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The Political Economy of CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

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This book is concerned with what Barrington Moore has called "the chains of historical causation." Lionel Cliffe in his essay "Rural Political Economy of Africa" has expressed this orientation from a similar perspective when he writes, "The full task of a political economy of Africa must . . . start with an analysis of the precapitalist modes" of production.

The contemporary economy and polity of Africa, while its antecedents are indigenous, must be analyzed in the context of the specifics of an evolving world system of economic and political relations starting in the sixteenth century, leading at first to the gradual involvement of Africa with worldwide exchange relations and later, by the middle of the nineteenth century, into more direct incorporation and finally, by the early twentieth century, to the subordination of the continent to the economic and political needs and objectives of the major Western powers.

This "chain of historical causation" is best studied, in our view, by means of the model of "political economy." This approach, Chris Allen writes, "is still a relatively recent, minority trend, and since it must draw on the large body of work that is derived from other approaches, it seems more fruitful at present to define it in deliberately broad terms." More specifically, the notion of political economy, Steve Langdon (1974:123) has suggested, emphasizes "the inter-meshing of so-called 'political,' 'economic' and social factors of change in one ongoing historical process. The dynamics of such change emerge from the

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THE THREE STAGES OF AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY

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The historiography of modern Africa has been a battleground of so-called Eurocentric versus so-called Afrocentric interpretations, and we have passed from early crude versions of each to a state of sophisticated and subtle arguments about analytical primacy. This intellectual battle of course reflects a wider social battle. But in the end both versions seem to me to be wrong. At a certain point in time, both Europe and Africa (or at least large zones of each) came to be incorporated into a single social system, a capitalist world-economy, whose fundamental dynamic largely controlled the actors located in both sectors of one united arena. It is in the reciprocal linkages of the various regions of the capitalist world-economy that we find the underlying determinants of social actions at a more local level.

It will be said that this ignores the relative autonomy of the acting groups. It does indeed in the sense that all systemic analysis denies the real autonomy of parts of a whole. It is not that there are no particularities of each acting group. Quite the contrary. It is that the alternatives available for each unit are constrained by the framework of the whole, even while each actor opting for a given alternative in fact alters the framework of the whole.

An analysis then must start from how the whole operates, and of course one must determine what is the whole in a given instance. Only then may we be able to draw an interpretative sketch of the historical outlines of the political economy of contemporary Africa, which is in my view an outline of the various stages (and modes) of its involvement in this capitalist world-economy.

The essential elements of a capitalist world-economy include the creation of a single world division of labor, production for profit in this world-market, capital accumulation for expanded reproduction as a key mode of maximizing profit in the long run, emergence of three zones of economic activity (core, semipe-

riphery; and periphery) with not merely unequal exchange between them[1] but also persistent merchandise trade imbalances,[2] a multiplicity of state-structures (strongest in the core, weakest in the periphery), and the development over time of two principal world class-formations (a bourgeoisie and a proletariat) whose concrete manifestations are however complicated by the constant formation and reformation of a host of ethno-national groupings (Wallerstein, 1972, 1974a, 1975b). This historically unique combination of elements first crystallized in Europe in the sixteenth century (Wallerstein, 1974b), and the boundaries slowly expanded to include the entire world. This is why it could be thought of, quite misleadingly, as the "expansion of Europe" (when it was really the "expansion of the capitalist mode of production") and why it could lead to both Eurocentric and, by reaction, Afrocentric versions of modern African history.

Because the capitalist world-economy originated in one part of the globe and then expanded to include all parts, areas (such as Africa) not within the original boundaries were at one point in time outside the world-economy and at a later point in time incorporated into it. At the earlier point in time, to the extent that various African systems and the European world-economy were in trade contact one with the other, they were in each other's "external arena," and the trade was of a nature quite different from that which would subsequently occur between the African periphery and the European core of the capitalist world-economy. It is to this early period that we must first turn in order to clarify later developments.

Trade between external arenas is trade in "luxuries" (Wallerstein, 1974b). If it is not, if the trade becomes trade in essentials, the two arenas have become one, a single division of labor. "Luxury" may be defined in terms of consumption, as does Samir Amin: "In the strictest sense of the term, luxury goods are those for which the demand originates from the part of profit which is consumed" as opposed to demand coming from wages (1974).[3] Or it may be defined in terms of whether the products are themselves means of production, as does Piero Sraffa, luxury products being those *not* used in the production of others:

> Luxury products have no part in the determination of the system. Their role is purely passive. If an invention were to reduce by half the quantity of each of the means of production which are required to produce a unit of a "luxury" commodity of this type, the commodity itself would be halved in price, but there would be no further consequences. . . .
>
> What has just been said of the passive role of luxury goods can readily be extended to such "luxuries" as are merely used in their own reproduction either directly (e.g. race horses) or indirectly (e.g. ostriches and ostrich-eggs) or merely for the production of other luxuries (e.g. raw silk).
>
> The criterion is whether a commodity enters (no matter whether directly or indirectly) into the production of *all* commodities. [1972:6-7]

In terms of either of these definitions, the trade of various parts of Africa with various European traders prior to about 1750 falls in this category, especially if we bear in mind Amin's stricture about "the historically relative nature of the distinction between mass consumption goods and luxury goods" (1974).

Indeed the point that should be borne in mind is that the kind of trade the Portuguese launched in West Africa, in the Congo region, and in East Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (and in which subsequently other European powers engaged) at first was essentially of the same nature, and involved essentially the same products, as the trans-Saharan trade that dates at least to the tenth century A.D. and the Indian Ocean trade that goes back further still (Alpers, 1973:111-113).

All of this trade prior to 1750 which involved various African states with partners outside of themselves was "long-distance trade" whose quantity varied on a market determined less by demand than by effective supply, that is, of products successfully transported from the point of production to the mart. As a consequence, production was not determined by variations in this demand but by the politico-technological ability of the long-distance traders to transport the material. The resulting trade involved no transfer of surplus, but could in fact be considered a mutual windfall.

Because this was so, this trade had very limited consequences for the social organization of the trading societies, except to strengthen somewhat the political machineries that guaranteed it. A stoppage in the trade, which occurred frequently over the centuries, had relatively few repercussions other than on the lives of the state officials and merchants directly living off the trade. The data on the nature of the trade between Europe and Africa from 1450 to 1750 has not yet been collected in a sufficiently systematic manner to verify this argument definitely, but I have presented previously some evidence that would support this interpretation (Wallerstein, 1973:7-9). What is important here is to suggest what may have happened around 1750 to have changed the situation.

In fact, as with all such situations, the change was not abrupt. It was the case that since about 1700, the export in slaves from West Africa began to increase in importance in response to a growing demand in the Caribbean area[4] and a relative diminution of interference with movement on the seas. In a recent calculation, Richard Bean located the shift in curve quite precisely:

> Both the price of slaves in Africa and the number of slaves doubled after the Peace of Ryswick in 1697. From then until the reductions in the trade following 1807, slaves were clearly the most important export of Africa. [1974:354-355]

Looked at more closely, decade by decade, we see that the export of slaves from Africa to the Western Hemisphere rises quantitatively until 1750, after which it remains at a high level until 1810.[5]

PHASE I: 1750-1900

Slave exports from Africa had certainly now ceased to be a "luxury" item from the point of view of the capitalist world-economy. They were, in Sraffa's terms, "entering into the production of all commodities." And the quantitative

expansion of the trade was in turn having its effect on the social structures of the exporting regions. As has long been noted, the growth of the slave trade led to the expansion of such states as Dahomey and Oyo. Although, as Hopkins (1973:106) cautions us, "it would be mistaken to imply that the slave trade was a necessary condition for the formation of large, centralised states in West Africa,"[6] the point is that the initial impact of increased trade was by and large to strengthen the state structures in the exporting arena, a consequence typical of trade in the external arena.

But matters could not stop there precisely because Africa, or at least the coastal regions, were now being in fact "incorporated" into the world-economy and thereby becoming peripheralized.

It was about 1750 that the capitalist world-economy was emerging from the long-term relative contraction which it had been suffering since about 1620. This contraction had led to acute competition among those states that were in the core of the world-economy in 1620—the United Provinces, England, and France. This competition took the form of mercantilist closure for both England and France in order to strengthn their position against the United Provinces, which, as of 1620, was more efficient economically. One aspect of this mercantilism was the creation of closed imperial trade networks between the European metropoles, the Caribbean, and North America. The slow increase in economic activity that resulted accounted for the steady increase in importation of slaves after 1700.

