Symbolic capital and social classes

Pierre Bourdieu
Collège de France, France

In this short but dense piece, written for a special issue of the journal L’Arc devoted to the medieval historian Georges Duby (whose sprawling oeuvre Bourdieu admired and drew on for its scrupulous genealogy of the mental-cum-social structure of the feudal triad of knight, priest, and peasant: see Georges Duby, The Three Orders (1982 [1978]), Bourdieu sums up and clarifies the core thesis of Distinction just as he was completing the book. This article is valuable for (1) stating forthrightly Bourdieu’s conception of the ‘double objectivity’ of the social world and spotlighting the recursive constitution of social and mental structures; (2) stressing the performative capacity of symbolic forms and their multi-level implication in social struggles over and across social divisions; and (3) suggesting alluring parallels and obstinate differences between Bourdieu’s ‘genetic structuralism’ and both the literary vision of Marcel Proust and the marginalist microsociology of Erving Goffman – two of his favorite mental ‘sparring partners.’ In all, this article illuminates how Bourdieu mingled Marx’s sensuous materialism, Durkheim’s teachings on classification (later extended by Cassirer), and Weber’s insights into hierarchies of honor into a sociological model of class all his own – LW.

To be noble is to squander; it is an obligation to appear; it is to be sentenced, on pain of degradation, to luxury and to spending. I would even say that this tendency to prodigality asserted itself at the beginning of the thirteenth century as a reaction to the social ascent of the newly rich. To distinguish yourself from villeins, you must outclass them by showing that you are more generous than they are. The testimony of literature is conclusive on this point: what opposes the knight to the upstart? The latter is stingy, while the former is noble because he spends all that he has, joyfully, and because he is drowning in debt.

Georges Duby, Hommes et structures du Moyen Âge, 1973

Corresponding author:
Loïc Wacquant, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94703, USA.
Email: loic@berkeley.edu

Permission for re-use of this material (including translations) should be directed to Jerôme Bourdieu at jerome.bourdieu@ens.fr
Any scientific enterprise of classification must take into account the fact that social agents appear as objectively characterized by two different orders of properties: on the one hand, by material properties which, starting with the body, can be numbered and measured like any other object of the physical world; and, on the other hand, by symbolic properties which are affixed upon them through a relationship with subjects capable of perceiving and evaluating them and which demand to be grasped according to their specific logic. This implies that social reality is amenable to two different readings: on the one side, those that arm themselves with an objectivist usage of statistics to establish distributions (in the statistical and also economic sense), that is, quantified expressions of the allocation of a definite quantum of social energy, grasped through ‘objective indicators’ (that is, material properties), among a large number of competing individuals; and, on the other side, those which endeavor to decipher meanings and to uncover the cognitive operations through which agents produce and decipher them.

The first approach aims at capturing an objective ‘reality’ quite inaccessible to ordinary experience and to bring to light ‘laws,’ that is, significant relationships – significant in the sense of non-random – between distributions. The second approach takes as its object not ‘reality’ itself but the representations that agents form of it and that make the full ‘reality’ of a social world conceived, in the manner of idealist philosophers, as ‘will and representation.’ The objectivists, who acknowledge the existence of a social ‘reality’ ‘independent of individual consciousness and will,’ quite logically base the constructions of science upon a break with mundane representations of the social world (the Durkheimian ‘prenotions’). The subjectivists, who reduce social reality to the representation that agents have of it, quite logically take as their object the primary knowledge of the social world: a mere ‘account of accounts,’ as Garfinkel puts it, this ‘science’ which takes as its object another ‘science,’ that which social agents deploy in their practice, can do no more than record the recordings of a social world which, in the final analysis, would be nothing other than the product of mental, that is, linguistic structures.

In contradistinction to social physics, social science cannot be reduced to a recording of the (most often continuous) distributions of material indicators of the different species of capital. Without ever relapsing into an ‘account of accounts,’ it must integrate within the (scholarly) knowledge of the object the (practical) knowledge that agents (the objects) have of the object. Put differently, it must bring into the (scholarly) knowledge of scarcity and of the competition for scarce goods the practical knowledge that agents acquire of this competition by producing individual or collective divisions that are no less objective than the distributions established by the balance sheets of social physics.

