THE MAGICAL POWER OF WORDS

S. J. Tambiah

University of Cambridge

Words in ritual

Contemporary anthropology has in recent years become aware of the relevance of linguistics for its theoretical advance, and it is remarkable that Malinowski, perhaps more far-sighted than many of his successors, not only saw this relevance but also put forward an ethnographical theory of language which sprang directly from his fieldwork, particularly from his immersion in Trobriand magic.

Malinowski argued that the potency of Trobriand magic was felt by the Trobrianders to lie in words (spells). In many of his works, particularly in Volume 2 of Coral gardens and their magic, he provided an unusual amount of supporting linguistic data. This evidence has had some influence on linguists, notably J. R. Firth, but it has never been critically examined by anthropologists. Can an anthropologist get more out of the evidence than Malinowski himself managed to do, either by resort to comparative material from other cultures or by closer attention to Malinowski’s own material?

Although Malinowski’s immediate successors who worked in the same or nearby regions confirmed that the verbal component in ritual was important (Fortune 1963; R. Firth 1967), the orthodox anthropological approach devalued the role of words in ritual which was seen as stereotyped behaviour consisting of a sequence of non-verbal acts and manipulation of objects. However, recent literature has again shown appreciation of the role of words and no-one today I think will dispute this statement by Leach (1966: 407): ‘Ritual as one observes it in primitive communities is a complex of words and actions... it is not the case that words are one thing and the rite another. The uttering of the words itself is a ritual.’

One virtue at least of defining ritual as consisting of the word and the deed is that this formula solves the dilemma posed by Goethe’s Faust—whether in the beginning there was the word or the deed. Freud concluded his Totem and taboo with the rhetorical statement that in the beginning was the deed. According to Gellner (1959: 22), linguistic philosophy has unsuccessfully tried to solve the puzzle by saying that ‘the word is a deed’. What I find interesting about Faust is that he progressed from the word, to thought, then to the notion of power, and ended with the deed. These four terms are in fact the ingredients of most ritual systems in which there is a reciprocal relation between the word and the deed, with the other two terms intervening. The formula raises one question that is quantitative in nature: the ratio of words to actions may vary between rituals in the same society

* The Malinowski Memorial Lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science on 20 February 1968. Extra material has been added to the text of the lecture: future Malinowski lectures will, however, be published as delivered.
or even between societies). At one extreme is the case of rituals performed with words alone and at the other the case where actions dominate though perhaps words are not excluded. Most rituals fall in between but yet may show distinct differences in the proportion of words to acts. Thus a healing ritual or an initiation rite may emphasise words while a collective rite in which there is mass participation may rely less on auditory communication and more on the display of conspicuous visible material symbols.

In most cases it would appear that ritual words are at least as important as other kinds of ritual act; but besides that, and this is an intriguing point, very often (but not always) if the ethnographer questions his informants ‘Why is this ritual effective?’ the reply takes the form of a formally expressed belief that the power is in the ‘words’ even though the words only become effective if uttered in a very special context of other action.

In attempting to solve this puzzle the first point I want to make is that ritual words cannot be treated as an undifferentiated category. Rituals exploit a number of verbal forms which we loosely refer to as prayers, songs, spells, addresses, blessings, etc. It is necessary to study whether a ritual is composed of such recognised categories and to analyse their distinctive features in terms of their internal form and their sequence. The fact that such a battery of verbal devices may appear in a single rite should not only give us insights into the art of ritual but also dispel any lingering traces of a Frazerian hangover. Some of us have operated with the concept of ‘magic’ as something different from ‘religion’; we have thought of ‘spell’ as acting mechanically and as being intrinsically associated with magic; we have opposed ‘spell’ to ‘prayer’ which was thought to connote a different kind of communication with the divine. Frazer carried this thinking to an extreme by asserting that magic was thoroughly opposed to religion and in the interest of preserving this distinction dismissed half the globe as victims of the ‘confusion of magic with religion’.

It is possible to question the general validity of this dichotomy by demonstrating that in a single class of rituals practised in Ceylon there are used a variety of verbal forms in a particular sequence and that the very logic of the ritual depends on this order and distinction. A Sinhalese healing ritual or exorcism ceremony exploits three main kinds of verbal form which accompany other ritual acts (such as dancing, miming, food offerings and manipulation of objects). They are called mantra, kankanavva and kaviya, and they are arranged in a progression of four sequences beginning and ending with the mantra. The mantra corresponds to our stereotype notion of ‘spell’. It is in prose, it has no poetic structure, it has a characteristic opening and ending (e.g. ‘ōm namō’ and ‘hṛing’). The mantra is muttered by the exorcist and it is not meant to be heard for it constitutes secret knowledge. The ceremony begins with the recitation of mantra which summon the demons responsible for the disease. This summoning is phrased in Sinhalese as ‘hitting with sound’ (anda gahanavā), but the language of command is also accompanied by the language of entreaty and persuasion. These spells also contain abbreviated allusions to myths and thus prepare the ground for the next sequence.

This sequence is the kankanavva which is chanted aloud in rhythmic prose composed of ordinary intelligible language and is meant to be heard and understood by the participants. The ritual as a public ceremony may be said to begin with the
kannalavva. It states why the ceremony is being held, describes the nature of the patient’s affliction, and makes a plea to the gods to come and bless the ceremony and to the demons to act benevolently and remove the disease. Typically the pleas are accompanied by food offerings.

The next in sequence are the kaviya (verses) which take up the major part of the ceremony. Kaviya are composed in quatrains with end (and sometimes also beginning) rhymes. Sinhalese kaviya are highly lyrical and framed in literary Sinhalese (of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries), perfectly intelligible but yet distinct from contemporary everyday language. They are normally recorded in texts. From the point of view of the dramatic presentation of the ritual it is important that they are sung loudly to the accompaniment of music and mime. The semantic content of the verses is a long and highly redundant recital of the origin myths of gods and demons and their encounters, in which the demons finally subject themselves to the practice of conditional evil, sanctioned by the deities (varan), provided that humans reciprocate by appropriate gift giving. In the rite the myths are sung in order that evil and disease can be defined, objectified or personified and presented realistically on the stage so that the appropriate action of changing the undesirable to the desirable, in other words, the act of transfer which changes the condition of the patient, with his unequivocal participation, can take place. The redundancy, lengthy recital and staging are contrived to achieve that crucial understanding by the patient of his illness which is a necessary prelude to and a condition of the cure.

The ceremony logically enough concludes with a mantra which enacts the expulsion of the demon itself. Typically this spell concludes thus: ‘Just as god so and so, by a certain action subdued such and such a demon, by that power may the patient overcome the disease and the demon be subdued’. The lexical and semantic contents of the spells present a special problem when compared to the other two forms (invocation and praise songs) which are readily intelligible and heard by the audience. Indologists will be familiar with the literature on the long history of charms and spells—mantra, dhāranī, and paritā—in Hinduism and Buddhism. I shall digress from my main theme if I enter that territory and shall therefore limit myself to the Sinhalese situation.

A prevailing misconception is that Sinhalese mantra are unintelligible or even nonsensical. Credibility is lent to this notion by the fact that mantra are referred to as the ‘language of the demons’ (yakṣa bāśīva) as opposed to human language. A linguistic analysis of some recorded and published Sinhalese mantra made by Wimal Dissanayake of King’s College, Cambridge, shows that they embody a subtle design which uses the notion of a hierarchy of languages. When Hindu gods are invoked and their origin myths referred to, the spells contain Sanskrit expressions, no doubt distorted from the point of view of the purist. When the Buddha and Buddhist mythological events are alluded to, Pali words are employed, once again portraying syntactical infelicities. When however the spell actually narrates an origin myth, the language used is that of the classical Sinhalese literary forms prevalent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Finally, when demons are directly addressed and commanded, the words are a polyglot mixture and therefore unintelligible, being compounded of Sinhalese, Tamil, Pali, Sanskrit, Malayalam, Telugu, Bengali and even Persian. This exotic and powerful mixture is the
‘demon language’. Some points can be briefly made concerning the design of these spells: the language stratification is indicative of the hierarchical positions of gods and demons: the ‘demon language’ is consciously constructed to connote power, and though largely unintelligible is nevertheless based on the theory of language that the demons can understand. Thus, far from being nonsensical and indiscriminately concocted, the spells show a sophisticated logic. The logic of construction must of course be separated from the problem of whether the exorcist actually understands all the words contained in the spell. From his, as well as the audience’s, point of view, the spells have power by virtue of secrecy and their capacity to communicate with demons and thereby influence their actions. However, mantra do not fall outside the requirements of language as a system of communication, and their literal intelligibility to humans is not the critical factor in understanding their logic.

What I have indicated in this example is that a single Sinhalese ritual progresses from spells which summon the demons to invocation and supplication of the gods and demons, then to sung and dramatised myths in verse form, and concludes with a spell which uses the language of command and exorcism. Each type has a characteristic form and content (though this shows redundancy), and this structured sequence is fundamental to the logic which has dictated the construction of the ritual. The verbal forms and their sequence have at least two dimensions. On the one hand they directly correspond to the pantheon, the theology it embodies, including man’s interaction with the gods and spirits; and on the other, they suggest another logic which relates to the craft of communication whereby patient and participants successfully experience the passage from illness to the promised cure. Furthermore, in this example, it is difficult to see where magic ends and religion begins.

I am of course not suggesting that this Sinhalese example provides a cross-cultural representative scheme, but I am certain that the exploitation of different verbal forms arranged in ordered sequence is true of many complex rituals. Let me very briefly refer to some examples. The Stratherns report (personal communication) that the Mount Hageners distinguish between prayer (atenga) and spell (mon); both may on occasions be combined in different patterns as for example when a spell may be said to remove a sickness, and then a prayer is made to the ancestral ghosts accompanied by a sacrifice. While a prayer is an audible invocation and a supplication, the spells are muttered, use the language of command and employ a series of metaphorical images (see Strathern & Strathern 1968 for details). Dr Audrey Richards (personal communication) states that Bemba rituals combine prayers and spells which are distinguished as are praise songs and other formal uses of language. Again Victor Turner reports (1964) that in the Ndembu ihamba performance there is mass participation in hunters’ cult songs which are sung to ‘please ihamba’, followed by a spate of confessions and the airing of grievances, then by the reverent or hortatory prayers made by the doctor and the elders. He comments that all these elements constitute a dialectical and dialogical pattern of activity, but he does not focus his attention on this particular problem of alternating verbal forms and their structured progression. It thus seems to me that there is scope for using this frame of analysis to provide additional illumination in the study of ritual.
Sacred and profane language

I want now to pursue further the question of the intelligibility of sacred words to both officiant and congregation. If sacred words are thought to possess a special kind of power not normally associated with ordinary language, to what extent is this due to the fact that the sacred language as such may be exclusive and different from the secular or profane language?

The role of language in ritual immediately confronts problems if placed in relation to a primary function of language which is that it is a vehicle of communication between persons. By definition, the persons in communication must understand one another. In ritual, language appears to be used in ways that violate the communication function. For instance, it is possible to distinguish three different uses of language in the rituals of a village in northeast Thailand.

1. Firstly, there are rituals conducted by Buddhist monks in which the sacred words are chanted aloud, i.e. they are meant to be heard, but paradoxically they are not understood by the majority of the congregation (and some of the monks themselves) because the sacred language is the dead Pali language. In this case the words are broadcast but not understood.

2. There is a second set of rituals where again the major feature is the loud recitation of texts, but here the words are understood because the local Lao language is used. The rituals in question are called sikhawan or calling the spirit essence. They are used by village elders when installing members of the junior generation in village statuses, or as inaugural or threshold rites before individuals start new enterprises. In this instance, then, words are broadcast and understood.

