P3 “gains” in the discourse realization of the second goal are greater than the relative “losses” in the realization of the first, hence the overall P3 advantage in the counts.

Looking at the counts in the particular categories of the temporal framework, one can see that, except in category 5, all of the P3 counts are much higher than the corresponding main corpus counts and, recalling the figures in Table 2, also much higher than the P2 counts. The two items in category 5 cannot join in the trend, as they include indications of the US evidence of the external threat, as well as declarations to conduct a pre-emptive action, which both seem problematic given the P3 context (there occur terrorist acts, but not within the US, and the
Table 3. Counts of the key spatial, temporal and axiological proximization items in P3 and in main corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[&quot;USA&quot;, &quot;United States&quot;, &quot;America&quot;]</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;American people&quot;, &quot;Americans&quot;, &quot;our people/nation/country/society&quot;]</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;free people/nations/countries/societies/world&quot;]</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world&quot;]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[&quot;Iraq&quot;, &quot;Saddam Hussein&quot;, &quot;Saddam&quot;, &quot;Hussein&quot;]</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;terrorists&quot;]</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;Iraqi regime/dictatorship&quot;]</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;terrorist organizations/networks&quot;, &quot;Al-Qaeda&quot;]</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;extremists/radicals&quot;]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;foreign regimes/dictatorships&quot;]</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[&quot;are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD&quot;]</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC&quot;]</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC&quot;]</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC&quot;]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[&quot;destroy an IDC&quot;]</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values&quot;]</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[&quot;threat&quot;]</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;danger&quot;]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[&quot;tragedy&quot;]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;catastrophe&quot;]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
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FRAMEWORK TOTAL 13.69 14.01
Table 3. (continued)

Counts from the temporal framework

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[“a September morning”]</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday”]</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work”]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.95</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.20</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief”]</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“In the past/for centuries/long ago America’s/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations”]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed/before it/they materializes/materialize/before it/they appears/appear/before it is too late”]</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance”]</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[“Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs”]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time”]</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.51</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“Some IDCs think.believe America/we can wait. The US government think/believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat”]</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.35</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.43</strong></td>
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Table 3. (continued)

Counts from the axiological framework

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<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P3</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[&quot;freedom/liberty&quot;]</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;democracy&quot;]</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;equality&quot;]</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;peace&quot;]</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;justice&quot;]</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;progress&quot;]</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;prosperity&quot;]</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;economic freedom/liberty&quot;]</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>5.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[&quot;dictatorship&quot;]</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;radicalism&quot;]</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;extremism&quot;]</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;terrorism&quot;]</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;political regime&quot;]</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;military regime&quot;]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[&quot;(1) NP denoting ODC value(s)&quot;]</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>followed by or combined with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) VP denoting a remote possibility of the ODC-IDC conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>followed by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) VP denoting a close probability of the ODC-IDC conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>followed by or combined with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) NP denoting physical consequences of the ODC-IDC conflict&quot;]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

threat levels after the Madrid and London attacks might not be high enough to allow pre-emptive measures). Interestingly, if evidence and pre-emptive are removed from the fifth category forms, there are numerous examples of the quasi-dialogue (“alternative future” vs. “privileged future”; cf. Section 5.2.2) embedded in these forms. This should not be a surprise, as such formulas make excellent tools to impose view of the speaker’s premeditation and diligence in assessing various ways in which the future may develop:
(21) Some would like to believe the free Iraq means the end of violence in the region. But we know from history that freedom, if not defended, can be lost.  
(G. W. Bush, September 11, 2005)

(22) To leave Iraq now [after the ITG has been formed], as many demand, would be to falter in our long-standing commitment to help the people of Iraq build a democratic society at the heart of the Middle East. There are still enemies of freedom who want to dictate the course of events in Iraq and to prevent the Iraqi people from having a true voice in their future.  
(G. W. Bush, May 5, 2005, two days after formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government)

(23) Many had claimed we don't need the Patriot Act any more. What happened yesterday proves that we do.  
(G. W. Bush, July 8, 2005, the day after the London bombings)

The interplay of the alternative future and Bush’s privileged future mirrors, to some extent, the thesis-antithesis mechanism as described by the Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann and Thompson 1988). The alternative future, such as “we don’t need the Patriot Act any more”, is expressed in the thesis part, which is countered by the speaker’s antithesis expressing the privileged future (“we do”). Typically, both parts are direct assertions, which, as we have seen in Chapter 3, help the reception of the message as maximally clear and appealing. In (21) and (23), Bush abides by the central assumption of the formula: for best rhetorical effects, the privileged antithesis must follow the thesis.

In categories 1–4, the most telling set of counts is arguably the three-item set in the second category. This is because the second category items are engaged in prospective visions extending from the past; we have found in Chapter 5 they do not force construals along the entire time axis, like for instance the items in category 1. As such, the second category items, subsuming the contrastive use of past and present tenses, are the most directly involved in construals which present the speaker as being fully competent to handle the past and present premises in the service of future visions necessitating specific postures and actions. Since the (re-)establishment of leadership competence along these lines is a/the central goal of the Bush administration in P3, it is easy to understand why the second category items respond with an increase that is unique among all the P3 temporal counts. Notably enough, all of the second category counts are consistently higher than: the corresponding main corpus counts, the P1 counts (!), and the P2 counts.

This of course does not detract from the role of the items in the remaining categories of the framework. The indefinite descriptions in the first category and the presuppositions of the external impact in the third category work together toward reconstruction of the aura of unexpectedness of the impact. Establishing such an
aura is a pre-requisite for the enactment of strong leadership (Bacevich 2010) involving continual monitoring of the world stage to detect possibly threatening developments. The items in categories 1 and 3 can thus be said to realize both of the P3 discourse goals as defined above. How important it is for the Bush government that the two goals be realized simultaneously can be seen from several parallels between the first and the third category counts. Most notably, the category totals reveal almost identical P3-to-main corpus ratios (1.95 : 1.20 (= 1.62) in category 1; 0.79 : 0.49 (= 1.61) in category 3). Also, they reveal a comparable advantage over the respective P2 category totals (1.95 : 0.52 (= 3.75), category 1; 0.79 : 0.27 (= 2.92), category 3). The latter parallel begs an extra comment of a theoretical and methodological nature: the first and the third category seem to possess a solid explanatory power in capturing both the consistency (viz. category 2) and the sharpness as well as the overall (quantitative) magnitude of the P2–P3 rise in temporal discourse forms. As such, together with category 2, they offer the most salient evidence of the arguably abrupt change in the US anti-terrorist rhetoric following the successful formation of the Iraqi Interim Government and the other contextual developments. This change is further documented in the counts from the fourth category, especially the markedly high P3 count of the second item. Involving syntactic fronting of the time adverbial, it puts extra emphasis on the globality of approach implicit in the phrase (Birner and Ward 1998).

The temporal proximization in P3 is, as has been mentioned, not without help from the spatial proximization forms, though there is no longer a fully concerted interaction of the kind we have observed in P1 (recall for instance the examples (4)–(13)). Since one of the goals, legitimization-wise, is reconstruction of a conceptual arrangement involving a physical threat, but at the same time there are no contextual premises that allow a precise assignment of the threat to specific parties (like Saddam Hussein in P1), the arising discourse is full of vague, generalized attributions of agency:

(24) Foreign dictatorships continue to plot against America and other civilized countries.
(G. W. Bush, June 24, 2006)

(25) Today, in the whole world, we face the clearest of divides: between those who seek order and peaceful change and the extremists who spread chaos and violence.
(G. W. Bush, July 11, 2007)

Equally vague are thus also indications of a possible impact:

(26) We still face challenges from rogue states and terrorists who expand their arsenals to attack what they hate the most, our way of life.
(G. W. Bush, September 11, 2006)
In these examples, Bush makes use of the items (italicized) captured in the second (24)–(26) and the third (26) category of the spatial framework, but only those lacking a clear reference to external agents (24)–(26) and their resources (26). This is quite representative of the entire P3 discourse: the items that engage in spatio-temporal construals of threat are, mainly, the “non-Iraq” items in the second category and the “non-WMD” items in the third category, plus the [“destroy”] item, as long as the latter does not appear with a concrete agent. Of course, “Iraq” remains a frequent lexical choice, but is no longer used to force fear appeals:

(27) The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq shall be a grave setback for international terrorism.  
(G. W. Bush, May 5, 2005)

Consequently, the second category total, 4.67, is higher than the P2 total (3.74; cf. Table 2), though continues to be smaller than the main corpus total (5.11). The counts of the other items employed for the (vague) construals of threat are higher than both the P2 counts and the main corpus counts.

The notable moments when the threat is concretized are relatively short periods of time following terrorist acts. These periods see a direct return to the P1 rhetoric. For example:

(28) The war on terror goes on, and we must be vigilant, day in and day out. As long as there are people willing to kill other people, the whole world is a battlefield. As long as there are terrorist harbors, rogue states and their terrorist clients, we and our allies are a direct target. If we don't confront these transnational threats, the consequences will be deadly. There are no borders that could protect us. We and our friends won't feel safe on our streets, on our planes, on our subways, on our trains and buses.