But by 1750, the whole world-economy was in an upswing once again, and England and France were in the last stages of their struggle for economic (and political) hegemony in the world-economy. This world-economy could now sustain a considerably increased production of manufactures, provided one could rapidly augment primary production. There was thus a rush to expand. One obvious place was in the Caribbean. As a result:

> In the second half of the eighteenth century the French government offered bounties to slave ships leaving France for Africa, and made an additional payment for every slave they landed in the French West Indies. This concern is understandable when it is realised that . . . sugar was the most valuable commodity sent to France from overseas. Sugar was also the largest single item imported into England in the eighteenth century [Hopkins, 1973:91]

Nor did Britain's growing military success vis-à-vis France in fact lessen French economic activity, at least at first:

> England's supremacy was the result of the relatively quick pace of her commercial expansion and was not brought about by an absolute decline in French commerce with West Africa. . . . Indeed, the tempo of French activity in West Africa actually increased after 1763, following Choiseul's efforts to develop Africa to compensate for the loss of Canada, and to free the French West Indies from dependence on British ships for supplies of slaves. [Hopkins, 1973:92] [7]

The pressure to expand the geographic bounds of the capitalist world-economy began to be felt from 1750 on. One of the easiest ways to expand total primary production to feed the industries that were being established was to expand extensively, to include new areas of primary production, because this involves the windfall profits of labor and land priced below world market rates. Of course, in addition, primary producers already in existence sought to maintain and expand their production.

This double effort to expand led to a labor shortage within the world-economy and hence accounts for the need for more slaves. Thus there came to be a growing demand in Africa for slaves at the same time as there was a growing demand for the use of African land—and African labor on African land—for primary crop production.

At first, the prior demand took priority. It accorded with the existing mores and trade channels. And neither Britain nor France could take the chance that the other would surge ahead in such areas as sugar production in the West Indies. Furthermore, it was precisely the acuteness of their rivalry that strengthened the hand of slave-raiding states in West Africa like Ashanti.[8] The crucial aspect to note of such states is that they were engaged less in wars than in "raids," as Daaku insists, which were "made possible mainly by the introduction of fire-arms" (1968:136). Ashanti (and its analogues) thus became part of the periphery[9] of the capitalist world-economy not by *producing* slaves but by raiding them from areas outside this world-economy.

This kind of involvement of coastal West Africa made it impossible, however, to use these same areas as cash-crop producing areas. Daaku speaks of the failure of the Dutch attempt to create sugar, cotton, and indigo plantations in West Africa, explaining it thus:

> It can be said that between the 17th and 18th centuries, West African interest was permanently subordinated to that of the West Indies and the Americas. This more than anything else must be the explanation for why the Europeans did not interest themselves in both the political and economic well being of West Africa, rather than the popularly accepted view that the African system of land tenure, their numerical superiority and the inhospitable climate debarred the Europeans from taking other interests apart from the commercial in affairs of Africa. [1968:138-139]

But it did not necessarily have to remain eternally true that both trade partners would be primarily served by the primacy of the slave trade. The situation did in fact change. As the British moved into clear hegemony in the world-economy, their priorities shifted, and their ability to make these priorities prevail increased. Furthermore, it now became profitable for some Africans to produce agricultural crops for this world-economy, as we shall see.

Thus the slave trade served as the cutting edge of the peripheralization of Africa in the period 1750-1900, but it was also incompatible with it, because the production of slaves is less profitable than cash-crop production, forcing slaves to be continuously drawn from outside the world-economy. Hence, we see a clear pattern of geographic dislocation. As the nineteenth century proceeded, the slave trade died out in West Africa and to a lesser extent in Angola, to be replaced by a slave trade based on the East African mainland, whose incorporation into the world-economy would not come about until the very end of the nineteenth century.

Let us trace the steps of this shift of locus. The abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain, the prospectively hegemonic world power, as Boahen points out:

> rendered illegal as much as nine-tenths of European trade with the coast of West Africa. A huge economic vacuum was thus created and the British hoped that it might be filled by the encouragement of the cultivation of exportable commodities such as white rice, indigo, cotton, coffee and palm oil. [1974:179][10]

What served British interest, however, did not necessarily serve the interest of other actors in the world-economy. The slave-trading African states saw their principal source of wealth attacked and, in Boahen's words, "found abolition incomprehensible." He goes on to point out the *short-term* economic dilemmas of the African traders:

> Like other powerful rulers, the Asantehene now had the problem of the disposal of war captives. Though he strongly denied going to war simply to acquire slaves, he pointed out that one of the readiest ways of disposing of war captives who could not be absorbed locally was to sell them. At the time of abolition [1807] he had twenty thousand captives on his hands whom, he frankly confessed, he could not feed, adding that unless I kill or sell them, they will grow strong and kill my people. [1974:179]

Similarly, some European groups equally were dismayed by abolition. It was the weakness of Portugal's export position in the world-economy that explains why she "was clinging to the Atlantic slave-trade and to the institution of slavery in Brazil" (Rodney, 1968:62).

Neither slavery nor the slave-trade was abolished from one day to the next in the capitalist world-economy. Rather, there was a century-long disengagement from the use of slave labor, during which not only did many sectors of the world-economy resist this process, but its leading proponent, Great Britain, sacrificed logical consistency to the complex and contradictory economic needs of powerful internal forces. Eric Williams succinctly summarized the dilemma:

> The British West Indian planters pleaded that theirs was a free labour economy which deserved protection from slave grown products in Brazil and Cuba. Britain's textile industry was, however, completely dependent on the slave grown cotton of the Southern States of the United States of America. [1964:15][11]

Nonetheless, the major thrust was toward abolition—in West Africa, in Angola, and in the Cape Colony, leaving East Africa relatively untouched until much later. And those hurt by this shift moved to minimize or recoup their losses.

In Angola, the Portuguese sought to replace revenue from the slave trade with increased taxation on the African population, increased customs duties, and the expansion of the area under Portuguese sovereignty, which then precisely ran into British opposition because both expansion and customs dues "would inevitably curtail the freedom of trade then enjoyed by British merchants" (Wheeler, 1971:54).

In the Cape, where, since 1716, slaves had been imported (Omer-Cooper, 1966b:347-348) from West Africa, Madagascar, and Mozambique, as well as from the East Indies (those who would come to be called the Cape Malays), the British administration undermined not merely the ethos but the economic basis of the Boer farm units:

> The price of slaves [in the Cape], driven up by the limitation of supply which resulted from the stopping of the slave trade in 1807, had risen too high for slaves to be used very extensively by frontier farmers operating on small capital. [Omer-Cooper, 1966a:369]

Eventually, this economic (and hence cultural and political) pressure on the Boers would culminate in the Great Trek of 1837 (Patterson, 1957, chap. 1; Davenport, 1969:287-297).

East Africa, by contrast, began to play in the nineteenth century the role that West Africa had played in the eighteenth. It remained largely outside the capitalist world-economy, the slave trade expanding steadily[12] and strengthening thereby slave-trading state structures on the mainland.[13] While the mainland areas came to be the external arenas of slave recruitment, the Indian Ocean islands (particularly Zanzibar, but also Madagascar, Reunion, and Mauritius) became peripheral areas of the world-economy, producing export crops for exchange with Europe and obtaining slaves from the mainland as workers.[14]

The abolition of the slave trade by Great Britain was most efficacious and had the greatest consequences in West Africa. Economic "substitutes" grew up: timber trade in coastal Sierra Leone, palm oil in the Niger Delta and Dahomey, groundnut oil in Gambia and Senegal. Thus, as Fyfe notes:

> The colonial economic relationship . . . was intensified. The volume of manufactured imports from the expanding factories of Europe increased steadily, pushing the frontier of import-export trading inland and bringing more peoples within the European trading sphere. [1974:47][15]

The growth of this trade began to affect the structure of production in West Africa. Some previous economic activities—blacksmithing, iron smelting, even the mining of iron—declined, "ruined by the competition of cheaper and purer iron bars imported from Europe," as well as by

> increasing quantities of cheap European imports of iron basins, matchets, knives, hoes, wire and other metal goods turned out by the expanding mass production techniques of the industrial revolution. [Flint, 1974:387]

Nor was African textile production better able to maintain its local market untouched. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the African producers had effectively resisted European intrusion because of product differentiation, but this began to change once the English mills began to mass produce cheap cotton cloth after the mid-eighteenth century (Flint, 1974:388-389). Nor, as Fyfe notes, were Africans able to establish new industries:

> Produce was exported in a raw state. No processing industries grew up; a few factories which were opened in Freetown in the 1840's for pressing groundnut oil soon closed. The French prohibited oil-processing in Senegal. [1974:47]

In short, West Africa was being peripheralized or, in the splendidly arrogant phraseology of the Sierra Leone Company, made to conform to "the true principles of Commerce," that is, "the export of British manufactures in return for African produce."[16]

Peripheralization is a corrosive process. Trade with an external arena requires strong partners—to guarantee its continuity (since presumably the internal economic needs of the systems that are trading are not dependent or less dependent on the continuity of the trade) and to minimize transaction costs when the intermittent trade occurs. But trade within a capitalist world-economy must be able to respond rapidly and accurately to the demands of the market, capitalist producers seeking to control the vagaries of the market by expanding vertical and horizontal integration to the degree the technology and political systems permit.