The problem of social class offers an especially propitious opportunity to grasp the opposition between these two perspectives. Indeed, the apparent antagonism between those who want to prove the existence of classes and those who wish to deny it, thereby concretely revealing that classifications are a stake of struggle, hides a more important opposition about the very theory of knowledge of the social world. The former, who, to suit their purposes, embrace the point of view of social physics, want to construe social classes as nothing but heuristic constructs or statistical categories arbitrarily imposed by the researcher who thereby introduces discontinuity in a continuous reality. The latter seek to ground the existence of social classes in the experience of agents: they strive to
establish that agents recognize the existence of classes differentiated according to their prestige, that they can assign individuals to these classes based on more or less explicit criteria, and that these individuals think of themselves as members of classes.

The opposition between Marxist theory, in the strictly objectivist form it often assumes, and Weberian theory which distinguishes between social class and status group (Stand), defined by such symbolic properties as those that make up the lifestyle, constitutes yet another form, just as fictitious, of this alternative between objectivism and subjectivism: by definition, lifestyles fulfill their function of distinction only for subjects inclined to recognize them and the Weberian theory of status groups is very close to all those subjectivist theories of classes, such as Warner’s, which include lifestyles and subjective representations into the very constitution of social divisions. But Max Weber’s merit resides in the fact that, far from presenting them as as mutually exclusive, as do most of his American commentators and epigones in particular, he brings together these two opposed conceptions, thereby posing the issue of the twofold root of social divisions, in the objectivity of material differences and in the subjectivity of representations. However, he gives to this question, and thereby enshrouds it in, a naively realist solution by distinguishing as two ‘types’ of groups what are only two modes of existence of any group.

The theory of social classes must thus transcend the opposition between objectivist theories which identify classes (be it for purposes of demonstrating per absurdum that they do not exist) with discrete groups, mere populations that can be numbered and separated by boundaries objectively inscribed in reality, and subjectivist theories (or, if one prefers, marginalist theories) which reduce the ‘social order’ to a kind of collective classification obtained by aggregating individual classifications or, more precisely, the individual strategies, classified and classifying, whereby agents classify themselves and others.

The challenge posed by those who use the argument of the continuity of distributions to deny the existence of social classes is thrust onto those who strive to take it up as foolish bet and a con game. In effect, it leaves no choice but to confront indefinitely the contradictory countings of social classes encountered in Marx’s works or to ask of statistics that it resolve these new forms of the paradox of the heap of grain it brings up, in the very operation whereby it reveals differences and allows us rigorously to measure their magnitude, by erasing the boundaries between rich and poor, bourgeois and petty bourgeois, urban and rural dwellers, young and old, residents of the suburbs and of the central city, and so on. The trap mercilessly closes upon those who, in the name of Marxism, proclaim today, straight-faced, as the output of positivist bean counting, that the petty bourgeois number ‘at the very most 4,311,000.’

The sociologists of continuity, most of whom are ‘pure theoreticians’ – in the very ordinary sense that their pronouncements are not based on any empirical validation – win at every turn by shifting the burden of experimental proof onto their adversaries. It thus suffices to rebut them by invoking Pareto, whose authority they ordinarily claim: ‘One cannot draw a line to separate in absolute manner the rich from the poor, the owners of landed or industrial capital from workers. Several authors purport to draw from this fact the consequence that, in our society, one cannot speak meaningfully of a capitalist class, nor oppose bourgeois to workers.’ This amounts to saying, Pareto continues, that there
exist no elderly because we do not know at what age, or at what point in life, old age begins.

