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APPROACHES, LEVELS, AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
CROSSING BOUNDARIES

Edited by Harvey Starr
To Bruce Russett

Teacher, mentor, colleague, friend, and most of all—inspiration—to us and to a discipline
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INTRODUCTION: THE FUTURE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TWO-LEVEL GAMES, AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LINKAGES

Harvey Starr

Crossing Boundaries

The subtitle of this edited volume, and its unifying theme, is crossing boundaries. In my view, scholars—not only in international relations (IR) but across the subfields of political science—have pursued research more fruitfully when their theory and research designs “cross boundaries” of various kinds. Boundaries can indicate the limits of some set of phenomena; such simplification and specification can be valuable in the development of theory, concepts, and research design. However, boundaries also often loom as barriers, which can hinder how we think about phenomena, how we theorize about phenomena, and how we study the world about us. As scholars we must be conscious of artificial boundaries or barriers that constrain our thinking, and be just as conscious of finding ways to promote fertile theory and effective research design. In this sense we should think of the crossing boundaries approach not as some new theory or theoretical approach, but rather as a synthesizing device that helps us in organizing theory and research.

Crossing boundaries is even more critical given that a number of issues or themes have relatively recently become central to the concern to scholars involved in the contemporary study of international relations. These
themes or issues have arisen in both the way scholars approach research in international relations and the very substance of that study. As such they are central to the future of the study of international politics or relations. Additionally, they reflect broader debates in the discipline of political science as a whole—the nature of Political Science subfields, a renewed attempt to more clearly specify the differences (and similarities!) between “qualitative” and “quantitative” research, the relationship of basic research to applied research, and the role of academics regarding policy analysis and advice.

In addition, we need to reflect more carefully on the complexity (especially the causal complexity) of the phenomena that we study. Current approaches to the analysis of international politics, in the words of Bear Braumoeller, reflect “theories that posit complex causation, or multiple causal paths.” These are the sorts of theories that “pervade the study of politics” (Braumoeller 2003, 209). Braumoeller’s attempts to develop appropriate methods to study causal complexity in terms of substitutability and conjunctural causality involve bridging different methodological traditions as in the quantitative-qualitative divide. His discussion includes all three components of what Most and Starr (1989, 9–11) call the “research triad” of logic, theory, and method. Taking a lead from Braumoeller (as well as the previous work of Most and Starr), we must recognize the existence of multiple complex causal paths, and tailor our research enterprise to deal with them. This will often involve a common logic of inference, such as proposed in King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). In other words, scholars of IR must learn how to cross boundaries in all aspects of the research process. In the study of international relations, and in politics as a whole, we must encourage analysts to incorporate multiple dimensions and approaches, and to cross other boundaries, such as levels of analysis.

For international relations scholars to cross levels of analysis downward (to state, societal, governmental, and individual levels), they must become more familiar with and understand the literature of Comparative Politics; and of course, the reverse is required as well. Recently, a number of IR scholars have been concerned with “dissolving boundaries,” the topic of a symposium in the December 2003 issue of International Studies Review. Introducing the issue, Werner, Davis, and Bueno de Mesquita (2003, 1) note thus:

The traditional boundaries drawn between comparative politics and international relations are dissolving. With only a few exceptions, international relations scholars acknowledge that “domestic politics matter” and matter much. Comparative politics scholars likewise recognize with increasing regularity that international politics influences relations within states.
Accordingly, a number of the essays in their special issue highlighted the need to cross boundaries between international and comparative politics. For example, Russett calls for “Reintegrating the Subdisciplines of International and Comparative Politics” (2003). Starting with Thucydides and Aristotle, he notes that the great writers on politics understood how what “we call international relations and comparative politics informed each other” (2003, 9). Indeed, I would argue that a trend toward this “reintegration” has been in progress since the introduction of transnational politics about 35 years ago. It gathered force in the work of James Rosenau (1990) on “turbulent systems” during the 1980s and 1990s. These were the precursors of the ongoing enterprise of looking at what were once considered to be realist questions from decidedly non–realist perspectives.

Numerous examples exist—involving conflict and cooperation, war and peace. In recent years we have seen the lines between international and comparative political economy breaking down—in both research and teaching. Scholars of conflict have come more and more to look at both internal and external forms of conflict, and their relationships (e.g., see Starr 1994). Starr (1994), Walt (1992), and Conge (1996), among others, have looked at the interrelationships between war and revolution. The current, and major, resurgence in the study of civil war is another example, as is the post–9/11 focus on terrorism and antiterrorism. Perhaps the most important and striking example is the work on the democratic peace.

A decade and a half of work on the democratic peace has led to a progressive research program, whose additive and integrative cumulation (see Russett and Starr 2000, Chernoff 2004) has led many scholars to understand the need to cross the boundaries between domestic and international politics. While the democratic peace refers specifically to the absence of large–scale interstate war between democracies, research into why this dyadic effect exists has led to the analysis of almost all forms of conflict and cooperation between democracies. Following even more of the implications of the theories behind the dyadic democratic peace has led, as well, to study of the monadic effects of democratic government on the behavior of states. As with previous research on international integration, the democratic peace has uncovered behaviors that a realist perspective would argue could not happen and would not happen. Such research programs violate a major assumption of classic Realism that domestic factors/conditions are not relevant to questions of security, war, and peace. This challenge applies not only to the democratic peace, but also to all the ways that the forms and dynamics of domestic governance affect the making of foreign policy and the international interactions of international actors.
Perhaps the best example of the blurring of the lines between international and domestic policy, and thus between international relations and comparative politics, is the emergence and importance of “two-level” games models. A two-level game approach also serves as a useful way to integrate the democratic peace, public opinion, and foreign policy, and the range of other ways that the domestic arena (society and government) affect and constrain the making of foreign policy. Introducing the idea of “two-level games” in his 1988 article, Robert Putnam explicitly linked the “win sets” of domestic politics to the success of diplomatic activities and the ratification of international agreements. As a comparativist, Putnam provided a fertile framework for crossing boundaries between the domestic and the foreign, the internal and the external. Another student of comparative politics, George Tsebelis (1990) presented a complementary model of “nested games,” which similarly linked political choices and strategic games across levels of analysis—across domestic and foreign policy.

Arguably the most extensive, and impressive work that links domestic factors to international policy (international relations) and internal policy (comparative politics) is that by a set of international relations scholars, Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues. Their work on *The Logic of Political Survival* (2003) is a broad-scale project based on the blurring both of international and comparative politics as well as the complex interaction of internal and external political processes. The two-level game perspective is evident in its focus on *strategic choice* in the interaction of decision makers and domestic political units in regard to domestic and foreign policy issues. This book crosses levels of analysis by dealing with two-level games as well as investigating the interactions among politics, economics, and the foreign policy making process (all within a context of democratic theory). Bueno de Mesquita et al. present a theory of political incentives and survival: “Political leaders need to hold office in order to accomplish any goal . . . We take it as axiomatic that everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime . . . We treat political survival as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for leaders to achieve other personal objectives” (2003, 7, 9, 23).

Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s model is based on the reality that every leader is kept in power by some group of sufficient size (the “winning coalition”) to prevail over the rest of the “selectorate” in addition to the disenfranchised. The logic of the model leads to what I think is its central dynamic—that “the size of the winning coalition determines whether policies have a public or private focus” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 104).
Leaders, all of whom face challengers who wish to depose them, maintain their coalitions of supporters by taxing and spending in ways that allocate mixes of public and private goods. That nature of the mix depends on the size of the winning coalition, while the total amount spent depends both on the size of the selectorate and on the winning coalition. (2003, 37; emphasis in the original)

The spirit of two-level games, as well as the growing recognition of the need to incorporate domestic and international aims, choices, factors, and processes has become extensive. So much so, that I dare to presume that this is the future of international relations. While the impressive edited volume by Michael Brecher and Frank Harvey, *Millennium Reflections on International Studies* (2002), asked a wide variety of scholars to think into the future, contributors were split into groupings that substantially excluded the boundary-crossing vision presented here. Other scholars are coming to recognize the complex causality with which we deal. The focus of the current volume, however, is not only the “why” behind this complexity, but how scholars can deal with it. To deal with multiple, complex causal paths, we must recognize the two-level nature of international phenomena, and the network of internal-external linkages. And to do so, we must cross boundaries. Included in this enterprise is the need to cross levels of analysis, to cross subdisciplines, and indeed, to cross disciplines.

A related development in political science is a resurgence in “qualitative” methods (e.g., the new Qualitative Methods Organized Section of the American Political Science Association), which aims to indicate the commonalities of the logic of inquiry across small-N and large-N studies, especially bridging the gap between comparative politics and international relations. To deal with complex causality, based in two-level phenomena, we need to develop and use all of the research methods at our command. That is, we need to cross the “qualitative” and “quantitative” divide as well, in the search for the most appropriate methods for the research question at hand. One final boundary must be crossed—the divide between basic research and policy analysis, which includes the incorporation of ethics in our discussions of policy. The Perestroika movement in Political Science, as well as the development of new journals by both the International Studies Association (International Studies Perspectives) and the American Political Science Association (Perspectives on Politics) indicate clearly and explicitly that scholars need to attend more to the normative and/or policy implications of their work.

As members of a community of scholars, most individuals do not have to attempt all of these boundary-crossing endeavors in one project, or even
across a single career. However, all of the contributors to this volume have had the good fortune to have studied under, or coauthored with, someone whose scholarly career exemplifies the unity of theory, method, and policy—Bruce Russett. Russett, the Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale, is best known as one of the founders of the empirical, analytic study of international relations and foreign policy, with pioneering work in methodology, data collection, and the application of economics to the field of international relations. Substantively, he has also played a major role in the study of integration as well as alliance and deterrence. He has studied a broad range of domestic influences on foreign and security policy in democratic polities. He has looked at the relationships between a number of domestic factors and foreign policy, including public opinion, ideology, governmental structure, domestic policy, and business. He was a pioneer in the study of the democratic peace. Both theoretically and empirically Russett expanded the agenda of the democratic peace, transforming it into the “Kantian peace.”

Russett’s work has also had a strong normative component, arising from an interest in the conditions and causes of war and peace. His association with Karl Deutsch at Yale both reinforced his scientific commitment and focused such concerns around the issues raised by the study of integration: what builds community among people, how group ties are created and maintained, how they can disintegrate, how they affect conflict and cooperation, and in what ways conflict should be conducted. As such, Russett also served as principal consultant to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops for the pastoral letter on war and peace.

The Chapters to Follow

Bruce Russett’s work has played a part in the development of all the contemporary themes and issues noted above, and especially to the enterprise of crossing boundaries. In honor of that work, this volume is dedicated to him. The chapters in this volume include original studies—new and important scholarly contributions—that address various combinations of these issues, theoretically and/or empirically. The chapters are a mixture of empirical studies and theoretical/conceptual essays. Some chapters employ quantitative methods of analysis; others a variety of qualitative or interpretive methods (including Licklider’s case oriented approach or Hurd’s textual analysis of the UN Charter).

However, all these studies “cross-boundaries,” and thus, in some sense, broaden their approach to international relations. As Art Stein notes in his chapter, “Crossing boundaries requires some sense of when and how to
integrate perspectives.” Five sections are used to organize the chapters, as discussed below. But, given that these chapters link theoretical concerns with the logic and methods of research design, some studies do not fit neatly into the different sections.

The first section is “Crossing Boundaries: Levels of Analysis.” Todd Allee and Paul Huth investigate three different explanations for agreements to territorial disputes. They find support for an “accountability model,” which is a model of strategic choice, based on the accountability of incumbent leaders and their survivability in office. As with Bueno de Mesquita et al., their work includes moving across levels of analysis—linking decision makers to the external policy environment. They also specifically cross the boundary between comparative and international politics. David Sylvan, in his chapter, makes a different attempt to cross boundaries and contextualize politics. Following Russett’s lead (taking a ‘macroscopic’ view), Sylvan takes a “meso-sopic” view of the fascinating issue of “world cities.” In this chapter, he wants to look at middle-level phenomena within the world economy. By crossing levels of analysis, Sylvan brings a whole new perspective to the study of comparative political economy and international relations (as well as comparative and international politics).

The second section of the book is “Crossing Boundaries: Domestic-External Dynamics, Democracy, and Peace.” Four chapters look at different aspects of the democratic peace, which is perhaps the major international relations research focus of the past two decades, and one that requires scholars to investigate the boundary-crossing interplay of political dynamics. It requires that scholars ask how the international structure and the process of international politics affect domestic structure and process, and the reverse. As Zeev Maoz comments in his chapter, “The democratic peace research program has done more . . . [than other studies] to eradicate the artificial wall that realists have constructed between domestic and international politics.” In his chapter, Maoz looks at one critique of the democratic peace, and he tests the proposition that democracy is a consequence, not a cause, of peace. While his findings support the democratic peace proposition, they also suggest that conflict can have effects that promote peace. John Oneal also returns to the basic democratic peace proposition, but uses directed dyads in his analyses in order to get at the crucial question of who initiates conflict. His results support the argument for the peaceful effects of democracy and trade. Roy Licklider shifts his concern to the applicability of democratic peace models and arguments to civil war—investigating the implications of the models for other conflict phenomena. Clearly merging comparative and international politics, he wants to look at the “mechanisms” that connect democracy and the renewal of civil war, and does so
through a process tracing, case oriented small-N study. He uncovers a clear role for democracy in the periods before the three civil wars studied. Finally, Starr steps back and argues that the democratic peace should be located as a subset of the more general processes that comprise theories of integration. This clearly crosses a variety of analytic boundaries, as integration theories, almost by definition, can be applied to social units at a variety of national and subnational levels. From this perspective, Starr links prosperity, stability, and the survival of new democracies to “legitimacy”—a central phenomenon in integration.

The third section also has four chapters that deal with “Crossing Boundaries: Domestic-External Dynamics and Foreign Policy.” The first two chapters, by Shoon Murray and by David Brulé and Alex Mintz investigate the dynamics between public opinion and foreign policy. Crossing boundaries into the field of political communication and political psychology, Murray investigates the conditions under which a president can “sell” his “narrative” of a conflict situation to produce a rally-round-the-flag effect. Brulé and Mintz, using Mintz’s poliheuristic theory, argue that president’s do not have a “blank check” from the public to use or not use force whenever they wish, but that presidents can be constrained away from nonforce options. Annalisa Zinn looks at these domestic-external dynamics by investigating the relationship between internal and external conflict. Like Licklider, she also uses the lessons of the democratic peace to look at civil violence within states. She finds that the Kantian triad, especially democracy, works within states as well as between states to dampen the probability of civil war. Finally, Art Stein wants to reconceptualize our approaches to the study of domestic-external dynamics, by arguing that we need to look at the international or external context in terms of “constraints” vs. “determinants.” By doing so, he can reassess the use of (and crossing) levels of analysis in the study of international relation.

The fourth section is “Crossing Boundaries: From Analysis to Policy.” Here, two chapters more explicitly look at ways in which theory and findings can be directed to policy questions and advice. They do so by looking at very different political phenomena. Miroslav Nincic investigates partisan identification and the “partisan gap” and their effects on support for war in the United States. He is specifically concerned with the “practical implications” of his findings for contemporary party politics. Ian Hurd, in contrast, focuses on the use of international organizations, specifically the United Nations and the role of the Security Council. Hurd argues that a correct understanding of the Security Council is required to properly analyze the war in Iraq, especially as it relates to the role of the UN and American policy. The reader will find that Stein’s concern with
“constraining” versus “determining” factors becomes very important in linking analysis to policy!

The final section follows directly from these policy concerns—“Crossing Boundaries: From Ethics to Policy.” Both chapters are concerned with the doctrine of just war, and the use of force in international politics. David Kinsella forcefully notes that while social science inquiry “may often appear dispassionate and detached from the pressing moral issues of our times . . . social scientists need not be.” Crossing the boundaries between policy and ethics, Kinsella uses Just-War theory as a framework to analyze and evaluate the post-9/11 U.S. war on terror. Brian Hehir takes both a broader and deeper look at the *jus in bello* component of Just-War theory “in public arguments surrounding U.S. military engagements.” Hehir brings together the strategic and normative dimensions of American foreign policy through analysis of the changing status of *jus in bello* as found in World War II, Vietnam, and the 1991 Gulf War.

A few final words of thanks are in order. I want to thank the contributors for their timely responses to my various (and frequent requests), and Bruce Russett for his advice. Thanks also to Mekell Mikell for her help in preparing the final manuscript. I especially want to thank David Pervin, our initial Editor at Palgrave Macmillan, for his encouragement and assistance in bringing this project to fruition.
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PART 1

CROSSING BOUNDARIES:
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 1

WHEN ARE GOVERNMENTS ABLE TO REACH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS? AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, 1919–1995

Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth

Introduction

It has been well documented that territorial disputes historically have been a frequent cause of international wars (e.g., Holsti 1991) and that among the various issues at stake in international disputes, the risk of armed conflict is perhaps greatest when the issue centers on conflicting claims to territory (e.g., Vasquez 1993, ch. 4; Hensel 2000; Senese and Vasquez 2003). Because territorial disputes often turn violent, it is imperative to understand not only why territorial disputes escalate to armed violence, but also when such disputes can be settled, thus averting future violence and bloodshed. Yet much of the scholarship on territorial disputes focuses on explaining when territorial disputes will escalate to crises and armed conflict. In turn, there has been relatively little scholarly work on processes of territorial conflict resolution (see however Simmons 1999, 2002; Hensel 2001; Mitchell 2002a). In this chapter, we seek to address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses about the international and domestic conditions that led
states to reach negotiated settlement agreements to end territorial disputes during the period 1919–1995.

Although in other research (Simmons 1999, 2002; Hensel 2001; Mitchell 2002a; Allee and Huth 2006, forthcoming) we and other scholars have studied the conditions associated with the settlement of territorial disputes through legal rulings issued by international arbitration panels or courts, here our attention is directed at peaceful settlements achieved through direct bilateral negotiations. In our view, there is a need for more theoretical and empirical work that identifies the types of situations in which states are most likely to resolve their disputes through direct negotiations. The most common method of resolving territorial disputes, in fact, is through direct bilateral talks between the two disputing parties. In fact, among the 348 territorial disputes in our data set, 147 are resolved through negotiated settlement agreements. In contrast, only 26 disputes are settled through international arbitration or adjudication (see Allee and Huth, forthcoming).

Therefore, in this chapter we develop and test three different explanations for the conclusion of settlement agreements in territorial disputes. The first explanation draws upon a realist theoretical approach and emphasizes power and security considerations, whereas the other two are domestic-level explanations drawn from the democratic peace literature. The first domestic-level approach (Accountability Model) emphasizes the domestic audience costs for political leaders that are associated with concession-making in international disputes, while the other domestic-level approach (Norms Model) focuses on norms of political bargaining held by high-level decision makers. Empirically, we find consistent support for at least one of the realist hypotheses. Furthermore, while we identify only limited support for the Norms Model, we find particularly strong support for the Accountability Model. The relative strength of accountability-based explanations is consistent with previous work on states’ negotiating behavior in territorial disputes (see Huth and Allee 2002). Interestingly, we find that accountability explanations are generally best at understanding why governments at times shy away from or find it difficult to reach negotiated agreements. Thus, to analyze an important question in international politics—the settlement of territorial disputes—most fully, analysts are required to cross boundaries, and look at the interaction of internal and external factors.

Theoretical Analysis

In this section, we describe three different theoretical approaches for explaining the settlement of territorial disputes. In particular, we consider why a pair of states who have competing claims to disputed territory would
decide to reach an agreement to settle the dispute during the course of a round of territorial negotiations. We begin with a realist model and then turn to the democratic peace literature for two different domestic-level models. For each model we begin by discussing its basic logic and then turn to hypotheses that build upon that logic.

**Realist Theoretical Approach**

A fundamental starting point for realist theorizing is that there is no generally recognized international actor with the authority and power to determine or enforce the settlement of international disputes among sovereign states. International anarchy does not mean that there is there a pervasive lack of political order in the international system. Instead, the term is meant to highlight the political reality that in a system of sovereign states, government leaders must ultimately rely on their own domestic and foreign policies to ensure their country’s military and territorial security, as they cannot rely upon a supranational authority to resolve disputes with other countries (e.g., Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001).

For realists, there is an important implication of anarchy that is particularly applicable here. Since ensuring military security is a critical policy goal, state leaders will assess the interests at stake in international disputes in terms of whether the outcomes of disputes will have military security implications for their country. When such security interests are at stake, state leaders can be expected to place a high priority on securing those vital interests. For example, in the context of territorial disputes, realists would expect states to assess the value of disputed territory in terms of whether control over territory would have important consequences for a country’s military security. Disputed territory with military and strategic value should be highly desired by state leaders; therefore, they should be expected to pursue tougher diplomatic and military policies in such disputes. Another consideration would be whether the dispute over territory would have implications for relations with military allies. Thus, states would seek to avoid damaging relations with allies over the resolution of disputed territory.

Another key theoretical foundation for realists is that domestic policy issues and political pressures are subordinated to the larger goals of ensuring the territorial integrity of the country and preserving its political independence. Because the consequences of suffering military and diplomatic defeats in international conflicts can be so severe, realists maintain that state leaders will give highest priority to achieving success in security policies at the expense, if necessary, of domestic policy goals and short-term
considerations of domestic political gains or losses. Ken Waltz (1988, 329) summarizes the realist position when he states, “In self-help systems the pressures of international competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures.”

A critical implication for realists is that domestic political variables and processes can be black-boxed and treated as if they do not produce any systematic effects on security and defense policy. As a result, when diplomatic and military policies in territorial disputes are analyzed, the role of domestic politics can be ignored in a realist model. That is, governments can be modeled as unitary rational actors seeking to advance security goals in international disputes without regard to differences in domestic political institutions and processes.

A final critical premise of realist theoretical analysis is that the threat or use of military force is the most important single source of influence in international relations, and therefore is a critical source of bargaining leverage for state leaders involved in international disputes. Realists generally argue that relative military strength is a fungible resource that supports the foreign policy goals of governments in a wide range of issue areas. As a result, maintaining or acquiring military strength is deemed a central policy goal of all governments since it can contribute to policy success in a broad range of substantive issues that might be disputed with other governments (Mearsheimer 2001, 33–35). While other analysts have argued that the political value of the threat or use of military force is not equally effective in support of foreign policy goals across all issue areas (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977; Baldwin 1985; Lamborn 1997), realists would argue that military force is particularly effective in support of state policy goals in disputes in which disputed territory is at stake because military victory often translates into control of territory. Territorial disputes, then, should be a general class of international disputes in which relative military strength should be a very important variable in explaining state behavior.

Two implications follow from this final premise. First, state leaders should be selective in threatening or using force in international disputes so as to avoid overextending their country’s military capabilities. As a result, realists would expect that state leaders should generally be risk-averse to placing themselves in the vulnerable strategic position of having to respond with military force in multiple international conflicts. The second implication is that the threat of force serves as backdrop to negotiations and therefore states bargain with each other understanding that the option of military force is available if negotiations end in failure.

Realist Hypotheses on Settlement Agreements
Drawing on this summary of the general logic of realism, we derive a series of hypotheses about the (un)willingness of state leaders to settle territorial
disputes through direct bilateral negotiations. The first set of hypotheses focuses on the role played by relative military strength in concluding settlement agreements.

**R1:** Negotiated settlement agreements over disputed territory are more likely as the disparity in military power increases between the disputants.

**R2:** Negotiated settlement agreements over disputed territory are more likely when both disputants are engulfed in military confrontations with other states.

The logic of **R1** is that realists expect states with a military advantage in territorial dispute to be in a favorable bargaining position to pressure their adversary into making concessions. The reason for this is that states with a military advantage can credibly threaten the use of military force to secure territorial gains. The weaker party recognizes this as a credible threat, and therefore should be more willing to make concessions to avoid a military defeat and the costs of war. As a result, realists expect that when state leaders sit down to negotiate, the anticipated outcome of a military conflict serves as a critical backdrop to the bargaining even though no military threats are issued. This suggests that as the relative military power of states increases, its leaders should be more confident that their country’s military strength will provide leverage in talks. Therefore, they should become more intransigent while, in contrast, an increasingly weak adversary should be more likely to offer territorial concessions. Conversely, in negotiations in which relative parity exists in military power, settlement agreements should be more difficult to reach as neither party may be willing to offer extensive concessions to avoid a military confrontation as neither party should feel it is in a weak military position.

To test **R1**, we employ a variable that captures the degree to which the military capabilities of the two states differs from parity. This variable is drawn from our measure of relative military capabilities for each state in a territorial dispute (see Huth and Allee 2002). This original variable ranges from 0 to 1, with values near 0.5 indicating a situation of military parity (and values near 0 and 1 indicating a significant advantage for one state). We subtract the original variable from 0.5 to capture the degree to which one side in the dispute has an advantage over the other.

For **R2** the logic is that both parties in the territorial dispute have incentives to accommodate each other in order to maximize their relative military strength in ongoing military confrontations with other countries. Given their relatively vulnerable strategic position due to other pressing security threats, a settlement of their territorial dispute through mutual concessions would help to improve their military position in their ongoing military conflicts. That is, a settlement agreement should enable political and military leaders to shift military resources to the immediate threat they
face by removing their former territorial adversary as a potential second front for a military conflict. To create the variable used to test $R2$, we first identify the beginning and end month and year of any war or militarized dispute in which either the challenger or the target was involved, other than the territorial dispute between them. We then construct two dummy variables—one for the challenger and one for the target—with a value of one indicating that the state is simultaneously involved in a military campaign elsewhere. To create our final operational measure, we simply aggregate these two dummy variables.

The next hypothesis focuses on the role played by common security interests in reaching settlement agreements.

$R3$: Negotiated settlement agreements over disputed territory are more likely when states share common security interests.

States that share common security interests have strong incentives to avoid severe conflicts among themselves in order to ensure cooperation against a common security threat. Whereas some states are able to rely largely on their own diplomatic and military means to achieve foreign policy goals, often states find it necessary to form alliances to counter international threats. Having allies can enhance a country’s security position when the ally takes on commitments of direct military and diplomatic support, provides assurances to not oppose that country in the event of war, or provides arms and aid to build up military capabilities. Given these types of security benefits, realists would argue that allies would be careful to avoid escalating territorial disputes to high levels of diplomatic or military conflict and to instead strongly prefer that disputes be resolved through negotiations and mutual concessions. That is, accommodative policies should be accepted as the necessary price to pay for ensuring that states maintain the support of their allies against other security threats. As a result, among allies negotiations should be marked by more frequent concessions and a greater likelihood of settlement agreements being reached. To test $R3$, we create a variable that captures whether the two sides currently have a defense pact or entente military alliance. The updated COW data set on interstate alliances is used to code this variable.

The final hypothesis centers on the strategic value of territory and its implications for negotiations and dispute settlement.

$R4$: Negotiated settlement agreements over disputed territory are less likely when territory of strategic value is at stake for either state.

Securing strategically valuable territory should be a highly salient policy goal for state leaders in territorial disputes. Given the importance of securing such territory, leaders should be resolved in negotiations to bargain very hard and adopt a more inflexible position of offering few if any territorial concessions. As a result, agreements should be more be difficult to
conclude as reciprocal concessions are less likely, since the state seeking strategically valuable territory should hold out for terms of an agreement that enable it to control the strategic territory. Our operational measure for \( R4 \) is taken from our data set on territorial claims (see Huth and Allee 2002).

**Political Accountability Theoretical Approach**

In the democratic peace literature, several theoretical analyses rely upon the accountability of political leaders as a primary motivation for behavior in international disputes (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001; Schultz 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Accordingly, in the first of our two theoretical frameworks that center on domestic political institutions and processes, we focus on the accountability of incumbent leaders to domestic political opposition as a determinant of dispute settlement. According to this model, leaders are likely to reach settlement agreements when they are relatively less constrained by domestic political institutions.

One of the logical foundations of the Political Accountability approach is that a critical goal of incumbent leaders is to maintain their position of political leadership and to protect their hold on office from political opposition. Political leaders are expected to be strategic in their pursuit of both domestic and foreign policies and to try and anticipate the domestic political responses to various policies they might adopt. Leaders generally should not be expected to choose policies that might produce high political costs; they should instead prefer policies that will maintain, if not improve, their political standing.

At the same time, political opposition will act strategically in deciding when to challenge incumbents and seek their removal. For example, counterelites and political opposition should be more active in challenging incumbents when the latter’s foreign policy initiatives have failed or proven controversial (see e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 2000). In territorial disputes the policy preferences of opposition elites and groups are often characterized by what we have termed a “pragmatic nationalist bias” (see Huth and Allee 2002, ch. 4). In other words, we believe that a policy of unilateral concessions by state leaders in a territorial dispute is a policy that generally risks greater domestic political opposition than a policy of continued diplomatic stalemate. This is because opposition elites and mass publics will seek to punish leaders who adopt controversial or failed foreign policies.

Another important premise is that differences in domestic political institutions lead to varying levels of political accountability, since differences in
political institutions affect the ability of opposition groups to contest government policies. Thus, it is commonly argued that democratic leaders are typically more accountable for their foreign policy choices. This is because political opposition in democratic regimes is generally more capable of derailing policy programs and removing leaders from power due to institutions such as well-organized and independent political parties, regular competitive elections, and independent legislatures.

**Political Accountability Hypotheses on Settlement Agreements**

Our first accountability hypothesis focuses on the comparison between the negotiating behavior of democratic and nondemocratic governments in territorial disputes.

**PA1**: Negotiated settlement agreements in territorial disputes are less likely between democratic states while more likely between authoritarian states.

While at first this hypothesis may seem counterintuitive, the logic is that when foreign policy leaders in both states face political opposition forces that are in relatively strong positions to hold them responsible for pursuing policies in territorial disputes that prove controversial, we should expect such decision makers to be particularly wary of offering concessions to settle territorial disputes. As a result, democratic leaders should be more worried about the domestic audience costs of settlement agreements that include substantial concessions compared to their nondemocratic counterparts. Thus, in territorial disputes between democratic states, while leaders are unlikely to engage in military confrontations over disputed territory and generally should favor negotiations, they will still find it difficult to bring an end to negotiations through concessions easily and quickly. In contrast, in disputes between authoritarian states we would expect political and military leaders to be more willing to pursue risky and controversial policies that include both using force more frequently and settling disputes through major concessions. To test **PA1**, we utilize a dummy variable that captures whether both disputants possess democratic political institutions. Those regimes that have a Polity net-democracy score of +6 or higher are classified as having strong democratic political institutions (Jaggers and Gurr 1995).

We now consider a series of hypotheses that focus on the history of diplomatic and military conflict between territorial adversaries and the domestic political implications of such conflicts for both democratic and nondemocratic states. One hypothesis (**PA2**) focuses on prior diplomatic conflict, while the other hypothesis (**PA3**) considers a history of military conflicts.
Negotiated settlement agreements in territorial disputes are less likely between states that have a history of repeated stalemates in negotiations. Negotiated settlement agreements in territorial disputes are less likely between states that have a history of prior military conflicts.

The common logic supporting both these hypotheses is that high levels of diplomatic and military conflict with a territorial adversary is likely to generate a political dynamic in each country in which governments and even the political opposition converge on denouncing the adversary as inflexible, lacking legitimate grounds for claiming territory, and posing a security threat. The result is that nationalist rhetoric is more likely to be invoked and hard-line policies accepted as legitimate and necessary across much of the political spectrum. In this domestic context, offering concessions to reach a settlement agreement becomes particularly difficult as political opposition is likely to denounce such a policy and actively seek to prevent ratification of any such agreement.

In the case of diplomatic conflict and a history of stalemated negotiations, this would suggest that the pathway to settlement agreements is not one in which repeated failures of negotiations are abruptly reversed by settlement agreements containing major concessions by one or both sides. Instead, a more incremental process of limited concessions or progress on secondary issue—which is then followed by more substantial concessions on the central territorial issues—would be a more desirable path to settlement agreements. The reasoning is that from a domestic political perspective, governments are likely to be sensitive to the domestic political risks of what would seem like a major reversal of policy by suddenly reaching a settlement after repeated stalemates. Instead, it would seem advantageous to manage the domestic controversy of reaching a settlement agreement by moving more slowly through a sequence of negotiations, in which limited progress provides an opportunity to the government to prepare domestic audiences for more substantial concessions in a final agreement.

To capture the states’ history of past stalemates in previous rounds of negotiations, we code a variable that captures the number of consecutive negotiated stalemates that have occurred in the past five years. A previous round of talks is coded as ending in stalemate if neither side made even minor territorial concessions to the other government. In addition, the two sides are coded as having a history of armed conflict if they have experienced at least five militarized conflicts during the past two decades. Several sources are used to identify militarized confrontations, including the Correlates of War data set on militarized interstate disputes (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996), the International Crisis Behavior data set (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 1997), and data on military confrontations over disputed territory (Huth and Allee 2002).

Democratic Norms Theoretical Approach

Our third and final theoretical model is the Democratic Norms Model. This approach, like the Political Accountability Model, is also well established in the democratic peace literature (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994; Raymond 1994, 1996; Slaughter 1995; Russett and Oneal 2001; Huth and Allee 2003, ch. 5). More precisely, the Norms Model points to standards and principles that characterize domestic political competition and examines how those standards and principles might affect the external behavior of state leaders.

A key premise of this theoretical approach is that decisions by political leaders regarding coercion and accommodation in situations of domestic political conflict are influenced by prevailing norms regarding the legitimacy of different tactics and strategies of political bargaining. For our purposes, the term “political norms” refers to principles or standards concerning which political actions and behaviors are viewed as legitimate when engaging in political competition and seeking to resolve political conflict. Theoretically, norms are important because they can help to explain why individuals and groups engage in consistent patterns of political behavior. Indeed, if political norms are strongly held and widely shared among members of a political system, it is to be expected that certain patterns of political behavior will emerge based on generally accepted principles. In any political system, conflicts of interest arise over state policies and competition for control of positions of political power and authority. Political norms refer to the beliefs that are widely accepted by political leaders regarding the legitimacy of coercion and compromise with political opponents as well as respect for legal institutions and the rule of law in regulating competition and potentially settling political disputes.

It is important to note that in the Democratic Norms Model theoretical analysis is focused on the beliefs and principles of political bargaining accepted by political elites and high-level decision makers (also see Huth and Allee 2003, ch. 5). The reason for this is that a focus on political elite norms helps to maintain a more direct theoretical relationship between norms and political decisions in international disputes by analyzing those who have decision-making authority and power.

A second premise is that domestic political institutions structure political conflict and therefore provide incentives to political elites to resolve conflict in particular ways. Scholars of comparative politics have long recognized that relatively stable and ending domestic political institutions
help to establish the prevailing “rules” for strategic interaction among political elites (e.g., Powell 1982, 2000; Lijphart 1984; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). Politicians who disregard these rules face various sanctions and risk political defeat, whereas those political elites who skillfully use the rules are more likely to be successful and to achieve positions of leadership. As a result, these formal and informal rules regulating political competition are likely to gain acceptance among political elites as legitimate principles regarding how to bargain and compete for positions of political influence and power.

One important implication of this second premise is that basic differences between democratic and authoritarian political institutions should result in different political norms of bargaining among political leaders in each political system. As many comparative politics scholars have argued, norms of restrained competition, tolerance of political opposition, and acceptance of the rule of law are benchmarks of political elite beliefs in well-established democratic systems. In contrast, in very authoritarian systems, which are marked by repression of political opposition, elite norms of political bargaining are much more likely to include acceptance of coercion, disdain for legal restraints, and an unwillingness to compromise on a regular basis with political opposition (e.g., Powell 1982; Lijphardt 1984; Przeworski; et al. 2000). In sum, the stronger and more established are democratic political institutions, the more likely are norms of bargaining among political leaders to include

1. an unwillingness to rely on threats or the use of violence as a means to compel political opponents;
2. a greater level of respect for the rule of law and legal institutions in regulating political competition and in resolving political conflicts; and
3. a greater willingness to compromise with political opposition.

A third premise of the democratic norms approach is that norms of political bargaining accepted by political leaders in situations of domestic political conflict and competition should also shape the bargaining strategies adopted by these leaders in international disputes. The reason for expecting this is that well-established political norms are viewed as constituting fundamental components of a political elite’s belief system about how to manage political conflict. These normative principles and standards then serve as stable and important reference points for leaders in judging what actions to take in a diverse set of decision-making situations (e.g., Kahneman 1992). As a result, domestic norms regarding the legitimacy of political compromise, the violent resolution of political disputes, and
respect for the rule of law are core beliefs that political elites should be expected to draw upon when they become engaged in international disputes and bargaining with international adversaries.

Democratic Norms Hypotheses on Settlement Agreements

Two hypotheses can be developed regarding the relationship between domestic political norms and the willingness to reach agreements to settle territorial disputes.

**DN1:** Negotiated settlement agreements over disputed territory are more likely between states that share strong democratic norms as opposed to states that have weak democratic norms.

**DN2:** In the wake of prior stalemates in negotiations, settlement agreements over disputed territory are more likely between states with strong democratic norms as opposed to states with weak democratic norms.

Both these hypotheses share a logic that political norms of conflict resolution differ substantially between leaders of states with strong democratic traditions when compared with leaders in repressive authoritarian regimes. As a result, patterns of negotiating behavior and reaching settlement agreements should vary when comparing democratic dyads to authoritarian dyads. If both states share democratic norms of political bargaining, then we would expect both parties to prefer negotiations and mutual concessions as the way to resolve political conflict. As a result, we should expect that negotiations would lead to concessions being exchanged and settlement agreements being reached over fewer rounds of talks after it becomes clear that neither side will easily concede and offer large unilateral concessions. In contrast, stalemates in negotiations and difficulties in concluding settlement agreements should be greatest when the leaders of two highly repressive political systems confront one another. In these territorial disputes, both parties should be disinclined to offer concessions to break diplomatic deadlocks due to strong beliefs in the efficacy of force as a means to coerce concessions from the adversary. Thus, initial failures of negotiations should be followed by a greater willingness to turn to military threats and the use of force in attempts to coerce the adversary into making territorial concessions.

To test PN1 and PN2, we rely upon a measure of democratic norms that is conceptually and operationally distinct from the Polity-based measures used to test PA1. Once again, the Norms Model focuses on the importance of legitimate patterns of domestic political competition and compromise, and the way in which internal political disagreements are dealt with by ruling elites within a polity. Therefore, to capture the degree
to which states uphold democratic political norms, we look at the way in which domestic political disputes are typically handled. In particular, we identify how frequently each state in the territorial dispute experienced violent political conflict during the past two decades. That is, in how many of the past 20 years did ruling elites employ violence against nonelites or against other high-level elites? Dyads with strong democratic norms are those in which both sides experienced internal violence for fewer than 5 of the past 20 years. On the other hand, dyads with weak democratic norms are those in which both states witnessed elite-sponsored violence for at least 15 of the past 20 years. Likewise, to test $PN_2$, we interact our measure for dyads with strong democratic norms with the aforementioned variable that captures the degree to which the states have experienced stalemates in previous rounds of talks (see the description of $PA_2$). We also include this stalemate term in the model on its own, as a control variable.

**Empirical Findings**

We now turn to an evaluation of the explanatory power of the three theoretical models discussed above. Before doing so, it is useful to briefly identify a few additional features of our data and the empirical models being estimated. To test the hypotheses discussed above, we utilize our data set on claims to disputed territory during the period 1919–1995 (Huth and Allee 2002). Within this data set, there are 348 territorial disputes, 147 of which are resolved through bilateral settlement agreements. It is these 147 negotiated territorial settlements that we are trying to predict.

It is also useful to note that rounds of negotiations over disputed territory serve as our unit of analysis for examining decisions to reach negotiated settlement agreements. This is because decisions to reach bilateral settlements always emerge from a round of negotiations. Put differently, state leaders must be negotiating over the disputed issue in order for them to make the necessary progress that could lead to a formal settlement. For each round of talks, we identify whether that round of talks results in an agreement to end the territorial dispute. Therefore, our dependent variable is effectively dyadic in nature. That is, we are simply interested in knowing whether states reach a bilateral settlement agreement. Here neither do we capture the precise terms of the agreement, nor do we look to see which disputing state makes greater concessions in leading to the agreement.

In total, the disputing states engage in more than 1,500 rounds of negotiations intended to resolve the disputed territorial issue. We actually analyze 1,447 rounds of negotiations, due to the omission of a few dozen rounds of talks that occur during or right after violent military conflict, or
talks that occasionally follow-up after a settlement agreement has been reached. In addition, we also exclude those approximately 30 rounds of talks that end with a decision to settle the dispute through international arbitration or adjudication.  

Because disputing states hold an average of five rounds of negotiations throughout the course of a dispute, we also must acknowledge the fact that these negotiations across the life of the dispute are not fully independent. We address this issue in part through our hypotheses and variables, such as those that capture the past negotiating history of the dispute (PN2 and PA3). Furthermore, we also consider a variety of estimation features that capture the relatively minor temporal and cross-sectional properties of our data. In terms of error structure, we first employ Huber-White standard errors when estimating the various logit models reported below and finally settled on the use of logit models in which the standard errors are clustered by dispute. We also estimate a parallel set of generalized estimating equations (GEE) models with a logit link. In all cases, the results from the various GEE models are nearly identical to the results using robust or clustered standard errors. Finally, given the fact that negotiated settlements effectively terminate or end the territorial dispute, some type of time-duration model might seem appropriate. The problem, however, is that these models typically require (balanced) time-series data, which we do not have. We could transform our data into a series of annual observations for each dispute, although we know that the states in our data set fail to negotiate in nearly 75 percent of the years in our sample.

In moving to the actual estimation of the logit models, we first estimate a single logit model to evaluate the realist hypotheses (table 1.1). We then estimate two related logit models for both the Political Accountability Model, as well as for the Political Norms Model (see tables 1.3 and 1.5, respectively). When testing the explanatory power of the two domestic politics models, we also include the realist variables in the regression equation. This is because we do not necessarily view the domestic and realist models as incompatible, but rather view the realist variables as a baseline to which additional domestic political factors might be important. In turn, we do not believe that theoretical models of domestic politics should rule out the importance of international political and security considerations. In addition, given the number of supported findings for the Realist and Political Accountability Models, we also present a series of predicted probability estimates, in order to ascertain the substantive importance of statistically significant variables from each model (see tables 1.2 and 1.4, respectively).
Turning to the statistical findings, we begin with the results for the realist model in tables 1.1 and 1.2. Of the four hypotheses tested, only R2 is clearly supported indicating that when leaders from both governments find themselves confronting the threat of military conflicts with other states, they are more likely to reach settlement agreements with each other in negotiations over disputed territory. In table 1.2 we see that the likelihood of a settlement agreement increases by close to 7 percent under such conditions. The results for two other hypotheses (R3 and R4) are only weakly supportive. That is, in table 1.1 the reported coefficients are in the expected direction but the statistical significance levels are not strong ($p > .10$), and in table 1.2 the substantive effects of these two variables are modest. For example, we find that when disputed territory is of strategic value (R4) the likelihood of a settlement agreement drops by about 2 percent, while the chances of reaching a settlement agreement increases by close to 3 percent among military allies (R3). Finally, the hypothesis that negotiated settlement agreements are more likely as the disparity in military power increases between states (R1) is not supported at all by the results in table 1.1. In fact, the coefficient is negative (though not statistically significant) suggesting that negotiated settlement agreements are more likely as

### Table 1.1 Logit Model of Negotiated Settlement Agreements to Territorial Disputes: Realist Theoretical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imbalance of military capabilities</td>
<td>$-0.903 (0.639)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states are currently involved in other militarized disputes</td>
<td>$0.632^*$ (0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory is of strategic value to at least one state</td>
<td>$-0.271 (0.226)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are military allies</td>
<td>$0.289 (0.233)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$-2.30\dagger (0.256)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
- $^* p < .05$ (one-tailed)
- $\dagger p < .01$ (two-tailed)

- Number of Observations: 1447
- Log pseudo-likelihood: $-440.54$
- F-test of all Realist variables $\chi^2$ (4df): 10.19 ($p = .04$)
the balance of military power approaches parity. Overall, these findings suggest that realist variables provide only limited insights into understanding when territorial disputes are likely to be resolved by settlement agreements. In the remaining statistical tests that focus on the Accountability and Norms Models (tables 1.3–1.5) this pattern of results for the realist variables remains quite stable.

The next set of findings to discuss are in tables 1.3 and 1.4 and relate to the hypotheses tested from the Political Accountability Model. In general, the findings are quite supportive. For example, as posited in PA1 in disputes between democratic states it is more difficult to reach negotiated settlement agreements. The coefficient on democratic dyad variable is negative and significant in models 1 and 3 of table 1.3. Conversely, the coefficient for nondemocratic dyads is positive though not always statistically significant. In table 1.4 we find that negotiated settlement agreements are about 5 percent less likely between democratic states while 3 percent more likely between nondemocratic states. The second set of findings is that a history of diplomatic and military conflict reduces the likelihood of settlement agreements, as expected in PA2 and PA3. For both hypotheses the coefficients are negative and significant in model 3 of table 1.3. Enduring rivals with a history of recurrent military conflicts are close to 11 percent less likely to reach

### Table 1.2: The Impact of Changes in Realist Variables on the Predicted Probability of a Negotiated Settlement Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realist variables</th>
<th>Impact on probability of settlement agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imbalance in military capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/50 balance to 90/10 advantage</td>
<td>$-0.037$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states are currently involved in other militarized disputes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory is of strategic value</td>
<td>$-0.020$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are military allies</td>
<td>$+0.026$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

Variables in **Bold** are Statistically Significant in table 1.1. The baseline (pre-change) probability of a Negotiated Settlement Agreement is .090 in all cases, except for the comparison of an imbalance in military capabilities, in which case the baseline probability is .111.

In performing all predicted probability calculations, all variables but the variable of interest are held at median values.
Table 1.3 Logit Model of Negotiated Settlement Agreements to Territorial Disputes: Political Accountability Theoretical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realist hypotheses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbalance in military capabilities</td>
<td>-.962</td>
<td>-.657</td>
<td>-1.27†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.628)</td>
<td>(.668)</td>
<td>(.630)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states are currently involved in other militarized disputes</td>
<td>.672 ***</td>
<td>.669 **</td>
<td>.684 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.290)</td>
<td>(.280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory is of strategic value to at least one state</td>
<td>-.265</td>
<td>-.244</td>
<td>-.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.225)</td>
<td>(.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are military allies</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.231)</td>
<td>(.235)</td>
<td>(.214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Political Accountability hypotheses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states have strong democratic institutions (democratic dyad—accountability)</td>
<td>-.605 **</td>
<td>-.565 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.350)</td>
<td>(.360)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither state has strong democratic institutions (Nondemocratic dyad—accountability)</td>
<td>.343*</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.215)</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are enduring rivals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.67 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemates in past negotiations (Number of consecutive stalemates in past five years)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- .626 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.02††</td>
<td>-2.30††</td>
<td>-1.52††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.213)</td>
<td>(.256)</td>
<td>(.250)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (one-tailed)
† p < .05; †† p < .01 (two-tailed)
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by dispute
Number of Observations 1447 1447 1447
Log pseudo-likelihood -438.41 -438.94 -407.54
F-test of all Political Accountability variables $\chi^2$ (4df) 45.93 (p = .00)

settlement agreements, as are states that have a record of repeated stalemates in prior negotiations according to the results in table 1.4.

Finally, in table 1.5 we consider the results for the Political Norms Model. The findings here are mixed for the individual hypotheses tested and overall the political norms variables collectively are not significant according to the F-test (5.17, p = .16). The first hypothesis DN1 produces mixed results. One the one hand, settlement agreements are somewhat less likely between leaders from nondemocratic states, as expected. On the other hand, there is no systematic pattern of democratic leaders being more likely to reach settlement agreements. The coefficient on the democratic
dyad variable flip flops from positive to negative across models 1 and 3. The second hypothesis (DN2) was that democratic leaders would be more likely than their nondemocratic counterparts to respond to prior stalemates in negotiations by shifting to a policy of reciprocal concessions resulting in a greater chance of settlement agreements. While the coefficient on the interaction term between democratic dyads and stalemates is positive and marginally significant in model 3 as expected, the net substantive effect is negligible once the negative values on the individual coefficients for the democratic dyad and stalemate variables are subtracted from the coefficient on the interaction term. As a result, it is not possible to conclude that settlement agreements are more likely among democratic dyads following prior stalemated negotiations.

**Conclusion**

We began this chapter by arguing that much of the existing research on territorial disputes has been focused on understanding why they are more likely to escalate into military confrontations and war compared with other types of international disputes. This is an important question to address but
one consequence of this focus on military conflict is that our understanding of when territorial disputes are actually settled peacefully through negotiations is limited. In this chapter, we have laid out alternative approaches to analyzing the resolution of territorial disputes that cut across different levels of analysis, subfields, and theoretical approaches in the study of international relations. The realist model emphasizes the importance of the international security context and the balance of military power when explaining bargaining behavior in negotiations, whereas the Political Accountability and Political Norms Models shift attention to the domestic level and how domestic institutions shape the negotiating behavior of political and military leaders.

### Table 1.5 Logit Model of Negotiated Settlement Agreements to Territorial Disputes: Political Norms Theoretical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realist hypotheses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbalance in military capabilities</td>
<td>-.936</td>
<td>-1.15†</td>
<td>-1.15†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.646)</td>
<td>(.650)</td>
<td>(.618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states are currently involved in other militarized disputes</td>
<td>.612 **</td>
<td>.604 **</td>
<td>.598 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.279)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory is of strategic value to at least one state</td>
<td>-.267</td>
<td>-.298 *</td>
<td>-.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.225)</td>
<td>(.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States are military allies</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.316 *</td>
<td>.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.232)</td>
<td>(.227)</td>
<td>(.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Political Norms hypotheses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states have strong democratic norms (Democratic dyad—norms)</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.219)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither state has strong democratic norms (Nondemocratic dyad—norms)</td>
<td>-.549 **</td>
<td>-.496 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.277)</td>
<td>(.275)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both states have strong democratic norms * stalemates in past negotiations</td>
<td>.407 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.293)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control for stalemates in past negotiations (Number of consecutive stalemates in past five years)</td>
<td>-.809 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.172)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.13††</td>
<td>-1.90††</td>
<td>-1.50††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.217)</td>
<td>(.226)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

* * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (one-tailed)
† * p < .10; †† p < .01 (two-tailed)

- Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by dispute
- Number of Observations 1447 1447 1447
- Log pseudo-likelihood -440.28 -437.57 -420.52
- F-test of all Political Norms variables $\chi^2$ (3df) 5.17 ($p = .16$)
The results of our statistical tests suggest that domestic political variables are more central to understanding the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes than are realist variables, thus reinforcing the need to cross-boundaries regarding internal and external politics. The empirical findings also favor the Accountability Model over the Political Norms Model, which is consistent with our previous findings (Huth and Allee 2002) that there are often substantial domestic political risks and controversies associated with the process of peaceful dispute resolution. The Accountability Model is sensitive to these domestic audience costs and treats them as central to theoretical analysis whereas both the Realist and Political Norms Models fail to do so.

These empirical findings and conclusions are relevant to larger debates among IR scholars in two areas. First, we agree with many analysts within the democratic peace tradition that the domestic level of analysis is essential to consider in the study of international conflict despite realist contentions that domestic political processes and conditions are of secondary importance. Second, within the democratic peace literature, our findings support those who argue that political accountability models provide greater explanatory power than political norms theoretical approaches.

Notes
1. For example, states are less likely to be attacked if they have allies (Leeds 2003) and they are more likely to win wars if they have allies (see Stam 1996 and Reiter and Stam 2002).
2. This conception of norms is shared by many constructivists in the study of international relations such as Kratochwil 1989; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999, ch. 6; and Finnemore 2004.
3. The relevant data on violent leadership changes, military coups, coup attempts, military revolts, political purges by incumbent regimes, and civil wars are compiled from multiple sources (e.g., Cross-Polity Data Set; Thompson 1973; Vanhanen 1979; Small and Singer 1982; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).
4. The inclusion or exclusion of these arbitration and adjudication cases has no substantive impact on our findings and conclusions.
Over 30 years ago, Bruce Russett argued that “political research, and especially research on international politics, has too much neglected the environment of politics . . . too much effort has gone into examining the ways in which choices are made . . . rather than . . . what possible choices were in fact available.” Instead, he urged “a macroscopic view” of international politics focusing on “social, economic, and technological factors” determining what was possible and impossible for decision makers (Russett 1974a, 33). However, since the number of potentially relevant factors was enormous, as were the ways in which those factors in fact constrained choices, it was necessary for scholars to proceed, in part, by induction: starting with broad patterns and then proceeding both with “detailed analysis” and with explicit deductive theorizing (Russett 1974a, 42–45). A search for correlational patterns was in this sense not some type of “barefoot empiricist” substitute for other types of research but, ideally, an adjunct and spur to them.

Russett’s proposal was only to a very limited degree taken up by others. In certain subfields—I am thinking of work on the “democratic peace”—the patterns discovered by him and his coauthors have led in exactly the two directions (theory and close detail) one would hope. In other subfields, however, the situation is different. This is especially the case in international political economy, an area that has eschewed any search for correlational patterns, focusing instead, with almost clockwork regularity every
few years, on general claims about certain ubiquitous phenomena: regimes, institutions, epistemic communities, hegemonic stability, the role of ideas and norms, and so forth. Obviously, research about these phenomena has helped to shed light on particular situations; just as obviously, though, this kind of focus makes it difficult to study broad patterns of correlations, which may account for the fact that when a new concept comes into vogue, older research is often reinterpreted terminologically rather than integrated theoretically.

Can this tendency be counteracted? In principle, it would be useful to do so, as a way of getting a sense of some general patterns in the international political economy. Clearly, though, research in the twenty-first century cannot simply content itself with correlations among the kind of aggregate data series whose gathering and systematizing launched the behavioral revolution. Instead, we can look for patterns in particular types of significant middle-level phenomena, those which, together, can be seen as making up the international political economy. One such set of phenomena is certain types of places (cf. Agnew 2003). Capital flows and labor migration, for example, are not simply to rich or poor countries, or to continents or broad regions (e.g., “Western Europe”), but to particular places: provinces, districts, cities, even neighborhoods. Moreover, from a political point of view, certain of those places are significant less because they serve as catchment basins for various types of resources than because they are endowed with institutional decision-making authority and because the exercise of that authority has various relations with those resource flows: aiming to attract certain flows, managing the consequences of the flows, and so forth. Locales thus have a significance as particular interlocking relationships: specific places have, in effect, their own political economy, one that connects with global patterns, that involves decision making, but that is a distinct level of analysis.

This level of analysis is not the same as the famous “mid-range” theory connecting abstract concepts to concrete situations. The point, rather, is that specific places are the loci of interrelated multiple transactions; types of places differ or are similar by precisely which transactions interrelate and the nature of those interrelations. Seen in this way, the international political economy would be a congeries of such place types.1 By extension, the international system would span other, equally middle-level, phenomena (e.g., classical great power politics as involving different types of chanceries and military staffs). Systemic phenomena would be analyzable as arrays of internally complex phenomena. These would cross both the analytical boundary between pure comparative politics and international relations, and the disciplinary boundary between political science and sociology.
This general argument for a “meso-scopic” view of international political economy by itself means little. What I wish to do in this chapter is to supply some specific content to the argument by focusing on a particular place-specific phenomenon: that of “world cities.” I will contend that world cities are uniquely identified as certain patterned interrelations between political, economic, and other phenomena, and that those interrelations tell us something more general about both the structure and the functioning of the global political economy today.

Cities and World Cities

In the early to mid-1980s, the urban planning specialist John Friedmann published two papers about what he called “world cities” (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Friedmann 1986; cf. Knox 1995). His argument was that the international economy was characterized by a hierarchy of functions, and that at the top of the hierarchy, where basic decisions were made about the composition and flow of financial and embodied capital, were a handful of cities. The latter, in addition to playing a command and decisional role, were destinations for numerous domestic and international migrants; the resulting demand for services created a dilemma for the state: fiscal crisis or else social unrest. By the mid-1990s, Friedmann (1995, 24) had refined his position, setting out a ranking of world cities in several tiers: (1) “global financial articulations” (London, New York, and Tokyo); (2) “multinational articulations” (Miami, Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and Singapore); (3) “important national articulations” (Paris, Zurich, Madrid, Mexico City, São Paulo, Seoul, and Sydney); and (4) “subnational/regional articulations” (Osaka-Kobe, San Francisco, Seattle, Houston, Chicago, Boston, Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, Hong Kong, Milan, Lyon, Barcelona, Munich, and Düsseldorf-Cologne–Essen–Dortmund).

Friedmann’s work soon sparked other studies using related concepts. Sassen (2001), for example, focused on globalization as a process that, by dispersing firms’ operations widely, made their central strategic functions a matter of vital strategic importance; this led firms to outsource various such functions to specialists who clustered in certain cities. Typical labor market dynamics then resulted in large and growing inequalities between the conditions of life of the specialists and of the rest of the population in those cities (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000).

At the other extreme, so to speak, were analyses that “localized” the concept of world city, tying it to more city-specific historical developments, although without denying the existence of the international division of labor. For example, Abu-Lughod (1995, 1999) included Chicago as
a “global city” on the grounds that the Mercantile Exchange and other commodities markets—all of which stemmed from the specific history of Chicago as a center of futures trading—played a vital command role in the world economy. However, commodities markets represent a tiny fraction of the labor market in Chicago and contribute relatively little to the city’s capital formation. In the end, the situation is not all that different in New York or Los Angeles; or, for that matter, in London or Tokyo (cf. Martinotti 1994; Beauregard 1995; Brenner, 1998, 2001, 2003).

From this perspective, the concept of “world city” appears still as fairly thin. First, the “world” in relation to which certain cities can be characterized as at the top of the heap is for the most part a world of financial markets, in which state financing plays only a limited role. Production facilities and marketing operations, for example, involve a different, and much wider, set of locations, depending on which commodities we are talking about. When it comes to politics, the situation is again different: if, for many decades, military decisions have been concentrated in the capitals of the great powers, then, as commentators have been discussing since the days of Hobson and Lenin, the link with financial markets is anything but direct. Presumably the same is true today in a number of domains, for example, the spatial clustering of nongovernmental organizations (Taylor 2004) or of cultural products (e.g., Hollywood was influential in films long before Los Angeles became even a major regional city).

Second, as we saw above, the local significance of even world financial control is aleatory in the extreme. Certainly when Wall Street does well, there is a knock-on effect in Manhattan real estate and retail, not to mention in the city’s coffers; but for large swaths of New York and its population, the financial markets have little direct significance. Conversely, the major immigration waves into New York have for almost 200 years had little to do with world financial markets. The same is true of the city of London. It should be recalled that most of the capital flowing through major financial centers is there (whatever, in fact, “there” means) for an exceedingly short time, often no longer than an hour. How, even in principle, it could have economic consequences elsewhere in the city is unclear.

Third, the nature of the command relation supposedly patterned in capital flows is hazy. Who is supposed to make decisions about which kind of capital, and what are their motives? Many investments depend critically on guarantees, which are provided by states, not bankers or traders. What role does proximity play? If a loan is turned down by one investment bank, does the fact that the vice president who does so plays squash with the CEO of a competitor mean that the latter is any the more likely to step into the breach?
In short, the concept of world cities is intriguing but leaves many blanks to be filled in. What we need are a broader set of transactions to consider, a way of thinking through how those transactions echo, if at all, throughout the cities, and a pattern of interrelations that involve specific actors and decisions. Before we can start discussing the international functions of world cities, we should begin by discussing what it means to be a city prominent in a particular world. For example, Paris was, in Benjamin’s (1999) evocative phrase, the capital of the nineteenth century because of a series of interlocking transactions: an authoritarian political system that gave a local official (Haussmann) enormous powers over investment and urban renewal. Contacts among bankers and developers made it possible to attract large sums of money to Paris for slum clearance, infrastructure projects, and real estate speculation. Outlying areas were brought into the planning process and labor was both attracted into the city and displaced to its edges. This provided a built-in clientele for the new forms of entertainment that were being invented, and that quickly attracted imitators elsewhere (Clark 1984; Harvey 2003).

I am not claiming that world cities today are like Paris in the era of Haussmann and his successors. My point is that if the concept of world cities is to be useful, it has to point to particular interlocking transactions, carried out by actors with recurring motives, across multiple worlds (e.g., politics, the economy, culture), and that affect large numbers of people in cities. What follows is a preliminary sketch of these transactions, provided as a way of illustrating one meso-scopic view of international political economy.

Transactions

World cities are in effect packages of different interlocked transactions. To get a sense of them, consider three sets of transactions: those pertaining to migration, those to capital flows, and those to culture and entertainment.

Migration

Almost all cities attract migrants. For centuries, people have left villages in the countryside to move to urban areas. More recently, international migration, which had been characterized historically by rural destinations (e.g., Barbadian plantations, Minnesotan farmsteads), has become strongly urban. Thus, even though most of the world’s largest metropolises are populated by migrants from within the country (see, e.g., Chakravorty 2000; Friedmann 2002; Davis 2004), a number of cities have for many decades...
attracted numerous migrants from other countries. They come, obviously, in search of employment, but which cities they in fact move to is affected to a significant degree by both national and local immigration policy.

At the national level, states can affect immigration through a variety of means, from citizenship laws to permanent residence policy, law enforcement crackdowns, and visa requirements. The local level also makes a difference: if there is no discrimination with regard to various government services (e.g., education, health), or if politicians bid for the support of immigrant groups, then the atmosphere automatically becomes more welcoming. Most of the localities commonly identified as world cities are characterized by such de facto welcoming mechanisms, even if the national-level discourse is sterner (cf. Marcuse 2003).

The fact that immigrants find a relatively open door does not mean that there is no prejudice or discrimination against them. There can be high levels of both immigration and residential segregation (e.g., Logan 2000). However, if immigration continues, then there must also be some kind of vertical mechanism permitting immigrants to move to more desirable (perhaps still segregated) neighborhoods once they have saved enough money. This is indirect evidence for national and local policies of openness; it is significant that exceptions to residential mobility are, in world cities, most commonly found among nonimmigrant minorities (e.g., African Americans).

An additional integrative mechanism is found in the recent efforts by many states to attract, or at least cope with, immigration by individuals with high education levels. Typically, this occurs by formulating rules that facilitate certain bureaucratic processes, such as the granting of visas or residence permits; although in the case of one of the metropolises most often cited as a world city, London, citizens of most European Union members already have certain living and work rights there. Rules of this sort obviously aim at a certain small group of potential immigrants, but they can just as obviously be exploited by others who nonetheless satisfy their formal requirements.