From the point of view of the dominant economic forces—that is, those with most capital, who were now located largely in Europe—the "strong" states of West Africa were potential competitors.[17] As peripheralization proceeded, the local bourgeoisies might come to utilize the local state structures to erect mercantilist barriers. Ideally what the core countries wanted was a direct channel to primary producers, an unencumbered economic alliance.

The political response of Africans in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century was mixed. As already noted, slave-trading rulers were unhappy about abolition, but they sought to compensate in several ways: warfare with neighbors, which was in the end mutually destructive and contributed to the decline of these states; creation of export-crop estates using slave labor, which was often undermined by competition from peasant farmers producing for the export market more efficiently; creation of alliances between the state and small producers, which was difficult and did not succeed because of all the forces opposing such an alliance. A.G. Hopkins underlines the limits of the contradictions involved in these attempts to conserve the relatively strong state structures as peripheralization proceeded:

> The difficulties of the progressive rulers arose first from an internal conflict of interest stemming from a basic change in the structure of export-producing firms, and second from the fact that they were unable or unwilling to make the necessary adjustments in the time allowed by impatient and often unsympathetic foreigners. For a while it seemed that there was a chance of stabilizing the existing frontier between Europeans and Africans on the West Coast, but in the last quarter of the century the indigenous rulers were called upon to make concessions upon such matters as railways, internal tolls and slavery, which they judged, quite rightly, would undermine their independence. [1973:145]

One may view as essentially similar the source of the continuing latent tensions between the British and the strong states established by the Boers in southern Africa[18] and by the Omani Arabs in eastern Africa (John Flint, 1963).

Indeed, not only were the European countries faced with strong states with whom their interests increasingly diverged but some of the now flourishing African merchant classes were thinking of inspiring new ones, such as the Fanti Confederation.[19] Presented by James Africanus Horton to Lord Granville as a mode of relieving the imperial exchequer,[20] the proposal received an ambivalent and ultimately negative British response.[21] Furthermore, as the quantity of total export trade from Africa continued to expand steadily, if slowly,[22] there was growing competition in the coastal trading markets

> between European and African jurisdiction over the traders. In the mutually antagonistic methods of bringing sanctions to bear against thieves and debtors, in the struggle between the rough justice of the "palm oil ruffians" and the attempt to extend the power of colonial courts, in the sanctions of African boycott and European naval blockade lay a search for authority which transcended the search for trade. [Newbury, 1969:84][23]

As long as the capitalist world-economy lived under the smug and clear hegemonic control of Great Britain, roughly 1815-1873, the peripheralization of African coastal regions advanced slowly, like lava curling down a mountainside. But when the capitalist world-economy erupted into a major crisis of accumulation, whose onset was signaled by the market crash of 1873, the rules of the game suddenly changed. For one thing, Great Britain's hegemony was now openly challenged anew by France, her perennial rival; by Germany, sharply rising as Europe's new great political and economic power; and by her erstwhile junior partner, the United States.

What this meant for Africa was that the process of political decline would be suddenly accelerated as the European powers, first tentatively and then in a sudden onrush, undertook the "scramble for Africa," dividing up the continent (somewhat unevenly) and "pacifying" those who dared to resist.

Prior to partition, Britain dominated trade in Africa throughout the nineteenth century. But already in mid-century, the percentage was declining, even though it was still the leading commercial power. Newbury summarizes the situation on the west coast as follows:

> Expressed as a percentage, the United Kingdom share with British possessions on the Coast declined between the fifties and sixties to about half of their total trade, as German, French and American agents took advantage of the lack of restrictions at Bathurst, Freetown, Cape Coast and Lagos. . . . British trade with other parts of the coast (though still much greater than Britain's stake in her own West African colonies) also declined. [1969:79]

Furthermore, the value of the particular export products was declining. The boom in palm oil ended in 1861, caused by the expansion of worldwide commodity production, as competitive products from the U.S., Australia, and India come on the world market (Hopkins, 1973:133).

This is not the place to argue once more the immediate causes of partition. I will merely assert my view that in a contracting world market, France and Germany sought to seal off areas of this market from Britain by colonization, to which the only sensible response by Britain was to join the scramble (and indeed largely win it). Thus, one does not have to argue the economic importance of particular areas to explain colonization, for it was above all "preemptive colonization" (Wallerstein, 1970). G.N. Uzoigwe wrote:

> Evidently those in Britain who cried for new markets had every reason to be alarmed. It can, of course, be argued that since the cry for new markets only became loud in the 1890's when Africa had practically been partitioned, it was a mere rationalization after the event. It must be pointed out however that those in authority were not unaware of Britain's economic difficulties in the 1880's. That this consideration may have driven them to participate in the greatest international share-out in world history cannot be ruled out. Rosebery's summary of the partition as pegging out claims for futurity explains a great deal about this. . . . Indeed Africa may have been partitioned in the 1880's but this was only on paper. The real partition took place in the 1890's with effective occupation. [1974:34]

Whatever the immediate explanation, there was indeed effective occupation. The slave trade finally ended throughout Africa.[24]

Phase I was the phase of "informal empire";[25] that is, those areas of Africa, mainly on the coast, that came to be incorporated into the capitalist world-economy as peripheral zones retained their local sovereign political institutions for the most part. It is not that sovereignty was never alienated by a core state. It is that the expense of direct political domination was avoided to the extent possible because it was seldom required to maintain the flow of commerce. Gallagher and Robinson seize the situation precisely when they say, "By informal means if possible or by formal annexations when necessary, British paramountcy was steadily upheld" (1970:145). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, all African sovereignty disappeared (except that of Liberia and Ethiopia). The way was open now for a second integration of Africa into the capitalist world-economy, which would occur in the twentieth century, one that would not only be more extensive but more intensive, as it would begin to reorganize the class structure.

PHASE II: 1900-1975

We have seen that the combination of the growing competition of British (and other European) merchants versus indigenous Africans and the growing challenge of German, French, and American industry to British world market hegemony together led to the dislocation of the balance that sustained "informal empire" and hence to the scramble for Africa.

The period 1873-1897 was a period of contraction in the capitalist world-economy (Schumpeter, 1939:321-325, 335-341, 356-366). When the phase of expansion occurred, notably during the period 1900-1913, there was an alteration in the world terms of trade in favor of agricultural exports (Lewis, 1952). In effect, there was a felt shortage in the supply of world raw materials, and hence it was eminently profitable to initiate new (or expanded) production of export crops in Africa. However, since these areas were now under direct European political control, the largest part of the profits of this expansion could be diverted into European hands either by direct ownership of the agricultural domains, by monopsonistic control of the purchasing of the product for export, by monopolistic control of transportation facilities, or by direct taxation. The direct benefits of colonization for Great Britain, presumably the reluctant dragon, have been argued by Richard Wolff:

> In terms of supplying food and raw materials imports, colonial administration meant for Britain ultimate control and hence a greater measure of security than would have obtained if France or Germany or another power had annexed the territories. Also, whatever the final destination of food and raw materials export from any colony, British political control almost always meant British predominance in the financing, insurance, and freight for the colony's exports, and hence British balance of payments advantages. Foreign political control could and frequently did deny Britain such predominance, regardless of the relative prices of the services provided by Britain and other countries. Finally, . . . colonial control enabled the British authorities to determine to a large extent the choice of foods and raw materials developed and exported from any colonial territory. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of Britain's new empire, her security, her gains from invisible exports, and both the general mix and quantities of food and raw materials supplied to world markets would have been less favorable to her. [1974:23]

And nothing is said here of the advantage to individual settlers.

