In this article, I introduce and discuss some of the ways situated intersectional analysis can help to describe — and even explain — different kinds of social, economic, political and personal inequalities. As I have been working on intersectionality for many years — both before and after the issues discussed under this term were to be so labeled, I shall focus primarily on my own version rather than conduct a review of the literature.

The paper starts by discussing the ways sociological studies traditionally describe inequality focusing on issues of class. It then introduces intersectionality as a theoretical framework that can encompass different kinds of inequalities, simultaneously (ontologically), but enmeshed (concretely). The latter part of the article examines the ways different kinds of systemic domains provide multiple grounds for the production and reproduction of these inequalities.

Stratification, class, situated intersectionality

Traditionally, sociological studies of inequality privileged economic inequality and labeled it as “class structure”. While in their theorizations of class Marxist sociologists focused on relations of production and sometimes reproduction, with the feminist turn especially, Weberian approaches to stratification differentiate between three different axes, those of economy, power (political, but also as backed by the physical) and status. Many theoretical debates were issued regarding the relationship and exchangeability between these axes of power, as well as the extent to which

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1 - An earlier version of this paper was presented at an ISA plenary in Yokohama, Summer 2014.


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the distribution of people along these stratification axes necessarily congeal into fixed separate classes, between which the conflict is so central in the Marxist approach. Generally, however, the overall effects of people’s differential stratified locations have tended to be seen as resulting in people’s differential “life chances”. In Britain, at least, this was transformed for the purpose of census into a list of categories based on people’s occupations.³

More recently, we have seen what many call “the cultural turn”, largely affected by Bourdieu⁴ who highlighted the crucial importance of symbolic power as well as the different kinds of capital – social, cultural, as well as economic and political – which people use to differentiate and distance themselves from other, inferior, class groupings. Indeed, the latest issue of the journal Sociology⁵ is focused around the recent study of class in British society⁶, inspired by Bourdieu (although with an additional theoretical contribution), which used the BBC Great British Class Survey Experiment: it has been hailed as the new definitive contribution to both class theory and contemporary class structure in the UK. Other important feminist contributions in this vein have been Diana Reay⁷ and Beverly Skeggs⁸.

However, in a recent sociological symposium on “Living with the cuts”, which took place at the British Library on May 30, 2014, when Mike Savage presented his study and I was asked to be the discussant, he was either too polite to disagree with me or actually agreed when I pointed out to him that the clusters he and his colleagues found, which are supposed to describe the new class structure of Britain, are actually intersectional clusters – as they were characterised not only in terms of specific economic positions but most of them also clustered around specific regions of residence, age and/or gender. This is why in my writings⁹ I have argued that intersectionality should be “mainstreamed” by sociological theory which, until recently, has tended to ignore it: it should be considered as the most valid theoretical approach to study social stratification.

What is intersectionality? Lesley McCall and others argue that intersectionality is “the most important theoretical contribution that women’s studies in conjunction with related fields has made so far”. Indeed, the imprint of intersectional analysis can easily be traced to innovations in equality legislation, human rights and development discourses. Given its multiple and multi-disciplinarian history, intersectionality is not a unified body of theory but more a range of theoretical and conceptual tools. As such, however, it is similar to all other major theoretical perspectives that have been developed by more than one theorist or space/time context, from Marxism to Neo-Liberalism to feminism, let alone sociology. This does not mean that we cannot debate what should be the right theoretical framing using intersectionality for particular analytical and political purposes. I call my particular version of intersectionality theory “situated intersectionality”, which is quite different from some of the other versions of intersectionality that have been popularized.

While originally developed as a counter to identity politics that emphasize (as well as homogenize and reify) unidimensional versions of identity, some of these intersectional approaches have become a kind of fragmented identity politics, in which the focus is no longer, for instance, women or Blacks, but Black women. Fundamental to my approach to situated intersectionality analysis (which I started to develop with Floya Anthias in the early 1980’s, before the term intersectionality was invented by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989), is that intersectional analysis should be applied to all people and not just to marginalised and racialised women, with whom the rise of intersectionality theory is historically linked. Our contention is that while the political, professional, and disciplinary interests of those who use intersectionality analysis might vary, only such a generic approach to intersectionality analysis could ultimately avoid the risk of exceptionalism and of reifying and essentialising social boundaries. As critical race and ethnicity studies point out, not only black people are racially constructed, and feminists do remind men they too have a gender.

