Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations

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Examining the history, conceptual breadth, and recent trends in the study of foreign policy analysis, it is clear that this subfield provides what may be the best conceptual connection to the empirical ground upon which all international relations (IR) theory is based. Foreign policy analysis is characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups. FPA offers significant contributions to IR— theoretical, substantive, and methodological—and is situated at the intersection of all social science and policy fields as they relate to international affairs. A renewed emphasis on actor-specific theory will allow IR to more fully reclaim its ability to manifest human agency, with its attendant change, creativity, accountability, and meaning.

Every theoretical discipline has a ground. A “ground” means the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occur. So, for example, the ground of physics is now that of matter and antimatter particles. Economists often use the ground of firms or households. It is upon such ground that theories are built, modified, and even discarded. Sometimes just the knowledge that the ground exists frees the researcher from having to anchor his or her work in it, permitting greater heights of abstraction to be reached. A physicist can work on problems related to black holes, and economists can speak of trends in world markets without having to begin each new research effort by going over the ground of their respective disciplines.

International relations (IR) as a field of study has a ground, as well. All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups. In a sense, the ground of IR is thus the same ground of all the social sciences. Understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them, is central to the inquiry of social scientists, including those in IR.

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However, it is fair to say that most contemporary theoretical work in IR gives the impression that its ground lies in states, or, in slightly alternative language, that whatever decision-making unit is involved, be it a state or a human being or a group, that this unit can be approximated as a unitary rational actor and therefore be made equivalent to the state. Sometimes this approach is referred to as “black-boxing” the state, or as a “billiard ball model” of state interaction. It can also be termed theory of actors-in-general, or actor-general theory.

It is possible to simultaneously value contemporary IR theory while also insisting that the ground of IR is neglected to the detriment of the field, with that detriment felt substantively, theoretically, and methodologically. It is IR’s subfield of foreign policy analysis (FPA) that develops the actor-specific theory required to engage the ground of IR. With its assumption that human decision makers acting singly and in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations and that such decision makers are not best approximated as unitary rational actors equivalent to the state, FPA is positioned to provide the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation (Lane, 1990). A fuller exploration of the positive ramifications of this reinvigorated linkage to ground will be possible after a discussion of the nature of the subfield.

Hallmarks of the Foreign Policy Analysis Approach

The explanandum of foreign policy analysis includes the process and resultants of human decision making with reference to or having known consequences for foreign entities. Typically, the horizon of interest is delimited to decision making performed by those with the authority to commit resources, usually but not always the legitimate authorities of nation-states. Often one may be examining not simply a single decision or indecision, but a constellation and/or sequence of decisions taken with reference to a particular situation. At other times it is the process of decision making that is the focus of inquiry, including problem recognition, framing, perception, goal prioritization, option assessment, and so forth. Usually excluded from analysis are nonpurposeful actions and decisions that cannot be conceptualized as having an international component.

However, it is the explanans of FPA wherein we find its most noteworthy hallmarks. The explanans of FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers. Thus, two of the hallmarks of FPA scholarship are that it views the explanation of foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, with the desideratum of examining variables from more than one level of analysis (multilevel). Explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from the most micro to the most macro, are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect the decision-making process. As a result, insights from many intellectual disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, anthropology, economics, and so forth, will be useful to foreign policy analysts in their efforts to explain foreign policy decision making, making multi-/interdisciplinarity a third hallmark of FPA. Thus, of all subfields of IR, FPA is the most radically integrative theoretical enterprise, which is its fourth hallmark, for it integrates a variety of information across levels of analysis and spanning numerous disciplines of human knowledge.

It is also true that the ground of the human decision maker leads us toward an emphasis on agent-oriented theory, this being a fifth hallmark of FPA. States are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency. Only human beings

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1 Much in the same way that Richard Thaler’s (1994) school of behavioral economics regrounds the modern discipline of economics.

2 However, it should be noted that the same conceptual and methodological tools used in FPA may still be useful in examining human decision making regardless of substantive focus.
can be true agents, and it is their agency that is the source of all international politics and all change therein. Going further, FPA theory is also profoundly actor-specific in its orientation (to use a term coined by Alexander George, 1993, 1994), unwilling to “black box” the human decision makers under study. The humans involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, were not interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers and were not equivalent to the states for which they served. Not just general and abstract information, but specific and concrete information about the decision makers in all three countries (the Soviet Union, the United States, and Cuba) would be necessary to explain that crisis. Actor specificity, then, is FPA's sixth hallmark.

Some have argued that FPA requires a “back-breaking burden” of near-impossible proportions to be assumed by the analyst (McClosky, 1962:201). Others have argued that IR theory and FPA theory may not even be commensurable (Waltz, 1986). But these assertions are not true, and cannot be true if FPA theoretically engages the ground of IR. Rather, FPA’s possibility is of positive value to IR.

**The Value of Foreign Policy Analysis**

The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behavior: material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision makers.

If our IR theories contain no human beings, they will erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion, no accountability. And yet few mainstream IR theories over the decades of the Cold War placed human beings in the theoretical mix. Adding human decision makers as the key theoretical intersection confers some advantages generally lacking in IR theory. Let us explore each in turn:

First, theories at different levels of analysis can finally be integrated in a meaningful fashion. As Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin put it over 40 years ago,

> The central concept of decision-making may provide a basis for linking a group of theories which hitherto have been applicable only to a segment of international politics or have not been susceptible of application at all . . . By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus, we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers. (1962:74, 85)

In IR, there are quite a number of well-developed theoretical threads, studying such phenomena as institutions, systems, group dynamics, domestic politics, and so forth. Often we refer to the “two-level” game that state decision makers must play: the simultaneous play of the game of domestic politics and the game of international politics (Putnam, 1988). The formidable task of weaving these threads together has been stymied by the insistence on retaining the state as a “metaphysical” actor. If one replaces metaphysics with a more realistic conceptualization of “actor,” the weaving becomes feasible, although certainly still complex.

In addition, other types of theory that have not been well developed in IR, such as the theory of how cultural factors and social constructions within a culture affect state behavior, can now be attempted with a greater probability of success. It was not until the 1990s that serious work on this subject by IR scholars became more accepted as informing the major theoretical questions of the discipline (e.g., Katzenstein, 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Hudson, 1997). Only a move toward placing human decision makers at the center of the theoretical
matrix would allow the theorist to link to the social constructions present in a culture.

The engine of theoretical integration in IR, then, is the definition of the situation created by the human decision makers. As Simon (1985:303) put it 20 years ago, “It is far easier to calculate the rational response to a fully specified situation than it is to arrive at a reasonable specification of the situation. And there is no way, without empirical study, to predict which of innumerable reasonable specifications the actors will adopt.” FPA provides that necessary empirical study.