One of the reasons why, given a felt shortage in the world-economy of certain commodities, it is so eminently profitable to open up *new* areas for peripheral inclusion in the world-economy (as opposed to intensifying production in old areas) is the low cost of labor in terms of world market prices at a given era. There is a school of thought that sees these low wages as the marginal sales value of previously unutilized labor. Thus Szereszewski argues of the new cocoa industry in the Gold Coast in the period 1891-1911:

> [T]he first forest belt of the Gold Coast had a built-in capacity to increase its real output under certain stimuli which disturbed the equilibrium position of individual economic units. This resulted from the existence of unutilised labour potential and from the fact that labour services were the limiting factor over a wide range of activities: the economic units could react to the introduction of new commodities, to new price situations and to changes in transport conditions with increased flow of exportable output. . . . This was basically an *underemployment situation* in the sense that the resources of the economy—land and labour—were at the low level of *physical utilisation* determined by the preferences of the population for income and leisure and the available conversion rates between the two. [1965:84-85] [26]

In this theory, economically virgin land and labor await the plucking by world capitalism. In fact, this was not historically true for West Africa, which by the 1880s had "an internal exchange economy of some magnitude," as Marion Johnson points out in specific response to this explanation (1974:180). Still it might be argued that it was true for some of the land areas brought into cash-crop cultivation at that time. We would then retain the explanation of the profitability but look for *institutional* in addition to *market* factors to explain the emergence of this agricultural production for the world market.

One of the vital mechanisms involved in the utilization of this "surplus" labor force was the development of a transportation network which would keep the total cost of the product on the world market competitive,[27] and such "external economies" depended in turn on an active role of the colonial governments. Fieldhouse recognized this when he warned us against seeing colonial rule and

informal empire as "merely points along the same spectrum, differing in degree rather than kind."

> The distinctive feature of an imperial economic system was that the metropolis could, within limits, create the formal framework for economic activity and in some degree determine the character of development. [1971:600]

To appreciate, then, the dynamics of the evolution, we must take into account that the colonial governments operated in a double context: they reflected the economic needs of the various metropolitan economic actors, as mediated through political pressures on the government (both in the metropole and directly on the colonial administrations), but as a substructure they had their own immediate needs to fulfill. What is striking in this early period of colonial rule is that the larger needs of metropolitan economic institutions for expanded cash-crop production in Africa coincided with the administrative needs of the colonial officials. Export production was needed to provide a tax base sufficient to cover the costs of administration. And export production provided an ideological reinforcement. It was seen as part of the "civilizing" process, as well as an alternative to the slave trade. Finally, as Barber notes:

> Mixed with these factors was a consideration of prudence. The *pax* in Africa, it was widely believed, depended on the provision of opportunities for Africans to earn money incomes. Otherwise, idleness among African men might well breed mischief and thereby expensive threats to the new order. [1964:301]

Moreover, the point is that in terms of income to those African producers who had already been related to the world market during the late nineteenth century, a period of slump, there was a rise in income from the improvement in world terms of trade. Hence, Hopkins is probably right when he says that "it helped to reconcile Africans to colonial rule, and so made the task of the new administrations much easier than it would otherwise have been" (1973:183).

Thus opportunities were created by the favorable world market, and both metropolitan economic interests and colonial administrators were interested in seizing the opportunities offered. The modes of possible response to these opportunities, in terms of the formal organization of the new agricultural enterprises, were varied. In fact, empirically Africa knew three such modes: African peasant farming, European concessions, and white settler farming.[28] Within limits, these modes corresponded to geographical areas: peasant farming in West Africa, concessions in Equatorial Africa, white settlers in the East, South, and North (although there were some pockets of peasant farming in these latter areas—most notably in Uganda).

Why were different modes employed? From the point of view of colonial administrators, the preferred mode was the one that was easiest in terms of its consequence for administration. Presumably African peasant farming usually fit this bill best. First of all, it required least disruption and dislocation of Africans and hence the least administrative machinery to enforce. Secondly, it represented a dispersal of economic power and hence minimized the growth of economic entities *within* the colony that could put forward political demands upon the administration. It was a path of least resistance.

Obviously, however, it required a situation where Africans could be tempted into cash-crop production with perhaps some technical assistance and a little judicious coercion. Thus, the more involved some local Africans had been previously in market-oriented activities, the more likely it was that there would be speedy response to market opportunities. This explains why the coastal and forest regions of West Africa were likely candidates for this mode.

The other factor, however, was the political strength of persons interested in an alternative mode of development. Thus, the question should be posed as follows: given that there might be said to be an initial administrative bias in favor of African peasant production, under what conditions do concessionary companies or white settlers displace the peasantry as the mode of development?

How do we explain, for example, that of the two major arenas of French colonization in black Africa–West Africa and Equatorial Africa–the latter developed a concessionary regime and the former did not?[29] Basically, it represented a competition between two French interest groups–those involved in large import-export firms and those seeking monopolistic concessions. The former were well established in West Africa as a result of the long commerce of the nineteenth century but were not similarly established in Equatorial Africa. This seemed to make the difference in who won out (Suret-Canale, 1964:37-39). In terms of securing production for the world-economy, the two systems both "worked." As Jean Suret-Canale put it:

> [I] n French West Africa, colonial trade *(la traite)* reigned under the auspices of "free trade"–and of the *de facto* monopoly of merchant houses. The exploitation of the "independent" African peasant occurred through the mediation of the market. . . .
>
> In French Equatorial Africa, colonial trade reigned via the channel of large colonial [chartered] companies, holding legal monopolies. On the surface, investments in agriculture, forestry, and mining were more significant if one believes the titles of the companies and the activities projected in their statutes.
>
> Actually, it was import and export that constituted their real activity, with this difference that the facade of free trade was more often replaced by pure and simple brutal plundering, the companies considering the men and the product of their labor as their property. [1964:39, 41]

A second important arena of concessionary development was the Congo Free State, which from 1885 to 1908 constituted a juridically "independent state" owned and personally governed by King Leopold II of Belgium. This bizarre political structure created a situation in which it was in the personal financial interest of the head of the colonial administration to invite in concessionary companies. Under the *régime domanial* the state appropriated all so-called "vacant land," which it then sold to willing buyers (Stengers, 1969:265-271). The concessionary companies that bought much of this land felt they had the right to exploit the African's labor for their own private profit, thereby reaping "unheard of profits" and creating "veritable hells-on-earth," wherein "the lot of the Africans was tragic" (Stengers, 1969:270-271).

As it turned out, the generic administrator's instinct against concessions as a mode of development was right, for concessions turned out to be a less profitable mode from the point of view of the world-economy as a whole. Between 1900 and 1920, "French West Africa appeared relatively prosperous, while French Equatorial Africa suffered bitter distress" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969:193).[30] As for the Congo Free State, Merlier points out the other side of Leopold's financial advantage:

> These Leopoldian expropriations retained their speculative character. Thanks to the concessions, the companies speculated on the stock exchange but seldom exploited the land. Each expropriation enriched Leopold II and those close to him, the crooks who hung around the royal family and the offices of the companies: they rushed to divide up the concessions into smaller lots and resell them to less important companies or to settlers. Often the land consisted of vast swamps that could not be cultivated. . . . Except for some operations that involved simple gathering *(la cueillette)* undertaken in accessible areas, the granting of concessions did not often result in effective occupation of lands and forests. [1962:58]

It was thus as much because of their inefficiency as because of the cruelties associated with them that the Belgian government after 1908 sought to liquidate the Leopoldian concessions.[31]

If we now take the second alternative to peasant farming, the installation of white settlers, we discover that settlers came usually because they pressed to come, and frequently against the will or at least to the discomfort of the administrators. There were three main areas of white settlement: southern Africa, North Africa, and East Africa. Each deserves a brief word.

The origins of white farming in South Africa center on the fact that the Cape was a strategic way station on the world's sea routes, first for the Dutch, then for the British. When in the late nineteenth century, diamonds and gold were discovered, this led to still further white immigration and confirmed the role of South Africa as an area of white settlement, both in farming and in mining. It was in a sense, however, the white farming that protected politically the role of whites as the skilled personnel of the mining operations, as the later history of Zambia and Katanga was to prove.

