Identity Trouble
Critical Discourse and Contested Identities

Edited by
Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Rick Iedema
Identity Trouble
Also by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard

NEWS AS SOCIAL PRACTICE
TEXTS AND PRACTICES: READINGS IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Edited with Malcolm Coulthard
THE WRITER'S CRAFT, THE CULTURES TECHNOLOGY
Edited with Michael Toolan

Also by Rick Iedema

DISCOURSES OF POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
THE DISCOURSE OF HOSPITAL COMMUNICATION
Editor
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Preface

This collection of chapters was inspired by the extremely stimulating Discourse Nexus Seminar (DeXus) held at the Centre for Discourse Studies of the University of Aalborg in Denmark, organized by Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski in August 2003. Some of the contributors to this volume and other colleagues discussed for many hours the troubles inherent in identity construction and the rising pressures on contemporary identity formation. These initial ideas led us to contact other scholars interested in the same issues and this collection was born.

We would like to thank all the contributors who waited patiently for the book to be published and to the publishers, especially Jill Lake who supported us throughout this project. We also would like to thank Rowena Forsyth for pre-editing the final manuscript.

Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Rick Iedema
Florianópolis, Brazil and Sydney, Australia
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Introduction: Identity Trouble: Critical Discourse and Contested Identities

Rick Iedema and Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard

1 Introduction

‘Identity trouble’ is a term that captures the increasing work that goes into defining and identifying ourselves, our practices, our communities, and our understanding of contemporary social life. With the innumerable social and technological changes of recent times, our sense of a stable identity anchored in familiar social class hierarchies and cultural practice conventions has come under threat. Increasingly, we face fragmented and uncertain identity projects, as is evident from our concern with lifestyle, consumer choice, social and organizational participation, and so forth. All this produces intense ‘identity politics’, thanks to existing family and workplace loyalties and traditional political and community commitments being called into question. Part of this trend, too, as if to compensate for the latter developments, is the upsurge of intense solidarities based on religious, ethnic and national identities. The negative side of this is expressed through exclusion, a sense of ‘not belonging’ and through hostility towards those who are thought to embody ‘different’ identities.

For both citizens of the contemporary world and for scholars interested in understanding social life, the concern with the trouble evident in situated identity performances is becoming increasingly prominent. People need to confront the ways in which identity performances shift rapidly and straddle registers in order to cope with what Bauman (2000) characterizes as ‘liquid modernity’ and Sloterdijk (2004) as ‘foamy present’. Bauman and Sloterdijk’s metaphors serve to characterize the rapidly reconstituting nature of interpersonal, social and organizational spheres and associated conducts, and to express the idea that social life is losing stability and certainty as to who we can be and what we can do and say. Both authors highlight how stable truths appear to have become unstable truces, and how we require new resources and skills to manage the intensification and speed of identity formation and reformation. The identity trouble that arises at the heart of these developments emerges from the contradiction
between the desire for certainty and stability, and the opportunity, possibility and expectation (if not requirement) to re-invent identity to suit the emerging complexity of social situations, needs and conditions. The trouble at issue is how to accommodate the sense that we and the social world we inhabit are rapidly reconstituting and transforming spheres whose changes strain conventional, recognizable notions of self.

For Sloterdijk (2005), Western notions of self began to change with the rise in sea-borne expansionism and trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Central for him is the emerging realization that the European continent was but a small component of a much larger world. This new world, people began to realize thanks to new seafaring technological inventions, was comprised of huge expanses of water, harbouring a wealth of uncertain opportunities and deadly threats. With this realization came a relocation of spiritual orientation, life opportunity and purposive roots from the Middle East to the Americas (towards the west). This east-to-west shift deeply affected and complicated European sensibilities about social positioning, personal identity, life trajectory, fate and opportunity.

At the heart of these emerging sensibilities, Sloterdijk argues, lay Jules Verne’s motto ‘be mobile amidst mobility’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 146). Verne’s motto captures how the seas opened fortune up to people who had thus far been ensnared in strict religious understandings, narrow cultural mores, rigid social structures and fixed positionings and identities. While the seas were dangerous, they also produced a ‘general sense of flexibilization’. Thus, our maritime movements in geographic space engendered a new sense of self, rooted in ‘the ability to navigate across the totality of all reachable places and objects without oneself getting ensnared in others’ nets’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 146). In Sloterdijk’s reasoning, Western maritime colonial explorations and capitalist mercantilism are the ultimate sources of complex and mobile experiences and parallel expressions of identity: ‘To realize oneself in this fluidity as subject – that is the absolute entrepreneurial freedom’ (2005: 146).

With this fluidity and the entrepreneurial freedom that it engenders (and requires) comes the ‘self without place’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 235). ‘Because, on the one hand, contemporary societies dissolve people’s attachments to place, in that big populations are beginning to appropriate a level of mobility that lacks precedent and example; on the other hand, the number of “transition spaces” is growing, preventing those who frequent them from taking up permanent settlement’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 238). For the deterritorialized self, social coherence is pursued through more and more intense and dynamic forms of communication, seeking to create and recreate a sense of interactive place, however temporary.

In their different ways, each of the chapters in this book homes in on this dilemma: displaced selves constructing a new sense of place symbolically, linguistically, emotionally, professionally, organizationally. This
replacing may involve ‘branding’ the self (van Leeuwen and Machin), transnational adoption (Raudaskoski and McIlvenny), blogging (Leppanen), emigration/immigration (Krzyszanowski and Wodak; Caldas-Coulthard), sexual transformation (Escudero), workplace emotionality (Rhodes, Scheeres and Iedema; Long, Lee and Braithwaite), linguistic masking (Coulthard), and entrepreneurializing the professional self (Iedema, Ainsworth and Grant).

What Sloterdijk’s account offers in this regard is a specification of the socio-historical circumstances that inform current sensibilities. Sloterdijk’s account not only confirms Lemke’s argument (Lemke, Chapter 1 in this volume) that identity multiplicity is far from a recent phenomenon, but it also explains Lemke’s point about the centrality to identity of fear and desire. Our ‘oceanic self’, as Sloterdijk calls it, is now a ‘mobility amidst mobility’. This dynamic positioning harbours both a desire for opportunity and fulfilment, and constitutes the root of uncertainty and fear. This brings us still closer to our definition of identity and its prime source of trouble. Like a complex gaming strategy whose currency is comprised of opportunity and risk, contemporary identity at once affords an intensification of desire, opportunity of fulfilment, and total dissolution of self.

Despite its connotations of individuality and fixedness, then, the term ‘identity’ buttresses a perspective on the self that emphasizes complexity and dynamicity. Identity enables us to acknowledge that our conduct is at once structured and open-ended. Identity references the tension between what has been and what we do, say and are in the here-and-now; between what has become automatic in our conducts and other aspects of behaviour that afford learning, change, redefinition, restyling.

Garfinkel talked about these kinds of tensions several decades ago. Understandings about who we are and what we do, he notes, are constituted in and through our conduct in the here-and-now. The strength of Garfinkel’s insight was that he did not regard these understandings as ‘pre-coded entries on a memory drum, to be consulted as a definite set of alternative meanings from among which one was to select’ (1967: 41). In this and other respects, Garfinkel’s analysis of social conduct and of the people in it is insightful and unforgiving. For him, our sense of who we are was always already hostage to ‘the occasionality of the expression, the specific vagueness of references, the retrospective-prospective sense of a present occurrence, waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before’. Moreover, these are not unusual but ‘sanctioned properties of common discourse’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 41).

Garfinkel’s writings have informed more recent views of identity as performative achievement (Butler, 1996). Identity is performed and achieved amidst constraints that ‘prefigure’ who we are and what we do (Butler, 1990). But Garfinkel’s work problematizes self-identity in a way that credits ‘the occasionality of the expression’ with a central role in figuring identity both as present performance and as past prefiguration. That is, Garfinkel’s
work unsettles the notion of a prefigured, stabilized and constraining past that informs a malleable here-and-now. Ezzy elaborates this point by drawing on G. H. Mead’s original writings on this issue: ‘the only test of truth of what we have discovered [about our identity] is our ability to so state the past’ (cited in Ezzy, 2005: 47; from Mead, 1964). On this reasoning, identity is not negotiated in the face of an accumulation of past experiences that simply structure or inform our identity performances in the here-and-now. To accept such a notion of prefiguring would imply that we regard identity performances as accessible to empirical verification and as explainable (retraceable) in rational-scientific terms. Ezzy’s (and Mead’s) point is that identity is the constantly-needing-to-be-negotiated outcome of a multitude of (our own as well as others’) social performances and interpretations in the now. Here, identity lacks not just fixity in the present, but also certainty about its past.

Where does this leave identity? And where does it leave us? Well, the opening chapter to the present volume provides a rich array of reflections and directions to these and related questions. In it Jay Lemke redefines identity away from being a simple descriptor of self to embodying a notion that plays a very specific socio-political role in the social sciences. Straddling social and personal dimensions of self, identity reconciles sociological and phenomenological accounts about who people are and what they do. But for Lemke, the boundary position of identity is still more complex. As a concept, identity is capable of opening up the possibility of recognizing that who we are and what we do is traversed by not just two, but by numerous ‘timescales’. That is, speaking of identity makes it possible to acknowledge that we are criss-crossed with meanings, resources, feelings and regimes of being that reference a multitude of others, other places, other times and other practices. We speak words and sentences devised by others over centuries, we wear clothes imported from around the globe, we move in spaces designed and built by others, we display and experience affects that echo previous species and earlier encounters, and so on. To locate identity performance purely in the interactive present, therefore, is to lose sight of the complex reality that we are always part of:

We say, without giving the matter too much thought, that we engage in ‘face-to-face’ interactions. Indeed we do, but the clothing we are wearing comes from elsewhere and was manufactured a long time ago; the words we use are not formed on this occasion; the walls we have been leaning on were designed by an architect for a client, and constructed by workers – people who are absent today, although their action continues to make itself felt. The very person we are addressing is a product of history that goes far beyond the framework of our relationship. If one attempted to draw a spatio-temporal map of what is present in the interaction, and to draw up a list of everyone who in one form or another
were present, one would not sketch out a well-demarcated frame, but a convoluted network with a multiplicity of highly diverse dates, places and people.

(Latour, 1996: 231)

Clearly, the timescales that Lemke and Latour invoke in their discussions are not simply ‘neutral’ components that ‘contextualize’ or frame who we are and what we do. Rather, these timescales themselves are unstable, as well as cutting across and exacerbating the complexity and indeterminacy of the here-and-now. In the contemporary world, there is a steep increase in time-spaces that are relevant and available in the here-and-now, and this complicates the ways in which we go about ‘doing being self’. Given the growing numbers of resources, technologies, meanings, discourses, and styles that we deploy, our struggle to understand (fix, define) both the present and the past becomes so much harder, and our understandings of the real so much more easily contested and unsettled.

2 Contents of the Book

This book originates from the first DeXus or Discourse Nexus Seminar held at the Centre for Discourse Studies, the University of Aalborg, Denmark in 2003, organized by Paul McIlvenny and Pirkko Raudaskoski. The volume brings together a range of authors in a wide variety of critical discursive fields, all focusing on the rising pressures on contemporary identity. Its chapters pay specific attention to occasions where our identity accomplishment comes under threat, or fails. The primary concern here is with the troubles that emerge during people’s identity constructions and enactments as they face or try to explain the social, cultural, organizational and other kinds of fluidity and uncertainty that envelop them. Examples of such troubles are:

- the developments in social institutions and formal organizations which bear on who people can be and what they can say and do (see Chapters 11, 12 and 13);
- the co-presence and actional interdependence of old, recent and new media, posing challenges of response and appropriation which reconstitute how people interact and self-identify (see Chapters 2, 3 and 7);
- the ability of new (medical, economic, bureaucratic) technologies to inform people, their positioning and their relationships in ways that far exceed the informational powers of old technologies (see Chapters 10 and 13);
- the many new ways in which people cross borders (space, work, and so on) and are able to reconstrue and re-present themselves (see Chapters 4 and 6).
While the chapters in this book share the view that identity is an embodied and socially situated accomplishment, and while the notion discourse provides a common point of departure, they do not answer to a unified analytical regime (cf. the chapters in Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998). This means that for the contributing authors discussions of identity can traverse a number of domains:

- Identity is relational (that is, a performativity achieved in social interaction in the here-and-now) but also extends materially across non-local timescales.
- Identity is linguistic/discursive and multi-modal or semiotic: identity is the things we say, do, gesture, posture, wear, possess, create, and so on (acknowledging that not all sites/activities call for multi-modal repertoires in the same way).
- Identity is realized as representational enactment (meaning), as interpersonal experience (feeling) and organized performance (acting), and as a controlled distribution (who has access to such enactments? who are legitimate producers/consumers/overhearers, and so on of these enactments?).
- Identity is not beholden to one particular dimension of being, but corresponds to anything that actors (or analysts) treat as significant. Conversation Analysts regard spoken interaction as the ‘absolute baseline’ for doing identity, and volumes like Coupland and Gwyn’s postulate the body as principal interstice between ‘self-identity and social identity’ (Coupland and Gwyn, 2003). Chapters in the present collection accept these and other facets of being and doing that may anchor an identity performance, acknowledging that people can choose to foreground different facets and timescales of social life for identity investment and self-realization.

The main aim that unites this book is to enhance our understanding of the processes involved in the performing of selves, groups and communities by focusing on what threatens or destabilizes their identity. Our focus is on how people’s performances constitute and reconstitute identity across social practices and social sites, and how contestations over identity come to occupy social spaces and how these result in conflicted social relations.

The book is divided into two parts – Part 1, ‘Doing Identity Analysis’, is concerned with identity as articulation, challenge, and resistance in the narration of public self. Jay Lemke, in Chapter 1, ‘Identity, Development, and Desire: Critical Questions’, suggests that the concept of ‘identity’ is increasingly being asked to bear a heavy theoretical burden in discourses concerned with education, learning, development and the relation of the individual and the social. He raises a number of critical questions about the concept of identity in the hope of stimulating discussion in the research
community about its uses and limitations and how it might be refigured, elaborated or superseded by alternative conceptualizations. From the perspective of a socio-cultural and historical analysis, he suggests that we need to understand the ways in which the concept of identity functions in contemporary discourses as a mediating term between social-structural phenomena and lived, interactional experiences (Lemke, 1995). In this boundary-riding role, the notion of identity inherits many features of earlier discourses framed in terms of soul, psyche, persona, personality, selfhood, subject, agency, and the like. In this way, Lemke opens up for discussion three principal theoretical proposals: (1) that the multiplicity and hybridity of postmodern identities is not new or exceptional, but is rather the contemporary realization of a more general principle (Lemke, 2002); (2) that the notion of identity needs to be more scale-differentiated, that is, we need a range of differentiated concepts in between that of identity-in-practice and identity as characterizing larger institutional scales and life-span development; and (3) that identities on all scales shape and are shaped by desires and fears rooted in human embodiedness and its subsistence needs, affordances for pleasure, and vulnerability to pain. In Lemke’s terms, the phenomenological experience of unique selfhood ‘overflows’ into social semiotic categories, both structural and agentive, as we create feelings as well as meanings for ourselves and others across the multiple timescales of our lives.

In Chapter 2, ‘Branding the Self’, Theo van Leeuwen and David Machin explore the relationship between corporate practices and personal identity under globalization. For at least the past 200 years identity has increasingly had both a public side (through categories like class, gender and age) and a private side (through the way individuals expressed their relation to the categories that defined them publicly). The two were thought of as distinct and kept distinct. Today society mass-produces resources for creating identities which subjectively appear personal, but objectively are not, as people belonging to the same ‘lifestyle’ categories make the same choices across the globe. Their chapter describes how this has been brought about by new techniques of marketing, and how lifestyle experts, celebrities and ordinary people formulate and limit both what identity is and what they see as their own identity in magazine articles, television programmes and home pages.

In Chapter 3, ‘Identity Work and Transnational Adoption’, Pirkko Raudaskoski and Paul McIlvenny propose that social and political theory has taken a decidedly ‘global’ turn in recent years, resulting in a sustained critique of conceptualizations of ‘society’ and the ‘nation-state’. Instead, social theorists ask us to refocus on, for example, transnationality, global orderings, hybrid collectives, flows, mobilities and networks. Given that discourse studies draws heavily on social theory, the authors ask what new possibilities there are for discourse studies as a result of contemporary social and political theorizing. They also investigate the consequences of taking
seriously an emerging ‘network sociality’ for a discourse studies methodology. What can discourse analysis in its various forms provide for understanding practices such as transnational adoption, as mediated in, through and across talk, text and other modalities of discourse? With the emergence of a new socio-cultural order of globalization, how can we refigure ‘discourse’ and ‘identity’ in relation to the post-national? Their contribution to this collection traces a host of discourses and contingent practices of care and kinship that are heterogeneously assembled to ‘translate’ a child (legally and/or willingly) from one familial ‘place’ or nexus of practice in the world to another, crossing linguistic, socio-cultural, racial, class and national boundaries in the process. Their concern is with how the ‘child-to-be-adopted’ is figured as a quasi-object, a heterogeneous assemblage of biology and culture, and thus how its origin, identity and agency are performatively distributed across the social and discursive field. They focus on the crucial role of the ‘intimate public sphere’ of the Internet, particularly from the parents’ point-of-view, specifically how they anticipate the ‘transnational’ mobility of the ‘waiting’ or abandoned child in a faraway place.

Maite Escudero Alíás in Chapter 4, ‘When (non) Anglo-Saxon Queers Speak a Queer Language: Homogeneous Identities or Disenfranchised Bodies?’ discusses how Queer Studies, which emerged in the early 1990s in Anglo-Saxon contexts, challenges different essentialist definitions of gender in favour of a wider sexual and cultural diversity. Drawing upon the notion of gender as performance in the context of Judith Butler’s work on the subversive potential of drag, the chapter integrates queer politics into the work of feminism through the different definitions of gender identity. It does so by exploring the presence and representations of queer bodies, such as lesbians, trans-identified individuals and drag kings as globalized developments. Escudero Alíás highlights a ‘gendered identity trouble’ that is present in both cultural recognition and linguistic nomenclature.

Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak in Chapter 5, ‘Multiple Identities, Migration and Belonging: “Voices of Migrants”’ propose a processual and multi-level approach to the question of identity based on the concept of belonging through identification. Their contribution sheds new light on the multilayered and highly diverse processes of identity formation of migrants living in various European countries. They argue that several social-scientific approaches to ‘identity’ proposed in recent years prove to be particularly fruitful in conceptualizing identities as multiple, collective, fragmented, contingent, and so forth. However, for them, the processes of establishing identities in general, and of migrant identities in particular, seem to be frequently omitted from social-scientific analysis. By elaborating on their conception of belonging, the authors propose a new conception of migrant identities which treats processes of identity-formation as forever unsettled kinds of discursive and dynamic constructions. A detailed and systematic (critical-analytic) examination of a set of more than 40 focus
groups with migrants from eight European countries is used to exemplify several processes of discursive formation and negotiation of migrant belongings. The main aim of the analysis is to depict various ways in which these identities are caught in the feeling of ‘in-between-ness’.

In Chapter 6, ‘Mongrel Selves: Narratives of Displacement and Multi-Positioning’, Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Amélia Maria Fernandes Alvès adopt a similar approach as they examine the question of cultural identity from the immigrant point of view. They examine Brazilian immigrants who choose to live in Britain and the ways they place themselves in the new culture. They are particularly interested in the ways they resemiotize (Iedema, 2001) their public and private identities in an attempt to integrate more successfully into the host country, changing their native practices, relocating (or not) in the (many times hostile) new environment. By examining linguistic/discursive and multi-modal resources used by the narrators, the author discusses processes of border crossing, social change and ‘multi-positioning’. Personal narratives and the use of new technologies (web pages) are analysed in order to discuss notions of belonging and the processes involved in the making of ‘new’ selves, since dislocation or multi-positioning may threaten or destabilize cultural identities. The focus in this chapter is on how non-natives are de- and reconstituted in new social contexts and spaces and how their social relations are affected by these new ‘constitutions’. Since the relations between personal experience and public meaning, subjective choice and social location are inscribed in discourses, the authors examine both the narrativization of lives and the ‘troubles’ inherited in ‘living abroad’, and the multi-modal choices used to signify cultural and national identities and meanings of assimilation (or rejection) of the new culture.

Malcolm Coulthard suggests in Chapter 7, ‘By Their Words Shall Ye Know Them: On Linguistic Identity’, that we still lack a detailed knowledge of how far an individual identity is transmitted and displayed through particular lexico-grammatical selections and how far an individual speaker/ writer can be identified irrespective of the homogenizing constraints of genres used. For him, this raises the question of the existence of the idiolect, a concept first floated in the 1940s by Bloch and Hall, and since then in and out of favour with linguists. Recent work seems to suggest that given sufficient data, it is possible to make progress in distinguishing individuals and their identities by their words, at least so far as written texts are concerned. He discusses and exemplifies some of the progress with an analysis of a collection of written texts and applies the methodology to texts where the authorship is unknown or disputed.

Sirpa Leppänen in Chapter 8, ‘Cyber girls in Trouble? Fan Fiction as a Discursive Space for Interrogating Gender and Sexuality’, suggests that fan fiction involves the writing, reading and discussion of novels, stories,
poems and songs by fans of cult TV series, films and fiction, on web sites founded and monitored by fans themselves. It is based on, and intervenes in, characters, plot and themes of a cult ‘text’ originally produced by someone else with a legal right to them. Interestingly, and no doubt as a result of more general attitudes towards popular culture, fan cultures and activities have often been seen in essentially ambiguous and ambivalent ways: as both realist and escapist, marginalized and participatory. Similarly, fans have been regarded as both victims of multinational media capitalism and as heroes, resisting passive consumerism and suggesting alternative visions of the world and ways of life. The author views fan fiction as one example of late modern ‘communitarian’ spirit, as elective, diverse, sensuous and unstable social spaces which are no longer necessarily tied to particular locations and allegiances (such as the nation-state, national culture, or mother tongue). Chapter 8 thus investigates the varied ways in which young Finnish women, prolific fan fiction writers, draw on both English and Finnish discursive, generic and stylistic conventions to build up, negotiate and struggle over gendered identities and relations, and share, discuss and debate them with other fans in fan fiction sites. She argues that the identities and identifications of these women, as constructed by and in fan fiction, are both local and trans-local. On the other hand, fan fiction by the young Finnish women also mediates and rearticulates their everyday lifestyles, concerns, dreams and fantasies. Fan fiction can thus be seen as offering them opportunities for identifications with gender positions which can be both emancipative and conformist; fictional and very here-and-now.

Branca Telles Ribeiro and Maria Tereza Lopes Dantas in Chapter 9, “‘I’m good’. ‘I’m nice’. ‘I’m beautiful’: Idealization and Contradiction in Female Psychiatric Patients’ Discourse’, focus on how women portray and perform troubled identities in a psychiatric interview. While narrating who they are, patients display a sense of self that is fragmented and multiple. Often these different representations are contradictory (such as, ‘the good wife’ and ‘the one who betrays’ or the anorexic woman vs. the beauty queen). While there are many facets to identity, the authors see women pursuing an ideal of wellness or goodness or beauty in an attempt to meta-communicate to the listener that in spite of their mental illness there is a feeling of well being or normality. Mental illness creates identity trouble of different sorts. The patients’ narratives capture the tension of shifting between health and illness and its consequence for understanding ‘who they are’. It seems that, in order to have a sense of self, these women frequently refer to an ‘ideal me’ or an ‘ideal other’, where identity emerges in a rather fixed representation, though layered in many contradictions. Excerpts illustrate the voices of idealized and rather passive women, troubled by contradictory statements or actions that also reveal active, masculine and transgressive persona.
The analysis presented here focuses on stories told by four female patients in an interview situation. The women had been diagnosed as manic-depressive, in a manic episode. These interviews were videotaped while the patients were hospitalized. Finally, the chapter discusses why ideals are represented so strongly in these women’s conversations with the doctor. Specifically, why are these female stereotypes foregrounded in these interactions? It is clear that they point to different femininities and their contradictions. They can be seen as feminine practices as well as how these women perceive and project female behaviour. The authors suggest that for some of these women, voicing these idealizations may be an important aspect of a socialization process as a woman. It may be part of the essential process of shifting from patient to person and re-engaging in the performance of different gender identities.

In Part 2, ‘New Ways of Understanding Identity/Identities in Professional Settings’, the focus of the analyses is on educational, professional and institutional identities. For Stanton Worthan in Chapter 10, ‘Shifting Identities in the Classroom’, social identification happens only during an inter-textually linked chain of discursive events, as a particular frame or meta-discourse consistently comes to regiment discursive interactions involving an individual. In classroom discourse, students get socially identified partly by means of a chain of events that function not only to identify students but also to help students learn the curriculum. This chapter describes a case in which a theme from the curriculum becomes a resource for the social identification of one student. The chapter traces the intersection of one curricular theme and one student’s identity development over an academic year in a ninth grade classroom, arguing that she develops a certain aspect of her social identity in part as the curricular theme provides relevant categories or meta-signs of identity over a chain of discursive interactions.

In Chapter 11, ‘Triple Trouble: Undecidability, Identity and Organizational Change’, Carl Rhodes, Hermine Scheeres and Rick Iedema describe identities as being redefined both from within changing forms of organization and as a result of an increasing emphasis on ‘emergent practices’ that are seen to benefit organizational cohesion and productivity. The relationships that are being enacted across existing organizational responsibilities and hierarchies problematize assumptions about the linearity of work (in terms of production, employment and management). This reflects rising interest in the temporalization of production, the self-organization of work and the reconstitution of scrutinizing management into motivating leadership. The authors chart the ongoing hybridization of work relationships and identities by conceptualizing organizational identity as a situated navigation between ‘self and other’ and ‘self as other’. In a climate where employees are increasingly inducted and co-opted into being actively engaged in realizing regimes of surveillance, people also and inevitably seek to enact an ‘aesthetics of self at work’ (following Foucault), or what the
the authors term ‘observance’. Thus they argue that as workers we struggle with positionings at the interstice between surveillance, resistance and a reconstitution of self (observance), with this struggle being a pre-condition for the emerging, twenty-first century ethics of worker subjectivity. The authors note that, as a nexus of social, capital, sexual and psychal struggles, identity is a temporal and troubled outcome stretched between ‘what I want’ and ‘what they want’, and its unfolding is rationalized as the managerial passage of (personal into organizational) time and meaning. The chapter draws on data from a gaming machine factory to draw out the tensions between identity investment in enactments of surveillance and observance, and being the object of the subjectivity of others.

Debbi Long, Bonsan Bonne Lee and Jeffrey Braithwaite, argue in Chapter 12, ‘Attempting Clinical Democracy: Enhancing Multivocality in a Multidisciplinary Clinical Team’, that hospital-based clinical work is increasingly characterized by high levels of specialization and complexity. Multidisciplinary care teams are increasingly being used to handle complex hospital-based care. Their chapter explores the tension between the multivocal, democratic communication strategies necessary for optimizing such multidisciplinary care, and the hospital practices and environments characterized by deeply entrenched hierarchical communication and relationship structures. Based on ethnographic research undertaken in a clinic caring for patients with spinal cord injuries, this chapter describes the practices of a highly functional and efficient multidisciplinary clinical team, illustrating barriers that the team experienced in attempting to incorporate clinically democratic communication structures.

In Chapter 13, ‘Embodying the Contemporary “Clinician-Manager”: Performing Professional Values or Entrepreneurializing Middle-Management?’, Rick Iedema, Susan Ainsworth and David Grant delve into the tensions that characterize the clinician-manager role. In doing so, they note that contemporary health policy began to emphasize the importance of clinicians taking on managerial roles when it became clear that health organizations incurred increasing levels of government expenditure. As ‘inflationary hotspots’, these organizations needed to be ‘financially better managed’ and clinicians were called on to make this possible. Clinicians have for years resisted this new role, and many publications have described the lack of fit between clinical and managerial concerns. Against this background, the chapter presents an analysis of two clinician-managers, a nurse and a doctor, to show that clinicians’ resistance to entering management appears to have given way to a new hybrid, complex clinical-managerial identity. Based on their analysis of the interview data, the authors suggest that clinicians may have taken on managerial roles in ways that subvert policy makers’ and hospital managers’ original intention of ‘incorporating’ clinicians into management. The chapter reveals how clinicians capitalize on their new managerial position, and how they have devised ways of evading
the edicts of senior management and accessing alternative sources of power and influence. Drawing on Sloterdijk’s link between identity flexibilization and incalculability, the authors argue that through hybridizing their professional self (as ‘clinician-managers’), the interviewees have become skilled in intervening in the effect of the gaze of senior management, neutralizing its power.

As these summaries show, the book brings together a rich array of empirical studies of identity manifestations and performances. It traverses both theoretical and empirical research, and presents studies of a range of social, discursive and organizational sites. We hope that the book will contribute not merely to identity studies as an academic enterprise, but also to problematizing identity as a theoretical and experiential construct, given the trouble that it occasions across the many facets of social life which are reported on in the chapters that follow.

Notes

1. Translated from the original German: ‘Beweglich im Beweglichen’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 146).
2. ‘Seine Devise, “Beweglich im Beweglichen”, erläutert in unüberbietbarer Klarheit und Allgemeinheit, was modernisierte Subjectivität will und soll. Der Sinn der grossen Flexibilisierung ist die Macht, in der Gesamtheit aller erreichbaren Orte und Objekte zu navigieren, ohne selbst für die Erfassungsmittel der anderen feststellbar zu sein. Sic him flüssigen Element als Subjekt verwirklichen: absolute Unternehmensfreiheit.’
3. ‘Denn auf einen Seite lockern solche “Gesellschaften” ihre Ortsbindungen, indem große Populationen sich eine beispiellose Mobilität aneignen; auf der anderen vermehren sich die Zahl der Transit-Orte, zu denen für die Menschen, die sie frequentieren, kein wohnendes Verhältnis möglich ist’ (Sloterdijk, 2005: 238).

References


Part 1

Doing Identity Analysis: Articulation, Challenge, Resistance in the Narration of the Public and of the Self
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The concept of ‘identity’ is increasingly being asked to bear a heavy theoretical burden in discourses concerned with education, learning, development, and the relation of the individual and the social. I would like to raise a number of critical questions about the concept of identity in hopes of stimulating discussion in the research community about its uses and limitations and how it might be refigured, elaborated or superseded by alternative conceptualizations.

From the perspective of a socio-cultural and historical analysis, we need to understand the ways in which the concept of identity functions in contemporary discourses as a mediating term between social-structural approaches and views of lived, interactional experience (Lemke, 1995: chs 2, 5). In this role the notion of identity inherits many features of earlier discourses framed in terms of soul, psyche, persona, personality, selfhood, subject, agency, and so forth. We also need to understand in what sense postmodern notions of identity embrace multiplicity and hybridity of social identities across both diverse human relationships and social categories such as gender, sexuality, class, culture, race, ethnicity, and so on:

- What are the implications of specifically relational notions of identity (e.g., Gergen, 1991) for its multiplicity and hybridity? How can identities be unitary or integrative when they function as part of our relationships with diverse members of our communities (elders and juniors, same gender and non-same gender, same and non-same class, ethnicity, and so forth)?
- If identities are enacted or performed (Butler, 1993), how are they influenced by feelings of desire and fear? What is the role of the body and physical interaction, dependence and vulnerability in shaping identity (body to body; body to environment, tools, foods, threats)? Is a single notion of identity protean enough to apply across different timescales of human activity? If not, how is the identity we enact across a momentary interaction to be distinguished from the sort of identity that we perform over decades (Goffman, 1961; Harre, 1979)?
• Do we construct identities only from fixed semiotic options provided by our culture and its constraints? If not, how can we innovate and perform new kinds of identities that potentially subvert the normative formations of our communities? What role do transgressive identities play in social and cultural change?

• Finally, what is the politics of the notion of identity? How does the spread of discourses framed in terms of this concept advance the interests of some in society over those of others? How do they re-inscribe existing power relations and/or challenge them and offer alternatives?

My aim in this chapter will not be the impossible task of comprehensively reviewing social theories of identity, but the more specific one of raising challenging questions for those of us who use this currently fashionable concept in our research and analysis. In particular, I will suggest and open for discussion three principal theoretical proposals:

• The multiplicity and hybridity of postmodern identities is not new or exceptional, but is rather the contemporary realization of the more general principle (Lemke, 2002a) that in identity development, we learn how to perform diverse relational identities in interaction with diverse others across the significant social divisions within our community, particularly age and gender, but also class, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on.

• The notion of identity needs to be more scale-differentiated: that is, we need a range of differentiated concepts from that of identity-in-practice on the short timescales of situated small-group activity, to notions of identity appropriate to larger institutional scales and lifespan development. Identities across timescales are integrated by means of the material continuity of bodies and other socially meaningful material constructions across time (Lemke, 2000, 2002b).

• Identities on all scales shape and are shaped by desires and fears rooted in human embodiedness and its subsistence needs, affordances for pleasure, and vulnerabilities to pain. The phenomenological experience of unique selfhood overflows social semiotic categories, both structural and agentive, as we create feeling as well as meaning for ourselves and others across the multiple timescales of our lives.

1.1 Identity is multiplex: why, and how?

As part of its inheritance from earlier notions such as personality, subject and soul, we tend initially to imagine an identity as unitary. Throughout my discussion, however, I want to emphasize its multiplicity. We act differently with children and with peers, in formal situations and informal ones, in our professional settings and in our intimate settings. We cumulate over
our lifetimes elements of identity that may have had their origins in childhood, adolescence and the many later ‘periods’ of our lives. We may claim affiliation with different cultures and with different institutions and act differently, playing different roles, foregrounding different ‘sides’ of our personality in each. We are always ourselves, but who we are, who we portray ourselves as being, who we are construed as being changes with interactants and settings, with age of life. Identities develop and change, they are at least multi-faceted if not in fact plural. Their consistency and continuity are our constructions, mandated by our cultural notions of the kinds of selves that are normal and abnormal in our community.

How do we characterize an identity? Most often we do so by using simplistic social categories that stand in for complex, multi-dimensional degrees of performance or fit in a high-dimensional space of gradable, socially significant traits of being or behaviour. Our ‘gender’ identity is never so simple as being just ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’. We may be more stereotypically masculine on some traits (aggressiveness, impassiveness, physical courage) and less so on others (strength, tolerance for pain, group leadership). We may at the same time also be more stereotypically feminine in some respects (cooperativeness, nurturance, sexual passivity). We may dress in stereotypically feminine clothes, but have a highly developed and defined musculature (female bodybuilder). We may be good at boys’ sports and like playing with dolls. What cultural stereotypes insist are ‘packages’ of traits that must, ‘by nature’, go together, are in social fact and in principle relatively independent dimensions of behaviour and disposition that are correlated in a population only because of the social pressures to conform to the stereotypes. And there are always very many individuals, perhaps in some respect nearly all individuals, who do not conform in every respect to these stereotypes. (For further development of these themes see Lemke, 1998, and 1995: ch. 5.)

What is true of gender identity is also true of its near associates, such as sexuality, and indeed of every categorizable dimension of identity. What culture announces as one natural kind is in fact a distribution of dissociable traits which do actually combine in many different ways in real individuals. Are we a ‘religious man’ or a ‘good Catholic’? More so by some criteria and less so by others, always. Are we typically American or Chinese? Only in some ways and not in others. And so we may also be ‘hybrid’ in our identities: a bit ‘masculine’ and a bit ‘feminine’, a bit ‘American’ and a bit ‘Chinese’, more African-American with our mother’s family and more Puerto Rican with our father’s family. We may be able to code-shift our identity performances because we have substantial competence in more than one culture and its identity repertoire, or we may just inherit or have acquired portions of each total ‘package’.

In fact, hybridity is something of a misnomer. It presupposes the essentialization of the categories across which we ‘hybridize’ when there is no
good reason to take those categories as other than cultural ideals (and often the representatives of cultural ideologies). People are diverse. We populate a large volume in the space of possible ways of being human along all dimensions of similarity and difference. Many of us may clump near the ideal-types of our cultures in many respects, but never in all, and we are as often outliers on many other dimensions. We are all ‘queer’ in one way or another, and that, not ‘normality’, is the ordinary condition of being human. Normality is always a mystification of normativity, a social lie that succeeds in part by introducing simplistic, low-dimensional category grids for pigeon-holing us, and in part by sanctioning any too public display of mismatched qualities. There is no reason why fierce warriors and outstanding athletes should not favour flamboyant clothing and frequent bouts of tears, and no doubt many do, but they are taught not to reveal in public realities which contradict the illusions of cultural norms. We are all forced to pretend that the world is far more like our culture imagines it than it really is, and that we too are far more normalized than we really are. From this arise the frequently noted contradictions between our subjective identities, who we are to ourselves, and our projected identities, who we wish to seem to be to others.

Projected identities, however, are not solely the product of normalizing forces. We also often really are different people to different others, and particularly as we shift in our lives from dealing with those who are much younger or much older, much weaker or much stronger, and those whose ways of life are very different from our own. Our identities are the product of life in a community, and we learn how to interact with many sorts of people very different from ourselves, in the process building up a cumulative repertoire of roles we can play, and with them of identities we can assume. We remember how to be playful, how to play the role of child in parent-child interactions, how to play at being a parent when we are still a child. A child is partly still an infant, partly a child of different kinds to different people and in different situations, and partly a person who has already begun to internalize and build a model of what it is like to be and play the part of those older than ourselves with whom we have learned to interact successfully. Every child can imitate the ways of grown-ups, often quite tellingly. Every student can stand in front of the class and play the role of teacher, often with surprising competence. Every customer has a well-developed model of the service agent or seller we deal with regularly. Every woman has a pretty good idea how to play the part of a man. Everyone of lower or weaker status must learn as part of survival how the minds of the powerful work. Asymmetrically, the powerful are often much less able to put themselves in the shoes of those whose ways of thinking they are privileged to ignore.

Each of us internalizes a great deal of the diversity of the communities in which we live. Our identities include components that understand and
model other roles and identities which we may not be licensed to perform. Children at play, and all of us in our playful moments, experiment with donning identities that we are not sure whether we wish to continue to perform or not, but which we are just trying on to feel their texture and fit. We are in a sense microcosms of the social ecology of which we are a part. (For further discussion, see Lemke, 2002a).

1.2 Some theoretical functions of the notion of identity

Why has the notion of identity become so ubiquitous and central in socio-cultural discourse in the last decade or two? What are its theoretical functions? I believe that the primary value of this notion for most socio-cultural discourses is its function of mediating between the micro-social events in which human agency is foregrounded and the macro-social structures in which aggregate relations and longer timescale processes are most significant. Identity mediates between:

*positionality in the social-structural system* of social category relations based on power, exchange, distribution of resources, distribution of access, expectations, beliefs, values, opportunities, participation frequencies in various activity types, and so on

and

*the habitus of embodied* dispositions to action of particular meaningful kinds of individuals who have lived over some extended period of time in the social-structural positions as above, and experienced differentially and acted/performed differentially the repertory of options for meaning and action provided by the internally diverse culture/community (either on grounds of division of labour, classificatory subdivision, or embodied history of cross-group encounters, immigrations, conquests, and so on).

Identity gives us a way to link the phenomenological domain of lived, moment-by-moment experience and the semiotic domain of enduring cultural and social systems of beliefs, values and meaning-making practices.

What the specific notion of identity adds to a basic sociological or cultural framework is the sense of Agency, that we construct our own identities out of the options afforded to us by our general positionality and our particular trajectory of experiences, encounters, options for action, and so forth. (For the variety of meanings of identity in educational discourse, see Gee, 2001.)

Recent work by Dorothy Holland and her collaborators (1998) on *identity-in-practice* also wrestles with the contradictions between semiotic-analytic characterizations of identity and more phenomenological-experiential
ones and provides empirical grounding for further discussions. Her dominant concern is to show how the longer-term, larger-scale social institutions of a culture can provide resources, material and symbolic, interactional and situational which identity-in-practice can use to reconstruct both itself and, ultimately, these same social and cultural systems.

I propose below a number of ways in which this can happen, including the role of anomalous and transgressive identities, the contradictions between lived experience and cultural norms, and the options opened to us for creating new identities and social relations by conflicts among social institutions and by the incipient reorganization of societies into larger global systems in which the dependence of individuals on particular institutions and organizations is greatly diminished.

1.3 Politics of the concept of identity

Who benefits and who loses from the more widespread adoption of the concept of Identity and its associated discourses and discourse functions?

Superficially, within the academic discourse community, the concept of identity provides a way for scholars who use it to by-pass some of the persistent political conflict between more individualistic psychological paradigms and more socio-cultural ones. This largely benefits the socio-culturalists.

More broadly in the wider community, discourses of identity highlight the differential opportunities and the legitimate anger of those who are positioned in subordinate statuses according to an ‘identity politics’ which disguises itself as category-blind in order to perpetuate the status quo. Discourses of identity call attention to diversity of identities and so to the pressures to conform to socially approved identities, the benefits of doing so, the costs of not doing so, and who determines which identities are approved and who provides the benefits and exacts the costs and how.

Nevertheless it is also true that discourses of identity often tend to re-inscribe more fundamental cultural assumptions which in turn promote a longer-term status quo.

First, ‘identities’ legitimate the dominant ideology of autonomous individuals as morally responsible for their actions and the life-consequences of their cumulative choices. This favours those who benefit from the dominance of a modern euro-cultural bourgeois legitimation of a political-legal-moral economy in which powerful individuals are freed from communal responsibilities to pursue their self-interest at the expense of both the community as a whole and its less powerful members.

Second, identity-types (e.g., masculine vs. feminine, straight vs. gay, middle vs. working class, children vs. adults, white vs. black, etc.), as previously said, tend to reproduce low-dimensional and highly biased oversimplifications of the high-dimensional space of diversity-by-degree of
possible patterns of human self-presentation through action. This favours the power of those who benefit from illusory political alliances which group together different coalitions as members of the ‘mainstream’ or ‘majority’ or dominant category in each case, even though it is only this small powerful minority which is always included in all these coalitions. Every such reduction of the cultural model of human diversity results in the creation of one ‘superior’ group categorically contrasted with all other ‘naturally inferior’ groups, whatever the prevailing rhetoric of equality or democracy.

Third, traditional notions of Identity elide the significant role of fear, desire, anger and other powerful feelings in shaping forms of action and reduce identity-performance to a matter of rational conformity or non-conformity to a small set of fixed social identity options. This again benefits a small cultural minority which claims that it has a right to power and privilege because of its superior ‘rationality’, a claim which is undermined by every discourse that identifies the fundamental role of other modes of affect in shaping all human behaviour and self-presentation.

Finally, notions of identity tend to emphasize invariance over change, unity over multiplicity, and neglect to examine whether notions of identity apply in the same sense at different timescales of activity or to units of analysis at different extensional or organizational scales. This benefits those who prefer an ideology of the inevitability of the status quo (invariance), sharp contrasts between superior and inferior identities and their associated dispositions for action (i.e., one such identity per individual), and the neglect of perspectives in which all apparent unity and stability is merely the contingent result of process of change at very many different timescales, occurring in and producing meta-stable units of organization at many extensional scales, from those below that of the single organism to those above, thus dis-privileging the unit of the individual moral and economic agent.

1.4 Limitations and expansions of the notion of identity

Many of the defects in common uses of the notion of identity can be remedied, but we need to understand its limitations and to begin to develop a sense of what alternative notions and discourses might be useful successors to the discourses of identity we now use.

1.4.1 Identities across timescales

We cannot, I think, usefully maintain that identity-in-the-moment, or identity-in-practice is identical with identity-across-events or with identity-across-the-lifespan. The main theoretical motivations for this are two:

- first, that in general, developmental or dynamical models have to show how phenomena which occur on much shorter and on much longer
timescales come to be linked to one another, given that as material processes they cannot directly exchange energy or information with one another, that is, they do not naturally interact (Lemke, 2002b);
• second, that the element of agency is more predominant in the notion of identity conceived of or observed at short timescales (identity-in-practice) and the element of structural or positional determination more predominant as we look to longer timescales.

Judith Butler’s notion of identity performance (1993) incorporates the notion that the longer-term aspects of identity are maintained and reinscribed in us as we act in the moment in particular ways. They are also, therefore, subject to change for the future through our active agentive choice to perform in some ways and not in others. We perform a pre-existing identity, that is, we continue a previous pattern of response to certain types of situations, to the extent that the actual situation now presents us with both the affordances to do so and the ‘figured’ (Holland et al., 1998) opportunities and expectations to see ourselves as performing some such aspects of our continuing identity. Some situations can be construed as fitting typical cultural scenarios in which we can take on some culturally recognizable identity, both because the scenario seems relevant and because the material affordances to enact our identity are present. The situation may fit the scenario of ‘being a good father’ or ‘acting tough’ both situationally and materially. To play the role of a father it helps to have someone present who can be construed as a son or daughter, or someone present who can observe our action and interpret it as relevant to our status as a ‘good father’. We have an opportunity to renew our identity as a good father … but therefore also an opportunity not to do so. We may try to perform our part and ‘fail’ in our own eyes or those of others, or we may choose not to perform this part, with potential consequences for how we see ourselves and how others see us in the future.

But the longer term aspects of our identity are not determined by a single performance. They constitute patterns across time, across situations, even across clusters of situation types (e.g., all the types of situations in which acting the ‘good father’ makes sense).

We can perform longer-term identities through how we enact an identity-in-practice, and we can constitute and change longer-term identities in the same way. The longer-term identities inscribed in our habitus (Bourdieu, 1987, 1990) constitute dispositions for action in the moment, and are themselves constituted through many actions across many moments. If these dispositions are positional and structural, similar for persons of the same social-class background, gender, and so on, it is because of the similar life opportunities, access to situation types, expectations of others, and so forth that we encounter repeatedly in living the kind of lives typical of our caste, generation, and the like. We are more
likely to have certain choices in clothes, foods, discourses and not others presented to us or available to us, and to consistently choose within this range of choices, developing a habitus which distinguishes us in our later ‘spontaneous’ choices from those whose life trajectories led them to develop dispositions in a different range of opportunities.

What does it take for momentary actions to add up to a consistent longer-term identity? It takes both the recurrence of the opportunities to enact these identities, for example, access to situations, material affordances/resources, presence of particular others or types of others, and so on, and the will to enact that identity on each such occasion. Bourdieu (1987, 1990) emphasizes the automatism of our dispositions, especially when events demand responses on shorter timescales than those on which we can deliberate about how to respond. He emphasizes as well the typicality of our responses, over longer timescales in our lives, and despite the occasional exception. Most of all he emphasizes the similarity and difference of dispositions, not according to individuality, but according to similarity and difference in the typical opportunities and demands of lives lived in different positions in society.

Bourdieu (1987) also makes use of the notion of a life-trajectory in which we may change our social position, and shows that, even so, dispositions are associated with such typical trajectories. The dispositions of the parvenu are not those of ‘old money’. The end of the trajectory may be the same, but the pathway was different, and it is the pathway that shapes the habitus.

What links the long term to the short is precisely recurrence: of persons with whom we can continue to enact some relationship in which our role is significant to our identity; of objects, including diaries, favourite books and films, familiar furnishings and clothes, through which we can continue to express aspects of our identities; of situation types in which we can recognize familiar scenarios and roles we can perform. Take all these things away and there is still the recurrence of our own bodies across moments, in respect not just of memory and embodied habit and habitus, but also of our physical characteristics: perceptual acuities and saliencies, motor skills, physiological needs and dependencies, body hexis and body image. Change all these, over sufficient time, and replace them with other opportunities, demands and characteristics, and identity itself will mutate. Keep us long enough outside all links to our native culture and engaged with another culture and we will in many respects ‘go native’ or at least diverge from who we were. Take away our children and our identity as fathers or mothers will eventually fade. Suspend us in a sensory deprivation tank and eventually even core aspects of identity with long histories from infancy may fail to maintain themselves for us.

Meaningful human action is always a site of heterochrony: the intersection of processes and practices which have radically different inherent
timescales. In each moment, we act in response to the events of the moment before, producing the conditions and affordances of actions by ourselves and others in the moment next-to-come. At the same time, how we act in response to momentary events depends on both relatively automated and relatively volitional processes of identity maintenance (habit, habitus and habitual conscious preferences) that have been ongoing over much longer periods of our lives and which therefore are also adapted to their typical and recurring conditions on longer timescales. Those recurrent situation types, in turn, depend (in regard to frequency, invariant features across events, etc.) on much larger-scale patterns in the social ecology which make them more likely to happen, and to happen to us, as a function of our (possibly changing) position within that ecology. Which kinds of other persons, with what dispositions, in which sorts of recurrent situations we are likely to experience depends on our place in systems and processes whose coherence is defined, and whose stability is determined on much longer timescales and much larger extensional scales in space and quantities of matter, energy and information involved than the momentary.

Finally, it is important to recognize that there are not simply momentary-agentive and long-term-positional components to the genesis, maintenance and change of identity. These are merely extremal zones along a continuum, or at least a spectrum of timescales (because relevant timescales may clump in a discrete spectrum rather than spread evenly across time; cf. Holling, Gunderson and Petersen, 2002). Some aspects of our identities may persist for days or weeks, but not longer, as we travel, as we create intense but transient personal relationships, as we ‘try on’ identities in play or game environments (cf. computer role-playing games, e.g., Gee, 2003; Internet communities, Turkle, 1995) and communities in which we participate only on these timescales. Other aspects may develop and be maintained over months and years, or decades and ‘periods’ of our lives, across which we may change occupations, spouses, countries, religions, political commitments, and so forth.

1.4.2 Fear and desire in the construction of identity

The maintenance and development of identity is always also a material process, however symbolically mediated it may be by the value systems and cultural meaning relations of a ‘figured world’. Its continuity inheres in the persistence of material bodies, both our own and those of the landscapes and artefacts of our world. But the materiality of the human body makes it dependent and vulnerable: to thirst, starvation, pain and death. We are dependent on ecosystems and social cooperation (whether directly voluntary or consequential on participation in a social system) for water, food, shelter, protection and defence. Our desires begin with the needs of the body, our fears begin with the vulnerability of our bodies. And our iden-
tities are built in response to these primordial desires and fears, as well as to those additional desires and fears which our cultural worlds elaborate on their foundation.

We are what we fear, we are what we desire. ‘Who are we?’ is the basic question of identity. Who by natural gifts and weaknesses; who by membership and affiliation; who by social positioning, by financial, social and cultural capital; who by what we have and what we lack, what we desire and what we fear? Values and ambitions, search and avoidance are clearly grounded in fear and desire. So, one can persuasively argue, I think, are our beliefs about ourselves, others and the ecological world we are a part of. Belief systems are more collective than individual, they are features of communities (which all have many, not necessarily consistent, beliefs and webs of beliefs; cf. Bakhtin’s 1935/1981 *heteroglossia*). Our own identities-by-belief are positional as well as individual. We find ourselves always somewhat unique in our resources and vulnerabilities relative to particular circumstances. We try to find among the beliefs available in our community some that will serve us in achieving our desires and avoiding the pains we fear. Across time and situations, we come to have persistent fears and recurrent desires, and these as much as anything define our longer-timescale identities.

The role of desire in the construction of identity has been developed by feminist theory (e.g., Butler, 1993), but the complementary role of fear is perhaps something less palatable to our own identities, beset as we are as vulnerable individuals by threats and assaults from an ungentle world and an anti-communitarian society. Underlying fear is the vulnerability of the physical body to pain. We fear pain more than we fear death, if only because death is unknowable and unexperienced, whereas pain is only too real in our lives. The primary socialization of children in much of American and Western European society (I do not speak for other societies in this matter) is based on pain and the threat of pain. In our efforts to control and shape the behaviour of children ‘for their own good’, but most often for our good, and indirectly for the good of the currently dominant social order, we hurt children’s bodies and we threaten to repeat the inflicting of pain. We may belittle the degree of pain involved, but the reactions of children indicate that, combining physical and emotional (which is bodily by other means) pain, for them it is substantial. We learn these lessons early in our identity construction: pain matters, fear matters. We begin both to conform and to dissemble. We construct identities of ‘good boy’ and ‘bad boy’, often embodying both in unstable tensions, and we project identities which we do not necessarily feel.

The pains of adolescence and adult life are manifold, and most are related to socialization, to pressures to conform to particular identities. The threats and beatings of the boy who seems to be a ‘sissy’ and who may or may not identify as gay. The emotional abuse of youthful early sexuality,
feared by adults and proscribed by the dominant social order, leading to frustrations, exaggerated desires, conformity to norms in promise of licence for sexual satisfaction by individuals and institutions loom large. Later in adulthood (though biologically we are adult from puberty, whatever our social norms may prefer us to believe), we may suffer the pains of poverty, of criminal abuse, of emotional abuse by those with institutional power over our livelihoods, and always the threats of the powerful and of institutions to withdraw their support of us and leave us to the pains of the powerless, the hungry, the homeless or the dependent. We live in a very unjust society, where our present social order is enforced by far more aggregate pain than is in principle necessary for the maintenance of some supportive social order. Even if we are immunized from these regimes of pain by our social position, we are still subject to the threat of it ‘in the last instance’ (what else enforces law? what else do police and prisons do?), and we know that most members of our society are not immune, they suffer.

What aspects of our identities are shaped by pain and fear? Over what timescales? I believe these are important issues that our research on identity has not at all adequately dealt with as yet.

1.4.3 The phenomenology of identity

Do we actually feel or directly experience our identities as such? My sense is that we do not. What we feel and experience is some positive or negative valence associated with actions that we sense as performing some aspect of who we are, of which we are distinctly proud or ashamed. Insofar as identity is an abstract and composite notion which sums over many aspects of who we are and what and how we behave or feel, it is an analytical tool rather than a phenomenological reality. Insofar as identity refers to a cumulative identity over longer timescales, rather than the identity-in-practice of action in the moment, it also cannot be phenomenological except insofar as we may feel an echo across time as we re-enact some part of us that we recognize as having been part of us before, and perhaps for a long time. There is certainly some phenomenological sense of self-recognition that is related to the continuity of identity, but it does not appear to be an experience of identity as such.

This issue is important for thinking about the description of identity. Identities are described in terms of abstract categories and types; they are not narrated as experiences are. Identities belong to the semiotic domain of the conceptual rather than to the phenomenological domain of the experiential. Nonetheless, we often try to use the concept of identity to link across these two modes of making meaning. I believe this is so because it has been very difficult for phenomenological accounts of self to gain legitimacy in academic discourse, where more semiotic accounts of nearly everything predominate.
What such phenomenological accounts add to anything we can say semiotically is a sense of how the experiential overflows categorizations, how it exceeds any typological account. The phenomenological gives an account of flow, the semiotic of structure or pattern. Flow, or process, takes into account how being and doing make us feel in time; they are dynamical perspectives, whereas semiotic accounts are aoristic: they take a stance which stands outside of time. Phenomenological accounts saliently include affect, which semiotic accounts rarely do. The uses of language which more effectively convey phenomenological experience are narrative and poetic, efforts to create blends and shades of meaning which may be unique rather than to instance typical and familiar meanings with well-known contrasts and associations. In visual media, the semiotic is represented best by the monological and definite abstract diagram or graph, the phenomenological by the emotive and polysemic work of visual art.

We know that rich and meaningful accounts of selves and lives, of lived experience in its qualities and nuances are not fully possible with the canonical tools of semiotic meaning-making. We need to extend our repertoire of semiotic resources to more fully develop their potential for gradation and nuance, for ambiguity and polysemy, or, to the extent that such resources do already exist, what is needed are better ways of combining the definitive and the evocative forms and genres available to us. Our dominant intellectual and cultural traditions have preferred to keep them separate, allocating social power to the categorically based representations and marginalizing those closer to the phenomenological realism of the experiential as mere amusements.

The insistence that identities are embodied, and that embodied experience is fundamental to our sense of self, has led us to want more phenomenologically authentic accounts of identity, or at least of the experiences associated with recognition and performance of aspects of identity. We are still a long way from knowing how to integrate the knowing of narrative, poetry and art with that of analytical accounts of identity. Including this one.

Having tried to sketch out a somewhat broader prospective notion of identity, one that is coupled to complementary notions such as timescales, traversals, situation types, heterochrony, and the embodied bases of fear and desire, I want to return to three kinds of processes in which agency in the moment is given a greater scope to construct alternative identities and associated changes in socio-cultural systems.

1.5 Transgressive and anomalous identities: troublemakers

Social systems require the flexibility to respond to unpredictable new conditions that may appear at large scales (climate change, invasions, new technologies). This flexibility comes from the variability of social units at
smaller scales (types of organizations, persons, identities). The normal distribution of social types favours those which interact in predictable ways to produce the usual emergent and self-reproducing dynamics of the society. But it also includes a percentage of deviant outliers which are capable of introducing perturbations which the system as a whole normally ‘resists’, except when its ability to filter them out or buffer against their effects is disrupted, for example, during times of social upheaval or great challenges. In such circumstances the net diversity of the system increases and the effects of these outliers can cascade upwards to have larger social effects. These effects may or may not generate sufficient novelty to allow the system to adapt to the new situation, but at least they increase the chances that some path to survival will be found: a path that necessarily requires change.

It is theoretically interesting to compare, as in evolutionary biology, the conditions under which perturbations of a system favour the survival of the most ‘normal’ or typical members versus those that favour the survival of (some) outliers. My guess is that when perturbations are random and not statistically very different from those which have shaped the previous evolution/adaptation of the system – what we might call ‘predictable catastrophes’, then on average, such perturbations will favour the pre-adapted, more typical members. It is only when the perturbations are unprecedented (as with newly emergent internal developments or first-meetings with external systems), and when they shift the average environment systematically away from the prior normal conditions, that the outliers will be favoured.

So, for example, a cyclic economic downturn (a ‘normal’ and not unprecedented disaster) will favour conservative investors, and such a strategy will be optimal over many cycles up and down. But when a new technology appears, and makes large-scale and permanent shifts in the economy (electric power grids, inexpensive computing), then some outliers who have a non-conservative strategy may be favoured, but only over the long-term. Over the short-term there will still be normal fluctuations that will favour the old-line conservatives, whose strategies are ‘pre-adapted’ to such fluctuations.

There are two sorts of identity outliers: the anti-establishment ‘rebels’ and the more genuinely unprecedented ‘weirdos’. Directly anti-establishment behaviour simply re-inscribes the polarities of the existing system, even though at the same time it does work to prevent over-rigidity and excessive uniformity which would oppose the minimal flexibility needed for survival. It is the genuinely unprecedented outliers, however, which provide true novelty and variety to the system. They will tend to be viewed by others as simply not making sense, as mad or weird rather than as criminal or evil. They may be regarded as idiosyncratic, dysfunctional, disturbing, or even insane (but with no ready-made diagnostic category available), but
transgressive only as a side-effect. They are in fact not deliberately transgressive, but only accidentally transgressive. Going their own way, they do not necessarily notice or care that they are transgressing social norms. It must be pointed out to them. Ordinarily the ‘cultural police’ – which includes all of us at times – effectively limit the spread of transgressive innovations or unprecedented novelties, whether in language, art or behaviour. Nevertheless, and perhaps especially when there are other social upheavals or crises to keep our attention elsewhere, these outliers can sometimes spread and have influence on a wider scale.

Among rebels, there are those who hate the system, the status quo, but there are also those who enact a strategy of deliberate transgression designed to test boundaries and expose implicit norms, or force social examination of the grounds of those norms. Unfortunately it is only when this happens on a sufficiently wide scale that the re-examination can be forced, and once again this happens only when there is already some sort of serious larger-scale disturbance or perturbation to the social system.

Both the transgressors and those whose identities are simply anomalous are sources of identity-based ‘trouble’ for the society. Societies regulate themselves in part, and maintain their stability over time, by offering us only some and not other conceivable ‘identities’. Whether we think of identities as radically individual, or as identifications with social groups, making trouble for the legitimacy of social identities, or for the notion of identity itself, or for the belief that identifying with a social group is a good thing: all of these intellectual moves make trouble for society.

1.6 Conflicting institutional demands on identity

Identities are contested not just in the sense that there are struggles over the kinds of identities we are allowed to claim for ourselves, but there are also struggles over the kinds of identities we can conceive for ourselves, and which identities in any system of heteroglossic practice we will strive to establish in ourselves.

This thesis of struggle and contestation over identity recognizes that the technologies of the Self, as described by Foucault, are both technologies by which we can make identities for ourselves, and technologies by which social institutions, through the practices they afford for us and the practices of control exercised by others playing roles within them, attempt to shape and control our identities.

Governments try to make us docile and conforming citizens by manipulating the mass media and the flow of information, and by creating images of wise and courageous leaders, and loyal and patriotic citizens. They work to define what the identity of ‘good citizen’ consists of, in general, that is, for the long term and irrespective of specific events, but also in the short term; for example, what being patriotic means when the government
decides to have a war, or what being a good citizen means when the
government decides the ordinary citizen should use less energy to keep the
costs down for owners of energy-intensive industries.

Corporations try to make us docile and predictable consumers through
advertising media and marketing strategies, selling us not just products, but
lifestyles which incline us to want products, trying to get us to identify
with certain stereotypical pseudo-identities which slot our consumption
preferences into more predictable market-segment categories.

Corporations and other institutions also try to make us ‘good employees’,
who care about the interests of the institution, whose behaviours are rela-
tively predictable, and who see ourselves through the role-identity lenses of
the good worker, supervisor or manager, and often specified by professional
role identities such as the good researcher, professor, attorney, physician,
minister, or less professionalized as the good secretary, technician, and so
forth.

Institutions offer us pseudo-identities, their practices and material set-
tings afford us and constrain for us various opportunities for action and
interaction, and their norms and practices as embodied in others, con-
stantly monitor us, evaluate us, and work to control us and push us, by
promise and threat, to conform to their stereotypes.

Schools work to make us over in their image of the good student or the
good teacher. Families work to make us conform to their image of the good
child, the good mother or father, the good brother or sister, the good boy
and the good girl. In doing this, each institution is embedded in its cultural
and political-economic (i.e., ecological) relations to other institutions. It is
not just families which are selling an image of the good son or daughter,
but also Hollywood, the television networks, their owners and sponsors,
magazine advertisers, fiction writers, journalists, and the like. The degree of
convergence among these views of a particular identity is not simply a
function of some miraculous invisible hand of shared or common Culture.
It is the product of interests and the domination of some interests over
others. It is governed by ideology that serves interests, and as Bourdieu
(1990) argues regarding the limited autonomy of various social fields, such
as the academy or the arts, much of the convergence is a product of the
interests of those who dominate the dominant field of money-and-power.

This view of identity asks us to imagine that identities are not purely
matters of internal feeling states or personalized discourses. Identities are
contested public terrain. As Foucault argues, modernism has found more
and more ways to take the inner soul, which was private, if publicly
accountable under older forms of Christianity, and make it into a more
public terrain of identity, under surveillance and subject to control by
outside interests.

We often celebrate hybridity as an opportunity for people to escape from
the prescribed role identities of particular cultures or institutions and
fashion their own unique sense of self, along with more unique modes of behaviour. But we should also recognize that hybridity represents a compromise by the individual among the pressures and forces of multiple cultures and institutions which are seeking to control our identities. Increasingly in the modern, mobile world, people are under pressure to conform to the identity stereotypes of more than one traditional community, ethnic or national culture. Increasingly we participate in multiple institutions, each of which has its own ideas about who we should be. Yes, we can sometimes play these off against one another to gain some space of greater freedom, but just as often, or more often I think, we hybridize merely to reconcile the conflicting pressures.

*When* does hybridity enhance our freedom of action and construction of meaningful selves? If we shuttle among institutions all of which are more or less subservient to the same dominant interests, then the differences among the identities demanded by these institutions are not likely to be differences from which we can productively expand a greater space of freedom to conceive and pursue our own interests and agendas.

There is a Nepalese woman in Holland’s book who scales the wall of a house to participate in an interview despite the possible strictures of her Hindu caste status (thus avoiding entering the first floor and passing through a kitchen she might ‘treif’). We can see her as creatively enacting a potential identity outside her traditional culture, afforded by the presence and practices of a Western interviewer from a very different cultural world. But we can also see her as constrained by the conflicting pressures of two cultures, Hindu and Western, each making demands on her, and forcing her to improvise a very uncomfortable compromise. Is she taking the first steps toward liberation? Or is she just being more constrained by the additional demands of new cultural forces? Is the liberated, anomic Western female identity, dependent on clothes and cosmetics to find a prospective partner in a competitive consumerist culture of romance (as described for US college students in another chapter of Holland’s book), a better choice for a shy, conventionally unattractive, poor young woman than the relative security of a system of arranged marriages? *When* does the divergence between cultural systems genuinely offer us a space of greater freedom to create our own identities, and when does it only offer us either a choice of equally constraining alternatives, or perhaps worse, double the constraints and double the conflicts we labour under?

Bhabha (1994) recognizes the ambivalent affordances of post-colonial situations in which we can strive to create a cultural ‘third space’. The tensions between pre-colonial and colonial cultures can be very destructive, tearing people apart, at the same time that they can also be very productive of creative post-colonial hybridity. But how do we transform conflicting demands for conformity into resources for creative freedom?
I do not want to fetishize creativity and individual freedom in this discussion. They are themselves ideals of Western culture that fit only too well with the interests of those who want a mobile workforce untied to local communities and a consumer unbound to tradition and free to buy new products. What matters in regard to the stake that each of us has in the ‘identity wars’ are the resources our culture and institutions make available to us to work past the contradictions between who we feel we are and want to be and who society demands that we become. Each of us is more individually unique by temperament and biography than is allowed by any system of stereotypical identities-on-offer. No prêt-a-porter, ready-to-wear identity for sale by the institutions whose interests are served by conformity to such identities will comfortably fit a real and unique human person.

We may well wish to support the family or the community in some respects, but not in others. We may well find ourselves comfortable and comforted by the norms and practices of some institution or community, or we may not. We may want to take up some of its affordances but not others. There may be feelings we have for which there are no recognized institutional or cultural channels of expression, or none which are allowed as appropriate to our social position. There may be desires we have which are taboo because they run counter to institutional interests, or even because their suppression is part of some long-evolved strategy of social control that has nothing much to do with us personally (e.g., homophobia arguably has far more to do with strategies for controlling the identities of young, working-class heterosexual males than with actually suppressing anyone’s sexual activity).