3. In a third set of rites relating to the exorcism of demons which possess and cause mental disorders, the interrogation of the patient is in the local language but spells are secretly muttered by the exorcist over substances like water which are used to cleanse and purify the patient. Here the virtue of the spells resides in the fact that it is secret knowledge similar to the Sinhalese mantra. The language is private and is not meant to be heard. The spells which are called gāthā (verses) are said to be portions of Buddhist sītra (sacred texts) which are in this context used in a special manner, and there is some evidence for saying that the exorcist is an inversion of the Buddhist monk.

It is not necessary for me to give detailed descriptions of the second and third types of ritual because they represent forms well known to you. The spirit essence rite shares the character of that class of healing rituals which are constructed on the therapeutic theory that messages are to be transmitted to and understood by the celebrant or patient. The words recited invoke and invite the divine angels (thewada), paint the ritual situation as a grand mythological event in which the participants become gods themselves, define status requirements, bind a person to his new role commitments, evoke past experience (especially of early childhood and dependence on parents), and anticipate future events. By contrast, the exorcism ritual uses shock therapy in which the patient is made to confront, formulate and give objective form to his illness in terms of a demonic agent which is culturally defined. Here the exorcist as protagonist must appear more terrible and powerful than the demon inside the patient, and the secretly muttered spells not only constitute the language the demons can understand, but more importantly, contribute to the image of the exorcist’s own power.
It is the first set, the Buddhist rituals, that I want to take up because it represents a general but baffling situation. The majority of village monks in northeast Thailand (as in many other parts of the country) are young men who only temporarily occupy the status of monk, and their most important role is to conduct calendrical temple rituals for the community as a whole, and mortuary rites and certain other threshold and protection-giving ceremonies for individual families and groups of kin. There are some conspicuous paradoxes in the communication system of Buddhist ritual. The view is emphatic that the Pali chants should be recited aloud and that through listening to them the congregation gains merit, blessings and protection. Yet the sacred Pali words as such are not understood. The chants are of course not nonsensical—they expound matters of Buddhist doctrine, the noble truths of detachment and conquest of life, victorious episodes in the Buddha’s life, which have no direct relation to the everyday concerns of village life. Yet at the conclusion of the chants, especially those designated as parittā (chants of blessing and protection), the blessings transferred by the monk to the layman are long life, good health and fair complexion. The intriguing paradox is that the conquests of the Buddha which relate to the withdrawal from life are in the process of transference transmuted to an affirmation of life. Between the recitation of the sacred words (sūtra) and the final “pay off” to the layman intervenes a mechanism of transfer which is not far removed from that implied in the Sinhalese mantra. For instance, the chayamangalāgāthā, the victory blessing so often heard in Buddhist rites, states in each of the stanzas a victory won by the Buddha and concludes ‘By this power, may you be endowed with conquests and blessings’. The mechanism of transfer depends not only on the semantic structure of the words and the ritual acts that accompany them (e.g. transmission of grace through a sacred cord or by sprinkling lustral water) but also on a particular social relation between monk and layman, which connotes an inter-generational reciprocity. Village sons temporarily renounce their virility and sexuality and transfer to elderly householders long life and ethical merit; the latter in turn sponsor their ordination, maintain them in the temple and afterwards, when they give up their robes, install them as their successors (Tambiah 1968).

The fact that the Buddhist chants are couched in Pali is representative of a more general feature of most of the so-called world religions, which also show the same remarkable disjunction between religious and profane language: Latin in the occidental Catholic Church, Hebrew for Jews, Vedic Sanskrit for Hindus and Arabic for Muslims, are sacred languages that are different from the language of ordinary use. But the nature of the authority attached to the sacred language and its range of exclusiveness shows complex variations. The Muslims take up the extreme position that the Koran is efficacious only in its original Arabic and that it will cease to be the Book by being translated. The Jewish attitude to the Biblical texts is the same—the word of God is in Hebrew. On the other hand the Catholics have never maintained that any part of the Bible was originally written in Latin, but it is the case that the official version, the Vulgate, was authorised by the Pope as Vicar of God in 1546 at the Council of Trent. This text went through certain revisions in the second half of the sixteenth century to reach a definitive version. But more interestingly, Latin had by 250 A.D. supplanted Greek and become the language of church government and worship in Rome and for the entire
western world, and was explicitly considered the holy language of the occidental church.

In Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Judaism the view has been strictly held that in religious ceremonies the sacred words recited should be in the language of the authorised sacred texts. The problem whether their congregations understood the words or not was not a major consideration affecting either the efficacy of the ritual or the change in the moral condition of the worshippers. The Catholic Church maintained the same view in respect of Latin liturgy until last year. It is interesting that many reformist movements which attacked the extreme formalism and ritualism of the established church attempted to destroy the exclusiveness of the sacred language in an attempt to increase accessibility and understanding among the faithful; Lutherans, Calvinists, Waldensians are cases in point. But note that they also attacked the Latin Bible on the grounds that there were older and more genuine Greek versions. There is an important lesson to be learned here. Evangelical Protestant Englishmen often get passionately committed to the precise wording of the Biblical text, as it appears in the English of the authorised version of 1611, even though it was authorised, illogically perhaps, by the King. The Buddha used a local dialect in contrast to the Sanskrit of the Brahmans to preach his message, but Pali itself was later to become the enshrined language of Theravada Buddhism. And breakaway churches in turn come to have their true versions and first editions of doctrine around which problems of orthodoxy centre and which generate the familiar activities of textual criticism and commentary that provide the bread and butter for theologians and scholars. Thus in all these cases it could be said that texts tend to acquire authority because they are ancient, but that it is authority that matters more than antiquity.

The question then is; how important is it in unravelling the problem of the power of sacred words that the sacred language be different from the ordinary language? Is there a vital difference in the fact that the Koran is in Arabic and the Trobriand sacred words are in Trobriand? I think the distinction is not absolute but only relative. It is true that in many of these higher religions the sacred language is thought to be that language in which the saviour, or prophet or saint first revealed the message (or in the case of Catholicism to be the language authorised by the Papacy). But this argument in terms of revelation or authority is just as applicable to the Trobrianders who believed that their spells came with their first ancestors, and therefore provides no distinguishing criterion between higher and primitive religion. Tylor’s distinction between revealed and natural religion is false.

A more convincing reason may be that the sacred words of Islam, Buddhism, and the Jewish and Christian faiths at some point came to be written down, and that writing is a revolutionary technology that fixes and freezes religious dogma in a manner that is different from the dogma of oral tradition which is inevitably flexible and adaptive, even though it believes in an unchanging tradition. But again is this a fundamental or a relative difference? For the problem that I am dealing with—whence the magical power of sacred words—this distinction again is by itself insufficient. The sharp disjunction between the case of a written holy language and a secular language in higher religion is paralleled in the Trobriands by a weaker disjunction, nevertheless of the same kind, between the elements of
archaic or esoteric language in the orally transmitted spells and the language of ordinary use. Many ‘primitive’ peoples who recite their religious mythology in saga form do so in an ‘archaic’ form of speech which is only barely comprehensible to contemporary speakers, e.g. this is the case among the Kachin. The point is that as long as religion both in literate or pre-literate societies harks back to a period of revelation and insists on the authority of properly transmitted true texts either orally or in written form, its sacred language will contain an archaic component, whether this is represented by a totally different language or older elements of the same language.

It is perhaps relevant to note, whenever we meet such formalised oral or written texts, that their ‘archaism’ may also be related to the fact that they are composed in a special style, which uses highly symbolic devices, specially coined words, and words without meaning to fill in gaps (Vansina 1965). Furthermore writing per se, made possible by the alphabet, by giving a physical existence to words, may lend added veneration to written texts. Thus it is not at all accidental that the present day term for the major alphabet in India is Devanāgarī (the abode of the Gods).

Another criterion—that of the degree of specialisation and training and differentiation of religious personnel—is again of little value in accounting for the belief in the power of sacred words. It is frequently true that the societies in which the higher religions exist are stratified, that literacy itself is specialised and the vast bulk of the population depends on specially trained intermediaries, and that the professional priesthood is separated from lay occupations and modes of life. But specialised skills, subjection to taboos, and exclusive knowledge of sacred lore are in varying degree characteristic of the religious experts of simpler non-literate societies as well.

Finally the fact that the Pali chants of Buddhism are normally not strictly understood by the laity but that the language of Trobriand spells is largely intelligible to the Trobrianders has not produced any significant difference in the attitude towards sacred words. This is so because for the Buddhist layman the fact that he does not understand does not mean for him that the chants are mumbo-jumbo. He believes quite rightly that for those who know Pali the words contain great wisdom and sense; his ignorance is a reflection of his unworthiness and involvement in an inferior mode of life compared with that of the monk. I have thus come to the negative conclusion that the remarkable disjunction between sacred and profane language which exists as a general fact is not necessarily linked to the need to embody sacred words in an exclusive language or in writing and, secondly, that both higher and lower religions portray no qualitative differences in respect of their beliefs in revelation and true knowledge, specialisation of religious office, and attitudes to sacred languages whether those languages are understood or not.

It therefore appears necessary to try to formulate a general statement about the widespread belief in the magical power of sacred words. No book on religion or the origins of language fails to refer to this ancient belief in the creative power of the word. It would be possible to confirm this belief in the classical literature. The Vedic hymns speculated on vāc (the word) and asserted that the gods ruled the world through magical formulae; the Parsi religion states that in the battle between good and evil it was through the spoken word that chaos was transformed into cosmos; ancient Egypt believed in a God of the Word; the Semites and the
Sumerians have held that the world and its objects were created by the word of God; and the Greek doctrine of logos postulated that the soul or essence of things resided in their names. But commentators have entangled themselves in the somewhat barren debate about whether such ideas asserted that the word in its own right was powerful, or whether it acted through the participation of the supernatural or through the agency of the Lord’s anointed. What has not been seen is that within any single religious system multiple values are given to the character and role of the sacred language, and that these values taken together form a set of three postulates in mutual tension.

The Bible can conveniently serve to illustrate this trinity of ideas:

1. The first idea is that God created the world by assigning names. ‘And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night’ (Genesis 1:5). (Together with this goes the idea in certain religions that the Creator God created himself by uttering his own name.)

2. The Bible also asserts the directly opposite idea that after God had created heaven and earth, man assumed the naming function through speech. ‘And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto the man to see what he would call them: and whatsoever the man called every living creature, that was the name thereof...’ (Genesis 2: 19–20).

3. There is yet a third character assigned to the word: that it is an entity which is able to act and produce effects in its own right. Thus we read in Isaiah (55.11): ‘...So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.’

These Biblical notions express Hebrew concepts and I think come together in the first lines of the Gospel according to St John which also explicitly refers to the Greek notion of logos: the word was in the beginning with God, the word was made flesh in Jesus Christ, and those who received Christ became the sons of God and the word dwelt with them.

It is these three notions that are also reflected in Buddhism which constantly affirms its three gems: the Buddha, the all-enlightened one, was the source of the sacred words; the Dhamma, the doctrines preached by the Buddha, and inscribed in the texts are themselves holy objects in their own right, and can transmit virtue and dispel evil; and the Sangha, the monastic order whose ordained members practise good conduct, is the most appropriate agent for a recital of the sacred words.

These notions are also represented in Trobriand thought. Consider the following Trobriand propositions:

1. Magic appeared with the first ancestors and culture heroes, together with the gardens and natural phenomena they created. 'Magic is a thing never invented and never tampered with, by man or any other agency' (Malinowski 1960: 402). It was handed over to man whose descendants have inherited it in unbroken succession.

2. At the same time the Trobriands conceived of magic as an essentially human possession especially of the accredited magicians. Malinowski asserted that for the native magic was 'not a force of nature, captured by man... and put to his
service; it is essentially the assertion of man's intrinsic power over nature'. It was
the human belly that was the tabernacle of magical knowledge and the force of
magic resided in man and could 'escape only through his voice' (1960: 409).