Much the same process occurs with the children of immigrants. Individuals who may be hired for low-skill, menial jobs cannot simply be deported after several months; this is why not only most Western European countries, but also Japan, found themselves with significant numbers of long-term “foreign” residents (Castells 1976). The question then becomes what happens to the children of those workers. States can of course opt for a hard line, excluding children and even the third generation from citizenship, but systematic discrimination creates both social and workplace difficulties; in practice, world cities end up improvising integrative and participatory mechanisms. Although this hardly fits the (mythical) ideal of
the city as melting pot, these and other day-to-day arrangements serve to keep world cities as ongoing targets for immigration.

Capital Flows

As densely built environments, cities have significant capital needs. Streets, lights, water, and sewage lines come to mind; but so too do apartment buildings or houses, commercial buildings, hospitals, schools, police, and fire stations; and perhaps industrial facilities as well. For the last two centuries or so, the financing for these various types of real property has in most countries come from a combination of public and private sources. Typically, housing and commercial construction is put together by private developers, though with significant state support (loan guarantees, interest subsidies, utilities financing, zoning arrangements, and so forth). Just as typically, infrastructure is a state responsibility, though the actual construction is usually put out for bids by private companies, and these projects are usually paid for by special bond arrangements, the marketing of which is more often than not in the hands of private investment consortia.

This mixture of public and private creates numerous opportunities for lobbying and influence. Political office holders may come and go, but there is a well-understood developmental consensus, even when there are no major “urban renewal” projects on the horizon (Dahl 1961; Rae 2003; cf. Mollenkopf 1992). Given the large numbers of people who can be served by new construction as well as the scale of the activities involved, it is normal that political and economic maneuvers will also take place at the level of the national government (Stren 2001; Le Galès 2002). Such involvement is particularly likely if there is a tacit competition for national government financing between municipal governments and new cities built in hitherto rural areas (e.g., the U.S. case presented in Hayden 2003).

In fact, urban development in many countries shows a recurring cycle of capital being poured into lower-priced or lower-rent zones, either in what had been the fringes of cities or in urban districts that were seen as having fallen on hard times. This is simultaneously a political development—a deliberate policy carried out by government bodies—and an economic one, in which developers look for relatively undercapitalized areas offering the possibilities of greater returns on investment (Gurr and King 1987; Harvey 1989; Soja 1996; Soja and Scott 1996; Gordon and McCann 2000). Usually, even when some explicit planning mechanism is put in place, development decisions as to which areas will be built up or rebuilt are highly controversial and occasion considerable rancor (e.g., on Tokyo, Machimura 1992; Waley 2000; Saito and Thornley 2003; Sorensen 2003).
Where does this capital come from? It is tempting to imagine that world cities have some kind of direct line to international capital markets, so that investment banks in London or New York can tap into funds from around the world as a way of paying for the built environment in which they live and work. On the whole, this is incorrect. As investment vehicles, municipal bonds of major cities are not necessarily any more attractive than other portfolio items, and so there is no reason that financial advisers would recommend them preferentially to foreign investors. The same is true of private development projects, with the added caveat that the peculiarities of particular real estate markets make them particularly knotty for any nonlocal (including overseas) investor. Hence, although foreign capital plays a role in real estate and infrastructural investments, its geographic concentration is not per se facilitated by the density of financial enterprises in world cities.

However, if certain migrant communities have established themselves in a given city, they may well be able to help mobilize capital from their places of origin to underwrite particular real estate developments. This has happened particularly in Los Angeles, with waves of Asian capital remaking the downtown and certain other business districts (Davis 1992, 134–138), but it has been on ongoing, though not enormous, feature of commercial investments in various cities, such as London, for a number of years. In addition, migrants, like everyone else, need places to live, and so a significant population influx, especially among those whose skills provide them with higher incomes, can bid up housing prices, thereby making real estate a more attractive investment.

World cities thus exist astride two major streams of capital. On the one hand, they are characterized by large numbers of financial firms who manage many global investment transactions. These relations, to a great degree, exist more in cyberspace than in any specific location, even though banks and other firms tend to cluster together. On the other, world cities are physical places with considerable capital needs, investment opportunities, and purchase possibilities. Both sets of transactions may involve the same persons (and, to a lesser degree, the same government officials), but in two different roles. If world cities concentrate migrants, they bifurcate investors.

This same duality can also be seen with regard to some of the criminal activities typical of large, reasonably open cities. Consider the cocaine trade, which involves important transnational production, shipment, and distribution channels capable of serving any market. From the standpoint of both the large-scale shippers and the eventual consumers (be they welfare mothers or stock market analysts), the identity of the local distributors is
mostly irrelevant: if the police bust up one streetcorner operation or if the vendors shoot each other, new salespersons will quickly take their place. But from the standpoint of those doing the actual selling, the identity is all-important: operators need to be able to trust each other and find a particular location in which they can safely do business. This is why, in practice, so many operations are ethnically circumscribed, often to members of a particular immigrant group (e.g., Dominicans in East Harlem; see Bourgois 1995; d’Eramo 2002, ch. 21. Iranians and Chinese play a similar role in the Tokyo amphetamine market). In this way, characteristics of world cities tend to be functional, and indeed reinforcing of, other, more generic, urban transactions.

Culture and Entertainment

It has been a commonplace in urban studies that cities are characterized by distinctive cultural traits (Mumford 1938) or tend to be laboratories of cultural forms. Over a century ago, Simmel argued that “the metropolis is the genuine arena of [objective] culture . . . an overwhelming fullness of crystallized and impersonalized spirit”; in the face of this, the city dweller developed “that blasé attitude which, in fact, every metropolitan child shows when compared with children of quieter and less changeable milieus” (Simmel 1950, 422, 414). Presumably, the density and variety of everyday social interactions are productive of both new types of representations and a heightened receptivity to them.

Thus, it has been argued that city sidewalks, by facilitating multiple contacts, give rise to distinct forms of urban life (Jacobs 1961; Duneier 1999; cf. Bender 2002). By implication, cities built around the automobile, like Los Angeles, will tend toward particular pathologies, whether real or imagined (Soja 2000, chs. 8, 14); unless one believes that urban topography and spatial forms can in fact be experienced in multiple ways (Miles 2003). Claims like these, however, are too general to be of much use.

Instead, we can start from the observation that although forms of entertainment may arise randomly, a positive response to them by audiences or clients will serve as a spur for their further development. This is particularly the case when entertainment can be marketed, sold, and invested in. A classic case in point, referred to above, is the development of the immediate outskirts of Paris in the late nineteenth century: railroads could offer low-priced day excursions; villagers could invest in rowboats for hourly rentals; and riverside cafés could flourish in close proximity to rail spurs. Another Parisian example were the so-called café concerts, in which singers and other musicians were hired by the owners of large eating
and drinking establishments, which themselves were built on the assumption that they could earn a profit if they attracted an extensive clientele. In both of these cases, newspaper stories, paid advertisements, and various images (including paintings by contemporary artists) served to market the entertainment forms far beyond their original Parisian clientele, thereby contributing in no small way to the development of what soon was thought of as distinctively Parisian culture.

A contemporary example is the invention and spread of hip-hop. As a type of music, this arose originally in poor, mostly African-American areas of New York. Rapidly, it became commercialized and spread, as music, political attitudes, and, more diffusely, lifestyle, around the world (Hesmondhalgh and Melville 2001; Prévos 2001; Forman 2002). In this process, the New York-specific elements of hip-hop were for the most part lost, including at the level of popular images. Still, the genre has a kind of residual specificity to it: stereotypes continue to identify it with African Americans in U.S. cities, and it is expected that certain themes (e.g., police brutality) will continue to be raised by hip-hop artists. Whatever the artistic effects of commercialization, it reinforced, rather than watered down, a certain cultural distinctiveness in hip-hop.

Cities contain large numbers of potential consumers with significant aggregate (even if not individual) income. On the “market selection” model I have sketched above, we should expect distinctive subgroups, whether ethnic, racial, or other affinities, both to generate forms of entertainment and distinctive lifestyles, and to favor, with their patronage, the development of certain of those forms and styles. In an era of electronic communication and high-speed travel, more commercially successful cultural products will rapidly diffuse to other urban centers, in part by being associated with particular cities and/or groups. However, these products will also diffuse back to their place of initial popularity, not only in the form of images but also via secondary migration by individuals who seek to move to the supposed source of those cultural forms or lifestyles. This works at both ends of the income scale, depending on the specific lifestyle or cultural form (e.g., Castells and Murphy 1982); it can be facilitated not only by tolerant municipal authorities but, paradoxically, by residential segregation and its concentration of individuals into distinctive spaces.

The production, distribution, and (re)diffusion cycles described above are aided immeasurably when there are significant entertainment media present in a given city. Images need not be accurate or even pleasant, but without regular media products, it is much harder for a city to have its cultural identity updated, or even clearly limned. Absent these media, Tokyo could not have developed the same cultural identity (often linked to Japan
more generally) it has today; nor could Los Angeles have forged its (largely mythic) image as a gang-war dystopia (Davis 1998; Iwabuchi 2002). If there is one reason that Chicago does not qualify as a world city today, this is it; conversely, the importance of entertainment media may presage a Los Angeles-like future for Mumbai. Without denying the economic importance of various entertainment forms, the diffusion effect they have adds certain urban stereotypes to the representation of the country as a whole and is therefore of considerable potential political significance.

**World Cities and International Political Economy**

The argument I have been sketching above treats world cities neither as seamless wholes nor as general governance mechanisms for international political economy. Instead, it depicts world cities as loci of interlocking transactions, discrete patterns of interactions. Thus, financial firms in world cities use historically developed expertise and the role of the national state to capture and guide large numbers of financial flows. In doing so, they can attract skilled labor and entertain it with particular urban cultural forms. At the same time, world cities are also built environments in which generations of immigrants have been housed, employed, educated, acculturated, and eventually sent their way up the ladder. This cycle is facilitated by political will and reinforced by commercialized cultural forms originating in those communities.

Seen in this way, world cities are zones of articulation, in which transactions are correlated into different patterns, and in which multiple patterns exist in spatial and, often, individual, proximity. World cities therefore encapsulate certain recurring relationships in international political economy; although they do not in any way reflect all of those relationships, the cities do serve as a kind of natural setting in which those patterns can flourish. In this sense, world cities are arenas or localization of international political economy.

By the same token, world cities obviously do not serve to correlate all of the patterns that do or could exist in international political economy. Other locales—smaller cities, developmental zones—correlate different patterns, certain of which may involve some of the same transactions in world cities (e.g., real estate financing), others involving entirely different transactions (e.g., rural development projects). World cities are important in certain worlds, irrelevant in others. A comprehensive picture of the international political economy as a whole would therefore have to involve amassing correlations across numerous and different locales.

Such a mapping exercise must, of necessity, have a data component to it. In Russett’s “macroscopic view” article, he called for induction. I would
prefer to say, with Peirce, abduction, since the point is to amass correlations with an eye to generating theoretical categories, not universally applicable truths. What we want to do, in understanding international political economy, is to choose types of locales (qua packages of interlocked transactions) so as to shed maximal light on the relationships between international power and wealth. World cities are grist for that mill; so too, perhaps, are semi-rural development zones (e.g., soybean-growing areas in Brazil) or new factory complexes (e.g., Chinese-owned textile operations in Botswana), or new cities located not far from petroleum facilities (e.g., Dubai).

What seems clear, however, is that theory-building is not likely to be successful if carried out in a prematurely abstract manner. Before we can start theorizing as international political economy specialists about relationships between patterns, we first have to have an idea at an international, national, and local level of what the patterns are. It is too easy to guess; we need cross-boundary information about which to theorize. World cities offer a way to that information; they are, in effect, a “meso-scope.”

Notes

My thanks to students and colleagues at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, for their helpful comments on the precursors of ideas presented in this chapter.

1. In the 1970s, there was considerable interest in studying what were then called multinational corporations. However, even when separated analytically into different kinds of firms, multinationals were seen more as powerful actors than as loci of transactions. The international political economy was therefore not made up of different types of phenomena, of which multinationals were one.

2. Note that this list does not coincide terribly well with rankings in pure population terms. The 20 most populous cities are Tokyo, Mexico City, Seoul, New York, São Paulo, Bombay, Delhi, Los Angeles, Jakarta, Osaka, Calcutta, Cairo, Manila, Karachi, Moscow, Shanghai, Buenos Aires, Dhaka, Rio de Janeiro, and London. See http://www.citypopulation.de/World.html. To be sure, the population list is for 2005 and Friedmann’s is for a decade earlier, but the point remains: economic control has little necessarily to do with population.

3. Indeed, the famous piece by Burgess (1925), in which he develops the model of the city as built in concentric circles, presumes both immigration and segregation.
PART 2

CROSSING BOUNDARIES: DOMESTIC-EXTERNAL DYNAMICS, DEMOCRACY, AND PEACE
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CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRACY AND PEACE: WHICH COMES FIRST?

Zeev Maoz

Introduction

One of the more interesting and least explored critiques of the democratic peace is that democracy is a consequence—rather than a cause—of peace (Thompson 1996; Wolfson, James, and Solberg 1998; Mousseau and Shi 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003). On a more general level, recent studies show that international processes significantly affect domestic structures and processes (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Maoz 1996, 175–224; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001, 2003). Specifically, conflict affects both regime change and leadership survival. The correlation between regime type and regime persistence, on the one hand (Gurr 1974; Maoz 1996, 45–51), and between regime persistence and peace, on the other (Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993) suggests that we may be missing a significant process by ignoring the possibly reciprocal relations between democracy and peace.

The democratic peace research program has done more—perhaps more than other studies in the field—to eradicate the artificial wall that realists have constructed between domestic and international politics. Ironically, however, studies that examine the relations between regime type, leadership calculations, and international conflict tended to pay little attention to other domestic factors that affect regime structure and regime change. Likewise, students of comparative politics tended to ignore the international determinants of political stability and change. Accordingly, this chapter
focuses on the following questions:

1. **Does peace give rise to democracy? Does peace affect regime stability?** Empirical studies of this hypothesis used the dyad-year as their unit of analysis (James, Solberg, and Wolfson 1999; Reuveny and Li 2003). Yet, as regime structure is a national feature, the use of regime structure of *dyads* is theoretically and empirically improper.

2. **What is the relative impact of domestic and international factors on regime stability and change? Which factors affect transition and stability in democracies as opposed to nondemocratic states?** Students of comparative politics focus on domestic (e.g., economic, social, and political) determinants of regime stability and change. International relations scholars focus on the effects of war or conflict on regime, government, or leaders’ survival. Only few studies explored the joint effect of domestic and international factors on regime stability and change.

3. **Is there a linkage between the structure of the international environment and the domestic structures of states?** Several scholars argue that patterns of democratization exhibit spatial diffusion patterns (Huntington 1991; Starr 1991; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Ray 1995; Maoz 1996, 188–190; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Starr and Lindborg 2003). This implies that regime change may be affected by external factors.

4. **Do democracy and peace exhibit a reciprocal relationship?** Several studies suggest a fairly strong association between democracy and peace, when controlling for the political structure of a state’s politically relevant international environment (Maoz 1996, 2001). To the extent that external factors affect regime structure and political stability of states, there may exist a reciprocal relationship between peace and democracy. Alternatively, the effect of peace on democracy may cancel out the effect of democracy on peace.

The investigation of all these questions requires analyses that cross levels of analysis and cross the internal–external boundaries that realists so strongly support.

### Research on Determinants of Regime Structure and Change

Several themes pervade the literature on regime structure, regime stability, and regime change. The most important pertains to the effect of economic factors on regime type and regime stability. Economic crises—both high inflation and negative economic growth—tend to trigger democratic
breakdowns. On the other hand, the transition toward democracy is affected by growth in per-capita income and the standard of living of people in nondemocratic states (Gasiorowski 1995; Londregan and Poole 1996; Feng 1997; Przeworski et al. 1997).

Structural social factors are often mentioned as correlates of regime structure and of regime stability. Specifically, social homogeneity is said to affect democratization and regime stability, but the evidence on this is mixed (Przeworski et al. 1997). Empirical research also suggests that the presence, rise, and strength of a substantial middle class is a powerful predictor of democratization and of democratic stability (Huntington 1991, 59–72; Haggard and Kaufman 1997).

Finally, political tradition is considered a powerful determinant of political stability and democratization. The distribution of political stability across states is anything but normal; few nations have experienced a very high rate of regime change throughout their history, whereas most nations experienced few or no regime changes. Nearly 42 percent of all states over the 1816–1986 period (75 out of 180) experienced no regime change, and 24 other nations (13.3 percent) experienced only one regime change. On the other hand, a total of 31 nations (17.2 percent) experienced over five regime changes during their history (Maoz 1996, 185–186). Moreover, only four of the nations with five or more regime changes had an average regime score of zero or above, and none had an average regime score above 14.1 In fact, the only state that was democratic for most of its (post-1792) history and experienced substantial instability is France with 12 regime changes. Hence, a tradition of political instability adversely affects democracy and present political stability.

The effects of social and economic factors on democracy are relatively well established. However, recent studies have revealed a persistent effect of international factors on regime stability and on leadership survival. In particular, war and dispute participation, and victory or defeat in such adventures appear to affect regime stability, government stability, and leadership tenure/change (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Ray 1995, 204–206; Maoz 1996).

Studies relating international factors to regime stability typically do not control for domestic factors reputed to affect stability or change. It is thus unclear whether these factors interact with each other, cancel each other out, or complement each other. Moreover, the causal relations nexus between domestic and international processes is unclear. For example, it is argued that the democratic peace proposition actually reverses cause and effect; specifically it is peace that promotes democracy, not democracy that promotes peace (Thompson 1996; Wolfson, James, and Solberg 1998;
Reuveny and Li 2003). Likewise, the argument that peace is enhanced by political stability could also be logically reversed.

The lack of integration between studies conducted by comparative politics scholars and those conducted by international relations scholars suggest that it is important to cross boundaries and examine which, if any, causal relations exist among democracy, political stability, and peace. This analysis may enhance our understanding of the relationship between domestic and international processes.

Themes on the Causes and Consequences of Democracy and Authoritarianism

Huntington identifies three waves of global democratization. This was corroborated by others (Huntington 1991, 30; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Gleditsch and Ward 1997). This “wavelike” pattern suggests that democratization may well be a contagious process: transitions to and from democracy in any given state may be affected by temporally parallel or temporally proximate transitions in other states (Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Starr and Lindborg 2003). This observation suggests three possible causal paths that link regime type, regime stability, and peace. Each path rests on different theoretical foundations, but they are by no means inclusive. Other plausible causal relationships among these factors may exist. I explore briefly each of these causal paths.

1. Model I: The Peace → Democracy Path

This model argues that external factors may affect the structure and stability of a state’s regime in two principal ways. First, regime changes in a state’s environment might affect its regime structure and stability through spatial diffusion processes (Most and Starr 1980; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Starr and Lindborg 2003). The economic, social, and historical conditions that create a propensity for regime change may surface when other states are undergoing processes of political change. Ethnic, economic, or political opposition groups may be encouraged to seek change when others do the same because they feel that the international climate is conducive for political change. Likewise, the success or failure of political ideologies (e.g., Liberalism, Marxism, Fascism, Social Nationalism) abroad may encourage similar groups in a given state to try their luck. Finally, governments may institute political reforms in response to similar changes taking place in other states.
Second, a state’s international experience may also affect domestic politics. The diversionary theory of conflict argues that leaders in states undergoing periods of political instability act to divert domestic attention to foreign policy by initiating interstate conflict (Levy 1988, 1989). Moreover, states tend to increase their international conflict proneness following revolutionary political change (Maoz 1996, 85–132; Walt 1996). Thus, a nation’s international conflict experience affects its domestic structure in both direct and indirect ways. The relative absence of international conflict involvement enables governments to direct attention to domestic problems and divert resources from military preparedness to economic growth and social welfare, thus contributing to their durability. These processes are also conducive to democratization and democratic stability; (see also chapter 6, in this volume). Leaders who feel politically secure are less likely to employ coercive instruments. Thus, even leaders who emerged through nondemocratic processes may be receptive to democratic reforms.

Peace also directly affects regime structure and regime stability. Repeated conflict involvement often prompts emergency measures that limit personal and political freedoms. These measures may induce political instability (Wolfson, James, and Solberg 1998). Conversely, peace enables governments to relax such emergency measures, allows them to promote political participation, and facilitates regulation of political competition. The upperblock of Figure 3.1 depicts this causal sequence.

2. Model II: The Democracy→Peace Path
This model posits that domestic processes affect a state’s external behavior. The democratic peace proposition suggests that democracies are less prone to conflict. The finding that democracies are more peaceful when their politically relevant environment is made up of a large proportion of other democracies—suggests that both regime structure and regime stability may affect subsequent levels of conflict involvement of states (Ray 1995, 18–21; Maoz 2001). This model asserts that three sets of factors account for national conflict behavior: a state’s strategic attributes, its domestic structure, and the strategic structure of its international environment. The strategic attributes of states are typically defined in terms of their capabilities and alliance ties (Maoz 1993, 1996, 153–162). The strategic attributes of the focal state’s Politically Relevant International Environment (PRIE)\(^2\) consists of the number of states in the PRIE, their military capabilities, their alliance ties, and their conflict involvement patterns with other states. The domestic structure of the focal state is defined in terms of its regime structure and stability. The second block of Figure 3.1 depicts this model.
Figure 3.1 The Reciprocal Effects of Peace, Regime Type, and Regime Stability.

a Political structure of international environment. This includes such factors as the regime structure and regime stability of states in the focal nation’s politically relevant international environment (PRIE). More on that below.

b Strategic structure of international environment includes the number, capabilities, and alliance portfolios of states in the focal nation’s PRIE. More on that below.

c Strategic attributes of the focal state include such factors as the capabilities and alliance portfolio of the focal states. More on that below.

d Not examined in this chapter.
3. Model III: The Peace ↔ Democracy Path

The basic argument is fairly straightforward: peace, democracy, and regime stability are mutually reinforcing factors. The complications arise in the temporal sequence involved. Peace is said to increase the likelihood of democratization and regime stability just as model I suggests. However, democracy—once in place—and political stability tend to increase the likelihood of peace, as model II suggests. This is depicted in Figure 3.1.3

I point out several ideas about model III. First, the model envisions domestic and international processes as being intimately related over time. External conditions—including domestic processes within other nations—affect political change. Second, the state’s international conflict experience affects the nature and stability of its regime. Third, the interaction between domestic structures and international factors affects the state’s subsequent international behavior. Fourth, the causal sequence is temporally significant. The causal chain starts with explanations of regime type and regime stability. These are the first elements in the causal chain; international behavior is said to follow. At a more general level, however, this cyclical process suggests some chicken-and-egg type of indeterminacy. Thus the reversal of the causal sequence discussed herein may also be plausible.

From this discussion, I derive the following hypotheses.

1. Regime stability and regime type—controlling for the strategic and political structure of a state’s Politically Relevant International Environment (PRIE)—have a positive effect on the likelihood of peace (or a negative effect on the likelihood of conflict involvement) of the focal state (model II).
   1.(a.) However, the level of peace or conflict involvement of the focal state does not affect its level of political stability or its regime score (model II).

2. The extent of international conflict involvement of a given state inversely affects its level of political stability and its regime score. (model I).

3. The type and stability of regimes in the state’s PRIE affect the regime type of a state and its level of stability. Specifically, the more democratic and the more stable a state’s PRIE, the more democratic and the more stable is the regime of the focal state (models II and III).

4. Peace, regime stability, and regime type have a reciprocal effect on each other. Peace affects democratization and regime stability in one period; democratization and regime stability, in turn, affect peace in a subsequent period (model III).
Instrumental and Control Variables

The reciprocal effects of regime type, regime stability, and peace on each other, require specifying the instrumental variables that are expected to account for each of these three variables separately and independently of the other endogenous variables. I rely on the expectation that regime type, regime stability, and peace are each affected by environmental conditions. As noted above, the regime structure of a state is affected by the degree of democracy in its environment, but so is the state’s pattern of conflict involvement. Thus, when we attempt to examine the combination of factors that account for a state’s regime structure, we must examine the average regime scores of states in its politically relevant environment. However, both the state’s regime and its stability are affected by its political history. Specifically, it appears that a state’s level of regime stability is a function of its past heritage of political stability. Likewise, the greater durability of democracy compared to other regime types suggests that regime type is also a matter of heritage.

Thus, the instrumental variable hypothesized to account for regime score is the average regime score of the state starting from its entry into the system as an independent member, and up to one year preceding the current year of observation. Likewise, the instrumental variable accounting for the regime stability is the average regime duration of the state in the past (measured in the same manner as regime heritage).

For the conflict variables in the second set of equations, instrumental variables include a number of variables typically employed in national studies of dispute involvement, such as the state’s military capabilities, its alliance commitments, and the number of states in its politically relevant international environment. Due to the specification of these multiple variables, the entire model is overidentified. I discuss this issue below. Figure 3.1 shows the designated instrumental variables within double frames.

In addition to the factors mentioned in these hypotheses, it is necessary to control for the economic, social, and political factors that have been shown by previous studies to have a significant effect on regime structure, regime stability, and national conflict behavior. These factors are not mentioned in terms of specific hypotheses, but their effects are hypothesized in the graphic depiction of the models.

Research Design

Spatial and Temporal Domain

The chapter covers all states in the interstate system over the 1816–1992 period. Yet, data availability restrictions on some variables—for example,
economic wealth and growth—limit some of the analyses to the post–World War II era. I have used substitute economic measures that cover pre–World War II periods, but these measures do not correlate highly with the more conventional modern measures of such concepts as economic wealth and economic growth. Thus the pre–World War II analyses that utilize economic indices should be taken as highly tentative.

**Data Sources**

*Regime Measures.* Regime score, regime change and regime duration data were obtained from the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall 2004).

*International Conflict Data.* All conflict measures were obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) datasets (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Maoz 1999).

*Economic Data.* Most economic indicators of wealth and economic growth were obtained from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). Figures on energy consumption and iron and steel production are derived from the COW military capabilities dataset (2003 update).

*PRIE-Related Data.* All data related to states’ politically relevant international environment (PRIE) have been collected by the author and are available upon request. A PRIE is defined as the set of states that satisfy one of the following three conditions.

1. They are directly or indirectly contiguous to the focal state.
2. All major powers with global reach capacity.
3. All regional powers with regional reach capacity (Maoz 1996, 137–139).

**Units of Analysis**

Three units of analysis are used herein. First, the typical unit of analysis used in such investigations is the nation–year. This interprets the periods listed in figure 3.1 as $t_0 = \text{year 1}$, $t_1 = \text{year 2}$, and $t_3 = \text{year 3}$. So the independent variables in year 1 are said to affect the value of the dependent variables at year 2, and the values of the variables (independent and endogenous) variables in year 2 are said to affect the values of the endogenous variable in year 3. The reasoning behind this layout is that changes in regime and especially in conflict involvement can be highly fluid and fluctuate considerably from one year to another.
The second and third units of analysis are the five-year and ten-year national history, respectively. The history of each state is divided into five- or ten-year intervals starting either from the year of independence (for states that entered the system after 1816) or from 1816 (for states that acquired independence before that year). Thus a state that entered the system in 1832 has 1823–1827 as its first five-year interval and the years 1823–1832 as its first ten-year interval and so forth. The logic behind this conception is that some of the key variables (e.g., regime scores) change rather slowly over time. Moreover, in some of the theoretical discussions of the reciprocal relationships of democracy and conflict (e.g., Thompson 1996) the effects of conflict on democracy are cumulative and long-term, and a nation-year unit of analysis cannot fully capture this kind of process (Maoz 2004).

**Measuring the Variables**

In the interest of space, appendix 3.1 lists all operational measures of the variables used in this chapter. Here I focus on some issues that require explanation.

*Endogenous Variables.* In addition to the distinct measures of regime score and regime persistence, I integrate both via an interactive variable. This variable is the regime score of a state multiplied by its persistence score \( \text{REGPRST} = \text{REGSCORE} \times \text{PERSIST} \) (see appendix 3.1). This variable serves both theoretical and methodological purposes. Theoretically, it was suggested that the interaction between a state’s regime and its stability affects a state’s propensity for peace or war (Russett 1993, 29–30; Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996; Thompson 1996). Methodologically, this combined variable allows reduction of the number of estimated equations, thus somewhat simplifying the causal model analysis.

The conventional measures of peace/conflict used in most studies are:

1. A dichotomous variable with a value of one if a state was involved in a MID/war at a given year or zero otherwise.
2. An ordinal level of hostility variable denoting the highest level of hostility reached by an state during an MID. These variables can be used in single-equation models, but they cannot be employed in multiple-equation models that require interval or ratio dependent variables. For this reason, I use the number of dyadic dispute or war involvements of a given state in a given year as measures of conflict.

In addition to the more conventional variables, and in line with recent studies (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), we may be interested in the temporal span of peace for a given state. This variable \( \text{PEACEYRS} \) is measured as the number of years without militarized dispute involvement of the state (from the preceding MID/war involvement to the preceding year).
Exogenous Variables. For the most part, I relied on the typical measure of economic wealth used in similar studies: per-capita GDP in constant prices (Maoz and Russett 1993; Feng 1997; Londregan and Poole 1998). However, measures on GDP figures limit the temporal domain to the post-1950 era, and even within this period they contain a considerable amount of missing data, which may result in significant selection bias. In order to overcome these problems, I rely on an additional set of measures of these concepts, which is based on the COW military capability dataset.4 Measures for these indices are given in the appendix.

Models and Estimation Methods

Several methodological problems are present in the current design. First, the models presented here could be best estimated via a system of equations representing the various layers in model III. Yet most prior analyses of these issues relied on the nation- or dyad-year as the unit of observation (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992, 1993; Farber and Gowa 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Maoz 1996, 157–162; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Maoz 1998). The hypotheses in these studies were tested through the use of single-equation logistic regression, event-count (Poisson or negative binomial) regression, or event-history. In some cases, cross-sectional time-series (binary or Poisson) models were used to take account of the panel structure of the dataset.

The analysis of all nation-years in the system between 1816–1992 defines a pooled time-series design of \( i = [1, 2, \ldots, m] \) nations, each with \( t_i \) years (or half-decades or decades) of existence as an independent system member. To test hypotheses on this population entails either making assumptions about the characteristics of the distributions that may be empirically tenuous (e.g., that no serial correlation exists) or that no heteroskedasticity is present). Thus, by using multiple-equation estimation procedures such as two- or three-stage least-squares we are risking violation of fundamental assumptions. Alternatively, using a cross-sectional time-series models may result in testing misspecified single-equation models.

Second, a key problem concerns the distribution of some of the endogenous variables. Regime scores and regime stability exhibit little variation over time. Even in single-equation models estimating regime score and regime stability, an extremely high proportion of the variance is accounted for simply by regressing these scores on their past values. For that reason, as well as for the theoretical reasons mentioned above, the instrumental variables identified for the regime score and regime stability equations were defined in terms of past averages, rather than in terms of their values in the previous immediate period.
Yet another aspect of the problem concerns the use of significance tests when employing a population of cases rather than a sample. Since in almost all of the above examples the entire population (of nations or dyads) is employed, significance tests may be meaningless; no inference from samples to population is involved. Any relationship, no matter how small, is—by definition—statistically significant (Ray 1995, 27). Let us start by specifying the equations tested herein.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{REGSCORE}_{t1} &= \alpha_1 + \beta_{11} \text{WEALTH}_{t1} + \beta_{12} \text{ECGRWTH}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{13} \text{AVGREG}_{t0} + \beta_{14} \text{ENVCH}_{t(t - 3 \rightarrow \alpha - 1)} \\
&\quad + \beta_{15} \text{AVPRERG}_{t1} + \beta_{16} \text{TARGET}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 \\
&\quad + \beta_{17} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \beta_{18} \text{PERSIST}_{t1} + \varepsilon_1 \\
\text{PERSIST}_{t1} &= \alpha_2 + \beta_{21} \text{WEALTH}_{t1} + \beta_{22} \text{ECGRWTH}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{23} \text{CUMRGCH}_{t1} + \beta_{34} \text{ENVCH}_{t(t - 3 \rightarrow \alpha - 1)} \\
&\quad + \beta_{25} \text{AVPRERG}_{t1} + \beta_{26} \text{TARGET}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 \\
&\quad + \beta_{27} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \beta_{28} \text{REGSCORE}_{t1} + \varepsilon_2 \\
\text{PEACE}_{t2} &= \alpha_3 + \beta_{31} \text{ENVCH}_{t1} + \beta_{32} \text{ENVCH}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{33} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} + \beta_{34} \text{CAPRT}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{35} \text{WGHALLY}_{t1} + \beta_{36} \text{ALLYPRIE}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{37} \text{TARGET}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \beta_{38} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \varepsilon_3
\end{align*}
\]

Where variables noted in bold letters are designated as instrumental variables. The economic variables, as well as the instability variables are replaced in various runs by the alternative indicators as mentioned in appendix 3.1. The endogenous variable PEACE is replaced in some runs by DISPUTE. I have also used the combined REGSTB variable to substitute for the two first equations such that,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{REGSTB}_t &= \alpha_1 + \beta_{11} \text{WEALTH}_{t1} + \beta_{12} \text{ECGRWTH}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{13} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} - t1 + \beta_{14} \text{ENVCH}_{t(t - 3 \rightarrow \alpha - 1)} \\
&\quad + \beta_{15} \text{AVPRERG}_{t1} + \beta_{16} \text{TARGET}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 \\
&\quad + \beta_{17} \text{AVREGSTB}_{t - 1} + \varepsilon_1 \\
\text{PEACE} &= \alpha_2 + \beta_{21} \text{ENVCH}_{t(t - 3 \rightarrow \alpha - 1)} + \beta_{22} \text{REGSTB}_t \\
&\quad + \beta_{23} \text{CAPRT}_{t1} + \beta_{24} \text{WGHALLY}_{t1} + \beta_{25} \text{ALLYPRIE}_{t1} \\
&\quad + \beta_{26} \text{TARGET}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \beta_{27} \text{ENVMIDS}_{t0} \rightarrow t1 + \varepsilon_2
\end{align*}
\]

Table 3.1 specifies the hypotheses of the models about the relationship between regime score, stability, and peace.
The problems discussed above suggest that a straightforward estimation of a system of equations may be problematic. Different assumptions about the underlying structure of the data produce drastically different results in different two- and three-stage simultaneous equation models (Baltagi, 1995, 120–122; Greene 1997, 734–761). Thus, I employ several steps to address the problems discussed above.

First, I start with a set of single-equation analyses to provide a preliminary assessment of the three models. Since in equations [1] and [2] (as well as in equation [4] using the combined regime persistence index), the endogenous variables are determined only by exogenous variables, we can get a preliminary sense of the effect of peace on democracy and on regime stability. The test of equations [3] and [5] without taking endogeneity into account can provide us only a first cut into the effects of democracy on peace, but should not be taken as conclusive.

The single-equation estimates are obtained via Generalized Least-Squares (GLS) with corrections for panel-specific autocorrelations and heteroskedasticity. Regime stability can be also examined in terms of the timing of regime change as a function of a set of independent variables. This is done using the dichotomous regime change variable (see below) as a “failure” event within a proportional-hazard model with repeated failures. This is estimated using the Cox proportional-hazard model.

Second, for the estimation of the system of equations, I used the following approach. Rather than examine the entire population, I focus on random samples of 20–25 percent of the population. Each of the random

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### Table 3.1 Relationships Among Regime Score, Regime Stability, and Peace as Expected by the Three Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation no.</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} &lt; 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} \approx 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} &lt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>$\beta_{26} &lt; 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{26} \approx 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{26} &lt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4]</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} &lt; 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} \approx 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{16} &lt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>$\beta_{32} \approx 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{32} &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{32} &gt; 0$</td>
<td>When PEACE in equations [3] or [5] is replaced by DISPUTE or WAR, the signs of the coefficients for models I and III are reversed, $\beta_{32} &lt; 0$, $\beta_{33} &lt; 0$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5]</td>
<td>$\beta_{22} \approx 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{22} &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$\beta_{22} &gt; 0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
samples is subjected to three-stage least-squares (3SLS) estimation based on each of the three models specified above. Random sampling has the effect of converting the pooled time-series data structure into a cross-sectional structure with no meaningful serial correlations. Spatial correlation assumptions are also unlikely to be violated in this kind of design because the probability of obtaining a simultaneous spatial effect (i.e., a high numbers of observations with $t_i = t_j$) is negligible. In this kind of design, the use of three-stage least-squares (3SLS) is appropriate since the risk of violation of basic assumptions is minimal.

The question, however, is to what extent any given sample represents the entire population of nation-years. In order to deal with this issue, I subject the analysis to bootstrapping techniques (Mooney and Duval 1993). Parameter estimates and standard errors, as well as adjusted $R^2$ statistics are then bootstrapped. That is, this procedure of sample extraction, estimation, and saving of results is repeated 500 times. The bootstrapped results provide the bias-corrected means and standard errors of the estimated 3SLS coefficients.

Bootstrapping techniques enable us to perform repeated sampling analyses (with replacement) and thus gain a better degree of generalizability. They also enable meaningful interpretations of the statistical significance tests. However, bootstrapped statistics—even in large samples—are biased by the size of the statistic. For that reason, I examine the extent to which a conclusion about statistical significance is robust over the bootstrap replications. This is indicated by a proportion measure, $pt$, which denotes, for each coefficient produced by the bootstrapped analysis, the percentage of the 500 replications that conform to the overall bootstrapping result. The $pt$ statistic specifies the proportion of the bootstrap replications with a significant T-statistic. If $pt$ is 0.5 or higher, we can conclude that the bootstrapping results are robust and hence substantive interpretations of such results are reliable. In the analyses using the nation-five year or nation-decade units, the simultaneous equations were tested via simple three-stage least-squares, because the problems of serial and spatial correlations are less severe than in the nation-year case.

**Results**

The results of single-equation models that test the effects of peace on regime type and stability are presented in table 3.2. The first part of this table reveals several interesting and surprising aspects of the relationships between democracy, stability, and peace. First, it corroborates findings of previous studies regarding the economic determinants of democratization, but contradicts others. Economic wealth is
related to regime score, to regime stability, and to their interaction. Economic growth is not significantly associated with regime score, regime persistence, and regime stability. However, it is inversely related to the interaction between regime score and regime persistence, and this applies to both democracies and nondemocracies.

Regime persistence has a positive effect on regime score, but a state’s regime score does not affect regime persistence. However, a state’s regime appears to reduce the likelihood of regime change. A democratic/non-democratic breakdown of the analysis shown in the third column of table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Regime Scores, Regime Stability, and Combined Regime Persistence Scores, 1950–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Regime score</th>
<th>Regime persistence</th>
<th>Regime change^</th>
<th>All states</th>
<th>Non democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime score</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.045** (.004)</td>
<td>.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime persistence</td>
<td>.099** (.011)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per-capita GDP</td>
<td>.003** (.001)</td>
<td>.004** (.0001)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.189** (.003)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average GDP change</td>
<td>—1.229</td>
<td>—1.665</td>
<td>—10.139**</td>
<td>—68.759**</td>
<td>—128.701</td>
<td>2390.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(last three years)</td>
<td>(1.262)</td>
<td>(1.152)</td>
<td>(2.352)</td>
<td>(53.759)</td>
<td>(73.940)</td>
<td>(106.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime legacy</td>
<td>.988** (.009)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of political</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—2.349** (.122)</td>
<td>.142** (.049)</td>
<td>—52.266**</td>
<td>25.889**</td>
<td>—104.55**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of reg. changes</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.032 (.025)</td>
<td>4.160 (4.673)</td>
<td>16.165**</td>
<td>16.210*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(2.751)</td>
<td>(4.084)</td>
<td>(7.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. regime score in</td>
<td>.063** (.012)</td>
<td>.013* (.006)</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>2.878**</td>
<td>1.945**</td>
<td>—1.199**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. no. of MIDs as</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.233†</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>47.892**</td>
<td>42.700**</td>
<td>135.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(1.141)</td>
<td>(2.229)</td>
<td>(8.296)</td>
<td>(11.941)</td>
<td>(21.598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of MIDs in</td>
<td>.006* (.003)</td>
<td>.009** (.003)</td>
<td>—0.27* (.010)</td>
<td>.695**</td>
<td>1.303**</td>
<td>3.504**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjusted R^2</td>
<td>.415</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.364</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall N</td>
<td>3,283</td>
<td>3,317</td>
<td>3,283</td>
<td>3,317</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>1,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of states</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

^ Results in table are parameter estimates in first row of each cell; standard errors in second row (parenthesized).

b Estimated via Cox regression for event history data with repeated failures.

* p < .05; ** p < .01; † .05 ≤ p ≤ .10.
suggests that the entire effect applies to nondemocracies, where a high regime score actually means that the regime type is anocratic.

A history of political instability has a seemingly unexpected positive effect on regime score, but an expected negative effect on regime persistence. Likewise a history of political instability has a positive effect on the likelihood of regime change. The explanation for this lies in the democratic/nondemocratic breakdown. A history of political instability is associated with an anocratic, and thus, unstable regime. This is evident in the regime score–persistence interaction.

Several new insights emerge from this analysis. First, regime scores and regime persistence are spatially dependent: the more democratic the politically relevant international environment of a state, the more likely is a state to become and stay democratic. The instability of a state’s PRIE has a positive effect on the regime persistence of a state, but again, the regime type breakdown suggests that environmental political instability has a negative effect on the regime persistence interaction of nondemocracies, but a positive effect on the stability of democracies.

Most importantly, the state’s past involvement in militarized disputes does not have a robust effect either on its regime score or on its stability, but when it does this effect is positive—contrary to model I’s prediction. It appears that, especially for democracies, what doesn’t kill them, strengthens them. The regime score and persistence of democratic states is enhanced by violent external conflict in the recent past. We can now state tentatively that the hypothesis that peace causes democracy is not supported. On the contrary, it appears that democracy is affected by intensive conflict experience of the state.

When we run the same equations looking at five- and ten-year time intervals, we find that by and large, the results are similar to those reported in the the table. This suggests that the effects of independent variables on regime structure and regime stability that are observed for short time intervals (one-year lags), generally hold for longer time intervals (five- or ten-year lags). We now turn to the second part of the single-equation analyses, using various conflict involvement indices as dependent variables, as reported in table 3.3.

Space considerations prohibit an elaborate discussion of most control variables in table 3.4. In general, the results replicate the findings of other studies examining dispute and war behavior (Maoz 1996, 2001; Gleditsch and Ward 2000). First, and most relevant to our hypotheses, it appears that the regime persistence interaction has a negative impact on conflict involvement and a positive impact on the duration of peace. This is so both when we use the interaction variable as well as when we use its components, as is evident in the second part of table 3.3.
Table 3.3  Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of the Effects of Regime Type and Regime Stability on Dispute and War Behavior of States, 1816–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Years of peace</th>
<th>War involvement</th>
<th>Non variable</th>
<th>All states</th>
<th>democracies</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime*persistence</td>
<td>.0005**</td>
<td>−.0001**</td>
<td>−.0001**</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of political instability</td>
<td>−.659**</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.036**</td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td>.045**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. reg. changes in PRIE</td>
<td>−.073</td>
<td>−.006</td>
<td>−.011</td>
<td>.005†</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. regime score in PRIE</td>
<td>.037**</td>
<td>−.004**</td>
<td>−.001</td>
<td>.003**</td>
<td>−.025**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability ratio: state-to-PRIE</td>
<td>−29.805**</td>
<td>2.433**</td>
<td>3.374**</td>
<td>3.772**</td>
<td>2.725**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.940)</td>
<td>(1.545)</td>
<td>(3.542)</td>
<td>(3.690)</td>
<td>(3.600)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliance commitments.</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>−.022**</td>
<td>−.012**</td>
<td>−.041**</td>
<td>−.007*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. MIDs in PRIE</td>
<td>−.107**</td>
<td>.016**</td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td>.014**</td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliances</td>
<td>−.047**</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>−.002**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. no. of MIDs as target</td>
<td>−4.128**</td>
<td>.383**</td>
<td>.632**</td>
<td>.590**</td>
<td>.544**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.376)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>.513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall N</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>6,609</td>
<td>1,698</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of states</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nation five-year and nation-decade observation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five-year period</th>
<th>Ten-year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M ID involvement</td>
<td>M ID involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>−.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence</td>
<td>.025**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of political instability</td>
<td>.057*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Second, the degree of democratization in a state’s PRIE also has a pacifying effect. However, it has a positive impact on the dispute behavior of nondemocracies and a negative impact on the dispute involvement of democracies. In this case too, short-term effects (one-year lags) on conflict behavior are, generally speaking, similar to longer-term effects (five- or ten-year lags). It appears therefore that, in line with the arguments of model II, democracy and political stability jointly have a pacifying effect on states. It now remains to be seen whether these results stand up when allowing for endogeneity in the relationship among democracy, political stability, and peace, as in table 3.4.

Table 3.3 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five-year period</th>
<th>Ten-year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MID involvement</td>
<td>War involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID involvement</td>
<td>War involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. reg. changes in PRIE</td>
<td>.229**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. regime score in PRIE</td>
<td>.002†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability ratio: state-to-PRIE</td>
<td>27.567**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliance commitments in PRIE</td>
<td>.131*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. MIDs in PRIE</td>
<td>−.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliances in PRIE</td>
<td>−.0001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. no. of MIDs as target</td>
<td>.548**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ | .125 | .387 | .286 | .085 |
Overall $N$ | 2,150 | 2,150 | 1,037 | 1,037 |
No. of states | 179 | 179 | 170 | 170 |

Notes
Results in table are parameter estimates in first row of each cell; standard errors in second row (parenthesized).
† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. 

Second, the degree of democratization in a state’s PRIE also has a pacifying effect. However, it has a positive impact on the dispute behavior of nondemocracies and a negative impact on the dispute involvement of democracies. In this case too, short-term effects (one-year lags) on conflict behavior are, generally speaking, similar to longer-term effects (five- or ten-year lags). It appears therefore that, in line with the arguments of model II, democracy and political stability jointly have a pacifying effect on states. It now remains to be seen whether these results stand up when allowing for endogeneity in the relationship among democracy, political stability, and peace, as in table 3.4.
Table 3.4  Three-Stage Least-Squares, Bootstrapped Estimates of Model III: Peace → [Regime Persistence] → Peace: All States, Years, 1950–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Equation 1: Regime persistence</th>
<th>Equation 2: Years of peace</th>
<th>Equation 2: No. dispute invol.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All states</td>
<td>Nondem</td>
<td>Democs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime * Persistence</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged regime* persistence</td>
<td>23.221**</td>
<td>(1.180)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.509**</td>
<td>(1.170)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.658**</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = 1.00</td>
<td>pt = 0.96</td>
<td>pt = 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.191**</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.104**</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.806**</td>
<td>(3.474)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = 1.00</td>
<td>pt = 0.44</td>
<td>pt = 0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>-5,042.1**</td>
<td>(645.05)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Change in GDP per capita)</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>(.319)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2521.8</td>
<td>(1782.3)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = 0.73</td>
<td>pt = 0.15</td>
<td>pt = 0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cum. no. regime changes</td>
<td>-70.485**</td>
<td>(10.152)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-18.372*</td>
<td>(7.851)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-227.03**</td>
<td>(35.678)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-443**</td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-356**</td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-829**</td>
<td>(.182)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.061**</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = .99</td>
<td>pt = 1.00</td>
<td>pt = .93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary change in PRIE</td>
<td>92.318**</td>
<td>(28.933)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-52.148†</td>
<td>(27.986)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>168.496**</td>
<td>(59.201)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.450**</td>
<td>(.204)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>(.319)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.557†</td>
<td>(.310)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.231**</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.155**</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = .52</td>
<td>pt = .07</td>
<td>pt = .55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. regime score in PRIE</td>
<td>7.903**</td>
<td>(1.390)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.310**</td>
<td>(1.999)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.762</td>
<td>(4.899)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.036**</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.037**</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.068**</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.007**</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.007**</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pt = .67</td>
<td>pt = .00</td>
<td>pt = .68</td>
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<td></td>
<td>pt = .67</td>
<td>pt = .00</td>
<td>pt = .68</td>
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Continued
### Table 3.4 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Equation 1: Regime persistence</th>
<th>Equation 2: Years of peace</th>
<th>Equation 2: No. dispute invol.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All states</td>
<td>Nondem</td>
<td>Democs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability ratio, state / PRIE</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliance commitments</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes in PRIE</td>
<td>7.515** (1.506) pt = 0.78</td>
<td>−3.324** (1.388) pt = 0.88</td>
<td>15.828** (2.551) pt = 0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliances in PRIE</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. no. of MIDs as target</td>
<td>279.61** (55.50) pt = 0.64</td>
<td>−17.475 (91.443) pt = 0.06</td>
<td>175.104* (91.390) pt = 0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootsrapped adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.283</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$ (per iteration)</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of iterations</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

All analyses are bootstrapped three-stage least-squares analyses of the 1950–1986 period. Similar analyses were performed (using the WEALTH and MVAVWLTH variables) for the 1816–1992 period, with results essentially similar to the ones reported above.

pt = the proportion of samples (iterations) for which results were in accordance with the Student T statistic from which significance levels were inferred.

(for insignificant results, pt is the proportion of significant Student T statistics in line with the test hypothesis).

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$. 

$^{*}$ $p < .01$; $^{*}$ $p < .05$; $^{†}$ $p < .10$. 

By and large, the three-stage least-squares results corroborate the conclusions derived from the single-equation analyses above. This similarity between the results derived via different estimation approaches suggests that the results are more robust than expected given the problems arising from this particular data structure. Most importantly, these results suggest that there exists a reciprocal relationship between regime structure, regime stability, and peace, but this relationship is, at least in part, different from the expectations set up by the various models. First, prior conflict involvement has a positive, rather than negative effect on regime structure and regime stability. This contrasts with the propositions of models I and III and with the findings of James, Solberg, and Wolfson (1999) and Reuveny and Li (2003). This applies mostly to democratizing and democratic states, and less to autocracies. Past conflict involvement of autocracies does not appear to have a statistically significant effect either on their regime score or on its persistence. Second, regime structure and persistence appear to have consistent effects on peace. This effect is almost exclusively due to democracies and democratizing states. This supports the argument that democracy breeds peace at the monadic level of analysis. Third, the relationship between democracy, democratization, and peace holds only when controls are introduced for the regime structure of the state’s politically relevant international environment. Specifically, the more democratic and the more stable a state, and the more democratic its politically relevant international environment, the lower its conflict and war involvement. Without such controls, the monadic relationship between democracy, political stability, and peace is not robust with respect to sampling or estimation method used (see Maoz 2001).

Interestingly, these findings imply an indirect negative path from conflict to conflict through democracy. Exposure to conflict as primary targets increases the stability and level of democracy of democratic and democratizing states. Increased democratization and political stability makes these states less likely to engage in subsequent disputes than nondemocratic states. The direct effect of prior conflict involvement on current conflict involvement is consistently positive, however. Thus, the interaction of democratization with the regime structure of the PRIE acts to mollify the spiraling effect of past conflict involvement on present conflict involvement. Similar three-stage least-square analyses were conducted using the five-year and ten-year period intervals. The results for the long- and short-term are generally similar. The conclusions stated above seem to hold whether we look at short-, medium-, or longer-term relationships between democracy and peace.
Conclusion

This chapter examines the possibly reciprocal relationship between democracy and political stability, on the one hand, and peace, on the other. I aimed to bridge the gap—cross the boundaries—between findings of comparative politics scholars and the findings of international relations scholars by introducing domestic and international correlates of political structure and political stability. The most important conclusion of this chapter is that the democratic peace proposition generally holds. Democracy appears to increase the likelihood of peace, but not vice versa. On the contrary, high levels of conflict involvement tend to increase, rather than decrease the likelihood of democracy and the stability thereof. In addition, several interesting findings have emerged.

1. Regime structure and regime stability in a given state are related to the structure and stability of its politically relevant international environment. This finding did not receive empirical support in previous studies of domestic processes, although speculations on this issue abound in the literature on patterns of democratization.

2. Regime structure and regime stability affect the conflict behavior of states, when controlling for the political structure of their politically relevant international environment. The more democratic and the more stable a state and the more democratic its politically relevant international environment, the less likely is the state to engage in conflict or war, and the longer the period of peace that it experiences.

3. These findings obtain when controlling for other correlates of regime structure, regime stability, and conflict and war behavior that are commonly discussed and analyzed in the relevant bodies of knowledge from which this chapter draws.

More generally, this chapter suggests the presence of a two-way relationship between domestic political processes and international processes. This corroborates previous findings on the domestic sources of international behavior (Maoz 1996, 1998).

As noted, this chapter is a first cut into an important yet extremely complex issue. This suggests that the present results are tentative in nature and more investigation into both the substantive and methodological issues raised by this chapter appear to be warranted.
### Appendix 3.1A Variables, Definitions, Measures and Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Sources and comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime score</td>
<td>Maoz-Russett regime score: REGSCORE ≡ (DEMOC–AUTOC) × CONCEN</td>
<td>Source: Maoz and Russett (1993). Regime scores are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime persistence</td>
<td>PERSIST ≡ Number of years of current regime.</td>
<td>Maoz and Russett (1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated regime-</td>
<td>REGPRST ≡ REGSCORE × PERSIST</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persistence score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>REGCHG ≡ Switch from one regime type to another: 0 = No change, 1 = Regime change.</td>
<td>Regime Types and regime change definitions in Maoz (1996, 127–129, 217–219). Values are summed up over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute/war involvement</td>
<td>DISPUTE ≡ No. of dispute involvements per year; WAR ≡ No. of war involvements per year</td>
<td>Maoz (1999).³ Values are summed up over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of peace</td>
<td>PEACEYR ≡ No. years without dispute involvement from the previous dispute to the present. Also: LONGPCE: 0 = PEACEYR ≤ 10; 1 = PEACEYR &gt; 10.</td>
<td>Same as above. Values in the half and full-decade analyses are the maximum number obtained for this period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime legacy</td>
<td>Average regime score of state from first year of independence to one year previous to extant observatin (t₀→t₋₁)</td>
<td>Period covered, 1800–1992. Valued averaged over the five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative no. of regime changes</td>
<td>CUMREGCH: Cumulative number of regime changes from independence to preceding year.</td>
<td>Maoz (1996). Period covered, 1800–1992. Values in the half and full–decade analyses are the maximum number obtained for this period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3.1A  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Sources and comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weighted alliances in PRIE</td>
<td>ALLYPRIE: No of alliance commitments of states in PRIE, excluding alliances with the focal state, weighted by type and partner’s status</td>
<td>Maoz (1997b). Period covered, 1816–1992. Values are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic wealth II</td>
<td>Average share of energy consumption and iron-steel production divided by share of total population: WEALTH ≡ 1/2 (PRENRGY + PRIRNSTL)/PRTOTPOP</td>
<td>COW Period covered, 1860–1992. Values are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political change in PRIE</td>
<td>RGCHPRIE: No. of regime changes in PRIE over the previous four-year period</td>
<td>Maoz (1996). Period covered, 1816–1992. Values are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Continued
Appendix 3.1A  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Sources and comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental conflict</td>
<td>ENVDIS: Sum of all dispute involvements of states in one’s PRIE not involving the focal state.</td>
<td>Maoz (2001). Period covered 1816–1992. Values are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disputes directed at the focal state</td>
<td>AVGTARG: Three-year average of number of disputes in which the state was a primary target.</td>
<td>Maoz (2001). Also served as exogenous indicator of peace. Values are averaged over five- or ten-year periods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

This study is part of a project conducted jointly with Bruce Russett and John Oneal. Earlier versions were presented at Rice University, University of Illinois, and University of North Texas. I wish to thank, Bruce Russett, John Oneal, Jim Ray, Bill Thompson, Paul Diehl, Harvey Starr, and Dina Zinnes for comments on previous versions of this manuscript.

1. The regime scale discussed herein ranges from −100 to +100 where −100 is a “perfect” autocracy and +100 is a “perfect” democracy (Maoz and Russett 1993). See appendix 3.1 for details.

2. The politically relevant international environment of a state is “the set of political units (state and nonstate) whose structure, behavior, and policies have a direct impact on the focal state’s political and strategic calculus . . . This is so because developments in these units are perceived to have direct, immediate, and profound impact on one’s own state” Maoz (1996, 138).

3. The upper part of figure 3.1 captures the arguments of model I, the bottom part captures the argument of model II. The figure as a whole captures the integrated model’s (model III) logic.

4. As noted above, the correlations between this economic wealth measure and the PCGDP indicator of wealth is statistically significant, but not high ($r = 0.341; p < .01; N = 3,679$). The correlation between the wealth change and the economic growth variables is not even statistically significant ($r = 0.010; p < .56; N = 3,446$).

5. Two other, less severe, problems afflict the data. First, different states have different time spans, so that the group of $m$ states has a different number of time points. This also implies that the contemporaneous correlation at a given point in time is made up of a different number of observations than at another point in time. Second, the number of units ($m$) is much larger than the number of time points per unit. Prof. Nathaniel Beck (personal communication) suggested that the first problem is not serious in CSTS designs,
and the second problem is manageable as long as there are at least 20 time points per observation. Thus states with fewer than 20 time points are omitted from the analyses.

6. I increase somewhat the samples for subpopulations in order to take account of significant amounts of missing data on some variables. Thus, each sample for the entire population of nation-years for the entire period is about 2,600 cases (out of a total nation-year population of 10,419 nation-years), and for different temporal or substantive breakdowns samples are computed proportionately to the reduction in the total population for a given particular breakdown (with Ns ranging from 300 to 600 observations).

7. A cross-sectional time series probit analysis with a dichotomous regime type score confirms the facts reported above. The type of a state’s regime (0 = nondemocracy, 1 = democracy) is affected by its economic wealth, by the democratization of the state’s PRIE, by the level of instability in the PRIE, and by the state’s past involvement in MIDs as principal target.

CHAPTER 4

CONFIRMING THE LIBERAL PEACE WITH ANALYSES OF DIRECTED DYADS, 1885–2001

John R. Oneal

Introduction

In his treatise *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* ([1795] 1970), Immanuel Kant suggested that international peace could be established on a foundation of three elements: republican constitutions, “cosmopolitan law” embodied in free trade and economic interdependence, and international law and organizations. This was a visionary proposal. There were very few democracies in the world in 1795 and no international organizations as we now know them. There was trade, of course; but most countries followed mercantilist principles: explicitly subordinating commerce to the interests of the state, seeking economic independence when possible, and pursuing economic gains through the use of force. Kant’s approach to the problem of interstate conflict was in itself noteworthy because he believed that a lasting peace, not just a lull in fighting between wars, was possible. He expected that the world would eventually weary of war and seek solutions outside the system of *Realpolitik*. Kant and the other classical liberals were not idealists. In their view, peace does not depend upon a great moral conversion. Rather, emerging institutions and practical possibilities make war contrary to people’s self-interests. Peace is possible, Kant argued, as long as even devils can calculate where their interests lay.

Though Kant presented his ideas over 200 years ago, it has only recently become possible to evaluate scientifically his “philosophical sketch.” It is
feasible today because the three elements of Kant’s prescription for peace have come into existence in large parts of the world so history can serve as a great laboratory for the study of interstate relations. In a series of publications Bruce Russett and I, with several collaborators, have presented substantial evidence that indeed Kant was right: democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations do have important pacific benefits. The danger of a war among the great powers is probably as small as it has ever been; and despite the threat posed by terrorism and the existence of unresolved disputes in some regions, the post–cold war era has been remarkably peaceful (Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2000). The prospects for lasting peace in much of the world are excellent. This is not cause for complacency. Rather, the evidence for Kant’s thesis that we and many others have reported should encourage us to do what we can to strengthen the liberal influences where they now operate and extend them to regions still caught in the cycle of violence.

Over the past 20 years, research on the correlates of war has made remarkable progress by examining the relations of pairs of states (dyads) observed through time. The analysis of dyadic time series (Polachek 1980; Bremer 1992) marks an important advance over research at the global or the national level. Attention to pairs of states addresses the questions of greatest concern to political scientists and policy makers alike: which countries are likely to fight one another, and which will remain at peace? Thus, dyadic studies escape the ecological fallacy that plagued research at the systemic level; and unlike investigations of individual nations, they easily accommodate variables that are inherently relational in character, notably the balance of power, the existence of an alliance, or the degree of interdependence. Militarized disputes take place between states, so one cannot examine their causes properly by looking at the attributes of a single country (Most and Starr 1989), as research on the democratic peace has amply demonstrated.

In the past, Russett and I, and most others, have relied upon nondirected dyads to study the causes of war and evaluate liberal prescriptions for peace. Nondirected dyads allow scholars to identify influences that affect states’ involvement in militarized disputes. There are good reasons for the discipline’s preference for this unit of analysis. It is often difficult to determine who actually starts a militarized dispute (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997), and we have little data regarding the tactical considerations that influence the military decision to initiate the use of force when conflict seems imminent. The analysis of directed dyads, however, does permit one to assess how Kantian and realist factors influence the likelihood that a state will initiate a militarized dispute. Consequently, I report in this chapter the results of tests
using directed dyads for the period 1885–2001. Each state is paired twice with every other state in the system in each year, once as the focal state that might use military force against the other and once as the potential target of such an action. The results reported below provide new evidence for the pacific benefits of democracy and trade. The independent contribution of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as in past research, is less certain.

The Kantian Peace

In our previous research, Russett and I have estimated the probability of a dyadic dispute as a function of several liberal and realist influences (Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999b; Russett and Oneal 2001; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003): the character of states’ political regimes, the economic importance of their bilateral trade, the number of IGOs in which they share membership, whether the states were allied, and the bilateral balance of power. We have routinely controlled for contiguity, the distance separating the two states, and whether the dyad includes a major power. Strong support for liberal theory has emerged. In Triangulating Peace, for example, we report that the annual probability of a militarized interstate dispute falls by 33 percent, \textit{ceteris paribus}, if the level of democracy in the less democratic state in the dyad—the state less constrained politically—is one standard deviation greater than the average. The probability of a dispute drops by 43 percent if both states are economically dependent on their commercial relations. A dense network of IGOs is associated with a 24 percent reduction in conflict. If all three Kantian influences are increased simultaneously, the probability of a dispute drops 71 percent (p. 171).