The second major advantage conferred is the possibility of incorporating a more robust concept of agency into IR theory. Scholars in IR have struggled with the “agent-structure” problematique for some time now (Carlnaes, 1992; Checkel, 1993; Wight, 1999). Although no final resolution will ever be accepted, as this is a perennial philosophical conundrum, what is accepted is that IR theory currently provides much more insight into structure than agency. This is a severe theoretical handicap, for to lack a robust concept of the “agent” in IR means to be at a disadvantage when trying to explain or project significant change and noteworthy creativity. In FPA, we often speak of the concept of “foreign policy substitutability” (Most and Starr, 1986); that is to say, for any possible combination of material and structural conditions, there will still be variability in resulting foreign policy. FPA’s agent-oriented and actor-specific theory is what is required in attempting to explain that variability. Furthermore, it is very difficult to grapple with the issue of accountability in international affairs if the theoretical language cannot, in a realistic fashion, link acts of human agency in that realm to the consequences thereof. That a standing international court to try individuals for crimes against humanity was recently formed suggests that the broader world community hungers after ideological frameworks that manifest the agency embedded in international affairs. Work in FPA empowers IR scholars to make an appreciated contribution in that regard.

The third major advantage is to move beyond a description or postulation of natural law-like generalizations of state behavior to a fuller and more satisfying explanation for state behavior that requires an account of the contributions of human beings. Again, as it was put decades ago by some of the founding fathers of FPA,

We believe that the phenomena normally studied in the field of international politics can be interpreted and meaningfully related by means of [the decision-making approach] as we shall present it. It should be clearly understood that this is not to say that all useful work in the field must or can be done within the decision-making framework . . . However, and the qualification is crucial, if one wishes to probe the “why” questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say that the “why” questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision making [emphasis in original]. (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962:33)

Social science is unlike the physical sciences in that what is analyzed possesses agency. Description of an act of agency, or assertion that natural law was operative in a particular case of the use of agency, cannot fully satisfy, for we know that agency means the agent could have acted otherwise. What is required is almost an anthropology of IR that delves into such agency-oriented concepts as motivation, emotion, and problem representation. Indeed, this methodological orientation speaks to some of the themes of the recent Perestroika movement in political

3 Indeed, much of the early empirical work in FPA (see, e.g., Snyder and Paige, 1958) does resemble a more anthropological approach.
science, particularly the assertion of the necessity of complementarity between currently dominant abstract quantitative approaches in political science and IR and more concrete, more qualitative methodologies. Parsimony for its own sake is not revered in FPA.

Again, some would argue that this approach is not feasible. It might be true that if FPA-style research cannot be performed, then the state of current IR theory makes sense: abstractions are of necessity at the heart of our theories, agency vanishes, and to the extent that we speak of the power of ideational forces, we can only speak of them in a vague way, as if they were elusive mists that float through the theoretical landscape. But a rebuttal could be as follows: even if only a few IR scholars are willing to undertake FPA work, it salvages the entire enterprise of IR theorizing from irrelevance and vacuity. One can justify using shorthand if there is a full language underlying that use. We can justify theoretical shorthand in IR (e.g., using the metaphysical state as an actor) if we understand what spelling our sentences out in the underlying language would look like and what the meaning of those sentences would be in that fuller language. If someone is willing to write in the full language, we can still translate the shorthand. It is only if the shorthand completely replaces the fuller language that we are truly impoverished in a theoretical sense in IR. It is when we stop wincing slightly when the abstraction of the state is used as a theoretical actor; it is when we feel fully comfortable with the omission of the real human actors behind the abstraction that we have lost something profoundly important in IR.

The fourth major benefit derived from FPA research is that it is often a natural bridge from IR to other fields, such as comparative politics and public policy. FPA's ability to speak to domestic political constraints and contexts provides a common language between FPA and comparative politics. Indeed, some of the most interesting FPA work in recent years has featured teams of FPA theorists and country or regional experts collaborating on specific theoretical projects (Hermann, 2001). Similarly, FPA research also shares a common language with public policy researchers, including security analysts. FPA's focus on decision making allows for a fairly free exchange, but one that needs more explicit emphasis (George, 1993, 1994).

In sum, then, the existence of FPA scholarship provides several important benefits to the field of IR, many of which are now beginning to become more apparent. The appearance of this new journal, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, is thus both timely and appropriate.

### The Origins of FPA: Three Paradigmatic Works

In one sense, FPA-style work has been around as long as there have been historians and others who have sought to understand why national leaders have made the choices they did regarding interstate relations. But FPA-style work within the field of international relations per se is best dated back to the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Three paradigmatic works arguably built the foundation of foreign policy analysis:

- *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954: also see Snyder et al., 1962; reprinted in 2002).
The work of Snyder and his colleagues inspired researchers to look below the nation-state level of analysis to the players involved:

We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. (Snyder et al., 1954:53)

In taking this approach, Snyder and his colleagues bequeathed to FPA its characteristic emphasis on foreign policy decision-making as versus foreign policy outcomes. Decision making was best viewed as “organizational behavior,” in which variables such as spheres of competence of the actors involved, communication and information flow, and motivations of the various players would figure prominently. Explanations would thus be both multifactorial and draw upon multiple social science disciplines.

Rosenau’s pre-theorizing encouraged scholars to develop systematically what we would now call actor-specific theory. As Rosenau put it,

To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. . . . Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations. . . Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory.” (1966:98–99)

Rosenau desired general, testable theory, and the intent of the Pre-theories article was to point in the direction it lay. However, the general theory Rosenau advocates was not what we are terming actor-general theory: the metaphor Rosenau used in this work is instructive in this regard—FPA researchers should emulate Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, who was able to discern genotype from phenotype in plants through careful observation and comparison. Are there genotypes of nation-states, knowledge of which would confer explanatory and predictive power on our models of foreign policy interaction? What Rosenau was encouraging was the development of actor-specific theory: theory that mediated between grand principles and the complexity of reality. At the time Rosenau wrote this article, he felt that the best way to develop such theory was through aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation. Rosenau also underscored the need to integrate information at several levels of analysis—from individual leaders to the international system—in understanding foreign policy. As with Snyder, the best explanations would be multilevel and multicausal, integrating information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.

Sprout and Sprout (1965:226) contributed to the formation of the field by suggesting that analyzing power capabilities within an interstate system, without reference to foreign policy undertakings, which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions, was misguided. “Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an undertaking, there can be no achievement—and nothing to explain or estimate.” To explain undertakings, one needs to look at what they termed the “psycho-milieu” of the individuals and groups making the foreign policy decision. The psycho-milieu is the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by these decisionmakers. Discongruities between the perceived and the real operational environments can occur, leading to less than
satisfactory choices in foreign policy. The sources of these discongruities were di-
verse, requiring multilevel explanations drawing from a variety of fields. Even in
these early years, the Sprouts saw a clear difference between foreign policy analysis
and what we have called actor-general theory:

Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual’s probable motivations and
purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking
purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are
likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behaviora-
list—be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist—undertakes to find
out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond
in particular contingencies. (1965:118)

The message of these three paradigmatic works—those by Snyder et al., Rosenau,
and the Sprouts—persuaded certain scholars that the particularities of the human
beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding
foreign policy choice. Such particularities should not remain as undigested id-
iosyncracies (as in traditional single-country studies), but should rather be incor-
porated as instances of larger categories of variation in the process of actor-specific
theory-building. Multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the
most macro, should ideally be integrated in the service of such theory. The stores of
knowledge of all the social sciences must be drawn upon in this endeavor. And the
process of foreign policymaking was at least as important as foreign policy as a
resultant. The substance of this message was and continues to be the “hard core” of
FPA.