Modernist social systems and institutions demand and probably require narrow conformity to a certain very limited range of stereotypical identities. Much of this is the product of the effort to create very large scale social systems and institutions. That effort was motivated by the enormous concentration of resources it affords for those in control of the systems and institutions. Its consequence is largely that modernist systems and institutions have grown increasingly rigid and intolerant of unpredictable or divergent behaviour. Mass production, mass culture, mass consumption, mass conformity. Only a very superficial level of trivial diversity is tolerated. No social institutions in modern society encourage uniqueness or non-conformity, least of all schools and universities.

1.7 Troubling ‘identity’ as a mode of social control

The only resources that modern society affords for innovation or individualization of identity are its internal conflicts and cleavages and its intersections with radically different cultures. In time past, we were most often the captives of a small number of institutions. One family, one
school, one company, one church, one local community. Today we are far more likely to live as part of multiple families through divorce, remarriage, foster care, and so forth, both in our youth and throughout our lives. Because of social mobility, we are much more likely to move around from school to school in our youth and community to community throughout our lives. We no longer expect to spend our lives working in one company or university, or even pursuing one career or line of work. We are even more likely to shop around from church to church, if not actually change religious affiliation more than once during our lives. We are exposed through mass media and communications, as well as travel, to a wide range of social institutions and their norms and cultures. While most of these institutions of all kinds show a certain convergence of culture because of their common domination by dominant interests, and their common historical heritage, there are inevitably also contradictions and conflicts among them. The more institutions we visit in our lives, the more likely we are to encounter and recognize these internal contradictions and conflicts, and thereby acquire at least some independent freedom of vision with regard to possible values and identities.

Of course we encounter institutions not just in themselves, but mainly through their constituents: people, artefacts, media, discourses, practices, settings, and so forth. Somewhere in these, especially in the least ‘designed’ of them, that is, the people, we encounter contradictory elements and potential models for being different. One can never make a person or an artefact or discourse that includes only the features we are seeking to build in. There will always also be ‘accidental’ features and side-effects not under our control, or even always visible to the surveillance of designers who are focused on particular other features. There are always things about unique individual people, artefacts, discourses and settings that do not quite ‘fit’ with their institutional roles and functions. This ‘slippage’ affords us opportunities to question, trouble and escape from identities that are being used to control us to suit someone else’s social interests.

In late modern society we are also increasingly globalized, at least in the immediate sense that people, discourses and media from other cultures with whom we share less common historical heritage and fewer values, practices, norms, and so on come more and more often into our lives and communities. We hear other languages spoken on the street and on television. We meet or at least see and hear people born and raised in distant cultures. Traditionally there have been ‘natural’ barriers to learning from such people or sharing with them resources for identity development: we don’t understand their languages, we find their practices strange and often distasteful, we feel uncomfortable and anxious around them, we worry about our inability to predict their behaviour, we fear the unknown and uncertain. At first meeting. But if we work together with them, if we live nearby, if our children play together, if our joint participation in social
institutions throws us together long enough, then some individuals will start to get used to each other, like each other, share with each other, learn from each other. This becomes easier when the differences are attenuated but not lost: when we encounter second-generation immigrants, or immigrants who have been living among us for a long time already. If we belong to a more affluent stratum of our society, we will also visit other cultures on their own terrain. I do not underestimate our ability to travel and still manage to remain within our own culture, but equally, and particularly for younger travellers, there is more and more opportunity for genuine encounters with other ways of looking at the world and acting in it, for other identity possibilities.

All this is little enough, but it is far more than existed for most people even in the recent past. The result is a gradual de-articulation of culture. What was once a seamless whole, each part reinforcing the others, has increasingly become for many people a loose collection of different elements: norms, values, discourses, institutions, identities, roles, artefacts, settings each of which does not have to be joined with all the others in a consistent and stereotypical pattern. We can see this as an irony of consumer capitalism, which has produced for us all a strategy of disarticulation, of ‘mix-and-match’, to increase its overall consumer appeal and profitability. You don’t have to make the large resource commitment as a consumer to buy the whole package, you can just buy the parts that you want. Once this strategy is turned back on the culture itself, its hold on us is enormously weakened: the various elements do not necessarily any more reinforce one another. Identities are packages. If we start to mix and match, then the social control functions of identity are in trouble.

Schools, parents, mass media, and youth culture all war with one another. Our society is becoming more and more factionalized and factionated. If, like me, you believe that our society has long since become a pathological one, creating far more pain and suffering for its members than is required for maintaining itself as a positive and supportive environment, sacrificing the interests of most to those of a very few, enlarging the scale of monolithic institutions far past the point where their main effects became dehumanizing and dangerous to ecological sustainability, then you may be happy to hear that social control is beginning to fall apart.

There is no immediate danger of a total collapse. We are tightly bound to one another by a complex economic system of mutual interdependence in which we all have a stake. We will continue to transact and participate in institutions that are necessary to keep us alive and/or comfortable. But at the same time we are less and less persuaded of the legitimacy or necessity of any of these institutions or the norms, values, conventions, discourses, identities and practices associated with them. We are more and more disposed to disengage our loyalty, to pick and choose, to mix and match.
There is a lot of talk of people’s ‘multiple identities’. We can mean this in various senses. At short timescales, we may enact somewhat different identities in different social settings, playing different roles with different partners. At longer timescales we may continue to develop for ourselves identities that are useful to us, or required of us, as we participate again and again in the same institutions, communities, social networks or communities of practice. None of these identities, however, is necessarily a creative or unique individual hybrid. In many cases all of them may be stereotypical identities which we mix and match like ready-to-wear ‘separates’ to our strategic advantage, or just to navigate the compromises demanded by conflicting social pressures. When and how does this multiplicity become a resource for genuinely creative construction of unique identities? The kind of identities that can move our society in new directions?

One useful perspective on this issue is represented by a view of personal identity development that looks at the internal diversity of all human communities. We learn to be the people we are largely by the ways we interact with various other members of our community. Communities are diverse in age, in genders and sexualities, in social classes and occupations, in ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and in what is unfortunately still too often called ‘racial’, subgroups. We learn to interact more or less effectively, if not always comfortably, across most of these differences from whatever our own location is in social space at the time. That means that we learn expectations about the behaviour and responses of these other members of our villages. We even learn to some extent to mimic or imitate them, and certainly to stereotype and parody them. We cannot do this except by learning to some degree to act like them, to be like them. We acquire some part of the identity kits that enable people to be people of particular kinds. We may not ‘identify’ with these other identity competencies, but we do acquire them. We may not have the competence in the full ‘active’ sense of being able to pass for a person of this kind, but we do acquire it very often in the ‘passive’ sense of being able to interpret the behaviours of others sufficiently well for the purposes of ordinary life and social interaction.

And so here too are resources for making identity trouble. For the most part there are emotional factors and pressures that lead us to ‘identify’ only with one or a few of the available social types in our communities. We are strongly shaped by family and significant others, by early friendships, and of course by the institutional forces of divide-and-conquer that work so hard to polarize identities into incompatible camps. We are not allowed to assume identities that are socially polarized as conflicting and incompatible, at least not in terms of public performance and often also not in terms of emotional identification. But we do know these identities in many ways, and we can and do sometimes play at them, or in private try them on for complex emotional reasons we may not even understand ourselves. I believe there is a great deal of covert identity transgression in people’s
private and fantasy lives which is itself part of the work of resolving the lack of fit between our unique feelings and dispositions and the ready-to-wear identities that are useful to social institutions with which we share only limited interests.

If you are asked, as we so often are, ‘what do you do?’ how do you feel about any particular reply that you give? How adequate as a representation of your identity do you feel any of the stereotypical, culturally named, institutionally sanctioned options available to you as answers really are? In multi-ethnic New York, there is a common social question: ‘Lemke, so what kind of name is that?’, which is part of the effort to simplify social relationships by fitting each person to one of a small number of ethnic-religious groups, mainly those that have been or are of political consequence in the city’s alliances of interest. I can claim several such identities, but none of them are ones that I feel much identification with. It is taboo to ask people about their sexuality beyond some overt markers of gender, but I would feel equally unsatisfied with any of the possible conventional answers. We don’t usually ask people more simply, ‘Who are you?’ in any sense other than asking for their name, but if it was asked, and you were to try to name your identity or identities, could you do so in any way that was satisfying to you?

Imagine some answers of the sort: ‘I’m an educator’, ‘I’m a teacher’, ‘I’m an American’, ‘I’m a mother’, ‘I’m a lesbian’, ‘I’m a hacker’, ‘I’m a Goth kid’, ‘I’m a researcher’, ‘I’m a physicist’, ‘I’m a theoretician’, ‘I’m a Catholic’, ‘I’m a liberal’, ‘I’m Jewish’, ‘I’m a twin’, ‘I’m a woman’ ... and think not so much about how each leaves out a lot that you also are, but about how good a fit you really feel with any of these generic identities? How much more would you want to say to qualify such an answer? How would you get closer to saying who you really feel you are, what you really feel your identity is in terms of nationality, occupation, sexuality, cultural disposition, religion, ethnicity, and so forth. How much of your identification with these categories is based on the need to find allies against prejudice or opponents? Or to gain acceptance in social circles or institutions? Or to increase your status? Or not to offend your family or colleagues? Or not to have to deal with unresolved ambivalences in your own feelings?

What language of identity do we have that lets us go beyond institutionally defined stereotypical identities? Or long lists of them? What can we say about who we really feel ourselves to be, socially and personally, that is not couched in the language of these institutional stereotypes? If those stereotypes are sold to us in the interests of the institutions that benefit from conformity to them, what kinds of identities are imaginable from what we regard to be our own interests, especially those of our own interests which are not supported by social institutions, and which may be in conflict with those of the social institutions around us?
Paulo Freire in some very wise passages in his classic *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2000) asks us to try to speak an authentic word, to try to name ourselves outside the realm of names given to us by social institutions and the interests of power. To say something about our lives, our problems, our feelings, our social condition, our anger, our desires, our selves that was not put in our mouths to serve someone else’s interests. Can we do it?

Bakhtin (1935/1981), with regard to discourse, and others (e.g., de Certeau, 1984) for social practices more generally, give us some hope for strategies of appropriation and re-accentuation of existing discourses and practices. The conventional forms may well have originated with the interests of powerful institutions and social groups, but they can often be re-articulated in our own interests to speak and enact our more fully authentic selves. Doing so, however, requires that we act from some critical stance, whether based on our personal conflicts with the demands of these institutions, or from some alternative perspective afforded us by our encounters with other institutions or cultures, often as mediated through persons. This re-articulation, when it occurs in new communities of discourse and practice, can begin the process of production of the kind of ‘third space’ described by Bhabha (1994).

### 1.8 Post-institutional society and traversal identities

I have argued elsewhere (Lemke 2002c, 2003) for another important linkage between shorter-term identities and historical changes in the organization of society. As society becomes more tightly organized, more interdependent, at larger and larger scales (cf. globalization), the stability of many individual institutions (in the sense of persistent organizations) becomes less critical to the overall sustainability of the (transnational and global) social ecology, and the functional need for tight linkages between individual lives and such organizational institutions also becomes weaker. Organizations come and go on shorter timescales, more easily substitutable in the larger more stable global patterns. Individuals move among institutions and organizations, also on shorter timescales, and more of the meaning of our lives is made across institutions rather than within them.

This phenomenon shows itself in the greater number of careers and organizations we work in, the greater number of families and relationships we form and live in across a lifetime, compared to a generation ago, and also, at shorter timescales, in the ways in which our identities may depend less on being a student in a school, a manager in a company, or even a father in a family, and more on our particular style of juggling these institutional identities as we move among institutions in the course of a year or even a day. As we make meaning across (substitutable) institutions, repeatedly, along the course of our traversals across these institutions, we develop
ways of linking and combining them, or relating them to one another, of
distributing our time and attention among them. These styles are to some
extent personal, but they are also in part positional. There may even be
emerging in our post-modern society new divisions based on similar
‘lifestyles’ that consist in our ways of living across the affordances of par-
ticular institutions. We gain in this process a greater power to create our
own mixes and combinations of the situational affordances of traditional
institutions, and so of our own identities.

The process of re-assortment of significance among levels of organization
of a complex dynamical system, when a new level of organization emerges
in between other prior levels, is well known. The new level, here quasi-
global networks of sustainable interdependence among more substitutable,
less persistent organizations and institutions, weakens the coupling matrix
among units at the next lower level (the elements which come together to
make up an organization, leading to shorter lifetimes for organizations and
more transience among their components, including people). At the same
time, the greater combinatorial freedom of these components may lead to
the emergence of other new levels of organization among them, such as
perhaps the new lifestyle castes.

From the perspective of the individual, institutions become relatively less
important to identity, and recurrent styles of traversals and linkages we
make among and across institutions become more important. Similarly, the
units of the organizations and institutions, both practices and persons (as
well as artefacts), may develop more identity-relevant connections and
recurrent joint activities unrelated to the institutional matrices in which
they may have initially combined. In some cases they will continue to
depend on those matrices for the affordances needed for their new relation-
ships and activities, or they may find substitutes that enable them to con-
tinue independently of any particular organization or institution. In time,
and with aggregation of mutual interdependence for the sake of sustain-
ability (ecological relations) of these initially ad hoc, trans-institutional for-
mations at the multi-individual scale, new organizations or institutions
may emerge that look quite different from those of modernism (e.g., they
may be more spatially distributed, they may involve more asynchronous
interactions, their timescales of change of practices or substitution of
persons may be shorter, etc.).

1.9 Coda

We are nowhere near any conclusion of this discourse on identity. I hope,
however, that the preceding arguments have opened up further space for
discussion and development of our ways of using this important concept,
ways that make more explicit how agency and positionality play off one
another, how the multiplicity of identity mirrors the diversity of communi-
ties, how changing opportunities for making identities are connected to changing institutional and social configurations, how identities are made across multiple timescales and in the spaces created by the conflicting demands of institutions, and how identities are grounded in embodied experience, fear, and desire.

References


2
Branding the Self
David Machin and Theo van Leeuwen

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter we focus on the origins of two powerful ‘models of identity’, two powerful ways of constructing ‘identity’. One is constructed and propagated by nation-states, the other by global corporations and their agents. Both models involve classifications which not only have material effects in people’s lives, but also provide them with resources for talking about their own identity, and about identity generally. We will begin with an example of such identity talk, an extract from a research interview with two 37-year-old women. They were asked to describe their identity to a male interlocutor, and they did so confidently. As one of them said: ‘I know who I am and what I want.’

Extract 1

Woman A: I am a confident person. I think that this is difficult for men.
Machin: What do you mean by confident?
Woman A: Well, me and my friends, we are just confident and independent. I guess we just really know ourselves. We are independent. Men don’t know what to do with this.
Machin: What do you mean?
Woman A: Well my friends just do anything they want, when they want.
Machin: Like what?
Woman A: Well anything. They go to parties, they like dancing. I really like cars.
Woman B: They have whatever boyfriends they want. The men have been doing it for years and now we can do exactly the same. I have a friend who just picks guys up. She knows just what she wants.
Machin: Are they independent in terms of political thinking?
Woman A: I just don’t bother with politics, you have to get on with life, not be so heavy. Live a bit. You have to get out some.

Woman B: Well I think it’s about really knowing yourself. You have to know who you are. I think my boyfriend has difficulty with that. I just say to him I am independent and I am proud of that. I just know who I am and what I want.

Identity is here first of all of female identity, positively contrasted to male identity. Being a woman is fundamental to these women’s view of who they are. Other features of identity are ‘psychological’ rather than social, ‘personality traits’ such as ‘confident’ and ‘independent’, or based on preferred leisure time activities such as ‘going to parties’ and ‘picking up guys’ and consumer goods such as ‘cars’. Many other potential aspects of identity, however, are not mentioned, for instance nationality, race, class background, family relationships (being someone’s daughter, wife, lover, mother, aunt, etc.), job, income level, education, religion, political convictions, and so on. As it happens, both women work in a child nursery. Their income is low, they do not have a fixed contract, and they live in rented accommodation. But they do not choose to see that as part of ‘who they are’.

The interview was part of a research project on the magazine *Cosmopolitan* (see Machin and Van Leeuwen, 2003, 2004, in press) in which we analysed the model of female identity this magazine disseminates. In this model, we argued, women are part of a global sisterhood of ‘fun, fearless women’, yet essentially on their own. They may have friends and colleagues, but they have no parents or children, and the few husbands that appear are usually a source of problems. They do not have political or religious beliefs or forms of community and solidarity, and their chief preoccupations are the pursuit of romantic adventure and sexual pleasure, of health and beauty, of consumer goods and pleasurable activities, and of career success, although the latter varies across different versions. The ‘career’ sections in the Indian version of *Cosmopolitan*, for instance, address their readers as though they are company directors, managers or self-employed designers, actors, and the like, while the career sections in European versions address their readers as though they are employees, usually in offices (Machin and Van Leeuwen, 2004). Clearly there are similarities between this model and the way the women in the interview described their identity to us.

In this chapter we want to take this issue a bit further. We will contrast two dominant sets of identity categories, or ‘models of identity’, that are now available in contemporary society, often in an uneasy tension with each other, a tension which, we feel, is insufficiently acknowledged in the literature. One is imposed by nation-states and reinforced in national news
media, education systems and other national institutions. It primarily defines people as citizens. The other serves the interests of global corporations and is disseminated through marketing practices and global media. It primarily defines people as consumers. The two models are in the first place discourses, realized by specific sets of linguistic, visual and other semiotic resources. But they also have a history and they inform, and are informed by, practices that have material consequences, both in macro-contexts such as the policies and practices of nation-states and global corporations, and in the micro-practices all citizens/consumers have to engage with in their daily lives.

We will discuss the two models in turn, using van Leeuwen’s ‘social actor analysis’ (1996) to identify the crucial features of the two models and show how they manifest themselves in textual constructs such as diversity questionnaires and descriptions of lifestyle groups from newspapers and magazines. We will conclude the chapter by relating our approach to some of the theoretical positions taken up in the now very extensive literature on identity as our argument differs in crucial ways from some of the most dominant tendencies in this literature. This literature rightly criticizes the essentialism that is fundamental to our first model. But it does not only criticize, it also celebrates. It celebrates our second model as an alternative which allows identities to be individual, flexible and complex, and it does so without taking into account the origins of this model, and its continuing and quite fundamental links with corporate ideologies and practices. More than a proposal for a different approach we cannot offer at this stage. But we hope it will highlight some of the ways in which contemporary identity is ‘troubled’ and in this way form a useful contribution to the debate on which this book centres.

2.2 Identity and the power of the nation-state

Van Leeuwen (1996) surveyed linguistic resources for constructing identity, investigating the words and expressions available to speakers of English for answering the question ‘Who are you?’ (or: ‘Who are we?’, ‘Who is he/she?’, ‘Who are they?’). He distinguished two major categories of ‘categorization’. One is ‘functionalization’, defining people’s identity ‘in terms of an activity, in terms of something [people] do, for instance an occupation or a role’ (van Leeuwen, 1996: 54). To express functionalization, English allows us to turn verbs that denote activities into nouns, into fixed categories, by adding suffixes such as -er, -ant, -ent, -ian, and so on (e.g., ‘asylum seeker’, ‘immigrant’, ‘insurgent’, ‘guardian’, etc.), or to make nouns from other nouns that denote a place or tool closely associated with an activity, through suffixes such as -ist, and -eer, and so on (e.g., ‘pianist’, ‘mountaineer’). The other is ‘identification’, defining people’s identity, ‘not in terms of what they do, but in terms of what they, more or less
permanently, or unavoidably, are’ (van Leeuwen, 1996: 54). Van Leeuwen then distinguishes three types of ‘identification’: ‘classification’, ‘relational identification’ and ‘physical identification’.

In the case of ‘classification’, people’s identity is defined ‘in terms of the major categories by means of which a given society or institution differentiates between classes of people’ (van Leeuwen, 1996: 54). Van Leeuwen notes that such categories are historically and culturally variable. What in one period or culture is constructed as ‘doing’, as a more or less impermanent and changeable role, may in another be constructed as ‘being’, as a more or less fixed and unchangeable identity. As an example he cites Foucault’s description of the way homosexuality changed from ‘the practice of sodomy’ into ‘a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul’. As Foucault said: ‘The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species’ (Foucault, 1981: 42). Such changes may occur slowly, appearing at first as new ideas, before they are incorporated into practices, but they always respond to the needs and interests of the institutions which introduce and promote them. We always have to ask whose interests they serve, and how.

‘Relational identification’ defines identity in terms of people’s relations to each other (e.g., kinship, work, friendship, ‘connections’). Limited and culturally specific sets of nouns denote such relations: ‘friend’, ‘aunt’, ‘colleague’, and so on. In English they typically come with possessive pronouns (‘my friend’, ‘his mother’), genitives (‘the child’s mother’) or other means of denoting both the parties of the relationship. Van Leeuwen notes that relational identification plays an increasingly marginal role in Western society, but anthropologists have shown that in many societies it is the single most important form of ‘classification’. Von Sturmer, for instance, has described how Australian Aborigines, when they first meet, ‘search for relations whom they share and then establish relationships on that basis’ (1981: 13). This clearly differs from first meetings in Western societies, where the opening questions tend to be ‘What do you do?’ and ‘Where are you from?’. In the past, however, relational identification was more prominent in British society. In Jane Austen’s novels characters are constantly asked about their connections. In Pride and Prejudice, for instance, Lizzie is asked by Catherine De Burgh, ‘Your father may be a gentleman, but who are your connections? Who are your aunts and uncles?’

In the case of ‘physical identification’, finally, identity is constructed in terms of physical characteristics. This is realized by a limited and specific repertoire of nouns denoting the physical characteristics (e.g., skin colour, colour of hair) of specific groups of people, for instance women and blacks (‘blonde’, ‘redhead’, ‘black’).

Let us now look at how these resources are used in a specific context, a University Appointees Payroll Details form that has to be filled in as part of applying for a job:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black or Black British</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any other Black Background</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese or other ethnic group</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic group</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>White</th>
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<tr>
<td>British</td>
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<td>Irish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asian or Asian British</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
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<td>Bangladeshi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any other Asian background</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mixed race</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White &amp; Black Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>White &amp; Black African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White &amp; Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other Mixed Race</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three types of categorization are used here, in diffuse and complex co-articulations: the 'physical identifications' of certain 'races'; classifications on the basis of provenance which constitute 'ethnic' groups; and classifications on the basis of citizenship ('British', and perhaps also 'Irish').

Looking at the specific categorizations, and the way in which they combine, we can make a number of observations:

- Much as it may have been discredited by writers about racist practices in the Colonial era, the form maintains the distinction between 'pure' and 'mixed' race.
- Going by the criterion of 'physical identification', the form recognizes only two races, 'white' and 'black'. Other 'races' are no longer defined in this way. With respect to 'Asians', for instance, there has been a redefinition, a shift of emphasis from 'physical' to 'cultural' difference that coincided with the rapid economic development of a number of important 'Asian' states (although the term 'Asian' still appears under the heading of 'mixed race').
- The form explicitly recognizes only one or two specific nationalities, 'British', and perhaps 'Irish', even though these nationalities are listed as subgroups of (the white) 'race'. 'Non-whites' from ex-colonies can be 'British', albeit in a diluted, qualified form, but others cannot, even though many immigrants and descendants from immigrants from other places have been given British citizenship.
- Anyone who is not 'British', or hailing from an ex-colony, or Chinese, is an 'other': apart from its complex and sometimes confused co-articulations of race, provenance and nationality, the form also sets up a fine-grained pecking order among the groups it lists.

Classifications of this kind are designed in the service of specific needs and interests, in this case, the needs of nation states (and key national institutions such as education) and their current preoccupation with formulating and propagating a coherent sense of 'nationality' despite the 'diversity' that has resulted from the new patterns of immigration that characterize the age of globalization. What can constitute 'national identity'? In the case of this form, two factors play a role. The first is 'race', which here plays an undiminished role, however much racism has been debated and critiqued in the national media. The second is a shared history, more specifically the history of the British Empire, which allows 'Black British' and 'Asian British' people the status of citizens, albeit in a qualified way that sets them apart from 'true' citizens.

Note also the absence of 'functionalization'. If 'functionalization' had been the dominant mode of categorizing people, it might have been more easy to see that people from all these racial, 'ethnic' and national categories do the same kind of things, even if they 'are' not the same (they go to
school, set up households, purchase goods and services, work, pay taxes, etc.). But it isn’t. The nation-state and its institutions classify people in terms of what they ‘are’. And these classifications are kept as permanent records. However long members of any of these intricately classified groups live in the United Kingdom, they will always have to reaffirm their identity in these terms. They will always have to reaffirm their difference too. They will see this mirrored in the classifications used by the media, which continue to quote, for instance, ‘Asian community leaders’ and ‘Muslim spokespeople’, as though all the members of these groups think and feel the same. And they will have to reaffirm these identities also in the private sphere. At the very least, they will continue to be asked: ‘Where are you from?’, even if they have lived in the United Kingdom all their lives. One of us grew up in the Netherlands, but has not lived there for over 30 years. When meeting new people, they notice his Dutch accent and immediately ask: ‘Where are you from?’ If he answers ‘London’, the question is repeated impatiently, ‘No, where are you really from?’ The other author comes from the North of England, where his family always associated ‘Britain’ with the South and with London, and fought on the streets with what they called the ‘British police’ during the miners’ strike. As a result, he does not identify with Britain as a political entity. Yet he has no choice but to continue to tick the category ‘White British’. The form of identity we have discussed here is one we can neither choose, nor change, and the further it is removed from the privileged category of ‘White British’, the more we will feel the consequences of its power, both in the public and the private sphere.

So far we have focused on the linguistic realizations of identity, but it should be noted that identity is realized in many other ways. Van Leeuwen (2000) discusses how visual images realize ‘racist’ and ‘ethnic’ stereotypes. What he calls ‘biological categorization’ is signified, he says, by standardized exaggerations of physical features that connote the usually negative associations which the members of a particular group evoke to those for whom the representation is primarily intended. Such categorizations have a history. The stereotyped black, for instance, has exaggeratedly white teeth and eyes. In the United States this signifier developed out of comparisons with raccoons (hence the derogatory slang word ‘coons’ for ‘blacks’), animals of the night with a reputation of being sly thieves. Initially the comparison was explicit, with pictures that contained both a raccoon and a little black boy and exaggerated the supposed visual similarities. Later it could be recognized as a stereotyped part of black physiognomy without any form of explicit comparison, for instance in ‘black minstrel’ imagery (van Leeuwen, 2000: 347). Such stereotypes continue to be used, especially in advertisements, cartoons, toys, and so on (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992).

‘Cultural categorization’, on the other hand, is signified by means of standard attributes such as items of dress and hair styles. These do not have
to be exaggerated or caricatured. Their mere presence is enough. Again, a shift from ‘racial’ to cultural difference can be noted, at least on the surface. Many of the debates now centre on the signifiers of cultural difference, for instance the head coverings of Muslim women. Yet, as we have seen, this does not mean that racism has disappeared.

2.3 Identity and corporate power

Let us now look at another example, an article in the G2 Supplement of *The Guardian* (12/3/04) which explains how a particular marketing expert describes the identity of people as consumers. We include three of his 11 categories: ‘Symbols of success’ (representing 9.6 per cent of the population), ‘Ties of community’ (representing 16 per cent) and ‘Urban intelligence’ (representing 7.2 per cent).

I ‘Symbols of success’

Their incomes have risen into upper income tax ranges, they have substantial equity and are most likely to be white British. They typically live in posh areas such as Kensington or Edinburgh’s New Town, work as senior managers for large corporations, or have respected roles in professional practices. You only call them Smug Ponces because you’re jealous. Likely to shop at: Waitrose, M&S, Sainsbury’s, Tesco.

II ‘Ties of community’

This group lives in very established, rather old-fashioned communities. Traditionally they marry young, work in manual jobs and have strong social support networks with friends and relations living nearby. There is a sub-type of this group called Coronation Street, but not all Lees and Noreens live in back-to-back terraces or keep pigeons. Likely to shop at: Morrisons, Asda, Kwik Save.

III ‘Urban intelligence’

Young, well-educated, liberal, childless and well off. They are mindful of career uncertainties but are often involved in high-risk investments such as the buy-to-let market. Not all of them read the Guardian; many are in lifestyle thrall to Sarah Beeney. Likely to shop at: Sainsbury’s.

How do these classifications differ from those of our previous example?

- They are unsystematic. Despite the way they mixed race, provenance and nationality, the classifications in our previous example involved clear binary opposites: specific and unspecific identities (‘others’), ‘mixed’ and ‘pure’ races, ‘white’ and ‘black’. It would be possible to represent them in the form of a taxonomy. The form recognizes two kinds
of white people, for instance, those with a named nationality and those without (the ‘other whites’); it recognizes two kinds of named nationality (‘British’ and ‘Irish’), and so on. The classifications of consumer identities we cited above cannot be represented in this way, because they define identity in terms of clusters of features, rather than in terms of single designations.

- Although it does use a number of traditional demographic categories, including race and nationality (and age), our second model does not do so systematically (for instance, race and nationality are only used as one of the co-categorizations in the case of ‘Symbols of success’), and it prefers categorizations which can change as people climb the social ladder: income, property, place of residence. It also includes a new, and even more easily changeable, set of identity features, co-defining identity on the basis of what people think, their ‘outlook’ (‘liberal’, ‘old-fashioned’, etc.), on the basis of their ‘independence’ from people who might ‘tie them down’ (husbands or wives, children, relatives living close by), on the basis of the newspapers or magazines they read and the hobbies they pursue, and, above all, on the basis of their consumer behaviour.

- The identity features used by the model include functionalizations as well as categorizations. People are defined, not only on the basis of ‘who they are’, but also, and above all, on the basis of ‘what they do’: their job, their leisure time activities, and of course their patterns of consumption. ‘Ethnic’ provenance matters less here. So long as you are a good consumer it is no longer important whether you are Asian, Chinese, Irish or any kind of ‘other’.

‘Lifestyle’ identities of this kind emerged as corporations looked for new ways of creating market demand. They were first formulated in the work of Arnold Mitchell (1978), who referred to them, not as ‘demographics’ but as ‘psychographics’, clusters of ‘behaviours’, ‘attitudes’ and consumption patterns. Mitchell described a range of identities in this way, including for instance the ‘Actualizer’, who is sceptical of advertising, has considerable financial resources, and reads newspapers every day; the ‘Experiencer’, who follows fashion, buys on impulse, and listens to music a lot; the ‘Striver’, who is status oriented and spends a great deal of money on leisure time activities and on him- or herself, and so on. Sociologists such as Chaney (1996) have described such lifestyles as forms of identity that are less fixed than traditional identities and can be more freely chosen: ‘People use lifestyles in everyday life to identify and explain wider complexes of identity and affiliation’ (1996: 12), and he, too, stresses their link with consumer goods. Lifestyle identities, he says, are fundamentally based on appearances. They allow attitudes, values and preferences to be signified by styles of dress and adornment, interior decoration, and so on. They are
situated, not in the realm of production, but in the realm of consumption and chosen:

by people for whom occupational and economic roles no longer provide a coherent set of values and for whom identity has come to be generated in the consumption rather than in the production realm.

(Zablocki and Kanter, 1976: 270)

It may be true that ‘people use lifestyles’, but such formulations make it easy to forget that lifestyles also use people. They are created and propagated to serve the interests and needs of powerful social institutions, in this case large corporations; and these institutions, like the nation-state, keep records of people’s identities, in this case through marketing surveys, and through the information consumers wittingly or unwittingly provide every time they use their credit cards and ‘loyalty cards’ for purchases. This information, like the classifications required by the nation-state, has material consequences, as it is instrumental in deciding what goods and services will be provided for whom.

Returning for a moment to our first example, we can now see the role of the ‘lifestyle’ model of identity in the way the two interviewed women talked about ‘independence’. They focused, not on traditional identity categories, or on their dependence on the patriarchal practices that still prevent women from receiving equal pay and equal access to many professions, but on ‘independence’ as an ‘attitude’ embodied in consumer goods such as cars, and lived out in leisure time activities such as clubbing and having casual affairs, exactly as in the Cosmopolitan discourse of the ‘fun, fearless woman’. And at times the identification with this kind of independence, and with the devaluation of relational identification it entails (e.g., the devaluation of the ‘relational’ identity of ‘wife’ and ‘mother’), seems only skin-deep.

Extract 2

Machin: So you are happy to have casual relationships
Woman B: I would like to fall in love and have family. I haven’t met the right guy.
Woman A: It’s hard in the clubs and pubs. Most guys are just after a shag really.
Woman B: Or they are just boring. You want someone who can have a laugh but is also pretty sensitive. Lots of guys are scared of us I think.
Woman A: We just end up having a laugh together. We have a drink, take the piss out of some guys.

A few other aspects of ‘consumer identity’ need to be pointed out. To do so, we will use a final example, an article in Cosmopolitan (November 2003)
which introduced ‘Joseph Cohen, author of The Penis Book’, who can tell ‘what kind of a man he is by the size and shape of his penis’. He describes five types of man, the ‘Peanut’, the ‘Banana’, the ‘Baggy Jacket’, the ‘Well Hung’ and ‘Mr Average’. Here are some extracts from his characterization of the ‘Baggy Jacket’ (i.e., man whose penis has a loose foreskin):

He is very laid back. He likes to be in a job where he can be as relaxed as his foreskin is ... He isn’t a fussy lover and has plenty of ideas if the lady is willing ... But if you’re looking for a laugh-a-minute kind of man, Cohen suggests you look elsewhere. ‘He is going to leave you feeling pretty empty in your heart and mind. He’ll never suggest a restaurant or a weekend getaway destination’, he says. ‘But on the plus-side, he’s always up for some hot sex.’

This excerpt illustrates a number of further points:

- Lifestyle classifications, especially in magazines, but also elsewhere, are often presented in the tongue in cheek, humorous way that also characterizes many advertisements and, indeed, increasingly many of the texts that corporations distribute to their consumers or clients, for instance the brochures through which banks offer insurance policies. On the one hand, the message is received. Men are reduced to their penis and to the skill with which they use it to provide women with pleasure. All else follows from this. On the other hand, the message can also be dismissed, laughed away: ‘it’s only a joke, a bit of fun’.

- The article is also an example of ‘physical identification’. Reflection on the vocabulary of physical identification (‘blonde’, ‘black’, ‘cripple’, ‘hulk’, etc.) quickly reveals that it focuses on people who are deemed inferior, stigmatized or otherwise held in low regard. The science that linked physical features to identities has been discredited precisely because it led to the racist theories that have legitimated colonialism, and eventually the Nazi genocides. Here it returns. As a joke. But, as we have already mentioned in relation to visual categorization, it is, today, precisely in entertainment contexts that the degrading stereotypes of ‘physical identity’ continue to flourish.

- Finally, ‘pop psychological’ classifications of this kind describe identity in entirely individualist terms. Neither ‘Baggy Jackets’, nor ‘Strivers’ can be said to form a social group. These classifications encourage people to think of themselves, not in terms of the groups with which they may have some form of solidarity and community, but as isolated individuals, whose actions are either determined by fate (astrology, the colour of your skin, the shape of your penis), or active individual agency; and whose identity is to a large extent defined by the kind of ‘personality traits’ (‘confident’, ‘independent’, ‘fun loving’, ‘shy’, ‘laid back’) that
were developed for the purpose of personality tests by psychologists such as Eysenck and have now become ubiquitous in the lifestyle media that constantly interpret people’s taste in matters such as colour, interior decoration and so on as expressions of their unique personalities, rather than (also) of the habitus of one or more social groups.

2.4 The power of classification

There is now an extensive literature on identity. Sociologists, anthropologists, linguists and, to a lesser degree, social psychologists have observed that identity is dependent on context, adaptive, in flux throughout our lives. In this they have built on the work of Simmel (e.g., 1971), Tönnies (2001) and Durkheim (2002), who studied what happens to people’s identity when they move from traditional rural communities to urban environments that are characterized by change and anonymity and require people to play different roles throughout the day.

Derrida (e.g., 1998) has observed that Western thought has had the tendency to isolate features and build them into systems of binary opposites in which one side is always given higher status, marginalizing the other, as on the ‘diversity’ form discussed above (‘white’ vs. ‘black’; ‘citizen’ vs. ‘non-citizen’; etc.). This can make diversity and complexity invisible. Many contemporary writers on identity, similarly, critique singular, essentialist constructions of identity, and stress complexity. In their view, the elements of identity are not only potentially infinite (Weeks, 1990), they combine and can only be understood in combination. A person’s identity is:

a heterogeneous set made up of all the names or identities given or taken up by her. But in a lifelong process, identity is endlessly created anew, according to various social constraints, social interactions, encounters, and wishes that may happen to be very subjective and unique.

(Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 316)

In a similar vein, Mercer has argued that ‘essentialist notions of identity and objectivity surface in the vortex of this bewildering experience of difference because of the absence of a common idea of what diversity really means’ (1989: 65), and that the ‘official discourse of anti-racism failed precisely because it imposed a one-dimensional view’ (p. 97). Again, Homi Bhabha (1990) has critiqued the Western tendency to essentialize other cultures and ascribe static identities to them, and Hall (1989) has discussed how the Caribbean diaspora rediscovered Africa and used this to construct a narrative that could make Caribbean identity whole, arguing that this hides difference and obscures how people change as they collect experience. Such accounts critique our first model of identity, together with the
practices it has engendered, for instance the tendency to have one black or Asian representative on a committee as if there was something essential about blacks or Asians that could be represented by a single representative – a tendency which can make members of such groups who do not subscribe to such an identity feel guilty, or cause them to be marginalized, thus leading to fragmented identities (Parmar, 1989). We agree with these critiques. They link classification systems to powerful social practices and their effects on subjects in just the way we have argued for. But many of the writers we have discussed go a step further, they also assert, sometimes even celebrate, our second model of identity, as one that offers the alternative – unique, individual, flexible, complex identities – and they do so without taking into account the origins of this model in the work of 1970s marketing experts, and the way in which it serves the interests of large corporations and informs their policies and practices. In our view, this link needs, at the very least, to be explicitly discussed and problematized. If people, in interviews such as those from which we have quoted here, use the ‘lifestyle model’ as a resource for describing themselves, then this is not so different from the way others may use the essentialist categories imposed by the nation-state and its institutions to describe themselves. Both can be ‘owned’ in the same way – and both can lead to fragmented identities, to contradictions, for instance the contradiction between identifying with the idea of ‘independence’ and yet also longing for ‘Mr Right’ and for ‘having a family’.

This tendency is particularly noticeable in work that links identity to media reception. The same period that spawned the theories we have just discussed (it was the era of Reagan and Thatcher, let us not forget), also spawned a new direction in media and cultural studies, a new emphasis on reception rather than on production or product (e.g., Morley, 1981; Radway, 1987). The initial aim was to relate differences in reception to demographic factors. But this was soon abandoned for an approach in which reception was related to people’s individual identities and histories (Radway, 1988). It was an approach with clear predecessors in 1950s and 1960s American mass-communication theory (see, e.g., Berlo (1960), who coined the slogan ‘meanings are in people’) – and again, origins and affinities of this kind, and their implications, are not acknowledged or discussed.

Historically, there is a pattern here. As marketing experts and large corporations began to emphasize production over consumption, so did theorists of identity and meaning. As they abandoned singular, stable demographic identities in favour of complex, flexible and individual identities, so did theorists of identity. As they championed the consumer’s power of choice, so did theorists of identity. We do not want to argue here that these theorists are wrong. As we said, they have contributed a necessary and wholly convincing critique of the essentialist identity model. The greater
emphasis on functionalization, on choice, and on identity as a cluster of features does have positive potentialities. But this does not diminish the fact that the ‘lifestyle’ model is just as much produced and imposed by a powerful social institution as the older model, even if it propagates a different kind of identity and communicates it very differently.

We also want to argue for a different kind of complexity, a complexity in which at least two powerful ‘regimes’ of identity, driven by different needs and interests, operate side by side, that of nation-states and that of large, global corporations. The question, therefore, is not what identity is, in some absolute, indeed essentialist sense. The question is how nation-states and global corporations (re)construct identity in different ways, and how people use these (re)constructions when they talk about their own identity. What agency people have in doing so has to be seen as constrained to different degrees by these socially constructed and imposed models of identity. And, while ‘lifestyle identity’ may have some genuine advantages over essentialist forms of identity, there is also a drawback here: just how agentic people can be within this model, how much they will, or will not be constrained by it, depends to a great extent on the financial, social and cultural resources at their disposal.

References


3
Identity Work and Transnational Adoption: Discursive Representations of the ‘Adoptive-Parent-To-Be’ in the Satellite Texts of a Danish TV Documentary Series

Pirkko Raudaskoski and Paul McIlvenny

3.1 Introduction

In the Scandinavian countries, transnational adoption is state controlled and subject to an official institutional procedure with various gate-keeping phases. For instance, prospective adopters have to produce detailed applications and various legally binding documents in which they show that they qualify – legally, financially and emotionally – to adopt (McIlvenny and Raudaskoski, 2005a; Rygvold, Dalen and Sætersdal, 1999). They also meet with social workers for interviews, home assessments and discussions (cf. Hall and Slembrouck, 2001). Adoption is, moreover, a highly affective process for the applicants, and hence their decision-making to adopt is usually troubled in many respects. The process involves at least a ‘traversal’ (Lemke, 2002) from the presumed ‘normal’ course of biological parenthood to a set of practices and concerns they might not have been aware of at all (Daly, 1988; Farber et al., 2003; Throsby, 2002). Once occupied in the official institutional process, the prospective adoptive parents wait for the official decision about whether or not they qualify to adopt, and later, after selecting an approved adoption agency, they wait for the referral of a child from their selected ‘sending’ country (Telfer, 1998). In this complex process, the prospective adoptive parents engage in situated and mediated discussions with a range of actors, such as state and agency officials and other adopters, and their discursive nexus is thus effectively and voluntarily enlarged.¹ From non-adopters’ perspective, this process is often shrouded in mystery, yet it is increasingly becoming visible and the subject of debate in the mass media.²

During 2002 and 2003, the Danish national public broadcasting channel, DR, produced a high-profile documentary series about transnational adoption, which was broadcast nationally in a prime-time slot between September and October 2003. The documentary series has since
been shown in several other countries, including Norway and Finland. Instead of drawing upon the ‘experts’ in adoption circles (e.g., social workers, researchers and adoption agencies) as sources, DR followed five prospective adoptive, heterosexual couples for a year, concentrating especially on their affective labour. In order to do this, the heterosexual couples who were selected were teamed up with a journalist and a camera crew, who often appeared in their private households to film ad hoc. By using lower quality and less intrusive video cameras and microphones, great effort was made to simulate the ‘reality’ (and the spectacle of trauma or joy) of the prospective adopters’ receipt of good or bad news. After editing, the end result was broadcast as a five-part documentary series entitled ‘When the Stork Fails’ (in Danish, *Når storken svigter*).

Not only was the documentary series broadcast on national Danish television, there were a number of ‘satellite texts’ accompanying it, namely written press releases, a hyper-modal website (combining multimodality with hypertext), an asynchronous discussion forum and a synchronous online web chat (see Kress, 2004; Sarangi, 2004; and Östman and Simon-Vandenbergen, 2004). On the web site, the general public could find out much more about the prospective adoptive couples prior to adoption, as well as their ‘transnational’ families after their first contact with the child, for example by viewing the extra video clips and family photographs. Moreover, the general public could discuss difficult matters related to adoption with the couples featured in the documentary in the asynchronous discussion forum and in the synchronous chatroom.

The people who participated in the programme did so as individuals, but also as actors in a complex *nexus of practice* (Scollon, 2001), as well as members and representatives of the category of people who have been through or are in the process of adoption. The personal reasons for these couples’ participation in the programme are varied (for instance, to be on ‘reality TV’, or to become famous, or to help others in a similar position), but as (future) adoptive parents they were also part of a community of practice found, for example, in adoption associations and parent support groups (Way and Mason, 2000). Therefore, it was in the interests of their private and public concerns for the larger public audience to come to understand what adoption is about. The state media channel (DR) wanted to make topical programmes of interest, and the programme series turned out to be successful in terms of audience ratings: there were over one million viewers for each episode, about 20 per cent of the Danish population. The fact that a documentary has been made about transnational adoption demonstrates that adopters are somehow worthy of attention, somehow ‘different’, but, as our analysis shows, the Danes were educated throughout the programme about
how economically and morally ‘normal’ these people are. Indeed, no challenges were made to the fundamental cultural assumptions about what a parent is and what being a parent means (cf. Lemke, Chapter 1 in this volume). The documentary thus contributes to the discursive construction of adoption as ‘mimicry’, because ‘in their attempts to be whole, real families, adoptive families produce the very differences [of kinship, for example] that they are compelled to deny’ (Yngvesson and Mahoney, 2000: 87). In fact, the documentary could be seen as a record of the ‘slippage’, the ‘excess’ or ‘its difference’ that any mimicry continually must performatively produce (Bhabha, 1994: 86).

By participating in the making of the television programme, the (prospective) adoptive parents not only (re)presented a certain account of their identity that mostly referenced their suffering and pain, they also opened up the possibility for a small number of the viewers to show their ‘active attitude’ towards their pain and frustration, and the suffering of the distant ‘child-to-be-adopted’ (see Boltanski, 1999 on distant suffering; and Rose, 1999a on the governmental shaping of the private self, the child and the family). This was facilitated by DR, who had provided the possibility for those with Internet connections to chat online with the couples featured in each episode immediately after the episode had finished its premiere.

Using mediated discourse analysis and virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000; Scollon, 2001), we track how the prospective adoptive parents (adoptive-parents-to-be) talk about their own process, how they are represented and resemiotized in the television programme, and how they describe the adoption and their own identifications and sense of completeness or belonging (see Telfer, 1999, 2004; Yngvesson, 2004) in their private web sites, in the public chatrooms, and so on. Mediated discourse analysis focuses on the relations between discourse, practice, materiality and social action, which all come together in the nexus of practice, whereas virtual ethnography emphasizes connectivity and that places are performed rather than simply being material spaces. Consequently, Internet sites can also be regarded as a nexus of practice.

There are various steps in their adoption process that are remediated in the documentary: the ‘adoptive-parents-to-be’ wait for an allocation, and if they are successful, they travel to the donor country, meet the ‘child’ and return ‘home’ with their child (Krusiewicz and Wood, 2001). At the same time, we follow the ways in which ‘the couple’ and the ‘the adoptive-parent-to-be’ are described, talked about and contested in the mass media and on the Internet by a range of actors (see also Carsten, 2004; Cohen, 1994; Daly, 1988; Gaber and Aldridge, 1994; Gupta, 2003; Howell, 2003; Kennedy, 2003; Lal, 2001; Luke, 2003; Richards, 1994; Sætersdal and Dalen, 2000).
This chapter focuses on the representations of the ‘adoptive-parents-to-be’, but since adoption is also about a child, we briefly note here how the child-to-be-adopted is figured (see Castaneda, 2002; Krusiewicz and Wood, 2001; McIlvenny and Raudaskoski, 2005b; Telfer, 2003). In the press releases and on the web site, the child is often figured as a missing object of experience (e.g., the empty tummy; family life without noise and movement), which the parents cannot wait to receive from the ‘sending’ country. It is an owned object of love (e.g., visiting an office to become a mother; surprise at the parents’ rapid attachment to the child), and also an actual eating, shitting and sleeping child with a new Danish name who causes problems with the parents’ self-esteem and their relationship. Thus the child is frequently depicted as just an ordinary child, not as a transnational adoptee. In that sense, the child is purified, and scaled such that the child can be understood in terms of a Danish identity, but at the same time as just a child, and thus it becomes intelligible for a mass-media audience.

The documentary is an interesting object for discursive analysis in that it is built up almost completely from the everyday ‘voices’ and visible practices of the prospective adopters (Smith and Watson, 1996). It is a combination of ‘ethnographic’ observation (they were followed through various stages of the process) and interviews (from which the questions were edited out). There were two types of auto/biographical narratives present in the interviews (see Grotevant et al., 1999): those mainly about the past and how they feel about things in general (typically situated in the interviewees’ home), and those about how the persons feel at that very moment (typically produced in connection with some other ongoing activity). Since they were heavily edited answers to questions posed by DR journalists, these narratives presented in the documentary were more biographical. It has to be kept in mind, however, that the edited, fragmentary version of the raw, recorded audiovisual materials is not wholly DR’s nor the participants’ version, because the documentary genre is virtual and arte-factual: ‘it is not given but actively produced, sifted, invested, performatively interpreted by numerous apparatuses which are factitious or artificial, hierarchizing and selective’ (Derrida and Stigler, 2002: 3). Hence, we cannot assume anything about the situated ‘relational notions of identity’ – the activity-bound production of talk that Lemke (this volume) discusses when referring to Gergen (1994) – which took place when the couples actually said the things they said. What we focus on, instead, is the remediated versions or shards of adoptive identity, particularly those that trouble identity in its very performative iterability (Butler, 1997).

3.2 Satellite texts and direct quotations

The satellite texts that preceded the screening of the documentary, such as the press release and the web site, were designed to be used to
persuade people to watch the programme (see Latour’s 1987 ‘action-at-distance’). In terms of intertextuality, these satellite texts heavily used direct quotations from the episodes.\(^5\) However, as seems to be typical for press releases (Jacobs, 1999), these quotations were often changed slightly and also placed in a different narrative order than the original ‘story’, such that the mini-stories that the web site and the press release offered were sometimes different from those in the televised episode. The press releases were written partly to be requoted, so the direct quotations were used as a mediational means (Scollon, 2001) for other actions to take place. Most of the comparable texts in the press releases and on the web sites were identical in content (see, for instance, Extracts 2b and 3 below). In a personal communication, a DR information officer says that, typically, the press release is written first by one person and then more or less copied to the web site by another person; that is, that any differences are the result of changes to the press release.

To give an illustration of how a direct quotation was used in the press releases and on the web sites, in Extract 1 we see a transcript of the talk-in-interaction broadcast in the last episode of the series. In our extracts, the English translation appears first, followed by the segment in the original Danish language, marked off in italics.

**Extract 1: translation**\(^6\)

Lotte: b’t I had to go to a psychiatrist because I had an erroneous operation in the hospital (0.6) where I wanted to have a child and then they removed my fallopian tubes so they: .h::: (1.0) they r- they removed the wish about it (0.4) right (.) that is why I beca:me (0.8) I went down men tally (0.6) and that can be seen (0.5) in the papers (.) and those papers are with the county (0.8) so:: (0.5) ONE HAS COME OVER IT (.) right (.) IT IS TEN YEAR AGO right I mean (.) THERE HAVE BEEN MANY OTHer qualities .h:: in my life (0.4) it’s not something one has in mind all the time you know I mean:: and It has been for: for a long time (0.5) for given an:::d (.) accepted that so it is (.) and gone ahead with my life (.) right

**Extract 1a: original in Danish**

Lotte: m’n jeg var nødt til at gå til psykiater fordi jeg havde en fejloperation oppe på sygehuset (0.6) hvor jeg gerne ville have et barn og så fjernede de min æggeleder så de: .h::: (1.0) de f- de fjernede ønsket om det (0.4) ik’ (.) derfor så ble:v (0.8) røg jeg psykisk ned (0.6) og det står (0.5) i papirerne (.) og de papirer har amtet (0.8) så:: (0.5) DET ER MAN KOMMET OVER (.) ik’ (.) DET ER TI ÅR SIDEN ik’ altså (.) DER HAR VÆRET MANGE ANdre kvaliteter .h:: inde i mit liv (0.4) det er ikke noget man går og tænker over vel
Both the web site and the press release about this televised episode used a direct quotation from this sequence. In Extracts 2a and b and Extract 3 below, we see how the direct quotation appeared textually and visually in the press release and on the official programme web site respectively.

Extract 2a: translation of text in the press release and on the website

Nervous before meeting
Michael and Lotte have decided to adopt. But before this can happen, the county has to first accept them as adoptive parents. This applies both in relation to the couple’s purely factual conditions, such as financial, etc. But also whether they will be capable of giving the personal contribution that is needed to take care of a small child. And here Lotte becomes a little nervous. Many years ago her Fallopian tubes were mistakenly removed in an operation and she consulted a psychiatrist afterwards,
– It has been for a long time forgiven and accepted, and I’ve gone ahead with my life, says Lotte. However, she is worried about how the county will understand the situation. DR's journalists follow when the couple have to go to their first interview with the county,

Extract 2b: original from the press release

Nervos for møde
Michael og Lotte har besluttet sig for, at de gerne vil adoptere. Men for det kan ske, skal amtet først godkende dem som adoptivforældre. Det gælder bade med hensyn til parrets rent faktuelle forhold som økonomi osv. Men også om de vil være i stand til at yde den personlige indsats, der skal til for at tage et lille barn til sig. Og her bliver Lotte en smule nervøs. Hun fik for mange år siden fjernet æggelederne ved en fejl under en operation og konsulterede efterfølgende en psykiater,
– Det er for længst tilgivet og accepteret, og jeg er videre i mit liv, fortæller Lotte. Alligevel er hun bekymret over, hvordan amtet vil opfatte situationen. DR's journalister følger med, da parret skal til deres første samtale med amtet,
In Extract 2a (translation of 2b and 3), the quotation (‘It has been for a long time forgiven and accepted, and I’ve gone ahead with my life’) is, as such, very close to what she says in the televised episode. However, the placement of the quotation on the web site next to a photograph taken in the meeting with her social worker (from the regional county) can provide an ambiguous recontextualization in which she is apparently saying those words in the meeting, whereas she was uttering them in a separate interview with the documentary makers. This kind of ‘redesign’ was not uncommon. Sometimes, the meaning of a quotation can be transformed. In another case, a direct quotation from the same episode in which a cry for help about a newly adopted child refusing any food was recontextualized in the satellite texts in relation to the child’s bad diarrhoea, not her difficulties with eating.

3.3 Identity work

As direct quotations were used frequently in these satellite texts, and since – as has been documented elsewhere (e.g., Jacobs, 1999) – direct quotations
can make a text livelier and therefore more interesting to read, we wanted to find out what kind of identities are constructed and contested through these direct quotations. In this chapter, we use Lemke’s (Chapter 1 in this volume) discussion of identity as a starting point. Lemke focuses on the various theories about identity construction, and also on the individual and his/her construction of identity both *in situ* and over longer time-scales. However, he does not discuss methods of analysis, but only gives hypothetical examples of how persons might feel or what they might say in different situations about themselves. The situated production of identity has been a central interest in discursive psychology and recently conversation analysis and membership categorization analysis has become a rich method of analysis to see how that ‘identity work’ is negotiated in morally accountable ways (see Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Jayyusi, 1984; Lawrence, 1996; Sacks, 1984, 1995; Stokoe, 2003).

In the filming of the documentary series, the prospective adopters repeatedly performed their identities locally. Yet, as a consequence of DR’s editing and selection of the participants’ talk chosen in order to build up a poignant and viewable television programme, the viewers encountered a remediatized and recontextualized version of events and interactions. The situated production of identity has been a central interest in discursive psychology and recently conversation analysis and membership categorization analysis has become a rich method of analysis to see how that ‘identity work’ is negotiated in morally accountable ways (see Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Jayyusi, 1984; Lawrence, 1996; Sacks, 1984, 1995; Stokoe, 2003).

In the filming of the documentary series, the prospective adopters repeatedly performed their identities locally. Yet, as a consequence of DR’s editing and selection of the participants’ talk chosen in order to build up a poignant and viewable television programme, the viewers encountered a remediatized and recontextualized version of events and interactions. The direct quotations in the satellite texts are another intertextual resemiotization (Iedema, 2001) of the original talk, and, as has been shown above, they are sometimes adapted from the ‘original’ (shown in the televised episode), to convey new meanings in the genre chain (Fairclough, 2001, 2003). The producers thus ‘immediately and totally reappropriated’ (Derrida and Stigler, 2002: 37) the adoptive parents’ utterances. They were taken out of the context of production, out of the ‘singular, unrepeatable moment’ (Derrida and Stigler, 2002: 38) as semiotic material that might change meaning during the process. Those utterances were elevated from being part of the fabric of unfolding talk-in-interaction to being ‘statements’, ‘confessions’ or ‘testimonies’, not just about how the participants felt and thought at that very time of the utterance, but how they in general feel and think about transnational adoption itself and all the processes that accompany it. That is, their local, situated identity production is appropriated *at-a-distance*, in the process of creating the various media products. The quotations are circulated to another context, that of a written press release or to a website, and are now surrounded by text produced by others with which there is an exchange of properties (Latour, 1999). When we trace the circulation of quotations across sites, we are following certain objects – a network of texts-in-action (Prior, 2003: 98) – produced by certain people, and occurring in certain stories about them (Green, 1999: 409; Hine, 2000; Marcus, 1995). The quotations are locally produced, most often in the interviews about the participants’ life world, but in the press releases and on the web (and, of course, in the edited programme itself) they become part of a media system that is national, and nowadays even global.
Thus, our research question is: What kind of identities are constructed and mediated through the use of these quotations, and what consequences might those constructions have?

When we examine the direct quotations in the press releases and on the web site, it is clear that at least two kinds of identities are emerging: one before the adoption and the other after the child has been adopted. Often the reporting verbs are included in the analysis of direct quotations. We omit further discussion here because they all belong to the category ‘neutral’ (see Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 306), and therefore they accentuate the ‘ Authenticity’ of the original speaker’s words, instead of giving an interpretation of them. Before adoption, the parents are depicted as fulfilling their societal and emotional needs (e.g., of having the same experiences as others), as we can see in Extracts 4 and 5 below.

### Extract 4

‘It’s very hard to know that one won’t ever have a baby in the tummy’, says Nanna in the first episode of the series ‘When the stork fails’, but at the same time she is aware that she can love a little adopted child to the full.


### Extract 5

‘I don’t want to be him, the strange one, but rather one of the crowd’, says Stig, who thinks that couples without children can become a little peculiar.

‘Jeg vil ikke være ham den underlige, så hellere en af massen’, siger Stig, som synes par uden børn kan blive lidt sære.

In both extracts, the childless identity is depicted through negative judgements. After the adoption, on the other hand, the everyday harsh reality is the focus, and the adopters’ feelings of inadequacy as parents and the tension between the partners are highlighted, as illustrated in Extracts 6 and 7.

### Extract 6

One feels oneself to be inadequate, and I think that I am a bad mother, states Winnie.

*Man føler sig utilstrækkelig, og jeg synes, jeg er en dårlig mor, konstaterer Winnie.*

### Extract 7

‘Would you mind taking her – so I can take some initiative. Because what you’re doing is not fast enough’, says Vibeke decisively when it takes Stig a little too long to choose the right product.
‘Gider du at komme og tage hende – så tager jeg nogle initiativer. Fordi det der, det går ikke stærkt nok’, lyder det bestemt fra Vibeke, da Stig er lidt for længe om at vælge det rigtige produkt.

Thus, both before and after adoption, the parents are constructed as emotional societal beings with the normal wishes (e.g., to have a child) of a heterosexual partnership, and the normal problems of parents with children; that is, they are seen as doing ‘being ordinary’ Danish couples and parents (Sacks, 1984; Throsby 2002).

However, there was an exception. In the documentary, in contrast to the other three couples who were followed from just prior to their receipt of a phone call from the adoption agency, one couple, Lotte and Mikael (see Extracts 1–3 above), were followed from the very early stages of their official adoption process. That is, they were followed from when they began to fill in their application papers. In the television programme it was made clear that there might be a potential obstacle to the success of their adoption process, namely Lotte’s depression in the past. In the programme itself, they were depicted in more or less the same way as the others, as desiring to be a normal family with a child (see Letherby, 1999). However, on the web site and in the press releases of the episodes in which they were present (the last two of the five that were broadcast), they were treated differently from the other couples vis-à-vis direct quotations. They were not quoted at all in the press release or on the web site of the penultimate episode, and in the last one it was only Lotte who was quoted. In the other cases, there was a balance between selecting quotations of speech from both partners. Extracts 8, 9 and 10 are all quotations from the web site.

Extract 8

Many years ago her Fallopian tubes were mistakenly removed in an operation and she consulted a psychiatrist afterwards, It has been for a long time forgiven and accepted, and I’ve gone ahead with my life, says Lotte.

Hun fik for mange år siden fjernet æggelederne ved en fejl under en operation og konsulterede efterfølgende en psykiater, Det er for længst tilgivet og accepteret, og jeg er videre i mit liv, fortæller Lotte.

Extract 9

DR’s journalists follow when the couple have to go to their first interview with the county,
– I think it went really well. But I am nervous about whether or not they accept the things we have said, says Lotte after the visit.

DR’s journalister følger med, da parret skal til deres første samtale med amtet,
– Jeg synes, det gik rigtig godt. Men jeg er nervøs for, om de accepterer de ting, vi har sagt, fortæller Lotte efter besøget.
Extract 10

I don’t know what I will do if I won’t be approved, says Lotte before the verdict is pronounced.
– Jeg ved ikke, hvad jeg vil gøre, hvis ikke jeg bliver godkendt, siger Lotte, inden afgørelsen falder.

The direct quotations form a continuum from Lotte’s claim that she is healed (Extract 8), to how she articulates that their discussion with a social worker – which is shown in the documentary in fragments – went well (the subtitle for this section in the press release and on the web site was ‘Nervous before meeting’; see Extract 2a). The first quotation in Extract 8 shows how Lotte, instead of challenging the legal rules concerning psychiatric problems and adoption (which have since been loosened anyway), goes for the more culturally acceptable and strategically safer option when she claims forgiveness and forgetting. In other words, she chooses ‘the fixed semiotic options provided by our culture and its constraints’ (Lemke, this volume). The latter part of the quotation in Extract 9 – ‘But I am nervous about whether or not they accept the things we have said’ – is ambiguous, since acceptance could point both to their honest account of their life and relationship or to a performance that is ‘sold’ to the social worker. In any case, there is a clear emphasis on Lotte’s nervousness in this section. When Lotte’s future action description (see Extract 10) appears after these quotations, instead of it being heard as an emotional outburst that anyone willing to adopt would come up with, in its mediated form it now conveys a more disturbing message that questions Lotte’s claim about her being healed.

In this case, the press release had one more direct quotation (see Extract 11), which was omitted from the web site.

Extract 11

Because we want to have a child together, and we cannot get that for biological reasons, says Lotte, whose Fallopian tubes have been removed.
Fordi vi gerne vil have et barn sammen, og det kan vi ikke få af biologiske årsager, fortæller Lotte, som har fået fjernet æggelederne.

It is interesting to see how the ‘original’ utterance (see Extract 12) which appeared in the broadcast television episode has been reformulated in the direct quotation above.

Extract 12

Lotte: because we want to have a child together and that we cannot get (.) biologically (.) that’s why we want to adopt
Lotte: fordi vi gerne vil have et barn sammen og det kan vi ikke få (.) biologisk (.) derfor så ønsker vi at adoptere
The press release, even though it appears to be formulated to describe, similarly to the other couples, their reasons for, and sorrows in, trying to achieve parenthood, it does not directly quote ‘and that’s why we want to adopt’, but, instead, it adds an account of Lotte’s biological or medical condition as the reason for adoption. Thus Lotte is medicalized through the modification of the direct quotations, and at the same time, the emphasis is shifted from the individual ‘troubles’ to become a parent to the official procedure and its gate-keeping phases. Even though the last quotation on the web site brings in her feelings, in this context the quotation serves as depicting her as an unstable rather than an unhappy person. With adoption, strong feelings and emotions are patiently acknowledged and in some ways they are a prerequisite for a ‘normal’ prospective parent, but this is the case only in relation to their desire for a child, not in relation to their ascribed psychological problems. Through direct quotation, a subtler identity construction of a ‘problem case’ is then achieved because a number of less positive inferences are made available for the reader (see Edwards and Potter, 2001).

The introductory appetizers at the beginning of the fourth and fifth episodes were also hinting at the possibility that this couple’s application might be rejected. Indeed, the outcome was that the couple did not receive the required official permission to proceed to adopt, the news of which was also remediated in the last episode of the documentary. The differential treatment of the couple in how direct quotations were used on the web site and in the press releases contrasts sharply with the construction of normalcy in regard to the other couples. In this way, the final decision was made more understandable, with the result that it took the side of the official establishment instead of being neutral. Of course, the couple’s participation in the programme might have been strategic, in the sense that they might have attempted to enhance their chances since they would open up their wishes and potential problems not just for official inspection but for public scrutiny (implying that they had nothing to hide). Then again, they would have to talk about these problems because they would need to show that they have a disinterested stance (see Potter, 1996). In building up the episodes and the satellite materials, it was incumbent on DR to remain neutral.

In the chatroom, Lotte and Mikael were the only couple whose attempt at adoption was clearly and sometimes heatedly challenged. Whether or not the anonymous public chatters who challenged them had seen the web site, not just the episodes, is unclear (though one always had to go to the chatroom via the web site), and therefore no claims can be made about a connection between their attitude and their ‘reception’ of the web site. Nevertheless, Lotte’s statement (in Extract 8) about having overcome the trauma of the past was noted, and it was quoted and challenged on the basis of what she had said in the previous episode. Thus, the chatroom
provided a possibility for ‘opening up’ the identities that the documentary and its satellite texts had unavoidably construed.