The support we have found for the democratic peace and the constraining influence of economically important trade is consistent with other recent research (Hegre 2000; Mousseau 2000; Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; King and Zeng 2001; Jungblut and Stoll 2002; Kinsella and Russett 2002; Heagerty, Ward and Gleditsch 2002; Beck 2003; Crescenzi 2003; Gartzke and Li 2003; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2003; Lagazio and Russett 2003; Reed 2003a; Dorussen 2004; Hegre 2004; Krustev 2004; McDonald 2004; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Choi and James 2005).² Bennett and Stam (2000b) provided a particularly valuable, independent assessment of the Kantian peace. They use alternative estimators and control for several other influences thought to affect the incidence of dyadic conflict. Their tests include an indicator that conflict is likely based on the model of strategic behavior proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), a sophisticated game theoretic account of interstate conflict. Bennett and Stam’s analyses of nondirected dyads are consistent with the democratic
peace in all 12 tests. Economic interdependence is significantly related to peaceful relations in 9 of the 12: the same number as the indicator of whether a dyad includes a major power and more than any other theoretically interesting variable except democracy. Joint membership in IGOs is not statistically significant in any test, but evidence for the pacific benefits of IGOs is greater when the increasing trend in the number of international organizations is factored out (Oneal and Russett 1999b; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). Recently, Bennett and Stam (2004) have confirmed their earlier findings.

**Historical Domain, Definitions of Variables, and Sources of Data**

In the analyses of directed dyads reported below, I analyze all pairs of states, 1885–2001, for which data are available, as Lemke and Reed (2001) and Bearce and Fisher (2002) recommend, and the subset of politically relevant dyads (PRDs)—those pairs of states that share a common boundary or that include at least one major power. For the best regression model, I also report results from analyzing just the contiguous dyads. There are large differences in the rate of conflict among the contiguous, major-power, and “non-relevant” pairs (Oneal and Russett 1999a). Contiguous states are particularly prone to violence, so it is important to confirm that our principal findings apply to this subset of cases. All but the first years of World War I and II are omitted because bilateral trade data are fragmentary, as they are for the immediate postwar years, 1919–1920 and 1946–1949. Omitting all but the first year of the world wars provides assurance that the results reported below are not determined by these dramatic but atypical events—a concern expressed by Farber and Gowa (1997). The definitions of the variables and the data are similar to those used in our recent analyses; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum (2003) can be consulted for additional information.

I use a general model of dyadic conflict, in which the likelihood of conflict is a function of the political character of the two states, the degree to which the focal state is economically dependent on the potential target, whether the states are allied, the balance of power from the focal state’s perspective, whether the states share a common border, the distance separating them, and whether the focal state is a major power. I take into account temporal dependence by controlling for the time elapsed since the last dispute and adjust for the rapid growth in the number of states in the international system, especially after World War II. This regression model has evolved from the early work of Bremer (1992), and Maoz and Russett (1993), and Polachek and Robst (1998).
In the analyses reported below, I model the initiation of fatal militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), using the conflict data of the Correlates of War (COW) project prepared by Maoz (1999) and available from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a). An initiator is a state that was involved in the conflict from its inception and threatened or used military force against another. Fatal disputes are conflicts in which at least one member of the armed forces of the parties to the hostilities died. Focusing on these particularly violent conflicts serves two purposes. First, it reduces bias in the reporting of less severe military incidents. The use of force at even a low level in Western Europe, for example, small arms’ fire across an international border, would certainly be reported in the Western media from which the COW data are primarily gleaned; such incidents in Africa are apt often to go unnoticed. Attention to fatal disputes also insures that the analyses reported below are relevant to the violent interstate conflicts of greatest concern. Somewhat different dynamics may characterize less severe conflicts. Bluffing, for example, is more apt to occur at lower levels of violence, as Bueno de Mesquita (1981) showed many years ago.

$\text{FATAL\_INITIATION}_{ij,t}$ equals one if the focal state $i$ initiated a fatal dispute against state $j$ in year $t$; it equals zero otherwise.

**Democracy**

I use the Polity data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995) to assess the political character of regimes. This measure ranges from $-10$ for an extreme autocracy to $+10$ for the most democratic states and is measured for both the initiator ($\text{DEMOC}_{i,t}$) and the target ($\text{DEMOC}_{j,t}$) in each year. I also noted which states were coherent democracies, autocracies, or “incoherent” regimes and used these designations to identify nine possible types of directed dyads: democracy→democracy ($\text{DEM} \rightarrow \text{DEM}_{ij,t}$), democracy→mixed regime ($\text{DEM} \rightarrow \text{MIX}_{ij,t}$), democracy→autocracy ($\text{DEM} \rightarrow \text{AUT}_{ij,t}$), autocracy→democracy ($\text{AUT} \rightarrow \text{DEM}_{ij,t}$), autocracy→mixed regime ($\text{AUT} \rightarrow \text{MIX}_{ij,t}$), and so on. Following Jaggers and Gurr (1995), a state is a coherent democracy if its democracy score minus its autocracy score is greater than 6; it is a coherent autocracy if the net Polity score is less than $-6$. Mixed or incoherent regimes have both democratic and autocratic qualities; their scores range from $-6$ to $+6$. Given the extensive documentation of the democratic peace, the clear expectation is that democracies are unlikely to initiate a dispute against other democratic states. Regime scores and all other right-hand-side variables are lagged one year to ensure that they are not affected by a dispute that is to be explained. Thus, conditions in year $t-1$ account for militarized disputes initiated in year $t$. 
**Economic Dependence**

To measure a state’s dependence on trade with its dyadic partner in the post-1949 period, I use Gleditsch’s (2002) latest data, which were drawn from the International Monetary Fund and specialized sources for the Soviet bloc and other non-IMF members. For earlier years, statistical information regarding trade is harder to acquire. I rely primarily on data compiled by the League of Nations (various years) for the interwar period and *The Statesman’s Yearbook* (Epstein 1913) for the pre–World War I era. Since trade is expected to influence a state’s actions only if it is economically (and hence politically) important, I divided the sum of a country’s exports and imports with its partner by its gross domestic product (GDP). Gleditsch has also assembled information regarding gross domestic product per capita for the years after 1949 from Summers et al. (1995) and the Central Intelligence Agency. No comprehensive collection of average incomes exists for the pre-1950 era; but Maddison (1995) reports estimates for 56 countries in all regions of the world for 1870–1992, which provide the basis for estimating per capita GDPs for many other countries. These data with population estimates from the COW Project were used to calculate countries’ GDPs. The measure of a focal state’s dependence on its trade with a potential target is

\[
\text{DEP\_STATE}_{ij,t} = \left( \frac{\text{Exports}_{ij,t} + \text{Imports}_{ij,t}}{\text{GDP}_{i,t}} \right)
\]

Previous research indicates that the more economically dependent one state is on another, the less likely is the use of force. We should expect, therefore, that a state will be disinclined to initiate the use of force against a state with which it has important commercial relations.

**Joint Memberships in Intergovernmental Organizations**

To assess the influence of international organizations on interstate conflict, I use the count of the number of intergovernmental organizations in which both states in a dyad share membership (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). This is by no means a perfect measure of the effectiveness of international institutions because it includes organizations that are weak and strong, regional and global, functional and multipurpose (Russett and Oneal 2001). Ideally, the total should be broken down and some organizations
given special weight, but this effort is only beginning (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). Consequently, I rely on a simple count of joint memberships. To eliminate the strong rising trend in the number of international organizations, especially since the end of World War II, I calculated a pair of states’ involvement in international organizations relative to the yearly average for all dyads. \( IGO_{ij,t} \) equals the number of a dyad’s joint memberships minus the annual average for all dyads divided by the yearly standard deviation of all dyads’ joint memberships.

**Capability Ratio**

Realist theories emphasize the importance of the balance of power in determining the character of interstate relations. The belief that an equal distribution of power leads to peace has deep historical roots, but almost all recent empirical work indicates that it is preponderance that deters military action (Bremer 1992; Lemke and Kugler 1996; Reed 2003b; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Bennett and Stam 2004; Hegre 2004). My index of relative power (\( \ln\text{CAPRATIO}_{ij,t} \)) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the focal state’s military capability index to that of the potential target in each dyad. I use the COW Project’s data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) on population (total and urban), industry (iron or steel production and energy consumption), and military forces (number of armed forces personnel and defense budget) to calculate military capabilities. Because previous research on nondirected dyads indicates that conflict is more likely when there is a balance of military capabilities, I expect the risk that a state will initiate military action to increase as the capability ratio approaches 1.0 and then to decline. Hegre (2004) reports exactly this finding in his analysis of directed dyads. To capture this curvilinear function, I include in the regression model the logarithm of the capability ratio and its square.

**Alliance**

Allies are thought to fight each other less than other states because they share common security interests. They often share other political and economic interests as well. I control for this influence using a variable (\( \text{ALLIES}_{ij,t} \)) that equals one if the members of a dyad were linked by a mutual defense treaty, neutrality pact, or entente; it equals zero otherwise. These data, too, are from the COW Project (Small and Singer 1969) and, like many of the other variables, were downloaded from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000a).
Contiguity, Distance, and Major-Power Status

The potential for interstate violence exists when one member of a dyad can reach the other with military force. For most states, the ability to do so, especially the farther back one goes in history, is determined by geographic proximity. Furthermore, neighbors are likely to have the most reasons to fight—over territorial boundaries, natural resources, irredentist sentiments, and so forth. Thus, distance reduces the capability to fight and most of the incentives to do so as well, a finding that is extremely robust in previous research. Because of the importance of geographic proximity, I include two terms in my regression analyses to capture its influence as fully as possible. The variable \( \text{DISTANCE}_{ij,t} \) is the natural logarithm of the great circle distance in miles between the two states’ capitals (or major ports for the largest countries); using the logarithm is consistent with the belief that there is a declining marginal effect of distance on a state’s ability to use military force. I also include \( \text{CONTIG}_{ij,t} \), a variable that equals one if two states are directly contiguous. It equals zero if they do not share a land boundary and are separated by more than 400 miles of water (Stinnett et al. 2002). The effect of distance in constraining conflict, however, is less for powerful states, that is those with the capability to deploy substantial military forces globally. The major powers have been identified by the COW Project based on the consensus of historians. To control fully for the ability to initiate conflict, I add, therefore, a third variable (\( \text{MAJPOWER}_{i,t} \)) coded one if the focal state in a dyad is a great power and zero if not (Small and Singer 1982).

These three variables—contiguity, distance, and major-power status—are important controls in evaluating theories of war and peace, especially when potentially important causal factors, viz., economic interdependence and alliances, are themselves influenced by and correlated with geographic proximity. Common sense can account for the peace that Burma and Bolivia have enjoyed. Without adequate statistical controls, it can appear that their peaceful relations are a consequence of not being either interdependent or allied. This problem is most acute when all possible pairs of states are analyzed; it is least an issue when regressions are limited to the set of contiguous dyads.

Years of Peace and the Size of the International System

Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998; Beck 2003) recommend that researchers control for duration dependence. Consequently I created a variable
(YEARS_PEACE\textsubscript{ij,t}) that marks the number of years that elapsed since a state last initiated a fatal dispute against its dyadic partner, and then I generated a natural cubic spline with three interior knots. Inclusion of these variables in logistic regression creates the equivalent of hazard analysis and addresses the possibility that some explanatory variables are endogenous (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). By controlling for the years of peace, we can be confident that the influence of past conflict on states’ interdependence, for example, has been taken into account. I also introduce, as Raknerud and Hegre (1997) and Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal (2003) recommend, a variable that corrects for the change in the probability of dyadic conflict due to the increasing number of states in the international system over time. In logistic analysis, we assume that, after controlling for the explanatory variables, the probability of conflict remains constant. The results reported below clearly indicate that this assumption is violated if the expansion in the number of states is not taken into account. SYSTEM\_SIZE\textsubscript{t} equals the natural logarithm of the number of states in the system for pairs of non-contiguous, minor powers; it is zero otherwise.

**Results**

In this section, I report the results of tests using directed dyads designed to show the effect of the Kantian and realist variables on the likelihood that a state will initiate a fatal militarized dispute. I use logistic regression analysis of data for the period 1885–2001. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are reported, because the effects of regime type on the risk of initiation are unclear, other than the expectation that democracies will not attack other democracies. I rely on robust standard errors that take into account the clustering of the data by dyads.

In table 4.1 the results of the first set of tests are reported. The following regression equation is estimated:

\[
\text{FATAL\_INITIATION}_{ij,t} = \text{DEMOC}_{i,t-1} + \text{DEMOC}_{j,t-1} + \text{DEP\_STATE}_{ij,t-1} + \text{IGO}_{ij,t-1} + \text{lnCAPRATIO}_{ij,t-1} + \text{lnCAPRATIO}\textsuperscript{2}_{ij,t-1} + \text{ALLIES}_{ij,t-1} + \text{CONTIG}_{ij,t-1} + \text{DISTANCE}_{ij,t-1} + \text{MAJPOWER}_{i,t-1} + \text{SYSTEM\_SIZE}_{t-1} + \text{YEARS\_PEACE\_SPLINE}_{ij,t}
\]  

(1)

where \( i \) represents the focal state that may initiate a fatal dispute, \( j \) represents the potential target, and \( t \) indicates the year.
In column 1 are the estimated coefficients of model 1 with all possible pairs of states included in the sample. The results indicate that democracies are less likely to initiate conflict than are more autocratic states ($p < .02$). The political character of the target state does not influence the likelihood of an initiation in this specification. Democracies seem disinclined to start a dispute with any type of regime, not just other democracies. This model does not allow, however, for the possibility that the political character of a potential target affects the likelihood of conflict differently depending upon the nature of the focal state’s regime. Of particular interest is the possibility that autocratic states are prone to initiate military action against democratic targets while democracies are particularly unlikely to do so. This issue is addressed below.

The other variables, except for the measure of joint memberships in international organizations, perform as expected. As liberals have suggested, a state that is economically interdependent with a potential target is unlikely to initiate conflict against it ($p < .03$). The effect of the capability ratio, as will be discussed later, is consistent with previous research indicating that conflict is most likely when the capability ratio is near 1.0, that is, when power is evenly distributed within a dyad. If either the focal state or the target hold a preponderance of capabilities, the use of force is unlikely (Hegre 2004). The logarithm of the capability ratio ($p < .04$) and its square ($p < .02$) are individually and jointly ($p < .02$) significant. Great relative power allows states to promote their interests without actually using military force. A state is also less likely to initiate conflict against an ally ($p < .11$). The measure of dyads’ involvement in international organizations, the states’ joint memberships in IGOs relative to the yearly average, is insignificant ($p < .70$) and the sign of the coefficient is unexpectedly positive. In previous research, the results for this Kantian variable have been mixed. Some analyses show that a dense network of IGOs reduces the risk of conflict; others do not (Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999a; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Bennett and Stam 2000b; Russett and Oneal 2001; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Pevehouse and Russett 2005). Further research on the influence of international organizations is certainly warranted: IGOs significantly reduced the risk of war, 1885–2001, in the nondirected analyses reported in Oneal and Russett (2004).

Distance makes the initiation of a fatal dispute less likely, while the existence of a shared border increases the probability that a conflict will occur. Major powers are more likely to initiate a dispute than smaller states; a long period without a fatal dispute is a good predictor of continued peace; and the probability of conflict for a given pair of noncontiguous, minor powers
has declined as the number of states in the system has increased. All of these control variables are highly significant (at least $p < .007$) except for the major-power indicator ($p < .07$).

In the second column of Table 4.1, the estimated coefficients for the same model are reported but with the analysis limited to the politically relevant dyads (PRDs). This eliminates pairs of minor powers that do not share a common land border or are separated by more than 400 miles of water, focusing attention on dyads that are more likely to become involved in military conflict. The results for the PRDs are substantially the same as
for the full set of cases. The biggest differences are that the political character of the focal state is less significant \((p < .13)\), the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of the trade-to-GDP ratio is larger, and the alliance indicator is more significant \((p < .04)\).

To clarify the influence of political regimes, I use indicators to identify the nine possible types of directed dyads: democracy→democracy, democracy→mixed regime, democracy→autocracy, autocracy→democracy, autocracy→mixed regime, and so forth. This specification allows for discontinuities in the influence of political regimes on the initiation of conflict. This is important because the initiation of force may be conditional on the character of both the focal state’s and the target’s political institutions. The nine indicators are substituted for the democracy scores of the focal state and the target in the specification used in table 4.1. The autocracy→autocracy dyad is the omitted category so these pairs comprise the reference group. This, then, is model 2:

\[
\text{FATAL\_INITIATION}_{ij,t} = \text{DEM}\_\text{DEM}_{ij,t-1} + \text{DEM}\_\text{MIX}_{ij,t-1} + \text{DEM}\_\text{AUT}_{ij,t-1} + \text{MIX}\_\text{DEM}_{ij,t-1} + \text{MIX}\_\text{MIX}_{ij,t-1} + \text{MIX}\_\text{AUT}_{ij,t-1} + \text{AUT}\_\text{DEM}_{ij,t-1} + \text{AUT}\_\text{MIX}_{ij,t-1} + \text{DEP\_STATE}_{ij,t-1} + \ln \text{CAPRATIO}_{ij,t-1} + \ln \text{CAPRATIO}^2_{ij,t-1} + \text{ALLIES}_{ij,t-1} + \text{CONTIG}_{ij,t-1} + \text{DISTANCE}_{ij,t-1} + \text{MAJORPOWER}_{i,t-1} + \text{SYSTEM\_SIZE}_{t-1} + \text{YEARS\_PEACE\_SPLINE}_{ij,t}
\]

To simplify the presentation of the results of estimating model 2, I report in table 4.2 information only for the variables that are most interesting theoretically: the indicators of the various dyadic types, the bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio of the focal state with the potential target, the capability ratio and its square, and the alliance indicator. The measure of the states’ joint memberships relative to the yearly average has been dropped from the analysis. If included in model 2, its estimated coefficient and standard error are similar to those reported in table 4.1. As noted earlier, there are ongoing efforts to improve the measurement of the influence of international organizations on dyadic conflict; therefore, I leave further consideration of IGOs to future research. The coefficients of the other variables in the model (the indicator of contiguity, the logarithm of the distance separating the two states, the major-power indicator, the measure of the size of the
international system, and the years of peace spline) are also similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those reported in table 4.1.

In the first column of table 4.2, the results of estimating model 2 for all possible pairs of states, 1885–2001, are reported. Of the nine dyadic indicators, only the estimated coefficients for the democracy→democracy

Table 4.2  Initiation of Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1885–2001, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All dyads</th>
<th>Politically relevant dyads only</th>
<th>Contiguous dyads only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy→democracy</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$-.979^{*}$</td>
<td>$-.945^{*}$</td>
<td>$-.743$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E.$\beta$</td>
<td>$$.511$</td>
<td>$.568$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy→autocracy</td>
<td>$.327$</td>
<td>$.374$</td>
<td>$.208$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.301$</td>
<td>$.312$</td>
<td>$.350$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy→mixed regime</td>
<td>$-.0228$</td>
<td>$.0158$</td>
<td>$.191$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.3062$</td>
<td>$.3198$</td>
<td>$.312$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy→democracy</td>
<td>$.729^{**}$</td>
<td>$.573$</td>
<td>$.632^{*}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.331$</td>
<td>$.366$</td>
<td>$.370$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy→mixed regime</td>
<td>$.203$</td>
<td>$.197$</td>
<td>$.236$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.233$</td>
<td>$.238$</td>
<td>$.240$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed regime→democracy</td>
<td>$.0116$</td>
<td>$-.0385$</td>
<td>$.0640$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.3907$</td>
<td>$.4431$</td>
<td>$.4417$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed regime→autocracy</td>
<td>$-.193$</td>
<td>$.265$</td>
<td>$.349$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.288$</td>
<td>$.299$</td>
<td>$.308$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed regime→mixed regime</td>
<td>$.286$</td>
<td>$.275$</td>
<td>$.171$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.275$</td>
<td>$.283$</td>
<td>$.282$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>$-13.1^{**}$</td>
<td>$-21.9^{*}$</td>
<td>$-29.7^{*}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$6.5$</td>
<td>$11.8$</td>
<td>$15.4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>$-.161$</td>
<td>$.275$</td>
<td>$-.301$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.193$</td>
<td>$.198$</td>
<td>$.203$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log capability ratio</td>
<td>$.738^{**}$</td>
<td>$1.52^{***}$</td>
<td>$1.59^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.311$</td>
<td>$.36$</td>
<td>$.43$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log capability ratio$^2$</td>
<td>$-.0408^{***}$</td>
<td>$-.0766^{***}$</td>
<td>$-.0798^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$.0153$</td>
<td>$.0178$</td>
<td>$.0216$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>$.34$</td>
<td>$.19$</td>
<td>$.15$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>$927,100$</td>
<td>$75,705$</td>
<td>$39,406$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note  
* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test). The estimated coefficients of contiguity, distance, major-power indicator, the years-of-peace spline, and the number of states in the international system are not reported to save space; all are statistically significant.
(p < .06) and the autocracy→democracy (p < .03) dyads are significantly different from zero. As expected, democracies are unlikely to start a dispute with another democracy. In addition, autocracies are prone to target democratic states. Democracies apparently are unconstrained in initiating conflict against mixed regimes or autocracies. At the same time, democracies are not significantly more likely to target autocracies than are other autocratic states. There is, therefore, strong evidence for the democratic peace in this analysis, which is consistent with previous analyses of directed dyads (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Ray 2004; Hegre 2004). There is also clear indication that the animosity between autocracies and democracies we have noted before (Oneal and Russett 1997) is primarily a result of aggressive behavior by autocratic states. There is no evidence of an “autocratic peace” in the estimation of model 2. The probability that an autocratic state will initiate a fatal dispute against another autocracy is not significantly different from the odds that any of the six dyads whose coefficients are insignificant will experience an initiation. Autocracies in general do not enjoy a separate peace, therefore, as Bueno de Mesquita and Ray (2004) also conclude, contrary to Werner (2000) and Henderson (2002). The insignificance of the estimated coefficient of the mixed→mixed dyad is further indication that it is not simply political similarity that promotes peace.

There is again strong support in these results for the liberal view that economic interdependence reduces conflict. The estimated coefficient of the focal state’s dependence ratio is negative as expected and significant at the .05 level. The capability ratio (p < .02) and its square (p < .01) are statistically significant individually and jointly (p < .01). The alliance indicator is clearly not (p < .41). It is hard to reconcile this last result with the emphasis that Senese and Vasquez (2005) place on the pacifying benefit of alliances in their account of the steps to war.

In columns 2 and 3 of table 4.2, the results of estimating model 2 are reported but I limit the sample to the politically relevant dyads and then to just the contiguous pairs of states, those dyads most prone to conflict. The results for the PRDs are similar to those for all dyads, though there is a slight drop in the significance of the democracy→democracy (p < .10) and the autocracy→democracy (p < .12) indicators and the focal state’s dependence measure (p < .07). The logarithm of the capability ratio and its square are significant, individually and jointly, at the .001 level. The absolute magnitude of the coefficient of the alliance indicator is larger but still not insignificant by conventional standards (p < .17). For the contiguous dyads, the democracy→democracy indicator is insignificant (p < .19), whereas the autocracy→democracy indicator (p < .09) and the focal state’s bilateral
trade-to-GDP measure ($p < .06$) are significant at reasonable levels. Again, the two terms marking the balance of power are very significant statistically.\(^8\)

On the most important points, the analyses in table 4.2 are consistent with those of Bennett and Stam (2004). We agree on the democratic peace, the benefit of economic interdependence, and the pacifying influence of a preponderance of power; and we both conclude that the conflict-reducing effect of alliances is less certain. However, there are also important differences in our findings. The most obvious concerns who bears responsibility for the initiation of conflict in the violence-prone autocracy-democracy dyads. Bennett and Stam report that both the autocracy→democracy and democracy→autocracy pairs are more conflictual than the baseline case, but “autocracies appear to target democracies less often than vice versa” (p. 131). I find no evidence that democracies attack autocracies with unusual frequency, and I conclude that it is the autocratic states that tend to initiate fatal disputes against democracies. In addition, my results indicate that, holding the nondirected balance of capabilities constant, the weak state in the dyad is as likely to initiate a fatal dispute as is the strong country—a finding discussed in detail later.\(^9\)

The results reported in table 4.2 can be made more concrete by estimating the effect each theoretical variable has on the likelihood that a state will initiate a fatal militarized dispute. First, I calculated a baseline probability against which to make comparisons. I made both the focal and target states autocratic, setting their regime scores at the 10th percentile among the contiguous pairs (−9 on the democracy–autocracy scale). The focal state’s bilateral trade-to-GDP measure was also set at the 10th percentile (0.0). The capability ratio was set at 1.0, indicating that the two states had equal military capabilities. I stipulated that the members of the dyad were not allied but did share a border and that the focal state was not a major power. The capital-to-capital distance and the years of peace were set at their means for the contiguous pairs. I estimated the annual probability of the initiation of a fatal militarized dispute for this dyad using the coefficients in table 4.1 for the three samples of cases: all dyads, the politically relevant pairs, or those that share a land border or are separated by less than 400 miles of water. To show the substantive effects of the theoretically interesting variables, the democracy scores of the focal and target states or the focal state’s dependence measure was increased to the 90th percentile among the contiguous dyads (+10 for the democracy score, .035 for the dependence measure), or the states were made allies. The annual baseline probabilities and the reductions in risk under these various conditions are reported in table 4.3. The capability ratio was set at several values to indicate the effect of the balance of power on the likelihood that a state would initiate a fatal dispute. Those results are shown in figure 4.1.
Table 4.3 Annual Probability of the Initiation of a Fatal Militarized Dispute, 1885–2001, Based on Estimated Coefficients in Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All dyads</th>
<th>Politically relevant dyads only</th>
<th>Contiguous dyads only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Autocracy→Autocracy; trade-to-GDP</td>
<td>.0043</td>
<td>.0049</td>
<td>.0054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Democracy→Democracy</td>
<td>−62%</td>
<td>−61%</td>
<td>−52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Autocracy→Democracy</td>
<td>+106%</td>
<td>+77%</td>
<td>+87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Increase trade-to-GDP ratio to</td>
<td>−37%</td>
<td>−53%</td>
<td>−65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Allies equals 1</td>
<td>−15%</td>
<td>−24%</td>
<td>−26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Democracy→Democracy and increase</td>
<td>−76%</td>
<td>−82%</td>
<td>−83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade-to-GDP ratio to 90th percentile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The baseline probability is reported in row 1; subsequently, the change in the probability of initiation is shown.

Figure 4.1 Effect of the Capability Ratio on Fatal Initiations.
As seen in table 4.3, the results for the three sets of cases are consistent, though there are interesting differences as well. I focus first on the analysis of the politically relevant dyads found in column 2. The annual baseline probability for the initiation of a fatal militarized dispute when this set of cases is used in the estimation is .0049. Making both states democratic sharply reduces the probability of conflict; the likelihood of an initiation falls to .0019, a reduction of 61 percent. On the other hand, keeping the focal state autocratic and making the potential target a democracy raises the risk by 77 percent, to .0087. Increasing the focal state’s bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio, while holding all other variables at their baseline values, lowers the probability of an initiation by 53 percent. Making the states allied has less effect—a decrease of 24 percent. If the dyad is composed of two democracies and the focal state is economically dependent on the potential target, the risk of an initiation is .0009, 82 percent less than under the baseline conditions (.0049).

Comparing the results across the three columns of table 4.3 reveals that the estimated probability of a fatal initiation for a contiguous pair of states increases as the sample is progressively restricted. This suggests that our efforts to model the ability to use military force—using contiguity, distance, and major-power status—are not completely successful when large subsets of cases with lower probabilities of conflict (major-power dyads and especially the nonrelevant pairs) are added. Not surprisingly, this most affects those variables correlated with geographic proximity: interdependence and the alliance indicator. The effects of both, and generally their statistical significance, increase as the sample is restricted.

Figure 4.1 shows the results of systematically modifying the capability ratio. The values for the other variables in the equation are the same as those for the baseline case in table 4.2. Again I focus on the results for a contiguous pair of states using the estimated coefficients from column 2, table 4.2. The effect of modifying the balance of power on the risk of conflict is striking. As the capability ratio moves from 1.0, where there is an equal distribution of militarily relevant resources, the likelihood of a fatal initiation falls sharply. The curve is remarkably symmetrical around the central point. This result is, of course, consistent with the great majority of recent studies that use nondirected dyadic analysis (Geller 2000) and with Hegre’s (2004) study of directed dyads. It is clearly inconsistent with the traditional realist belief that a balance of power preserves the peace.

Surprisingly, in figure 4.1 the curve peaks when the capability ratio is less than 1.0. The likelihood of initiation is at its maximum when the capability ratio is about 0.83 (or 1:1.2). Thus, the initiation of a fatal dispute is most likely when the focal state is somewhat weaker than the target.
Indeed, at equal intervals from a true balance of power, there is a slightly greater chance that the smaller state will initiate the use of force. Given the limitations on the accuracy of our measure of power, not too much should be made of minor differences in the probability of initiating conflict; but of the 266 fatal initiations among the politically relevant dyads in this sample of cases, 131 were by the weaker party. It is surprising that the weaker state in a dyad is at least as likely to be the first to use force as is the stronger party. Perhaps this is the point at which war really is in the error term (Gartzke 1999), at least with the analysis limited to the political and economic variables currently in use. Tactical military considerations may play an important role in determining, for states at the precipice of conflict, who actually initiates the use of force.

Conclusions

The research reported here is a logical extension of the research program on which Bruce Russett and I have been working for the last ten years. Like that earlier work, there has been an emphasis on crossing boundaries: between political and economic influences on interstate conflict and between liberal and realist theories of international relations. One thing that has remained constant is the search for theoretically justified, empirically verified paths to a real, lasting peace, not just a lull in fighting. Democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations, especially taken together, offer such hope. Scores of scientific studies confirm that there is a separate peace among the world’s democracies, and now more than 35 published research reports by nearly 30 scholars show that commerce, too, is a powerful force for peace. The independent role of intergovernmental organizations has, thus far, proven less certain.

Most previous studies have used nondirected dyads to analyze the onset of militarized disputes. Here I employ directed dyads instead, examining the period 1885–2001. The use of directed dyads permits the determination of how the Kantian and realist factors influence the likelihood that a state will initiate conflict. The results reported strongly reinforce previous evidence regarding the pacific benefits of democracy and interdependence. Depending on the sample of dyads analyzed, a democracy is 52–62 percent less likely to initiate a fatal dispute against another democracy than is an autocratic state against another autocracy. Other dyads suffer virtually the same risk of conflict as the autocracy → autocracy pair, except that autocracies are prone to attack democratic states. The rate of initiation for an autocracy against a democracy is 77–106 percent greater than for an autocracy against another autocracy. This is convincing evidence that there is a uniquely democratic peace.
A state highly dependent on trade is also much less likely to initiate conflict. A state whose trade-to-GDP ratio is at the 90th percentile is 37–65 percent less likely to initiate a fatal dispute than one at the 10th percentile. A democratic pair of states with a high level of interdependence is 76–83 percent less likely to experience the initiation of such a serious conflict as an autocratic dyad with no trade.

In these analyses, I found no evidence for an independent pacific benefit of intergovernmental organizations. Past results have also been mixed. Work on this important topic is continuing, as better measures of the effectiveness of IGOs are developed. Past research has shown that democracies are particularly likely to join international organizations with other democratic countries, and they cooperate in the international organizations of which they are jointly members (Kim and Russett 1996, Pevehouse and Russett 2005). IGOs also bring together states linked by economically important commerce (Russett and Oneal 2001, 212–218), and the pacific benefits of trade are reinforced by the opportunities for peaceful conflict resolution they provide (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). Continued research on the contributions of international organizations is clearly justified.

For the foreseeable future, military force will remain an important tool for preventing and responding to aggression; but the story of Damocles illustrates the danger of seeking peace through military strength alone. According to Greek legend, Damocles envied Dionysius, the autocratic ruler of Syracuse. To demonstrate the perilous nature of a life sustained by power, Dionysius invited Damocles to a banquet where he was seated under a sword hanging by a single thread. Today we live under a threat not of swords but of weapons of mass destruction. If peace is to be maintained in this century and beyond, it must be established on a more secure foundation than deterrence and the threat of force. Technology has made war more horrible, increasing the desire for peace, as many have argued; but “fear and permanent peace are more difficult to equate,” as Waltz (1959, 235) noted. The danger with realist solutions in the contemporary era is that they will produce a peace of a very different sort: “A vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried” (Kant [1795] 1970, 105). Even if there is only one chance in a hundred of a nuclear war in a year, there is better than a 50–50 chance that at least one nuclear war will have occurred after 69 years. We cannot trust that the good fortune experienced during the cold war will continue.

The evidence that has been presented for the liberal peace provides good grounds for optimism. Democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations, too, substantially reduce the danger of war; and
we can reasonably expect that the number of democracies and their economic interdependence will increase. People naturally desire to govern themselves in order that they may enjoy liberty. As a consequence, democracy is preferred to authoritarianism. People also desire prosperity. Markets encourage specialization according to comparative advantage and trade—a tendency that seems bound to increase as the cost of communication and transportation continue to decline. The outcome of this grand historical process is not certain; but the danger associated with relying too heavily on military force is apparent. International relations scholars can, with increasing confidence, cross the boundary between science and policy prescription regarding the causes of peace.

Notes

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1. Since our first article (Oneal et al. 1996), Russett and I have published 19 research reports together. Each of us has in addition several publications alone or with others that draw on our common work. In this ongoing line of investigation, I gratefully acknowledge the coauthors with whom I have worked: Michael Berbaum, Michaelene Cox, David Davis, Håvard Hegre, Zeev Maoz, Michael Mousseau, James Ray, Jaroslav Tir, and Douglas Van Belle.

2. Chan (1997), Ray (1998), and Russett and Starr (2000) survey research on the democratic peace. McMillan (1997), Reuveny (2000), Mansfield and Pollins (2003), and Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003) provide useful reviews of the growing literature on interdependence and conflict. The contribution of international organizations, on the other hand, has not been widely examined; and the results are less consistent.

3. Because the data before 1950 are less standardized, the appropriate exchange rates for converting the data to a common unit are less certain, and there are more missing data, I also consulted Mitchell (1981) and Barbieri (1996) for bilateral trade statistics for the pre–1950 period.

4. In the tests reported below, there are 266 initiations among the 75,705 observations for politically relevant dyads, an annual rate of .00351. With all possible pairs, the number of observations grows more than 12-fold but the number of conflicts by little more than 11 percent; the annual rate of initiation for all dyads, 1885–2001, is .000320.

6. The consistency between the results reported in table 4.2 and those in research using nondirected cases suggests that concern about our ability to determine which state actually initiated conflict may be overblown. Forceful actions are sometimes taken in anticipation of an attack, as in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In other instances, an attack is staged to make the real act of aggression look like a defensive response (e.g., the supposed Polish attack on Germany on the eve of World War II). Apparently, however, the initiator can be identified with reliability in most cases. One continuing problem with the analyses of directed dyads is the small number of initiations relative to the number of observations. If all dyads are analyzed, 1885–2001, there are only 297 positive cases out of a total of 927,100 or .03 of 1 percent.

7. The results for the PRDs were tested for robustness using King and Zeng’s (2001) rare events logistics estimator and with a minimal set of covariates (contiguity, distance, the major-power indicator, and the years of peace spline). The only important change was for the indicator of an alliance, which was significant at the .07 level without the other theoretically interesting variables in the specification. The measure of joint IGO memberships was still insignificant with the minimal number of covariates.

8. In a test not reported in a table, I added the target’s bilateral trade-to-GDP measure to model 2. The dependence measures of the focal and target states are marginally insignificant individually when both are entered into the regression equation; but both are associated with a reduced risk of a fatal initiation, are similar in magnitude, and jointly significant at the .04 level. This result is consistent with those reported by Bennett and Stam (2004). It provides evidence for Hegre’s (2004) argument that interdependence has its greatest benefit in reducing conflict for dyads of roughly equal size—dyads that are prone to fight.

9. Neither Bennett and Stam (2004) nor I find that the leading state influences the likelihood of military conflict system-wide, contrary to both hegemonic-stability theory and power-transition theory. In several analyses not reported in a table, I found that the initiation of a fatal dispute is unrelated to the power of the leading state or to the level of satisfaction of either the focal state or a potential target, as indicated by the similarity of their alliance portfolios with that of the leading state. In determining the prospects for peace, states’ bilateral relations seem much more important than the influence of the so-called hegemon. One of the most interesting differences between my analyses and Bennett and Stam’s concerns the influence of systemic power concentration. They report that the most powerful predictor of interstate conflict is the concentration of power (CON) in the international system. I find no evidence that systemic concentration is related ($p < .70$) to the incidence of fatal disputes.

10. Figure 4.1 is constructed to make this apparent. The value plotted for the capability ratio is actually $1/capratio$ if $capratio > 1$, so a capability ratio of $1/40$ is represented as $-40$ on the graph. In this way, the same balance
of power, favoring the focal state to the right of 1 or the target to the left, is represented at equal intervals from 1.

11. Others assess the balance of power using the focal state’s share of the sum of its capabilities and the capabilities of the target. Substituting this measure for the logarithm of the capability ratio has very little effect on the results: initiation is most likely when power is evenly distributed between the members of the dyad.
The international relations research on democratic peace has focused on the outbreak of interstate wars. There has also been some similar work in comparative politics on the outbreak of internal wars. A third comparative politics literature deals with the question of whether it is possible to establish a democratic government after an internal war. However, there has been less work on whether, after an internal war, a postwar democratic government makes renewed civil war less likely. In fact, this is the issue that has the most policy relevance; it is precisely in postwar situations that outsiders have a chance to actually influence the type of government that emerges. The consensus seems to be that democratic governments will make renewed civil war less likely. This in turn is one of the major justifications for the current costly and risky strategy of trying to establish democracies in states that lack any of the conventional preconditions for democracy and where it would obviously be easier to simply select an authoritarian leader.

However in fact there is less consensus than meets the eye. People on the ground are often highly dubious both about the prospects for establishing democracies and the likely effects of doing so; we are looking exclusively at the latter question in this chapter. There is some feeling that the pro-democracy policy is being driven by Wilsonian ideology rather than reality. We need to establish whether the democratic peace theory applies to the renewal of civil wars. If it is not, democratization may not be a worthwhile goal in such cases.
The obvious initial response to this sort of question would be a large-N study. Two such studies have been carried out. Although they use somewhat different methods and the analysis is not yet complete, they both tentatively find a negative correlation between postwar democracy and civil war renewal in the post-1945 period (Dubey 2002; Mukherjee 2004). The two studies used similar variables and databases. Their cases came from the dataset of Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) of civil wars from 1945 to 2000. Their causal variables included democracy and presidential, mixed or parliamentarian system, which were taken from the ACLP database (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003); proportional representation/ majoritarian measures taken from other sources (Kurian 1998; Derbyshire and Derbyshire 2000); executive constraints taken from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers); several powersharing variables from Barbara Walter’s Civil War Resolution Data Set (Walter 2002); and data on international interventions from Doyle and Sambanis. Control variables included intensity of human cost, type of war, peace treaty/informal truce, powersharing agreement (political, military, territorial), size of government forces, ethnic heterogeneity, natural resource dependency, and development. Their dependent variable was the length of time between a settlement and a renewed civil war, if any (a considerable advance over earlier work, including my own, which had dichotomized this variable into success and failure, usually at the five-year mark).

Dubey used a Cox proportional hazards model to reduce the effects of two problems: the dependent variable may not be normally distributed, and “right-censoring,” the fact that we do not know the end of a peace process that has not yet broken down but may do so in the future. Mukherjee used a parametric Weibull duration model, which he suggests has certain statistical advantages over Cox and is a better fit to the data. He also employed some sophisticated techniques to check for collinearity and endogeneity. Both analyses concluded that democracy was related to longer peace. At a fairly basic level, Dubey noted that only 14 percent of the democracies had reverted to civil wars as opposed to 48 percent of the nondemocracies. In more sophisticated analysis, he found that democracy reduced the likelihood of failure of peace by 74 percent; Mukherjee’s comparable figure was 34 percent, and both were highly significant. They also found that proportional representation regimes increased the length of time of peace more than presidential and majoritarian parliamentary regimes. Dubey also found that democracies with constrained executives are linked to longer periods of peace than democracies that are not. It is interesting to note that they both also found that powersharing without democracy did not extend the period of peace and that third-party intervention had no significant impact.
Nonetheless, like most large-N studies, they do not establish the mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variables, and without such linkages we have difficulty explaining the findings in a way that is persuasive to skeptics or sorting out conditions under which the effects are more or less likely to be observed. They also cannot refute the argument that some prior variable accounts for the relationship, making it spurious.

This analysis focuses on the intervening variables to try to sort out whether these results were due to democracy or not and, if so, which of the several different theoretical explanations of this linkage is more persuasive. The strategy is to (1) specify several different possible explanations why postsettlement democracy might make renewed civil war less likely, (2) specify for each different explanation a set of hypotheses about how it would predict the way people and institutions will behave in democratic and nondemocratic postsettlement states, (3) select several cases of postsettlement democracy from the data used by Dubey and Mukherjee, and (4) use process tracing to determine which, if any, of the theorized processes were actually present in these cases and whether they actually had the expected effects. The strategy does not assume that a single dominant process will appear in all cases; indeed one of the objects is to see whether there are different paths to similar outcomes and, if so, when each is more likely to occur. It thus links international relations and comparative politics by looking at the impact of democracy on renewed civil wars and uses qualitative methods to refine and develop the results of quantitative analyses.

Clearly the method hinges on process tracing, a term that has been used in many ways. Ideally it would mean first developing a set of theories that would specify the processes and mechanisms that would connect the independent to the dependent variables and the sequence in which they would occur, that is what kind of behavior by what sorts of people would vary at what particular times. So far this looks like a mathematical model, and indeed there is no reason, other than my own inadequacies, why it should not be. However, unlike the claims of many modelers, this method assumes that the linkages specified are real and that, if they are not, the theory is weakened. (For a good discussion of this issue, see Ray 1995, 131–157.)

However, I cannot specify the sequences of variables in many cases. Instead of a causal chain, we have causal clusters, which are groups of things that the theory predicts will be happen in order to cause the result. I have attempted to divide them into sequences of clusters to suggest some causal activity. The “testing” of the different theories involves seeing if some or
all of these predicted changes happened in the kinds of cases which that particular theory predicts and whether they are plausibly connected to the outcome. Note that the hypotheses are probabilistic rather than absolute so we are more concerned with patterns across cases than any individual example.

Theory: Why Might Postsettlement Democracy Reduce the Likelihood of Renewed Civil War?

What particular qualities of democracy are expected to influence what sort of people to behave in what sorts of ways? The definition of democracy is contested on at least three dimensions: what societal issue areas are subject to some sort of popular control (often framed as economic vs. political questions), what sort of individual and collective rights must be widespread aside from some sort of election, and how long does the system have to be in place before having the hypothesized impact on behavior (the democracy/democratization debate). The role of democracy in reducing the likelihood of interstate war (the “democratic peace” issue) has been the subject of considerable analysis, including contributions in this volume. There appears to be a fairly solid correlation between the variables, but there is no single widely accepted theoretical explanation for this relationship on which we can draw. Similarly, when looking at the relationship between postsettlement democracy and renewed civil war, we do not have a single theoretical argument for a relationship; instead there are fragments of several different and possibly contradictory arguments. Thus, rather than looking for a single set of variables linked by good theory, it makes more sense to specify several different ones. The research thus has two objectives—to see whether any set of processes and mechanisms linked to theories of democracy explain the absence of renewed civil war and, if so, to see which theory or combination does the best job.

One advantage of this technique is that, while we try to sort out the utility of separate explanations, it is not necessary to think of them as necessarily opposed to one another (Most and Starr 1989; Russett and Oneal 2001, 53–54). We may be able to isolate particular elements of different explanations that seem to work and how elements from different theories work together in particular cases. Nonetheless, I attempted to develop hypotheses that were different for each of the explanations; ideally they would be certain and unique (Van Evera 1997, 30–35).

1. One argument is that democracy gives leaders of competing factions incentives to organize themselves differently from how they did during the
civil war. In war, relatively small groups with deep levels of commitment and access to weapons can succeed in gaining considerable influence for their leaders; indeed in two of our cases the actual numbers of people engaged in violent activities is fairly small. Democracy, however, rewards leaders who can assemble large coalitions that need not be intensely cohesive and may shift over time on different issues. “Effective governance in a democracy requires leaders to attend to a wide range of societal interests” (Russett and Oneal 2001, 70). We can call this the elite incentive theory according to which democracies will make civil war less likely by giving formerly competing participants incentives to cooperate with one another and, if successful, be successful in influencing the government, either now or in the future. This in turn is expected to make the factions less willing to break the settlement terms when the government inevitably does something that they dislike. This process focuses on elites within the society.

If this is true, the following things should be observed in democratic postsettlement governments:

1a: Elites and populations will increasingly believe guarantees of political freedom and access. Therefore the following:

1b1: Factions are more likely to believe that they can influence government decisions.

1b2: Old coalitions, organized for the war, break up; the new ones are larger and include members from different sides of the previous civil war.

1b3: Competition becomes less intense since even losers believe they may be more successful in the future; political becomes less of a zero-sum game.

1b4: Groups working outside the system increasingly get less public support. Thus:

1c: New challengers are brought into the political system and given a stake because of shifting coalitions.¹

This argument is distinctive to civil wars. Another obvious source of explanations is the democratic peace literature in international relations. In fact, however, the fit is not very good. The strongest finding of this literature is that democratic states seldom go to war with one another. It’s not entirely clear how to translate this finding into renewal of civil wars; presumably the argument would be that if both the government and the potential opponent were democratic, renewed civil war would be less likely than if one or both were nondemocratic. This would require identifying every faction in every country that might provoke a civil war and then classifying each as to its degree of democracy, a task well beyond this study. Thus any application of democratic peace theories is likely to be
somewhat indirect. Moreover, as a recent major study tactfully points out, “there is as yet no consensus on why liberal democracies have not gone to war with one another” (Bennett and Stam 2003, 208).

Nonetheless, the two major theoretical approaches to the democratic peace, cultures/norms and structures/institutions, each offer some ideas that can be adapted for civil war renewal. At one level, of course, the division is artificial; presumably institutions flow from and influence societal norms and culture (Russett and Oneal 2001, 53–59). This is particularly true in established democracies. In post–civil war societies, on the other hand, the two are less likely to go hand in hand. In many of these cases the prewar government was not democratic, and in any case the war had probably significantly reduced agreement on democratic norms for resolving political disputes. Indeed one of the central questions of state-building is precisely how much weight institutions can have in creating democracy in societies where democratic norms are less than universal.

2. The culture and norms argument is that democracies have “norms of bounded political competition and peaceful resolution of disputes” (Levy 2002, 359). This argument should be particularly strong in civil wars in which all of the factions have presumably shared a common culture before the war at least to some extent. If this is true, the following things are more likely to occur in democratic than nondemocratic postsettlement governments; the stress here is on beliefs and behavior widely shared within the populations.

2a1: Elites and publics should oppose the use of violence to resolve political disputes.
2a2: Society should encourage and support individuals and groups with connections across competing factions. Therefore the following:
2b1: Media will support individuals and groups advocating negotiation and compromise.
2b2: Societal discourse should stress unity rather than historic divisions.
2b3: Violence during the previous civil war should not be glorified. Therefore the following:
2c1: Successful political strategies should stress conciliation rather than coercion.
2c2: Costly compromises should be accepted by publics and elites.
2c3: There should be considerable support for measures of transitional justice applied equitably to both sides, especially as regards individuals.
2c4: Leaders responsive to the public will be less likely to support war than those who are not.
3. The *institutional constraints* argument is that divided power and open societies, including a free press, make it difficult for governments to resort to war. The argument has been further developed by game theoretic methods “Leaders of democracies typically experience high political costs from fighting wars—always from losing them, and often despite winning them” (Russett and Oneal 2001, 54). The plausibility of this approach is heightened by the fact that Dubey (2002, 23–24) found that democracies whose executives were constrained had longer periods of postwar peace than those whose executives were unconstrained.

I have included at least two interesting ideas stemming from this approach. The first is the game theoretic work that is based on the assumption that democracies require large winning coalitions that can only be held together by successful public policies, as opposed to nondemocracies that require smaller coalitions that can be obtained by private goods. Thus democratic leaders who engage in war run higher personal risks than nondemocratic leaders and are less likely to do so (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). The second is Kenneth Schultz’s argument (1998) that democracies are more transparent, because of a free press and especially competing parties, reducing the role of misperception that some analysts see as a major contributor to war (see also Starr, chapter 6, this volume). As a result they are less likely to enter a war because of poor information, and their opponents should have a more realistic idea of what the government’s response is likely to be. Moreover, since democratic leaders realize that they cannot really bluff successfully, they are more likely to settle conflicts that they feel they cannot win than their nondemocratic counterparts.

If this is true, leaders in democratic postsettlement governments are likely to behave in the following ways:

3a1: Decision making will be more transparent to the media and the public.
3a2: The media and the public are more likely to oppose a resort to civil war.
3a3: Leaders on both sides will have a more realistic understanding of the probable consequences of civil war.
3a4: Leaders on both sides are less likely to misjudge intentions of their opponents. Therefore the following:
3b1: Leaders with warlike constituencies are more likely to be less warlike than their followers.
3b2: Top government leaders who desire renewed civil war will be constrained by other individuals and institutions within government.
3b3: Leaders believe that if they go to renewed civil war they will suffer politically if they lose.
Leaders are likely to support negotiation and compromises, even those that are politically costly. Therefore the following:

Leaders in democracies whose executives are relatively constrained will be less likely to renew civil war than those in democracies with relatively unconstrained executives.

However, leaders whose public policies have failed are more likely to resort to civil war in order to redeem themselves (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 803–804).

This gives us about 30 hypotheses to test on our cases. We are actually looking for two quite different things when using these ideas—we want to know (1) whether this did happen in the particular case and, (2) if so, is it plausible to attribute much causal weight to this process in avoiding renewed civil war? Obviously the latter judgment is much more difficult to defend.

**Case Selection**

What cases should we use? At one level the choice is simple—states whose civil wars have ended, that have a democratic government, and whose wars have not resumed. In fact the issue is a little more complicated. Since this is a theory-building exercise, I decided to look at cases in which democracy was in effect immediately after the civil wars; the processes associated with democracy should be easiest to observe and have the most impact here. Dubey’s data uses two different measures of democracy, Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers) and ACLP (Przeworski et al. 2000). He lists only four cases in which governments which were both (1) 9 or 10 on the polity scale (which runs from +10 for most democratic to -10 for least democratic) and (2) “democratic” on the dichotomous variable in the ACLP data had civil wars that had not been renewed until his cutoff date of 2000: South Africa 1994, Cyprus 1974, Northern Ireland 1994, and Israel-Palestine 1993. To these I added India-partition (coded democratic for 25 years afterward, which should have been long enough to observe its effects) and India-Sikh (coded as 8 from 1994–1995, 9 thereafter by Polity IV but democratic for both periods by ACLP), which is very close to the cutoff point. Of these six I then deleted Israel-Palestine 1993 because we know that it broke down after Dubey’s 2000 data cutoff. I also deleted India-partition and Cyprus because they were two of the very few cases in which civil war resulted in separation; “renewal of the civil war” thus would mean either the foreign policy issue of violence with another state (albeit unrecognized in Cyprus) or relations with the very small number of Turks remaining in Greek Cyprus and the larger number of Moslems in India who were so few
in number that they were unable to resort to civil war had they desired to do so. This left me with three cases: India-Sikh, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.

The cases are certainly varied. The outcome of India-Sikh is usually classified as a government military victory; South Africa and Northern Ireland are both negotiated settlements. The magnitude of the violence is very different; estimates of total numbers of civilian and military deaths are 100,000 for South Africa, 25,000 for India-Sikh, and 3,200 for Northern Ireland (indeed Northern Ireland does not qualify as a civil war in many datasets, including my older one). All would probably be classified as ethnic rather than political-economic conflicts. The goals of the rebels are secession for India-Sikh, revolution in South Africa, and I guess irredentist in Northern Ireland, which is certainly unusual. They are definitely not representative of the post-1945 civil wars, although that is immaterial for our present purpose of theory-building about a particular subset of those wars.

**Cases**

**India-Sikhs**

The Sikhs are a religious group that believes in a common ancestry, although the distinction between Hindu and Sikh has traditionally been quite vague (Madan 1998, 977); roughly half of them live in the Punjab area of India. The example of the Moslem state of Pakistan, along with a sense of discrimination by the Indian government, encouraged separatism; this is an example of a wealthy area seeking secession. (A good summary of different explanations is Singh 1987; cf. Brass 1988; Nandi 1996; and Chima 2002.) In the 1980s militants escalated to organized terrorism, using the Sikh Golden Temple complex at Amritsar as a sanctuary from the Indian authorities. In 1984, the Indian Army attacked the temple, after getting permission from moderate Sikh politicians (Chima 2002, 29). The fierce fighting outraged Sikhs everywhere. The then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. The violence increased to its high point in 1991–1992; by 1993 it had virtually ended with the defeat of the major militant Sikh groups and the deaths of many of their prominent leaders, with an overall death count of almost 25,000 (Singh 1996, 411).

1. **Elite incentive model:** In 1992, at the height of war, elections for the provincial government were held. Many Sikhs boycotted these elections, and, with the help of “massive rigging” (Grewal 1998, 237), a minority of
the voters elected a provincial government that waged a brutal and successful struggle against the Sikh militants (Singh 1987, 414). However, within a year after the violence subsided, “the Sikhs generally expressed a clear preference for electoral politics through local body elections, and normalcy began to be restored after a decade of unrest” (Madan 1998, 981; cf. Grewal 1998, 238). By 1997, the mainstream Akali Dal Party, in an “odd couple” alliance with the nationalist Hindu BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party), swept the provincial elections. Bringing Sikh politicians back into the Indian political system so quickly probably strengthened moderates. It also may have contributed to their high level of factionalism; by 2001 there were five separate Akali parties, all competing for moderate votes; “(n)o overtly radical or communal Akali leader can do well in electoral politics in Punjab” (Chima 2002, 32).

Nor was this merely nominal participation. By the end of the Sikh civil war, the Congress Party and the BJP competed for influence in India. Coalition governments with regional political parties became normal, giving the regions much more autonomy. Thus Sikh politicians could ally with BJP, despite its Hindu nationalism, on the understanding that it would not impose its ideals on Punjab (Chima 2002, 29–30). This made renewed civil war less likely, confirming the elite incentives model. However, this was not an inevitable result of democracy but the unexpected result of national power shifts. Indeed Chima (2002, 30) suggests that if either Congress Party or the BJP became strong enough to rule by themselves, tensions in the Punjab might well rise again.

2. The cultural model: This model, on the other hand, doesn’t seem to have applied. The government repression is remembered with bitterness by many Sikhs, while the general Indian public approved the use of force during the war, although most of the details were kept secret (Nandi 1996, 186). Concessions to the Sikhs were mostly those that did not cost much money, and a number of issues that had been raised as early as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973 remained unsettled (Nandi 1996, 188). Nothing has been done to reveal covert government operations, much less punish anyone for violations of human rights. One possible argument in favor of the cultural model is the quick collapse of Sikh rebellion after the death of a relatively small number of prominent leaders in 1992–1993, suggesting that there was never much of a mass basis for secession in the first place, that many people really wanted some sort of recognition, regional autonomy, and cultural protection (Gupta 1996, 86–89). This might be seen as a product of a culture encouraged by political democracy before the war, but it has no obvious links to postsettlement government.
3. *The institutional model*: This model has a mixed record. The major decisions about using violence during the war were made by Indian politicians who had been selected by democratic processes, not the military or other specialists in violence (Madan 1998, 980), reflecting the very high degree of civilian control of the Indian armed forces. However, after the war Indian leaders and Sikh political moderates tried to restrain their constituents and avoid a resumption of violence. (Purewal 2000, 165).

In the India-Sikh case the elite incentives model seems to have been at work; that is, appropriate things seem to have happened. It may also be an explanation for why the Sikh revolt ended so quickly. It thus seems to have had some real impact on the outcome.

**South Africa**

In South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) eventually led the challenge to apartheid, in alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Community Party, and South African National Civic Organization. The struggle escalated to violence and ended with a negotiated transition to majoritarian political democracy. Both the ANC and the white government and army saw that they were at stalemate, that neither side could win and that continued violence would undermine South Africa as a whole. Violence continued during the negotiations (Marx 1998, 211; Höglund 2004, 121–152). The result was an elite pact to create a powersharing government for five years; elections would be held in 1994, and any party that got more than 5 percent would be represented in government. In the resulting Government of National Unity, the ANC shared power with the National Party (former governing party) and the Inkatha Freedom Party. The National Party eventually withdrew from the coalition to fight the 1999 election, which resulted in another major victory for the ANC.

1. *Elite incentives model*: The guarantees of political freedom seem to have been widely enforced and used by individuals and groups on all sides of the conflict. Certainly different groups were given access to government with the creation of a “new class” of blacks in official and, to a lesser extent, business positions. Black elites seem to believe that they can influence government decisions, although this is much less true of black masses. Fewer people do seem to feel excluded from the political system. New coalitions have been formed on all sorts of issues, although the basic party
breakdown is still largely along racial lines. While the degree of political competition does seem to have become less intense, this doesn’t seem to be because losers believe they can be winners, since there is no effective check on the power of the ANC. It is a little early to see whether new challengers can be brought into the system, but the Inkatha example suggests that it is possible. In general the elite incentives model seems to be operative.

2. The cultural model: This model is presumably operating under a handicap here; multiracial democracy is so recent that it seems unlikely to have had much effect on culture. I look at two aspects of culture: mass attitudes toward tolerance and elite political behavior and discourse. Tolerance seems rather low, as might be expected in a transitional state, which makes the remarkably consensual South African political culture all the more surprising.

James Gibson and Amanda Gouws (2002) argue that popular tolerance is particularly important in South Africa, given its appalling history, the role of mass mobilization in bringing about change, and the weakness of contemporary institutions. In 1996, relatively early in the transition process, they found that South Africans in general were less tolerant than people in the United States and Great Britain and established democracies, but more tolerant than Russia, another country in political transition (Gibson and Gouws 2002, 12–38, 56–67). The level of intolerance did not change significantly from 1996 to 2001 (Gibson 2004, 234–235). A contradictory study showed that the level of tolerance among South Africans for one another increased significantly from 1994 to 1998. The increase was particularly strong among blacks, possibly reflecting their new dominance of the political system, but it was also visible among whites. On the other hand, trust in governmental institutions declined somewhat over the same period because of declining trust in their ability to guarantee human rights (Garcia-Riovero et al. 2002).

Regardless of mass attitudes, there has been remarkably little violence between the races after the settlement. Moreover, the concept of liberal democracy quickly dominated political discourse, greatly reducing divisive arguments about redistribution of wealth and control of production and creating a remarkably calm political culture. This is particularly interesting since much more radical ideas had been voiced within the ANC during the long struggle against apartheid. This apparent consensus has greatly reduced possible conflicts, at least among national elites, although it obscures a lack of change in both local townships (Zuern 2001) and rural areas (Gibson 2001, 69–70). There has been considerable debate as to the source of this agreement.

One line of thought is that it is the result of largely external factors, in particular the extensive support by Western governments, corporations,
and NGOs to advocates of liberal democracy during the transition period, using the instruments of civic society to preach the need for tolerance and, by implication, avoiding large-scale economic and social change. Estimates of foreign support for these efforts range from $500 million to $700 million from 1986 to 1994 (Davis 1997; Hearn 1999, 7, 2000, 817, 820; Taylor 2002, 41). It was a great deal of money, creating and supporting what Taylor calls a “change industry” and a “transitariat.” Much of the discussion focused on “scenarios,” often on the likely impact of different political futures on South Africa’s role in the global marketplace. People with very different views of this effort suggest that it had a major impact on political discourse by delegitimizing discussion of major change (Hearn 2000; Taylor 2002; Galer 2004).

An alternate second explanation is that the low level of postwar violence involves shared interests of domestic elites.

[W]e must avoid the reductionist tendency to see this process simply as a manufactured conspiracy. The process is more accurately depicted as a complex convergence of interests between the established political elites, domestic and transnational capital, and crucially, aspiring elites espousing, initially perhaps, an alternate vision for the country. (Taylor 2002, 36)

A broader view is that the transition is ongoing and creates a situation in which long-range change becomes more possible, although not guaranteed (Judson 2001, 75). David Dickinson argues that in the long run government policies are less important than the fact that people of different backgrounds are now “rubbing together” in different ways. As a result of changes in the system, a substantial, although still quite small, number of nonwhites have moved to higher economic positions, which in turn mean that they find themselves mediating between the different sides of a very polarized society. He notes two “changing agents of change” in particular: nonwhite workers who have been promoted to supervisory capacities and his nonwhite MBA students (Dickinson 2002, 19). This argument is strengthened by James Gibson’s finding that increased contact outside of work with people of different races substantially increases racial reconciliation, although such contact remains quite rare among blacks (Gibson 2004, 135–142).

South Africa has been a leader in transitional justice with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Indeed, it became a model of this new institution, which has become more popular as civil wars are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than victory for one side. Any negotiated settlement is likely to require amnesty for the signatories; otherwise they are unlikely to sign. But many people are dissatisfied with having
to allow gross human rights violations during the civil war go unpunished. Truth commissions have been developed as a second-best strategy of transitional justice. Priscilla Hayner has defined them as officially sanctioned, temporary bodies charged with investigating a pattern of past abuses (Hayner 2001, 14). In the South Africa case, the TRC did not have the power to punish anyone, although it promised to grant immunity to anyone who told the truth about a political crime they had committed; this may make it acceptable to both sides in a negotiated settlement, since it does not threaten anyone and indeed may be a way of escaping punishment. It is worth remembering that the alternative to truth commissions is often not trials but renewed civil war.

The South African TRC was unusual in several respects. Its mandate was elaborate and sophisticated, its powers of search were considerable, its budget was large, it was designed to run for several years, it featured public testimony by victims, and it was led by Bishop Desmond Tutu, a prominent African religious and political leader. The TRC’s actions were widely publicized. Stories appeared in papers all over the country every day, four hours of hearings were broadcast daily over radio, and a television program on Sunday was the most-watched news program in the country. About 21,000 victims and witnesses were interviewed, 2,000 of them in public. It investigated acts by both the government and the rebels (Hayner 2001, 42; Villa-Vicencio 2003, 240–244).