It was the presence of white settlers in the Cape that explains why the British South Africa Company turned to white settlers to recoup its losses in its Rhodesian "concession" when the hopes of mineral wealth turned out to be fruitless and the African revolts posed a political threat.[32] This was ultimately to be enshrined in the self-government act of 1923, the critical political base for the unilateral declaration of independence of 1965.

In the German areas, settlers came because they pushed to come, and they encountered ambivalent responses from the administrators. In Southwest Africa, it was quite possibly only the transfer of power from Germany to South Africa after World War I that enabled the settlers to survive the growing hostility of the government.[33] As for German East Africa, its history involved a constant strain between the settlers and the Africans and an open hostility toward the settlers on the part of the most successful governor, Albrecht Rechenberg.[34] The oscillation of colonial administrative attitudes was to continue under the British

Mandate and result in an inability of the settlers to consolidate political power.[35]

If we turn to North Africa, we find that the French administration in Algeria did not start out in clear support of settlers. The so-called founder of French Algeria, General Bugeaud, was, in Charles-André Julien's phrase, "profoundly anti-settler." He was converted to "official and systematic colonization" only to counter the "private and anarchic colonization which had led to the massacre of Mitidja" (1964:231). Under the Second Empire, the administrators still were cool to settlers:

> This is because the Emperor preferred capitalist colonization, which did not require the intervention of the State, to family colonization and settlement which required administrative overseeing. The government, by favoring primarily large concessionaries, indicated disinterest in the fate [of the settlers] and refused to offer them assistance in case of difficulty. [Julien, 1964:403]

It is only in 1871 with the simultaneous defeat by Germany (and the impulses it created for compensatory outlets), the repression of the Paris Commune, and the putting down of the Kabyle uprising that white settlement politically won out in Algeria (and thus consequently in the latter part of the century in Tunisia and Morocco):

> The end of the war [of 1870-71] marked the opening, in effect, of the era of colonization triumphant. Reassured by the repression, proud of its vitality and spirit of its correctness and of its republican and civilizing vocation, the European population felt itself at last free to impose, on the country and the indigenous masses, a political, economic and social dominance that nothing could shake. [Julien, 1964:500]

In fact, it is only in Kenya that the colonial authorities seemed to have been committed from the outset to white settlers as a solution to the need for cash-crop production. It seems that the most likely source of this relative unusual position on the part of administrators, in striking contrast to British attitudes in neighboring Uganda, may have been the sense of British officials that the earlier disruption by slave trading combined with the absence of hierarchical states had created a situation in which Africans would not respond to cash-crop market opportunities.[36] Furthermore, the building of the railroad had established a high cost load for the administration, which required urgent measures to secure immediate income (Low, 1965:21-22).

Thus we have argued that the essential objective of the second phase of African incorporation into the capitalist world-economy was to create sufficient cash crops to meet world needs as defined at this stage and to sustain the political administrative costs that European powers had forced on each other. Where possible, this was done by using Africans as the farm managers (as well as the farm laborers), either in the form of small peasant holdings or, where the social structure was too centralized to permit this, as in parts of the West African savannah zones where the Muslim brotherhoods were strong, in the form of large networks coordinated by these religious structures monopolizing the marketing.[37] But where the African social structure was too disintegrated or the settlers too strong for historical reasons or where concessionary companies were in a position to be momentarily very persuasive in the metropole, other modes of social organization emerged. From the point of view of metropolitan capitalist interests as a whole, however, it is probably true to say that these alternative forms (concessions which had a short life, and white settlement which survived longer) were less desirable than African land ownership. And this fact would in part explain some of the unexpected alliances in the later era of "decolonization."

If the first segment (1900-1913) of this second phase was a moment of a very favorable market for Africa's products, the world balance of trade would shift against Africa subsequently, very markedly in the period between the two world wars, less so but still so in the period following World War II. The reasons for these unfavorable balances in the two latter periods were however different. Between the two wars, the world market was basically depressed for all primary products. After World War II, at least until 1965 or so, demand for Africa's exports was expanding, but this fact was more than counterbalanced by a marked increase in imports.

That the first period 1900-1913/1920 was exceptionally favorable to African income levels and saw consequently greater *structural* change than later periods is attested to around the continent. Ehrlich notes:

> It was Uganda's good fortune that, at the very time [1903-1913] that the [British] Administration was becoming concerned with the development of a viable export crop, world market conditions were uniquely favourable for such experiments. [1965:399]

In the case of South Africa, De Kiewiet marks the change as coming between 1890 and World War I:

> With a speed that even the United States could hardly match, thriving towns sprang up where there formerly had been a struggling village or simply the bare veld. Between 1891 and 1911 the urban population increased by more than 200 per cent. In New Zealand, Australia, and Canada industry, commerce and the movement of population were stimulated by rising prices and an increased demand for goods. But in South Africa these world conditions were spurred forward still more emphatically by diamonds, gold, railway building, and the expenditures of war and reconstruction. [1957:195][38]

Szereszewski, whose discussion of structural change in Ghana between 1891 and 1911 we have already mentioned, explicitly notes how this period was different from the subsequent period:

> [T]he process of structural change lost its momentum after 1911, and after 50 years Ghana's economy retains a close affinity with 1911 Gold Coast, albeit at a level of roughly double per capita income. The pattern evolved between 1891 and 1911 almost froze for half a century. [1965:112]

Samir Amin, noting that one of the realities of colonial domination was the decline of the indigenous bourgeoisie, says that in Senegal the attempts of

French merchants to liquidate the indigenous bourgeoisie succeeded only after World War I when it lost its independent status and its members either became employees of European firms or, if younger sons, went into the civil service (1969:20-29).[39] Finally, Merlier argues that this economic transformation did not occur in the Belgian Congo before the 1920s, exceptionally because of the Leopoldian interlude (and presumably the outcome of its errors). "The colony of the Congo paid the price of its late conquest" (1962:74). Or, perhaps more relevantly, as Vellut indicates, the Leopoldian period was one in which the social basis for imperialist enterprise was unusual: it consisted of "speculators, military men seeking an escape from the mediocre boredom of Belgian garrisons" (1975:17), rather than the usual solid financial groups.

Leaving aside the perhaps special case of the Belgian Congo, how do we account for a slowdown in further structural change in the patterns of economic production after World War I? Very simply, it is that a pattern had been established which fitted within the parameters of the needs of the world-economy and which would be relatively stable until these parameters shifted.

The first half of the twentieth century is sometimes referred to as the "second industrial revolution," one based heavily on the automobile and petro-chemical industries. The worldwide spurt in the forces of production required an expansion in industrial facilities and in global production of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as an expansion of consumption income to provide markets. As to be expected, these expansions did not proceed evenly, as is reflected in both shifting global terms of trade and shifting loci of world unemployment. Basically the world curve of raw material production rose more rapidly at first than the curve of industrial production. This was because there was a demand pull coming from profitable sectors of new industries and because expansion of raw material production required relatively little investment on the part of the entrepreneurs of this production (as we have seen in the case of Africa). This relatively more rapid rise of raw material production took place before World War I. The period between the two wars was one of relative stagnation (or slow upward movement) of both raw materials and industrial curves. The period from 1945 to 1965 was one in which the industrial curve rose *more* rapidly than the raw materials curve, although both went up.

It follows from this general pattern that what went on in Africa from 1919 to 1965 was an expansion of total output, especially after 1945, but always facing a weak world market.[40] The one exception to this is the period immediately following the Korean War when there was a very sudden increase in world demand, which quickly however evened out.

The consequent political economy of Africa was composed of four main elements:

(1) Most production was primary production, but primary production was itself divided into three zones. The first zone produced for the world market. Its size was limited by the weakness of this market, but its fluctuating needs governed the other two zones. The second zone essentially produced food crops for workers in the first zone and in the allied urban zones and occupations. Both these zones added up to a small proportion of the total land area. The third zone produced manpower to export to the first zone (and to a very small extent to the second zone), sustaining itself largely on "subsistence" agriculture or pasturage.

The land of the first zone was controlled in different ways, as we have already seen: by white settler farmers, by companies (concessions), by African peasant farmers. The land of the second zone was controlled largely by Africans. The land of the third zone was controlled by the indigenous population, largely in the form of communal ownership.