(G. W. Bush, July 11, 2005, four days after the London bombings)

We have been over this kind of discourse before, just recall the examples (3)–(13). There is a direct threat which, if unstopped, will result in physical impact that will be catastrophic. The threat knows no borders and can materialize anytime. Unlike in the P1 discourse, there are no resources (such as WMD) mentioned, but Bush offsets this, here and in the other “post-7/7” statements, by a precise, elaborate enumeration of the sites of the envisaged impact (“streets”, “planes”, etc.). Readily visible is the timely inclusion of the “subways”, “trains” and “buses”, addressing the context of the London attacks, as well as the Madrid bombings. The inclusion of all these items as denotations of impact targets goes a long way toward re-establishing the aura of directness of the terrorist threat. Since, as has been argued, the threat can hardly be attributed to specific agents, its directness is construed, alternatively, in terms of the everyday physical closeness of the impact sites. Thus, any
routinely frequented public place becomes concretized, viz. the third sentence in (28), as a “direct target”.

In discussing the P3 discourse of the Bush administration, we have not addressed the counts of the items from the axiological framework. This is because virtually all of the counts are similar to the corresponding main corpus counts, as well as reveal similar drops compared to the respective P2 counts. As such, the items do not appear to contribute much to the P3 proximization pattern, whether directly or in combination with items in the other frameworks. It is also hard to spot any consistent contribution looking at discourse examples. This invites a hypothesis that Bush’s ideological argument in P2, however thoroughly pre-meditated and diligently structured, has been not more than an ad hoc rhetorical venture, instrumental to the accomplishment of the current political goals and not meant to develop into a consistent, long-term pattern. But does this also mean that, in the 2001–2010 decade of the US anti-terrorist rhetoric, there is no more room for legitimization appeals based on axiological proximization? We get answers from the discourse of the new government.

6.5 Period Four (P4): January 20, 2009 – December 31, 2010

6.5.1 Context

There is no consistent picture of the P4 context. Having won the White House through a rhetoric of “hope” and “change”, Obama puts forward a “new” national security strategy that seemingly rejects unilateralism in favor of an approach that steers multilateral cooperation “in the direction of liberty and justice” (United States National Security Council 2010: 2). The new approach is reflected in a series of spectacular steps, such as ordering the closure of the prison at Guantanamo Bay and the CIA’s secret prisons, and prohibiting harsh interrogation practices. Torturing terrorist suspects, Obama’s strategy holds, “has no role to play in policies of a country committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (USNSC 2010: 2). But, as of the end of 2010 (and until now, in fact), detention facilities remain open at Bagram Airforce Base in Afghanistan, where the suspects continue to be abused, and similar practices are reported to be taking place at several other camps, especially in Syria and Egypt (Dunmire 2011). At the same time, a large number of unilateral raids on suspected extremists are carried out in Pakistan. Between 2009–2010 there is actually an increase in drone attacks and attacks using cluster bombs placing civilians at particular risk (Ali 2010).
Intriguingly, compared to the Bush period, relatively few of these attacks receive due attention in the American media. This seems a timely response to the moods of the public, who demand, from the government but also from the media, more focus on home, especially economic, matters (Bacevich 2010). Consequently, even terrorist acts get less coverage and less public attention. For instance, the March 2009 attack against Sri Lankan cricketers in Pakistan, the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, and, notably, the Fort Hood shooting in Texas (November 2009), all three revealing links to Al-Qaeda, get at CNN a small fraction of the “breaking news time” compared to similar-size acts happening during the rule of the Bush government. It seems like the American public and the media in a way “get used” to terrorist attacks occurring randomly in different corners of the world (including individual cases of terrorism in the States!), and they “do not care” quite as much as they did under the Bush administration (Goldstein 2011).

This is of course surprising and, moreover, inconsistent with the frightening toll of the War on Terror the Obama government publish right in January 2009: 5,921 US military killed since 9/11, 149,600 (!) civilians killed in Iraq alone, 49,000 civilians killed in the ongoing operation in Afghanistan. In fact, in 2010 the United States presence in Afghanistan increases by 20,000 troops, without much Congressional or public opposition (Goldstein 2011). How is that possible? As we see below, the US do not apparently wage a “War on Terror” any more then.

6.5.2 Response to context: Threat routinized

In March 2009, Obama renames the “War-on-Terror” as “Overseas Contingency Operations”. The rationale is as follows. A war on terror is too broad ever to be won once and for all, and defining not a group or ideology but a type of violence as the enemy is incoherent. In contrast, contingency operations involve a coherent defense posture, subsuming, among others, the treatment of terrorist acts as criminals acts against the State.15 Such criminal acts cannot be fully eradicated, but the State can (and should) possess a legally and operationally consistent framework of policies aimed to detect, track and punish terrorist activities. The focus of the policies must be on American interests, America must not be “at war” with all practitioners of terrorism worldwide, even though the groundwork for the policies are globally pertaining values such as freedom, justice or peace. If the State’s ability to enforce the policies, both home and abroad, is kept at a continual high, then, notwithstanding periodic rises in terrorist activity that cannot be prevented, the contingency approach is “successful” (Bacevich 2010).

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The new strategy is a masterpiece of response to the behavior and expectations of the American public. It recognizes the need to refocus on home matters, it answers the demand to work out legal solutions that can be applied universally (thus preventing the perception that the system is unstable and each new terrorist act can mean restructuring it), it recognizes and draws on Americans’ growing awareness that there is no definable end of the terrorist threat. Finally, it sets up a firm link between the continuity of the threat and the continuity of the US government’s mission to contain the threat, a mission of constant preparedness following the constant adherence to the central values of the State.

At the language level, the new approach means a discourse that is quintessentially ideological and oriented towards the home arena. At the more specific level of the strategies of proximization, it means a return to predominantly axiological rhetoric, though markedly different from Bush’s axiological proximization in P2. Obama’s axiological proximization involves the home values, rather than external values, and at places combines with temporal proximization, to construe the home values as historically permanent. The evidence lies in the lexical counts as well as in longer discourse sequences; we start, as usual, with the counts (Table 4).

One might say this picture is rather dull: most of the P4 counts fall below the corresponding main corpus counts. Yet there are intriguing exceptions, which prove proximization strategies continue to operate, even if less conspicuously than in the discourse of the Bush government. Most notably, the first category of the axiological framework reveals a total count which, at 5.98, is only minimally lower than the record-high first category count observed in P2 (6.01, cf. Table 2). As such, it is obviously higher than the category main corpus count of 5.17. Does this indicate a return to the axiological proximization discourse of the kind we have examined before? Not quite, since the P4 salience of the home values is much bigger than the salience of the antagonistic values (viz. category 2), and the disparity has grown significantly since P2. While Bush’s axiological proximization in P2 involves primarily the capacity of the external “evil” values to inspire concrete physical acts, Obama’s axiological proximization is, at the same time, the proximization of the external negative values and the proximization of the American positive values, with an emphasis on the latter, as the counts from categories 1 and 2 suggest. The arising ideological conflict can only lead to a physical clash if, in addition to the growth of the foreign antagonistic ideologies, Americans falter in the commitment to their own ideology and the acts it prescribes. This is what Obama has to say in his Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq:
### Table 4. Counts of the key spatial, temporal and axiological proximization items in P4 and in main corpus

**Counts from the spatial framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>% in 1000 words</th>
<th>P4</th>
<th>Main corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[“USA”, “United States”, “America”]</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“American people”, “Americans”, “our people/nation/country/society”]</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“free people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“democratic people/nations/countries/societies/world”]</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.04</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.25</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[“Iraq”, “Saddam Hussein”, “Saddam”, “Hussein”]</td>
<td><strong>0.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.68</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorists”]</td>
<td><strong>1.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.80</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“Iraqi regime/dictatorship”]</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“terrorist organizations/networks”, “Al-Qaeda”]</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“extremists/radicals”]</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“foreign regimes/dictatorships”]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.63</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.11</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[“are determined/intend to seek/acquire WMD”]</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“might/may/could/can use WMD against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“expand/grow in military capacity that could be directed against an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“move/are moving/head/are heading/have set their course toward confrontation with an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.08</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.94</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[“destroy an IDC”]</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“set aflame/burn down an IDC or IDC values”]</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.66</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.23</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[“threat”]</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“danger”]</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.56</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.77</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>[“tragedy”]</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[“catastrophe”]</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.53</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.71</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.01</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ctg.</th>
<th>Key items</th>
<th>P4 %</th>
<th>Main corpus %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[&quot;a September morning&quot;]</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a clear/sunny/busy September morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a/another New York/Manhattan morning/day/workday/Tuesday&quot;]</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;a train/underground/tube ride/journey to work&quot;]</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.20</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>[&quot;Americans/America/we used to think/believe that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;It used to be that IDCs were safe as ODC threat was far away. September the 11th/9/11/September attacks has/have changed the/that IDC belief&quot;]</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;In the past/for centuries/long ago America’s/our enemies/adversaries needed extensive conventional military capacity to endanger/threaten America/us. Now/at present/today new/different threat/threats has/have emerged from terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations&quot;]</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.83</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>[&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers before it/they is/are fully formed / before it/they materializes/materialize/before it/they appears/appear/before it is too late&quot;]</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;IDCs will act against emerging WMD threat/threats/danger/dangers to preempt/prevent/forestall its/their formation/presence/appearance&quot;]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.37</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>[&quot;Terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could now/today/at this moment/at the moment impact IDCs&quot;]</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;Nowadays/today/now terrorists/terrorist networks/terrorist organizations can/could impact IDCs at any moment/at any time/in no time&quot;]</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.57</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.51</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>[&quot;Some IDCs think/believe America/we can wait. The US government think/believe the opposite as they have evidence of ODC threat&quot;]</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[&quot;Some IDCs ask why America/we must act pre-emptively. The US government think/believe pre-emptive action is necessary given the evidence of the ODC threat&quot;]</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRAMEWORK TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The threat persists. It will get stronger anytime we lose sight of our goal to remain faithful to the values this nation has held dear for centuries. Radicals and extremists will keep plotting against America and we shall not embolden them by abandoning the ideals to which we have always been committed. We will defeat our adversaries by promoting justice, dignity and mutual respect, in the Middle East and around the world.  