In a major study of the impact of the TRC on opinion and racial reconciliation, James Gibson concluded that a substantial number of whites changed their opinion of what had happened and became more sympathetic toward Africans. Interestingly, African attitudes toward whites were not affected by whether they believed the “truth” of the TRC (Gibson 2004). On balance, then, it seems to have had some positive impact on racial attitudes.

3. The institutional model: This model has some purchase but not much. There is certainly evidence that many leaders, particularly Mandela, have pleaded for their followers to be tolerant and not to respond to violence with violence (Gibson and Gouws 2002, 25). However, it’s not clear that this is driven by institutional pressure; indeed such pressure seems to be minimal and decreasing.

The central fact of the South African national political scene is that the ANC is totally dominant and is likely to remain so. In 1994, 62 percent of the electorate voted for the ANC; in 1999, 66 percent did so. It is hard to see how this will change much. The ANC continues to wear the mantle of liberation party for many Africans, and polls do not suggest substantial opposition, even given major problems in unemployment and the economy.
Parliament seems unlikely to be a check on the executive. In both governments just under two-thirds of the Parliament belonged to the ANC, and it is accepted that, if the ANC wanted to change the constitution, it could do so easily by making an agreement with some minority parties. Within Parliament itself, there is strict party discipline; members are told how to vote and are faced with the threat of expulsion from the party that by the Constitution automatically means expulsion from Parliament. The party appoints representatives who usually have no real connection with their constituents so they have no independent power base (Sadie 1998, 277–278). The judiciary has shown some independence (Lodge 2003, 168), but both Parliament and the Constitutional Court have little public support (Gibson 2004, 300–315), which would make it more difficult to defy the executive. The media increasingly seems reluctant to do much in the way of serious reporting and opposition (Lodge 2003, 171–172). Control within the party has been centralized (Sadie 1998, 286–287; Lodge 2003, 28–29).

There seem to be virtually no institutional checks on the ANC leadership; it is free to do pretty much whatever it wants. It may continue to give positions to its coalition partners on the left, but not because they pose any threat to its dominance (Lodge 2003, 159–160). Interestingly the goals of this group remain somewhat unclear, in particular whether it wants to continue its policy of limited economic change in order to do well in the global economic arena or whether it wants to “transform” South Africa in a more radical way, as some of its rhetoric suggests. In any case postsettlement democratic institutions seem unlikely to have much influence on these choices.

In general the elite incentives model seems to work better here than the others, especially at the elite level. But if the lack of retaliatory violence after settlement at the mass level needs to be explained, the cultural model also probably comes into play. Both models seem to go a long way to explaining the remarkable outcome (so far) of this conflict, second only to the end of the cold war as the most pleasant surprise of the end of the twentieth century.

**Northern Ireland**

Northern Ireland is the result of the partition of Ireland after World War I. The Protestant majority has effectively dominated the minority Catholic population, using the Westminster political system in the same way that the ANC seems to be doing in South Africa. Violence flared in 1969 and continued intermittently for decades, although with relatively few casualties.
In 1972 Britain reinstituted direct rule over the province. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement established a short-lived local powersharing government. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 established that Britain had primary responsibility for security in Northern Ireland but that the Republic of Ireland would have a consultative role, putting both governments in conflict with their supposed supporters (Morrow 1999, 123–124). In 1994, the PIRA and the loyalist paramilitaries called cease-fires, and negotiations began.

In 1998, the Good Friday agreements, sometimes called “Sunningdale for slow learners” (Tonge 2000, 39), set up a powersharing, consociational government structure with complex checks and balances. Essentially it called on paramilitaries on both sides to disarm (“decommission”) on a schedule linked to British reforms of the justice system and policing as well as implementing new human rights provisions. The agreement was ratified by a referendum in 1999. In 2002, Unionist party members withdrew from the Assembly because they felt disarmament was not being carried out, forcing its suspension for the fourth time in as many years. In elections in 2003, Sinn Fein, the party linked to the PIRA, overtook the Social Democratic Labor Party, formerly the largest nationalist party, which some believe was the consequence of “significant decommissioning by the IRA” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 215). The sectarian parties on both sides got 80–90 percent of the vote, and the two largest parties were the two extreme unionist and nationalist ones, making it the most polarized election in recent history (Hazleton 2004, 229) and making it impossible for the Assembly to operate. Despite this gridlock, large-scale violence has not yet broken out again, and the process continues.

The Loyalist parties that signed the agreement have been seriously weakened politically. The paramilitaries have no chance of getting ministerial positions, so they have no real incentive to disarm. Trimble signed the agreement, but his party is deeply divided, and he often has refused to implement it. “(O)n balance, both policing and justice reforms look primed to fulfill the promise of the Agreement” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004, 217), but it’s unclear that political leaders in Britain and Northern Ireland are prepared to institute them.

1. *Elite incentives model:* Certainly the prestige of the PIRA has increased. From terrorists its leaders have become routine participants in high-level negotiations, often with international figures like Senator George Mitchell or President Clinton. Formed in 1970 to oppose the parent organization’s decision to participate in elections, it now sends members to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The powersharing arrangements promise to give Catholics more access to power, but they have not yet been put into effect,
mostly because the Unionists demand that the PIRA disarm first. (Decommissioning is something of a phony issue; it can’t be verified, since no one knows how many weapons the PIRA has, and even if it could it wouldn’t prevent rearmament (Wolff 2002, 113).) Perhaps because of the uncertainty, the extremist parties (DUP for the Unionists and Sinn Fein for the Republicans) did very well in the last election. There is little evidence of coalitions reaching across old divisions, and new challengers have not yet been brought into the system. It’s not clear that the Republicans actually have any more impact on policy than they did before because the governing institutions haven’t worked. On balance the elite incentives model doesn’t seem to work well here.

2. Cultural model: There are at least two different cultures to be considered, that of Northern Ireland and that of Great Britain itself. Certainly British political culture has shaped the dispute in many ways, mostly by taking certain options off the table. For the past 30 years British governments have insisted that the old system of Unionist dominance must change and be replaced with some form of powersharing; a simple majoritarian system is simply unacceptable. Second, the use of military force, although always controversial, has been significantly limited, as a quick comparison with Chechnya or Iraq will suggest. Most interestingly, the British were able to strike a deal with the Irish government, bringing it into the process; indeed Britain has historically said that it would leave Northern Ireland if a majority of its residents requested it (Tonge 2000, 40–42).

Within Northern Ireland itself, political violence increased after 2001. However, it seemed to be becoming less legitimate; the murder of a Catholic postal worker was widely condemned and resulted in rallies against violence attended by thousands of people, and the violence around the Holy Cross Girls School in Belfast did not spread, as it often had before. This suggests a potentially important change in the political culture (Wolff 2002, 104; cf. Cox 1999, 66). The British have released a significant number of prisoners, but there has been no move toward transitional justice (Lundy and McGovern 2001, 29–33).

3. Institutional model: As noted above, a new set of institutions has been instituted in Northern Ireland to make renewed violence less likely. However, so far they have not gone into operation. In the meantime, the paramilitary groups are outside of government, and they seem largely unaffected by institutions. To the extent that the British government is an active combatant (a highly debated point), the institutions of British intelligence are not at all transparent. More moderate political Loyalist leaders like John Trimble who have to face reelection periodically have recently suffered electoral setbacks, in part because they are connected to the
settlement, and Ian Paisley’s party and Sinn Fein have done better. Membership in civil organizations is fairly high, but civil society is divided between the two communities (Wolff 2002, 107–108). The institutional model doesn’t seem very helpful in this case.

Rather to my surprise, the cultural model seems to work best here. It may also explain the interesting fact that, despite the deep divisions in the society and the violent history that has been mythologized, casualties and mass mobilization are relatively low; one can plausibly argue that this is a case of terrorists or gangs with popular support rather than a war. This may have something to do with the fact that it is part of one of the older democracies in the world. My sense is that the model does in fact explain some of relative moderation of violence, although obviously it is hard to persuade victims that the struggle is moderate. However, the democratic culture at work here seems to have been prewar rather than postsettlement; it seems unlikely that the culture of the postsettlement democracy explains much of what was going on.

**Conclusion**

We need to answer two types of questions: (1) Did the behavior predicted by the theories appear in the cases and (2) if so, how plausible is it that these behaviors account for the lack of resumption of civil war?

Table 5.1 summarizes my judgments about behaviors. The elite incentives model seems to do well in India-Sikh and South Africa; the fact that new challengers have not been brought into the political system reflects the fact that there haven’t been many such challengers yet. The model does not do well in Northern Ireland, where elites remain deeply divided along the civil war lines. The cultural model, contrary to my expectations, also does well in India-Sikh and South Africa and less well in Northern Ireland. The institutional model starts off well, but it gets much weaker toward the end, in large part because there seems to be no real institutional constraint on decisions by the executive concerning renewed civil violence in any of the three countries.

I suspected, when I began this research, that the elite incentives model would do fairly well and that the cultural and institutional models would not. It seemed plausible that culture and institutions would take a long time to work, so neither explanation seemed well suited to civil war termination (and, of course, they were not developed for that purpose). Thus the surprise is the apparent success of the cultural model, at least in terms of behavior.
Table 5.1  Summary of Cases and Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>N. Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elite Incentive Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a: Elites and populations will increasingly believe guarantees of political freedom and access</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b1: Factions are more likely to believe that they can influence government decisions.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b2: Old coalitions, organized for the war, break up; the new ones are larger and include members from different sides of the previous civil war.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b3: Competition becomes less intense since even losers believe they may be more successful in the future; political becomes less of a zero-sum game.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (no check on ANC)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b4: Groups working outside the system increasingly get less public support.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c: New challengers are bought into the political system and given a stake because of shifting coalitions.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural/Normative Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a1: Elites and publics should generally be opposed to the large-scale use of violence to resolve political disputes.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (no large-scale violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a2: Society should encourage and support individuals and groups with connections across competing factions.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b1: Media will support individuals and groups advocating negotiation and compromise.</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b2: Societal discourse should stress unity rather than historic divisions.</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b3: Violence during the previous civil war should not be glorified.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c1: Successful political strategies should stress conciliation rather than coercion.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c2: Costly compromises should be accepted by publics and elites.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c3: There should be considerable support for measures of transitional justice applied equitably to both sides, especially as regards individuals.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c4: Leaders responsive to the public will be less likely to support war than those who are not.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a1: Decision making will be more transparent to the media and the public.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a2: The media and the public are more likely to oppose a resort to civil war.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Table 5.1 Continued

| 3a3: Leaders on both sides will have a more realistic understanding of the probable consequences of civil war. | India | South Africa | N. Ireland |
| 3a4: Leaders on both sides are less likely to misjudge the intentions of their opponents. | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 3b1: Leaders with warlike constituencies are more likely to be less warlike than their followers. | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 3b2: Top government leaders who desire renewed civil war will be constrained by other individuals and institutions within government. | No | No | No |
| 3b3: Leaders believe that if they go to renewed civil war they will suffer politically if they lose. | Yes | No | No |
| 3b4: Leaders are likely to support negotiation and compromises, even those that are politically costly. | No | No | No |
| 3c: Leaders in democracies whose executives are relatively constrained will be less likely to renew civil war than those in democracies with relatively unconstrained executives. | NA | (low constraint) | (low constraint) |
| 3d: However, leaders whose public policies have failed are more likely to resort to civil war in order to redeem themselves. | DK | No | DK |

Notes
Yes means that the behavior predicted by the theory seems to have occurred.
No means that the behavior predicted by the theory does not seem to have occurred.
DK means don’t know.
NA means not applicable.

Obviously the impact of these behaviors on the probability of civil war resumption is harder to establish. It necessarily reflects my own judgment, and I am far from being expert on any one of these three cases; at some point it may be appropriate to organize some sort of Delphi process to have real country experts analyze this issue more carefully. For what it’s worth, my sense is that the elite incentive model does seem to have substantially reduced the likelihood of renewed civil war in India and South Africa, something that was not a foregone conclusion in either case. This process does not seem to have had a chance to work yet in Northern Ireland, and it may not be a coincidence that this is also the case where the renewal of violence seems the most probable.

I also think that the cultural behaviors have been important, not only in India and South Africa, but also in Northern Ireland. While I certainly cannot track this in my data, such as it is, I think that the low level of
violence in Northern Ireland can best be explained by cultural norms against large-scale violence; there is evidence that, when one side escalates the violence, popular dissatisfaction with it seems to increase. On the other hand, I do not believe that the new institutions constitute a real check on the power of the executive in any of the three countries.

But this in turn raises a third question: Are the behaviors of the elite incentive and cultural models really caused by postsettlement democracy? I have become increasingly skeptical of this link in the argument. The most obvious problem is culture—how can a new democracy transmit cultural norms to a population in a short time? Is there another explanation for the existence of such norms?

One of the striking things about these three cases is the role of democracy before their civil wars. India and Northern Ireland had well-established democratic political systems long before the violence, and even South Africa had a set of democratic institutions in place, although obviously marred by the total exclusion of a majority of the population from them. In fact this background probably explains why democracy was so quickly established (or reestablished) in these cases. This also suggests that, if the cultural theory of democracy helps explain the nonrestitution of violence in India and South Africa and the limited violence in Northern Ireland, it stems from prewar rather than postwar democracy, since it seems quite unlikely that postsettlement democracy could establish cultural norms in a few years. Prewar democracy may, then, be a preexisting variable that helps explain both postsettlement democracy and peace.

Elite incentives seems a more straightforward case, however. In earlier work I had linked this to powersharing, which was not necessarily linked to democracy (Licklider 1999). However, the large-N studies isolated powersharing and found that it had no independent impact on civil war resumption—in democracies and otherwise. The elite incentives model, then, is a logical product of postsettlement democracy and predicts some behavior that seems to make renewed civil war less likely. It thus may be one justification for attempting to establish democracy in such countries. However, we obviously need to see if these relationships hold for other countries, particularly those without prewar democracy, before we can have much confidence in their validity. We also need more quantitative analysis geared to intervening variables to uncover the conditions under which different causal processes are likely to appear. This in turn may suggest methods of reaching agreement on the theoretical foundations of the democratic peace findings in international relations.
Notes

This chapter is part of a larger project on the resumption of civil war. I acknowledge with gratitude major financial support on earlier aspects of the project by the United States Institute of Peace (grant 077-94F) and the Rutgers Center for Conflict Resolution and International Peace Studies, Manus Midlarksy, director, and research and collaboration by Pierre Atlas and Ayse Ozkan. For this particular chapter Jack Levy guided me through the thicket of the democratic peace literature, Amitabh Dubey generously provided me with his data, and Dubey, Bumba Mukherjee, and Beth Leech were enormously helpful in working through the intricacies of the data itself and the STATA statistical package. As always, however, the most important contributions were the thoughtful and incisive comments on this and earlier papers by my colleagues in Charles Tilly’s Workshop on Contentious Politics at Columbia University. Unfortunately I cannot blame these kind people for the use I have made of their invaluable assistance.

1. This is an edited version of a longer set developed in conjunction with Pierre Atlas and Ayse Ozkan.
CHAPTER 6

DEMOCRATIC PEACE
AND INTEGRATION:
SYNERGIES ACROSS LEVELS
OF ANALYSIS

Harvey Starr

Introduction

There is no need to belabor an obvious observation regarding the current study of international relations—that the form of the governments of states, especially democratic forms—has played an increasingly important role in the theories and findings of a broad range of research programs. Over the past two decades, the “democratic peace” in all of its various forms, implications, and ramifications has been a (perhaps the) major focus of international relations (IR) scholars, producing a steadily cumulative research project investigating conflict, cooperation, and the relationship between internal and external politics (see Russett and Starr 2000; and especially Chernoff 2004). As noted in Russett and Starr, among other overviews, a variety of theoretical explanations have been developed to explain why democratic states to date have avoided engaging in war with one another, and why the existence of democratic governments (especially stable and generally economically developed ones) produces a variety of related positive/cooperative behaviors, both dyadically and monadically. Such theories, which cross the boundaries between internal and external politics, include the initial models based on norms or values, structural constraints, and combined strategic models of democratic policy making based in rational choice.¹
While new graduate students working in the subfield of international relations would recognize the work of Bruce Russett (and colleagues) as being central to the study of the democratic peace, it is useful to remind such scholars that Russett’s initial research derived from Karl Deutsch’s social communication theory of integration (e.g., see Deutsch et al. 1957). Russett’s first book (1963), *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* applied key concepts of social communication theory—especially community and the mutual identification of responsiveness—to the relations between Britain and the United States from the end of the nineteenth century to the early 1960s, stressing the “trends in mutual responsiveness” (1963, vii) that were seen as the basis of amity and cooperation. This chapter argues that it is important to recognize explicitly the role of integration theory in the pedigree of the democratic peace, and the theories that attempt to explain the behavior of democracies (especially dyadic behaviors). Such an exercise helps to place recent studies within a broader theoretical context, help the democratic peace deal with its critics, and provide a theoretical springboard for understanding the nature of democracy: *how and why* the structures and norms of society and government that are called democratic affect foreign policy. Thus, this chapter will link the democratic peace to the now-classic theories of international integration developed by Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas—both of which explicitly link domestic factors and politics to international politics. Through the phenomenon of integration I hope to highlight the importance of the development of community and responsiveness in the democratic peace, and outline the commonalities of this process to the domestic processes that lead to the development of legitimacy.

It should be noted that the research areas to which Russett has contributed—integration theory and democratic peace theory—cross boundaries by theoretically crossing levels of analysis. Integration theory provides a model for social integration at any level of social or societal aggregation. The democratic peace is based upon the explicit relationship between individuals, groups, society, and governments to the policies between states. In addition, this chapter will draw upon an additional perspective that crosses levels of analysis—an agent-structure framework. Using the opportunity-willingness version of the agent-structure approach, decision makers and decision situations are placed within broader environmental or contextual settings (see especially Friedman and Starr 1997, chs. 5 and 6). The opportunity and willingness formulation may be viewed as one type of agent-structure framework in which decisions, choice, and choice processes take place within different contexts of possibility, constraints, and opportunity (see also Starr 1978, 1997a; Most and Starr 1989). And, as with all such
agent-structure formulations, the opportunity and willingness version must cross several levels of analysis and deal with several arenas of action simultaneously. This chapter similarly picks up this multilevel and multiarena theme—by looking at the nature of integration for interdependent units within the international system, at the democratic peace that exists at the dyadic and regional levels, and finally at democracy and legitimacy within single units.

The use of an integration framework provides a number of advantages. Perhaps one of the most important is the explicit notion that where there is integration there may also be disintegration. If the democratic peace, as well as other components of the Kantian peace (see Russett and Oneal 2001), such as the impact of democracy on development, rests on the creation and maintenance of legitimacy—in processes analogous to those found in models of integration—then those processes must be constantly attended to or disintegration can occur. Indeed, the present use of integration theory to address the democratic peace (and the effects of democracy on development), speaks directly to a major critique of the international politics literature raised by McGinnis and Ostrom (1999, 16):

This is where the connection between Toqueville’s analysis of democracy and the prospects for a peaceful world order lies. If the conditions of democratic self-government are by their very nature vulnerable to decay, then any democratic zone of peace is potentially at risk. We argue that a crucial step in the democratic peace argument has been overlooked by international relations scholars.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to set out the connections that demonstrate the democratic peace to be a subset of more general integration processes. The following sections will discuss integration, democracy, and legitimacy. I will show how the key element of the democratic peace—the absence of large-scale military violence between democracies—flows from the development of a Deutschian “security community.” After pulling all of these elements together in a discussion of “the good society,” the chapter will turn to democracy and development.

### Integration and the Democratic Peace

The literature on the democratic peace has now become broader in several ways, including the work of Russett and colleagues expanding it to the “Kantian peace”; more extensive work on the monadic version of the democratic peace; and the exploration of the implications of theories
explaining the democratic peace to a variety of forms of conflict and cooperation. In this chapter, however, I wish to go back to basics. The original core of the democratic peace concerns the lack of war among democratic states. Indeed, much of the writing on the democratic peace—whether devoted to analysis, proof, or critique—loses track of exactly what is under discussion or what is to be explained. That is, scholars have often forgotten that the democratic peace proposition (or hypothesis, or law, or whatever) at its core is a statement that claims the following: there is a virtual absence of war among dyads of democratic polities. Thus, the democratic peace proposition, at its most basic, is about the absence of war. It is about a set of conditions that explains the variance in a specific dependent variable—war. While this question is an important starting point for a number of other theoretical interests and empirical analyses (see Russett and Starr 2000), it is also important to understand that this is the central linkage to Deutschian theories of integration. Once we deal with this issue, we can drop back to look at broader implications of the Deutschian concept of security communities.

Since integration is all about the positive ways in which interdependence can be managed (see Starr 1997a), the democratic peace is also about how democracies manage the conflict that is inevitably generated by the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of interdependence; that is, as units existing within an interdependent system (see Keohane and Nye 1989). The democratic peace proposition—and whatever the combination of theories used to explain it—makes a simple empirical claim: that war does not occur in democratic dyads. To realist critics this appears to be a radical claim. If, however, this proposition is placed within the context of the peace created by processes of integration, the position is not so radical. After all, both the theory and findings reported in the integration literature have presented exactly the same type of challenge to realism by identifying state behavior that, according to realists, was not supposed to occur in the international system; or if it did occur was to be trivial in nature (see Puchala 1981, or Lijphart 1981 for presentations of this argument).

In sum, the discussion of the democratic peace challenges realist views on conflict, cooperation, and the role of norms. As a boundary-crossing enterprise it also challenges central realist assumptions about the distinction between domestic and international politics and possibilities for system change without war. Focusing on the nature of governments and societies, and how they can have an impact on state behavior in the international system, forces us to face a part of the context or environment generally ignored in Realist analyses—the two-level interaction of domestic and foreign politics.
Security Communities

The end product of the process of integration according to Deutschian theory is the “security community”:

A security community is a group of people which has become “integrated.” By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure . . . dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief . . . that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change. (Deutsch et al. 1957, 5)

This Deutschian definition of integration—just as the democratic peace proposition—focuses on peace, and the conditions for peace; but it does more. A security community involves not only the absence of war (“negative peace”), but more importantly, the absence of even consideration of the military option in the interactions of the states within the security community (see also Adler and Barnett 1998; Mueller 1989). Security communities may be amalgamated, where the units merge into a new, single unit. Importantly, Deutsch allows for the existence of pluralistic security communities, where such conditions can hold even among a set of independent, sovereign, non-amalgamated states. It should be clear then, that the Deutschian pluralistic security community is an outcome that is broader than, but overarches, the democratic peace phenomenon. With such prerequisites for the formation of security communities as compatibility of values, the extension of political elites, and multiple forms of transactions and communication (Deutsch et al. 1957; see also Russett 1963), it is not surprising that the only historically identified security communities—either amalgamated or pluralistic—are composed of democracies.

When we look closely at the components of the Deutschian social communication model of the integration process as well as the neo-functional process model of Ernst Haas, we find all the primary components of the two initial, central theories used by scholars to explain the democratic peace: (1) the structural constraints model, which looks at the constraints of organizations and formal laws or constitutions; (2) the democratic culture argument, which involves the presence of community, responsiveness, shared values, and norms. Thus, key components of the original two basic explanations of how the democratic peace works are found in the two basic theories of integration. Additionally, the theories of integration stress the role of learning in the development of norms of cooperation and a sense of community; they stress the need for mutual benefits and the positive impact of interdependence on the management of interdependent relations.
Again, these are key components of theories attempting to explain the democratic peace. Below, I will show how the international interaction game of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) can help us understand how Deutsch gets from a social communication process that explains the development of responsiveness and community to the outcome of that process, namely a security community.

From an integration perspective, what does it mean when one uncovers evidence that democracies might intervene in other democracies, or escalate a conflict with another democracy to the point where the military option is considered? From the perspective of integration theory, all it means is that there has been, to that point in time, incomplete integration in terms of “dependable expectations of peaceful change.” That is, the democracies involved exist within a not yet fully formed, or imperfectly formed, pluralistic security community. Deutsch (1977) has referred to a process of integration that is not fully formed as an “incomplete assembly line.” Thus, under certain dispute conditions, the military option may indeed be raised—but still does not escalate to actual war. Does such a situation invalidate theories of integration? Is there not a difference between claiming that integration does not exist or is a failure, and merely indicating that the processes involved have not yet produced the final end product of integration—the pluralistic security community as Deutsch envisioned it? Analogous questions and answers may be used to address critiques of the democratic peace that discuss the existence of various forms of conflict between democratic states, even though examples cannot be found for cases in which conflicts or militarized disputes escalated to the point where war (large scale, organized violent conflict) occurred.

Before returning to further correspondences in conditions and processes between pluralistic security communities and the democratic peace, it is necessary to discuss one of the basic features of democracy that is central to any theory attempting to explain the democratic peace—the notion of transparency.

**Democracy and Transparency:**

**Hawks, Doves, and “Separation”**

One possible factor that distinguishes democracy from other governmental forms is its “transparency.” Democratic transparency—the openness of its political processes and the vast amount of economic, political, and social information that is public and generally available—is a prerequisite for democracy as conceptualized in terms of the contestation for political leadership, and/or “effective participation,” regardless of the specific definition used (see Dahl 1998, 1989).
Such a conceptualization sees democracy as providing an environment within which oppositions can effectively challenge incumbent governmental office holders for power in a legal, legitimate manner through prescribed procedures. In order to do so, the range of political and civil liberties commonly understood as those embodied in the American Bill of Rights, must obtain—freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly, freedom from a range of techniques of repression available to a government. It is only through transparency that a society can monitor and know of abuses of political and civil liberties. It is only through transparency that a government would fear the repercussions of such abuses. Thus, only transparency can provide the safe environment for effective governmental opposition that is at the core of democracy as conceptualized in terms of the contestation for political leadership.

The concept of transparency is also a useful point of departure for investigating how the nature of democracy could explain the democratic peace. Why should transparency be important? One way to approach this question is to look at the arguments presented by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) regarding the policy choices of “hawks” and “doves” and how these two types of states are related to democratic and nondemocratic states.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) develop the extensive form “international interaction game” to investigate the behavior of “instrumentally rational” foreign policy decision makers. They use this game to analyze how the sequence of actions taken by decision makers may lead to war or one of several forms of peaceful resolution. What is important to us here is that they present the central problem facing decision makers as that of separation: how to distinguish what type of opponent one is facing in terms of its preferences and preference ordering. Under what conditions will the opponent prefer the status quo? prefer negotiations over other alternatives? prefer capitulation to war? prefer war it initiates over war initiated by the other party? They analyze the outcomes that will be produced with states that might be characterized as “doves” (states with preference orderings that make them generally averse to the use of force, depending, of course, on the nature of the opponent they face), as they interact with other doves or non-doves. They present a proof demonstrating that if both states are doves, and both know that the other is a dove, then war outcomes are impossible. As they note at several points, a crucial assumption is that there is “common knowledge” by each side of the other’s dovishness.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, ch. 5) apply these results to the puzzle of why democracies rarely fight one another. In the real world, they argue, decision makers can never be sure what type of state they are
facing—doves or non-doves. How can both sides in the real world attain the common knowledge regarding dove/non-dove that is simply assumed in the game model? While decision makers cannot know who is a dove/non-dove, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argue that there is fairly common knowledge whether or not the opponent is a liberal democracy. Basing their logic on a combination of the theories used to explain the democratic peace, if a certain country is a liberal democracy then decision makers know that the leaders of that state will be under greater constraints not to use force, and will bear heavier costs than the leaders of nondemocracies if they do. All of this is known because of the various elements of transparency, that is the free movement of information in liberal democracies, the existence of opposition groups, and knowledge of internal politics, institutions, and debates.

Using transparency and separation, their argument is summarized as follows:

1. It is formally demonstrated that two states who are doves, and each of whom knows that both of the pair are doves, will not go to war.
2. This separation requires common knowledge, which cannot be assumed in the real world.
3. Various aspects of liberal democracies, as summarized by cultural and structural models, can be seen as making them averse to the use of force, by the higher constraints imposed on leaders by democratic societies and governments.
4. Most often, the indications that a state is a liberal democracy are known and can be used as prior information by decision makers in helping them separate opponents into types (doves and non-doves).
5. The greater the belief that a state is dove-like (which, I have argued, becomes literally 100 percent in a security community), the lower the probability that a dove will use force against it. Again, if the indicators of being a democracy are useful in identifying another state as a dove, then the satisfaction of Deutsch’s criteria for community and responsiveness, and the recognition of the conditions needed for a security community will make dove-identification a certainty (e.g., within the European Union).

The transparency of democracy means that outside observers can see into such states, scrutinize the activity that occurs within the society and political system, and recognize that the political behaviors conform to some broadly accepted notion of democracy, and are robust enough to cross some threshold in order to be called democracy. Such transparency is inherent in
truly open societies. In addition, Mancur Olson (2000) has argued that for free market economies to work, and especially to work well enough to generate economic development, certain internal conditions are required for the exchange of information and the enforcement of contracts. These are the same conditions listed as prerequisites for the development and functioning of democracy. The movement of information needed for free market capitalism both within democracies and for open trade relations among democracies also require and reinforce democratic transparency.

Transparency that reveals the democratic nature of a polity is crucial for Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s use of democracy as an indicator of dovishness. The Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman formulation only works when each party can be clearly recognized as a democracy by the other party. The mutual recognition of democracy (which equates to dovishness) is crucial to the use of the international interaction game to explain the democratic peace, just as it is to many other such theories. Transparency (including the degree or level of transparency) is thus crucial to how we measure democracy and which cases we look at to test our theories. 5

Transparency means that leaders and populations of other states can see that a country provides for the political and civil liberties that permit the regularized and legal contestation for political power (as well as the working of a free market economy). In democratic dyads this means both sides can see into each other. If both countries are democracies, it is likely that they share a broad range of transactions, and that the levels of transactions are high enough that each society knows a great deal about the other; such a multiplicity of transactions and communication is also strongly consistent with Deutschian integration theory (see, e.g., Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, 436). On one broad level, this makes war between democracies much more difficult than war between a democracy and an authoritarian regime. 6

Integration, Interdependence and Learning

As noted, the process of integration, whether based on the models of Deutsch or Haas, is based on learning: the parties involved learn that such transactions provide benefits, that such benefits outweigh the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to continue such interactions and even expand them. As such interactions occur, and expand, the peoples involved become more and more interdependent, and thus raise the costs of stopping such interactions.

The discussion above specifically noted two families of theories used to explain the democratic peace: culture and structure. The international interaction game of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman exemplifies another set
of models that combine the elements of opportunity and willingness inherent in culture and structure, “strategic interaction” models (see Russett and Starr 2000). Such expected-utility models of strategic decision making make it clear that if leaders are to incur the significant costs of breaking the bonds of interdependence, then they will have to present compelling reasons for the use of force or war (see also the work of Mintz and associates, e.g., Geva et al. 1993). As we have seen, with two democracies this is extremely difficult. Yet another kind of learning is involved. All leaders will be punished for policy failures. They do not survive as leaders. Democratic leaders are particularly subject to this effect. According to Mintz and associates, the policy of significant military conflict with another democracy is seen as a policy failure. As Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) note, leaders of democracies tend to choose wars with a lower risk of defeat. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate more broadly that leaders in general try to avoid conflict situations that might endanger their support from the winning coalition that keeps leaders in power.

The strategic interaction approach makes it clear why it is so difficult for democracies to pursue a policy of war against other democracies. Starting with the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997)—but also applicable to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)—Russett and Starr (2000) develop the argument in detail:

In order to satisfy the “selectorate” and maintain a domestic winning coalition, leaders have both policy objectives and rent-seeking objectives. Leaders were assumed to be motivated to retain their hold over office. To do so they were assumed to distribute private goods to their supporters as well as to pursue collective goods—public policies consumed by all. Elsewhere, Olson (1993) shows in an elegant argument how the leaders of democracies are driven both to lower rent-seeking and to raise their commitment to the provision of collective goods that benefit all of society. These dynamics are related to the range and depth of the interests that leaders and elites have in a society, or the breadth of the stake they have in society.

Olson concludes, as do Lake (1992) and Brawley (1993), that such leadership will have greater legitimacy and support from society. This would both make them “powerful” as Lake suggests, and forge a utility calculus for leaders based firmly within the domestic setting. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997) outline domestic or endogenous institutional constraints based on the nature of the selectorate and the size of the winning coalition (somewhat akin to Putnam’s 1988 argument concerning two-level games and the domestic “win set”). In sum, given the nature of the overall set of relationships between leaders and rent-seeking, the provision of public goods, the creation and maintenance of legitimacy, the care and feeding of the selectorate and the domestic
winning coalition, policy makers in democracies must pay particular attention to the overall expected utility of getting involved in conflict. In a state with a wide voting franchise, leaders cannot readily seek rents for themselves while spreading the costs of military action among the populace (Verdier 1994).

Legitimacy and Integration

The argument above also merges into a discussion of the nature of governments in democracies and the legitimacy of those governments. The experimental work of Alex Mintz and associates tests a “political incentive” explanation for the dyadic democratic peace. They argue that the leaders of democracies do not pursue war against other democracies because they have no political incentive to do so. People in democracies who themselves manage conflict peacefully and within legitimized institutions and procedures, and who know that people in other democracies do the same, will expect their governments to act similarly regarding interstate conflict. People who share norms of self-government, governmental constraint, civil liberties, and the workings of democratic transparency know that people in other democracies do the same, and thus expect their governments to find appropriate modes of nonviolent conflict resolution. Therefore, the range of legitimate casus belli is greatly restricted in democratic dyads. As noted, the transparency of democracies, along with shared democratic norms and procedures as well as other liberal norms regarding trade, markets, and property rights, makes it nearly impossible for policy makers to dehumanize the people of another democracy through the manipulation of images of the other as the “enemy.” In contrast, authoritarian and totalitarian states are both less transparent to others and limit their own people’s access to information, facilitating the development of enemy images in both directions (Boulding 1956; White 1970; Regan 1994).

In sum, models of integration are based upon increasing numbers of interactions between countries—the transnational transactions of the Deutschian social communication model and/or the transgovernmental transactions of the Haasian neo-functionalist model. These interactions foster growth in the amount and quality of interdependencies between the countries. To break these bonds of interdependence, which provide positive payoffs to both sides, entails costs that are unacceptable to democratic leaders (including the loss of resources that can be devoted to the public goods necessary for large selectorates and winning coalitions). The failure to settle conflicts without force through the norms of democratic practice is also seen as governmental failure. And finally, following both models of
integration, as interactions occur and increase, peoples develop greater responsiveness to one another.

As developed by Russett (1974b), responsiveness entails the expectation that wants and needs will be responded to positively. It reflects both attitude and capabilities. While the war avoidance phenomenon that is at the heart of the democratic peace is a necessary component, responsiveness reflects the broader aspects of “positive peace.” At some point responsiveness produces the “we-feeling,” trust and mutual consideration that Deutsch called community. As cited in Adler and Barnett (1996, 67), Deutsch defines community as

a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we feeling,” trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior . . . in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.

This should remind the reader of comments made in the introduction, where the need to be concerned with process—integration and/or disintegration—was noted. Responsiveness and community arise out of a continuing and growing set of social transactions by which people learn they can benefit, and through which they come to respect and trust others, and expect such respect and trust in return. This is what Putnam (1993, 137) has called “dense networks of social exchange.” He argues that, “Networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that citizens there will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit.” In a similar conclusion, Taylor and Singleton (1993) also argue that community can act to reduce uncertainty, and thus lower the transaction costs of solving collective action problems. This is the Deutschian definition of the security community, and it also characterizes the dynamics of the dyadic democratic peace.

Legitimacy and “The Good Society”

Thus, on one level we see that the interactions between democracies reflect the interstate interactions described and predicted by theories of integration (and thus, clearly diverge from and argue against realism). However, to fully understand why democracy has such effects and why it fits within these models, we must again cross boundaries by stepping backward, and looking within states to understand the nature and working of democracy. As noted in Russett and Starr (2000) such an understanding entails investigation of
the three central relationships that exist at the state level: (1) the relationships among individuals and groups within society; (2) the relationships that exist between society as a whole (and of its various components) and government—how society sees, reacts to, and deals with government; and (3) the relationships between government and society—how government sees, reacts to, and deals with society.

The first relationship is rather straightforward, and it has already been discussed. Deutschian integration models of social community work at a variety of societal levels; they describe “nationalism,” and how humans form community at any level of aggregation. The elements that make up community within a democratic society are summarized in the Deutsch quotation above. Adler and Barnett also present Michael Taylor’s (1982) three elements of community. First, community involves shared values, beliefs, identities, and meaning. Second it involves multiple and multifaceted direct relationships. And third, there is recognition of long-term interests, reciprocity and even “altruism.” Democracies not only have a community, but one that is based on special values, such as legal and political equality, democratic process for governance, belief in civil and political liberties, and the like. In the spirit of the “bottom up” boundary-crossing logic by which the organization and governance within states can affect the interaction between states (see, e.g., Russett 1993), individuals within societies sharing democratic values and that are based on community and responsiveness, would expect their governments to behave toward the governments of other such societies in the same manner that individuals and groups within a democracy behave toward one another.

For democracies, the second relationship—between society and government—must be characterized by “legitimacy.” This phenomenon is considered in depth in literature presenting the cultural/norms and structural/constraints theories of the dyadic democratic peace. However, as with opportunity and willingness, neither culture nor structure are individually sufficient to explain democracy, or the behavior of democracies. This is because they interact with one another and each contributes to a larger syndrome that makes up democracy. Each is a necessary, important component of the legitimacy of the political system. Such legitimacy rests upon the same conditions that undergird the Deutschian ideas of community and responsiveness. For example, look at Jackman’s (1993, 98) definition of legitimacy:

A regime is thus legitimate to the extent that it can induce a measure of compliance from most people without resort to the use of physical force. The compliance need not be total, but it does need to be extensive.
Just as norms and procedures for dealing with each other within democratic society are seen to be externalized, so are the norms and procedures by which citizens in democracies (individually or in groups) see and deal with their governments. The community, responsiveness, and legitimacy of these relationships are assumed for other democracies as well, and they fashion the relationships between democracies. It should also be noted that in countries with very large selectorates, and thus very large winning coalitions, leaders must provide greater collective goods (to deal with Olson’s larger “encompassing interests”). Thus, political survival based on the rational political ambition theory is closely connected to the need for legitimacy that flows from society to government.

The third key relationship deals with the linkages that exist between government and society—how government sees, reacts to, and deals with society. For many scholars this relationship is represented by the notion of the “liberal” state (e.g., see Doyle 1995; Onuf and Johnson 1995; Solingen 1996). According to Peet and Simon (1997, 3), “Owen (1994, 122) suggests that ‘liberalism’ is the antecedent concept that gives rise to liberal ideology and democratic institutions through which the democratic peace operates.” There is, however, a lack of consensus on exactly what liberalism means. As Doyle (1995, 84) notes, “There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—for example, a commitment to individual freedom, government through democratic representation, rights of private property, and equality of opportunity.”

Many scholars stress Kant’s attention to republicanism as the core of liberalism, others stress private property and the free market as the basis for economic relationships (again, see Russett and Oneal 2001). The government of the liberal state, then, supports the pluralism necessary for the popular selection and replacement of governmental leaders, as well as the workings of a free market economy. Although these are part of the core relationship between government and society, it is not the whole of it. Popular representation through republicanism and the pluralism of a free market economy do not fully capture the set of important norms we have hinted at in discussing societal integration and society-to-government legitimacy. Ruggie (1982) helps us to move in this direction with his notion of “embedded liberalism” and the idea of a shared social purpose. However, Ruggie expresses this shared purpose only in economic terms, “To provide domestic stability by ensuring social welfare is improving in aggregate while maintaining a minimum standard for all” (Peet and Simon 1997, 5; see also Peet and Simon 2001 and McMillan’s 1997 discussion of “sophisticated liberalism”).
Leaders in Olson’s (1993, 2000) analysis also share broad interests in society, and act to provide stability, low rents, and high levels of public goods to maintain legitimacy. Again, this is not enough. Drawing on Deutschian concepts, I am arguing that such interests must be set within the development of a range of social norms—“oughts” concerning how governments are to treat the members of society. Many such norms derive from Idealist (or Liberal) assumptions about the affirmative and optimistic aspects of human nature, and even the natural law (rather than utilitarian) foundations of reciprocity and the Golden Rule (e.g., Lippmann 1943, ch. 17).

But perhaps just as important is the recognition by governmental leaders in democracies of the first two relationships: (1) governments recognize the nature of societal integration, and the community and responsiveness that orders behavior among individuals and groups and (2) governments recognize the elements of democratic legitimacy that are at the core of societal perception of government and behavior toward government. This recognition of how democracy works at other levels—this recognition of the commonalities of democracy—generates a set of norms about how government ought to behave toward society. Government responsibilities revolve around the welfare of people and society; democratic governments care about people and society (in a normative way that goes beyond Olson’s economic utility arguments).

To Lippmann (1943, 376), one key element is the recognition that all humans are “persons” and not “things.” Governments must deal with such persons through the Golden Rule and through justice. In Lippmann’s (1943, 363) words,

There must be a strong desire to be just. There must be a growing capacity to be just. There must be discernment and sympathy in estimating the particular claims of divergent interests. There must be moral standards which discourage the quest of privilege and the exercise of arbitrary power . . . There must be patience and tolerance and kindness in hearing claims, in argument, in negotiation, and in reconciliation.

For Lippmann, these norms are at the heart of his “good society.” The usual descriptions and definitions of liberalism have a strong economic flavor (and this includes much of Lippmann as well). As such they do not capture this dimension well. Perhaps along with the integration of the first relationship, and the legitimacy of the second relationship, we should simply characterize the third relationship as “the good society.”

The three relationships taken together—integration, legitimacy, and the good society—provide a set of powerful forces that are represented by the
cultural and structural theories used to explain the democratic peace. Solingen (1996, 84) provides an excellent summary of the “basic conceptual links between democracy and the likelihood for conflict and cooperation.” She presents five elements: (1) domestic legitimacy and accountability; (2) institutional checks and balances; (3) democratic transparency, communication, and the costs of regime-creation; (4) democratic process, credibility and ratification; and (5) sensitivity to the human and material costs of war.

As these forces regularly come together in democracies, they help account for the preference orderings of democratic leaders, and thus help account for the purposive choices of those leaders (and thus the impressive contributions by a number of studies based on rational choice). Together they account for Rummel’s (1997) observation of democracy as a “general method of nonviolence.”

Democracy and Development: Good Things Can Go Together

As Russett has noted, “good things” can go together. While the relationship is complex, empirical research has begun to uncover the reciprocal linkages among democracy, peace, and economic development: “We can see however, that material well-being, political liberty, and stable peace really are interconnected” (Russett and Starr 1996, 466). The work of Russett and Oneal (e.g., 2001) has investigated the impact of all three legs of the Kantian peace. These are three multiple and overlapping liberal behaviors that result in peace among states: democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations. They have found that each separately, and together in interaction, promote peaceful behavior. In turn, there is a vast commentary on the utility of peace—and the stability it brings—for economic development and the survival of democracies.10

Analyses of the Kantian triad are much more complex than the simple democracy-economic development theories of the 1950s and early 1960s. Greater numbers of democracies should be of help in generating economic growth, and the more equitable distribution of that growth. Peace is both a consequence of this process and a cause of greater growth. Even without a direct dollar-to-dollar “peace dividend,” if a world of increasing numbers of democracies lowers the probability and threat of war, the enormous sums spent globally on defense could be substantially reduced.

These are external effects that exist at the level of the international system. Dropping to the societal level, the legitimacy that undergirds and sustains the domestic environment of democracy also has “spillover” effects on economic development. The transparency of society necessary for democracy is also
necessary for a market system to work well. Individuals and groups within a society can understand in what ways the economic system distributes its rewards/wealth/payoffs. When an economic (and political) system can provide positive outcomes for most participants that are distributed with some degree of equity—again, conditions of Deutschian integration—this, in turn, will promote further societal legitimacy and community through the expectation of mutual rewards.

Dahl (1998) asks, “Why democracy?” He provides eight general answers, plus two relevant only to “modern democracies”: peace-seeking and prosperity. He notes the substantial relationship between “affluence and democracy” since the end of World War II; a point developed in a number of articles on the democratic peace, (e.g., Mousseau 2000). A large part of Dahl’s explanation reflects the discussion of transparency and legitimacy noted above:

The explanation is partly to be found in the affinity between representative democracy and a market economy, in which markets are for the most part not highly regulated, workers are free to move from one place or job to another, privately owned firms compete for sales and resources, and consumers can choose among goods and services . . . Because all modern democratic countries have market economies, and a country with a market economy is likely to prosper, a modern democratic country is likely also to be a rich country. (Dahl 1998, 58–59)

Another argument derives from the legitimacy that democracies enjoy, as well as its boundary-crossing properties. Legitimacy becomes central if scholars focus analysis around the extraction of societal resources for both domestic and foreign policies, and for the allocation of resources especially across various societal interests or segments of the population. For example, extraction of resources was the major dynamic of the lateral pressure model of Choucri and North (1975), while extraction and allocation are central factors in the model of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Although the studies discussed below are concerned primarily with security interests and the survival of new democracies, the extraction of resources is also directly related to economic growth and stability. This chapter will conclude, then, by briefly presenting the results of several research projects that link the prosperity, stability, and “survival” of new democracies to legitimacy.

Legitimacy, Stability and Survival

The focus on democratic survival derives from two larger projects. One is the Two-Level Security Management Project that is based on the opportunity
and willingness framework. It is concerned with the relationship of internal and external conflict and the reciprocal types of impact that domestic and external factors might have on one another (see, e.g., Starr 1994; Simon and Starr 1996, 2000). Simon and Starr (2000) and the two-level simulation around which it is based is a direct product of this research program. The second project is part of the extension of diffusion analyses to the growth of democracy in the international system, looking at possible global, regional, and neighbor demonstration effects on transitions to (and away from) democracy. Using a modified form of the Freedom House data, these transitions involve the movement in a state’s status across three categories: Free (F), Partly Free (PF), and Nonfree (NF) from one year to the next. These analyses are reflected in Starr (1991, 1995), Starr and Lindborg (2003), and Crislip and Starr (1996).

Briefly, what are some fundamental observations that can be made about democratic survival? Starr (1995) and Starr and Lindborg (2003) [as well as Crislip and Starr 1996] support the earlier observation of Starr (1991) that there are modest global effects but stronger regional effects in the transition of states from NF and PF to F (see also Crescenzi and Enterline 1999). There is support for the proposition that having bordering countries that are engaged in transitions toward democracy has some effect on whether PF countries also move toward democracy. More importantly, a combined regional/neighbor effect was found: the democratic or nondemocratic status of a country’s neighbors at the time of that country’s transition. Countries moving from PF to NF were either entirely or almost entirely surrounded by countries who were already NF. These results, from empirical studies of states across a quarter century, are mutually supportive with the results from a series of computer simulation analyses of the two-level security management model. This model is based on models of extraction and allocation, repression and accommodation that were derived from opportunity, willingness, and substitution (see also Most and Starr 1989). The empirical results of the democratic diffusion studies fit with a central finding of Simon and Starr (2000), that having neighbors who were already democratic could set the stage for the internal governmental extraction of resources that could then be devoted to societal development. Simon and Starr (2000) show that ally support is crucial for new democracies facing internal threats. In addition, and central to the democratic peace literature, new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. Indeed, “endangered” democracies are seen to be able to recover security by attempting to buy off domestic threats rather than deter them, and by improving legitimacy with the allocation of resources to society (resources that need not be devoted to external security).
Crislip and Starr (1996), using a proportional hazard model, present another fundamental result: the longer a democracy survives, the more likely it becomes that it will continue to survive (a finding consistent with other survival analyses of governmental regimes). But what contributes to this survival? The simulations found in Simon and Starr (2000) pick up the same theme found in Starr (1995) and Starr and Lindborg (2003)—the degree to which there are other democratic states in the system.

Because new (and, in the Simon and Starr simulation purposively “endangered”) democracies must devote resources to increasing domestic “legitimacy,” it is important to have a context of other democratic states—democratic allies. Through the “integration-effects” noted above in discussing Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, such allies will both encourage dovish policies and provide for the international security of new/endangered democracies. The simulation results generated by Simon and Starr (2000) show that ally support can also provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. It needs to be repeated that new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. The simulation shows that legitimacy helps make new democracies less vulnerable to long run security problems by building up societal resources. Yet to address immediate domestic security threats, new democracies will be most successful if they pursue a dovish strategy of allocation or buying off threats in the domestic arena. This strategy will leave them more vulnerable internationally, however. It is therefore important that democratic allies both encourage the dovish policies (via diplomacy, economic sanctions, human rights policies, etc.) and provide for the international security of the endangered democracy via new or existing alliance structures.

Thus, these various projects provide differing streams of evidence that indicate that for democracy to survive governments must devote resources and effort into generating legitimacy through attention to human welfare and economic development. Starr (1995) and Crislip and Starr (1996) show that very poor countries are different—less likely to move to democracy, and less likely to stay there if such a move takes place.

Concluding Notes

As with the Kantian triad, these studies of democratic survival bring us back to a set of complex feedback loops between democracy and development, and how each can foster the other. We also see how these studies cross the internal-external divide, and how they combine major themes of both Comparative and International Politics. In order to deal with the democratic peace, especially its dyadic and systemic effects, and the survival of new
democracies, it is clear that scholars must deal with complex causation, cross levels of analysis, and take both opportunity and willingness into account.

This chapter was one attempt to bring together two major research strands in the career of Bruce Russett—integration and the democratic peace. In demonstrating that the democratic peace is a subset of integration, and that they rely on similar processes, I have attempted to outline the following:

1. The two basic arguments (theories) used to explain how the democratic peace works—cultural and structural—are captured by the two main theories of integration, the Deutschian social communication/community model, and the Haasian neo-functionalist model respectively.

2. The key to theories of successful integration is the development of the conditions of community and responsiveness. These concepts reflect the shift of loyalties that is central to neo-functionalism. They are the conditions that make war between units sharing these conditions impossible in Deutschian security communities.

3. The essential nature of democracy requires legitimacy for the successful relationship between and among societal groups, for the way societal groups see and deal with government (and thus, the way in which government sees, and deals with society). A close investigation reveals the equivalence between societal legitimacy and Deutschian community and responsiveness.

4. The societal-to-governmental and governmental-to-societal relationships within a society that are needed for the democratic peace are based on legitimacy. That is, legitimacy is necessary for the democratic peace to occur (for democracies to be democracies, and to understand that other countries are democracies). Liberal transparency is a key factor here, one that allows the democratic peace to occur.

5. Finally, it can be argued that democratic legitimacy is important for democratic survival and stability, and thus for the feedback loops that reinforce democracy and economic growth.

Notes

Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Second Workshop on the Workshop, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana
1. A recent work by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) comes to many of the same conclusions and supports many of the results of these other models. This analysis derives from a model of choice—a “rational political ambition model”—in which the incentives derive entirely from the desire of leaders to remain in office and the factors that affect leadership survival: the size of the “selectorate,” the size of the “winning coalition” within that selectorate, as well as several other elements of resources available to leaders and challengers. See also Chernoff (2004), who uses the logic of philosophy of science to argue persuasively that the (boundary-crossing) democratic peace research project has been a progressive and cumulative enterprise, demonstrating “scientific progress.”

2. The material in the sections to follow draws heavily from Starr (1992, 1997a, ch. 7, 1997b), and Russett and Starr (2000).

3. This search for implications, is, as I have often noted, a significant feature of the Lave and March (1975, 19–20) procedure for the development of disciplined speculation—model building—in the social sciences. After a model is created to provide an explanation for a set of observations, one is required then to deduce other implications—consequences—predictions from the model, which then can be empirically tested.

4. The natural extension to legitimacy, discussed below, will also link integration theory to the “rational political ambition” theory of the democratic peace.

5. That is, the democratic peace proposition does not necessarily cover “almost” democracies! This point is important in considering analyses of, or including, new or “fragile” democracies, or countries in the process of democratization. For in-depth analyses of these “almost” cases, see Ray (1995) and Weart (1998).

6. For example, one mechanism by which the leaders of states create a willingness for societal masses (and elites) to support and prosecute a war, is the creation of an enemy image that involves the dehumanization of the opponent. A number of studies indicate that this enemy image is used to portray the opponent as evil and/or nonhuman in some way, thus justifying the use of violence against such an enemy and warranting the costs of war. Images of the “Hun” on British posters during World War I, or the images of the Japanese in American films during World War II exemplify this phenomenon (e.g., see Dower 1986). With two democracies, and the amount of information flowing in and out of each, it is almost impossible to create such an image.

7. Political equality is central to Dahl’s (1998) criteria for a democratic process within “modern” polyarchies. It overarches each of his five criteria for a “democratic process”: (1) effective participation, (2) voting equality, (3) enlightened understanding, (4) control of the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults.
8. Russett (1993, 137) notes, “Perhaps major features of the international system can be socially constructed from the bottom up; that is, norms and rules of behavior internationally can become extensions of the norms and rules of domestic political behavior.”

9. Nie et al. (1996, 2) in a discussion of citizenship within democracy discuss legitimacy in very similar terms as the “cement of society”: “Democracy requires relatively little punitive or physical coercion for legitimacy; . . . The method of social governance for the majority of citizens is, in essence, noncoercive, voluntary, and compliant.”

10. Perhaps two of the best examples of such endogenous models have been noted above—Olson (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). But see also Weede (1996).

11. This point is argued forcefully in the last chapter of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) through empirical confirmation of the formal model. The data analysis is based on the use of an ingenious new measure, the Hobbes Index, to operationalize human and societal welfare.
PART 3

CROSSING BOUNDARIES: DOMESTIC-EXTERNAL DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
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CHAPTER 7

TOUGH TALK, PUBLIC PREDISPOSITIONS, AND MILITARY ACTION: REASSESSING THE RALLY—’ROUND-THE-FLAG-PHENOMENON

Shoon Kathleen Murray

[If toughness is more likely than conciliation to glean electoral rewards, a president who is aware of this can be expected to tailor his foreign policy accordingly. Apparently most are, and do.

—Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword

Scholars continue to debate the evidence supporting the “diversionary theory of war” and whether U.S. presidents, in particular, use military force to distract the public from domestic woes (e.g. MacKuen 1983; Ostrom and Job 1986; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1989; Russett 1990a; James and Hristoulas 1994; Meernik 1994, 2000; DeRouen 1995, 2002b; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998b; Mitchell 2002b, Mitchell and Prins 2004).

Outside of academia, many people suspect that presidents do, at times, threaten or use military force either to divert national attention or boost their approval ratings. The 1997 movie “Wag the Dog” is the most obvious example in popular culture: the plot involves a president caught in a sex scandal close to an election; the president’s “spin-doctor” works with a Hollywood producer to fake a war in some Eastern European country. Not long after this movie’s release, it seemed that life was imitating
art: President Bill Clinton authorized air strikes on so-called terrorist outposts in the Sudan and Afghanistan just three days after apologizing on national television about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.¹ The next day, the New York Times reported that “Across the city [Washington, DC] there was an inescapable sense that the timing of the raid might have been dictated by politics rather than intelligence information” (Purdum 1998, A1). Later that same year, on December 16th, Clinton authorized yet another military strike under suspicious circumstances: as the Washington Times editorial scolded the following day “Of all the 365 days of the year, President Clinton chose the eve of the impeachment vote in the House of Representatives . . . to take on Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein after an entire year of hesitation. Coincidence? Not a chance.”² And more recently, pundits speculated that George W. Bush launched his media campaign about confronting Iraq in September 2002—just before the mid-term elections—as a “wag the dog” strategy to divert public attention away from economic troubles and onto foreign threats.³

Whether U.S. presidents actually use military force for such politically self-interested reasons is beyond the scope of this study. I will focus on a narrower question: whether presidents are likely to get a significant boost in public support—even a fleeting one—by doing so. Surprisingly, Lian and Oneal (1993, 294) find that they do not: “There seems to be no rally effect following a use of force.” After analyzing “all major uses of force by the United States from 1950 through 1984,” Lian and Oneal (1993, 277) report that the “mean change in the president’s approval rating is 0% . . . Even well-publicized uses of force during a crisis boost the president’s standing only 2%–3% on average.” Other scholars also find small rallies in public opinion associated with the use of force (e.g., DeRouen 1995; Oneal and Bryan 1995; James and Rioux 1998; cf. Burbach 1994).

But considering the ongoing popular suspicion that presidents do act to create rally events, as well as the historically high surges in presidential approval ratings that accompanied the start of the Gulf War in 1991 (a 19 percent jump) and the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 (a 39 percent jump), the question of whether a president can derive substantial political gains from foreign crises seems worth another look with updated data.

Background and Hypotheses

Modifying the Data Set

Perhaps the mismatch between popular wisdom and Lian and Oneal’s (1993) research findings is derived from how their analysis was conducted.
In particular, Lian and Oneal (1993) did not in fact look at “all major uses of force”; they used major uses of force short of war or direct coercion. The conventional wisdom makes no such distinctions. More specifically, Lian and Oneal’s (1993, 282) 102 cases between 1950 and 1984 were drawn from “Blechman and Kaplan’s (1978) original compendium of political uses of military force prior to 1975 and from Zelikow’s (1987) updated chronology.”

Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 13), in turn, explicitly distinguish between using the armed forces “as a political or as a martial instrument”:

When used as a martial instrument a military unit acts to seize an objective (occupy territory) or to destroy an objective (defeat an invading army). In both of these examples, attainment of the immediate objective itself satisfies the purpose for which the force was used. When used as a political instrument, the objective is to influence the behavior of another actor—that is, to cause an actor to do something that he would not otherwise do, or not to do something that he would do otherwise. Thus, the activity of the military units themselves does not attain the objective: goals are achieved through the effect of the force on the perceptions of the actor.

As such, “uses of U.S. armed forces deployed abroad to defend directly U.S. property, citizens, or military positions were not considered political incidents for our purposes” (Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 13).

Zelikow (1987, 33) follows the same methodology to update the data set from 1975 to 1984: the decision maker “must have used force to influence the conduct, not just to seize an objective physically.” He goes on to explain that “although U.S. deployments during the Iranian hostage crisis were designed to influence Iranian conduct, the April 1980 rescue mission itself was not meant to influence the Iranians to release the hostages; it was aimed only at taking the hostages by force.” The former event is included in the data set; the latter is not.

But the concept of “political uses of force” as defined here (meaning force used to influence the behavior of another international actor) would eliminate many cases wherein we might expect the “political uses of force” as usually understood, meaning action by the president meant to affect the domestic situation. The criteria established by Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and extended by Zelikow (1987) could undercount the number of coercive actions taken by the president to protect American citizens or U.S. interests. But these are exactly the types of cases that the popular wisdom associates with the rally-around-the-flag phenomenon, whether the 4 percent gain that President Carter received from the failed Iranian Hostage
Rescue Mission in 1980, or the 13 percent surge that President George W. Bush received at the start of the Iraq War in 2003. To illustrate this point, let me use some examples in the popular media cited by Lian and Oneal (1993). They (1993, 278) observed that as President George H. W. Bush’s “popularity slumped” following the Gulf War in 1991:

Toles (1991), a political cartoonist, portrayed the president reviewing his options for dealing with the recession—war against Gadhafi or Saddam Hussein—while a small figure asked, “What do you mean, ‘or’?” In August 1992, with the president trailing Governor Clinton in the polls, the New York Times (Tyler 1992) reported on page one that the Bush administration was planning a military confrontation with Iraq timed to coincide with the Republican national convention.

As these examples show, the popular wisdom about when presidents use force for political reasons does not exclude war or direct coercion.

To be sure, some analysts might argue that it would be unlikely for a president to shoulder the risk of all-out war for ephemeral domestic political gains and that the distinction between short-term military operations and war makes sense (e.g., Russett 1990a). And certainly this distinction is appropriate for the era prior to the 1980s. But fatalities during interventions—at least among American military personnel—have been remarkably low since that time (not counting the second stage of the Iraq War). As Feaver and Gelpi (2004, 153) observe, “Since Vietnam, fatality rates have been several orders of magnitude off historical levels for combat operations . . . precisely because they have not involved the United States in a prolonged conflict against a peer competitor.” U.S. fatalities from the Korean and Vietnam Wars stood at 36,913 and 58,177 respectively; yet only 19 U.S. soldiers died during the Grenada intervention; 23 during the Panama intervention; 383 during the Gulf War; and 2 during the Kosovo War (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 154). In these later conflicts, the actual fighting was over in a matter of days in some cases and lasted no longer than several months in others.

With these considerations in mind, I will test whether Lian and Oneal’s (1993) results hold up for the years between 1973 and 2003, when all major uses of force, including interventions and other coercive actions, are included in the updated data set.

**Crossing Interdisciplinary Boundaries**

No one would expect the public to rally every time the United States undertakes a major military operation: the number of military responses by
the United States is high and many remain invisible to the public. So we
need some further criteria about when a military event might be expected
to elicit a surge in presidential approval ratings. By crossing disciplinary
boundaries, and emphasizing several insights from the field of political
communication, I will look for predictable patterns of when the public
rallies after the threat or actual use of force.

The first insight is that the White House has formidable resources to
frame a military event through the media during times of crisis (Entman
2004). In part, this is due to the institutional resources of the White House
Office of Communications combined with a sophisticated in-house polling
apparatus (e.g., Maltese 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). But more impor-
tantly, the opposition party usually has incentives to either support the
president or remain silent in crisis situations relating to national security
(Brody 1991). Reporters, in turn, tend to reflect the elite debate, or lack
thereof, without interjecting their own voice (e.g., Hallin 1984; Bennett
1990; Brody 1991; Mermin 1999). When the opposition party falls silent,
the president’s narrative dominates media coverage (Mermin 1999). Even
if the opposition party tries to challenge the president, it is difficult for con-
gressional leaders to stick to a single compelling counterframe that can dis-
place the president’s story (Entman 2004). Furthermore, even during
periods of elite controversy, the media relies on routines that give promi-
nence to highly placed administration officials over other political leaders
(Entman and Page 1994; Entman 2004). In short, the president’s frame for
an event—if he actively attempts to cast one—will probably receive
heightened play in the media.