3. Finally, the Trobrianders also had the notion that magical formulae, once
voiced, acted and influenced the course of events. Hence their insistence that the
spell was the most important component of magic, a view also held firmly by the
Dobuans (Fortune 1963: 101).

Thus it is clear that we are dealing with three notions which form an interrelated
set: deities or first ancestors or their equivalents instigated speech and the classi-
fying activity; man himself is the creator and user of this propensity; finally,
language as such has an independent existence and has the power to influence
reality.

I would suggest that it is the perception of these characteristics of language that
has perhaps brought about the elevation of the word as supremely endowed with
mystical power. Let me explain. There is a sense in which it is true to say that
language is outside us and given to us as a part of our cultural and historical
heritage; at the same time language is within us, it moves us and we generate it as
active agents. Since words exist and are in a sense agents in themselves which
establish connexions and relations between both man and man, and man and the
world, and are capable of 'acting' upon them, they are one of the most realistic
representations we have of the concept of force which is either not directly
observable or is a metaphysical notion which we find necessary to use.

In respect of religion and ritual, the three notions in their widest extension
correspond to the following levels of behaviour which we meet time and again in
many societies:

1. The domain of myth which relates stories about the doings of saviours or
prophets or ancestors and the arrival of the message, be it doctrine or magic.

2. The ritual or magical system itself, i.e. the linguistic structure of the sacred
words and the grammar of the non-verbal acts that go with them.

3. The present day human priests or magicians, their sacred status, their links
with the saviours or ancestors and their special behaviour and preparations which
make their ritual practices effective.

Any exhaustive study of religion and ritual needs to study not only those levels
but also the functional relations between them. But there is again another major
relationship to be unravelled, a relationship that is difficult to establish in a mean-
ful sense, and is least well-established in anthropology. This is the link between
religion and ritual and the domains of social and practical activities into which it
penetrates and which it influences but is also at the same time separated from in
some fashion.

To return to my major theme which is the basis for the belief in the magical
power of words: I have taken the inquiry up to a certain point, but the hardest
part of the exercise is yet to come. If our definition of ritual is that it is a complex of
words and actions (including the manipulation of objects) then it remains to be
shown what precisely is the interconnexion between the words and the actions. This I
shall attempt to show in respect of the Trobriand magical system, paying particular
attention to the verbal component. Before I can do this, it is necessary to clear the
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Malinowski's views on language can be roughly divided into two related theories, one pertaining to what he called an 'ethnographic theory of language' in general, and the other to the language of magic in particular.

The chief feature of his general theory was the pragmatic character of language. Language was not so much a vehicle for expressing ideas, concepts or categories, as for achieving practical effects. We recognise in this stand a self-conscious attack on the mentalistic theories of language current in his time, such as those held by Sweet and Sapir (1921). Malinowski's approach to language corresponded with his approach to myth and magic: anti-intellectualistic, non-explanatory, seeing them simply as hard-worked tools for practical living.

Malinowski made no distinction between 'langue' and 'parole', language and speech. His analysis was specifically related to the speech context. Speech was a part of concerted activity, like gesture and motion, 'an adjunct to bodily activities'. Words were a part of action and were equivalents to actions (1965b: 9). It is from this perspective that he developed his 'contextual theory of meaning' and the notion of the 'pragmatic setting of utterances'. The role of language could only be understood in relation to other activities; language regulated concerted work, transmitted knowledge and set in motion a series of tribal activities, and 'the effective force of such verbal acts lies in directly reproducing their consequences' (1965b: 49).

His definition of 'meaning' was a logical derivative from his pragmatic perspective: 'Meaning is the effect of words on human minds and bodies and through these on the environmental reality as created or conceived in a given culture' (1965b: 53). Compare this formulation with that of structural linguistics for which the speaker and the listener are contingent and belong to 'la parole', whereas meaning is the relation between sign and the thing signified, between 'significant' and 'signifié', which belong to the engraphic system of 'la langue'.

Linguists have criticised Malinowski for confusing the context of situation with other levels of analysis pertaining to language qua language (J. R. Firth 1957). It was his passion for viewing words as a part of action that made Malinowski argue with excessive flourish that words had no existence and that texts divorced from context were meaningless. These arguments were directly contravened by him because his exposition in Coral gardens and their magic was in terms of a word for word translation and a commentary on recorded texts. It was the same histrionic talent that led him to dwell on the problem of meaningless words and the 'coefficient of weirdness' in magical language. In fact his translation was excellent and he concluded that the 'coefficient of intelligibility' in the spells was high. His strategy of teasing the credulous reader and taking him on a circuitous and repetitious route, strewn with his sins of commission and omission, was adopted so that a dramatic answer could be produced in the end, which was that magical language was eminently intelligible. And he graciously conceded that the untranslatable words were untranslatable because he failed to get the services of a 'competent commentator'.
Malinowski chose not to follow the perspectives offered by this finding and maintained that magical language worked differently from ordinary speech. The difference was that magical utterances were believed by the natives to produce supernatural effects which they did not expect ordinary speech to produce. The very basis of verbal magic was the ‘creative metaphor of magic’, which suggestive phrase he interpreted as ‘the belief that the repetitive statement of certain words is believed to produce the reality stated’ (1965b: 238). This belief again, that the knowledge of a name or the correct repetition of a formula produced mystical effects, Malinowski traced to mythological associations or, as he put it, ‘some other aspect of Frazer’s principle of sympathy’ (1965b: 232). The implication is that the laws of association that apply to ordinary speech do not hold for magical speech, an inference that inevitably led Malinowski to the barren conclusion that magical language is objectively a delusion and ‘irrational in nature’. ‘The essence of verbal magic, then, consists in a statement which is untrue and which stands in direct opposition to the context of reality . . .’ (1965b: 235). He thus searched for another kind of rational reason grounded in individual psychology for the objectively false use of magical language.

There was however another strand in Malinowski’s thought which led him to posit a rather different relation between magical and ordinary language. The question was, how did man come to believe in the first place in the mystical power of words? He argued from his pragmatist and behaviourist premisses that there was a real basis to the human belief in the mystic and binding power of words. Language gave man the sense of power over his environment. ‘The belief that to know the name of a thing is to get a hold on it is thus empirically true’ (1965b: 233). Thus although he saw in magical language obvious distortions of ordinary language in the direction of mysticism, both engendered the belief in the creative force and pragmatic power of words which he traced to childhood experience. A baby reacts to bodily discomfort with cries which attract the mother’s attention, and later the child learns that the utterance is the essence of welfare and that it acts upon the environment to satisfy its needs. Here lies the early magical attitude to words, that a name sufficiently often repeated can materialise the thing.

Now this biographical theory is subject to the same criticisms which have been directed against Malinowski’s attempt to account for the classificatory categories of kinship in terms of ego-centred extensions. Furthermore, this theory is question-begging because the notion of language is prior to a child’s comprehension of language. It is because adults respond to the cries as meaningful, and direct a child’s efforts at communication, that a child learns the concept and use of language. Finally, the random acts of a baby are susceptible of diametrically opposed interpretations: Malinowski saw the child’s physical grasping movements as the beginnings of its belief in the power to control the environment, while Cassirer (1966: 181) saw the displacement of the grasp to a pointing or indicative gesture as the genesis of symbolic behaviour.

I turn now to certain other theorists of language who have tried to account for the primitive’s ‘magical attitude to words’. I shall briefly mention the ideas of Ogden & Richards (1923), Izutsu (1956) and Cassirer (1953). Ogden and Richards’s linguistic and philosophical arguments in The meaning of meaning (for which Malinowski wrote his classic supplement) happily converged with Malin-
owski's arguments based on anthropological field experience. Unlike those theorists of today who hold the elevated view of language that it is the basis of categorical knowledge, Ogden and Richards were impressed with the delusions produced in man by language, 'a medium developed to meet the needs of arboreal man' and therefore a cumbersome instrument for contemporary needs. They saw the roots of the mistaken belief in the magical powers of words in the superstition that there was a direct, even causal, relation between the word and the thing it referred to, between symbol and its referent. The denotative fallacy explained man's logophobia.

There is one simple retort to this theory. It is perfectly conceivable that speakers of a language, especially those who are unaware that there are other languages in existence, may think that words are not arbitrary and conventional but truly represent the objects they stand for. But surely, if many contemporary Westerners who may be victims of this fallacy do not thereby think that by saying a word they can conjure up a thing into existence, it is amazing that we can contemplate attributing this magical outlook to the primitive. This cavalier attitude of investing the savage with linguistic pathology is portrayed by another writer who has advanced a connotative theory of the origins of verbal magic. Izutsu (1956) describes with great perceptiveness the capacity of words as symbols to evoke in our minds references and images. Extra-verbally, words enable us to re-experience past events, intra-verbally they evoke the associative networks between words within the language system. All this is impeccable, but what warrant is there to speculate that primitive man believes that words produce images as concrete reality?

Cassirer (1953) propounded a philosophical cum linguistic theory to account for the basis and origin of the word veneration reflected widely in religious thought. He opposed mythic thought to theoretical discursive logical thought, the two poles in an evolutionary continuum, and directly linked the evolution of religious ideas to the evolution of linguistic notions. Since it was language which actually produced the organisation of reality and shaped the forms of predication, the contrasting characters of mythic thought and logical thought, he argued, would be reflected in man's attitude to language. Cassirer related the phenomenon of the hypostatisation of the word (which implied the notion that the name of a thing and its essence bear a necessary and internal relation to each other) to the mythic consciousness and imagination of early man who first grasped his experience of the world through separate mythical images. Mythic imagination 'tends towards concentration, telescoping, separate characterization' of images. In the sphere of language it results in the belief in word magic, in attributing a physico-magical power to the word, and in a relation of identity and substantial unity between name and thing. Logical thought which is a later development in man has an entirely different attitude to the word, which is seen as a symbol and vehicle which mediates between the immediate data of sense impressions and ideation. Being theoretical and discursive, logical thought 'tends towards expansion, implication and systematic connection', and towards the establishment of relations between phenomena which are 'alike' according to some co-ordinating law.

Cassirer's theory, which appeals to shaky ethnography, is in fact an imaginary and speculative evolutionary scheme of religious ideas and language. In so far as Lévi-Strauss has demonstrated the logical and relational character of mythic
thought, Cassirer’s basic dichotomy of modes of thought disappears. And if it can be demonstrated that primitive magic is based on true relational metaphorical thinking we shall explode the classical theory which postulates that magic is based on the belief in a real identity between word and thing. The basic fallacy of linguists and philosophers who search for the origins of the magical attitude to words is their prior assumption and acceptance that the primitive has in fact such an attitude. This axiom they have derived principally from Frazer, and indeed from Malinowski who had affirmed the truth of this classical assertion on the basis of his fieldwork. It would perhaps have been safer for the linguists to have held fast to their knowledge of how language works and to have questioned whether anthropologists had correctly reported primitive thought.

Before I conclude this survey I should refer to another feature of the theory of language formulated by Ogden and Richards which did not appeal to man’s evolution but to a synchronic scheme which fitted beautifully with Malinowski’s assertions. They postulated two uses of speech: the scientific use in which words symbolised a reference which could be verified in relation to external reality; and the evocative or emotive use in which words simply became signs for emotions or attitudes, their referential power being secondary. I. A. Richards (1938) argued that poetry made its impact through the emotive use of language. Malinowski, too, asserted that magical language was an emotive use of language, that magic was born of the emotional tension of particular situations and that the spells, ritual acts and gestures expressed a spontaneous flow of emotions. When carried away by his own emotive use of language, he even argued that the paraphernalia and ritual substances of Trobriand magic were used as they happened to bear on the purpose of the act through emotional association (Malinowski 1948: 53). These statements do not do justice to the highly formalised nature of Trobriand rituals. And as for emotive use of words, Richards’s views find their match and corrective in Leach (1964) who has demonstrated that even the most emotive words of abuse have a referential and structural basis.