As to reducing the social world to the representation that some form of the representation that others give of it or, more precisely, to the aggregation of the (mental) representations that every agent forms of the (theatrical) representations that others give to him, it overlooks the fact that subjective classifications are founded in the objectivity of a classification which is not reducible to the collective classification obtained by summing up individual classifications: the ‘social order’ is not formed on the basis of individual orderings, in the manner of a vote or a market price.\(^6\)

The class condition that social statistics captures through different material indicators of the position in the relations of production, or, more precisely, of the capacities for material appropriation of the instruments of material or cultural production (economic capital) and of the capacities for symbolic appropriation of these instruments (cultural capital), determines, directly and indirectly, through the position it receives from collective classifications, the representations that each agent forms of his or her position and her strategies of ‘presentation of self’ (as Goffman says), that is, the staging of his position that she deploys. This could be shown even in the most unfavorable cases, whether in the universe of the American middle classes, with their multiple and scrambled hierarchies described by symbolic interactionism, or in the limiting case represented by the world of snobishness and salons as depicted by Marcel Proust.\(^7\)

These social universes given over to strategies of distinction and pretension provide a rough approximation of a universe wherein the ‘social order,’ resulting from a kind of ongoing creation, would be at every moment the provisional and continually revokable result of a class struggle reduced to a classification struggle, to a confrontation between symbolic strategies aiming to modify positions by manipulating the representations of positions, such as those which consist, for instance, in denying distances (by appearing ‘simple,’ by making oneself ‘accessible’) in order better to make them recognized or, on the contrary, to recognize them with ostentation so as better to deny them (as with a variant of Schlemiel’s game described by Eric Berne).\(^8\)

This Berkeleyan space, where all differences would be reduced to the thought of differences, where the only distances would be those that one ‘takes’ or ‘holds,’ is the site of strategies that always have as their principle the search for assimilation or dissimulation: bluffer [to bluff], by trying to identify with groups spotted as superior because they are reputed as such, or snobber [to snob], by striving to distinguish oneself from groups identified as inferior (according to the famous definition, ‘a snob is a person who despises everyone who does not despise him’). To force one’s way through the gates of groups that are placed higher, more ‘closed,’ more ‘select,’ to close one’s doors on more and more people: such is the law of socialite ‘credit.’ The prestige of a salon hinges upon the strictness of its exclusions (one cannot admit into one’s place a person of little repute without oneself losing in repute) and on the ‘quality’ of the persons invited, which is itself measured by the quality of the salons which invite them: the ups and downs of the stock market for society values, recorded by socialite publications, are measured by these two criteria, that is, by a universe of infinitesimal nuances, which call for a discerning eye. In a universe where everything is classified, and therefore classifying – the places, for instance, where one ought to be seen, such as fashionable
restaurants, horse jumping competitions, public lectures, exhibitions; the shows that one ought to have seen, Venice, Florence, Bayreuth, the Russian ballet; finally the secluded places such as salons and private clubs – a perfect mastery of classifications (which the umpires of elegance hasten to deem old fashioned as soon as they become too commonplace) is indispensable to obtain the highest yield for one’s society investments and, at minimum, to avoid being identified with groups whose value has fallen. We are classified by our principles of classification: it is not only Odette and Swann, who know how to tell the ‘level of chic’ of a dinner simply by reading the list of guests, but also Charlus, Madame Verdurin, and the First President on vacation in Balbec who have different classifications, which classify them at the same time as they think they are classifying. And this occurs infallibly because nothing varies more clearly with one’s position in classifications than one’s vision of classifications.

It would be dangerous, however, to accept as is the vision of the ‘world’ that Proust offers, that of the ‘pretender’ who sees the ‘world’ as a space to be conquered, in the manner of Madame Swann, whose outings always take the form of risky expeditions, compared somewhere with colonial war. For the value of individuals and groups is not a direct function of the socialite work of the snob to the degree suggested by Proust when he writes: ‘Our social personality is a creation of the thought of others.’ The symbolic capital of those who dominate high society, Charlus, Bergotte, or the Duchess of Guermantes, does not depend solely on disdains and refusals, on expressions of coolness or eagerness, on marks of recognition and testimonials of discredit, on tokens of respect or contempt, in sum, on the whole game of reciprocal judgments. It is the sublimated form taken by such flatly objective realities as those recorded by social physics, castles or land, titles of property, of nobility or of higher learning, when these are transfigured by the enchanted, mystified, and complicitous perception which defines snobishness proper (or, at a different level, petty bourgeois pretension). Operations of classification refer themselves not only to the clues of collective judgment but also to the positions in distributions that this collective judgment already recounts. Classifications tend to espouse distributions, thereby tending to reproduce them. Social value, as credit or discredit, repute or prestige, respectability or honorability, is not the product of the representations that agents perform or form, and social being is not merely a perceived-being.

