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# The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations

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You wish me to speak about “Science as a Vocation.” Now, we political economists have a pedantic custom, which I should like to follow, of always beginning with the external conditions. In this case, we begin with the question: What are the conditions of science as a vocation in the material sense of the term? Today this question means, practically and essentially: What are the prospects of a graduate student who is resolved to dedicate himself professionally to science in university life? In order to understand the peculiarities of German conditions it is expedient to proceed by comparison and to realize the conditions abroad. In this respect, the United States stands in the deepest contrast with Germany, so we shall focus upon that country.

—Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” speech at Munich University, 1918

## Introduction

This special issue of *International Organization* (IO) exhibits a consistent ambivalence about whether it reports on the development of international relations (IR) or American IR. Maybe this should be expected. IR is and has been “an American social science”.<sup>1</sup> The incident in the late 1980s when the International Studies Association (ISA) approached (other?) national associations (such as the British International Studies Association, BISA, and the Japan Association of International Relations, JAIR) in the mantle of the global meta-organization of international studies

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1. Hoffmann 1977.

asking for their annual report nicely illustrated this.<sup>2</sup> The ambivalence of some toward the organization's name was eventually resolved in favor of the ISA presenting itself as a regional organization cooperating on equal terms with the Japanese and European associations, but in some respects the opposite—less politically correct—resolution would have been more accurate: to acknowledge how small the difference was between American IR and the “global” discipline.

Movement toward a more pluralistic or balanced situation is widely expected, and several signs have appeared—from increased European self-assuredness and collaboration (with a new European journal and an emerging European association) and a successful, new, theoretical German-language journal to a growing interest in “non-Western” approaches. Dramatic change has not materialized so far, and the novelty is rather an expectation that “real world” developments will eventually be reflected in the discipline, and thus a more regionalized post-Cold War order, European integration, and Asian values will lead to the emergence of distinct IR voices.

Many scholars, however, argue that there is no such thing as national perspectives on international relations (“What do Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, Cynthia Enloe, and Craig Murphy have in common?”<sup>3</sup>). Distribution among competing theories or “paradigms” is more important than national distinctions. If more Americans are participating in the networks of our globalized discipline, this is of no relevance to the content, to our theorizing. In this article I show that an American hegemony exists and that it influences the theoretical profile of the discipline, and I explain where it comes from.

Broadly, this article asks why IR develops as it does in different societies. More narrowly, it investigates American dominance in the field: what does it rest on and what are its effects? More specifically, why do some American theories travel and others do not? Behavioralism was absolutely central to American political science for two decades, and scholars often argue that its reverberations shaped the next two decades in the form of postbehavioralism.<sup>4</sup> Its importance in Europe was not comparable. Today, a similar question emerges in relation to rational choice: will it become as dominant in Europe as it has in the United States? So far this has not been the case, and there might be reasons to expect that it never will.

The prognosis is “American IR: from global hegemony to national professionalization.” The American mainstream turns overwhelmingly toward rational choice approaches (noncooperative game theory in particular). Because this current wave is inspired from the other parts of political science as taught in the United States—comparative politics and American politics—this turn is accompanied by great hopes of establishing IR on a more solid theoretical foundation as part of a general scientific breakthrough in political science and in the social sciences in general. Maximizing its integration into political science as a unitary discipline weakens the basis for continued global hegemony. Mainstream IR enthusiastically integrates with theories

2. Strange 1995.

3. Porter forthcoming; for similar arguments see Palmer 1980.

4. Farr, Dryzek, and Leonard 1995.

peculiar to the United States (for example, those based on the logic of committees in the U.S. Congress), which are furthermore attractive due to the distinctively American ideals of social science. Therefore, the rest of the world increasingly sees the back of American IR.

I first show that the way the discipline usually reflects on its own development falls embarrassingly behind standards developed in sociology of science and historiography; I then turn to the sociology of science to establish an explanatory model to account for the national variations discovered. The main factors are organized at three levels: societal-political features of the country, the standing and structure of social science in general in that country, and the internal intellectual and social structures of the IR discipline, including its theories and forms of debate. I offer some data on the issue of dominance: who publishes what and where? I then follow the structure of the model based on the sociology of science and address these questions to German, French, British, and American IR. A central explanation for the lack of congruity between American and European IR at present is the gradual de-Europeanization of American IR. American IR is cutting itself off from those of its roots that are continental European and is building increasingly on a "liberal," Anglo-American philosophical tradition. There was always a strong European component in American IR, and when the U.S. community, for various reasons, became the largest and most innovative, it produced theory that was basically (re-)exportable to Europe. Current theory is shifting toward an American liberal format much less applicable to continental Europe and most other parts of the world. Finally, I explain causes and effects of the strange combination of American insularity and hegemony. What potentially useful forms of theory does American IR cut itself off from, and what are the effects on European IR?

One major line of argument starts by comparing IR to the ideal of a global discipline. "An ideal model of a community of scholars," Kal Holsti has written, "would suggest reasonably symmetrical flows of communication, with 'exporters' of knowledge also being 'importers' from other sources."<sup>5</sup> Later in the article, I outline the unbalanced relationship between American and non-American IR in terms of patterns of publication, citation, and, especially, theory borrowing. All other national IR communities are running huge balance-of-trade deficits against the United States. Although unpleasant for individual non-Americans in career terms, the situation need not have an impact on the content of the science. Maybe Americans and non-Americans do the same things, only the Americans better, and so they get published everywhere? However, the dominant approaches on the two sides of the Atlantic differ systematically, here documented along the current main axis of metatheoretical disagreement, rationalism versus reflectivism (compare the article in this issue by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner). Judging from the tone of much rationalist scholarship, a likely counterargument could be that this difference is only a matter of time: American IR is ahead (due, for example, to the better training

5. Holsti 1985, 13. His own conclusion is "that patterns of international exchange of scholarly knowledge in our field remain far from an ideal model of an international community of scholars." *Ibid.*, 148.

of students in methodology), and eventually Europeans and others will catch up and become equally rational choice. The discipline could be consoled: there is no distortion effected by an American dominance, only an acceleration of progress. I later show why this projection is unlikely to come about. Consistent and explainable differences exist between American and European IR. Although I do not offer a full sociological explanation of the history of IR, I do begin to sketch one because it is necessary for answering the American–European question.

## Explaining How We Got Here

### *How (Not) to Depict Disciplinary Developments*

Most of the articles in this issue take a characteristic form: a field is presented, previous attempts and contributions are critically evaluated, and an explanation is offered about why current approaches (most strongly articulated in the case of rational choice) have started to solve previous problems. According to almost all the authors, their subfields currently rest on sound footing.

Naturally, a field looks like this to its current practitioners. Typically, we are doing what we are doing because we believe it is the right thing to do, and this appears to us as superior to previous efforts. To a historian or sociologist of science, however, this will appear a naive approach. As typical “Whig” history writing it assumes a progress where the winning line is necessarily also the best, and the past should be measured on the standards of the present.<sup>6</sup> To assume that these previous studies were attempting to do what we are doing today, only less successfully, ignores their contemporary context (replacing it with allegedly eternal questions with which mankind grapples). Also, present theoretical contributions need to be placed in context and not read purely as relationships between disembodied academics and abstract issues. We need to not only explain past “mistakes” but also accept that what we do today can hardly be a result of the discipline having freed itself of all extra-scientific impulses and achieved some kind of purity. More likely, there are also social and contextual reasons why we do what we do. In no way should this imply that our efforts are disqualified as scientific, objective, or valuable. Only by assuming that true science purely reflects subject matter on a passive, receiving level would sociological explanation and scientific value be necessary opposites. More realistically, the theories of all eras should in like manner be submitted to sociological explanation at the same time that we conduct our usual discussions within the discipline to establish what theories we find most convincing, valid, or truthful. In the words of Theodore J. Lowi: “even assuming that we are all sincerely searching for the truth (and it is more interesting to assume that), there are reasons other than the search for truth why we do the kinds of political science we do.”<sup>7</sup>

6. Butterfield coined the term, and it has been developed into a more general characteristic by the new historians of ideas in the Cambridge school: Pocock, Skinner, Dunn. See Butterfield 1959; compare Tully 1988.

7. Lowi 1992, 1.

The relationship between IR and sociology of science is virtually nonexistent.<sup>8</sup> Sociology of science has concentrated on the natural sciences, with most of the remaining attention reserved for medicine and law. Of the fraction left for social science<sup>9</sup> and humanities, most of the attention goes to economics and sociology. A subdiscipline (IR) within one of the least studied disciplines (political science), therefore gets no attention from “professional” sociology of science. If sociology of science were to be applied to IR, a combination of the two could come from the opposite side, but IR scholars usually write about the discipline without any theoretical framework whatsoever.<sup>10</sup> Usually they write about the past as part of one of the debates about who is right and who is wrong, what mistakes were made in the past, and why everyone should follow me now.

### *Explanations With or Without Sociology of Science*

In the history and sociology of science, internal explanations originally referred to explanations based on the allegedly inherent telos of science (and therefore it produced linear, progressive stories), whereas external accounts introduced various political, economic, social, and intellectual causes. In IR, however, this setup has been curiously reversed. The most popular explanations are “external” in a particular sense: the impact of developments in real-world international relations on developments within the discipline of IR. Thus, paradoxically, external explanations reinstall receptiveness toward the empirical stuff the discipline is supposed to react to, assisting a quasi-positivist, progressivist self-understanding. This is paradoxical because “external” explanations in normal sociology of science debates mean external both to the academic universe of the discipline and to its subject matter—they mean developments in the surrounding society.

Often, IR’s external stories seem convincing. The partial change from realism to transnationalism and interdependence surely had something to do with Vietnam, the oil crisis, post-Bretton Woods global finance, and détente. In several other cases, it sounds easier than it is: idealism was replaced by realism because of World War II. Maybe causality operates in reverse: the history of the interwar period is told with the idealists responsible for the war because realism won the battle. The general pattern could be that each major rupture in the international system triggers a swing away from whatever theory dominates. Currently, the end of the Cold War reads time to

8. One surprising—but then also systematically ignored—exception is Crawford and Biderman 1969, financed by the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. It concentrates on “the relationship between social scientists and the activities of the United States Government in the international field since the beginning of World War II.” (1969, v) But in this more limited task, it draws on and discusses developments within the sociology of social science.

9. “The hesitancy of social scientists to apply to themselves even a fraction of the energies that they have used in scrutinizing the behaviors of others may account for the slow development of the sociology of social science as a field of empirical research”; see Crawford and Biderman 1969, vi. A notable recent exception is the emerging body of work around Wagner, Whitley, and Wittrock discussed in a later section.

10. Whitley notices the same for economics. Whitley 1986. Partial IR exceptions are Giesen 1995; and Guzzini 1998.

leave neorealism. It is not evident why neorealism should be more troubled by this event than any of the other theories that cannot explain it. The causal connection between external events and developments in theory is, as usual, vague.<sup>11</sup>

The articles on the history of the discipline,<sup>12</sup> slowly growing in number, are usually not based on systematic research or clear methods. They are, at best, elegant restatements of “common knowledge” of our past, implicitly assuming that any good practitioner can tell the history of the discipline. However, without looking systematically at the past, we tend to reproduce myths such as the nature of the idealists in the (alleged) first debate.<sup>13</sup> For instance, without reading through all articles of *IO*, we assume that IR in the 1960s was generally centered around the Kaplan-Bull debate because it has come to represent that period. Reading the old issues brings lots of surprises (for example, see Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons’ article in this issue) and makes one think about how the discipline looked to people writing at the time. This phenomenon is, of course, even more pressing for the periods that fewer current participants remember personally. How many scholars have reread the textbooks of the 1930s before speaking about typical IR in the interwar period? If they have, how can they ignore, for instance, the strong geopolitical component and continue with the story about dominant “idealism”?

Within the genre of self-reflections of the discipline and especially those scholars who discuss national perspectives, one contribution stands out (and most of the rest build on it): Stanley Hoffmann’s article “An American Social Science: International Relations.”<sup>14</sup> It contains many brilliant insights and is generally very convincing about why IR emerged as a full-size discipline in the United States, why it took the form it did, and what the peculiar problems of the American condition are. However, it is all very ad hoc. The factors and the framework are tailor-made for the American case. It is, of course, possible to transfer it to other cases, as Christer Jönsson, for example, has done very elegantly by comparing it to Scandinavian IR on exactly those points Hoffmann pointed to as typically American.<sup>15</sup> However, if the debate on the discipline evolves in this way, it paradoxically creates a kind of second-order Americanization. Also, the debate on the discipline and its Americanization is conducted in an America-shaped framework! One must be more deductive, guided by theory developments within the sociology of science, and set up a general framework for explaining evolutions within IR theory.