A re-analysis of Trobriand ritual

If I am critical of these theories I should try and provide an alternative view of how the language of ritual works. I shall attempt a brief re-analysis of some aspects of Trobriand magic in order to demonstrate my point of view. But first I should outline the scheme and assumptions that guide my analysis.

Trobriand magical language is intelligible language, not mumbo-jumbo shot through with mystical ideas not amenable to rational examination. It is not qualitatively ‘different’ from ordinary language, but is a heightened use of it. The same laws of association that apply to ordinary language apply to magical language.

Trobriand magic is a clear case of a system that combines, more often than not, word and deed, language and action. Therefore rather than analyse the words separately from the actions we should find a way of linking them.

This difficult inquiry I call the ‘inner frame’ of Trobriand magic, and it deals with the technique of transfer, the manner in which spells are constructed, the logic of choice of the substances used, and the mode of synchronisation of linguistic devices with those of non-verbal action in a structured sequence. We may call this perspective the ‘semantics’ of Trobriand ritual.
THE MAGICAL POWER OF WORDS

I use the term 'outer frame' to refer to another level of meaning. Here the ritual complex as a whole is regarded as an activity engaged in by individuals or groups in pursuit of their institutional aims. This perspective we may call 'pragmatics', and it corresponds in some ways to what Malinowski called the 'context of situation'. It investigates how ritual relates to other activities, in what contexts and situations it is practised and what consequences it may produce for various segments of the society.

At the cost of oversimplifying one could say that there are two perspectives for viewing this relationship between ritual and other activities: ritual can be seen as a stimulus or signal for activities that follow in time, e.g. in the case of prospective magic exemplified by Trobriand agricultural and canoe magic, and as a response to preceding events, e.g. in the case of 'retrospective' ritual, a good example of which is witchcraft.

In investigating how language and action are synchronised in Trobriand magic I have found it useful to elaborate a suggestion made by Jakobson (1956). Having discussed two devices or operations in language, the metaphoric and metonymic, which are based on the principles of similarity and contiguity, he indicated a formal correspondence between them and Frazer's division of magic into 'imitative' and 'contagious' kinds also based on the principles of similarity and contiguity. Frazer, you will recall, used these principles not in relation to the words but to the objects used and actions enacted in magical rites.

In respect of linguistic operations the concept of metaphor presents no problem. The dictionary meaning is that it is a figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object to which it is not properly applicable. The implications of metaphor (which is a shorthand expression I use to include simile and analogy) are that it is a surrogate which has a dual reference to the original object and to the object for which it now stands. Every metaphor or symbol contains both truth and fiction; if it is taken literally it misrepresents, but it is more than a conventional sign because it highlights a resemblance. The metaphor is a mode of reflection and enables abstract thought on the basis of analogical predication (Urban 1939). In terms of Jakobson's formulation, the metaphoric use of language exploits the procedures of selection and substitution by which words or ideas replace one another in terms of semantic similarity.

Contemplate what implications this device may have for ritual, which has for its aim the actual transfer of an attribute to the recipient. The spell can exploit the metaphorical use of language, which verbally and in thought makes the transfer. There is no trick here; it is a normal use of language. The verbal transfer is an example of what was called in traditional theology the analogy of attribution.

The dictionary meaning of metonymy is a 'figure of speech which consists in substituting for the name of a thing the name of an attribute or part of it', e.g. when 'sceptre' stands for 'authority'. This is a case of the part standing for the whole based on the contiguity principle. If a metaphor is a substitute, a metonym is a complement; both involve verbal transfer. Jakobson expands the notion of metonymy to discuss linguistic operations, based on the principles of contiguity and contexture, which enable the formulation of complex forms of linguistic units according to syntactic rules: the rules by which words are combined and strung together to form sentences and sentences combined to form utterances.
Now metonymy as traditionally understood and expanded by Jakobson sheds light on the structure of Trobriand spells. Frequently the various parts or constituent units of the recipient of the magic, whether it be a canoe or a human being, are enumerated and the magical transfer made to each of them. Thus we get a realistic picture of the whole built up from the parts, and this metonymic technique has several implications for lending realism to the rite, for transmitting a message through redundancy, for storing vital technological knowledge in an oral culture, and for the construction of the spell itself as a lengthy verbal form.

Both linguistic procedures, metaphorical through substitution permitting abstractions, and metonymic through building an organic whole through details, are accompanied in Trobriand magic by action.

Objects and substances are used as agents and vehicles of transfer through contagious action. In these vehicles of transfer we find expressed Frazer’s substitution (or similarity) and contiguity principles, imitative and contagious magic, but never in an exclusive manner. A close analysis of Trobriand ritual shows that it actively exploits the expressive properties of language, the sensory qualities of objects, and the instrumental properties of action simultaneously in a number of ways. The semantics of ritual are more complex than suggested by Frazer’s principles which lead to absurd inferences about the logic of magic.

Now we are in a position to see how these propositions hold in detail in the Trobriand case.

Malinowski considered the spell (yopa) as the most important constituent of Trobriand magic. The magical rites took two forms. In one, spells were uttered without a concomitant rite (i.e. manipulation of objects), but this abbreviated form was not practised in the major rituals. In the other, which was the more important, the spells were accompanied by simple rites of ‘impregnation’ or ‘transference’, which shared a common grammar. Typically, certain substances (e.g. leaves) were brought into contact with an object such as an adze, or a lashing creeper, or a pregnancy cloak, and spells were uttered close to them so that they became charged; these objects in turn transferred their virtue to the final recipient of the magic. Thus the wayugo creeper, which was used for lashing together the parts, imparted speed to the finished canoe, and the charmed medications of kula beauty magic conveyed beauty and attractiveness to the voyager.

The most elaborate Trobriand spells had three consecutive parts: the u’ula, the tapwana and the dogina. The meanings associated with u’ula are ‘foundation’, ‘cause’, ‘beginning’, ‘first possessor’, ‘reason’; the tapwana had a similar coherent range of meanings: ‘surface’, ‘skin’, ‘body’, ‘trunk’, ‘middle part’, and ‘main part’; the dogina meant ‘tip’, ‘end’, ‘tail’, or ‘final part’. The three parts appear to present the following progression. The u’ula, which is brief, states the basis on which the spell is constructed, firstly the major theme or metaphorical idea which is elaborated in the spell and secondly the mythical heroes and ancestors who wielded the magical powers in question and with whom the magician himself becomes identified. This second feature is the portion of the spell that relates the magic to myth, which I do not discuss. The tapwana is the longest and main part on which we have to concentrate in order to see how the spell is constructed and to unravel the logic and technique of the rite. The dogina, which is also brief, is a
statement that the intended effect has been achieved. It is clear that the Trobriand spell is constructed as an ordered progression.

Malinowski described the tapwana as a 'continuous stream of utterance' and, important for us, he stated that this main part of the formula was easier to translate than the u'ula because it was expressed in a less condensed form and in words approximating ordinary language. We are thus faced here with descriptive referential language rather than untranslatable language.

In the simpler kind of spell a list of words is repeated in sequence with changes in key expressions. The list is an enumeration of the constituent parts of a canoe, or a yam house, or the anatomy of the performer. These words we may loosely call 'substance words'. The key expression is an action word or a verb. The logic of the recitation is that each part enumerated undergoes an event or process by which it acquires the desired attribute or quality. (Examples 2 and 3 in diagram 1 illustrate this construction.) Alternatively a single substance word or noun may be attached in succession to a series of verbs which represent a range of related states or processes (see example 1a in diagram 1).

A more complex structure consists of the use of two series of key expressions, one consisting of the body parts of the recipient, to each of which are transferred energies represented by another series of verbs (see example 1b).

Diagram 1. The structure of Trobriand spells (with special reference to the tapwana)

Example 1. The striking of the soil. Formula 2 in Coral gardens and their magic.

a. The belly of my garden --- leavens
   rises
   reclines
   grows to the size of a bush hen's nest
   grows like an anthill
   rises and is bowed down
   rises like the ironwood palm
   lies down
   swells
   swells as with a child

b. List 1 (garden pests) List 2
   the grubs --- I sweep away
   the insects
   the beetle with the sharp tooth
   the beetle that bores
   the beetle that destroys the taro underground
   the white blight on taro leaves
   the marking blight
   the blight that shines

Example 2. Anchoring the garden (after planting and erecting posts). Formula 10 in Coral garden and their magic.

Parts of the garden named:

soil --- 'shall be anchored'

magical prism (kamkokola)
yam pole (kavatam)
branching pole (kaysalu)
stem saved from the cutting (kantuva)
training stick (kaybudi)
uncharmed prism (kaynutatala)
partition stock (tula)
slender support (yeye’i)
boundary line (tuklumwala)
boundary triangle (karivisi)
light yam pole (tankwalamo)
tabooing stick (kayluvalova)
great yam pole (kayvalihuwa)

Example 3. Post–harvest magic of prosperity—the second act of vilamalia magic (anchoring the yam house and village). Formula 29 in Coral gardens and their magic.

Parts of the yam house named:
- corner stone (ullilagwa) → ‘shall be anchored’
- floor (hikukua)
- log house (liku)
- compartments (kabisivisi)
- young sprout of taytu yam (sobula)
- sticks that divide the log cabin (teta)
- decorated front board (bisiya’i)
- gable boards (karalapu)
- supports of thatch (kiluma)
- roof batten (kavala)
- rafters (kaligwasi)
- thatch battens (kiti)
- lower ridge pole (kakulumwala)
- thatch (katuwa)
- upper ridge pole (vatalo)
- ornamented end of ridge pole (muwmwala)

Other examples, which show the same regularity of structure, are:

   In this spell first a man’s kula objects are enumerated and each is said to ‘boil’; next the performer’s own headparts are enumerated and each in turn ‘boils’ (‘to boil’, ‘to foam’, ‘to stir’ are frequently used to represent activation):
   - **Inventory of kula objects**
     - My mint plant (boils); my herb ornament, my lime spatula, my lime pot, my comb, my mat, my presentation goods, my personal blanket, my magical bundle.
     - **Head parts enumerated**
     - My head (boils); my nose, my occiput, my tongue, my larynx, my speaking organ, my mouth.

2. The renowned wayugo (lashing creeper) spell used in canoe building magic transfers speed to the canoe under construction (1960: 431). We should note that technically the lashing creeper maintains the cohesion of the various parts of the canoe. Here is an enumeration of the constituents of the canoe, each of which is followed by the verb ‘might heel over’ (i.e. overtake):
   - **Inventory of canoe parts**
     - I (might heel over); my keel, my canoe bottom, my prow, my rib, my threading stick, my prowboard, my transverse board, my canoe side.

There are some readily comprehensible features in the spells constructed on such simple principles.11 Such permutations with words allow for a great deal of repetitiveness which Malinowski referred to as the prosaic pedantry of Trobriand magic. Today in the light of communication theory we would say that the redundancy is a device used in ritual to transmit its message (Cherry 1961), a point that has already been argued by Leach (1966).

Another implication of the repetitive pattern, which in contemporary jargon we
would call ‘store of information’ or ‘memory bank’ in the absence of written language, was noted casually by Malinowski. Commenting upon the Kudayuri canoe myth which contained a detailed account of canoe parts and their building sequence, Malinowski wrote: ‘He [the native] is quite used to recite one after the other the various stages of customary proceedings in his own narratives, and he does it with an almost pedantic accuracy and completeness, and it is an easy task for him to transfer these qualities to the accounts which he is called upon to make in the service of ethnography’ (1960: 318). It is clear that the spells and myths contain information, which is not the remains of archaic beliefs, but a living knowledge related to technological and social activities.

Furthermore, and this I would emphasise, the spells I have cited portray a metonymic use of language, i.e. linguistic operations in terms of combination and context, based on contiguity principles. All the parts of a canoe, or a human head or a yam house, comprise a configuration or a set by virtue of contiguous association which when systematically varied with action words creates a long utterance. Metonymy so used lends a ‘realistic’ colouring to the description.