Social groups, and especially social classes, exist twice, so to speak, and they do so prior to the intervention of the scientific gaze itself: they exist in the objectivity of the first order, that which is recorded by distributions of material properties; and they exist in the objectivity of the second order, that of the contrasted classifications and representations produced by agents on the basis of a practical knowledge of these distributions such as they are expressed in lifestyles. These two modes of existence are not independent, even as representations enjoy a definite autonomy with respect to distributions: the representation that agents form of their position in social space (as well as the representation of it that they perform – in the theatrical sense, as with Goffman) is the product of a system of schemata of perception and appreciation (habitus) which is itself the embodied product of a condition defined by a definite position in distributions of material properties (objectivity I) and of symbolic capital (objectivity II), and which takes into account, not only the representations (which obey the same laws) that others
have of this position and whose aggregation defines symbolic capital (commonly designated as prestige, authority, and so on), but also the position in distributions symbolically retranslated as lifestyle.

While refusing to grant that differences exist only because agents believe or make others believe that they exist, we must admit that objective differences, inscribed in material properties and in the differential profits these provide, are converted into recognized distinctions in and through the representations that agents form and perform of them. Any difference that is recognized, accepted as legitimate, functions by that very fact as a symbolic capital providing a profit of distinction. Symbolic capital, together with the forms of profit and power it warrants, exists only in the relationship between distinct and distinctive properties, such as the body proper, language, clothing, interior furnishings (each of which receives its value from its position in the system of corresponding properties, this system itself being objectively referred to the system of positions in distributions), and the individuals or groups endowed with schemata of perception and appreciation that predispose them to recognize (in the twofold meaning of the term) these properties, that is, to constitute them into expressive styles, transformed and unrecognizable forms of positions in relations of force.

There is not a single practice or property (in the sense of appropriated object) characteristic of a particular manner of living that cannot be given a distinctive value as a function of a socially determined principle of pertinence and thereby express a social position. Proof is that the same ‘physical’ or ‘moral’ feature – for instance, a fat or thin body, a light or dark skin, the consumption or rejection of alcohol – can be given opposite (positional) values in the same society at different epochs or in different societies.10 For a practice or a property to function as a sign of distinction, it suffices for it to be put in relation with this or that practice or property among those that can be practically substituted for it in a given social universe, and thus that it be placed back into the symbolic universe of practices and properties that, functioning according to the specific logic of symbolic systems, that of differential gap or distance, retranslates economic differences into distinctive marks, signs of distinction, or social stigmata. The symbol of distinction, arbitrary as the linguistic sign, receives the determinations that make it appear as necessary in the consciousness of agents only from its insertion in the relations of opposition constitutive of the system of distinctive marks which is characteristic of a given social formation. This explains why, being essentially relational (the very word of distinction expresses this well), symbols of distinction, which can vary widely depending on the social foil to which they are opposed, are nonetheless perceived as the innate attributes of a ‘natural distinction.’ What properly characterizes symbols of distinction, whether they be the style of homes or their decoration, or the rhetoric of a speech, linguistic ‘accents’, or the cut and color of a garment, table manners or ethical dispositions, resides in the fact that, given their expressive function, they are, as it were, doubly determined: they are determined, first, by their position in the system of distinctive signs and, second, by the bi-univocal relation of correspondence that obtains between that system and the system of positions in the distribution of goods. It follows that, whenever they are grasped as socially pertinent and legitimate as a function of a classification system, properties cease being only material goods liable to enter into exchanges and to yield material profits to become expressions, signs of recognition that
signify and acquire value through the complete set of gaps or distances [écarts] in relation to other properties — or non-properties. Embodied or objectified properties thus function as a kind of primordial language, through which we are spoken more than we speak it, in spite of all strategies of presentation of self.\textsuperscript{11} Any unequal distribution of goods or services tends thus to be perceived as a symbolic system, that is, as a system of distinctive marks: distributions, such as that of automobiles, places of residence, sports, parlor games, and so on, are, for common perception, so many symbolic systems within which every practice (or non-practice) receives a value. The sum of these socially pertinent distributions sketches the system of lifestyles, the system of differential distances engendered by taste and apprehended by it as signs of good or bad taste and, by the same token, as titles of nobility capable of bringing a profit of distinction all the greater when their relative scarcity is higher or as a mark of infamy.