11. Compare Wæver 1992, vi–viii; and Schmidt 1998, 32–38.

12. For example, Alker and Biersteker 1984; Banks 1984; Bull 1972; Donnelly 1995; Gareau 1981; Hoffmann 1977; Holsti 1985; Kahler 1993; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, this issue; Knutsen 1992; Meyers 1990; Olson 1972; Olson and Groom 1991; Olson and Onuf 1985; Smith 1985, 1987, 1995; and Wæver 1992, 1996.

13. Schmidt made the first major attempt at serious historical scholarship like this (beyond more or less single-author or single-episode focused work). Schmidt 1998. Unfortunately, he only covers American (political science based) IR from the mid-1800s to 1940 and only with internal discursive explanations. He effectively shows the problems of posterity’s dominant construction of this period; compare de Wilde 1991. However, he does not explore why and with what effects this myth has been established and thus misses how it has become socially real even if historically false.

14. Hoffmann 1977.

15. Jönsson 1993. Lyons builds parts of his discussion of French IR on the Hoffmann list. Lyons 1982.

Many will undoubtedly object that IR and the sociology of science have met often through Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. Surely, there was widespread reference to Kuhn during the late 1970s and early 1980s,<sup>16</sup> and the last ten years have seen declarations of allegiance to Lakatos and some attempts to apply his principles systematically.<sup>17</sup> However, this is not sociology of science. Kuhn's importance was primarily as a historically based intervention into the philosophy of science, and Lakatos had a constructive agenda of defining procedures that would reinstall a modified falsificationist methodology. More importantly, their IR applications were not empirical sociology or history of science, but a kind of metamethodology. A slightly sociologized philosophy of science retains the form of "rules" for appropriate behavior necessary (and guaranteed!?) to ensure scientific progress. As noted by Donald McCloskey, Karl Popper and Lakatos "do not pretend to give persuasive histories of how science actually did progress. Theirs is rational not historical reconstruction."<sup>18</sup> Whatever merits Kuhn's and Lakatos' approaches might have as schemes for measuring progress in the discipline, they have not proven useful for generating sociologically informed studies of the development of IR.

In the discipline of political science at large (and the subdiscipline of political theory in particular), a lively debate and growing literature has emerged on how to write its history.<sup>19</sup> In IR this has not been the case.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, I will establish an explanatory model based on general sociology of science, specific sociology of the social sciences, the literature on the history of political science, and the few existing essays on the history of IR.

The sociology of science developed in roughly three phases.<sup>21</sup> In the first phase, the original midcentury sociology of science focused on the ethos of science.<sup>22</sup> True science needs no social explanation—it reflects reality. A sociology of science should therefore, on the one hand, explain deviation (for example, Lysenkoism) and, on the other, study social conditions conducive for the development of science.

In the second phase, the so-called new sociology of science (or the sociology of scientific knowledge) explained knowledge purely from the social context, excluding any role for its cognitive validity (such as compatibility with empirical observations). It fought its main battle in relation to the natural sciences and technology to

16. For example, Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; and Banks 1984. For a convincing exception that brings Kuhn to constructive usage, see Guzzini 1998.

17. Most noticed, probably Keohane 1983b, 1986a; most recently Vasquez 1997.

18. McCloskey 1994, 92.

19. For example, Collini et al. 1983; Easton et al. 1991; Farr 1988; Farr et al. 1990; Farr et al. 1995; Farr and Seidelman 1993; Gunnell 1993; and Wittrock 1992.

20. Again, Schmidt seems to be the lonely exception. Schmidt 1998. A critical literature argues how *not* to use the classics and thus criticizes the mythic tradition(s), not least realism; works by Daniel Garst, Rob Walker, Steven Forde, Michael C. Williams, and Laurie M. Johnson mostly on Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

21. For general overviews of the development of the sociology of science, see Whitley 1984; Nowotny and Taschwer 1996; Zuckerman 1989; Restivo 1994; and Andersen 1997, chap. 1.

22. According to Merton, the ethos of modern science is communism (scientific knowledge is collective property for society), universalism, *disinterestedness*, and *organized skepticism*, CUDOS. Merton 1942.

show that even they had no neutral core. Case studies demonstrated how new theories and crucial experiments were socially conditioned. The main problem with this approach—beyond its neglect of the social sciences—was that science became indistinguishable from any other social form of knowledge. It ignored science as a specific social institution in a wider institutional setting.<sup>23</sup>

### *Explanatory Model—Toward a Comparative Sociology of IR*

In the sociology of the social sciences, in particular, a third phase of analysis is emerging in which scholars are attempting a nonreductionist combination of social and cognitive explanations. With different irreducible layers, actors must forge “discourse coalitions” so that scholarly programs and policy programs become compatible or even mutually reinforcing. Within this “political sociology of the social sciences,”<sup>24</sup> Peter Wagner, in *Sozialwissenschaften und Staat*, works with three layers: the intellectual traditions, the scientific institutions, and the political structures.<sup>25</sup> For our specific purpose, this should be broadened a little. IR is specifically influenced by the foreign policy orientation of a country, for instance, and therefore the model must be extended while keeping the three layers intact. The result is a more elaborate typology (see Table 1) that retains the division into “intellectual, institutional, and political constellations.”<sup>26</sup>

The first layer of the model is society and polity. Within this layer, four dimensions can be distinguished: cultural–linguistic, political ideology, political institutions, and foreign policy.

Regarding the cultural–intellectual dimension, Johan Galtung once made an elegant, provocative, and problematic characterization of Gallic, Nipponic, Teutonic, and Saxon intellectual styles.<sup>27</sup> At one level, we all recognize the phenomenon, at another we have difficulty dealing with it. It will here not appear as an independent causal factor (leading into “national character” speculations). However, this variation becomes an important “instrument” when one country or region dominates. Today, because dominance is American, the stylistic criteria are those of the American brand of the Anglo-Saxon intellectual style, with brief, straightforward statements and linear progression of an argument (not simultaneous attached provisos as in German grammar). In American self-understanding this simply spells clarity, but it is experienced by some Germans, for example, as a barrier to expressing real complexity and thus introduces an increased distance between intention and text, that is,

23. See Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 331; and Whitley 1984, 5–7.

24. Wagner 1990a, 24. See also works by, especially, Björn Wittrock and Richard Whitley; and Wagner et al. 1991.

25. Wagner 1990a, 23. See also Wagner 1989.

26. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 7. These three sound almost identical to Hoffmann’s three factors: “intellectual predispositions, political circumstances, and institutional opportunities”; Hoffmann 1977, 45. His political factor, however, only contains foreign policy (Figure 1, 1d); his intellectual factors concentrate on dominant views of science (which is a subset of Figure 1, 2a, and possibly 1b); and his “institutional” factor mainly covers some ad hoc peculiarities, not the general setup (my second layer). The similarity, however, simplifies a merger of these independently generated works.

27. Galtung 1981.



TABLE 1. *Explanatory model*


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Layer 1: Society and polity
a. Cultural, intellectual styles
b. “Ideologies” or traditions of political thought
c. Form of state; state–society relations
d. Foreign policy
Layer 2: Social sciences
a. General conditions and definitions of social science
b. Disciplinary patterning: disciplines and subdisciplines
Layer 3: Intellectual activities in IR
a. Social and intellectual structure of the discipline
b. Theoretical traditions

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less clarity. Had the discipline a German hegemony, Americans not only would have to struggle with expressing themselves in the German language but also would experience the challenge of adapting to an alien ideal of intellectual style.

The other dimensions in the first layer of the model can be introduced more briefly because they will be covered later in the four national cases. Characteristically, the studies by Peter Wagner, Björn Wittrock, and their colleagues concentrate on parallel histories of state and social science. Changing forms of state and state intervention raise a need for social scientific knowledge, and thus political developments are shaped by whether and how social scientists supply this, and the social sciences are structured by these roles. State–society relations (Table 1, 1c) are therefore central, but national traditions of thought about state and society (1b) are an independent factor influencing the social sciences through different channels (modes of thinking versus political constellations) and are often more inert than political structures. That a country’s foreign policy situation (1d) can influence the development of IR theory is probably the least controversial element in the model.

The second layer of the model is partly about the emergence of “social science” as such (2a) and partly about the division into disciplines (2b) that emerged at different times and in different ways in different countries. To become an accepted science depended both on the links that a discipline could make to societal interests (discourse coalitions) and on the formulation of an organizing concept and from that a scientific language.

The third layer deals with internal developments in IR. Third-generation sociology of science categorizes disciplines and subdisciplines according to their intellectual and social structure; according to factors such as degrees of formalization, unity, and stability of paradigms; and according to social hierarchy. In this context I investigate the role and meaning of the famous “great debates” of IR: Are these an IR peculiarity, and, if so, why? The second major element of the third layer is “content,” that is, the main theoretical traditions in different countries.

This model will be implemented using a two-step process. In the fourth section I explain and characterize the second layer—the general situation and subdivisions of social sciences in the different countries and the overall orientation of IR. I draw

mainly on 1c in Table 1 and, for the IR-specific part, 1d. As patterns form in the second layer, these become causes for their own reproduction and influence later transformations. I address the third layer in the fifth section. The structural characteristics of IR are discussed both generally for the discipline and in terms of national variations. In addition to explanations from the second layer, I discuss how the specific development of different traditions of IR thinking has been influenced by 1b (national ideological and philosophical traditions) as well as by 1d (foreign policy).

Before applying this model to the United States and the major European countries, we need a clearer picture of what it will explain. How does the current more or less global discipline look? Can the widely assumed U.S. dominance in IR actually be documented, and is it decreasing or increasing? Does such dominance have implications for content—that is, do Americans and Europeans publish the same kinds of articles, only the Americans do so more successfully?

## **IR: A Global Discipline?**

### *Anglo-American, Western, Global*

This article concentrates on IR in North America and Europe. But what about the rest of the world? Some surveys claim that not much research is to be found elsewhere—the next largest community is the Japanese, which produces very little theory in general and much less that is not based on American inspiration. The most obvious candidate for an independent IR tradition based on a unique philosophical tradition is China, though very little independent theorizing has taken place.<sup>28</sup> Even a sympathetic pro-non-Western observer like Stephen Chan concludes that for most of the non-Western world strategic studies overshadows IR theory.<sup>29</sup>

Still, this is not my line—quite the contrary. There is much to be learned from many non-Western writings, even if not yet well-established. However, I intend to present data to describe the situation and sociology of science to explain it. This can only be done systematically with fewer countries, especially those where many variables vary little. Finally, Europe and the United States not only are compared; they also have interacted in important ways, which makes a study focused on these two most fruitful—for a start. In the future, it will be important to investigate non-Western cases equally systematically.

### *How American? Patterns of Publishing in Journals*

To look for patterns in IR, one could examine three types of sources: textbooks (used by Holsti in *The Dividing Discipline*), curricula (such as by Hayward Alker and

28. G. Chan 1997.

29. Chan 1994, 248; in this extensive survey, Chan finds that policy work of a relatively realist orientation dominates in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Japan, China (with some exceptions), and all of Africa; the most important area of original theory was Iran. For similar conclusions, see Holsti 1985.

Thomas Biersteker and in a small survey of national distribution by Alfredo Robles),<sup>30</sup> and, finally, journals. Journals are the most direct measure of the discipline itself. The sociology of science from Merton to Whitley has pointed to journals as the crucial institution of modern sciences. Textbooks are important because they introduce newcomers, but though they might affect the discipline, they are not the discipline itself. For practitioners, the field exists mostly in the journals.

Table 2 compares the distribution of authors' country of residence in the leading journals in North America and Europe.<sup>31</sup> In all four North American journals for all investigated years (1970–95), Americans account for between 66 and 100 percent of the authors, with an average of 88.1 percent. The European journals are relatively balanced, with Americans and Britons equally represented at around 40 percent in the *Review of International Studies* and *Millennium* (though with a clear majority of Britons in 1975), and with Americans and “the rest of Europe” (meaning, in this case, primarily Scandinavians<sup>32</sup>) equally represented at about 40 percent in the *Journal of Peace Research*. This difference between American “concentration” and European variety (or asymmetric penetration) in 1995 is shown in Figure 1. (Note that this analysis is not a claim about discrimination, gate keeping, or closedness—we cannot know what stems from patterns of submissions, evaluation, or quality. Relevant is simply the fact of this pattern.) There seems to be no strong change over time, as shown for the case of *IO* in Figure 2.