3.4 Conclusion

It is clear that the DR web site and their press releases used direct quotations in order to stir interest in the mass media in the series, and thus to build a potential audience. Nevertheless, they were also redesigned, in that the quotations were altered (e.g., in content and in placement) to acquire new meanings, to tell a different ‘mini-story’, another version of the story of the participants and their identities, with a variety of consequences. For example, one can wonder how strongly the ascription of Lotte’s troubled identity in this programme is seen by others as implying that she is morally not worthy to take care of an adopted child (see Slembrouck, 2003). Unfortunately, there were only at most 50 people in the online chatroom to hear about the more positive evaluation of Lotte as a caregiver; these few people had the possibility to discuss the programme, and to address the mediation of the ‘past’ in the ‘present’. When Lemke (this volume) wonders about situated and longer time-scale identities, Lotte’s case serves as an important reminder that this identity work is not just up to an individual, but that especially the mass media and increasingly the new media have important roles to play in the distributed identity construction of individuals (and groups for that matter). Lemke rightly reminds us of the notion of situated identity construction, but we have to be aware that the direct quotations from the couples on a web site or in a press release have travelled a long distance both in time and space from the embodied situated identity production in which they were uttered (and from the time/space called ‘self’ whose desires and fears were at stake). Moreover, those mediated identity productions, divorced from the bodies and lives of the participants, are potentially more influential and durable than the speaker’s attempts in situ, and they might come back to haunt them. Following Prior (2003), who argues that documents can ‘strike back’, becoming counter-agents to oneself, the projected identity (see Lemke, this volume) can turn into a ‘projectile’, as happened in the chatroom. Lemke discusses direct quotations in the mass media as a conforming identity resource. However, our analysis shows how direct quotations can, in fact, fix one’s own identity, and, ironically, in one’s own words. Unfortunately, we do not have access to how Lotte felt about being at the heart of a media storm – in the chatroom it was clearly Michael who answered all the questions and also talked for Lotte and about Lotte, emphasizing how wrong the psychologist’s report had been about Lotte’s ability to take care of children.

Finally, we can interpret our findings in terms of emerging forms of governance and control, of circuits of inclusion and exclusion (Bang, 2003; Iedema, 2003; Rose, 1999b). In the making and broadcast of the documen-
tary, there are many actors: DR with their narrative and legal power, the parents engaged in their situated activities and (regulated) emotions, and the official state adoption system and the adoption agency with their role as gatekeepers. In the process of mediation, certain meanings about adoption (e.g., about adoptive-parents-to-be and children-to-be-adopted) were circulated, stabilized and made more durable. When identities are unavoidably produced and ‘consumed’ in this assemblage of people, media, persons of interest, and political parties, it is clear that identity and politics are inseparable.

Notes

1. This chapter has been written by people who have themselves gone through the troubles and joys of transnational adoption. However, in our research we are not about to determine any ‘real’ feelings that prospective adoptive parents may or may not have had. Instead, in this chapter we prefer to analyse the tension between the mass media’s re-presentation via recontextualisations of ‘direct quotations’ of people that have chosen to apply for the right to adopt and those prospective adopter’s reappropriation or contestation of those mediated re-presentations. That we have ourselves adopted does not give us any more access to the ‘inner’ feelings of the people referred to in those texts. We can only presume that adoptive parents have nothing else in common than a wish to adopt. However, we do know about the procedures and practices that the prospective adoptive parents have to go through in Denmark.

2. In an article on ‘mediadoption’, the mediation of adoption in the mass media, Clark (1998) notes the recent rise in the number of films about domestic adoption in the United States that focus on the spectacle and commodification of disruption. Hübnette (2005) documents the proliferation of media representations of transnational adoption and adopted Koreans in Korean popular culture.

3. The website can be found at: http://www.dr.dk/dokument/Storken/ [Last accessed: October 2005]. There is no public record of the chatroom textual interactions, which the authors have archived.

4. A good example of the interactional decontextualisation and fragmentation that necessarily, and sometimes more drastically, takes place in the edit, can be seen in how two apparently adjacent turns-at-talk were split apart and used separately in two distinct introductory extracts (used as appetizers) found in the last two episodes of the documentary series. At the beginning of the fourth episode, Lotte says (to Mikael) ‘If it doesn’t work out now, you mustn’t think that I couldn’t apply again’ (hvvis den ikke går nu så skal du da ikke tro at jeg ikke kunne finde på at søge igen), and in the fifth one, Mikael says in a low voice ‘(inhale), and if it works out it will, and if it doesn’t, then one has tried, anyways’ (.h: og går den så går den og gør den ikke så har man da prøvet).

5. Much research has been done on direct quotation (also called direct reported speech), for example in discourse studies and conversation analysis (e.g., Buttny, 1997; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994; Hamilton, 1998; Holt, 1996; Jacobs, 1999; Leudar and Antaki, 1996; Myers 1999).

6. The transcription conventions are as follows:
   - stressed (part of) word
   - lengthened production of a word or sound
7. For the media producers, the time-scale was more extended: from their initial contact with an adoption agency, through which the potential adopters were first contacted, then filming them for a year, editing a programme, producing web-sites and press release documents, broadcasting the episode, and then monitoring the chat room discussion. For the viewers, the satellite texts might be encountered over a period of a few months, but it was only possible to participate in the chat room immediately after viewing each episode.

8. Cf. Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 307): “Quoting” what people say is a very dangerous activity. Sayings are transformed through the perspective of a teller, who is an agent in a discursive practice. In this way, social identities and roles are created according to the values of who reports and the institution this person represents.’

9. See Kirkman (2001, 2003), Letherby (1999), and Williams (1992) for detailed analyses of autobiographical infertility narratives amongst women desiring to conceive a child.

10. In the online chatroom, it became clear that Lotte had been deemed by another psychologist to have been an excellent caregiver to Mikael’s daughter from his first marriage.

11. The chatroom event took place immediately after the broadcast of each episode, and therefore the context for the viewers, who had just seen the fragments from film recorded in the distant past, was jarringly out of synchrony with the current situation of the couples who were now present in the chatroom.

12. Scollon (2001: 158) is fundamentally concerned with ‘how the transformations from practice, action, and habitus to person, characteristics, and identity is performed through discursive practices and other practices of technologisation and objectivisation.’ We might compare his formulation to that of Foucault’s: ‘it is one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals’ (1980: 98). Thus, in our approach the apparently fundamental relations that constitute our beliefs in identity, self and individuality are contingent, and thus just how they are (re)articulated on each occasion is left open for investigation.

References


4
When (non) Anglo-Saxon Queers Speak in a Queer Language: Homogeneous Identities or Disenfranchised Bodies?

Maite Escudero Alías

4.1 Introduction

In an era in which almost all academic disciplines have been critically analysed through the lenses of identity categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, and so on, I would like to start this chapter by acknowledging the relevant role that different perspectives of feminist, post-colonial, gay and lesbian, social and cultural studies have played throughout approximately the last three decades. Many and varied have been the theoretical and practical postulates to ponder on the question of identity politics, thus making possible complex constructions of identity. In this respect, some of the primary aspects that have been keenly addressed are the relationship between gender and the concept of identity on the one hand, and the articulation of diverse and heterogeneous representations of identity categories on the other.

Significantly enough, feminist discourses have answered to some of women’s demands – equal opportunities, visibility in all domains of public life, and the like – from different perspectives. As necessary as it has been to cogitate about the notion of ‘gender’ and bring it to the fore and visibility, so has it been the vindication of other categories such as sexuality, race or class in the representation of identity. So, for non-white and non-heterosexual communities, the production of social and cultural counter-discourses with which to resist and challenge hegemonic identity (re)presentations has remained crucial. This is the main reason why, as I see it, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, the configuration of identity should not overlook the presence of other discourses such as queer rhetorics, in order to open up wider spaces in which the variety and complexity of diversely gendered communities can find a legitimate position of sexual and cultural difference.

My starting point, then, is that the inclusion of queer methodologies in the redefinition and revision of concepts such as identity, desire, sexuality and identification, produces an indispensable framework to theorize all those non-normative identities that disrupt the binary space of
heterosexual and homosexual categories, while also questioning the functional scope of sexuality, gender, class or race. The very creation of queer studies has called into question the idea that the above-mentioned identity categories are monolithic and stable. In this sense, as will be seen in this chapter, queer is continually sceptical of normalized identities; queer has become an umbrella term for encompassing unstable homosexual identities and/or socially rejected sexual practices, thus bringing together a variety of practices, cultural representations and gender transgressions conceived as the source of political engagement.

Queer theory becomes an important deconstructivist influence when reflecting on gender identity and sexuality. Particularly, I will take as the object of my analysis some (non) Anglo-Saxon ‘queer bodies’ – that is, Drag Kings’ – who manage to dissolve the ontological boundaries between what a man and a woman is, both in cultural and linguistic terms. As will be shown, the Drag King phenomenon addresses contemporary queer discourses and challenges the existing gender identity binary hierarchies. Since the illegibility of these bodies may pose a set of controversial questions, this chapter will then focus on how the subjects, who identify themselves under certain linguistic terms, live in a double-edged space: while one belongs to globalizing strategies of defining identity processes, the other underlines national and local features which resist a growing homogenization of the construction of identity.

4.2 The Birth of Queerhood

Queer Studies emerged in the early 1990s in Anglo-Saxon contexts as a theoretical weapon to transform the study of sexuality and gender in almost all academic disciplines. Its subsequent, pervading, and yet controversial, reinterpretations of identity categories have become the threshold to provide gender studies with a more complex and enlarged theoretical framework; one that facilitates the exploration not only of gender, but more specifically, of how the category of gender interferes with those of race, social class, age and, more remarkably, with that of sexuality. Queer theory, which has it roots in political gay liberation movements of the early 1970s, emerged as a reaction against fixed and coherent notions of homosexual identity, and it was partly influenced by the social constructivist perspective developed by lesbian and gay scholars that foregrounds the constructedness of identity categories such as gender and sexuality. Moreover, it was highly influenced by the post-modern critique of identity that both problematizes ontological paradigms of the subject and underlines the paradoxical role of the Foucauldian notion of power in the formation of the subject.

The discussions and multiple definitions of the term ‘queer’ have been, and continue to be, diverse and controversial, particularly within and
outside Anglo-Saxon queer communities when it comes to delimiting who and how people are represented under this term. The literal meaning of the term ‘queer’ has traditionally been linked to ‘accusation, pathologization, insult’ (Butler, 1993: 226) embodied in homosexual persons. In spite of the fact that ‘queer’ signalled degradation and an aberrant sexuality, the term became subject to re-signification. In 1990, a group of queers at a New York Pride March anonymously published a leaflet entitled ‘Queers Read This’ with the purpose of contesting the widespread pejorative connotations of the term ‘queer’. This publication was instrumental in shifting the cultural, social and pragmatic delimitations of the concept of ‘queer’:

Well, yes, ‘gay’ is great. It has its place. But when lots of lesbians and gay men wake up in the morning we feel angry and disgusted, not gay. So we’ve chosen to call ourselves queer. Using ‘queer’ is a way of reminding us how we are perceived by the rest of the world. It’s a way of telling ourselves we don’t have to be witty and charming people who keep our lives discreet and marginalized in the straight world ... Yeah, QUEER can be a rough word but it is also a sly and ironic weapon that we can steal from the homophobe’s hands and use it against him.

(VV.AA., 1990)

The term ‘queer’, then, gained momentum in gay and lesbian communities and claimed its space as a legitimate word to name themselves. By appropriating the term ‘queer’ and giving it positive and different meanings, those who labelled themselves under this rubric attempted to include other identity categories, such as bisexual, transsexual and transgender people, within the social practice and existence of ‘queer’. Furthermore, the queering of the gay and lesbian community brought about the widespread awareness of queer as both a tool of political mobilization and a homosexual identity revisited with irony. In this manner, the last decade of the twentieth century witnessed how a newly developing field of studies emerged in almost all academic disciplines. The inclusion of queer theoretical weapons in academia first took place in Arts departments, like literary and film studies; soon, queer analyses expanded to a variety of disciplines such as history, anthropology, political science, and so on.

The theoretical formation of Queer Studies firstly gave way to the analysis and problematization of heterosexuality on the one hand, and to the visibility and inclusion of non-white, working-class, and ‘unhealthy’ Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Trans-sexual and Trans-gendered (hereafter GLBT) people on the other. As can be appreciated, the term in its origins was born out of political activism but soon expanded along other sectors, mainly within Anglo-Saxon academia. Furthermore, the political effectiveness of queer theory has also been called into question by gay and lesbian studies in the
United Kingdom. In an attempt to set out the main differences between American and British configurations of identity politics, British gay and lesbian studies reject the term ‘queer’ for being ‘a prevailing trend in publishing ... that has manifested its own exclusions, and has become a minority discourse institutionalized within academic and performance/art contexts’ (Medhurst and Munt, 1997: xi). Following on from this line of argument, I would like to comment briefly on some cultural and political divergences between the American and British conceptualizations of troubled identity politics. Particularly, I will refer to those practices of representation that have prevailed in each culture and that have paved the way for stressing local anxieties and discourses on identity politics. From a British perspective, the conjunction of cultural studies and gay and lesbian studies becomes useful as an inclusive site for the articulation of class, race, culture and ideology within the matrix of gender and sexuality.

In this sense, many critics have remarked on the shared interests of both fields of study, especially considering that ‘cultural studies engages in ideological analysis of cultural texts; lesbian and gay studies concentrates on the ideological analyses of sex, sexuality and sexual identity, concepts that can also be understood as texts or discourses’ (Medhurst and Munt 1997: xiv). More specifically, Stuart Hall, who is considered one of the leading exponents of British Cultural Studies, has interestingly remarked that the understanding of identity takes place always within cultural representation. For him, culture is ‘a site of ongoing struggle ... that involves exposing the relations of power that exist within society at any given moment in order to consider how marginal, or subordinate groups might secure or win, however temporarily, cultural space from the dominant group’ (in Procter, 2004: 2). Like Hall, I would suggest that the same holds true for British gay and lesbian political goals; that is, neither culture nor its different axes of representation (i.e., sexuality, race, class) are grounded on essentialist, fixed and univocal foundations. On the contrary, the representation of gay and lesbian identities in the United Kingdom has relied on the recognition of ‘difference’ in terms of social class and race within the community. Contrary to ‘Lesbian and Gay Studies in the USA (like the broader academic mainstream there) which seems more oriented towards the creation of a star system’ (Medhurst and Munt, 1997: xvi), British gay and lesbian studies tend to emphasize the role of the community in the construction of collective non-normative identities. While the former seem to focus on and develop a more individualistic, and yet globalizing, queer subject, the latter are more interested in defining and/or embodying social and remarkable procedures of identity-construction. Accordingly, the politics of cultural and linguistic resistance in the re-elaboration of identity may raise the question of whether local, national and global mechanisms can be reconciled in the construction of queer identities.
Bearing these ideas in mind and among the wide spectrum of queer genders and sexualities, the present chapter puts a special emphasis on the presence of some ‘unreadable’ queer bodies, whose unreadability engenders gender trouble by limiting cultural and linguistic recognition. In order to explain what these abjected bodies represent for the sex/gender grid, I would like to frame my theoretical postulates within Judith Butler’s main contentions, since my following discussion is an attempt to analyse how her most widely cited statement that ‘gender is performative’ (1990) can be embodied by those queer subjects whose given gendered bodies may not be grafted onto their biologically mandated ones. In addition, Butler’s theories on gender identity as the performative process of a reiteration of cultural norms has opened up the possibility of creating subversive re-significations of unexpected and new queer genders that may propitiate the dismantling of heterosexuality as the natural given, and the positing of heterosexuality as a cultural fiction. Such queer subjects destabilize and deconstruct terms such as ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘masculinity’, ‘femininity’, ‘he’ and ‘she’; indeed, they have dissected the binary concepts on which the categories of gender, sex and sexuality have been defined. Importantly enough, the publication of Butler’s book Gender Trouble in 1990 has been considered the foundational book of queer studies. Since then, the emergence of queer theory as a developing academic field has shifted the focus of most contemporary discourses on the representation of gender, sex and sexuality.

Queer studies’ relationship to postmodernism and to the constructivist theories of gender has relied deeply on the development of some concepts, such as ‘performance’, ‘parody’ and ‘drag’. These notions will also be adopted in the present chapter as an explanatory theoretical framework, with the purpose of opening new loci in which the combination of semiotic and phenomenological accounts of identity are of utmost importance to construct and redefine the cultural and linguistic scope of queer identities. Or, to borrow Jay Lemke’s words when he insists on the phenomenological exploration of identities, such notions could well be considered as ‘efforts to create blends and shades of meaning which may be unique rather than to instance typical and familiar meanings with well-known contrasts and associations’ (Lemke this volume). Thus, my main intention is to sketch the notion of ‘gender as performance’ in the context of Judith Butler’s work on the subversive potential of drag, so as to further explore Drag Kings as queer representations that disrupt previous, binary assumptions of language and gender.

In this regard, the importance of the body, as the site in which meanings and representations of different subjects are drawn upon and contested, has been given careful consideration by feminist, post-modernist and queer theories alike (Holliday and Hassard, 2001: p. 7). Particularly, the body becomes a crucial signifier for the construction of those identities that have been banished from culture. And it is with this idea in mind that Drag
Kings’ emphasis on defining deviant bodies through parody and performance is endowed with power and resistance.

4.3 Queering the body: Drag Kings and the performance of gender

Judith Butler outlines her now classic statement that ‘gender is performative’ (1990, 1993) drawing upon Foucault’s notion of power as a double-edged weapon (1990), that is, power is not only formed by domination and repression, but also by formative and positive forces in the sense that it allows new and unexpected configurations of subject formation. For Butler, the notion of gender identity is a cultural construct that exposes the performative process of a reiteration of gender cultural norms. This is not to say, however, that the subject is passive and subjugated to cultural norms. Rather, gender identity becomes an imitative process that may reveal the paradoxical discursive operation through which the subject is formed; namely, this subject can invent new delimitations of gender by reiterating the existing cultural conventions. In this way, the act of resistance finds its place within power relations, and as such it is a fluid, active and unexpected act of power.

The performative construction of gender questions those defining categories of feminism, such as ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, that have established a rigid gender/sex dichotomy. By dismantling the gender/sex system in which the two elements are postulated as different and autonomous in the sense that sex refers to nature and gender to culture, Butler puts forward the necessity of deconstructing the naturalness not only of gender, but also of sex. According to her, gender is not an effect of sex, but rather sex is an effect of gender and cultural norms. Thus, she states that ‘sex is a cultural norm that governs the materialization of the body; sex is an ideal construct that is forcibly materialized through time’ (Butler, 1993: p. 3). From this perspective, there is no foundational basis that sustains an ontological configuration of gender and sex. In fact, the correlative link between sex and gender is effaced inasmuch as a given gendered body may not be configured onto its biologically mandated one. In this sense, Butler argues that ‘when the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one’ (Butler, 1990: p. 5). Consequently, the possibilities opened up by Butler have facilitated the proliferation of discourses on sexuality and gender and have enabled queer studies to analyse the configuration of those non-normative identities traditionally banished from culture.

As a result, queer theory explores gateways into inhabiting identities and practices that are developed in the subcultural contexts in which these
identities emerge. In this way, ‘queer’ is used as a global term to redefine non-normative identities such as transgender female-to-male and male-to-female persons, transsexuals, stone butches, hermaphrodites and intersex persons, Drag Kings and so on. Before pointing out some of the features and notions that are attached to the Drag King phenomenon, I would like to highlight that it is not a coincidence that Drag Kings first became visible in the 1990s, since this is the decade which most notoriously bridged the gap between feminism, gay and lesbian studies, post-colonialism and queer theory. Besides, it is important to underline that the existence of the linguistic term Drag King will render Drag Kings visible and real, since it was not until this label was created that they became linguistically and culturally acknowledged.

Drag Kings emerged in the United States, in lesbian and queer contexts. Most performances started in San Francisco and then proliferated in New York. The Drag King scene was later visible and predominant in European cities such as London and Berlin. The term Drag King defines those persons who are women (understood in strictly anatomical and physiological terms), but who appropriate masculinity through an act, through a parodic performance of masculinity. To be more precise, and following Judith Halberstam’s definition, a Drag King is ‘a female who dresses up in recognizably male costume and performs theatrically in that costume’ (Halberstam, 1998: p. 232) or as Volcano has noted, a Drag King is ‘anyone who consciously makes a performance out of masculinity’ (Volcano and Halberstam, 1999: p. 16, emphasis added). Although these definitions can be considered the starting point to analyse performances of masculinity, there is evidence of the varied connotations that Drag Kings’ performances convey. Thus, for some, being a Drag King allows them the possibility of playing with gender. Others like to play with the boundary between femininity and masculinity and underline their androgyny. Conversely, other Drag Kings like Murray Hill are not interested in blurring the boundaries between the male and female sex, and ‘would like to think themselves as butches’ (Hasten, 1998). Annie Toone also notices that ‘as much as it is a deconstruction of masculinity, for me, Drag King is a glorification of butch sexuality, a focus for queer desire’ (Taormino, 2002). All in all, according to the interviews carried out by Lauren Hasten in her fieldwork (1998), most Drag Kings agree in defining themselves in the following terms:

‘drag’ as dressing as something that you’re not used to ... drag king is performance, and cross-dressing is a lifestyle kind of a thing – somebody who’s dressing as a man and passing every day; it’s about performance. It’s about being big and larger than life perhaps, or stereotypical, taking those stereotypes and playing on them ... Drag’s a lot of different things. It’s a lot of things for different people. For me it’s all about parody, and
that’s pretty much it is … The main element of drag, to me, is parody. It’s comedy.

(Anonymous definitions, in Hasten, 1998)

As can be appreciated, such a variety of perspectives highlights the fact that the Drag King phenomenon cannot be approached in a univocal, monolithic way, while it also emphasizes that ‘drag’, ‘performance’ and ‘parody’ are key terms to understand what a Drag King is.

Although the concept of ‘drag’ has been traditionally a product of gay male culture, it also proves to be useful to expose the constructed quality of other queer genders. The selection of ‘drag’ to portray ironic representations of both masculinity and femininity, aims at launching a critique on the sedimentation of binary genders and so, Butler argues that ‘the notion of an original identity is often parodied within the cultural practices of drag … In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency’ (Butler, 1990: pp. 52, 137). It is precisely this gender contingency that activates the topography of parodic practices which re-signify those unintelligible genders that have been stigmatized and doomed to comply with the traditional dichotomy of gender.

By subverting the cultural, physical and linguistic boundaries that define intelligible genders, Drag Kings’ performances amount to a political act, to a conscious desire to escape from dichotomized gender. Not coincidentally, terms such as ‘genderfuck’ and ‘gender terrorist’ (Volcano and Halberstam, 1999: p. 21) are commonly used among them to describe their intentions.

In this stance, it can be argued that those persons who move and live outside the realms of intelligibility (be it linguistic, cultural or sexual), are indeed risking their survival and existence. If, according to Butler, language can either reinforce a position of human existence or deny it, then, it follows that the above-mentioned people can be classified as deviant or inhuman. Or to recall her own words: ‘to move outside of the domain of speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject. To embody the norms that govern speakability in one’s speech is to consummate one’s status as a subject of speech’ (Butler, 1997: p. 133). Therefore, Drag Kings put into practice Butler’s words, a fact which compels us to seek a different nomenclature when talking about their masculinities, one that is less oppressive and limited, and one that stresses the empowering discursive strategies of power to enact Drag Kings’ performative masculinities. Similar to the Foucauldian notion of power, Butler understands performativity:

not as a singular act, but rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names; performativity is a renewable action without clear origin or end; the subject is not constrained by its originating context.

(Butler, 1993: p. 234)
Re-signifying language in a way that it can express what might be different in Drag Kings’ masculinities is a subtle issue. On the one hand, identities and language are social constituents that produce certain stable meanings or effects, hence their power to reinforce sameness and univocal meanings. If the task of Drag Kings exclusively consisted in repeating, rather than in breaking up the symbolic terms that define masculinity, then Drag Kings’ performances would not subvert the hegemonic and dominant masculinity, but would reinforce it within the established meanings. On the other hand, by exceeding the originating context, identity and language are also capable of producing instability, thus allowing Drag Kings’ masculinities to transgress the initial context of hegemonic masculinity they seek to effect, and so, their masculinities would not reproduce but deconstruct the hegemonic masculinity. As I see it, the category of ‘masculinity’ is a discursive practice and a performative act through which other forms of masculinity can be articulated. Drag Kings’ performances accurately dramatize a rupture with the so-called ‘myth of masculinity’. According to Easthope (1986), such a myth is meant to embody a set of features commonly associated with men, (i.e., masculinity as invisible, white, universal, natural, etc). By making masculinity visible, Drag Kings’ performances foresee masculinity as a cultural construct that may be twisted and turned into different types of masculinities. Their performances may also suggest the disruption of a canonical masculinity that essentializes gender as if it were an impenetrable and irreducible category. Drag Kings’ task is to recapture those abject spaces inhabited by their masculinities and to overtly seize other legitimate queer possibilities which are worth being explored; in Butler’s words: ‘the re-signification of speech requires opening new contexts, speaking in ways that have never yet been legitimated, and hence producing legitimatization in new and future forms’ (Butler, 1997: p. 41).

Drag Kings’ performances of masculinities may also pose a problem of nomenclature; namely, their masculinities are indeed masculinities but they are neither male nor female. To name them accurately, a further elaboration and/or re-signification of language would be needed; to define them as queer would stress the unfathomable and yet elastic defining pattern of identity. A further example of Drag Kings’ appropriation of language is their use of pseudonyms. Thus, although they are usually addressed as ‘he’ on stage (and ‘she’ or ‘he’ offstage, depending on their self-identification with transgender identities), the use of male pseudonyms such as ‘Dred’ for Mildred Gerestant, ‘Mo. B. Dick’ for Maureen Fisher, or ‘Murray Hill’ for Betsy Gallagher sustain their queer masculinities in consciously performing maleness. Most names are made up out of irony and wit and some are even used to entitle their greatest shows: Drag King ‘Dred’ has performed his own pseudonym D.R.E.D as ‘Daring Reality Every Day’. While subverting the dual order of stable concepts of gender and sexuality, Drag Kings also play with the boundaries of language. By being
gender-disruptive, they portray a queer form of expressing masculinities, they inhabit different genders, masculinities and identity troubles.

In the same way, the concept of gender performativity as exposed through drag practices relies extensively on the notion of ‘camp’. Like drag, camp has been mostly analysed through the lenses of gay male subcultures, and yet, it is also linked with lesbian contexts because ‘camp is successful in ironizing and distancing the regime of realist terror mounted by heterosexist forces’ (Case, 1993: p. 298). Camp’s discourse is strictly related to the reiteration of Butler’s performative gender in that it ‘provides, through repetition with a difference, certain tools such as artifice, wit, irony and exaggeration’ (Muñoz, 1999: p. 130). To this extent, it might also be useful to recall Dyer’s emphasis on the notion of ‘camp’ as being ‘profoundly denaturalizing because camp implies an ironic stance towards official and mainstream images or representations’ (Dyer, 1993: p. 42). Camp’s subversive force, then, by being dislodged from the discourse of male dominance, can develop ironic perspectives of both femininity and masculinity, and it is with this issue in mind that I consider Drag Kings’ performances as embedded with irony and parody.

One of the main aims of Drag Kings’ performances does not exclusively consist in imitating an original masculinity, as if masculinity were an immune and aseptic receptacle, but rather in transforming it by creating renewed possibilities of masculinity, so far designated as illicit or unreal in culture. In this regard, Linda Hutcheon’s post-modern notion of ‘parody’ is deployed to stimulate and provoke a conceptual crisis in the symbolic terms that define hegemonic masculinity, since for Hutcheon, ‘parody is a form of imitation, but imitation characterized by ironic inversion … Unlike imitation, quotation, or even allusion, parody requires that critical ironic distance’ (Hutcheon, 1985: pp. 6, 34). Indeed, what the spectator observes in Drag Kings’ bodies, clothes and bodily gestures is an altered and transformed masculinity. This act of redefining masculinity and maleness through parody brings in an empowering diagnosis of queer genders with a revitalized twist, all of which should be taken into account in order to distinguish between imitating maleness and transforming masculinity.

Significantly, different Drag Kings’ scenes entail the representation of varied national stereotypes of maleness. Most American Drag Kings make ironic performances of different paradigms of male Americanness, namely the production of ‘redneck’, working-class masculinities through highly exaggerated dressing gestures, the performances of non-white masculinities which play upon the stereotype of the black cool rapper ‘hip hop masculinity’, stressing the idea that race is as performative as gender and sex or the embodiment of Elvis Presley’s stardom. By contrast, in Europe some of them play upon different stereotypes: by imitating the male Nazi look, ‘Not a NeoNazi’, Bridge Markland, a German-Jewish Drag King, does indeed draw a harsh critique on such a stereotypical image. By dressing as a Nazi, he poses
that there is no such a thing as natural origin of political ideology while revealing that the mentioned ideology and aesthetics can be appropriated and performed in comic and hyperbolic ways. By the same token, there are several common British masculinities available for being reappropriated and transformed by Drag Kings. One amusing sample is the ‘geezer masculinity’ which ‘references a peculiarly British brand of masculinity that may loosely translate in American vernacular as “a man’s man”’ (Volcano and Halberstam, 1999: p. 68). As this definition shows, the lack of linguistic and cultural accuracy to be adopted in other settings provides the term with a certain specificity that can only be deciphered by those who inhabit that culture. Its translation into a different culture requires a further linguistic elaboration, and as it is claimed in Volcano and Halberstam’s The Drag King Book:

geezer references a particularly repulsive laddish English masculinity ... a geezer conjures up the image of a sleazy con artist who believes in the power of his own masculine charm and who refers to women as ‘birds’ or ‘tarts’ and enjoys a pint or two at the pub and a good laugh, usually at some form of toilet humour.

(1999: pp. 68, 69)

Although there is indeed a tendency in Drag Kings’ acts to perform homogeneous representations in terms of race and social class in the sense that most of them are white and middle class and, not coincidentally they only perform white masculinities, the presence of some black women equally shows performances of black masculinities and other ethnic groups such as latinas. It is precisely the vindication of a greater diversity of Drag Kings’ masculinities (i.e., non-white, working class and non-urban) that has fuelled the birth of The Drag King Anthology, an anthology written ‘to showcase the amazing growth and development of drag king troupes and communities outside the well-known happening scenes of New York, London and San Francisco’ (Troka, Lebesco and Noble, 2002: p. 1). All in all, far from corroborating a hegemonic continuity of male masculinity, all these varied masculinities indicate a failure in the very creation of masculinity, because these new male stereotypes are rearticulated differently.

One of the most remarkable features of Drag Kings precisely lies in the hyperbolization of masculinity, which reveals, often in exaggerated acts, its constructed status. What all the different performances have in common is that they all combine appropriation, critical distance and the creation of alternative (female) masculinities that contest the notion of hegemonic masculinity ‘as the domain of biological men’ (Halberstam, 1998: p. 58). They also share the use of parody to mock cultural scenarios of sexism, misogyny and homophobia, and by so doing, they question the excess of male power and authority in the direction of redefining identity politics. To perform masculinity in different and queer ways is to constantly
denaturalize and transform the cultural imperative that underlines the construction of normative genders. To inhabit the boundary between legitimate and deviant bodies entails the commitment to re-signify power relationships, foregrounding the performative quality of power. Not coincidentally, Foucault’s polyvalent notion of power leads to the ‘theory of disidentification’ as claimed by Esteban Muñoz (1999). Muñoz develops this term as the process of transforming mainstream stereotypes of coloured queers which are often embedded with homophobic and racist connotations. Thus, by performing disidentification, minority subjects can both render visible and problematize aberrant and abjected narratives, with the purpose of constructing mobile sites of identity formation as critiques of oppressive hegemonic ideologies. So, Muñoz claims that ‘although disidentification can be performed as a mode of cultural and psychic survival, it neither opts to assimilate the structure of dominant ideology nor strictly opposes it; rather, disidentification is a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology’ (Muñoz, 1999: p. 11). Bearing this issue in mind, Drag Kings can be said to perform disidentification strategies with respect to the dominant forms of male masculinity, therefore revealing the possibility of a different and visible empowerment of minority identity politics. At the same time, their performances raise a number of questions related to the (im)possibility of translating them into non Anglo-Saxon contexts, as will be shown in the following section.

4.4 Queering the English language

The emergent field of queer studies and the increasing number of queer people all around the globe who identify themselves under the rubric of ‘queer’ is symptomatic not only of a globalizing cultural net that entails non-normative identities, but also of how the internationalization of English serves as the language to define, represent and deconstruct queer identities. One of the ironies of queer studies’ predominance may be found in their success in targeting non-English-speakers’ academic and/or personal needs. Parallel to the growing standardization of queer theory and its postulates, one can establish the overpowering position of English as the language through which queer identities are defined and as an empowering critical tool to name and frame discriminated (non) Anglo-Saxon gender forms. Whereas the main aim of queer studies was, at their outset, to break up and challenge the homogenization of white homosexual identities and the dual scheme of gender, they have gradually moved towards a global and homogeneous paradigm of understanding non-normative genders. In this respect, much has been recently written by post-colonial studies in an attempt to decenter the rapid Westernization of queer identities. For many post-colonial and non-white scholars, queer theory may be reproducing a historical amnesia which acts as a catalyst to erase non-Anglo-Saxon, local and specific gender differences.
Thus, and following Stuart Hall’s conceptualizations of ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ (1997), I would argue that queer is to the global as gay and lesbian are to the local – albeit the latter are recognized globally. Hall distinguishes two forms of globalization, namely the colonial and the post-colonial power; accordingly, he reads the local as the site of resistance where specific gender categories can be formed and redefined. By contrast, the appearance of queer cyberspaces such as electronic mail discussion lists, chatrooms and web sites, has given rise to the increasing construction of a global and predominantly Anglo-Saxon queer community, a new space in which the English language is predominant and necessary to be able to participate in it. For some (Wakeford, 1997), the creation of such cyberspaces has contributed to the mobility and fluidity of identity as well as to the expansion of safe (i.e., less homophobic) spaces in which a variety of queer identities are articulated. For others ‘queer’ has, then, become a fashionable and trendy umbrella term for encompassing non-normative genders: it is ‘an apparent internalization of a certain form of cultural identity, conceptualized in terms that are very much derived from recent American fashion and intellectual style: young, upwardly mobile, sexually adventurous, with an in-your-face attitude toward traditional restrictions and interest in both activism and fashion’ (Spurlin, 2001: p. 20).

It is the aim of what follows to explore to what extent local, cultural and linguistic differences of queer identities can be effective when outside Anglo-Saxon queer communities. The identity trouble may be twofold: on the one hand we could argue that, for instance, the term ‘Drag King’ is only readable in Anglo-Saxon contexts and by English speakers. Hence, the authors of The Drag King Book remark that ‘Drag King is not a universally useful term and in other cultures it is called by other names. It’s those places where crossdressing, butch/femme and transgender overlap that we really want to go’ (Volcano and Halberstam, 1999: p. 21). There are indeed remarkable cultural, linguistic and historical differences that must be taken into account when distinguishing between Drag Kings and other previous and current representations of masculinity. On the other hand, when one is being named by non-normative gender expressions such as the Thai ying rakying, tom or diii, the West-Sumatra mahu, the Japanese onabees, the Spanish bollera or tortillera, thereby enhancing local strategies of identity representation, new boundaries between sex and gender are being constructed in a variety of ways. Moreover, there is a sense in which these local bodies are more silent and invisible within a globalized culture. While they may resist and transform Anglo-Saxon queer identities, they may also be banished, unproblematically, from the queer realm in which they are said to belong.

In a similar vein, within Anglo-Saxon queer communities, there has been a redefinition of English personal pronouns to denote different genders, other than the dualistic male and female. Accordingly, someone who is
transgender may prefer the terms *hir* or *zee* over he or she. Dualistic pronouns structure and limit the way our world functions, the way in which some people perform everyday tasks. Taking part in these actions of language re-signification entails the interesting possibility of translating the above-mentioned non-normative gender expressions into the straight and non-Western cultures; for one of the intricate aspects of queer theory, as I see it, may be its lack of propagation into wider social contexts. For instance, some other complex self-constructed identities such as *hermaphrodyke, transman, trans-butch, drag butch, fag drag*, and so on, raise the question of the (im)possibility of identification when used outside the (queer) Anglo-Saxon community. The task of translating them into different languages has proven so far to be more difficult than using the English names per se. Like the term ‘queer’, these identity categories have rapidly expanded themselves among some non-Anglo-Saxon ‘queer’ communities which have reappropriated them to construct renewed representations of identity. Yet, there is a sense in which the cultural, social and ideological features of non Anglo-Saxon cultures are faded out in the very same act of non-translation.

4.5 Conclusion

The adoption of the English language to define non-normative identities may be considered a safer and more distant mechanism to name such transgressive identities within non Anglo-Saxon cultures. In other words, to take terms such as ‘butch’ or ‘queer’ out of their initial pragmatic and cultural context and to use them in non-English speaking countries may signify nothing, except a newer and more innovative way of defining themselves through the use of English terminology. As mentioned earlier, the potential of English queer language to be re-signified in wider cultural contexts is an evident and interesting phenomenon; however, I would also argue that such a re-signification is not fully effective in terms of cultural and linguistic recognition. It might seem less oppressive and safer to call oneself ‘queer’ outside Anglo-Saxon contexts, for the vast majority of people know neither its original meaning nor its detached and subsequent re-significations, or at the least, they are not interested in what queer (theory) is. In addition, the very act of reappropriating this expression also prevents queer terms of other languages from being redefined and used differently. This is not to say, however, that the linguistic introductions of English queer concepts do not affect the original language usage; for admittedy, any linguistic introduction perturbs the existing linguistic potential of language. What interests me here is to underline the ways in which the increasing adoption of English queer terms, like ‘Drag Kings’ and ‘queer’, brings about the sedimentation of a global paradigm of understanding non-normative genders. The straightforward adoption of an English queer
language to define non-normative gender identity categories may be the result of a fashionable cultural and linguistic tendency that ‘Americanizes’ and commercializes queerness. Nevertheless, it should also call our attention to reconsidering the establishment of different grounds that allow us both to broaden the production of linguistic and cultural venues on identity politics and to acknowledge the potential of identity embodiments to cross over into alternative identity configurations.

This idea leads my argumentation to the previous global/national/local debate and to the political implications that certain translations from English into other languages would have in terms of identity representation and subversion. The linguistic and cultural terrains in which queer identities are constructed may lead to the crystallization of an exclusively Anglo-Saxon paradigm of non-normative identities. Rather than using the same English queer language within enclosed identity contexts, there should be a wider and enlarged negotiation between other past and present patterns, to construct identities and in order to point out ‘the role of transgressive identities, the contradictions between lived experience and cultural norms, and the options opened for us for creating new identities and social relations’ (Lemke, 2003). Acknowledging the options to produce and inhabit new identities needs collaboration and exchange between all those positions interested in resisting monolithic and homogeneous accounts of identity politics. Likewise, the mapping out of comparative and contextualized representations of queer identities will help to create and develop new narratives and visual discourses in which the cultural and linguistic visibility of queer identities can be overtly recognized in all their complexity and fluidity. Finally, attention should also be given to those altered spaces and practices of self-identification, whether by imitating or resisting global notions of identity, in order to make them relevant and hybrid within the poignant process of queer politics.

Notes

1. Since the term ‘queer’ entered academia, its theoretical engagement has prompted a proliferation of queer cultural (re)presentations and sexual practices in different literary genres and visual domains such as films, videotapes and photography. Those representations challenged the negative stereotypes of queers and focused on their differences of race, culture and class. Some of these representations can be seen in the work of Isaac Julien, the director of Looking for Langston (1988), Pratibha Parmar’s documentary Memory Pictures (1989), Cindy Patton’s works on the representation of lesbian sex and pornography (1991) and a series of videotapes that explored gay safe sex in order to diminish the HIV/AIDS epidemic, among others. Indeed, those representations have been partly by the merit of diverse activist groups – that is, AIDS activists such as ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) – which was organized in 1987 by the gay community to demand, among other issues, greater visibility of HIV-infected gay men. What is interesting in the creation of ACT-UP was their adoption of
subversive visual practices in an attempt to effect social and political change; that is to say, rather than portray HIV-infected homosexuals as victims, their activism was targeted at the gay community in particular, with the aim of promoting a counter-visibility which directly subverted the politically correct and homogeneous representations of the white and middle-class gay community. For further information, see Bad Object-Choices (1991), a reading group formed in New York in the spring of 1987 to address questions of gay and lesbian theory. Among the group members who edited the proceedings of a conference entitled ‘How Do I Look?’ were Martha Gever, Bill Horrigan, Amber Hollibaugh, or Douglas Crimp.

2. By ‘unreadable queer bodies’, I mean that they are not easily categorized into binary accounts of gender and sexuality, nor into a linguistic availability, at least, for those who are not familiar with queer cultures.

3. The characterization of heterosexuality as the reified economy through which only binary and stable notions of male and female genders makes sense is questioned by the Butlerian discussion on the supremacy of a ‘heterosexual matrix that is a hegemonic discursive/epistemic mode of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to make sense there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality’ (Butler, 1990: 151).

4. Nowadays, it can be noted that the Drag King scene has spread over most American and European cities, therefore paving its way within Western subcultural contexts. On the other hand, the appearance of several academic texts (Volcano and Halberstam, 1999; Volcano, 2000; Troka, Lebesco and Noble, 2002), and of the documentary film *Venus Boyz* (Baur, 2001) has been of utmost importance for the task of rescuing Drag Kings from invisibility and theoretical discrimination. Besides, the increasing and copious information that can be found at diverse web sites has contributed to their globalized presence in queer cultures.

5. At this point, it might be useful to remind the reader that no surgery is used in the construction and transformation of their bodies, thus identifying themselves, to a greater extent, with some transgender people and consequently, keeping themselves at a distance from other queer identities (i.e., transsexuals).

6. While some lesbian theorists, such as Newton (1979) and Halberstam (1998), have remarked that ‘camp’, when applied to lesbian contexts, may remain problematic since ‘camp is associated to the genre for an outrageous performance of femininity rather than outrageous performances of masculinity’ (Halberstam, 1998: 237), others find it readily available for lesbian appropriation and for performances of (non-Western) masculinity. For more precise information on this point, see Muñoz (1999), Case (1993) and Dyer (1993).


8. It is interesting to note how most Spanish speakers, when hearing the word ‘Drag King’ for the very first time, are unable to understand it; instead, they mistake it for its analogous ‘Drag Queen’, which is always and already legible in all cultures.

9. In *Same-Sex Relations and Female Desires: Transgender Practices Across Cultures*, E. Blackwood and S. Wieringa collect an array of different essays that deal with gender transgressions across non-Western cultures. Part III is specifically
addressed to different women who ‘do masculinity’ and ‘to any gender identities (transgendered, reversed, mixed, crossed, cross-dressed, two spirited, liminal, etc.)
that go beyond, or violate, gender-“appropriate” norms enshrined in the domi-
nant cultural ideology’ (Blackwood and Wieringa, 1999: 183. Also see Williams’s
work on the ‘berdache’ as a Native American figure that escapes the dichotomy

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5

Multiple Identities, Migration and Belonging: ‘Voices of Migrants’

Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak

5.1 Defining the Problem

Well me for example I do feel like being in between (1.5) I feel as neither nor a foreigner (.) or or well I don’t know (.) sometimes when I am among Austrian girls (.) then I do feel like a foreigner (.) whereas I am not a I don’t know I am not a pure foreigner I was only born here but my roots are in Turkey (0.5) and that is why I only know life as it is here (.) the life here and I do not know what it’s like over there that is why when I go there I feel myself somehow different because because they are also well for example I do not know Turkish THAT well and so (0.5) and (0.5) well when I go there then they say that I am born there and so (.) and here when I come here then they say that I am I am well that I am Turkish (0.5) I am Turkish and so but (.) I am one but ((laughs)) I am not saying now that I am not but well I feel-I feel in between I don’t know well I feel

(AT-FG5-F2) ¹, ²

In the short text sequence quoted above, a young Turkish woman points to problems often faced by migrants nowadays in an extremely well articulated and moving way: where do we belong? Which identity/ies do we all have? Who am I?

These are issues which affect aspects of everybody’s life. However, migrants experience the problem of ‘not knowing where one belongs’ in a much more acute way. The young girl seems not to belong anywhere anymore, neither to the country of her origin, nor to her target country. Wherever she moves, she does not (yet) belong, she has not been able to acquire a sense of either belonging or identification. She feels in between; even if she and/or her family have already been given citizenship in the target country. As repeatedly expressed in this short self-reflective quote, she just does not know.

Experiences (or voices) of migrants, such as the one referred to above, must be seen in a broader European context, where migration has become
frequently and increasingly stigmatized, both in public debates and in everyday encounters (cf. Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000). In Europe as a whole, and specifically in the eight (Western, Central and Eastern) European countries investigated in our study, migration has had different meanings and has led to various reactions. Some common features and patterns can nevertheless be observed (i.e., statistically, migration in Europe is on the rise, and it is generally agreed throughout the EU that Europe needs migration economically and demographically). However, migrants are treated in highly ambivalent ways in EU countries, not least through official policies which usually aim at cultural, linguistic and other coercive assimilation of migrants, rather than supporting integration and diversity. The official actions of the European Union seem to add to this particular ambivalence towards migration: European richness in diversity and the liberal stance on ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural plurality of European societies are praised on many occasions (e.g., in the 2001 – EU Year of Languages or in the recent Future of Europe Debates resulting in the widely debated and contested EU Constitutional Treaty, cf. Krzyżanowski, 2005 and 2008; Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007). On the other hand, Fortress Europe excludes many migrants and denies their right to mobility and residence in European countries, while it also makes ‘combating (illegal) migration ... one of the top priorities of the European Union’ (Busch and Krzyżanowski, 2007). Thus, in the European context, where migration has been approached statistically or as a demographic need and as a temporary anomaly rather than as a permanent and positive element of socio-political reality, the question of migrant identities and migrant belongings becomes particularly important and acute.

This chapter will address relevant aspects of migrant identities by analysing them from the point of view of their construction in/through discourse, that is, the main locus of reformulations and negotiations of migrant identifications. Such an approach allows us to present the vast array of dilemmas faced by the individuals in the objective context of migration as well as the frequent inherent contradictions which characterize migrants’ subjective accounts of their personal experiences. In a similar vein, we will also illustrate how the personal and emotional aspects of migrants’ identities (i.e., their desires, hopes, feelings and other positive/negative emotions) frequently clash with different structural conditions of membership (e.g., residence rights or citizenship) which limit their belonging to ‘target communities’.

Unlike other approaches to the concept of belonging in the social sciences (cf. Castles and Davidson, 2000; Crowley, 1999; Favell and Geddes, 1999; Fortier, 2000; Kalpana, Vieten and Yuval-Davis, 2006; Westwood and Phizacklea, 2001; Yuval-Davies, 2006), we embed our research in the Discourse-Historical Approach of the CDA (cf. Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak et al., 1999; Wodak, 2001 and 2004). In sum, we analyse how migrants (of various ages, and of the first, second and third generation) of European
and non-European origin discursively construct their modes of belonging (a term we take from Sicakkan and Lithman, 2005), and thus their identities and identifications, in group discussions.

We begin our chapter by summarizing our theoretical approach. We focus on several crucial concepts developed in migration-related research within the social sciences in recent years while we elaborate the salience of, and interfaces between, key concepts such as ‘belonging’, ‘identity’, ‘identification’, ‘membership’ and ‘citizenship’. We then propose a theoretical model which consists of the three crucial modes of belonging (including attachments, belonging and perceptions of membership) and which helps us analyse, understand and explain the range of discursive negotiations and co-constructions of migrant belongings. Moreover, we briefly portray how (i.e., through what linguistic means and forms of realization) different modes of migrant belonging are explicitly or implicitly constructed in discourse. Finally, in the concluding part of the chapter, we discuss our findings and link these to the theoretical concepts which we believe to be indispensable for the understanding of the many ambivalent and contradictory aspects of migrant belongings.

5.2 Theoretical background: constructing identities and/or belonging(s)?

Although the social sciences have been more than effective in conceptualizing and researching individual and collective identities, some of the intricate aspects of the processes of identifying/belonging of the new ‘nomads’ (Augé, 1992; Urry, 2003) have not been dealt with in all their complexity. So far, theoretical approaches to individual and collective identities (e.g., Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Hall, 1996; Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003; Wodak et al., 1999) have proved to be particularly useful when dealing with the problematic, often fluid and vague concepts of multiple, collective or fragmented identities, but not with the processes of establishing identities or belonging. Moreover, none of these approaches seems to have dealt in an apt and exhaustive way with migrant identities. What makes migrant identities so ‘special’? Why is it difficult to analyse identities in the context of migration in an adequate way both theoretically and methodologically?

There are many answers to these questions, which, due to obvious limitations of space, cannot all be touched upon or developed here. However, let us elaborate on at least two key aspects of migrant identities in this chapter (see Jones and Krzyżanowski, 2004 and 2007; Delanty, Jones and Wodak, 2007).

Firstly, the specific dynamics and contexts, both socio-political and individual, of migrants’ lives make migrant identities a very difficult object of study. Migration implies constant mobility and instability, an often endless search for belonging to the constantly changing other, as well as having to
cope with constantly shifting legal and bureaucratic requirements for social acceptance and divergent parameters for recognition. Therefore the identities of those who migrate cannot be simply explained with one concept, such as ‘dynamism’ (Hall, 1996), which is used for national collectives, national minorities or other groups who enjoy relatively stable points of reference.

Secondly, although migration is (correctly) seen by many as something which is undertaken by groups and collectives and frequently referred to by such labels as diasporas, migrant groups, ethnic minorities, and so on, recent studies suggest that migration remains a singular, subjective and unique experience which resists generalization. Neither identities of the individual self, nor ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991) allow for sufficient answers for what migrant identities might mean, how their construction proceeds, and how their dynamics influence various patterns of collective and individual identification.

One possible solution to the problem of approaching migrant identities might thus consist of rethinking the concept of identity in general. Here, we propose, taking up Anne-Marie Fortier’s approach, to treat ‘identity as threshold … a location that by definition frames the passage from one space to another’ and to look at migrant identities ‘as transition, always producing itself through the combined process of being and becoming’ (2000: 2) within ‘identity spaces in between’ (Krzyżanowski, 2008) or as ‘passages’ (Probyn, 1996).

Another way out of the dilemma posed by the dichotomy between individual/collective identities consists, we believe, in assuming that personhood ‘is socially constructed through social interaction between individuals and/or between individuals and groups’ (Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003: 211). If ‘collective identities are constantly in a process of negotiation, affirmation or change through the individuals who identify with a given group or social category and act in their name’ (Triandafyllidou and Wodak, 2003: 211), we approach migrant identities in a new and different way, cutting across the boundaries posed by the traditional divide. Thus we want to see ‘how transient, sometimes unclear relationships between self and other contribute to an individual’s position vis-à-vis a collective identity’ (Jones and Krzyżanowski, 2004: 5). In sum, we focus on the interaction between objective (legal, socio-political) thresholds and attributed membership categories, and subjective experiences and self-assessments. We assume that these two, necessarily linked, perspectives often conflict and contradict each other or, on the other hand, determine a self-fulfilling prophecy of staying ‘in between’.

5.3 Identification

The socio-psychological concept of identification comes close to our understanding of belonging postulated here, since the former allows conceiving
of identity-construction of migrants as a multi-level process. By the same token, the conceptualization of identification presented below enables us to differentiate between its various constituent processes (e.g., those of articulation, differentiation or categorization described below) which we treat as identical to those identified in the discursive constructions of modes of belonging highlighted in this study.

Explaining the rationale for our turning to the process of identification (and relating the latter to the concept of identity), we claim with Brubaker and Cooper that ‘identification – of oneself and of others – is intrinsic to social life; “identity” in the strong sense is not’ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 14). When identification ‘calls attention to complex (and very often ambivalent) processes … the term ‘identity’, designating a condition rather than a process implies too easy a fit between the individual and the social’ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 17). Additionally, identification is ‘a processual, active term, derived from a verb’ (p. 17) and hence it ‘lacks the reifying connotations of “identity”’ (p. 14). Thus, identification ‘invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying’ (ibid.) while it also ‘does not presuppose that such identifying (...) will necessarily result in the internal sameness’ (p. 14).

We also follow Ewa Rewers (), who defines identification (given in the Polish original as ‘utożsamienie’) as ‘the possibility of being anchored … just to strive for a certain identity’ (2000: 86). Rewers views identification as functioning on the basis of processes of difference and recognition, which manifest as the subject’s ‘uncertainty stemming from the fact that he/she is not yet what he/she wants to become’ (2000: 86). Thus, identification is based on the subjective and emotional process of ‘identifying with the Other’, which may lead to a referential process of differentiation entailing ‘answering the question “Whom can I identify myself with in order to affirm my own identity?”’ (p. 86). Hence, ‘when someone wants that his/her belonging to a certain group, this or that culture, tradition or language community be recognized, he/she … subsequently demands something more – the act establishing him/herself as someone whom he/she has not yet become’ (p. 86).

Like Stuart Hall, we perceive identification as contained in ‘a process of articulation …, an over-determination not a subsumption; … there is always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’, an over-determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality’ (1996: 3, our emphasis). Further, we also define identification ‘as a process … [which] operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of “frontier-effects” … requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process’ (Hall, 1996: 3, our emphasis).

Finally, categorization, as the basic process accompanying identification, ‘involve[s] identifying oneself (or someone else) as someone who fits certain description or belongs to a certain category’ (Brubaker and Cooper,
2000: 17); however, it often is/needs to be juxtaposed with a ‘psychodynamic meaning’ (p. 17) of identification involving ‘identifying oneself with another person, category, or collectivity’ (p. 17).

5.4 Membership/citizenship: recognized/’legal’ belonging?

The political-scientific research on citizenship has witnessed a substantial turn towards ‘identity’ ‘as one of the key aspects for defining the role of modern citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 84; cf. also Soysal, 1994, 2000). Corresponding questions of who belongs and who does not belong legally in/to contemporary societies and polities have become crucial problems in defining the current and future roles of citizenship in a world characterized by transnationalism (Westwood and Phizacklea, 2001) and increased human mobility (Urry, 1998). According to Castles and Davidson, ‘the growing international mobility of people questions the basis for belonging to the nation state’ (2000: vii), while ‘the heterogeneity of cultural values and practices grows exponentially, so there is no time for the processes of acculturation and assimilation’ (p. vii), both frequently subsumed under the buzzword of integration. This ignores the fact that ‘most nation-states have had groups on their territory not considered capable of belonging, and therefore either denied citizenship or alternatively forced to go through a process of cultural assimilation in order to belong’ (p. vii).

Moreover, ‘even those with formal membership have often been denied some of the rights vital to citizenship’ or ‘lack many of the rights that are meant to go with this’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000: viii). As bureaucratic ‘thresholds of citizenship’ (Bauböck, 1994) have acquired various meanings for different groups of migrants, it has become clear that ‘porous boundaries and multiple identities undermine ideas of cultural belonging as a necessary accompaniment to political membership’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000: viii). Differently put, although citizenship has always been a clear marker of social/political belonging, ‘increasing numbers of citizens who do not belong’ have appeared (Castles and Davidson, 2000: viii), as have strict gate-keepers (within state-systems) guarding and controlling access to membership, recognition, and citizenship.

5.5 Belonging in discourse: a dynamic view on migrant identifications and the struggle for migrants’ (recognition of) membership

To elaborate on the theoretical considerations spelled out above, we would like to introduce another perspective to the concept of belonging. We believe that the process of acquiring feelings of belonging ‘captures the desire for some sort of attachment, be it to other people, places or modes of being’ (Probyn, 1996: 19). Turning to the concept of belonging allows us to
focus on ‘the ways in which individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, wanting to become’ (Probyn, 1996: 19), while it also sees ‘narratives of identity as part of the longing to belong, as constituted by the desire for an identity, rather than surfacing from an already constituted identity’ (Fortier, 2000: 2).

In relation to these considerations, we follow an approach which allows for an understanding of the transience and fluidity of identity constructions of migrants, namely of those who have left one country and have not yet arrived in another. Even if they have arrived in their target location, they still do not or cannot (fully) belong to the target community. We are interested in studying the struggle for new attachments and new belonging as well as how the perceptions of the original migrant communities change due to growing ties with the target communities and due to the search for recognition in the eyes of the others and by the institutions regulating social life in the target countries.

As will be illustrated below, perceptions of belonging/not belonging change due to (altering) subjective perceptions of context(s) and due to objective legal-structural, bureaucratic and social conditions and criteria of membership (e.g., citizenship), language competence, access to education, and so forth. Finally, our discourse analysis of conversations, interactions and narratives of identity/belonging illustrates the constant and ongoing co-construction and reformulation through the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. These are discursive strategies which are also applied by migrants, that is, those who are usually at the receiving end of processes of differentiation and social exclusion.

Our theoretical approach to the processes of ‘belonging’ thus integrates many aspects of the concepts of identification presented above. Moreover, we believe that belonging is anchored in the individual, emotional as well as in the structural bureaucratic process of becoming a member; this duality never allows for a quasi-static state of identity formation. The fluidity, identity shifts and processual identifications are particularly visible in discourses of migrants (see below), which display the process of becoming someone, rather than already being someone:

1. Like Brubaker and Cooper (2000), we believe that the concept of belonging is able to incorporate both aspects of identification: identification as, and identification with. Discourses of belonging manifest processes of identifying as desired members of a community or as its unwanted aliens, identifying with their target communities or with communities left back home. Furthermore, we attempt to distinguish between explicit and implicit, manifest and latent thresholds to particular groupings and collectivities.

2. As discourses of belonging are also strongly characterized by the ‘uncertainty stemming from the fact that he/she is not yet what he/she
wants to become’ (Rewers, 2000: 86), they also highlight an urge to identify strongly with the other, with them and almost never with the same or with us. Hence, discourses of belonging are almost exclusively constructed through highlighting differences and juxtapositions, thus re-highlighting the otherness of migrants.

3. We believe that our approach to the discursive construction of belonging could also shed light on contemporary meanings of membership and citizenship in Europe in the context of migration. By ‘looking at the practices of citizenship on the ground’ (Fairclough, Pardoe and Szerszynski, 2006: 99), our analysis allows us ‘to get away from preconceptions about what citizenship is, and to force us to look at how it’s done – at the range of ways in which people position themselves and others as citizens’ (p. 99). The concept of belonging thus helps us to gain insights into how citizenship (and other forms of collective membership) is done by migrants in discourse, as well as how it is perceived by the target population as opposed to by themselves.

4. Since belonging ‘makes it possible to include sentimental, cultural, and symbolic dimensions in a discussion of what ties a collectivity together’, and ‘stresses that participation is not necessarily founded on membership’ (Sicakkan and Lithman, 2005), we should be able to detect whether discursive constructions of migrant belonging are as tied to norms and rights as they are to sentiments, abstract attachments and emotional reasoning.

5. Our analysis also contributes to understanding the widely-debated forms of recognition of one’s rights (Fraser and Honneth, 2003) in the context of social justice and inclusion/exclusion (Young, 1990 and 2002). As we will illustrate below, both moral (Honneth, 1996; Taylor, 1994) as well as economic recognition (Fraser, 1995 and 2001) are valued equally strongly, with greater importance ascribed to the access to equal economic opportunities than to recognizing migrants’ social membership.

In line with the conceptualization of belonging put forth by Jones and Krzyżanowski (2004 and 2007), the discursive construction of modes of belonging necessarily includes: (a) tentative and random attachments; (b) a range of ‘feelings’ of belonging; and (c) legal forms of membership. Attachments and belonging represent types of migrants’ self-definitions which may be developed in detachment from the actual recognition of one’s membership in a particular collectivity. On the other hand, membership is to be defined as a separate category which entails official recognition of one’s status and is rooted in legal and bureaucratic actions of institutions and therefore extends beyond or even conflicts with migrants’ self-definitions (as is the case with, e.g., granting citizenship).

Attachments (cf. (a) above) can vary in their strength (there can be stronger and weaker attachments); in their character (there can be abstract
attachments to tradition, culture, religion, etc.; and functional attachments to places and collectives within which certain life-functions can be fulfilled; e.g., attachment to one’s workplace allowing someone to earn his/her living); and in their functions (attachments can arise from one’s ability to e.g. support oneself and one’s family in the target country in comparison to a difficult financial situation back home). As abstract and functional attachments can very often contradict each other, they may be perceived as frequently creating inherently ambivalent multiple attachments. As is illustrated in Extract 1 (below), attachments are tentative initial forms of belonging, characterized by uncertainty, and therefore suggest the search for identities.

**Extract 1**

We want to be at home because we have nothing to live on, no work and here we are fine (1.0) but it is not our home, I mean, not fully ours. Nor because we are not fine here but because our roots are there (.) in the Ukraine. We have friends there, a family … (incomp. – 2.0)

(PL-FG3-F3)⁶

On the other hand, belonging can be developed from a set of sustained attachments, such as long-term economic ties to the target country and

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**Figure 5.1** Schematic representation of modes of belonging

positive contacts with the members of the target community in the workplace, and so on. Belonging is (a) elective, developed by a migrant, irrespective of the recognition of his/her status as belonging to a certain collective and may sometimes remain purely abstract in nature (as is the case with, e.g., attachments to places/persons without visiting/meeting them even once); (b) is also characterized by resetting the perception of one’s ‘home’ (Rapport and Dawson, 1998), that is, displaying the new, yet well-grounded, belonging to target communities (see Extract 2, below).

**Extract 2**

I know that I am Italian in my heart I sense things Italian especially when I am with Germans but I cannot say that Italy is my home [Heimat] my home [Heimat] is Germany is Köln […]

(DE-FG3-M1)

The electiveness of belonging seems to vanish, however, once the construction of belonging enters the third stage within which various forms of membership (e.g., residence or labour rights, citizenship, as well as many other forms of collective membership) are sought for by migrants. Here, the importance of particular institutional and bureaucratic thresholds of membership – legal and structural barriers to the recognition of one’s belonging to a community – is apparent in the process of becoming a member of a particular real-life collectivity. Recognition and acknowledgment of one’s rights and one’s belonging become pivotal for the final grounding of one’s belonging, as the latter cannot remain a question of one’s choice, but must be recognized and acknowledged by institutionalized sets of practices (e.g., citizenship or other residence and work rights). If someone’s membership in a particular (target) collective is granted, one’s belonging becomes stabilized. However, if the recognition of one’s status as a member is denied or challenged, a retreat to previous modes of ‘belonging’ may be chosen (by weakening the feelings of belonging and turning them ‘back’ into attachments), thus reinforcing the feeling of remaining in-between (cf. Extract 3, below) various collectives and not belonging to any of them (see Jones and Krzyżanowski, 2004 and 2007, for further details).

**Extract 3**

a German passport does not bring more social acceptance it is not so it is a piece of paper I would have been legitimate but still excluded [ausgegrenzt] for this reason this piece of paper isn’t worth it [lohnt sich nicht] […] if I had two passports I would have felt better if I only had a German passport I still would be a foreigner here

(DE-FG2-M4)
5.6 ‘Voices of migrants’: discourse and belonging

Modes of belonging and lived experiences are highly fragile and unstable in nature. Therefore, we assume that the representations and constructions of various modes of belonging can be traced through detailed and systematic linguistic analyses of discourses (of ‘voices of migrants’, in our case). We assume that ‘discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). Hence, migrant identities and belongings are discursively constructed and reformulated; macro-social and discursive practices influence these constructions and re-reformulations.

5.6.1 Design and categories of analysis

In order to systematize the large corpus of empirical data stemming from more than 45 focus groups,7 we first undertook a qualitative content analysis which resulted in the range of topics developed by the participants of the focus-group discussions organized in the eight European countries.8 The number of salient discourse topics was constructed according to: (a) the relevance in all focus groups to the issues directly and indirectly linked to belonging, inter-group relations, migrant identities, and so forth; and, (b) within those passages, we were particularly interested in discursive representations of attachment, modes of belonging and membership/citizenship.9

Although they are continuous conversations of two or more hours, the analysed group discussions consist of a variety of sub-genres, such as narratives (exemplary stories), self-reflections of an almost monologous type (descriptions/reports), and argumentative or even justificatory accounts. Almost none of the genres, moreover, are entirely consistent; the feelings of in between are necessarily realized in ambivalence and contradictions, according to what Michael Billig labels ‘ideological dilemmas’ (Billig et. al., 1988). We can only illustrate our in-depth analysis with a few examples and summarize the most relevant patterns (see Wodak et. al., 2004, for the detailed analysis and comparison of the data from eight investigated countries). We focus, inter alia, on the following categories:

- **Discursive strategies of (collective and individual) self and other-presentation.** We distinguish between: (a) reference and nomination, (b) predication, (c) perspectivation and involvement, and (d) intensification and mitigation (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). While examining reference and nomination, we focus mostly on the naming of social actors and their positioning in discourse (personal-deictic forms, nominalizations, etc.). Secondly, the analysis of predications aims at defining characteristics ascribed to the social actors. Thirdly, we characterize the ways in which ‘speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point
of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 45). Finally, we investigate which elements influence the discursive representation ‘by sharpening or toning it down’ (p. 45). This analysis thus sheds light on how migrants position actors/objects and which characteristics they attribute to them. Moreover, we analysed how constructions of attachments, modes of belonging and perceptions of membership/citizenship were intensified or toned down.

- **Argumentation / Metaphors.** We focus primarily on topoi as both explicit and implicit ‘content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 75). This analysis allows investigating various context-dependent topoi which supported the argumentation(s) for or against attachments and belonging, as well as providing arguments for positive or negative perceptions of membership and citizenship. While analysing topoi, we also focus on particular relevant, reoccurring metaphors and the cognitive frames established through their use (Koller, 2004; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

- **Grammatical categories – transitivity.** The analysis of verb categories portrays the more ‘emotionally-loaded’ or rational analytic constructions of attachments and belongings.

### 5.6.2 Discursive constructions of attachments

Extract 4 illustrates that frequently metaphors (such as ‘home’, ‘family’, ‘sun’) are highly emotional in their meaning, and intensified by possessive pronouns (‘my’):

**Extract 4**

Cuba is my home my family my sun Everything is there I am here for love and because I wanted a better future but I do not belong here everything in me says it I am not German […] and I would not like to become German either.

(DE-FG2-F1)

This emotionally laden discourse contributes to constructing a strong attachment to one’s own group of origin. Attachment to the target group is rejected by the statements ‘I do not belong here’ and ‘I would not like to become German’, which are linked through the reference ‘here’ (spatial deixis = Germany) in the first statement and becoming ‘German’ in the second one. Such constructions manifest that attachments depict belonging as depending on one’s place of origin as well as one’s place of living (geographical conditions).