Other parts of the message were more temporally bounded. In particular, a
methodological tension between Rosenau’s desire for large-N studies and FPA’s
emphasis on actor-specific theory developed. Nevertheless, the first period in FPA’s
evolution, lasting from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, was a time of great in-
tellectual effort and excitement.

Classic FPA Scholarship

The first period of FPA scholarship was marked by path-breaking work in con-
ceptualization, development of actor-specific theory at various levels of analysis, and
methodological experimentation. The following overview of classic works does not
pretend to be comprehensive in scope, but merely representative.

Group Decision Making

Snyder et al. had emphasized the process and structure of groups making foreign
policy decisions (Snyder extended his work with case studies in collaboration with
Glenn Paige; see Snyder and Paige, 1958; Paige, 1959; Paige, 1968). Numerous
scholars echoed this theme in their work, which ranged from the study of foreign
policy-making in very small groups to the study of foreign policy-making in very
large organizations and bureaucracies.

Small Group Dynamics

Some of the most theoretically long-lived work produced during this period cen-
tered on the consequences of making foreign policy decisions in small groups.
Social psychologists had explored the unique dynamics of such a decision setting
before, but never in relation to foreign policy decision making, where the stakes
might be much higher. The most important work is that of Irving Janis, whose
seminal Victims of Groupthink almost singlehandedly began this research tradition. In
that volume, and using studies drawn specifically from the realm of foreign policy, Janis shows convincingly that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision-making quality. The empirical research of Leana (1975), Semmel and Minix (1979), Semmel (1982), Tetlock (1979), and others extended this research using aggregate analysis of experimental data, as well as case studies. Groupthink becomes one outcome of several possible in the work of Hermann (1978). Hermann categorizes groups along several dimensions (size, role of leader, rules for decision, autonomy of group participants), and is able to make general predictions about the likely outcome of deliberations in each type of group.

Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics

This first period also witnessed the emergence of a strong research agenda that examined the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision making. The foundations of this approach can be traced back to Weber’s *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations* (from the 1920s see Weber, 1964). First period research showed how “rational” foreign policymaking can be upended by the attempt to work with and through large organized governmental groups. Organizations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, and this survival is measured by relative influence vis à vis other organizations (“turf”), by the organization’s budget, and by the morale of its personnel. The organization will jealously guard and seek to increase its turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its “essence” or “mission.” Large organizations also develop standard operating procedures (SOPs), which, while allowing them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or creativity. These SOPs may be the undoing of more innovative solutions of decision makers operating at levels higher than the organization, but there is little alternative to the implementation of policy by bureaucracy. The interface between objectives and implementation is directly met at this point, and there may be substantial slippage between the two, due to the incompatibility of the players’ perspectives.

Although the articulation of this research agenda can be found in works such as Huntington (1960), Hilsman (1967), Neustadt (1970), and Schilling, Hammard, and Snyder (1962), probably the most cited works are Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974; additional works coauthored by Halperin include Allison and Halperin [1972] and Halperin and Kanter [1973]). In his famous *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison offers three cuts at explaining one episode in foreign policy—the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Investigating both the U.S. and the Soviet sides of this case, Allison shows that the unitary rational actor model of foreign policymaking does not suffice to explain the curiosities of the crisis. Offering two additional models as successive “cuts” at explanation, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (the first, intraorganizational factors; the second, interorganizational factors), allows Allison to explain more fully what transpired. His use of three levels of analysis also points to the desire to integrate rather than segregate explanations at different levels.

Halperin’s (1974) book *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* is an extremely detailed amalgam of generalizations about bureaucratic behavior, accompanied by unforgettable examples from American defense policymaking of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. It should be noted that bureaucratic politics research gained impetus from the Vietnam War ongoing during this period, because the war was seen by the public as defense policy run amok due, in part, to bureaucratic imperatives (see, e.g., Krasner, 1971). Work in the late 1980s in this tradition was continued by Hilsman (1987), Kozak and Keagle (1988), Wiarda (1990), Posen (1984), and Korany (1986).
Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP)

Those who took up James Rosenau’s challenge to build a cross-national and multi-level theory of foreign policy and subject that theory to rigorous aggregate empirical testing created the subfield known as comparative foreign policy (CFP). It is in CFP that we see most directly the legacy of scientism/behavioralism in FPA’s genealogy. Foreign policy could not be studied in aggregate: foreign policy behavior could. Searching for an analog to the “vote” as the fundamental explanandum in behavioralist American political studies, CFPers proposed the foreign policy “event:” the tangible artifact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy, alternatively viewed as “who does what to whom, how” in international affairs. Events could be compared along behavioral dimensions, such as whether positive or negative affect was being displayed, or what instruments of statecraft (e.g., diplomatic, military, economics, and so on) were used in the influence attempt, or what level of commitment of resources was evident. Behavior as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit could now be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion.

This conceptualization of the dependent variable was essential to the theory-building enterprise in CFP. To uncover law-like generalizations, one would have to conduct empirical testing across nations and across time: case studies were not an efficient methodology from this standpoint. However, with the conceptual breakthrough of the “event,” it was now possible to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determine (by analyzing the variance in the events’ behavioral dimensions) the patterns by which these independent variables were correlated with foreign policy behavior (see McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). Indeed, to talk to some scholars involved in CFP research, it seemed that their goal was nothing less than a grand unified theory of all foreign policy behavior for all nations for all time. Some set of master equations would link all the relevant variables, independent and dependent, together, and when applied to massive databases providing values for these variables, would yield $r^2$ approaching 1.0. Although the goal was perhaps naive in its ambition, the sheer enormosity of the task called forth immense efforts in theory building, data collection, and methodological innovation that have few parallels in IR.

Events Data

The collection of “events data” was funded to a significant degree by the U.S. government. Andriole and Hopple (1981) estimate that the government (primarily DARPA and the NSF) provided over $5 million for the development of events data sets during the time period 1967–1981. Generally speaking, the collection effort went like this: students were employed to comb through newspapers, chronologies, and other sources for foreign policy events, which they would then code according to (usually elaborate) coding rules listed in (usually ponderous) coding manuals, have their coding periodically checked for intercoder reliability, and finally punch their codings up on computer cards. The acronyms of some of these events data projects live on: some because the data are still being collected (see, e.g., Gerner et al., 1994; some collection was funded by the DDIR [Data Development for International Research] Project of the NSF), others because the data are still useful as a testing ground for hypotheses: WEIS (the World Event/Interaction Survey), COPDAB (the Conflict and Peace Data Bank), CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations), and so forth.