How does this situation compare with other disciplines? A recent comparison of thirty-eight leading journals from different fields found that in the natural sciences, the percentage of American authors in U.S.-published journals was typically 40–50 percent, whereas almost all the social science journals have a score of more than 80 percent for American authors. The two journals publishing the highest percentage of American authors are the two American political science journals in the survey: *American Political Science Review* (97 percent American authors) and *American Journal of Political Science* (96.8 percent American authors).<sup>33</sup>

Knowing the authors' countries of residence may be useful for showing the relative “power” of the different IR communities. However, it tells us little about what they write; and given the increasing importance of European journals, knowing whether they still work from American theories or develop independent theories and debates

30. See Holsti 1985; Alker and Biersteker 1984; and Robles 1993.

31. One might discuss whether country of residence or country of origin is most interesting. Besides the former being much easier to register, it could also be argued that because of the way the American metropole works, ambitious scholars from other regions are drawn to it as the only way to register on the main screen whereby the dominance of the American environment is reinforced. Thus, country of residence captures more accurately the actual dominance of North America as the leading academic community, whereas the other measure might be more relevant if our interest were relative career opportunities for IR scholars born in different countries.

32. According to similar statistics in Goldmann 1995, 252—and nonquantified impressions from my own data.

33. Andersen and Frederiksen 1995, 20, tab. 2. Two more political science journals are included, the *British Journal of Political Science*, with 25.5 percent for country of publication, and *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (Germany), with 90.2 percent for own country.


**TABLE 2.** *Distribution of authors by geographical residence in American and European journals, 1970–95*

<i>Journal/Origin</i>		<i>North American (%)</i>	<i>British (%)</i>	<i>Rest of Europe (%)</i>	<i>Rest of the world (%)</i>
<i>International Organization</i>	1970	92.3 (24)	0	3.8 (1)	3.8 (1)
	1975	100 (25)	0	0	0
	1980	66.7 (14)	14.3 (3)	4.8 (1)	14.3 (3)
	1985	80 (16)	10 (2)	5 (1)	5 (1)
	1990	78.1 (12.5)	0	18.8 (3)	3.1 (0.5)
	1995	85.7 (18)	4.8 (1)	9.5 (2)	0
<i>International Studies Quarterly</i>	1970	95.5 (21)	4.5 (1)	0	0
	1975	92.9 (19.5)	0	0	7.1 (1.5)
	1980	88.5 (23)	0	7.7 (2)	3.8 (1)
	1985	88.5 (23)	0	7.7 (2)	3.8 (1)
	1990	90.9 (20)	0	9.1 (2)	0
	1995	83.3 (20)	8.3 (2)	8.3 (2)	0
<i>International Security (1975)</i>	1980	68.75 (22)	18.75 (6)	0	12.5 (4)
	1985	100 (28)	0	0	0
	1990	86.4 (19)	9.1 (2)	0	4.5 (1)
	1995	96 (24)	0	4 (1)	0
<i>World Politics</i>	1970	100 (20)	0	0	0
	1975	79.3 (18.25)	15.2 (3.5)	4.3 (1)	1.1 (0.25)
	1980	81.8 (9)	0	9.1 (1)	9.1 (1)
	1985	100 (22)	0	0	0
	1990	89.5 (17)	0	0	10.5 (2)
	1995	91.7 (11)	0	0	8.3 (1)
<i>Review of International Studies, formerly British Journal (1976)</i>	1975	0	100 (20)	0	0
	1980	40 (6)	40 (6)	6.7 (1)	13.3 (2)
	1985	26.1 (6)	65.2 (15)	0	8.7 (2)
	1990	14.7 (2.5)	73.5 (12.5)	5.9 (1)	5.9 (1)
	1995	43.3 (8.66)	40 (8)	5 (1)	11.7 (1.33)
<i>European Journal (1995) Millennium (1972)</i>	1995	30.8 (6.16)	30 (6)	39.2 (7.83)	0
	1975	28.6 (6)	71.4 (15)	0	0
	1980	15.4 (2)	52.3 (6.8)	23.1 (3)	9.2 (1.2)
	1985	34.4 (5.5)	43.8 (7)	12.5 (2)	9.4 (1.5)
	1990	61.1 (11)	38.9 (7)	0	0
	1995	46.7 (7)	33.3 (5)	13.3 (3)	6.7 (1)
<i>Journal of Peace Research</i>	1970	28.6 (6)	0	71.4 (15)	0
	1975	18.8 (3)	6.3 (1)	75 (12)	0
	1980	50 (12)	12.5 (3)	33.3 (8)	4.2 (1)
	1985	43.5 (10)	4.3 (1)	43.5 (10)	8.7 (2)
	1990	50 (16)	9.4 (3)	34.4 (11)	6.2 (2)
	1995	43.8 (14)	12.5 (4)	39.1 (12.5)	4.9 (1.5)

*Note:* Actual numbers are shown in parentheses. Fractions occur because co-authored articles are divided among the authors. For example, an article with two authors is counted as .5 to each.

Years in parentheses are first year of publication for journals founded after 1970.

is crucial. One way of approximating this would be to compare the relative distribution, by country of publication, of sources cited in reference lists in different journals. This method, however, is often very difficult, especially for books (due to copublishing) and minor journals. A more manageable and reliable coding is the method chosen by Kjell Goldmann, which looks for the most cited journals in the different



**FIGURE 1.** *Distribution of authors by country of residence in international journals, 1995*

journals.<sup>34</sup> If anything, Goldmann found a modest increase in American sources in the European journals; in both 1972 and 1992 the only journals cited in large numbers by authors in the American journals were American journals.

All such citation and publication habits must be measured against the relative size of the different research environments. Not that one should expect a proportional representation, but some sense of size is still necessary—fewer citations to Estonian IR, for example, than to Canadian IR most likely reflects the difference in numbers of IR scholars in the respective countries. American IR is the largest community, whether one counts membership in associations,<sup>35</sup> attendance at annual conferences,<sup>36</sup> or (the

34. Goldmann 1995, 254, tab. 7. For seven major journals, Goldmann measured which other journals accounted for 3 percent or more of the references to journals.

35. Membership at the end of 1997 was about 3,200 in ISA (founded in 1959), 920 in BISA (founded in 1975), 1,987 in JAIR (founded in 1956), 120 in the Scandinavian “Nordic International Studies Association” (NISA, founded in 1993), and no individual members yet in the young Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA, founded in 1996). It is not easy to compare the United States and Europe directly, because the all-European emerging organization does not have individual memberships, and countries like Germany and France do not have separate national IR organizations, only sections within the Political Science Association. At the European meetings, however, the biggest contingency is the British, with Scandinavians second, Germans third, and the French as well as various East Central and Southern Europeans making up small groups that add up to a third of the attendance. Therefore, had there been a European membership organization, it probably would have numbered some 2,000 members.

36. During 1995–97, the annual conference of ISA drew an attendance averaging 1,800, BISA somewhere around 350, and JAIR approximately 500. The triennial “European” conference organized by the




FIGURE 2. *Distribution of authors by country of residence in IO, 1970–95*

very tricky figure of) academic posts under an IR label. However, the numbers are probably only slightly larger than the aggregate figure for Europe (which weighs less by not actually being a category of its own), and certainly less than a total “non-American” category.<sup>37</sup> Thus, there is a quite significant American dominance in sheer numbers. But the dominance in the journals is still much higher than it should be if all appeared proportionally.

Probably in contrast to some expectations, American journals are not becoming more “global”—that is, densely populated by non-American authors. The American dominance of American journals—both in terms of authors and sources—is overwhelming. The American presence in European journals is, if anything, increasing slightly. How this latter finding is to be interpreted is, however, an open question. It could be a sign of increased dominance regarding the production of theory, or it might reflect a shift in the European journals toward more theory<sup>38</sup> and possibly an emergence of the European journals as respectable outlets for Americans.

elegantly named “Standing Group on International Relations of the European Consortium for Political Research” attracted 460 at the first conference in 1992 and 480 in 1995.

37. Approximately 25 percent of the members of ISA are non-North American. On the one hand, we could correct for this without changing the overall result. On the other hand, we probably should not: That others join the ISA simply means that the America-centered IR research community has more members (including extraterritorial ones), whereas some of the other communities are unable even to attract their natural clientele, who then obviously do not define themselves as members of say a “Scandinavian” IR community.

38. Documented by Goldmann 1995.

Not much more can be said about hegemony without including questions about content. How strong are different theories in different places?

### *Content—Metatheoretical Orientations*

This investigation concentrated on two leading journals from each side of the Atlantic (*IO*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *European Journal of International Relations*, and *Review of International Studies*).<sup>39</sup> All articles appearing in these journals for the last three years have been sorted into five main categories along the axis that seems most decisive for these decades: rationalist-reflectivist.<sup>40</sup> The categories, as shown in Figure 3, are (1) formalized rational choice, game theory, and modeling; (2) quantitative studies;<sup>41</sup> (3) nonformalized rationalism, that is, “soft rational choice,” which includes most neorealism, all neoliberal institutionalism, and a few “independents;” (4) non-postmodern constructivism; and (5) the “radicals,” be they poststructuralists, Marxists, or feminists. Finally, “other” typically means purely historical or policy articles (without theory), articles on authors (ancient or current), or articles that drew on theories from other fields (for example, organization theory). (These five categories are rough and combine approaches that differ in other respects. Therefore, each was subdivided in order both to see whether the journals varied strongly within the categories and to be able to count along other axes for specific questions.<sup>42</sup>) Although some classifications involve difficult judgments, the result is striking enough to rule out any decisive impact of any minor border problems. Actually, the most complicated and recurrent border problem was a genre of alleged “constructivism” that uses rationalist methods and assumptions. These are a growing presence in *IO*, and thus, with a slightly more restrictive criteria for constructivism, the contrast would have been stronger. (To become aware of this genre, which is in itself an interesting trend, was an additional benefit of the coding effort.)


Formalized rational choice arguments make up 22.1 percent of the articles in the one American journal and 16.7 percent in the other, whereas in the two European journals they make up 9.6 and 0 percent. The three rationalisms (quantitative plus formalized and nonformalized rational choice) add up to 77.9 percent in *Interna-*

39. No specific bias has been introduced by choosing a European journal with a particularly radical profile like *Millennium* (although many Europeans would undoubtedly count it as one of the two or three leading journals) or an American journal that has specialized in game theory and quantitative methods for decades, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. *International Studies Quarterly* has recently become almost as specialized, but it after all remains the official journal of ISA, with both the status and circulation this involves, and *IO* is clearly the leading American journal. In terms of impact factor, according to *Journal Citation Reports* from the Social Science Citation Index, *Journal of Peace Research* is actually the highest scoring European journal in the field of IR, but since it is not a strictly IR journal, including it would create problems of interpretation.

40. Compare Keohane 1988; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, this issue; and Wæver 1996.

41. Quantitative studies are, of course, not necessarily rational choice. They are listed on the same “side” in order to catch the axis of formalization irrespective of whether it follows “second debate” (quantitative vs. traditional) or fourth debate (rationalist–reflectivist) patterns.

42. The data for the categories and subcategories are presented in the appendix; the total documentation, including the coding of each specific article, can be viewed at <http://www.copri.dk/staff/owaever/htm>



*ISQ* = *International Studies Quarterly*    *EJIR* = *European Journal of International Relations*  
*IO* = *International Organization*        *RIS* = *Review of International Studies*

**FIGURE 3.** *Theoretical position of articles in four international journals, 1995-97*

*tional Studies Quarterly* and 63.9 percent in *IO*, compared with 42.3 percent in *European Journal* and only 17.4 percent in *Review of International Studies*. Conversely, the two forms of “reflectivism” add up to 7.8 and 25.0 percent in the two American journals; and 40.6 percent in the *Review of International Studies* and 40.4 percent in the *European Journal*—postmodernism varied from 2.6 percent in *International Studies Quarterly* to more than 15 percent in both European journals.<sup>43</sup> The contrast is overwhelmingly clear.

If one re-counts the articles on the basis of country of residence, Americans who publish in European journals are more rationalist than the Europeans but clearly more constructivist than Americans publishing in American journals.<sup>44</sup> Thus, what

43. It might be objected that the “other” category should be subtracted from these numbers and from those in Figure 3. This would have been convincing had it been a simple “error” or “don’t know” category. However, the contributions in “other” have an equally clear identity to those that are classified in the other categories (only not any of the dominant ones in the self-categorizations of the discipline), and thus they are part of the diversity of especially the *Review of International Studies*. Excluding them, of course, boosts the numbers for the two European journals and for the *Review of International Studies* in particular. This would narrow the gap on rationalism a little but far from close it (*International Studies Quarterly*, 90.9; *IO*, 71.9; *European Journal of International Relations*, 51.2; *Review of International Studies*, 30 on the three rationalisms combined), and the gap on reflectivism would grow (*International Studies Quarterly*, 9.1; *IO*, 28.1; and *European Journal of International Relations*, 48.8; and *Review of International Studies*, 70 on the two reflectivisms combined).