The metaphor of family which supports attachment is well developed in many parts of the analysed discourse, and is strongly linked with the salient topos of family (a container-metaphor, cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980):
Extract 5
I have my parents. My mother is over there, my father, my younger sisters, my brothers are over there. [...] We endure all this suffering in France to make our parents in Senegal happy.

(Mental verbs referring to experience (‘endure’) strengthen the emotional aspects experienced by this migrant. The importance of a time-factor in discursive constructions of attachments is typically realized as follows, most frequently in form of a narrative:

Extract 6
At the beginning, this happened a bit also to me, but now I am at ease [...] at the beginning, seeing as I did not know even how life was outside my country, I found myself like a fish out of water. I was a little bit closed. At the beginning, I looked for people from my country, maybe I would have felt more relaxed. But later, with the passing of time, I opened up. But yes, more or less, it is the same friendship that I have with others [...] at this point, it counts only if someone is friendly or not, if you like to be together or not [...]

In this quote, the initial attachment to one’s group of origin (‘my’ and ‘country’) is portrayed by the search for contacts with one’s fellow-nationals (‘I looked for people from my country’). The metaphor ‘like a fish out of water’ emphasizes this initial attachment. The element of time is marked with a temporal clause ‘at the beginning’ as well as by the adverb ‘later’. The topos of friendship (‘friendship’, ‘friends’) to all (multiple attachments) oscillates between the search for similar ‘others’ and feelings (‘friends’ and ‘friendliness’). The ‘in-between-ness of belonging’ (cf. Probyn, 1996; and above) is frequently realized through multiple attachments (i.e., attachments to both the target group and the group of origin) which are predominantly constructed through context-dependent topoi of multiple attachments. These topoi include the specific both/and and neither/nor patterns of arguing for one’s belonging. In this case, ambivalence and emotional dilemmas are marked through the contrast between ‘knowing and not-knowing’ (cf. Extract 7, below):

Extract 7
I am Turk and I am Swede, and it is really hard to stand on them equally, I do not really know WHAT I AM, I am like CONFUSED, you understand.

(SE-FG1-F4)
Topoi of multiple attachments are also frequently supported by metaphors (‘my heart’, ‘my home’ = my fatherland = my ‘Heimat’), like in Extract 8:

**Extract 8**
I know that I am Italian in my heart I sense things Italian especially when I am with Germans but I cannot say that Italy is my home [Heimat] my home [Heimat] is Germany is Köln [...]  
(DE-FG3-M1)

In the following passage (see introduction),

**Extract 9**
Well me for example I do feel like being in between (1.5) I feel as neither nor a foreigner (.) or or well I don’t know (.) sometimes when I am between the Austrian girls (.) then I do feel like a foreigner (.) whereas I am not any I don’t know I am not any pure foreigner I was only born here but my roots are in Turkey (0.5) and that is why I only know life as it is here (.) the life here and I do not know what it’s like over there that is why when I go there I feel myself somehow different because because they are also well for example I do not know Turkish THAT well and so (0.5) and (0.5) well when I go there then they say that I am born there and so (.) and here when I come here then they say that I am I am well that I am Turkish (0.5) I am Turkish and so but (.) I am one but ((laughs)) I am not saying now that I am not but well I feel-I feel in between I don’t know well I feel  
(AT-FG5-F2)

the topos of multiple attachments is realized through mitigating particles (‘well’, ‘but’, ‘somehow’). While mental verbs play a predominant role here (‘feel’, ‘know’), the overriding self-reflective strategy is further amplified by the topos of example as well as by the metaphor of roots (‘having roots’). Being neither attached to X, nor Y is particularly constructed through the use of deictic forms. While spatial deixis refers to physical locations (‘here’ = Austria, ‘there’ = Turkey), the actual lack of any other groups is realized through the vague pronoun ‘they’ (both Austrians and Turkish: ‘when I go there they say’ and ‘I come here they say’).

Self-reflective constructions can be identified quite frequently,

**Extract 10**
I also have gotten a feeling that I am a stranger here and I am a stranger there.  
(SE-FG1-F3)
while the topos of neither nor is supported through the self-reference as ‘stranger’ (to whatever groups, in whatever locations).

**Extract 11**

[…] And since 7 years (.) I’ve been standing astride, one leg here and another there. We want to be at home because we have nothing to live on, no work and here we are fine (1.0) but it is not our home, I mean, not fully ours. Not because we are not fine here but because our roots are there (.) in the Ukraine. We have friends there, a family … (incomp. – 2.0)

(PL-FG3-F2)

In Extract 11, multiple attachments and ambivalence are constructed through metaphors such as ‘standing astride’ and ‘one leg here and another there’. Attachments for functional reasons (to the target country = ‘here’) are collectivized through the personal pronoun ‘we’ (‘here we are fine’) in juxtaposition with the description of the situation ‘there’ (in the country of origin: ‘we have nothing to live on, no work’). The attachment to the home country is intensified by metaphors of ‘the roots’ being ‘there’.

Attachments are also emphasized by topoi of difference, in which the difference from group X or Y is constructed as a point of reference for one’s identity and range of attachments. The topos of different religion (Extract 12), the topos of different culture (Extract 13) or the topos of different mentality (Extract 14) were all used to emphasize such differences:

**Extract 12**

LF2: I know my religion keeps me apart from the English people because nearly every English person was a protestant.

(UK-FG2-F2)

**Extract 13**

Having another culture is useful […] it is important to know where one is from […] many don’t know. I like to talk about it, because if you don’t know your origins and your roots, it has no sense.

(IT-FG5-F3)

**Extract 14**

Because you see other people with other ideas different from you

(IT-FG5-F3)

5.6.3 Discursive constructions of belonging

Constructions of belonging (to the target community) can frequently be observed as denying one’s previous attachments and origin:
**Extract 15**

Poland has become another mother country for me, no matter there are good or bad Poles, well, I don’t know, gentle or not. (.) I tolerate all, I like all, also the drunk in the street, also drug addicts, these learned or not, and it hurts, what I see, because I treat it as mine. And now a moment came that I thought to go to Armenia, I have such a complex, that I come there, it was my dream for many years and I will look at all this from the other side; it is like a Pole who visit Armenia.

(PL-FG1-F2)

The new belonging is intensified by the topos of the idyllic presentation of the target country, framed by disclaimers (‘I tolerate all’, ‘I like all’), by the overriding wish to integrate with the target group (‘I treat it as mine’), as well as by metaphors of vision (‘dream’). The denial of one’s origin is furthermore manifested through spatial deixis (‘Armenia’ = ‘there’) as well as through the choice of perspectivation: the speaker becomes external to his group of origin and looks at it from the other side.

Time continues to play an important role in the construction of belonging. Temporal deixis (‘when’, ‘at the beginning’, ‘much later’) marks this feature, either marking sequentiality of events or stages:

**Extract 16**

I think it happens to everyone when they arrive here at the beginning, they find themselves a bit lost until they understand a little the situation, the people, class mates, the group ... I, at the beginning looked for someone to cling to, someone from my country, because I also felt a bit lost. [...] At the beginning, you find yourself in difficulty and later you understand the situation and meet people, and manage to open up and then things get easier. But much later.

(IT-FG5-F3)

Interestingly, in these cases, the topoi of feeling lost and of looking for contacts with fellow-nationals are replaced by the topos of opening up to the target group, emphasizing the processual character of belonging and the fact that belongings are dependent on time and growing/aggregating attachments. This factor is particularly emphasized in the second generation of migrants,

**Extract 17**

But I am born in Sweden (.) I am Swedish (.) And they are like ‘you are joking with me’ (.) But my parents are from Turkey (.) I am born here so I am then well Swedish

(SE-FG1-F4)
who make a clear reference to themselves as Swedish (‘I am Swedish’, mentioned twice). Moreover the spatial reference to ‘Sweden’ as one’s place of birth reinforces the fact that belonging depends on geographical location (‘I am born in Sweden’) in opposition to their parents, born elsewhere.

Belonging is also constructed through metaphors of ‘home’ (see Extract 18).

**Extract 18**

I have been here almost 9 years and it took such a long time to say, now I am going home to Sweden, it took so long to say the word HOME, to feel like that I was going home.

(SE-FG1-F3)

The ambivalent feelings of belonging are moreover emphasized through a topos of self-definition (‘who you really are’)

**Extract 19**

F1: (...) Or Who you really are? And after some time I started to think (. ) are you from this side or from that side. It’s not possible to be on a borderline. And then (. ) I became more conscious who I was.

Mod: So, who you are? How would you answer this question, from an angle of nationality, this is what I mean.

F1: From an angle of nationality...

Mod: Yes.

F1: A Pole, who found himself outside his mother country (1.0)

(PL-FG2-F1)

which incorporates the topos of multiple attachments (‘to be on a borderline’, see above).

Finally, the explicit attachment to the target group and country allows developing feelings of belonging through symbolic recognition by the target group:

**Extract 20**

LF3: Yes I’ve been here since 1965 and I’ve always found people here very friendly and I’ve made lots of friends here – more than I ever had in Ireland ... I always feel at home here and always did from the minute I came

(UK-FG2-F3)

This recognition is constructed in reference to the target group (‘people’-’here’), further elaborated by the topos of friends, all in all portraying the target group positively (positive other-presentation; the other becomes similar to oneself).
5.6.4 Discursive constructions of membership/citizenship

Unlike attachments and belonging, constructed through a set of content-dependent topoi (Kienpointner, 1992), discursive constructions of membership/citizenship are realized by means of formal topoi (Kopperschmidt, 1989). The topos of example is frequently employed in order to depict ‘formal’ artefacts of membership, which however do not correspond to one’s recognition of belonging to the group within which one’s membership has been acknowledged. In Extract 21, ‘passport’ is used as an example of an artefact of one’s membership.

**Extract 21**

> a German passport does not bring more societal acceptance it is not so it is a piece of paper I would have been legitimate but still excluded [ausgegrenzt] for this reason this piece of paper isn’t worth it [lohnt sich nicht] [...] if I had two passports I would have felt better if I only had a German passport I still would be a foreigner here and when I would fly back home also a foreigner where do I then belong my identity would be gone

(DE-FG2-M4)

Citizenship is also perceived as a form of official membership which clearly does not correspond to one’s self-assessment:

**Extract 22**

> EE-F4 – I forgot to mention that I hold the Austrian citizenship but I REALLY don’t care which citizenship one holds [...] I I gave up the Swedish citizenship but actually I AM Swedish (0.5) I I just have to open my mouth and speak my mother tongue then nobody asks who I am ((laughing))

(AT-FG3-F4)

While the importance of citizenship is overtly denied (‘don’t care’), intensified by the adverb ‘really’ (with an audible emphasis), one’s perceived belonging is emphasized by the topos of language (‘my mother tongue’), displaying one’s primary identification.

Moreover, perceptions of citizenship manifest a large number of contradictory statements (‘dilemmas’). While the speaker in Extract 23 overtly rejects any need for membership and belonging in a set of negative clauses, he ends his statement by referring to his country of origin as ‘my country’:

**Extract 23**

> I don’t belong to any nation, I don’t need a citizenship. I don’t have an identity problem, I didn’t have it with my family and all that [...] If they ask what I am, I don’t know. I’m not interested in asking for a specific citizenship. I’m from my country

(FR-FG1-F1)
In Extract 24 the official artefact of membership (‘Croatian passport’) is seen as coinciding with the subjective sense of belonging, intensified by the adverb ‘actually’:

**Extract 24**

so if I go on vacation ((clears throat)) and you pull out a Croatian passport(.) then you know(.) that you’re actually Croatian(.) you feel Croatian too(.) in my own case actually(.) and uh as soon as you put the passport back in the drawer you’re a normal fellow citizen again(.) actually

(DE-FG4-M4)

### 5.7 Conclusions

Constructions of attachments and belonging (which, although treated separately, remain strongly linked) display numerous discursive-grammatical features which emphasize the emotional character of attachments/belongings, their ambivalence, their processual character as well as the importance of ‘difference’. Emotional elements, such as metaphors of home, roots, fatherland, and so on; topoi of family and home; and mental verbs, illustrate the salience migrants ascribe to their search for new identifications and identities. Moreover, the processual character of attachments/belongings (topoi/metaphors of searching contacts, or the better future) manifests the aspiration of migrant identifications as well as the ongoing struggle to become or belong.

Both the emotional and processual aspects of attachments/belongings are framed through a high degree of uncertainty and ambivalence about one’s status and social position, realized through topoi of multiple attachments or the topos of neither-nor. This illustrates the insecurity of migrant trajectories. Often many weak attachments are preferred rather than opting for one target identity. All aspects of attachments/belonging are, in a way, responsive to difference (topoi of culture, of religion, or of mentality). As we have shown above, the discursive constructions of belonging are thus also constructed by highlighting differences and juxtapositions, while almost always drawing borders between migrants and the target communities and re-highlighting the otherness of migrants.

In general, the discursive constructions of attachments and belonging thus display a huge range of options, because migrants develop these in the search for specific points of reference for their identifications.

On the other hand, discursive constructions of membership and citizenship (formal ‘topoi of examples’ – of language or of legal/symbolic artefacts of citizenship/membership) are limited to pointing to certain aspects of social life on which migrants have no influence and which are defined by others. This illustrates that constructions of citizenship/membership only react to hegemonic elements of social and political organization, imposed by the dominant groups (e.g., citizenship with its artefacts) which migrants
have to accept and which they are unable to change or influence. The rarely perceived recognition of migrants' membership in societies/communities illustrates the critical role of this aspect in sustaining and grounding migrants' belongings on the way to becoming recognized and desired members in the host country (e.g., note the emphasis above on the 'long time' needed to feel 'at home' in the target country or the persistent feeling of 'not belonging' or being 'excluded' even if officially granted citizenship).

When referring to the theoretical concepts which frame our analysis and interpretation, it becomes clear that this study illustrates how different options for identification are realized in migrant constructions of belonging. Hence, we may conclude that, indeed, migrant belongings are always perceived as having 'too much ... or too little' identification and never reach 'a proper fit' (Hall, 1996) of origin and target communities. As we have seen, the subjects' relations to the target communities are particularly troubled in this respect: while migrants do want to, in a personally-specific and emotionalized way, construct the 'identification with' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) their target communities, the latter rarely provide the migrants with their reciprocal 'identification as' true and desired members thus impairing their sense of belonging. When analysing the ways in which membership and citizenship are 'done' (Fairclough, Pardoe and Szerszynski, 2005), the 'thresholds of citizenship' (Bauböck, 1994) and other forms of official membership are frequently referred to by migrants as the main means of exclusion from the target communities (at the structural-institutional level). This, of course, reflects on the personal experiences and feelings of belonging to those communities, since, as it appears from the analysis above (e.g., in Extracts 5, 9, 12 or 21), the official and institutionalized thresholds of membership are paired with (and actually reflect) the everyday thresholds of migrants (not) being accepted as members of the target communities.

Similarly, the critical discourse analysis of the many meanings and forms of belonging illustrates the complexity and multilayered character of migrant identities theorized earlier on. The (necessarily brief) analysis of discussion sequences and narratives highlights the in-betweenness and ambivalence which migrants encounter and are exposed to in their everyday lives in Eastern and Western European countries. These salient features are reformulated and recontextualized in discourse and illustrate in which way categorization and differentiation of self from the other leave a traumatic stigma on individual and collective identifications. These features (e.g., the frequently stated 'not knowing' or the immense hesitance in the majority of the quoted statements) also display that 'uncertainty' of becoming (Rewers, 2000) is one of the key characteristics of the analysed discourses.

Moreover, the search for new attachments and new belongings (e.g., the 'wanting to be at home' or the actual, not only official or institutional
acknowledgment of one’s membership in the target community, cf. above) is discursively constructed as a particularly troubled struggle for recognition (Fraser, 1995, 2001; Fraser and Honneth, 2003), while the perception of the original migrant home communities changes due to growing ties with the target communities, the intense search for recognition in the eyes of the others, and the institutions regulating membership in European countries (cf. also Rapport and Dawson, 1998). Frequently, these dilemmas stay unresolved. Thus, the emotional phenomenon of feeling in between relates to a material and real experience of having left home but not having arrived (in a primarily abstract sense). Migrant identities, we thus conclude, are inherently ambivalent and constantly subject to inherent and continuous change. On the other hand, the discourses of belonging signal the lost agency of subjects who are ‘longing to belong’ (Fortier, 2000), yet who are rarely given the possibility to truly belong to the European societies which are (still) based on obsolete principles of exclusiveness and ethnic homogeneity.

Notes

1. Key to Coding (applicable to all quoted extracts): (a) country (AT = Austria, CY = Cyprus, FR = France, DE = Germany, IT = Italy, SE = Sweden, PL = Poland, UK = UK); (b) number of a focus group discussion in a particular country (FG 1, FG 2, FG 3, etc.); (c) participant’s gender (F = female, M = male) and number (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.).

2. Transcription symbols:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1, M2, (or other)</td>
<td>Speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>Short pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6.0), (8.0), (9.0), …</td>
<td>Longer pause (six seconds, eight seconds, nine seconds, …)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incomp. 6.0)</td>
<td>Incomprehensible elements of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[</td>
<td>Overlapping speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhm. Eeeeh</td>
<td>Paraverbal elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((leans back)),((laughs))</td>
<td>Non-verbal behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Heimat]</td>
<td>Elements of original language (difficult to translate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would not say so</td>
<td>Normal speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIS</td>
<td>Accentuated/stressed element of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(↑)</td>
<td>Rising intonation (if significant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(↓)</td>
<td>Falling intonation (if significant)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The data used in this chapter comes from an EU-Fifth-Framework Research Project ‘The European Dilemma: Institutional Patterns and Politics of Racial Discrimination’, coordinated by Masoud Kamali (Uppsala University, Sweden, cf. www.multietn.uu.se) 2002–05. The project investigated socio-political developments and attitudes towards migration as well as mechanisms of social exclusion of migrants in eight European countries (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Poland, and the United Kingdom). We participated in the project as the ‘Austrian partner institution’ located at the Research Centre ‘Discourse, Politics, Identity’ and Department of Linguistics, University of Vienna.

4. As suggested by the recent report of the Council of Europe (CoE), ‘the total recorded stock of foreign population living in European countries in 2001/2002 or before … stood at around 22.72 million’, thus constituting ‘some 4.5 per cent of the aggregate population of Europe’ (Salt, 2003: 11). The estimated increase of ‘foreign population’ (between 1995 and 2001/2002) in Western Europe, largely converging, before its enlargement, with member states of the EU, is estimated in the same report at 11.4 per cent.

5. Unlike many other theoreticians, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) do not point to the presence of *self* and *other* or any *subject* and *object* in the process of identification. As the authors suggest, identification ‘invites the specification of agents that do the identifying … yet identification does not *require* a specifiable “identifier”; it can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete, specified persons or institutions … can be carried more or less anonymously by discourses or public narratives’ (ibid.).

6. In the provided extracts, we are using either original transcripts of the extracts or translations of those transcripts which we received from our project-collaborators (cf. note 3). As the transcripts are based on recorded speech, they might include grammatical mistakes which were left in the text in order not to distort the original material. The analysis is based on the original and not on the translated data.

7. In this chapter, we summarize empirical data from more than 40 focus groups organized in all eight European countries under investigation (cf. note 3). These focus groups analysed ‘voices of migrants’, i.e., a set of discourse-based experiences of migrants collected throughout a specific time in their contacts with institutions and members of societies in the countries in question. The analysis of these individual and collective experiences helped us deconstruct discursive and material phenomena which reproduce racist and discriminatory (everyday and institutional) practices. Through focus groups, we approached the largest migrant groups (according to their origin) in each of the investigated countries (e.g., Turks, migrants from the former Yugoslavia and Poles in Austria; or Turks, Greeks, former-Yugoslavians and Poles in Germany, etc.). We would like to express our gratitude to our colleagues from all partner institutions in the project for their permission to use the empirical material gathered in their countries.

8. The resulting topics in our focus group came as a response to several general stimuli which were used to structure and moderate the focus groups. Taking this two-step development of topics into consideration, our analysis consisted of: Content analysis and subsequent systematization of those sub-topics developed by the participants/interviewees in the debates which relate to ‘attachment, belonging and citizenship’ (see below), by categorizing them according to (a) the explicitly formulated different linguistic realizations of both *attached to X* or *feeling of belonging to X*, and (b) the positive and negative attributes for or against *citizenship* and/or *membership*. Whereas the former occur in specific transitivity
processes, the latter tend to construct argumentative patterns. This content analysis also allowed us to detect that some themes were country specific, but that most of them, however, were developed irrespective of the country.


10. Linked to the specific contents of discourse (i.e., the ‘discourse topics’ described above, cf. notes 8 and 9) the specific topoi are, in line with their definition provided in the text, derived by means of summarizing the arguments expressed by the participants of the focus groups. While the actual list of identified topoi (as well as their naming) is largely congruent with that of the discourse topics (cf. Jones and Krzyżanowski, 2004 and 2007, for details) the closer focus on topoi in the text allows identifying the key elements deployed by the speakers in discourse to support their claims (arguments) which are then grouped according to our theorization of constructions of different modes of belonging described above.

11. The ‘formal’ topoi are the ones which are based on the set of ‘classical’ topoi or ‘loci’ (such as the topos of ‘difference’, ‘analogy’, ‘example’, ‘equality’, ‘consequence’, etc., cf. Kopperrschmidt, 1989), whereas topoi which are context dependent (or content dependent, cf. Kienpointner, 1992) are ‘unique’ and ‘typical’ for the aims of the texts which have previously been structured according to aims set up by the author/speaker.

References


6

‘Mongrel Selves’: Identity Change, Displacement and Multi-Positioning

Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Amelia Maria Fernandes Alves

To belong: what to, how, at what price? This is the central problem for the immigrant.

(Darko Suvin, 2005: 117)

Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world ... It is a love song to our mongrel selves.

(Salmon Rushdie, 1991: 394)

6.1 Introduction

The following two scenarios are typical of our experience as Brazilians living in Britain:

1. A carpet fitter comes to the house. After the usual greetings, comes the inevitable classifying question: ‘Where are you from?’
2. In the pub, with a couple of British friends. And the embarrassing assertion from one of them – ‘have you noticed that Carmen said ‘sYNtom’ instead of ‘syMPtom’?

Such frequent occurrences provoke, apart from loss of face, what Suvin describes as a ‘sense of feeling alien and out of place, a widespread unease sometimes deepening into despair that seems so intrinsic to other experiences of modernity’ (Suvin, 2005: 107). However, positive feelings about the experience of living abroad also exist – we can refer to many rewarding occasions when we feel we are part of the foreign setting.

The scenarios above and other markers such as one’s ‘looks’ constantly locate us in what Bhabha (1994) refers as a ‘third space’ – a hybrid location of antagonism, perpetual tension and even chaos. In turn, back home such markers work in reverse as people note the ways one has changed. This is the condition of living ‘in-between worlds’. As expatriates, we have been confronted with all these challenges. Our stance as scholars has not only
enhanced our perception of the discourses that permeate such challenges, but it has also triggered our curiosity to investigate further. We therefore embarked on a project of examining how other Brazilian immigrants in Britain experience their own identities and how they perceive their place in the host culture.

In this chapter, we take a sociolinguistic and discourse-analytical perspective – for us identities are mainly constructed discursively. Our investigation is therefore based on questionnaires (104 in total) and interviews, collected over the course of one year. The subjects of our research are all members of ‘Diálogo Brasil’ (Brazilian Dialogue), a forum established by the Embassy and the Consulate-General of Brazil in collaboration with the Brazilian community in London. DB tries to facilitate the exchange of views and initiatives aimed at improving the services and support provided by the Brazilian government to its nationals in the United Kingdom. The list of community representatives who actively participate in the DB forum includes people from London-based Brazilian organizations, businesses, media, arts groups, as well as students (on postgraduate courses or at language schools) and professionals in various areas. They constitute a diverse group as far as education, religion, race and social background are concerned. The table below illustrates the population researched:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20–35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36–50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great majority of people interviewed had been living in Britain for more than 2 years.

Given our belief that visual representations also constitute identity construction and add evaluative meanings to interaction, we also examined the web pages of newspapers and of other associations run by Brazilians in Britain.

Theoretically, the notion of discourse adopted here relates to a set of attitudes or values of the writer/speaker. Inevitably, our linguistic choices in speech or text reflect these attitudes and values, and also constitute them. We draw on the concept of discourse following authors such as Fairclough (1992), Foucault (1972), Hall, (1992a, 1992b, 1997, 2000), Kress (1985), Van Leeuwen (1993, 2000, 2005), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), for whom discourses are knowledges of practices which are at the same time:
1. knowledges of how things are or must be done, together with specific evaluations and legitimations of, and purposes for, these practices (Caldas-Coulthard and Van Leeuwen: 2001: 158; Caldas-Coulthard, 2003);
2. knowledges which are linked to the context of specific communicative practices materialized in texts or other semiotic resources.

Hall also suggests that a discourse is a ‘group of statements which provide a language for talking about – that is, a way of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic’ (1992b: 291).

By using discourse analysis as a methodological tool, we are in fact considering the way semiotic resources create meaning and reflect the views and ideology of speakers/writers and their society, since discourse is always part of social action. Every text is an instrument of communication placed in a social context, being influenced by it and at the same time, influencing it.

We analyse our data sources therefore from the perspective of how the speakers and authors transform discursively their original Brazilian identities or how they ‘resemiotize’ (Iedema, 2003) themselves in an attempt to integrate into the host country, relocating and re-inventing themselves in the (frequently hostile) new environment.

Central to this examination of discursive/visual data is the question of how people’s border-crossing translates into realizing a particular positioning. Since the relations between personal experience, subjective choice and social location are inscribed in discourses, we examine both the ‘troubles’ inherent in ‘living abroad’, the multi-modal choices used to signify hybrid, transplanted and fused cultural identities and the meanings of assimilation into the new culture.

The focus in this chapter is, then, on how non-natives are reconstituted in new social contexts and spaces and how their sense of themselves is affected by these new ‘constitutions’, which are realized by specific sets of linguistic, visual and other semiotic resources.

More specifically, to analyse our data, we use ‘naming’ or ‘classification’ analysis and evaluation/appraisal theory as methods for analysing language (Labov, 1972; Van Leeuwen, 1996; White, 1998), combined with multi-modal analysis for the discussion of web resources. For the multi-modal analysis, we use semiotic categories put forward by Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996, 2001), Van Leeuwen (2005) and Machin (2007) to consider photographs, colours and type fonts as meaning potential.

Our analysis will demonstrate:

- how our subjects’ positioning as outsiders changes their ways of feeling, thinking and being;
- to what extent they use multi-modal resources to materialize their identities (in pictures, colours, fonts and symbols);
• how, through classification and self-evaluation, they construct a ‘third space’ where positioning and multi-positioning highlight differences but also accommodation and fusion.

We want to claim that we can, discursively, be re-invented positively when we change countries, although the dominant discourses of immigration always see it as a loss. Our subjects demonstrate that ‘gain’ and consequently, ‘multi-positioning’ can also be achieved.

For us, thus, ‘mongrel’ or re-invented identities are made up of building blocks – they are:

• the things we say, do, gesture, posture, wear, possess, create;
• dependent on time and space;
• a discursive and interactional achievement, multi-modal in nature.

6.2 Exiles, expatriates, refugees, émigrés – a question of classification

We know, from our own life experience and from the vast literature on the topic, how to interpret the negative historical meanings of ‘exile’, exemplified in the wording of many authors. In a recent publication, Suvin (2005: 107) makes the comment that exile ‘requires detaching oneself from all belonging and love of place, and adopting a mind of winter’. He also says that ‘to be placed from one’s country of origin and upbringing is a wrench perhaps comparable in impact to that of war, longer-term hunger or imprisonment’. Similarly for Said (2000), exile means a critical distance from all cultural identities, a restless opposition to all orthodoxies. By the same token, we construct our identities, Lemke (in this volume) suggests, by living in communities:

... and we learn how to interact with many sorts of people very different from ourselves, in the process building up a cumulative repertoire of roles we can play, and with them of identities we can assume. We are in a sense microcosms of the social ecology of which we are a part.

When we move to another country, we lose touch with the social ecology which originally defined us and instability sets in. Discourses construe this loss negatively. Suvin (2005: 110), for example, puts forward a classification of people according to a ‘typology’, attaching to his classifications, reasons for departure:

(O for ‘Original Society’ S for ‘Strange Society’)

Exiles O → S Single Departure, political reasons
Refugees O → S Mass Departure, political reasons
Expatriates  $O \leftrightarrow S$  Single Departure, ideological and/or economic reasons

Émigrés  $O \rightarrow S$  Mass departure, economic reasons (only sometimes $O \leftrightarrow S$)

For Expatriates and Émigrés, there is always a possibility of return while for exiles and refugees, this is only possible in a very limited way.

Table 6.1  A typology of departure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departure</th>
<th>Possible</th>
<th>Impossible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>Exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Émigrés</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While Suvin’s classification appears elegant, one could argue that it frames people in terms of dichotomous and essentialist categories. As Dascal points out in his definition of ‘identity’ (2003: 154), ‘essential properties are supposed to be fixed, intrinsically important and shared by all members of a class’. However, from the moment we are born, he continues (p. 155), ‘our personal identity is changing, incorporating new elements and dropping old ones. A rigid, unchangeable identity seems to be the exception rather than the rule’. Lemke (in this volume) adds that ‘the longer term aspects of our identity are not determined by a single performance. They constitute patterns across time, across situations, even across clusters of situation types’ – a departure, for example.

If asked, we might not be able to fit ourselves easily into any one of the categories proposed by Suvin, since we chose to be abroad and are in a sense ‘privileged’ (Krzyżanowski and Wodak in this volume) to be able to do that. Although world migration has intensified in late modernity, governments’ and peoples’ negative responses towards immigrants have not changed due mainly, we would suggest, to discourse representation. For political reasons, people are ‘named’ according to departure and in times of war, it has always been convenient to exclude people by calling them ‘exiles’ or ‘refugees’. In a way, perceptions of exiled people (or expatriates, refugees or émigrés) are still grounded in the concept of nationalism, ‘a discourse that depends on notions of space, of territory. Outsiders do not belong, are not rooted in the soil, and indeed have immigrated from outside’ (Van der Veer, 1995: 6). We want to claim that this is not the case. There is always a possibility of being positively positioned in a new social context and of re-inventing oneself. A new classification of departure would have to include positive new classifications like ‘Pro-patriates’ and ‘Immigrés’ –
people, like some of our subjects exemplified below, who have positively chosen another country, who typically learn the host language, intermarry and apply for nationality. But as with all classification systems, however detailed, there will always be grey areas.

Implied in the physical reference of ‘belonging’ is the idea of being rooted in the culture and values of one’s own country. We agree that from an early age one learns traditions, standards of behaviour, values, cultural symbols and narratives which are embedded in family history, government norms on citizens’ rights and duties, and society’s knowledge. This learning process is aimed at enabling one to develop knowledges about oneself as well as rooting oneself in the experience of the country’s national identity. However, such knowledges are established on ‘representational’ dichotomies of self and other, national identity and foreign cultures. Conveyed by socio-semiotic systems, such representations are open to different shades of meaning according to political and economic tendencies (see Wodak, 2003, 2004).

Today, as Giddens puts it:

with the increasing globalization of media, a multifarious number of milieus are, in principle, rendered visible to anyone who cares to glean the relevant information. The collage effect of television and newspapers gives specific form to the juxtaposition of settings and potential lifestyle choices. As a result, on the one hand, one celebrates the chaotic co-existence of different languages, diverse cultures, and identity groups in the margins. On the other, uprooted and floating in media waves, public perception of immigrants is often associated with stereotyping, rejection and displacement.

(1991: 84)

After the bombings in London, Jane Daley, from the Sunday Times (17 July 2005: 16), trying to explain why the second troubled generation of Pakistani immigrants to the United Kingdom were perpetrating violent acts against the country, says that:

The migrants arrive fully aware of having made a conscious decision to take on a different life. Many of them never truly leave the home country in their hearts. They cling tighter in communities that resemble as closely as possible the old world and the old ties. They learn the new language as minimally as survival requires and adapt to the strange customs with reluctance. They are aware that their closed introverted culture incurs resentment but this is a necessary insulation – it is how they maintain their sanity. The immigrants know why they have come and who they still are. Their children however, are the truly displaced people. These children have no actual recollection of the old country but having been raised in insular communities whose only cultural
references were to the lost home, they do not feel a part of the new place either. It is essential that we understand the relationship between these two things – the estrangement and disorientation of the first-born generation and the easily perverted longing to give up one’s life to a cause.

In Brazil, by contrast, representations of foreign and ‘superior’ national identities have fed into the dreams that drive increasing waves of migration from Brazil into many different parts of the world. In the early to mid-twentieth century the dream of belonging, or one’s integration and ‘acculturation’ in a hosting country, was to be achieved through the learning of that country’s national identity and language.

From our own experience as children and adolescents living in Brazil in the 1960s, the desire to learn to speak English ‘without an accent’ so that one day we could travel (and consequently ‘fit in’ to either America or England) resulted in many hours of study and practice. Both of us eventually managed to cross borders and encountered the ‘superior’ culture, but now we have dismissed the dream of total acculturation as an empty concept. Estrangement, disorientation, doubt and trouble are part of our lives abroad as well as feelings of being ‘located’ and fused. And certainly, we transversed time and space (Lemke, this volume), we changed our ways of behaving, appearing, interacting to become different from when we arrived. The narrative from one of our research subjects below illustrates these points:

This year (2006), I will request British citizenship. What changes? I will have the right to vote, and to live here. But, do I stop being Brazilian? I was born and brought up in Brazil. Ironically, I did not have the right to a European passport like other people who live here, and the privileges that this entails – no interview with the Home Office, home fees if I wanted to study here. But then, I ‘ran away’ from Brazil, different from others that I know who have the right to have passports from the ‘first world’ but decide to stay there, fighting for their existence, paying Brazilian taxes and contributing to the society as a whole. Am I worse or better than these people? To emigrate signifies to run away. What changes if I acquire European citizenship?

(Lucia)

6.3 Invisible Brazilians in Britain: living in the margins

Brazilian emigration notably started in the 1980s, when skyrocketing inflation and recession encouraged people to look for a better life elsewhere. Most emigrated to the United States, where they could do odd jobs on unregulated employment schemes. Others ventured to start a new life in their grandparents’ home countries. Disheartened by economic instability and news of corruption, those emigrants were more likely to become
long-term immigrants. Invisibility was a useful strategy to avoid acknowledging that they could only get poorly paid jobs and, in some cases, living standards that placed them in a lower social class than the one they had enjoyed in Brazil. Consequently, most of the people we interviewed dream they will return to Brazil ‘sometime in their old age’, as a comforting idea based on nostalgic memories of life surrounded by family and friends.

Brazilian migration to the United Kingdom has increased significantly in the past two decades. No official numbers have ever been provided, but recent informal counting by Brazilian community leaders (from churches and businesses) shows an unofficial tally of around 100,000 Brazilians currently living in England. Around 50,000–60,000 alone are said to live in London. Although the Brazilian government advises its nationals overseas to register with its Consulate General so as to be able to provide them with information and assistance, only about 13,000 have done so in the United Kingdom. Likewise, the British government has been unable to provide an official count of Brazilian immigrants because until very recently, their system kept records of immigrants’ entries only. In 2001, according to the Official Census, 76,000 people from Latin America entered the country, but these statistics do not provide numbers for specific countries. However, in the light of rapidly increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and government pressures for tighter security controls, especially since the 7 July bombings in London in 2005, immigration officers started in 2006 to register foreign nationals’ departures.

Another difficulty in gathering accurate, official data is related to the entry of dual-nationality immigrants. Since many Brazilians are descended from European families, they can enter any of the EU member countries with no visa requirements. Despite the larger number of Brazilians living in Britain, officially this is an ‘invisible’ community. Similar to the situation of un acknowledged Brazilians living in New York City (Margolis, 1994: 44), few British people admit or even know that there are so many Brazilians living among them. Brazilians and the Portuguese language are rarely mentioned in the press or even in academic publications. As a linguistic and ethnic group, Brazilian immigrants are neglected by the British system. By contrast, in popular culture, there is a growing fashion for everything ‘Brazilian’ from football, music, to Brazilian bikinis, flip flops and the famous Brazilian waxing!

Brazilian immigration is mainly ‘economic migration’. Immigrants are mostly driven by economic self-interest, the pursuit of work and what Bourdieu (1984) defines as ‘economic capital’ – ‘the resources distributed throughout the social body which have an exchange value in one or more of the various ‘markets’ or ‘fields’ which comprise the social world’ (Crossley, 2001: 96). Immigrant workers from small towns in Brazil, generally uneducated, repeat the same pattern of migrant workers everywhere, namely they count on the support of relatives and religious or community groups already established in the United Kingdom. They emigrate in search of economic stability (Rocha Reis and Sales, 1999; Ribeiro, 2000).
In the last two decades however, young middle-class, educated Brazilians have started coming to the United Kingdom for higher education, to learn English and to broaden their life experience (74 of our subjects belong to this group, aged between 20 and 35). They are not immigrants in Suvin’s terms because most return home at the completion of their studies. Consequently, they do not seek to integrate themselves in the host country. In most cases, their friends are from Brazil and/or from the same social/educational background. They see their lives as being that of temporary migrants.

This group of people come in search of other kinds of ‘capital’:

- Cultural/linguistic or the exchange value which accumulated forms of culture have within the social world – these bring new forms of empowering;
- symbolic capital – status and prestige in the home country for having lived abroad;
- social capital – the connections and networks which immigrants as agents can call upon in their effort to achieve a specified goal in the home and foreign countries. Some of our interviewees established affective relationships and started families in Britain.

‘Social’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984) relate mainly to the knowledge of English and cultural exposure, very important assets in Brazil. The ultimate aim for venturing a new life outside the home country, however, varies accordingly with age, education and the social status one has back home.

One of our interviewees said:

I came to realize my ideals. To challenge myself. To put into practice the life experiences I had in Brazil. I came to educate myself, to grow as a human being, to discover the limits on my potential, to get out of my mother’s care, to have financial, social and emotional independence. I came to learn foreign languages, to know new places, new people, new cultures and new races. I came in search of a better world. I came to win.

(Mauro)

Bauman when addressing the question of immigration refers to the question of ‘quality of life’, saying that this notion has superseded that of survival as the standard against which the development of post-modern society can be evaluated (1995: 78). He talks about ‘life strategies’ that have to do, ideationally, with strategies of empowerment and self-enhancement, as the example above demonstrates.

to challenge myself, to educate myself, to grow as a human being, to explore the potentiality of my own limits, to learn foreign languages, to know new places, new people, new cultures.
By contrast, while relating to people with a similar background and not interacting enough with locals, other Brazilians see the ‘invisibility’ in the hosting country as offering a possibility of freedom, or quasi-transgression, away from the standards and status they left back home. This paradoxical and troubled stance in a way can be grounded in their awareness of the stereotypes and discourses related to immigration that place them as outsiders. While celebrating freedom and transgression in the margins, they seek to associate themselves with other Brazilian peers as an occasional respite from invisibility.

6.4 The community

In contrast to the lack of official recognition, there is in fact a vibrant constituted Brazilian community in Britain. Four online and print newspapers represent this community: Brazilian News, Jungle Drums, Leros (or as they subtitle themselves – ‘The Bible for Brazilians in the UK’) and Brasilnet, all shown below. Each represents themselves through the colours of the Brazilian flag (yellow, green and blue).

![Brazilian News](image1)

![Jungle Drums](image2)

![Leros](image3)

![Brasilnet](image4)

**Figure 6.1** Brazilian community publications

Other institutional organizations are advertised in the yellow pages of the newspapers: schools, legal firms, medical clinics, translation schools, estate agents, travel agents, banks, personal services, beauty parlours, restaurants where the service is provided in Portuguese. The web page below exemplifies the wide social practices available to the Brazilian community in London.
On these pages, edged with green and yellow lines and humorously and intertextually subtitled ‘green and yellow pages’, different linguistic genres in different modes (personal ads, letters, editorials, interviews with native Brazilians, etc …) provide information, guidance, instruction and news for established residents and new comers alike. It is interesting to notice that the strongest links to the Brazilian culture and its preservation in the foreign land are associated with practices of eating and dressing. These practices are very common in other migrant communities. However, the Brazilian community is distinguished by an excessive concern with practices of body beautification. There are, therefore, large numbers of advertisements for hair and nail salons, depilation, and so on in the yellow and green pages. The strongest link of all is, of course, the use of the Portuguese language. But how do the social actors represent and locate themselves and their practices as immigrants in Britain?

6.5 Hybrid identities, transplanted identities: multimodal constructions

The idea of ‘belonging’ to a nation is highly elaborated through symbols and rituals from the mother country.
Consider the examples below taken from a web page where such representations of belonging are materialized.

Example 1

![G.R.E.S Unidos de Londres: The London School of Samba](image)

*Figure 6.3  The London School of Samba
Source: www.londonschoolofsamba.co.uk.*

Samba is Brazil’s major cultural manifestation. Associated with samba is Carnival, the most important Brazilian road show where millions of people attend the annual parade in cities like Rio, São Paulo and Salvador. The World-Wide Samba Home Page – (http://www.worldsamba.org) presents Schools of Samba in Germany, Austria, the United States, Finland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Poland and Sweden. The image of Brazil that Carnival projects outside its own borders is of Brazilians being lively, enjoying music and dance, having beautiful bodies and dancing on the streets. This, nevertheless, can have the downside of connoting sexual liberation and generating sexual tourism (see Caldas-Coulthard, 2005).

Stam, referring to the Bakhtinian (1984) notion of Carnival says that

> the carnivalesque, the reversal of social norms, is a counter-hegemonic tradition which embraces an anti-classical aesthetic that rejects formal harmony and unity in favour of the asymmetrical, the heterogeneous, the oxymoronic, the miscegenated. Within carnival, all hierarchical distinction, all barriers, all norms and prohibition are temporarily suspended.

*(Stam, 2000: 18)*

Brazilians living in Britain also recontextualize the practices of carnival by participating in the ‘London School of Samba’ (LSS), also named as ‘Gremio Recreativo Escola de Samba Unidos de Londres’ (the banner of their web page and sample pictures in Figure 6.3 represent their activities).
From a multi-modal perspective, the photographs above are very revealing. The images which occur in abundance on the Brazilian web pages are used not merely to illustrate the text, but also convey subliminal meanings and values which are not present in the text (Barthes, 1977). As Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) have shown so well, there are some parallels that can be drawn between visual and linguistic interpellation. If the participants’ eye-line makes contact with the viewer, an imaginary contact is established between the represented participants and the viewer. That image is then categorized as a ‘demand’ and the power of ‘demand’ is that the participants are directly addressing the viewer.

The photographs above are examples of ‘demand’ pictures, where the interaction between people represented in the picture and viewers is extremely easily established – the vectors (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996) of the eyes point directly to the viewer producing a reaction, the distance between the represented participants and the viewer is also very small given that the pictures are taken as close shots. All these characteristics signal ‘intimacy’ between the participants. According to Hall (1964, cited in Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996: 131), intimate distance (seeing face or head only) is the distance at which one can hold or grasp the other person and therefore also the distance between people who have an intimate relation with each other. In Carnival, there is no distance between people who can easily touch each other. This is what the photos connote.

Apart from the use of vectors and distance, a photographer can manipulate how an image may look by skilful uses of ‘lighting, exposure and printing techniques, or by just taking a picture from a lower or higher angle’ (photogenia) (Barthes, 1977: 23). The angle can establish an imaginary power relation between the viewer and the represented participant. If the viewer is positioned higher than what is displayed (high angle), the viewer is in a position of superiority. On the other hand, if the viewer sees the represented participant from a low angle, the represented participant has power over the viewer. If the participant is at eye level, no power difference is involved. Our examples show that there is no power relation involved in the representation.

Another important semiotic aspect in the multimodal representation of Brazilian identity in this example is ‘colour’. Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996, 2001) put forward the idea that one of the ways reality is modulated in visual communication is through colour, focus and depth (perspective), which may be idealized to a greater or lesser degree. ‘Colour functions as a formal semiotic device to provide cohesion and coherence’ (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001: 58), as well as playing a role in all coding orientations. Colour is also a source of pleasure and can produce affective meanings. We react positively to colours that attract us. And colours in general are loaded with social, generic and cultural signification. Think, for example, of the associations of the colour ‘pink’ and little girls (see Koller, 2007).
In our examples, the use of green in the banner and of yellow and green in the clothes of the man and of the woman are cohesive elements and point once again to the Brazilian flag, categorizing the actors culturally (see Chapter 2 in this volume). The dark skin of the participants contrasts with vivid greens and saturated pinks connoting the senses. Colours here therefore add positive and affective evaluation to the representation, at least for Brazilian viewers.

It is important to note that Carnival goes against the recognized characteristics of the British identity, where order, organization and rule-obeying are important values. However, Carnival is an essential practice in the Brazilian context. The LSS and all that is involved with the institution is therefore a ‘transplantation’ – a social practice originated in one special and cultural setting ‘superimposed’ onto another cultural setting. The web page represents ‘Brazilianness’ through images of ‘Brazilian people’ (portrayed as happy, smiling, directly interacting with the viewer through their gaze, using the colours of the national flag). All these modes, as mentioned above, have to do with the dimension of ‘affect’ (Martin, 2001).

Although most of the page is written in English, some crucial references like the slogan of the page ‘Vinte anos de Avenida e de Emoção’ (Twenty years of Parading and Emotion’) can only be understood by Brazilians – ‘Avenue’ here is a reference to the Avenida Presidente Vargas, the main avenue where the Carnival Parade used to happen in Rio. The important point however is that these Brazilians are in Britain and their social identities are transformed and re-invented through the recontextualization of home practices abroad.

Example 2
Example 2 is an advert for a Brazilian sport/dance called Capoeira. In this advert, the localized practice of a martial art converted into a dance, accompanied by music in the streets of Brazil, is resemiotized and recontextualized in the British global context. This is done by using multi-modes of communication – words, colours and font types. Machin (2007) suggests these modes are part of a social-semiotic landscape.

Typefaces have always been used to convey different kinds of meaning. As much as the semantic meaning of the word, the font itself is an important vehicle of communication. Graphic designers have long been aware that bolder fonts can be used to add emphasis to a word or piece of text. Curved fonts have been used as they seem gentler and feminine. Letter forms themselves have become more important as part of the overall meaning of composition, and have themselves become more graphic and iconic.

In this example, The Brazilian flag colours (yellow, green, blue and white) and the Portuguese language in ‘Capoeira’ are superimposed on the British flag colours (red, white and blue) and on the letters – UK. Although the advert is presented mainly in English, the expanded typographic meaningful choices in ‘Capoeira’ connote ideas associated with ‘being Brazilian’ – the expanded, wide, curved types can be associated with movement and rhythm, while the weighty ‘UK’ fonts connote solidity, assertiveness, stereotypical characteristics of ‘being’ British.

Capoeira and Carnival in Britain are very good examples of hybrid, transplanted and fused identities where there is:

- the creation of a third space, challenging the concept of ‘home’ – Capoeira and Carnival are transplanted from home to the host country;
- the desire to maintain a national identification, but at the same time indicating a process of desidentification – we are Brazilians but we live in Britain;
- the paradoxical reaffirmation of national identities, connoted by the colours of the flag and by the repetition of Brazilian practices (or what Billig (1995) calls ‘banal nationalism’);
- and cultural intertextuality (Albert, 1995).

The examples above reaffirm what Anderson (1991) describes as ‘an imagined community’. For Brazilians in Britain, the basic component of their identity is connected to a ‘home country’. This home country becomes imaginary and re-invented in relation to the new. The present home is materially real, but yet not real enough to feel authentic (see also Chapter 5 in this volume). So, the question is: to what extent does the old country function as a framework and regulate social practices in the host country?
6.6 Who am I? Linguistic identification

Gumperz (1982) suggests that members of speech communities use their linguistic resources to construct a social identity – language is the key to understanding how people see themselves. In his discussion of how social practices are transformed in recontextualizations, Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests that there are possible choices or a systematic network to represent social actors. They can be included or excluded in texts. If included, they can be personalized or impersonalized. When personalized, they can be determined in many ways. They can be categorized or classified in terms of their identity (age, gender, social class, physical appearance). They can also be identified by their function in society (by their profession or social activity).

The Brazilians interviewed in our research construe themselves through strategies of categorization and classification. Above all, they are ‘Brazilian’. But they are also ‘foreigners’. Some of them, however, ‘functionalized’ themselves also as ‘visitors’, ‘travellers’, and ‘good foreign workers’. The statements below exemplify linguistic classification:

- Above all else, I am Brazilian. I only have a Brazilian passport. My body is different. I will die if I lose my Brazilianess. I have no wish to give up being Brazilian. (Ana)
- I always introduce myself as a Brazilian. My origins are essential to what I am and to what I can offer to people and institutions that surround me, even if I am victimized by being a foreigner, I don’t care. (Debora)
- I think it is very easy for people to recognize that I am a foreigner by my accent. In my car, I do have a small Brazilian flag on the steering-wheel side – it is not very visible, but if you look inside the car, you can see it. This is one more expression of ‘human warmth’. (Maria)
- I am proud of being Brazilian. (M. Cristina)
- I am well received in many places in London because I come from a beautiful country and I am a good worker. (Aline)

Social actors and their practices can be evaluated (Labov, 1972) and appraised (White, 1998). Appraisal can be realized linguistically or visually. It is through evaluation and appraisement that narrators or focalizers show their involvement in the action. As White points out, by using evaluative language, ‘speakers come to express, negotiate and naturalize particular inter-subjective and ultimately ideological positions’ (http://www.grammarics.com/appraisal). It is through evaluation that speakers show attitude and emotion, using a set of resources which explicitly position their behaviour, social norms and physical attributes interpersonally. Consider the following examples, where being a ‘foreigner’ has to do with negative attitude, in other words, values of affect and judgment express feelings of
dislocation, struggle and unrest. They also express the ‘troubles’ of being an immigrant and living on the margins of society:

- I am sad because I have already changed – I have lost the ability to communicate with others, I am becoming sad like the British.
- I do not feel I have integrated, I believe it is very difficult to fit into the English culture. (Marcelo)
- I have had problems finding work and this is a professional limbo for me. I feel rejected, excluded, inferior and isolated. Not being fluent in the language contributes to this. (Marcia)
- In Brazil, I used to be middle-class – going to bars, restaurants, cinemas, shows. I used to have an intense social life. Here, it is totally different. My social network is very restricted.
- My language with a strong accent is my parameter for my place in this society – I don’t feel like assuming another identity. (Chris)
- I feel excluded, yes. I am still considered overseas, even being here for more than 4 years and being married to a British person. I cannot apply for grants or funding. I am also excluded from some work possibilities.
- I came back to live here in 2004 and it was very difficult for me to adapt, mainly in relation to my profession and in terms of work experience. I felt discriminated against even being fully fluent in the language.

Positive traits associated with ‘being’ Brazilian have to do with sensuality, easy communication and touch, passion, extravagance, energy and heat. These characteristics are perceived to be antagonistic to British society, where, to the immigrant, norms of behaviour appear to be more controlled by distance and discretion. The media text below confirms these values and related stereotypes:

Who decided Brazil was cool?
[The creative director of the Fashion and Textile Museum in London] puts Brazil’s new-found influence down to its people’s attitude to life – relaxed, sensual, up for a party – a mix very appealing to sun-starved Britons. Among the adverts which seek to capture this mood are campaigns for Nissan, Sunsilk, Always and Habitat.

(Megan Lane, BBC News Online Magazine, 7 May 2004)

However, the positive traits can also be a reason for discrimination and stereotyping.

Lemke (Chapter 1 in this volume) suggests that cultural stereotyping is ‘packages’ of traits that must, by nature, go together; [they] are in social fact and in principle relatively independent dimensions of behaviour and disposition that are correlated in a population only because of the social pressures to conform to the stereotypes.
The press contributes to the reinforcement of these stereotypes when they publish texts like the example below:

*Swings so cool, sways so gently*
By Jonathan Franklin
Within a day my plan collapses – I would not be covering Carnival from inside a Brazilian favela. So much for my plan to watch as a grandmother sews feathers on her granddaughter’s sequinned cape. The favela I sought to enter is known for community groups ranging from Capoeira dance troupes to college classes ... The scene is similar to the grimy neighbourhood featured in the recently acclaimed Brazilian film City of God.


Accompanying this text, there is a photograph of a semi-naked woman, dressed in Carnival clothing and with the following subtitle: ‘Butterfly woman is always grateful when Carnival comes round’. The woman by being classified as a ‘butterfly’ connotes meanings of freedom (sexual, most certainly given her body) and availability. The text, by contrast, draws attention to the other 51 weeks of virtual slavery and poor life in the favelas.

In stereotyping, the writer of the article categorizes other individuals on the basis of highly visible characteristics such as gender or race (semi-naked, Sexy black woman) and attributes to her a set of characteristics that are extended to all members of a community. As a result of this type of representation, different characteristics are condensed into one and individual differences are ignored (Van Dijk, 1993). The stereotypical person (the butterfly woman, in this case) is always created as an ‘object’ regardless of whether it is given ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ value. Stereotyping is in this sense, an excluding practice of ‘closure’. It defines what is ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’, or ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’, dividing people between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Texts like *Swings so cool, sways so gently* only function to reproduce stereotypical and racist effects.

Another value added to these representations is ‘exoticism’ which turns the ‘Other’ into an erotic figure for the exoticist’s pleasure (Shohat and Stam, 1994). These representations give evidence to Hall’s (1997: 229) argument about the tropes of representation: ‘otherness’ can be repelling/compelling and exotic which leads to ‘fetishism’. Fetishism as ‘stereotyping’ turns the represented person into an object and substitutes a part (an organ, a portion of the body) for the whole. The substitute then becomes eroticized, invested with sexual energy, power and desire. The representation of Brazilian naked women in the press is an example of stereotyping and fetishism, and has repercussions for the community of Brazilians living in Britain. In this context, several of our subjects, through negative evaluation, observed that:
• English men think Brazilian women are ‘easy’. (Joana)
• I had to answer very difficult and unpleasant sexual questions when I first came into England. (Rogeria)
• What bothers me most is the image projected about Brazil. It limits Brazil to be the land of carnival and football, things that are not necessarily bad, but they become bad since they reduce Brazilian culture to a collectivity of individuals that have no intellectual activity. (Mara).

Positive appraisal, by contrast, marks relocation and multi-positioning. Many of our subjects place themselves positively in the host country:

• London is a place where a multicultural community coexists, independent of nationality, religions and sex. I see London today as my home. (Alessandro)
• I feel very happy in the country I chose to live in. I would be very sad if I had to leave England. (Mario)
• Here, I feel free in my way of thinking and being. I feel there is a lot of respect for individuals and their choices. I became more selective. (Lucia)
• I love living here because I feel secure and stable, although I am away from my family. (Mauri)
• I feel integrated to the British society because I can practice the same activities here that I used to do in Brazil. (Celia)

As Kress and Hodge suggest, ‘classification is an instrument of control in two directions: it is control over the flux of experience of physical and social reality and it is society’s control over conceptions of that reality’ (1979: 63). From a multi-modal perspective, images like the butterfly woman add implicit evaluation to the semiotic representation in the same way as the linguistic code does. It is through classification and evaluation, therefore, that social actors represent themselves as displaced or re-invented in the foreign land.

6.7 Concluding remarks: mongrel selves

Krzyżanowski and Wodak ask the question in Chapter 5:

What makes migrant identities so ‘special’? Migration implies constant mobility and instability, an often endless search for belonging to the constantly changing other.

As we hope to have demonstrated through our analysis, ‘loss’ is a constant theme in the speech accounts of our subjects – feelings of discrimination, of being alien and out of place, of having lost the ability to communicate properly, of not belonging to a social class. Some of them are transitory
beings – travellers, visitors. The return ‘home’ is always a possibility. Trouble, struggle, unrest, uncertainty, displacement are the consequences of departure from the home country.

But ‘gain’ is also achieved by many:

- I live happily and realized. What Brazil has not given me, the UK did – an opportunity to have a dignified life. (Maria)
- I changed my way of dressing. Nowadays, I dress more discreetly, using fewer colours. My body adapted to the winter. (Chris)

In *Imaginary Homelands*, Salman Rushdie’s defence of *The Satanic Verses* sums up today’s society in light of global migration and provides useful pointers to our discussion about Brazilian immigrants’ troubled and untroubled identities:

If the Satanic Verses is anything, it is a migrant’s eye view of the world. It is written from the very experience of uprooting, disjuncture and metamorphosis (slow or rapid, painful or pleasurable) that is the migrant condition, and from which, I believe, can be derived a metaphor for all humanity. The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes from new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelisation (our emphasis) and fears the absolutism of the Pure.

(1991: 394)

We named some of our Brazilians ‘mongrel selves’, since this concept celebrates human migration as part of the unavoidable and unstoppable development of humankind. The concept of mongrelization is also useful to explain the dilemma in some Brazilians’ attitude towards migration. They are constantly positioned between the exhilaration of discovering or transgressing and the nostalgia for the protective enclosure of family environments. They often face the dilemma of embracing the economic opportunity offered by the hosting country and the social identity provided by family ties back home. Consequently, they do not completely root themselves in the new hosting place, but rather move in the margins, construing a ‘third space’ where superimpositions and juxtapositions, positioning and multi-positioning, point to a hybrid location of antagonism. The example above of ‘a body adapting to the winter’ illustrates this point.

By using discourse and multi-modality frameworks, our analysis has tried to demonstrate that through processes of representation, classification and evaluation, we can identify a cline in processes of adaptation and different positionings are articulated. The ones who came only to earn money or to educate themselves live alienated and displaced lives since their return ‘home’ is always a priority:
‘Home’ for me is Brazil. My grandparents’ small farm in Lagoa dos Mares. Although I have lived abroad for many years, I never wanted nor imagined growing old outside Brazil. My country is my home and if I have not returned so far, it is because of a complete lack of professional opportunities.

(Antonio)

However, the ones who are positively positioned in the host country are the true mongrels. Chris says:

My language with a strong accent is my compass for my place in this society – I don’t feel like assuming another identity. England has advantages and disadvantages, like Brazil. My philosophy of life is the following; when I am in England, I try to live the best way I can with the English. If I am in Brazil, I live like the Brazilians do. The most important thing for me is not allowing the geographical and cultural spaces to interfere with my own moral and ethical values. I try to enjoy the advantages of living here. I accept the disadvantages as part of this process.

We want to conclude by saying that our mongrel selves or our troubled ones are the product of lives in communities, abroad and at home, where we suffer and are happy. The world would be a better place if ‘exiles, refugees, pro-patriates and immigrés’ were able to integrate in a mongrelized world.

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Notes
1. All examples cited in this chapter were translated from Portuguese into English by C. R. Caldas-Coulthard. The original names of our subjects have been changed.
2. Since we did this analysis, the site is no longer accessible.

References


7

By Their Words Shall Ye Know Them: On Linguistic Identity

Malcolm Coulthard

A high-profile New Zealand lawyer has decided to wear women’s clothing to court to highlight male bias within the justice system. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5212752.stm)

7.1 Introduction

My main professional interest in the communication and interpretation of signals of identity is in the context of forensic authorship attribution and so I focus particularly on what it is possible to glean early in their encounter with a previously unknown speaker/writer. My main personal interest is in the experience of semi-competent non-native speakers struggling to maintain their identity in a new culture.

My title reflects the fact that, as a forensic linguist, I work almost exclusively with written texts and therefore focus mainly on lexico-grammatical items, but I certainly do not intend to exclude from consideration the clues provided via the phonological and paralinguistic channels, nor the information that can be derived from topic selection and interactive strategies and structures. I will, however, say nothing about any non-linguistic signalling, even though that can often be a very powerful initial marker of identity, as 67-year-old Rob Moodie demonstrated when he arrived at court in a blue skirt and stockings and asked to be addressed as Ms Alice. Interestingly, though, the former rugby player still felt the need to make explicit linguistically the significance of his new sartorially transmitted identity, just in case someone misinterpreted the signal as non-ironic: ‘I’m objecting to the male ethos that is dominating this case.’

As will already be evident, my concerns are much narrower than those of the majority of the other authors in this book; whereas they are in the main examining multi-faceted and complex aspects of identity, I am looking at a small number of low-level linguistic realizations, but hopefully we are all engaged in describing different aspects of the same picture.
7.2 Lay decoding of identity features

From the moment we begin to interact with a previously unknown speaker/writer we start to construct an identity for them, first collecting individual clues and then trying to link those early clues together, like beginning a jigsaw puzzle without a picture of the assembled whole, joining single pieces together and then producing small, but growingly significant clumps until it is possible to form an impression of how the whole must look.

One proceeds much faster when the interaction is oral, because the voice itself carries important information – within seconds we can derive information about national, regional, social and often educational background from the speaker’s accent and can normally determine biological sex from the pitch of the voice, although here mistakes are not uncommon, particularly on the telephone. Of course, there are interesting linguo-cultural conventions superimposed on pitch, so, for example, Japanese female voices have a significantly higher average pitch than Western voices, while among native Englishmen there is a small but measurable difference in pitch between male voices speaking Urdu and those speaking English.

What is perhaps more surprising is that listeners can also determine, with a fair degree of accuracy, the biological sex of young children from their voices alone and this demonstrates that gender differences produced and recognized vocally are more complex than just pitch phenomena. In fact, the voices of pre-adolescent boys are on average slightly higher in pitch than those of girls of the same age, but from an early age children start to model their speech on that of same sex carers and they mimic the sex-based formant differences so successfully that listeners can distinguish boys from girls, even when presented with single decontextualized vowels. The linguistic display of identity begins very early.

The richness of information carried by the voice alone is very important in a forensic context where a phonetician, investigating recordings of bomb threats, ransom demands or obscene phone calls may have only 10–15 seconds of speech to work on and even then there may have been an attempt to muffle the voice and/or change the accent. A classic example of successful forensic phonetic analysis was the hoax tape recording in the 1970s Yorkshire Ripper serial murder case. Everyone who listened to the tape recording recognized the voice as having a ‘Geordie’ accent, from the northeast of England, but the phonetician involved, using professional descriptive tools and detailed knowledge about local phonetic variation derived from dialect surveys he himself had conducted, managed to locate the accent with amazing accuracy. The hoaxter, when eventually arrested, was living only a mile away from the village that the phonetician had identified as the most likely place where the speaker had spent his formative childhood years.

Obviously the untrained lay person, in attempting to assign identity to an unknown speaker in real-time, begins with crude stereotypes and gradually
refines them, but sometimes the initial stereotyping can have unfortunate consequences, particularly when there is no opportunity for subsequent refinement. I will give an example from lexico-grammar. Lakoff (1975) suggested that women’s speech contained lexico-grammatical features sufficiently distinctive to allow anyone reading a transcript of a conversation to distinguish male from female without the benefit of the voice information or reference to content. She claimed that many of these features were a consequence of women’s less powerful social roles. However, when Conley, O’Barr and Allan (1978) looked at the language used by witnesses in courtroom settings, they discovered that, although some of the women were indeed using ‘women’s language’, some certainly were not and more surprisingly, some of the less confident male witnesses were using women’s language too.

Conley and colleagues therefore relabelled Lakoff’s collection of markers as ‘powerless language’ and classified utterances where such features did not occur as instances of powerful language. Although linguists researching language and gender have since severely criticized the Lakoff claims as at best amateurish and at worst simply mistaken, it would appear that the stereotype she was identifying does have some psychological reality. The worrying finding from the Conley et al. study was that, irrespective of gender, jury members said they had less faith in evidence given by those speakers Conley et al. classified as using ‘powerless’ language and placed greater credence in the evidence given by those speakers using powerful language.

This seems to support suggestions that a default interpretative setting for listeners is to take any new speaker at face value – that is to accept the face/identity the speaker chooses to present to the world – until there is evidence to force them to modify it.

Of course stereotype interpretation depends crucially on recognizing the communicative and interpretative framework that the unknown speaker is using; if not, significant misinterpretations can occur. In a very different judicial context from that investigated by Conley and colleagues, Eades (1992) examined the performance of Aboriginal witnesses in court. The court had no difficulty in perceiving the identity difference of such witnesses as their distinctive physical appearance was a constant reminder, but, until recently, courts had insisted in proceeding on the assumption that Aboriginals were communicatively competent in English. Eades (1992), reporting a campaign she co-ordinated and which eventually led to Aboriginals being granted the right to court interpreters, observed that the typical aboriginal response to a question is a short respectful silence, designed to show that the question and the questioner are being treated seriously. However, in a white Australian courtroom this behaviour, silence following a question, has a very different significance, it is interpreted as an indication of ‘shifty’ behaviour, of the witness weighing up possible alternative answers, rather than coming straight out with the truth. In this context what an aboriginal witness did not say immediately would
devalue the subsequent evidence, because the silence reinforced the stereotypical view that aboriginals are untrustworthy.

7.3 Idiolect

The professional linguist can approach the question of identity from the theoretical position that every speaker/writer has their own distinct and individual version of the language(s) they speak, their own idiolect and the assumption that this idiolect will manifest itself through distinctive and idiosyncratic choices (see Bloch, 1948; Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens, 1964: 75). Thus, every speaker has a very large active vocabulary built up over many years, which differs from the vocabularies others have similarly built up, not only in terms of actual items, but also in preferences for selecting certain items rather than others (see Hoey (2005) on lexical priming). Thus, whereas in principle any speaker/writer can use any word at any time, speakers in fact tend to make typical and individuating co-selections of preferred words. The same principle of preferred co-selections will be true for all the other linguistic areas already mentioned, but I will exemplify it here using lexis, because that is the area where description is most advanced.