(B. Obama, August 31, 2010)
Evidently, the threat construed by Obama is just as much a “routinely present”, ceaseless threat “from the outside” (posed by “radicals and extremists”), as a possible threat “from the inside”, involving “losing sight” of the nation’s ideals. Obama’s axiological proximization is thus not only, so to say, the “definitionally prototypical” construal of the external threatening values as possible impact agents (in fact, Obama’s rhetoric does not give any clear outlines of the impact), but also – and mainly – the less typical construal whereby it is the home values that become proximized, along diachronic lines, to motivate the current actions, including the preventive\textsuperscript{16} policies. Hence, again, the advantage of the first category counts (of the IDC, “home” items) over the second category counts, as well as the truly negligible count (0.11, smallest in the whole P1–P4 decade) of the discourse sequence in the third category. Obama’s “IDC proximization” strand of axiological proximization creates a common conceptual space for the historically grounded proximized values and the prospective acts reflecting a continual commitment to these values. As such, it involves a spatio-temporal element, and – at the pragmalinguistic level – the use of assertion to force legitimacy of the diachronic link:\textsuperscript{17}

(30) As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our values (...) Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew our power grows through its prudent use (...) We are the keepers of this legacy, guided by these principles once more, we can meet the new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations (...) Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old. These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is demanded then is a return to these truths.  

(B. Obama, January 20, 2009; boldface mine)

\textsuperscript{16} The terms “pre-empt”, “pre-emptive”, “pre-emption”, rhetorical trademarks of the Bush Doctrine, are virtually non-existent in Obama’s anti-terrorist discourse (“a more emollient and less provocative rhetoric”, in Bacevich’s (2010: 77) words). Compare the discussion of “pre-emptive vs. preventive” in Section 3.3.3.

\textsuperscript{17} There have been very random cases of Bush’s anti-terrorist discourse featuring the same pattern. Recall the discussion of the AEI speech in Chapter 3.
The assertoric sequences in boldface essentialize Obama’s argument, seeking legitimation of a new multilateral policy framework as extending from long-accepted principles. The “new challenges”, goes the argument, can only be met if there is a continuity of commitment to cornerstone values, which have successfully guided America throughout history. The values Obama enumerates, honesty, courage, hard work, etc., seem a credible collection: note that the list includes mainly everyday postures, which the audience can easily perceive as triggers of concrete, personal success. Thus, although Obama’s argument is ultimately concerned with US defense policy – which directly connects with foreign policy – its premises are located, deliberately, “close to the addressee”. This complex arrangement involves proximization in a number of ways. In temporal terms, the past postures and ensuing acts (“faced down fascism and communism”) are construed as mirroring or pertaining to the current challenges. In axiological terms, the “old values” are simultaneously the values the country needs reinforced at the moment. In spatial terms, the postures needed to handle the external challenges are construed as drawing on traits which grow and manifest themselves internally. Obviously, as in any proximization discourse involving historical flashbacks (cf. Section 4.2), the boundaries between the “temporal”, the “axiological”, and the “spatial” remain fuzzy.

Obama’s use of past premises as axiological motives for present/future acts is reflected in some of the P4 counts from the temporal framework. For instance the total count from the fourth category, 0.57, is higher than the corresponding main corpus count (0.51). This is because the fourth category includes items which, like “nowadays” or “today”, construe the speaker’s assessment of the present in broad temporal terms, involving inferences from past events in the service of mapping out future visions. The reason why some of the other P4 counts do not equal the respective main corpus counts is not that they are low in their own right, but that the main corpus counts “profit” from the salience of temporal items in P3. For instance, the P4 total count of the indefinite forms in the first category looks high indeed: at 1.11 (eleven occurrences per every 1000 words in the P4 sub-corpus), it is twice as high as the P2 total (0.52, cf. Table 2). This means that, in general terms, the axiological proximization in P4 receives a considerable backup from temporal proximization, and that, in more particular terms, indefinite descriptions continue to work effectively in the way of construing a future that is uncertain and thus needs a knowledge-based, strong leadership:

(31) Our confidence lies in the knowledge we possess to shape an uncertain destiny.  
(B. Obama, March 19, 2009)
Knowledge-based claims to leadership are among the most noticeable characteristics of the Obama discourse. If “radicals and extremists (...) keep plotting against America” and, under the contingency approach, the threat is routinely present, America must develop similarly routine ways of handling it. The central way is to maintain the efficiency of the anti-terrorist intelligence, manpower, and infrastructure, at a continual high. This stance is expressed in a number of metaphors construing the intelligence as a “product” and Obama and Americans as its daily “consumers”:

(32) Thank you from me, who uses your product each and every day to make some very tough decisions, and thank you on behalf of the American people, who may not even know that you’re here but are relying on you each and every day to make sure that their kids get home safely and that when they commute to work it’s going to be ok. (B. Obama, October 6, 2009)

(33) As I said before, I am one of the consumers of your work product here at NCTC. Every morning I look to you for the latest intelligence. (B. Obama, October 6, 2009)

Obama’s rhetoric involves other metaphors as well and thus, in the spatial framework, one of the few P4 counts that compare to the main corpus count is the 0.26 count of the second item in the fourth category. Otherwise, Obama’s discourse is the discourse of permanence, control, balance, and steadfast mastery of the future (Dunmire 2011). While the axiological-temporal construals produce a timely response to context, the response seems far from the arguably ad hoc and “full of twists” (Bacevich 2010) legitimization rhetoric of the Bush administration. One might attribute this difference to the difference in the contextual developments under the two administrations. Unlike Bush, Obama does not have to react to a 9/11, nor, later, walk 200,000 troops into a regime country in the Middle East to neutralize what his services present to him as a deadly imminent threat. On the other hand, there are no such momentous developments in P3 yet Bush’s switches between positive visions and fear appeals remain anything but smooth.

6.6 Conclusion

The US anti-terrorist rhetoric in the years 2001–2010 is a complex pattern of legitimization discourse, which evolves in response to the continually changing characteristics of the social, political, as well as military, context. The contextual
conditions and the discourse responses unfold in four distinct periods, which feature different quantitative and qualitative inputs from each of the three proximization strategies.

The discourse of Period One (September 11, 2001 – October 31, 2003) is dominated by spatial and temporal proximization. Assuming the existence of a clear, direct, gathering, “tangible” threat, it aims at an ultra-fast and unequivocal legitimization of, first, the retaliatory action in Afghanistan and, later, the pre-emptive war on Iraq. It involves construals of the intense and threatening activity of the enemy entities (terrorists, regimes harboring terrorists), a large number of fear appeals, as well as multiple claims to power and strong leadership. The groundwork for these claims is G. W. Bush’s critical assessment of the past negligence, a well-informed picture of the present (threat), and a clear vision of securing the future against the threat.

The discourse of Period Two (November 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004) employs mainly axiological proximization. The axiological argument serves to redefine the case for the Iraq war; it foregrounds the stable ideological rationale for the intervention, while downplaying its pre-emptive character. The rhetorical switch to axiological proximization responds swiftly to the geopolitical, extra-linguistic changes and developments, especially the loss of the “WMD premise” for the Iraq war. The proximized impact of the antagonistic external entities is no longer construed in purely physical terms, but in ideological-physical terms; the antagonistic values are assigned the capacity to grow, accumulate and, eventually, materialize within the US home territory.

The discourse of Period Three (July 1, 2004 – January 19, 2009) reveals a growing salience of temporal proximization, which is re-applied to re-enact the strong leadership based on rational judgment and competence in the assessment of the past and the present, and the visualization of the future. As the time goes by, the US administration recover from the loss of credibility incurred through the WMD intelligence failure, and the positive developments such as the formation of the free government of Iraq allow construals of the future that the Bush government have the capacity (as well as the right and the obligation) to prefigure and control. Thus, the temporal proximization in Period Three serves both the long-term and the current legitimization goals, as the future visions determine near-term policies. Throughout that period, axiological proximization operates at a comparatively moderate level, and spatial proximization sometimes combines with temporal proximization in the moments of increased terrorist activity (e.g. the 2005 London bombings).