44. Aggregate numbers for hard rational plus soft rational plus quantitative studies versus hard constructivist plus soft constructivist are (the remaining percentage up to 100 is in the “other” category): Americans in American journals, 68.3 percent and 17.4 percent, respectively; Americans in European journals, 39.1 percent and 38 percent, respectively; Europeans in American journals, 46.9 percent and 23.4 percent, respectively; Europeans in European journals, 21.9 percent and 41.1 percent, respectively.



Europeans publish differs from what Americans publish.<sup>45</sup> The difference between what Americans publish in America and in Europe underlines that the general intellectual environment must be different in a way that influences acceptance rates and/or motivation for submitting to one journal rather than another. All four journals are sufficiently embedded in their own academic establishments on the respective sides of the Atlantic that systematic variation among the journals can be seen as expressions of differences between “American” and “European” IR.

Could it be that a specialization among journals is self-reproducing, so that if you have a test of neoliberal institutionalism on a trade negotiation you send it to *IO*, whereas if it is a constructivist analysis of the European Union you send it to *European Journal of International Relations*? Even allowing for this specialization, it would be indefensible to treat the different journals simply as transnational issue- or school-specific specializations within one deterritorialized discipline. We have looked at central institutions—the leading journals—on each side. Two journals are published in Europe, mainly edited by Europeans, refereed by Europeans, and thus partly reflecting, partly constituting the definition of what is good IR in Europe. Two are published in the United States, edited mainly by Americans, refereed mainly by Americans, and, in contrast to the European journals, adding a fourth factor, predominantly written by Americans—and they show a different profile, which is then likely to mean a different ideal of IR scholarship. Of course, it is possible to move down the ranks and find journals in the United States with a theoretical profile more like the European journals, but the four journals discussed here are, or are clearly among, the leading journals.

There is one IR discipline, not several. Lots of interaction and transatlantic publishing takes place—especially in the one direction. Theories are mainly produced in the United States. Metatheoretical orientations differ on the two sides of the Atlantic, with much more U.S. interest in (more or less formalized) rational choice approaches versus more European interest in constructivism and postmodernism.

This could all be explained away by the suggestion that there is a European “delay” in coming to rational choice (which would seem most in line with several of the most programmatic articles in this issue of *IO*). Only the future can answer this definitively, but we might as a preliminary answer look for a causal explanation of the current differences. If a sociology of IR can explain this pattern, maybe it rests on more solid pillars and will therefore continue.

## **The Evolution of IR as a Social Science in Four National Contexts**

I will briefly discuss the evolution of IR in four cases: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other interesting cases within the European context are Italy and Russia, with unique state histories, and Scandinavia, the second or third largest IR community in Europe today.

45. “Europeans” and “Americans” here still refer to institutional setting, not nationality.

Each country section follows the same format. The modern social sciences were born in the mid-nineteenth century in the context of two important institutional transformations: the nation-state underwent dramatic changes (national unification in Germany and Italy, modernization in France, and the beginning of state building in the United States), and the universities went through intensive reform, moving toward the modern research-oriented university. After considering the general constitution of social science, I address the struggles among the social sciences: what pattern and especially what kind of political science? Since IR is in most places a subdiscipline in political science, and political science emerged as a distinct discipline before IR—but usually after the other social sciences—the other social sciences are dealt with mainly during the nineteenth century and political science during the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. I then trace the development of IR through the interwar, immediate postwar, and later periods. Did an independent IR evolve—and if so, with what borders, core, and characteristics?

### *Germany*

Compared with France and Italy, fewer attempts were made to develop political science in Germany after 1870 “perhaps because the state was least challenged by the contemporary social transformations. On the contrary, in the eyes of many of the “Mandarins,” university professors in the state service . . . , the idea of the state had ultimately come to realize itself in imperial Germany, and if there was anything to do for policy intellectuals, it was not to scrutinize the structures and workings of this state but to serve to enhance its fulfilling its functions.”<sup>46</sup> Political institutions could be excluded from analysis because of a basic complementarity to the legal theory of the state, as formulated in legal positivism. With its systematic body of concepts and knowledge, it promised a doctrine for lawyers, judges, and state officials to act from and allowed law to form as a modern discipline with specific methods and concepts.<sup>47</sup> This discourse coalition between actors in the scientific and political fields was more efficient in Germany than elsewhere because of the state-building process.

The famous early nineteenth century university reforms by Prussian minister of education Wilhelm von Humboldt had three major effects, two of which were intended. First, Humboldt intended a strong role for professors—appointed by the state, not the university—and entrenched the single professor system (in contrast to the American multiprofessor department). Second, the discipline-divided university was contrary to Humboldt’s intention of *allgemeine Bildung*, though partly a result of his third effect. Third, the research-oriented university with unity of research and higher education created a dynamism demanding eventual specialization. Compared to a more pragmatic process in the United States, specialization in Germany went through extreme theoretical purification to pure economy, law, and sociology.<sup>48</sup> The threshold

46. See Wagner 1990b, 269; and Kastendiek 1991, 110.

47. See Wagner 1990b, 271–76; Dyson 1980, 107–17; and Wittrock 1992.

48. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 345–48.

for disciplinary status was high, and the cognitive demands difficult to meet for political science. Implications of lasting importance for our subject were, first, the development of a weak political science, not in control of professional training (which law has largely kept to this day); and, second, the establishment of a hierarchical structure within departments.

Paradoxically, a conceptual core formed in the nineteenth century for what could have been—and in a sense later became in the United States—a discipline of IR. In this place and time this set of ideas was seen as the core of history, so it did not trigger attempts to construct a separate discipline of IR. Historicism or the “power school” in German history constructed from the idealist, strong concept of the state a general and strict power theory with states as units.<sup>49</sup>

All such links, including developments of IR in the interwar period, are, however, in the German case less important than elsewhere because of the rupture in Germany in 1945. Institutional features rather than content were carried over and achieved importance for postwar developments. IR developed solidly within political science (no separate organization, and a separate theoretical journal only since 1994). Content was shaped by the impossibility of continuing with realism (not to speak of geopolitics). Paradoxically, at a time when the mainly German-bred tradition of realism became the official theory of the dominant, American IR community, it had a very hard time in American-dominated Germany.<sup>50</sup> This turn of events led to several peculiarities in German IR. In the 1960s to 1980s much of the theoretically innovative work took place within peace research. Although some of it was more sociological than political science-inspired (like the Galtung-type Scandinavian peace research with which it was closely integrated), much of it engaged directly with the IR literature, such as Dieter Senghaas’s path-breaking works on deterrence.<sup>51</sup> Much of the critical theory that emerged in the Anglo-American world in the 1980s and 1990s must have looked strangely familiar to a middle-aged German peace researcher.

In the 1970s the median point in German IR leaned more toward transnational-interdependence than was the case in the United States or even more clearly in the United Kingdom. Most of this “liberal” IR literature leaned on American IR and contributed little original theory. For a number of reasons, German IR in the 1990s seems to have both developed more independent theory and, to a lesser extent, oriented these theories toward an international audience. Should this continue, German scholars have a number of comparative advantages, both theoretical and contextual.<sup>52</sup> For instance, one has a Habermas at hand (in the original language). Therefore, the whole discussion about rational choice, which at first looks like the U.S.

49. Meinecke [1924] 1976, especially 409–21.

50. The “Munich school” of “neorealism” was the lonely exception and did not catch on beyond Munich; compare Meier-Walser 1994. Several of the German-speaking “Americans” had their works translated “back” into German: Morgenthau, Herz, Kissinger, and the German-speaking Czechoslovak Deutsch. Only the latter seems to have retained a continuous engagement with German academic circles.

51. Senghaas 1969.

52. *Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen* hosted a much noticed debate among primarily Gunther Hellmann (1994) and Michael Zürn (1994) on the state of IR in Germany compared to the United States and whether one *should* compare to (and then copy from) the United States.

debate, is couched in different terms because the alternative to strategic rationality is not mainly norm-regulated but communicative rationality.<sup>53</sup> The linguistic advantage might become even more pronounced when the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann finally reaches IR.<sup>54</sup> A major contextual advantage stems from Germany being in important ways the most deeply Europeanized country,<sup>55</sup> and, therefore, from German scholars being prone to the most radical postsovereign interpretations of integration (compare the discussion in the section titled “Status and Outlook” and footnote 126).

Still, most of the mainstream scholars—not least, the still very important lead professors at the large universities—are mainly engaged in elaborations on American theories. Characteristic are the works that are probably best known to an English-speaking audience, the regime theory of the Tübingen team headed by Volker Rittberger.<sup>56</sup> A theory that is already too complex and open-ended is exposed to German *Gründlichkeit*, and the result is a complicated model that might be more “correct” but certainly misses the American call of the day for “parsimony.” Under the pressure from an increasingly mobilized lower level—vindicated by the successful journal *ZIB*, which has not been dominated by the mandarins<sup>57</sup>—and a transnationalization of European IR, things might start to happen in German IR. At last, some might add. But the conditions are probably better here than anywhere else for an independent dynamism, drawing on national traditions while fully keeping up with American developments.

### France

Observers of the French scene often notice the creative and societally influential sociology, “the administration-oriented, professional character of political science, and the mixture of neoclassical and engineering thinking in economics.”<sup>58</sup> Institutional cleavages dating back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries explain the present tripartite structure of French social science. Transformations of the French state had a decisive impact on the cognitive identity of the social sciences.

Whereas the social sciences in some other countries evolved together and were only reluctantly differentiated (as from one Ur-social science), they grew quite separately in France. During the eighteenth century the human sciences came to include different forms of social theory; and in the nineteenth century disciplines like philosophy, psychology, and sociology were institutionalized in a “faculty of letters.” Simultaneously, economics was incorporated into the faculty of law. Political science had for a long time no institutional home, and when it got one in 1871 it was in the form

53. Müller 1994 and 1995; Keck 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995a; Schmalz-Bruns 1995; and several more interventions. For an excellent discussion (in English) of this German debate in relation to the American one, see Risse 1997.

54. Watch for future publications by Mathias Albert.

55. Katzenstein 1997.

56. See Rittberger 1993; and Hasenclever et al. 1997.

57. Off the record, this is widely ascribed to a healthy institutional Americanization: the introduction of the—in Germany relatively rare—system of anonymous peer reviews.

58. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 7.

of a professional school primarily for training upper-level civil servants (*Ecole libre des sciences politiques*, today's *Institut d'études politiques*). In the early postwar period, all of the disciplines achieved professional organizations, journals, a university degree, and thus became full-fledged disciplines, but they remained in their separate contexts. A "faculty for the social sciences" is not the normal format in France.<sup>59</sup>

Two important sources for this development are the absolutist state and the decline of the university. In contrast to Germany, for example, the universities did not remain important centers of learning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. New institutions became more dynamic—the *Collège de France* (1530) and the academies. Independence from the church and dependence on the state influenced different proto-disciplines differently. The humanities achieved an unusual degree of freedom and prestige, creating the French tradition for "intellectuals." "The one domain for which no academic rights were granted was that of politics, law, and administration. . . . In absolutist France, politics was a state monopoly and was not recognized as being a legitimate subject for intellectual consideration."<sup>60</sup>

Within the contemporary fragmentation between teaching, research, and professional education (each entrusted to separate institutions), the *grandes écoles* embody the Napoleonic ideal of the "engineer-administrator."<sup>61</sup> Taking the latter route, political science gained full intellectual recognition but at the cost of becoming "a profession without a cognitive core."<sup>62</sup> Emile Boutmy, who founded the *Ecole libre*, gave institution building priority over his own (political psychology inspired) program for a political science. A training institute was thus established but without any clear profile for a political science within it. Today political science can be found in all three parts of the academic system: research within *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* (CNRS), in the case of IR mainly in *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales* (CERI); elite training in the *Grandes Ecoles*; and mass teaching in the universities, where a few have politics departments and the others position politics as the junior partner of law. However, the early history, with political science primarily institutionalized in the elite training function, left its mark.

Many themes that are elsewhere political science went in France to political economy or sociology. In the practical field, however, French political science was for a while strong compared with, especially, Germany because it supplied many of the civil servants. However, when de Gaulle created *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (ENA) in 1945, the training role of political science was weakened. Still, it remained practical, which orients IR toward practical knowledge such as international law rather than toward theory. Where the ideal for political scientists in the United States is economics (and ultimately the natural sciences), French political science is torn between administration and the humanities.