Now each utterance sounds as if it states an imperative transference, e.g. ‘The belly of my garden swells’ or ‘The floor of my yam house shall be anchored’. It is a common view, also shared by Malinowski, that a magical spell is identifiable by its insistent use of imperatives and that this provides the evidence for saying that primitives believe that words create their effects by their very utterance. This however is not the case. The verbal assertion is mediated by a middle term which is the substance (or materia medica) into which the spells are uttered; and these substances in turn convey the attribute to the final recipient. It is therefore necessary to investigate the role of these mediating substances.

Let us take as our example the substances used in two contrasting rites in the gardening cycle. The inaugural rite of the first cutting of the soil, the first in the cycle, has for its purpose the conferring of fertility on the soil; the vilamalia which comes at the end is enacted after the storing of the yams, and seeks to confer durability and permanence on the yam stocks.

**Diagram 2.** The metaphorical associations of substances used in two rites in Omarakana garden magic

(compiled from *Coral gardens and their magic*, vols. 1 and 2 and *The sexual life of savages*).

**Substances used in the inaugural rite (first cutting of the soil).**

A. Leaves, plants and creepers.
1. **Yoyu:** coconut leaves; ‘they are of the dark green colour which the taytu (small yam) leaves should have if they are to be strong and healthy’.
2. **Arecanut leaves:** same association as 1).
3. **Ubwara:** wild plant with long tubers which are white and beautiful; used so that ‘the taytu in the garden will also produce beautiful white tubers’. (The white colour is associated with fertility and purity in the pregnancy ritual.)
4. **Kaybwibwi:** white petals of the fragrant pandanus; used so that the ‘taytu should have a pleasant smell . . .’ (Here again the symbolism of ‘whiteness’ used in pregnancy ritual is relevant.)
5. **Kubila:** a plant with scented flowers; same association as 4).
6. **Sasoka:** tree with big round bulky fruit; used to influence the size of the taytu yam.
7. **Wakaya:** largest variety of banana; it has a massive trunk swelling out near the ground; same association as 6).
8. Youlula: creeper with white flowers and luxuriant foliage resembling taytu foliage; used so that the taytu will have the same luxuriant foliage; also 'whiteness' is associated with 
'pregnancy'.
9. a) Ipikwanada  } creeper with luxuriant foliage,
b) Yekumikvunana ) same association as 9).
B. Earthy substances.
10. Ge'wu: enormous mounds scraped together by the bush hen for breeding purposes; 'used so that the taytu may grow and swell up, like one of these mounds'.
11. Kaybu'a: chalk from large boulders; association same as 10. Also note the symbolism of 
'whiteness'.
12. Kabuahu: large round nests which hornets make in the ground; 'the taytu should be as bulging and large as one of these nests'.

Substances used in Vilamalia (prosperity of the village magic).
A. Trees and plants; the materials 1–5 figure in the two acts of vilamalia magic which 'anchor' 
the yam house and the village. The metaphorical association of the objects as regards 
'anchoring' is clear.
2. Lewo: stunted tree reaching to very old age, used in the second act.
3. Setagava: tough weed with strong roots used in the first act.
4. Kayaulo: an extremely tough tree whose wood cannot be broken but can be cut with an axe 
or knife.
5. Leya: wild ginger used in the second act; associated with fierceness and toughness.
B. Other substances.
Binabina: stone or volcanic rock imported from the south; it is heavier, harder and less 
brittle than the local dead coral; the two stones used in the ritual are called 'the pressers 
of the floor' which impart their qualities to the stored food.

The contrast in the meanings of the material symbols used is clear-cut (see 
diagram 2). In the inaugural rite the substances brought into contact with an adze 
or ritually planted while the spell is recited are luxuriant green leaves, wild plants 
which produce large tubers, plants which produce scented white flowers and tubers 
(the white connoting fertility and sexual purity), soil scraped from the enormous 
mounds made by the bush hen, etc. In the vilamalia the substances used connote 
hardness and durability; tough weeds with strong roots, wood of stunted long-
lived trees, hard volcanic rock, etc. The logic guiding the selection of these 
articles is not some mysterious magical force that inheres in them; they are selected on 
the basis of their spatio-temporal characters like size and shape and their sensible 
properties like colour and hardness which are abstract concepts and which are given 
metaphorical values in the Trobriand scheme of symbolic classification.

What then is the garden magician up to when he scrapes some soil from a bush 
hen's nest, brings it into contact with an adze, and recites 'The belly of my garden 
grows to the size of a bush hen's nest'? Is this a case of mystical contagion between 
bush hen mound and the size of the yam, or is it simply a metaphorical equivalence 
set up verbally between the property of size portrayed by the bush hen's nest with 
the desired same property in the yam, and lending the mental comparison an air 
of operational reality by using the soil of the bush hen's nest as a medium of 
transfer? The rite of transfer portrays a metaphorical use of language (verbal 
substitution) whereby an attribute is transferred to the recipient via a material 
symbol which is used metonymically as a transformer. Frazer would simply have 
described the procedure as contagious magic. The technique gains its realism by 
clothing a metaphorical procedure in the operational or manipulative mode of 
practical action; it unites both concept and action, word and deed.
Confirmation is lent to this argument when we scrutinise the spells used without the mediation of material substances, spells which the Trobrianders call ‘mouth magic’ (o wadola). A good example of this category is the magic of growth performed in the middle phase of gardening. The natives are aware that nature must do its work and that the crops have to sprout and grow by themselves. The magician’s function is described by Malinowski thus: ‘In a rapid succession of rites, he has to anticipate each stage in the growth of the gardens, and stimulate the various crucial phases in the development of the plant . . .’ (1965a: 139).

In the following examples, taken from formulae 13, 17 and 18 in ‘The magic of growth’ (1965a: ch. 4), I state some suggestive lines and then in parenthesis the native commentary upon them.

Formula 13. ‘O dadeda tree that sprouts again and again’. (The native commentary is that the ‘dadeda is a plant of extremely rank growth; we cut it, already it has sprouted.’) The same formula contains other metaphors suggesting speed of growth:

‘Thy shoots are as quick as the eyes of the kapapita, the quick bird,
Thy shoots are as quick as the kabaia, the quick black ants’.

Formula 17. ‘Thy head, O taytu, shoots along as the millipede shoots along’. (The natives say that the millipede is noted for its rapidity of movement.)

Formula 18. ‘Thy open space, the open space between thy branches, O taytu, the spider covers up’. (‘The natives told me’ reports Malinowski ‘that as the spider spins his web, so should the taytu plant produce many branches’.)

It is obvious that the mouth magic depends entirely on suggestive metaphors and similes which the Trobrianders themselves recognise as such. It is puzzling indeed why Malinowski who compiled notes on native exegesis should have insisted on the ‘pragmatic function of words’ and in the same breath ‘the mystical associations’ of magic. Thus, when in the wind-blown gardens the Trobrianders invoke the image of a dolphin playing in the water, Malinowski interprets the act as portraying ‘the mystical association between the undulating movements of the dolphin and the windings and weavings of the vine . . .’ (1965a: 170).12

Because of his commitment to his emotional and pragmatic view of language, Malinowski failed to connect the symbolism of the inaugural garden magic with the pregnancy ritual which he described in The sexual life of savages (1929). The gardening magic constantly refers to ‘the belly of my garden’. Malinowski denied that this implied any metaphorical allusion to animal or human fertility, but he disarmingly went on to say: ‘My informants, as a matter of fact, commented on it in this sense . . . “taytu is the child of the garden”’ (1965b: 262–3).

Let me consider the pregnancy ritual, for it succinctly illuminates the inner form of Trobriand magic and also some of the behaviour of the garden magician.

When a woman achieves her first conception the tabugu (women of the father’s matrilineage, chief of whom is the father’s own sister) are charged with the conduct of the pregnancy ritual. They prepare two fibre skirts and two mantles, white in colour; one set is worn by the pregnant woman at the celebration of her first pregnancy (about the fifth month) and the second set after childbirth when she emerges from seclusion and returns to her conjugal household. The mantles are the garments of special importance on which the saykeulo magic is performed. They are placed on a mat, the fleshy lower parts of the creamy white leaves of the lily
plant (which bears a snowy white flower) are cut and strewn over them and the tabugu thrust their faces close and say spells.

The symbolism of these objects and operations, as well as those of the subsequent rituals, cannot be understood without paying close attention to the words of the spell (see 1929: 181). The ʻulu, the stem of the spell, refers to the buaytuva, a bird of white plumage (similar to the reef heron) which is invited to hover over the bathing place and the principal locations of water in the village. The white bird is the major symbol and there is no doubt that the pregnancy cloak stands for the bird’s plumage. The tapwana, the main part of the spell, shows the following pattern: the white bird is said to make resplendent the different parts of the robe (the top, fringe, etc.) which are named in turn; next the bird makes resplendent the various parts of the body of the pregnant woman from head to foot (head, nose, cheeks, chest, belly, groins, buttocks, thighs, knees, calves and feet). The dogina, the conclusion of the spell, states that the pregnant woman has been whitened; a metaphorical equivalence is stated between the head of the woman and the pallor before dawn, her face and the white sprouts of the areca plant (1929: 182).

It is clear that the robe (which materially represents the bird) and its charming have for their objective the transference of ‘whiteness’ to the pregnant woman. This is also the emphasis in the ceremony at which a woman is actually invested by the tabugu with the robe after five months of pregnancy. She is carried into the water on a ‘queen’s chair’ formed of human arms, cleansed and bathed, isolated from the earth and made to stand on a mat, subjected to an elaborate toilet which smooths out and whitens her body, dressed in a robe, lifted up, carried and deposited on a small platform in her father’s or mother’s brother’s house. There she remains elevated, sacred and separated: she should not speak, she is fed by her tabugu because she cannot touch food, and she washes frequently to become white, and keeps indoors away from the sun.

Thus the ‘whiteness’ which is conveyed to the woman itself stands for the attributes of elevation, sexual purity (by whitening ‘she does not think about adultery’ and she must also henceforth refrain from sexual intercourse with her husband) and beauty of motherhood. The bathing ceremony, apart from ritually cleansing her, loosens the child in the womb.

The pregnant woman is subjected to certain food taboos: she avoids delicacies, mainly fruit (kavayulu’a) for if she eats fruit the child will have a big belly, it will be full of excrement and die. She also avoids fish that live in submarine holes, and fish with sharp-pointed and poisonous fins. The logic of these taboos is a metaphorical similarity and difference principle which is the first rule of Trobriand food taboos: e.g. normally edible things that suggest an analogy to the condition of the mother in some respect (fruit of the tree, and fish in holes are like the child in the womb) but are also antagonistic in certain other respects (fruit rot, and fish in submarine holes do not easily emerge, but a child must be delivered easily and whole) are tabooed.

One more set of facts requires to be brought into focus before we return to the garden magician. In the pregnancy ritual, the concept of ‘whiteness’ is opposed to the concept of ‘blackness’ of black magic. The father of the pregnant woman has to give part of the sagali distribution to women who possess black magic, to appease them, ‘for by addressing the mwanita [black millipede: the symbol opposite to the
white bird], the sorceress is able to make a pregnant woman’s skin black, as black as the worm itself” (1929: 190). If a woman’s skin is black she has men on her mind.

Now the customs of mourning after death, especially those imposed on a widow, show a precise reversal of those associated with pregnancy. The colour of mourning is black and the widow’s mourning behaviour is concordant with the idea of ugliness. The widow’s hair is shaved, she wears soiled clothes, she cannot wear ornaments, her body is thickly smeared with soot and grease which will not be washed off for a long time. Her body blackness is associated with the blackness of witchcraft which she and her matrikin must publicly disavow. She is confined in a small cage and relegated to darkness inside the house. But her ritual uncleanness resulting in her separateness also shares some aspects of the sacred state of the pregnant woman, in that the widow too should not speak and cannot touch food and therefore has to be fed.