(2) The manpower of the first zone (and even of the second zone) was largely migratory, which kept the cost of labor low in terms of world scales, a corollary of being in a weak world market for the products. As a consequence, the vast majority of Africans were "semiproletarians," persons who earned part of their life family income in wage labor (whether contractual or forced) and the other part of it in so-called subsistence production. Such a system optimized the possibility of shifting any burden of reduced relative world demand onto the direct producers rather than the owners of enterprise. Nonetheless, the steady expansion of absolute production involved a steady increase in "proletariani-zation," the increase in the number of workers who obtained virtually their entire life-income from wage-labor, as well as in "peasantization," the increase in the number of Africans who moved into ownership status in the second (and even the first) zone.

(3) The administrative bureaucracy that was required for such a system was small and relatively inexpensive. There were two main functions for the admin-istration. One was to construct the necessary economic infrastructure. This was done more or less on a cost basis. The taxes on African direct producers largely covered the costs of this infrastructure, but it brought in no profit as such. Needless to say, most of the owners of the first zone found this an admirable arrangement.[41]

The second function was to assure a proper *location* of African producers, getting them to move from one zone to the other as required. At first, force was widely used to get persons from the third to the first zone. Later, as the persons in the third zone became increasingly dependent on the cash economy, taxation or even temptation sufficed. In addition, workers in the third zone were often prevented from becoming owners in the first or second zones in order that they be available as wage workers (Arrighi, 1973). Finally, often the government intervened to force surplus workers back to the third zone.

Given the general lack of well-organized resistance in Africa, the bureaucracy needed to perform these two limited functions remained small until the rise of nationalist movements after the Second World War.

(4) The fourth aspect of the political economy was the slow growth of African middle classes. They remained few in number, given the limited urban and intermediary occupations for which they were required. Nonetheless, they

grew, and over time the contradictions between their strength and their limited political and economic opportunities accounted for the rise of nationalist movements. Once these movements began to link up with mass protest, the potential cost of colonial administration rose drastically, both the direct costs resulting from the need to expand the bureaucracy for purposes of control and the indirect costs of investment in infrastructure required for purposes of political appeasement.

This provided the major impetus for "decolonization." This story is now quite familiar, and we shall not repeat it.

The second phase of Africa's incorporation into the capitalist world-economy would be brought to an end by the accumulated contradictions both of the world-economy as a whole and of Africa's role within it. On the one hand, the expansion of total industrial capacity in the world-economy had by the mid-1960s significantly outdistanced both the expansion of raw material production and more importantly the expansion of effective demand, given the world distribution of income. This led to the beginning of the world economic downturn whose first serious signs were the world monetary crises circa 1967.

The fact that the expansion of total industrial capacity had led to a diminution of the relative share of the United States, as well as a lowered relative efficiency of U.S. production, meant the end of undisputed U.S. world economic hegemony; and there ensued the uncertain transition of the 1970s when at least five centers of structural power (the U.S., Western Europe, the U.S.S.R., China, and Japan) maneuvered for optimal advantage in the prospective realignment of forces.

The fact that raw material production had fallen relatively behind accounted for both the energy and the food crises. The energy crisis made possible the improved terms of trade for petroleum via the politics of OPEC, with similar organizations of producers of critical raw materials in prospect. The food crisis, combined with transitory climatological shifts, led to the widespread famine, in Africa and elsewhere.[42]

This sudden shift in the patterns of the world system accounted in large part for the sudden "decolonization" of Portuguese Africa, and the prospective decolonization of Zimbabwe and Namibia, thus completing a political process started in the 1950s, except for the case of South Africa. Phase two, that of colonialism, was passing into history.

PHASE III: 1975-

The third phase now starting will complete Africa's integration into the world-economy. In the coming 50 years this incorporation will take one of two forms: dependent development[43] or revolutionary transformation as part of a network of forces within the world-economy as a whole, which will further the transformation to a socialist world system.

I will merely sketch very briefly the factors at play. The capitalist world-

economy will probably now see a phase of contraction and depression, during which there will be a slowdown of expansion of industrial productive capacity and a reallocation of world income to increase effective demand and recreate the conditions for a further significant expansion of overall world expansion of the forces of production, probably to begin again circa 1990. This will be accompanied by a political realignment to reflect the new socioeconomic hierarchy of the world system (Wallerstein, 1975a).

In the early period of contraction, semiperipheral areas of the world-economy will be in a relatively strong position. In Africa, this means areas with relative industrial and critical raw material strength: South Africa, Zaire, Nigeria, and possibly Algeria and Egypt. They will emerge as significant producers of industrial products not only for their home markets but for neighboring countries, and this increased income will represent part of the worldwide expansion of effective demand for the products of the core countries.

This same period will be one of acute suffering for truly peripheral areas, whose nonessential exports will find a very weak world market and whose internal food production may collapse further. They will bear the brunt of death from famine and major transfers of remaining populations from rural areas to bidonvilles. The corresponding political regimes will almost certainly be that of corrupt and repressive pretorians. The principal consequence for the social structure will be the disintegration of the third zone, the so-called subsistence sector, clearing the land areas of men and largely sounding the death knell for the concept of a semiproletarian labor force. The "reserve army of the unemployed" will thus become visible but also will have to be kept alive by some process of social redistribution of income.

The emptying out of the land areas will provide the space for an immense mechanization of African primary production, whether controlled by cooperatives, the state, multinational corporations, or some combinations thereof, permitting dramatic "development" of export crops when the new moment of world economic expansion begins.

The South African journal, *To the Point International,* caught the flavor of this prospect exactly in an article entitled "The Sahel: Today's disaster area . . . tomorrow's glorious garden?" (October 5, 1974, pp. 24-25). The article opened:

> Space-age farms, modern cattle ranches and lush market gardens in the middle of the Sahara. . . . This is no mirage. It is what experts from six of the world's most backward nations have conjured up for the future. Their idea is to roll back the desert and turn their drought-ravaged countries into a fertile green belt of productive crop land and pasture.
>
> The plan calls for giant dams to harness the Senegal and Niger rivers and provide power; advanced irrigation systems to water the dust bowls; and forest walls to check the southern march of the Sahara.
>
> It could eventually turn the rural subsistence economies of the west African nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta into a vegetable garden for Europe and a vast beef belt.

But to have a chance to succeed, the plan would require millions of dollars, take years to accomplish and need a spectacular social and political revolution within the countries.

It is clear that one version or another of this "revolution" will occur, but in whose interests? This will depend on the outcome of the class struggles both internal to Africa and in the world system as a whole.

What the third phase of incorporation of Africa signals is the culmination of a long process of expansion of the geographic parameters of the capitalist world system, and the approximation in reality, *for the first time,* of the model of this system, as outlined by both the classical economists and Marx. It thus constitutes a vital *political* turning-point, as it finally threatens to remove the veils that have obscured the functioning of the capitalist system and thus have sustained it.

The elimination of the African (and other) subsistence sectors and the corollary full proletarianization of world labor must in the coming period intensify the political conflict caused by contradictory interests, unless the capitalist classes can discover some new artificial equivalent of the subsistence sector and its semiproletarian labor force. The substitute, if one be found, would bound to be more expensive and hence only partially preserve the system; but for the tenants of privilege, every extra few decades of survival are worth it.

NOTES

1. The now-classic exposition is Arghiri Emmanuel's *Unequal Exchange* (1972), a book that has given rise to a voluminous debate.

2. See the forthcoming article by André Gunder Frank, "Multilateral Merchandise Trade Imbalances and Uneven Economic Development." Frank sees these imbalances as an element different from unequal exchange, each significantly reinforcing and aggravating the other.

3. Amin is, however, talking of exchange within the capitalist world-economy, of the periphery exporting essential goods and importing luxuries. I am talking of exchange in which both sides are exchanging luxuries, or preciosities. As I put it previously, it is a form of exchange in which "each can export to the other what is in its system socially defined as worth little in return for the import of what in its system is defined as worth much" (Wallerstein, 1974a). Compare the similar expression of Edward Alpers: "trade from which each side believed itself to be profiting" (1973). Alpers, however, asserts this is the pattern of all Euro-African trade prior to "direct colonial rule," whereas I argue, as shall be seen, that a shift in pattern occurred earlier, circa 1750.

4. A.G. Hopkins (1973:90-91) said: "The eighteenth century was the golden age of prosperity for the West Indies, the time when the Islands became the chief suppliers of sugar to Europe. . . . [A]bout two-thirds of all the slaves shipped to the Caribbean worked on sugar plantations. . . . The expansion of sugar production was stimulated by a rise in demand in Europe following an increase in the consumption of tea and coffee; by a growth in the capacity of the sugar processing industry, which had caught up with supply by about the middle of the eighteenth century; and by government support, which underpinned the structure of Atlantic trade."