59. This and the following paragraph are mainly based on Heilbron 1991.

60. Heilbron 1991, 78.

61. Hayward 1983, 214.

62. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 10.

Because French state institutions were more consolidated than those in Germany and Italy, sociology became more central to cohesion than law. The new nation-states imposed in the 1860s–70s on heterogeneous societies in Germany and Italy had to rely on legal thinking. “In France, in contrast, the understanding of societal solidarity, as advanced in Durkheimian sociology, became an important element of the self-understanding of a republican state.”<sup>63</sup> Thus, when political science turns theoretical, it is most obvious to borrow from a theoretical, society-centered sociology.

Three other general effects on IR are that no separate IR discipline exists, most IR is practical and lacks theory, and, finally, single intellectuals can range widely across fields. Leading sociologists like Alain Touraine or Pierre Bourdieu publish on IR as do philosophers like André Glucksmann and Alain Finkielkraut. And IR scholars regularly appear side by side with other intellectuals in journals like *Esprit* and *Le Débat*, as did Hans Morgenthau and a few others in the first postwar decades in similar American publications. (Today, the leading American IR theorists are not public intellectuals.<sup>64</sup>)

French IR did not have a heated realism–idealism debate in the interwar years, much less the following debates. As Marie-Claude Smouts suggests: “Impervious to the systems theory of M. Kaplan, indifferent to K. Waltz, skeptical of the successive versions of ‘transnationalism’ (functionalism, integration, interdependence, etc.), the fellow countrymen of General de Gaulle probably felt American imperialism over the discipline a good deal less than their German and Scandinavian counterparts.”<sup>65</sup>

Where the Germans, for example, have been concerned about measuring up to the Americans,<sup>66</sup> the French have not been terribly interested in comparing themselves, neither in having a national tradition nor in making it in some global discipline.<sup>67</sup> As noted by John Groom, French scholars have played a surprisingly minor role internationally, but “the relative isolation of the French academic world does have advantages. It gives the subject of International Relations an element of diversity and an independent academic discourse. It gives the outsider the shock of the new and of the different, and this is, or can be, salutary. It is not a question of center-periphery but of a separate, autonomous, intellectual agenda and academic discourse. By simply existing, it serves a purpose.”<sup>68</sup>

Raymond Aron is by far the best-known figure outside France, but he was atypical in taking a strong interest in American IR (Morgenthau in particular) and thus phrasing his work in ways recognizable (if still different) to Americans. (Different, primarily because he strove to integrate history, sociology, and “praxeology.”) The other main tradition in postwar French IR, the historical school, was more idiosyncratic, not least as diplomatic history was increasingly merged with inspiration from the

63. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 344; also see Wagner 1990a, 73ff.

64. Neumann 1997, 364–67.

65. Smouts 1987, 283.

66. See Hellmann 1994; Zürn 1994; and Rittberger and Hummel 1990.

67. See Leander 1997, 162; Groom n.d.; and Giesen 1995.

68. See Groom n.d.; compare Groom 1994, 223.

Annales school.<sup>69</sup> In the last decades, Annales has mainly been important through its influence on Marcel Merle. Merle, Badie, and Smouts stress the importance of cultural specificity versus American universalist theorizing, and—in stark contrast to Aron—the basic idea of a uniform state unit is given up.<sup>70</sup> The result is a surprisingly radical transnationalism, which does not seem to correspond well with the dominant conception in French policy circles. This probably has to be understood on the basis of the weak link between theoretical and empirical work in French IR and the lower status of theory. Most French IR scholars do empirical or policy work without the obligation felt by American scholars to locate themselves theoretically or to justify an article by referring to theory implications. Consequently, many write in the old, state-centric tradition, more or less influenced by Aron. Since theory is superfluous, it can develop independently and takes the role of opposing conventional wisdom.<sup>71</sup> What counts in both theory and policy work is firm conceptualization and a proper use of the concepts, not a constant positioning vis-à-vis one general debate.

Area studies is widely recognized as one of the strengths of French IR and influences theory development.<sup>72</sup> In a process that has almost disappeared in other IR communities, some, like Bertrand Badie, began work in another discipline and developed quite late into international relationists.<sup>73</sup> Those working in IR in a more strict sense have had almost no design for claiming autonomy for the subject—according to Smouts, because it seemed unrealistic given the difficulty political science had in being established.<sup>74</sup> More maliciously, Klaus-Gerd Giesen has suggested that a dominance on the home market is secured by decoupling from the world market, and therefore a clear disciplinary identity as IR is unattractive to the leaders.<sup>75</sup> The most benign explanation would be that it serves to preserve the main strength of French IR: the close relationship to sociology, philosophy, and anthropology, one of its main characteristics from Aron to the current, innovative literature on the post-Westphalian system.

### *United Kingdom*

The case of the United Kingdom is comparatively simple because it has one major thematic string, which, though multidimensional, explains most of the current situation. The old tradition of a liberal education as “gentlemen’s knowledge” was continued and aligned with the new roles of university education. Rather than transmit-

69. Renouvin and Duroselle 1964 (traditional diplomatic history) and Renouvin 1954 (more Annales school). For an excellent discussion of the main traditions in French IR, see Giesen 1995.

70. See Merle 1987; and Badie and Smouts 1992. For an introduction to Badie—in English—see Leander 1997. For a state-of-the-art overview on French IR as conducted mostly by the CERI people, see Smouts 1998.

71. Ulla Holm suggested this interpretation.

72. See Smouts 1987; Giesen 1995; and Groom 1994 and n.d.

73. Leander 1997.

74. Smouts 1987, 282.

75. Giesen 1995, 160.

ting knowledge, the colleges of the old British universities aimed to form the characters and minds of very young students and produced in the nineteenth century a homogeneous governing class for the empire.<sup>76</sup> This “reflected the well-entrenched position of a landed aristocracy, hostile towards efforts at formalized, central control and rule. . . . [R]elatively non-formalized state institutions . . . were ultimately sustained by an elite culture. To some important extent that elite culture was reproduced and modified in academic institutions, which then may be better described as seats of elite socialization rather than of formal training for particular professions.”<sup>77</sup>

This traditional core was supplemented even at Oxford and Cambridge by more professional medicine and engineering and also at the end of the nineteenth century by a number of new universities. The old role was, however, never displaced by the new elements. Civil servants still often have their training in quite classical and “unpractical” subjects.

Political science therefore remained centered on political philosophy, especially at the elite institutions, until the mid-twentieth century. The war experience of involvement and the postwar demands of regional development and the welfare state created an agenda of planning and administration that was met not least in the newly established politics departments in the younger universities (beyond London, Oxford, and Cambridge). The subject shifted from law and history to sociology, economics, and psychology. However, in the 1950s—under Michael Oakeshott—at the leading political science department, the London School of Economics, “The study of politics was in effect political theory and the history of political ideas, and the rest of the curriculum was public administration or what an Oakeshottian would call the ‘plumbing’ side of political inquiry.”<sup>78</sup>

IR was originally seen not as part of political science, but as a new field drawing on many disciplines. Even when it became institutionalized within political science, this discipline was itself not closed to other disciplines. IR could therefore continue to cultivate its links to especially history, international law, political philosophy, and sociology.<sup>79</sup> IR is much less one-dimensionally defined as political science than is the case in the United States.

The leading role of the United Kingdom in the early history of IR is explained primarily by the foreign policy situation. The policy- (that is, peace-) oriented study of international affairs that emerged after Versailles was ideationally and institutionally linked to the League of Nations and thus naturally headed by the status quo powers (and specific circles in Germany). Additionally, Arnold Wolfers’ classical argument about the Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs offers a paradoxical explanation. Continental theories of international relations center on “necessity of state,” due to experiences of being exposed to forces beyond their control. With insular security, England and America experienced a choice of how to apply prin-

76. Wittrock 1993, 324–27.

77. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 343. See also Hayward 1991.

78. Vout 1991, 166.

79. Hill 1987, 305ff.



ciples of morality to foreign policy.<sup>80</sup> Choice stimulated a search for new solutions and thus a new discipline.

Most noticed about British IR is its one distinct contribution to “grand theory,” the English school or “the international society tradition.” However, only a minority of British IR scholars are involved in this “school.” The British community is uniquely diverse and ranges from the “very American” to the type that Steve Smith depicts as critical of recent overly theoretical approaches like Morgenthau, that is, believes diplomatic history really is what IR should be.<sup>81</sup>

The English school itself was—as argued by its primary chronicler, Tim Dunne—created by reformist realists. British and American IR share the foundational event of the realist-idealist (pseudo-)debate, but whereas in the United States it was mostly kept as a mobilizable rhetorical blackmail, in the United Kingdom it was soon taken for decided (won by the realists), and both E. H. Carr and those influenced by him wanted to explore the societal elements of international relations.<sup>82</sup> The policy context thus plays an important role: Without the specific educational need felt by American postwar realists, it was absurd for realists to just stick to cultivating the bottom line lesson. Furthermore, the idea of international society derives from experiences in European, maybe particularly British, history.<sup>83</sup> Americans who thought about history usually meant post-1945, not imagining that much earlier history could be relevant to the problems of this unique, nuclear superpower.<sup>84</sup> In the British case, continuation of the Eurocentric diplomatic system meant a link to the part of history where Britain played a significant role and possibly implied a continued British role.

The international society tradition offers an organizing core for IR because it argues that international relations should be studied as a society in its own right, not assimilated through “domestic analogy” into either polar opposite or delayed replica of domestic society.<sup>85</sup> This probably contributes to the reluctance among British IR scholars to see IR as a subset of political science.

The American image of British IR remains shaped by the fact that from here Bull led the counterattack in the second debate against “scientific approaches.” British “traditionalism” has thereby become a cliché. However, the hard scientific approaches never did find many followers in Britain and neither does rational choice today. The main explanation remains the embeddedness of IR in liberal education and the relationship to history and philosophy. However, a strategic factor should not be underestimated. Britain is the second strongest IR community (compare Figure 1 and Table 2), and thus the natural challenger for the United States. Thus, surprisingly, in light of British attitudes to (other) European integration but not surprising to balance-of-power theory, the British lead the attempt to form a European IR organization aiming at a stronger stand in relation to the United States.

80. Wolfers 1956.

81. Smith 1993.

82. Dunne 1994.

83. Lyons 1986, 642.

84. Isaacson 1992, 74–75.

85. Bull 1977.

Whereas prognoses for French and German IR revolve around the question of forming a more coherent national community, the prospects for British IR are different because it shares a language with the dominant community. This situation makes it more realistic for individuals to enter the U.S.–global arena (although there are still surprisingly few Britons who make it in the general discipline; hardly more than one or two would be included in a top-twenty-five list based on the Social Science Citation Index, which is still better than the likely zero for continental Europeans). This British participation in the global, English-speaking discipline is supplemented in some fields by a U.K.-centered (but open) community, and British international relationists are very active in the emerging European community (which is predominantly English speaking). A more distinct and self-conscious national community is therefore a less likely option in the United Kingdom than in France and Germany. Rather, Britons are likely to continue to play important roles in several overlapping transnational systems.

### *United States*

Modeled on (an often idealized image of) German universities, the new nineteenth century American universities soon both developed unique features and overtook the Germans on those they shared. Already at the turn of the century, the number of students enrolled in American universities was six times larger than in the celebrated German universities.<sup>86</sup> The American universities were more adaptive, less dependent on the state, and had strong presidential leadership instead. Due to less ingrained vested interests, specialization into disciplines occurred more easily and fully here.<sup>87</sup>

In the late nineteenth century when the separate organizations split out from the American Social Science Association, they shared “a commitment to an empirical, often and increasingly quantitative, methodology and to some conception of the usefulness of scientific knowledge for the allegedly neutral solution of social problems.”<sup>88</sup> The atheoretical and empirical work fit the progressive agenda, not critical of the state, rather of the lack of state.<sup>89</sup> Dorothy Ross has shown the importance of American historical consciousness. The millennial belief in American exceptionalism exempted the United States from qualitative change, and the historicist threat to this ideology was kept at bay with the assistance of a naturalistic social science containing change within the categories of progress, law, and reason. This historical consciousness adapted and survived dramatic challenges and thus sustained—very differently from Europe with its historicist consciousness—a more abstract and “scientific” social science, divorced from history.<sup>90</sup>

As already noticed by Thorstein Veblen in 1906, American social science had become empiricist, abstaining from studying underlying (allegedly “metaphysical”)

86. Wittrock 1993, 330.

87. *Ibid.*, 331.