The objectivist theory of social classes reduces the truth of social classifications to the objective truth of these classifications, forgetting to inscribe in the full definition of the social world the primary truth against which it was constructed (and which comes back to haunt political practice oriented by this objective truth in the guise of those obstacles it must continually overcome in order to impose a vision of the social world conforming to that theory). Scientific objectivation is complete only when it is also applied to the subjective experience which hinders it. And the adequate theory is that which integrates the partial truth captured by objectivist knowledge and the truth specific to primary experience as the (more or less permanent and total) misrecognition of that truth, that is, the disenchanted knowledge of the social world and the knowledge of recognition as enchanted or mystified cognition of which it is the object in primary experience.

The misrecognition of the real foundations of differences and of the principles of their perpetuation is what makes for the fact that the social world is perceived not as the site of conflict or competition between groups endowed with antagonistic interests but as a ‘social order.’ Every recognition is misrecognition: every type of authority, and not only that which imposes itself through commands, but that which is wielded without having to be wielded, that which is said to be natural and which is sedimented in language, a demeanor, manners, a lifestyle, or even in things ( scepters and crowns, ermines and gowns in another time, luxury cars and lavish offices nowadays), rests on a form of primeval belief, more profound and more ineradicable than what we ordinarily convey by that word. A social world is a universe of presuppositions: the games and the stakes it proposes, the hierarchies and the preferences it imposes, in short the ensemble of tacit conditions of membership, what is taken for granted by those who belong to it and which is invested with value in the eyes of those who want to be of it, all of this rests at bottom upon the immediate agreement between the structures of the social world and the categories of perception which constitute the doxa or, as Husserl put it, the protodoxa, a perception of the social world as natural and taken for granted.\textsuperscript{12}

Objectivism, which reduces social relations to their objective truth of relations of force, forgets that this truth can be repressed by an effect of collective bad faith and of the enchanted perception that transfigures them into relations of legitimate domination, authority, or prestige.

Any capital, whatever the form it assumes, exerts a symbolic violence as soon as it is recognized, that is, misrecognized in its truth as capital and imposes itself as an authority
calling for recognition. Symbolic capital would be nothing more than another way of designating what Max Weber called charisma if he, who no doubt had best understood that the sociology of religion is a chapter of the sociology of power (and not a minor one at that), hamstrung by the logic of realist typologies, had not made charisma into a particular form of power instead of seeing in it a dimension of any power, that is, another name for legitimacy as the product of recognition or misrecognition, or of the belief (these are so many quasi-synonyms) ‘by virtue of which persons wielding authority are endowed with prestige.’ Belief is defined by the misrecognition of the credit it grants its object and which adds to the powers that this object has upon it, nobility, goodwill, repute, notoriety, prestige, honor, renown, or yet gift, talent, intelligence, culture, distinction, taste – so many projections of collective belief that belief believes it discovers in the nature of its objects. Snobbishness or pretension are the dispositions of believers who are forever haunted by the fear of a breach, of an error of judgment and of committing a sin against good taste and inevitably dominated by the transcendent powers to which they surrender by the mere fact of recognizing them – art, culture, literature, high fashion, or other such fetishes of high society13 – and by the recipients of these powers, those arbitrary arbitrators of elegance – fashion designers, painters, writers, or critics – mere figments of social belief who wield a real power upon the believers, be it the power to consecrate material objects by transferring upon them the collective sacred or the power to transform the representations of those who delegate their power to them. Belief is an adhesion which ignores that it brings into being that to which it adheres; it does not know, or does not want to know, that everything which makes for the intrinsic charm of its object, its charisma, is nothing other than the product of the countless operations of credit and discredit, all equally unconscious of their truth, that are made on the market of symbolic goods and materialized in officially recognized and guaranteed symbols, signs of distinction, tokens of consecration, and certificates of charisma such as titles of nobility or school credentials, objectified marks of respect calling for tokens of respect, pomp, and ceremony, whose effect is to express not only one’s social position but also the collective recognition accorded to it by the mere fact of allowing it to make such public display of its importance. By contradistinction with pretension, stemming from a discrepancy between the importance that the subject grants himself and that which the group grants him, between what he ‘allows himself’ and what he is allowed, between pretensions and legitimate ambitions, legitimate authority asserts and imposes itself as such by the very fact of having nothing else to do than to exist in order to impose itself.14