5. Philip D. Curtin (1969:222) notes, "In the mid-[eighteenth] century, [slave] exports from both [West Africa and Central and East Africa] reached a plateau of relative stability." See also his Figure 15 and Table 63.

6. Hopkins cites Benin, which developed without the slave trade, and the Niger Delta, where the trade did not lend itself to the creation of major states.

7. Of course, this increased effort by the French government, it could be argued, only brought the French slave trade back to the level it was at before 1763, and from which it fell because of military defeat. See, for example, Pierre H. Boulle (1972:106-107): "It was the slave trade, the fastest growing sector before the war, which suffered the most serious impact, dropping below prewar levels until the last years of the Ancien Régime. Indeed, the figures of the 1750's when Nantes' slavers carried from Africa an annual average of over 9000 Blacks for five years running, were never again equalled."

8. See Adu Boahen (1974:174, 178): "Finally, though the British had not abandoned their policy of Fante support, it is clear that their own position was so weakened by the turn of the nineteenth century, due mainly to the Seven Years' War, the American War of Independence and the Napoleonic Wars, that the policy could not be effectively enforced. . . . The final conquest of Fante by Asante produced a situation the British had done everything to prevent in the eighteenth century, the domination of the entire coastline by Asante."

9. Or perhaps they did not become peripheralized through the slave trade even to the limited extent suggested here. Dov Ronen makes the case that right up to the end of slave trading, it remained for Dahomey what I have called a trade in "luxuries," the exchange of a leftover accumulation (hence worthless in Dahomean terms) for European weapons and gifts. "It is suggested here, basically as an inference from a re-analysis of the role of the king, that the 'slave raids' were not carried out for the purpose of selling those captured but for the glorification and the aggrandizement of Dahomey (by means of sacrifice and absorption), the prime function of the king in his ritual role in the society. The surplus captives were exchanged for weapons and gifts, and were then sold as slaves by the European trade, quite possibly together with others that the latter, with his own men, had hunted. The weapons he gave the Dahomeans were used in the Annual Wars and the gifts redistributed to Dahomeans at the Annual Customs. Dahomey was not a slave-trading state and slaves were not a trading item in the Dahomean economy, but Dahomey was a society dominated by the ancestor cult and had an economy based on agriculture" (1971:13).

10. Boahen cites as evidence c.o. 267/24, Zachary Macauley to Lord Castlereagh, 6 May 1807.

11. At first, the British West Indian planters pressed for protection. Later they pressed to enforce abolition of the slave trade. In any case, the net effect of the ambivalence was to keep abolition an objective rather than a reality. See Christopher Fyfe (1974:44): "Despite the apparatus of enforcement the transatlantic slave trade went on undeterred. Large expanding markets for slaves opened in Brazil and Cuba, which were developed intensively for sugar production during the early nineteenth century. Supply met demand. . . . By the late 1830's it was estimated that the slave trade, far from being 'abolished,' had doubled since 1807."

12. See Curtin (1969), Tables 66 and 74 and Figure 18. Edward A. Alpers (1967:81) argues: "It is only in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, then, that the East African slave trade began to reach the proportions of the sixteenth century trade in West Africa. By 1810 the total East African trade was barely two-thirds of the average annual number of slaves exported from West Africa throughout the seventeenth century. It was not until after 1810 that the East African slave trade became anywhere near as voracious as the West African trade at its height in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries."

13. Alpers (1969:246) notes: "There is, however, another aspect of the [East African] slave trade [in the 19th century]: not only did it uproot people, it also encouraged the growth of larger political units."

14. See the discussion of the consequences of these agricultural developments for the social structure of Zanzibar in J.M. Gray, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-1884" (1963:217f.). The pattern of Indian Ocean trade changed as well, as explained by Alpers (forthcoming): "Gujarati textiles continued to dominate the East African market into the early decades of the nineteenth century, when first American and then British cottons seized the East African market while decimating the Indian cotton textile manufacturing industry. Although Gujarati merchants continued to play a vital role in East Africa after this time, they no longer operated as independent merchant capitalists, but as compradors for Western industrial capitalism."

15. See also George E. Brooks (1975:30): "Spurred by European and Eurafrican coastal

traders, African agriculturists responded [in the 1830s and 1840s] to the new marketing opportunities [for peanuts] with remarkable swiftness."

16. The latter phrase is that of Fyfe (1974:38-39). The former phrase is that of the Company, which Fyfe cites from Sierra Leone Studies, o.s., 1932, 18:42-77.

17. See J.E. Flint (1974:399): "The *laissez faire* attitude to trade seemed in fact to have worked itself out, the trade seemed stagnant, competition too fierce, and African middlemen too strong. Increasingly some of the British traders began to turn to ideas of monopoly as a way out of their difficulties. From this time forward there were constant negotiations among the more powerful Liverpool traders, designed to secure price-fixing arrangements whereby African middlemen could be presented with a united front."

18. Leonard Thompson (1971a:291) notes: "The growth of the diamond-mining industry in Griqualand West and the gold-mining industry in the Transvaal strengthened the previously tenuous arguments for territorial supremacy."

19. "Now flourishing" may give a wrong impression. They were flourishing in the sense of expanding in numbers in response to a widening world trade. But obviously many of these merchants were unsuccessful, which may have been one of the motivations behind the Fanti Confederation. Edward Reynolds (1975:114) argues: "Although the merchant community of the Gold Coast was in sympathy with the objectives of the Confederation, it is significant that most of the leaders and advisors of the movement were ambitious literate Africans who had failed to make good in trade and other employment."

20. Letter No. IX, to the Right Hon. Earl Granville, K.G., D.C.L., Secretary of State for the Colonies, on "The Fantee Confederation" from James Africanus B. Horton, *Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold Coast* (1870), reprinted in Henry S. Wilson (1969). The proposed Constitution of the Fanti Confederacy (1873) provided in Article 43 that "the officers of the Confederation shall render assistance as directed by the executive in carrying out the wishes of the British Government" (p. 218).

21. Governor Pope-Hennessy of Sierra Leone (under whom the Gold Coast then came) urged the British government to seize upon the desire for change of "every educated native at Cape Coast" as shown in support for the Fanti Confederation by "extending the system of Colonial Administration," which however he would have combined with "a certain amount of native self-government in the towns, and of judicial power by chiefs in the interior, in concert with District Magistrates" (Wilson, 1969:221-222). The ultimate frustration of Horton's plans is described by Christopher Fyfe (1972, chap. 5). Far from getting self-government, what the Fanti got was the proclamation by the British of a protectorate over the Gold Coast in 1874.

22. Colin W. Newbury (1969:77) noted: "Throughout the decades of the 'economic revolution' in the palm-oil and ground-nut trade there was an erratic upward progression in the value of exports between 1850 and 1880."

23. "By the end of the seventies, limited colonial enclaves and consular jurisdiction were no longer felt to be enough where relations with African rulers were concerned" (Newbury, 1969:94). The motives for the accelerating desire by local whites for political authority over Africans in South Africa after 1870 is described by Leonard Thompson (1971b:251): "Chiefdoms were undermined from within and overwhelmed from without. Resident missionaries were a revolutionary influence, because they condemned African customs and institutions. . . . Resident traders pushed the chiefdoms more tightly into the network of British commerce and created a demand for European manufactures and the money with which to buy them. White farmers infiltrated inside the frontiers of African chiefdoms, often starting by asking permission . . . , but usually ending by claiming proprietary rights over farms. Recruiters sought labourers for railway construction and for the diamond- and gold-mines. Speculators solicited all manner of industrial and mining concessions from chiefs."

24. See Richard Wolff (1974:33-35): "The change in British policy [in East Africa between 1873 and 1887] was first and foremost a response to closely interconnected phenomena: the commercial interests of private European companies in East Africa, which had increased rapidly, and the simultaneous activity there of the major European powers. . . .

"Facing this situation, the British government operating through Consul Kirk resorted to a strategy that had succeeded well for the previous half century. Put bluntly, the strategy

involved the activation of serious anti-slave trade campaigns as a means of establishing British economic and political hegemony in an area. . . .

"In the second stage [of the British campaign], from 1884 through the 1890's, the British finally subjected the slave trade to a systematic attack sufficient to stop it and to confront the traders with economic ruin. The coup de grâce followed, as Britain replaced both the Sultan and the Arab-Swahili aristocracy with the direct economy and political hegemony of the British colonial administration." Thus the last of the external arenas in Africa was being liquidated. Slavery had become definitely uneconomic.