Finally, the discourse of Period Four (January 20, 2009 – December 31, 2010) reveals, on the whole, a relatively moderate proximization input, in which the most salient seem the forms of axiological and temporal proximization. This
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reflects Obama’s context-motivated routinization of the terrorist threat. Such a stance is expressed, at the cognitive-linguistic level, in a number of axiological construals whereby the “external threat” functions parallel to an “internal threat”, that is the threat of ignoring the US historical values, which Obama takes as major warrants of America’s safety. The terrorist danger is construed, often metaphorically, as virtually ceaseless, but it can be minimized, “day in and day out”, by skillful manufacturing of the intelligence “product”. Obama’s proximization is thus less force-dynamic than Bush’s: far fewer items are used which indicate conflict-bound movement between the external and the home entities. This is in striking contrast with lexico-grammatical choices such as “head for tragedy”, “drift towards conflict”, “threats looming from”, etc., the favorite catch-phrases of Bush’s rhetoric, especially in the wake of the Iraq war. As a result, Obama’s threshold for pre-emptive response is increased and a possible legitimization of such a response takes more focus, insight and analysis.

The US 2001–2010 anti-terrorist rhetoric is, as has been said at the beginning of this chapter, a fine example of a temporally-extensive interventionist discourse which continually adjusts its pragmalinguistic input to sustain legitimization challenged by changes in political and social context. The chapter has shown that the STA model is well-suited to account for these adjustments by describing the different and flexible inputs from the three proximization strategies, applied in diverse ratios and configurations to respond to particular needs of the current moment. Thus, the theoretical and methodological validity of the model established in Chapter 5 has now been supported by its descriptive validity. That said, the next step is to provide argument for a possible extension of the empirical scope of the STA model.
“The model is a structure of symbols interpreted in certain ways, and what it is a model of is the subject-matter specified by the interpretation. The theory is more abstract: we learn something about the subject-matter from the theory, but not by investigating properties of the theory. The theory states that the subject-matter has a certain structure, but the theory does not therefore necessarily exhibit that structure in itself. All theories treat as irrelevant some properties of their subject matter.”

7.1 Introduction

The task of this final chapter is to postulate that the STA proximization model applies to public space legitimization discourses other than the state political discourse as represented in this book by the US anti-terrorist rhetoric. We have recognized such prospects at the end of Chapter 3; the current discussion is thus, first, an empirical follow up aiming to identify more discourse domains where proximization operations work towards legitimization goals. There is however a related theoretical aim. It is to discuss what the new data may mean in the way of refining proximization theory, and the design of the STA proximization model, to further enhance its explanatory power to become, one day, a theory of communication.

These two aims define the structure of the chapter. In its first part (Sections 7.2–5), I give specimens of four public space discourses, which, however differing in thematic, locational, and cultural terms, reveal enough similarity at the conceptual level to be accounted for in terms of the STA proximization model. Three of them can be described as essentially Anglo-Saxon discourses, coming from domains widely explored within the current interdisciplinary paradigm of critical studies: health, environment, and modern technology. The fourth is, on purpose, a non-Anglo-Saxon discourse, representing the Polish parliamentary

arena. In the second part of the chapter (Section 7.6), I argue that the application of the STA model to these discourses promises further empirical extensions, and potentially successful ones, as long as extra theoretical tools are implemented, and certain revisions made regarding such concepts as the in-out distinction, discourse space, interventionist discourse, and “positive” legitimization.

7.2 Health: Proximization in cancer prevention discourse

The main reason why it seems worthwhile to apply proximization to the analysis of cancer discourse is that much of this discourse involves metaphoric construals of an enemy entity (cancer) posing an imminent threat of impact on the home entity (patient). In response, the patient and her healthcare team wage a “war on cancer”, which is often a preventive kind of war. Although, as will be shown, the construals underlying the war on cancer metaphor are not completely synonymous with the proximization construals recognized by the STA model, there is apparently enough similarity to consider the discourse of cancer prevention a possible empirical field for the application of proximization theory.

The war metaphor has been the prevailing metaphor used to describe and “combat” cancer since at least 1971, when US President Richard M. Nixon declared a federal “war on cancer” with the National Cancer Act. Following this legislation, as well as Sontag’s (1978) seminal book *Illness as Metaphor*, medical discourse, both in and outside the US, has quickly implemented the concept, adding the war on cancer metaphor to an already rich inventory of metaphors involving “wars” on other negative social phenomena, such as drugs, poverty or illiteracy.

Van Rijn-van Tongeren (1997) claims the concepts of war and cancer reveal a perfect metaphoric correspondence: there is an enemy (the cancer), a commander (the physician), a combatant (the patient), allies (the medical team), as well as formidable weaponry (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, at the disposal of the medical team). Another analogy, she argues, is that both concepts connote “an unmistakable seriousness of purpose” (1997: 46). Based on these observations, she describes the “war on cancer” in terms of the following conceptual scenario:

1. Cancer is an aggressive enemy that invades the body. In response, the body launches an offensive and defends itself, fighting back with its army of killer T-cells. However, this is not enough and doctors are needed to target, attack and try to defeat, destroy, kill or wipe out the cancer cells with their arsenal of lethal weapons. However, cancer cells may become resistant and more specialised treatments are required, such as magic bullets or stealth viruses.

(Van Rijn-van Tongeren (1997), emphasis original)
The consecutive stages of the scenario are widely represented in discourse. Van Rijn-van Tongeren (1997) gives, among many others, the following examples (emphasis original). Van Rijn-van Tongeren’s data come, in general, from various publications, including scholarly monographs, textbooks and articles (viz. examples (3)–(5)), but also bulletins and newspaper articles aimed at broad public (example (2)).

(2) The next trial involves several hundred patients, helping microwaves become another cancer-fighting tool.

(3) This molecule called Sumo, is then attacked by an enzyme called RNF4, a process that also destroys the cancer-causing proteins.

(4) A second gene, called LMTK2 is a promising target for new drugs to treat the disease.

(5) This activates only those antibodies surrounding cancer, which then attract the immune system’s army of killer T cells, to destroy the tumor.

Van Rijn-van Tongeren’s scenario, as well as the examples, ring some familiar notes. Like in the STA proximization arrangement, there is an “alien” entity ready to invade (or actually invading) the “home” entity, i.e., here, the body of the patient. The “alien” entity is construed as evil and actively operating (“aggressive enemy”), thus the impact probability is high. The “home” entity has the capacity to deliver a counter-strike, which is defensive/neutralizing, as much as offensive/preventive in character (“the body launches an offensive and defends itself, fighting back with its army of killer T-cells”). This is, however, where the analogies seem to end. The “alien” entity cannot be described, as the STA model has it, as truly “external” entity (ODC), since cancer cells develop inside of the patient’s body. Furthermore, the body is not, technically, the only “home” entity (IDC) that counters the alien entity, since its “army of T-cells” gets support (medical treatment) from another party (the physician), which the latter has not been “invaded”. These and other differences call for a more extensive, textual look at the cancer prevention discourse, to distinguish the areas which can be described in terms of the STA model, from those which might not be describable quite as easily, unless the model is revised to deal with a broader spectrum of data. The following is a text that appeared in the spring 2011 edition of the Newsletter of the British Association of Cancer Research (BACR). Its argument, structure, and lexis seem all quite representative of the contemporary discourse of cancer prevention and treatment, both specialized and popular (cf. Semino 2008):

(6) Some say we can contain melanoma with standard chemotherapy measures. The evidence we have says we must strike it with a full force in its earliest
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stages. We will continue to conduct screening programmes to spot the deadly disease before it has spread throughout the body. We must be able to wipe out all the infected cells in one strike, otherwise it takes a moment before they continue to replicate and migrate around the body. We now aim to develop a new treatment that targets the infected cells with precision, effectively destroying the engine at the heart of the disease, and doing minimal harm to healthy cells. We will inject specially-designed antibodies coated in a light-sensitive shell. The coating prevents the antibodies from causing a massive immune reaction throughout the body. Once the “cloaked” antibodies have been injected, we will shine the new strong ultraviolet light on the engine and the infected cells.