During this early period, CFP researchers received a large amount of money from the government to create events data sets by successfully arguing that such an investment would yield information of use to foreign policymakers. Specifically, events data would be used to set up early warning systems that would alert policy
makers to crises in the making around the world. Computerized decision aids and analysis packages with telltale acronyms began to appear—EWAMS (Early Warning and Monitoring System), CASCON (Computer-Aided Systems for Handling Information on Local Conflicts), CACIS (Computer-Aided Conflict Information System), and XAIDS (Crisis Management Executive Decision Aids) (see Andriole and Hopple, 1981). In hindsight, these could never live up to their promise: the collected events could be had from other sources and so were nothing without the theory to explain and predict their occurrence.

Integrated Explanations

In contrast to the other two types of FPA scholarship being discussed, CFP research aimed explicitly at integrated multilevel explanations. The four most ambitious of these projects were those of Michael Brecher (1972) and his associates of the IBA Project (Wilkenfeld et al., 1980), of DON (Rummel, 1972, 1977), of CREON (East et al., 1978; Callahan, Brady, and Hermann 1982), and of Harold Guetzkow’s INS (Guetzkow, 1963). Independent variables at several levels of analysis were linked by theoretical propositions (sometimes instantiated in statistical or mathematical equations) to properties or types of foreign policy behavior. At least three of the four attempted to confirm or disconfirm the propositions by aggregate empirical testing. Unfortunately, the fact that the empirical results were not all that had been hoped for ushered in a period of disenchantment with all things CFP, as we will see in a later section.

The Psychological and Societal Milieux of Foreign Policy Decision Making

The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa: it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions. Each decision-maker’s mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates. The Sprouts referred to these as the milieu of decision making, and scholarly efforts to explore that milieu were both innovative and impressive during this first period. Brecher’s (1972) work cited above belongs to this tradition as well. Brecher’s The Foreign Policy System of Israel explores that nation’s psychocultural environment and its effects on Israel’s foreign policy. Unlike Brecher’s integrative approach to the psychosocial milieu, most works in the Sprout paradigm either examined the psychological aspects of foreign policy decision making or its broader societal aspects.

Individual Characteristics

Would there be a distinct field of foreign policy analysis without this most micro of all explanatory levels? Arguably not. It is in the cognition and information processing of an actual human agent that all the explanatory levels of FPA are in reality integrated. What sets FPA apart from more mainstream IR is this insistence that, as Hermann and Kegley (1994:4) put it, “a compelling explanation [of foreign policy] cannot treat the decider exogenously.”

Political psychology can assist us in understanding the decider. Under certain conditions—high stress, high uncertainty, dominant position of the head of state in FPDM—the personal characteristics of the individual would become crucial in understanding foreign policy choice. The work of Lasswell (1930, 1948) on political leadership was a significant influence on many early pioneers of political psychology with reference to foreign policy. De Rivera’s (1968) The Psychological Dimension
of *Foreign Policy* is an excellent survey and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to foreign policy cases. Another early effort at a systematic study of leader personality effects is the concept of “operational code,” an idea originating with Leites (1951), and refined and extended by one of the most important figures in this area of research: George (1969). Defining an operational code involves identifying the core political beliefs of the leader about the inevitability of conflict in the world, the leader’s estimation of his or her own power to change events, and so forth, as well as an exploration of the preferred means and style of pursuing goals (see also Johnson, 1977; Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1977). It should be noted that George’s influence on the field is by no means confined to his work on operational codes; he has offered useful suggestions on methodological issues (see George [1979] on process tracing, on the demerits of abstract theorizing versus actor-specific theory (see George and Smoke, 1974 and George, 1993), and on the need to bridge the gap between theory and practice in foreign policy (see George, 1993, 1994).

The work of Margaret G. Hermann is likewise an attempt to typologize leaders with specific reference to foreign policy dispositions. A psychologist by training, she was also previously involved in a CFP project (CREON). However, the core of her research is leaders’ personal characteristics (1970, 1978). Using a modified operational code framework in conjunction with content analysis, she is able to compare and contrast leaders’ beliefs, motivations, decisional styles, and interpersonal styles. Furthermore, Hermann integrates this information into a more holistic picture of the leader, who may belong to one of several distinct “foreign policy orientations.” Orientation allows her to make more specific projections about a leader’s behavior in a variety of circumstances.

The role of perceptions and images in foreign policy was a very important research agenda in this first generation of FPA. The work of both Robert Jervis and Richard Cottam deserve special mention here. Jervis’s (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and Cottam’s (1977) *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* both explicate the potentially grave consequences of misperception in foreign policy situations by exploring its roots. Deterrence strategies can fail catastrophically if misperception of the other’s intentions or motivations occur (see also Holsti, North, and Brody’s, 1968 stimulus-response models). Like Janis, Halperin, and others, the work of Jervis and Cottam is consciously prescriptive: both include advice and suggestions for policymakers. Work in the late 1980s continuing this tradition included scholarship by Janice Gross Stein, Richard Ned Lebow, Ole Holsti, Alexander George, Deborah Welch Larson, Betty Glad, and Stephen Walt (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; Martha Cottan, Cottam, 1986; George and Smoke, 1989; O. Holsti, 1989; Lebow and Stein, 1990; Larson, 1985, 1993; Glad, 1989; Walt, 1992). An excellent example of work in this period includes that of Hermann (1985, 1986, 1993), who developed a typology of stereotypical images with reference to Soviet perceptions (the other as “child,” as “degenerate,” etc.) and began to extend his analysis to the images held by other nations, including American and Islamic images.

The work on cognitive constraints was informed by work of scholars in other fields, including that of Simon (1985) on bounded rationality, Heuer (1999, but written 1978–1986) on cognitive bias, and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) on heuristic error. Many other important cognitive and psychological studies in FPA that came forth during the 1970s and early 1980s dealt with a diversity of factors: motivations of leaders (Barber, 1972; Winter, 1973; Etheredge, 1978); cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Axelrod, 1976; Carbonell, 1978); cognitive style (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977); life experience of leaders (Stewart, 1977); and others. Good edited collections of the time include Hermann (1977) and Falkowski (1979).
National and Societal Characteristics

Holsti’s (1970) elucidation of “national role conception” spans both the psychological and the social milieu. With this concept, Holsti seeks to capture how a nation views itself and its role in the international arena. Operationally, Holsti turns to elite perceptions of national role, arguing that these perceptions are arguably more salient to foreign policy choice. Perception of national role is also influenced by societal character, a product of the nation’s socialization process. Differences here can lead to differences in national behavior as well (see, e.g., Broderson, 1961; Hess, 1963; Merelman, 1969; Renshon, 1977; Bobrow et al., 1979). The methodology of national role conception was continued in the 1980s by Walker (1987) and others (Wish, 1980; Cottam and Shih, 1992; Shih, 1993).