As a fundamental operation of social alchemy, the transformation of any species of capital into symbolic capital, as legitimate possession founded upon the nature of its possessor, always presupposes a form of labor, a visible expenditure (which needs not be conspicuous) of time, money, and energy, a redistribution that is necessary to ensure the recognition of the distribution, in the form of the recognition granted by the one who receives to the one who, being better situated in the distribution, is in a position to give, a recognition of indebtedness which is also an acknowledgement of value.15 Lifestyle is the foremost and perhaps today the most fundamental of these symbolic manifestations, clothing, furnishings, or any other property which, functioning according to the logic of membership and exclusion, makes differences in capital (understood as the capacity to appropriate scarce goods and the corresponding profits) visible under a form such that
they escape the unjustifiable brutality of the fact, *datum brutum*, mere insignificance or pure violence, to accede to this form of misrecognized and denegated violence, which is thereby asserted and recognized as legitimate, which is symbolic violence.¹⁶ Thus it is that the ‘lifestyle’ and the ‘stylization of life’ transfigure relations of force into relations of meaning, into a system of signs which, being ‘defined,’ as Hjelmslev says, ‘not positively by their contents but negatively by their relationship to the other terms of the system,’¹⁷ are predisposed by a sort of preexisting harmony to express one’s *rank* in the distributions: although they derive their value from their position in a system of oppositions and are nothing other than what the others are not, lifestyles – and the groups they distinguish – seem to have no foundation other than the natural dispositions of their bearers, like this distinction which is said to be ‘natural,’ even though – the words says it – it exists only in and through its relationship of contradistinction to other, more ‘common’ dispositions, that is, statistically more frequent. With natural distinction, privilege contains its own justification. The legitimizing theatricalization which always accompanies the exercise of power extends to all practices, and especially to consumptions which need not be inspired by the search for distinction to be distinctive, such as the material and symbolic appropriation of art works, which seem to have as sole principle the dispositions of the *person* in her irreplaceable singularity. Like religious symbols for other modes of domination, the symbols of cultural capital, objectified or embodied, contribute to the legitimation of domination, and the very *art of living* of the power holders contributes to the power which makes them possible insofar as its true conditions of possibility remain ignored and as it is perceived, not only as the legitimate manifestation of power, but as the foundation of legitimacy.¹⁸ ‘Status groups’ based on ‘lifestyles’ and the ‘stylization of life’ are not, as Weber believes, a sort of group different from classes but denegated classes, or if one prefers, sublimated and thereby legitimated classes.

**Notes**

1. By considering here only that form of social physics (represented for instance by Durkheim) which agrees with social cybernetics to admit that reality can only be known by deploying logical instruments of classification, we do not intend to deny the special affinity between social energetics and the positivist inclination to construe classifications either as arbitrary ‘operational’ partitions (as with age categories or income strata) or as ‘objective’ breaks (set by discontinuities in distributions or inflexions in curves) that one merely has to record. We simply wish to stress that the fundamental alternative opposes not the ‘cognitive perspective’ and behaviorism (or any other form of mechanistic social analysis) but a hermeneutics of relations of meaning and a mechanics of relations of force.