The analysis of this text in terms of proximization theory and the STA model must involve, same as the analysis of the US anti-terrorist discourse in the previous chapters, at least three, interrelated levels: the conceptual level of organization of the Discourse Space (DS), the level of lexis responsible for enactment of strategic changes to the DS principal organization, and the coercion level, where the text is considered an example of legitimization discourse which aims to win support for specific actions performed by the speaker. At the DS conceptual level, we must be able to determine the presence of the IDC (“home”, “central”) entity and the ODC (“alien”, “external”, “peripheral”) entity, the existence of a conceptual shift whereby the ODC entity impacts the IDC entity, and a preventive or reactive posture of the IDC entity. Looking at (6), this arrangement indeed holds in general, though there are some deviations. The IDC status can be assigned, most directly, to the patient’s body, which is invaded by cancer cells, which thus emerge as the ODC entity. This basic proximization construal follows the standard metaphoric conceptualization of the body as a container (see references in Chapters 2 and 3). But the container metaphor is only partly of relevance here since the patient’s body is not a typical IDC, in the sense of where the impact it undergoes comes from. In that sense, the cancer cells, responsible for the impact, are not a typical ODC, either. As has been pointed out, cancer cells develop, technically, inside of the patient’s body. At the same time, causes of cancer are put down to internal (e.g. genetic), as well as external (e.g. civilizational), factors. The picture gets even more complex if we consider the aspect of agency. While the body has an internal defense mechanism, fighting the cancer cells involves mostly external resources, i.e. measures applied by the physician. Thus, in terms of neutralization of the ODC impact, the physician becomes an IDC entity as well, and even more so considering he remains under the cancer threat herself. What we arrive at, then, is a rather broad concept of the IDC entity, involving the patient and, by the attribution of agency and the recognition of common threat, the physician, as well as a vaguely construed concept of the
ODC party, involving the infected cells in the patient, but also a whole network of cancer provoking factors, “located” externally (viz. secondhand smoke; cf. Section 3.4). Looking at (6), it appears that the only (but crucial!) part of the default proximization arrangement that cancer discourse does not alter in any way is the construal of the very impact; indeed, it seems that all of its characteristics, like speed, imminence, and deadliness, are there in the text.

This last observation explains why there are apparently fewer problems at the level of lexis. As has been documented in the STA frameworks, in proximization discourse the lexical markers of the ODC impact count among the most plentiful; as a result, the abundance of such markers in (6) makes its phrases resemble many of the discourse items and sequences we have analyzed in the war on terror rhetoric.\(^2\) The ODC impact speed is coded explicitly in phrases such as “spread throughout the body”, “it takes a moment”, “replicate and migrate around”, and can be inferred from “we must strike it with a full force in its earliest stages”, “we must be able to wipe out all the infected cells in one strike” and “the engine at the heart of the disease”. The imminence is construed in, for instance, “before it has spread throughout” and “in its earliest stages”, presuppositions of the ODC’s inevitably fast growth. The effects of the impact are explicitly marked by the “deadly disease” phrase. Note that some of these phrases could easily find their way into categories of the frameworks of the STA model, in its present shape. For example, the two presuppositions would qualify in the third category of the STA temporal framework, and the markers of indefiniteness (“a moment”) would go in the first.

At the coercion-legitimization level, the STA model recognizes in (6) an attempt to solicit legitimization of a non-standard course of treatment, sanctioned by the momentousness of the decision-making context (“We now aim”), as well as by the clear evidence the speaker possesses (“The evidence we have says”) which speaks in favor of the treatment. Note, again, the presence of discourse items mirroring the member items of the categories of the STA model (for instance, the oppositional vs. privileged future phrase “Some say …”). Since the legitimization is sought by the physician acting, in a way, “on behalf of” the patient, and not by the patient herself, we again face the problem of who, under the current design of the STA model, belongs to the deictic center and who, thus, is acting (or is supposed to act) in response to the ODC threat. The recurrence of this issue at the coercion-legitimization level of analysis of cancer discourse delineates a possible avenue for

\(^2\) Let alone intriguing metaphoric correspondences. Apart from the analogies listed by Van Rijn-van Tongeren (1997), note that (6) may force construal of the screening programs as intelligence, the infected cells as terrorist cells, the new treatment as air strikes on the terrorist cells, and the healthy cells as civilian population (“We now aim to (...), doing minimal harm to healthy cells”).
the model’s extension, to accommodate data beyond the state-political interventionist discourse. Apparently, what we need is revision of the size and range of the Discourse Space and its deictic center in proximization operations.

7.3 Environment: Proximization in climate change discourse

As will become clear, the same postulate holds for the application of proximization to the discourse of climate change. Climate change is a relatively new domain of discourse studies, investigated mainly within the rapidly expanding CDA paradigm (e.g. Boykoff 2008; Berglez and Olausson 2010; Krzyżanowski 2009). Thus far, studies in climate change have revealed a unilateral focus: most analyses concentrate on climate change as a form of transnational crisis. There are, however, two different ways in which this broad conception is approached in actual analysis. These result – probably – from two rather contradictory views that emerge from the media and the related discourses. On the one hand (cf. Krzyżanowski 2009), there exists a tendency to frame climate change as a general issue of interest and critical importance to the entire societies and all social groups. Within that trend, climate change is described mainly as a threat to the entire humanity which thus must be dealt with by entire societies or the global populace as a whole. On the other hand, the somewhat contradictory approach (cf. Boykoff 2008) sees climate change as a problem which cannot be handled by entire societies but by selected individuals who, due to their knowledge and expertise, are able to cope with different facets of climate change.

Where does proximization, as an analytic device, belong, then? It seems, tentatively, that the former, “global” view invites proximization better than the “particularized” view. It would be quite unrealistic to approach data subsuming the latter view hoping to establish any uniform conception of the discourse deictic center and its agents in the first place. We have seen already from the analysis of cancer discourse how difficult that might be. In the current case, assuming climate change is dealt with by a number of different (locationally, politically, rhetorically, perhaps ideologically) individual expert voices in the vast and heterogeneous area of the world social space, an attempt to ascribe any stable and homogeneous discursive strategies or practices to these actors would probably fail. On the contrary, if we take the global institutionalized discourse of climate change, a discourse that evens out the individual legitimization-rhetorical and other differences and conceptually consolidates the deictic center (concretizing, at the same time, the deictic periphery), chances emerge that proximization, as a concept that always benefits from clarity of the in-out distinction, may indeed be applicable. To determine that applicability, I will discuss excerpts from the
speech “Emerging Security Risks” by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The speech was given in London, on October 1, 2009:

(7) I want to devote a little more time today discussing the security aspects of climate change, because I think the time has come for a change in our approach.

First, I think we now know enough to start moving from analysis to action. Because the trend lines from climate change are clear enough, and grim enough, that we need to begin taking active steps to deal with this global threat.

We know that there will be more extreme weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding. If anyone doubts the security implications of that, look at what happened in New Orleans in 2006.

We know sea levels will rise. Two thirds of the world’s population lives near coastlines. Critical infrastructure like ports, power plants and factories are all there. If people have to move they will do so in large numbers, always into where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders.

We know there will be more droughts. According to evidence, by 2025 about 40% of the world’s population will be living in countries experiencing water shortages. Again, populations will have to move. And again, the security aspects could be devastating.

If you think I’m using dramatic language, let me draw your attention to one of the worst conflicts in the world, in Darfur. One of the main causes was a long drought. Both herders and farmers lost land, including to the desert. What happened? The nomads moved South, in search of grazing land – right to where the farmers are. Of course, a lot of other factors have contributed to what has happened – political decisions, religious differences and ethnic tensions. But climate change in Sudan has been a major contributor to this tragedy. And it will put pressure on peace in other areas as well. When it comes to climate change, the threat knows no borders.

There are more examples, but to my mind, the bottom line is clear. We may not yet know the precise effects, the exact costs or the definite dates of how climate change will affect security. But we already know enough to start taking action. This is my first point: either we start to pay now, or we will pay much more later.

You get the point. Climate change is different than any other threat we face today. The science is not yet perfect. The effects are just starting to be visible, and it’s difficult to pin down what will actually change because of climate change. The timelines are not clear either. But that only makes the threat bigger. Sailors never thought the mythical North-West Passage would ever open. But it is opening. Anything’s possible.
The security challenges being discussed today are big, and they are growing. They might also seem overwhelming. But I firmly believe that a lot can be done – to address the root causes, to minimize their impact, and to manage the effects when they hit.

But for the topic, Rasmussen’s speech could easily count in the Period One discourse of the Bush administration. Rasmussen’s construal of climate change is in terms of a global threat whose outlines are “clear enough” and consequences “devastating”; thus, an immediate action is necessary (“either we start to pay [costs of the climate change] now, or we will pay much more later”). Similar to Bush’s rhetoric, the threat “knows no borders” and a delay in response “makes the threat bigger.” Analogy is used, like in the anti-terrorist discourse, to a past event (the war in Darfur), to endorse credibility of future visions. The visions involve construals of future events as personally consequential, thus strengthening the fear appeals (“Two thirds of the world’s population lives near coastlines (...) If people have to move they will do so in large numbers, always into where someone else lives (...”)”). Another familiar strategy is the construal of the moment of impact as virtually unpredictable (“the timelines are not clear”). Construing the climate change threat as continual and extending infinitely into the future, Rasmussen centralizes “the now” and the near future as the most appropriate timeframe in which to act preventively.