The study of culture as an independent variable affecting foreign policy was just beginning to be redeveloped near the end of the 1980s, after petering out in the 1960s (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965). Culture might have an effect on cognition (Motokawa, 1989); it might have ramifications for structuration of institutions such as bureaucracies (Sampson, 1987). Conflict resolution techniques might be different for different cultures, as well (Cushman and King, 1985; Pye, 1986; Gaenslen, 1989). Indeed, the very processes of policymaking might be stamped by one’s cultural heritage and socialization (Holland, 1984; Etheredge, 1985; Lampton, 1986; Merelman, 1986; Leung, 1987; Voss and Dorsey, 1992).

The study of the role of societal groups in foreign policymaking can be seen as an outgrowth of the more advanced study of societal groups in American domestic politics. Sometimes an individual scholar used theory developed for the American case to explore the more diverse universe of the international system: for example, it was Dahl’s (1973) volume, *Regimes and Oppositions*, that provided key theoretical concepts necessary to analyze the relationship between domestic political pressure by societal groups and foreign policy choice by the government. Other more country- and region-specific case studies were also developed: see Chittick (1970), Dallin (1969), Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis and Merritt (1967), Hellman (1969), Hughes (1978), and Ogata (1977), among others. In the late 1980s, a new wave of thinking began to explore the limits of state autonomy in relation to other societal groups in the course of foreign policymaking. The work of Putnam (1988) on the “two-level game” of foreign and domestic policy was paradigmatic for establishing the major questions of this research subfield. Other excellent work includes Levy (1988), Levy and Vakili (1989), Lamborn and Mumme (1989), Evans et al. (1985), Hagan (1987), and Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989).

Domestic political imperatives could also be ascertained by probing elite and mass opinion (again, piggy-backing onto the sophisticated voter-attitude studies of American politics). Though usually confined to studies of democratic nations (especially America, where survey research results were abundant), these analyses were used to investigate the limits of the so-called Almond–Lippman consensus: that is, that public opinion is incoherent and lacking unity on foreign policy issues, and thus that public opinion does not have a large impact on the nation’s conduct of foreign policy (see Bailey, 1948; Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1964; Converse, 1964; and Lipset, 1966). Opinion data collected during the Vietnam War period appear to have served as a catalyst to re-examine this question. Caspary (1970) and Achen (1975) found more stability in American public opinion concerning foreign policy and international involvement than their predecessors. Mueller (1973) used the Vietnam War to show that although the public may change their opinions on international issues, they do so for rational reasons. Holsti and Rosenau (1979) and Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979) use survey data to identify recognizable ideological positions to which the public subscribes on foreign policy issues. A large amount of research was undertaken to show that public and elite opinion does affect governmental foreign policy.
decision making (see Cantril, 1967; Verba et al., 1967; Graber, 1968; Verba and Brody, 1970; Hughes, 1978; Yankelovich, 1979; and Beal and Hinckley, 1984).

The study of the effect of national attributes (size, wealth, political accountability, economic system, etc.) on foreign policy was certainly, in a theoretical sense, in the Sprout tradition, but was carried out by scholars typically performing large-N studies. The propensity to be involved in war was usually the foreign policy-dependent variable of choice in this work (see Rummel, 1972, 1977, 1979; Kean and McGowan, 1973; East and Hermann, 1974; East, 1978; Salmore and Salmore, 1978). Are large nations more likely to go to war than small nations? Are rich nations more likely to go to war than poor ones? Are authoritarian regimes more bellicose than democracies? Statistical manipulation of aggregate data, at best a blunt instrument, was unable to uncover any lawlike generalizations on this score, except for the relative lack of war between democracies (although for an interesting and hard-to-classify treatment of the multilevel causes and effects of war, see Beer, 1981). Political economy researches on the effects of economic structures and conditions on foreign policy choice are fairly rare: the “culture” of IPE and the “culture” of FPA did not mix well, for reasons explored below. However, the works of Richardson and Kegley (1980) and of Katzenstein (1985) are notable as exceptions to this generalization.

Finally, since it is possible to see the international system as part of the psychosocial milieu in which foreign policy decision making takes place, then the work of much of mainstream IR at this time can be seen as contributing to the foreign policy analysis research agenda. The effects of system type, as elucidated by Kaplan (1957, 1972), may depend on the number of poles in the system, the distribution of power among poles, and the rules of the system game that permit its maintenance. This structure may then determine to a large extent the range of permissible foreign policy behavior of nations. The work of Waltz (1979) was extremely influential in its description of the effects of an anarchical world system on the behavior of its member states (see also Hoffman, 1961; Rosecrance, 1963; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). FPA seemed not to emphasize this type of explanation, primarily because the variation in behavior during the time when a certain system is maintained cannot be explained by reference to system structure because the structure has not changed. Explanation of that variation must be found at lower levels of analysis, where variation in the explanans can be identified. Here, then, is one of several sources for the notable lack of integration between actor-general systems theory in IR and FPA.

Contemporary FPA Scholarship

Two developments ushered in a new period of FPA scholarship after a time of relative quiescence in the late 1980s. First, the end of the Cold War brought with it a renewed interest in actor-specific theory. A bipolar, quasi-zero-sum rivalry lends itself relatively well to abstract, actor-general analysis focused primarily on the macro-constraints imposed by that system. Furthermore, actor-general theory was more practical for scholars to use during the Cold War because the Soviet system was fairly opaque. However, the end of the Cold War revealed anew that it is not possible to explain or predict system change at the level of system-level variables alone. Our intuitive understanding of this event involves variables more in harmony with FPA: the personalities of Gorbachev, Havel, Walesa; the activities of actors such as the Lutheran Church and the Green Movement; the struggles be-

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4 Thus, Gideon Rose’s treatment of what he calls *Innenpolitikers* is very troubling. No one in FPA neglects or downplays the importance of variables at or above the nation-state level. Since no pure *Innenpolitikers* really exist in FPA, I have therefore never met any “chastened” ones, who are only now seeing the value of realist analysis (Rose, 1998:170).
tween various domestic players, such as the military, the Communist Party, the bureaucrats, and so forth. The need for renewed progression in actor-specific theory development was made plain.

Second, the resolution of a central methodological paradox that arose from the classic works of FPA scholarship was finally accomplished. This paradox was felt most keenly in the CFP school of FPA, which was completely transformed as a result. Indeed, the term “comparative foreign policy” has largely disappeared from the subfield. The paradox centered around theoretical desiderata in FPA, and their consequences for methodological choice. As the larger field of IR was moving ever more steadily toward a dominance of actor-general theory during the Cold War, it is fair to say that the field internalized the attributes of this type of theory as ideals for all theory. Parsimony, abstraction, “elegance,” and an admiration for grand, overarching theory resting upon timeless, contextless generalizations about nation-state behavior were held up as goals for theory-building in IR. Such ideals yield some definite methodological preferences: game theory, rational choice modeling, econometrics, large-N empirics. However, the attempt to apply the ideals and preferences appropriate for actor-general theory to actor-specific theory was misguided. Actor-specific theory is simply different in its objectives, and hence is different in its methods, as well. Actor-specific theory is concrete, contextual, complex, and parsimony is not necessarily an attribute of good actor-specific theory. Although one could use some of the methods preferred by actor-general theorists, most often the methodological choices will be quite different: content analysis, in-depth case study, process-tracing, agent-based computational models and simulations, among others. And many of the variables examined will be nonquantifiable: culture, small group dynamics, bureaucratic politics. It was only when the subfield began to acknowledge and accept that FPA’s theory development and methodological preferences would differ from those of the contemporary mainstream in IR that fresh progress could be made. It is interesting to note that other subfields and scholars have recently begun to make more room for such differences, also, through, for example, the Perestroika movement in political science and the Post-Autistic Economics movement in economics (Fulbrook, 2001; Kasza, 2001).