An early and persuasive example of the forensic significance of idiolectal co-selection was the Unabomber case. Between 1978 and 1995, someone living in the United States, who referred to himself as FC, sent a series of bombs, on average once a year, through the post. At first there seemed to be no pattern, but after several years the FBI noticed that the victims seemed to be people working in Universities and Airlines and so named the unknown individual the Unabomber. In 1995 six national publications received a 35,000-word manuscript, entitled Industrial Society and its Future, from someone claiming to be the Unabomber, along with an offer to stop sending bombs if the manuscript was published.

In August 1995, the Washington Post published the manuscript as a supplement and three months later, a man contacted the FBI with the observation that the document sounded as if it had been written by his brother, whom he had not seen for some ten years. He cited in particular the use of the phrase ‘cool-headed logician’ as being his brother’s terminology, or in our terms an idiolectal preference, which he had noticed and remembered. The FBI traced and arrested the brother, who was living in a log cabin in Montana. They found a series of documents there and performed a linguistic analysis on them – one of the documents was a 300-word newspaper article on the same topic as the published manuscript, which had been written a decade earlier. The FBI analysts claimed major linguistic similarities between the 35,000 and the 300 word documents: they shared a series of lexical and grammatical words and fixed phrases which, the FBI argued, provided linguistic evidence of common authorship.
The defence contracted a distinguished linguist, who counter-argued that one could attach no significance to the isolated shared items because anyone can use any word at any time and therefore shared vocabulary can have no diagnostic significance. The linguist singled out 12 words and phrases for particular critical comment, on the grounds that they were items that could be expected to occur in any text that was arguing a case: *at any rate; clearly; gotten; in practice; moreover; more or less; on the other hand; presumably; propaganda; thereabouts;* and words derived from the roots or ‘lemmas’ *argu* and *propos*. The FBI searched the internet, which in those days was a fraction its current size, but even so they discovered some 3 million internet documents which included one or more of the 12 items. However, when they narrowed the search to those which included instances of all 12 items they found a mere 69 and, on closer inspection, every single one of these documents proved to be an internet version of the 35,000 word manifesto. This was a massive rejection of the defence expert’s view of text creation as purely open choice, as well as a powerful example of the idiolectal phenomenon of co-selection and an illustration of the consequent forensic possibilities that idiolectal co-selection affords for authorship attribution or the matching of linguistically conveyed identity.²

7.4 Plagiarism

The education and assessment of students is a fascinating site for the investigation of linguistically mediated identity – in setting assignments and term papers the professor invites the student to display her/himself through expressed opinions and methods of argumentation. The tradition in which I was myself educated, and then taught to subsequent generations, considers that a student has only really learned something when able to express it in her/his own words. For that reason it severely discourages the mere sewing together of text which has been produced by others, however eminent they are and however good the resulting argument: so plagiarism is punished severely.

Seen from an identity viewpoint plagiarism is a phenomenon which is usually first identified because the text is perceived by the reader to be presenting multiple and incompatible linguistic identities or, as their linguistic realizations have traditionally been labelled, styles. In the following text, written by a 12-year-old girl, the identity/style shifts are particularly obvious:

**Text 1**

*The Soldiers* (all spelling as in the original; names changed)

Down in the country side an old couple husband and wife Brooklyn and Susan. When in one afternoon they were having tea they heard a drumming sound that was coming from down the lane. Brooklyn asks,
‘What is that glorious sound which so thrills the ear?’ when Susan replied in her o sweat voice
‘Only the scarlet soldiers, dear,’
The soldiers are coming, The soldiers are coming. Brooklyn is confused he doesn’t no what is happening.
Mr and Mrs Waters were still having their afternoon tea when suddenly a bright light was shinning trough the window.
‘What is that bright light I see flashing so clear over the distance so brightly?’ said Brooklyn sounding so amazed but Susan soon reassured him when she replied ...

The first paragraph is unremarkable, but the style shifts dramatically in the second, ‘What is that glorious sound which so thrills the ear?’. The narrative then moves back into the opening style, before shifting again to ‘What is that bright light I see flashing so clear over the distance so brightly?’ This reader seriously doubted that the young author could have written in two styles so contrasting in sophistication and assumed the more sophisticated items had been borrowed.

From what has been said above it is evident that access to some of the distinctiveness of an identity, as expressed linguistically through idiolect, will be through examining collocations, particularly ones that strike the reader as unusual and so possibly created specially for that particular use. This detailed linguistic focus proves to be a very efficient way of finding text which has been plagiarized from the internet. If one chooses as search items unusual two-word collocations, typically as few as three of them are sufficient, one will normally locate the borrowed text very quickly. In the case of the 12-year-old’s story, if we take as search terms the three collocate pairs ‘thrills/ear’, ‘flashing/clear’ and ‘distance/brightly’ we can immediately appreciate the distinctiveness of idiolectal co-selection. The single collocation ‘flashing/clear’ yields over half a million hits on Google, but the three pairings together a mere 360 hits, of which the first 13 are all different internet versions of the same W. H. Auden poem ‘O What is that sound’. The borrowed words from the first two verses are highlighted in bold:

Text 2
O what is that sound which so thrills the ear Down in the valley drumming, drumming? Only the scarlet soldiers, dear, The soldiers coming. O what is that light I see flashing so clear Over the distance brightly, brightly?
Only the sun on their weapons, dear, As they step lightly.

Given the detection successes of collocation-led searching, the discovery of even small amounts of identical text in two documents begins to look less like two authors happening to select the same formulation and more like
one borrowing from the other. What then comes to be of crucial impor-
tance to the forensic linguist, as well as to the amateur plagiarism hunter, is
to know how long, or rather how short, a sequence of words one needs to
have before one can assert that it is almost certainly a unique encoding.
Evidence suggests that sequences can be surprisingly short.

The data I will use for exemplificatory purposes come from the Appeal of
Robert Brown in 2003. In this case there was a disputed confession state-
ment and a disputed record of an interview, both recorded by police
officers. Brown claimed that the monologue confession statement had in
reality been an interview or dialogue, in which all the incriminating
content attributed to him had been introduced by the interviewing police
officer. In disputing the interview, he agreed that there had been an inter-
view, but said the record was not made contemporaneously, but rather
constructed afterwards, partly on the basis of the statement – ‘no police
officer took any notes’ (Judge’s Summing-up, p. 93 section E).

Below are two sentences taken from the statement matched with sen-
tences occurring in the disputed interview record:

Text 3

(i) Statement I asked her if I could carry her bags she said ‘Yes’
Interview I asked her if I could carry her bags and she said ‘yes’

(ii) Statement I picked something up like an ornament
Interview I picked something up like an ornament

The police argued that the noted similarity was unremarkable; indeed one
would in fact expect that the same person talking about the same events
on two separate occasions would use the same linguistic formulations.
My problem was to suggest, counter-intuitively for a lay audience, that even
such short extracts are almost always unique encodings and so the fact that
the same wording occurred in two separate documents was compelling
evidence that one document had been created on the basis of the other.

I chose to use examples from an internet search engine rather than from a
professionally assembled corpus such as the Bank of English or the British
National Corpus, on the grounds that search engines are accessible to
the layperson for whom the argument was designed and so my claims could
be easily tested. What is surprising to lay people is how quickly a lengthen-
ing sequence of linguistic choices moves towards becoming a unique utter-
ance. If you, Dear Reader, take a text you have written yourself, choose
a sentence at random and type the first dozen words into a search engine,
the odds against discovering any other instance of that sequence are
astronomical.

For this case I chose to use Google and the results from a search for
‘I asked her if I could carry her bags and she said “yes”’ were as follows:
I asked 2,170,000
I asked her 284,000
I asked her if 86,000
I asked her if I 10,400
I asked her if I could 7,770
I asked her if I could carry 7
I asked her if I could carry her 4
I asked her if I could carry her bags 0

While the 13-word sentence may have seemed, when you first read it, not to be at all remarkable, there was not a single occurrence of even the first eight words in the more than five billion texts that Google searched. However, my report was written seven years ago, in February 2000, and Google now searches billions of new texts – could the situation have changed? After writing the above sentence, in January 2007 I searched Google again and found to my horror that there were now four occurrences of the sequence ‘I asked her if I could carry her bags’ and even two of the whole 13-word sequence ‘I asked her if I could carry her bags and she said “yes”’. However, it is often the exception that proves the rule because all of the occurrences are repetitions of the one original encoding: since Robert Brown’s successful appeal against his original conviction, there is a website devoted to the case, which reproduces the disputed statement – and the other examples occur in internet versions of articles I wrote about the case. Thus it is indeed by their words that we know them.

7.5 Projecting identity

As everyone has an understanding of the bases of the stereotypes by which others will judge them, they may consciously alter some of their linguistic realizations in order to try to ensure that others ‘decode’ what they see as their ‘proper’ identity. I myself did this when I discovered, as a trainee teacher, that my North-East of England regional accent appeared to be interfering with the interpersonal aspects of my teaching. It not only marked me out as a rank outsider but also projected to my students a less-educated identity than my position required. For better or worse, I altered my accent, so that it gave away little regional information. Now, even though 40 years later the meanings of regional accents have changed, it is only when I return to my native Yorkshire that I slip back into the old groove and happily assert my origins and belongingness.

A famous example of deliberate change of vocal identity is that of Margaret Thatcher, who took voice training classes to enable her to lower the pitch of her voice and thereby benefit from the respect typically awarded to the lower-pitched male voice; and for this very reason for the first 50 years of its existence the BBC did not consider female voices to be appropriate for news-reading.
One can see in the following news item the intimate relationship that is felt by non-linguists to exist between accent and identity:

Text 4

A Geordie woman has apparently developed foreign accents after waking up following a stroke. Linda Walker awoke in hospital to find her distinctive Newcastle accent had been transformed into [what others heard as] a mixture of Jamaican, Canadian and Slovakian ... Mrs Walker added: 'I've lost my identity, because I never talked like this before. I'm a very different person.'

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tyne/5144300.stm)

7.6 Projecting identity in another language

The problem of projecting identity can be much more severe for those trying to communicate in a foreign language and in a foreign country as I know to my cost, at both the conscious and semi-conscious levels. When I was working on doctor-patient interaction in the early 1970s, a doctor said to me ‘simple people have simple diseases’ and he could have added ‘semi-competent foreign language speakers (appear to) have simple if not simplistic opinions’. Like all semi-competent foreign language speakers I learned to survive by saying what I could rather than what I wanted to and I was painfully aware of expressing views that were much cruder than I would have expressed in my native English.

Competent non-natives have different problems, one of which is accent. Do they try to sound like native speakers, but then they may suffer when their genuine mistakes with other less well-acquired features, such as sophisticated politeness markers or register rules, are interpreted as giving offence intentionally rather than unwittingly. Or do they insist on marking their foreignness explicitly through their accent and suffer different consequences, at the very least of being thought to be less competent linguistically than they actually are, or at the worst of being seen to be too arrogant to bother to learn to pronounce more accurately.

One area where I have been conscious of deliberately changing my own behaviour in order to try to convey what I see as my ‘real’ identity, is with non-verbal behaviour. In my early days in Brazil, when, without thinking, I carried over my English non-verbal signalling, particularly into greeting situations, I was thought to be a cold withdrawn person. I tried to learn how to behave in Portuguese in a way that would convey (what I considered to be) the same ‘identity’ that I tried to project in my native language in my native country. But, even if successful, this strategy can create two kinds of difficulty – firstly, when interacting in English in Brazil, particularly with native speakers, which non-verbal system should I use? does the country or the language of interaction determine the most appropriate realizations?; and
secondly, when I switch countries it can take me some time to readjust – I once flew overnight to the United Kingdom, went straight from the airport to the University and as I crossed the campus met, greeted in English and then kissed on both cheeks a female Muslim student – only her startled reaction made me realize my mistake – in Brazil I could greet students and secretaries with a kiss, but not in England.

But much more difficult is topic and turn-taking management when one is doing ones best to perform like an in-group member without really being one, which is the task that faces me as the husband of a Brazilian mixing with Brazilian husbands. In the group of closest friends there is a fairly strict division of roles, skills, responsibilities and interactional groupings. Some of my interests in cooking and childcare for instance are regarded as women’s topics and so I may find myself at a party, deep in an interesting conversation about recipes and ingredients, being ‘rescued’ from the women’s group and taken off to join the men’s group at the bar.

Performing interactively like a Brazilian husband is a real challenge; I am unable to contribute with jokes, as mine tend to be based on word play, which is not regarded as funny and even worse, my attempts are typically received by a gentle, though uncomprehending explanation that I am actually confusing two distinct words. Their jokes, by contrast, are sexist and often anti-gay which I in turn don’t find funny and can never remember in order to be able to retell to others. The group does indulge in quite a lot of teasing (Eggins and Slade 1997), which I am used to from an English context, but, although I am quite successful at doing being teased and appreciating the teasing of others, I have not yet learned how to tease fully successfully and on at least one occasion I am sure I caused offence.

Some of my other problems are similar to those experienced by anyone joining an existing grouping – they have shared the past for 50 years and the best I can do is to gradually acquire knowledge about it; they have preferred topics and there at least I can be well informed – I know much more about football than I used to, though I have no greater enthusiasm for watching it and my insights into local politics are impressive. But interestingly, the whole group collaborates in actively searching for shared topics, we make cross-cultural comparisons frequently and talk more than one usually would about visits abroad. Even so, my main strategy is to address the group as a whole as little as possible and to interact instead with individuals or small subgroups – in other words I change the interaction type to one where intercultural differences are fewer and my difference less obvious.

7.7 Masking identity

There are times when people assume a false identity. The traditional criminal contexts for forensic linguists are falsified wills and suicide notes, but
all Internet users now receive on a regular basis letters purporting to come from their banks, from Paypal and, of course, from the insistent impecunious heirs of deceased African generals.

If you recently accessed your account while traveling, the unusual log in attempts may have been initiated by you. However, if you did not initiate the log ins, please visit Barclays IBank as soon as possible to check-up your account information.

Our client is the wife of former chief security officer (cso) to the former Nigerian head of state Late Gen Sani Abacha, who (i.e. Major Hamza AL-Mustapha) is currently being detained by the present civilian government.

Quite recently there has been a growing number of criminal cases involving suspect mobile phone text messages and these are a fascinating challenge to the forensic linguist, as there is so little language available to analyse in order to determine the identity of the texter.

In 2001 a 15-year-old girl set off for school one Monday morning and was never seen again. In the afternoon her favourite uncle reported that he had received a text message, to which he replied. Then next day he received a second, after which there was silence. The police soon discovered that he had been having an affair with his niece and suspected he was involved in her disappearance. They began to wonder whether he had in fact sent the text messages to himself from her phone. I was given access to all the messages that had been sent from the phone on the three days preceding her disappearance, there were some 65 of them, and was asked to express an opinion as to the likelihood that she had written the final two or whether they could have been written by someone pretending to be her.

Texting is linguistically very interesting because the conventions for abbreviating are still quite fluid and so messages can display considerable idiolectal variation. The first of the two suspect text messages, which is reproduced in full below, had a series of abbreviations, which I have highlighted in bold, which were atypical of her usage during the three previous days:

**Text 5**

HIYA STU **WOT** U **UP** 2.IM IN SO MUCH TRUBLE AT HOME AT **MOMENT EVONE** HATES ME EVEN U! **WOT** THE HELL **AV** I DONE NOW? Y **WONT** U **JUST** **TELL** ME **TEXT BCK** PLEASE LUV DAN XXX

In the texts from the three previous days, the girl almost invariably used sentence case not full capitalization; her abbreviation of ‘what’ was always ‘wat’ and of ‘have’ usually ‘ave’, although there were occasional examples of ‘av’. Also, on every occasion that she sent the homonym ‘one’, whether
it was acting as a pronoun or as a cardinal number, she used the numeral ‘1’, her abbreviations of prepositional phrases did not omit the article ‘the’ completely, but rather reduced it to ‘da’, and indeed, there was even an example of ‘at the moment’ abbreviated to ‘at da mo’. Finally, almost all of her messages ended with a request to the recipient to ‘text back’, but the form ‘text bck’ was never used – the most frequently used form was ‘txtb’ and in none of the messages was ‘text’ written in full. Thus the comparative evidence suggested this was a message produced by someone else pretending to be her.

Text messages are typified by their brevity, but some people attempt to mask their identity for much longer stretches of text and time:

**Text 6**

A thirteen year old Southampton girl and an only child, Michaela Montague, disappeared for five days after visiting an internet café on Valentine’s Day ... it is strongly suspected that she was abducted by a paedophile she ‘met’ on the internet. [Her mother] voiced her concerns about the ease with which paedophiles can make direct contact with children via the web, saying ... ‘People can pretend to be anything they seem when you cannot see them.’


Such interactions and subsequent encounters are already a major problem for the police. In a recent case in Britain a middle-aged American ex-serviceman pretending to be a 19-year-old set up a meeting with a 13-year-old girl pretending to be a 17-year-old woman and took her off to Germany – what we do not know is whether one or both of the pair had seen through the assumed identity before they met in person and if they had, whether it was due to inappropriate topics and/or linguistic choices unusual for the assumed identity.

In an attempt to catch such paedophiles there are now groups of law enforcement officers, as well as members of amateur vigilante groups, logging on to Internet chatrooms used by teenagers. We now have the bizarre, but deadly serious situation of middle-aged men and women pretending to be teenagers in order to try to ensnare paedophiles, who may also be pretending to be teenagers. In a recent case a man accused, and later convicted of being a paedophile on the basis of chatroom conversations, claimed he was actually acting as a vigilante ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/6200338.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/6200338.stm)).

However, from all we know about the linguistics of identity, assuming another identity and masking your own is by no means an easy task, so a new challenge for the forensic linguist is to discover which are the most fruitful areas on which to concentrate in order to unmask false identities.
rapidly and successfully. If that proves possible the even greater challenge will be to make the detection semi-automatic, a project the British police are actively considering funding.

7.8 Concluding remarks

I hope I have managed, in this short exploratory chapter, to suggest some of the ways in which a detailed focus on lower level linguistic phenomena can fruitfully supplement and complement the more theoretical approaches to identity description and analysis presented in some of the other chapters in the collection.

Notes

1. For a report on the original investigation, see Ellis (1994); and for report on the eventual identification of the hoaxer, see French, Harrison and Lewis (2006).
2. For an accessible version of events, from someone who wrote a report on the language of the manuscript, see Foster (2001). The full text of the Unabomber manuscript is available at: http://www.panix.com/~clays/Una/.

References

8
Cybergirls in Trouble? Fan Fiction as a Discursive Space for Interrogating Gender and Sexuality

Sirpa Leppänen

8.1 Introduction

In modern Finland, which is often referred to as one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, every girl and young woman has, in principle, an opportunity to education and employment and, thus, to social and economic independence (Julkunen, 2002). Backed up by significant changes in law, policy and rights for women, independence, choice and possibility increasingly characterize young women’s self-perceptions. Girls’ and young women’s relationships to family, friends, sexual partners, and their bodies seem far freer than for previous generations. At the same time, in the aftermath of a severe economic recession and a weakening of the welfare state in the 1990s, Finnish society became distinctly more polarized than before. Part of the population is now better off than ever before, while others have become permanently marginalized (Aaltonen and Honkatukia, 2002: 8; Kuure, 2001).

For girls and young women these developments have meant that, despite the fact that they continue to do very well in education and working life, they are also ‘required to take responsibility for their livelihoods and lifestyles in the new economy, manage their way through a risk society, and make high-stakes choices with less structural support than ever before’ (Aapola, Gonick and Harris, 2005: 217–18). In planning their life trajectories, and in the course of negotiating them, they go through a number of periods of crisis, remain vulnerable and experience trouble. This trouble is manifested in, for example, girls’ and young women’s increased use of alcohol and drugs, violence and other asocial behaviour, associated with increased psychological problems such as eating disorders, depression, and anxiety (Aaltonen and Honkatukia 2002: 8; Kalliomaa, Puura and Tasanko, 2004). Further, they now have to face the difficulties of a gender and sexual culture which has become distinctly harsher and more commercial (Näre and Lähteenmaa, 1995).

These conflicting pressures are also manifested in girls’ and young women’s activities in cyberspace. As confident and competent users of
information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Kangas, 2002), Finnish girls and young women now make use of ‘underground and alternative’ ICT spaces (Giroux, 1998: 24) to get their voices heard and appreciated and to engage in dialogue with others. One cyberspace which is particularly popular among girls and young women is fan fiction forums. Inspired by popular cult films, TV series and novels, girls and young women publish and discuss their own fictional writings, play and fantasize in these forums. For many, these forums also offer new opportunities for constructing self-assured identities about themselves (see also Blackmore, 2001: 128). At the same time, these discursive spaces are also contested and complex. In them, girls and young women also need to negotiate, in the words of Aapola and colleagues, the two compelling narratives that they have to face in their lives: ‘one of opportunity and choice, and the other of crisis and risk’ (2005: 217).

In this chapter I will attempt to show how, in fan fiction forums, girls and young women deal with the conflicting identity scenarios they face in their lives. More particularly, I will focus on how, by drawing on resources provided by two languages, Finnish and English, and by means of complex intertextuality, they investigate gender and sexuality in ways that range from playful modifications to critical feminist rewritings. In doing this, I hope to demonstrate how girls’ and young women’s fan fiction can be seen to spell out possible identity positions which can at times be quite empowering, but which can also entail trouble, problems and questions that remain unanswered, even in fiction.

8.2 Fan fiction as gendered discourse

Fan fiction involves the writing, reading and discussion of novels, stories, poems and songs by fans of TV series, films and fiction on web sites founded and monitored by the fans themselves. It is based on and rewrites, for example, the characters, plot and themes of a text originally produced by someone else.

The texts that inspire fan fiction writers typically have a cult status as objects of fans’ and fan communities’ interest, emotional investment and activities. They also have what Matt Hills (2002: 134) has referred to as an endlessly deferred narrative with no or an ambiguous closure, and a multi-dimensional and nuanced fictional world which nevertheless has ‘gaps’ that can be filled in or reinterpreted by fans. For example, at the moment cult texts that are particularly popular in Finland include Harry Potter novels and films, Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings and its film adaptations, Japanese anime and manga series, American science fiction, TV drama and soap, musicals (e.g., Les Misérables, Cats), electronic games and real-life actors, rock/pop musicians and groups.
Along with other fan activities and discourses such as fanzines, fan conventions, costume plays and live role games, fan fiction is an important part of fan culture. It offers fans opportunities for communality and social interaction (see also Hodginson, 2002: 2; Osgerby 2004: 214) that are negotiated and maintained through a set of habitual and recurrent practices (for the notion of community of practice, see Lave and Wenger, 1991; and Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 1992). In this sense, fan fiction is also a good example of late modern social and cultural life which, as has been argued by Maffesoli (1996: 64), increasingly takes place in ‘neo-tribal’, temporary, shifting and changing micro-communities which have a common sensuous or aesthetic lifestyle or hobby, and for which it offers a meaningful basis for identity construction.

In Finland, the majority of fan fiction is written by girls and young women. One indication of this is that 89 per cent of the answers to a questionnaire (n = 109) I posted on a number of Finnish fan web sites in 2004 were by female respondents. The answers also showed that fan fiction writers are typically quite young (60 per cent of my respondents were between the ages 12 and 17). When asked what a typical fan fiction writer is like, one respondent gave the following description:

[Fan fiction is written by] very different types of people. Most of them are young women, but the writer’s age, educational background and interests vary a great deal. The most professional writers are people in whose lives writing has a central role, either as a long-term hobby or as a part of their work (e.g., many journalists write fan fiction). At the other end, there are writers who see fan fiction as an opportunity to express some personal fantasy either for themselves of for other fans (good examples of this are so-called Mary Sue stories which are apparently written by very young people who insert themselves as the protagonist in a story and have adventures with the characters of the original story). (my translation)

Further, as studies on young women’s playing of electronic games (Cunningham, 1998: 145) and Internet use (Leonard, 1998) have already pointed out, the respondents to my questionnaire also confirmed that young women use ICTs primarily as a means of cultural production, in a way that is closely enmeshed with their private lives and ‘integrated within their bedroom culture’ (Osgerby, 2004: 213).

While certain fandoms (fan cultures and collectivities based on particular cultural products) and fan activities are popular among men and women alike, some of them are clearly gendered. Particularly clear cases are fandoms that are based on romance. In North America, for example, key themes in women’s fan fiction (Clerc, 2000: 227–8) and discussion forums (Baym, 2000) are romantic relationships between characters which can
involve sex, but also talk and touching. Similarly, in my corpus of 200 fan fiction texts which were collected from Finnish fan sites, romance is one of the most popular genres written by young women. These romances range from innocent, ‘fluffy’ accounts of romantic relationships to sexually very explicit texts (‘lemons’), to almost pornographic accounts of sexual encounters (‘limes’) and to ‘angst’ and ‘hurt and comfort’ stories. A particularly popular sub-genre of romance is also ‘slash’, which refers to stories about homosexual relationships among characters who are heterosexual in the original source text. Interestingly, these stories are most often written by young, heterosexual female writers. The so-called ‘Mary Sue’ fan fiction is yet another popular ‘feminine’ genre of fan fiction – these are texts in which either the alter ego of the female writer is given access to the fictional world of the cult work or in which an extraneous female character is given the role of the almost omnipotent protagonist who – not atypically – also ends up having a romantic relationship with the male protagonist of the cult text. In contrast, romance hardly features in fan fiction written by boys and young men. For them, sports, battle games, action films, anime, manga or high-tech science fiction are clearly more appealing. In my data, the stories by male writers typically feature action, adventure and humour, although stories about sexual conquests are not uncommon either.

It thus seems that fan fiction by men and women often relies on clearly distinct aesthetics (see also Clerc, 2000). Further, fans themselves display different attitudes to ways of writing typical of male and female fans. Clerc, for example, shows that female fans often regard male fans as comic and dangerous, because their texts tend to tell thinly disguised stories of the writers themselves and pay too much attention to ‘hardware, violence and convoluted plots that go nowhere’ (2000: 225). Female fans, in turn, have been seen as erotic and orgiastic (Jenkins, 1992: 15; Nikunen 2001: 2). In North America both male fans and ‘crusading conservatives’ have found it particularly upsetting that women’s fan fiction so openly and frequently ‘expresses overtly lustful thoughts’ (Clerc, 2000: 225). Similar gendered differences seem to cut across Finnish fan fiction. On the one hand, the few male writers (11 per cent) who responded to my questionnaire strongly emphasized that they take their writing very seriously and strived to become authors respected by their fan community or even real writers whose work could be published by commercial publishers. Women’s fan fiction, on the other hand, was often trivialized. In particular, the Mary Sue stories were frequently made fun of. Interestingly enough, these stories were not ridiculed by male writers only, but older and more experienced females found them problematic – the fact that they are typically produced by quite young female fans seems to make them one of the least respected fan fiction genres.
8.3 Aims and approach

In the following sections, with the help of five examples, I will investigate how young Finnish girls and women deal with gender and sexuality (sexuality referring both to sexual identity and desire, see Cameron and Kulick, 2003: 5) in their fan fiction. The choices that the writers make in their texts are here considered a salient form of social practice with which they build up realities and identities. Further, following Appadurai (1991: 196–200), I see their fan fiction as actively making use of the rich repertoires of possible lives depicted in the films, TV and fiction, some of which may have an important role as part of their lived imagination and life worlds. In other words, despite the fact that these constructions are essentially fictional, they may have repercussions and effects in terms of the writers’ identities. As it was argued above, the fact that the writers choose to publish their writings in public web forums is in itself socially meaningful: fan fiction forums provide them with virtual rooms of their own where they can investigate the questions, challenges and troubles they face in their real lives. In addition, in these forums they can gain access to and interaction with a community of like-minded people – something that many of the fans who answered my questionnaire considered a crucially important element in what it means to be a fan.

In my analysis I will pay particular attention to intertextuality and interdiscursivity, both of which are central aspects of fan fiction (see, e.g., Alvermann and Hagood, 2000; Baym, 2000; Chandler-Olcott and Mahar, 2003; Clerc, 2000; Jenkins, 1992, 1998; Pullen, 2000; Storey, 1996). In a sense intertextuality is what fan fiction is all about: one of its key characteristics is that it incorporates, mixes and appropriates elements from other texts and social and cultural discourses. Interdiscursivity, the use and mixture of styles, generic features and registers within the same text (Fairclough, 1992), in turn, gives fan fiction writers means with which they can balance between the voice of the source text and their own voices. Typically, this entails both the simulation and the appropriation of the style of the source text, and the creation of different types of discourse fusions. For example, the writers can combine two genres (as in ‘songfic’, ‘horror-romance’, or ‘cross-over’ fan fiction which combine aspects of two or more cult texts), modify the conventional language and textual patterns of genres (of the romance genre, in particular) and mix their everyday ways of talking with the discourse of the source text.

In addition, I will also investigate fan fiction writers use of language in both Finnish and English. Although the majority of Finnish fans still prefer to write in Finnish, some of them also write in English. The ways in which they use English varies a great deal, however: its role in fan fiction ranges from occasional lexical insertions, to texts in which English and Finnish alternate, and to texts that are primarily or completely in English.
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To an extent, why Finnish fan writers choose to use English is explained by the Finns’ high proficiency in English – nowadays practically everyone studies English at school from grade three onwards. Within fan cultures, its use is, however, clearly more motivated by the fact that in many cases English is the language of the cult texts. With English, the Finnish fans can also communicate with fans elsewhere in the world. Its clear presence in Finnish fan fiction is thus one indication of the fact that fandoms and fan cultures are no longer tied to particular locations and allegiances only (such as the nation-state, national culture or mother tongue), but that they also now have a trans-local dimension. Importantly, the use of the two languages is also interesting from the point of view of gender and sexuality, because it is one means by which fan fiction characters can be aligned in different ways with the representations of gender of the source texts.

In sum, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and resources provided by Finnish and English offer fan fiction writers rich repertoires of materials for the construction of gender and sexuality in their texts. Next, I will illustrate the different ways in which they put these resources to use in their writing.

8.4 Recycling and modifying stereotypical gender

My first example is an extract of a Mary Sue story written by a young Finnish woman. The story is based on an American science fiction TV serial called *The Invisible Man* which depicts as its hero a handsome young man, Darien Fawkes, who has a shady past but who now works for the government. Thanks to a gland implant that allows him to turn invisible, he is exceptionally good at his work. Unfortunately, the gland has serious side-effects if a counter-agent is not occasionally injected. As a character Darien Fawkes has inspired a great deal of romantic fan fiction. This particular story is no exception: here the writer develops a romance between Darien and a young Finnish girl not unlike the writer herself. The writer’s original text is presented first, and my translation follows.

Extract 1  A Mary Sue story about *The Invisible Man*  


Darien:  Look, I’ll call you later, ok? Bye.

Mä:  Darien, I …

Darien:  Why did you lie to me?

Darien sulki puhelimen ja katto mua niillä ruskeilla tunteeekalla silmilään, mä olin jääny kiinni valheestani.

Darien:  Kevin called.

Mä:  Darien, I ...

Darien:  Why did you lie to me?
Mä: I’m sorry! I couldn’t just say that I went to sleep in Finland and woke up in here! ‘cause that’s the truth, that you wouldn’t have believed.

Darien yritti sanoa jotain väliin, mä en antanut
Mä: Truth is that I’m Anna-Liisa Hokkanen, 15 years old, from Finland. There’s this show called The Invisible man and you are the star of it! You are my idol! And I know it sounds crazy, but I just wanted to feel you close to me. I just wanted to have one kiss, but no it’s impossible [sic].


One day Darien got a phone call while I was taking a shower. When I came out of the shower I dressed and combed my dyed hair. I put the digital camera back into my pocket and went to Darien. He was talking on the phone.

Darien: Look, I’ll call you later, ok? Bye.

Darien put the phone down and looked at me with those brown eyes, full of emotion, I was caught lying

Darien: Kevin called.

Mä: Darien, I …

Darien: Why did you lie to me?

Mä: I’m sorry! I couldn’t just say that I went to sleep in Finland and woke up in here! ‘cause that’s the truth, that you wouldn’t have believed.

Darien tried to interrupt but I didn’t let him.

Mä: Truth is that I’m Anna-Liisa Hokkanen, 15 years old, from Finland. There’s this show called The Invisible man and you are the star of it! You are my idol! And I know it sounds crazy, but I just wanted to feel you close to me. I just wanted to have one kiss, but no it’s imossible [sic].

I ran into the rain, crying. I ran almost for half an hour before I stopped. I sat down on the wet ground and removed all the pictures. When I was taking a photo of myself as a miserable liar, Darien came there and kissed me. That photo got taken. I woke up by the sound of the alarm clock in my mobile phone. It is 7.00 on Monday morning. Was it a dream? I get up and go to my computer to have a look at the digital photos. There is this one photo. A photo about me and Darien, that kiss! It couldn’t have been a dream, there’s a photo
about it! I didn’t tell anybody about this, no one would have believed me. But I know it is real. And there’s evidence! The end.

The story tells a classic heterosexual romance which recycles many familiar generic elements of popular romances: with the help of a subjective first person narrator it tells the story of a budding romantic relationship, including a misunderstanding that almost puts an end to it and finally a romantic reconciliation. The story also contains scenes that are very typical of popular romantic imagery (e.g., the heroine running away, alone in the rain, crying). Also the description of the division of labour in the story follows the typical conventions of popular romances (Reah, 2005), according to which the woman is clearly the less active participant, the receiver of kisses rather than the one who bestows them. From this perspective, its female protagonist is described in a fairly stereotypical way.

At the same time, the writer introduces elements that modify the classic romance. The clearest example of this is the fantastic element she adds to the story: one day the girl miraculously wakes up in Darien’s bed. Further, when developing the romantic plot, the writer adds to her story a moral dimension by describing the ensuing love affair as a strictly chaste one. Even though the couple share the same bed, the under-aged girl and the grown-up man are not depicted as having a sexual relationship. In a way, the female protagonist, although temporarily a part of the fictional world, still remains a voyeur who is satisfied with primarily watching the spectacle of Darien. It is clear that there are feelings and even erotic desire, however. This is shown, for example, in the girl’s yearning for a kiss which would be the culmination of the whole romance for her. When one bears in mind the fact that the writers (as well as their audience) are young girls, this type of sexless romantic story is perhaps all that they want and are prepared for: it could be seen as providing them with a very safe and idealized site in which they can investigate and fantasize about the possibility of romantic love without having to deal with its sexual aspects.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the discourse of this narrative is, however, its use of two languages, Finnish and English. The whole text is characterized, in fact, by systematic code alternation (Muysken, 2000), each language having a distinct discourse function. Every time the writer describes the events and setting of the story and represents the girl’s thoughts she uses everyday informal Finnish. In this way, the writer is able to emphasize that the female protagonist is distinctly a Finnish girl. Despite the fact that she has temporarily become a character in the TV series, she still remains an outsider who has her own life on the other side of the TV screen. Her Finnishness is further accentuated by several references to aspects of Finnish society and culture. For example, the highly technologized Finnish society with its computers, digital cameras and mobile phones is a natural part of the young girl’s world, characterizing her as a
competent user of such technologies. In this way, the writer’s use of Finnish as well as the description of the girl as an expert user of ICTs could even be read as a kind of emancipative discourse – despite her gender (and stereotypical expectations about girls’ and women’s lesser uses of and interest in these technologies), the Finnish girl is depicted as a new, technologically empowered woman who is even able to document her romance with the help of her digital camera and computer.

In contrast, whenever the writer represents the dialogue between Darien and the young girl, she uses English. She simulates the informal American English spoken language and style of the dialogue in the TV series in a fairly convincing way. The use of English is here no doubt motivated by the fact that the fictional world is an English-speaking one. In order to become a legitimate part of this world, the young girl has to communicate in English. English also has a key role in the development of the romance – without the girl’s ability to express her thoughts, feelings and wishes in English, the romance would not have reached its culmination. Further, the use of both Finnish and English in the story emphasizes the fact that the young girl clearly has more knowledge than the otherwise almost perfect male hero. Because of her position as both outside and inside the fictional world, she is the one who knows that Darien is a fictional character in a TV serial and also informs Darien of this fact. In this way, the young girl is represented as a more privileged character than the male protagonist, because she knows that nothing in the fictional world is really true. At the same time, the writer introduces a further twist to her story in the form of the digital photo of the kiss, thus indicating that fantasy can still be true – or produce feelings and pleasure that are true.

In sum, with the help of these bilingual modifications of the romance plot, the writer creates a discursive space in which she has an opportunity to playfully try on the role of the conventional romantic heroine and explore the possibility of romantic love and sexual desire in ways that are at the same time fantastic and firmly grounded on her identity as a modern Finnish girl who has no difficulty in telling the difference between what is fictional and what is real.

8.5 Ridiculing stereotypical images of gender and sexual desire

In romance, fan fiction characters often tend to be described in extremely idealized ways. Typically, the characters serve as objects of the fans’ romantic and erotic fantasies and, as was partly the case with Extract 1, they often recycle and replicate clichés familiar from romantic fiction, film and TV. However, not all fan fiction writers are keen on such stereotypical images. As was indicated by the respondents to my questionnaire, what seems particularly irritating to many writers is the romance writers’ adoration of and attachment to the unrealistically perfected male and female characters
in fan fiction romances. Such critical reactions are illustrated by my next example, a parody of romantic Mary Sue fan fiction.

Extract 2  Cats parody by ‘Eunike’
(http://www.fanfiction.net/s/1118790/1,11/2003)
FOREWORDs
Making fun of Cats Mary Sues (= the infamous mushy love stories starring a random tom and a perfect made-up character and blah blah blah) Yes! Crappy character constructions, over-used plot, extreme shallowness, sickening romance and a made-up you wish to choke! The things you write when you’re bored … *
Disclaimer: I don’t own Cats but I unfortunately own the Mary Sue but I really don’t care if you poke her in the eye or something. Hate her.

THE CATS MARY SUE PARODY
It was midnight. The full moon was brighter than ever and stars twinkle on the sky like millions of diamonds. Yes, it was time for the Jellicle Ball. Again. […]
Mistoffelees sat alone in the darkest corner of the junkyard. The black and white tom was staring at the moon feeling very strange. He knew that something was happening (he was a magical cat, I tell you) […]
Mistoffelees looked at the moon. Suddenly, he heard something. Someone was walking towards him from shadows!
’Who’s there?!?!?!?!?!?!’ He asked and prepared himself for a battle. The shape came into the light. Mistoffelees gasped. He was looking at the most beautiful queen he had ever seen.
(Take a comfortable position, please! This description is gonna be long!) (Yes, these author’s notes within the story are a part of the deal)
She was small sized, just like Mistoffelees himself, only a little bit smaller. Her silky, shining coat had the finest shade of moonlight silver mixing perfectly her snow white chest and face with a few, golden spots on it. The tip of her beautiful tail was also white like the full moon as well as her soft paws. She looked like an angel standing in the silvery moonlight that made the grey of her coat look even more wonderful. Her big eyes were sparkling blue like two sapphires or springs. Only a short glance were those two bright stars was enough to hypnotize Mistoffelees. Her other face features were also perfect and stunningly beautiful; the lovely, black nose with the faultless shape and pink lips. Her smile was like a peaceful spring morning or the song of a thousand birds. Her ears were also wonderful with small tips of black on the tip of them. The other ear was silvery like most of her amazing body; the other one was white like a wild lily or fresh milk. The ears made the mysterious queen look special but even more gorgeous.
This text illustrates the fact that Finnish fans sometimes choose to write in English only, thus showing perhaps that their engagement with, and immersion in, the cult texts also involves the willingness and ability to use its language, English, even when they write for Finnish fan audiences. It also exemplifies how fan fiction writers deliberately use intertextuality as an important resource with which they can generate new stories. Here the writer crafts her story in a way that is not simply a commentary (Genette, 1997) and that adopts and modifies elements from a variety of ‘preceding’ texts (Fairclough, 1999; Kristeva, 1986: 36; Kelly-Holmes, 2000: 21). In Extract 2, these preceding texts include Andrew Lloyd Webber’s *Cats* as well as previous Mary Sue fan fiction about the musical. In *The Cats* the writer adopts the characters, their names, the setting and the romantic plot, which she then mixes with the typical set-up of a Mary Sue, involving a supernaturally perfect female character under whose erotic spell the male protagonist falls.

At the same time, the writer uses other intertextual and interdiscursive strategies to build up her story. Most significantly, she makes use of two strategies which help her to craft her text as a parody, in other words, as an ironic and reflexive imitation and subversion of its preceding texts in order to critique and ridicule them (see, e.g., Hutcheon, 2000). On the one hand, with the help of a number of hyperbolic strategies, she builds up an exaggerated characterization of both the male and the female cat. This she achieves by depicting the female cat through the point of view and narrative voice of the enraptured male cat, to whom the she-cat appears as a veritable sensory and erotic spectacle. For example, the male cat describes the female cat with the help of an abundance of highly evaluative attributes (‘finest’, ‘perfect’, ‘wonderful’, ‘stunningly beautiful’, ‘lovely’). He zooms in on her seductive body piece by piece, in a way that no doubt elaborates on the ways in which the female body is typically described in popular romantic fiction (Mills, 1995: 174). Further, with the help of an excessively long list of similes the female cat is compared to a range of heavenly, natural and precious phenomena. On the other hand, the writer interrupts the narrative several times with ironic authorial comments which are no doubt designed to function as a humorous Verfremdungseffekt (term originally coined by Bertolt Brecht), as a defamiliarization strategy reminding the readers of the illusory and artificial nature of the world and emotions of the characters, and urging them to reflect critically on what is being presented (e.g., ‘INTERVAL! Free coffee and muffins! ….’).

Clearly, these strategies display an extremely knowing and ironic stance towards both popular romances and Mary Sue fan fiction. In this particular
story this stance is manifest in its explicit and playful subversion of the stereotypical and one-dimensional ways of representing gender and sexual desire in popular romances and Mary Sue fan fiction. In this sense, this story makes full use of the potential that parody has as a form of critique and thus offers girls and young women a niche for interrogations of gender and sexuality that are distinctly political in nature.

8.6 Making women matter

Extract 2 showed how young women are not merely consuming and recycling media images of gender and sexual desire, but how they also actively interrogate them through parody and humour. This is not, however, all: many girls and young women who responded to my questionnaire emphasized the fact that another important motivation for their writing is to compensate for the lack of interesting female characters in the cult texts. By this they mean that as a rule, in many of these texts, female characters are seldom the main protagonists or even fully rounded actors who can express their own thoughts, feelings and actively pursue their own goals. For many fans, it is problematic that female characters are often depicted as objects rather than active subjects. Good examples of cult texts like this are, for example, many fantasy, action and adventure films and TV series where women seldom feature as the main characters or, if they are, they are primarily seen in relation to the more fully rounded and narratively more interesting male protagonists. As a consequence of the fans’ discontent with the invisibility and marginality of female characters, they often write fan fiction in which they deliberately strive to make girls and women more central, active and interesting.

This kind of corrective fan fiction is illustrated by Extract 3 which is based on Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*. The example is an extract of a narrative written by a young Finnish woman who routinely writes her fan fiction first in English and then translates it into Finnish. In the same way as many other Finnish fans who select English as their preferred code, this writer uses English very skilfully to compose her story. This is manifest in the way in which she simulates Tolkien’s neutral and detached third-person narrative style and provides descriptions of the fictional world and its characters that are full of details typical of Tolkien’s original work. Thematically, she also retains a number of elements that are familiar from Tolkien’s work: most significantly, she adapts here the theme of forbidden love – which in the original novel is one of its sub-narratives, but which she makes here distinctly more significant.

However, the writer is not satisfied with only imitating Tolkien’s style of writing, but also strives to integrate it with her own discourse, thereby creating an interdiscursive mixture of her own. More specifically, she transforms and partly replaces Tolkien’s epic prose with a narrative that is much
more diffuse in terms of its contents and language. Most significantly, the writer’s additions include a number of female characters – characters who are practically absent from Tolkien’s original text. Further, it is through the voices and points of view of these female characters that the story is depicted and whose decisions and actions actively contribute to the evolving of the plot. These women are also represented as multi-dimensional and complex persons – manifest, for instance, in the writer’s depiction of their thought processes and feelings. However, unlike the male characters in Tolkien’s work, whose narrative life mainly consists of heroic adventures and battles, these new female characters are described in their mundane activities and in personal and intimate discussions with each other, in a style that is distinctly more domestic than in Tolkien’s text. Together, all these additions and modifications build up a completely new dimension to the tolkienesque discourse where women and girls, their experiences, thoughts and feelings are in the spotlight.

Extract 3 shows one of these new female characters, Eowyn of Brandy Hall, a strong and tall young woman. This extract is a part of a long and winding story involving a series of domestic scenes between women – mothers, grandmothers, sisters, children – and conversations between Eowyn and other women. At the focus here is discourse on human relationships – this is, in fact, yet another fan fiction reformulation of the romance genre. The men, most significantly Eowyn’s lover, ‘Marron’, are constructed only through secondary discourse when the women talk about them and via letters which Eowyn reads, thinks about and discusses with other women. The story also involves a complex account of Eowyn’s past (Marron is her cousin, but as Eowyn is an adopted child this does not matter to her, whereas it does matter a great deal to her adoptive parents). Extract 3 contains a fairly typical scene where many of these characteristics of this fan fiction writer’s discourse are quite evident. In this scene Eowyn’s hair is being combed by her mother.

Extract 3 Fan fiction on The Lord of the Rings by ‘Arwen Imladviel’

(http://www.fanfiction.net/s/1251953/1/, 9/2004)

Letters from Bree
One: Tangles
Estella Brandybuck was brushing her daughter Eowyn’s hair.
‘Honestly, dear, it seems to me you have more tangles than you have hair, if that is possible.’
‘I know. My hair looks like a bush of brambles.’
‘Maybe, but it is a very beautiful golden bush.’
Eowyn was not convinced. She had looked in a mirror often enough to know no other maiden had hair like hers. Her hair was long, but very curly, so that it looked short. She had tried braiding it, but the braids made terrible painful tangles and looked messy. Of course there were
worse things in the world than bad hair. One of them was being almost as tall as one's father. And some things so terrible they could not really be mentioned even in thoughts. Eowyn’s distant cousin, Kitty, bustled into the room.

‘My uncle brought the letters. There’s one for you, Eowyn.’

Estella peered over her daughter’s shoulder and saw the address.

‘Eowyn of Brandy Hall, Bucklebury, Buckland’

She sighed. Eowyn hated it when people called her by any other name than Brandybuck. True, she was adopted, but the adoption was official and final. She had been born the bastard child of Lily Maggot, true, but now she was the daughter of Meriadoc and Estella Brandybuck.

Eowyn did not seem offended. Nor did she open the letter. It disappeared into the pocket of her apron. She picked the hairbrush and rushed into her room.

Kitty and Estella stared at each other. They did not need to say the name on their mind.

Marron Brandybuck.

In a way all of the features assigned to Eowyn could be taken to suggest that she represents fairly traditional femininity – that she is a woman who, instead of outward action, turns to talk and introspection as ways to solve a complicated situation. However, while her actions are not dramatic, they are still significant in the sense that with them she is actively trying to solve the problems she faces. Thus, this story is no longer about quests and adventures in a fantasy world, but about women’s predicaments and possibilities for identities and relationships that may still take place in a fantasy world, but which have, at the same time, obvious interest and connection to the life situations of the Finnish female fans who (re)write these types of stories. As we saw, such rewritings also tackle the question of gender equality – or, rather, the lack of it – showing, again, that fan fiction by girls and young women often has its own explicit feminist goals.

8.7 Investigating sex safely: feminizing and resexualizing men

Another way in which the dominance and centrality of male characters is addressed in fan fiction is slash, in which originally heterosexual male characters are coupled with one other. At the moment, slash is one of the most popular fan fiction genres, especially among heterosexual female writers. One of the explanations of why it is so popular is provided by the fans themselves: in their view, it is easier to focus on male characters in fan fiction, simply because they tend to be much more interesting and fully developed than the female ones.

However, the phenomenal success of slash no doubt calls for other explanations, too (see, e.g. Cicioni, 1998; Penley, 1997). One explanation may
be that for young female writers, slash can be a neutral way of investigating romantic and sexual relationships, because it does not involve women at all. In slash no female characters are taken advantage of or abused. Further, it may also offer heterosexual female writers and readers new ways for investigating romance and sex with its pleasurable and tantalizing opportunities for voyeurism of romantic and sexual encounters between men who are desirable to women and girls, too. From this perspective, it could be argued that despite its seemingly homosexual content, slash is often also an expression of heterosexual fantasies. Some of these complexities can be detected in Extract 4 as well:

**Extract 4  Harry Potter slash by ‘Eileen Malfoy’**

(http://www.geocities.com/eileenc84, 10/2003)  
Draco Malfoy, the dead-gorgeous Slytherin ...[...]

Draco looked the laughing boy up and down. ‘If I were you, Potter, I’d be damn afraid ...’ he tried to look scary, but all he got as reward was another burst of giggling from Harry. He crawled up to him. ‘Potter, I am warning you ...’ But the words had no effect on the over-joyed one. Actions speak more than words, he thought, and grabbed Harry’s neck. Potter jumped, seemingly surprised. ‘D-Draco ...?’ ‘That’s Mr Malfoy to you ...’ he madly grinned, and his free hand grabbed his shirt and the other tightened its grip. ‘Now shut up so that I can kiss you, you idiot.’ Harry went speechless and just stared at Draco who possessingly put his lips on Potter’s. Passionately he kissed him while the other was just shocked. ‘I love you too,’ he spoke the words to the other’s mouth, knowing all too well that Potter would not understand, but it didn’t really matter whether he understood or not. For he would find it out sooner or later. For he had plans for the geek.

In the same way as my previous examples, this extract from slash adopts a number of its plot and stylistic ingredients from the source text. These include the setting, two of the main characters and some of their typical characteristics. At the same time, in this example the writer also introduces new elements that radically change aspects of Rowling’s original fictional world and discourse. Once more, this is achieved by the introduction of the romance theme. This time, however, the romance takes place between Draco – one of the evil characters in Harry Potter – and Harry himself, both of whom are unambiguously heterosexual in the source texts.

Another modification of the original story by the young female is the sexual encounter between the two boys. Here she creates a scene full of sexual tension and promise (‘[H]e madly grinned, and his free hand grabbed his shirt and the other tightened its grip’) as well as captures the surprise of the unexpected kiss (‘Passionately he kissed him ...’). What is also particularly interesting here is the way in which Harry Potter, who in
the original cult texts is clearly the most active and dynamic character, is
made to respond in ways that could be seen as traditionally feminine (e.g.,
‘but all he got was another burst of giggling from Harry’; ‘Potter jumped,
seemingly surprised’; ‘Potter went speechless’). In this scene, Harry is thus
constructed in a way that is familiar from popular romantic heterosexual
narratives as the less active participant, who is surprised and paralysed by
the sexual advances of the (more explicitly) male character. In these ways,
Harry Potter is not only feminized but also re-sexualized – which is a good
example of the kind of subversive playfulness typical of slash as a whole.

The selection of English as the language of this story also contributes in
an interesting way to its subversive goals. As indicated by several of my
informants, this is because fans thought it easier to write about such risqué
topics as sex in English rather than in their own language. The use of the
foreign language could thus be a way for the writer to keep a distance
between the (homo) sexual content of the story and herself and to avoid a
full identification with it. That said, writing a homosexual story on the
basis of a distinctly heterosexual source text in its own language could be
seen as even more transgressive than writing the story in Finnish. The
(homo) sexualization of the originally neutral world of the private school
depicted in the *Harry Potter* novels is thus even more striking than it would
be if this transformation was done in Finnish.

This fan fiction romance is sexually ambiguous. Therefore, it may not be
all that difficult for girls and women to identify with Harry and to enjoy
the excitement of the love scene with the ‘dead-gorgeous’ Draco without
the anxieties and worries they might have if the sex scene were explicitly
heterosexual and involved a female character instead of Harry. In my final
example, by contrast, some of these anxieties are much more explicit.

8.8 Girls in trouble over sex

Besides recycling, critiquing and rewriting images of gender and sexuality
suggested in cult texts, Finnish girls and young women also use fan fiction
as a discursive space to investigate issues and problems that they have as
young women, particularly in relation to their relationships. Thus, fan
fiction is also a type of genre in which the fantastic, clearly quite removed
from the everyday lives of fan fiction writers, and their life world concerns
are woven together. Within the framework offered by the source text, fan
fictional writers recontextualize their experiences, problems and questions
as girls and young women and investigate them in the guise of a fictional
story.

Extract 5 is again based on *Harry Potter* novels and films. It illustrates the
‘angst’ genre which is, along with slash, one of the most popular genres
that especially girls and young women write. It tells a sombre and melodra-
matic romantic story involving three characters familiar from the cult texts,
Draco, Ginny and Thomas. In this story these characters are used by the writer to develop a plot and narrative complication which, like those in all of my previous examples, would not be possible in the source texts. Once more, the most important change is the tragic relationship between Draco and Ginny. Draco is tempted by another boy to try and seduce Ginny. In a way, this affair is part of a sexual competition between the two boys, and it also involves a curious erotic bond between them which has its consummation in Draco’s sexual intercourse with the girl, almost witnessed by Thomas. However, the girl is not simply seduced by the boy, but is herself quite determined to have sex with Draco. At the same time, her decision is an uneasy one and seems to be motivated by her wish to placate and please Draco, because this is what he ‘really wants’. The end of the story is a tragic one in that the girl finally learns about the two boys’ conspiracy, and, feeling utterly abused, commits suicide. Its tragic ending is further accentuated by Draco’s realization, that despite his confused feelings and masculine erotic competitiveness, he had feelings for Ginny. As a result, he, too, kills himself. (The original Finnish text is first followed by my translation.)

Extract 5  Harry Potter fan fiction by ‘Lorelei McFlareon’
-Whatever you say … Thomas sanoi välinpitämättömästi
Oletko varma tästä? Draco kysyi epävarman
-Etkö sitten halua tätä?! Ginny kysyi epäillen. Kyllä, tätä Draco juuri halusi. Oli halunnut jo viikoja. Hän voittaisi vedon ja olisi vieläkin rikkaampi mies,
mutta jokin vaivasi häntä
-Heeei…Draco!! En olisi uskonut että pystyt siihen, mutta täytyy myöntää...ole rahasi ansainnut!! Thomas huusi tyhjän (no melkein ainakin) luokkahuoneen ovelta juuri kun Draco ja Ginny olivat puke-massa päälleen.
Draco katsoi Thomasia kauhuissaan ja sitten Ginnyä
-Mitä…?! Ginny kysyi rauhallisesti
-Ai..sinä et tiedä!! Katsos tämä Draco tässä löi kanssani pienen vedon…sinusta!
Onko se totta Draco?! Ginny ei ollut enää rauhallinen
-Ginny, kuuntele minua...!.. Draco aloitti
-Kuinka saatoit!?! Olet TÄYSI PASKA!! Ginny huusi ja lähti juoksemaan
-Haista vittu Tom!! Draco huusi ja lähti juoksemaan Ginnyn perään. Dracon sydän pamppaili, Ginny suuntasi askeleensa kohti pohjoistornia. Ei kai Ginny aikonut hypätä?! Asia selvisi Dracolle tuota pikaa; Ginny seisoi tonin reunalla
-Ginny, kuuntele. En tarkottanut mitää pahaa. Draco selitti
-Ginny, minä rakastan sinua!! Draco sanoi hiljaa
-HAH, paljon rahaa sait tuosta?! Ginny sanoi raivoissaan
-Ginny, minä... Draco aloitti, mutta ei ehtinyt lopettaa lausettaan kun näki tytön hyppäävän
-Ginny?! EEEEEEΙ... Draco huusi ja juoksi tornin laidalle. Hän näki tytön putoavan alapuolellaan
-GINNYYYYY... Draco huusi. Hän ei pystynyt ajattelemaan elämää ilman Ginnyä...... Seuraavana aamuna aamuna Tylypahkan pihalta löytyi kaksi ruumista: Nuoren tytön ja pojan....

Draco and Ginny had been together for a few weeks. Without anyone knowing, naturally. –How is your project going? Thomas asked Draco over breakfast in the Slytherin dining hall. –Well, thank you for asking. – You haven’t had sex yet? You haven’t fallen in love with her, have you? Thomas teased Draco. – Of course not. With that little red head? Draco said, but wasn’t very convinced himself.
-Whatever you say... Thomas said, acting indifferent.
Are you sure about this? Draco asked, feeling uncertain. – Don’t you want this? Ginny asked, doubtfully. Yes, this was exactly what Draco wanted. Had wanted for weeks. He would win the bet and would become an even richer man, but something was bothering him.
-Come on now. Ginny sat down on the table and started unbuttoning her shirt. Suddenly all of Draco’s doubts disappeared. He would complete this with honour ...
- Heeey, Draco! I wouldn’t have thought that you could do it, but I have to admit ... you have earned your money! Thomas shouted from the door of the empty (well, almost empty) classroom as Draco and Ginny were getting dressed.
Draco looked at Thomas, horrified, and then at Ginny.
-What...?! Ginny asked calmly.
-Oh you don’t know! You see this Draco here made a small bet with me ...over you!
-Is that true, Draco?! Ginny was no longer calm.
-Ginny, listen to me! Drago started saying
-How could you?! You’re a REAL SHIT!! Ginny shouted and started running.
- Fuck you Tom! Draco shouted and started running after Ginny. Draco’s heart was pounding. Ginny was heading towards the North Tower. She was not going to jump, was she?! Draco found out very soon; Ginny was standing on the edge of the tower.
-Ginny, listen. I didn’t mean anything bad. Draco explained.
-You know what, I was finally feeling happy… Ginny was crying
-Ginny, I love you! Draco said quietly
-HA, how much money did you get for that? Ginny said, furious.
-Ginny, I… Draco began, but didn’t have time to finish his sentence, when he saw the girl jumping
-Ginny?! NOOOOOO…. Draco shouts and ran to the edge of the tower. He saw the girl falling below him
-GINNYYYYYYYYY… Draco shouted. He couldn’t imagine his life without Ginny. The next morning two bodies were found in the courtyard of Hogwarts. A young girl and a boy.

In this story, fiction and reality enmesh in a number of ways. Firstly, its fictionality shows in the way in which the writer replicates the melodramatic and ‘unrealistic’ conventions of the angst genre (and other related popular genres, such as so-called popular ‘love metal’ whose lyrics tell similar stories of doomed love). In real life, extreme solutions like those depicted in the story are fortunately quite rare. Secondly, its connection to the real-life contexts and concerns of Finnish young women shows in the fact that for the most part the story is told in Finnish. Judging by the questionnaire answers I got, it seems the choice of Finnish as the language with which tragic stories like Extract 5 are told is at least partly motivated by the subject matter. For many fans it is generally easier to write in Finnish whenever they are dealing with difficult and painful emotions and topics. Further, the kind of Finnish that the characters speak is a mixture of speech styles that link it up to both contemporary Finland and the upper-class English boarding school of the original novels. More specifically, the characters of the story at times use expressions that are typical of contemporary adolescent ways of talking in Finland. The strong swear words they use (e.g., ‘Senkin paska!’ – ‘You shit!’; ‘Haista vittu’ – ‘Fuck you’) are particularly good examples of this, and clearly distinguish the characters from the linguistically more correct and docile characters in the Harry Potter novels. At the same time, the characters also use fairly formal Finnish expressions; for example, the formal version of the first-person singular personal pronoun (‘sinä’) which is normally used in written language only in today’s Finland. This kind of formality, in turn, links the discourse with the novels in which most of the characters use carefully crafted Standard English. This effect is further accentuated by the fan fiction writer’s occasional (and most likely unconscious) switches to English (‘Whatever you say’).
Thirdly, the teenage romantic and erotic trouble the story depicts suggests that the context of today’s Finnish teenagers is very relevant to its interpretation. Most importantly, the young girl’s position and reactions can be read against the problems and challenges young Finnish girls face in relation to sex. According to recent studies on young people and sex (e.g., Kosunen and Ritamo 2004; Ritamo [1998] 2000), Finnish girls not only have their first sexual experiences very young (the average age is 16), but also often seem to be pressed by boys to do so. Most of them also say that if they themselves could choose, they would rather postpone the beginning of an active sex life. From this perspective, this type of angst fan fiction could be seen to provide the female writers with a site for therapeutic exploration – which was, in fact, something that the fans’ questionnaire answers also confirmed. In their answers, they pointed out that in angst fans can let out their darker feelings and seek relief from whatever is troubling them in their real-life relationships.

To recap, the writer’s decision to end her story in the death of both of her main protagonists seems shaped by the conventions of the genre in question which calls for drama and tragedy. At the same time, it conveys something of the intensity of the feelings and problems that young girls face in their real-life relationships with respect to relationships and sex.

The fact that, often, fan fiction is sometimes only one step away from the writers’ real lives and problems also became very clear to me in December 2003 when I was collecting my data. In a discussion forum related to one popular Finnish fan fiction site, there was an ongoing ‘real world’ discussion about personal and relationship problems one writer was facing in her life. This young woman was participating in the discussions while hospitalized because of an acute psychological crisis. Despite the fact that during the discussions she got a lot of support and encouragement from others, she ended up committing suicide after she was released from the hospital. The news of her death spread rapidly on the web site, where it was also discussed at length. In these discussions, the writers – who now all came out onto the virtual space of the web site with their real names – shared their feelings of shock and guilt among themselves, as well as expressing condolences to the girl’s family. The troubles depicted in fan fiction thus sometimes speak of very real troubles that the young women are facing – and the borderline between what is fantasy and what is reality can wear very thin indeed.

8.9 Conclusion

The five examples discussed above show how Finnish girls’ and young women’s fan fiction makes use of a range of communicative resources in the virtual spaces offered by fan fiction sites. Drawing on resources offered by two languages and a range of intertextual and interdiscursive resources...
the writers build up texts that explore gender and sexuality in ways that intervene into the discourse of the original cult texts in different ways.

Similar to the findings on electronic fanzines by and for girls (Radway, 2001), fan fiction makes use of and combines discourses about gender and sexuality that consist of heterogeneous and conflicting cultural fragments. A case in point is the way in which stereotypical gender images are made use of in fan fiction and merged with images that correspond to the public image of the contemporary Finnish woman as a knowledgeable, competent and technologically savvy actor. My examples also showed how Finnish girls and young women are far from being simply victimized by media or cult discourses whose fans they are, but actually actively shape and rearticulate these discourses. While the imitation of the styles, characterizations and storylines of the cult texts is taken by fans as an important goal in fan fiction, it seems that most of the writers in my data are not content in simply simulating and recycling conventional and stereotypical images of gender and sexuality. Instead, they use the discursive space of fan fiction to modify, question, parody, critique and radically subvert the ways gender and sexuality are represented in the cult texts. Importantly, in their fan fiction the girls and young women do not generally strive to build unified identities but a variety of complex subject positions, or identity possibilities. In this, fan fiction again seems quite similar to girls’ fanzines, which in Radway’s view (2001: 10–11) are not simply ‘expressions of emerging, idiosyncratic selves or earnest, searching explorations of singular identities’ but combine and recombine rich repertoires of contradictory cultural fragments, thus creating spaces for multiple subject positions.

In addition, fan fiction seems to be closely connected to and to reverberate with the real-life contexts, pressures, troubles and concerns that girls and young women are faced with in today’s Finland. At least for some of them it can even offer an opportunity to investigate these in ways that can be emancipative and therapeutic. From this perspective it could be argued that fan fiction can involve what psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Winnicott, 1992: 107; see also Hills, 2002: 104–12) has referred to as a transitional space which enables young girls and women to both explore problems and questions related to their own identity and, equally importantly, seek pleasure and fulfilment through play, fantasy and imagination.

References


9

‘I’m good.’ ‘I’m nice.’ ‘I’m beautiful.’
Idealization and Contradiction in Female Psychiatric Patients’ Discourse

Branca Telles Ribeiro and Maria Tereza Lopes Dantas

We find ourselves always somewhat unique in our resources and vulnerabilities relative to particular circumstances. We try to find among the beliefs available in our community some that will serve us in achieving our desires and avoiding the pains we fear.

(Lemke, Chapter 1 in this volume)

9.1 Introduction

This article focuses on how women portray themselves in a psychiatric interview. We will see that patients display a sense of self that is fragmented and multiple. Often these different aspects of self are contradictory (such as, ‘the good wife’ and ‘the one who betrays’). We will argue that, in order to have a sense of self, a sense of who they are, these women frequently refer to an ‘ideal me’ or an ‘ideal other’, where identity seems to emerge in a rather fixed representation, though layered in many contradictions.

The process of idealization – and its inherent contradictions – frequently emerges in talk and interaction between doctors and psychiatric patients. In an acute manic crisis, a psychiatric patient tends to display an inflated self-esteem or a sense of grandiosity (Shea, 1998: 240). These processes corroborate to create an ideal of a better self. In the midst of psychiatric processes that threaten or radically destabilize a self, we will see that often a woman will seek to present a socially prestigious self (the beauty queen, the good housewife, the nice girl), alluding to attributes that are endorsed by the society at large. Yet, as Lemke (this volume) points out, there are often contradictions between one’s subjective identities and one’s projected identities to others.

We will present bits of stories told by four female patients that capture idealization and its contradictions. Understanding stories in psychiatric interviews means listening to fragments of narratives as they unfold. For the most part, talk is quite difficult to follow, since these patients are in
 manic episodes. They often speak very fast while bringing up a series of unrelated references. They also introduce idiosyncratic topics and shift reference unexpectedly. Thus, some narratives may never be concluded, and others may not get to be developed. Most often, however, stories are partly developed by the patient and the doctor.

In our discussion, we will focus on three points: (1) the patient’s projection and representation of a feminine ideal; (2) the patient’s performance (alignments to self and other); (3) the patient’s and doctor’s alignments to each other in the interview situation.

In these interviews, both patient and doctor have key speaking and listening roles, what Goffman calls ‘footings’ (1981), that may either hinder or sustain a narrative. Bits and pieces of narratives emerge, co-constructed by the doctor and the patient. These fragmented narratives provide a schema (Tannen and Wallat, 1993) for how the patient represents herself and a significant other.

9.2 Background to this study

The data discussed here derives from an ongoing research project developed at the Institute of Psychiatry of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. We observed, taped, and analysed talk and interaction among psychiatric patients, between doctors and patients, patients and caretakers, and patients and the researcher.