Again, quite a number of Rasmussen’s phrases reflect the items captured in particular categories of the STA frameworks. To name but a few, note, first and foremost, the ample use of “threat” (S: category 5), the use of “catastrophic”, “tragedy” (S: category 6), the presence of verbs in the progressive (“growing”) indicating the closeness of the threat (S: category 3), the use of a modal auxiliary (“could”) construing conditions increasing impact probability (T: category 4), or the application of the present perfect (“the time has come”) construing change from the “safe past” to the “threatening future” (T: category 2). The frequent repetitions of the “will” phrases in the speech (“We know that there will be more extreme weather events”) deserve a separate comment. Resembling the war on terror items captured in the third and the fourth category of the spatial framework, they have an even stronger appeal in Rasmussen’s speech. This is due, first, to the epistemic modality marker (“will”), second, to the syntactic embedding of that marker, that is the entire evidential claim. At places, then, Rasmussen’s climate change discourse forces construals of threat in a more direct and appealing fashion than the anti-terrorist discourse of the Bush government (!).

Rasmussen’s success in proximizing the climate change threat is not hindered by its global character. The globality of the threat does not result in vagueness or weakening of the ODC’s (i.e. the climate change) agentive capacity. Conversely,
listing specific consequences such as storms, floodings, droughts, and linking them to specific places, regions, or countries (New Orleans, Darfur, Sudan), concretizes the ODC in terms of its proven capacity to strike whichever part of the IDC’s (i.e. the world) territory. This is obviously, as in any kind of interventionist discourse (cf. Section 3.3), the most effective pre-requisite to solicit legitimization of preventive measures. The latter are, somewhat surprisingly, missing from the speech but we can assume (which later developments seem to prove) the goal of Rasmussen’s address is, first and foremost, to alert public attention to the gravity of the issue so the follow-up goals, involving specific actions, could be enacted as a matter of course. The spatial and temporal proximization strategies used in the speech make a significant contribution and, given the recurrence of some of the forms (for instance all the lexical as well as grammatical forms construing the threat as growing with time), one can say their application has been a strategic choice.

7.4 Modern technology: Proximization of cyber-threat

According to Sandwell (2006), the discourse of cyber-terror is a direct consequence of 9/11; cyber-threats are construed within the “general context of uncertainty and common anxiety” following the WTC and the Pentagon terrorist attacks. The most extreme manifestations of cyber-fear, says Sandwell, are articulated around the “[post-9/11] boundary dissolving threats, intrusive alterities, and existential ambivalences created by the erosion of binary distinctions and hierarchies that are assumed to be constitutive principles of everyday life” (2006: 40). As such, the discourse of cyber-terror is not merely a US discourse, it is a world discourse. Its principal practitioners are the world media, and the press in particular, which, on Sandwell’s view, perpetuate the threat by creating mixed representations of “the offline and the online world, the real or physical and the virtual or imagined” (2006: 40).

Neither Sandwell (2006) nor other scholars (e.g. Graham 2004) go on to speculate on the motives that might underlie such fear-inducing representations. This is unfortunate since establishing the motives is of clear relevance to the analysis of the discourse of cyber-terror as, potentially, a legitimization discourse. There are two hypotheses that emerge. On the first, the media discourse of cyber-terror has a strong political purpose: it aims to alert the people, the government and the state’s security structures to the seriousness of the issue, thus exerting pressure on the state to implement or strengthen defense measures. Such a discourse can be considered a legitimization discourse since the measures become pre-legitimized by discourse construals reflecting a true intent to influence the state’s policies. On
the other hypothesis, the press representations of cyber-terror have no real political purpose and only pretend to have it; the motives are purely commercial and the central aim is to increase readership.

There are clearly not enough data to determine which of the two hypotheses (if any) is correct. Thus, the proximization analysis that follows cannot possibly address the coercion-legitimization level. In other words it cannot tell, from the macro functional perspective, why the proximization strategies, as a whole, have been used. Notwithstanding that, it is definitely thought-provoking to identify so many of the particular forms operating over relatively small text instants. The two examples below are excerpts from a book by Dan Verton, a respected IT journalist working with the influential Computerworld magazine.³ In the book (2003), he recaps the thoughts presented in the 2002 issues of the Computerworld:

(8) This is the emerging face of the new terrorism. It is a thinking man’s game that applies the violent tactics of the old world to the realities and vulnerabilities of the new high-tech world. Gone are the days when the only victims are those who are unfortunate enough to be standing within striking distance of the blast. Terrorism is now about smart, well-planned indirect targeting of the electronic sinews of the whole nations. Terrorists are growing in their evil capacity to turn our greatest technologies against us. Imagine, one day, overloaded digital networks, resulting in the collapse of finance and e-commerce networks, collapsed power grids and non-functioning telephone networks. Imagine, another day, the collapse, within seconds, of air traffic control systems, resulting in multiple airplane crashes; or of any other control systems, resulting in widespread car and train crashes, and nuclear meltdowns. Meanwhile, the perpetrators of the war remain undetected behind their distant, encrypted terminals, free to bring the world’s mightiest nations to their knees with a few keystrokes in total impunity. (Verton 2003: 55)

(9) Armed with nothing but a laptop and a high speed Internet connection, a computer geek could release a fast spreading computer virus that in a matter of minutes gives him control of thousands, perhaps millions, of personal computers and servers throughout the world. This drone army launches a silent and sustained attack on computers that are crucial for sending around the billions of packets of data that keep e-mail, the Web and other, more basic necessities of modern life humming. At first the attack seems to be an inconvenience – e-mail traffic grinds to a halt, Web browsing is impossible. But then the problems spread to services only tangentially related to the Internet: your automated-teller machine freezes up, your emergency call fails to get routed to police stations and ambulance services, airport- and train-reservation systems

³. www.computerworld.com
come down. After a few hours, the slowdown starts to affect critical systems: the computers that help run power grids, air-traffic control and telephone networks. (Verton 2003: 87)

Similar to the discourse of climate change, (8) and (9) construe a broad spectrum of the IDC entities: there is seemingly no entity in the world, whether a nation or an individual that is not under threat. Forcing the construal involves a number of lexico-grammatical ploys, such as, in text (8), abundant pluralization of the affected entities (e.g. “victims”, “nations”, “networks”, “systems”, etc.), or, in (9), depicting the cyber-threat in personally consequential terms (“your automated-teller machine freezes up, your emergency call fails to get routed to police stations and ambulance services”). Unlike in the discourse of climate change – but similar to cancer discourse – we face a problem with demarcating the ODC entities. Unless we take Verton’s “cyber-terrorists” to count among “terrorists” in the ideological, geopolitical and locational sense of alterity we have recognized so far, we have to admit the cyber-terrorists make, as if, isolated “ODC cells” among the IDC entities. Because of the short history of the cyber-threat discourse and, as has been mentioned, the shortage of data, especially reference data, the dilemma is apparently unresolvable. Thus, again, the part of the current conceptual scenario that remains most in line with the “default” proximization scenario (viz. Chapter 4) is the act of proximization as such, the symbolic shift of the threat entity in the direction of the IDC entities. Though neither (8) nor (9) construe a clear picture of the source of the threat, they include a large number of lexico-grammatical forms construing its speed, imminence, as well as devastating effects.

Most of these forms echo the language choices and strategies from the war on terror discourse, and, to the clear benefit of proximization as a theory, from the two discourses that we have approached earlier in this chapter. The cyber-threat is construed as having redefined, once and for all, the “old world” security arrangement ((8): “Gone are the days when (…)”). The “new world” arrangement is far more “vulnerable”: not only do the “old” ideologies of “evil” and “violence” continue to exist, but the ones exercising them have now acquired new formidable (“high-tech”) tools. As a result, the threat is “growing”, its “blast” can reach entire “nations”, and the impact is unpredictable, it can come “one day” or another. Both (8) and (9) construe the impact as ultra-fast ((8): “within seconds”; (9): “fast spreading”, “in a matter of minutes”) and massively destructive ((8): “airplane crashes”, “nuclear meltdowns”; (9): “affect critical systems”). Virtually all of these forms seem readily categorizable in the current STA frameworks. For instance, “fast spreading” counts in category 3 of the S framework, the “blast” in its fourth category, and “one day” counts in the first category of the T framework. In contrast to the discourse of climate change, as well as cancer discourse, we find
candidate items for inclusion in the axiological framework as well ("evil capacity", "violent tactics"). Intriguingly, (9) features a discourse sequence that might need an extra category in one of the frameworks. Spanned by “At first the attack seems to be an inconvenience” and “After a few hours, the slowdown starts to affect critical systems”, it proximizes the threat in the way yet unrecognized by the existing categories: the construal involves enumeration of relatively trivial consequences, followed by genuinely grave effects. Actually, but for the absence of the ideological element, it somewhat resembles the discourse form captured in category 3 of the A framework.

7.5 Proximization in political party representation: A view from Poland

In this last empirical section my aim is to show that proximization operations can be identified in discourses representing different political and public communication cultures. To this end I focus on Polish parliamentary discourse; more specifically, the discourse of the two biggest political parties in Poland, Civic Platform (CP) and Law and Justice (L&J).