With a healthy recognition of the differences and complementarity of actor-general and actor-specific theory, FPA has moved forward through the 1990s to the present. Again, the following overview of contemporary FPA scholarship is meant only to be representative, not comprehensive, in its scope. The discussion will be organized around major themes of the three research traditions articulated previously and will focus on those areas of most active theory development in FPA today: decision making, leader characteristics, culture and identity, methodology, and integration.

Theory Development in Decision Making

Construction of Meaning and Framing of Situations by Human Agents in IR

Arguably at the heart of necessary microfoundational theoretical work in IR, some very innovative studies of situational interpretation and problem representation by human agents in foreign policy exist. The work of established scholars such as Philip Tetlock, James, Voss, George Breslauer, Donald Sylvan, and Charles F. Hermann (Vertzberger, 1990; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Voss Wolfe, Lawrence, and Engler, 1991; Billings and Hermann, 1994) is now being joined by a younger cohort. Indeed, Sylvan and Voss’s edited volume, entitled Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making (Sylvan and Voss, 1998), is a must-read in this regard, showcasing the efforts of younger scholars in this area.

Turning to efforts by individual scholars, Boynton’s longstanding research agenda on interpretation of new foreign policy situations by human agents is noteworthy in this regard. For example, in a 1991 piece, Boynton uses the official record of
hearings of congressional committees to investigate how committee members make sense of current events and policies. By viewing the questions and responses in the hearing as an unfolding narrative, Boynton is able to chart how “meaning” crystallizes for each committee member, and how they attempt to share that meaning with other members and with those who are testifying. Boynton posits the concept of “interpretive triple” as a way to understand how connections between facts are made through plausible interpretations. He is then able to illuminate how plausibility is granted to an interpretation—in effect, ascertaining which interpretations are plausible within the social context created by the hearings.

Khong’s (1992) *Analogies at War* demonstrates how the use of conflicting analogies to frame the problem of Vietnam led to conceptual difficulties in reasoning about policy options. The “Korea” analogy gained ascendance in framing the Vietnam problem, without sufficient attention paid to the incongruities between the two sets of circumstances.

Purkitt (1998) has pioneered the use of the “think aloud protocol” in international relations to discern what happens in the “pre-decision” phase of foreign policy. Verbalizations by human agents as they ponder a hypothetical problem in foreign policy are used by Purkitt to inquire as to the parameters of the reasoning used. She discovers that the background of the reasoners do influence their reasoning, but perhaps her more important finding is that problem representations are being made typically after consideration of only two to four factors. Furthermore, these representations are made and then “harden” fairly quickly.

Alex Mintz and his research team have developed a decision board platform for examining information acquisition, evaluation of alternatives, and choice by decision makers. Using an experimental approach, Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes (1997) have created a computer interface to instantiate the decision board. The computer tracks how the decision maker accesses information from the board, for example, in what sequence a decision maker requests information about various alternatives. Mintz and his team are able to show a two-step process of decision: in the first step, alternatives that would translate into serious political losses are weeded out, and in the second step, alternatives are analyzed against one another in a more direct fashion. Mintz (2004) views this poliheuristic approach as one means of reconciling cognitive theory with more mainstream expected utility approaches. Mintz (2003) and his team have also undertaken several case studies of actual foreign policy decision making to augment their experimental results.

**Persuasion and Diffusion Undertaken by Framing/Meaning Entrepreneurs within IR; Analysis of Interaction between Competing Entrepreneurs**

Once representations have begun to be formed by human agents in foreign policy, collective action can only follow when agreement has been reached with others that a particular representation or set of representations are the appropriate basis for state action. To that end, diffusion of representations must occur, followed by persuasion and competition for persuasive power within a social context. “Entrepreneurs” of framing and meaning will be the agents studied in such research. There are some excellent examples of innovative work in this area.

For example, Lotz (1997) asks how it was that Americans ever acquiesced to NAFTA (the North America Free Trade Agreement). After all, Mexico, to most Americans, is constructed as “foreign” in a way Canada is not. Traditionally, it would not be seen as either possible or desirable to link the economic fate of the United States to such an alien culture. Indeed, American public opinion was very divided on this issue, with a large bloc of undecideds. Knowing that the Gore–Perot debate of 1993 was crucial in swaying the significant undecided bloc, Lotz analyzes the rhetoric of the debate to show how Gore and Perot used different versions of American national identity (what Lotz calls “myth”). Gore successfully outmaneuve-
red Perot by recasting the American Dream portion of the myth to make NAFTA seem a natural extension of it. This discursive maneuver had real empirical effects, including arguably the passage of NAFTA.

Grove and Carter (1999) make an important contribution to this area of research through their study of the interaction between the persuasion attempts of Gerry Adams and the persuasion attempts of John Hume to sway their countrymen in Northern Ireland to respond to the initiatives of third parties to the conflict there. Comparing the rival discourse of the two men, Grove and Carter are able to analyze the horizons of possibility for each man and the groups that follow them. They are then able to map out the maneuvering room Adams and Hume have left themselves by adhering to their particular stories of the conflict. Even more boldly, Grove and Carter go on to suggest how the pressure and influence of third parties, such as the United States, who possess their own story of the Northern Ireland conflict, could either succeed or fail depending on the state of the internal debate between Hume and Adams.

Sylvan, Majeski, and Milliken (1991) examine the mountains of written material generated by the U.S. national security establishment with reference to the conduct of the Vietnam War. They question the war policy recommendations in this material: When did a statement become a “bona fide” recommendation, to which other agents had to pay attention? How did such statements fit into the flow of recommendations and counter-recommendations? How did persuasion occur? Sylvan et al. schematically map the river of recommendations in order to answer such questions.

Also to be mentioned in this context is the long-running ICONS (International Communication and Negotiation Simulation) project at the University of Maryland (ICONS, 2004). Although geared toward the teaching of high school and college students by having them participate in a web-based foreign policy negotiation or crisis scenario, the simulation can also be used to study how persuasion occurs. The simulation proceeds through the exchange of public and private messages and “attendance” at web-based conferences. The simulation ends with a final vote on proffered proposals.

**Change and Learning by Human Agents in IR**

Levy (1994) provides a useful overview of efforts to capture social learning in IR theory. Here I will highlight but two efforts that address this concern.

Using Bonham’s technique of cognitive mapping, Bonham, Sergeev, and Parshin (1997) are able to detect the emergence of new knowledge structures within the minds of Kennedy and Khrushchev during the negotiations of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. These new knowledge structures improved mutual understanding, and allowed for greater reflexivity in the interactions between the two men. The authors suggest that such a “shared reality-building process” may be a prerequisite for successful negotiations between two antagonists.

Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot (1997) use national role conception (NRC) analysis to trace identity change over time. This is an interesting use of NRC, for usually NRCs are utilized to explain the persistence, not the change, of state behavior over time. Their case study is that of Ukraine, in its first years of existence. During that time of flux, Ukraine was asked to relinquish its nuclear weapons. First refusing, and then acquiescing over a period of several years, Chafetz et al. argue for a process of subtle change in NRC over this time period. Tracking statements by highly placed officials in Ukraine, Chafetz et al. are able to demonstrate who was making what statements that were then built upon by others.

**The Study of Human Agents as They Interact in Groups in IR**

The study of how individual human agency is transformed by interaction with other human agents in small groups has a long and distinguished history in FPA.
The work of Janis (1982), of course, is paradigmatic in this regard. The newest work is even more nuanced and insightful, if that is possible, than the old. In addition to the fine recent volume *Beyond Groupthink* (‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius, 1997; but see also Herek et al., 1987, 1989; McCauley, 1989; Ripley, 1989; Stewart, Hermann ‘T Hart, and Hermann, 1989, 1990; Gaenslen, 1992), Beasley (1998:109) tackles the aggregation problem inherent in group research directly, by offering new methods for “consider[ing] the group as a complex forum for the interaction of decision makers and to begin to apply our insights regarding individuals to the collective level.” He explores six aggregation principles, and empirically investigates the degree to which each could be said to have been used in his case study of the British Cabinet meetings of 1938. These principles include simplicity, single representation embellishment, factionalism, common decomposition, common alternatives, and expertise.

Sylvan and Haddad (1998) investigate how group environments mediate individual cognition. Using an experimental model, they study small groups of subjects who are discussing a given foreign policy problem and attempting to come up with a decision as to what to do about it. They discover that such small groups attempt to create a coauthored “story” of what is taking place. The coauthorship then allows for the action decision to be made collectively. The group interaction surrounding the creation of this story is punctuated by moments of rival story lines colliding. The social working-through of these collisions can be traced to moments where participants ponder what Sylvan and Haddad call the “it depends” challenge. When one participant says, “It depends . . . (on what we mean, on what we want to do, etc.),” the group as a whole must work its way back to a consistent story line through persuasion and analysis.

Recent works on bureaucratic or organizational influences on foreign policy apply agent-oriented perspectives to explain sources of institutional innovation (Drezner, 2000) or variations in the policy outputs of foreign aid bureaucracies (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter, 2004).

**Theory Development Regarding Leader Characteristics**

Some excellent new overview volumes have recently appeared, including *Political Psychology in International Relations* by Rose McDermott (2004) and *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders* edited by Post (2003a). One of the most exciting new developments in this area has been the automation of content analysis. Programs such as ProfilerPlus, created by Young and Schafer (1998) Social Science Automation group, have revolutionized researchers’ ability to perform word-count or thematic content analysis, or even cognitive mapping. What used to be an extremely laborious and time-consuming task now requires but the positing of coding rules and the inputting of text to perform speedy and accurate analyses. This technological breakthrough will permit content analysis methodology to become more important as a research tool over time.

**Leader Assessment Frameworks**

A variety of leader assessment schema have undergone revision and refinement recently (Hermann, 2003; Post, 2003a, b; Renshon, 2003; Weintrub, 2003; Winter, 2003). A welcome innovation has been the explicit comparison of different types of explanatory frameworks by applying them to understanding the same leader, allowing inspection of these frameworks’ relative strengths and weaknesses ( Winter, Hermann, Weintrab, and Walker, 1991; Singer and Hudson, 1992; Snare, 1992; Post, 2003a). Looking once more at the work of Margaret G. Hermann as an example, the last decade has brought a reworking of the framework to emphasize the leader’s openness to new information and attitude toward constraints. Combined with an evaluation as to whether the leader is motivated more by external or
internal forces, Hermann has now constructed a more systematic tool for assessment of leader foreign policy orientation. Not only Hermann's framework, but also those of Walter Weintraub, Richard Herrmann, and an operational code variant developed by Stephen Walker and Michael Young, have all been automated using ProfilerPlus (Young, 2004). It is fair to say that this technology has allowed for a resurgence of operational code analysis in recent years (Young and Schafer, 1998; Marfleet, 2000). On the more qualitative side of leader assessment methodology, Post (2003b) has extended and explicated his technique of anamnesis, a form of political psychobiography.

New Frontiers: Neuroscience, Emotion, and Embodiment
The recent outpouring of new work in the field of neuroscience has not completely filtered into FPA as yet, although the first few works linking the two are already beginning to appear (McDermott, forthcoming). Neuroscience seems poised to profoundly alter theories of human decision making, and this will have important consequences for FPA. A second new frontier concerns the role of emotions and affect in decision making. There is as yet very little work on the role of emotion and strong affect in international relations (Crawford, 2000; Cottam and McCoy, 1998). But significant new findings in other disciplines, such as “miswanting” described by Daniel Gilbert, or the “empathy gap” noted by George Lowenstein, or findings by the behavioral economics school of Richard Thaler, all point to a strong role for emotion that may lead to a new research subagenda in FPA (Gertner, 2003). A third new area of research addresses the question of the embodiment of intellect and cognition: in addition to emotions, what effect does our body have on our reasoning? In addition to new findings on the effects of pain and illness on decision making, other findings concerning, for example, the recent hypothesis concerning an individually and genetically determined “happiness setpoint” may have implications for FPA research (Schwartz, 2004).

Theory Development Concerning Culture, Identity, and Societal Groups
The study of culture and identity began an energetic renaissance after the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, this renewed interest found expression in several quite disparate schools of IR, including security studies (Katzenstein, 1996), post-modernism/IR (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996), and FPA (Hudson, 1997; Sampson and Hudson, 1999).

Construction of National Role Conception Identity by Human Agents within the Nation
National role conception research, originated by Holsti (1970), is still a very useful approach to questions of national identity formation (Walker, 1987). Holsti specifically tied NRC to human agency by making individuals’ articulations of national identity the measure of NRC. More recently, using eclectic methods such as discourse analysis, process-tracing, and computational modeling, Banerjee (1991, 1997) has traced the origins and evolution of identities in conflict. For example, Banerjee traces Indian and Pakistani national identities as individual human agents, such as Jinnah and Nehru, constructed by them for their followers.

In addition to the work of Glenn Chafetz, mentioned above, Breuning (1997, 1998) has empirically demonstrated how differences in NRC lead to the creation of different institutions and the enactment of different policies by nations that, materially speaking, are very similar. Once, again, as with Holsti, Banerjee, and Chafetz, the operationalization of NRC in Breuning’s studies (individual discourse) leads one directly back to human agency.
Horizon/Template Analysis
Hudson (1999) attempted to address the construction of meaning and the representation of foreign policy by exploring the horizon of imagination present within a culture. Creating several hypothetical foreign policy scenarios, she outlined numerous possible responses of a nation to each, and then inquired of average citizens in three countries what they thought their own country would do, and what they thought the other countries would do. For most scenarios, distinctive patterns of horizon visualization could be discerned within each culture. In two cases, respondents were able to imagine responses that the researcher could not. It appears that an understanding of “who we are” plays into the understanding of “what it is we do,” and new foreign policy situations will be rendered intelligible in part by imagining what it is that would be done in that situation. This research has much in common with a dramaturgical approach to intelligibility in IR (see, e.g., Etheredge, 1992).