3. [Translator’s note] The paradox of the heap is one of several ‘Sorite puzzles’ formulated by Eubulides of Miletus (350 BC), the student of Socrates and founder of the Megarian school of logic. It is also known as the ‘little-by-little argument’: since one grain of wheat does not make a heap, then two grains do not, then a thousand grains do not. The premise is true but the conclusion false owing to the indeterminacy affecting the predicates.

4. [Translator’s note] Bourdieu alludes here to the book by Christian Baudelot, Roger Establet, and Jacques Malemort, *La petite bourgeoisie en France* (1974), in which the authors, using a strictly objectivist definition of class based on one’s income source, develop a byzantine accounting scheme allowing them to enumerate the petty bourgeoisie.

6. Consider a particularly typical expression of this social marginalism, down to its use of metaphor: ‘Each individual is responsible for the demeanor image of himself and deference image of others, so that for a complete man to be expressed, individuals must hold hands in a chain of ceremony, each giving deferentially with proper demeanor to the one on the right what will be received deferentially from the one on the left’ (Erving Goffman, ‘The nature of deference and demeanor’, 1958: 484).


8. [Translator’s note] Eric Berne’s *Games People Play* (1964) is a transactional analysis of the structure of social interaction and the motivations behind them by a leading psychiatrist.


10. Joseph Gusfield shows, in a truly beautiful book (*Symbolic Crusade*, 1968), how abstinence, which was the symbol *par excellence* of membership in the bourgeoisie of nineteenth-century America, was progressively repudiated, among the same social circles, in favor of a moderate consumption of alcohol that has become one element of a new, more ‘relaxed,’ lifestyle.

11. Language itself always reveals, besides what it says, the social position of the speaker (there are even instances where it conveys nothing more), owing to the position it occupies – what Troubetzkoy calls its ‘expressive style’ – in the system of these styles. [Translator’s note: See Nicolai Trubetzkoy’s *Principles of Phonology* (1969), a book Bourdieu had translated into French for the series ‘Le sens commun’ that he directed at Éditions de Minuit.]


14. Every agent must, at each moment, take into account the price he fetches on the market of symbolic goods and which defines what he can afford himself (that is, among other things, what he can lay claim to and what he can legitimately appropriate in a universe where all goods are themselves hierarchized). The sense of the fiduciary value (which in some universes, such as the intellectual field or the artistic field, can be the sole fount of value) guides strategies which, to be recognized, must be pegged at just the right level, neither too high (pretension), nor too low (vulgarity, lack of ambition), and in particular the strategies of dissimulation from and assimilation into other groups which can, within certain limits, play with recognized distances. (I showed elsewhere how the ‘aging’ of the artist is, in part, an effect of the increase in symbolic capital and of the corresponding evolution of legitimate ambitions.) [Translator’s note: Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The invention of the artist’s life’ (1987 [1975]).]

15. In precapitalist societies, this work of transmutation imposes itself with special rigor owing to the fact that the accumulation of symbolic capital is most often the only possible form of accumulation, in fact and by law. More generally, the stronger the censorship of the direct manifestations of the power of capital (economic or even cultural), the more capital must be accumulated in the form of symbolic capital.

16. The weaker the degree of mutual familiarity, the more the ordinary operations of classification have to rely on symbolism to infer social position: in villages or small towns, social judgment can be grounded in a nearly comprehensive knowledge of the most determining economic and social characteristics. By contrast, in the anonymous and occasional encounters of urban life, style and taste no doubt contribute in a much more decisive fashion to guiding social judgment and the strategies deployed in interactions. [Translator’s note: On this contrast, see Pierre Bourdieu, *The Bachelors’ Ball* (2008 [2002]).]
17. [Translator’s note] The citation is actually from Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (1968: 162). This proposition was further developed by Hjelmslev and the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen. See Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* (1961 [1943]).

18. This implies that the analysis of the field of power as the system of positions of power cannot be separated from the analysis of the properties (in the two senses) of the agents occupying those positions and of the contribution that these properties bring to the perpetuation of power through the symbolic effects they wield.

**References**