CP & L&J, demonstrating “liberal” or “center” as opposed to “conservative” or “right-wing” mind-sets, have been the most important (the only important, one might say) players on the Polish political arena since 2007. In 2007 CP won parliamentary elections and formed a government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk, while L&J, with 43 MPs fewer, established itself as the main opposition party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński. Ever since, the arrangement has been remarkably stable. In 2011, in an unprecedented political feat, CP repeated their victory, extending the advantage over L&J to 50 MP seats (CP: 207 MPs; L&J: 157 MPs). As a result, Donald Tusk has remained the Prime Minister and his government, slightly reshaped over the years, continues to rule following its original lines. The post-2007 stability of the political scene in Poland is reflected in the polls: in the past five years, CP would continually attract about 40% of potential voters, and L&J about 30%, though recent (2012) polls reveal some narrowing of that gap. All in all, Polish political arena after 2007 can be described as fully dominated by the two parties, Civic Platform and Law & Justice, L&J being always “a step behind” the ruling CP.

Scoring so high in the opinion polls, both CP and L&J aspire to represent and define “the core” Polish interests (both home and abroad), “the central” values of

4. Polish Parliament (i.e. the Lower House, or the “Sejm”) has the total of 460 MP seats. In the 2007 elections CP won 209 seats, and L&J 166 seats. The 10 other parties participating in the elections managed to win, altogether, only 85 seats (!).
the nation, and “the closest” or “most direct” policy priorities. At the same time, they prescribe what is not in line with, beyond, opposing, and thus threatening those “central” ideologies, interests and policy goals. Consequently, their discourse defines, in terms of organization of the Discourse Space, the deictic center, the deictic periphery, and the distance between the two which is shrinking. As such, it is a typical proximization discourse, aiming to use the external threat as a premise for legitimization of own policies (or policy proposals, in the case of L&J). Of course, CP and L&J discourses “fill in” the deictic center and the periphery areas in a different way and with different entities; they also differ with regard to how dynamic is the construed move of the external entities in the direction of the deictic center. The following examples5 come from Donald Tusk’s parliamentary expose following CP’s win in the 2011 elections. Despite the unique character of the moment, they reveal some stable characteristics of the CP discourse:

(10) In the past four years, Poland managed to survive in good health the global crisis. But we know the storm is not over yet (…) The financial crisis, raging around us, is still threatening the security of the most developed countries, and it could be, one day, a direct threat to us as well (…) Millions of people accustomed to peace and prosperity, are now facing the dangers of poverty and destabilization (…) If we are to come off safe in these difficult times, we must continue to adhere to the same values our fathers fought for before the transformation, and to which we remained faithful in the time of the current crisis. We must continue with our hard work, responsibility, entrepreneurship, economic vigor, and the spirit of understanding, partnership and cooperation, both home and abroad (…) It is dedication to these values that keeps us safe. This is the face of the modern patriotism.

(Donald Tusk, November 11, 2011)

(11) Europe is changing right before us and the direction of this change is far from being certain. We are talking here not only about economic changes, but also about the grand vision of united Europe. The vision that in many places today is being challenged. That is being challenged also here in Poland, by our political opponents. I want to emphasize that in the present debate on the future of the European Union, there is no place for a political dilemma, whether to be in the center of Europe or to be cast away at its periphery. This is the dilemma of political illiterates. The actual dilemma for Poland is how to remain in the very heart of Europe, how to be a real, major player on the European forum, and how not to – due to the crisis – be marginalized, pushed to the periphery or outside the European Union.

(Donald Tusk, November 11, 2011)

5. All translations in this section are mine.
Tusk’s discourse reflects and reinforces the following conceptual arrangement. The DS center includes entities subscribing to such values as economic freedom, entrepreneurship, everyday economic resourcefulness, and enacting these values in the unconstrained space of partnership and cooperation, especially (viz. (11)) EU cooperation. The threat to the DS center entities is construed in complex geopolitical, ideological and economic terms. It involves, most directly, the financial crisis that “is raging around” to strike “one day” should Poland detract from the current pro-European course. Thus, the threat involves also any discontinuation of that course, as well as those political entities at home that demand such a change, the “our opponents”, eventually labeled “political illiterates”. The assignment of this label to L&J is quite evident and only apparently indirect, as there is, at the time, no other opposition party Tusk should seriously reckon with. The effects of the threat could be grave indeed: the fall in poverty of “millions” of individual households, but even more consequentially for the country in the long run, being “pushed outside the European Union”. Note that this “ultimate effect” comes at the very end of the argument in (10) and (11); what we have to do with here is a progression, over the two texts, from the largely ideological part (in (10)), to the part (11) where Tusk goes on to force construals of different possible futures, resulting from either following the values, or stopping following them. We have identified such “ideology-future policy” patterns when exploring the assertion-directive interface in Chapter 3. Apparently, Tusk’s assertions in (10) of indisputable, long-accepted values work much in the same way: of establishing credibility for future policy announcements.

At the linguistic level, Tusk proximizes the threat through the use of items we have discussed several times before: again, typical spatio-temporal centralization items such as indefinites (“one day”), impact proximity markers (“direct threat”), progressive forms (“is raging”, “is changing”), epistemic modality markers (“could be”), etc., are at play. There are no extraordinary choices here. What is worth noting, though, is that the overall dynamics of the proximization shift is relatively moderate. This is because, first, the primary ODC is an abstract entity (crisis) while the “concrete” (L&J) opposing entity makes only a “secondary ODC”; second, the construed encroachment of the abstract entity on the IDC home territory is immediately mitigated by a preventive solution, “remaining in the heart of Europe”. The L&J proximization is far more dynamic and, in fact, far more fear-inducing. The following is an excerpt from Jaroslaw Kaczyński’s reply to Donald Tusk’s expose:

(12) In serving Europe’s interests, Donald Tusk’s government fails to serve the central interests of Poland. There is no real political, economic, or moral rationale for most of the commitments this government has made. Now, in the time of
crisis, these commitments only bring us down. We, the people of Poland, have shown we can manage on our own. But not under this government, whose leader’s greatest aspiration is being patted on the back by Angela Merkel. Who has turned Poland into a German-Russian condominium, which is degrading us day in and day out. Today we witness the beginning of the end of Tusk’s rule.

(Jarosław Kaczyński, November 11, 2011)

The DS arrangement in (12) could hardly be any clearer. The center includes “the people of Poland”, L&J, and L&J’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński, speaking on behalf of the people. Note the function of the “inclusive we”, construing the unity, and at the same time alienating “this government” (rather than a “Polish government”) in the sentence that follows. The periphery, construed mostly in political-ideological terms, includes “Europe” as a whole, the countries in Europe that, apparently, pose a threat to Poland’s sovereignty as a state (“a German-Russian condominium”), plus, as has been said, Donald Tusk’s government and the CP, acting as a collaborator (“the commitments this government has made”). Although on such a construal Donald Tusk’s government, Germany and Russia all compare in terms of the general ODC status, the particular statutes are different: Tusk is construed as, virtually, a servant of German government; his “greatest aspiration” is “being patted on the back by Angela Merkel”. Forced that clearly and unambiguously, the IDC-ODC divide in (12) makes an excellent arrangement for proximization of the external threat, the threat of being engulfed in the economic crisis by foreign engagements (“Now, in the time of crisis, these commitments only bring us down”), and, eventually, the threat of disintegration as a state (“German-Russian condominium (…) is degrading us day in and day out”). Given the caliber of these threats, Kaczyński’s final words in (12) (“Today we witness the beginning of the end of Tusk’s rule”) fall close to a call for a revolution.

7.6 Outlook

The discourses analyzed (pre-analyzed, in fact) in Sections 7.2–5 illustrate, apparently, only a tiny fraction of domains where proximization operates or could be expected to operate. Many more can be identified especially within the vast scope of modern CDA, or “critical discourse studies” (CDS), to use a term that captures much better the rapid development of the field. The domains most explored in the past 25 years of CDS development have been at least the following: racism, xenophobia and national identity (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Dijk 1987, 1991, 1993; Wodak 1996, 1999), gender identity and inequality (e.g. Cameron 1992; Koller 2008; Litosseliti and Sunderland 2002; Morrish 2007),
media discourse (Bell 1991; Bell and Garrett 1998; Chilton 1988; Fairclough 1995; Fowler 1991; Fowler et al. 1979; Montgomery 2007; O’Keefe 2006; Richardson 2007; van Dijk 1988; etc.) and discourses of national vs. international politics (Chilton 2004; Chilton and Schäffner 2002; Wilson 1990; among many others). This is of course a highly subjective overview. It gives, however, a sense of the spectrum of domains where proximization seems applicable. Since the central commitments of CDS include investigating the ways in which ideologies and identities are reflected, enacted, re-enacted, negotiated, modified, reproduced, etc., in discourse, any “doing” of CDS must involve, first of all, studying the original positioning of the different ideologies and identities, and, in most cases, studying also the “target positioning”, that is the change the analyst claims is taking place through the speaker’s use of discourse. Thus, doing CDS means handling issues of the conceptual arrangement of the discourse space (DS), and most notably, the crucial issue of the DS symbolic re-arrangement. As such, any CDS practice may need the apparatus of proximization to account for both the original and the target setup of the DS. The most relevant seem those of the CDS domains whose discourses force the distinction between the different ideologies and/or identities in a particularly clear-cut and appealing manner, to construe opposition between “better” and “worse” ideologies/identities. This is evidently the case with discourses of xenophobia, racism, nationalism or social exclusion (for instance, the language of anti-gay propaganda), all of which presuppose in-group vs. out-group distinction, arguing for the “growing” threat from the out-group. It is also the case with many national discourses, in which similar opposition is construed between the “central-national” and the “peripheral-international” interests – the ongoing debate over the future of the Eurozone is a case in point.