But a president does not try to raise public attention about all uses of
force: some are too minor; others he believes will not benefit his political
fortunes (Baum 2004). We can safely presume, however, that if the presi-
dent seeks to provoke a rally in public support for an action that he took,
he expends considerable energy in conveying a compelling frame for the
event. Consequently, I will consider whether the amount of presidential
activity devoted to framing a military event affects the likelihood that the
public will rally (see also, Burbach 1994; Oneal and Bryan 1995; Baker and
Oneal 2001).

A second—and more important—insight is that the president cannot
successfully sell just any narrative. Public predispositions matter. It is very
difficult for a president—even one reputed to be a highly skilled commu-
nicator—to actually change established public attitudes (e.g., Edwards
2003; Holsti 2004). President Reagan used the bully pulpit repeatedly to
trumpet the importance of assisting the Nicaraguan contras in their fight
against the leftist Sandinista government. But try as he might, Reagan
could not move public opinion, which opposed military assistance and U.S. military involvement in the region (e.g., Sobel 1989; Edwards 2003, 54). The public feared “that the Central America conflicts could become another Vietnam” and all of Reagan’s talk about the threats posed by communism did nothing to displace this concern (Sobel 1989, 116). Eventually, Reagan’s private pollster, Richard Wirthlin, advised the president against “taking his case directly to the people through major speeches. The president’s pollster told him that doing so was likely to lower his approval and generate more public and congressional opposition than support” (Edwards 2003, 53–54). The moral of this story is that to succeed, a narrative needs a frame that fits the public’s predispositions, or an event that is so novel the public has no established attitudes about the situation (Entman 2004; see also Nincic 1997).

So what general predispositions do the public hold about the use of military force? The scholarship on mass attitudes toward past military interventions points to some discernable preferences (Jentleson 1992; Larson 1996; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2004; see also Russett and Nincic 1976). Jentleson (1992) finds that in the post-Vietnam era, if a military intervention can be framed as “foreign policy restraint” (i.e., defending American interests or lives), then it has a greater chance of garnering public support than if it is characterized as “internal political change” (i.e., meddling in the internal affairs of another country or trying to alter its institutions) (see also Eichenberg 2004). Humanitarian interventions (i.e., the use of the military to deliver food and supplies in emergency situations) fall in between (Jentleson and Britton 1998).

As such, Russett’s (1990, 41) observation about the popularity of toughness, quoted at the opening of this chapter, is apt—only it needs a qualification. The hypothesis considered herein is that if the president actively talks and acts tough about protecting Americans or American interests, then the public is likely to rally in support; but if the president talks and acts tough about stopping some injustice in another country, or constructing social order, or helping to keep the peace, then the public is less likely to rally.

Using an updated data set that incorporates all major uses of force (including war and direct acts of coercion), I will replicate Lian and Oneal’s (1993) approach of calculating the average rally following all major military deployments and then the average rally for only those deployments publicized in a headline on the front page of the New York Times. But I will also consider whether presidential activity oriented toward framing the issue for public consumption, and whether the “principal policy objective” of the action itself, affects the likelihood that the public will rally (Jentleson 1992).
Data

Following Lian and Oneal’s (1993) lead of using an independent source for potential military events, I drew cases from Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg’s (2003) compilation of All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970–2000 published by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). This study was conducted under a contract with the Pentagon and it is comprehensive: between 1975 and 1984, Zelikow (1987) identified 71 political uses of force. Over the same period, CNA identifies approximately 110 military responses. The CNA study lists almost 300 major operations between 1970 and 2000 (not including humanitarian operations in which forces were not sent into harm’s way), and one of the authors, Henry H. Gaffney, supplied me with their preliminary list of another 17 operations for years between 2001 and 2003.

I then whittled down the number to 90 “major uses of force” by applying Lian and Oneal’s (1993) definition (used originally by Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 50) and continued by Zelikow (1978)): those operations involving “two or more aircraft carrier task groups,” or “more than one battalion,” or “one or more combat wings.” The information for whether a deployment fits these criteria came from (1) Siegel (1991) who chronicles the number of aircraft carriers used in navy crisis response activity through 1990; (2) a chart supplied to me by Henry H. Gaffney at the Center for Naval Analyses that updates the Siegel information through 1999; and (3) the New York Times.5 Again, I include all major uses of force that fit the stated criteria; not just political uses of force as defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978). Also, I include combat operations regardless of the amount of force deployed unless the operation was truly minor.6 As a result, the data set used herein incorporates most but not all events used by Lian and Oneal (1993) for the overlapping periods under study (1973 to 1984),7 and it adds some cases for these years. More importantly, the data set is still comparable with Lian and Oneal’s (1993) but it is updated through 2003.

I chose to limit my analysis to the period between mid-1973 and 2003 to avoid any problems with the data that might be arise from war-fatigue during the Vietnam War (Ostrom and Job 1986; Brody 1991; Lian and Oneal 1993). In addition, this time frame controls for any changes in executive behavior that could result from the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973.

Following Lian and Oneal (1993), I primarily rely upon Edwards and Gallup (1990) for presidential approval polls through 1988, and then on other published Gallup compilations for later events.8 I selected the poll
closest to the start of the event, and the first one thereafter. However, if the
gap between these two polls was more than a month, I used Lexis-Nexis to
find other polls that might more accurately pick up the immediate reaction
to the event. If I did use an alternative poll, it had to be (1) conducted by
a major polling house; (2) with at least 1,000 respondents; (3) over an inter-
view period of a week or less; and (4) use a national adult sample. I dropped
three events from the data set because there was no polling conducted
about presidential approval between mid-June and mid-December 1976,
and another 2 other cases because they overlapped with more salient events
in the same polling period, bringing the number of cases in the data set
down to 85.

The start date of an event was determined either because conflict was
initiated on that day, or because the president or the press highlighted the
issue and it appeared in a headline on the front page of the New York Times.
From the start date, I counted the number times the issue appeared in a
headline on the front page thereafter over a two-week period: to be
counted, the headline had to explicitly connote the use or deployment of
U.S. military force or an attack upon Americans. I also created an additive
scale, counting the number of times that the president took an action fram-
ing the event: for example, televised prime-time speeches to the nation or
before a Joint Session of Congress (3 points); radio addresses (1 point);
news conferences in which the president highlighted the topic (2 points) or
gave comments when asked (1 point); other comments to reporters in less
formal settings (1 point); or remarks made at other events (1 point). My
sources of information for presidential activity came from reports in the
New York Times, supplemented by the Public Papers of the President.9

A final comment needs to be made about the treatment of the histori-
cally high surge of public support for George W. Bush following the
September 11 attack. Under the criteria I used—that a physical deployment
of military forces in response to an attack counts as a military event—this
rally should be incorporated into the data set. Yet, the sheer size of the
rally—at 39 percent—makes it a clear outlier; and the rally event was not
initially produced by an administration action. Therefore, I code the pub-
lic response to the attack starting a few days later, capturing a more limited
4 percent change in approval once Bush issues threats and orders the move-
ment of military personnel.

Findings

The question at the heart of this study is whether the president can expect
to produce a rally-'round-the-flag response from the public if he initiates
military force (or threatens to use force) under certain circumstances. If so, the popular perception that the president uses force at times to produce such a rally may be right.

Table 7.1 shows the average change in public’s approval rating of the president following all major uses of military force between 1973 and 2003. Lian and Oneal’s (1993) earlier findings still hold: the average rally for these 85 cases is negligible at 1.5 percent. They report an average of 0 percent for all major uses of force between 1950 and 1984 (Lian and Oneal 1993, 284). Considering that the data set used herein also incorporates major military interventions and wars, the absence of a bigger difference in results is notable.

But as Lian and Oneal (1993, 285) point out, it is essential that the deployment of force be known to the public: “The public cannot respond to what it does not know.” They reason that by “using a rigorous definition of ‘major uses of force,’ Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Zelikow(1987) may have inadvertently selected a substantial number of trivial cases, washing out the rally effect of truly important, publicized military actions” (Lian and Oneal 1993, 285). To remedy the problem, they subsequently limit their analysis to only those “uses of force that were reported in a front-page headline” (Lian and Oneal 1993, 285). Under these conditions, they report an average change in opinion of 1.4 percent for 44 cases (Lian and Oneal 1993, 286). When I replicate this procedure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean (%)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All uses</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page headline</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page headline and presidential activity</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page headline and presidential activity and foreign policy restraint</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page headline and presidential activity and internal political change or humanitarian efforts</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 The Rally Effects of Major Uses of Force Under Different Conditions, 1973–2003
with my updated data set, I find an average rally of 1.8 percent for 73 cases (see table 7.1). Again, our results do not differ much.

Lian and Oneal (1993, 286) go on to select those 20 cases wherein the event appeared in a headline on the front page of the *New York Times* and was categorized as a crisis by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1988). Under these conditions, the average rally rose to only 2.9 percent.

I consider instead the extent of presidential activity focused on framing the event. I select 44 events that appeared in a headline on the front page of the *New York Times* and for which the president scored at least a 4 on my scale: this captures any military event about which the president gave a televised prime-time speech; it also includes any event about which the president made at least four public remarks. I found that the average change in opinion following such cases to be 2.9 percent.10

Last, I consider the nature of the operation. I begin with the same 44 cases just discussed. I divided the cases into two camps: (1) IPC/Humanitarian if the military deployment was primarily an operation related to “internal political change” or humanitarian endeavors (e.g., peacekeeping in Lebanon; the war in Kosovo; creation of a no-fly-zone to protect the Kurds in Iraq; or activities in Somalia); or (2) FPR/Protect if the mission was primarily characterized by “foreign policy restraint” or protection of American citizens (e.g., bombing Iraq to retaliate against the alleged assassination attempt on President Bush or to ensure UN inspectors’ access to sites in Iraq; or threatening force in response to hijacking or hostage-taking incidents that involved Americans; or attempting to rescue Americans). Appendix 7.1 lists these operations.

The characterization of different operations into these two camps involves a few judgment calls. Even though the interventions into Panama and Grenada involved the removal of a government, I classified these mixed cases as FPR/Protect because each intervention was prominently justified on the grounds of protecting American lives. Reagan points to the safety of “1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. George’s University Medical School” as a major reason for the decision to intervene in Grenada. “I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened,” Reagan emphasized in his televised speech to the nation: “The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.” Likewise, George H.W. Bush framed the Panama invasion as precipitated by threats to American lives:

General Noriega’s reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama. As President, I
have no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens. And that is why I directed our Armed Forces to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States.

I classified several military exercises in Honduras in the 1980s as FPR/Protect because the Reagan administration justified these particular deployments as a reaction to aggressive border incursions made by the Nicaraguan government. A strong case can be made, however, that the public saw such operations as “internal political change.”

I made one other adjustment. If the administration deployed forces in a manner that qualified the action as a major use of force under Blechman and Kaplan’s (1978) criteria, but if the president framed the issue to the public as a situation that did not really pose a threat (e.g., Carter’s response to the Soviet brigade in Cuba in October 1979) or where force would not or could not be used (e.g., Reagan’s response to the embassy bombing in Lebanon in September 1984 or Bush’s response to the hostage situation in Lebanon in August 1989), then I eliminated the case.

Once the nature of the operation is taken into account, we do see a more significant rally emerge as part of a predictable pattern. In the 26 cases that can be characterized as FPR/Protect, the average change in opinion following the event is close to 5 percent. (The average rally effect moves up to 5.3 percent if the Honduras cases are taken out). However, for the 15 IPC/Humanitarian military operations, the average rally drops back down to around 1 percent. These findings suggest that tough talk and action about military deployments that can be characterized as FPR/Protect do predictably provoke a rally effect. On the other hand, tough talk and action about influencing the internal conditions of another countries, even for a just cause, do not.

**Discussion**

This analysis is only preliminary. Important variables—such as the extent of elite opposition to the president’s military action or the actual magnitude of force used—have not been considered here or controlled for (Brody 1991; Lian and Oneal 1993). Systematic criteria need to be set for how to characterize the “principal policy objective” of each operation (Jentleson 1992). And the duration of rally events should also be considered. Even so, the findings do suggest that the popular wisdom may not be so wrong: there does seem to be a predictable pattern for when a president can expect a surge of support in response to a military action.

To be sure, like Lian and Oneal (1993), I find the average rally for all major uses of force to be negligible. But this result—which seems so

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Rally (%)</th>
<th>Nature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequent Wind: Evacuation of U.S. Embassy in Saigon</td>
<td>4/25/1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayaguez rescue</td>
<td>5/12/1975</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba II: U.S. airlifts French and Belgian troops to Zaire</td>
<td>5/16/1978</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet troops in Cuba</td>
<td>10/2/1979</td>
<td>−4</td>
<td>No Threat/Dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage crisis in Iran</td>
<td>11/20/1979</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert One: Iranian hostage rescue attempt</td>
<td>4/25/1980</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evac. of P.L.O.: U.S. Marines to Beirut</td>
<td>8/21/1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Massacre: U.S. Marines Back to Beirut</td>
<td>9/21/1982</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras; U.S. Military exercises</td>
<td>7/19/1983</td>
<td>−5</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Acquisition Battery to Lebanon: Retaliatory strikes</td>
<td>9/8/1983</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Fury: U.S. invasion of Grenada (also Lebanon barracks attack)</td>
<td>10/25/1983</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. shells Syrian targets in Lebanon</td>
<td>12/5/1983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Embassy bombed in Beirut</td>
<td>9/21/1984</td>
<td>−3</td>
<td>No Threat/Dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWA 847 hijacking</td>
<td>6/15/1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achille Lauro: U.S. intercepts plane</td>
<td>10/8/1985</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVL-FON Ops: Gulf of Sidra Dispute II</td>
<td>3/24/1986</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Dorado Canyon: U.S. bombs Tripoli</td>
<td>4/10/1986</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Will: U.S. strikes Iranian boats and bases</td>
<td>10/16/1987</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pheasant: Show of force in Honduras</td>
<td>3/17/1988</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimrod Dancer: Troop reinforcement after Panama elections</td>
<td>5/10/1989</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon—Higgins killed: Hostage situation</td>
<td>8/1/1989</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No Threat/Dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Cause: U.S. invasion of Panama</td>
<td>12/20/1989</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield: Pledge to defend Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>8/7/1990</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield: Additional buildup in Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>11/8/1990</td>
<td>−4</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Percent Change</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm: Gulf War begins</td>
<td>1/17/1991</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm: Ground War begins</td>
<td>2/24/1991</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope: Troop deployments to Somalia</td>
<td>12/4/1992</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq TLAM strikes: Retaliation for assassination attempt on former president Bush</td>
<td>6/26/1993</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope II: Black Hawk down in Somalia</td>
<td>10/4/1993</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilant Warrior: U.S. sends troops to deter Iraq from threatening Kuwait</td>
<td>10/8/1994</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia air strikes</td>
<td>5/25/1995</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Force: Air strikes on Serbs</td>
<td>8/29/1995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Strike: Protection of Kurds in Iraq</td>
<td>8/31/1996</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix Scorpion: Showdown over access of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq</td>
<td>11/14/1997</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/Afghanistan Strikes: Response to terrorism</td>
<td>8/20/1998</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix Scorpion III: Showdown over access of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq</td>
<td>11/4/1998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Fox: Air strikes on Iraq</td>
<td>12/16/1998</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noble Anvil: Kosovo War</td>
<td>3/20/1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>IPC/Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan War</td>
<td>10/7/2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Freedom: Iraq War begins</td>
<td>3/19/2003</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>FPR/Protect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

FPR stands for “Foreign Policy Restraint.” IPC stands for “Internal Political Change.”

*This percentage only includes the increase in presidential approval once President George W. Bush started to take actions in response to 9/11. I do not include the full record-setting surge in presidential approval (at 39%) immediately following the attack because this one data-point would skew the results.*
surprising at first glance—makes sense upon reflection. No one should expect the public to know about or pay attention to all major deployments of force as defined here. There are simply too many military deployments that fit these criteria. Most are not highlighted in the media. Nor does even the most cynical political observer believe that presidents only use force to rally support from the public or to divert national attention. More often than not, a president may want to keep the use of force quiet or at least see no need to highlight it. So the pool of cases included in this category, “all major uses of military force,” is simply too broad: it includes too many instances that are trivial, or cases in which the president keeps the issue below the radar screen.

But once we select cases based on how much energy the president puts into framing an event for public consumption, and especially upon whether the event will fit with the public’s predispositions, then the average rally becomes significant. Equally important, the pattern of when the public supports an action coincides with our expectations. The findings suggest that a president can expect a surge of support following the use of force characterized as protecting American lives or U.S. interests if he actively promotes such a narrative for the action.

The findings reinforce Jentleson’s (1992) depiction of the public as sensible and “pretty prudent”—albeit not very generous if the stakes are high. The public appears to have established preferences about when American lives and treasure should be expended abroad. If a president desires a rally in public support, he is constrained by those preferences. For better or worse, a president who talks and acts tough about stopping murder and injustice occurring within another country, or retaliating against an aggressive party therein, or helping to establish political order, he probably will not be rewarded by an increase in public support for doing so.

Given the sophistication of private White House polling, it follows that if a president acts against public predispositions, he is doing so for reasons other than the desire to provoke a rally event at home (e.g., Clinton’s use of force in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo). If he acts in accordance with public predispositions (e.g., striking a known enemy such as Libya or Iraq), then it is likely that the president expects to be rewarded with a rally in public support for doing so, whether or not that is the primary motivation for his action.

Finally, the results herein suggest the importance of crossing boundaries from international relations into the field of political communication to better understand the rally-’round-the-flag-phenomenon.
Notes

Thanks are due to Nicholas Sweedo and Sara Thannhauser for their excellent research assistance, and to Henry H. Gaffney at the Center for Naval Analyses for his generosity in sharing data about U.S. military operations.

1. Clinton argued that the targets were related to activities of Osama bin Laden, that he used the site in Afghanistan as a training camp and was connected to the pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan that produced materials for chemical weapons. The latter claim has been questioned. See Weiner and Myers 1998.


3. Transcript from the McLaughlin Group, September 6, 2002.

4. It must be said that using an independent source to derive their cases was an improvement over earlier studies (e.g., Brody; Edwards and Gallup 1990) which had defined potential rally events in a more ad hoc fashion (see Burbach 1994, 15).

5. All of the military responses listed in Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg’s (2003) compilation of All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970–2000 were subject to a search in the Lexis-Nexis historical database for the New York Times. As such, I cannot be certain that I have found all of the major uses of force by the Blechman and Kaplan (1978) criteria; only all of those that were ever reported in the New York Times.

6. Three responses fit this description: the Libyan conflict in March 1973, when jets attacked U.S. ships but there was no reported U.S. response; the Lebanon withdrawal between February and April of 1984; and the use of U.S. helicopters to assist in removing mines in the Persian Gulf between August and October 1984.


9. Counting the number of headlines using a Lexis/Nexis search of the New York Times and counting the number of actions taken by the president are bound to be subject to some measurement error, so I only intend for these to be rough gauges of salience and presidential activity. For the
Public Papers of the President, I used the electronic data set created by John Wooley and Gerhard Peters. See the American Presidency Project available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

10. As the framing activity increases, so does the likelihood of a rally: If I limit the analysis to the 30 cases wherein the president scored a 6 or above for framing activity, then the average rises to 3.5 percent; if I limit the analysis to the 20 cases wherein the presidential score is 10 or above, then the average rally jumps to 4.4 percent.
CHAPTER 8

BLANK CHECK OR MARCHING ORDERS?
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL USE OF FORCE

David Brulé and Alex Mintz

Introduction

A basic assumption in democratic societies is that government policy is shaped by the preferences of the citizenry. This belief concerning the influence of public opinion applies to the realms of both domestic as well as foreign policy. Moreover, in the case of the United States, no other foreign policy issue is more provocative and salient to the public than those concerning the use of military force abroad (e.g., Mueller 1973; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987b; Barnet 1990). While some scholars argue that foreign policy is (or should be) beyond the reach of public pressure (e.g., Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955a; Cohen 1973; Morgenthau 1973), the assumption that the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is at the heart of prominent theories in international relations (e.g., Kant [1795] 1939; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Yet, there are hardly any quantitative, systematic studies evaluating the influence of public attitudes toward the use of force and presidential crisis decision making.

Does public opinion cross the boundary between domestic and international politics and influence decisions to use force abroad? Much of the recent literature (e.g., Russett 1990a; Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001) exploring
this question focuses on the United States and finds evidence supporting
the view of public opinion as a constraint on foreign policy—public opin-
ion limits the policies the president can pursue. Specifically, this constraints
perspective suggests that public opposition to a policy places it largely
beyond the administration’s consideration. But public support for a policy
does not necessarily rule out the pursuit of other, less costly alternatives.
The micro-theoretical foundations of the constraints perspective draw on
the “rational” view of public opinion (e.g., Jentleson 1992; Page and
Shapiro 1992; Nincic 1992b), which suggests that the judgments of ordi-
nary citizens are the product of such reasonable factors as individuals’ belief
systems and international events. Consequently, the public is able to eval-
uate whether the costs associated with a policy alternative are worth the
expected benefits. The public also exercises retrospective control of foreign
policy through elections, punishing officials who advocate policies that
defy the will of the citizenry (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 1990).

The constraining effect of public opinion is akin to a price cap—the
public places limits on the amount it is willing to pay for a “good.” If the
public is willing to pay a relatively high price for a good, it should be will-
ing to pay a lower price for an inferior good. In decisions concerning the
use of force abroad, public opposition to the use of force constrains that
alternative, making the pursuit of a less costly, nonforce alternative more
likely. Conversely, public support for the use of force affords the president
greater freedom of action to carry out any policy—up to and including the
use of force. Thus, public support provides the president with a “blank
check,” giving him considerable latitude in decisions to use force.

Although this view of public support as a “blank check” focuses on the
conditions under which presidents are able to take military action (i.e., lack
of constraints), it is largely silent on the possibility of constraints on presi-
dential inaction. The blank check perspective suggests that leaders are con-
cerned about being punished in the next election if they use force in the
face of public opposition. But leaders are relatively unconcerned about
electoral retribution if they fail to use force in defiance of widespread sup-
port for that course of action. Unless we assume that the president’s utility
for the use of force constantly exceeds his utility for other foreign policy
alternatives, there is little reason to expect public support for the use of
force to be systematically related to military action abroad.

In contrast, we develop an argument stemming from Poliheuristic
Theory (e.g., Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz 2004), which assert that presidents
interpret public support for the use of force as “marching orders.” Like the
blank check argument, the marching orders perspective contends that
public opposition to the use of force eliminates military alternatives from
consideration. We also share the blank check argument’s acceptance of a generally reasonable public, which is capable of holding leaders accountable for foreign policy behavior that is odds with public preferences. But if presidents are concerned about electoral punishment if they use force in defiance of public opposition, presidents should also be concerned about electoral punishment if they fail to use force in defiance of public support. As a consequence, public support for the use of force acts as a constraint on nonforce alternatives, ruling out passive foreign policy responses to international crises. The remaining set of alternatives from which the president may choose a policy is limited to those involving the use of military force. Thus, public support for the use of force is tantamount to marching orders.

In this chapter, we assess the role of public support in presidential decisions to use force. First, we review the relevant literature on public opinion and the use of force. Then, we offer an alternative explanation based on the Poliheuristic Theory. Because the president is reluctant to incur the political costs of defying the citizenry, he is likely to reject foreign policy alternatives that contradict the public’s preferences. Next, we describe the research design for testing our hypotheses. Using two different data sets and a new public opinion poll data set (Mintz and Brule 2004), we examine the relationship between public support and the use of force, 1949–2001. We discuss our empirical results in the following section. Generally, our results confirm our expectations concerning the impact of public support on presidential uses of force. These findings are robust across data sets and different measures of public opinion data. Finally, we conclude that—in the case of U.S. presidential uses of force—policy typically reflects the will of the people.

Opinion Manipulation, Constraints, and the Use of Force

It is a truism among policy makers that presidents must secure the support of the public in order to use force abroad (e.g., DeYoung and Milbank 2001). Presidents may use public support as leverage to overcome potential congressional opposition (e.g., Edwards 2003). On the other hand, a use of force conducted with a lack of public support but adequate support in Congress may result in electoral punishment. The vital role of American public support in decisions to use force has, therefore, become the focus of a number of studies exploring the relationship between mass public opinion and presidential uses of force. But the two primary perspectives presented in this literature differ markedly in their assumptions concerning the nature of public opinion as well as the president’s response to levels of support.
Opinion Manipulation: The “Top-Down” Process

One perspective posits a “top-down” process of public opinion formation (e.g., Wittkopf and McCormick 1993). According to this perspective, presidents influence the public through leadership and manipulation (e.g., Margolis and Mauser 1989). Presidents may increase public support for specific policies by “going public” (Kernell 1986), adding salience to world events. This view assumes that the public is largely uninformed and lacks coherent, stable opinions on foreign policy issues (e.g., Lippmann 1922; Almond 1950). Rather than follow public opinion, presidents manipulate it in order to marshal support for their desired policies.

Indeed, a growing body of research suggests that presidents not only make repeated speeches in order to sway the public, but also use force abroad in an effort to distract public attention from domestic problems (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986). Rooted in the “rally-'round-the-flag” effect (Mueller 1973)—a short-term boost in presidential approval ratings following the use of force—these studies postulate that presidents sometimes use force in an effort to reverse declining approval ratings (e.g., Morgan and Bickers 1992; DeRouen 1995) or divert attention from deteriorating economic conditions (e.g., Fordham 1998b; DeRouen 2000).

Overall, the “top-down” perspective conceives of a public whose opinions are malleable and readily subject to manipulation. However, this view is challenged by studies that suggest that public opinion on foreign policy issues is stable and coherent (e.g., Caspary 1970; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987b; Page and Shapiro 1992). Moreover, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) contend that public support for the use of force is structured by the perceived “prudence” of the policy objectives. A recent study by Edwards (2003) also argues that presidents’ efforts to garner support through public addresses are typically ineffective and often counterproductive. This stands in stark contrast to the view of the American public as the unwitting object of elite manipulation.

Additional challenges stem from criticisms of the “rally-'round-the-flag” effect. Several studies (e.g., Brody and Shapiro 1989; Lian and Oneal 1993) call the validity of the rally phenomenon into question. Opinion rallies—when they occur at all—tend to be substantively small and of short duration, casting doubt on whether the rally effect holds adequate incentives for presidents to use force abroad in response to problems at home; (but see Murray, chapter 7, this volume). In fact, a president’s attempt to add salience to an international crisis may reduce public support for the president’s preferred policy (e.g., Edwards 2003). If the president pursues his preferred policy in spite of public opposition, the public is likely to exercise
retrospective control over foreign policy through its electoral power (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990).

The “top-down” perspective of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has given rise to a burgeoning area of research in which presidents are regarded as manipulators of public opinion via policy speeches and military operations. But recent studies suggest that public opinion may not be sufficiently malleable to be the unwitting target of elite manipulation. Moreover, empirical evidence examining the rally phenomenon suggests that the potential fruits of highly publicized uses of force are unlikely to outweigh the possible consequences (Meernik and Waterman 1996).

“Blank Check”: Public Opinion as a Constraint on Presidential Decision Making

Another theoretical perspective holds that public opinion serves as a constraint on foreign policy decision making (e.g., Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001). Based on Key’s (1966) theory of public opinion as a “system of dikes” that channels the flow of policy as well as more recent studies that find that public opinion tends to be stable and coherent (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987b; Page and Shapiro 1992), this perspective contends that mass public opinion is capable of limiting the use of force. It figures prominently in the structural explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993). Essentially, the perspective contends that when public support for a specific policy is inadequate, presidents are unable to implement that policy. Conversely, when public support is deemed adequate, presidents have free rein to pursue their desired course of action.

While this “blank check” perspective of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy focuses on the conditions under which presidents are able to act, it ignores the possibility of constraints on presidential inaction. Indeed, if presidents are free to use force only when public support is sufficient, the president must be assumed to be perpetually bellicose. Otherwise, a president with a “blank check” can be expected to carry out any one of the available policies—not just a use of force. In contrast, if we accept that a constraint effectively reduces the size of the set of alternatives from which a leader may select a policy option or course of action, a constraint may prevent a leader from using force, but a constraint may also prevent a leader from not using force. Therefore, under certain conditions, leaders are compelled to use force; a use of force does not imply that the leader operates under the absence of constraints.
A useful approach for taking into account the role of public opinion in presidential decisions to use force is the Poliheuristic Theory of foreign policy decision making (Mintz et al. 1997; Mintz 2004). The theory posulates a two-stage decision-making process. In the first stage, leaders employ a noncompensatory decision-making strategy, which reduces the menu of alternatives through the elimination of options that are unacceptable on a critical decision-making dimension. A high score on a less critical dimension cannot compensate for a low score on the key dimension. In the second stage, leaders choose among the remaining alternatives by using analytic decision rules (see Mintz 2004).

According to the Poliheuristic Theory, a central consideration in the decision-making process are the preferences of the citizenry—which are capable of crossing boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the theory suggests that such international factors as strategic interests cannot overshadow a leader’s concerns about domestic politics. Unlike other decision-making approaches (e.g., Steinbruner 1974; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), the Poliheuristic Theory identifies a key dimension that must be satisfied in order for an alternative to be accepted. Alternatives are not evaluated simultaneously. Instead, leaders reduce the set of alternatives in the first stage by rejecting those options that fail to breach a minimum threshold on the key decision dimension. Because leaders are often self-interested politicians who seek to ensure their domestic political survival, Mintz (1993, 2004) suggests that this key dimension is typically domestic politics—the \textit{sine qua non} of decision making. For example, if a given alternative seriously threatens the electoral prospects of a democratic leader, then that alternative is rejected. A high score on other dimensions cannot compensate for a low score on the domestic political dimension.

In the second stage, a choice is selected from the remaining alternatives based on its ability to maximize expected benefits on other relevant dimensions (Mintz et al. 1997). In other words, decision makers choose from the remaining options based on an alternative’s ability to maximize expected net benefits. The two-stage, multidimensional decision-making strategy posited by the Poliheuristic Theory does not privilege process validity over outcome validity, or vice versa (see Mintz 2004). Indeed, it mirrors the manner in which decisions are often made. Additionally, the theory has exceptional predictive power across a range of diverse methodologies (e.g., DeRouen 2000, 2002; Redd 2001; Sathasivam 2002).
Poliheuristic Presidential Decisions

When faced with an international crisis, presidents can respond with a number of possible policy alternatives. Since World War II, presidents have responded to world conflict with such diverse actions as verbal denunciations, economic sanctions, arms shipments, and threats to use force. Similarly, presidents have ordered the mobilization and deployment of troops: the conduct of covert operations, air strikes, raids, and invasions. Broadly construed, these alternatives can be conceptualized as falling into one of two categories: force alternatives and nonforce alternatives.

As the Poliheuristic Theory suggests, presidents reject alternatives that fail to satisfy a key dimension—typically domestic politics. Therefore, we can expect a president to reject alternatives that threaten his domestic political fortunes. Depending on the president’s criteria, this elimination of alternatives will result in the survival of either a set of nonforce options, or a set of force options. But what are the criteria that must be satisfied on the domestic political dimension?

Among the operational indicators, or criteria, that presidents use to assess alternatives on the domestic political dimension is the level of public support for a given policy (Mintz 2004). One of the more common ways in which the public registers its preferences is through opinion polls (Margolis and Mauser 1989). Throughout the postwar period, opinion polls have been prevalent, facilitating the communication of the public’s wishes to elected officials (Holsti 1992). Additionally, there is growing evidence that officials take public opinion into account when formulating policy (e.g., Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Hinckley 1992).

Although the policy and scholarly communities are growing to acknowledge the role of public opinion in policy making, polls are not conducted for every issue. With respect to international crises, the public’s preferences are not queried for some incidents. This may be because some crises are not deemed newsworthy, or are overshadowed by other events. The speed with which some crises develop may outpace the ability of pollsters to conduct inquiries before the crisis is resolved. Nonetheless, the public registers its preferences concerning enough crises to justify an investigation of the impact of public opinion on presidential responses to international crises.

When considering which policy to choose in response to an international crisis, presidents can refer to public opinion polls in which respondents are asked whether the United States should “send troops,” or use “military force” in order to resolve the crisis. According to the Poliheuristic Theory, presidents are expected to reject alternatives that fail
to satisfy criteria on the domestic political dimension. In decisions to use force, this is equivalent to acting in accordance with the public’s preferences. Thus, when public support for the use of force is high, presidents should reject nonforce alternatives. If presidents defy the public, they run the risk of eroding political capital, or incurring the wrath of voters in the next election (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990).

In some crises, the president may take a position on how the United States should respond. Then, the public has the opportunity to “veto” or approve the president’s proposal. For example, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush suggested that the United States would, if necessary, use military force to compel the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Such statements by the president rouse a flurry of media coverage (Gans 1980; Powlick and Katz 1998), which affords the public the opportunity to learn about the crisis and develop an opinion (Zaller 1994; Powlick and Katz 1998). The activities of the president and the media provide the impetus for polling organizations to tap public opinion (Powlick and Katz 1998). According to our argument, the public has the ability to effectively “veto” the use of force through the expression of its opposition (or lack of support). Conversely, the public may also offer its approval for the use of force through supportive opinion polls.

This account of the role of public opinion in presidential decisions to use force differs from the constraints argument in a fundamental way. The manner in which the term “constraints” is typically used in the international relations literature suggests that constraints on presidential decision making leads directly to a reduction in the frequency or probability that force is used (e.g., Smith 1996). On the other hand, the absence of a constraint translates into an increased frequency or probability of the use of force. In the context of the role of public opinion, this argument suggests that opposition to the use of force is constraining, while support constitutes a “blank check” for the president. However, a blank check implies that presidents are free to choose any of the possible alternatives, including nonforce alternatives. Thus, we should only expect to observe a systematic relationship between public opinion and the use of force if presidents are assumed to be constantly bellicose.

In contrast, the Poliheuristic explanation of the role of public opinion in decisions to use force dismisses the possibility of presidential discretion when the level of public support for the use of force is high. Under such conditions, the set of alternatives from which the president can choose a response continues to be constrained. Those alternatives that fail to satisfy public preferences—that is, the nonforce alternatives—are typically beyond consideration. Thus, when public support for the use of force is high, the president must use force. Rather than regarding high levels of public
support as a “blank check,” presidents respond to such attitudes as though they were issued “marching orders.”

The key claim of this study is that presidents eliminate alternatives that fail to satisfy the public support prerequisite. Based on the above discussion we test the following hypothesis in this paper, subject to two data sets and several robustness checks:

When faced with international crises, presidents tend to reject passive alternatives when public support for military action is high.

**Research Design**

We assess the impact of public support on presidential decisions to use force by examining all crises in which the United States is involved from 1949–2001 using two different data sets and a new public opinion poll data set (Mintz and Brule 2004). Our unit of analysis is the international crisis. We use the Militarized Interstates Disputes (MID) data set (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) and the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000) to identify crises in which the United States is a participant. These data sets were compiled for somewhat different purposes and use different definitions and criteria. If we obtain similar results across both data sets, we can have greater confidence in our findings.

**Dependent Variable: The Use of Force**

Following previous studies (e.g., James and Oneal 1991; Miller 1995; Wang 1996), the dependent variable reflects the actual use of military force. In analyses using the MID data, the dependent variable takes on the value of one for the two highest levels of hostility—use of force and war involvement—and zero otherwise. For analyses using the ICB data, the dependent variable takes on the value of one when the United States is a crisis actor and the major response is “violent military act” and “multiple including violent military act.” The dependent variable is also equal to 1 when U.S. involvement is characterized by “U.S. direct military intervention.” Across the data sets, the dependent variable reflects the use of violent military force.

**Key Independent Variables: Public Support Toward the Use of Force**

The key independent variables portray whether a critical mass of the American public supports the use of military force in response to an
international crisis. Using Gallup poll data, we record the proportion of respondents who support the use of force in response to a crisis (Mintz and Brule 2004). We use only those polls that precede the president’s major response. Ex post evaluations of military actions by the public are not included as they were unknown prior to the president’s decision to use force.

During the course of some crises, more than one poll is conducted. This has some practical as well as theoretical implications for our analyses. Presidents may decide how to respond to a crisis on the basis of a single poll. But presidents may also take multiple polls into account, or only the earliest poll. Therefore, we construct three measures of public support. The first measure is the initial poll taken after the initiation of the crisis (Initial support). The second measure consists of polls that come closest to immediately preceding the president’s major response (Latest support). Because presidents may try to “prime” and influence the public, we also construct a measure consisting of the average of all polls pertaining to the specific crisis conducted during the period between the initiation of the crisis and the president’s response (Average support).

In order to compare the effect of public support with crisis in which the public did not register its preferences, we create a set of dichotomous variables reflecting high support. High support refers to instances in which a majority of respondents favor the use of force (i.e., the proportion of respondents supporting the use of force exceeds 50 percent). We construct a dummy variable for high support corresponding to each of the three continuous measures of public support—Latest high support, Initial high support, and Average high support on the use of force. In accordance with the “marching orders” argument, we expect the dummy variables reflecting high support to have a direct impact on the president’s propensity to use force. We use these measures and the two data sets to test the robustness of our findings.

Control Variables

The primary way in which public opinion enters into previous analyses of the use of force is presidential approval ratings (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 2000). The logic behind inclusion of this measure has been rooted in the “rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon (e.g., Mueller 1973). Given that presidents can boost their approval ratings by using force abroad, they may be more likely to undertake foreign adventures during times in which their approval is low (see e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986).
We also include a measure of the change in presidential approval as presidents may respond to declining (or rising) approval ratings rather than absolute levels of approval.³

A number of previous studies find that when economic conditions are poor, presidents are more likely to use force (e.g., Russett 1990b; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Fordham 1998b). In order to weigh the effect of the economy on the use of force, we include three measures of domestic economic conditions. We include quarterly measures of the unemployment rate along with the rate of inflation (consumer price index). Additionally, we include the quarterly growth rate of gross domestic product.⁴ All economic variables are lagged.

Research on elections and the presidential use of force (e.g., Stoll 1984; Gaubatz 1991) contends that presidents may exploit their primacy in foreign policy in an effort to secure reelection or the election of their preferred successors. Previous studies (e.g., Stoll 1984; Fordham 1998a, 1998b) find that presidents tend to use force more frequently during wartime elections. Thus, we include two dummy variables for elections. The peacetime elections variable takes on the value of one for crises that occur during the three-quarters preceding an election during peacetime. The wartime elections variable takes on the value of one for crises that occur during the three-quarters preceding an election during a war.

The realist tradition asserts that uses of force are primarily a function of exogenous forces located in the international environmental, rather than domestic political influences (see e.g., Waltz 1979; Meernik 1994). According to this perspective, we might expect presidents to use force when they are inundated with international crises. Consequently, we control for the number of international crises. The measure of concurrent crises is a quarterly count of the “universe” of new or ongoing crises, not just those to which the United States responds. In analyses using the ICB data, the measure reflects a count of all international crises recorded in the ICB data set. In analyses using MID data, the measure is a count of all disputes according to the MID data set.

The United States’ involvement in wars is thought to reduce the probability that a president will use force in response to other crises. Wars reduce the pool of available military resources with which force can be used elsewhere. Moreover, Mueller (1973) shows that when high casualties are sustained, public opinion tends to turn against the use of force. Thus, we control for the impact of casualties sustained during the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf War conflicts. Like Mueller, our measure is the log of the cumulative war dead occurring during the year of observation.⁵
Empirical Results

We use Probit to estimate the impact of the independent variables on the use of force/no use of force variable. In every crisis in which initial support is greater than 50 percent, average support is also greater than 50 percent. Because the results of the models that include Initial high support and Average high support are identical, we exclude the results of models including Average high support.

In Table 8.1, the two models on the left show the impact of Latest high support and Initial high support among crises identified using the MID data; the two models on the right side of the table show the results among crises identified by the ICB data. The coefficients for high support are positive and significant in all four models. When more than 50 percent of Gallup respondents support the use of force, the president is likely to rule out nonforce alternatives and pursue military action. This is consistent with the “marching orders” argument; reluctant to incur the wrath of voters, presidents act in accordance with public preferences.

Models 1 and 3 include the measures of Latest high support. As expected, Latest high support contributes to an increase in the likelihood that the president uses force in response to a crisis. The substantive impact of Latest high support on the president’s decision is large. In Model 1, the predicted probability of a use of force increases by 98 percent when more than half of Gallup respondents support the use of force in the most recent poll. According to Model 3—estimated with the ICB data—the predicted probability of a use of force in response to crises in which 50 percent or less of Gallup respondents support military action in the latest poll is .081. But when support for the use of force exceeds 50 percent, the predicted probability rises to .96.

Models 2 and 4 show the effect of Initial high support. Like Latest high support, the coefficients for Initial high support are positive and significant. Consistent with our expectations, these results suggest that when more than 50 percent of Gallup respondents support the use of force in the earliest poll conducted during the course of a crisis, the president is likely to use force. Again, the findings are suggestive of the marching orders argument: presidents appear to interpret high public support for the use of force as marching orders and reject nonforce alternatives. In Model 2, the probability that the president uses force increases by 74 percent when more than half of respondents express support for that course of action in the initial poll. In Model 4, the predicted probability increases from .097 to .949 when Initial high support is shifted from zero to one. Because the Initial high support and Average high support dummy variables are equivalent to
Table 8.1 Public Support and the U.S. Use of Force, 1949–2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latest high Support</td>
<td>.785***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.292)</td>
<td>(.305)</td>
<td>(.565)</td>
<td>(.561)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial high Support</td>
<td></td>
<td>.643**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.305)</td>
<td>(.301)</td>
<td>(.561)</td>
<td>(.568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential approval</td>
<td>−.0007</td>
<td>−.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in presidential approval</td>
<td>−.002</td>
<td>−.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>9.8e−05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>−.019</td>
<td>−.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>−.015</td>
<td>−.016</td>
<td>−.073***</td>
<td>−.061**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War election cycle</td>
<td>.662**</td>
<td>.656*</td>
<td>.939***</td>
<td>.811**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.353)</td>
<td>(.352)</td>
<td>(.399)</td>
<td>(.389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace election cycle</td>
<td>−.261</td>
<td>−.291</td>
<td>−.061</td>
<td>−.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.265)</td>
<td>(.264)</td>
<td>(.335)</td>
<td>(.326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent crises</td>
<td>−.104</td>
<td>−.112</td>
<td>−.013</td>
<td>−.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>−1.3e−06</td>
<td>−2.02e−06</td>
<td>2.5e−05</td>
<td>2.4e−05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.9e−06)</td>
<td>(9.93e−06)</td>
<td>(1.1e−05)</td>
<td>(1.1e−05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−.709</td>
<td>−.627</td>
<td>−1.75**</td>
<td>−1.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.879)</td>
<td>(.873)</td>
<td>(.856)</td>
<td>(.793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−119.42</td>
<td>−120.81</td>
<td>−70.25</td>
<td>−75.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
The top numbers are Probit estimates. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. All significance tests are one-tailed except for the constant term.

Each other, the results of Models 2 and 4 suggest that the impact of the average of all polls conducted during the course of a crisis is similar (if not identical) to that of the earliest poll.

Most of the other variables in the models provide less information than the measures of public support. From table 8.1, we cannot conclude that
presidential approval or change in presidential approval is related to the use of force in any of the four models. Similarly, the economic measures—Inflation, Unemployment, and GDP growth—also fail to have a significant effect on the use of force in the models estimated using the MID data. These null findings are consistent with previous studies of the use of force that employ crises, disputes, or “opportunities” as the units of analysis (e.g., Meernik 1994; Wang 1996). Such studies typically fail to find an effect of such trend variables as approval ratings and economic performance. However, studies that use quarters or years as the units of analysis tend to find such a relationship (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Fordham 2002).

In light of the temporal relationships that approval ratings and the economy have with U.S. crisis involvement (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Fordham 1998b), our null findings are suggestive of a selection effect. Presidents select themselves into crises on the basis of such factors as approval ratings or economic performance. Once in the crisis, however, the effect of such variables is attenuated (see e.g., Fordham 1998b). Moreover, it appears as though presidents consider public attitudes toward the use of force when choosing which course of action to pursue. In other words, presidential approval and the economy matter when presidents are deciding whether to get involved in a crisis, but do not matter in the decision to use force—such decisions are within the realm of public attitudes.

While GDP growth does not have a significant impact on the use of force using the MID data, its coefficient is negative and significant in Models 3 and 4, which are estimated using the ICB data. That leaders are more likely to use force abroad as GDP growth decreases is a robust finding (e.g., Russett 1990b; Miller 1995; Wang 1996). This finding is corroborated by models using the ICB data. In these models, a one-standard-deviation increase in GDP growth results in an average 48 percent decrease in the predicted probability. GDP growth is significant and in the predicted direction, confirming diversionary theory.

Although Peace election cycles fail to have a significant effect in table 8.1, all four models confirm the impact of War election cycles. Indeed, in the MID data, the effect of elections held during wartime increases the probability of a use of force by an average of 79 percent. In the ICB data, the substantive effect is even greater—an average of 390 percent. This result is not surprising. In previous studies of the use of force in which wartime and peacetime elections are evaluated separately (e.g., Stoll 1984; Fordham 1998a, 1998b), wartime elections significantly increase the likelihood of a use of force.
Turning to influences originating in the international system, the coefficients for concurrent crises are not significant across the four models in table 8.1. This is consistent with other studies that, although using different data sets and criteria (e.g., Fordham 1998b; DeRouen 2000), find no relationship between the number of ongoing crises and the president’s decision to use force. Similarly, the measure of war deaths does not have a significant effect on the use of force at least in the short run.

Taken together, the analyses provide robust support for our hypothesis. Regardless of the measurement of public support or the source data employed to identify crises, our hypothesis is consistently supported. The findings do not indicate that presidents interpret public support as a blank check. Rather than providing presidents with greater latitude in crisis decision making, public support is interpreted as marching orders—presidents tend to reject the nonforce alternatives when public support is high. Thus, the preferences of the citizenry are capable of crossing boundaries between domestic and international politics.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we develop a research strategy motivated by the Poliheuristic Theory of foreign policy decision making. With respect to use of force decisions, presidents eliminate alternatives that fail to satisfy the public’s preferences. When faced with international crises, presidents tend to reject passive alternatives when public support for military action is high. Public opinion plays a role in use of force decisions across a range of measurement scales and data sets. The results suggest that the judgments of ordinary citizens are capable of crossing the boundary between domestic and international politics. The analyses are consistent with the proposition that asserts that presidents reject passive alternatives when public support for the use of force is high. In sum, we can conclude with some confidence that higher levels of public support are tantamount to “marching orders.”

The conventional wisdom asserts that public support is a necessary condition for the use of force (e.g., Klarevas 2002). Rather than explore the relationship between public support and presidential decisions to use force, however, previous studies tend to treat the public as a potential constraint on otherwise autonomous policy makers. Unlike these, this study offers an explicit account of that relationship and contributes to our understanding of how public opinion influences presidential decisions to use force. We find that a basic assumption in democratic governance is met in the case of U.S. presidential decisions to use force: presidents appear to be, by and large, responsive to the public.
Notes

Our Research Agenda on the effects of domestic politics on the use of force, and more specifically, the effects of public opinion on the use of force and diversionary theory, has been greatly influenced by the work of Bruce M. Russett, to whom this volume is dedicated.

1. Gallup poll data were accessed via Lexis-Nexis and are available through the Roper Center, University of Connecticut.

2. Presidential approval is measured quarterly as the lag of the average percentage of persons responding in the affirmative to periodic Gallup polls that ask, “do you approve of the job (name of president) is doing as president?” The source is Fordham (1998b) from 1949–1994; from 1994 to 2001 the source is The Gallup Poll (retrieved from The Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com).

3. Change in presidential approval is the difference between current presidential approval and presidential approval in the previous quarter. Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991), DeRouen (1995), and Wang (1996) use the difference between initial approval ratings and current approval. The measure we employ is consistent with those used by Morgan Bickers (1992) and Meernik (2000).


5. The source for cumulative battle deaths is Meernik (2001). A quarterly measure of battle deaths was unavailable.
Although states do continue to rise up against other states, international war is no longer the dominant form of violent political conflict. On the contrary, most current-day warriors are nonstate actors: civilians who pick up arms—ranging from machetes, the ever-present AK-47 Soviet assault rifle, to unconventional weapons of mass destruction—to fight for a “cause,” most often within the confines of a single country. Sometimes this “cause” is publicly articulated, such as in the case of violent self-determination movements; other times it is overshadowed by banditry apparently aimed at gaining and maintaining control over lucrative natural resources such as diamonds (cf. Mueller 2003); and very often it is two-dimensional with private agendas motivating violence along with “master cleavages” (Kalyvas 2003). Sometimes these nonstate actors systematically kill their ethnic rivals in large numbers; other times they play “cat-and-mouse” with state security forces in remote areas or carry out fear-provoking attacks against civilians.

But despite these differences in the motives and forms of intrastate violent activity, the end result is always the same: human suffering that extends far beyond the losses incurred by the active combatants. According to Breaking the Conflict Trap, a World Bank policy research report on civil war and development (Collier et al. 2003), the social, political, and economic costs of civil war ripple out in three rings. The inner ring of suffering is the mortality, morbidity, displacement, and poverty inflicted on noncombatants within the country at war. The second ring consists of “neighborhood effects”: refugee flows and the spread of infectious diseases (e.g., malaria and HIV/AIDS),
regional arms races, reduced economic growth, and spillovers of violence. The outer ring of human suffering caused by civil war is global, with three of the most serious scourges of modern times—hard drugs, AIDS and international terrorism—all due, in substantial part, to the side effects of civil war.

Just as the suffering caused by civil war crosses the boundaries between participants and nonparticipants, be they individuals or countries, so too must the study of civil war cross the boundaries between academic disciplines and research methodologies. It is clear that civil war should be avoided; its social, economic, and political costs are too high to let the combatants fight it out among themselves. But some may argue that each civil war is too distinctive, especially in terms of its immediate causes, for there to be an effective conflict prevention strategy that is applicable to most, perhaps even all, countries. There is indeed evidence that different wars have been triggered by different precipitants. In some cases a political assassination sparked the violence (e.g., Colombia 1948–1966); in other cases the imposition of discriminatory ethnic policies was the last straw (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996–1997); in still other cases the annulment of democratic elections was the catalyst for war (e.g., Bolivia 1952); and so on.

At the same time, however, there is also substantial evidence that once researchers cross the boundary between case-specific and generalizable explanations, civil wars—conventionally defined as a conflict in which an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 5 percent on each side (Collier et al. 2003, 11)—appear to be intrinsically similar events that share many of the same “root causes.” Years of research have found that civil wars tend to occur in countries that are new, poor, in economic decline, highly dependent on natural resource exports (especially diamonds or oil), politically unstable, with large diasporas in rich countries, and characterized by either ethnic dominance, where one group is larger than the others, or ethnic polarization, where society is split into two fairly equal groups (Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). So devising universal strategies for the prevention of civil violence is not only a search for generality among the particular, but, indeed, a possibility.

Furthermore, the quest for understanding better the causes of civil peace is facilitated by the observation that countries involved in interstate wars have frequently also experienced civil war. Of the 42 countries that have been involved in at least one interstate war between 1946 and 1997 (Sarkees 2000), 64 percent have also been the locus of a civil war sometime between 1946 and 1997 (Sambanis 2004b). And this correlation is not surprising given that domestic revolution and interstate war have been
argued not only to share several commonalities, for example, a government's quest for greater resource extraction could lead to both internal resistance and external violent competition (Starr 1994), and also to be causally-related in that revolutions temporarily weaken a state and tend to bring to power regimes that are guided by ideology, both of which heighten the risk of international war (Walt 1996).

In this chapter, I cross the boundaries of international relations and comparative politics to argue that this correlation between internal and external peace is not coincidental, but rather a product of recurring inhibitors to violent conflict operating at different levels of analysis. Specifically, I propose that the political and economic practices underlying Russett and Oneal’s (2001) modern appropriation of Kant’s prescription for perpetual peace—representative government, economic interdependence between potential adversaries in a violent conflict, and institutionalized constraints to the use of force—would contribute to the development of virtuous cycles of civil peace, particularly in democratic countries, just as they have been shown to be effective in the creation and preservation of international peace. I support this claim with a statistical analysis of 170 countries from 1970–1999, which finds that democratic countries where (1) no cultural group dominates government to the deliberate exclusion of other cultural groups, (2) there is close correspondence between the proportion of the labor force employed in a given economic sector and the proportion of domestic wealth produced by that sector, and (3) there exists rule of law, are less likely to experience civil war, all else being equal.

The Triangle of International Peace

International peace, according to the evidence presented by Russett and Oneal (2001), is a result of three overlapping liberal behaviors: democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations. Democracies—countries where most citizens can vote, government comes to power through multiparty free and fair elections, and the chief executive is either elected by popular vote or held responsible to a legislature that is elected by popular vote—rarely fight each other in wars, skirmishes, and other military disputes, and are also more peaceful in general, all due to two complementary sets of reasons. First, democracies share common principles, most importantly the commitment to nonviolent resolution of domestic political disputes, and are therefore inclined to resolve disputes with each other in a similar fashion. Second, the institutional constraints democracies impose on decision makers, such as the separation of powers and public accountability, render them less likely to use military force.
The second point in the triangle of international peace is economic interdependence, which gives a country the material stake in the prosperity and stability of another’s economic system. Given that war disrupts trade and investment, economic interdependence therefore limits the probability that a state will use force against its commercial partners. And last, international governmental organizations contribute to peace by preventing and resolving disputes among countries, specifically by coercing or restraining those that use aggression, mediating and reducing uncertainty in negotiations by providing information, and promoting more pacifist interests and norms of behavior.

In addition to their independent contributions to the establishment of international peace, democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations are also mutually reinforcing antidotes to violent conflict and thus form a true triangle of peace. According to Russett and Oneal (2001), democracies are more likely to trade with each other in part because peaceful relations suggest that the benefits from trade are not strengthening a potential adversary. In turn, economic interdependence may induce pluralism, which encourages the formation of democratic culture and government. Democracies are also more likely to join intergovernmental organizations and to require new members to exhibit democratic governance, as seen in the criteria for ascension into the European Union. Multiple intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, have been formed for the specific purpose of promoting trade, and the cooperation built in trade relations is likely to spillover into other realms of international governance.

A Triangle of Civil Peace?

At first glance, the applicability of Russett and Oneal’s modern appropriation of Kant’s prescription for “perpetual peace” may seem questionable in light of democracy’s ambiguous relationship to civil war. In theory, democracy ought to reduce violent conflict not only by offering a peaceful means for changing governments, which inherently avoids bloodshed, but also by inducing moderation while in office and authorizing the electoral winners to impose their wills on the losers with the losers’ consent (Przeworski 1999).

In practice, however, the relationship between democracy and civil war is complicated. Several studies (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001) have claimed that democracies and dictatorships are equally peaceful while intermediate regimes, the so-called anocracies, face a higher risk of civil war. Although the logic behind democracy and dictatorship’s equal likelihood for peace is
plausible—democracies allow the peaceful expression of discontent and have mechanisms (e.g., elections) for redressing that discontent while dictatorships’ mechanisms for repression may inhibit the formation of rebel organizations (Hegre 2003)—the statistical results suggesting anocracy’s propensity to civil war are questionable due to endogeneity (Zinn 2004).

Others have found that democratic countries are less likely to be at peace than nondemocratic countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and that at low levels of per-capita income, political institutions tend to be less stable in democracies than in dictatorships, a condition that also leads to civil war (Hegre 2003). But this positive relationship between democracy and civil war is also questionable because it does not match the descriptive data, even without controls for the conflict-inducing effects of the process of democratization (Zinn 2004). Of the 141 civil war onsets that occurred in internationally recognized countries between 1946 and 1999 (Sambanis 2004b), 16 percent took place in democracies, 67 percent took place in dictatorships, and 17 percent took place in countries undergoing the process of democratization. Without the democratization category, 23 percent of these civil wars took place in democracies and 15 percent of these democracies with civil war would qualify as low income countries by the World Bank’s standards. But of the 77 percent of civil wars that took place in dictatorships, 39 percent took place in low income countries.

Despite these descriptive statistics, one must wonder why in statistical models democracy has appeared to be positively (albeit nonsignificantly) correlated with civil war? One answer could be that since it is presumably easier for rebel organizations to form in democracies, compared to dictatorships that tend to be more repressive (Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre 2003), it is possible that democracy is an intervening variable that permits other variables to influence the risk of civil war onset. If that is the case, then democracies and dictatorships face different underlying risks for civil war, meaning that a dictatorship with at least some of the reported causes of civil war (e.g., low level of development, declining economic growth, and a large population) would be less likely to experience an outbreak of civil war, compared to a democracy that possesses the same risk factors. It would then be necessary to estimate each regime type’s probability of civil war in separate statistical models and evidence that democracy is indeed an intervening variable would be that the coefficients for the two subsets of the model are substantially different.

A complementary reason why democracies may appear to be more prone to civil war could be that what matters for civil war is not the regime type per se, but the extent to which a country’s politically salient groups are represented in government institutions, given that nonstate actors are more likely to use
violence for political ends when nonviolent means of exercising power over
government policy, either in its entirety or over a specific issue area, are
perceived to be ineffective (cf. Lichbach 1987). In fact, Kant was critical of
democratic forms of government, which he viewed as despotic as they
imposed the will of the majority on the minority. He therefore advised that
“government must have a representative form, and in this system only a
republican government is possible” (Kant [1975] 1957, 15).

While modern-day democracies—where legislative and executive
decisions are made by elected representatives, not the citizens themselves—do
correspond to Kant’s conception of republicanism, Kant’s emphasis on
representation as the mechanism that leads to peace should not be underesti-
mated. Any given society is composed of a plurality of groups (e.g., ethnic,
religious, geographic, economic, gender) and especially in cases where one
or more of these have different policy preferences, a truly representative gov-
ernment would be one in which each politically salient group is represented
among the decision makers. Given that many rebellions have an ethnic,
religious, or ethno-regional dimension (Collier et al. 2003), I propose that
the kind of representative government most likely to be at peace is the one
characterized by cultural (i.e., ethnic, religious, or regional) group nondom-
ination, a condition that can exist in both democracies and dictatorships.

Representative Government and Cultural Group Nondomination

More specifically, I propose that the way in which cultural group
nondomination contributes to civil peace is by eliminating cultural group
political dominance, which significantly decreases the degree to which a
government is structurally representative of its constituent population and
in so doing increases the risk of civil war. There are two plausible scenarios
by which such lack of representation makes civil war more likely. In the
first scenario, the political dominance of one cultural group invokes resent-
ment among one or more of the excluded cultural groups; these groups
perceive that they are located in an unwarranted subordinate political posi-
tion on a status hierarchy and they feel politically dominated by a group
that has no right to be in a superior position (Petersen 2002, 40–41). This
resentment becomes the emotional mechanism that incites individuals to
violence; it triggers action by increasing the salience of violence over com-
peting desires and heightening the cognitive and physical capabilities that
are necessary for violence (Petersen 2002).

In the second scenario, cultural group political dominance limits the
available means by which members of the excluded groups can gain political
power. The mechanism that then incites individuals to violence is rational
choice. If nonviolent means for obtaining political power (i.e., political appointments and the electoral process) are not available and nonviolent strategies for registering dissent are perceived to be ineffective, or even costly, in light of the government’s repressive stance toward that group, violence is the only option available for members of excluded cultural groups who wish to obtain political power (cf. Licklider, chapter 5 this volume and Lichbach 1987).

Although the concept of cultural group political dominance is new, particularly to the study of civil war, others have found a strong link between ethnic dominance, a closely related variable, and the onset of civil war. In Collier and Hoeffler (2002), ethnic dominance is operationalized as a binary variable indicating whether a country’s largest ethnic group constitutes 45–90 percent of the population. This measure, however, is not necessarily a measure of political dominance. For instance, though a majority ethnic group may exclude minority ethnic groups from the political system, this does not have to occur because ethnic differences could be politically irrelevant; minority groups could also control the system; there could be institutional mechanisms in place to provide for some form of powersharing; or dominance could be exercised by a religious group or a regional coalition of minority groups. In addition, even when the political dominance of a particular ethnic group is facilitated by its numerical majority, measuring ethnic dominance by population share, a largely time-invariant measure, would not capture abrupt changes in political leadership (e.g., coups) that could lead to changes in which group dominates the political system.

These limitations with the Collier and Hoeffler (2002) measurement of ethnic dominance suggest that a more direct measure of cultural group political dominance is necessary. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, which tracks 285 politically active minorities at risk for state discrimination and repression, includes a variable called “Access to Higher Office,” which indicates whether access to top-level political positions was not restricted, moderately restricted, or prohibited for the minority group in question. While “prohibited access to higher office” would seem to correspond to cultural group political dominance, it is not a suitable variable for the present analysis due to its limited time-span (1990–2000), and exclusion of majority ethnic groups. This exclusion is significant, not only because there is evidence that majority groups are sometimes politically dominated by minorities (e.g., the Tutsi’s domination of the Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi), but also because political leaders belonging to a minority group would seem to be more likely to surround themselves with members of their own group—people whom they can presumably trust—as a means for consolidating their already tenuous hold on power.
Given the inappropriateness of existing comparable measures, I have constructed my own measure of cultural group political dominance using systematic information primarily from the U.S. Department of State’s annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (available for 1976 to present) and the U.S. Library of Congress’s Country Studies, which the library’s Federal Research Division has published, between 1988 and 1998, for 102 countries. Specifically, in the State Department’s human rights reports, section 3 and/or section 5 discuss *inter alia* whether or not in the given year an cultural group dominated the country’s political system to the deliberate exclusion of other citizen cultural groups. The Library of Congress Country Studies, chapter 2, provides an in-depth discussion of the country’s society, including its ethnic composition and which, if any, ethnic or regional groups have exclusively controlled the country’s political system for a delineated period of time. In a few cases I supplemented these sources with both country-specific works and information from the Minorities at Risk Project Group Assessment Files, which also systematically report political dominance, though only for some countries.

Since these sources provide systematic, time-varying information on whether or not a specific cultural group dominates a given country’s political system, I used these sources to construct *Cultural group political dominance*, an annual binary variable. Specifically, if I found evidence in these sources that a cultural (ethnic, regional, and/or religious) group dominated the political center to the deliberate exclusion or underrepresentation of another cultural group, (e.g., members of that group were denied access, either completely or proportionately, to top-level positions and/or were deliberately discriminated against in the allocation of government jobs and resources), I coded this variable “1” for the given country-year. By contrast, if I found evidence that ethnic, religious, or regional identities were politically irrelevant; that government control was more or less equally shared among different ethnic groups; that underrepresentation in government was due to economic or demographic factors, not deliberate government policy; or that the government was actively working effectively toward remedying previous dominance, then I coded this variable “0” for the given country-year.