Intersectionality analysis relates to the distribution of power and other resources in society and therefore it constitutes what in sociology is known as stratification theory. Stratification, or, rather, social stratification, relates to the differential hierarchical locations of individuals and groupings of people on
society’s grids of power. Intersectionality is the most valid approach to the sociological study of social stratification because it does not reduce the complexity of power constructions into a single social division, including class, as has been customarily the case in stratification theories. At the same time, it is important to emphasise that I do not see the different social divisions which construct power relations as additive\textsuperscript{14}, cross-cutting\textsuperscript{15} or interlocking\textsuperscript{16}, but rather as mutually constituted (although ontologically irreducible to each other), forming the particular nuanced and contested meanings of particular social locations in particular historical moments, within particular social, economic and political contexts in which some social divisions have more saliency and effect.

However, as Floya Anthias and I have always emphasized, although in concrete situations the different social divisions constitute each other, they are irreducible to each other – each of them has a different ontological discourse of particular dynamics of power relations of exclusion and/or exploitation, using a variety of legitimate and illegitimate technologies of inferiorizations, intimidations and sometimes actual violence to achieve this. For example, class relations are constructed around notions of production and consumption; gender – those of sexuality and reproduction; race/ethnicity as constructed by particular phenotypical or cultural boundaries; ability around the notion of “the normal”, etc. Social inequalities thus amount to much more than the mere lifestyle “distinctions” of the culturalist approach to stratification.

Intersectionality as the theoretical approach to study social inequality can be described as a development of feminist standpoint theory which claims, in somewhat different ways, that it is vital to account for the social positioning of the social agent – the researcher or the researched – and challenge “the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere”\textsuperscript{17} as a cover and a legitimisation of a hegemonic masculinist “positivistic” positioning. Situated gaze, situated knowledge and situated imagination\textsuperscript{18}, construct differently the ways we see the world. However, another irreducibility in my approach to intersectionality analysis\textsuperscript{19} is that I consider as crucial the analytical differentiation between different facets of social analysis – that of people’s positionings along socio-economic grids of power; that of people’s experiential and identificatory perspectives of where they belong; and that of their normative value systems. These

\textsuperscript{15} Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, \textit{Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex}, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{16} Patricia Hill Collins, \textit{Black Feminist Thought}, \textit{op. cit.}
different facets are related to each other but are also irreducible to one another. They need to be studied autonomously rather than automatically implied by each other, as identity politics tend to do. And yet, the meanings of these different facets can only be understood in relation to each other. People positioned in the same social locations would often develop different identifications, meanings and normative attitudes and attachments to them.

Situated intersectionality analysis, therefore, in all its facets, is highly sensitive to the geographical, social and temporal locations of the particular individual or collective social actors examined by it, contested, shifting and multiple as they usually are. Therefore, in the intersectionality approach presented here, we also highlight the central importance in the analysis of issues of translocality – i.e. the ways particular categories of social divisions have different meanings – and often different relative power – in the different spaces in which the analyzed social relations take place; of transcalarity – i.e. the ways different social divisions have often different meanings and power when we examine them in small-scale households or neighbourhoods, in particular cities, states, regions and globally; and of transtemporality – i.e. how these meanings and power change historically and even in different points in people’s life cycle.

Therefore, unlike in traditional social stratification theories, it is of vital importance that any comprehensive contemporary theory of social inequality include global and regional, as well as national and local, orders of stratification. While some would like to see the boundaries between them blurred in this transcalar analysis, I would argue that especially when examining the identificatory and normative facets of intersectional analysis it is important to consider the spatial multi-locational as well as a transcalar examination.

The transcalar spatial context, however, is especially important when we discuss the non-linear nature of social and political changes in global and local contexts, and this is where adopting chaos and especially complexity theory can add an important element into our analysis of intersectional power.

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20 - I used to refer to these different analytical dimensions as “levels” until Cass Balchin drew my attention to the fact that this term assumes a hierarchy. And indeed I do believe that it is a remnant of the old Marxist infra- and super-structural levels. For this reason I am using the term “facets” here and am grateful to Balchin for alerting me to this, as I do not want to assume here a presupposed hierarchy.