88. Wagner and Wittrock 1991, 347.

89. Lowi 1992, 1–2.

90. Ross 1991.

causes and searching for prediction and control. This fit with both ameliorist ambitions and universities controlled by businessmen. Searching for complex “underlying” causal determinants of, for instance, poverty could be dangerous, whereas empiricism apologetically conserves the framework of givens and points to conformist remedies.<sup>91</sup> World War I secured decisive victory for positivism. The competing, older German tradition of “metaphysical,” statist, historical, and holistic social science was delegitimized, as was everything German. Furthermore, support for the war effort entrenched the practical role.

Although American universities were generally created with great German inspiration, political science borrowed content in a particularly striking way because it went against dominant conceptions in American society. The concept of “the state” was made the organizing center of political science. The American classics did not use that concept much (preferring, instead, terms like “government,” “civil polity,” “civil society,” and “nation”).<sup>92</sup> Introducing a concept of the state in mid- and late nineteenth century America did have societal, political functions—the northern side in the Civil War, nationalism, state building—but political scientists pressed it with unusual force because it gave coherence to the emerging discipline.

John Gunnell speaks of a Germanization of the discipline. He convincingly argues both against seeing these concepts as ordinary ideas in the United States and against seeing them as completely alien and un-American—otherwise they would not have had a chance. They had political functions, but their general philosophical inspiration, and thus their ideational import, clearly meant a sudden pipeline to German idealism and organicism, which were basically at odds with the liberalism embedded at the heart of American self-understanding and political lexicon. Political science was founded in the United States on a continental European (German) philosophical tradition, which could make some relevant interventions in the United States but basically deviated from the mainstream. The counterattack by Harold Laski and other pluralists was generally in better conformity with the American conceptions of state, society, and individual; but it left political science without a focus. The state had been it. This led generations from Charles E. Merriam to the present to seek “the identity and authority of political science more in its method rather than its subject matter.”<sup>93</sup>

Hoffmann offers two criteria for the emergence of IR: (1) the democratization of foreign policy, and (2) a country actually involved in real foreign policy—that is, one neither standing aloof (as with the United States in relation to Europe before the 1930s) nor simply dominating weak neighbors (as the United States did in the Western Hemisphere); ideally, the country should be so involved that studying its foreign policy becomes synonymous with studying the system. After 1945, the United States fulfilled these criteria best, and accordingly it was here that IR became a discipline.<sup>94</sup> Scholars have often noted about the rigid formulation of postwar realism that it came

91. Manicas 1991, 50–51. The discussion refers to Veblen’s 1906 essay “The Place of Science in Modern Civilization.”

92. Gunnell 1991, 126.

93. Gunnell 1995, 29.

94. Hoffmann 1977, 42–43, 48–49.

close to caricature because its protagonists felt that this stance was necessary to teach a people inclined to go the opposite way. This observation might be said of IR in general: to get the message through, it was formulated as general propositions—an empirical science of laws or regularities of state behavior.

Hoffmann points to the American conviction that problems can be resolved and science will find the master key, issue by issue. The resulting prestige of the “exact sciences” (and the quest for certainty and the belief in progress) was, at the end of the war, bestowed on economics. Actually, one of the most striking features of American political science for an outside observer is this role model of economics, which seems self-evident to most American political scientists but needs explanation exactly as given by Hoffmann. It follows from a two-step development: first, the natural sciences were elevated to a much higher plane than the social sciences (in contrast to the situation in France or the United Kingdom, for example); and, second, economics is seen as making the jump. Political science has been shaped broadly by the drive for scientization stimulated by the image that a bar existed that could actually be surpassed and, more specifically, by imports of theory and methodology from economics.<sup>95</sup>

Despite the interest in linking to economics, American IR scholars generally take it for granted that IR is a subdiscipline of political science—in contrast to a widespread British wish to see IR as a separate discipline and its relationship to political science on par with that to other relevant disciplines. This finds expression in BISA being clearly the forum for IR scholars, whereas in the United States the ISA is hard pressed from the American Political Science Association (APSA) for the status as the most prestigious forum for IR. *IO*'s editorial board meets at APSA's annual meeting, not ISA's.

In the United States (1930s–1940s) and later in Western Europe (1960s–1970s) and in contrast to most other parts of the world, university-based research, rather than the more policy-oriented research centers and think tanks, came to dominate the field.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, the influence of policy concerns decreased, and a social scientific approach won out against the earlier conception based on law, history, and geography.

After 1945, the U.S. led in channeling increased funds to research (inspired by the applicability of research during the war). Although maintaining academic control in the National Science Foundation and even some of the private foundations, the new money stimulated practical, useful knowledge and thereby “behavioral sciences” and “policy sciences.”<sup>97</sup> (Due to the dominance of university-based research, these monies led to theory and research programs that promised policy relevance, not primarily to simple policy articles.)

In the postbehavioral period, economic methodology has increasingly replaced behaviorism as the method that organizes the discipline. This development occurred

95. Suhr 1997.

96. Kahler 1993, 398–402.

97. Wittrock 1993, 331–36.

for three reasons: (1) for IR to become more scientific, scholars have generally used economics as the most relevant model to emulate; (2) scholars needed methodology to replace the state as the conceptual core of the discipline, and (3) scholars thereby established correspondence with the political level, where, as argued by Lowi, “economics has replaced law as the language of the state. . . . Quite aside from whatever merits it may have as a method and however true its truths may be, public choice is hegemonic today for political reasons or (to be more dignified about it) for reasons of state.”<sup>98</sup> Also, constructivism developed in the United States as a method, whereas in Europe it was more often defined as substance, as historically constituted political questions with which one must engage.<sup>99</sup>

There is no need to rehash the detailed development of American IR given the rest of this issue. The question of the conceptual core for IR in different periods will be discussed in the next section.

## The Form and Content of IR

The third layer of a sociology of social sciences is the intellectual layer. It consists of two dimensions: first, the discipline as social and intellectual structure and, second, its main intellectual traditions. The first dimension will be discussed in relation to the common observation of IR’s peculiar obsession with “great debates” —is it true, is it really unusual, and, if so, what causes it and what are its most important effects? The second dimension will be explored by summarizing some large patterns in intellectual traditions in IR to explain why some theoretical developments are more appreciated in the United States or Europe.

### *Great Debates and Other Ways of Organizing Disciplines*

Observers often note that IR is peculiar among the social sciences for a series of “great debates.” Ask an IR scholar to present the discipline in fifteen minutes, and most likely you will get a story of three great debates. There is no other established means of telling the history of the discipline. Even presenting in a positive, operational way what the discipline is and can do today seems to be difficult. Our perception of where we are in the development of knowledge about international relations is deeply shaped by the idea of these great debates.<sup>100</sup> Although this feature of IR is a common topic of conversation among IR scholars, no good explanations have yet been offered for its existence. Before attempting to explain it, we need to get the question right. Two implicit assumptions in the existing IR interpretation of the discipline’s proclivity toward debates must be corrected.

98. Lowi 1992, 3–4 (see also 5).

99. Of course, many American constructivists use this approach to address important substantial issues, but it has become established as an increasingly respectable program due to its principled ideas and consciousness about what kind of questions constructivism can and cannot answer compared to the limitations of rationalism.

100. The role of debates shows in the tendency for labels to be coined by critics: “neorealism” (Cox, Ashley), “neoliberal institutionalism” (Grieco), and “reflectivists” (Keohane).

Both those who deplore the situation as fragmentation of the discipline and those (fewer) who celebrate it as pluralism assume that the alternative is a more coherent discipline—that is, agreement on a basic paradigm. However, debates are also expressions of coherence. Many of the social and human sciences are far more fragmented and therefore unable to agree on major debates. In comparative politics, for instance, there are often debates, but they are more fragmented than those in IR: which debates you believe to be currently central depends on what you study, and the various debates cannot be reduced to a common denominator as local versions of the same debate, for example, rationalism versus reflectivism. In IR, in contrast, the major debates orient the minor ones, and there is translatability across issues. A debate produces a shared frame of reference and expresses a less than totally fragmented discipline.

Additionally, other disciplines or subdisciplines that have roughly the same degree of fragmentation do not exhibit this particular pattern. Thus, we need both to explain this IR particularity and to ask systematically about its effects.

The usual masochistic contrast between natural and social sciences can be replaced by a more differentiated picture by drawing on Richard Whitley's *The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences*.<sup>101</sup> Whitley argues that "scientific fields are a particular work organization which structures and controls the production of intellectual novelty through competition for reputations from national and international audiences for contributions to collective goals."<sup>102</sup> "They reward intellectual innovation—only new knowledge is publishable—and yet contributions have to conform to collective standards and priorities if they are to be regarded as competent and scientific."<sup>103</sup> This paradoxical combination of novelty and conformity creates a high level of task uncertainty, one of Whitley's two master variables (subdivided as technical and strategic task uncertainty).

"The more limited access to the necessary means of intellectual production and distribution, the more dependent do scientists become upon the controllers of such channels and the more connected and competitive are their research strategies likely to be."<sup>104</sup> The second variable is degree of mutual dependence, which "refers to scientists' dependence upon particular groups of colleagues to make competent contributions to collective intellectual goals and acquire prestigious reputations which lead to material rewards."<sup>105</sup> Through journals and conferences, scientists try to persuade influential colleagues of the correctness and importance of their work. Researchers are therefore "quite dependent upon certain groups of colleagues who dominate reputational organizations and set standards of competence and significance."<sup>106</sup> In fields where you can contribute to a number of distinct problem areas and seek reputations from different audiences by publishing results in different journals, this

101. Whitley 1984.

102. *Ibid.*, 81.

103. Whitley 1986, 187.

104. Whitley 1984, 84ff.

105. *Ibid.*, 87.

106. *Ibid.*, 86.

dependence is much lower than in disciplines like particle physics, where journals form a clear hierarchy and audiences are clearly defined.

Functional dependence refers to the extent to which researchers depend on results, ideas, and procedures of fellow specialists to make contributions. Strategic dependence is the extent to which researchers have to persuade colleagues of the importance of their problem and approach to obtain a high reputation from them. This is about coordination of research strategies where functional dependence produces coordination through technique.<sup>107</sup> These basic patterns are not given features of the subject matter. For instance, increased state funding of biomedical research in the United States, especially for cancer and heart diseases, led to a decline of traditional disciplinary elites and boundaries, reduced strategic dependence, and thereby changed the dominant patterns in the field.<sup>108</sup>

Regarding IR, I will begin with the American-partly-turned-global discipline and then briefly compare the other three national situations. Within most subfields of IR, task uncertainty is relatively low: one knows which methods, approaches, and even questions count as appropriate. A student trained at one university and specializing in foreign policy analysis can go to another university and pass exams or get a job. Across subfields there is very high task uncertainty. A specialist in strategic studies who suddenly decides to write a feminist analysis of immigration policy—or vice versa—might have learned the techniques of this type of analysis in a general sense, but their application is sufficiently conventional to disable the writer from using the appropriate style and making the expected inferences.

In such a varied discipline, the crucial question is whether a hierarchy exists among fields. (Whitley points to a variation at equally low task uncertainty between chemistry and physics where only the latter has a hierarchy of fields, a privileging of theory, and thereby an integrative ordering of subfields.) Crucially, IR has a hierarchy of journals. The United States is a big job market with high circulation, and although a hierarchy exists among universities, the way up is through publications, so the leading journals are the most important bottleneck. In the natural sciences, the leading journals have high acceptance rates (65–83 percent) compared to 11–18 percent in economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology.<sup>109</sup> In the natural sciences, the norm seems to be that if nothing is wrong with an article, it should be printed, whereas leading journals in the social sciences assume that only the very best articles should be printed. Conversely, a scarce resource in the natural sciences is often access to expensive equipment, which makes being evaluated by foundations and being hired by leading institutions relatively more central to one's success than being published in journals, which take absolute priority in most social sciences. In most human sciences and some social sciences journals abound, and getting published is

107. Whitley combines these four times four possibilities to produce sixteen forms (summarized in Whitley 1984, 155, tab. 5.1) of which nine are unlikely or unstable, leaving a typology of seven. I will not, however, go through these, since IR does not fit comfortably into any of the forms. Instead, I focus on which dimensions vary among countries and which might explain the “debates.”

108. Whitley 1984, 165.

109. See Hargens 1988, 150; and Andersen and Frederiksen 1995, 17–18.

easy. (Reaching the pinnacle in parts of sociology, for example, is defined by publishing books rather than articles.) In IR, too, almost any article can be published, but there is a relatively clear intersubjective understanding of the value of different outlets. Leading journals thus become absolutely central.