Some of the symbolism of the inaugural gardening rite and the food taboos imposed on the garden magician become intelligible in the light of these facts. Both the garden and the magician are considered ‘pregnant’. It is the garden that is impregnated and activated (as indicated by the word vatuvu, the first word of the magic formula, which means ‘to make rise’), and the white scented vegetable substance and coral chalk used in the rite have the same value as the white substances in the pregnancy ritual. But it is the magician who simulates the woman and practises her food taboos. Thus in the act of ‘striking the soil’, as he inserts a sapling into the ground, he assumes a female sitting position which no male would normally adopt, for men squat and women sit with their buttocks touching the ground (1965a: 101).

The food taboos he observes are the following. He cannot eat immature or imperfect taytu taken from the soil during the thinning process, for they imply imperfect children; and the sina bird with black plumage, cuttle fish which squirt black fluid, and other black fish which live among coral rocks (all associated with the inauspiciousness of black) are forbidden. He also avoids the flesh of the ordinary bush hen and its eggs, wakaya bananas, and tubers of the ubwara creeper, all of which are either mentioned in the spell or used as substance in the inaugural rite: the logic of these taboos belongs to a second rule elucidated below.

One last example will help to round off our discussion for it introduces the third primary colour of red and also brings out other dimensions of the logic of the food taboos. The aim of the ‘beauty magic’ of kula (muasita) is to make each man attractive and irresistible to his kula partner, and the magic harks back to the myth in which an ugly old man is transformed into a radiant, charming youth. All the voyagers wash in sea water, rub themselves with medicated leaves, apply coconut grease on their bodies, tease out their hair with combs, paint ornamental designs on their faces in red and black, and insert in their white armlets mint plants preserved in coconut oil. In the spells recited (e.g. kaykakaya and talo spells, see 1960: 338–9) the major reference is to red colour as represented by certain kinds of red fish (e.g. ‘Red paint, red paint of the udawada fish’) which are the ‘foundation’ of the spell. With characteristic regularity the spell says that the various kula appurtenances and the parts of the head of each man will ‘flare up’ and ‘flash’.

It is clear that this magic does not say that the men become red fish or that there
is a substantial identity between them, but it simply postulates a comparison between the redness of the fish and the red painting on the human face, redness itself standing for flashing and irresistible attractiveness. At the same time the fact that red fish are tabooed food on the expedition (‘We eat bad fish and we are ugly’) leaves us in no doubt that the identification with red fish by physical ingestion is repudiated, that the comparison is strictly metaphorical, and that the ‘transfer’ made is that of abstract qualities and not physical resemblance. Thus we can infer the second law of Trobriand food taboos: objects invoked as metaphors whose abstract attributes are to be transferred to the recipient of the ritual must be avoided as food, thereby unambiguously rejecting any physical identification with them.

My elucidation of Trobriand magical symbolism, its inner semantic frame, is thus quite different from that of Malinowski who attributed to this beauty magic ‘an exceedingly obscure and confused concatenation of ideas’ and said that it expressed ‘one of the typical forms of magic thought, the contagion of ideas’ as propounded by Frazer. There is much more that can be said about Trobriand colour symbolism (see appendix) which again shows a systematic organisation not appreciated by Malinowski. It would appear that Malinowski misunderstood the ‘semantics’ of the magic he described, but that he had a keen appreciation of another feature of that magic, its outer frame.

The relation between magic and technical activity

The final question I deal with is the outer frame of Trobriand magic, its pragmatics, which I shall phrase as follows: What is the relation between Trobriand magic and practical activity? I must emphasise that I am dealing here with Trobriand prospective magic and I shall argue that the examination of the functional relationship between magic and technical activity reveals a refraction of the magical prism that has not yet been fully appreciated.

A rite is never conducted in a vacuum, but in the context of other activities or events which precede it and follow it. Malinowski insisted that the Trobrianders did not confuse magic with practical work; for them the road of magic (megwa la keda) was distinct from the road of garden work (bagula la keda). Yet at the same time, magic and practical work were, in native ideas, inseparable from each other, though they were not confused.

From the evidence (linguistic and behavioural) he provided, there is little doubt that the whole cycle of gardening or of canoe building must be seen as one long series of activities which form a regular pattern of M→T, M→T, M→T, M→T; where M stands for the magical rite and T for the technical operation that succeeds it. (We could substitute S for T where a social activity is involved.) Malinowski’s descriptions clearly show that there is a long chain in which two distinguishable kinds of activities were united in an alternating sequence. It is only when we see in canoe building, for example, that firstly the sequences of technical construction are punctuated by magical rites which precede them, and secondly that for the Trobriander the building of the seagoing canoe is inextricably bound up with the general proceedings of the kula (that in fact the construction of the canoe is the first link in the chain of the kula exchanges), that we can appreciate the

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THE MAGICAL POWER OF WORDS

semantic content of the magical spells and the functional relation of the rites to their extra-ritual context.

Diagram 3 is a summary of the sequences of magical rites and technical activities in canoe building which together form a single chain. I shall select three sequences in canoe building for particular comment. The ligugu spell is uttered in theory to impart magical virtue to the adze; it is followed by the technical activity of scooping out the canoe hull and making the canoe parts; the spell as such evokes images of the fantastic speed of the canoe about to be built. Another operation is the fixing of the ornamental prow boards; it is immediately preceded by the recitation of kula beauty (muasila) magic which will make the canoe owner irresistibly attractive to his kula partner. One of the most important spells, the wayugo (lashing creeper), in its verbal content imparts great speed to the canoe while the technical operation that follows is the fixing of gunwale planks and ribs, and the lashing together of the parts with the lashing creeper.

**Diagram 3.** The inter-relation of magical (M) and technical (T) sequences in canoe building.

1. *First phase* (all ritual sequences except the first are performed by the canoe-building expert).
   
   **M1** Rite of offering to wood-spirits and their expulsion before the tree, which in anticipation is referred to as ‘canoe’ (*waga*), is cut.
   
   **T1** Felling of the tree and cutting of the log into the rough shape of the canoe.
   
   **M2** Rite for dispelling the heaviness of the log and for giving it lightness; the spell also evokes the image of a fast canoe.
   
   **T2** Carrying of the log to the beach.
   
   **M3** Chanting of the ligugu spell to impart magical virtue to the adze; the spell in fact evokes images of the fantastic speed of the canoe and its parts (which are enumerated and charged with speed).
   
   **T3** Scooping out of the canoe and making of the canoe parts.
   
   **M4** Rite of ‘final determination’; the canoe makes up its mind to run quickly.

2. *Second phase* (all ritual sequences are performed by the owner of the canoe (toliwaaga)).

   **M5** Kula beauty (muasila) magic is performed by the owner to influence his kula partner.
   
   **T5** Fixing of ornamental prow boards.
   
   **M6** Chanting of wayugo (lashing creeper) spell to give speed to the canoe.
   
   **T6** Fixing of gunwale planks and ribs and lashing of the parts with the creeper.
   
   **M7** Rites of smoking and fumigating to cleanse the canoe and to impart speed; chanting spells over the paints.
   
   **T7** Painting of the canoe with black (primary colour), red and white colours.
   
   **M8** Kula (muasila) magic and ‘staining of the red mouth’ (ochre spots on bow and stern) performed.
   
   **T8** Launching of the canoe.

S Proceedings concluded with the ceremonial and social activity of sagali (ceremonial distribution of food by the canoe owner to the builders and helpers).

It is clear that the chief focus of the canoe magic as judged by the words said is the subsequent kula activities in which reputation is gained through the speed and seaworthiness of the canoe which give renown to the owner, and the personal success of each man in his dealings with his partner. But there appears to be a discrepancy in that these words are said immediately before scooping out the log, or lashing the canoe, or fixing the prow-boards and are indeed addressed to the implements and parts used in these operations. Hence we may well wonder how the dramatic description of feats of sailing can give magical virtue to an adze or
what relation the fixing of the prow-boards has to the beauty of the owner. Since explanations in terms of irrational mystical associations seem to me to be the refuge of the literal-minded, I must seek a different answer.

Surely there is another way forward? We can ask the question whether there is not an expansion and overflow of meaning from the mechanics of the rite to the human participants themselves, who, let us not forget, are always part of the scene. I shall presently examine this suggestion more rigorously, but let me here pose the question whether a sharp adze is not an extension and part of the canoe builder, and the ornamental prow-board an apt representation of the painted face and plumed head of the canoe-owner leading an expedition? More importantly, is not the expanded meaning of the magical ritual an imaginative, prospective and creative understanding of the very technological operations and social activities the Trobrianders are preparing to enact?

It was precisely because he viewed Trobriand magic in terms of the 'context of situation' that Malinowski illuminatingly argued that magic signals, inaugurates and regulates systematic work. But he subjected this positive sociological functional statement to a negative psychological function which was in direct contradiction to the first. He argued narrowly that magic is a product of man’s limitations of thought, of gaps in his empirical knowledge, that it is objectively absurd but has a subjective pragmatic rationale as an anxiety-queller. He thus reduced a highly formalised and structured system to the spontaneous expression of emotion with no intellectual content. It would be more in line with his evidence to say that Trobriand magic is a testimony to the creativity of thought, that its logic is an anticipatory effect. I am not merely stating that the magic provides incentives to work—though that is a part of the matter. More importantly it is a blue-print and a self-fulfilling prophecy and embodies for the Trobriander an understanding of the technical, aesthetic and evaluative properties of his activities, in a manner denied to us in our segmented civilisation. The point about gardening is not that it is uncertain but that it is a regularised activity repeated year after year and with which is associated the pride of matrilineal values reflected in generous urigubu payments; the point about the kula is not so much the dangers it carries but that expeditions are regularly made to prove individual success through competitive transactions with neighbours cast in the role of stereotyped fierce foreigners. In a sense Trobriand magical rituals produce what they predict, not in ideal or fantastic terms as painted in myths but in terms that are in accordance with reality. The Trobrianders regularly enjoy good harvests and kula successes.

Perhaps I can make my point obliquely through the words of Wittgenstein, who wrote:

‘An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question’ (1953: 108).

The Trobrianders practise prospective magic because they have engaged in systematically conceived activities in the past and because they intend to engage in them in the future. But when fate does withhold the regularity of events, when
pigs run away into the bush, when drought strikes or when canoes prove unseaworthy, they resort to a retrospective system of evil magic (bulubwalata) with which to re-order their experience and come to terms with failure. As with all classic types of witchcraft, the Trobriand system deals with misfortunes ex post, not in terms of ‘laws of nature’ but in terms of deviation from an ideal order of social relations.

We can now return to the question: to whom are rituals addressed and what kinds of effects do they seek to produce? This question is not problematic when the rituals in question are directly addressed to human beings as in healing rituals, initiation rites, beauty magic and the like (e.g. Lévi-Strauss 1963: ch. 10; Turner 1964). But what about agricultural and canoe building rites? Descriptions by anthropologists of these almost persuade us that it is immaterial objects such as the adze and the canoe or the soil that are addressed and that the spells and magical substances are used as causal agents in direct contravention of known physical laws.

The Trobrianders provide us with a revealing case which mystified Malinowski and which throws light on our problem. Before and after the filling of the ceremonial yam houses (buwyma) they perform the vilamalia magic: the ritual words anchor the yam house, and hard binabina stones and tough substances are placed on the floor to impart qualities of durability. Malinowski phrased his incomprehension thus: ‘Whereas the objective facts reveal to us that the whole performance is directed at the yam-house, at the food accumulated there, the comments of the native make the human organism the real subject-matter of magic influence’ (1965a: 220). While the rite says that the yam house, yams and the village should endure, the Trobrianders have not the slightest doubt that it does not directly act on the food but on the human organism, specifically the human belly. If the vilamalia were not performed man and woman would want to eat all the time, but after its performance hunger would be reduced, and the yams would rot in the storehouse.