**Economic Interdependence between Potential Combatants**

In the modern Kantian triangle of international peace, economic interdependence signals the material interest potential combatants have in each other, which prevents them from employing violence to settle their disputes. Within the boundaries of a single state and disregarding foreign invasions,
potential combatants in a war are agents of the official government and some subset of the population that is seeking to overthrow the official government or secede from the state. Such violent nonstate actors tend to be relatively small in number; Collier et al. (2003, 55) report that one of the largest rebel organizations active sometime since 1945 has been Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), which in 1984–1985 numbered 20,000 fighters—only 0.1 percent of the Mozambican population in 1985 (World Bank data).

But while rebel organizations tend to be relatively small in number, they are often times highly dependent on support of the local population (Fearon and Laitin 2003). And given the multiplicity of cleavages that are likely to exist in any given country—for example ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, urban/rural, regional, ideological—a government cannot know with certainty in or from which segment of a country’s population a rebel organization may form or obtain support in the future. Therefore, an application of Russett and Oneal’s (2001) theory to the civil context would predict that the larger the proportion of the population that is economically interdependent with the government, the smaller the probability that political conflicts will take the form of civil war.

But what does it mean for the population and the government to be economically interdependent? In simplistic terms, government capacity is a function of the country’s taxable wealth (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and it follows that those who work in government, especially at the top level, therefore have a material interest in the economy’s most productive sectors. A country where the government and the population are economically interdependent is therefore a country where there is close correspondence between the proportion of the population employed in the largest economic sector in terms of labor power and the proportion of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) that is produced by that sector. This notion of domestic economic interdependence is related to dependencia theory’s concept of sectoral heterogeneity, where the returns to factors of production, especially labor, will be much greater in some sectors, such as industry, than in other sectors, such as agriculture (Duvall et al. 1981).

And why might domestic economic interdependence, as I have defined it, reduce the likelihood of civil war? One plausible explanation is the following. Countries where the most productive economic sector tends to employ a relatively small proportion of the population tend to be “enclave economies”: geographically concentrated areas that provide access to primary export products (e.g., minerals, metals, oil, and agriculture from the estates of large corporations), generate much revenue, but require little in terms of labor costs (Leonard and Strauss 2003). Such economies are more prone to
civil war for two, often interrelated, reasons. First, the resource-rich area may seek secession, with claims that independence is necessary to enable the region’s inhabitants to benefit from their region’s resources (cf. Collier et al. 2003, 60–61). A key document of Biafran propaganda during the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970 illustrates this point: “The masses of Africa must rise and recover that which belongs to them. They must assume control of all the products of their own soil because whatever is contained in a piece of land is a part of it, and if a country belongs to a people, the people and not foreign oil companies should be the masters of their land” (Anyaogu 1967, 13). Second, these economies’ high asset specificity renders predation feasible, which in turn not only enables rebel organizations to survive (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2002), but also permits the government to participate in the civil war. In the words of Leonard and Strauss (2003, 66), “Long-standing conflicts inevitably take a toll on society. If a rebel group’s or government’s revenue depends on the overall economic productivity of a population, then over time, the social costs of war decrease the feasibility of its prosecution.”

To test this proposition, I have created for each country a yearly continuous variable called Labor-wealth gap, which is the percent of workforce employed in the largest economic sector in terms of labor power minus the percentage of GDP produced by this sector. To construct this variable, I used data on the economically active population in three sectors (agriculture, industry, and services) and the total number of people in the labor force from the International Labor Organization (available from the United Nations Statistics Division Common Database) and data on each sector’s value-added as percent of GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

**Institutionalized Constraints to the Use of Force**

International organizations are the third point in the neo-Kantian triangle of international peace and the underlying reason why they contribute to international peace is that by coercing or restraining those that use aggression and providing forums for nonviolent dispute resolution, they are institutionalized constraints to the use of force. Similar constraints can exist at the domestic level: just as a state with a grievance against another state can bring its case to the International Court of Justice, in countries with an independent judiciary nonstate actors can bring grievances against the government to the courts. There, nonstate actors can not only resolve these disputes nonviolently, but also potentially hold the government accountable for transgressions of the law. As such, independent judiciaries are a
form of institutionalized constraints to the use of force, the basis of which is the rule of law: the exercise of government authority in accordance with written laws that were adopted through an established procedure.

In addition to providing for an independent judiciary, rule of law—in its most complete form—also sets guidelines, based on human rights criteria, in regard to proper coercive actions by the state. In the context of civil conflict, repression—“any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100)—is a means by which governments seek to preserve civil peace. Given that civil war essentially results from a government’s failure to repress potential violent challengers, repression would seem to be an effective conflict prevention strategy. There is in fact some evidence that civil violence may be kept from escalating through selective forms of repression, such as the detention of a rebel group’s leader, particularly in cases like the Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood’s rebellion in the 1990s where the goal of the violence was the leader’s ascent to power (Zinn 2005).

At the same time, however, it is also very likely that repression stimulates nonviolent opposition organizations to adopt violent tactics, which in turn often escalates the conflict to the level of civil war (Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1987; Tarrow 1998). Multiple rebel organizations, such as the Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia (Jalata 1993) and the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance in Senegal (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005), have evolved from nonviolent organizations as a direct result, respectively, of the revocation of legal status and violence against nonviolent protesters. And this conflict-inducing effect of repression appears to be a recurring trend, especially in cases where repression consists of the abrogation of a previously granted right, such as regional autonomy (Sambanis and Zinn 2005).

Since regimes governed by the rule of law face institutionalized constraints to the use of force, they would seem more likely to allow nonviolent opposition organizations to operate and also to follow human rights standards in their counterinsurgency measures. As a result, in countries with high degrees of the rule of law, conflict escalation to the level of civil war ought to be less likely and all else being equal, these countries should be more likely to be at peace. To test this proposition, I will include Rule of law, the legal system and property rights indicator in the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report (Gwartney and Lawson 2004), in a model of civil peace.

**Empirical Analysis**

In the preceding sections of this chapter I have argued that that the political and economic practices underlying Russett and Oneal’s (2001) modern
appropriation of Kant’s prescription for perpetual peace—representative government, economic interdependence between potential adversaries in a violent conflict, and institutionalized constraints to the use of force—would contribute to the development of civil peace. I have operationalized these practices with numerical variables and to see whether Cultural group political dominance, Labor-wealth gap, and Rule of law are predictors of civil peace, I now add these variables to a statistical model of the prevalence of civil peace that includes, as controls, factors that previous studies (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004b) have found to be significant correlates of civil war and which should therefore have the opposite effect on civil peace.

These factors are: Economic growth, measured by the annual rate of growth of per-capita income; Level of development, measured by real per-capita income; Mountainous terrain, measured as the percentage of a country that is mountainous; Population size, measured as the country’s population; and Resource dependence, measured by a dummy variable indicating country-years in which oil exports exceeded 30 percent of GDP. My dependent variable, Civil peace, is coded one for each country-year in which there was no civil war according to Sambanis (2004b). I cluster same country observations as they may not be independent of one another and control for time dependence (Beck et al. 1998) with a dummy variable indicating whether the previous country-year was at peace (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2003). My data sample of 170 countries contains 4,575 nonmissing country-year observations and 3,830 country-years of civil peace. All variables have annual frequency from 1970–1999.

Table 9.1 presents the results of logistic regression analyses. Model 1.1 estimates the probability of civil peace in democratic countries, as measured by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004). In this statistically significant model exhibiting a good fit with the data, each component of the triangle of civil peace appears to be a statistically significant predictor of civil peace: as expected, Cultural group political dominance and Labor-wealth gap decrease the likelihood of civil peace while Rule of law raises it. And some of these variables’ effects are substantial: a one unit increase in the level of Rule of law, a measure for institutionalized constraints for the use of force, makes a country 81 percent more likely to be at peace at any given year, while countries with Cultural group political dominance, which translates into less representative governments, are about 92 percent less likely to be at peace in any given year. In addition, a one unit increase in the Labor-wealth gap, a measure of the lack of economic interdependence between potential adversaries in a civil war, makes a country about 4 percent less likely to be at peace in any given year. With regard to the statistically significant control variables, Economic
growth, Level of development, Population size, and Mountainous terrain decrease the likelihood of civil peace, though the effects of only the latter two variables are consistent with expectations. The negative coefficient for Level of development in a model of civil peace is especially surprising because this variable has consistently been a negative predictor of civil war (Sambanis 2004b), but given that the United Kingdom has been the only country to experience civil war as a high-income democratic country, it is likely that observations for the long civil war in Northern Ireland are driving the result. So in model 1.2, I exclude the United Kingdom and reestimate the probability of civil peace in democracies. While the coefficients of all other variables change only slightly, the coefficient of Level of development becomes positive and largely insignificant.
By contrast, in model 1.3, which estimates the probability of civil peace in dictatorships and is also statistically significant, Cultural group political dominance and Labor-wealth gap have positive coefficients and are completely insignificant, while Rule of law’s coefficient has the predicted sign but is also completely insignificant. The only significant predictors of civil peace in dictatorships appear to be Economic growth and Level of development, which exhibit the expected positive relationship with civil peace.

From these statistical models it appears that democracies and dictatorships do indeed face different risk factors for civil war. The most striking difference involves Level of development, which has been such a robust predictor of civil war onset that some have viewed low levels of income as a necessary condition for civil war (cf. Sambanis 2004c). Unsurprisingly, richer dictatorships appear to be more likely to be at peace than poorer dictatorships, presumably because greater state capacity permits the state to be more repressive and thus prevent the escalation of nascent insurgencies (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80). But in the case of democracies, it appears that peace can be substantially achieved by cultural, economic, and political (rule of law) justice, even when the state does not have a lot of resources for police and military power. This finding points to a promising area for future research because it suggests that there may be two pathways to civil peace, one repressive and the other justice-oriented, with dictatorships more likely to follow the former pathway and democracies more likely to follow the latter.

**Conclusion**

Civil wars are by far the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the world today and countries with first-hand experience of civil war are also frequently involved in interstate wars. In this chapter, I crossed the boundaries of international relations and comparative political to argue that this correlation between internal and external peace is not coincidental, but rather a product of recurring inhibitors to violent conflict operating at different levels of analysis. In a statistical analysis of 170 countries from 1970 to 1999 I found that measures for the political and economic practices underlying Russett and Oneal’s (2001) modern appropriation of Kant’s prescription for perpetual peace—representative government, economic interdependence between potential adversaries in a violent conflict, and institutionalized constraints to the use of force—significantly increase the likelihood of civil peace in democratic countries. While these results should be viewed as only the beginning of a deeper exploration of the comparative causes of
international and civil peace, they are nevertheless evidence of the valuable insights that can be gained by crossing disciplinary boundaries.

**Notes**

1. Although some have argued that regimes with mixed authoritarian and democratic institutions (i.e., “anocratic”) are also more prone to civil war, there is evidence that mixed institutions per se do not increase the risk of civil war. However, countries undergoing the process of democratization do appear to be more prone to civil war (Zinn 2004).

2. Following Zinn (2004), democratization is when an autocratic regime announces that it will hold multiparty elections in the near future and takes concrete steps in preparation for those elections, e.g., registering political parties, registering voters, convening a constitutional congress. A period of democratization lasts from when preparation is begun to when multiparty elections for the same office are repeated or the process is stopped (e.g., there is a coup, the elected head of state becomes a dictator, or the regime cancels upcoming elections). Once a regime begins to hold regularized elections, it is beginning to consolidate democratic governance and thus the process of democratization is complete. Specifically, the coding for democratization ends either the year in which the repeat elections were held or the year before the return to authoritarian rule. The measures for democracy and dictatorship are from Cheibub and Gandhi (2004).

3. I have chosen to code a binary measure of cultural group political dominance, rather than a graded measure, because the latter would be more prone to measurement error. In a graded measure of cultural group political dominance, the cutoff points between “gradients” of dominance would have to be arbitrary given that dominance either exists or does not exist, and it is not easily quantifiable. For example, the number of legislative seats a dominated group possesses may not make a difference in preventing violence if members of that group face no peaceful prospects for ascending to the top of government authority.

4. This indicator ranges from 1.1 to 9.3, with higher values indicating a higher degree of the rule of law.

5. I proxy Resource dependence with oil exports, rather than primary commodity exports (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2002) because the latter proxy has been shown to be “a very distant measure of resource dependence” (Sambanis 2004a, 265). The measures for Economic growth, Level of development, and Population size are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (from the Sambanis 2004 dataset). Resource dependence is from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Mountainous terrain is from both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002). I do not include an indicator for anocracy because it is conceptually and methodologically problematic (Zinn 2004); instability because the common measure using the Polity
scale also is affected by endogenity (Zinn 2004); and new states because it drops out of the analysis, given the sample’s time span.

6. This result cannot be due to multicollinearity because none of the right-hand-side variables are highly correlated.

7. I thank Bruce Russett for this insight.
CHAPTER 10

CONSTRAINTS AND DETERMINANTS: STRUCTURE, PURPOSE, AND PROCESS IN THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Arthur A. Stein

The study of international relations has historically been extraordinarily interdisciplinary and in many ways the least insular subfield in the social sciences. Scholars have drawn models from all of the other social science disciplines and from all of the other subfields of political science, the traditional home of the subfield. In the same vein, the work of scholars whose primary intellectual home is in other fields has been recognized and adopted as one’s own by the field.

The very diversity of the social sciences is thus reproduced within the subfield. There are a myriad of analytic approaches within the subfield, ranging from reducing international politics to the personalities of political leaders to assessing the international system as a system and without concern for its constituent components. And so even within the subfield, there is a choice between analytic insularity and crossing boundaries. Crossing boundaries requires some sense of when and how to integrate perspectives. This chapter argues that combining perspectives begins with understanding the differences between constraints and determinants.
International Systems are Constraints not Determinants

The international system generates constraints that operate on the behavior of all states. But unless the constraints are so narrow as to force a specific choice, systemic factors circumscribe a set of possibilities rather than determine a specific one. In such cases, the international system cannot be used fully to explain foreign policy.¹

Systemic theories of international politics represent arguments of constraint rather than determination. Yet confusion about causation leads to the scholarly use of ambiguous terms such as context and factor. Such terms are used to obfuscate; to make it possible for theorists to propose the importance of certain variables without precisely specifying their causal role. Thus, for example, the anarchic state system is described as setting the context within which states interact. Given this anarchic environment, states must be self-reliant in order to survive. Yet international systems theory can only vaguely delineate the resulting patterns of state behavior and can offer no specific deduction about it.

Theories of international politics are rarely delimiting. Even the venerable balance of power theory provides no specific prediction. States can respond to imbalances either by mobilization or by alliance. Realism determines no specific response or any specific balance (Zinnes 1967; Stein 2001). Further, both strategies of containment and war are explained by appeal to balance of power arguments (Stein 2006). Moreover, there is an array of state strategies beyond merely those of deterrence by oneself or with allies. States do not immediately respond to changes in power, or even to threats, with deterrence but rather adopt an array of strategies, including ingratiation (Healy and Stein 1973), appeasement (Kennedy 1976), conciliation (Luard 1967), and ultimately deterrence.²

Further, more narrowly focused strategic decisions are also not readily explainable by international factors. Whether to match an adversary’s forces or offset them in other ways represents a choice. In the postwar era, the need to make this kind of decision has generated both debate and actual shifts in strategic doctrine. At times, the United States has committed itself to deploy forces to respond in kind. Most often, the United States has developed an escalatory strategy, and relied either on horizontal escalation (responding somewhere other than the point of attack) or vertical escalation (relying on nuclear escalation to deter conventional attack).³

Although systems theorists argue that balancing behavior by threatened states is the invariant reaction to a potential threat, it is analytically and empirically clear that this is not readily and typically true. Although, the
system drives behavior, it does not uniquely determine one specific behavioral outcome. There exist a set of behavioral responses all consistent with the causal condition.

**Constraints as Incomplete Explanations**

Theories of constraints rather than determinants take us only part of the way toward a theory of behavior. To know that elephants cannot fly, for example, is important, but it indicates at best a partial theory of elephant behavior. The only derivable predictions are negative ones. Elephants will not be seen to fly. Any other theory from which we can deduce that elephants can fly is necessarily held suspect. Yet enormous ranges of elephant behavior are consistent with the constraint that they cannot fly.

Constraints are negative influences, not positive ones. They rule out possibilities. Take, for example, the situation in which a nation such as Russia confronts reduced hard currency revenues because of falling oil prices. This circumstance obviously requires a behavioral response, and it constrains that response to be within a certain range. The Russians must either reduce their purchases from the West to the level of the reduced earnings, increase oil or other exports to make up the shortfall in order to sustain their level of foreign purchases, or borrow and accept a higher level of foreign indebtedness so as to sustain foreign purchases. They could also respond with a mix—some reduction in purchases along with increases in both exports and indebtedness. But objective conditions do not determine the exact policy mix, they only constrain the policy to fall within some limited policy space. Indeed, Russian behavior will fall in this constraint space regardless of Russian perceptions and calculations. If the Russians do not recognize the new circumstances and follow their original purchasing plans, they will discover that they are short of cash. They will either have to do without or find some way to pay for or finance the purchases they want. What and how much they know may affect their chosen response, however. Awareness of the dilemma could lead them, for example, to cut back on purchases of nonessentials while maintaining expected food purchases. Unaware, they might end up purchasing nonessentials first, only to discover later that they must buy less food. But their behavior will necessarily fall within the set of constrained possibilities whether they recognize the constraints or not.

Constraints set boundaries for the possible rather than compel the actual. They exclude behavioral responses. In effect, they state “if x, then not y,” or “if x, then some range of y.” They do not state “if x, then y.” They are quite precise in what they exclude. Elephants cannot fly. But an extensive range of behavior can be consistent with the constraints.
Constraints upon behavior can vary. Some are quite confining and can, in fact, lead to specific predictions. The international economic behavior of small countries provides one example. Small states are typically described as price takers who have no choice but to accept the prices determined by international market forces. The constraints are quite specific. In addition, environmental conditions may allow a country to produce only certain crops, and global market conditions impose tight and specific constraints. The market, in effect, determines the price because the constraint is a pinpoint one.

The nature and degree of specificity of the constraint posed by any system and the actors on which it operates are all-important issues. In most circumstances, the international system constrains small powers more than great ones; in some, it may constrain great powers more. The question is which states have more room to maneuver under what circumstances. The irony is that the field has ignored as uninteresting the very states that are most constrained by the system, namely small states. International systems and international structure theorists have focused on the very states least constrained by the system, great powers. In either case, maneuvering room is one way to describe the range and specificity of the constraint space.

The specificity of constraints can be related to the nature of the actor and the peculiarities of timing. For example, without technological intervention, women can bear children only between certain ages. Thus, we cannot know how many children a 30-year old woman will have during the years she remains fertile. We can only predict a maximum number given knowledge about the length of gestation and the possibility of multiple births. On the other hand, we can predict with certainty that a postmenopausal woman will bear no more children. In one instance the prediction is precise; in the other it involves a substantial range. For the younger woman, knowledge of her predispositions can lead us to make more specific predictions. If she does not want children, she will probably have none; if she has two and wants three, she will probably have one more. On the other hand, the prediction about the postmenopausal woman is precise and independent of her preferences. She may want another child, or she may not, but she will not give birth to one. The biological constraint generates specific negative predictions in one case, but it is consistent with a range of positive predictions in the other.

**Implications of the Constraints-Determinants Distinction**

The distinction between constraints and determinants has important substantive implications. Ironically, for example, international relations
theorists argue both that the international system constrains all powers and that great powers determine the nature of the international system. International political economists, for example, argue that because hegemonic powers find free trade to be in their interest, they create a liberal international economic order. Implicit in this argument is that the structure of the system generates an imperative for the hegemonic power. At the same time, however, the argument also has the hegemonic power creating an international order in its own image, an order that reflects its worldview and its interests. The system is thus both something outside the great power and something created by it.

The distinction between constraints and determinants is important in assessing the bases of foreign policy. The most common analysis, for example, of Soviet foreign policy argues that the Soviet Union’s relative growth in power made it a less revolutionary and more conservative power in which the role of ideology waned. Yet in the early decades of its existence, the Soviet Union was beset by enemies and constantly struggled to insure its survival. In its early years, the Soviet Union was more constrained by the international system. Its range of options was quite limited. Soviet ideology had little to do with Soviet foreign policy because Soviet decision makers had few options to choose from. They may have used ideology to rationalize actions for which they had little alternative. Ideology may have helped to sustain the faith in trying times, but it played a minor role in determining policy in an era in which the USSR was constrained by other powers.

Asceticism may be central to explaining why a rich man eats beans, but is largely peripheral to explaining why a poor man does so. A poor man has little choice among foods. His asceticism may rationalize his choice, but it is the condition of limited alternatives that constraints his dietary practices. A rich man, on the other hand, can choose from an unconstrained array of possibilities. That such a man chooses to eat beans would have to be almost entirely attributable to his asceticism. The relative explanatory role of such an ideology (indeed, its status as explanation or rationalization) is related to the constraints operating on the decision maker.

The Soviet Union’s evolution into a great power implied that it had a much wider range to maneuver. The latitude for Soviet policy making became greater in that the international system, especially as the actions of other states constrained the Soviets less. These lessened constraints increased the potential role of ideology. Ideology could play a more important role precisely because there was a choice.

Yet Sovietologists argued that there was a secular decline in the role of ideology and offered as evidence the existence of extensive disagreement at
the highest levels of the Soviet elite. Yet it is hardly surprising that a world in which the Soviet Union had more choices led to disagreements among Soviet leaders. Elite consensus should be most expected when environmental conditions are overwhelming; its existence should not be attributed to ideology. Similarly, elite disagreement should not be surprising in an ambiguous world with many options and choices.

**Domestic Factors as Constraints and Determinants**

The distinction between constraints and determinants also applies to the impact of various domestic factors on foreign policy. Sometimes they act as constraints. The level of economic development, for example, limits the size and scope of the state and the military. Just as the planet has a fixed carrying capacity given extant technology at any point in time, so do nations have fixed capacities for sustaining military establishments. Yet these act as constraints, not as determinants. Similarly, a nation whose population is large enough to provide three million soldiers may choose to maintain only a half-million. The demographic constraint tells us only that it cannot create a military exceeding three million. As pointed out in every intelligence debate, estimates of what another country can do are not the same as estimates of what they will do. Again, such factors operate as constraints, not as determinants. They do not impel behavior, they limit it.

Indeed, intelligence analysts often distinguish between capabilities and intentions. Nations do not always choose to do what they are capable of doing. Implicit in this distinction is that there are material constraints which set the upper boundary on the possible. Yet these do not determine what will actually happen. A range of outcomes is possible, and thus, a knowledge of intentions is necessary to predict which will occur (Freedman 1977; Prados 1982).

Domestic factors can also act as determinants. An example of an imperative comes from North’s (1977) argument that states with large populations and a high level of technology but low access to resources must expand abroad. If such societies cannot trade freely to maintain their high levels of industrial production, they will become militaristic and expansionist. In this argument, a system constrains state options by not allowing free trade as a possibility; domestic forces and characteristics impel state behavior. The combination of the systemic constraint and the domestic imperative generates a precise prediction.

Domestic factors act as contextual forces in much the same way as international-systemic ones. National characteristics such as demography,
economy, and natural resource endowments all generate constraints and opportunities. Some of these are so constraining that they effectively become determinants.

**When Structure Only Constrains Turn to Decision Making**

Structural factors, whether domestic or international, sometimes determine and sometimes only constrain. When they serve only to constrain, they are causally incomplete; they act as necessary, but not as sufficient, conditions (Goertz and Starr 2003). In such cases, scholars in the social sciences turn to decision-making explanations.

Structural explanations are straightforward conjunctions of antecedent conditions and consequent outcomes that do not depend on assessments of human cognition. Conditions explain outcomes without the intervention of human calculation. They do not depend on individual beliefs or perceptions. An example of such an explanation would be the statement that countries without a feudal tradition developed neither a strong right wing nor a strong socialist labor movement. One can lay out a set of intervening steps, but they are epiphenomenal.

Structural explanations can be found at any level of analysis. The antecedent conditions can be systemic, domestic, or can inhere in an individual. The argument that totalitarian states are inherently expansionist is an example of a causal explanation in which the antecedent condition is a domestic political characteristic, that is, the nature of the political system. Such an argument does not depend on any calculations of particular individuals. Another example is the proposition that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones. So is the argument that leaders with a compensatory masculinity problem caused by their having had dominant mothers will be aggressive. Again, the antecedent condition is invariably linked with an outcome, and the intervening argument does not presume to depend on human purpose and calculation. At most, such arguments may depend on some assumption about a general human nature—that all people are concerned with their own survival, for example.5

Juxtaposed against structural explanations are decision-making ones. The latter conceptualize behavioral outcomes as human choices determined by the reasons for which, and the processes by which, decisions are made. Decision-making explanations fill the explanatory gap left by the indeterminacy of structural factors. When context does not impel, human choice takes center stage. Thus, crossing boundaries to include decision-making explanations becomes necessary (cf. Lukes 1977).
**Decision Making as Purpose**

The most basic decision-making explanations are purposive ones. Human behavior is goal-oriented, chosen for a reason. Goals, objectives, purposes, and interests explain behavior. Behavior is a function of purposive calculated human choice. Actors’ perceived interests matter. The alternatives actors think important and the calculations they make also matter. Thus, knowledge of aims and the nature of calculation become critical to explaining chosen behaviors. Explanation necessarily depends on the goals actors have and the nature of the calculations that they make. Indeed, such models are often described as rational actor explanations.

Purposive explanations are the staple of the field of foreign policy analysis, indeed, of all policy analysis. Foreign policy is seen as a product of decisions, and explaining the decision is considered equivalent to explaining the behavior. Since policy is nothing more than purposive corporate behavior, it cannot be explained without reference to the goals of either the individuals making the decisions or the corporate entity under discussion.

Whereas a purposive explanation treats an actor’s choice as the central issue, a structural nonpurposive explanation links circumstances and characteristics with behavior and ignores choice by treating it as fixed. An example described above linked an expansionist militaristic foreign policy with a state’s having a large population, a high level of technology, low access to resources, and no ability to trade for its needs. This nondecision-making explanation links the antecedent conditions to the pursuit of an expansionist militaristic foreign policy. A decision-making theorist could retort that such an explanation presumes the interests and choices of individuals. After all, expansionism would not be predicted if people in this country were willing to live with less or reverted to a preindustrial economy or society. In other words, linking antecedent conditions with a behavioral consequence presumes this nation’s people both to be interested in maintaining their structure of production and standard of living and to have recognized, considered, and eventually adopted the militaristic and expansionist options.

The purposive model of explanation has its roots in an individual-as-actor approach, but it is applied to states as well. The behavior of collectivities, whether interest groups, parties, or nation-states, is treated, then, as a mere extension of the individual-level model, and the foreign policies of states can be explained by reference to the goals and interests that they pursue. Indeed, the notion of a national interest has a long and venerable history in the analysis of foreign policy (Rosenau 1968; George and Keohane 1975; Sondermann 1977; Krasner 1978; and Nuechterlein 1978).
Often, purposive explanations are inappropriately equated with the rational actor model, although rational explanations usually entail more stringent assumptions than just the existence of purposive behavior. To say that an actor is rational is to say that an actor has a fixed hierarchy of values and interests, that all possible alternatives are assessed, that the expected utility of every alternative is calculated, and that the actor chooses the best option.

Indeed, the full-blown assumptions of rationality are often used to avoid analyzing goals, purposes, and calculations and so to transform purposive explanations into structural ones. Economists, for example, posit that firms are profit maximizers. They thus stipulate an invariant goal, assume that firms have full information and assess all alternative means of reaching the goal, and posit that firms maximize expected profits. Because economists take the intervening steps of decision making as given, they conjoin antecedent conditions with behavioral outcomes. The result is a structural explanation that involves intervening purposive steps, which remain unanalyzed, unstudied, and untested. Changes in environmental conditions are used to explain changes in behavior. Systemic explanations of state behavior that posit an invariant national interest are also of this character. The proposition that great powers fill power vacuums is an example of such a structural explanation. The antecedent condition of a power vacuum is invariably linked to a behavioral outcome. The assumed intervening step is that all states are power maximizers.

Truly purposive explanations necessarily presume that the intervening steps of choosing are crucial, determinative, and not invariant. Specific purposes and the nature of calculations matter. Not all actors are assumed to use the same decision criteria or to have the same value hierarchy with identical weights. Actors are assumed to respond differently to similar circumstances. Thus, policy analysis entails a more detailed view in which individual actors and their assessments matter. A microeconomist makes certain behavioral assumptions and deduces price from market supply and demand. An institutional economist, on the other hand, looks at individual firms to explain why some airlines responded to deregulation by expanding and others trimmed their operations as they confronted the same environment. Although the individual conditions of the airlines varied, this did not adequately explain the range of behavioral responses. To explain the corporate policies of specific airlines involved more than a specification of their conditions and circumstances; it also required an analysis of corporate goals and calculations. Such differences characterize the disjuncture between the general theory of microeconomics and the institutional specifics taught in business schools, and such differences also distinguish the general international relations theorist from the country specialist.
Purposive explanations include goals and calculations as important intervening steps. In the language developed earlier, the environmental conditions are not thought to be so constraining as invariably to generate outcomes that make an analysis of the intervening steps unnecessary. Purposive explanations necessarily presume that the intervening steps of calculation are determinative and essential. Policy analysis begins in precisely this way. A knowledge of objectives is as essential as a knowledge of underlying conditions. This is true whether the actor is an individual or a nation-state. The rational actor variant of purposive explanation has come under attack and a variety of alternatives have been offered (Stein 1999). Critics of rational actor explanations point out that the stringent requirements for full-blown rationality rarely occur in the real world. In most circumstances, for example, it is impossible to maximize, because it is impossible to analyze every conceivable option.9

Yet many of the proffered alternatives to rational explanation merely weaken some of the assumptions while retaining the essential one of purposive calculated behavior. It is easy, for example, to demonstrate that not all individuals maximize expected utility. There are a variety of decision criteria available to individuals (Stein 1990). People may simply choose to maximize gain, or maximize minimum gain, without calculating odds (Hamburger 1979, 46–47). Or individuals may not analyze every option. No one about to purchase a house looks at every house on the market but hones in on a particular subset. A decision to buy a house may then not be rational; but it is purposive. Further, if not every option is analyzed, then individuals do not maximize. After all, one can only choose the very best if one looks at every option. A person who looks at 60 houses on the market and finally chooses one may be choosing the best of the 60 seen, but this may not be the best on the entire market. Such a person chooses to stop searching and to accept the best item he or she has come across. Such an alternative model of decision making, dubbed satisficing by Herbert Simon, is still purposive and calculating. It is driven by the values and interests of an actor who compares alternatives with an eye to achieving a set of goals. The standard of total rationality may not be met, but the behavior is purposive and can only be explained by reference to goals, and exemplifies bounded rationality.10

Decision Making as Process

As theorists focusing on the processes by which decisions are made have attacked the purposive model of explanation, a process-based model of decision making has also become prominent (Brule and Mintz, chapter 8,
this volume). First, studies by cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that however purposive and calculating individuals may be, cognitive processes do not resemble a straightforward model of rational decision making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981; Abelson 1976; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1977; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Schoemaker 1982; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983). Second, studies of organizations have demonstrated that the application of a purposive model of explanation to an aggregate entity is highly problematic. Organizations are made up of competing subunits and groups of individuals with competing interests and assessments such that the final outcome cannot be said to reflect the interests of any organization, subunit, or individual. Rather, the outcome reflects the process by which decisions are made. Just as alternative cognitive processes can generate different choices by an individual in a particular situation, so different organizational processes and procedures can generate different outcomes as well.11

Hence, decision-making studies have come to concentrate on process as well as purpose. In part, the importance of process derives from the foregoing observations about constraints on rationality. After all, if an individual cannot see every house on the market in order to choose the one that maximizes his or her underlying objectives, then explaining the choice of a specific house requires knowledge not only of the goals and the available alternatives but of the order in which the alternatives are assessed and the criteria by which the search is stopped. The incremental model of decision making, for example, argues that policies are assessed sequentially, beginning with those closest to past behavior (Lindblom 1959; Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963). By conjoining the incremental model with the satisficing one, we can conclude that the alternatives closest to those pursued in the past are compared and at some point a minimally acceptable threshold is crossed and the search stops. They are path-dependent and context-dependent arguments of decision making. The choice is explained, then, by the goals, by the procedure for analyzing a subset of possible alternatives, and by the minimally acceptable threshold. In other words, some knowledge of the process of decision making is required along with a knowledge of the purpose. Decision-making studies are thus adjuncts to a purposive model of explanation—not an alternative. They emphasize the causal importance of procedure, but they do not deny the role of purpose.

Studies of decision making are often justly criticized as being descriptive adjuncts to other explanations rather than alternatives to them. They specify the contents of the black box between conditions and behavior, but they are not explanatory. Decision-making studies detail the process by which decisions are made: where the idea originated, who talked to whom,
what groups or governmental agencies took part, and the nature and course of debate and discussion. All of this information clearly describes what happened in a minute and detailed fashion.

For structuralists, the detail provided in studies of decision making is relegated to a black box whose internal workings need not be detailed. If, for example, all hegemonic powers pursue free trade because it is in their interest to do so, then why is it important to know what committees met, who gave testimony, what proposals were considered, or the exact order of votes and decisions that ultimately resulted in the liberal trade policy. Filling in the black box may be descriptively interesting, but it is explanatorily unnecessary.

For the process of decision making to have a causal role, it must be the case that such processes intervene in a meaningful way between conditions and outcomes. Indeed, the analysis of decision making must be justified on the grounds that it matters. And if it matters, then, all other things being equal, different processes of decision making will generate different outcomes. That is, the same actor confronting the same situation would choose differently depending on the decision-making process. If environmental constraints or determinants (whether international systemic or domestic) are seen as so overwhelming and determinative as to force a particular choice, then the process of decision making that intervenes between context and behavior (between stimulus and response) is epiphenomenal—not causal. To argue that decision-making matters is to argue that contextual factors are ambiguous enough to allow a range of potential responses (Most and Starr 1989). Further, even a knowledge of objectives and options leaves enough ambiguity so that even a purposive model is incomplete, and thus, one can argue that the specific response is determined by the process of arriving at a decision. Ceteris paribus, different procedures can generate different outcomes.

Many studies of decision making do not meet this stringent requirement of causality. Indeed, they do no more than provide a description of the intervening black box without providing an alternative explanation for behavior. Some, for example, do no more than describe the set of governmental actors involved in a decision, and in so disaggregating the state they add a dimension of subtlety by including a consideration of interests other than just the national interest. Thus, Allison (1971), in his study of the Cuban missile crisis, examines the explanation for American policy that comes from treating the United States as a unitary actor and determining its interests and preferences. He then argues that within the United States a number of organizations and bureaucracies disagreed. Yet he provides no alternative explanation for American behavior. Indeed, his explanation
depends not on process, but on purpose. What he does do is sensitize his readers to the fact that the process of making and, more importantly, implementing a decision included parties with different views. He points out that individuals representing a bureaucracy have personal and organizational interests as well as make their own assessments of the national interest. In the end, therefore, his proffered alternative explanation also turns out to be a purposive one not at all different from that obtained by treating the United States as a unitary actor.12

Process arguments also emphasize that governmental decisions are products of internal interaction. Procedure matters not only because of the way in which alternatives are analyzed, but because corporate decisions are products of interactions among individuals and various agencies of government. The house chosen by a couple will depend not only on their individual objectives and assessments and the way in which the realtor organizes the course of their search, but also on the interaction between the couple and how they resolve their disagreements. The end result, the house they choose, can reflect the realtor’s list and the couples’ debate and neither of their individual preferences. Corporate decisions often reflect peculiarities of the decision process—of the debate—such that even the participants cannot retrospectively reconstruct a preference hierarchy or a consistent set of assessments that would logically result in the course of action adopted. This is especially true of complex decisions that involve compromise. Omnibus congressional bills often reflect this. No single purposive logic explains a bill that includes both tobacco farm subsidies and funds for an antismoking campaign. Political decisions that involve such compromises and concatenate diverse characteristics are neither fish nor fowl.

No consistent hierarchy of objectives explains such outcomes, for no individual actor would have chosen them. Rather, they reflect the compromises of different actors with different goals and assessments. The nature of the political process is conjoined with the objectives of the set of decision makers to explain the actual decision. A knowledge of the players, their objectives, and the likely tradeoffs are all required to explain and predict. The inclusion or exclusion of a set of actors can be the essential component explaining shifts and changes.13 Anyone who has witnessed academic politics can attest to the importance of a shift in the cast of characters. The departure or arrival of a colleague can be critical to what decisions are made. Much the same is true of the White House staff and used to be true of the Soviet Politburo, and this is why such personnel changes are often so carefully analyzed.

Viewing decisions as products of the interaction of purposive actors leads to a recognition of the importance of process. Outcome reflects the
procedure by which individual preferences are aggregated to generate the social choice, the preference of the collectivity. Studies of voting mechanisms and their implications make it very clear that different voting schemes can carry immensely different consequences. All other things being equal, the same underlying preferences of individuals will result in different group policies in a winner-take-all electoral system than a system of proportional representation. Indeed, even using a single voting rule does not guarantee an outcome immune to issues of procedure. This is one straightforward implication of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which shows that the use of majority rule to generate a social choice from the set of individual preferences does not necessarily culminate in a unique outcome unaffected by process (Arrow 1963). Indeed, a possible result is that of cyclical majorities in which any alternative can emerge as the social choice depending on the agenda—the order in which alternatives are voted upon. The implications of Arrow’s work have led to an immense concern with agenda setting. After all, one conclusion to be drawn from Arrow’s work is that the aggregate choice of a collectivity using majority rule can be independent of the underlying preferences of individuals, for the agenda determines the outcome.

The existence of a variety of mechanisms by which individual preferences can be combined to arrive at a collective choice, and the fact that even the use of any individual mechanism may still not result in a unique outcome but can be affected by the agenda, reinforce the emphasis on studying the process by which decisions are made. As long as no individual is solely responsible for choosing, and there is no consensus, the process can be determinative.

Environmental Ambiguity and Decision Making

Decision-making variables have the greatest impact when the environment is ambiguous enough to generate alternative interpretations, diverse assessments, and different recommendations. One did not need to know much about the United States and its internal politics and procedures to predict its response to Pearl Harbor. One had no need to know the personality and background of the president or the internal alignment of political forces. Only when environmental conditions generate scope and leeway, when they create constraints and opportunities rather than imperatives, does a study of decision-making matter. Thus, an emphasis on process involves the underlying assumption that conditions and alternatives are so ambiguous or unrestraining that a variety of options exists. Thus, explanation requires a more detailed knowledge of the intervening steps in the process of decision making.
There is an empirical as well as analytic logic to thinking of certain variables as residual determinants operative only when other determinants generate ambiguity. Most factors can be made quite broad and inclusive. Personality, for example, can encompass individual characteristics that are also shared, such as cultural values. Thus, to demonstrate the impact of personality on foreign policy, Etheridge (1978) focuses only on a series of cases marked by intraelite disagreement. Because the international and domestic contexts are constant in each case, he can assess whether variation in policy preference is explained by variation in personality. There is an additional analytic logic to confining the explanatory role of personality to instances of intraelite disagreement. After all, there is no reason to see elite consensus as being explained by personality, since personality varies across individuals.

Not surprisingly, the specificity of detail is often at issue. One did not need to know much about the players or the decision-making process to predict a U.S. declaration of war against Japan in response to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. It is not difficult to explain this event. On the other hand, to predict the specific tactical response of the United States does require more detailed analysis. Once Germany declared war on the United States, America’s leaders had to decide whether to concentrate on the European or Pacific front and where and when to strike. Such tactical responses can rarely be explained merely by reference to antecedent conditions. Even though antecedent conditions can generate both behavioral imperatives and a consensus on the need for action, there typically remains elite disagreement about specifics that are not fully, if at all, determined by the antecedent conditions. Debates among scholars are often about the tactical level of specificity, about what is to be explained, and what is to be predicted.

Foreign policy can be assessed at various levels of abstraction. The explanatory and predictive requirements for foreign and military policy vary. The Germans expected the United States and Great Britain to launch a cross-channel invasion but wanted to know when and where such an attack would come. In other cases, knowledge of an enemy’s intention to launch a surprise attack would in itself be welcome, even without the details of location and timing.15

Another example of degrees of detail in foreign policy analysis is provided by one nation’s assessments of another’s defense policy. It is possible to predict another country’s aggregate defense spending without being able to specify the distribution of those expenditures. The factors that explain the aggregate may not explain the specifics.
Constraints, Determinants, and Attributions

The distinction between constraints and determinants is at the heart of certain debates about foreign policy. As argued above, the wider the latitude of structural constraints, the greater the explanatory importance of decision-making and process variables. Assessing the degree of constraint and the room available for maneuver is empirically problematic, however. Analysts observe antecedent conditions and subsequent outcomes, but cannot directly observe constraints. Thus, only extended comparison makes possible an assessment of the constraint space within which actors operate and within which they see themselves to be operating. Yet such a study invariably confronts the problem of the disjuncture between the respective judgments of the actor and the observer.

Psychologists have demonstrated the different causal attributions made by actors and observers. Actors feel themselves to be constrained, recognize all the factors affecting them, and tend at times to feel almost as if they are being carried along by overwhelming forces. Observers, on the other hand, often attribute the behavior of others not to structural forces but to actor preferences and choices. In other words, observers attribute behavior to actor choices, actors to structural forces (Jones and Nisbett 1972; Jones 1976; see also Kelley and Michela 1980 as well as Harvey and Weary 1984).

The disjuncture between actor and observer and its implications for foreign policy analysis is perhaps greatest where the object of analysis is the foreign policy of a rival. Indeed, the overlay of affect that necessarily existed in the United States among analysts of Soviet foreign policy made it inherently very difficult for them to study Soviet foreign policy. This was especially true because reconstructing relative causal importance involved an assessment of an inherent unobservable—the room for maneuver in any situation. The practitioners of Sovietology included both Sovietphobes and Sovietphiles. The phobe attributed hostile Soviet behavior to malevolent Soviet preferences. Unambiguously cooperative behavior, on the other hand, was charged instead to structural forces. Sovietphiles, on the other hand, found choice at the root of Soviet cooperation and considered structure to be responsible for Soviet hostility.

The debates among analysts of Soviet foreign policy and the more general scholarly debates about the origins of the cold war both exemplify these tendencies. Those who blamed the cold war on the Soviet Union pointed to its actions and their implications about Soviet interests and preferences as entailing unmitigated and unbridled hostility. Others argued that the Soviets felt encircled and had no choice; the structural conditions they confronted were such that any state would have responded the same way.
In other words, both the basically cooperative and the inherently hostile would have acted identically, since behavior was impelled by structural conditions and did not reflect underlying actor preferences. Those who blamed the cold war on the United States argued that the Americans, rather than the Soviets, had the room to maneuver. In the phrase used by lawyers to assign legal responsibility in accidents, the United States had the last reasonable chance to act before reaching the point of no escape.\textsuperscript{16}

The problem of misattribution changed as the nature of constraints and determinants shifted with the growth of Soviet power and industry. In an era in which the international system constrained Soviet choices, structurally determined behavior was incorrectly attributed to purpose and vice versa. But as constraints lessened, the problem of attribution became that of assessing the roles of purpose and process—and the problem became that of mistaking purposive behavior as a function of process and vice versa.

The relative importance of structure, purpose, and process also determine the importance of understanding another’s point of view. Structural explanations do not depend on the mind set, beliefs, or perceptions of the actors. When goals and calculations are used in a purposive model of explanation, however, and when these cannot be posited, then explanation necessarily requires seeing the world as does the actor whose behavior is to be explained. Structural explanations (and process ones as well) are not only independent of the views of the actor whose behavior is explained; they do not even have to be understood by that actor. Purposive explanations, on the other hand, necessarily resonate with the actor whose behavior is being explained; indeed, they are often synonymous with the actor’s own explanation of behavior.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, for example, a scholar’s assessment of the importance of understanding how others look at the world is related to the relative importance placed upon structure, purpose, and process in determining others’ behavior.

**Implications of a Constraints/Determinants Perspective**

A conceptualization of international politics and foreign policy as the product of constraints and determinants, of structure, purpose, and process, has a number of implications. For example, some scholars argue that the international system must be given some form of causal priority in any analysis of international politics. In this view, one must begin with the system and only then, if at all, proceed to some other level of analysis. But a view of outcomes as a result of constraints generates a different picture. If, for example, international politics is akin to a Venn diagram in which two (or more) circles represent international and domestic factors, and their
conjunction (overlap) determines (explains) state behavior in the international arena, then it is hard to argue that any priority should be given to the systemic level of analysis. The order in which the circles are placed in such a diagram hardly matters for the analysis—there is no a priori reason for starting with one or the other. Indeed, the only basis for arguing that the systemic level is more important would be if it were invariably more constraining, and that analytic case has not been made.

The distinction between constraints and determinants also has important consequences for statistical assessments of relative causal importance. Typically, regression analysis is used to assess the relative importance of causal variables, including the relative importance of international and domestic factors. But constraints and determinants cannot simply be placed in a regression analysis as if they function comparably. The standard regression model presumes that all variables act as determinants; assessments of constraint require alternative specifications.

The debate about the relationship between polarity and war provides an interesting illustration of the implication of the constraint/determinant perspective on rigorous formulation, specification, and empirical estimation. There is a long-standing argument that bipolar worlds are more stable than multipolar ones. Yet the empirical results on the matter are mixed. But the analytic argument is one about constraints: bipolar systems generate tighter constraints on state responses than multipolar ones, and thus produce balances of power more quickly and readily. What this suggests is that the expected mean level of balancing is really the same across systems, but that the variance around that mean is much greater in multipolar worlds than in bipolar worlds. It is not surprising, therefore, that empirical assessments have not generated consistent results—they are based on mean levels of balancing and conceive of systems as determinants rather than constraints.

Important implications also flow from the impact of domestic constraints on a state’s ability to undertake the balancing behavior presumed by realism. States incapable of raising the requisite capability (or of making the commitments to extend deterrence) may also opt for an alternative to deterrence and/or an arms race—appeasement and conciliation. Britain’s response to continental developments in the 1930s, for example, was constrained by domestic and international financial considerations. Appeasement reflected neither the British elite’s admiration of Hitler nor any British misunderstanding of the nature of his intentions, but a financial inability to sustain any alternative national security policy. Britain relied on a policy of short-term appeasement and long-term deterrence—it maintained as strong a national economy as possible in order to confront its
opponent Germany with the prospect of losing a war that included sustained wartime mobilization (Alexandroff and Rosecrance 1977).

Capability and commitment—the two dimensions that underlie the exercise of power—are both subject to domestic constraints. Asymmetric constraints on them generate a set of possibilities beyond that envisioned by realism (Stein 1993). The realist outcome occurs only if changes in both capability and commitment are unconstrained by domestic factors. On the other hand, states do not respond if both dimensions are constrained (see Stein 1993).

**Concluding Reflections**

International politics and the grand strategies of states reflect domestic constraints and imperatives as well as international ones, economic and political as well as military ones. Constraints do not act as determinants if they do not generate unique point solutions. When structural explanations act as constraints, foreign policy analysis crosses boundaries and turns to purpose and process to complete explanation.

Scholarly debate often reflects this logic of constraint and determination. Arguments often posed as rival hypotheses are not necessarily such. Truly competitive arguments must each claim to stipulate determinants. Statistical specification for empirical assessment must similarly reflect the disjuncture between constraints and determinants. Finally, scholars dispute how tight are the constraints imposed by different causal forces. Crossing boundaries and integrating perspectives requires distinguishing constraint from determination.

**Notes**

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1. One should not conclude from this simply that theories of foreign policy differ from theories of international politics. Since the international system constrains foreign policy, the key to combining the impact of the international system with other determinants of foreign policy is to recognize and understand the theoretical implications of the distinction developed below between constraints and determinants.
2. Jervis (1976, ch. 3) sees these responses as emerging from two rival paradigms of international politics. Unfortunately, Waltz delineated the alternative to balancing (whether by oneself or with allies) as bandwagoning (Waltz 1979, 126). This image from American politics is most unfortunate and generates an inappropriate view of what alternatives to balancing constitute. Walt (1987) dichotomizes state alignments as either constituting balancing or bandwagoning, as either aligning with the source of the threat or aligning with others to balance the threat. But those are not the only options states have, and appeasement and conciliation do not constitute aligning with the threat nor do they represent joining the expected winning side. Nevertheless, the appellation has caught on, see, among others, Jervis and Snyder (1991).

3. The first Bush administration was initially developing “competitive strategies” as ways to offset Soviet power while living within tight fiscal constraints.

4. The argument presented here is largely unrelated to the opportunity and willingness approach developed by Starr (1978).

5. The assumption that all states are minimally concerned with maintaining their physical and territorial integrity is necessary, for example, to predict the emergence of a balance of power in an anarchic world.

6. Graham Allison (1971) dubs this model I, or the rational actor paradigm; Steinbruner (1974) calls it the analytic paradigm.

7. Note that economics critically depends on conjoining purpose with constraint. At its most basic, microeconomics recognizes that a budget line acts as a constraint, and knowledge of a budget line is insufficient to determine anyone’s spending mix (unless the available budget is a point, zero). Preference, in the form of an indifference curve, must be combined with a budget constraint (when the budget is greater than zero) in order to explain the specific consumption pattern of any individual.

8. It should be noted that in so far as they stipulate objectives, structural explanations contain a purposive element.

9. Lindblom (1977) calls this “synoptic” decision making and argues that it is impossible even with computerized techniques such as linear programming.

10. There have been attempts to reduce satisficing to an expected utility argument by incorporating a term for the cost of information and decision making (Riker and Ordeshook 1973). Yet this differs from the rational actor model as embodied in maximization models. After all, the maximization model makes it possible to delineate an explanation that is independent of the process of decision making. The same maximal outcome is chosen regardless of process. But bounded rationality arguments that do away with the assumption of maximization can lead to the selection of different choices as a function of the path taken in the course of evaluating alternatives. Unlike unbounded rationality arguments, bounded rationality ones are path dependent and thus depend on process.

12. The bureaucratic politics literature often concentrates on the problem of policy implementation and emphasizes the disjuncture between the policies chosen and those actually implemented, and does not attempt to offer an alternative explanation for the decisions made.

13. Williamson (1974, also see 1979) makes precisely this sort of argument about the origins of World War I.

14. Social-choice theorists emphasize that policies may not reflect a social choice determined by people’s preferences but an outcome determined solely by the particular order in which options are compared. Policies thus reflect strategy or serendipity, but not underlying general interests. Others argue that better policies emerge from the democratic process (Lindblom 1965).

15. Work on strategic surprise typically treats all surprises as equivalent and thus conflates various aspects of the phenomenon. Sometimes the attack is itself a surprise, but sometimes only the timing or location comes as a surprise. Various combinations are, of course, possible. The point is that every event has different facets, and there are different degrees of specificity for any prediction or explanation.

16. Russett (1962) uses accidents as a conceptual scheme for understanding war.

17. This argument is related, but not equivalent, to the anthropological distinction between emic and etic analyses (Harris 1979).
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PART 4

CROSSING BOUNDARIES: FROM ANALYSIS TO POLICY
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Because politics cannot “stop at water’s edge,” even where national security is concerned (Nincic 1992a), the study of foreign relations must reflect configurations of domestic power and preference in which it is embedded. In democratic politics, this demands a grasp of the structures of partisanship that determine the constituencies to which decision makers respond. The foreign policy of any nation is, to some extent, a resultant of the various vectors of interest and preference manifest within it; in the United States, these often are vectors of party preference. Patterns of partisanship, and the mandates they seemed to confer, determine whether a Ronald Reagan—preferring military strength as a basis for policy—or a Jimmy Carter—believing in arms control and human rights—would be at the nation’s helm; whether a John Kennedy—emphasizing the importance of Third World development would chart the course for U.S. policy—or a Richard Nixon—with little interest at the time in developing nations; whether someone like Bill Clinton—largely espousing the positions of Israel’s Labor Party on the Middle East conflict would determine U.S. policy toward that region or a George W. Bush—adopting Likud’s views—and so forth. In between elections, the distribution and intensity of party preferences, within the nation and the legislature, sets the boundaries of politically feasible policies.

Here, we focus on one aspect of U.S. foreign policy—the resort to military coercion in pursuit of national objectives, a matter on which two
observations are pertinent. First, armed force is the form of power in which the United States enjoys its greatest relative advantage—U.S. military strength exceeds that implied by its economic capacity, and America’s edge has increased with its growing dominance of the technology of warfare. A heightened reliance on military force also parallels the apparent decline of U.S. noncoercive (“soft”) power, a decline persuasively documented in various ways (Nye 2004; Holsti 2005). Second, the manner and extent to which military force can be used is largely governed by domestic political considerations, one feature of which is the polarization of national politics along party lines. Not only are Republicans and Democrats, now, numerically balanced, but also the gap between their values and priorities has widened: on many issues, the distribution of national preferences no longer traces a bell-shaped curve, but one which, when viewed through the prism of intensity of feeling, crystallizes into increasingly bipolar political leanings. Few doubt that a partisan divide has defined many facets of American political life in recent years; the question, here, is whether it has also come to characterize attitudes toward the use of force abroad? An answer requires that we cast our analytic gaze across intellectual boundaries, encompassing the intersection of foreign and domestic interests and activities, as well as of national and subnational politics.

Partisan affiliations are, generally acquired early in adulthood and are not easily shed, and, although political party organizations have played a declining operational role in U.S. political life (Bigby 2003, ch. 2) party identification has not: on the one hand, more Americans now are Independents than a few decades ago; on the other hand, the ideational gap between Republicans and Democrats has increased. The partisan divide on foreign affairs, muted during the coldest years of the cold war, widened in the post-Vietnam years. As Ole Holsti (1996, 133) observed, “For two decades, spanning the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations... whatever differences divided the American public on foreign policy issues rarely fell along a cleavage defined by partisan loyalties.” By the 1980s, partisan divisions began crystallizing, encompassing a broad range of domestic and international issues (Layman and Carsey 2002). With regard to foreign policy, polarization was first exhibited at the level of the nation’s political elites, defining voting patterns within the U.S. Congress (Lindsay 2000). It has also come to permeate the body politic in a way conveyed, since the 2000 election, by the country’s division into Red (Republican-voting) and Blue (Democratic-voting) states. Recently, the Pew Research Center for The People and the Press computed composite attitudes scales on 24 questions concerning political and policy issues and 17 involving social and personal attitudes (Pew 2004). An examination of the two trends since 1987 revealed that the partisan gap has
widened during this period, and that it is even greater for political and policy positions than for social and personal attitudes.

Under the circumstances, we ask how partisanship affects the conduct of U.S. foreign policy—particularly its ability to use military means in pursuit of its international objectives. Here, as in other areas, the divide between Republican and Democratic preferences has grown, as revealed in national attitudes toward two wars that, in some respects, have defined the post–World War II history of U.S. armed intervention: the imbroglio in Vietnam and the current entanglement in Iraq. (see Figures 11.1 and 11.2)

Public support for the two wars reveals what one would naturally expect: Democrats and Republicans have been more likely to back wars conducted by presidents of their own party. The former were more supportive of the Vietnam War during the Johnson years; the latter, during the Nixon years. Predictably, Republicans have been more supportive of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and its military aftermath. Although the partisan gap is not new, it has nevertheless increased appreciably: relevant beliefs and values are now more divergent. A 6.2 point average difference separated the two sides’ war support in the Vietnam case, the average partisan difference on Iraq case has been 47.5 points—more than seven times larger than with Vietnam. Americans have long regarded the virtue of military intervention, along with other issues, through partisan lenses, but the gap has widened in recent years.

![Figure 11.1 Vietnam and the Partisan Gap.](image)

**Figure 11.1 Vietnam and the Partisan Gap.**

^a^ Gallup.

^b^ “Do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?”
Since overall support for resort to force is partly predictable on the basis of partisan affiliation, and as support is more polarized now than in previous decades, we ask how the effect is felt. The answer addresses conceptions of international politics and foreign policy: can the conduct of external affairs be insulated from the rough and tumble of domestic politics, and is an objective conception of the national interest feasible (Nincic 1999)? It thus requires a perspective crossing the boundaries between domestic and external affairs. The answer also has practical implications, shedding light on the political conditions that favor support for war and the nation’s ability to persevere in such ventures.

How Party Affiliation Matters

Which of the two leading political parties controls government largely determines the substance of the nation’s foreign policy and the style in which it is conducted; the distribution of partisan feeling sets policy’s permissible parameters. In turn, the impact of party identification on peoples’ preferences flows from the way in which attitudes toward specific policies are determined in the first place. The conviction of many political realists notwithstanding (Lippman 1955b; Kennan 1977; Morgenthau 1985), members of the public form their political opinions on an intelligible, and substantially sensible, basis; one that, while bearing little relation to the

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**Figure 11.2  Iraq and the Partisan Gap.**

*ABC-Washington Post.*

b “Do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting or not?”
full-information rationality envisaged by some political scientists, reflects peoples’ priorities and the nation’s foreign policy challenges. The notion of “low-information rationality” best captures the process. Since Herbert Simon’s pioneering work on the subject (Simon 1957), we recognize that behavior is not related to goals on the basis of an exhaustive evaluation of all courses of action and their probable outcomes, but via cognitive cues and “mini theories” providing seat-of-the-pants decisional guidance (Sniderman et al. 1991; Jervis 1994). These are captured by the concept of cognitive heuristics including such simple mental cues as benchmarks, analogies, the guidance of those we like and respect, and attempts to link specific issues to very simple general principles. Such rules of thumb generally indicate that, even at the individual level, the decisional process is not a random walk. Once statistically aggregated, opinions on politics and policy appear even more coherent and purposeful (Page and Shapiro 1992). Among cognitive heuristics, party identification plays a significant role (Popkin 1991)—not having the specialized information needed to assess the merits of individual policy choices, people often seek guidance from partisan cues, inclining them to believe that a war conducted by a president of shared party affiliation is more deserving of support than one undertaken by a president from the opposition party. Here, the heuristic is one of simple partisan identity. But it is also possible that the cognitive link between party affiliation and attitude toward the use of force is, in a sense, spurious, since both may simply flow from political values and assumptions held at a more general level. Thus, it may not be that a person’s response to some instance of military intervention primarily depends on partisan cues; rather, it may be that a person’s choice of party, as well as likely endorsement of the military tool of foreign policy, would reflect very general personal convictions that provide simple rules for evaluating complex national policies. This implies that differences between Republicans and Democrats flow from the gap between the beliefs representing the core of their respective credos, transcending, in this instance, the issue of which president is conducting the war. Here, the cognitive heuristic is provided by a limited number of core beliefs that determine both a person’s choice of party and attitudes toward various policies. This, nevertheless, often means that information about party affiliation provides clues to attitudes toward military coercion. Let us call this the heuristic of party-related credo.

No matter which heuristic dominates, it should affect how a person interprets several categories of information, each of which can be thought of as a general question, the answer to which is partly determined by party identity and/or credo. These are specified in Eric Larson’s examination of popular backing for military intervention (probably the most comprehensive
study of the subject), in which support is assumed to rest on “a result of
tests or questions that need to be answered collectively by political leaders
and the public.” These questions, grouped into general categories, are:

- Do the benefits seem to be great enough?
- Are the prospects for success good enough?
- Are the actual costs low enough?
- Taken together, does the probable outcome seem (or seem still) to be
  worth the costs? (Larson 1996, xviii)

These are, of course, precisely the questions that classical, full-information
rationality places at the basis of expected-utility calculations, but this is not
how they are conceived here. To begin with, there is no assumption that
individuals have anything approaching a full fund of information on these
issues—this is precisely why they revert to cognitive shortcuts. There is also
no assumption that they seek to optimize some conception of utility; the
modest notion of “satisficing” is far more plausible (Simon 1955). Finally,
there is no assumption that costs, benefits, and expectations of success enter
thinking in the multiplicative form of the calculus assumed by rational
choice/expected-utility theories. It is likely that the process is better cap-
tured by an additive model, where individuals assign the mental equivalent
of a certain number of points to each category and, then, judge whether the
sum meets some satisficing threshold. (In this conception, the range of
thought involved in the decision might not allow the value assigned to any
of the three categories—objectives, costs, expectations of success—to tend
either very close to zero or some infinitely large number).

If judgments regarding the categories by which force is evaluated
are partly predictable by partisan identification, then, as suggested, the
source of the relationship could be twofold. Intervention may seem more
desirable when undertaken by a president of one’s own party, responses to
casualties could be similarly influenced, and even the probability of success
perhaps is shaped in this manner. But it also is possible that Republicans
and Democrats approach these questions with materially different views on
these issues, whether or not force is used by a president they helped elect. It
is possible that, as one political observer crisply put it, “Contemporary
American politics is about worldview” (Lakoff 2002, 3).

Let us examine how party affiliation may predict these attitudes, where
possible, drawing parallels between the situation as it currently appears and
at the period surrounding the Vietnam War. To what degree does a partisan
gap color Americans’ evaluation of objectives requiring the use of force, of
its acceptable costs, and of the prospects that it would be successful? Has the
gap been growing or not, and how have party identification and party-relayed credo shaped relevant perceptions?

**Goals Justifying Military Force**

As in domestic arena, Democrats and Republicans have discrepant conceptions of the ends to which governmental policy should be applied. A first overview of the partisan difference is provided by a survey conducted in 1993, in which respondents were asked whether they would “favor or oppose the use of U.S. military forces given a variety of hypothetical stakes.” The results are presented in table 11.1. (see also table 11.2 for 2002 data)

The differences are not particularly large. Republicans were somewhat more inclined to fight for economic reasons, such as oil; Democrats were more prepared to defend democratic governments. The most pronounced difference involves the specifically humanitarian objective of preventing mass starvation, for which Democrats were much more willing to use force. To some extent, this may reflect the situation in Somalia at the time,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If the United States were under direct military threat</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When one nation is destroying another by killing its people and driving them from their homes</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To guarantee peace and security in an important region of the world</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help prevent large numbers of people from starving to death</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When important economic needs of the United States, such as oil, are at stake</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To guarantee that a democratically elected leader can govern, if that leader is under attack by that country’s military or rebels</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*

*a* Survey conducted by Hart and Teeter Research Companies. Available through the Roper Center.
where U.S. forces had been dispatched to ensure the security of UN food distribution to starving Somalis. However, since the operation had been initiated by President George H. Bush shortly before the presidential transition, the difference may not be grounded in party identity and feelings toward a Democratic president, but a more fundamental difference in priorities, that is, party-related credo. Let us compare these views on objectives justifying war to those expressed more recently, in 2002.