The Influence of Societal Groups
New directions in the study of societal groups and their influence on foreign policy have begun to take shape (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993). For example, Van Belle, (1993) (see also Bueno de Mesquida and Lalman, 1992 for another example) innovatively combines rational choice theory and game theory with FPA to develop a theoretical understanding of domestic political imperatives that has the potential to be cross-national in its applicability. Kaarbo’s (1993, 1994) work examines multiparty states and the inevitable challenges of coalition government rule. Her work is somewhat unique, as the study of legislative bargaining (vs. the study of broader domestic political imperatives and opposition) has, generally speaking, lacked the cross-national applicability that Kaarbo seeks to provide. The innovative conceptual work of Joe D. Hagan deserves special note. Hagan (1993) has compiled a large database on the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special reference to executive/legislative structures. The set includes 94 regimes for 38 nations over a 10-year period. His purpose is to explore the effects of political opposition on foreign policy choice. In this, Hagan’s work can also be considered as part of the research program on broader issues of domestic opposition. Using aggregate statistical analysis, Hagan is able to show, for example, that the internal fragmentation of a regime has substantially less effect on foreign policy behavior than military or party opposition to the regime.

Do broad differences in polity type lead to discernible differences in nation-state foreign policy? During the 1990s the “democratic peace” phenomenon was posited as an example of this linkage (Russett, 1993a, b). This has been an interesting bridging question for FPA and IR. Why do democracies not fight one another? Here we find more abstract theorists of war (Merritt and Zimes, 1991; Morgan, 1992; Bremer, 1993; Dixon, 1993; Ray, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993a, b) wrestling with a question that leads them into FPA waters and into conversation with FPA scholars (Hagan, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1995).

The powerful effect of the media on foreign policy has also been explored. Driven by apparent connections between intense media coverage and the involvement of Western powers in complex humanitarian emergencies (the so-called CNN-effect; Livingston, 1997), there has been an increasing effort to combine theoretical perspectives on international communication and the role of the news media in foreign policy decision making. This involves both policy effects from the mediated flow of information between foreign policy actors (Final and Lord, 2000; Jakobsen, 2000; Van Belle, 2000) and the way that the media influences the domestic political context of foreign policy decision making (Brody, 1991; Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Powlick, 1995; Van Belle et al., 2004).
Development of Innovative FPA Methodology

We have previously mentioned the technological innovation of automated content analysis that is revolutionizing the field of leader assessment in FPA. But there are other methodological advances that should also be noted. A technological advance parallel to ProfilerPlus is the development of machine coding for events data, spearheaded by the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) project of the University of Kansas. KEDS codes to a modified WEIS scheme, and has amassed a very large events database that draws upon both regional and international press reports (Schrodt, 1995). The ICB Project of the first period has also demonstrated longevity, with a substantial body of research and a recent extension of the data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997).

Computer interfaces allow for more detailed process-tracing of decision making than was possible before. The decision board platform of the poliheuristic theory group, as noted above, has been able to use this new technology to observe what was previously unobservable, even in an experimental setting (Mintz, 1997). Text modeling and agent-based computational models have also been explored (Alker, Duffy, Hurwitz and Mallery 1991; Mallery, 1991; Mefford, 1991; Taber, 1997; Hammond and Axelrod, forthcoming).

There may be other methodologies on the horizon, as well. For example, Hudson, Schrodt, and Whitmer (2004) have attempted to develop a methodology that would allow for the uncovering of agent-formulated rules in foreign policy behavior. Noting that standard statistico-mathematical modeling is useful for only a small and simplified slice of social reality, they base their work on the premise that the human mind has evolved over eons to recognize rule-based agency in the noisy and complex time streams of social interaction. If so, then it should be possible to draw upon these capabilities in a more formal way to create new pattern recognition methodologies that would be of significant value to FPA researchers. Such a methodology would not depend upon quantification, and so could adapt for use variables at any level of measurement precision, including qualitative factors. Furthermore, while a formal methodology, it would be capable of capturing the agency inherent in foreign policy behavior.

Theory Development on Integration

One way of examining the task of integration is to examine the effects of change at one level of analysis on phenomena at a different level. One such research question in the mid-1990s was the examination of drastic international system change (e.g., the end of the Cold War), on nation-state foreign policy. Hermann’s International Studies Association presidential address in 1990 was a call for FPA and IR to consider this issue in tandem. Later, an edited volume on the topic appeared (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson, 1995). But the meaning of integration in FPA is arguably larger than questions of this type.

Attempts to integrate theory in the sense of channeling both material and ideational factors through the human decision-maker intersection are extremely rare. Part of the problem may be, echoing Rose (1998), that such integrative work demands country- or area-expertise. However, at least one integrative FPA project attempted to “shoot the moon”: to integrate across all levels of theory as well as to draw upon country/area expertise. This was the effort of the now-defunct CREON 2 project. Interestingly, although having met its fate several years ago, the empirical pinnacle of its research is only now making its way into print: the summer 2001 special issue of International Studies Review lays out its theoretical framework and empirical results.

CREON 2 envisioned a model in which the constraining and enabling elements of the international system and the national society, coupled with an analysis of the
situation at hand, would be routed through a theoretical component called the ultimate decision unit. Within this ultimate decision unit, one would find theoretical clusters corresponding roughly to those originally postulated set forth by the three founding research traditions of FPA: personality of individual decision makers, organizational setting, bargaining among groups, and so forth. This overall model would require inputs from country experts before it could be applied to any discrete situation. Since the principal investigators were not themselves country experts, they entered into scholarly collaboration with IR researchers who were. The result is a fascinating effort at radical integration of IR theory, while retaining an account of human agency at the center of the theoretical enterprise. One wonders if we will ever see its like again in IR theory.

Conclusion

The actor-specific theory of FPA provides the theoretical micro-foundations upon which actor-general IR theory may be grounded as a social science enterprise. Foreign Policy analysis offers significant contributions to IR, not only theoretical in nature, but substantive and methodological contributions as well. Because it takes as its premise that the ground of IR is human decision makers acting singly or in groups, foreign policy analysis is situated at the intersection of all social science and policy fields as they relate to international affairs. The inauguration of this new journal, Foreign Policy Analysis, is timely, for IR needs now to more fully reclaim its ability to manifest human agency, with its attendant change, creativity, accountability, and meaning. This reclamation will also prove useful, for actor-specific theory is the type of theory most suited to aid foreign policy decision making. To be able to inform the very process one studies is an important aspect of FPA.

The possibility and the progress of FPA, then, is of great worth to all who study international relations.

References


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