What CDS landscape can offer in the way of domains, it cannot yet offer in the way of its own analytic tools, which makes proximization even more applicable. The STA model is hoped to offer one such tool. Reversely, the STA model should itself benefit from inclusion in the CDS focus, as more extensive applications of the model should productively influence its cognitive-pragmatic framework, “data-driving” the possible new or modified components. This book has shown that one of the most direct challenges to proximization theory resulting from further applications of the STA model is proposing a DS conception universal enough to handle different ranges of the deictic center and the deictic periphery, in particular discourses. The present chapter has made it evident enough, and the challenge will continue to grow as more discourses are investigated. To face it, proximization theory needs further input from Cognitive Linguistics, but, as we have observed, there are issues CL itself needs to answer, to offer such an input. As Dirven et al. (2007) point out, in the past 30 years CL’s treatment of discourse has hardly moved from the description to the interpretation stage, i.e. the practice
of discourse has not been critically analyzed. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) stress the focus of CL on the issues of conceptual representation, grammatical organization and general meaning construction, but at the same time admit to CL’s lack of focus on discourse social functions associated with particular instances of that general construction and organization. How do these limitations affect representation of the Discourse Space and its rearrangement following proximization? It seems that, as of today, proximization theory must remain happy with CL’s mere recognition of the core ability of discourse to force structured conceptualizations, with various levels of organization reflecting alternate ways in which the same situation, event or phenomenon can be construed (Verhagen 2007). This capacity has been documented in the present book: we have been able to define the “prototypically-central” and “prototypically-peripheral” entities of the DS in a state-political interventionist discourse, as well as indicate the existence of entities (in the discourses addressed in the present chapter) revealing different kinds/degrees of deviation from such prototypical characterization. But we have been unable to prescribe, as yet, a stable DS composition for many other discourses where proximization (as a discourse symbolic operation, not theory) could be identified. The reason lies within CL as a part of the theoretical groundwork of the STA model. Apparently, CL is not yet geared to describe “the structured conceptualizations with various levels of organization” in terms of the levels, direct and indirect, subordinate and superordinate, of social functions. Thus, we can only go as far as to observe that there are, in e.g. cancer prevention discourse, different IDCs, some of which (the patient) are “primary” in the sense they are the most evident social “insiders”, “around whom” and whose direct interests the discourse is construed, and some of which (the physician) are “primary” in another sense, that they author the discourse, and the construal the discourse forces is, formally speaking, theirs. What we cannot establish, though, is which of the two kinds of these “primary” entities is really central in deictic terms. Even if we take the exclusively linguistic perspective, and assign the central status to the speaker, we will not escape problems accounting for ODC acts, which affect the speaker’s interests only indirectly.

Proximization theory urges, in its own interest, that CL accounts for such dilemmas, that it tries to fill in the vague “multiple levels” of discourse construal with specific functions and specific actors (not always synonymous with speakers, as cancer prevention discourse indicates) typifying each of the levels, in different discourses. Unless we are able to say who “really speaks”, meaning who is the party from which and from whose interests the construal originates, we cannot determine who “really does”, meaning motivates, the proximization, and whose direct and indirect personal, professional, social, political, etc., goals, are enacted through the intervention the proximization serves to legitimate. Needless to say,
urging this is urging, broadly, that CL makes an attempt to approach construal operations in typological terms, which amounts to a general call for more focus on issues of directness and indirectness of discourse. It is quite surprising that while the very notion of construal in CL subsumes the view that the same situation, event, or phenomenon, can be conceptualized in different ways, there have been virtually no attempts to classify different construal operations from the function perspective of the direct and indirect social goals they perform. Such a classification would have to approach DS as a territory of gradable distances from the deictic center, rather than an area described in terms of simple, binary in-out oppositions. The aspiration seems huge, but there would be huge benefits in return. Recall the problems (Chapter 4) with the assignment of forms in the first (IDC) category of the S framework. The “upgraded” view of the DS would solve the issue of conflation of the “direct” IDCs (such as “USA” or “American people”) and the indirect IDCs (such as “free world” or “democratic societies”). We would receive backup to claim the need for an extra IDC category, and, as a result, the subsequent assignment of lexico-grammatical items in that category and the counts from it would produce more precise qualitative conclusions.

Such a call is essentially pragmatic, reflecting this book’s view of Pragmatics as a “mediator”, a research perspective deriving meanings from the universal categories of space, time, and value, and directing them to perform, in linguistic configurations, specific social goals in specific contexts. In Chapters 1 and 2, I have stressed the benefits of studying not only the “upward”, pragmatic-cognitive, but also the “downward”, pragmatic-lexical, link. Acknowledging research, such as Paul Chilton’s, at cognitive-linguistic levels, I have offered an approach integrating the cognitive-linguistic, pragma-linguistic and, crucially, lexico-grammatical components. Since the methodology applied to account for the lexico-grammatical items has been, unsurprisingly, corpus methodology, the evidence generated is, primarily, from item counts, and only secondarily, from text analysis. The latter has been used mainly to sanction the contents of the STA frameworks (Chapter 4), and then (Chapter 6) to illustrate the most important quantitative findings, i.e. to show the items “at work”. This was a pre-meditated move since, as was shown, cognitive pragmatics of political/public discourse had underappreciated the role of rigorous scrutiny of the lexical element. Thus, my primary objective was to argue for the key importance, to the proximization model, of lexical items, whose patterns not only establish the deictic center and the deictic periphery, but, most of all, help force symbolic construals wherein the peripheral entities cross the DS to enter the deictic center. A further, methodological advantage is that clearly demarcated lexical items, unlike longer, heterogeneous, virtually unbounded stretches of discourse, can be counted and the counts can be compared, in functional compensatory terms, for more tangible results and
thus stronger conclusions. In its future development, however, proximization theory could derive substantial benefits from a sharper focus on micro-textual phenomena. Apart from “feeding”, bottom-up, the theoretical architecture of the STA proximization model, micro-textual analysis helps handle the phenomena which, albeit not occurring within an entire discourse timeframe, are nonetheless important to the general characterization of the discourse. Not to search far, take the linear “ideology-materialization” formula captured in the third category of the axiological framework. It would have been counter-explanatory to leave the formula to quantitative analysis only. In fact, our qualitative micro-textual study has considerably added to the finding that discourse of the war on terror is, as a whole, a functional compensatory discourse, that the potential of flexible adjustment of proximization strategies extends throughout, even if actual discourse manifestations of such an adjustment are seen irregularly.

Speaking of the role of micro-textual analysis in possibly re-shaping the STA model of proximization, I must add that both quantitative and qualitative data in the book corroborate the rationale for introducing an independent metaphoric component, independent in the sense of defining its own category, in the spatial framework. We have seen, quite often, cases in which metaphoric construals of the ODC impact would much deviate, in terms of quantitative representation as well as specific function, from the functional line prescribed by category 4, and the other categories of the framework. Since one of the inherent properties of metaphor is that it neutralizes the literal meaning of the phrase or expression in which it occurs, it might be that only some metaphors are able to force fear appeals in the way the other items in the spatial framework do, and consequently, some other metaphors could be taken to perform other functions, for instance a mystifying function. Another concept/schema needing consideration for a possible inclusion in the STA model is topos. As has been observed in Chapter 2, topos provides a common-sense reasoning frame against which specific issues in the public space can be approached. As such, it functions as a facilitator of inference of the “obvious conclusions” regarding these issues. This characterization is quite in line with all those STA categories that presuppose an element of analogy as a facilitator of acceptance of the speaker’s future visions (especially in the temporal framework). As theoretical accounts of social topoi (van Eemeren et al. 1996; van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2001; etc.) have been quite successful in proposing typologies, and the latter reflect a whole plethora of social issues underlying a plethora of discourses, including all those mentioned at the outset of this section, introducing topos in the STA model could help maintain typological rigor in the face of the empirical extensions.

As can be seen, proximization theory can be further advanced, both theoretically and empirically, both in its own interest and, perhaps, in the interest of its
constitutive disciplines and perspectives. Regardless of the particular stages of its evolution, it can be expected that the main discourse function of proximiza-
tion will remain legitimization. This is because the very conceptual mechanism of proximization involves speaker’s and addressee’s recognition of the personal as well as the in-group social consequentiality of the events construed. Such a rec-
ognition constitutes, in turn, a legitimization premise for safeguarding interests of the in-group. The final word is that proximization, as a legitimization strategy, must not be equated or associated with deception. We have seen earlier in this chapter that symbolic construals of proximity of external entities may serve unequivocally positive social goals, such as for instance mobilization of resources in health and environment sectors. In that sense, proximization, as a theory, follows a critical mission that is free from ideological and political commitments.
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