Here enters mutual dependence crucially. Functionally, scholars primarily rely and draw upon their fellow specialists, but the demands regarding form for an article to be accepted by a leading journal constitutes a metafunctional dependence. The exact pattern is shaped by the relationship between theorists and specialists. Whitley has shown how economics has a unique partitioned structure with a strong hierarchy headed by theorists.<sup>110</sup> Training is highly standardized based on formal, analytical theory that forms a stable core of the discipline with low task uncertainty. However, most economists do applications, which are much less certain and formal but publicly draw prestige from the theoretical nature of the core. The core, in turn, is closed to results from the applications because of its nature as formal theory and model building. This dualistic system has shown a paradoxical stability. For the most part, only the theory articles make it to the leading journals; the subfields are largely left on their own, free to draw on the core as they wish.

IR is much less segregated due to the nature of the lead journals and the relationship between theory and “applied” articles. Theory articles do not as such rank higher than empirical, applied ones. On the contrary, there is a fatigue with new theories or metatheories and a premium (not least, for *IO*) on good tests that assist development of existing theories. However, the journals are mainly defined, structured, and to a certain extent controlled by theorists. You only become a star by doing theory. The highest citation index scores all belong to theorists. Thus, the battle among theories/theorists defines the structure of the field, but it stimulates competition among the subfields to make it into the leading journals.

The result is a two-tiered discipline. To get into the lower tier, scholars have to manage the functional dependence within a subfield and become accepted as competent in it. Most subfields are relatively tolerant, welcome new members, and are not terribly competitive. They are hierarchical, but the hierarchy is not settled internally, so there is not much to fight over. Scholars gain top positions by making it into the upper tier, that is, by publishing in the leading, all-round journals, which means convincing those at the center about relevance and quality (they still have to prove technical competence to their fellow specialists because some of them will most likely be reviewers).

This specific structure explains the debates in IR. Debates ensure that theorists remain central but empirical studies important (in contrast to economics). (As illustrated in Figure 3, this shows up in the high proportion of articles in American journals that fit into the dominant categories compared with, especially, the British journals.) Without recurrent debates, empirical work would break off, and scholars would simply apply the accepted theory without a continuous need for following developments among theorists. Most other disciplines with a clear hierarchy have lower task

110. Whitley 1986 and 1984, 181–87.



uncertainty and therefore also direct translatability among subfields. In IR the subfields only meet through the theorists and only in the arena of central competition. The combination of hierarchy and medium-high task uncertainty makes debates ever possible, but they do not multiply across fields—they typically get organized into one lead debate at the center.

Debates are possible in the United States because the discipline is more unified there than in Europe. With the benefit of one big national “market,” strategic dependence is higher and the discipline has broken local control. In the United States it is possible to compete for definition of the whole field; in Europe maintaining local peculiarities is easier.

As argued earlier, theory does not have the guiding role in France that it does in the United States. The French academic world is quite hierarchical, but the hierarchies play out within specializations, and general theory does not play the role of prioritizing and systematizing these different specialties.

German IR has traditionally been localized, with power still largely vested in professors, and, for example, until *ZfE*, there were no peer-reviewed journals, and a decisive premium on international publications did not necessarily exist. One’s career depends more on one’s relationship to the local professor (or local faculty for acceptance of the *Habilitationsschrift*) than on some national competition. This is beginning to change.

British IR is uniquely varied. Until recently, the theory debates were not central, and still the community managed to run journals that published across subfields. However, the journals often looked like many of those in the more fragmented human and social sciences: without any line or clear selection criteria. Also, the community was much smaller until recently and perhaps was managed as a less formalized social system. With growth and internationalization, British IR scholars are today primarily competitors in the global arena—which also means they are the ones complaining most consistently about the barriers and biases of American IR, the center of the global discipline.

These different structures explain some of the data discussed earlier—for example, the over-representation of American authors in American journals. This is explained not only by American journals metatheoretically privileging the kinds of theory that are dominant in the United States, not in Europe. The structure just uncovered also suggests that a much higher motive exists for Americans to make the effort to get into these journals. The reward structures in European settings generally do not convince European scholars of the rationality of spending the time necessary to meet the very specific demands of a leading journal.

The structure of different IR communities is reinforced by their convergence with different academic styles, confrontational versus balanced. European, and especially British, academic culture rewards balanced and civilized behavior. American culture is more oriented toward visibility, quotations (whether for something absurd or convincing), “originality” (the “I have a new theory” syndrome), and combativeness. Knowing now the function of debates in the structure of American–global IR, the emerging European IR community will need to stage some debates. Major debate

among non-Americans—along lines not already defined by Americans—have been few. Most important were probably the Hoffman-Rengger debate in *Millennium* and *ZiB*'s debates in German.<sup>111</sup>

Considering briefly a large field excluded by this article's focus on "national" characteristics, we might start an investigation of internal American hierarchies and differentiation. Asking for the percentage of articles where at least one author is from one of the ten highest ranking universities in the United States,<sup>112</sup> the aggregate figure for 1995–97 for *International Studies Quarterly* is 16 percent, for *IO* 40 percent. Combining this with the strong correlation between quantitative studies in *International Studies Quarterly* and soft and hard rational choice in *IO*, it seems that some hierarchies reach higher than others. If we can assume that the most successful and "high-scoring" authors will as a rule become located at the leading universities, the hierarchy affiliated with *IO* seems to reflect more closely the supreme reward structure, and its favored theories are dominant in the discipline.

### *Continental and American Traditions in International Thought*

I noted earlier the instances when attempts were made to define a distinct discipline of IR on the basis of some core concept. Two main intellectual traditions have supplied candidates: classical, historicist realism and "liberalism" in an ontological sense. The former leads to substantial definitions about the nature of the subject matter, the latter usually finds expression in definitions based on methodology. IR in the United States has moved from the former—statist, historicist definitions—to methodology.

In the Anglo-American world there is a preference for seeing realism as "Hobbesian," but the realism that was installed in the 1940s by Carr, Morgenthau, Wolfers, and Aron had roots that were much more German. Postwar "realism" often hides a tension between continental, historicist, and British liberal roots. To the former, states exist because they do—due to history and to their own will. They are their own justification, and they clash and struggle for numerous more or less rational reasons. To the latter, states exist because they fulfill functions for individuals (contract theory for security plus collective goods), and their relationship to other states is anarchical, which complicates cooperation.

In the 1940s, most of the inspiration came from the former source. Therefore, the rationalist, "six principles" reading of Morgenthau is misleading. In the classical realist world, conflicts were unavoidable because of the tragic nature of human interaction and the impossibility of fully rational decisions. Drawing on the long continental tradition of diplomacy and statesmanship, the realists advised on how to act even in situations that could not be fully known—based on a sense of history, the true

111. Mark Hoffman and Nick Rengger discussed different kinds of critical theory (Hoffman 1987; Rengger 1988). *ZiB* has consciously stimulated debates through its "Forum" section. Important examples are those introduced earlier in this article—for one on German IR in relation to American IR, see Hellmann 1994; and Zürn 1994; and one on rational choice, see Risse 1997.

112. "Ranking of IR Ph.D. programs in 1998," *U.S. News and World Report* web page, <http://www.usnews.com>.

statesman would know how to shape reality.<sup>113</sup> (Most of this is erased from today's textbook presentations of realism that define it in terms of state-centrism and, paradoxically, rational actors.) This continental tradition was specifically colored by nineteenth century *Machtsschule*, the state as a strong abstraction, and romanticism.<sup>114</sup>

The other main root of thinking is liberalism—less specifically liberal conceptions of international relations than liberalism as deep political ontology: a contract theory of the state, individualism, and rational calculation of interest. Whereas thinking about “power politics” can be traced back to ancient times, the conceptualization of the state of nature and of anarchy only emerged in the seventeenth century. From Hobbes stems the “liberal” problematique of order, an individualistic–atomistic social-contract perspective on society.

How any collection of self-interested agents might be capable of coexistence is one of the central substantive questions for social science paradigms in the positivist ontological mode. As the problem of individualism versus collectivism, it is the one procedural problem they all share. For there to be a problem, one must grant its terms. Agents are free; cooperative undertakings are calculated, and they are difficult. These are the terms of liberalism.<sup>115</sup>

Many contemporary Anglo-American realists are difficult to decipher exactly because their methodological and political approach is based on liberalism, while they qua their “tradition” have taken over a view of the state and politics deeply influenced by the continental tradition.

Despite the peculiar and idiosyncratic development of terminology in the United States, where “liberal” today means almost the opposite of what it has traditionally meant—state-loving and anti-individualist<sup>116</sup>—liberalism (in the classical sense) in the United States is not one side of a divide; rather, it is the consensus inside which people disagree. Almost all American political actors are “liberal” in this sense of individualism and basic concepts of politics, society, and economy.<sup>117</sup>

In epistemological terms, it is much easier to characterize American political science than European. Broadly speaking, American scholarship has been dominated by the liberal intellectual tradition. In the original legal and constitutionalist approach, during the behavioral revolution, and now with rational choice analysis, the individual has been and remains the basic unit of analysis. . . . Historically, no single tradition has dominated European political science, and even today a complex mix of liberal, structural, and collectivist approaches coexist.<sup>118</sup>

In IR, the basic unit is not necessarily “the individual,” but an individualistic and choice-theoretical ontology is transferred to other “primitive units” or ontologi-

113. For example, Kissinger 1957a, 329; and Morgenthau 1962.

114. The critical literature has an unfortunate tendency to make one monolithic problem out of positivism, realism, and Americans! Compare George, who seriously distorts the picture of realism by only pointing to the positivist elements; George 1994.

115. Onuf 1989, 163

116. Lakoff 1996.

117. Hartz 1955.

118. McKay 1988, 1054; compare Ross 1991.

cal givens who become the instrumental calculators, be they states, rulers, or firms.<sup>119</sup>

European postwar IR is more sociological—from Aron’s “historical sociology” of international relations to the British “international society” tradition. Europeans did not generally continue the *Machtschule* tradition but made other historicist attempts to constitute a distinct field.

The émigré generation meant a Europeanization of American IR after World War II (to political science, a second Europeanization).<sup>120</sup> Postwar IR was a mixture of substantial ideas of international relations drawn from the classical, continental tradition and attempts to reconstitute the field from more minimalist, methodological premises. The long-term story is thus one of a gradual de-Europeanization of American IR. Although the *Realpolitik* tradition was the main import from Europe, this is not simply the story of “the fall of realism”: Waltz’s realism is (in this sense) liberal realism and very much an Americanized form of theory. Neorealism’s microeconomic reformulation of realism is probably the clearest example of de-Europeanization.<sup>121</sup> Liberalism has become the shared premise of American mainstream rationalism. Therefore, “selling” American IR to societies that are less extremely liberalized has become more and more difficult. (The opposite, of course, is true for the—currently less dominant—“sociological turn” of American constructivists. Drawing on European inspiration like Durkheim, Weber, Giddens, and Habermas, it certainly sells well in Europe—compare, for example, Ruggie’s article in this issue of *IO*.)

Another reason why American IR is becoming American is the trivial fact that most of the leading figures now are “natives,” not immigrants. Almost twenty years ago, Norman D. Palmer rightly commented

If international relations is “an American social science,” this is due to a large extent to the contributions of European-born and European-educated scholars, including the author of “An American Social Science” himself. If asked to name the truly great figures in the academic field of international relations, I would mention Sir Alfred Zimmern, E. H. Carr, Quincy Wright, Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, and possibly also Arnold Toynbee, Arnold Wolfers, and Raymond Aron. Only one of them was born and educated in the United States. (Three of the others, to be sure, did much of their most significant work while living in the United States and made major contributions to the development of this “American social science.”)<sup>122</sup>

119. Compare, for example, Krasner forthcoming; and Milner 1997.

120. Gunnell 1993.

121. Theory that is liberal also in the sense of drawing on classical liberal thoughts about IR has undergone a similar minimalist, microeconomic reformulation—even twice. First, an institutional theory was developed by Keohane and others, and more recently Andrew Moravcsik has formulated a theory about domestic interests and state–society relations. Moravcsik 1997. As neorealism, both of these theories downplay ethics, history, and praxis in order to create empirical social science theory in the liberal epistemological tradition. On these minimalist reformulations and their effects, see Wæver 1992, 125–51; 1996.