Bauman’s discussion of “post-panoptic power” 23 and Urry’s analysis of “islands of social order within an ocean of social disorder” 24 are especially important. Similarly, such an examination also needs to have a clear temporal dimension. Feminist theorists 25 have been at the forefront of critiques of linear assumptions of time, arguing that narratives always include contextually framed intertwining traces of imagined pasts, present and future. Whilst Derrida sees spaces as “dead time” 26 or in which time is stopped, Massey argues that space is entirely lively, constituting a “simultaneity of stories so far” intrinsic to being located 27 – although I would argue that situated imagined futures are also intrinsic to these locations. 28

Intersectionality and inequality

Having elaborated the theoretical framework of situated intersectionality, we need to ask: in what ways can adopting it promote our understanding of social inequalities? 29 Firstly, as stated at the beginning of the paper, is the obvious point that intersectionality is a more comprehensive way to describe, understand and analyse social inequalities – not only does it go beyond the automatic privileging of the economic, as stratification theories based on class do, but it also goes beyond the dichotomy promoted by Nancy Fraser 30 and others of the redistribution and recognition dilemma. 31 Rather, it aims to explore the ways multiple axes of social power constitute particular (shifting and contested) social positionings, identifications and normative values, focusing on some rather than others, depending both on the research (or political) questions driving the analysis as well as the particular social divisions which are important in particular space/time locations and/or for particular people or groupings.

28 - Nira Yuval-Davis, Kathryn Cassidy and Georgie Wemyss, “Beyond a situated intersectional everyday approach to bordering”, op. cit.
29 - Before doing this, I want to emphasize that although in this paper I discuss inequalities in generic terms, I agree with Goran Therborn (The Killing Fields of Inequality, Cambridge: Polity, 2013) who differentiates between vital, existential and resources inequalities and considers them all as different facets of social inequalities. Vital inequalities relate to the actual life chances of babies to be born, survive infancy, grow to maturity and old age and with healthy, rather than stunted bodies. Existential ones relate to people’s abilities to live full and fulfilled lives, with dignity, social engagement and a sense of belonging. Resources inequalities relate not only to access to economic resources but also to those of cultural and other kinds of social capital.
Secondly, it combines in the exploration of inequalities the inter-categorical and intra-categorical methodologies described by Lesley McCall. The first methodology concerns comparisons between the distributions of inequalities of particular social divisions (e.g. gender, class or race) in different locations; the second focuses on the meaning of these categories in particular social and historical contexts. (Somewhat similarly, Rosemary Crompton and John Scott have differentiated between variable-oriented and case-oriented studies – but they spoke only of studies of class). The translocality, transcalarity and trans-temporality of situated intersectionality allows us to avoid the vernacularity of many studies of inequality (especially those affected by the Bourdieusian approach) as well as the simple universality of others which just assume, rather than enquire, the different meanings of these social divisions in different locations. Mignolo has called it epistemological pluriversality.

Thirdly, however, situated intersectional analysis does not homogenize or reify boundaries of localities or groupings. It takes into consideration the situated gazes of particular people in relation to their own social locations and social well-being. Focusing on these situated gazes enables us to incorporate minority and non-conformist perspectives of social actors rather than assume that all people in a particular social category even in the same geographical and social locations would necessarily share the same meaning of social relations of power in their own society or community in general and their own positionings in particular. Rather, we need to add to the pluriversal epistemology a dialogical inclusive one in which as many as possible of the participants in a particular social encounter would take part, as the only way to approximate the truth (although “the truth” would ever remain elusive). And there can be no social justice without attempting to approximate the truth as much as possible.

When we discuss issues of politics and domination, however, there is another kind of dialogical epistemology that has developed as a feminist political tool especially since the 1990s but has existed for much longer. This is what many of us call a transversal dialogue. The aim of these transversal dialogues is to create a common epistemology of particular practices, often conflictual,

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35 - Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, op. cit.
across borders and boundaries. The difference between transversal dialogue and Patricia Hill Collins’ inclusive dialogue is that this dialogue has clear boundaries based on shared normative (in the feminist case, emancipatory) values, although with different identifications and social locations. Using the tools of what Italian feminists have called “rooting” and “shifting”, i.e., being self-reflective regarding one’s own positioning and yet attempting to understand the situated gazes of the other participants, the resulting common transversal epistemology is used as a basis for a political solidarity.