Again a limited set of stakes was put before respondents. Republicans, as before, were more willing to fight for oil, and there is (a now slighter) difference in the two groups’ inclination to act militarily to prevent famine. The greatest gap separates their readiness to take armed action against a terrorist camp, on the one hand, and in support of international law, on the other.

Although this data suggests that Republicans focus more on the direct national interest, while Democrats consider more inclusive international interests—the information provided in these tables is too limited to justify firm conclusions. To place stakes for military action in a wider context of desirable foreign policy goals, let us compare two broadly conceived surveys on these topics, conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations—the first in 1975 (at the very end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam) and 2002 (after the 9/11 attacks and shortly before the invasion of Iraq).

Beginning with 2002, cleavages become apparent when two broad classes of foreign policy goals are compared. The first class involves aims directly related to America’s own specific interests, with no necessary assumption that they are shared by many other members of the international community. Such goals include, for example, maintaining U.S. military

Table 11.2 Goals Justifying Military Force 2002a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure oil supplies</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroy a terrorist camp</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring peace to a region in civil war</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberate hostages</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist population struck by famine</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold international law</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note

a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
supremacy, or the nation’s access to external energy sources. I will refer to these as self-regarding ends. The second class of goals includes those that, by their nature, encompass a substantial part of the international community (e.g., promoting international law, or helping poor nations). These will be termed system-regarding goals, a category similar to what Arnold Wolfers designated as “milieu” goals (Wolfers 1962, 73–75). Table 11.3, organizes these two types of goals into their corresponding categories.

As far as self-regarding aims are concerned, little distinguishes Republicans from Democrats—both accord considerable weight to most of these objectives, despite modest differences on individual goals; in other words, neither group is significantly more committed to the direct national interest than the other. It is with system-regarding goals that differences emerge more clearly, Democrats displaying a much firmer commitment to ends that major segments of the international system could identify with. Thus, significantly more Democrats than Republicans place a high priority on reducing world hunger, promoting human rights, protecting the global environment, promoting international law, and so on. To some extent, this parallels the tendency of Republicans to prefer, within the domestic context, individual over group goals to a greater extent than is apparent with Democrats. Within the class of system-regarding ends, goals that have a pronounced humanitarian content (e.g., raising the living standards of poor countries) reveal the sharpest partisan differences, there being less of a gap for system-regarding security goals (e.g., defending allies’ security).

Are these differences greater in recent times than in earlier decades? Let us compare the 2002 survey with a similar one, also conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in 1975—the last year of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. At the time, it appears, there was no pronounced party gap either for self-regarding or system-regarding goals (table 11.3). Republicans and Democrats scored comparably on both, while within the categories differences rose to a maximum of 6 percent (for promoting capitalism abroad). Even with regard to combating world hunger, for which the 2002 survey revealed a 20 point gap, no meaningful difference was encountered in 1975. Clearly, then, the partisan gap has widened; the apparent reason is a differential commitment to system-regarding ends. One might object that the two surveys do not fully overlap in terms of the questions asked, but even if goals present in both surveys are concerned, the same conclusion is reached (table 11.3, last row). These observations support the impression acquired from the surveys concerning ends specifically associated with U.S. military force (tables 11.1 and 11.2): Democrats seem more interested in those with a system-regarding character, both groups are comparably committed to self-regarding ends.
Table 11.3  Very Important Foreign Policy Goals: 1975 and 2002: Self-Regarding Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republicans (%)</td>
<td>Democrats (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing energy supplies</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting U.S. business</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting U.S. workers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average scores</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average scores for questions asked in 1975 and 2002</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containing communism</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising LDC living standards</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping peace</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending allies’ security</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting democracy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting capitalism</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting weak nations from aggression</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating world hunger</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening UN</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening friends</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International cooperation</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average scores for questions asked in 1975 and 2002</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Presumably, these preferences would hold when military intervention was contemplated.

In any case, the differential commitment to system-regarding goals is found at the pinnacle of the foreign policy establishment. Condoleezza Rice, shortly before becoming President George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser, argued in a *Foreign Affairs* article, not only for the primacy of national security and the value of military tools of policy, but also that foreign policy should “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community” (Rice 2000). By contrast, her predecessor in that office, President Clinton’s National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, explicitly urged in the pages of the same journal that a wider range of international goals be added to nation’s external agenda, including explicitly humanitarian goals, observing that “American power will be resisted—even by our friends—if it is applied solely for self-protection and not for purposes that are broadly shared” (Berger 2004).

**The Matter of Cost Tolerance**

With regard to the Iraq War, public tolerance for U.S. combat casualties is largely predictable on the basis of party affiliation. Figure 11.3 shows how both Democratic and Republican withdrawal of war support responded to US combat deaths. The overall level of Republican disapproval has been, not only lower overall, but also less sensitive to casualties than Democratic support (a flatter response line), suggesting that partisan identity and/or party-related credo affects not only overall inclinations to endorse military involvement but, also, the extent to which backing declines as casualties mount (see figures 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5).

Repeating the exercise for Vietnam, and distinguishing between the Democratic and the Republican phase of the war (1969 being the point of transition), we find, predictably, that Republican disapproval exceeded Democratic while this was Lyndon Johnson’s war, the situation was reversed when it became Richard Nixon’s. It is noteworthy that, although the slope of the Republicans’ casualty-response line was almost as flat as the Democrats’ during the Democratic phase of the war (indicating that the former were no more inclined to withdraw support because of combat deaths than the latter, despite the fact that it a Democratic Administration’s war), the Democratic slope was much steeper during the Republican phase. It is hard to avoid the impression that Republicans are more willing to tolerate U.S. casualties, independent of party cues.

The impact of partisanship is confirmed by statistical analysis. Table 11.4 displays separate regressions for Democratic and Republican disapproval of
225

Figure 11.3  Partisanship and Casualties: Iraq.\textsuperscript{a, b}
\textsuperscript{a} Disapproval: As in figure 11.3.
\textsuperscript{b} Casualties: \textit{New York Times} and \textit{Facts on File}.

Figure 11.4  Partisanship and Casualties: Vietnam (Democratic Phase).\textsuperscript{a, b}
\textsuperscript{a} Disapproval: As in figure 11.2.
\textsuperscript{b} Casualties: Globalsecurity.org.

the U.S. military intervention, both for Iraq and for the Vietnam involvement, viewed across its entire span. For Iraq, overall level of democratic disapproval for Iraq, controlling for casualties,\textsuperscript{3} is captured by the regression equation’s constant term, indicating Democratic disapprobation as more
than three times higher than that expressed by Republicans—a difference that is much larger than with Vietnam (when Republican disapproval was just 1.7 times the Democratic level). Democratic responsiveness to casualties in Iraq (as reflected in the regression coefficient) has, however, been nearly eight times greater than that of Republicans (a difference further expressed in the different percentage of the variance in war disapproval explained by U.S. combat deaths in the two cases). Comparing this to the complete span

Table 11.4 Party Differences in Casualty Tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constantb</th>
<th>Regression coefficientb</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq—</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>(27.2)</td>
<td>(8.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq—</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>(5.1)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam—</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>(18.2)</td>
<td>(15.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam—</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>(8.2)</td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

a Equations estimated with the Cochrane-Orcutt correction for first-order serial correlation.

b Bracketed numbers refer to values of the t statistic.

Figure 11.5 Partisanship and Casualties: Vietnam (Republican Phase). Data: As in figure 11.5.
of the Vietnam War, we find that Democratic sensitivity to casualties was just over twice that for Republicans—a much slighter difference.

In sum, we see a growing gulf between loyalists of the nation’s two leading parties in overall levels of war support; we also discern an increased gap in their casualty-tolerance. Although comparison of the two phases of the Vietnam War indicates that differences have something to do with partisan identity, the growing gap is more easily attributable to a widening gulf in core attitudes toward force that, in turn, may be linked to growing differences in the core political credos of Republicans and Democrats.

Table 11.5  Is the United States Bogged Down or Not? a, b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall (%)</th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogged down</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May 5, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogged down</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May 24, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
a ABC-Washington Post polls.
b “Do you think the United States has gotten bogged down in Iraq, or do you think the United States is making good progress in Iraq?”

Table 11.6  Is the United States Making Significant Progress in Iraq? a, b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall (%)</th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toward restoring civil order</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(June 21, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward establishing a democratic government</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(May 5, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
a ABC-Washington Post.
b Question wording: “Do you think the United States is or is not making significant progress toward restoring civil order in Iraq?” “Do you think the United States is Making Significant Progress in Establishing a Democratic government in Iraq?”
Democrats, Republicans, and Expectations of Military Success

Party-apparent differences also color judgments on how well the United States is doing in war. Getting “bogged down” has, since Vietnam, implied an intervention’s sluggish or nonexistent progress. Asked whether the United States was “bogged down” or making “significant progress” in Iraq, at least twice as many Democrats estimated, in *ABC-Washington Post* polls that the latter better described the situation (with Independents located approximately midway between the two). (See tables 11.5 and 11.6.)

Similar observations have emerged with more specific definitions of progress. Asked whether the United States was doing significantly better as concerns restoring (1) civil order and (2) democracy to Iraq, a very much larger percentage of Republicans than Democrats judged this to be the case. Clearly, Republicans have taken a much less pessimistic view of developments in Iraq than Democrats, although the two have encountered virtually the same information about the war’s progress.

The party-related differential was also apparent for Vietnam (table 11.7), but to a slighter degree, indicating that, here again, the divergence between Democrats and Republicans has grown. To some extent, the Vietnam–related differences, like those concerning Iraq, probably reflected cues linked to the incumbent president’s party. Asked, during the war’s Democratic phase, whether the United States was losing ground, standing still, or making progress, a greater percentage of Democrats than Republicans regularly chose the third option, with a gap hovering in the vicinity of 12 points. (Independents, here, were much closer to the Republican than to the Democratic view of progress.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.7 Partisan Estimates of Progress in Vietnam&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;—&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Overall (%)</th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making progress (July 1967)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making progress (March 1968)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making progress (June 1968)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

<sup>a</sup> Gallup.

<sup>b</sup> “Do you think the United States and its allies are losing ground in Vietnam, standing still, or making progress?”
A direct comparison of attitudes between the Democratic and Republican phases of the Vietnam war is afforded by a question asked in 1968 (Johnson phase), and, again, in 1972 (Nixon phase), regarding expectations on how the war would end—all out U.S. victory, compromise, or U.S. defeat (see table 11.8).

While the results are not overwhelming, and though very few Americans believed in victory at that point, the numbers just bear out the expectation that Democrats are inclined toward greater optimism than Republicans about the outcome of a war conducted by a Democratic president, that the situation is reversed once a Republican administration assumes responsibility for its conduct.

Our observations on expectations of success also shed light on those regarding attitudes toward casualties, since the differential cost tolerance of the two groups could partly be attributed to differential perceptions of success and progress: people being more willing to endure costs for ends that appear attainable and to which armed force seems apposite. The precise structure of causality behind the pronounced difference in the inclination of Democrats and Republicans to view war-related developments in an optimistic light may be subject to various interpretations, but the most convincing resides in the need for cognitive consistency. Since Leon Festinger’s initial research on the subject, social psychology has come to recognize how much people enforce consistency on their cognitions (Festinger 1957; Wickland and Brehm 1976)—ensuring that their inner beliefs and values are in equilibrium with each other, and that they appear consistent with external evidence. Dissonance among cognitions triggers a search for ways of restoring the consistency. Often, this means that empirical evidence clashing with basic beliefs is reinterpreted so as to maintain

Table 11.8  Partisan Expectations of War’s Outcome\textsuperscript{a, b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall (%)</th>
<th>Republicans (%)</th>
<th>Democrats (%)</th>
<th>Independents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory (May 1968)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory (November 1972)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Notes}

\textsuperscript{a} Gallup.

\textsuperscript{b} “How do you think the war in Vietnam will end—in an all out victory for the United States and the South Vietnamese, in a compromise peace settlement, or in a defeat for the United States and the South Vietnamese?”
the integrity of the latter. Some cognitive dissonance may stem from the fact that an apparent cognition (“a President sharing my party affiliation must be doing the right thing”) appears inconsistent with an empirical cue (“things are not going well”)—the solution, then, is to reject or reevaluate the empirical cue, reestablishing the equilibrium between fact and cognitive commitment. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the partisan gap in expectations is larger in the case of Iraq than, several decades earlier, with regard to Vietnam, implying, it seems, a widening and hardening of the partisan divide in U.S. politics.

Party-Related Credos: Further Observations

A party heuristic probably partly guides public attitudes toward the use of force abroad, since, not knowing quite how to interpret the available information, people seek cues in the behavior of those within the upper reaches of the political pinnacle with whom they share party affiliation. But, as I have argued, differences in partisan views on military interventions also derive from basically divergent core beliefs (that, then, inform views on specific policies). Accordingly, the differences we find spring partly from the fact that Democrats and Republicans simply hold different basic beliefs, not from the cues they get from observing which party holds the presidency. This is compatible with the notion that even if most people do not organize their thinking around what Philip Converse (1964) terms “horizontal constraints,” they do, nevertheless, operate on the basis of “vertical constraints,” that is, very general core convictions, asking in any specific instance how their policy choice would be compatible with a more general belief (Conover and Feldman 1984; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987a; Nincic 1992a). Thus, the same more basic attitude toward the virtues of force might dictate specific attitudes toward issues as apparently divergent as gun control or war. Following a line of vertical constraints, then, attitudes toward a specific instance of armed intervention—to the objectives that justify it, to the costs one should be willing to accept, and so forth—might flow from basic beliefs in the value of force and war in international relations (See figure 11.6, 11.7, 11.8 and Table 11.9).

A first step toward gauging the plausibility of this hypothesis is to ask whether Democrats and Republicans do, in fact, differ in terms of support for armed force, whether it is employed by leaders from their own party. Although pertinent survey data is not extensive, what there is suggests that the two groups exhibit real differences—that Republicans are more inclined to view armed force a necessary tool of foreign policy than are Democrats. On several occasions, Gallup has asked its respondents whether
war is an “outmoded” or “sometimes necessary” way of settling differences between nations. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press has, in recent years, solicited reactions to the statement that military strength is the “best way to ensure peace.” It has also asked whether Americans had an obligation to fight for their country, whether it was “right or wrong.”

Figure 11.6  Is War Outmoded? a, b

a Gallup.

b “Is war an outmoded way of settling differences between nations, or is it sometimes necessary?”

Figure 11.7  The Value of Force and the Obligation to Support. a, b

a Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

b Question wording: As in text above.
The first question was asked in an earlier period than the other two. It transpires that Republicans are more inclined to think that war is “sometimes necessary” than Democrats, and that the difference between the two, while slight in the 1970s, gained substance by 1990 (figure 11.6). The other two series (displayed in figure 11.3) also depict a party-related differential, placing Republicans above Democrats in their willingness to use military coercion, but with a gap that recently has increased.

The greater predilection of Republicans to use force may, in turn, flow from an even more general set of differences between them and Democrats on the overall manner in which foreign policy should be conducted (a vertical constraint at a higher level). A recent survey by Princeton Survey Research International displays a substantial divergence in this regard. Asked what priority various qualities should have in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, the groups of party-identifiers differed conspicuously in some ways. In particular, they differed in terms of the extent to which they felt it should be a top priority to be “cautious” and “flexible” (a position to which Democrats and Independents were more likely than Republicans to adhere) or “decisive” and “forceful” (preferred by significantly more Republican). At a very general level of foreign policy inclination, the resolute musculature of many Republicans implies greater commitment to armed force than the supple prudence of many Democrats.

This conclusion is buttressed by the gap separating Democratic and Republican commitment to diplomacy as opposed to force, a difference reflected in their respective belief that diplomacy, not military strength, is the best way to ensure peace. As figure 11.8 indicates, there is a large and widening gap between the views of the two partisan groups: Democrats becoming more supportive of diplomacy in recent years, Republicans less so. As diplomacy is, in many respects, the obverse of force, the difference is not surprising.

**Implications of the Partisan Gap**

Both party identity and party-related credos explain why the foreign policy preferences of Americans, including their attitudes toward military force, are tethered to partisan affiliation. A consequence of the fact that views on the desirability of force as an instrument of foreign policy are substantially predictable on the basis of party affiliation is that, even when core foreign policy goals and tools are concerned, it is hard to speak of a unitary national purpose. Rather, conceptions spring from competing philosophic assumptions and party cues, while the national interest’s definition, far from being an objective datum, emerges as a more or less lopsided political compromise.

A specific consequence of the fact that judgments on foreign policy in general, and on the use of armed force in particular, are cast in a party-related mold is that, when the White House changes hands, abrupt changes of policy can be anticipated. To the extent that national leaders rely on mobilizing core constituencies in their quest for power, rather than on the hazardous strategy of reaching out to independent voters, and to the degree that the two primary partisan constituencies seem to be moving ever–further apart, the lurches in policy may be significant.

To some degree, the discontinuity is apt to be exhibited in initial decisions on whether or not to intervene militarily. When Republican administrations resort to force, this is more likely to be on behalf of stakes involving self-regarding (security and economic) pursuits. When Democrats
go to war, they are as likely to do so on behalf of a combination of self- and system-related goals, bearing both on security and humanitarian needs. Still, given the different approaches to the pursuit of external goals characteristic of Republicans and Democrats, one might anticipate more caution from Democratic rather than from Republican presidents, a caution expressed in a more tentative approach to armed force, and a greater emphasis on other tools of foreign policy, especially diplomacy.

Major partisan differences also may affect decisions on how far to persevere when U.S. forces are committed to foreign conflict. If it were simply a matter of Democrats and Republicans supporting the ventures undertaken by the president they identify with, the issue would be fairly simple. It is complicated by the superior resilience of Republicans to combat casualties, as well, perhaps, by their greater inclination to view military force as a suitable instrument of foreign policy. The inference is that a tendency by Democrats to withdraw their support, even of their own president, when casualties mount may be partially offset by a greater willingness by Republicans to lend support for armed force, even when this benefits a president from the opposition party. In this regard, the Republican attitude toward casualties increases the likelihood that the nation would persevere with its interventions. If a nonobvious generalization may be hazarded, it is that Democratic support is more likely to be withdrawn in response to mounting costs in a Republican war than the other way around.

A final observation is that a firm grasp of the manner in which foreign policy is conducted—the ends it serves and the instruments it uses—implies that boundaries between national and international, systemic and subsystemic, must decisively be crossed, a mission that this study set for itself.

Notes

The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jennifer Ramos.

1. As has been observed, “One of the most pressing concerns in the study of international relations today is developing a systematic account of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy.” (Farnham 2004, 441).

2. Studies of grade school children have revealed that, in most cases, partisan preferences are acquired by the fourth grade (Greenstein 1965, 81).

3. That is, Assuming there were no casualties.
CHAPTER 12

UNREALIZABLE EXPECTATIONS: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE UN CHARTER, AND IRAQ

Ian Hurd

The UN Security Council has rarely been as much in the public eye as it was before the U.S.-Iraq War of 2003. Its institutional position, both as one channel for authorizing the use of force and as a party in the sanctions regime against Iraq, made it inevitable that a good part of the diplomacy over the war would take place in the Council. The Council paid dearly for its prominent place in the episode and it has been vilified by critics from across the American political spectrum. Two sets of critical voices have been the loudest: the pro-war cohort that criticized the Council for failing the support the war and the antiwar commentators who attacked it for failing to stop it. From very different perspectives, and with very different evidence, these two groups come to a common conclusion: the Security Council failed to fulfill its obligations under the Charter and so failed its mandate to preserve international security.

This chapter argues that both sets of critics are mistaken and that they are mistaken for essentially the same reason: both overestimate the power of the Council because they misunderstand its basic powers and design. They subscribe to the fallacious, though popular, understanding of the Council as a collective security system and neglect to see it instead as a Great-Power compact. This point is often misunderstood and lies at the heart of the confusion over the Iraq War. From its earliest origins, the Council was intended to manage the international system on behalf of
the Great Powers according to rules that minimized the underlying conflicts among them. The debates over the Charter in 1945 make clear that collective security was secondary in the Council and would be activated only when the Great Powers agreed with each other. The activism of the Council in the 1990s came from such an agreement and helped disguise for the post–cold war period the true nature of the bargain at the heart of the Council. The Council is more accurately seen as a concert of Great Powers in which the Great Powers consult among themselves on the management of the system but take on no necessary obligation to respond to collective threats or to modify their own ambitions. Ironically, the critics of the Council on both sides ascribe too much power to the Council even as they decry its “failure” to act more forcefully.

Understanding the Council properly is important for interpreting the Iraq episode, but the Iraq episode can also be used to shed light on more general questions of interest to IR theory and to policy makers. Making the most of the case is best done by taking a perspective that links theory and research to policy. There is more at stake than finding that the Council is still “relevant” (Lynch 2003). Chaim Kaufmann is right that “it matters whether this episode should be considered an uncommon exception to the rule” in world politics or whether it is part of a more general pattern (2004, 6). He concludes, as I do, that long-lived features of the international system are at the heart of the case—this was not an exception to the normal patterns of world politics, and so its lessons are valuable for future policy making. Recognizing the Great-Power compact in the Council helps to correct a number of misperceptions about the Council that have been allowed to remain in circulation due to the prevalence of the collective security view. I examine three of these. First, we see that disagreement among the permanent members of the Council is neither a crisis in itself nor a sign of fundamental problems in the international system. Second, we need to revise our criteria for assessing what is a success and what is failure at the Council. The standard interpretation that the Council “failed” over Iraq is wrong, but it raises interesting questions about assessing the performance of the Council. Finally, a more realistic reading of the Council’s power leads to a different set of expectations about what we should expect from the Council in the future. This is especially relevant today given the many inquiries into the future of the UN and proposals for reform of the Council. For these efforts to be productive, we must first correctly understand the powers and purpose of the Council in order to begin analyzing its performance and worth. This requires crossing the boundaries between theory, history, and policy.
The chapter is presented in four substantive sections. The first reviews three common complaints over the Council’s performance over Iraq in 2003: that the Council failed to stand up to a threat from Iraq; that the Council revealed itself to be out of step with the current distribution of power in the international system; and that it failed to defend international law against the power of American unipolarity. The second section examines the UN Charter and the debates of 1945 to show that the aspirations for the Council underpinning all three sets of critics are misplaced. The third section argues that the Council should be seen as a Great-Power compact in which the veto powers remain entirely unconstrained. The final section shows the importance of the distinction between the two visions of the Council. A brief conclusion summarizes the argument and points to future research on the history of norm development around the Council.

Three Charges against the Council

In the aftermath of the diplomacy over the Iraq War in 2003, three distinct lines of critique were offered of the Security Council’s performance. These disagreed with each other over basic matters such as the interpretation of international law, the assessment of security threats to the United States, and the likely consequences of invading Iraq, and as a result they offered distinct policy prescriptions—some overlapping and some in conflict. But they all agreed that the Council failed a significant test in the episode. I examine each of the three in turn before discussing their shared commitment to a collective security interpretation of the Council’s purpose.

“Defending the Credibility of Past Council Resolutions”

One line of critique suggested that the Council failed in its obligation to fully enforce its resolutions by refusing to explicitly authorize a U.S.-coalition invasion to remove Saddam Hussein. The resolutions in question are those stemming from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent cease-fire agreement in 1991. In 1990, the Council passed Resolution 678 that authorized “member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In 1991, it passed Resolution 687 to certify the cease-fire that ended the war and to bar Iraq from possessing or developing a list of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and some
delivery systems. It also imposed a series of financial obligations on Iraq in recompense for damage caused by the war on Kuwait and a monitoring regime of inspections to validate Iraq’s claims about its weapons programs. Resolution 715 required that Iraq “cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Directory of the Agency,” referring to the Council’s weapons inspectors and those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) respectively (Krasno and Sutterlin 2003).

Some of these obligations can be considered fully satisfied, such as the central demand of Resolution 660 that Iraq’s military retreat to its prewar positions and that Iraq recognize the sovereignty of Kuwait. But others were arguably not, including Iraq’s cooperation in the weapons-inspections programs. The U.S. Ambassador to the UN described Iraq’s conduct relative to the inspectors as of 1998 as a “flagrant material breach of resolution 687” that amounted to a justification for American air strikes against targets in Iraq (SC/6611, cited in Yoo 2003). As a result, the British government, among others, argued before the 2003 Iraq War that the state of war between Iraq and the 1990 coalition had not been ended by Iraq’s mere withdrawal; there were other necessary conditions that remained to be met (Franck 2003). The British Attorney General said in 2003 that “Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under Resolution 678.”2 This being the case, the requirement for a new Council authorization to use force against Iraq in defense of the goals of Resolution 678 was unnecessary. Based on this logic, one could say further that the Council had an obligation to fully enforce its past resolutions and so was negligent to the extent that it did not successfully press Iraq to fully comply with the inspections regime. The importance of full enforcement comes from two sources: first, as a matter of international security, reme­dying the original threat requires carrying out all of the measures included in Council resolutions; and second, as a matter of reputation, future Council action may be undermined if current resolutions are not forcefully defended by the Council.

Many have taken this interpretation as the foundation for criticizing the Council for failing in 2003 to carry out the necessary implications of its earlier resolutions. Schaefer, for instance, argued that because “many members of the Security Council refuse[d] to support forcefully disarming Iraq in spite of ample evidence of Iraq’s violation of 17 Security Council resolutions,” the Council failed “to fulfill its primary duty to Iraq.” This, he concludes, is entirely in the tradition of “delay and indecisiveness” that is characteristic of the Council, and it raises “questions about the effectiveness of the Security Council” with respect to its “ultimate responsibility— enforcement of peace and security” (Schaefer 2003). Similarly, Charles
Krauthammer identified the failure to forcefully implement Council resolutions (in this case 1441) as a demonstration of the Council’s “moral bankruptcy and its strategic irrelevance: moral bankruptcy because it . . . made a mockery of the very resolution on whose sanctity it [the UN] insists; strategic irrelevance because the United States disarm[ed] Iraq anyway” (2003). Giving explicit approval to the invasion of Iraq is one way that these critics would be satisfied that the Council was living up to its commitments of the past (Perle 2003).³

“A Structural Change Makes the Council Irrelevant”

A distinct critique has been offered by Michael Glennon (2003), who takes a longer historical view. The central elements of his analysis are not inconsistent with the first category of critics although it does rely on a different starting point and aims at a different target. Glennon finds that the changes in power distribution in the international system since 1945 have taken away the Council’s necessary geopolitical base. “It was the rise of American unipolarity—not the Iraq crisis—that, along with cultural clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the Council’s credibility.” Thus, “the fault for this failure [to respond to Iraq forcefully] did not lie with any one country; rather, it was the largely inexorable upshot of the development and evolution of the international system” (Glennon 2003, 18). This identifies a more chronic, and likely fatal, condition in the Council than did the first set of critics. If the structure of the international system is no longer conducive to the existing design of the Council, then the relevance and power of the Council will be low until the distribution of power in the system changes again to some pattern more supportive of collective security. This, however, it not likely to be soon.

The crux of the argument is the connection between the distribution of power in the international system and possibility for effective Council action. Glennon is not clear on the precise relationship that he hypothesizes except to say that they are connected through the operation of the balance of power. He says that American unipolarity has provoked a backlash from other strong states in an attempt to balance against American hegemony. These countries include most of the other main powers in the world, including Russia, Germany, France, and China, in various coalitions and combinations and with support from a host of smaller countries. The balancing efforts of these countries have been met by an American reaction that aims “to do all it can to maintain its preeminence” (Glennon 2003, 20). In the tug-of-war between the hegemon and its counterhegemonic
balancers, the Council cannot function effectively—thus, while in normal times “the body managed to limp along...it proved incapable of performing under periods of great stress” as in 2002–2003 (Glennon 2003, 20).

Glennon’s analysis implies that there was a moment in the history of the Council when the distribution of power in the system was compatible with the Council’s goals. He doesn’t say when this was, but the existence of such a moment is crucial to his central argument about the change in the Council. The question thus arises: If American unipolarity is a brake on Council effectiveness, what was the past distribution of power that allowed it to function? Glennon (2003, 16) cites September 12, 2001 as “the beginning of the end” for the Council but the logic of his argument suggests we look for the transformation earlier, at the moment that U.S. unipolarity began. This might be identified as any number of moments from the mid-1980s on. His logic thus suggests that the Council was more effective, or at least better suited to the international environment, in the period of bi- or multipolarity that preceded the relative increase in U.S. power in the 1990s. Unfortunately Glennon doesn’t explore how this might have worked, or why in this prior period the supposedly universal and constant aspiration of states to balance against potential threats led to “better” results in the Council in that period than he says it did in 2003.

Such an exploration would be fruitful because his unipolar hypothesis is precisely the opposite to the conventional understanding of the Council’s ineffectiveness through the cold war. The more common view agrees with Glennon that the Council’s effectiveness is dependent on its “fit” with the broader context of international geopolitics, but identifies bipolarity rather than unipolarity as the key problem. Kupchan and Kupchan present this interpretation succinctly: “The United Nations was formed under the assumption that the two countries emerging from World War II with predominant military capabilities could cooperate in forging a postwar order. But even as the UN was coming into being, the United States and the Soviet Union were pursuing conflicting goals, making collective security untenable...Commitments to collective security [institutionalized in the Security Council] were repeatedly challenged—and superceded—by the rivalry and hostility associated with the Cold War” (1991, 129). Thus, on this argument, it was the advent of bipolarity in the system that signaled a quick end to the Council’s security functions, not American unipolarity.

Both the bipolar and unipolar variants of this argument agree that the Council could conceivably operate as intended in the field of international security if its membership or structure (or both) were reconfigured to
better match the realities of state power politics. Glennon concludes that with either a different membership (better reflecting the current distribution of power) or a different attitude among the existing members (better reflecting existing members’ power realities) the Council might have been able to avoid clashing so directly with the United States and so could have prolonged its relevance to American decision makers.

“ Illegal Aggression by the United States Demands a Council Response”

The third set of critics stands apart from the first two in that its political project is generally the opposite: they aim to assert the primacy of international law over American “unilateralism.” These critics generally conclude that the American decision to go to war with Iraq without Council approval was a violation of international law, and they find the Council ineffective for not being able to better defend the legal and normative principles upon which it is based. The “failure” of the Council identified here is the inability to restrain the American government from what the critics see as committing a new breach of international peace and security. Erik Voeten (2005, 34) suggests that the Council will lose legitimacy if it “fails to provide an adequate check on US power.”

In this view, the veto is inherently dangerous to world order, and to the peace-and-security mission of the United Nations, because it protects the United States from criticism by the Council and ensures that illegalities conducted by Great Powers are immune from action (Ramonet 2003). This is a long-standing critique of the UN’s security arrangement and has been heard since the founding of the organization. It has led to a variety of proposals for reform, from doing away with the veto entirely to limiting it to a subset of Council decisions to recommending self-restraint by the permanent members. With respect to the Iraq episode, we have seen many of these proposals and others reanimated, although they arrive with little chance of being adopted (Ratner and Lobel 2003; Whitney 2004).

The Common Foundation of the Three Critiques

These different critics share some comment elements. First, they all see the presence of disagreements among the Great Powers in the Council as a sign of a problem. Second, they all subscribe to the view that what the Council should have done was recognize the existence of a threat to international security (they disagree on the nature of the threat) and respond automatically with action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Third, they all identify
the permanent-member veto as the ultimate obstacle to such a response. It was the veto, they say, that prevented the Council from fulfilling its obligations to satisfactorily respond to a breach of international peace and security.

These common features among the various critics reflect a shared underlying foundation about the Council: a “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense. At the core of the paradigm is the belief that the Council is part of a system of collective security for the international system. If we accept this belief, then it is possible to maintain that the body failed in any of the three ways described above: in other words, we expect the Council to respond to threats to the system and we are disappointed when it fails to do so.

As many have noted, collective security is a term used with unfortunate looseness in IR, resulting in broad range of institutions being identified with the term. For my purposes, I define it following George Downs as a “collective commitment of a group to hold members accountable for the maintenance of an internal security norm” (1994, 2). This entails two commitments on the part of the members of the group: first, a commitment to the principle of “all-for-one, one-for-all”; and second, an agreement on a binding institutional device for activating that principle in the defense of a threatened member. Both must be present. Glaser (1994, 235) rightly emphasizes the necessary requirement of a prior commitment to this principle—this is important because it allows one to distinguish collective security from a range of standard alliances and ad hoc collective actions. Lipson (1994) rightly emphasizes the need for a binding institution to enforce the principle—collective security cannot exist if group members are free to decide, case-by-case, whether to participate in collective actions. For collective security systems to have the deterrent effects and other benefits desired by their proponents, both of these elements must exist. Other kinds of security coordination may be important in practice, but lacking these two crucial elements they cannot work by the mechanisms that underlie collective security.

There is some support in the Charter for the view that the Council anchors a collective security system, and many commentators identify it as one, but to conclude that collective security is a central element of the UN system requires a very selective reading of the Charter and leads to very poor predictions about the Council’s behavior. In other words, the paradigm is faulty. A brief review of the Charter and its negotiating history makes clear that collective security was at best a secondary intention of the founders, subordinate to the needs and interests of the Great Powers individually.

The boldest references to collective security in the Charter appear early, in the preamble and first articles, where the ambitions and purposes of the
organization are set out. These reflect the values of the organization, although the institutional machinery of the Charter does not make them effective. The preamble states that one purpose of the organization is “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institutions of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” In the formal clauses of the Charter, Article 1 restates that ambition in more active language and with the greater legal authority: the first purpose of the UN is “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” Article 2(5) requires states to assist the UN in actions it decides to take. These obligations are operationalized in later articles that spell out the specific powers of the Security Council: Article 24 gives the Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and Article 39 states that it is the Council that must “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Once such a finding has been made, the Council can “call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures” as economic and cultural sanctions (Article 41) and may use military force “by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 42). Finally, Article 49 enacts the collective principle set out in the preamble: “The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.”

These clauses create a number of binding legal obligations on members with respect to collective international security. When the Council tells members to act against a threat, they must do so. When the Council initiates a military operation, members must contribute resources to support it and must not act in ways that impede it. Most broadly, members must not act in ways that are inconsistent with the general purposes and principles of the organization, including the objective of effective collective measures against international aggression.

But there are several things that the Charter does not do: it does not create an active requirement for action by the Council or any other part of the organization; it does not limit how the Council decides whether a threat exists; and it does not mandate that aggression against one member must automatically be construed as aggression against all. All of the collective provisions of the Charter on international security are filtered through the Council so that obligations come into effect only after the Council decides by a formal resolution that they should exist. Compare this to the League of Nations, where the Covenant included a legal obligation on all members to “preserve against external aggression” the integrity of other members;
the Covenant therefore had half of a collective security system, the legal commitment to all-against-one, but didn’t have the institutional structure to make it real. The UN Charter has neither. In the Charter, collective obligations for international security exist only once the Council brings them into being in individual cases. Collective security in the Charter is subordinate to the decision rules, and the veto, of the Council. Leaving out the obligations that would have made for a collective security system was not an accident in the drafting of the Charter. It was in fact a central goal of the Great Powers and a *sine qua non* of their participation. The veto for the permanent members was important to them precisely because it made it impossible for the organization to operate as a collective security system. It ensured that there would be *no* collective obligations in international security without the active agreement of each Great Power on a case-by-case basis.

The idea that the new world organization should comprise a special privilege for the Great Powers was in place from the very earliest discussions about the UN among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in 1944. This was made necessary by the early decision that the organization should have the capacity to make authoritative and binding decisions on behalf of all members with respect to international security. A body with such powers was acceptable to the Big Three only if each retained the right to opt out of its decisions, and the veto in the Council was therefore essential. The general shape of the veto in the Security Council was agreed upon by the Great Powers very early in the process of thinking about the new world organization and defended by them against all challenges through to the end of the San Francisco conference. In meetings among the Big Three at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, they debated important details regarding the scope of the veto, such as its relationship to peaceful dispute settlement, procedural questions, and disputes involving Great Powers, and some of these disputes carried forward to San Francisco, but the in-group consensus about the basic concept of the veto was never broken.

At San Francisco in 1945, the task facing the Big Four (i.e., the Big Three plus China, with France soon to join) was to gain support for the veto and for the rest of the Charter among the small and medium states that would make up the rank-and-file members of the UN (Hurd 2005a). The world conference of 1945 was designed as a conversation between the Great Powers as a bloc and the rest of the UN membership-to-be. In this sense, San Francisco was not a postwar peace conference on the model of, for instance, the Versailles Peace Treaty, and so it followed a different dynamic than predicted by Ikenberry among others. Ikenberry has argued
that these postwar moments are useful to Great Powers as they attempt to entrench their powers in new institutional arrangements (Ikenberry 2001).

This was clear after World War I, but after World War II is more complicated. After World War II, Ikenberry says, there were two distinct “settlements,” linked but each with its own logic: one was within the Western bloc and the other between that bloc and the Soviet alliance. In neither settlement does he find the founding of the UN to be a major event. In Ikenberry’s history, the early UN is seen as being conditioned by (and perhaps a victim of) the tentative military settlement reached elsewhere between the U.S. and Soviet blocs, rather than as itself contributing to the settlement. That San Francisco was not a peace conference is evident from the fact that the big issues, like territorial settlement and armistice terms, were not on the table and also that it both explicitly excluded enemy states and begun before the end of hostilities. The purpose of the conference was to allow conversations between the Great Powers and the small states in the system with the intention of ratifying a Great-Power settlement that already existed. Ikenberry leaves aside this purpose and so understates the importance of the conference in contributing to the post–World War II institutional order. In distinguishing between collective security and a Great-Power compact, these discussions are important.

The deliberations at San Francisco did include a great deal of controversy over the veto. Indeed, the veto was the most debated element of the entire plan, and at times the work of the whole conference was stopped because the subcommittee dealing with the veto reached an impasse. The objections of the small states were varied, but centered on the great freedom from collective constraint enjoyed by the permanent members of the Council. The small states proposed a series of amendments that would have limited the absolute quality of the veto in different ways: for instance, by applying it only to enforcement measures, or by not applying it to enforcement measures, or by increasing the required level of nonpermanent member support to pass resolutions.

Rather than concede any points of substance, the Great Powers responded to this pressure with a series of explanations of the logic behind the veto. The Sponsors clearly saw the dissent by the small states as a problem that called for diplomacy and legitimation, rather than as a substantive matter to be negotiated with compromise. They were prepared to offer justifications but not legal compromises. To a series of questions collected by a subcommittee of dissident states, the Big Four produced a long narrative restatement of the rationale for the veto, with hints of the political leverage they were willing to bring to bear to see it enacted without modification. This statement has become well known as the “Four Power
Statement” and it helped bring to an end the debate over the veto.\(^8\) The statement cast the proposals as a continuance of an existing system, improved by a small, reasonable change. It emphasized the inevitability and naturalness of an inequality between the Great Powers and the rest, and suggested that the proposed voting procedure was simply a way of dealing responsibly with that fact.

Moreover, the proposed Security Council was not giving the permanent five anything new, according to the statement, since the five already had a veto power in the Council of the League of Nations under the League’s rule of unanimity: “As regards the Permanent Members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right of veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had” (UNCIO 1945, 713). The question was restricting the right of nonpermanent members to veto a decision, a power which they formerly had in the League but which would be restricted in the Security Council in the interest of making “the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity” (UNCIO 1945, 713). This interpretation of the League of Nations was useful because it let the Great Powers cast the choice as one between everyone having the veto (as in the League) or just the P-5 plus a “collective veto” for two or more nonpermanent members.

The Four Power Statement was extremely powerful, largely because it was interpreted as the last word from the Sponsors on the veto. It signaled that no substantive amendment to the terms of the veto would be accepted by the Sponsors, and it changed the dynamic of the deliberations. A vote was then taken on the most modest of the anti-veto proposals, that of the Australian delegation that would have classed peaceful settlements as procedural questions and so be outside the scope of the veto. When this failed to win a two-thirds majority, the Sponsors’ own draft was adopted.

The Great Powers, through a combination of legitimation and coercion, won the day on the veto. They gave up nothing on the veto to win the support of the small states, and gave up very little on any other issues. There were no significant concessions made in other parts of the Charter to win small-state support on the veto. A number of changes to the original text were made in the course of the deliberations but almost all were the result of amendments proposed by the Sponsors themselves and they were all in areas far from the central concerns about the Council and the veto. These so-called Sponsors’ amendments were generally negotiated among the Great Powers behind closed doors and then presented to the relevant committee the next day for a vote. These included increasing the
Council’s role in issuing recommendations of peaceful settlement, including regional groupings as having rights with respect to self-defense, peaceful settlements, and local disputes and adding “equitable geographic representation” to the criteria for nonpermanent Council membership (see Russell 1958; Simma 1994). A handful of textual changes did result from pressure by the small states but these were very minor. For instance, the General Assembly was given slightly greater freedom of operation in Article 10, and the power of ECOSOC was increased. These changes were all formally proposed in Sponsors’ amendments but were motivated by continual pressure from one or more small states. The single instance in which a small-state amendment officially made it into the final Charter appears to be a Peruvian amendment regarding the Military Staff Committee in Article 47.

In short, the conference ended with the unanimous support for the draft Charter, including the Sponsors’ veto, among the small states. They all voted for it, carried it back to their domestic legislatures, and won ratification of it at home. As Grewe (1994, 11) says, the result of the conference was “the adoption and enactment of the draft negotiated [at Dumbarton Oaks] by the Great Powers without significant amendments or firm opposition.”

The significance of the negotiating history at San Francisco is that it makes clear that the Great Powers saw the veto as the sine qua non of the entire UN security system and were willing to scuttle the new organization if any reduction in the veto was voted by the rest of the membership. Maintaining the individual opt-out for the Great Powers over any collective security obligation in the UN was essential for their participation; proposals that moved toward enacting the collective security principle were treated by the Sponsors as mortal threats to the entire enterprise. The process of negotiation helped reveal how important the veto was to the Great Powers, and therefore contributes to our understanding of the UN’s security system as fundamentally hierarchical: the Great Powers were vested with the power to decide when the collective provisions of the Charter would be enacted and were insulated from any collective obligation except when they explicitly consented.

If Not Collective Security, Then What?

The permanent-member veto in the Council is the most important institutional device in the entire UN security system. With the veto in place, we know that the Council cannot function as a collective security system and further we know that it was never meant to. This remains the case today. Nothing has changed in the intervening years to modify the Great Powers’
obligations toward the Security Council. The absence of change means we are justified in taking a literal and ahistorical reading of the Charter in this case: the text that was negotiated in 1945 remains the relevant international law on collective security obligations in the United Nations (see Karl and Mützelburg 1994). What we have instead of a collective security institution is a forum for navigating around the fundamental interests of the strong states—in other words, a Great-Power concert.9

A Great-Power concert exists when the main players in the international system institutionalize a mechanism for consulting with each other over the management of the system. The objective is to minimize the potential conflicts among the Great Powers in the course of contributing to the stability of the system as a whole (Glaser 1994, 218; Cronin 1999). Such a system exists to serve the interests of the strong states; smaller states are treated as “the objects of international politics, not the subjects” (Lipson 1994, 121). The design, strength, and efficacy of these mechanisms vary greatly from one case to another, and range from mere consultation to full-blown consensus decision making, but all reflect a realization by the Great Powers that each stands to gain by diplomatic collaboration among themselves.10 It is not the case, as Dueck claims, that “concerts require moral consensus” among the Great Powers (Dueck 2004, 205). The desire for consultation by the Great Powers is generally not motivated by the shared sense of identity that constructivists associate with strong forms of international community, but rather by the recognition among the strong that some kinds of conflicts among themselves can be mitigated by dialog among them. This may then create a sense of community, with important effects on state behavior, but that is a subsequent step in the process independent of and perhaps even counter to the original interests of the participants.11

The veto reflects the UN founders’ interest in creating a compact rather than a collective security system. It is a negative power in that it allows permanent members to stop the process of creating collective security obligations at any moment. The permanent members thus have absolute control over the shape of their responsibilities toward the Council. The result is a strong bias in the direction of inaction by the Council. But this is not an oversight or an unintended consequence—quite the opposite. Inaction is strategically important at those moments where the Great Powers cannot agree with each other. The drafters of the Charter believed that in such cases the Council should not act, since to act would necessarily alienate a strong state and thus invite disaster for the whole organization. As in Hurd (2004), this is not a “flaw” in the design of the Council, nor evidence that the Council is based on “imaginary truths that transcend politics” as some
critics would have it (Glennon 2003, 32). It is the *raison d’être* of the Council. It reflects the sensitive political balance that was struck between the small states and the Great Powers at San Francisco to allow the possibility of *some* collective action within the broader context of a Great-Power concert. The Council has a legal position that can influence how the strong states collectively manage the rest of the system, but it has no power to regulate how the strong behave individually.

Kupchan and Kupchan (1991) confuse collective security systems with Great-Power concerts and so overstate the authority of the Council. They identify the latter as that subset of the former that have (i) membership limited to the Great Powers and (ii) no binding commitment to collective action: “Because a concert operates on the notion of all against one and relies on collective action to resist aggression, it falls into the collective security family” (1991, 119, fn. 12). They are thus able to conclude that the Security Council is a collective security institution, albeit one that has not worked as intended, for the reasons identified above. They cite Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter as “establishing a mechanism through which collective military action would take place,” although the veto “ensured that the UN’s provisions for collective action could not be directed against any of the major power, and prevented the UN from being able to address the most serious threats to the peace, disputes between the great powers” (1991, 122).

The limited scope of the obligations this places on the Great Powers does not qualify as “all-against-one.” With the veto as the key to all collective action by the UN, we see that the Council was designed to regulate the behavior of the small states but not that of the Great Powers. Kupchan and Kupchan recognize that a collective security mechanism needs to be egalitarian, creating obligations on all members equally and automatically. Thus, the two security arrangements are mutually exclusive, and the Council does not meet the minimum requirements for a collective security. As Russett and Oneal (2001, 163) note, “The founders of the United Nations were realistic enough to recognize the difficulties the institution would face if the great powers, which constitute the core of the Security Council, were in serious conflict . . . Nonetheless, those who wrote the UN Charter gave the organization the power to act forcefully when circumstances were right.” Inis Claude (1971, 76) made a similar point summarizing the relationship between collective security and the concert system in the Charter: “The founding fathers of the United Nations were realistic enough to accept the necessity of operating within the confines of the existing power structure and to recognize the grave dangers of future conflict among the superpowers; they were idealistic enough to make a
supreme effort to promote great power unity and to capitalize upon the chance that the wartime alliance might prove cohesive enough to uphold world peace.” Claude is careful to limit the idealism of the founders to promoting Great-Power unity, not to regulating Great-Power behavior, and makes the Council’s contribution to world peace dependent on the prior existence of Great-Power unity.

The mixed history of UN adventures in peacekeeping and peacebuilding supports the view that the Council operates still as a Great-Power compact: When the Great Powers agreed on interventions in the 1990s, the Council was empowered to intervene dramatically in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Latin America—but these same conflicts were allowed for years to fester while the Great Powers vetoed their way through the cold war.

### Three Implications of the Concert

Recognizing that the Council is a concert rather than a collective security body changes how one interprets a number of features of international politics around the United Nations. The Council’s three sets of critics generate misleading conclusions regarding these features because of their faulty paradigm.

First, if we take the collective security view, then we are led to conclude that the existence of disagreement among the Great Powers is a problem for the Council. The various critics are united that the crucial disagreement between the prowar and antiwar factions in the P-5 was an obstacle to the Council operating as it should on international security. They see lack of consensus as the origin of a failure. By contrast, the concert view highlights the important role that Great-Power disagreement played in the planners’ design of the Council in 1945. The Sponsors fully expected the Great Powers to disagree with each other, and to disagree on matters of fundamental importance to their national interests. It was the very high likelihood of this kind of disagreement that motivated them to design the veto in the first place and defend it from every amendment. The veto was the ultimate protection for Great Powers against collective action that they opposed.

Second, we must reassess the standard by which we measure the success and failure of the Council. Neither disagreement among the Great Powers, nor inaction by the Council, can be taken as evidence that the Council has failed since the Council was designed to incorporate both. The use or threat of the veto may indeed lead to the failure of an individual case of collective action, but this is not in itself a failure of the Council. What would count as a failure for the Council are instances in which a veto was
essentially ignored by the other Great Powers and collective action was taken against the express wishes of one of their number. The Kosovo campaign by NATO may be one such case: the Western states used NATO to legitimize its collective action against Yugoslavia when Russian opposition made action in the Council impossible. Using force in Kosovo did not itself violate the terms of the Great-Power compact inherent in the Council (since the right to individual action by Great Powers is preserved by San Francisco) but finding a secondary collective international body to legitimize it against the interests of a permanent member did.

Finally, we must reconfigure our expectations about the Council. Because it creates no legal obligations on them, we should not expect it to directly regulate the behavior of the Great Powers. We also cannot expect it to endorse a collective solution just because one permanent member strongly desires it; the veto can’t cause collective action, it can only prevent it. Getting our expectations right is important for thinking about Council reform. The recent report of the High-Level Panel on UN reform, for instance, seeks to encourage the higher expectations of those who want the Council to act as a collective security body but without suggesting the institutional reforms that would make this possible (United Nations 2004). The Panel proposes that the Council adopt the view that it has a “responsibility to protect” civilian populations whose security has been abandoned by their national government, and intends this principle to provide a conceptual foundation for Council activism. At the same time, it proposes no change to the voting structure of the Council; the veto remains primary. Thus, while promoting the higher expectations shared by the critics of the Council described above, it recognizes that there will be no change to the legal structure established in 1945, and whatever responsibility to protect it might engender therefore can exist only when the Great Powers collectively want it to.

This should not mean that we conclude that the Council is irrelevant to power politics. To come to this result, as Glennon does, requires that we assume that the Council’s legal powers fully describe its political powers. This is as unrealistic as is expecting the Council to embody collective security, and it well illustrated by the Iraq case.

In the Iraq episode, many states behaved as if they believed the Great Powers should be regulated by the Council. To this end, many said publicly that they would only support the war against Iraq if the Council approved it. The American strategy toward the Council, and more generally toward rationalizing the war according to accepted international law (Kaufmann 2004), was arranged around trying to accommodate those states. There may be no legal foundation in the Charter to support this
view of the Council’s power, but to the extent that it is widely shared among states it must be taken into account. The belief that such a norm or law exists is a separate social object from the actual existence of such a law. Widespread belief in the legitimacy of the Council can entrap the Great Powers and lead them to accord greater weight to the Council than its legal powers would suggest. It is in fact this expectation that the critics are reacting to, more so than to the law of the Charter itself.

How this “unrealistic” expectation came to be so prevalent is worth more research. The process seems to involve a combination of three forces important in normative evolution: available rhetorical resources (such as the references in the Charter to an aspiration to collective security), development in thinking about humanitarian obligations (such as in reaction to the Rwandan genocide in 1994), and the practice of some states in some cases (such as of the United States to use collective measures in 1990 against Iraq). These changes embody no legally binding precedent, but taken together may change the normative environment in which the Council exists.

To the extent that some states believe that a norm exists that war is illegal unless authorized by the Council, and act in accordance with that belief, then all countries need to anticipate that response as they plan their policies. Norms can increase the reputational costs of pursuing individual action and so the prudent Great Power could be faced with a choice between two unwelcome options: unilateral action that damages its reputation as a rule-follower, and (legally unnecessary) deference to the Council. The possibility of this kind of “entrapment” of strong states by norms they did not consent to motivates a number of recent works that combine constructivist and rational-choice variables to explore strategic behavior in socially constructed environments (Hurd 2005b; Schimmelfennig 2003; Johnstone 2003).

Conclusions

The Iraq episode should serve to remind us that the Charter did not create a collective security institution. Rather, it created a forum in which collective measures could be discussed and, when the Great Powers give their consent, collective obligations may be brought into being. The individual veto power of the Council’s permanent members allows them to defeat any collective action they disagree with, and so leaves them with no legal obligations. This point of law is overlooked by the Council’s three sets of critics over Iraq because they miss the basic premise of the Council: it was carefully constructed to avoid legal obligations that applied automatically to the
Great Powers. This is not a failure but rather a key piece of institutional design.

The critics of the Council agree on the basic claim that since the Council failed to act decisively to (either) prevent the Iraq War or endorse it, it violated the fundamental Charter obligation that the Council “maintain and restore international peace and security.” This demonstrated its weakness at a crucial point of crisis and so, for the critics, signals a broader problem for the Council as currently constituted. This interpretation begins with a flawed understanding of the power of the Council and leads to flawed conclusions about its performance. In putting collective security ahead of the Great Power compact in their interpretation of the Iraq episode, the Council’s critics take too seriously the aspirational phrases of the Charter’s preamble at the expense of a careful reading of the legal articles that set out its real powers. In aspiration, it may point toward an automatic collective security system; in law, it has always been precisely what Downs describes in defining a classic concert: “A mechanism for encouraging and enabling states to cooperate if they desired” (Downs 1994, 4). The critics expect too much. However, in ignoring the real, though modest, constraints on American unilateralism that exist due to the Council even when it does not invoke collective action, the critics simultaneously recognize too little.

Rather than demonstrating failure on Iraq issue, the veto and the Council worked as we would expect it to given the legal structures created by the Charter. The episode reflects the normal progress of power politics in the UN: the Council provided a forum and a procedure for the Great Powers to discuss system-management issues, and when it became clear that they could not agree amongst themselves about the best course of action the veto ensured that no collective action would be taken. Disagreement among the permanent members is not a crisis for the Council; the veto was designed in anticipation of such moments. Thus, collective action either against Iraq (for its violations of the resolutions) or against the US (for its alleged violations of the laws of war) was made impossible by disagreement among the Great Powers. The possibility of individual action was not affected. Krauthammer was right when he said “The Security Council is, on the very rare occasions when it actually works, realpolitik by committee” (2002/2003, 12). He presumably meant this as a criticism, but a realistic understanding of why being part of a committee is different than working alone reveals it to be a creditable account of the useful function of the Council.

To appreciate the limits and nature of the political power of the Security Council requires that we pay attention both to the legal structure of the
institution and to the subsequent practice of states. The former, informed by a historical reading of the negotiating history of the United Nations, shows clearly that the founders of the UN intentionally made collective action subordinate to consensus among the Great Powers; had it been otherwise, the organization would not have been acceptable to them. The latter reminds us that it is possible that interpretive change over the years may have shifted some states’ understandings of these limits. Only by crossing boundaries between the two spheres of research can we arrive at a meaningful understanding of the contemporary place of the Council in the diplomacy of states.

Notes

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1. Kaufmann’s statement refers particularly to the justifications for the war by the U.S. government, not to the role of the Council.


3. Thomas Franck, for one, disagrees sharply with the legal interpretation at the heart of this complaint and so ends up with a very different analysis of the Council’s position. His legal disagreement points out that there is nothing in any of the resolutions regarding Iraq that would indicate that the Council intended for individual member states to have the unilateral right to determine whether Iraq had satisfied the Council’s demands. Franck (2003).

4. I take this to include a commitment to protect against aggression by group members and by outsiders against group members, and so combine what are sometimes separated between “collective security” and “defensive alliances.”

5. For instance, Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), Ruggie (1993), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Lipson (1994) all give qualified support to the proposition that the UN is a collective security body.

6. Other collective obligations may exist in areas such as economic and cultural affairs, or arising from other security treaties, but here I am concerned only with the implications of the Charter for international security.


9. I equate being a permanent member with being a Great Power. This covers up a great deal of interesting controversy, both in 1945 (for instance,
France clearly didn’t qualify) and now (the permanent membership does not reflect current geopolitical realities). However, it makes sense within the institutional structure of because of the overwhelming power of veto holders relative to the rest.

10. Cronin goes too far in requiring that in a concert “any action [by a Great Power] must either be approved or initiated by the group” (1999, 10). This would give each a veto over the independent actions of all the others, which is inimical to the autonomy-preserving nature of a concert.

11. For examples of this effect, see Schimmelfennig (2003), Risse (2000), and in general the literature inspired by Habermas’ ‘communicative action’ thesis.

12. The phrase “responsibility to protect” was popularized by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).

13. Other international commitments may exist that regulate individual action, such as treaties and custom on the laws of war. These are distinct from UN members’ obligations with respect to the Council.
PART 5

CROSSING BOUNDARIES: FROM ETHICS TO POLICY
In the study of international relations today, the willingness to cross theoretical and methodological boundaries is often a sign of mature scholarship, as is the willingness to engage a diverse nonacademic audience that includes policy makers and practitioners. Few in the discipline have crossed as many of these boundaries, and with such good effect, as Bruce Russett. One frequent crossing has been into the area of international ethics, especially the ethics of war and nuclear deterrence. Russett served as principal consultant to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, participating in the drafting of their highly influential pastoral letter on the ethics of war in the nuclear era, *The Challenge of Peace* (1983). He has written on nearly every ethical problem encountered by the student of world politics: not only war and weapons, but also poverty, inequality, human rights, representation, female empowerment, and environmental degradation. In our field, social scientific inquiry may often appear dispassionate and detached from the pressing moral issues of our times, but social scientists need not be. Russett’s boundary crossings demonstrate that very clearly (e.g., Russett 1989, 2001).
This chapter is about a different kind of boundary crossing, though, a worrisome one. The boundaries I refer to are the limits established by just war theory; the crossings are the transgressions of those limits by the United States in its war on terror. In particular, I focus on two of the most controversial elements of the George W. Bush administration’s campaign against global terrorism. The first is the administration’s reconceptualization of preemptive self-defense, which challenges *jus ad bellum* limits in its rejection of the traditional notion of imminent threat. I consider whether this is a reasonable revision of the *jus ad bellum* principle, even if in practice—that is, as a justification for the war against Iraq—it was misapplied.

The second is the treatment of prisoners. The premium placed on intelligence as the key to dismantling global terrorist networks has encouraged practices that challenge and plainly cross the limits of *jus in bello*, namely the rules governing the rights of those not participating (or no longer participating) in combat. More than this, they may call into question the government’s, and maybe our society’s, commitment to basic human rights. The debate over torture is revealing; indeed, that there is a debate is revealing. I conclude this chapter by arguing that when we tolerate the crossing of *jus in bello* limits, even in emergencies, we erode another, more fundamental boundary in just war doctrine: the one requiring that we judge the conduct of war independently of the resort to war. If that boundary cannot be maintained, then we ought to consider whether just war doctrine can be applied at all to the war on terror.

My conjecture is that the threat of terrorism—its potential to impose truly catastrophic costs on American society—is taken very seriously by the Bush administration and this may account for its willingness to push ethical and legal limits. Therefore, I start with the question of American vulnerabilities.

### Expected Destruction

Most Americans, if asked, could probably provide a fairly accurate estimate of the death toll from the 9/11 attacks (the official count is 2,976). Although few would dispute that this represents an awful loss, there has also been some debate about the gravity of this human toll. We are encouraged, for example, to compare it to the number of innocent lives lost as the result of ongoing wars, ethnic cleansing, and other injustices, or natural disasters. As distasteful as such considerations and comparisons may be, they seem to be an important element in both the moral and policy discourse on just war in the post-9/11 context. In fact, contemplating the magnitude of death and destruction has always been an essential exercise when applying certain concepts inherited from the just war tradition.
Whether or not the Bush administration takes the principles of just war theory seriously—some in the administration surely do—the U.S. government presumably has given quite a lot of thought to the level of destruction likely to be caused by future terrorist attacks, and under various scenarios. I believe that the administration’s main violations of just war principles, and its apparent departure from prevailing interpretations of international law, can be partly explained by its estimate of the potential destruction that may be caused by subsequent terrorist attacks on the American homeland. Critics of U.S. strategy and tactics in the war on terror argue that American actions are nevertheless disproportionate to the probable threats the nation faces; in fact, some tactics, like torture, are condemned by many as crossing moral and legal limits regardless of the level of threat the nation faces.

The most authoritative statement of the Bush administration’s approach to combating terrorism, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, contains many references to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). “As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction” (Bush 2002).¹ In casting the Iraq War as a battle in the larger war on terror, officials encouraged the American public to contemplate the devastation associated with atomic “mushroom clouds” in lieu of demanding a rock solid case for preemptive military action. As the President put it in his 2003 State of the Union address: “Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known” (Bush 2003). Outsiders cannot know for sure how much of this is hyperbole, but we ought to assume that massive human losses—tens of thousands or more—are considered a real possibility by the U.S. government.

In addition to the human losses, there are the economic costs. The New York City Comptroller estimated the property loss due to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center at $22 billion, and the lost future earnings of those killed at $9 billion. Other costs, such as business relocations and foregone tourism, represent losses for New York City but not net economic losses to the nation. Although these and other direct costs are not insignificant sums, they are the smallest of the economic costs associated with 9/11 (about one-quarter of 1 percent of GDP).²

We may have more to fear from fear itself. Everyone knows that floods, hurricanes, tornados, and other natural disasters recur and that we should be ready for them. But we go about our business. Unlike Mother Nature,
however, we think terrorists are aiming at us, and that makes us nervous. We do try to go about our business, but until Americans become more accustomed to terrorist attacks, or until we are confident that our enemies have been defeated and that further attacks are unlikely, we behave with an additional measure of caution. Immediately following 9/11, this caution was most clearly manifest as a sharp decline in tourism, especially overseas tourism and air travel. After paying on claims related to the terrorist attacks, the insurance industry (which markets caution) substantially increased premiums in the aviation and tourism sectors, as well as in other areas such as shipping, commercial property, construction, and energy production.

The question of who profits—not only economically, but also politically—from this fear and caution is an interesting one, but it is safe to say that, from the perspective of the nation as a whole, it represents an overall drag on economic behavior and therefore a net cost. The big unknown is how high this cost might be in the aftermath of future terrorist strikes. The massive power failure in the northeast quadrant of the United States in August 2003 was instructive. Predictably, there was some panic and anxiety among those most directly affected: people trapped in darkened subway cars, traffic gridlock, and so on. But even far away in the Pacific Northwest, public places buzzed as cell phones brought news of the blackout and conversations immediately turned to the possibility that this was another al Qaeda attack. It wasn’t, but the point is that Americans were on edge after 9/11, and even though we are somewhat less jumpy today, it would not take much to bring the fear back.