25. The term is found in an essay by C.R. Fay in the Cambridge History of the British Empire, 1940, 2:399.

26. This argument is basically the same as that of Hla Myint, as Szereszewski recognizes (see p. 77, fn. 5), who argues that surplus land and labor is the basis of rapid development, thus applying Adam Smith's "vent-for-surplus" theory. See Myint's *The Economics of the Developing Countries,* London: Hutchinson, 1964, chap. 3.

27. See S. Daniel Neumark (1964:151-152): "The essential point is that, given an export demand the whole development of agricultural products in Africa prior to World War I has depended upon the provision of bulk transport, equally for plantation production and for peasant production which predominates in Africa. In West Africa, river transport made accessible forest zones along the Niger, the Gambia, the Congo, and other rivers. New areas were opened later by railways, which not only make the effectiveness of river transport, as in the case of the Niger, the Congo, and the Senegal, but also make the savannas available for commercial crops. Similarly, the opening of railway communications with the East Coast led to the expansion of cotton, coffee, and sisal production in East Africa, and to the production for export of tobacco, tea, and cotton in Nyassaland."

28. These correspond to the three categories used by Samir Amin (1973): Africa of the colonial economy *(économie de traite),* Africa of the concession-owning companies, Africa of the labor reserves.

29. For a very brief history of the policy of concessions, see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969), especially pp. 186-194.

30. Coquery-Vidrovitch's figures for growth of imports and exports in French West Africa showed a 25-fold leap (1969:181).

31. Why this was not so easy is explained in Merlier (1962:59-61). See also Robert Harms (1975:77): "Recent research on events in the concession of Abir, the most notorious of the Congo concession companies, has revealed that attempts at reform in the concession area were notably unsuccessful, and that the rubber system in the Abir territory had already broken down by 1906, when serious debate on the Congo question was just beginning in Europe. The cause of this breakdown had little to do with the reform movement or international diplomacy; the concession had run out of rubber."

32. T.O. Ranger (1967:334-335) notes: "As far as [Cecil] Rhodes [the dominant figure in the British South Africa Company] was concerned, then, the [revolts in both Mashonaland and Matabeleland] in 1896 and 1897 merely decided him to move towards settler representation more rapidly. . . . Finally, of course, there was the reluctance of the British government to become in any way financially responsible for Rhodesia which powerfully induced them to accept any reasonable looking settlement negotiated between Rhodes and [Lord] Milner [British High Commissioner in South Africa]. As Milner reminded them in December 1897, if further native troubles were to bankrupt the Company it 'will throw an impecunious, undeveloped country bigger than France upon your hands'." How the settlers pushed the African peasantry out of the food-crop sector as well is described in I.R. Phimister (1974).

33. Between 1911 and 1913 there were "a series of court cases in South-West Africa in which settlers were charged with the murder or manslaughter of Africans. . . . Although the trials were concerned with social tensions on the farms, they were taken by the whole of the settler population and the administration as representative test-cases. Thus, the two major groups of the German population in SWA were in open conflict; on the one side the settlers, the dependents, their defence counsel, their witnesses and jurymen; the farming press, and the whole of public opinion in Windhoek, on the other, the Civil Servants as judges and prosecutors, the police, and medical officers. The government intervened on behalf of the African victims and also called Africans as witnesses for the prosecution" (Bley, 1967:261).

34. Rechenberg's "private opposition to the settlers was never concealed. 'Any settlement by Europeans on a large scale,' he wrote, 'must lead to a conflict with the natives, which could only be settled in bloody fashion.' He never forgot the danger of rebellion. Further, he believed that the proper goal of German settlement was Eastern Europe" (Iliffe, 1969:131).

35. "The plantation sector, then, grew fairly slowly [in Tanganyika in the 1920s] and became really substantial only in the 1930's by which time . . . a rival African sector of cash crop production had emerged to balance it. Partly for this reason, the plantations never came to dominate the economy as did the European farms in Kenya" (Iliffe, 1971:14).

36. This is what Wolff suggests. He says (1974:135) that the British feared that Kenya in its "depressed economic conditions" faced only two alternatives: "to revert to an 'earlier, primitive' form of tribal, more or less subsistence economy or to implant non-African settlers in order to organize, invest in, and manage agricultural production of cash crops." As for the contrast of Uganda, Wolff argues (p. 177): "The geographic position of Uganda in the interior of the continent greatly reduced the economically damaging effects of the slave trade and its abolition. Furthermore, the relatively strictly structured and 'stable' Buganda Kingdom offered the attractive possibility of organizing African peasant agricultural production managed at middle and lower levels by Africans already accustomed to workable hierarchical relationships."

37. Amin points out (1973:191): "On the other hand, in the savannah, from Senegal through Northern Nigeria to Sudan, the Moslem brotherhoods permitted another type of colonial trading: the organization of production and export (groundnuts and cotton) in the context of vast areas subject to a theocratic political power–that of the Mourid brotherhoods of Senegal, the Sultanates of Nigeria and Ansar and Ashiqqa in the Sudan–which kept the form of a tribute–paying social formation, but was integrated into the international system because the surplus appropriated in the form of tribute levied on the village communities was itself marketed. It was the Egyptian colonization in Sudan which created the most advanced conditions for the development of this type of organization, which in that country tended towards a pure and simple *latifundium* system. The British merely gathered the fruits of this evolution. The new *latifundia*-owners, who after 1898 accepted the colonial administration, had cotton grown for the benefit of British industry. Powerful modern techniques (large-scale irrigation in the Gezira) were made available to them. But the second transformation of Islam in West Africa, after the colonial conquest, opened the way to the same kind of evolution, although less definite and slower."

38. Compare the discussion of the "mining revolution" of 1866-1918 offered by D. Hobart Houghton (1969). Figure 2 on page 18 of his essay shows how sharp the jump in exports were in the period of which we are speaking, doubling for example in the period 1906-1910 over the previous five years.

39. Hopkins (1973:204) does warn against exaggerating the decline of the African bourgeoisie on the grounds that "the European firms already dominated the trade of the main ports in the period 1850-1880," that the decline was relative but not absolute, that Africans went into forms of commerce other than export-import, "being astute enough to realize" where their comparative disadvantage lay. But none of this undoes the basic point that a mjaor structural change occurred at this point in time, what Hopkins calls "completing the open economy."

40. See for example this comment on the presumably relatively prosperous group of white settlers in Kenya (Van Zwanenberg, 1972:8-10): "In the period up to 1939 the European settlers were struggling to establish their estates on a firm economic and technical base. The settlers suffered from an almost permanent shortage of labour, inadequate finances, and a lack of sufficient technical knowledge and, as a result, the majority of estates were only able to use less than half the available land. . . . The whole plantation system had been rocked by the great depression. . . . In Kenya's case credit through the branches of the international banks was stopped for the duration of slump, while export prices dropped drastically [beginning in 1919]."

41. E.A. Brett (1973:87) captures the flavor of this situation splendidly: "Commitment [of the colonial administration in East Africa] to the 'managed economy' did not involve any ideological doubts about the right of private interests to exploit resources when they could so profitably without excessively raising the costs of everyone else. . . . What does emerge is the congruence between the interests of a bureaucracy committed to large-scale centralized administrative structures for reasons of simplicity of management and economy and those of private producing and trading groups that needed to have services provided at the cheapest possible rate. . . . [Where there was conflict, it] was really about the relative advantages to different private interests of a state versus a private monopoly for the provision of essential services. In the cases detailed here the State solution was accepted because the most important of the capitalist groups were not prepared to pay subsidies to the incompetence or greed of others of their number."

42. The socioeconomic roots of the African famine are well discussed in Comité Information Sahel, *Qui se nourrit de la famine en Afrique?* Paris: Ed. Maspero, Cahiers Libres 292-293, 1974, and two articles in Review of African Political Economy, No. 1, 1974: Claude Meillassoux, "Development or Exploitation: Is the Sahel Famine Good Business?," pp. 27-33; Lionel Cliffe, "Feudalism, Capitalism and Famine in Ethiopia," pp. 34-40.

43. I am using the phrase of F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, which emphasizes the fact that increased dependency and increased development (in terms of increase in industrial capacity and more generally in the forces of production) may go hand in hand. See their *Dependencia y desarollo en América Latina,* Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1965.

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