I would like here to briefly mention four kinds of domains that are important to the understanding of social inequalities. The genealogies and dynamics of production and reproduction of each kind are very different and thus they cannot be reduced to each other. Yet they are all interrelated and embedded in one another and contest each other, producing more or less blurred or permeable boundaries in different temporal and spatial locations. Before doing this, however, I would also like to enrich our understanding of what is social inequality.

The first domain that produces social inequalities relates to the borders of states, from local to national to supra- and international. These borders delineate the boundaries of legitimate governance. As we can see, for example, in what is happening at the moment in Libya and Syria, inability of States to govern, to gain legitimacy for their governance and to control State and non-State competing political actors, can crucially affect the quality of lives and the resources available to the people living within those boundaries.

The second domain relates to the boundaries of the multi-scalar zones in which differential levels of different kinds of economic, social, cultural and political resources are produced, reproduced and are distributed (or not) to the people living within these boundaries (which can vary from a particular neighbourhood in a city to a whole construction of “the West and the Rest”). Data relating to vital inequalities are especially revealing in this regard. Apparently, the average life expectancy differs significantly not only between, for example, Northern and Southern England, but also within the neighbourhoods in which different tube stations in London are located.

The third domain relates to the boundaries constructed by different kinds of political projects of belonging (such as nationalism, racism, religion, cosmopolitanism and more) 37. People can be citizens of the same states, live in the same neighbourhood and even work in similar occupations and yet their social positionings and access to different kinds of social capital – existential but also vital and economic – can vary hugely.

Last, but not least, the fourth domain relates to the production and reproduction of social inequalities within, and between, the boundaries of intergenerational, familial and informal communities and networks aimed at social, biological and symbolic reproduction. Stage in the life cycle, gender, generation and membership in particular kinds of kinship and/or vocational, friendship, religious and local communities greatly affect access to different kinds of social resources and can act as a buffer or as an enhancement of the structures and processes which produce and reproduce social inequalities.

**Conclusion**

The argument of this paper might seem paradoxical. I argue, on the one hand, that situated intersectionality should be adopted as the best theoretical approach to social stratification. On the other hand, I also argue that situated intersectionality – let alone other theories of social stratification – is not really useful in explaining social inequalities, as it tends to reflect a snapshot of differential positionings along different axes of power, rather than how they are produced and reproduced. To explain the latter, I introduced four different domains of states’ governance, economic zones, different projects of the politics of belonging and those of intergenerational, familial and interpersonal networks. The systemic edges of these domains encounter and construct each other.

This interplay among the different domains is complex, contested and constantly shifting and different kinds of social inequalities are being constructed, maintained and challenged. They are where the full relationships between different kinds of inequalities and different kinds of power and domination can be fully explored, using the tools of situated intersectionality as it methodological guide. But this involves a lot of work, as studying either macro global structures or micro social encounters is not enough. We need both, and we need them both to interrelate with each other and be understood by one another.

**AUTEUR**

RÉSUMÉ

Intersectionnalité située et inégalité sociale

Cet article introduit et discute certaines des manières dont l’analyse intersectionnelle située peut aider à décrire, et même à expliquer, différentes sortes d’inégalités sociales — économiques, politiques et personnelles. L’intersectionnalité située est un cadre théorique qui comprend différentes formes d’inégalités, de manière à la fois simultanée (ontologiquement) et imbriquée (pratiquement). Ce cadre est fondé sur une épistémologie dialogique qui incorpore des regards sur ces inégalités situés en différents lieux. L’article s’achève sur quatre domaines différents où se jouent la production et la reproduction des inégalités — politique, économique, communautaire et intersubjectif.

ABSTRACT

Situated intersectionality and social inequality

In this article I introduce and discuss some of the ways situated intersectional analysis can help to describe — and even explain — different kinds of social, economic, political and personal inequalities. Situated intersectionality is a theoretical framework that can encompass different kinds of inequalities, simultaneously (ontologically), but enmeshed (concretely), based on a dialogical epistemology which incorporates differentially located situated gazes at these inequalities. The end of the paper introduces four different domains in which production and reproduction of inequalities take place — political, economic, communal and intersubjective.