This study focuses on psychiatric interviews between a patient and a doctor. Such an interview is a complex institutional encounter (Shea, 1998; Sullivan, 1970). For the psychiatrist, the interview aims at gathering patient information to reach a diagnosis and establish a course of action for proper treatment. For the patient, this social encounter is seen as an optimal moment to introduce topics on health and illness, where personal stories emerge, and the doctor is framed as a potential listener (Ribeiro, 2002). Such differences in expectations are often not resolved (Ribeiro and Pinto, 2005).

The interviews were conducted by two different doctors – Dr Mauro Cardozo and Dr Mara Matos (not their real names) – as clinical interviews to be used for training and research. Dr Cardozo, 40 years old, is a male neuropsychiatrist. Dr Matos, 35 years old, is a female psychiatrist with a psychoanalytic orientation. Both doctors teach and provide case supervision at the clinic. Dr Cardozo conducted three of the interviews. Each of the patients – Odete Frazao, Elaine Serpa, Larissa Flores, and Rejane Rodrigues (again, not their real names) – had been hospitalized during a severe manic crisis. While each patient suffers from bipolar disorder (manic-depression), they were video-taped while experiencing mania, displaying elevated, expansive moods and a sense of inflated self-esteem.
9.3 Identity: idealization, paradoxes and stigma

Goffman (1959) assigns interaction and face engagements as the \textit{locus} for the presentation of ‘self’. He uses theatrical performance to define this presentation, that is the way we appear to others in everyday life, and states that self is constituted in social interaction and derives from one’s relationship with the social world. He then proceeds to fine tune the many aspects of this presentation. Goffman defines performance as ‘all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers’ (1959: 22). Participants in interaction present a ‘front’ to others, which is conveyed intentionally or not during any performance. Part of this ‘personal front’ includes social traits such as status and clothing; gender, age and ethnicity; size and looks; posture and speech patterns; facial expressions and gestures, and so on (1959: 24). Related to the ‘personal front’ is the ‘appearance’: how one shows up in interaction, that is, ways of performing discursive and interactional roles. In brief, how we enact our social attributes and therefore present our aspects of self in everyday life – what Erickson and Shultz named our ‘performed social identities’ (1982: 16). We will see that each patient in our study displays a different type of appearance, projecting different social roles, which will be sustained (or not) in interaction with the doctor. These are temporary states – or fleeting moments – that capture a performed identity and its inherent contradictions.

Performance – as described by Goffman – often presents ‘official social values’ projected by the ‘personal front’. These values express attributes or features that are socially endorsed as prestigious. When participants perform such attributes (as, e.g., being the girlfriend of a famous rock star or being a Beauty Queen in a beauty contest), they are putting on an appearance carried by such esteemed social values. This type of enactment captures ‘the tendency for performers to offer their observers an impression that is idealized in several different ways’ (1959: 35). An idealization, therefore, captures the enactment of celebrated and well-known social attributes. Goffman points out that in everyday interaction, individual performance ‘will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society’. Such performances not only aspire to present a higher strata or a prestigious position, but also convey a ‘desire for a place close to the sacred centre of the common values of society’ (1959: 36). Thus participants engaged in interaction perform actions that portray common and valued understandings about what it means to be good, to be nice, or to be pretty, for example. Such social attributes – goodness, niceness or beauty – will be presented by the women discussed in this chapter. This idealization process reflects ways that performers intend their actions to impact on their audience (or interactant), as they voice ideal standards. Individuals may
edit or correct behaviour to such effect so that their performances match expectations for a given social role. Often, in our data, it is the doctor who proposes adjustments or revisions by requesting clarification or probing further, in order to understand who the patient is or how the patient is trying to portray herself.

Considering expectations for a given social role, Goffman also discusses how a participant may build a ‘virtual social identity’ (1963: 2) with tints (or demands) from idealized attributes, thus distancing herself from her ‘actual social identity’. In her performance, an individual may present inconsistencies, a paradox between her virtual social identity (which she aims to project) and her actual social identity (who she is as she enacts different selves), revealing disparities related to the projected valued stereotype (of goodness, niceness, beauty, in the case of these women). When such inconsistencies come up, they may point to unworthy and socially depreciated attributes. In this case, they will constitute a stigma: a special discrepancy, an incongruous one, between a virtual and actual social identity (1963: 3). Stigma points to depreciative values in what is considered to be a social norm. In the following analysis, we will focus on one type of stigma, the one that is related to patients in a psychiatric institution. This group of people belong to the ‘discredited’, those that know that ‘their differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot’ (1963: 4). We are particularly interested in discussing how, in interaction with a doctor, these women project idealized selves and what sort of discrepancies come up in their performance. How are these women’s identities ‘troubled’? What are they pretending to be? What are they fighting against or what are they accommodating to?

9.4 Feminine and masculine identities: foregrounding and idealization

Prior studies on gender (Coates, 1998; Tannen, 1990, among others) noted differences in ways that men and women would engage in social discourses. Often a dichotomy was suggested. For example, men would talk about illness and pain to affirm recovery (and not the suffering itself); they would be prone to affirm bravery and strength. Women, on the other hand, would probe into the personal, the problematic, often leading to recurrent topics on emotions (engaging in talk about feelings, love, secrets). Such understanding would attribute a range of behaviour to men and women related to a division between reason and emotion, competition and cooperation, distancing and involvement. More recently, the notion of gendered identities and performativity (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002), that is, doing or performing one’s gender, points to the relevance of seeing gender as a contextualized social practice. Social attributes such as being ‘active or passive’ and ‘rational or emotional’ are now being investigated in the actual performance of a given interaction.
Lemke discusses in Chapter 1 how identity has become such a central notion, a link between the ‘phenomenological domain of lived, moment to moment experience and the semiotic domain of enduring cultural and social systems of beliefs, values, and meaning-making practices’ (p. 21). Considering gender, for example, Lemke states that matters are not simple, that is, it’s not just about being ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, or regulating behaviour without taking into account the heterogeneity of social identities expressed in discourse and interaction. While we may occasionally adopt traits that are more typically associated with feminine ideals (such as being delicate, cooperative, passive), on other occasions women do adopt traits that are stereotypically associated with males (i.e., aggression, boldness, strength). While we aim at a cultural ideal, we perform our diverse multiple selves/identities in interaction with others. Thus normality ‘is always a mystification of normativity, a social lie’ (p. 20). Our social and interactional lives are constructed in contradictions between ‘our subjective identities, who we are to ourselves, and our projected identities, who we wish to seem to be to others’ (p. 20). This understanding – captured by Goffman’s ‘virtual vs. actual social identities’ – will be particularly interesting in the data discussed in this chapter. It gets to be more complicated in interactions with psychiatric patients, where the social pressure to conform to stereotypes of normality is higher.

9.5 Identity and mental health

Goffman (1961, 1963) and Foucault ([1954]1987) examine everyday life in ‘total institutions’ (e.g., in psychiatric wards, prisons, boarding schools), where interns are regimented, surrounded by inmates, and unable to leave the premises. Special attention is given to mental hospitals, where Goffman discusses different aspects of the ‘career of the patient’. At the very onset of institutionalization, he states that ‘role dispossession … occurs’ (1961: 14), when a pre-patient becomes an inpatient and ‘curtailment of self’ takes place (1961: 46). This process takes place as a person goes through a series of interactions that work progressively towards this curtailment.

Present-day psychiatric practices tend to be attentive to what this defacement means. In various institutions patients keep their personal belongings, wear their everyday clothes (no uniforms are used) and have different degrees of access to exterior/external locations. Also institutionalization in psychiatry has been quite restricted in time span, so that today fewer patients are admitted to hospitals (only under quite severe conditions that would definitely indicate harm to themselves or others). At the Institute of Psychiatry of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, patients’ stay is restricted to a maximum of three weeks and most are discharged within a week or two.2
Nevertheless, institutionalization practices do take place, creating for the intern the role of patient, with its various social attributes and expectations. Embedded in such institutional contexts, we will see that the women in this study present and perform often conflicting identities. Mostly, we will focus on (1) the processes of idealization regarding identity construction; (2) how these ideals often relate to social behaviours typically associated with women; (3) the sorts of contradictions that emerge between ideals and their performed gendered identities; and (4) what we believe such discursive practices mean to these patients, that is, the relationship between idealization and the stigma of mental health.

9.6 Analytical framework

Our research methodology derives from sociolinguistic discourse analysis (Gumperz, 1982, 1992; Schiffrin, 1994; Tannen, 1993). When examining talk, we are concerned with units of meaning, referential (topics) and contextual, such as frames, which are meta messages that capture participants’ definitions (and ongoing redefinitions) of a social situation.

Framing can be thought of as the linguistic negotiation of our social and conversational identities in talk. Thus, identity can be understood as a composite of projected selves or multiple alignments that one brings to an interaction. Among the relatively stable social and cultural traits of a participant (education, social class, language background, ethnicity, gender, etc.), there are those that would be most salient in a given interaction. Goffman (1959) alerts us to look at the value placed on social attributes as they are performed and presented in the situation. In discussing identity, one should take into consideration the knowledge participants have and share in the encounter (knowledge schemas), the social and conversational attributes that surface in that encounter and are enacted face to face, and the effect these attributes have on the interactant(s). While knowledge schemas would capture the relatively more stable traits projected in an interaction, interactive frames would capture participants’ ever-changing alignments (or footings) to each other and to what is being communicated (Tannen and Wallat, 1993).

9.7 Ideal and paradox

So let’s turn to the psychiatric interview. For each of the four patients, we will comment on a few segments of talk, where the doctor may participate minimally (by back-channelling ‘mmm’) or quite extensively (by jointly developing a story). The sort of interaction portrayed in these excerpts is typical for these interviews. Each excerpt illustrates how the patient represents (and performs) different aspects of self. Each captures both idealization and contradictory alignments in the presentation of self. First, let’s hear Odete.
Extract 1

(a) Odete: *I’m good in everything*

Odete, 33 years old, was born in Bahia in 1962. She is retired due to disability. She lives in Rio de Janeiro with her adolescent son. Before being treated at the Institute of Psychiatry (IPUB), she was admitted to the hospital of the Federal University of Bahia, Salvador. The doctor is Dr Mauro Cardozo and, as mentioned before, he is a neuropsychiatrist:

*First segment*

1 Odete: I’m good, I’m a good mother.
2 Doctor: mmm mmm.
3 Odete: my son is beautiful, doctor. my son is beautiful. (pause) I’m a good mother, I’m a good wife, I’m a good woman, I’m a good lover. I’m not the type to cheat on my husband-
4 Doctor: mmm mmm.=
5 Odete: =I never cheated on my husband. I don’t need to- I never needed to- if I need to I’ll cheat on him even with two [men] if I want.
6 Doctor: oh really? but what’s this, ‘if I need to cheat on him.’?
7 Odete: if he cheats on me.
8 Doctor: mmm.
9 Odete: and I hear [about it], and he tells me ‘oh honey’ (pause) ‘here, I found someone like you, I thought about you, I flirted [with her]’ (pause) [Odete responds to husband] ‘is that right, dear?’.
   [acc]
   he’d come home, find (me) in bed. (laughter) (pause) I’d be in bed so that he could see how good it is (pause) to be cheated on.

Odete represents herself as a good mother (her son is ‘beautiful’) and a good wife (good woman and good lover) in a series of affirmative statements (turns 1 and 3). However, Odete juxtaposes a negative statement ‘I’m not the type to cheat on my husband.’ A series of negative statements follows (‘I never cheated’, ‘I don’t need to- I never needed to-‘). We see a change in Odete’s alignment from an affirmation of self (I’m good) to a denial of a bad self (I don’t cheat, I don’t need to cheat). A conditional ‘if I need to’ prefices a challenge to her husband ‘I’ll cheat on him’, a challenge that is twice reinforced (turn 5).

Thus, Odete articulates two troubled positions: ‘the good wife’ and ‘the challenging wife’. The doctor focuses on the challenge (turn 6 ‘oh really? 
But what’s this, “if I need to cheat on him”?). Odete explains her challenges as a response to her husband’s prior (hypothetical) behaviour (‘if he cheats on me.’). She embeds a fictional exchange to illustrate her position (turn 9).

This excerpt illustrates Odete’s search for a feminine ideal as a ‘good woman’ who embraces values such as being a good mother and wife. However, when she represents herself as a good lover (embedded in the wife persona), she implicitly brings up betrayal. This new alignment seems to realize a paradox of being good and not being good, of being faithful and unfaithful. Conflicting orientations inform how Odete views herself. Hypothetically, she may betray in style (‘even with two men’, and ‘in [her husband’s] bed’). However, in present time – throughout the interview – Odete asserts repeatedly that she’s ‘good’.

In the second excerpt we will see how disability, implicitly related to Odete’s mental health, placed her in an early retirement. The interaction with the doctor progresses from disability to a statement of utter success about ‘being good at everything’.

**Extract 2**

*Second segment*

1. Odete: I’m retired, doctor.
2. Doctor: right. why?
3. Odete: retirement- retirement due to disability. here in Brazil, but at the place I retired from, it’s a special retirement. [( )
4. Doctor: [but was it outside Brazil?]
5. Odete: I’m an employee of a multinational company.
6. Doctor: you’re an employee of a multinational company?
7. Odete: yeah.
8. Doctor: but how come? explain this to me.
10. Doctor: [uh-huh]
11. Odete: [for Stanley ( )
15. Odete: I retired in- (no- no- no- no) I started when I was eighteen years old. when I started at eighteen years old, [pause] [acc] I [pause] got first place in sales in Brazil, first place in sales in Brazil. I was number one in sales, [pause] in Brazil, me this person here. [pause]
this very person you’re looking at.

16 Doctor: uh-huh
17 Odete: three times on a row, three times. I picked up the company’s schedules, schedule, I studied and applied it and got first place in sales in Brazil, [pause] after three months in my job.

18 Doctor: you were a very good salesperson?
19 Odete: I’m very good at everything.

Odete first mentions that she is retired. When the doctor asks for clarification, she tells him that she has a special retirement ‘due to disability here in Brazil’. The doctor probes further to clarify the location ‘but was it outside Brazil?’ given that it had a special status. Odete does not define where her retirement comes from. Instead, she tells him ‘I’m an employee of a multinational company’ (turn 5). In turns (6) and (8), the doctor asks for confirmation (‘you’re an employee of a multinational company?’) and clarification (‘but how come? Explain this to me.’). In addressing these questions, Odete constructs a short narrative where she states that she was a ‘sales representative’ for Stanley (a home products multinational business), she started working at 18, and she won ‘first place in sales in Brazil.’ (turn 15). Three times she makes the same statement, while also emphatically positioning herself vis-à-vis the doctor ‘me this person here. This person you’re looking at.’ Odete adds further details of her successful performance at the company in a very short time (turn 17), leading the doctor to a conclusive question ‘you were a very good salesperson?’ which Odete closes by stating ‘I’m very good at everything.’

In Brazil, bipolar patients can take early retirement. In this segment, Odete initially constructs herself as a patient, based on an aspect of her illness: her retirement ‘due to disability.’ She creates, however, an unspecified location, sometimes referred to as ‘the place I retired from,’ ‘the multinational company’ in Brazil, or ‘Stanley’. It is an idealized space, with external and internal connotations. It is foreign – a multinational company with an English name. It is also located in Brazil. Within this space, present and past seem to co-occur. Sometimes Odete is a ‘multinational employee’ and ‘sales representative’ (‘I’m an employee of a multinational company’ in turn 5, ‘I’m a sales representative’ in turn 9), and sometimes she turns to the past, she got ‘first place in sales in Brazil’ (turn 15). The doctor follows the patient and, referring to the past, asks ‘you were a very good salesperson?’ Odete turns to the present and replies ‘I’m very good at everything.’ Thus, the patient creates an idealized setting for her presentation of an idealized self (‘number one’), where national and foreign status are mixed, past and present alternate and merge: she is retired ‘here in Brazil’ and at that unspecified foreign ‘place I retired from’, she is a sales representative; she was number one salesperson in Brazil, and she is good at everything.
Upon referring to her illness, Odete initially introduces herself as an ‘invalid’ (literally without value) in Brazilian Portuguese when she says ‘aposentadoria por invalidez’ (retirement for being disabled) – a situation that probably destabilized her self. She gradually reconstructs herself in an idealized presentation, in an encompassing space (internal/external) and time frame (present/past), as someone of great worth, who is able and valued in everything: ‘I’m good at everything.’

Let’s turn now to Elaine.

**Extract 3**

b) *Elaine: I’m nice. I’m the King’s girlfriend*

Elaine was born in Rio de Janeiro and is now around 40 years old. She lives with her parents and works as a sales representative. She was first admitted to the hospital when she was 17. Elaine has been a patient at IPUB for about seven years. The doctor, Dr Mara Matos, is a female psychiatrist with a psychoanalytic orientation.

In the first segment the doctor inquires about Elaine’s admission to the hospital.

*First segment:*

1. Doctor: have you been an inpatient before, Elaine?
2. Elaine: I’ve been (a patient) at Pinel.
3. Doctor: at Pinel? why were you admitted?=
4. Elaine: =I took 20 pills (pause) to die.
5. Doctor: but ( )?=
6. Elaine: =//I was sad, I needed love, I needed him//
7. Doctor: what do you mean?
8. Elaine listen to the song by Roberto Carlos that’s coming up ( ) like this,5
   *in the peace of your smile, my dreams I satisfy. I kiss you joyfully and with a crazy yearning for for your mouth, I am burning all of this you give me darling all of this,* see:::
   a kiss!
9. Doctor: who kissed you?=
10. Elaine =he was the one that kissed me.
11. Doctor: who?
12. Elaine: Roberto Carlos!

At this point in the interview, the doctor investigates why Elaine was admitted to the hospital, introducing questions that are part of any standard psychiatric interview (turns 1 and 3). Elaine says that she was admitted because of a suicide attempt (turn 4). The patient suggests that her attempt to commit suicide was related to sadness, a love relationship, and loneliness: ‘I was sad, I needed love, I needed him.’ The emphasis on ‘him’
raises the doctor’s interest. Dr Matos asks a clarifying question that Elaine addresses by placing the doctor as a potential audience to a performance ‘listen to the song by Roberto Carlos that’s coming up.’ (turn 8). A short performance takes place closing the scene with ‘a kiss’. Again the doctor requests clarification and Elaine keeps the suspense, referring with emphasis to her lover by pronoun (turn 10). A new request for clarification from the doctor follows: ‘who?’. Elaine builds up her narrative with suspense until she finally reveals the name of her lover: ‘Roberto Carlos!’

At first Elaine projects herself discursively through depression and despair, captured by her attempt to commit suicide. As she constructs this brief narrative, she starts to shift from sadness to loneliness (‘I needed love, I needed him’), evoking a partner, and then progressively projecting herself as being in love with Roberto Carlos. In this narrative, Elaine shifts from presenting herself as seriously ill (with a bout of severe depression) to displaying a performance (as a singer and an entertainer) about a person madly in love with a famous singer (an interesting and socially accepted ritual). Elaine works discursively (shifting topic and frames) to soften her identity as a mental patient; she also works to project an idealized image of herself: a woman who is very much in love with Brazil’s famous rock star.

The next segment further develops this idealized image and brings up some inherent contradictions.

**Extract 4**

*Second segment*

1 Elaine: what I most want today as a gift is ( )
2 Doctor: what you most want as a gift is what?
3 Elaine: I want, I want to get a bouquet of roses.
4 Doctor: and that Roberto Carlos would come to see you?
5 Elaine: yeah and that he’d give me, give me a bouquet of roses.
6 Doctor: and do you think that could possibly happen?
7 Elaine: ‘Roberto! I love you! (laughter) Elaine from Caxias who always goes there to Urca to bug you is ( ) you and your daughters, I love you (pause) he knows who I am.
8 Doctor: does he know you stick around his house waiting for him to come home?
9 Elaine: I drink beer, I fill up up- I fill the glass up, three glasses this tall, and I keep drinking, drinking like this, and worse I and ( ) I and ( ) drinking, eating, then he arrives reeking of booze ( ), I keep on eating way into the deep of night then (pause) you won’t tell anyone right? I’m single, right? one can’t talk [about these things] or it will hurt my mother and my father, one must act like a real lady, right?
Roberto Carlos (mentioned by the doctor in turn 4) is Brazil’s romantic rock idol. He’s known as the King. Elaine represents herself as the King’s girlfriend. It’s her birthday and Elaine tells the doctor she wants a ‘bouquet of roses’ from Roberto Carlos (turn 5). She then addresses the rock singer (turn 7), identifies herself, and declares her love – triggering a reframing as if she were on TV.6

The ideal image of being the King’s girlfriend, however, gets progressively tarnished. She represents herself as the one ‘who bugs [him]’ and the doctor ratifies ‘does he know you stick around his house waiting for him to come home’ (turn 8). She states that she drinks heavily, eats (sexually and otherwise) until late at night (turn 9). The King’s image is also tarnished as he arrives ‘reeking of booze’. Here the idol is shown to have feet of clay, and both King and girlfriend have fallen from grace.

The third and last segment restates and expands on constructing these contradictions.

**Extract 5**

**Third segment**

1 Elaine: I did all the laundry at my mom’s house, did all the laundry, tidied it up, polished everything at my mom’s house, I cooked, and then my mom went to the Universal Church, from the Universal Church7 and ( ) I went down to Urca8.

2 Doctor: Uh-huh

3 Elaine: I took the money for the bus fare, and then- then I went down to Urca. I started drinking beer. then I went to the section that’s near the sea, y’know. I drank beer facing the sea, y’know. suddenly a boat named Lady Laura9 passes by. (Roberto Carlos) stops-[for me.

4 Doctor: [hang on, hang on, speak up a bit higher cuz’ I can’t hear you anymore. the boat Lady Laura went by?=]

5 Elaine: =Lady Laura, y’know. and then it stopped near me. He said ‘gorgeous, what are you doing here alone? don’t you have a mother?’ and I said ‘no, I have God with me.’ [she sings]
there is a God who has power, there’s nothing he-, God knows everything.

6 Doctor: did you sing this to him?

7 Elaine: yes, I did.

Again Elaine talks about meeting Roberto Carlos. At first, she talks about doing household chores and how she helped her mother while she went to Church. After presenting a series of positive evaluative statements, Elaine introduces the topic ‘Urca’, to her narrative, the high middle-class neighbourhood in Rio where Roberto Carlos lives. The narrative then shifts from the home environment to the outdoors: ‘I took the money for the bus fare, and then – then I went down to Urca and I started drinking beer. Then I went to the section that’s near the sea, y’ know. I drank beer facing the sea, y’ know. Suddenly a boat named Lady Laura passes by. (Roberto Carlos) stops- for me.’

There is a major shift from the reliable nice daughter (doing laundry, polishing, cooking) safe at home to the one that transgresses outdoors (drinking beer at a bar, waiting for her loved one). Elaine not only visits Roberto Carlos’s wealthy neighbourhood, but she also has an unusual romantic meeting on the Lady Laura (in the Brazilian context, a well-known cruise ship that belongs to her idol). This statement prompts the doctor’s interruption and clarification question, given the unexpected nature of her account. Elaine replies by acting out a dialogue between the singer and herself, where the singer flirts with her (turn 5). However, Roberto Carlos’s query is clearly ambiguous: on the one hand, he appraises Elaine positively (‘gorgeous’), but he also introduces a negative evaluation (‘what are you doing here alone? Don’t you have a mother?’), reintroducing the family world and traditional values into the narrative. In her response to her supposed lover, Elaine projects a self based on traditional traits, shifting alignments to the home scene, to the religious values previously only attributed to her mother (‘my mom went to the Universal Church, from the Universal Church’).

We see that Elaine oscillates between a self that projects values such as the nice girl (who helps her mother, who is religious), to the liberal woman (who goes out and drinks beer alone). She also speaks of a glamourous and wealthy world that contrasts with a lower-middle-class and rather traditional world. Again, an idealized image of the self emerges through the account of a love relationship.

Elaine captures the feminine paradox of ‘the nice girl’ (the one who gets a bouquet of roses, who is concerned about mom and dad) and ‘the bad girl’ (the one who bugs people, the one who drinks and ‘eats’ way into the night). In the above segments, Elaine projects herself discursively in different troubled ways: (a) as an inpatient at Pinel who is sad and tries to commit suicide; (b) as a liberal woman, the girlfriend of a famous singer; and finally (c) as a daughter devoted to her home,
who helps mom and is as religious as mom is. In the development of her narrative, five different settings are evoked – the psychiatric institute, the bar, the mother’s house, the Universal Church, the boat Lady Laura – mixing up the sacred (the home and the church) and the profane (the bar, the boat). Elaine seems to construct her account as a psychiatric patient, while juxtaposing an ideal image of a famous singer’s girlfriend, evoking socially appreciated values, such as status, fame and niceness.

In Larissa, we will see similar constructions of self: from the patient to the muse of a famous Brazilian composer.

Extract 6

c) Larissa: ‘I’m a beauty queen’

Larissa was born in Paraíba state in northern Brazil. She is 48 years old and has been a patient of the Institute of Psychiatry for about 10 years. When the interview was recorded, she was an active member of the Brazilian Association of Mental Health Service Users, whose main objective is to fight against compulsory psychiatric hospitalization. Dr Mauro Cardozo is the interviewer.

First segment

1 Doctor: you like Dr Rogers, don’t you?
2 Larissa: I like him a lot. I was anorexic and he cured me.
3 Doctor: you were anorexic?
4 Larissa: yeah. I almost died.
5 Doctor: how [was it-
6 Larissa: [I almost died.
7 Doctor: how was it with the anorexia?
8 Larissa: I didn’t want to eat anything, I only drank water, I only wanted coke, the food, when it came I would throw it up. he said ‘you’re anorexic, Larissa’. And I was thin, I lost 10 pounds, see, I used to look better, I had well-rounded legs. now they’re thin, they’re ugly, outside my endowments as a ‘Beauty Queen,’ see?

9 Doctor: [which ‘Beauty Queen’ endowments do you have? tell me.
10 Larissa: [oh, at 17 I was ‘Miss Paraiba’ in ’72, at 18 I was ‘Miss Objetiva,’10 Queen of the Pools, Queen of Rio de Janeiro College Games,
 I put a medal on Zico [famous soccer star], on all of them [soccer stars]

11 Doctor: oh, really?
Larissa embraces an emblematic feminine contradiction: the anorexic woman (who tells us a narrative of illness, loss of weight, possibility of death, turns 2–4–6–8) versus the beauty queen (‘Miss Paraíba’, turns 10 and 12). It is the queen who enters the masculine world (the soccer players’ quarters), a sophisticated and foreign scenario (demonstrated by the Spanish pronunciation ‘concentracion’) and has a relationship with the soccer king, Zico. Thus, the female ideal finds her equal to a male ideal. Both images (beauty queen and soccer king), as well as her illness, are reported as past events. However, Larissa refers to conflicting attributes in the present as she talks to the doctor: she has the status of a beauty queen but she also has skinny legs; so she embodies the female paradox of beauty and illness.

In the next segment, Larissa reasserts herself as this beautiful woman, who is revered by Brazil’s most famous poets and singers.

**Extract 7**

**Second segment**

1 Larissa: and I have these friends, who used to work by night, who were singers, and who are famous today, and who still get along with me, like Djavan, for example.

2 Doctor: uh-huh.

3 Larissa: Maria Betânia, Gal Costa, Caetano Veloso and the late Vinicius de Moraes, who knelt down at my feet and sang ‘Tristeza’ [Sadness] because I was sad ( ) ‘sadness has no end, happiness does.’ he sang this to me.

4 Doctor: hum.

We see references to a glamorized world: Larissa is the friend of several celebrities from the Brazilian artistic world. Within this universe, Larissa is Vinicius de Moraes’s muse in a brief narrative about how he knelt down and sang to her. In this idealized universe, sadness (a major symptom of
depression) becomes an attribute appreciated in such a special way that it deserves a well-known poem and love song. Larissa represents herself as a sick woman who may be anorexic, a beauty queen who attracts Brazil’s famous soccer player, the poet’s muse, who captures her sadness in verse and melody. This idealized image constructed by Larissa embraces a celebrated self (a beauty queen) and a sad muse evoked by a dead celebrity: ‘the late Vinicius de Moraes, who knelt down at my feet and sang ‘Tristeza’ [Sadness] because I was sad’.

Odete, Elaine and Larissa refer to ideal feminine images. There is the good wife, the nice girl, the beauty queen. These are rather static and traditional female representations. In many ways these images reproduce lifestyles propagated by the media (see Chapter 2 in this volume) and the society at large. What would the use of such stereotypes accomplish in talk and interaction with the doctor? What would these women be fighting against or accommodating to? Odete, Elaine and Larissa are working-class women. In Brazil, these women are often held in low regard. To complicate matters, they have been classified as manic-depressive patients – a mental illness that marks a ‘spoiled identity’ (Goffman, 1963). Such practice of identification ‘can neither be chosen, nor changed’ (see Chapter 2). Thus, these women embody a double stigma as working-class females and mental patients. However, by referring to and performing a ‘better self’, each of them may be able for a moment to transcend the ‘here and now’, to move beyond the territory and the confinement of a relatively ‘fixed identity’ as psychiatric patient. A sense of agency may emerge, a movement away from illness and pain.

Also each woman is immersed in a relationship, seeking ways to overcome isolation. They refer to romanticized (and glamorized) affairs (with the soccer king, the rock star, the romantic poet). Yet, they relate to their loved ones in different ways. Elaine embodies the idealized female who is in love with Brazil’s romantic bard Roberto Carlos, a persona created in opposition to death and pain. Elaine gets sick because of the absence of ‘his’ love – not because of her illness (manic-depression). Larissa closely relates the ideal self (the beauty queen) to an illness of the soul (sadness). These are the same ingredients that help constitute Vinicius’ (the poet’s) muse. Art (poetry and music) is the chosen form to transcend illness, and thus overcome isolation. A sense of agency as well as the need to overcome isolation seem to thread Odete’s, Elaine’s and Larissa’s self representations and need for idealization.

Yet contradictory information to such ideals do emerge. We see that each woman also presents and performs contradictory aspects of self. For example, there is the wife who is not good enough (who might be betrayed? who might betray?); there is the nice girl (who drinks, eats and fools around); there is the beauty queen (who becomes ill and anorexic). Voicing an ideal may be a way of attempting to resolve the many contradictions of socially negative traits.
Rejane Rodrigues, the fourth patient, presents a more complex portrait. Rejane is a 35-year-old woman who has been a patient at IPUB for about five years. She lives with relatives and is originally from Rio de Janeiro. Dr Mauro Cardozo is again the interviewer.

**Extract 8**

d) *Rejane: We’re God’s children and we can do it all*

1st segment

1 Doctor: and boyfriends?
2 Rejane: I’ve got three.
3 Doctor: three boyfriends?
4 Rejane: yeah, I can only (put out for three) more or less if it feels good.
   [smiling and bending towards the doctor]
5 Doctor: oh, really?
6 Rejane: really ... that one there is Eric.
   [pointing down]
7 Doctor: that one who was downstairs | speaking to you?
8 Rejane: | he’s the first love of my life, for ten years.
9 Doctor: and you are | going out with him?
10 Rejane: | Bozo is a real drag, Bozo is a real drag
   [referring to a prior lover]
   (he stays pretty much like that, never gets out of that shit)
   I’m normal,
   I curse like crazy, that’s my nature, I can’t change that.
11 Doctor: you curse a lot?
12 Rejane: now and then which is always good ... if Faustão is right (shit, man)
   ( ) you, right?
13 Doctor: Faustão curses a lot, right?
14 Rejane: he’s right (he sees far away) ‘go fuck yourself!’
   [laughs, gestures and gazes beyond doctor]
15 Doctor: and you also curse a lot, right?
16 Rejane: I curse with the Holy Ghost as my support,
   if it comes making noises on my head,
   I’ll smack the shit out of him, I’ll put up a fight.
17 Doctor: but what’s this thing with the Holy Ghost and cursing?
18 Rejane: — Kung Fu!
   (laughs)
19 Doctor: but is it something ... | very-
20 Rejane: well, we are all God’s children and we can [overcome] everythin-...
do you understand what grace is? It’s a grace that comes from heaven.

21 Doctor: mmm mmm.

Several identities are present in fragmented narratives (being a woman and having many boyfriends, such as Eric and Bozo; or being normal and cursing and fighting). None of these fragments are developed into stories, however (at this point in the interaction), or concluded. They also trigger different alignments: (1) there is a flirtatious footing with the doctor (turn 4 ‘I can only put out for three more or less if it feels good’); (2) there is an aggressive footing (turn 14 ‘go fuck yourself;’ turn 16 ‘I’ll smack the shit out of him.’); (3) and there is a preaching footing (turn 20 ‘we are all God’s children.’ and ‘do you understand what grace is?’). Rejane’s footings are sustained by the doctor, who ratifies her playful alignments (turns 3–5–7–9) as well as her challenges (e.g., on turn 15, the doctor goes along, encouraging rather than shifting topic).

There are many contradictions in this excerpt. Rejane’s different alignments (the flirt, the fighter and the pious person) point to conflict. The doctor inquires about these inconsistencies (turn 17 ‘but what’s this thing with the Holy Ghost and cursing?’). Rejane responds across several turns by referring to the ideal world. There is Faustão (a well-known Brazilian talk show host) who also ‘curses a lot.’ (turns 12–13). There is Kung Fu (a hero in a Japanese TV series) who puts up martial arts fights. And in the spiritual realm, there’s the Holy Ghost who helps us ‘overcome everything.’ (turn 20). Rejane may be resolving these contradictory attributes (the flirt, the fighter, the pious person) by addressing ideal images – either projected by the media or by a religious doctrine. An idealized other (in the media or a religious doctrine) seems to sanction Rejane’s behaviour. Each reference and representation constitute shared knowledge with the doctor for accepted behaviour (as we see in turn 13, the doctor says ‘Faustão curses a lot, right?’).

Rejane’s self-representation and performance of these different alignments are particularly interesting when compared to Odete’s, Elaine’s and Larissa’s performed gender identities. Rather than displaying attributes of goodness, niceness, or beauty, Rejane voices overt combativeness. Also she does not voice an ideal. She is provocative as a seducer (turns 2–4–6–8); she fights with words and gestures (as men do); she does not speak like a lady (she uses coarse language); she invokes grace from God (as a preacher would). In many ways she breaks away from the ideal feminine projection captured by Odete, Elaine and Larissa. Rejane also comes closer to traditional male attributes of identity, which are seduction (and having many boyfriends), verbal and gestural aggressiveness, and a preaching exhortation.
9.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed how four women represent and perform different aspects of self in interview situations. Giddens (1992) conceptualizes identity as a series of choices one continually makes about oneself. We choose (though not always consciously) to display and perform a given set of personal attributes in social interaction. This is an ongoing social process sometimes labelled ‘doing identity work.’ Goffman’s frame analysis (1974) is particularly interesting for capturing this social work, especially if one looks at shifts in alignment: alignment to self (which may be an idealized representation) or alignment to other (the doctor or projected audience of the video recorded).

In the interview situation, we saw that three women attempt to capture an ideal of femininity, to present ‘a better self’ to the doctor. In each of these cases, there was a representation of goodness, beauty, and niceness. We also saw how each one of these women performs contradictory alignments regarding this ideal (the possible cheater, the bad girl, the anorexic woman). These different alignments work to question the rather static and traditional schema of femininity.

In these self-portraits, information on time matters. Odete’s reports on ‘being good’ are in the present tense, an identity she reasserts throughout the interview. However, her implied ‘bad self’ is hypothetical, conditioned to her husband’s actions (she may be bad if certain actions take place). Her contradictions are reported as possibilities. Larissa situates her stories of illness and beauty in the past (‘I was anorexic,’ and ‘I was Miss Paraiba in ’72’). They belong to a legendary time of extraordinary events (being queen and being with a king) which counterbalances serious illness. There are consequences in the present, but they are minor ones (skinny legs) as she still has her beauty endowments. Elaine speaks in the present. Positive and negative traits are part of today’s self representation. Of the three, Elaine represents herself closer to the norm – where good and bad coexist and alternate.

We also saw one woman, Rejane, explicitly contradicting the standard, rather passive feminine ideal by bringing up more active (masculine) alignments, such as flirt, fighter (in gesture and words) and preacher. Also Rejane does not voice an ideal self. Rather, she refers to idealized – symbolic – social and religious entities as a way of having her own behaviour approved.

There are common traits to these four women. Each of them voices some sort of idealization, either an ideal portrait (a representation of a ‘better self’) or the projection of an ideal audience; each woman also performs several contradictory alignments of a similar nature: they are active, masculine and they transgress norms.

Now why are ideals represented in these women’s conversations with the doctor? Specifically, why are these female stereotypes foregrounded in
these interactions? It is clear that they point to different femininities. They can be seen as feminine practices as well as how these women perceive female behaviour. We would like to argue that representing and voicing such ideals may bring to these women a sense of agency, a sense of success, and a distance from conflicting identities and psychological pain. First, mental illness brings disturbing processes that may radically destabilize a self. We would argue that in some ways, each woman claims an agency for a better self (to be good, nice and pretty) so as to fit in and be accepted by the larger social group. In doing so, each woman would overcome a deep sense of isolation so prevalent in mental illness. While there is fear (of a disintegrating self), there is also pain and stigma (how others view them as mental patients). Goffman (1963) notes that the individual bears full responsibility – thus agency – for soothing the social discomfort of her stigma. We believe that by voicing an ideal self, each woman makes an affirmation of belonging to a selected group. There is a sense of belonging, a sense that one would fit in a conventional lifestyle (Chapter 2 in this volume). Second, there is a sense of success as each woman relates to well-known symbols of social achievements. Following a traditional model, these women seek success in voicing relationships with powerful men (a soccer star, a rock star, a major poet). Again we see an effort to overcome isolation. In the midst of psychiatric processes that threatens the self, each woman seeks a conventional relationship to overcome a sense of abandonment. Finally, idealization wipes out distinctions and conflicting identities. In presenting a socially prestigious self (the beauty queen, the good housewife, the nice girl), these women may create a sense (and rather an illusion) of stability or duration. Voicing an ideal may be a way of attempting to resolve (or conceal) the many contradictions of socially negative traits.

In many ways, Goffman tells us, people tend to offer their observers an impression of themselves that is idealized. Citing Cooley, he says that ‘if we never tried to seem a little better than we are, how could we improve or train ourselves from the outside inward?’ (Goffman, 1959: 35). So we could risk saying that, for some of these women, voicing these idealizations may be an important aspect of a socialization process as a woman. It may be part of the process of shifting from patient to person and re-engaging in the performance of different gender identities.
APPENDIX

Transcription Conventions

. sentence-final falling intonation
, phrase-final intonation, indicating more talk to come
? sentence-final rising intonation
- abrupt cutting off of sound
: lengthened sound (extra colons indicate greater lengthening)
(words) uncertain transcription
( ) transcription impossible
[talk] various characterizations of the talk (such as laughing, singing) are indicated one line below the segment of talk
= latching (utterance linked by = indicate no break in flow of talk)
[ overlapping speech: two people talking at the same time
/words/ spoken softly
//words// spoken very softly
underline emphatic stress
(pause) noticeable break in rhythm with no speech; length of time was not assigned.
Notes

1. We are grateful for the doctors’ and patients’ time and availability. All names have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants. The Institute Review Board (IRB) oversees that patients and family members are informed on the nature of the research developed at the Institute. Each recording was discussed and ethics clearance was obtained for the purposes of this research. All participants are Brazilian, and the interviews were conducted in Portuguese. The English translation is not a word-for-word translation. Rather, it portrays ‘the sense of the talk that is taking place at that moment’ (Ribeiro, 1994: 40). Our goal was to preserve most of the information presented in Portuguese while making the English text as close as possible to natural English discourse. However, one must bear in mind that translating involves transcreating a text: there is the inevitable loss of information as well as gains that permeate the process of translating talk (1994: 40–6).

2. Of course, there are a few chronic patients that leave the clinic and come back when they are unable to handle their medicine and treatment. Most patients, however, are discharged and then cared for at the out-patient clinic.

3. Neuropsychiatrists’ clinical practice is geared towards assessing the patient’s cognitive processes and establishing a psychiatric diagnosis. Such practices differ from other orientations, namely professionals with a psychoanalytical background (Pinto, Ribeiro and Lopes Dantas, 2005). For this chapter – idealization in female psychiatric patient’s talk – the doctor’s professional orientation does not seem to influence the stance of the women’s projected selves.

4. A psychiatrist who holds a psychoanalytic orientation tends to listen to patient’s stories and stay within those story frames; she would not only listen attentively to very personal topics introduced by the patient, but also sustain and develop these topics (Pinto, Ribeiro and Lopes Dantas, 2005).

5. In this interview, Elaine sings for long stretches, many times as a response to the doctor’s questions. Roberto Carlos is one of Brazil’s favourite composers and singers. He has been called ‘the king’: Brazil’s most famous rock star since the 1960s. Most songs that Elaine sings are from his repertoire.

6. Such reframing could also capture implicitly the videotaping of the research interview. Odete would then be also performing to a potential audience of researchers.

7. The Universal Church is of Fundamentalist Protestant Denomination. Since the 1980s, the Church has been growing in large numbers. Most members come from the working class and low middle class, in search of a new credo to replace Catholicism.

8. Urca is an upper-middle- to middle-class neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro. It establishes a contrast with Elaine’s low-middle-/working-class background.

9. Lady Laura is Roberto Carlos’s yacht, often noted in pop culture magazines.

10. ‘Miss’ is the foreign word used in Brazilian Portuguese indicating a ‘Beauty Queen’ from a certain place – Miss Paraiba, Miss Bahia.

11. Maria Betania, Gal Costa, Caetano Veloso are celebrities among Brazilian musicians. Vinicius de Moraes tops them all. Vinicius is considered the major poet of the Bossa Nova – a music genre that mixes samba and jazz, and originated in the late 1950s.

12. Conventions are based on Tannen (1984).
References


Part 2

New Ways of Understanding Identity/Identities in Professional Settings
10
Shifting Identities in the Classroom

Stanton Wortham

10.1 Introduction

Teacher: no, you’re wrong, because you’re guessing without looking. and that is
Student: [no way.
Teacher: [exactly what you do as a bad [student.
Student: [no I wasn’t
T/S: halt.

How does this exchange between a teacher and a 14-year-old student contribute to the student’s social identity? Knowing that the student is a working-class African-American girl, and that the teacher is a middle-class European-American man, we might construe this as a powerful teacher silencing a disempowered student. Widely circulating categories of identity, like ‘working class’ and ‘African American’ are in fact crucial resources that people use, and that operate through people, as they identify themselves and others. This fragment could, of course, be uncharacteristic for the teacher and the student, and there could be mitigating circumstances. If this sort of event recurred, however, we could plausibly argue that the student is being identified as ‘bad’ because this fits with a widely circulating model of identity that includes ‘resistant,’ ‘disruptive’ students who are disproportionately African American and working class.

As important as widely circulating categories of identity are, however, many have warned that we cannot assume events like this simply represent instances of such categories (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1976; Rampton, 1999; Schegloff, 1988). Identification happens only in practice, and it is always constructed for particular purposes and in particular events. Thus signs of identity can be interpreted only with respect to particular contexts of use. The case above could in fact be teasing or irony, and the student might understand perfectly well that the teacher does not mean to label her as resistant and disruptive. In order to tell what sort of identification is
in fact being accomplished, both participants and analysts must attend to the details of the event and its relevant context.

In order to interpret what signs of identity come to mean in actual events, however, participants and analysts must presuppose more widely circulating models that specify types of people and the types of events that they characteristically engage in. Identification cannot occur unless people presuppose socially circulating models, but these models only exist in particular events in which they are recontextualized in specific ways. Both ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ are essential to social identification.

Instead of drawing the typical conclusion – that we need a ‘dialectic’ account that moves between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ – in this chapter I argue that we need a more adequate formulation of the issue. Processes like social identification do not occur only at two levels, ‘macro’ and ‘micro’. In fact, many different timescales are potentially relevant to understanding the identity adopted by, or imposed on, an individual. Instead of choosing between or vaguely combining the ‘macro’ and the ‘micro’, we need to look more closely at other timescales that can be relevant to social identification. I make this argument by describing the emergence of one student’s social identity over several months in a classroom. The analysis demonstrates that locally circulating categories of identity – in addition to ‘macro’ categories and ‘micro’ events – can be essential to social identification in practice.

### 10.2 Local timescales and resources

The most common account of social identification and related processes involves a ‘dialectic’ between ‘macro’ processes – say, institutionalized practices and publicly circulating categories of identity – and particular events of identification. ‘Dialectic’ here is not used in the more complex Hegelian sense, but simply means moving back and forth between two poles. On such an account, widely circulating categories of identity constrain acts of identification, but particular acts either reproduce or help to transform the circulating categories. This position is often credited to Giddens (1976), who called it ‘structuration’, but many others in sociology, anthropology, education and related fields have adopted a similar position (e.g., Levinson and Holland, 1996; Linger, 2001). This ‘macro-micro dialectic’ account of social identification captures some essential aspects of the process. Both publicly circulating, often institutionalized categories of identity and particular events of identification play essential roles, and neither can be reduced to the other.

Despite these strengths, however, many have recently criticized the macro-micro dialectic model (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Eckert, 2000; Holland and Lave, 2000; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny, 2001;
Urban, 2001). At its worst the model assumes widely circulating categories of identity and institutionalized practices, without explaining how these are created and maintained – except with the vague claim that they are constituted in actual events. This claim simply means that the ‘macro’ categories and practices repeatedly appear in actual events. But a deterministic ‘macro’ account would agree with this claim too. Properties of groups or institutions must appear in events for them to be empirically available, but the fact of their appearance does not change the ‘macro’ emphasis of such an account.

‘Practice theory’ claims to go beyond a simple ‘dialectic’ account. Proponents of practice theory describe the ‘articulation between’ (Bucholtz, Liang and Sutton, 1999; Eckert, 2000), or the ‘co-development of’ the widely circulating and the local (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner and Cain, 1998). But such terms by themselves do not describe more precisely how publicly circulating categories and institutional processes interrelate with contingent events to constitute social identification. I do not mean to denigrate the important point made by claims about practice – that we do not know what publicly circulating categories mean in the abstract, but that we must instead examine how they are contextualized in practice to understand their role in social identification. I am simply pointing out that ‘practice’ must be explicated further in order to explain how processes like social identification work. If ‘practice’ means the space in which ‘macro’, ‘micro’ and perhaps other resources help accomplish social identification, we must know more specifically what it looks like.

Lemke’s (2000) concept of ‘timescales’ is useful here. A timescale is the spatio-temporal envelope within which a process happens. Processes relevant to understanding social identification take place across characteristic intervals. The emergence of capitalism, a process which in some respects has taken millennia, and in other respects centuries (Marx, 1867; Postone, 1993), occurs at a relatively long timescale. In contrast, individuals develop their capacities and live their lives at an ontogenetic timescale, across decades. Particular groups develop relationships and local habits, like those that emerge within a classroom over a year, at what I will call a ‘local’ timescale. And particular events take place at shorter timescales, taking minutes or hours. ‘Macro’, ‘micro’ and ‘practice’, as categories for analysing processes like social identification, abstract away from a continuum of timescales.

Social scientists characteristically envision these as different ‘levels of explanation.’ Parsons’s (1951) strategy for dealing with multiple levels of explanation was to divide human phenomena into fiefdoms, each of which was owned by a discipline – sociology owned longer timescale institutional change, anthropology owned culture, psychology owned individual development, and so on. In more contentious times social scientists try to reduce or subsume other levels into their own favoured level. Lemke
presents an alternative approach, arguing that any human phenomenon likely depends on processes at several timescales. We need to explore ‘cross-timescale relations’ – the set of linked processes across several timescales that collectively explain how any phenomenon occurs. As I argue below, for instance, it will not suffice to argue that the student in the excerpt above was an African-American girl identified using the longer-timescale stereotype of being a resistant, disruptive ‘loud black girl’. Longer-timescale processes that included her race were relevant to how this girl was identified over time in the classroom, but these were mediated through processes at shorter timescales. Neither can we understand this student’s emerging social identity only with reference to short-timescale events in which her identity was ‘constructed’, however. Instead of trying to explain the phenomenon with recourse to only one or two timescales, we must explore how processes from various timescales were linked such that they collectively yielded the phenomenon. For different phenomena, the relevant timescales and cross-timescale linkages would likely be different.

My phenomenon in this chapter is the social identification that happened to one student in an urban ninth grade American classroom over an academic year. I will show that, in order to understand this phenomenon, we must attend to a months-long timescale across which habitual patterns of social identification developed in the classroom. Teachers and students developed local models of identity and habitually applied these to students like the girl from the excerpt above. These local models were constrained by longer-timescale processes, but they could not have been fully predicted from those longer-timescale processes. The local models were also constituted by shorter-timescale processes, like the use of certain categories to identify students in actual classroom discussions. The local models thus emerged from, but cannot be reduced to, event-level processes.

The social identity of the focal student in this case shifted twice over the academic year. We cannot explain these shifts solely with recourse to widely circulating social models – because this would not explain why two or three from among the many potentially relevant models of identity were applied to her, nor why her identity shifted as and when it did. We cannot explain the shifts in identity solely with reference to particular events of identification either. These events themselves only became intelligible with reference to more widely circulating models. The shifts in identity also emerged over a trajectory of several mutually presupposing events, instead of through discrete events of transformation. By examining a local timescale, across months in the classroom, we can see more clearly how the shifts occurred.

For a full account of this student’s social identity development see Wortham (2006). This chapter focuses on the local timescale, and on one local resource that played an important role. In this classroom, concepts and themes from the academic curriculum became an important resource
for some students’ identity development. The ‘Paideia’ (Adler, 1982) or ‘Great Books’ (Great Books Foundation, 1991) curriculum centred on several questions of enduring human concern. In the middle of the year, for instance, they discussed whether individuals should sacrifice their desires for the good of the group, or whether a society should be organized so as to allow maximal individual freedom. The teachers deliberately assigned texts that took different positions on this issue – for example, Plutarch’s ‘Life of Lycurgus’, which describes the collectivist ancient Spartan system, as opposed to Ayn Rand’s *Anthem*, which advocates extreme individualism. These texts about collectivism and individualism identify characteristic types of people. From some collectivist perspectives, for instance, those who contribute to the collective good are admirable comrades while those who refuse to sacrifice for the group are parasites or outcasts. The analysis below shows how such models of identity were mobilized to identify students themselves. The curriculum became a resource for social identification, as curricular categories like ‘social outcast’ were used to identify the focal student.

### 10.3 Research site and focal student

Colleoni High School was a large three-story brick building that occupied an entire city block in an ethnically mixed working-class neighbourhood of a large American city. When this research was conducted, more than a decade ago, the neighbourhood had become predominantly African American, together with growing populations of Latino and South Asian immigrants. The student body was ethnically mixed and mostly working class – approximately 50 per cent black, 25 per cent Latino, 15 per cent white, and 10 per cent Asian.

Like many other schools in the city, Colleoni participated voluntarily in desegregation by offering a special educational programme to students throughout the district. At Colleoni the programme was based on guidelines from *The Paideia Proposal* (Adler, 1982) and *An Introduction to Shared Inquiry* (Great Books Foundation, 1991). Adler and the Great Books Foundation recommend that students discuss ‘genuine questions’. That is, ‘seminar’ discussions should involve students presenting and defending positions on complex questions, not simply parroting back the teacher’s preferred answers. The two ninth grade teachers I spent most time with, Mrs Bailey and Mr Smith, ran joint history/English classes twice a week, when they had 80-minute seminar discussions with their 19 students. The other three days, each teacher ran more conventional didactic lessons for 40 minutes each. Increasingly over the year, they engaged students in rich seminar discussions of complex texts – discussions in which students came to recognize issues of enduring human concern and to formulate their own arguments about these issues.
The focal student for this analysis, whom I will call Tyisha, was a 14-year-old African-American girl. Because this was her first year in high school the teachers had limited information about her. Her scores on the city-wide exam for eighth grade students placed her in the third quartile among students taking the test – about average for this ninth grade class, though slightly below average for all students in the great books programme at Colleoni High. Anyone observing Mrs Bailey and Mr Smith’s class for the first time would notice Tyisha. She drew attention to herself both verbally and non-verbally. On most days she participated early and often in class discussion, answering teachers’ questions and offering opinions of her own. One or two other students spoke as often as she did, but she called attention to herself by speaking more loudly and colourfully and by referring often to her own opinions and experiences. Tyisha also moved around in her seat more than most students, both when she was raising her hand and at other times. About once a week she created a commotion by dropping something on the floor during class – often her pile of xeroxed readings, handouts and notes, which were not fastened into her folder and cascaded across the floor. Despite drawing attention to herself in these ways, Tyisha was not officially classified as a problem student. She was not diagnosed with any disorder, nor was she identified as having special needs. She finished the year in this class, received a passing grade, and expected to return for her sophomore year. Based on the 50 hours I spent observing this classroom over the year, together with my experience in other settings, I would say that she was at least as intelligent as the average ninth grader.

10.4 Summary of Tyisha’s classroom identity development

Tyisha’s behaviour remained stable over the year in several important respects. She spoke often, she did not hesitate to disagree with the teachers, and her comments focused on her own opinions and her own experiences. In September and October the teachers identified her as a cooperative student. Their pedagogical philosophy called for students to present their own positions on curricular themes and to defend those positions with reference to their own experience and the text under discussion. While most other students were still trying to figure out what the teachers wanted to hear, Tyisha was articulating and defending her own opinions. In December, however, teachers and students began to identify Tyisha as disruptive. By then many other students were offering their own arguments, as the teachers wanted, and the teachers labelled Tyisha’s strident disagreements and focus on her own opinions as a refusal to conform to classroom norms.

Tyisha’s emerging identity as a disruptive student was atypical in this classroom, against the background of Mrs Bailey’s gendered expectations for students. Mrs Bailey both explicitly and implicitly communicated that ninth grade girls were easier to teach than boys, because they conformed to
school expectations. Girls, she claimed, were more likely to succeed in school and in adulthood. Boys were more difficult to teach because they resisted school expectations. As a result, they were less likely to succeed both in school and in later life. This gendered difference in expectations and outcomes is increasingly common in American schools (Lopez, 2002; Newkirk, 2002; Wortham, 2001). Whether because the stereotype is true, or because of self-fulfilling expectations, most students did come to enact these gender stereotypes throughout the year. Whenever possible the boys sat together in the back of the room, and all but one boy generally refused to participate, while many girls participated actively and dominated classroom discussions. Tyisha’s identity development over the year took her from being typical for her gender to being atypical. Several girls in the class were quiet, and spoke only when called on. But Tyisha was the only girl who was identified as difficult.

Teachers and students identified Tyisha as an atypical girl, in part, using categories from the curriculum. The development of Tyisha’s identity as a classroom ‘outcast’ occurred as teachers and students discussed one theme from the curriculum, a theme about the appropriate relation between individuals and society. Over about two months, the class read and discussed literature (like the Plutarch and Rand mentioned above) that advocated different positions on the question of whether society should be individualist or collectivist. When the class explored how all societies must ask individuals to sacrifice something for the good of the whole, and how people who refuse to conform cause problems, they developed local cognitive models of the curriculum that included categories for appropriate behaviour in a group. People who pursue their own desires without regard for the group’s needs, for example, might be identified as disruptive outcasts. Over time, teacher and students identified Tyisha using this category at the same time as the class discussed this curricular theme.

While discussing their curricular theme, teachers and students developed an analogy between some aspects of the theme and their own classroom relationships: if students were to pursue their own ideas and desires in class without following any norms, the class would face the serious problems foreseen by critics of individualism; but if students did not express any ideas of their own, at least in this sort of ‘great books’ class, the discussion would grind to a halt. They used this analogy to understand the curriculum – exploring Lycurgus’s collectivism, for instance, by discussing how their classroom discussions required individuals to sacrifice their desires for the good of the group. Teachers and students developed the analogy between the class and ‘society’ in part through a series of examples, including what I have called ‘participant examples’ – in which a participant in the conversation him or herself becomes a character in the example (Wortham, 1994). In several of these examples, Tyisha played the role of an individualist, disrupting or cast out from the group. Her transition from ‘good student’ to
‘disruptive outcast’ solidified as teachers and students used the category of a disruptive outcast who refuses to conform to social expectations, both in their cognitive models of the curricular theme and as a category they used to identify Tyisha.

Tyisha’s identity development proceeded through four phases over the school year. First, from September into November she was just another promising female student. Second, from November to January teachers and students objected to her strenuous and opinionated statements. Third, from January into February, as described in the last paragraph, they drew systematically on the individualism/collectivism curricular theme to identify Tyisha as a disruptive outcast from the classroom ‘society’. Fourth, from late February into May, they drew from another curricular theme – one that explored the tension between loyalty to and resistance against authority – to identify Tyisha. During the spring, Tyisha’s identity as an outcast who resisted the teachers’ authority was sometimes construed as admirable resistance. She remained an outcast, but on occasion teachers and students identified her as an outcast legitimately resisting authority. These shifts in identity only become visible if we attend to the local timescale, as classroom-specific models of identity developed across the months of the academic year. And they can only be explained (in part) by tracing how categories from the curriculum contributed to Tyisha’s various identities over time.

10.5 From typical girl to disruptive outcast

From near the beginning of the year in Mrs Bailey and Mr Smith’s class, teachers and most students acted as if girls and boys have different social identities with respect to school. As Mrs Bailey said explicitly one day, girls are easier for teachers to deal with because they conform to school expectations, and they are more likely to succeed in school and in adulthood. Boys are more difficult to deal with, because they resist school expectations, and they are less likely to succeed both in school and in later life. I call this the stereotype of ‘promising girls and unpromising boys’. This stereotype draws on widely circulating socio-historical patterns, like those that identify black male students as particularly concerned with respect and more likely to resist participation in school (Anderson, 1999; Ferguson, 2000) and those that identify adolescent boys as disdainful of school success (Newkirk, 2002). But the gender difference was especially salient in this classroom, for two reasons. First, Mrs Bailey believed what she said – she both explicitly and implicitly stated it throughout the year, and the girls often reminded the boys about these alleged gender differences. Second, the boys tried to sit together in the back of the room, and all but one of them generally refused to participate in class discussion, while many girls participated actively and dominated classroom discussions. For more evidence of this local gender difference, see Wortham (2006).
At the beginning of the year, Tyisha fit the gender stereotype: she was an active, successful female student. She was engaged, offering her opinions on many subjects related to class discussion. Most of the students started the year trying to parrot back what the teachers wanted them to say. Because Tyisha instead offered her own opinions, the teachers initially identified her as a successful student who made her own arguments. In a Paideia seminar this is desirable, so Tyisha was treated as a normal and even as a good student. This social identity drew both on locally robust models of gender identity and on both widely and locally circulating models of Paideia or great books students.

The following segment comes from a class on 9 October. (‘T/B’ stands for Mrs Bailey; ‘FST’ stands for an unidentified female student; ‘TYI’ stands for Tyisha; transcription conventions are in the appendix).

**Extract 1**

T/B: okay, we’ve got **women** having babies. how does that relate to having **women** goddesses?

40 TYI: it doesn’t, to me.

T/B: it doesn’t to you. how about you?

FST: maybe they think that that’s supernatural.

T/B: that that’s supernatural? having a baby is supernatural.

At line 40 Tyisha fails to give an answer the teacher is looking for. She also emphasizes her opinion, by adding the phrase ‘to me’. Mrs Bailey does not evaluate Tyisha negatively, however. In fact, the teacher repeats Tyisha’s utterance and goes on to ask for another student’s opinion. Mrs Bailey often asks several students in turn for their opinions on issues raised in the text, and here we see how Tyisha’s habitual personalization of her opinions fits with the teacher’s expectations. Early in the year the teachers often react positively when Tyisha offers her own opinions because they want other students to do the same.

Later in the 9 October class, Tyisha says something deliberately off-topic, apparently as a joke. In the following segment they are discussing bees, in order to understand a Chinese myth that compares humans to insects.

**Extract 2**

T/B: bees do what?

TYI: kill.

290 [laughter]

MRC: some bee pollen, they raise[pollen

T/B: [they fertilize

FST: flowers.

T/B: what do spiders do? they fertilize plants. bees are people who, are insects who ahh, Cassandra?
At line 290 several students treat Tyisha’s comment as a joke, by laughing. It was a small joke, but apparently successful. Note that the teachers do not discipline Tyisha for this. Mrs Bailey simply ignores Tyisha’s comment and continues with the discussion. Tyisha then re-enters the conversation more constructively.

Extract 3

T/B: how long do insects live?
CAN: maybe ten days, about [a week
MRC: [a week.
T/B: a day, a couple of months, alright.
320 TYI: some of them a day because you know, if they bite you, they die.
T/B: okay some of them as soon- as soon as they, they, they put their stinger in it, they’re dead. okay, now put that back to Pampu. why might the Chinese believe or feel
325 that man comes from the earth as an insect. that man is similar to an insect?

At lines 322–3, Mrs Bailey ratifies Tyisha’s comment as a useful contribution, one which allows the teacher to articulate her analogy between the mortality of bees and the idea of humans as insects (at lines 323–6).

At the beginning of the year, then, the teachers positioned Tyisha as a normal or a good student. They appreciated her opinions, and they did not discipline her when she made jokes. As the fall went on, however, several other students learned to offer arguments and give evidence in the way that Paideia or great books teachers want. At this point the teachers increasingly distinguished between Tyisha’s comments – which they began to characterize as ‘opinions’ offered without supporting evidence – and more successful students who gave better arguments. Tyisha’s behaviour had not changed much. But relative to the teachers’ expectations and to other students’ increasingly successful participation, it looked as if Tyisha was acting differently. In December and January, her social identity began to shift from that of a good student to one who inappropriately pushes her own opinion, who gives incorrect answers and who disrupts class by leading discussion off-topic. Both teachers and other students began to treat her this way, drawing on a more traditional model of appropriate classroom behaviour in which students should not disrupt the teachers’ agenda.

Some evidence for this shift comes from the teachers’ increasingly blunt evaluations of Tyisha. Right before the following segment (from 18 January), Mrs Bailey has just interpreted a passage of a text from Aristotle that they had read. Aristotle is not saying that women are slaves to men,
only that the relationship between a man and woman is partly analogous to the relationship between a master and a slave.

Extract 4

TYI: okay, when- um Sylvia was talking about the slave and the master, the master, okay, the slave, he uses his hands and stuff but- they won’t give him a chance to use his- to teach him to read and stuff and the master know how, so he using his mind. why does he [4 unintelligible syllables]

T/B: [okay, didn’t you]

just missed the connection, the con- the thing is that- do not look at this as saying that slaves are manual workers, slaves- women are slaves. look at these as four distinct relationships.

Tyisha’s reasoning wanders a bit from lines 428–33, but she is apparently struggling with academic issues relevant to the discussion. Nonetheless, Mrs Bailey interrupts to tell her that ‘you just missed the connection’ (lines 434–5).

This incident alone might have reflected momentary impatience on the teacher’s part, but the following evaluation follows immediately.

Extract 5

T/B: and in Greeks- in Greece, there certainly were slaves that used their mind. yeah?

FST: I’m talking about going back to what Tyisha said about how slaves that- well- if, okay if a master didn’t teach the slaves how to read, how did they learn how to read? how did we know how to read and talk ourselves?

T/B: o[kay, you just missed-

TYI: [ right, thank you.

T/B: you just missed the point.

JAS: you missed the point. we’re not compari [ng them.

TYI: [I know,

but I’m talking about-

T/B: okay, look at this again, mental, manual workers, are mental workers.

At line 445 an unidentified student refers back to the earlier comment by Tyisha, building on Tyisha’s comment to ask a question. Mrs Bailey and Mr Smith normally encouraged students to refer to each other’s comments in this way, because it helped students listen to each other
and develop more complex arguments across the group. At line 450 Tyisha explicitly thanks the other student for resuscitating her point and asking the question.

But Mrs Bailey immediately jumps in (at lines 449 and 451) and returns to her earlier evaluation of Tyisha’s point, with similar phrasing: ‘you just missed the point.’ The speed of Mrs Bailey’s intervention, and her blunt characterization of Tyisha’s (and the second student’s) point, is uncharacteristic for this class. These teachers wanted students to develop their own arguments, and they generally helped students who are struggling to articulate something. But by January they expected that Tyisha’s points would not contribute to the conversation – that her comments were disruptive and not substantive. Note that another student (Jasmine) echoes Mrs Bailey’s evaluation of Tyisha at line 452. This illustrates how other students also assume that Tyisha’s comments will lead the class off-topic and are not worth pursuing. Jasmine uses an exclusive ‘we’ in line 452, probably to distinguish Tyisha from the teachers and the other students. In this instance Tyisha did have one defender, the unidentified girl who sided with her at line 445. We will see Jasmine herself side with Tyisha in the extended example below.

The split between Tyisha and students who contributed to class broadened over time. Teachers and students increasingly identified Tyisha as a student prone to give incorrect answers and lead the discussion off-topic. The teachers continued to react quickly and harshly to many of her comments, presupposing that her contributions were disruptive and intellectually unproductive. The following segment, for instance, comes from 25 January.

Extract 6

T/B: okay. well I think that he's talking more not about not being with people, but that he will not have to have people bail him out at any point. he can make it on his own.

TYI: so you gonna be the only person living there?

T/B: no. that's not what he's saying, Tyisha.

CAN: he's saying that he can live without people helping him.

At lines 1052–5, Mrs Bailey is summarizing her interpretation of a point. Tyisha offers a gloss at lines 1056–7, a gloss which misstates Mrs Bailey’s point, and the teacher reacts immediately by telling Tyisha she is wrong. This quick and blunt response contrasts with the teachers’ typical response in such situations. If another student had said this, or if Tyisha herself had said it earlier in the year, they would most likely have explored her point or been more gentle in evaluating her response. Another student gives a more
accurate gloss at lines 1059–60, then the class continues to discuss the point and ignores Tyisha.