Malinowski found this explanation astonishing and wrote an unnecessary harangue on the Trobrianders’ misunderstanding of the process of nutrition and metabolism (matched by their misapprehension of the fundamentals of human procreation).

What are the facts? The natives have postulated a homology between the yam house and the human belly. A man’s ceremonial store house is filled with the urigubu gifts—the yams are used primarily for ceremonial distributions or for wasi (ceremonial barter). The yams are the foundation of wealth and a Trobriander gloats over his full storehouse. One never returns a yam to the storehouse or adds to its contents. It is better to let the yam rot than deplete the stock.

While the yam house should be ‘full’, the human stomach which diminishes the yams should be ‘empty’. The Trobriand ideology in the midst of plenty is that abstention from food is a virtue, and to have little food or to show hunger is shameful. There is no greater insult than ‘no food thine’ or ‘thy hunger’. Now, in Trobriand thought the belly is not only the receptacle of food, it is also the seat of emotions and understanding (1965a: 10). It is the storehouse of magical formulae and traditions, i.e. it is the seat of memory (1960: 409). Since the belly is the tabernacle of magical force, food taboos and restrictions are intimately connected with the preparations of the magician to achieve a sacred state before performing magic.

The Trobriand logic is that a rite conducted realistically to make the storehouse
endure is really a metaphorical analogy urging the human belly to restrain its hunger and greed for food. It is the belly that ‘hears’ and ‘understands’ the rite which is externally performed on an inanimate object. The Trobrianders carry the metaphor further to its exacting conclusion. There is a Trobriand taboo on cooking imposed on any dwelling that stands in the inner ring of the village near the yam houses. In fact, only the bachelor house and the chief’s dwelling stand there, and cooking is prohibited in them. The Trobriand phrasing of the taboo is in terms of the ‘sensibility of the taytu (yam) to the smell of cooking’. Is it so difficult to understand that it is the human belly that is sensitive to cooking in the vicinity of the yam houses?

Thus it is possible to argue that all ritual, whatever the idiom, is addressed to the human participants and uses a technique which attempts to re-structure and integrate the minds and emotions of the actors. The technique combines verbal and non-verbal behaviour and exploits their special properties. Language is an artificial construct and its strength is that its form owes nothing to external reality: it thus enjoys the power to invoke images and comparisons, refer to time past and future and relate events which cannot be represented in action. Non-verbal action on the other hand excels in what words cannot easily do—it can codify analogically by imitating real events, reproduce technical acts and express multiple implications simultaneously. Words excel in expressive enlargement, physical actions in realistic presentation.

It is a truer tribute to the savage mind to say that, rather than being confused by verbal fallacies or acting in defiance of known physical laws, it ingeniously conjoins the expressive and metaphorical properties of language with the operational and empirical properties of technical activity. It is this which gives magical operations a ‘realistic’ colouring and allows them to achieve their expressiveness through verbal substitution and transfer combined with an instrumental technique that imitates practical action. Lévi-Strauss (1963: 221) has aptly said that magic treats certain human actions as if they are part of physical determinism. Let me emphasise that there is only a simulation involved here, and that the mechanics are also accompanied by a ‘humanisation of natural laws’ which implies not only that material objects and sensory dates are given symbolic meanings but also that supernatural entities are postulated and impersonated by human actors. Language figures importantly in this double relation of ritual to myth on the one hand and instrumental action on the other.

This perspective allows us not only to retrieve ourselves from the Frazerian absurdity but also to see certain problems in Mauss’s formulation. Mauss (1902–3) was surely right in his view that magical ideas are a category of collective thought. He was not sensitive to the role of words in magic and concentrated primarily on the manual act. Taking the notion of mana as his point of reference, he located the concept of spiritual force as the essence of magic, comparable to our concept of ‘mechanical force’, and was thus able to assimilate magic to the more general theme of causality. Magic was described as a ‘gigantic variation on the principle of causality’. But this theoretical step also led him to assert that magic was ‘absurd from the standpoint of pure reason’. While perhaps Mauss understood some aspects of the inner frame of magical action, especially the technique of transfer, he missed its expanded meanings and refractions.
Lévi-Strauss has applauded Mauss’s views and has therefore not been able to extricate himself from the difficulties contained in them. In *The savage mind* (1966 ch. 1) Lévi-Strauss vacillates in a series of equivocations when he first argues on the lines of Mauss, that magic postulates an all-embracing determinism, an ‘unconscious apprehension of the truth of determinism’, ‘an act of faith in a science yet to be born’, i.e. that magic is like science; then shifts his ground in the face of magic’s sometimes illusory results to say that to order is better than not to order and therefore ‘taxonomy’ as represented in magical ideas has eminent aesthetic value, i.e. magic is like art; and finally says that the analogy between magic and science is merely formal, and therefore instead of contrasting magic and science, it would be better ‘to compare them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge’. These vacillations indicate at least that the primitive has with incomparable wit and imagination posed for anthropology an ingenious puzzle. Malinowski was by comparison more consistent and less equivocal and in some ways remarkably close to Evans-Pritchard. Malinowski was quite clear in his mind that Trobriand magical ideas should not be confused with ideas of determinism implied in their practical activities; and he was equally clear that magic and practical activity were joined in complementarity in one total series. This view commends itself to serious consideration.

**APPENDIX:** Trobriand colour symbolism

The Trobrianders appear to have three primary colours—white, red and black—which are of aesthetic, symbolic and ceremonial importance. White and red have relatively unambiguous meanings, black has positive and negative aspects shifting with context, although it too has a dominant meaning. Perhaps more important than their single values is their configurational significance when all three colours are combined, as for example ih face and canoe painting. I summarise below first the connotations of each colour separately and then of all three in combination.

**Primary colours**

*White.* A set of rituals in which white appears as the dominant colour is that associated with pregnancy (referred to in the text). The dominant symbol for the spell and the rite is the white bird *bwatwana*, or the white pigeon. The fibre or banana leaf cloaks and skirts which the pregnant woman dons are white in colour. In the rite for charming the cloak creamy white leaves and white flowers of the lily are used. During her toilet the face and body of the woman are stroked with the mother of pearl shell and she is decked with white shell ornaments. (Note that the *kula* valuables are red (necklaces) and white (armlets).) In the pregnancy ritual the white symbolism is expressed in terms of whitening and smoothing of the skin and body. Washing and cleansing also achieve this objective. Whiteness here stands for: beauty of body but not of an erotic kind; fertility or conception; sexual purity in that the pregnant woman must not indulge in adultery or even intercourse with her husband; elevated status like that of the chief, expressed by sitting on a platform and being ‘off the ground’. In the inaugural agricultural rite, which also connotes impregnating of the soil and the rising of the belly of the garden, white vegetable and chalky substances are used (see text). Whiteness has also certain peripheral negative connotations as in the case of the white blight that attacks the yam leaves and albinism of human beings.

*Black.* Witchcraft and sorcery are associated with black, one of their dominant symbols being *mumiti*, the black millipede. Blackness of skin is considered ugly and unattractive; with black skin (as opposed to whitened skin) go patchy skin, boils, ulcers, baldness, deformity and defective speech. Blackness also connotes adultery in women: if a woman’s skin is black she has men on her mind. Blackness gets its unambiguous emphatic expression in mourning customs when the widow wears dirty clothes, her body is blackened with grease and charcoal, she does not wash and is prohibited from wearing festive clothes, ornaments and scent. Thus black is
associated with physical and ritual dirt. Paradoxically by shaving her head hair and by being blackened, the widow (and the affines) show that they are innocent of witchcraft which may have caused the death. But shaving of hair will become more comprehensible when we examine Trobrianders conceptions of beauty and head decoration.

The garden magician’s food taboos include the avoidance of black fish. Blackness, however, has in certain contexts positive virtue. A child’s head is smeared with charcoal and coconut oil to make the head strong. A black head of hair is positively beautiful. Also, black colour has the power to dispel the very thing it is associated with—sorcery, witchcraft, and evil intentions. When black is used in combination with other colours it has positive connotations.

Red. Kula beauty magic for attracting the kula partner puts emphasis on red. Red paint is called talo, which is also the name of one of the mwasita magic spells (see Malinowski 1960: 337, 339). The major symbol in this magic is the red fish. Red fish is also the proper food for ancestors, presumably in order to ‘animate’ them or their power. Redness on the whole connotes radiance, animation, irresistible physical charm and beauty. The main words associated with talo are ikata (flares up) and inamila (flashes) (1960: 446). In the beauty ritual performed for ceremonial dancing and courtship, redness has erotic value. Chewing of betel nut (which produces red liquid) is associated with ‘excitement’. Lovers chew betel nut together. In the kula, betel nut is given to the partner after charming it with a seducing spell.

Red appears to have no special association with blood, except that the Trobriander theory of conception says that the mother contributes flesh and blood to the child. Nor does it appear to stand conspicuously for matrilineal values as among the Ndembu. The Trobrianders have no menstruation taboos, nor special ablations at first menstruation, and there is ‘no pronounced dislike or dread of menstrual blood’ (Malinowski 1929: 144-5).

Face painting (soba) and head ornamentation

All the colours come together in this activity. Malinowski at several points notes that all three colours are used for painting of the face with graceful scrolls and designs, but he does not bother to document the intricacies, primarily because he views the matter as simply ornamental and nothing more. But he shows a lively appreciation of Trobriand ornamentation and ceremonial display, and provides enough evidence for us to compile the symbolic basis.

The Trobrianders rarely paint their bodies, but anoint them with aromatic oil. The wished-for state of the body and its skin is ‘whiteness’. The shape of the ideally beautiful face is that of the full moon (Malinowski 1929: 249), in which image roundness and whiteness are expressed. The main erotic interest of the Trobriander is focused on the head and face, while the seat of emotions is located in the lower part of the body, in the breasts and belly. Face painting and head ornamentation are an important feature of beauty magic in general associated with pregnancy rituals, kula and ceremonial dancing. Both men and women appear to practise the same toilet.

The three paints are manufactured thus. Red (talo) paint is obtained from a compound of crushed betel nut and lime; red ochre is also used. White paint was traditionally made from certain kinds of clay mixed with crushed coral, but imported white lead is also used. There are two kinds of black paint—aromatic paint (sayaku) made from charred coconut fibre or charcoal mixed with scented coconut oil, and nowa which is the ordinary charcoal blacking.

The individual parts of the face and head, decorated with paints and ornaments, are given complex aesthetic values. The eyes are considered the ‘gateways of erotic desire’, ‘the seat of desire and lust’, the cause (u’ula) of sexual passion (1929: 141) with communicating ducts to the lower parts of the body. (The eyes we may note are a combination of black and white.) However, black hair on the face is not appreciated, and the eyebrows are shaved. (The biting off of the eyelashes is indulged in in sexual play.) Next to the eyes it is the mouth that is the focus of attention. The magic of talo (the red paint made of betel nut) is used to redden the lips. The vermillion lips are set off against the teeth which are blackened by contact with a special mangrove root. The ear lobes are pierced and the holes enlarged and ornamented, normally with earrings of turtle shell and other ornaments made especially with red spondylus shell discs. The proper place for hair is the head (and not on any other part of the body). Black thick moppy hair is highly appreciated, grey or white hair and baldness being considered ugly. The Trobrianders have elaborate modes of hair-dressing and hairstyles, such as the favourite mop (gugwapo’u) or
the elongated cylindrical form (bobobu); there are separate mourning styles, including full shaving of the head to convey withdrawal from normal life and obligatory assumption of a dirty state (1929: 253). In ceremonial attire the black head of hair is crowned with flaming (red) hibiscus flowers. The ornaments worn on the body are red necklaces and white arm shells.