122. Palmer 1980, 347ff.

The reader might try to draw up a similar list today, and I guess most would end up with a list dominated by Americans born and educated in the United States.<sup>123</sup>

## Status and Outlook

There is a global discipline of IR, since most national IR communities follow the American debates, teach American theories, and Americans publish in European journals. Still, IR is quite different in different places. Some American theories travel well, others—typically those most rationalist and methodology-based, such as behavioralism and rational choice—do not. Traffic into the United States is only possible by individuals migrating and Americanizing themselves.

What is the price of this pattern to Americans, Europeans, and the discipline at large? Systematic variations in theoretical development mean that both Americans and Europeans miss out on potentially interesting contributions. To both sides, this is an intellectual loss. The price, however, due to the asymmetrical setup in IR, is not distributed equally. Europeans will typically be aware of developments in the United States, but the opposite is far from always the case (variously caused by lack of attention or language skills). Europeans at least have the theoretical choice that to Americans appears nonexistent. Personally, in terms of careers, the price is skewed the opposite way, that is, to the advantage of Americans, because their approaches typically will be better rewarded, offer access to more prestigious journals, and thus result in materially superior jobs. This reinforces a situation in which European IR can be criticized for insufficient professionalism and too much local control, whereas American IR is threatened by parochialism and sequences of fads. The result for the discipline is lower standards, less exchange, and fewer challenges to think in new ways. Global orientation could help to break exceedingly local bastions, especially in Europe, while overcoming the structural narrow-mindedness of much of American IR.

Two examples from the last decade illustrate how the differences materialize on specific issues. The first example relates to EU studies. Since the new dynamism in Europe stemming from the mid-1980s launch of the 1992 program for the single market of the EU and the 1989–90 end of the Cold War and of Europe's division, the study of European integration has received an upsurge of interest. Theoretical developments in the United States and Europe have already gone through several phases in which the two sides of the Atlantic were simultaneously markedly different, yet closely connected.

The first phase showed (once again) disappointingly low levels of theorizing in European IR. For all the complaints from European scholars about American hegemony and the difficulties of being heard, it must be noticed that even when a tempt-

123. A recent (European) attempt to, problematically, single out twelve "masters in the making" contained ten North Americans (of which two—Ruggie and Walker—were born in Europe but trained in North America, and one—Der Derian—did his Ph.D. in Britain), one Briton, and one Frenchman; Neumann and Wæver 1997. See also Lyons 1982, 138.

ing new agenda was served right in front of Europeans, little impressive theoretical work was done. Most work was atheoretical, and at best old neofunctionalism was dusted off without answering the criticisms that brought it down the first time around. Filling this void, Andrew Moravcsik's *IO* article in 1991 had an extraordinary reception in Europe.<sup>124</sup> Here was an effort that both made sense in relation to existing categories—neofunctionalism and general IR schools—and offered clear theoretical propositions. Only an American seemed to have the courage to simplify and put forward new theory in contrast to European elaborate explanatory schemes built on dated American theories.<sup>125</sup> If microphones had been installed to generate an oral citation index at the second all-European IR conference in Paris in 1995, Moravcsik's name would have, undoubtedly, been the one most frequently heard—most likely not primarily because of support but rather as the Waltz of integration studies—the one clear theoretical position to define oneself against. This signaled the move into the second phase.

Recently, a new literature on each side has begun to emerge. One literature, mainly European (with important American contributions), is organized around the idea of multilevel governance;<sup>126</sup> the other, mainly American (with some Europeans), applies rational choice approaches to the European institutions.<sup>127</sup> Both are promising, but their contrast is striking. The European literature is a historicist attempt to capture an epochal transformation of the European order and its corresponding political lexicon; the American literature is driven by methodology and general theory.

The second example of the differences between American and European IR relates to identity and security. After the Cold War, security studies confronted the challenge of nationalism and ethnic identity, especially in Europe. American security studies has a clearly focused and hierarchical structure led by the journal *International Security*. In security studies neorealism actually is hegemonic (in contrast to general IR, where numerous articles are legitimized as critiques of the allegedly hegemonic neorealism, and critiques far outnumber the purported hegemon). The reaction to identity was therefore largely a question of how to reconcile it with neorealism. As noticed by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, the result was a very constrained process where “nations” were reinterpreted as protostates to be re-entered into the existing and thereby unchanged theory.<sup>128</sup>

124. Moravcsik 1991.

125. For a rather depressing picture of the state of European efforts in the early 1990s, see the proceedings from the first in the series of European IR conferences held every third year by the Standing Group on International Relations under the European Consortium for Political Research: Pfetsch 1993.

126. For instance, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Hix 1998; Marks 1993; Majone 1996; and more radical contributions like Diez 1997. In the words of one of the leading exponents, Markus Jachtenfuchs, “the governance approach to European integration is mainly a European one. It simply has to do with the fact that Europeans are exposed to the actions of the EU on a day-to-day basis and are thus highly sensitive to questions of effective and democratic governance in the European multi-level system. They are much less interested in U.S.-style reasoning about the true motives for and the decisive actors behind European integration.” Jachtenfuchs, personal correspondence with the author, 18 April 1998.

127. Notably, Tsebelis 1994; Garrett and Weingast 1993; Milner 1997, chap. 7–8; and Schneider et al. 1995.

128. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996. See this article for a list of the most important contributions by the *International Security* school—authors like Posen, Mearsheimer, and van Evera.

A number of French contributions draw much more intensively on sociological, philosophical, and anthropological literature while, in some cases, also staying close to policy concerns. Suddenly it pays off for individuals strong in IR and strategic studies to also be cognizant of general developments in social theory and philosophy (due to the all-round nature of Parisian intellectuals).<sup>129</sup> Pathbreaking works by Didier Bigo on the merger of internal and external security draws on Foucault and Bourdieu while doing detailed empirical work on European police cooperation.<sup>130</sup> Pierre Hassner, who has been at the forefront so often in the study of European changes, has increasingly linked back to his original interests in philosophy and general social theory.<sup>131</sup>

In-between these two is the so-called Copenhagen school.<sup>132</sup> Those working from this perspective are more traditional than the French in striving for interoperability with mainstream IR and strategic studies while modifying even central features of neorealism. The price is a more problematic treatment of concepts like identity and society. Finding a Scandinavian–British cooperation in-between the French and the American is hardly surprising: research in Scandinavia is often oriented toward the American mainstream. Although having distance and freedom enough to operate differently from the mainstream, usually the aim is ultimately to make an impact in the heartland of security studies/IR. Criteria of validation and reward are not as independent as those in France; they are rather those of a relatively independent periphery.

Recently, a second American wave of literature under the heading “security and identity,” this time by constructivists, was epitomized by the monumental *The Culture of National Security*.<sup>133</sup> Structured more by the theory- (or even “school-”) driven debate among constructivists and rationalists, constructivists have joined efforts to show, in an important field like security, what significant results their approach can yield. This is not the policy-guided “security studies” question of how to deal with these new challenges, but in characteristic American fashion a theory-driven agenda, the current great debate.

These two examples illustrate how characteristic patterns reproduce on new agendas. How issues in international affairs are theorized follows not only from the influence of international events on the learning processes of a deterritorialized discipline, but also from the process being very much a product of national, academic culture.

### **Conclusion: American IR—from Global Hegemony to National Professionalization?**

Differences in how—and how much—IR has developed in different countries is not just a matter of national idiosyncrasies or unnamable national character. Political,

129. See, for instance, several of the contributions to Le Gloanec 1998.

130. Bigo 1996.

131. Hassner 1997.

132. Discussed by McSweeney 1996; Huysmans 1998; and Lapid and Kratochwil 1996. Most recent work from the school is Buzan et al. 1997.

133. Katzenstein 1996c.

institutional history explains different definitions, relationship to neighboring disciplines, and scientific ideals. Widespread American expectations that others will follow their current development are therefore likely to be frustrated. As often pointed out by French scholars, American IR scholars are prone to thinking in universalistic categories, but they are likely to be reminded of the cultural specificity of these categories.

The internal intellectual structure of American IR explains both the recurring great debates and why American IR generates global leadership. It has a hierarchy centered on theoretical journals, and scholars must compete for access to these. This they have not had to do in Europe, where power historically rested either in subfields or in local universities, not in a disciplinary elite. American IR alone generates an apex that therefore comes to serve as the global core of the discipline.

American IR is heading for national professionalization, but since it happens on the basis of a liberal ontology through rational choice methods, it will not be easily exportable and therefore entails a de-Americanization of IR elsewhere. The best hope for a more global, less asymmetrical discipline lies in the American turn to rational choice, which is not going to be copied in Europe.

European IR simultaneously shows signs of increasing professionalization, but not necessarily Americanization.<sup>134</sup> IR in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom has started to break the very local (single university, subdisciplinary, or informal, personal) power structures and is heading toward a larger academic market—national, or maybe more often defined by language area (French-speaking, German-speaking<sup>135</sup>), and occasionally European.

The result is likely to be a slow shift from a pattern with only one professional and coherent national market—the United States, and the rest of the world more or less peripheral or disconnected—toward a relative American abdication and larger academic communities forming around their own independent cores in Europe. When and to what extent this increasing pluralism will include sizable independent IR communities beyond the West are among the important questions remaining for a future sociology of the IR discipline.

134. This in contrast to the true periphery, where the aim is to reach America. To get tenure in Israel, you have to be published in an American journal and complete training outside the country (personal communication from Michael Barnett, 18 March 1998), and even the relatively large Scandinavian research community uses the revealing language of “publishing internationally” (meaning in the United States). As noted by Andersen and Frederiksen, the term is small-state language; Andersen and Frederiksen 1995, 18. “An American researcher would hardly say he has “published internationally,” if he, for once, had an article printed in a foreign journal in another language than English. Sivertsen 1994, 42. In such places, professionalization is likely to mean increased Americanization.

135. Compare Giesen 1995; and Rittberger and Hummel 1990. The role of language areas would justify treating Scandinavian IR as a unit rather than as national communities— in the event of a future extended analysis.



**Appendix**

**TABLE A.1. Theoretical position of articles in four international journals, 1995–97**

<i>Metatheoretical Position</i>	<i>European Journal of International Relations (%)</i>				<i>Review of International Studies (%)</i>				<i>International Studies Quarterly (%)</i>				<i>International Organization (%)</i>			
	1995	1996	1997	Total	1995	1996	1997	Total	1995	1996	1997	Total	1995	1996	1997	Total
Formalized rational choice	14.3 (3)	6.25 (1)	6.7 (1)	9.6 (5)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	20.8 (5)	26.1 (6)	20.0 (6)	22.1 (17)	19.2 (5)	26.1 (6)	4.3 (1)	16.7 (12)
Quantitative studies	19.0 (4)	12.5 (2)	13.3 (2)	15.4 (8)	4.5 (1)	0 (0)	4.0 (1)	2.9 (2)	37.5 (9)	30.4 (7)	40.0 (12)	36.4 (28)	7.7 (2)	17.4 (4)	8.7 (2)	11.1 (8)
Nonformalized rationalism ("soft" rational choice)	23.8 (5)	6.25 (1)	20.0 (3)	17.3 (9)	13.6 (3)	9.1 (2)	20.0 (5)	14.5 (10)	16.7 (4)	17.4 (4)	23.3 (7)	19.5 (15)	38.5 (10)	30.4 (7)	39.1 (9)	36.1 (26)
Nonpostmodern constructivism	28.6 (6)	18.8 (3)	26.7 (4)	25.0 (13)	18.2 (4)	27.3 (6)	20.0 (5)	21.7 (15)	4.2 (1)	8.7 (2)	3.3 (1)	5.2 (4)	19.2 (5)	8.7 (2)	34.8 (8)	20.8 (15)
Post-structuralism, Marxism, and feminism	0 (0)	31.25 (5)	20.0 (3)	15.4 (8)	13.6 (3)	27.3 (6)	16.0 (4)	18.8 (13)	4.2 (1)	27.3 (6)	3.3 (1)	2.6 (2)	3.8 (1)	8.7 (2)	0 (0)	4.2 (3)
Other	14.3 (3)	25.0 (4)	13.3 (2)	17.3 (9)	50.0 (11)	36.4 (8)	40.0 (10)	42.0 (29)	16.7 (4)	17.4 (4)	10.0 (3)	14.3 (11)	11.5 (3)	8.7 (2)	13.0 (3)	11.1 (8)
Number of articles	100.0 (21)	100.1 (16)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (52)	99.9 (22)	100.1 (22)	100.0 (25)	99.9 (69)	100.1 (24)	100.0 (23)	99.9 (30)	100.1 (77)	99.9 (26)	100.0 (23)	99.9 (23)	100.0 (72)

*Note:* Actual numbers are shown in parentheses.