By February, Tyisha’s identity as a disruptive outcast had solidified. Teachers and students generally acted as if she was disorganized, prone to offer comments that took the class off-topic, and concerned with her own ideas more than with helping the group develop a coherent discussion. Thus Tyisha became an exception to the local gender stereotype. She was a girl who, nonetheless, was not a good student and was not likely to succeed. In the following segment, for example, from 11 February, Mr Smith explicitly characterizes Tyisha as a bad student who does not listen.

Extract 7

50 T/S: I will do a spot check, spot check your notebook. the notebook, and you better listen Tyisha, because you have a habit of never listening to me. Tyisha
TYI: I know what you’re talking about
T/S: [no.

55 TYI: you’re talking about [the notebook
T/S: [your ears are unfortunately closed sometimes.

... T/S: number five. who made the laws?
65 FST: the assembly.
T/S: okay [ what page?
TYI: [the king
T/S: no. you’re wrong. because you’re guessing without looking. and that is [

70 TYI: [no way.
T/S: exactly what you do as a bad [student.
TYI: [no I wasn’t
T/S: halt.

At line 52, Mr Smith says that Tyisha never listens to him. And at line 71 he calls her a bad student. Mr Smith had a temper, and he sometimes made inappropriate comments like this about other students. But Tyisha was more likely to be the target, as teachers and students increasingly assumed that she made inappropriate contributions and took the class off-topic.

My data contain at least a dozen other telling examples, from December through May, of how Tyisha was explicitly identified as disruptive by the teachers and students. They accused her of not listening, of being wrong, and of making comments that led discussion off-track. Taken together, these comments show that the teachers and students came to identify her differently than they had earlier in the year. From September through
November she was just another student, and sometimes a good one, but by December and January she had become a disruptive student who made implausible arguments that derailed discussions. Instead of taking time to explore the reasoning behind her comments – and, it must be said, there was only sometimes defensible reasoning behind them – the teachers and other students quickly dismissed Tyisha and moved back to their own discussion. Further evidence of Tyisha’s emerging identity can be found in Wortham (2003, 2004, 2006), which analyse extended segments of classroom discourse in which Tyisha gets identified as disruptive and as an outcast from the classroom community. Wortham (2003) shows how the disruptive outcast identity was not only attributed to Tyisha by others, but was also sometimes actively embraced by Tyisha herself. She did not deliberately plan to become a disruptive outcast, but she willingly challenged the teachers despite their explicit complaints about her ‘disruptions.’

10.6 From disruptive outcast to reasonable sceptic

So Tyisha’s identity shifted from that of a good student to a disruptive one, especially during December and January. But she did not get trapped in this identity. Instead of labelling her simply as disruptive for the rest of the year, in the spring the teachers sometimes evaluated Tyisha’s vigorous arguments as legitimate resistance to authority. Teachers and students still identified her as a disruptive student some of the time. But Tyisha developed another identity as a student who sometimes offered reasoned dissent.

The first evidence for this new identity comes from a discussion on 22 February. In this class Tyisha argued that the students themselves have been tricked by the teachers and the assigned texts, which are probably not describing historical events as they really happened. Thus she positioned herself as a sceptic who defended other students against the teachers’ misinformation.

**Extract 8**

890  TYI: all this stuff is probably phony.
     T/B: all of this stuff is phony. you’ve been in a class now for the last seven months where you’ve been receiving phony information.
     TYI: and nobody cannot tell me, prove it to me that this is true. so I just listen and talk, just like I believe it.
     T/B: well, you know, I think that’s a good point. I think that you should question. what would be the evidence that this might be true?
     TYI: that it’s just in Greece.
you don’t think there was a Greece?
yeah, I do believe that. we found it on the map, but when we go there we gonna see different, totally different stuff. I don’t know, I just don’t believe it.
okay, you don’t think there are any documents from the period? you don’t think there are any things that- that have been left around from like when Athens was in its glory?
some people probably went to Athens and made up the story.

At line 890 Tyisha claims that the information in the curriculum is ‘probably phony’. She refuses to believe it, although she pretends that she does in order to get by in class. Given the teachers’ reactions to Tyisha over the past months, we might expect that Tyisha’s challenge would generate a hostile or dismissive response. But, after initially being sarcastic at lines 891–3, Mrs Bailey praises Tyisha for ‘questioning’ at lines 896–7. This is one of the highest values in the teachers’ pedagogical philosophy. One must continually question, as Adler and the Great Books Foundation advocate. So Mrs Bailey’s comment (at lines 896–7) seems to be uncharacteristic praise for Tyisha. Just this one segment by itself certainly did not change Tyisha’s identity. We will need more evidence to assess the significance of Mrs Bailey’s comments. But this segment raises the possibility that, instead of being a disruptive outcast, at the end of February Tyisha may have been turning into a reasonable sceptic.

Mrs Bailey followed up Tyisha’s challenge on February 22 with a discussion of evidence and scepticism in interpreting history. The teachers asked students to look through another text they had just read for evidence that might contradict Pericles’s description of Athens. In this way they modelled historical method for the students. They also enacted how Tyisha’s position as a sceptic is integral to the practice of historical interpretation. Mrs Bailey then summarizes their discussion.

Extract 9
... and, certainly, in your class, you’ve gone back five thousand years ago. where are these documents? how do we know that they’re real, and they just weren’t made up by somebody who wanted to lie? and those are questions that historians deal with? and you know what a cynic Mr Smith is and can you imagine an entire community full of Mr Smiths who are going around trying to make a name
for themselves by saying this is false. okay, people like you that go, I don’t believe this. I’m going to go and find out that it was false and spend the rest of my life proving this wasn’t false. and there have been millions of people, thousands of people, certainly hundreds of thousands of people, that have engaged in that kind of inquiry. so I, I appreciate your scepticism. I think, I think it’s right. I think that you need to sometimes say, where is this information coming from? but I’d also like you to recognize that you’re not the first person to have those questions and that there are people who have devoted their lives to authenticating, to saying this is really real or did somebody make it up? okay. is it time to go yet? you want to pull this together wherever you are at the moment. I really like this question. it’s very good.

At lines 1069–71 Mrs Bailey echoes Tyisha’s question, and at lines 1071–2 she makes clear that professional historians ask questions similar to Tyisha’s. There is an interlude from lines 1072–8 where she paints a somewhat unflattering picture of Mr Smith – with whom she generally did not get along. But at line 1081 she ‘appreciates’ Tyisha’s ‘scepticism’, and at lines 1088–9 she again praises Tyisha’s question. She thus identifies Tyisha as an independent, critical, even heroic dissenter. In this discussion on 22 February, then, Tyisha may be changing from a disruptive outcast into a reasoned sceptic. At this point the new identity was provisional. But in the spring, legitimate resistance to authority became a central topic in the curriculum. Just as the curricular concept of disruptive outcast had been used earlier to facilitate Tyisha’s developing identity in January and February, the new curricular concept of a citizen legitimately resisting authority became important to Tyisha’s new identity as a legitimate dissenter.

Tyisha’s dissent was also framed as legitimate resistance on 12 April, when teachers and students juxtaposed Tyisha’s identity as a dissenter with a protagonist who analogously refused to go along with authority. The class had read a story, ‘The Pearl’, in which a poor Native American named Kino finds a pearl. He brings it to the Europeans who control the local town and they offer him 1000 pesos for it. Because he knows that the pearl is worth much more, and because Europeans have often cheated the Indians, Kino refuses their offer and makes a perilous journey to the capital city to get a fair price. Given the curricular theme of loyalty and resistance that the students and teachers have been discussing, students take Kino to represent people who have been exploited and the Europeans to represent unjust
rulers. The central question for the seminar is whether Kino should have sold the pearl to the Europeans. Should he have been content with his station in life, or should he have resisted the Europeans’ attempt to exploit him?

Well into the discussion, Tyisha offers an example. A student has asked how Kino knows his pearl is worth more than 1000 pesos. Tyisha responds with an unclear analogy to Nike Air Jordan basketball shoes.

Extract 10

TYI: it’s just like these Nike’s that out- that’s out. people want it now cause they think they Jordan.

1075 MRC: (hh)
TYI: but when he got on tv, and said, they not real. they got mad, you know they not real, but you know he’s like they not bad. people stop buying them.

...

1090 T/B: whoa, whoa, whoa, I, I, I lost the connection to the pearl here.
STS: (hhh)
T/B: perhaps you could make the connection between-
TYI: just like people see this pearl and they think it’s real
1095 so they willing to spend money on it.
FST: yeah, like the [gym shoes.
JAS: [yeah, like my shoes.
T/B: oh, so you’re making the connection, your connection here is a repercussion to what Germaine said. that Germaine was saying, hey, he knows it’s worth something because everybody else seems to think it’s worth something= [
TYI: [right
T/B: = and you’re saying people can have, all be deceived.
1100 is that what I’m hearing Tyisha?
TYI: yeah sure.
FST: (hh)
T/B: so you’re rescinding what Germaine said.
TYI: no I’m agreeing with her.
1110 T/B: no. you’re disagreeing with Germaine.
TYI: what’d she say?
FST: he opposite of what she’s saying.
TYI: oh, my fault. I’m disagreeing with her.
STS: [3 seconds of laughter]
1115 T/B: you have to start relating you’re points directly so we all follow your thinking.
The analogy between Tyisha’s account of fake Jordan shoes (at lines 1073–8) and Kino’s pearl is not clear, as Mrs Bailey points out at lines 1090–1. Tyisha tries to clarify at lines 1094–5. But since Kino’s pearl was real, the analogy does not hold.

Mrs Bailey tries to articulate Tyisha’s point such that it makes some sense, at lines 1098–1102. But Tyisha’s response at line 1106 sounds sarcastic – as if she does not really care what she was trying to say. Tyisha acknowledges that she was not following the earlier discussion, by asking a question at line 1111. Then at line 1113 she makes a joke, indicating again that she does not really care about the substance. Mrs Bailey responds to this oppositional behaviour with a comment at lines 1115–16 that echoes many others the teachers made in preceding months. She distinguishes between Tyisha (‘you’) and the rest of the class (‘we’). Even in April, then, Tyisha is sometimes a disruptive student who does not care enough to contribute constructively to class discussion.

As the class proceeds, however, the theme of resistance against authority opens up the identity of legitimate dissenter for Tyisha. While discussing whether Kino should have sold the pearl to the Europeans, Tyisha vigorously argues that he should not have, while several other students argue that he should have just sold it and not been greedy. Mrs Bailey makes the argument more relevant to students’ own identities by giving a participant example. She imagines that the students are facing oppression like Kino, and asks whether they would resist it. The specific topic concerns education. In the story, Kino wants to get more money for the pearl in order to buy an education for his child. In the example, students must decide whether to tolerate a ‘separate but equal’ Jim Crow education or whether to demand a more adequate education.

Extract 11

T/B: okay, I, I, excuse me, I’m a southern state. a:nd uh, 1180 I’ll give you an education Jasmine. I’ll give you an education in that building over there, with all these kids cramme in, with text books that are fifty years old. o:rt (1.0) you can take a chance. and you can stand up to the power structur:re. and maybe even pull your kids out of school and boycott schools for a while. and maybe not get any education at all for awhile because you want a real education and not this Jim Crow education.

1185 FST: right.

T/B: what do you do? 1190 FST: you stand up for what you believe in.

T/B: you take what you can get? or do you go after what is really what you want?

STS: [3 seconds of chatter]
TYI: because, if he had been poor for this long, and he had a chance to be happy with his life, why don’t give it to someone you know that’s not gonna be satisfied as you?

JAS: but, but in, in the long run, wait a minute, in the long run you might not even get nothing, so you just gonna sit there.

TYI: I’d rather go try, then just sit there and say this is about sitting down. I- I think I could have got more than that. I’m not gonna sit there no longer, I’m gonna go out and search for some money. I’m not gonna be like that.

... T/B: [reading from text] ... for it is said that humans are never satisfied, that you give them one thing and they want something more. and this is said in disparagement? °that means put down, kind of [5 unintelligible syllables]° whereas it is one of the greatest talents the species has and one that made it superior to the animals that are satisfied with what they have. that Jasmine who’s telling us should be satisfied with what you have, we’ve got Tyisha saying hey, go for it. now. this again we’re circling around, do we? are we to be content with what we have or should we go after other things?

At lines 1200–3, Tyisha argues that Kino should not have been satisfied with the Europeans’ offer. She imagines herself in such a situation, using ‘I’, and says that she would not cooperate with the Europeans’ exploitation. At line 1238 Mrs Bailey summarizes Tyisha’s position as ‘go for it’. She then uses Tyisha’s argument to restate the larger question about whether people should resist exploitation.

This participant example develops an analogy between students’ identities as African Americans – who have been and in many cases continue to be denied adequate public education – and Kino’s identity as a Native American exploited by Europeans. Mrs Bailey explicitly makes race relevant at line 1187 when she mentions ‘Jim Crow’, a term that indexes the unequal social conditions endured by African Americans before the Civil Rights Movement. This analogy between the black students and Kino participates in a broader analogy, developed over many classes, between the students as disempowered black people and the ‘citizens’ (of the second curricular theme) who must decide whether to remain loyal to or resist authority.

Analogies like this can mediate social identification. Teachers and students construct local cognitive models to understand the curricular topic of
legitimate resistance. Through the analogy, they use categories of identity from their own experience – like the legitimate resistance to Jim Crow segregation that many of the students’ ancestors suffered – to construct these models. Categories of identity from these cognitive models become available to amend or construct models they use to identify each other socially. When participant examples bring the analogy into the classroom itself and apply cognitive categories to individual students, the curriculum can become a resource for identifying students like Tyisha (Wortham, 2003).

The analogy between Kino and African Americans facilitates Tyisha’s emerging identity as a reasoned dissenter and a defender of the disempowered. Those who worked for equal education in the Civil Rights Movement pursued a just cause. If Kino’s situation is in fact like theirs, he should resist exploitation and stick up for himself. By analogy, in the classroom, Tyisha’s regular dissent against the teachers could also be framed as legitimate resistance. And in fact, in the discussion on 12 April, Mrs Bailey does shift her evaluation of Tyisha. Earlier in the discussion Tyisha had been labelled as disruptive (e.g., at lines 1115–16), but by line 1238 Mrs Bailey positions Tyisha as contributing to the conversation by defending an alternative point of view.

In this segment Tyisha both articulates and enacts a position of opposition or resistance. She argues that someone marginalized, like Kino, should oppose the powerful and stand up for himself. She also defends her opinion against several others in the class. She habitually opposes the teachers and other students by defending unpopular positions. So in this discussion Tyisha enacts what she recommends that marginalized people should be doing. People like Kino who stick up for themselves are not greedy, but are justifiably defending their interests against others who take advantage of them. Mrs Bailey’s favourable response to Tyisha here endorses Tyisha’s position. Sticking up for oneself with reasoned arguments in classroom discussion is valued by the teachers, just as Kino’s decision to stick up for himself is valued by Tyisha.

In this class on 12 April, then, Tyisha gets explicitly labelled as and enacts both emergent identities – as a disruptive outcast and as a legitimate dissenter. The first identity emerged and solidified from December through February, with respect to the individualism/collectivism curricular theme, and it remains available as teachers and students identify her throughout the rest of the school year. The second identity became available in April and thereafter. At the end of the school year, Tyisha was sometimes positioned as a legitimate dissenter, as someone who was justifiably sceptical about majority opinions and stuck up for her point of view. This identity as a legitimate dissenter was facilitated by the loyalty/resistance curricular theme, as discussions of legitimate resistance appeared in the curriculum and became available as a category of identity. The 12 April example shows how both identities sometimes appeared in the same discussions and how Tyisha shifted from one to the other within a few minutes.
10.7 Conclusions

Over the academic year, Tyisha went from being a normal female student, to being a disruptive outcast, to sometimes being a reasoned dissenter and sometimes being a disruptive outcast. These shifts in classroom identity happened despite the fact that her behaviour remained relatively consistent across the year. Tyisha’s identity development was accomplished – by her, the teachers and other students – in part using categories made available through the curricular themes of individualism/collectivism and loyalty/resistance. The category of ‘outcast’ became available to frame Tyisha’s identity as the class started discussing the first curricular theme. As they built local cognitive models of that theme, those models intertwined with the local models of identity they constructed to identify Tyisha. Then, when the category of ‘reasoned sceptic’ became available during discussions of the second theme, Tyisha’s identity sometimes shifted again.

These local models of identity, which entered the classroom through discussion of curricular themes, were not the only resources used to identify Tyisha. Institutionalized expectations about appropriate student and teacher behaviour, stereotypes and expectations about how working-class African Americans relate to mainstream institutions like school, and other widely circulating models and processes were relevant to Tyisha’s social identification in this classroom. But these more widely circulating models are not sufficient to account for her shifts in identity, because the shifts were mediated through more local categories. Tyisha became a particular type of girl, one who violated the local stereotype of promising girls and unpromising boys, as teachers and students borrowed categories of identity from the local curricular themes. If the curriculum had not been organized as it was in this particular classroom, Tyisha’s identity would probably have developed somewhat differently. She might have been ‘disruptive,’ but probably not a ‘disruptive outcast’. In addition to the importance of the local timescale, the contingent shapes of particular events also influenced how Tyisha was identified in context. But neither were her shifts in identity constructed entirely at the event-level.

The analyses show how local, intermediate-timescale processes, like the development of categories within a particular classroom over several months, can play an essential role in constituting the social identification of students. These processes draw on longer-timescale processes, which supply widely circulating models of identity. They also draw on shorter-timescale processes like interactional events in the classroom. But locally emerging models and resources, like the curricular models of identity and the habitual positions that other students took with respect to Tyisha, played an essential role in this case. In at least some cases, then, we must go beyond ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ and examine other relevant timescales.
I do not claim that the configuration of widely circulating, local and event-level processes that played a role in Tyisha’s social identification is always the right one for studying social identification. The relevant processes and timescales will vary depending on the focal phenomenon being analysed. Even the social identification of different individuals in the same context can draw on different configurations of timescales (Wortham, 2006). Nor do I claim to have analysed all timescales relevant to the social identification of Tyisha in this classroom – to do so would require more space and expertise than I have. But I do claim to have shown that adequate analysis of social identification in this case must examine how processes at various timescales interconnect. I emphasize local processes of emerging models and categories of identity over the course of the school year in order to show how ‘micro’ and ‘macro,’ singly or in ‘dialectic,’ will not suffice as levels of analysis.
APPENDIX

Transcription Conventions

‘-’ abrupt breaks or stops (if several, stammering)
‘?’ rising intonation
‘.’ falling intonation
‘_’ underline stress
(1.0) silences, timed to the nearest second
‘[‘ indicates simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance represented on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by left brackets
‘=’ interruption or next utterance following immediately, or continuous talk represented on separate lines because of need to represent overlapping comment on intervening line
‘[…]’ transcriber comment
‘:’ elongated vowel
‘°…°’ segment quieter than surrounding talk
‘;’ pause or breath without marked intonation
‘(hh)’ laughter breaking into words while speaking

References


11
Triple Trouble: Undecidability, Identity and Organizational Change

Carl Rhodes, Hermine Scheeres and Rick Iedema

11.1 Introduction

If, as is the premise of this book, personal identity is best regarded as a socially enacted accomplishment, then a key institutional site where such enactments take place is at work. In this chapter we seek to explore the ‘trouble’ of such identity enactment as it relates to contemporary organizational and management practice. In so doing, we note that identity is linked to organizations in two ways. First, organizations are the settings in which identities are (re)constructed; and, second, identities are the materials, or rather, processes, out of which organizational identities are built. Given such relationships, it is not surprising, as the history of management can attest, that managerial practice has recognized from its inception that managing identity on a day-to-day basis is central to organizing. Of course this does not mean that management has a monopoly on identity. Where managers have concerned themselves with managing workers’ identities, such practices are deployed as an overlay (or interlay) on the ‘management’ of identity in social life more broadly.

As we will explore, it is in this social-personal context that people mobilize a set of strategies and tactics by means of which they (try to) contain the uncertainty to which their identity discourses and practices remain inevitably beholden (see the Introduction to this volume). Various identity positions attempt to foist themselves on people who are, moreover, already identified in particular ways, as well as these people attempting to produce their own identities anew and in newly personalizing ways. Put differently, these processes and struggles are characterized by undecidability (Critchley, 1996; Derrida, 1978). Following Derrida, undecidability is regarded as ‘always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations’ (Derrida, 1988: 148, emphasis in original). ‘Undecidability’ is a term used here to signal that identity discourses and practices are not a chaos of indeterminacies (‘total free play’),
but a constant movement across fields of multiple and shifting constraints (Torfing, 1999: 96).

What this suggests is that in efforts to establish self-identity, people are always already in trouble – in the sense of trouble as turbulence, unrest, uncertainty and oscillation. But as far as work is concerned, we argue there is not just double trouble, as occurs when social-familial self identity confronts the norms and values of organized work. Instead, we suggest that work incurs *triple trouble*. First, people struggle with the inevitable undecidabilities and constraints that bear on self-identity in everyday social and familial life, and that struggle is not entirely suspended once they enter the organization. Second, at work they are confronted with managerial-organizational notions about how to be at work, as well as with shifting, contested and resistant views on what is appropriate. Work, in this sense, is a source of identity trouble, because it puts workers in the position of having to navigate in between ways of being and doing sanctioned from above and those negotiated among workers themselves. Third, identity trouble is inherent in the changing nature of contemporary organization and management. While in the past hierarchical distinctions between management and workers could be drawn in quite categorical terms, this is much less the case now. Until quite recently, work was premised on relatively clearly prescribed tasks, roles and responsibilities. In many contemporary organizations, by contrast, these ‘certainties’ are eroded by an emerging expectation placed on workers to come together from across the organization to address, resolve and intervene in problems surrounding work processes. In this emerging ethos of self-steering (Rose, 1989) and bottom-up participation (Iedema, 2003; Scheeres, 2003) workers now have to take the initiative and negotiate across their mutual differences, concerns and interests to produce solutions and interventions that are not just technically and financially workable, but interpersonally and politically acceptable.

It is between these various determinations and porosities affecting identity at work that the individual operates and is operated on. Collectively exacerbating the undecidability of identity at work, these trends point to managers’ ambivalence about persisting in their attempts to control and own the organizational production of worker identity. Managers’ traditional role of predetermining not just work tasks but also identity decisions for workers is incommensurate with the current climate of ongoing organizational restructuring, the ‘hollowing out’ of managerial hierarchy (Munro, 2003), the devolution of responsibility and the rise of worker initiative. In contrast, and creating what we identify as the *third* source of identity trouble, contemporary organization and management engender ‘cultures of undecidability’. Here, workers are put in the position of (re)designing their tasks and continuously extending their scope of responsibility and involvement. If early industrialization was about denying workers their social-personal identity, we have now come to witness developments by which
managers tentatively come to terms with the value of creating spaces where workers more or less freely tackle their differences and settle directions for action. Embodying their own ‘withdrawal’ (Munro, 2003), contemporary management appears to be retreating from imposing order on material and identity production, to creating a vacuum that elicits the display of participation, interest, concern and creativity.

This public display through which workers themselves, and to an important degree for themselves, confront and settle disorder, is the third source of trouble – it is this trouble that forms the central concern of the present chapter. The questions that we address here are, first, how does management elicit these discursive displays without structuring their contents, such that workers by themselves, and for themselves, become able to confront and embody organizational-managerial disorder? Second, what consequences does this emerging ethos of discursive display have for workers’ identities? To address these questions, we will begin by briefly situating contemporary management in and against its antecedents in Taylorism and Human Relations Management. Then we move on to fleshing out more recent developments in management practice, and the ways in which it has begun to be concerned with ‘organizational culture’ on the one hand, and with ‘excellence’ on the other. Here we put a twofold argument. First, the 1980s ‘cultural turn’ in management practice signalled an intensification of the rapprochement between managers and workers that began in the 1920s with Human Relations theorists like Mayo (Mayo, 1933) who sought to formalize tasks, relationships and identities in ways that produced mutually agreeable conditions for managers and workers alike (Barley and Kunda, 1992). Second, and more recently, this (re)personalization of work tasks, relationships and identities took a radical turn with the ‘search for excellence’. Instead of extending their means of involvement with and control over workers, we argue that managers have begun to withdraw from micro-assembling workers’ discourses and conducts. In effect, from inculcating and naturalizing ‘cultures of decidability’ through rapprochement, personalization and calculation, managers are now having to come to terms with ‘deciding’ conducts, norms and identities in ways that are significantly modulated by structural distance, interpersonal tentativeness and substantive openness.

To explore this shift more fully, we turn to a case study about one factory worker’s trajectory over a number of years. The case study delves into what this person’s move from directive towards performative ways of being at work meant for her, and what it might mean for us, as organizational researchers. By the time we reach the conclusion of this chapter we aim to have equipped ourselves well enough to be able to argue that by becoming less directive as to the substance and formal contours of tasks, expectations and identities, managers and their organizations are concurrently employing discourses of culture and identity in which the ‘self’ of the worker and its relational dynamics with others are more and more at stake.
11.2 From Taylorism to cultures of excellence

In the early twentieth century the scientific management of F. W. Taylor appeared as a management technology based on controlling the labour process through a separation of the conception of work (by management) from its execution (by workers). In opposition to craft-based work, it was suggested that the requirements of a newly industrialized world were such that work should be ‘scientifically’ analysed and broken down into small parts so as to be reassembled in the most efficient manner whilst maximizing the division of labour. The worker was thus seen as merely an unthinking cog in the machine of work – in Taylor’s own words ‘a mere automaton, a wooden man’ ([1867]1911: 125). From one perspective this suggests that the work involves a ‘dehumanization of labour’ (Clarke and Clegg, 1998: 242) where automation projects a ‘desire for the worker to be cleansed not only from personhood but, as a consequence, also from social influences’ (ten Bos and Rhodes, 2002: 404).

Burrell’s (1997) discussion of the growth of Taylorism in the United States adds an historical lens to what is at stake here. Burrell explains that Taylorism was not just an impartial science of work, but a means of ‘putting agricultural immigrants into the service of industrialism immediately’ (1997: 106). Here those ‘huddled masses’ of the European peasantry were to have their social and personal ‘origins, beliefs and values [made] meaningless and immaterial’ (Burrell, 1997: 105), such that their peasant identities might be eradicated and replaced by that of the technically efficient, yet mindless, worker. What late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century organizations needed was ‘timeliness, discipline, and cleanliness, all designed to overcome any tendencies to recalcitrance that Polish peasants in American factories might display in the face of arduous and demanding work’ (Chan and Clegg, 2002: 267). As one of the first statements on the nature of modern management, Taylorism was in large part about reconfiguring management/worker relationships and identities (Taylor, 1911). By concentrating these relationships and identities in the close confines of the factory, Taylor put identity at risk in ways no social-organizational strategy or theory had done before.

Taylor’s mechanistic rationality, however, was not uncontested. From the 1920s, a reaction against the depersonalizing premises of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Taylorism, focused on reconfiguring the manager-worker relationship in ways that gave greater acknowledgement to workers’ personal and social needs and sources of work motivation (Barley and Kunda, 1992). Under the banner of the Human Relations Theory, ‘humanity’ was increasingly recognized as a determining factor of worker productivity. This rapprochement between manager and worker translated into devices that served to encourage workers into reconciling their self identity with the demands and constraints of organizational pro-
duction. In more contemporary times, this concern of management with devising means through which it could produce and contain worker identity became not only central to the practice of management, but also an explicit part of its discourse. In part this extended Human Relations Theory where, rather than just stressing ‘the importance of informal social organization within formal organization’ (Clegg, 1990: 27), the formality of organization itself came under question. This started with those managerial practices that became popularized in the 1980s with the term ‘corporate culture’. The ways in which this term colonized management discourse over a stretch of less than 30 years is quite extraordinary. Now it is commonplace for people in organizations to discuss ‘our culture’ and to plan cultural change. Important in this process of naturalizing and intensifying the managerial gaze on worker relationships and attitudes was the publication of Peters and Waterman’s massively successful book In Search of Excellence (1982). This book suggested that those organizations which ‘excelled’ were the ones that possessed a ‘strong’ culture. A strong culture meant that a single, dominant set of values and norms guided employee behaviour and infused work with meaning. Not only did Peters and Waterman translate ‘unfashionable and highly abstract organizational theory into a form that a wider audience was able to appreciate’ (Chan and Clegg, 2002: 269), but they helped set in train a whole new semantics through which management could be discursively conducted.

Once the realm of efficiency, directives, ranks, control and reporting, organizations were now to be understood in terms of organizational meanings, rituals, myths, stories, values and so forth. At a time when the US economy had faced unprecedented foreign competition (especially from Japan), the desire for a new way of managing that would counter the attack on US economic supremacy was high. Culture became an important device through which managers tried to satisfy that desire. As the 1980s progressed, what was formerly a relatively unknown concept in relation to work became part of the every-day discourse of organizations from the shop-floor to the boardroom. Following in the wake of Peters and Waterman’s book, there was a plethora of both popular texts and academic treatises which accorded culture a prime position in terms of how contemporary organizational life was to be conceived and governed (du Gay, 1996b).

Commonly, the view was that ‘culture consists of some combination of artefacts (also called practices, expressive symbols or forms), values and beliefs, and underlying assumptions that organizational members share about appropriate behaviour’ (Detert, Schroeder and Mauriel, 2000: 851). This relationship was said to be such that culture is generated from beliefs and values that are commonly held amongst members of the organization, and expressed through artefacts, structures and behaviours (Harris and Ogbonna, 2002; Schein, 1984). This view of organization as a cultural
phenomenon served an undeniably instrumental intent: ‘corporate culture protagonists have promised managers that it is possible to manage culture in order to improve social integration and commitment in the organization, thereby ultimately gaining innovativeness, productivity and competitive advantage’ (Dahler-Larsen, 1994: 1). For many businesses the primacy of culture as an arena in which management is practised has meant a pre-occupation with ‘the consideration of culture and emotions as decisive factors influencing both individual behavior and enterprise results’ (Ibarra-Colado, 2002: 165). The general theme of this concern with cultural change is captured in Senge’s notion of ‘alignment’: ‘when a team becomes more aligned, a commonality of direction emerges, and individuals’ energies harmonize. There is less wasted energy. In fact, a resonance or synergy develops, like the ‘coherent’ light of a laser rather than the incoherent and scattered light of a light bulb’ (Senge, 1990: 234).

The quest for alignment shifts the gaze from the management of body and its movements to the management of the ‘whole’ person – inside and out. Here, ‘the ‘autonomous’ subjectivity of the productive individual has become a central economic resource’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 26). Identity is seen as something that organizations and their managers might determine in alignment with corporate requirements for economically defined performance. Clearly, culture, as a ‘tool that mediates and intervenes in the organizing process’ (Chan, 2000: 21) is ‘intimately bound up with questions of identity’ (du Gay, 1996a: 156). This ‘binding up’ is a process of ‘governing the behaviour of individuals in organizations by proposing to fabricate new identities for them … as subjects of excellence, making them directly accountable for the fate of the organization’ (Ibarra-Colado, 2002: 173).

The development of concepts and practices associated with corporate culture can also be seen historically, as a contemporary shift to work which is less reliant on people’s physical labour and material products, and more concerned with their cognitive and interpretive capacities (Rhodes and Garrick, 2002). But workers’ cognitive and interpretive capacities are best displayed when not entirely determined by organizational procedure, managerial surveillance and technical constraint. That is, workers’ personal engagement with the culture of the organization only becomes tangible in situations where they have the opportunity of self-expression and personalizing organizational relations and processes; that is, the opportunity to put self-identity at risk over organizational issues in front of colleagues (Iedema, Rhodes and Scheeres, 2006). Put in these terms, it becomes evident that an unintended consequence of this drive towards organizational excellence and the concern to produce a shared organizational culture has been that, over a period of the last 20 to 30 years (and not in a small way thanks to developments in IT), work in many organizations has started to become reorganized away from linear hierarchies towards temporary groups and multi-functional networks (Castells, 1990, 2004; Hardt and
Negri, 2000, 2003, 2004). This trend towards structuring contemporary work around teams, projects, problems, opportunities and personalized responsibilities has meant that work has shifted towards workers engaging in *talking* and *writing* with and to each other about their work, in addition to doing it. This gradual and ongoing displacement of the traditional configuration of work tasks, work roles and worker identities (Castells, 2004) has led some to speak about the rise of ‘immaterial labour’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 53).

Besides getting managers to focus on and try to mould organizational culture, then, an important off-shoot of the up-take of Peters and Waterman’s efforts is the *intensity of/at work* created by this ethos of ‘excellence’. While culture is a concept that enables managers to extend the reach and breadth of their productivity in so far as workers’ conduct is concerned, the intensification brought about by striving for excellence, while appearing to provide a means for managers to reach deeply into workers’ souls, at the same time naturalizes the desirability of competitive and constantly shifting standards, roles, identities, processes and practices. This latter effect, of course, further delegitimates the manager as locus of control and reinscribes management into a dynamic of responsiveness to initiative and ‘structuration from below’.

But even more peculiar are the means through which workers are to realize this moral distinction and interpersonal transparency. While the essence of Taylorism lay in the prescription of tasks beyond the cognition of the worker, and the basis of subsequent Human Relations management was an acceptance that workers needed more material resources and structured opportunities through which to ‘actualize’ themselves, the ideal of excellence now appears to have reconstituted itself from requiring a manager-led production of cultural alignment to an emergent acceptance that workers are able to self-organize. Management, in this emergent paradigm, is no longer a matter of seeking to create alignment, but about withdrawing from the work and allowing its ‘disordering’ (Munro, 2003: 283). As workers confront disorder (in the form of project questions, process problems, team conflicts, political struggles, organizational uncertainties and casualization), they gain the opportunity to display their moral and interpersonal acumen at (re)ordering work amongst themselves, and at dynamically maintaining that order through constant communication and negotiation.

Devices once seen as rational, such as tall hierarchies and the time-honoured division between line and staff, are now fingered as part of the problem. In their place is a raft of dismantling logics, including customerization, empowerment, flexibility, lean production and outsourcing.

(Munro, 2003: 283)
In what follows, we trace some of these developments in the talk produced by an ordinary worker caught up in organizational reform. As we show below, this reform was multi-faceted: management determined that she was to be appointed as ‘facilitator’, but it had very little guidance for her once she arrived in her new job, and it had equally few ideas about what it was that the new teams that she was to facilitate were to ‘produce’.

11.3 Restructuring the work(er)

Given the importance of culture and excellence in contemporary management discourse, the practice of management, as mediated by these discourses, has developed a variety of concrete practices that can be pragmatically (or even programmatically) implemented. In an important sense, these practices actively seek to ‘contribute to the deliberate fashioning of employee identities by appropriating identities within the language of empowerment, belonging, reward and valuing individual difference’ (Garrick and Solomon, 2001) rather than through micro-practice of control and regimentation. It is in such a practical context that we can locate the factory worker, Carol, with whom our empirical material is concerned. The organization in question is a gaming machine factory in an industrial suburb in Sydney, Australia. At the time of the research (late 1990s), the non-unionized site employed approximately 800 workers, the majority of whom were from language backgrounds other than English. Most of these workers were deployed on production lines.

As a managerial response to changes that saw the previously family-owned company transition to a publicly owned enterprise, the organization devised a mission statement that proclaimed it would ‘provide innovative and entertaining gaming solutions to customers on a worldwide basis’. The key change that this heralded was an expansion of the company into global markets. Further, given the changes in its governance regime, the organization’s continued existence became dependent not just on making a reasonable profit, but also on constantly improving its competitive position in the national and international marketplace and on maintaining a positive image with its shareholders and with the stock market more generally. These changes meant that it was considered no longer sufficient for employees to learn, know and do a particular management or production-line job as previously conceived. As the company changed to take on the globalized market, workers were increasingly expected to find a way of participating in producing entrepreneurial discourses, practices and relationships (Scheeres, 1999).

Setting up a programme of worker participation occurred through the implementation of teams. A new organizational unit was created called World Class Manufacturing (WCM) whose prime function was the develop-
ment of teams across the manufacturing plant – teams that were to be autonomous and empowered to make decisions that would enhance productivity. The managing director issued the edict: ‘I want everybody in teams, everybody’ (Interview Data: Carol, WCM Facilitator). Following that, a WCM manager and five facilitators were appointed from manufacturing areas within the company. The autocratic nature of the decision to move to teams and team meetings, the creation of the WCM unit, and the selection of the unit’s staff, were indicative of the tensions that developed between old hierarchical practices and contemporary organizational practices that emphasize shared decision-making.

According to popular management discourse, of course, the teams of the twenty-first-century organization should be autonomous, self-managed, empowered, responsible, accountable, and a key part of a devolved management structure. Below, we hear from the HR manager who has not witnessed much empowerment or responsibility, and from the plant manager who eagerly expounds the success of teams in terms of increased production numbers. Their responses suggest, however, that neither of these managers is aware of the tensions they have set in train for the new teams and team leaders. Let us first turn to what the Human Resources Manager had to say about the move towards teams. For him, all the effort expended on creating teams has not paid off in the way it should have (Extract 1).

**Extract 1**  Donald, Human Resources Manager – Interview

What distressed me somewhat was after about four years of work, going into this … world class manufacturing umm … training and training and training of employees about what it is to work in a team and empowerment and such like, I saw very little example of it in practice. I heard … people wanting demarcation complaining that their jobs were being widened … So, I found that less than … impressive for the amount of investment that has supposedly gone in so much training activity and so forth.

Donald regrets that after all this training and investment there are no textbook teams to show for it. However, when he goes on to suggest where the problem lies, he pinpoints the tension between traditional hierarchies and participative management (Extract 2).

**Extract 2**  Donald, Human Resources Manager – Interview

I mean I personally think this may be one of the reasons why it umm … it hasn't been quite as successful because those facilitators start to get leant upon to actually do management type … roles, rather than … force the teams to take the accountability for themselves. They just defer all the time to those facilitators and get them to do the job for them.
The HR manager’s neat, linear story-grammar of training, to empowerment, to accountability and responsibility, to realizing investment, has apparently not been followed. At the same time, he allows little space for examining why the practices and attitudes do not turn out to be as he wants to construct them. Management has done its work to the best of its ability, ‘training and training and training’ employees, but the recipients have not responded appropriately. In one conversation with the General Manager of Production about the progress of the teams he commented that ‘I can’t understand why they just won’t co-operate; there are too many who just don’t want to change’ (Fieldnotes Data). For Donald, not becoming particular kinds of workers is a form of non-compliance and deliberate obstruction.

A slightly different perspective is offered by the plant manager, the manager with day-to-day responsibility for the actual production output. The plant manager is concerned with numbers of machines and he sees teams as working successfully because production numbers have increased (Extract 3).

**Extract 3  Paul, Plant Manager – Interview**

Well if we look at the um the, you know, what’s happening with teams um and ah, ... there’s been a lot of progress there. Um if we look at production output um the place has never produced more than what it currently is. I mean last month nine hundred and twenty machines ... I mean that’s a record that’s an all time record. Um. You know, the plant itself has never produced so many machines.

The plant manager is direct and explicit regarding the company’s and his plant’s main goal, namely, to produce more machines. He only mentions teams once, near the beginning of his response to a question about how he thinks the teams are going. It serves as an opening for him to explicate ‘progress’ in what is most important, and what he is most able to talk about with both ease and pride. He attributes the record numbers of machines to the progress of the teams, even though he does not explain the relationship between the two. For the plant manager, the life of the factory is the production process, to which people are necessary but secondary. The team is a ‘thing’, nominalized in his talk, and at a distance from the people who make up a team. The team is located as part of the production process: ‘with teams’ is an expression that demotes teams from being a key participant to being an adjunct. Things have been ‘happening with teams’ and there has been ‘a lot of progress there’ (with teams). The key participants are ‘the place’, ‘the plant’, and ‘the factory’, constructed as principal actors with ‘machines’ as the goal, the output. For Paul, teams have turned out to be productive, even if he is unable or too uninterested to articulate why or how.
By contrast, the WCM manager and the facilitators are the ones who have observed the changes towards team work close-up. Given their responsibility of developing the teams and ensuring their effectiveness, they had the most thought-provoking things to say about the problems and successes of teams. In the eyes of the WCM manager cited below, for example, the practices that encourage self-managed teams and that give them ‘the chance to flourish themselves’ are central to the future of teams (Extract 4).

**Extract 4  Adam, WCM Manager – Interview**

I think with the teams, we’ve got to make a decision, one way or the other … as to how fair dinkum we are with teams. And if we want to …. fully go down that road, then we’ve got to give teams the autonomy and authority to do, what we expect of them. At the moment our teams are in limbo because they’re not given any, any sort of autonomy, authority, within the team structure, as to what they can achieve … A lot of the team discussion is led. It’s not a team per se, let’s come in and talk about the issues that go on. It’s led … Now depending on who’s leading, and Carol has a certain outcome which she would like to achieve, so she’s going to point the team within that direction. Uhm … plant managers tend to be reactive, so if the General Manager of production says, ‘this isn’t happening’, all of a sudden, we’ve got to have four hundred statements of problems where before, we were allowed to have none. So … to me, I would like to see the teams given the authority to work as teams.

Up until now the teams worked in accordance with a leader’s design and goals, whether these be the facilitator’s ‘certain outcome’ or the plant manager’s edict (straight down the line from the production manager) that says, ‘we’ve got to have four hundred problem statements’. Allowing the teams to find their own direction would constitute giving them ‘the authority to work as teams’. Adam takes seriously the devolution of authority, and the breaking-down of hierarchical boundaries.

But how are these new practices enacted ‘on the ground’? Let us turn to Carol, a team facilitator whom we followed over considerable time. In Extract 5, Carol comments on how she became a WCM facilitator, and then talks about how she sees her place in the organization, and how she understands her facilitation role. The first time Carol heard about the facilitator’s job was when her manager came up and said, ‘I’ve got a job for you’ (Extract 5):

**Extract 5  Interview data: Carol, WCM Facilitator**

‘I know’ he says ‘I’ve got a good job for you’. He says ‘you’re going to do W’s job, which is facilitator, in Plant One’. And I said ‘but I don’t know anything about it’. And he says ‘No, no, you’ll be good, you’ll be good’ It’s all he ever used to say to me, ‘you’ll be good’.
Carol notes that the appointment came as a surprise – a surprise coupled with some trepidation shown through Carol’s stated lack of knowledge and experience. Further comments demonstrate that she didn’t really know why she was chosen to be a facilitator (Extract 6).

Extract 6  Interview data: Carol, WCM Facilitator

obviously my ... I don’t know really, I mean, I’d say he must have believed that I could do it, but ... [sigh] I was, I would question his motives too, ‘cos I’m not sure he really wanted teams to work there, so maybe he thought that I couldn’t do it ... and because he didn’t want it to work, I don’t know. I did do it though.

Carol’s hedges and reformulations and unfinished statements bear out her bewilderment and suspicion. All her statements (except the final one) manifest uncertainty – the use of ‘could’, ‘would’, ‘maybe’ – and the repeated negative polarity of ‘I’m not sure’, and ‘I don’t know’. The mental processes of (not) knowing, believing, questioning, and (not) wanting predominate and construct mental ‘actions’, while the material processes or actions of ‘doing it’ and working are relegated to a more minor role.

When Carol moves to talk about where she now ‘sits’ in the organisation, she tries to locate herself in terms of power and accountability (Extract 7).

Extract 7  Interview data: Carol, WCM Facilitator

[the WCM manager is] higher than like the plant managers, and then we’re [the facilitators] supposed to obviously come off him. But we’re no higher, we are not higher than the managers, and we’re not higher than team leaders, and really I don’t think we’re higher than people on the floor. I mean I see my level there on the factory floor with ... with the teams.

She wants to position herself in relation to both managers and production-line workers but admits she is ‘confused as to what they see me as’. Carol employs the discourse of traditional organizational levels (‘come off him’), but she is aware that the ‘we’, that is, the facilitators in the WCM unit, don’t fit in hierarchically. At the same time she wants to stay connected to her former peers on the factory floor. This is an instance of triple identity trouble: the unit is tentatively held together by an ambiguous ‘we’ (‘maybe he didn’t want it to work’ in the previous quote); Carol is an uncertain part of this ‘we’ (‘maybe he thought that I couldn’t do it’), and Carol – now realized not as ‘we’ but as ‘I’ – insists on regarding herself as ‘on the factory floor ... with the teams’.

The unit and its members clearly did not slot neatly into organizational flow charts. Traditional linear structures were being disturbed as the WCM
unit created new relationships and ways of working with other employees and among themselves. With the uncertainties that this restructuring incurs, questions of identity emerge regarding both the unit itself and its members as they struggle to find a ‘place’. It is this that Carol highlights during the interview: her trouble with giving up her ‘old’ place, understanding her new ‘place’, and coming to terms with the uncertain ‘place’ of the WCM unit in the organization.

Carol’s reflexivity regarding her move from production-line worker to facilitator contrasts somewhat with her understanding of what she actually does as a facilitator. When she describes what she now does, Carol shows more confidence, as is evident in the following extract (Extract 8).

**Extract 8  Interview data: Carol, WCM Facilitator**

I look after teams within Plant Three. Um my job really is, is to try and change their culture, to try and look at their work situation and improve upon that using various tools and techniques like Problem Solving Plus and Station Control, and um ... can be improvements to the quality, can be improvements um, not JIT, um ... improvements to like the system the procedures um, streamline things.

Carol talks the talk of the emerging cultural organization in a number of ways. She ‘looks after’ teams in Plant Three, but then quickly moves on to acknowledge that her work is involved with the formidable process of changing workplace culture. This is juxtaposed with her explanation of how she goes about trying to accomplish this cultural change. Carol uses the discourses of the factory floor: her ‘tools and techniques’ include ‘Problem Solving Plus’ (PSP) and ‘Station Control’, both of which are highly structured, step-by-step procedures, designed to lead to predictable productivity improvements. The ‘tools and techniques’ are material and tangible. They are set procedures that help keep her connected to the core work of the organization, to the process workers in their teams, and they are possibly essential too to her own understanding of what her work now is.

Following her move from the factory floor Carol still constructs her facilitation as ‘doing’ work, as predominantly organized and set out procedures to be followed. Notably, she uses the vocabulary of material work practices to explain the more ‘immaterial’ discourse work that she is now involved in. In that way, she both ‘looks after’ the teams while at the same time being one of them.

Carol’s multiple positionings can also be seen in how the team meetings unfold. Many of the team meetings that were observed as part of the research begin with Carol prompting reflection on the last meeting together with an outline of a clear direction and task(s) for that day’s meeting (Extract 9).
Extract 9  Team meeting data

Carol: We wrote a problem statement. Okay, what, what we now need to do is write a target statement. Okay. We look at the ... we’re going to follow the PSP ahh ... and we’re all in stage one where we use the tally sheet, the tally sheets told us ... gave us dates are and they told us what the problem was the highest problem. So we had records dated from last year as well ... and now what we need to do is our target statement. Right. And then go on to stage 2. So [4 seconds] very similar to the problem statement. Umm ... and I’ll give you [4 seconds] copies. Some of you might have to share. Let’s just read through that and say ... and see [4 seconds] what our problem statement is, oh sorry a target statement. Somebody want to read that out what it says there?

This long turn illustrates how Carol tries to contain the undecidability of her new situation. She begins with constructing the work of the team as a series of steps; steps that are dictated by the PSP manual and flow chart of activities. This new work for production-line workers/team members is discourse work: the talk and texts of problem-solving at a distance from the production-line. Yet the activities are presented as a kind of production-line process. There is an expectation that this team work will be organized and enacted somewhat like a production-line. As the meetings progress, however, the talk ranges widely between and among members as they struggle with what is going on, why they are there, and indeed who they are. Carol, too, is caught up in these complexities (Extract 10).

Extract 10  Team meeting data

Carol: What is a cross-functional team do you think? [No response]
The way we can solve problems together ... communicate with others

Team Member: Why we want to know their problems when we have our own problems?

Carol’s answer to her own question in Extract 10 is one of many examples of where she talks the talk of ‘new work order’ teams (Gee, Hull and Lankshear, 1996). She speaks into being the commitment and communication central to successful team work. The team members’ response on the other hand articulates a key difficulty regarding the acceptance of shared responsibilities. Similarly, team members are sometimes explicit about their confusion (Extract 11).
Extract 11  Team meeting data

Team Member:  I’ve got no problem. I just don’t know what’s going on.
Carol:   Neither do I.
[General laughter]

In this last extract above Carol shows she understands that the problem-solving PSP path is not necessarily as direct as it is often constructed, either by managers or by her own agenda-setting comments. Here, then, she signals publicly (to the team members) that besides embodying and representing the discourse of management, she also embodies a more doubting discourse through which she seeks solidarity with her team members. Seen from a dynamic interactive perspective, it is here that our third dimension of identity trouble comes into view: Carol produces a complex hybrid discourse that constantly needs to balance PSP proceduralization and team solidarity. It is through this dynamically enacted hybridity that Carol elicits a new, complex kind of organizational sociality into being.

11.4 Culture, excellence and (un)decidability

As we argued in the beginning of this chapter, contemporary management theory and practice have, for many, given rise to a withdrawal from directive modalities of work, and placed more emphasis on performative ones. This, we suggest, has significant implications for workers, especially in terms of identity and identification. Whereas identity might be regarded as ‘always already’ being located within an oscillation of different determinations, these emerging forms of work produce added undecidability. This undecidability, however, is not one that is an open plurality of options over which any given person has free choice, but rather a changing field of determinations through which workers are to act. Hence, whereas the ‘underpinning assumption for many of the approaches to cultural change recommended is that employees are willing agents who are powerless and will respond positively to management initiatives’ (Harris and Ogbonna, 1998: 78), the lived practice of the negotiation over identity is significantly more turbulent.

At an extreme it has been suggested that corporate change programmes and their emphasis on organizational culture and excellence are processes that extend managements’ governance of employees’ souls (Willmott, 1993). This view has also been put in terms of a corporate colonization of the self (Casey, 1995) that purports to create a harmonious accommodation by employees of the preferred selves proffered by the organization. Here, organizations are said to seek to ‘achieve appropriate fit between employee and culture … [and the] … internalization of the values and practices of the new culture’ (Casey, 1995: 142–3). Personal identity is at stake where employees are actively encouraged to ‘develop self-images and work
orientations that are deemed congruent with managerially defined objectives’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002: 619). The managerial aspiration that this reflects is one of ‘management control by colonizing the affective domain’ (Willmott, 1993: 517) and redefining ‘the nature of employee identification’ (Parker, 2000: 23). Workers are not just instructed to follow particular procedures but are also ‘enjoined to incorporate the new managerial discourses into narratives of self-identity’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002: 622).

For us, two questions remain, however. First, to what extent do managers have the power to enact such precision and potency in reconstituting the identity of others? Second, to what extent are managers aware that the new modalities of work they are prescribing undermine their own power to control and determine the details of workers’ practices?

What we suggest is that management discourse is indeed built on the assumption that ‘cultures of decidability’ can be created at will. Such cultures attempt, variously, to impose a determined identity position on workers. In practice, however, and particularly in the current climate of the ‘new work order’ (Gee, Hull and Lankshear, 1996), such a determination becomes one of many that particular workers are faced with; a plurality, not the least of which is made up of the changing and multiple instantiations of managerial rhetoric itself. The result, we argue, is an inherent and far-reaching undecidability affecting workers’ identities. Amidst this arena, the issue for workers is not necessarily a wholesale reformulation of their selves, but rather that workers learn to display and perform identity such that they are rendered visible through discoursing in ways that conform with (volatile) organizational expectations. In Carol’s case this involved changes to the character of her work performance, not the least of which was her retreat from factory-floor activities into a work regime enacted through the rhythms of the various meetings she had to lead and/or participate in. Clearly, these new practices were not governed by concrete directing or surveillance of her activities, but still the new forms of management practice engendered new kinds of performance at work and monitoring of work from a distance. This did amount to a new performance of identity, but it was not one that was as straightforward as immediate or predetermined re-identification.

Carol’s case demonstrates that her response to the new order of work was one where she had to learn to manage the ‘volatilities’ that came into play in speaking with others on-line/face-to-face about things she had not previously been involved in talking about, in the context of a managerially defined culture that was itself not entirely clear. This is a form of active identification amidst the shifting possibilities (i.e., undecidability) for identity and the need to retain a legitimate position in relation to the organization. In part this rendered itself in an inability to declare (dis)approval for anyone or any agenda too soon, due to the political volatility of control at
work and the need to maintain legitimacy amongst this volatility. In relation to the changes that were happening in this organization, it appears that Carol sought a form of strategic participation in the organization and her new position within it.

Rather than lamenting the inevitability and inadequacy of structures of control, Carol’s work practice entailed developing a new way of being at work in relation to the changes. In so doing, we surmise that she appreciated that there was a considerable gap between top-down management’s edicts and the operations of the workplace, and that it was in this space that her conduct was ‘decided’ as an ongoing accomplishment. This was engendered between ‘a steely determination on the part of those charged with delivery to take routine production for granted and affirm the presence of excess by “ordering” it only when needed for the purposes of “enhancement”’ (Munro, 2003: 294); that is, volatility is not ruled out, but only those volatilities that register as enhancements will produce comparative interest and lasting effect. In Carol’s case, such enhancements were grist for the mill in her newly defined role as facilitator. In this sense her identity was on the one hand at stake in her response to the new way of working, but on the other her response was not wholly determined by it. Instead, the new work created a shift in the matrix of determinate possibilities within which she made choices about how to conduct her work and her identity performances at work.

11.5 Concluding comments

Contemporary managerial discourse suggests that ‘identity is seen as something that organizations and their managers have at their disposal such that it can be changed and aligned with corporate imperatives in order to improve organizational performance’ (Chappell et al., 2003: 92). As we have argued, however, such attempts are best understood as a means of trying to impose an ‘organizational culture of decidability’ on the multitude of identity determinations that oscillate in and around organizations – a multitude that includes those embedded in the variously reformed change agendas promoted by organizations themselves. On the one hand, people at work are ‘multiple members of, and participants in, other social and cultural institutions and forms, many of which might be expected to exert a more powerful influence on values and beliefs, if not on behaviour and performance, than the organizational credo’ (Linstead and Grafton-Small, 1992: 225). Further, however, the incomplete and shifting demands for identification at work itself add to the undecidability vis-à-vis identity at work. In this sense, that contemporary management practice can engender a re-identification of worker identity can be expected always to be a site of contradiction, ambiguity or even conflict, in the balance of which lies employee identification. The managerial discourse and the workplace practice are not commensurate.
We thus concur that the ‘colluded corporate self is an inherently contradictory and unstable identity based on simulated myths of community, consensus, family and solidarity’ (Reed, 1998: 201). The result appears to us as a form of ambivalence that manifests itself in an incomplete internalization of the variability of organizationally espoused values and behaviours (Casey, 1999) as we saw in the case discussed in this chapter.

In terms of our case, the change to the organization of work did exert a powerful influence on the forms of identification that were socially enacted at work. This influence, however, cannot be understood as one where employees passively take on a new identity as prescribed by management and implicit in the new mode of organizing. The recreation of identity is not as simple as putting on a new coat. Indeed, it is by the very confrontation by workers of having to take on new identities that identity trouble at work can be seen to begin. This attests to the view that the ‘conscious management of organizational culture is at worst an impossibility and at best extraordinarily complex’ (Harris and Ogbonna, 1998: 89). This does not mean, however, that new modes of organizing are innocuous, but rather that their effects are not entirely determined by its designers. As we have argued, although composed of powerful discourses, an inherent undecidability remains.

Based on our discussion, we propose a scepticism about whether contemporary managerial techniques are as effective as might appear on first glance. Here we suggest that attempts to modify or circumscribe identity might be responded to in ways that do not engender a wholesale reidentification, but rather enhance undecidability. This does not deny the potency of managerial discourse, but it does deny it providence. Hence, we suggest that the effects of managerial power are not determined solely by that which is internal to managerial discourse. In this sense culture is recast as a diffuse political struggle over employee identity where the ‘organizational regulation of identity ... is a precarious and often contested process involving active identity work ... organizational members are not reducible to passive consumers of managerially designed and designated identities’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002: 621). Further, the volatility of change means that it is ‘a continually contested process of making claims of difference within and between groups of people who are formally constituted as members of a defined group’ (Parker, 2000: 233). As Clegg and Hardy put it, what is called for is:

The need to understand identity as a complex, multifaceted, and transient construct; to appreciate that individuals have multiple identities; that identities intersect to create an amalgamated identity; that identities are socially, historically, culturally and organizationally constructed, and subject to contradictions, revisions, and change.

(1996: 685)
In today’s world, it is at work that such complexities of power and identification are particularly vividly at stake.

References


12

Attempting Clinical Democracy: Enhancing Multivocality in a Multidisciplinary Clinical Team

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12.1 Introduction

This chapter explores identity shifts demanded of a multidisciplinary team of clinicians who treat spinal cord injury patients with pressure ulcers in an outpatient’s clinic of an Australian public hospital. Multidisciplinary clinical teams are increasingly part of the hospital organizational landscape (Colombo et al., 2003; Latham et al., 2000; Sherer et al., 2002). This type of teamwork demands of clinicians that they are experts in their own area of ‘content knowledge’, and expects them to be able to communicate across disciplinary boundaries, into other clinicians’ areas of content expertise. In addition, multidisciplinary teams can require a destabilization of established hierarchies in order to communicate effectively across disciplinary boundaries (Cott, 1997; Gair and Hartery, 2001). Both of these shifts, of content knowledge and of hierarchical valuing of particular types of expertise, require clinicians to reconfigure their professional identities.

Similar to other authors in this volume, we are not using identity in the static psychological definitional sense of ‘a person’s essential, continuous self’ (Reber, 1985: 341). Like Lemke (this volume), Skevington and Baker (1989: 2) and Jansen (1993: 158), we understand identity to encompass dynamic and multi-faceted expressions of positioning, performativity and ways of being-in-the-world. As clinicians in the team negotiate the liminal, unstable terrain of multidisciplinary complex care work, they are expected to destabilize their learned sense of discipline-bounded clinical self to produce a coherent team of multidisciplinary clinical selves. They are also expected, in the clinic discussed in this chapter, to destabilize their own place and the place of others in their enculturated sense of hospital hierarchy. Dominance of any single professional voice is understood as being potentially compromising to quality of care, and the team works actively at integrating allied health, nursing, medical and community perspectives into team decision-making. All team members are in accord with the value
of this approach, and the clinical outcomes indicate the effectiveness of this clinic in terms of quality of care.

Unsettling established and deeply entrenched hierarchical structures in one small island within an institution, however, is not a straightforward task (Hinjosa et al., 2001: 211, 219). Hospitals are highly stratified institutional spaces within which professional identities are situated and performed. In sociology and nursing literature, it is frequently and vehemently argued that particular professional identities, for example medical and surgical, dominate less empowered professional identities, such as nursing and allied health (Coburn and Willis, 2000; Wicks, 1999; Williams, 2002). This stratification of professional identity is seen as problematic, and doctors are taken to task both for being complicit in creating ‘medical dominance’, and for actively seeking to maintain the status quo (Germov, 2002: 288; Willis, 1989; Wearing, 1999).

In the Australian context, organizational reform has resulted in a ‘reduced dominance of the previously universal medical model’ (Boyce, 2001) and shifted doctors’ ‘power vis-à-vis nurses and allied health professions’ (Braithwaite and Westbrook, 2005: 11). Clinical directorate structures, adopted widely in Australian hospitals in the 1990s, involve members of health professions taking on administrative and managerial roles in hospitals, and allowing non-medical professional groups, especially nurses, access to decision-making positions (Braithwaite and Westbrook, 2004, 2005). Medical and nursing voices are (mostly) well represented in management structures within Australian hospitals, whereas allied health is not as well represented at key decision-making levels (Rowe et al., 2004: 17). This has significant ramifications for the clinicians in this team, as much of the clinical work undertaken includes key allied health interventions.

The multidisciplinary health care team which runs the pressure area clinic is actively and successfully attempting to operate in a clinically democratic way, that is, in a way which facilitates collaborative, consultative and multivocal decision-making processes. In spite of their success, however, a number of barriers remain. Members of the team see the medical specialist as ‘team leader’, an identity he reframes as ‘team facilitator’. The team actively contest his relinquishing of leadership, and invest in strategies of both active and passive resistance which frustrate his attempts at devolving leadership. Although the team has created a structure in which a variety of modes of formal and informal communication can and do effectively coexist, the medical voice still dominates in some crucial areas of team communication. The destabilization of stratification of professional identities is uneven: in some ways, for example, informality of communication structures is highly successful; in other areas, medical dominance is proving to be highly persistent, even when the medical officer in question actively and overtly encourages and facilitates destabilization.
In this chapter, we will first provide background to the clinic and to the medical and social complexity clinicians face in providing care for spinal patients with pressure areas. We illustrate communication modes utilized within the team, and the flexibility that they offer in accommodating both different types of messages, and different types of messengers. In spite of the success of the team in developing highly functional communication modes, four challenges to clinically democratic working practices face the clinicians. The first two challenges are internal to the team, while the other two challenges stem from the situatedness of the multidisciplinary team in the broader organizational structure of the hospital. Firstly, there is internalization of medical dominance by non-medical members of the team. Secondly, there is resistance from the non-medical team members to shared or devolved leadership. Thirdly, medical time is valued more highly than nursing or allied health time, and can be more easily articulated in ways which align with billing structures than non-medical time. Fourthly, the medical voice is accepted as more authoritative in interactions between the team and other parts of the hospital. We argue that, as troubling as medical dominance is to the team members, the attempt to move beyond medical dominance to a more clinically democratic structure is far from straightforward, and deeply enculturated beliefs, values and behaviours make these professional identity shifts far from trouble-free.

12.2 Background: the pressure area clinic and the research project

The clinic provides care for people with spinal cord injury who have developed pressure areas, which in their most severe form are also known as pressure ulcers, pressure sores or bed sores. The pressure area clinic is held as a hospital outpatient’s clinic for one morning each fortnight. The clinical team on hand for each outpatient’s clinic is comprised of a spinal medical specialist, a spinal occupational therapist, a spinal physiotherapist, a wound care clinical nurse consultant, a social worker, a dietician and peer support workers. They are supported in clinic by one or two outpatient nurses. The team also gather for monthly team and case management meetings and for teleconferences to rural clinicians as required. Most of the team members of this clinic also work together in other capacities within the spinal unit: servicing inpatient clients, and in other outpatient clinics.

The multidisciplinary pressure area clinic is a relatively new innovation. Previously, patients with pressure areas were referred to clinicians for separate appointments. This had disadvantages for both patients and clinicians: clinicians worked in greater isolation to treat their narrow aspect of what was inevitably a multifactorial issue and patients had to arrange multiple visits, with the associated time and transport complications involved for people with spinal cord injury. The multidisciplinary approach is preferred
by both patients and clinicians, and shows markedly better clinical outcomes. For patients with areas requiring surgery, the average time spent in hospital was reduced from 264 to 54 days. The cost benefits to the hospital system are significant: in this hospital, the cost of treating a pressure area surgically, for someone who hasn’t come for pre-operative consultation in the clinic, costs on average $198,000 per patient. The average cost for patients who have come through the clinic is less than a quarter of that, $42,000.

The data for this chapter were collected as part of a research project exploring practitioner identity in multidisciplinary clinic environments, using video ethnography to stimulate clinician reflexivity. One of the authors (Long) spent ten months undertaking ethnographic observations of the clinic, including clinic sessions, team meetings, teleconferences, staff in-service training sessions and research feedback sessions. The quotes used in this chapter derive from video transcripts of either team meetings, research feedback sessions or one-on-one interviews, with most of the quotes coming from one particular feedback session where issues of voice, leadership and communication styles were discussed by the team. The term ‘clinicians’ refers to all health care workers on the team: medical, allied health, nursing and surgical. All clinician names used are pseudonyms.

The multidisciplinary clinic began with three core members: Kim, a spinal medical specialist; Liz, a spinal occupational therapist, and Nicky, a spinal physiotherapist. Kim is the instigator of the clinic. When the research project that this material draws on began, the team had been operating for nearly two years with these three core members and Tony, a clinical nurse consultant who was on call from the spinal unit during clinic time. Kim had recently received a significant grant that allowed him to expand the expertise within the clinic. With the grant money, he hired a full-time clinical nurse consultant (Claire), a part-time social worker (Don) and a part-time dietician (Marilyn). The new members of the team started work in the first couple of months of observations in the clinic.

12.3 Decision-making and communication

Kim is vehement in his conviction that allied health input is as critical as medical input in healing pressure areas. When the team was initially established, he consciously designed the team to have a ‘flat’ organizational structure (Burke et al., 2000; Cott, 1997; Senge, 1990), attempting to create a treatment environment where the occupational therapy voice and the physiotherapy voice carried as much weight as nursing and medical voices.

Extract 1

We’ve always tried to give people permission to speak. When you look at the medical problems, or the problems that occur after someone
is discharged from hospital, most of those problems are actually preventable, and most of those problems are social, environmental issues. Usually [patients are] clear to go on a very narrow medical filter, whether they’re going to live or die, whether or not their blood pressure’s stable or whatever. But things that make them fail [i.e., have pressure areas] are these other issues, and they just haven’t been given voice.

(Kim, doctor, research feedback session)

Kim is seen as an unusual clinician in this way. All of the team members present nodded their agreement to the following statement:

**Extract 2**

I think, with Kim as the clinician, it [informal communication for non-medical clinicians] works, because Kim … is very receptive to that … The things that we pick up, whether it be in the corridor afterwards if we talk to Kim or email or phone, he’s always happy to take that on. But … I have had experience with other clinicians who are not as open to that sort of input.

(Nicky, physiotherapist, research feedback session)

Communication, especially flexibility of communication, is seen as central to the success of the team.

**Extract 3**

This team operates on informal and formal communication … [these] communication channels are absolutely vital … informal communication is the glue that keeps this team going … it’s disruptive sometimes, but it works.