We have little information about facial designs: white, though used, appears to have secondary emphasis and red and black paint are the dominant colours. One could guess that red stands for animation and erotic charm, black for power to dispel the evil forces and intentions stemming from other human beings. On the whole the face and head decorations emphasise red and black, with white showing in the armlets and being given its value mainly in relation to the body and skin.

Festive dress for women is described as a ‘radiant combination of crimson, purple and golden skirts’ (with black probably excluded?). Normal dress is the yellowish-white or golden colour of fibre or banana leaf skirts.

**Canoe painting**

The canoe (uwaga) is also painted in the three primary colours, of which the most important is black (Malinowski 1960: 140). It is clear that the dominance of black is expressive of the canoe’s speed, and the power of dispelling or withstanding the dangers of sailing. When the canoe has been constructed, three magical rites of exorcism are conducted, to smoke and cleanse it and to impart speed and lightness. This sequence is followed by the painting of the canoe. Rites are performed for each paint: the kaykoulo for black paint, the malakava for red paint and the pwaka for white paint (1960: 416). The first is compulsory (the others being optional), and the substances used are the wings of the bat, the nest of a small bird called posisiku and dried bracken leaves (all black but here connoting, in addition to dispensing power, lightness and therefore speed) which are charred with coconut husk. The first ceremonial strokes of black are made with this mixture, followed by a watery mixture of charred coconut.

It is clear that the magic of black paint and the symbolism of the colour is related to the Trobriand notion of female flying witches (mulukwausi) who in the night take the form of flying foxes or nightbirds, etc. and attack corpses and ship—wrecked sailors. But by an inversion this same image of the witch becomes the image of the much desired ‘flying canoe’ (see ‘Myth of Kayaduri’ in Malinowski 1960) which has great speed and power to dispel dangers. The substances used in the magic are a ‘witch’s brew’.

The next painting sequence is the ‘staining of the red mouth’ of the canoe: a cowrie shell attached to the prow board (tabuyo) is stained at each end (bow and stern). The rite is a component of kula magic, and the red may be said to symbolise the animation and flashing beauty of the canoe. Unfortunately Malinowski provides no data on the designs on the prow boards and how they were painted (however, see plates XXVI and XXVII in Malinowski 1960).

The reader may wish to relate the significance of Trobriand colour symbolism to the assertions and hypothesis made by Turner (1966). There is confirmation of his thesis of a basic colour triad. Each colour may be emphasised separately in particular rituals (white in pregnancy rites, red in kula mwasila or beauty magic, black in mortuary rites) but they also come together as a configuration in face painting and canoe painting. But, unlike for the Ndembu, red for the Trobrianders does not appear to be an ambivalent colour. They do not hunt nor do they fear menstrual blood. White is positive, and black dominantly negative, but it too in its proper place and context can be inverted to produce positive virtues.

**Notes**

I am grateful to Edmund Leach for reading and critically commenting on this lecture while it was in preparation. He is of course not responsible for its limitations and controversial statements. I am also grateful to M. Egan and W. Dissanayake for providing me with most of the information on the words used in Sinhalese healing rituals.

1 Malinowski’s theoretical concern with language probably started after his first trip to Kiriwina in 1916. In *Argonauts of the western Pacific* he had begun to state the ideas which were formalised in the classic supplement to Ogden and Richards (1923). Since magic was so pervasive in the Trobriands all his other works (e.g. 1920) contained further elaborations of his views on language. He attempted his most elaborate statement in the two volumes of *Coral gardens and their magic*, which he considered his best work.
Recent literature in one way or another has been sensitive to the role of words in ritual. Freedman (1966) has referred to the didactic nature of the songs sung when a Chinese bride leaves her home and the significance of bawdy songs before she is deflowered. Goody (1962) has reported Lodaga funeral speeches and chants (which interestingly are largely impromptu though they always use phrases of a proverbial kind). Middleton's (1960) analysis of the cult of the dead among the Lugbara, alludes to the ritual addresses (adi) made by elders. In the rites of sacrifice and purification, which legitimise changes in the alignment of lineage segments, the addresses recount traditional lore, genealogical history, the animosities and quarrels of the participants and the motive and identity of the agent responsible for the illness. More dramatic is Spencer's description (1965) of the 'brain washing' of Samburu brides by inquisitorial elders. Turner (1966) has described the cybernetic function of Ndembu divination as a form of social analysis and a mechanism of social redress. But even this supreme exponent concentrates on major symbols (Turner 1962; 1964; 1966) to the exclusion of words said: it is precisely because Turner seeks the meanings of symbols in the verbal explanation (exegesis) of his informants that he has successfully pushed our understanding of ritual away from sympathetic magic to expressive symbolism. Would not then an analysis of the words used directly in the ritual advance this kind of interpretation further? In a way it is A. I. Richards's *Chisungu* (1936) which shines more brilliantly in this galaxy: for in her description of the Initiation ceremony for girls among the Bemba, a ceremony which was explicitly a teaching device, she highlights the complex inter-relates of songs, mimes, ritual objects and actions, which comprise a system of knowledge and a mnemonic of the roles to be assumed. She concludes that the mumbo-jumbo was one of the prized items of information in the society. I throw in for good measure Kuper's description of the Royal Incwala ceremony (1961), if only to indicate that Gluckman's theory of the rituals of rebellion (1954), rightly or wrongly conceived, turns crucially on the interpretation of songs sung during the installation.

There is also a fourth use of which we do not discuss, namely, comic dialogues in prose which are interludes in the ritual.

The account owes much to information provided by M. Egan and W. Disanayake. Egan’s study of Sinhalese ritual will, when it is published, give a more correct and revealing analysis of the use of words and the kinds of verbal form that build up the ceremony.

A book written in Sinhalese (Andris Appuhamy 1927) makes a cogent case for the comprehensibility and intellectual structure of *mantra*. *Mantra* are usually recorded and memorised though some of them may be transmitted orally.

While the Buddhist situation shows a disjunction between the sacred language and the language of ordinary discourse, we should be careful in drawing conclusions about the lack of understanding of Pali chants by the congregation. Villagers can recognise chants, know which are appropriate for which occasion and understand some of the key words, for they have some measure of moral instruction through sermons which are in full or in part rendered in the local language. Furthermore a number of them have themselves been monks in the past, although this is countered by the quick obsolescence of liturgical learning that has no direct relevance or frequent use in lay life. Thus the disjunction is nevertheless there.

In respect of the first conclusion some readers may feel that I have cheated by ignoring the case of the use of 'mystical sounds' and 'unintelligible' phonemes in the *mantras* and *dhārānīs* of tantric Hinduism and Buddhism (and the Muslim technique of *dhikr* in mystical Sufism, about which I am altogether uninformed except to say that it appears to resemble the tantric technique). The theory of the *dhārānī* is that the phonemes are 'supports' for concentration and meditation. The sounds as such are not 'meaningless'; they will reveal their meaning to the initiated only during meditation accompanied by yogic exercises. Thus the sounds are secret to the initiated and unintelligible to the uninitiated. Furthermore the *dhārānī* are different from ordinary secular language only because the latter is considered inadequate to communicate the mystical experience; they represent a language that discovers the primordial consciousness. This theory then squarely places the language of *dhārānī* within the confines and conventions of normal language as a system of communication. The phonemes and 'distorted' words are taken from the secular language and put to special use by the sects. They hardly constitute a full blown ritual language; in any case relates to more than any other form.

There are thus about six functional relations to be analysed relating to the four levels:

1. The relation of myth to what is enacted in the ritual.
2. The relation of the *persona* of myth to the ritual practitioners (pedigree, recruitment, etc.).
3. The relation of mythical time to present day reality.
4. The relation between ritual (as a symbolic form) and the officiants who enact it (which includes the mode of training of the officiant and the taboos and special rules that apply to him).
5. The relation between ritual and the social or practical activities which it is supposed to influence.
6. The relation between ritual practitioners and non-ritual activities and occupations.

There appears to be a resemblance between Malinowski’s pragmatist formulation and Wittgenstein’s oft-quoted operational view that “The meaning of words lies in their use” (1953: 80, 109). But this resemblance is superficial, for although Wittgenstein placed emphasis on context in the determination of meaning, he went on to argue that meanings are best established by substituting words for each other, and that language is like a game of chess, which brings his functional theory in line with structuralist views (Ullman 1957).

10 Malinowski distinguished rites of impregnation where the mediating object was an essential component of the final object of magic (either as an implement in the making of it, or as a constituent part of it) from rites of transference in which the object chanted over and then used as the medium of transfer of magical virtue had no intrinsic connexion with the final object of magic, e.g. a pregnancy cloak or a stone. But there is no real distinction between the rites, and in my view they have the same arrangement. The rite of impregnation also involves a transfer.

The naming of the parts and the transfer of attributes which is evident in Trobriand spells appear in identical form in Dobuan magic (Fortune 1963), in some of the spells cited by Skeat (1900) and in Sinhalese mantra (Wirz 1934). One can see two ways in which the verbal technique can be exploited. The recipient of the transfer may be described in terms of his body parts (i.e. metonymically) and the required attribute present in the desirable symbol or metaphor transferred to it. The converse is where an ‘unknown’ disease or evil is given objective definition and form by describing its parts in terms of the characteristics of known concrete objects or persons, e.g. the description of a demon. By thus describing it metaphorically and metonymically you are able to control it, or by thus representing it to a patient, he is made to expel or reject the demon and by implication the disease.

12 The native commentary indicates that many of the words used in the spells are polyvalent in meaning and have ranges of meaning, as is the case with our poetic language and indeed with our ordinary discourse. Malinowski’s startling commentary on these phenomena, which linguists discuss under the labels of synonymy, polyvalence and homonymy is as follows: ‘It is important to realise that the native commentaries are not to be regarded as correct translations, but rather as free associations suggested to the native by the word mentioned to them. We must remember that the very character of magical words makes it futile to attribute to them a precise and definite lexical meaning . . .’ (1958: 261). He misses the native point of view when he reports ‘It is the multifarious associations, the emotional fringe of the word, which is believed by them to influence the course of nature, and which through this really influences their own psychology and the organisation of their work’ (1958: 261).

13 Evans-Pritchard in his classic contribution (1937), while analysing Zande witchcraft and magic as a coherent system in its own right, felt it necessary to ask what their relation was to Zande empirical activity, and also how magic, which was oriented to achieving effects, compared with Western empiricism based on canons of proof and experimentation. This brilliant book thus faced intellectual problems some of which were the creation of an European mentality. Like Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard (1937: 81) states that ‘Azande undoubtedly perceive a difference between what we consider the workings of nature on the one hand and the workings of magic and witchcraft on the other, though in the absence of a formulated doctrine of natural law they do not, and cannot, express the difference as we express it’ (see also 1937: 463). Again (1937: 73 par.) he argues that belief in witchcraft in no way contradicts empirical knowledge of cause and effect, because what witchcraft focuses on is ‘the socially relevant cause, since it is the only one which allows intervention and determines social behaviour’; in other words, it is on a different wave length from empirical action altogether.

Certain of my conclusions concerning Trobriand magic are confirmed by Evans-Pritchard in respect of Zande prospective magic: ‘The results which magic is supposed to produce actually happen after rites are performed . . .’ ‘Magic is only made to produce events which are likely to happen in any case . . . Magic is not asked to achieve what is unlikely to occur’; ‘Magic is seldom asked to produce a result by itself, but is associated with empirical action that does in fact produce it . . .’ (1937: 475, 476, 477).

There are thus important convergences in the ideas of Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard, whatever their other differences. Evans-Pritchard’s critique of Lévy-Bruhl is Malinowskian—why do primitives in some situations behave ‘ritually’ or ‘mystically’ while in others they behave ‘empirically’, and why do the same objects evoke different attitudes in ritual and non-ritual contexts?

REFERENCES