(Kim, doctor, team meeting)

Liz and Nicky have very different communication styles. In Nicky’s terms, Liz is a gifted communicator, comfortable in asserting herself in a medical environment. Nicky, who is more introverted, describes herself as being ‘not particularly good at that sort of thing’. Liz feels that Kim has created an environment in which she can fully express her professional capabilities. Nicky also feels that, although much of her communication and recommendations take place on a one-on-one basis: she will talk to Kim or Liz privately. Her recommendations are often fed through to the team via a mediator, especially if there are a number of medical people present. Both Liz’s (very direct) and Nicky’s (more indirect) individually preferred styles of communication are accommodated and enabled thanks to the flexibility of communication structures within the team.
As well as allowing for differences in personal style, a structure that allows a variety of communication styles also allows the appropriate channel to be found for different types of information. Although Don, the social worker, and Theresa, the peer support worker, are both confident in expressing their professional opinion in case meetings and crowded clinic sessions, they often need to pass on information discretely. They may deal with issues such as substance abuse, depression or financial circumstances, and prefer for some information not to be aired formally. Communication strategies in a multidisciplinary team such as this require a constant balancing between the need for structure and the need for flexibility (Hinjosa et al., 2001: 211).

**Extract 4**

I think the informal ad hoc system seems to work really well, there are problems with it, I agree, but in general, because I mean we’re all adult, or most of the time we’re adult. [laughter] I think we feel that we can all say what we feel is important, and there’s odd times things might be missed, but the responsibility’s on the person to follow that up. And we can always come down and talk to you [indicating Claire] or you [indicating Kim]

(Don, social worker, research feedback session)

However flat Kim wishes the decision-making structure and communication structure of the team to be, all team members, Kim included, have been presented with challenges in putting this philosophy into practice. The following section illustrates four of these challenges: density of the medical voice, dynamic leadership, differential valuation of clinicians’ time, and changing authority structures in a context oriented towards hierarchy and centralized control.

### 12.4 Challenges to achieving clinical democracy

#### 12.4.1 Density of medical voice

The first challenge to realizing clinical democracy is an internalization of the dominance of the medical voice and a muting of ‘Other’ voices. ‘Unlearning to not speak’ (Piercy, 1973: 38) is as much of a challenge for nursing and allied health professionals in the team as learning how to not-speak is for Kim. The imperative to share voice is strong; however, putting this into practice is not always straightforward (see also Dukewits and Gowan 1996, Hinjosa et al., 2001, Cott, 1997). Even in a team which is committed to multidisciplinarity, the medical voice dominates (see also Hinjosa et al., 2001: 213). An analysis of an hour of team-meeting time showed that Kim had the floor for 43 out of 60 minutes, or 70 per cent of the time. Kim found what he called the ‘density of medical talk time’ unacceptable.
Extract 5

It’s about patient safety issues ... 70 per cent of the time ... being medical is possibly going to compromise patient safety when we know that all these other things are there. I think that density of medical talk time is a problem ... [we need] to allow some of the other light to shine on the subject ... it’s going to take some self-monitoring on my part ... [otherwise] we’re going to lose information. I think we’re going to potentially make worse clinical decisions because the different co-factors that lead to failure are not going to be properly expressed.

(Kim, doctor, research feedback session)

Brought into stark relief in a well-functioning multidisciplinary team, the dominance of the medical identity is realized here by the prominence of the medical voice. This making visible of something that is usually taken for granted can be unsettling for all involved, and requires significant inputs of what Hardt and Negri (2000) label ‘immaterial labour’: communicative, emotional and affective work. In a biomedical environment, medical knowledge is privileged, and medical people are understood to be the holders of the most knowledge, and the most important knowledge. Even though clinicians working in a hospital environment may question this implicitly, it can be unsettling for it to be made explicit that medical knowledge is ‘different’ rather than ‘better’. It can be profoundly unsettling to realize that medical people are denied access to some types of knowledge as an effect of medicine muting other voices. As in Hegelian master/slave dialectics (Hegel, 1977: 191), people in subordinate positions in hospital hierarchies will always know more about some things than people occupying dominant positions in the social hierarchy. Lemke (this volume) states that:

Everyone of lower or weaker status must learn as part of survival how the minds of the powerful work. Asymmetrically, the powerful are often much less able to put themselves in the shoes of those whose ways of thinking they are privileged to ignore.

An illustration of this occurred when the team reviewed video segments that showed the difference in the way a patient talked to clinic staff when there was medical staff in the room, as opposed to the way they interacted with nursing and allied health clinicians. The non-medical clinicians in the research feedback session had all experienced both types of interactions before. For Kim, however, this was the first time he had seen the types of interactions that occurred in the clinic when neither he nor the surgical members of the team were in the room. This led to a discussion about the types of things that medical staff may not get to know about, which may hinder optimal patient outcomes.
Extract 6

Kim: There is a different feel ... I think that there really is ... Is that a bad thing?

Don: It’s to be expected

Debbi: [Researcher] I don’t think it’s unusual ... it’s something that’s important to know about. I think the nursing and allied health staff are probably very aware of it, because they’re in the room when the medical staff are there, but it’s like families ... of daddy not really aware of what happens when he’s away, with mum and the kids, whereas mum and the kids know exactly what happens when daddy’s there.

Kim: You probably don’t tell as much to Dad as you do to Mum, so you don’t actually outline your compliance issues or other problems

Debbi: This [is] the point, that the nursing and allied health staff have an awful lot of information that’s medically relevant, that is not always accessed by the people who are making the medical decisions

Don: That’s always been the case, I reckon ... I think it’s something to do with the way that doctors are perceived by patients, by the public, that you don’t confront them directly, that you go in a non-threatening way, because doctors are powerful people, who have a coat, and have clout. And that’s the reality of it, and patients sometimes feel vulnerable with it.

Kim: (citing a case of a particular patient’s postoperative care) if it was ... just left to medical people to deal with it would have been ‘you do this or else’ sort of thing, whereas we’ve ended up with a good situation here without that, and he’s actually felt in control of what’s happening ... ... If it was left to a doctor to negotiate with the [nursing home] it would never have happened.

In reflecting later on the video that showed the difference in interactions when there was no medical presence in the consultation room, Kim commented:

Extract 7

What we say in front of patients very rarely becomes what they internalize and do ... When we talk to people it would be nice to know what’s actually happening. I didn’t know what happens when I leave the room, for instance, with the communication flows with the patient. In effect you could argue that everything that I say would be ineffective if there
wasn’t that secondary communication structure there, picking up things and explaining things to the patient ...

(Kim, doctor, informal interview)

Enabling all members of the team to have equal ‘voice’, does not, however, mean they have equal ‘say’. Ultimate decision-making, authority and responsibility rests with Kim, a point obliquely shown by the following reference to the importance of clinical input from non-medical team members:

**Extract 8**

Without Don and Nicky [and Liz⁸], I wouldn’t actually get information on [patients’] compliance or any of this other stuff. I mean Nicky’s actually touching the patients, and examining their shoulders and the rest of it, and actually takes a lot of time, 20 minutes plus, maybe an hour to do that, and they tell her things that they never tell me, and they are so relevant. I think if I didn’t have that information, there’s no way that we would know what was happening.

(Kim, doctor, informal interview)

There is a conflation here between medical knowledge and team knowledge: ‘if I didn’t have that information, there’s no way that we would know what was happening’. The implication is that if Kim doesn’t know it, it is not ‘team’ knowledge, but that if Kim does know it, then it is ‘team’ knowledge, irrespective of which other members of the team have access to the knowledge. This conflation recognizes the reality of knowledge flow: if the knowledge is medically available, it can be acted upon.

**Extract 9**

Kim is the team’s link between the hospital and the clinic. Only a doctor has admitting rights, or can book someone for surgery. I can’t do that. I can’t go to a doctor and just say ‘admit this patient.’

(Liz, OT, informal interview)

In some senses, if knowledge is not medically available, it is not recognized as part of clinical knowledge upon which treatment can be based.⁹ There is an exception to this: two team members do act outside of Kim’s ‘gaze’. Nicky and Liz both implement treatment and recommendations without necessarily ‘clearing’ these first with Kim. Like autonomous recommendations Kim makes (for example drug prescription or test referrals), Nicky and Liz do sometimes implement treatment or make recommendations to the patient that are then reported back to the team retrospectively. Having worked with Kim in this team for over two years, both Nicky the physiotherapist and Liz the occupational therapist have the confidence to initiate treatment.
The fact that Kim, for whom ultimate legal-judicial responsibility in the clinic lies, feels safe in relying on Liz’s and Nicky’s clinical skills and judgement illustrates the enormous amount of professional trust invested in these relationships. The trust that the team has in Kim’s leadership is openly articulated, here again in a discussion about communication structure:

**Extract 10**

Don: I think it works pretty well. I think there’s a bit of an ad-hocness about it, where things could get not said because Kim gets called away, and something happens so you just don’t do it. That’s unfortunate, and I don’t know if you can have systems to prevent that, but the informality’s probably worth that happening occasionally. I see it as an advantage, really. As you say [indicating Nicky], we’re lucky that Kim’s particularly open to information ... [all the way though this, other non-medical team members were nodding their agreement with Don]

Kim: and that’s the problem, isn’t it, because these clinics have to be sustainable beyond individual clinicians.

Don: and that could be a problem in the future.

Nicky: and maybe this is one of the lessons that we learn from these studies, is that the person leading this type of clinic ...

Don: ... needs to have that ...

Nicky: ... yeah, needs to have that open mindedness and respect of the team

Don: absolutely.

Lemke argues that social analysis needs to take account of the ‘significant role of fear, desire, anger and other powerful feelings in shaping forms of action’ (Lemke, this volume). Multidisciplinary clinical teamwork involves emotional work to shape and maintain one’s own sense of professional self, and to support (or undermine) colleagues’ sense of professional self. Dominance and density of medical voice is foundational to hospital culture: to question that voice presents deep and fundamental challenges to core principles of professional identity for hospital-based health care workers. In challenging medical dominance, the team are taking on hospital and professional hierarchies in ways which could conceivably make them profoundly vulnerable: emotionally, professionally and legally. The team members’ frequent reiteration of how much trust is involved in their ways of working is an expression of that potential vulnerability.

### 12.4.2 Leadership

The concept of leadership was openly interrogated by the team: Kim labels himself as a facilitator, rather than leader, whereas other members of the
team contest his claims of non-leadership. Although team members embraced some aspects of a ‘flat’ multidisciplinary structure, there was significant resistance to the idea of Kim not ‘leading’ the team. As the next extract shows, non-medical team members ascribed Kim the leadership role in the clinic. Kim was vigorous in his contestation of this. The following transcript excerpt leads directly on from the one above.

**Extract 11**

Kim: The point is I don’t actually lead this clinic
Nicky: well … [smiling doubt in voice]
Kim: I facilitate this clinic but I don’t actually tell anyone what to do.
Debbi: [Researcher] How do other people feel about that? Do you think that … when Kim says ‘I don’t lead the clinic’
Kim: [protesting] yeah but … I don’t … but …
Don: I think you do, really. [smile] And that’s OK …
Nicky: I think it’s a good thing. I think we think of it as you leading.
Don: That’s OK, I don’t have a problem with that at all.
Claire: It may not be something that is intentional, but I would think yes, you do lead.
Marilyn: Maybe it’s the word lead that’s wrong.
Collette: And I think that as Claire’s becoming more … used to her role, she’s maybe taking over some of that …
Kim: You’ve got to have different people in each of these different roles, you know, hopefully this clinic lasts ten years … this clinic has to be sustainable, you might have a different doctor … What happens if I’m on leave and someone else is doing the clinic?
Claire: We cancel it!
[laughter]
Kim: No, but …
Don: … or sickness or something.
Kim: No … but we shouldn’t have to rely on that. In the future I would hope that we’ve got the structure right so that maybe there are different [medical and non-medical] facilitators that can say that ‘I know what needs to happen’ you know.

The centrality that the team ascribe to Kim was evident when clinicians viewed a section of video that showed a team meeting. One involved a segment where Kim’s mobile phone rang, and as he answered the call, all the other team members shifted their body language ‘in’ towards the centre of the table, and started talking in a totally different way. It was chatty, with lots of giggly laughter, in contrast to the more formal professional
'meeting-speak' used just seconds before. The researcher asked the team to comment on the video footage.

**Extract 12**

Nicky: I thought it was interesting ... how the dynamics changed when Kim’s talking on the phone. I don’t know if it was the fact that Kim was out of the equation, or that it suddenly lightened the mood. The formality had gone, we weren’t following the agenda, we were able to discuss what was happening, and maybe that was a good thing, that we actually got to consolidate a few things, because not everyone knew what the seating thing was, it had sort of happened without a lot of us knowing what was going, so it was nice to be able to take that break and be able to discuss it.

Claire: ... It was interesting when Kim was on the phone, and suddenly more people spoke, and even the body language where more people were leaning forward [*indicates*]. I have no idea why that is.

...  

Marilyn: I think one of my issues is that I’ve only just started, and there’s sort of terms get used, and I think I must write that down and ask Claire later what that means, because everybody else sort of knows what they’re talking about, and I don’t want to be going ‘but what’s ... but what’s ...’ you know and disrupting the flow of the whole meeting, and you know, everybody else knows, and I don’t want to interrupt just to find out for me.

Collette: I ... agree with Marilyn, that sometimes Kim’s sort of two or three steps ahead and we’re all sort of chasing to catch up mentally sometimes [*laughs and yeahs of agreement from others*] and you go ‘what was that’ ‘oh, I’ll ask someone later’, and so when Kim’s phone rang it was as Nicky said it was a nice break for us all to catch up to it, so what was that term that I didn’t understand ...

Here, non-medical clinicians are acknowledging Kim’s expertise, but what is also being displayed is the dominance of the medical paradigm. If a piece of knowledge is something the doctor values, then everybody expects to understand it, and to ‘catch up’ if they don’t understand. The same emphasis is not placed, for example, on dietary or physiotherapy knowledge. What is also evident is the idea that medical people are enculturated to take charge, while other professionals are not. Another video segment involved Kim attempting to hand the chair of a meeting over to Claire, who jokingly declined to take it. Claire commented:
Extract 13
Claire: The issue that you raised about Kim trying to hand over leadership. I suppose from my perspective I’m just used to him doing it, so I just let him do it.

The expectation that the medical personnel will take the lead is part of deeply ingrained hospital enculturation. Claire reflected on the weekly case conference of the ward, at which a number of the team attend in their various capacities on the ward:

Extract 14
Claire: The last meeting was quite amazing, because to start with, there were no doctors there, and no one had any idea what to do. I just sat back. I thought ‘I’m going to do a bit of a study here myself.’ [laughter] I just sat back and watched. No one took a leadership role, no one really knew what to do. [a physiotherapist] was sitting in front of the laptop and said ‘oh, I’m just pressing the down button and scrolling it through’, but no one took over the role. [laughter]
Marilyn: So we rely on them, don’t we?

Claire: As soon as a doctor came, there was suddenly format, there was suddenly leadership, and there was discussion, you know, like standardized discussion, which I thought was pretty amazing.
Don: But that’s the culture of hospitals, surely. It’s been like that forever.

The tension between sustainability of organizational structure and flexibility of individual practice (Samualsen and Steffan, 2004: 3) is highlighted in the team’s contestation over Kim’s ‘leadership’ status. Members of the team talk about the ability of ‘the team’ to undertake certain roles. The potential tension between group and individual (Jansen, 1993: 158), in this case between the group identity of the team and individual professional identities, highlights ways in which identity shifts can become identity conflicts. Brügmann and colleagues describe ‘the potential of identity to become a battleground, with protagonists struggling for the right to define’ (1993: 7). Taking away leadership as an activity and behaviour could, for some doctors, deprive them of aspects of their professional identity, making it difficult for them to work in a team such as this. In expressing how unusual Kim is as a doctor, the team express their doubt in the willingness of ‘other’ doctors to work in this way.
Similarly, taking away followership (Degeling et al., 2003) as an activity and behaviour can deprive some nursing and allied health clinicians of the stability of known structures, and of aspects of their professional identity: where do they fit in, if the structure is not-as-they-know-it? The longest serving members of the team, Kim, Liz and Nicky, identify easily as team members. Newer members of the team, especially where they work part-time in the team, are more tentative in placing their full identification with the team, and with its multidisciplinary mode of working.

12.4 3 Time

Another aspect of the dominance of the medical voice is the valuation of medical time, and the labelling of tasks that medical people do as measurable in terms of billing and time-sheets. Many of the tasks which allied health and nursing staff undertake are valued differently, or are not provided with a descriptive vocabulary so that they can be measured, counted and accounted for. Allied health and nursing time is treated as vastly subservient to medical time: physiotherapists, occupational therapists and nurses stand around waiting for doctors: doctors rarely, if ever, stand around waiting for allied health or nursing colleagues.

In an analysis of work tasks in the clinic, it emerges that Kim almost never waits for other clinicians. All team members recognize Nicky (physiotherapist) as having the largest patient workload of all team members, however, Nicky not infrequently waits until medical clinicians are finished before she can do her work with the patient. There is a waiting hierarchy among the clinicians: surgical waits for no one; medical waits for surgical, but not for allied health or nursing; physiotherapist and occupational therapist wait for medical and surgical, but not for nursing, social work, peer support or dietician. Nursing waits for surgical, medical, physiotherapist and occupational therapist and occasionally for social work and dietician, but never for peer support. Social work, dietician and peer support do their work when everyone else is finished, or when the team are waiting for people further up the hierarchy to arrive.

The further up the waiting hierarchy a clinician is, the more they can account for their time in ways that are measured by the hospital billing system. The further down the waiting hierarchy they are, the more difficulty they may have in accounting for their time in ways that ‘count’.11 This is illustrated in the many conversations that occur involving Kim asking other team members to fill in the ‘time’ section of their notes on the centralized, computerized patient notes system that Ravet, the unit IT consultant, has set up for the team:

**Extract 15**

Kim: You’ve got to put your staff times down on that thing by the way, Don. I checked the letter on [patient’s name] the other day.
Don: Oh yes, didn’t I put the time down?
Kim: No, you didn’t put the time down. I’m going to need that sort of data when I’m going back to admin to say whether or not we’ve actually resourced enough social work hours. And try and think about the people you see outside and estimate that sort of time. I know it’s hard …
Don: I can do that
Kim: … I need that sort of data because that’s the other thing – if we have under-funded social work, I don’t want it to remain under-funded.

This is a common conversation in the team: Kim asks politely for people to fill in the times taken for their individual consultations, team members politely respond by apologizing for not doing it, and saying they’ll do it. There is often a shrug or a grimace accompanying the statement. Kim will explain the importance of filling in the time section. The team member will agree and say they will do it, but then it will not be done by the next meeting (a month later). Kim will ask again, the team member will again apologize and say they will do it. It is an ongoing conversation, and one that is unarticulated as yet within the team. Filling in times for consultations creates real dilemmas for allied health staff, as much of their work is done in informal ways, making it difficult to quantify. While the clinical team values this informality, they are still under pressure to record their activities within formal hospital-defined categories. Justifying people’s time expenditure is a major challenge in gaining funding for multidisciplinary clinics, and the uncertainty of ongoing funding for such a large complex team is an ongoing vulnerability to the sustainability of the team. As has been shown above, significant amounts of clinically relevant information is communicated via informal channels. Facilitating informal channels means factoring in unstructured time. Accounting for every minute of every clinician’s time in the clinic is an impossibility, but it is an impossi-
bility required by the funding structures of the Australian health system.

A different aspect of time relates to clinicians’ length of service in the clinic. Dealing with such complex care as pressure sores in spinal patients means continuity of care plays a large role. Just as team members’ response to Kim’s question of ‘what happens if I’m not here?’ was ‘the clinic would have to be cancelled’, Kim describes Nicky and Liz as ‘irreplaceable’ due to their personal qualities, the knowledge they have acquired due to long experience of working with spinal patients, and the relationship and knowledge they have of these particular patients. Other members of the team, who have been working in the clinic for a shorter length of time, appreciate the knowledge of the more experienced team members, and anticipate their own confidence and ability to take on more active roles outside their own clinical specialties will develop with time:
Extract 16

Because Liz has been so involved in clinic, and I don’t want to make any decisions that Liz will have to change later, or I don’t know what’s already in place sometimes, so it’s like treading water, I don’t want to do too much, but I don’t want to not do anything, so it’s sort of a limbo.

(Collette, relieving occupational therapist, research feedback meeting)

... when we are discussing the patients, again I suppose because a lot of us are new to this, a lot of us don’t really know the patients well, and the way you [Kim] discuss the patients – you have really thorough knowledge of your patients.

(Claire, CNC, research feedback meeting)

Burke and colleagues (2000) identify continuity of care as a key element in successful multidisciplinary health care team collaboration. Length of service in this clinic generated two key things: intimate knowledge of the complexity of individual patients’ cases, and increasing identification as a member of the multidisciplinary team. Lemke asks:

What does it take for momentary actions to add up to a consistent longer-term identity? It takes both the recurrence of the opportunities to enact these identities, for example: access to situations, material affordances/resources, presence of particular others or types of others, etc. and the will to enact that identity on each such occasion.

(Lemke, this volume, emphasis in original)

Lemke’s ‘spectrum of timescales’, scattered along a continuum between ‘momentary-agentive’ and ‘long-term-positional’ are richly illustrated in identity shifts within the team. Newer members of the team talk about ‘the’ patients, whereas longer serving members of the team talk about ‘our’ patients: a sense of community, a sense of identifying as a team member, develops with time. Continuity of care allows clinicians to build up both very thorough clinical knowledge of their patients and to develop the trust relationships with patients and each other that are crucial to the work of the clinic. It also allows clinicians to gradually identify more strongly as members of the multidisciplinary team, as well as members of their own professional group.

12.4.4 Authority in broader hospital context

Another challenge to clinical democracy is presented by the fact that the medical opinion in a team is recognized by the broader hospital environment as the dominant opinion. Other team members have much lower levels of authority to implement treatment autonomously: to have treatments or recommendations implemented, the medical clinician has to
authorize them. This means that Kim is in a position to authorize without consultation with the rest of the team, whereas team members have much less scope to authorize treatment without Kim’s agreement. Even where it is possible to achieve egalitarianism of voice within the clinic, the clinic team still has to interrelate and access material and social resources from the broader health community, who may not necessarily (and mostly do not) share the team philosophy of a clinically democratic structure.

Extract 17

Kim: ... say that case that you raised with me the other day, Don ... the [ref. to patient] situation. I’m happy to facilitate that, but really the concern came from you. All that happened once you talked to me was that I opened the channel to the medical superintendent and said ‘you’ve got to do something about that’.

Don: But you were the right person to do that, weren’t you?
Kim: Yeah, probably true, because he knows me, and we talk anyway

In an idealized clinically democratic world, any of the team members should be able to go to the medical superintendent about an issue that concerns them. However proper channels have to be observed and the medical specialist is the appropriate person to approach the medical superintendent. Kim did not just have access to the medical superintendent because they ‘knew each other and talk anyway’; he knew him and talked to him because of his position as senior staff specialist.

Kim feels that for the team to work well, they have to develop a culture different to that of the hospital.

Extract 18

I think we need to operate differently from the ward ... we have to be more flexible than the ward situation. And I think that means that we need to give people permission to you know, say the leadership or whatever you call the leadership, say that changes five times, as long as we’re all aligned and we know where we’re going with this. It’s my personal view that it’s acceptable that if someone is more qualified to take the lead in a discussion, whether it’s social issues or whatever, then they should be directing and aligning the team towards what they feel is best practice. I would hope that this evolves. I think it has to.

(Kim, doctor, research feedback session)

Non-medical team members have no articulated problems with the idea of a medical leader of this team. The medical team member, Kim, struggles with the dissonance of trying to reconcile two irreconcilable systems.
Hinjosa and colleagues suggest that in a bureaucratically structured clinical setting (2004: 209), ‘team collaboration may be hard to realize’ (2004: 219). The pressure area clinic team achieve collaboration, but at present it is largely a medically led collaboration, rather than a multidisciplinary, democratic, equal-voiced collaboration that the instigator of the clinic envisages. The very fact that Kim has invited our research into his site, and other members of the team continue to be open to these discussions, shows that this is not the end of the story. Many of our feedback sessions must have been challenging to Kim’s medical identity, and to other team members’ sense of professional self. To their credit, they have persisted with this enquiry, recognizing that clinical democracy will serve the patient, even if it threatens to bring into the open previously unarticulated challenges to their sense of professional self.

12.5 Discussion

Within medical sociology discourse, medical dominance is presented dichotomously in terms of empowerment and disempowerment. Dominance of any kind is seen as morally problematic within the underlying subtext of a social justice framework (Dzur, 2002; Germov, 2002; Wearing, 1999; Willis, 1989). Resistance to this critique of medical hierarchy from health professionals – not just doctors – often stems from the clinical reality that there are some processes where clinical hierarchies are appropriate and provide best quality care. Within the pressure area clinic, the dominance of any single professional voice is rejected not on the basis of politics, but on the basis of clinical outcome. Muting of allied health voice is seen as hindering complexity of communication flow, and therefore compromising to patient safety and quality of care. All of the clinicians are in agreement about the importance of a clinically democratic structure, but as has been shown, they are differentially engaged in terms of how to achieve it. For the non-medical members of the team, medical leadership is not seen to compromise clinical democracy, whereas the designated leader finds this problematic, both for patient care and for long-term sustainability of the clinic.

Democracy, from the Greek: ‘demokratia’ (‘demos’, the people and ‘kratein’, to rule) translates literally as ‘rule by the people’. In the broadest sense democracy implies universal suffrage, that is, for everyone to have rights and inputs into decisions. In most social and political settings, however, someone has to be voted or has to agree to be in charge. There is a difference between direct democratic approaches [everyone participates in decision-making processes] and representative approaches [people choose someone or some party to represent their interests]. Kim strives for the former, and achieves the latter. Although Kim expresses a desire for more lateralized decision-making processes, both Kim and the non-medical
clinicians by their behaviours and attitudes keep the medical member of the team as the leader and thus inevitably democracy in the clinical unit is at least in some areas representative rather than fully participatory.

Problematising the either/or view of dominance, this research reveals how a clinical team has established complex and flexible communication modes through which they achieve a large measure of clinical democracy within the clinic. Some facets of what the team members do are highly democratic, others are less so. Overall, the team members are interested in addressing and revising their assumptions about what constitutes leadership and authority, and the research findings were in some way instrumental in bringing aspects of behaviour to the fore that had not yet escaped being taken as given.

What is further highlighted in this chapter are the subtle ways in which all parties work towards producing and reproducing medical dominance in the team. Kim, despite his espousal of and aspirations for democracy, speaks and turn-takes more than others. Non-medical team members insist on Kim as leader, and reject opportunities to chair sessions or lead decision-making processes. For many commentators in the sociological literature, medical dominance is forced on others by doctors, or is assumed via various taken for granted power structures. This chapter brings out acceptance, even insistence, of medical dominance by non-medical clinicians. This implies that there are added complications in attempting to produce more lateralized, democratic clinical environments.

Another complicating factor with regard to realizing clinical democracy in this team is that each team member still has to operate in the broader hospital and professional environment. Two examples illustrated the potentially troubled nature of those interactions: ways in which clinician time was differentially valued; and acceptance of the medical voice as more authoritative in interactions between the clinic and the hospital, where the professional identities of non-medical team members carry far less weight than that of the medical team member. This suggests that working in a multidisciplinary clinical environment requires constant shifts from the clinicians in their professional identities: from democratic to hierarchical, depending on whether they are in the team or whether they are engaging with processes related to the rest of the hospital. All of this is difficult, complex and ‘troubling’ work.

Just as shifts from ‘specialized’ medicine to ‘socialized’ medicine ‘introduced a new organizing principle for the division of labour’ and ‘provide the basis for a fundamental reorganization of the basic notions of health and illness’ (Armstrong, 2002: 52), a multidisciplinary approach as employed in this clinic requires fundamental shifts in structural and symbolic systems (Cott, 1998), and corresponding shifts in practitioner identities.
In asking ‘critical questions’ of identity, Lemke discusses ‘three kinds of processes in which agency in the moment is given greater scope to construct alternative identities and associated changes in socio cultural systems’: transgression, conflicting institutional demands, and the potential that identity disruption has for social change and innovation (Lemke, this volume).

These three processes are clearly illustrated in the multidisciplinary clinic. The clinic is populated with transgressive identities: the consultative doctor, the assertive occupational therapist, the collaborative social worker, the opinionated physiotherapist. These transgressive clinicians, who do not always behave like a ‘proper’ doctor, nurse or allied health professional, are functional within the professional space of the multidisciplinary clinic. However each of these clinicians also has to function in the broader hospital context, and for each individual in the team, (idealized) institutional norms of behaviour and identity conflict with (idealized) norms of behaviour and identity for the team.

Why is the relationship between transgressive identity and hospital care important in the case of this particular clinic? Pressure area patients in need of surgery who have been treated by this clinic have had postoperative hospitalization reduced to less than a fifth of the usual length of stay required for this procedure, incurring a quarter of the previous cost to the community. The radically improved outcomes offered by the clinic legitimate the ‘troubling’ nature of the clinicians’ identity transgressions. By disrupting normal communication and power hierarchies, by incorporating at least partially effective clinical democracy which allows allied health professional opinion to be expressed and acted upon within a biomedical environment, team members have provided innovative and effective challenges to the institutionalized social order of the hospital.

Finally, Lemke condenses the issue that characterizes the spinal team in the following notion: ‘heterochrony’, or being able to be-(come) different people in time. ‘Meaningful human interaction is always a site of heterochrony: the intersection of processes and practices which have radically different inherent timescales’ (Lemke, this volume). But while heterochrony is possible and even necessary within the spinal team, it is less accepted outside of it. This research suggests that for the multidisciplinary clinic to thrive in its current form, the institution(s) within which it is embedded will have to be increasingly open to clinically democratic modes of decision-making. Put in different terms, if health care is serious about promoting multidisciplinary care for the well-being of patients, it will have to normalize the flexibility of clinical identities that accompanies such care across hospital contexts and timescales. It remains to be seen whether the clinical democracy of the pressure area clinical team will be able to continue operating within the broader context of the contemporary tertiary hospital, or whether its experiment with clinical multidisciplinarity and identity change will give way to the more conservative form of professional dominance.
Notes

1. We would like to thank Katherine Carroll, Jenny Nicholls and Rick Iedema for their valuable contributions. The greatest thanks, of course, go to ‘the team’, a committed and talented group of health care professionals who have generously allowed themselves to be scrutinized under the ethnographic microscope, and have actively participated in this reflexive-oriented research project, including offering feedback on this chapter.


4. ARC (Australian Research Council) funded project: ‘Preventative health care: How compatible are clinicians’ identity and practice with transition to the new roles that health reforms require?’. Chief investigator: Rick Iedema. Coinvestigators: Jeffrey Braithwaite, Bonnie Lee, Ross Kerridge and Ros Sorensen. Senior researcher: Debbi Long, PhD researcher: Katherine Carroll.


6. He also wanted a psychologist to joint the team, but was unable to get the funds for that position.

7. Claire the nurse, Nicky the physiotherapist, Don the social worker, Marilyn the dietician and Collette the fill-in occupational therapist (Liz was on leave).

8. At the time of this conversation, Liz was on leave, so she wasn’t named specifically by Kim. However, in later conversations Kim added that Liz would be included in this description.

9. The other side to this coin is that other clinical disciplines do not have the same level of responsibility and accountability that doctors have: medical clinicians can be held responsible, and are vulnerable to litigation, in ways that rarely, if ever, apply to nursing or allied health professionals.

10. All team members leave on either their mobile phones or beepers in meetings, and all team members will respond to phones or beepers when they ring. Kim’s phone rings most often, he will talk longer when he answers the call, and the meeting will ‘stop’ and resume when he finishes, whereas meetings usually continue as other team members take calls or answer beepers.

11. And, in other places in the hospital, the more likely your time is to be scrutinized (personal communication, Jo Travaglia).

References


Cott, C. (1997) ‘“We decide, you carry it out”: A social network analysis of multidisciplinary long-term care teams’. In Social Science and Medicine, 45(9): 1411–21.


‘Mobile amidst mobility’ illustrates with unparalleled clarity and generality the condition that modernized subjectivities will and must realize. Their sense of the great flexibilization manifests as the ability to navigate across the totality of all reachable places and objects without oneself getting ensnared in others’ nets. To realize oneself in this fluidity as subject – that is the absolute entrepreneurial freedom ...

(Sloterdijk, 2004)

13.1 Introduction

This chapter operates at the interstices of three domains: the theorization of identity; the entry of clinical professionals into ‘middle’ management, and the ‘post-bureaucratization’ of contemporary organizational relationships.1 With regard to the first, the thematic opening chapter by Jay Lemke, as well as the other chapters in the present volume, provide a profound insight into the relevance and underpinning of identity as analytic construct. Lemke suggests that identity serves ‘to by-pass some of the persistent political conflict between more individualistic psychological paradigms and more socio-cultural ones’ (Lemke this volume). This produces the possibility, he argues, of connecting the semiotic manifestation of self (as meaning-making phenomenon) to its phenomenological (i.e., its experiential-affective) dimension. The most important point about Lemke’s exposition is that he sees identity as ultimately being traversed by a multitude of timescales. These traversals occur because, as citizens of the modern world, we link into people and things in complex and multiple ways: we use technologies made elsewhere – everything from language and transport to clothes and computers – enabling us to be in and move across different times, spaces and selves. This view of identity informs our analysis below of
two clinicians’ interview narratives in which they describe themselves as hospital middle-managers.

The second domain that contextualizes this chapter concerns the entry of clinical professionals into management. This is a complex domain as well, because clinicians have for many years focused their training and certification on matters at the heart of traditional clinical (nursing, doctoring and allied health) expertise rather than formal management. Since the global economic downturn in the 1970s, the time when governments had to invent ways of controlling ‘inflationary hotspots’ such as tertiary health care hospitals, health departmental efforts in many countries began to target a more comprehensive managing of hospital clinicians who had for a long time enjoyed high levels of autonomy (particularly doctors). This greater scrutiny of health expenditures and clinical practices led during the eighties and nineties to a rise in (non-clinical) health care administrators’ powers, while at the same time broadening organizational-managerial responsibilities for clinicians themselves. For many clinicians, however, this change in role definition constituted a threat to their professional integrity and focus, and take-up among the different professions of this new role proved slow, difficult and contested (Degeling, Kennedy and Hill, 1998; Degeling et al., 2003).

One additional point here is that nursing’s approach to these issues markedly differs from medicine’s. For nursing, the opportunity to enter into managerial positions offered the promise of more formal (managerial) recognition and power over colleagues (doctors) who had thus far escaped accountability while to a large degree directing and determining the substance of nurses’ (and allied health professionals’) work (Porter, 1992). While controlling nursing and allied health in this way, medicine nevertheless tended to regard the drive to formalize managerial relationships as a bureaucratizing intrusion into their enactment of knowledge-dependent and creatively-realized expertise. In many doctors’ eyes (Degeling, 2000), the high levels of uncertainty that characterize medical work are incommensurable with managerial aims centring on planning, informing, costing and reporting (Zuckerman et al., 1998). It is in light of this that the interview narratives analysed below can be regarded as particularly valuable records of two specific kinds of development in the clinician-manager relationship. On the one hand, we hear from a nurse manager who struggles to superimpose her own moral framework on the rigidity of a bureaucratic and indifferent management. On the other hand, we hear from the doctor-manager who – instead of limiting her managerial role to facilitating the work of her immediate colleagues as did those who preceded her (Degeling, Kennedy and Hill, 1998) – links in with extra-organizational committees and stakeholders, thereby giving leverage to her interests and concerns in negotiations with her own hospital’s senior management.
This brief description of the data analysis that is to follow leads us to the third domain that contextualizes the present chapter: the ‘post-bureaucratization’ of contemporary organizational relationships (see Chapter 11 in this volume). In related work (Iedema, 2006), we have described this trend as follows. In selected instances and areas, and the intensification of managerial and bureaucratic intervention in specific areas of work notwithstanding (McSweeney, 2006), management appears to be moving away from positioning itself as the designer of tasks and relationships to acting as an arbiter for, and facilitator of, processes initiated and designed by workers. This aspect has been described as ‘hollowing out’ the managerial role (Munro, 2003), and management’s ‘withdrawal’ is now recommended in the expectation that it translates into worker initiative and empowerment (Drucker et al., 1997). Workers, in turn, are increasingly to respond to the dynamics and problematics of work with initiatives that target problems and create solutions. No doubt, if these developments can be said to take place, the emerging flexibilities are in an important way off-set by the growing reach of information-technological surveillance and performance monitoring. Computational data analysis makes it possible to direct work from afar, helped by the unrelenting and penetrating gaze of IT-enabled performance monitoring. Put in these terms, post-bureaucratization does not refer to the end of bureaucratic organization (Höpfl, 2006), but to an emergent blend of organizational surveillance and flexibility, managerial scrutiny and facilitation, information-technologized administration, and, last but not least, control dispersed across peers and colleagues (Barker, 1993). As we shall see, the transcripts analysed below throw fascinating light on all of these issues, confirming as well as elaborating our understanding of what it means to work in a post-bureaucratic (health) organization.

With this as background, we now structure our chapter as follows. First, we delve more deeply into the tensions that surround the clinician-manager role, providing the contours of contemporary health policy to frame recent developments in this domain. Then we turn to the two interview narratives, and provide a discourse analysis of the talk of two clinicians, a nurse-manager and a doctor-manager. Following that, the discussion section turns to revisiting our argument by exploring in greater depth how the three domains that contextualize the present chapter are refracted in the interview data. Here, we draw on Peter Sloterdijk’s insights into modern subjectivity to sketch out the ways in which the interview narratives provide a window on how contemporary nursing and medical identity can exploit the opportunities and resources offered by this post-bureaucratization of work and management. We finish with returning to the theme that characterizes the present volume – identity trouble – by asking what kinds of trouble these clinicians’ positionings incur for the professions at issue here and for the health organizations of the future. Given that health services’ main task is to build cross-disciplinary
allegiances among clinical professionals so they can confront the rising complexity and prevalence of chronic disease, the findings presented in the present chapter are of considerable value for understanding how this task might be achieved.

13.2 Clinicians as managers: an uneasy alliance

In this section we outline how clinicians, their autonomy and their ways of organizing clinical care have come under increased pressure over the last three to four decades, and how this pressure increasingly translates into clinicians’ being asked to engage with and move into modes of identification that diverge from those produced by their original clinical-expert training. The factors that have most contributed to governments beginning to pursue health reform include the rising cost of health care, growing national populations, and growing public awareness of the quality of their care. Health services are incurring rising expenditures thanks to the availability of new and more expensive medical technologies and drugs, in conjunction with growing numbers of ‘old old’ people (particularly in post-industrial nations) needing extended, complex and technologized care. The issue of quality of care has come to prominence thanks to academics (Brennan et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995), but also practising clinicians themselves (including whistleblowers; Bolsin, 1998), as well as health consumers (patients and their families), becoming more and more vocal about inadequate and error-prone care processes. These inadequacies and failures result not just from health services dealing with more powerful and therefore more dangerous technologies, but from old old patients requiring coordinated or ‘streamed’ care that goes beyond the organizational capacities of existing hospital departments, and from rising levels of staff turnover due to social, organizational and international migration (Productivity Commission, 2005).

Collectively, these factors have motivated governments to move away from laissez-faire attitudes to how (well) hospitals were managed, towards seeking greater degrees of policy intervention, management presence and clinician involvement. All in all, health policy reform has produced much managerial change and organizational restructuring (Braithwaite, Westbrook and Iedema, 2005). As well, the reform agenda has initiated clinical reprofessionalization programs run either by health departmental agencies (such as the National Patient Safety Agency in the UK and the NSW Health Department’s Quality Branch in Australia) or, more recently and tentatively, by Medical Colleges (e.g., the College of Anaesthetists). These developments have been far from smooth, producing constant and often bitter contestation between clinicians, managers and policy-makers about the need for change and intervention by management (Degeling et al., 2003; Dent and Whitehead, 2002; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994).
Each of the organizational change initiatives detailed above impinge on clinicians’ perception and performance of identity and practice. The interconnection between organizational change initiatives and the performance of identity is illustrated with particular force by the drive towards performance monitoring. Here, who and how respected someone is as a clinician is no longer determined by relationships with patients and immediate peers, but is increasingly inflected through the data analyses afforded and publicized by new information technologies (Irvine, 1999). Addressing the relationship between performance and improvement means targeting the relationships between identity and autonomy, and between legal obligation, professional ethics and personal morals. As the interview data bear out, clinicians need not sit back and wait for the waves of these initiatives to wash over them, but can instead opt to ride in on the tide of these reforms.

While on the one hand these reforms create extra work and responsibility for frontline and middle-management staff, they also open up new spaces for being, saying and doing (Iedema, Rhodes and Scheeres, 2006). What appears to have become the new norm is for clinicians to look beyond their clinical expertises and learn to speak the discourses of hospital finance, quality improvement and consumer involvement. The tensions that arise between those who put themselves in charge of realizing these measures and those who feel they are the target of these measures are played out in everyday interaction (Iedema et al., 2004), as they are on a smaller scale in our interview data. The next section of this chapter empiricizes these tensions at the heart of organizational reform and the risks that are unleashed for people upon refashioning practice and identity.

13.3 Narratives of identity

This section of the chapter presents two extracts taken from two interview transcripts with a nurse manager and a medical manager currently working in a local metropolitan teaching hospital in Australia. The interviews were gathered as part of an international project that aims to understand contemporary embodiments of middle management across a variety of industry sectors and types of organization. We present the two interview extracts to put empirical flesh on the developments and tensions sketched above, and to create greater specificity about how clinicians in contemporary health care organizations are beginning to embody the role of ‘middle management’. It will become evident, by the end of our discussion, that this term ‘middle management’ is hardly adequate to describe the positionings articulated by the two clinicians focused on here. Initially described three decades ago by Hodge and colleagues (Hodge, Kress and Jones, 1979), the ‘spatial certainty’ that can be seen to be inscribed into the term ‘middle management’ does little justice to the dynamic, networked and
moral-affective dimensions of what it means to be a clinician-manager in contemporary health organizations.

Let us first turn to the transcript extract that captures some of the statements produced by our nurse unit manager in response to our questions (extract 1).

**Extract 1: Interview Nurse Unit Manager**

**Interviewer1:** Would you say that you are typical of managers at [hospital name]?

**Interviewee:** No.

**Interviewer1:** What would be typical in your mind?

**Interviewee:** Traditional. Managers who were there to do and perform a job but they weren’t there to get into the underneath of the job. I think they did a superficial job, if you know what I mean. And I don’t think they took on the political battles. I think they sat in a box, confined in a space, doing a job within certain parameters. That was it. I think they were very subservient, from what I saw. I have seen a lot of change, but I think it was a role that needed to be there but I don’t think it was very highly valued. I think it was just process-driven and I think it had little impact on the organisation as a whole. It was a hidden role and it was only really known by nurses.

That is what I believe it was. I think it has now changed. I think I am different in the sense that I am more vocal than what I was before, obviously, because I have been doing it a lot longer. I manage a service that is complex and interacts with the whole hospital so it makes me very, very different. I deal with a high volume of staff compared to the wards ... Don’t get me wrong. I am not being big-headed. I am just saying the differences. I think in many instances I have learnt to play politics better than what I had when I first started, and that is pretty obvious.

I believe, honestly, that I can be a really good leader and have demonstrated that I can, but the difference is I am prepared to speak up and I take the fight on. A lot of people won’t. A lot of people just sit there and be the nodding dog, and nod away forever. That is the sadness because you can make
a difference. You don’t have to agree with everything. You are an individual and you do have choice. And I don’t think people exercise that enough, sometimes.

Interviewer1: Fascinating. It really is. We might leave it there for today.
Interviewer2: Yes, there is an awful lot to look at. It is really interesting.
Interviewer1: But it has been really forthcoming and it’s great.
Interviewee: I’m being totally honest with you.
Interviewer1: No. It’s great, it’s great.
Interviewee: Is that what you want? Is that what you are after?
Interviewer1: Yes. And we are going to go away and have a bit more think about some of the things that are coming out of the interviews and then come back, hopefully in six months time, and focus more on particular issues like some of the conflicts and competing demands in your role. Is that okay?

Interviewee: Yes. Because you do ... you juggle six, seven or eight balls every day and you have to be answerable for every single one of them. And the other thing I think, too, the difference that you could say in many ways in [specialty] is, the doctors are there and they are there on your shifts, but they have non-clinical time. They have down-time where they don’t actually take a patient load, part of their award, so they may be rostered say Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday and they make Thursday, maybe, non-clinical. So they are doing other things like education or research projects or something like that. So they are there but they are there in a sort of intermittent sort of way on the day-to-day life of that department, as in crucial, pressure-point, life. I am there every day. I don’t have non-clinical time. I am not allowed out. My job is solely in there. And I think that is the difference and I think ... don’t get me wrong. I enjoy working with the medical staff I work with but I think sometimes they don’t have full ownership of what goes on. They pick up ownership uniquely, on certain points. Whereas I don’t have that opportunity because I am the one that is permanently there, five days a week, working days, when the Executive is there and I am the one that gets most of the phone calls to give the answers, because the others may not be there. And that is a real difference. You are sort of the constant.
The Nurse Manager (NM from now on) explains that there is a difference to be drawn between her approach to management and a more traditional approach. Traditional managers are managers who ‘were there to do and perform a job but they weren’t there to get into the underneath of the job’. By contrast, the NM describes herself as ‘getting underneath the job’, which she explains to mean ‘taking on the political battles’. She goes on to deploy spatial metaphors to describe traditional managers’ positioning: ‘they sat in a box, confined in a space, doing a job within certain parameters’. She then translates these metaphors into a more direct judgment: ‘they were subservient’. She, on the other hand, is prepared to do ‘the politics’: ‘I am prepared to speak up and I take the fight on’. Whereas her managerial colleagues play it by rules laid down by senior management, the NM lays claim to moral-ethical discernment. She, unlike her middle-managerial colleagues, has the mettle to stand up against her superiors: ‘You don’t have to agree with everything. You are an individual and you do have choice’.

The NM’s positioning is therefore problematic: she answers to senior management, but she will take senior management on over issues that she judges to be unacceptable. Her allegiance is not simply to ‘the hierarchy of management’, as she depicts the positioning of her colleagues. Her approach to managing takes account of how decisions impact on her staff and her patients, and she will make a moral call in case she judges higher level decisions to be unacceptable, risking the wrath of her senior management.

Upon closing the interview, the interviewers are asked if this is ‘what they were after’. The interviewee continues with a theme that runs parallel to the theme just explored: that of her organizational position compared to that of her medical colleagues. She makes the point that the doctors are ‘there but they are there in a sort of intermittent sort of way on the day-to-day life of that department’, whereas her job is ‘solely in there’. She says that she does not have non-clinical time to go and do research: she is ‘the constant’. This theme, in sharp contrast to the one just explored above, foregrounds the way in which the NM now positions herself as a stable, constant and present manager. While the doctors have only intermittent ownership of what happen in the department, the NM takes ongoing responsibility for the patients in the unit, and she seeks to derive moral privilege from this commitment. If the NM began with constructing her role in terms of being able to evade the strictures of hierarchical management and predetermined responsibilities, here she reinvests herself with stability and commitment to the organization. She intimates that her willingness to step outside of the envelope on moral-ethical grounds does not mean that she will shirk her duties as a manager, as the reliable face of the department. This produces a hybrid positioning whose contrasts she choreographs with great care, producing a complex and dynamic identity performance.

Before turning to the transcript extract from the interview with the Medical Manager (MM), we need to note that the governance of hospital
services in Australia is the responsibility of the State Governments. This point throws important light on comments in the extract about the relatively close links between hospital staff, the health bureaucracy and the Health Minister’s Office.

**Extract 2 Interview Medical Manager**

**Interviewer1:** Would you say you were typical of other managers in the hospital or not?

**Interviewee:** I don’t think so; atypical in one respect, because [specialty]\(^4\) are a different kettle of fish to other units. There may be some comparison with say, Intensive Care, or something, but not really, because of that fixed bed base. That is a very predictable workload and you know you’ve got x number of patients, that is it. You can never have more than x. It is completely different.

The other thing that makes [specialty] more difficult, I think, is that there is more interference from other people. For example, the Department of Health, or the Minister’s Office not so much, the Minister probably interferes in everything. *(Laughing).* But [specialty], because it is a relatively young medical specialty, [specialty] physicians in Australia are maybe 20 years old. It is older in the US and it is younger in the UK. And because everybody worked in [specialty] when they were a junior medical officer or a nurse or whatever, 30 years ago, they know how to run the service. And the service might bear absolutely no resemblance whatsoever to what it did even five years ago, but they know, so they don’t need to ask you or even listen to what you say.

That is changing, and that is part of the reason also to get involved in the management side of things and also in the college, my professional college, because it gives you an entrée to other venues to meet people who are influential …

One of the best meetings that I go to now is a meeting with the Minister’s Advisor, one of the key players running strategies to do with [specialty] departments in the Department of Health, who has no idea about [specialty]. He is a doctor, but I wouldn’t go and presume to advise on his sub-speciality area so please don’t, but that doesn’t stop people. The head of the
[second specialty] and myself and another [specialty] physician and the whole point of these meetings, (there is the text and there is the sub-text) but the sub-text has evolved into being showing the Minister’s office that this guy running this strategy wouldn’t have a clue and he is not committed to listening to [specialty] physicians. And that’s worked a treat and it has been fantastic. But that is not the text of the meeting, but we both understand that. The Minister’s, we were discussing that the other week and [name] was saying how he enjoyed these meetings so much because we were watching this other guy squirm.

That is a very powerful meeting to go to. What direct benefit does it have on your Department? Well, eventually it has a lot of direct benefit because there is a whole lot of things going on which are very politically driven. For example, setting up, dolling out money for [sub-specialty] centres which are essentially part of [specialty] Departments but the Centre for [third specialty] and the Department of Health are controlling the money and there has really been no consultation with [specialty]. You hear these things on the grapevine and the minute you hear something, you know something is going on, so you have to find out what it is, find out where it is coming from.

... Anyway all this stuff goes on all the time. But it is just a matter of keeping your ear to the ground and having good enough networks. My previous job is a case in point because it was a difficult organisation and really terrible leadership and culture and speaking out there was a shoot-the-messenger sort of attitude. But you can’t put up with that and one of the things that I did which I knew would get the ire of the CEO ... but this was after a long history of discussions, doing things appropriately, due process and all that sort of thing and nothing happens about these things. And basically the Area is lying to the Department of Health and everybody else about some funding or something and they are saying they are spending on [specialty], and [specialty] is not getting a cent of it. And they say to us, oh well it is only the Department of Health, as if, you know, we can lie to them, you will be
in cahoots with us. But why should we? We’re not getting the benefit and we are getting the expectation because they think we are getting the money.

Anyway, I sent an e-mail which went to everybody, which I knew it would. It was appropriate comment to make and everything but anybody that knew the situation would understand what this e-mail was, which was saying these guys are a pack of liars, without saying that. And I got a personal letter from the CEO, paraphrase, which basically said, pull your head in and shut-up. And the only reason you can survive that is that because you’ve got other networks. So you need other networks, but not in this organisation. Well, you do to get things done, but not for negative reasons.

As this extract shows, this interview was both similar to, and different from, the NM interview. Interestingly, the MM, as did the NM, starts with pointing out how different she is as manager. But rather than putting this difference down to her own moral-ethical determination and assertiveness as does the NM, the MM relates the difference of her approach to management to the characteristics of her specialty. In lacking a predictable clinical workload, she explains, this specialty stands out from other specialties in the hospital. She goes on to elaborate on what this means for the specialty more generally: radical fluctuations in service load and resource utilization mean that it draws the attention of people in the Department of Health, the Minister’s Office and the media. This results in considerable outside ‘interference’ in her department’s operations. As with the NM heard above, here we encounter someone for whom edicts from above are not necessarily followed and automatically executed.

But where the NM prided herself on her own morality and acumen, the MM frames her identity in rather different terms. For her, entrance into a managerial role gives her access to people with influence: ‘part of the reason also to get involved in the management side of things and also in the College, my professional College, because it gives you an entrée to other venues to meet people who are influential …’. She details whom she meets with on a regular basis (‘the Minister’s Advisor’), and notes that this is ‘a very powerful meeting to go to’. It enables her, for example, to show ‘the Minister’s Office that this guy running this strategy wouldn’t have a clue’ about the needs and workings of her specialty, and that different kinds of strategies, policies and resource allocations would be more appropriate. Attending these meetings means she is in the position of hearing things ‘on the grapevine’. These ‘things’, clearly, go well beyond the confines of what is discussed at her own hospital meetings, and are issues that a hospital CEO
acts on: health departmental decisions about the rationalization of specialty services, for example, where ‘rationalization’ may involve merging different hospitals’ units or reallocating their resources. As if attempting to stay at least one step ahead of her own hospital CEO with regard to matters such as this, the MM believes in ‘keeping your ear to the ground and having good enough networks’. She regards her role as requiring knowing what kinds of agreements and understandings exist between the Department of Health and local health jurisdictions that oversee one or more hospitals (‘Area Health Services’). She advocates an approach to managing her unit that involves being able to influence people at both these levels if things do not move her way. She will go as far as to send out emails to people, at the risk of incurring the wrath of her hospital’s CEO. Rather than accepting her role and rank in the organization, then, she openly challenges the legitimacy of the CEO’s control over her as ‘middle’ manager: ‘And the reason you can survive that [the wrath of her CEO] is that because you’ve got networks. So you need networks, but not in this organization’.

In all, the MM positions herself as someone who is unique as did the NM, but she then goes on to specify her view of the middle managerial role in different terms. For her managing is about creating and accessing wide networks of influence, keeping her ear to the ground about issues that impact on her unit and its services, intervening in developments that go counter to her (unit’s) interests, and building and maintaining relationships that will protect her from the power of her own CEO. The MM’s main point of reference is not the organizational hierarchy, but dynamic interactions and shifting relationships, constant change and unpredictable allegiances, one of attack and defence, and one of bending the rules to suit the needs and interests of her unit and specialty.

13.4 Discussion

The interviews analysed above embody two very specific modes of uptake of the clinician-managerial role. For the NM, the managerial role becomes an opportunity to stand up for the views and needs of her staff and protect clinicians against the interference and politics of upper-management. For the MM, the managerial role becomes a springboard from which to infuse the unit’s management with political clout that goes well beyond the confines of the hospital and the power of the CEO, extending her access and influence to health bureaucratic committees, powerful bureaucrats, and the Minister’s Office. Moreover, both the NM and the MM embody what du Gay refers to as the entrepreneurial middle manager (du Gay, 1996), even if they do so in different ways. The NM takes senior management on to defend standards of practice (such as skill mix ratios). While the NM prides herself on heroically advocating moral values and awareness of
specialty-specific issues, she nevertheless constructs her role as ultimately belonging to a strict managerial-organizational hierarchy. By contrast, the MM is a doctor who has left her ambivalence about management behind and capitalizes on the access it affords to political capital and networks of influence. Like the NM, she describes her hospital-managerial position as not being about blindly realizing edicts sent from above, but unlike the NM, her point of reference is not enabling her frontline staff to shape their work in ways that make sense to them. Middle management, for the MM, is about claiming access to spheres of social life that she would have been excluded from as a frontline clinician, promoting interests that are inscribed into her ‘young’ and evolving specialty, and deploying the influence gained through her networks to affect the running of her hospital. Providing some additional elaborations, we have brought our comments together in Table 13.1 below.

*Table 13.1* Summarizing the main differences between the NM’s and the MM’s interview extracts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conception of management</th>
<th>Nurse Manager</th>
<th>Medical Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial role involves entry into a potentially indifferent order, putting the onus on the middle manager to learn in what ways it can be challenged and where it cannot</td>
<td>Managerial role as an opportunity for gathering influence through building inter-organizational relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of acceptance of established order</th>
<th>Nurse Manager</th>
<th>Medical Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>She is an outsider who will defend her views and values against the regimented world of managed work but knows she will ultimately have to reconcile herself with the inevitability and necessity of its order</td>
<td>She is an outsider who rejects the legitimacy of the managerial hierarchy and order and who will circumvent these in favour of creating and maintaining a dynamic (rhizomic) network of allegiances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value system</th>
<th>Nurse Manager</th>
<th>Medical Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational heroics, which manifests as a commitment to ‘higher’ level ethics that opposes the bureaucratizing intentions of senior management</td>
<td>A complex political-personal and heterogeneous set of values seeking to control the power of senior management and further the interests of her specialty and unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projection of identity</th>
<th>Nurse Manager</th>
<th>Medical Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity as something that is a hard won moral achievement in the face of outside challenges of indifference and lack of values</td>
<td>An opportunistic stance towards self and others, where accepted and static role definitions no longer count and where roles and manoeuvres are dictated by circumstance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, then, the two interviewees both show evidence of a complex mix of clinical-professional allegiance and entrepreneurial initiative. It is now necessary to contextualize this analysis with more traditional descriptions of the middle-managerial role. One description that stands out is that by Hodge and colleagues which emphasized how managers confirm and seek to ‘make real’ the spatial differentiations and graduations that are inscribed into views of management as linear career hierarchy (Hodge, Kress and Jones, 1979). The interviews they analysed provided evidence of middle managers discoursing into being the intermediate space that they saw themselves as embodying between frontline staff and senior management. The analysis presented in the previous section of this chapter, in contrast, demonstrates that our interviewees’ conceptualization of their middle managerial role diverges starkly from that described by Hodge and colleagues. In fact, our interviewees spoke in ways that move outside of their ‘spatial’ paradigm on two counts. First, the NM interview extends beyond Hodge and colleagues’ spatial-linear metaphor by strongly foregrounding the speaker’s affective world. The NM becomes emotionally involved when justifying her moral-ethical stance (‘the political battles’, ‘they are subservient’) in the face of the bureaucratic indifference displayed by senior management (‘the sadness of it’, ‘crucial pressure point’). In her case, it is the energy that underpins her moral commitment to her work and staff that potentially places her in tension with the managerial hierarchy, although she recognizes the importance of eventually having to return to the order that it embodies (‘you are the sort of constant’).

For her part, the MM’s main point of reference is the nature of the decisions that are made right at the political top, on the one hand, and the dynamic manoeuvring that she needs to engage in to limit and control the impact of those decisions on the other. For the MM there is no spatial-linear order that she feels she needs to respect. For her, managing means ‘keeping your ear to the ground’ and intervening in developments that are detrimental to her unit and specialty. A more appropriate metaphor for this middle manager’s position is that of the dynamically evolving network: relationships need to be nurtured with powerful people; influences can shift and priorities change, and none of this answers to a predetermined spatial-linear logic.

On a broader front, for both the NM and the MM, but particularly for the latter, there is validity in the image that Sloterdijk creates about contemporary identity. These clinicians’ willingness to take on senior management, each in their own way, gives expression to their identities being comfortable with a ‘sense of the great flexibilization’. For them, this flexibilization ‘manifests as the ability to navigate across the totality of all reachable places and objects without oneself getting ensnared in others’ nets’ (Sloterdijk, 2004). Bearing out Sloterdijk’s insight, the identities of these two clinicians person-
ify an emerging modality of self, albeit realized within the confines of hospi-
tal middle management. Sloterdijk’s formulation enables us further to put
into relief not merely these two clinicians’ flexible sense of self, but also that
their flexibility is a function of their ability to evade the ‘nets’, or the gazes,
of others. Sloterdijk makes an important connection in this regard between
identity flexibility and people’s efforts at remaining ‘incalculable’ for those
who would otherwise gain control over them: flexible identity consists in
‘navigat[ing] across the totality of all reachable places and objects without
oneself getting ensnared in others’ nets’. As demonstrated by our analysis,
both clinicians make a point of avoiding becoming defined and circum-
scribed by the interests and decisions of senior management. The NM was
able to access tracts of moral-ethical space that exceeded the sensibilities of
her senior management, and the MM sought to navigate across a socio-
politico-organizational space within which her hospital organization played
but a limited role. In both cases, these clinicians’ identities espoused a
degree of autonomy that challenges the aims and logics of traditionally
conceived, hierarchically enacted management.

This brings us to our final question. What do the positionings just out-
lined entail for health policy reform that seeks to involve clinicians in the
hybrid role of clinician-cum-manager (Dent and Whitehead, 2002)? Do
these positionings confirm existing understandings, or do they herald new
kinds of identity trouble? The relevant literature thus far has considered the
importance of clinicians assuming managerial responsibility (lest it be
taken away from them entirely). This literature reveals an unwillingness on
the part of doctors, in particular, to take on managerial responsibility along
the lines mandated by recent health policy (Degeling, Kennedy and Hill,
1998; Degeling et al., 2003), and points to struggles between nursing and
medicine over levels and domains of managerial responsibility and power
(Riley and Manias, 2007). Our analysis suggests that, rather than subverting
the hybrid role of the clinician-manager and using it as a way of disabling
the intent of hospital reform, the two clinicians heard above capitalize on
the power that their hybrid position offers them. Their responses suggest
that they use their position to impose their values and interests on what
happens in and to their unit, and to control the power of those who
presume to be able to decide its fate. This is a scenario that has thus far not
received much attention: clinicians taking up roles in management, not to
carry out the directives issued by senior management and policy makers
uncritically, but to create and access spheres of power and influence to
constrain and intervene in existing sources and flows of power.

The consequences of this post-bureaucratic modality of managerial iden-
tity (Chapter 11 in this volume) for the main tenets of health reform
are considerable. Where health policy has sought to interest clinicians in
management on the assumption that clinicians will automatically enact
management’s wishes, clinicians are discovering that managerial roles can
entail far more than obedience to a predetermined, hierarchical logic. Ironically, then, what policy-makers and senior hospital managers are faced with is competition of an entirely different sort from the indifference and resistance they have had to confront in the past. Clinicians have begun to invest themselves in the entrepreneurial, post-bureaucratic potential inscribed into hospital middle-managerial positions. Far from shutting themselves off from the affordances of managerial power and influence, clinicians have – as did our interviewees – come to realize the importance of exploiting middle-managerial appointments to suit their own units’ and specialties’ needs and wants. The trouble that this entrepreneurialization of the hospital middle manager now creates for health policy-makers and hospital managers lies in needing to contain and channel what may be regarded as an intensification of clinical-managerial power and influence. This reaches not just across professional bodies and associations (Colleges, Unions) as was the case in the past, but potentially nets in a far more extensive socio-politico-organizational space. In its concern to hybridize clinical and managerial appointments, then, contemporary health policy has begun to create employees whose newfound flexibility and incalculability will make it harder rather than easier for decision-makers to subject the clinical space to their gaze and direction.

13.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an analysis of two clinicians in middle-managerial positions. The chapter sought to demonstrate that in the talk of these clinicians there was evidence of positionings that exceed the logic of middle management as described in previous research. These positionings were further profiled against Peter Sloterdijk’s description of globalized and flexibilized subjectivity. This was done to bring out the irony of the close link that Sloterdijk posits between the flexibilization of self (being able to be both a clinician and a manager) and its efforts to remain incalculable to others (the possibility of withstanding senior managerial pressures). From there, we moved to considering what this emergent positioning – flexibility coupled with incalculability – entails for health policy and the management of hospitals. We noted that, for the last 20 years if not more, the hospital reform agenda has insisted that clinicians multi-skill so they can take on both clinical and managerial tasks. From there, we formulated the view that, given the indications offered by our analysis, clinicians may decide to move from resisting entry into hospital management as used to be the case (Degeling et al., 2003), to clinicians taking on managerial roles in order to contain the power and interference that is increasingly visited upon them by hospital managements, health bureaucrats and government representatives, not to mention media reporters and legal officials.
We offer our prognosis on the strength of two interviews and buttress it with a considerable amount of hypothetical reasoning. Clearly, our comments remain speculative about the future of clinicians in management. But, to draw again on Sloterdijk’s words, what is at issue for us here is foregrounding what has thus far remained unnoticed, ‘so that the small and the ephemeral gain a presence in over-arching theory – a trace-ology which seeks to read worldwide developments in non-obvious traces’ (Sloterdijk, 2004: 35). It seemed important to us to foreground the complex strands of meaning that are woven through these two interviews. Both are a tribute to frontline employees’ entrepreneurial initiative, and both harbour the promise of a modality of clinical management that transcends the either/or dichotomy that frequently characterizes discussions in the domain of hospital management and health services policy and research. For us, the interviews are emblematic of the complexity of contemporary hospital work (Iedema, 2007), and they foreshadow for us some of the challenges that hospitals and health organizations more broadly have to confront. If the convergence of clinical and managerial work has thus far appeared difficult if not unachievable, our analysis suggests that new manifestations of this hybrid appointment are beginning to come into being, complicating rather than simplifying the governance of contemporary health care.

Notes

1. This research was made possible in part thanks to Australian Research Council funding (Discovery project DP0556438).
2. The interviews were conducted by Susan Ainsworth and David Grant.
3. On one occasion, the NM called in the Nursing Union in protest against senior management not allowing her to declare ‘Code Red’ (a sign that the hospital is full and can’t receive any more patients other than those who suffer from a life-threatening illness). Code Red reflects badly on the health bureaucracy and the Health Minister because it suggests insufficient funding of health services. Senior hospital management are frequently ‘the meat in the sandwich’: they know they do not have enough staff to run services, and yet they do not want to go public with these problems because they incur (informal) warnings from people higher up in the health hierarchy.
4. We have anonymized the specialty as much as possible for reasons of confidentiality.
5. The matter of ‘Code Red’ (closing a hospital to patients other than those who have a life-threatening illness) was referred to in note 3. It is matters such as Code Red that are politically and bureaucratically ‘sensitive’, therefore attracting the attention of bureaucrats and politicians as well as senior hospital managers and the media.
6. Skill mix ratio refers to the number of qualified staff compared to the number of trainee staff needed per shift.
7. Translated from the German: ‘Zu sprechen wäre von einer Revolte des Unauffälligen, durch die das Kleine und Flüchtige sich einen Anteil an der Shekraft grosser Theorie sicherte – von einer Spuren-Kunde, die aus unschein-
barsten Indizien die Tendenzzeichen des Weltereignisses lessen wollte’ (Sloterdijk, 2004: 34).

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