This suggests that weapons need not produce mushroom clouds to cause mass destruction, especially in a modern, technology-dependent, and (as many say) “soft” society like the United States, unaccustomed in recent times to imposed hardships. The risk is not just due to the interconnectedness of our social and economic infrastructure, but also due to a social psychology that may serve to multiply the behavioral impact of any direct damage done in the form of human casualties, destroyed property, or the suspension of social services. Because the United States has experienced few direct attacks on its homeland, the government can only speculate as to their potential reverberations. The likely damage is unknowable, but potentially very great, and the Bush administration presumably takes it very seriously.

As hard as it is to estimate, this fear factor is only heightened by any perceived ineffectiveness in the U.S. government’s campaign against terrorist networks. And here is the special challenge presented by the nation’s current enemies: nonstate actors fighting a jihad cannot be deterred. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were prepared to sacrifice themselves to strike
a blow at the United States. Their willingness to die for the cause was not impulsive; these were not decisions in desperation or the heat of battle to give one’s life for comrades or country, but premeditated, carefully planned actions undertaken by individuals devoted to a struggle ordained by some sort of religious authority. That their jihad may not be consistent with Koranic or other Islamic teachings is not relevant to the unique threat this type of warrior poses.

Deterring terrorism or any other form of attack requires that the would-be attacker attaches greater value to something the deterrer is in a position to deny than to the attack itself (or its expected consequences). Jihadists, at least the type al Qaeda was able to recruit for 9/11, are not deterrable because there is nothing in the earthly realm, not even their lives, that meets this requirement. As nonstate actors without responsibility for the security and well-being of a political community, the threat of reprisal is also ineffective. Suicide bombers often do have families that might be punished, but Israel’s policy of bulldozing the homes of bombers’ families never seemed to meet with much success. A strategy involving more draconian reprisals has not been tried; they have probably been contemplated, but judged counterproductive.

The early years of the cold war were marked by bouts of public fear and anxiety as it became clear that the superpowers were developing nuclear force postures and strategies that involved holding each other’s population hostage; a nuclear first strike would bring on a retaliatory attack and the “assured destruction” of the aggressor. Over time, however, the fear and anxiety subsided and the general public came to regard nuclear war between the superpowers as nearly implausible. Americans believed that the Russians were deterrable, and vice versa. But we think that al Qaeda and its ilk are not deterrable and cannot be punished, and this knowledge keeps public fear from fully dissipating as long as these terrorist networks exist and are assumed to have some capacity to strike at the American homeland.

Obviously, Americans are now not paralyzed by the terrorist threat. Aside from longer lines at airport checkpoints and a general awareness that we are more vulnerable than we thought here at home, our day-to-day behavior is almost indistinguishable from what is was before 9/11. But neither do we know our tipping point. It may require only a few well-planned and faithfully executed attacks to get us very close, and this prospect may be especially worrisome for the Bush administration—perhaps more worrisome than any direct damage, including casualties, inflicted by those attacks. Americans would ultimately adjust to the new circumstances; paralysis, if it came, would be temporary. But the process of recovery and
adaptation to an environment perceived as substantially more threatening will alter our rather comfortable way of life.

All of this is very speculative, of course. We don’t know the likelihood of future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, the magnitude of the immediate damage they could cause, or the extent to which the fear they induce might reverberate, imposing indirect costs and social dislocations. Even coming up with probability distributions for attacks and direct losses is a major challenge, which is why the insurance industry has had so much difficulty pricing the risk (Major 2002; Woo 2002). But the likelihood that the United States will be hit hard again need not be terribly high for the “expected destruction”—that is, the destruction produced by the attack discounted by its probability—to prompt extreme measures by the U.S. government. In my view, this sort of risk assessment has pushed the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy beyond certain limits drawn by the just war tradition.

**Sufficient Threat**

Probably the most controversial element in what has now come to be known as the Bush doctrine is preemptive war. The administration’s *National Security Strategy* is forthright: “In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.” The administration’s reconceptualization of preemption, at least for purposes of conducting the war on terror, is a departure from the *jus ad bellum* criterion found in just war theory. It is not without some justification, however, and may (if not taken too far) accord with the underlying logic of self-defense employed by some just war theorists themselves. Its application to Iraq in 2003 is another matter altogether.

The Bush administration, in making its case for striking preemptively, points out that international law has long recognized states’ rights to attack first when presented with an imminent danger (see Yoo 2003). The danger does have to be imminent, though, if preemption is to be subsumed under the international legal concept of self-defense. In *The Rights of War and Peace*, Hugo Grotius (1901 [1625], 268) writes thus, “to authorize hostilities as a defensive measure, they must arise from the necessity, which just apprehensions create; apprehensions not only of the power, but of the intentions of a formidable state, and such apprehensions as amount to a moral certainty.” Political scientists, historians, and legal scholars have long distinguished between preemptive war and other anticipatory uses of force, like “preventive war,” and it was the latter that Grotius (1901 [1625], 83)
was anxious to condemn:

Some writers have advanced the doctrine which can never be admitted, maintaining that the law of nations authorises one power to commence hostilities against another, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. As a matter of expediency such a measure may be adopted, but the principles of justice can never be advanced in its favor. . . . To maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future annoyance from a neighbouring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity.

Many critics of the Bush administration’s war on Iraq maintained that this was not a case of preemptive self-defense, but rather the sort of preventive war that has never been sanctioned by just war theory or international law. The war certainly did not fit the customary legal definition of preemption, but neither was it a preventive war as such wars are normally understood. A preventive war is one launched by a state in order to head off a disadvantageous shift in the balance of power (e.g., Levy 2002, 354). This was Britain’s motivation (vis-à-vis France) during the War of the Spanish Succession and Germany’s motivation (vis-à-vis Russia) at the outset of World War I. Clearly, the United States had nothing to fear from Iraq in this regard, even if it did have nuclear weapons and the intention to use them or supply them to others. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the only plausible challengers to U.S. preponderance are China and a unified Europe.

This is not to say that the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq was a just war of preemptive self-defense. Few believe that to be the case, no matter what the other justifications may be. Yet the nature of the threat posed by contemporary global terrorism does challenge the suitability of the conventional interpretation of legitimate preemption. This is due, in part, to the fact that the war on terror is not the kind of conflict that the just war tradition and international law evolved to regulate; one or more parties to this conflict are nonstate actors, and the spatial and temporal boundaries of war itself are ill-defined. Who and where are we fighting, and for how long? How do we know when the war is over? Although this unfamiliar context may make it difficult to apply just war criteria—both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*—those interested in preserving the normative force of just war theory need to consider whether its principles can and should adapt to new realities, on the assumption that these new realities are likely to persist.

Even in the more familiar context of wars between states, Michael Walzer (1977) has argued that the “legalist paradigm” may be too restrictive
in regard to preemptive self-defense. The bar was set high by the *Caroline* precedent (1842), in which U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, while acknowledging Britain’s right to preemptive self-defense as a matter of principle, rejected their attack on the *Caroline* as unlawful. Although the American vessel was supplying Canadian rebels, the threat to the British was not, in Webster’s view, “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation” (Malanczuk 1997, 314). Walzer wants to set the bar lower, at what he calls “sufficient threat.” States are sufficient threats when they intend to injure us and are actively preparing to do so, and when our failure to strike first heightens the risk substantially.

His example is the Six Day War of 1967. Egypt may not have been making preparations to immediately attack Israel, but the joint mobilization of Arab military forces, as well as Egypt’s blockade of the Strait of Tiran was an ominous development. If the positioning of Arab forces was allowed to continue, Israel might be subject to an attack at the time of the enemy’s choosing, and there was little doubt that the choice would be made—if not now, then at some point in the near future. Walzer (1977, 84) describes the Israeli mood at the time:

[R]umors of coming disasters were endlessly repeated; frightened men and women raided food shops, buying up their entire stock, despite government announcements that there were ample reserves; thousands of graves were dug in the military cemeteries; Israel’s political and military leaders lived on the edge of nervous exhaustion. . . . Israeli anxiety during those weeks seems an almost classical case of “just fear”—first, because Israel really was in danger (as foreign observers readily agreed), and second, because it was Nasser’s intention to put it in danger.

Walzer contends that this danger was serious; Israel’s failure to act would have placed in jeopardy its territorial integrity and political independence.

In its *National Security Strategy*, the Bush administration asserts that “the United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” In the abstract, that sounds very much like Walzer’s revision of the legalist paradigm (which is not uncontroversial). As applied to the war on terror, however, the Bush doctrine lowers the bar to preemptive self-defense still further; the administration reserves for itself—and presumably other states engaged in the war on terror—greater latitude in regard to both the timing and the targets of preemptive attack.
The “sufficient threat” presented by contemporary global terrorism is said to derive from the proliferation of WMD and the enemy’s intention (and capacity) to use them against us. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that groups like al Qaeda can operate covertly in the United States, camouflaged by the diversity and tolerance found in American society, especially in urban areas. Legislation like the Patriot Act and the added precaution that settled over the land since 9/11 has constricted would-be terrorists’ freedom of maneuver somewhat but has not fundamentally changed the country’s vulnerability, one shared by most other advanced Western societies. The main impediment to a catastrophic terrorist strike at the American homeland is the difficulty these groups may have acquiring WMD and then getting them across U.S. borders. If this can be accomplished, the execution of the attack is much less likely to confront major hurdles. The United States is a target rich environment and, as I conjectured in the previous section, the immediate death and destruction of an attack will be only part of the total loss.

The covert means by which the 9/11 attacks came, and future attacks are likely to come, prompted the Bush administration to formulate a strategy that “adapt[s] the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” Again, setting aside the Iraq War as probably a misappropriation of the revised concept of imminent threat, the administration’s logic, at least, seems compelling and in some respects consistent with principle of self-defense contained in just war doctrine. If an impending attack at time $t$ is not signaled by the visible mobilization of enemy forces at $t - 1$, then the last opportunity for preemptive self-defense—if there is any opportunity at all—will come sometime before $t - 1$, when the attack is in fact not imminent. Luban (2004, 230) puts it this way: “The trajectory of the rogue state makes it an ‘imminent’ attacker, provided that we characterize imminence in probabilistic rather than temporal terms.” We assume the attack will come, eventually, once this last opportunity to prevent it passes (unless we are lucky). Thus, even before our attackers are at the doorstep, we may have “a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk” (Walzer 1977, 81).

The more significant departure from just war theory and customary international law is the latitude the Bush administration claims with respect to the targets of preemptive self-defense. That the concept of imminent threat needs to be adapted to take into account the destructive potential of enemy attacks and the covert means of delivering them is compelling. But the National Security Strategy also includes a great many statements and assumptions about our adversaries and their intentions. Rogue states—epitomized
by the “axis of evil”: Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Iran, and North Korea—“reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands . . . We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the United States and our allies and friends.” If a sufficient threat to the nation may not be visible until it is too late, then preemption can only be based on some earlier manifest intent to injure. In the case of Israel’s anticipatory attack in 1967, not only was there a visible mobilization, but Israel had ample reason to believe that the frontline Arab states intended to do it harm. In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, an analogous claim by the Bush administration was much less believable. What was more believable, though not necessarily true, was that the Iraqi regime had, or intended to develop, weapons of mass destruction and was willing to provide them to al Qaeda, which really did intend to do harm to the Americans. Even if it was true, there is little in just war theory or international law that would sanction the war as an act of preemptive self-defense.

Prevailing conceptions of *jus ad bellum* do change over time, but if the Bush administration was interested in seeing its revised principle of preemptive self-defense become the basis for a new international legal norm, then invoking self-defense to justify regime change in Iraq did that aim a disservice. A large portion of the international community, and a majority within the UN Security Council, did not believe that the Ba’ath regime constituted a sufficient threat to the security of the United States, or any other state, and the information that came to light after the occupation, especially the absence of WMD programs, only added to the skepticism. Still, as Drumbl (2003, 424) suggests, the international community does seem receptive to the idea that the traditional criteria for legitimate preemption need updating. “There is more going on here that the United States going its own way through the aspirations of one particular administration. For a variety of reasons, many states in diverse parts of the world support a more liberal use of violence to curb terrorists and mitigate the risk that rogue states may assist them.”

The danger here, as illustrated by the Iraq War, is that an assessment of “the nature and motivations of these new adversaries,” as the *National Security Strategy* puts it, and not just their active preparation to attack, becomes the smoking gun, a subjective criterion that is obviously subject to abuse. Little in just war doctrine or international law provides guidance for establishing evil intent, or the aiding and abetting of those with evil intent, aside from visible actions. When the “nature and motivation” of our adversaries becomes a just cause for war, *jus ad bellum* has probably been stretched beyond recognition.
Emergency Ethics

American society is at risk, the U.S. government maintains, and although such warnings are often packaged for public consumption, I think (but cannot prove) that there is more to this than simple fear-mongering. It seems to account for the Bush administration’s insistence on greater latitude for the exercise of self-defense, and similar fears motivate other governments’ receptivity to a revised conception of preemptive self-defense, even if some view the Iraq War as a misapplication. Analogous developments are evident as well in the norms governing the conduct of war, *jus in bello*.

The central pillar in *jus in bello*, and the foundation of international humanitarian law (the law of war), is the principle of discrimination, or noncombatant immunity. From this general prohibition—that those, like civilians, who are not members of the opposing armed forces (or armed partisans) should not be targeted—comes the set of rules regulating the treatment of captured combatants. For enemy soldiers, once captured, no longer present a danger to us or our armed forces and, in effect, have become noncombatants. The U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were criticized for causing an undue number of civilian deaths, despite the widespread use of discriminating smart weapons. Confirmed numbers are hard to come by, but if the U.S. invasion force was guilty of transgressing just war limits, those are the limits set by the principle of proportionality, which would encompass unintentional civilian deaths. There are probably few cases in which the military took deliberate aim at civilian targets. In any event, I want to focus on the treatment of prisoners.

There is no public document, like the *National Security Strategy*, laying out the Bush administration’s strategy or tactics for collecting information pertinent to the war on terror, but there is evidence that the administration means to push the limits of international humanitarian law, and perhaps also human rights law. The controversy over the Afghan detainees held at the U.S. military base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, provided the first indication. The relocation of captured fighters from the theater of war to another site outside the territorial United States raised suspicions that the U.S. military viewed the detainees as something other than prisoners of war with rights defined by the Third Geneva Convention (1949). The Bush administration’s response was that the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan were considered “unlawful combatants” and therefore were not entitled to POW status when captured. The balance of international legal opinion disputed the administration’s classification of Taliban fighters as unlawful combatants; they were clearly members of Afghanistan’s regular armed forces. Al Qaeda fighters, on the other hand, generally failed to
meet the lawful combatancy requirements for irregular forces—operating under a chain of command, wearing distinctive insignia, carrying their arms openly, and observing the laws of war—which otherwise allow opposing forces to distinguish them from noncombatants immune from attack. Taliban fighters who conducted themselves so as to blur such distinctions may be tried for war crimes, but they did not forfeit their status as lawful combatants and, once in captivity, POWs.

In asserting maximum latitude in the treatment of detainees, the Bush administration’s aim was to avail itself of every opportunity to extract information. Unprotected by POW rights, the captives could be interrogated, and the conditions of captivity and the methods of interrogation, the administration hoped, would not be subject to the same strictures as would apply in the territorial United States. U.S. courts did rein in the administration somewhat, asserting their own jurisdiction on certain matters, but the executive branch nevertheless retained a good deal of leeway. Nothing, however, could strip the detainees of their basic human rights, which are not contingent on meeting the requirements of lawful combatancy or noncombatancy. They should not be murdered; they should not be tortured.

The Guantánamo detentions and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, as well as the apprehension of terrorist masterminds Ramzi bin al Shibh and Khalid Sheik Mohamed, generated the sort of public debate on the pros and cons of torture that was taboo before 9/11. Alan Dershowitz, who was perhaps most responsible for bringing the discussion to the surface, has floated the idea of a court-issued “torture warrant” allowing the application of extreme force, medically supervised, designed to extract information from a “tick- ing bomb terrorist”—an individual who has set in motion an attack that will kill a large number of innocent civilians and who possesses the information necessary to avert it (Dershowitz 2002, ch. 4). If asked, many of us—probably more than care to admit it—would affirm the use of torture in such cases. But even among those willing to see torture used to stop this kind of attack, the notion of a court-issued warrant causes unease.

One reason for the unease is the presence of moral dilemma that Walzer (1973) and others have labeled “dirty hands.” Torture is bad; most countries, including the United States, have signed an international convention saying so and have pledged not to do it. Bombing innocent civilians is also bad, and we may be prepared to tolerate one evil to prevent another, but are we prepared to license it? Dershowitz believes we are hypocrites if we do not make some attempt to regulate by law what we all suspect has gone on in places like Camp X-Ray, Abu Ghraib, Bagram Air Base, and other detention centers doubling as outposts for the collection of intelligence. “Rendering” suspected terrorists to other countries, such as Egypt or
Pakistan, whose intelligence services may have fewer qualms about the use of torture is not, morally speaking, any better. When we look the other way, we say that torture is not, in fact, categorically wrong; it depends on the circumstances, which we hope are rare, and the likelihood that interrogators will get the information they need. Now we can leave it to the intelligence services to determine the circumstances and estimate the likelihood of success, in which case we continue to look the other way. Or we can create a system in which a judicial magistrate makes the final call by issuing, or refusing to issue, a torture warrant.

Critics of Dershowitz’s proposal worry about the slippery slope: if today we are willing to license torture in situations of extreme emergency, then tomorrow we may want to use it to confront less extreme dangers; and if today we are willing to torture the “ticking bomb terrorist,” then tomorrow we may try it on the probable terrorist, or the probable terrorist’s loved ones. But a criticism from the standpoint of “dirty hands” is somewhat different. Torture is wrong, always. If we are forced by emergency circumstances to resort to torture, so be it; but that does not make it right, even under those circumstances. Perhaps we have managed to save many innocent lives, but we still have dirty hands, and that should bother us. Any form of legal sanction, torture warrants included, permits us to be unbothered, to do bad things with clean hands.

The same moral dilemma has presented itself in the more familiar context of interstate war. Walzer’s (1977) example, a controversial one, is the Allied bombing of German cities during World War II. He argues that from 1940 to 1942 Britain faced a “supreme emergency.” The emergency existed because the prospect of Britain’s defeat by German forces was clear and present; British defenses were on the verge of collapse. The emergency was supreme because, from the perspective of those contemplating defeat, “Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (Walzer 1977, 253). This compound prospect, namely the disaster of Nazi victory and its imminence, left the British no other choice but to bomb German cities, an unambiguous violation of jus in bello. Walzer’s position is that a supreme emergency may provide an excuse for the commission of a wrongful act, but not a justification. Those who justify such acts fail to see their dirty hands.

Critics of Walzer’s position on the Allied bombings either refuse to admit exceptions to noncombatant immunity or dispute his assessment of the Nazi danger as an empirical matter. As a principle, though, supreme emergency sets the bar very high. The U.S. bombing of Japanese cities did
not clear it, in Walzer’s view, nor did the Allied bombing of German cities after 1942 when Britain’s defeat no longer loomed. Applied to the question of torture, the closest approximation is indeed the case of the ticking bomb terrorist. However, although “ticking bomb” implies an imminent threat and therefore an emergency, there is nothing in the hypothetical example suggesting that the consequences of a consummated attack, as terrible as they may be, necessarily qualify as “supreme” in Walzer’s sense. It is when entire political communities are in jeopardy that we have a supreme threat: “For the survival and freedom of political communities—whose members share a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children—are the highest values of international society” (Walzer 1977, 254). Whether the survival of subsets of political communities, in whatever numbers, can excuse such acts as torture would seem to require the kind of utilitarian calculation he wants to avoid.

Even if we are willing to depart from the deontological position that torture is always and everywhere wrong, then the conclusion, from the consequentialist position, may well be that it is practically always and everywhere wrong. If we are to license torture, by court order or some other mechanism, the good ends requiring bad means will depend on a joint probability estimate being sufficiently high. There must be a high probability that (1) the individual subject to interrogation has information, (2) which can be divulged by means of torture, and (3) when acted upon, will either prevent or mitigate a catastrophic human loss. Those willing to defend the use of torture under these circumstances may also want to require a high probability that a candidate for torture bears some guilt for the impending attack, otherwise we may be tempted to torture the innocent (e.g., the guilty party’s loved ones) in order to get the information we need; but this is not necessary for consequentialist argument. Without the guilt requirement, and assuming that the other three probabilities are estimable, an 80 percent probability of each—that the information is possessed, extractable, and actionable—yields a 50/50 chance of averting the loss. My guess is that most people affirming the emergency use of torture would expect better than even odds of success, but maybe that depends on the nature of the disaster one is asked to contemplate.

I have argued that we should take seriously the possibility that the Bush administration estimates the total cost of potential terrorist attacks on the American homeland to be an order of magnitude above the cost of 9/11, especially considering the economic reverberations and social paralysis that could follow. If this is the administration’s honest assessment, and not just hyperbole, and if imminence is understood not in strictly temporal terms but as a closing window of opportunity to avert catastrophe, then we may
be in a situation aptly described as a supreme emergency. Those who would excuse the use of torture as offering one of few remaining means of escaping these dire straits make a reasonable argument, I think. The problem is that very many of those who do excuse torture do not honestly believe that today we confront a supreme emergency. The public discourse—as sampled in college classrooms, around dinner tables, and on television news shows—suggests that many of us have set the bar rather lower than supreme emergency. If it were otherwise, then changing the hypothetical torture victim from the ticking bomb terrorist to, say, the terrorist’s innocent children would not lead to so many defections from the pro-torture position. Given what we know (as a public), our situation has not gotten so desperate that we are ready for such distasteful utilitarian calculations. Our readiness to talk torture, in my view, has more to do with the guilt we assume is attached to the terrorist suspects held in captivity. This has important implications for the applicability of just war doctrine to the war on terror, which I address in the last section.

Irrespective of the prevailing view within the U.S. government as to the magnitude and proximity of the threat to the country, many have accused the Bush administration of seeking to loosen the confines of international human rights law. A now infamous memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales argued thus:

[K]nowledge alone that a particular result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent . . . Thus, even if the defendant [i.e., the accused torturer] knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith. Instead, a defendant is guilty of torture only if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person within his custody or physical control. (Office of the Assistant Attorney General 2002, 4)

Put differently, if the objective is to extract information from a detainee, and the infliction of severe pain merely the means to do so, then there is no intent to commit torture. Even when there is specific intent to torture, “the victim must experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result. If that pain is psychological . . ., these acts must cause long-term mental harm” (Office of the Assistant Attorney General 2002, 13). Otherwise, the infliction of severe pain has not risen to the level of torture. Other memos circulated by
administration lawyers argued that the president’s authority as commander in chief allowed him to approve any technique, including torture, as was necessary to safeguard the nation’s security; neither international nor domestic anti-torture law constrained that authority.

President Bush and his cabinet officials distanced themselves from such positions, insisting that they were merely exploratory and, yes, the administration was committed to upholding laws against torture. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that these legal analyses, like the discussion of torture warrants, are indicative of our government’s and our society’s willingness to contemplate actions that before 9/11 we once agreed were beyond the pale. This becomes easier if dirty hands don’t look so dirty.

Crossing Just War Boundaries

Just war doctrine establishes boundaries that states should not cross when they have disputes and armies should not cross when they are called upon to fight. The most important of these are codified in the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. Although the U.S.-led war on terror is not exactly the type of war that just war doctrine and international law evolved to regulate, a common view—not only among those outside government, but also inside government—is that crossing just war boundaries is a very serious matter. Yet the principles delimiting them are under pressure; the boundaries are being pushed outward in an effort to provide for “self-defense” and “military necessity” in an unfamiliar context. This is certainly a cause for concern. At the same time, it is somewhat reassuring that the most controversial elements of the Bush administration’s war on terror—the reconceptualization of preemptive war and prisoners’ rights—have sought to redefine the boundaries rather than reject them outright.

Another, more fundamental boundary in just war theory may also be in danger, that separating *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. And if this one disintegrates then we really will find ourselves on unfamiliar moral terrain. The *National Security Strategy* identifies our new adversaries as terrorists and rogue states whose nature and motivations are unlike those we have confronted in the past. That our enemies are described in such terms is remarkable; ongoing wars, hot and cold, are often accompanied by images of the enemy as inherently evil and bent on our destruction (e.g., Dower 1986). In traditional interstate wars, however, and in just war theory, we distinguish between those with aggressive designs and those who are merely the agents of aggression. The agents of aggression, those who do the fighting, can and do inflict harm, so they may be killed or held captive. Our own fighters, who we are inclined to see as the agents of our self-defense,
also inflict harm, and therefore may be killed or held captive by our enemy. Soldiers on both sides, when they are fighting, have lost their right to life. Likewise, when they have stopped fighting—because they have been captured or otherwise incapacitated—they regain their right to life, and other basic human rights as well. Those are the rules of war we have settled on.

The rules are not always followed, of course. Supreme emergencies test our commitment to the rules, which is sometimes lacking. Our willingness to cross \textit{jus in bello} boundaries on the battlefield suggests that the evil designs of our enemies cannot be put totally out of mind. Those who do the fighting bring on emergencies; the nature and motivations of their political leaders are what make the emergencies supreme. Thus, when we suspend the rules of war, denying noncombatants their rights even for a short time, it is hard to escape the conclusion that we now attach to them some of the guilt normally reserved for political leaders who commit the crime of aggression. Walzer (1977, 21) says: “War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.” But in supreme emergencies we seem unable to make those judgments independently: the means we adopt are justified (or perhaps only excused) by the reasons we have for fighting. We have crossed a boundary at the very core of just war doctrine (Orend 2000, 127–133).

In the war on terror, we find this boundary easier to cross, especially when it comes to stateless terrorist organizations. After all, terror networks like al Qaeda are composed not of conscripts or professional military personnel, but of enthusiastic jihadists who are anxious to do us harm, and in ways we find reprehensible. They don’t follow the rules, why should we? Are the rules even relevant? We can’t judge this war twice. Their side consists only of willing combatants, and they are not always the kind of combatants (lawful or unlawful) that the Geneva Convention recognizes, for the war on terror is not always the kind of war the Convention recognizes. Their zealotry and the covert nature of their combat means that, even in captivity, terrorists continue to fight by virtue of their silence; only after we make them talk have they ceased doing us harm.

These are common sentiments on our side, and they are perhaps not wholly unreasonable in a society traumatized by 9/11. They do, however, contribute to an erosion of the moral foundations of just war theory as applied in this admittedly unfamiliar context. The laws of war extend privileges to lawful combatants—POW rights, most notably, but also others—that are denied to unlawful combatants, who are criminals not because (or only because) they violate \textit{jus in bello}, but because they are not licensed to fight in the first place. Yet the laws of war do not suspend unlawful
combatants’ basic human rights. However egregious their offences, international law says that such detainees may not be murdered, mutilated, or tortured. If the war on international terrorism really does require a new set of rules, are we prepared to rewrite this one as well? If during truly supreme emergencies, and even not-so-supreme emergencies, we have become willing to cross the line that now exists, we ought to be troubled by the direction we are heading.

When the war on international terrorism is extended, justly or unjustly, to rogue states like Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, we are squarely on the familiar ground of *jus in bello* and international humanitarian law. Fortunately, U.S. transgressions—epitomized by the Guantánamo detentions and the debacle of Abu Ghraib—have met with near-universal condemnation, and profound skepticism was a common response to the Bush administration’s claim that blame was not to be found up the chain of command (Danner 2004; Hersh 2004). Dirty wars are fought, and directed, by people not bothered by dirty hands. Our enemies, according the *National Security Strategy*, “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” The challenge is to defeat them without sacrificing anything for which we stand.

**Notes**

My thanks to Bruce Russett and Craig Carr for comments on an earlier draft.

1. All quotes from the *National Security Strategy* come from chapter V: “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

2. Studies of the economic costs of the 9/11 attacks are summarized by the General Accounting Office (2002).

3. Luban (2004) argues that preemptive war can be seen as a special case of preventive war. A preventive war is directed against a probable attacker, given its intent and power trajectory. A preemptive war is directed against a probable attacker, whose intent and power trajectory have culminated in its preparation to strike imminently.

4. Walzer, like most other just war theorists, rejects even this relaxed criterion as a justification for the 2003 war against Iraq. See, e.g., Walzer (2004, ch. 11).

5. Although Gaddis (2004) argues that this looser notion of imminent threat, and therefore the right of preemption, has been part of U.S. national security doctrine since the administration of John Quincy Adams.

6. For a useful recent philosophical discussion of why torture is wrong, if not always then almost always, see Sussman (2005).
7. These are among the “fundamental guarantees” found in the 1977 Geneva Protocols governing international and noninternational armed conflicts (see Article 75 of Protocol I and Article 4 of Protocol II). Although the United States has not ratified the Protocols, it considers most of the provisions binding as customary international law (Erikkson 2004, 276).
CHAPTER 14

STRATEGIC LOGIC AND THE ETHICS OF KILLING: FROM DRESDEN TO THE GULF WAR

J. Bryan Hehir

In Bruce Russett’s extensive record of publication there is a 1972 article devoted to the topic of a “countercombatant” strategy of deterrence (Russett 1972). Since then, over three decades, Russett has maintained an acute scholarly interest in the intersection of strategic policy and moral analysis. In the 1970s, Russett was already a well-established and respected figure in the academic world of international relations and foreign policy, and he helped to initiate a new level of strategic sophistication in the dialogue about ethics, war, and politics. Later in his career he added a distinctive second contribution in his work with the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference on the pastoral letter on the nuclear age, “The Challenge of Peace,” when he was principal consultant to the committee chaired by the late Cardinal Joseph Bernardin.

My purpose here is to acknowledge his continued interest in the ethics of war and politics by focusing on one theme in this broader narrative, the analysis of the *jus in bello* in public and policy arguments surrounding U.S. military engagements. In doing so, I too will be crossing the boundary between basic research and policy prescription, as well as the boundary between empirical and normative analysis. The relevant narrative runs from World War II through the war in Iraq. The storyline is a mix of moral analysis, strategic planning, and the debates about a series of quite different
wars involving the United States. A full case history, analyzing each of the wars, goes beyond the limits of this chapter, but a selective assessment of the normative and strategic dimensions of U.S. policy can highlight the main themes of a continuing conversation. To some degree the story exhibits a learning curve for the professional military and the American public. The chapter begins with a commentary on the ethical tradition from which Russett and others have worked, the classical Just-War doctrine. Then we go on to analyze how that tradition has been used in World War II, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. Finally we will offer a comment about the status of *jus in bello* today.

**The Just-War Tradition: The Role of *jus in bello***

Bruce Russett, like other major figures in international relations and foreign policy, relies on an ancient politico-moral argument to measure modern war. The Just-War ethic is best understood as a tradition of moral analysis, not a single theory. It has roots in classical political philosophy, took its basic shape in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (+430), then was developed over the next 1,600 years by a number of authors and disciplines. The tradition is rooted in a religious–theological worldview, but its principal analytical edge is moral; the moral argument in turn served as a basis for much of international law, and the moral–legal mix of Just-War and the Laws of War is today used by political analysts, strategists, and the media whenever war is contemplated or fought (Russell 1977; Johnson 1981).

The tradition of Just-War never disappeared as a resource, but it certainly was marginalized in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The revival of the tradition began as a reflection by theologians about how absent moral analysis had been during World War II. When the devastation of that war brought not simply peace but the cold war, key figures in the Protestant and Catholic traditions, in Europe and the United States, sought to reshape the ancient ethic to meet the demands of what Raymond Aron called the century of total war.

Two major voices in the Catholic and Protestant churches catalyzed a return to and revival of Just-War arguments in the 1960s. John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1960), argued that Just-War was a major element in Catholic moral theology, and that American Catholics had a responsibility to review, revise, and revitalize this guide for personal conscience and public policy. Paul Ramsey (1968) of Princeton acknowledged the historic Catholic cultivation of the ethic, but saw it as the common property of the Christian tradition, and undertook personally a wide-ranging retrieval and
revision of the tradition. The joint effort paid off over the next 30 years in a substantial renewal of Just-War scholarship, in a return of ethical discourse about war in the religious community and in the necessity for governments to explain their policies in more than purely strategic terms to their publics. A major contribution to this process was the scholarship of Michael Walzer. The extensive use of his *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* in colleges and universities, as well as in military academies and war colleges, testified to the impact of his research and writing.

These authors and their students were either theologians or moral philosophers; a new stage in the use of Just-War ethics appeared in the 1970s and 1980s when scholars such as Bruce Russett explicitly joined their political and strategic analysis with moral analysis. Stanley Hoffmann, Hedley Bull, William O’Brien, and Joseph S. Nye exemplify a broader spectrum of analysts whose work has expanded the reach and relevance of the ethical tradition.

The concern of this chapter is focused on one aspect of the tradition, the *jus in bello*, or “just means” test for war. An initial step for doing this is to make an historical note. Most students of the Just-War tradition locate its foundation in Augustine of Hippo. There clearly were classical antecedents to Augustine, but his work has over time served as a baseline for the tradition. The tradition itself has become more complex and expansive in the criteria used to assess warfare. Augustine’s three tests for “Just-War” were: (1) just cause; (2) proper authority; and (3) right intention. By contrast James Childress’s authoritative article (1982) on the contemporary meaning of the tradition identifies seven distinct tests for a Just-War. The development of the tradition has been organic in style, but also pluralistic in outcome; this is the reason for not describing it as a tightly coherent theory. A dominant faultline in the development of the tradition has been the shift in emphasis from the *jus ad bellum* criteria to *jus in bello*. The word emphasis is key because the two broad aspects of the tradition (i.e., whether war is justified and how to wage a justified war) have always been used together. But the first millennium of the tradition, running from Augustine through Aquinas to the Reformation, placed primary emphasis on the criteria that justify resort to force at all.

Faced with the newly emergent sovereign states of Europe whose rulers acknowledged neither secular nor religious authorities, the theologians of war in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries maintained the *jus ad bellum* tests, but concluded that the more secure restraint on force lay in efforts to contain the methods and means of war. This strategic shift yielded an extensive development of the criteria assessing strategy and tactics.
The classical *jus in bello* tests illustrated the complex moral structure of the ethic. The twin principles of noncombatant immunity (often called the principle of discrimination) and proportionality reflect two distinct methods for measuring the moral character of conducting war. The first prohibits the directly intended targeting or killing of civilians. The principle is the product of multiple premises. First, it ties the criteria on means to the fundamental justification for war: the moral rationale for war is that evil is being done and must be stopped or prevented. But this means that only those whose activities are substantially related to the war are open to attack. Second, because of this criterion there is no possibility that an entire society legitimately becomes a target of attack; the distinction between civilian and combatant is complex at times but always open to specification. Third, the principle does not mean that *any* deaths of civilians automatically amounts to a moral violation of the ethic of war. The concept of “directly intended” seeks to identify when the killing of civilians is either the objective of a strategy or a chosen means to its success. Civilians killed in spite of purposeful attempts not to target them are tragic results but not morally culpable actions. Of all the criteria in the Just-War tradition, this principle is the most definitive barrier to specific choices about war. Among authors using the Just-War ethic, there have been debates about the definition of the principle, but it has been at the heart of all modern arguments about war.

The second principle, proportionality, brings a different lens to the conduct of war. The distinguishing mark of discrimination is its identification of actions that are prohibited apart from the consequences they produce. Proportionality, by definition, is tied to a calculus of outcomes. It holds that actions that are rightly targeted and executed can still be morally wrong if the force used exceeds reasonable objectives. In the analysis of the strategy and tactics of war, the way these two criteria of *jus in bello* are invoked is crucial to maintaining their integrity. The primary test of the morality of strategy and tactics is always the principle of discrimination. Failure to pass this test—at least in the standard definition of the principle—indicts the strategy *ipso facto*. The judgment made is the difference between justifiable killing and a form of murder. Only when the discrimination test has been met is the proportionality test invoked. The latter test is always contested territory; it is in the nature of a proportionality judgment that it is always open to debate (Ramsey 1968, 308).

Two additional commentaries are needed to understand the status of the discrimination principle in the analysis of war. First, I believe it is accurate to hold that the principle has traditionally been understood as an “exceptionless rule,” that is, one that binds moral agents absolutely. John Finnis,
for example, commenting on Aquinas’s position on war, summarizes the traditional case: “And the norm which synthesizes his position on killing—‘killing the innocent . . . is always wrong, as a matter of natural law’—is subject to no exceptions, whatever the circumstances” (1998, 287). Although this interpretation remains in possession, there are contemporary authors who in different ways erode the absolute character of the principle. William O’Brien (1981) argues that the history of the principle—a product of multiple sources in the medieval period—and the inability to reconcile the principle with the character of modern warfare combine to render the best interpretation of the principle as a presumption that can be overridden in specific cases. Nye (1986) finds wisdom in O’Brien’s restructured interpretation of discrimination, particularly as it applies to cases of nuclear deterrence. Obviously what is at stake here is not only how one reads the development of the Just-War tradition, but a philosophical debate about consequentialist and nonconsequentialist conceptions of morality. The latter extends beyond the debates about the ethics of war and to some degree arises because the Just-War criteria have become a topic of interest to scholars and analysts who do not share broader common ground with theorists of the Natural Law tradition.

Second, the extension of the classical Just-War criteria into the realm of deterrence theory added new complexity to the configuration of Just-War analysts. For some the moral theory that best corresponded to the problem of deterrence was a version of consequentialism. Insofar as professional analysts attended to the moral dimensions of strategic deterrence this option was the one often adopted—usually without extensive argumentation. Other analysts recognized from the outset a deeper range of questions, namely, did effective deterrence inevitably tend to holding civilian populations as hostages. This is the problem Bruce Russett addressed in his writing, precisely because a purely consequentialist case, without attending to the principle of discrimination, was radically inadequate for a traditional conception of the Just-War concern for civilians. Others, like Nye, shared Russett’s concern, but the shared concern then had to be tested by how absolutely the discrimination principle was weighed.

A third test in the deterrence debate was the role of intentionality, that is, the intention of the actors pursuing a policy of deterrence that in turn became evident in the steps they were willing to condone and to take in the event deterrence failed. Here the split was not simply between those who placed civilians at the heart of the moral evaluation of deterrence and those who did not, but it was between those who invoked the connection between intention and action (what cannot be done, cannot be intended) and those who gave intentionality a far less binding power in the assessment
of deterrence policy. The first group stressed an ancient insight: intention involved a willingness to act, even if never fulfilled; that willingness to act in an immoral fashion in turn shaped the character of the actors planning, supporting, or standing ready to fulfill the action. Hence the implied or explicit willingness to strike civilian centers at some point in a strategic exchange already implicated the policy and its supporters in evil. The second group of analysts, even when seeking to protect civilians from direct attack, distinguished between a capacity to act, a threat to act and the intention to fulfill an action. While recognizing the tradition of Just-War ethics, these authors relativized the traditional linkage between intention and action and they often combined this move with an assertion about the need to include a consequential calculus in any assessment of deterrence, even if they resisted a purely consequentialist position. Bruce Russett’s work from his 1974 article through his 1984 article in *International Security*, and particularly in his role drafting the Catholic Bishops letter on the ethics of strategy, has been notable for his efforts to hold to the inner logic of the principle of discrimination and to relate it coherently to a range of strategic issues.

**Strategic Bombing and *jus in bello***

It is commonly recognized by both political analysts and philosophers or theologians that imposing ethical restraints on war is a unique normative challenge. In his classical essay on “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber (1958) focused on the difficulty of following either ethical or religious convictions in the world of politics. Realists from Thucydides to Aron have taken the added step of highlighting the special challenge of world politics—politics without an overarching authority or a strong fabric of law. The final step is to acknowledge the character of war and strategy from the other aspects of world politics. It is the hardest case.

The first test of an ethic is its internal foundation, its logical consistency, its clarity of purpose, and methods of inquiry and application. The second test is its ability to provide direction to human conduct at the level of personal conduct and institutional policies. This second test is the concern of this part of the chapter: examining the role of *jus in bello* in a series of policy choices. Detailed case studies lie beyond the scope of this chapter, but a synthetic comparative assessment stretching over 45 years highlights the changing role of *jus in bello* in U.S. policy.

**World War II**

The beginning of the narrative—strategically and ethically—is the bombing policy of the Axis powers and the Allies in World War II. Two
characteristics identify the importance of this case. On one hand, all the major powers violated *jus in bello* on a regular basis. On the other hand, these policies produced a moral analysis, unique in its rigor and precision, but without public effect on policy at the time. That analysis is a central feature of this chapter because it provided a modern restatement of the ancient moral tradition. Its author, John C. Ford, S.J., was the dominant figure in Catholic moral theology at the time he wrote the article “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing” in 1944. The article has served as a reference point in the last 50 years for those working in the Just-War tradition. What is striking about its tone and character is the sense Ford had that he was not breaking new ground in the essay. Its contents, as he saw them, simply made clear and precise what any moralist shaped by the Just-War ethic would say. At the outset of his analysis Ford (1944, 267–268) set forth his basic position:

I believe that it is possible for modern war to be used within the limits set by the laws of morality, and that resort to obliteration bombing is not an essential part of it, even when war is waged against an enemy who has no scruples in the matter . . . If anyone were to declare that modern war is necessarily total, and necessarily involves direct attack on the life of innocent civilians, and therefore that obliteration bombing is justified, my reply would be: So much the worse for modern war. If it necessarily includes such means, it is necessarily immoral in itself.

Ford then sets out to address the policy being pursued by the United States and the British. His description of the policy is drawn from official statements, with particular reference to General Arthur Harris of the RAF and General “Hap” Arnold of the USAF. The permanent value of the Ford article is not its originality but its precision and concrete character. Regarding the *strength* of the moral principle, Ford (1944, 272) acknowledges no exceptions to the principle of discrimination: “It is fundamental in the Catholic view that to take the life of an innocent person is always intrinsically wrong, that is, forbidden absolutely by natural law.” As to the *scope* of the principle, Ford goes to great lengths to discredit arguments being made in the 1940s to collapse the distinction between combatants and civilians. Regarding the latter, Ford (1944, 284) concludes that “though it is impossible to give accurate figures, from the proportion it can be maintained with complete certitude that they constitute the vast majority of the entire civil population even in war time.” On the basis of this analysis, Ford condemns the policy of obliteration bombing absolutely and without exception. He finds the policy pursued by and defended by the Allies in Europe unacceptable as a method of pursuing a “Just Cause.”
Two characteristics of the Ford article stand out in retrospect. First, its lack of influence in the U.S. debate and decision making about bombing policy. Explicit testimony of the inability of a case against targeting civilians to make its way into the upper reaches of the U.S. government is provided by McGeorge Bundy’s careful and authoritative account of the decision to use the atomic bomb against Hiroshima. Bundy traces the dramatic change in the stance of the U.S. government from explicit opposition to bombing civilians at the outset of the war (when the United States was not involved) to acceptance and endorsement of the tactic once American lives were at stake.

Of all the changes in war making wrought by experience and felt necessity in World War II, none is more remarkable than that which reversed both official and public attitudes toward the area bombing of cities. (Bundy 1988, 64)

Bundy’s narrative, focused on decision making about the bomb, culminates in his account of how the atomic bomb should be used to shorten the war. As Bundy puts it, among the central decision makers, “No one ever said simply, do not use it on a city at all” (1988, 95). While one can point to literature of various kinds opposing the policy of obliteration bombing, it is difficult to contest Bundy’s verdict that at the level of popular opinion and policy judgment the principle of noncombatant immunity was submerged and silenced during World War II.

The second notable characteristic of Ford’s article, however, is the post war reversal of public and policy views about obliteration bombing. The claim here must be precisely made: certainly not that civilians are well protected in war today; nor even that public opinion is a consistently reliable defense against indiscriminate warfare. Rather the claim is that governments today are regularly pressed on the issue of civilian casualties (whether intended or not) and Ford’s use of the *jus in bello* is now commonly invoked by other authors in every debate about war.

Although these changes will become evident in other cases, the baseline for the later developments must be rooted in the case of World War II. The advent of air power in the twentieth century had opened a new chapter in military strategy, but its full significance only became clear in the second global war. The ability to take the fight to the adversary’s homeland placed civilians in the very center of war planning. The contrast with the formative period of the Just-War tradition could not have been more striking. The ethic was shaped in a context of war fought by professional armies or mercenaries. While civilians died in war, the presumption was a clear distinction between the battlefield and civilian society. Air power collapsed
that distinction. The Germans crossed the line early in the war in the bombing of London and Rotterdam. The Allied response, beginning in 1943, was pursued without restraint. John Ford relied on official statements of governments and European commentators to describe the intent and consequences of obliteration bombing. In the past half-century historical and strategic studies have provided detailed analysis of both the conscious purpose of the policy and the damage it produced among civilian populations. Beginning in 1943 and extending through August 1945, the strategic use of air power had as an essential element “burning cities” (Pape 1996, 92). The target in this strategy was the morale of civilian society and its capacity to hold together as a functioning unit. There were always economic and industrial targets that could be identified from Hamburg to Hiroshima, but the inner logic of the strategy is captured in Sherry’s (1987, 154) description of the RAF’s “Bomber” Harris’s conception of war:

Hamburg revealed that Harris sought victory not by disarming Germans of their sword or disabling the forge that produced it, but by destroying the people manning the forge; and at that not through some sudden shock to their morale, which Harris now thought unlikely, but through sustained attrition of their habitats and lives.

The road from the bombing of Hamburg in 1943 to the bombing of Dresden in 1945 epitomizes what John Ford sought to describe, publicize, and then condemn in the name of the basic moral principle of the Just-War tradition: only those who threaten or attack the lives of others or the basic values required for social existence can be targeted or killed. The cause of World War II—its “Just Cause”—resided in the duty to resist Nazi aggression; but a key lesson of that war is that a self-evidently just cause does not guarantee the discipline of pursing it only with just means. Both the record and the threat evident in Hitler’s policies and purposes eroded the sense among the Allies that killing in war can be morally legitimate only if it is limited. By 1943 the limits were cast aside.

The destructive logic of a war without limits reached its climax when the theater of operations moved to Japan. Although the focus of this chapter is the consequences for civilians, it is important to recognize that multiple factors played into the decision to strike civilians without restraint. One factor by 1945 was the determination to end a long war with as few Allied casualties as possible. A second factor was the determination of the Army Air Force to demonstrate the unique military capability of air power. In the approach to Japan, Pape identifies four contending strategies for victory on American terms. They were interdiction of supplies (including bombing of
population centers), invasion, a mix of conventional bombing, and the use of atomic weapons (Pape 1996, 91). How these played out and how effective in retrospect each was is the stuff of military history. Each was employed except invasion. The bombing of cities was a continuation of and expansion of the strategy that left Hamburg and Dresden in ruins. While much of the postwar moral debate focused on the decision to use atomic weapons on cities, the prelude to this decision had already shattered the traditional restraints on war. Pape (1996, 103) describes the March 9, 1945 firebombing of Tokyo as “the most devastating air attack in history, exceeding even the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” On either side of the attack on Tokyo were smaller but substantial raids on other Japanese cities. The results—before August 6 and 9, 1945—were the following (Pape 1996, 104):

In all, 178 square miles were razed, amounting to 40 percent of the urban area of the sixty-six cities attacked. 2.2 million casualties were inflicted, including 900,000 fatalities, more than exceeding Japan’s combat casualties of approximately 780,000.

John Ford’s article was published a year before the bombing of Dresden and Tokyo. McGeorge Bundy’s assertion that “no one” protested the bombing of civilians in the debates leading to Hiroshima and Nagasaki is accurate in terms of the policy debate inside the U.S. government, but it is not accurate in a wider sense. Ford’s condemnation was absolute and absolutely clear. It was also without public or policy effect. It had a life beyond World War II; others would depend upon and use it to greater effect. But the failure to attend to it in 1944–1945 had profound consequences.

**Vietnam**

The narrative from John Ford to Vietnam runs through the scholarship of Michael Walzer. Notice has already been taken of Walzer’s crucial role in making the language and logic of the Just-War tradition available to the wider American public through his book *Just and Unjust Wars*, now in its third edition. For our purposes, it is the Preface to the first edition that highlights the enduring role of the Just-War ethic. Walzer describes his introduction to the ethic:

I did not begin by thinking about war in general, but about particular wars, above all the American intervention in Vietnam. Nor did I begin as a
philosopher, but as a political activist and a partisan . . . It was, for example a matter of great importance to all of us in the American anti-war movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s that we found a moral doctrine ready at hand, a connected set of names and concepts that we all knew—and that everyone else knew . . . When we talked about aggression and neutrality, the rights of prisoners of war and civilians, atrocities and war crimes, we were drawing upon the work of many generations of men and women, most of whom we had never heard of. (Walzer 2000, xvii)

Walzer goes on to acknowledge his debt to this moral doctrine and his promise to himself and to those who had gone before him “that one day I would try to set out the moral argument about war in a quiet and reflective way” (Walzer 2000, xviii).

The war that first engaged Walzer was a very different reality, in its character and its results, than the war John Ford analyzed in 1944. World War II has been called “the good war,” the phrase used to describe a war whose purposes and necessity were agreed upon by virtually all Americans and solidly supported by a broad alliance of nations. Ford began his article expressing his conviction that “Just Cause” for World War II was effectively self-evident; his critique was wholly focused on means and methods.

By the 1970s the Vietnam War was contested on the basis of both cause and means. There were political, legal, and moral arguments about whether the war should be fought and how it was being fought. The *jus ad bellum* arguments were about the nature of the conflict: whether Vietnam was a civil war in which the United States had intervened or whether the North had illegally invaded the South. While the just cause issues were contested throughout the war, they are not the focus of this article nor, in my view, did they play as significant a role in the public and policy debate as the issue of means.

A decisive difference between World War II and Vietnam, of course, is that U.S. participation in Vietnam was eventually terminated by the force of public and elite opinion, ultimately joined by congressional cutoff of funding for the war. Public opinion was a mix of multiple factors, one of them being the moral arguments Walzer and others crafted. A further distinguishing characteristic of Vietnam was that intense arguments about the moral limits of war took place inside and outside the U.S. government. This was particularly true about the topic of bombing policy and civilian casualties. There is no question that critics of U.S. policy believed little or no moral concerns were part of U.S. policy, but the record of debate found in *The Pentagon Papers* tells a different story. The story is not that morality was a decisive factor in the policy process but it was a decidedly different
element than one finds in the decision making about Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, and Hiroshima. A learning curve about the necessity to attend to the moral factor was beginning, even if it was far less effective than it should have been in the Vietnam case.

Pape (1996) divides his analysis of the bombing policy into two phases: the Johnson-McNamara period and the Nixon-Kissinger era. Pape’s principal concern in his book Bombing to Win is to examine the coercive capabilities of air power. On that scale his judgment is that the Johnson-McNamara policy failed to achieve results, but the final phase of the Nixon-Kissinger policy, Linebacker I and II, did achieve its objectives. In the broader public debate both phases of bombing policy were subjected to severe moral criticism. While this is both true and understandable, there is for our purpose (tracing the policy learning curve) value in providing a short version of the internal policy debate on bombing policy.

The significance of this debate lies in part in the fact that it was a product of a broader question that still runs through U.S. strategic planning for war. The Vietnam War was part of the debate about the meaning and effectiveness of limited war. The phrase “limited war” has its own strategic history: key figures in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations were deeply committed to the concept. But the concept of limited war also has a central place in the Just-War tradition. John Courtney Murray argued that even in the nuclear age, the central moral assertion of a just war should be “limited war” (Murray 1960, 58).

While the idea of limited war has a history, it took on particular significance in the nuclear age. Precisely because the nature of nuclear weapons promised war without any limits, the U.S. debate from the 1950s through the 1970s was centered on the idea of limited war. Participants included Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Maxwell Taylor, and Morton Halperin. In response to John Foster Dulles’s announced willingness to use nuclear weapons (“Massive Retaliation”) the Kennedy administration came to office committed to the role of limited war in U.S. policy. The central idea was that war remained a rational instrument of policy, usable, effective but not beyond control. Vietnam was seen as a test case and a necessary invocation of the doctrine of limited war. The challenge of the 1960s and 1970s was what limited meant in strategic, tactical, and moral terms. In the moral tradition the controlling concepts on limits were the principles of discrimination and proportionality. These were the leading concepts in a framework that said that the only morally legitimate war was a limited war—limited in its purposes, its methods, and its intentions.

The principal architects of Vietnam policy in the Kennedy-Johnson period were not only committed to the concept of limited war intellectually,
but they also believed they had seen the ideas behind limited and controlled strategies successfully played out in the Cuban Missile Crisis. David Halberstam (1971, 68) captures the linkage between the Missile Crisis and the bombing policy developed for Vietnam under Secretary McNamara:

The case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis was still very strong in his mind, and in the mind of others; this was the precedent for what they were doing now. They would, they thought, use power in the same slow cautious judicious manner. Not too much, not too little—signaling their intentions, that is that they did not want to go to war; rejecting the radicals on both sides; being in control of the communications all the way through.

The nexus between these two very different dimensions of world politics—the superpower nuclear relationship and an insurgency guerrilla war in Southeast Asia—was the strategy of Flexible Response. This was the Kennedy administration’s version of limited war, the design of how to use force but not lose control of war at any level of engagement.

The Vietnam War would demonstrate in detail the complexity of moving from the precise rationality of deterrence theory to various forms of trying to coerce a nationalist revolutionary movement into negotiations through bombing policy. Indeed the Vietnam debate shredded the consensus on the meaning of limited war; at the heart of the division was the issue of civilian casualties.

Two allies of the Kennedy administration found themselves deeply divided during the Vietnam debate. Both Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) were committed advocates of limited war in the formulation of nuclear policy in the 1960s. Symbolically they represented the distance U.S. policy had moved from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. As the Vietnam debate progressed from 1965 to 1968, these allies came to hold different conceptions of the meaning of “limited” in strategy and tactics. For Taylor, the essence of limited war was limited political purposes for which wars are fought. At the level of conventional war, however, Taylor did not envision significant restraints on means. Taylor saw restrictions on tactics as policy infected by “gradualism”; instead he advocated a bombing policy defined in terms of the threat of continuing escalation. The escalation could involve “the rate of attack, the intensity of attack or the territorial limits within which targets could be struck” (Taylor 1972, 350).

McNamara agreed with the objectives of the bombing policy and he espoused limited war, but he conceived of limits in terms of both the purposes and the means of war-fighting. This conception correlated with
the traditional Just-War ethic, but McNamara never argued his case in the classical principles of discrimination and proportionality. The overlap with the traditional ethic was a matter of convergence of views, not congruence of principles. But civilian casualties did surface in the policy debate in a way far different from World War II. The policy arguments that brought the conflicting views on limited war and civilian casualties to a head occurred in 1967 in the “POL Debates” (see Hehir 1977).

The POL Debates (petroleum-oil-lubricant facilities as targets) took place between March and June 1966. It was an intense argument that set McNamara against the Joint Chiefs (JCS) about which targets could be struck in North Vietnam. Since the beginning of systematic bombing of the North began in 1965, a small circle of key players at the highest level of the American government had debated daily and weekly the philosophy, objectives, tempo, and targeting of U.S. bombing policy. The central actors were McNamara and his closest advisor John McNaughton, the JCS, the CIA, and the President as the ultimate arbiter of choices put to him. Neil Sheehan (of the New York Times) in his commentary on The Pentagon Papers wrote as follows: “There is an absence of emotional anguish or moral questioning of action in the memorandums and cablegrams and records of the high level policy discussion” (Sheehan 1971, xv). For much of the time Sheehan’s comments are accurate, but three qualifications are in order. First, in comparison to what we know about the Dresden-Tokyo-Hiroshima debates, Vietnam had far more anguish, passion, and moral content than its predecessors. Second, the POL Debates exemplify how the anguish and passion surfaced. Third, the moral arguments were focused on civilian casualties, but they were not made in formal moral terms; they were often implicit rather than explicit.

By 1966 the JCS and McNamara had clashed often about the strategy and tactics of bombing policy. The disagreements were reflected in the shorthand of the bombing debate. The initial U.S. policy was named “Progressive Squeeze” but later proposals by the JCS were called “Hard Knock.” The dividing lines were about tempo, scope, and targeting. The POL targets were substantially and symbolically important. All recognized they were important “high value” targets; but they also were close to civilian areas in Hanoi and Haiphong. Hence, civilian casualties became a key focus of debate. The JCS and the CIA found the restraints the president and McNamara had placed on the bombing policy to be excessively cautious and militarily detrimental. The CIA wrote thus:

Consequently about 80 percent of North Vietnam’s limited modern industrial economy, 75 percent of the nation’s population and the most lucrative
military supply and LOC targets have been insulated from attack... The policy decision to avoid suburban casualties to the extent possible has proved to be a major constraint. (Gravel 1971, IV, 72)

In the end McNamara lost the POL Debates; most of the targets the JCS wanted to strike were made available. Even as he ceded the decision to strike POL facilities, he tried to contain the methods and means. The narrative of *The Pentagon Papers* summarizes McNamara's position: The belief that POL strikes would overload the negative side of the scale on political grounds had to do with the possibility that since the targets were situated in relatively populated “urban” areas (even though outside the center cities) the strikes would be construed as no less than the beginning of an attack on civilian targets and/or population centers (Gravel 1971, IV, 81).

Debate about civilians continued between McNamara and the JCS right up to the moment of the strikes. From the perspective of moral analysis of this case and of the larger question of the war as a whole, three comments are in order. First, the POL case illustrates an *intention* on the part of some actors in the policy process to protect civilians as a primary goal; since I am not aware of statistics about civilians hit in the strikes, *intention* cannot be tested by *consequences*. Second, while McNamara took a decisive position about protecting civilians, he argued the position primarily in consequentialist terms—much closer to proportionality than a clear statement of non-combatant immunity. A year after the POL strikes in May 1967, McNamara again sought to prevent escalation of bombing in the following argument:

> There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. (Gravel 1971, IV, 172)

If McNamara had argued the case in the unyielding terms of the principle of discrimination—targeting civilians is murder—it is not clear he would have been more effective in the policy debate, but his case would have been stronger in principle.

Third, McNamara lost the POL Debate, then later lost the larger argument about the scope of the bombing policy. Eventually, Pape argues, the Nixon-Kissinger policy embodied in the famous Christmas Bombing of 1972 did coerce the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Many in retrospect see the Nixon policy as exactly the kind of open-ended violence the moral
principles are designed to prevent. Pape argues to the contrary concerning the facts of the case:

Nixon was keenly aware of the domestic political criticism to which he would be subjected if large numbers of civilians were killed. Accordingly, both campaigns avoided civilians and pinpointed military targets with discriminate tactics and weapons. For instance, B-52 navigators were directed not to drop bombs unless they were 100 percent sure of the aim point and were supplied with the locations of schools, hospitals and POW camps. (Pape 1996, 208)

Describing the Christmas Bombing as an example of restraint seems counterintuitive, but Pape is careful about his description and numbers. Still, this case also leaves questions about how to use moral analysis. Pape argues that the casualties from bombing in 1972 in the North were 13,000; that the raids in Hanoi killed 1,318 and 305 were killed in Haiphong. He then compares these numbers to 125,000 Communist casualties in the South in 1972 and 851,000 total Communist deaths from 1964 to 1972. These comparisons indiscriminately seem to compare civilian and combatant deaths. It shows some concern for civilians in warfare but not enough.

Vietnam was a different internal debate from the one World War II demonstrated. Public attention in the two cases was dramatically different; civilian casualties did not seem to count in 1944–1945, but they were significantly present in the 1960s and 1970s. Attention to them would increase in the next section on the Gulf War.

The Gulf War (1991)

The key feature that lies between Vietnam and the Gulf War in the narrative about bombing policy and civilian casualties was the nuclear policy debate of the 1980s (Freedman 1989). The theoretical significance of the deterrence debates for jus in bello has been noted (it opened divisions among those committed to the basic principle of noncombatant immunity) but the specific impact of the 1980s nuclear debate was to bring the role of civilian casualties to new centrality in the public mind. The combination of the “Nuclear Freeze” movement and the analysis in the religious community made the threat to civilians an issue of broad public awareness and concern. In a sense, the more the public understood the inner workings of deterrence theory, the more problematic it became.

Although the emphasis in this chapter has been on the movement away from the utter disregard for civilian casualties that characterized World War II, Robert W. Tucker and David K. Hendrickson (1992), in their analysis of
the Gulf War, place greater stress on the legacy of Vietnam as embodied in the Powell Doctrine and on public attitudes determined to avoid another “quagmire” or protracted conventional conflict. In their view, “The conduct of the war also reflected the conditions placed on the use of force by a public that would not tolerate another Vietnam” (1992, 135). The consequence of this legacy threatened any concern for civilian casualties because “the war that resulted from these conditioning circumstances was waged with extraordinary ferocity” (Tucker and Hendrickson 1992, 136). Tucker and Hendrickson (1992, 137) acknowledge the point made in the essay about civilians: “In the Gulf War, a considerable effort was made to avoid direct attacks on Iraq’s civilian population.” In their view, however, this effort was eroded by the way in which the principle of discrimination was subordinated to the criterion of proportionality.

The Gulf War of 1991 was strikingly different from either World War II or Vietnam in the degree of open public debate that marked the approach to war. Although it was not a “war of choice” in the sense that the Iraq war of 2003 has been, four months of public debate carried on in the media, on op-ed pages, and finally in a detailed debate in the U.S. Senate preceded the decision to go to war. The period from August 1990 (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) through January 1991 was marked by an extensive debate—elite opinion and public opinion—in the United States. Like Vietnam, the Gulf War debate engaged both dimensions of the Just-War ethic. Unlike Vietnam, consensus about \textit{jus ad bellum} was widely shared. The pre-war debate, in both political and moral terms, turned on the means by which aggression was to be opposed. Here the \textit{jus ad bellum} criteria of “last resort” and “proportionality” were invoked by critics of the president’s policy. Options less than war were advocated as both strategically and morally the better choices. Debates about casualties were not primarily about civilian deaths but about American casualties. The prospects of a drawn-out desert conflict or of the possibility that Saddam would use chemical or biological warfare cut through the public debate. The recognition that the United States would depend upon its superiority in air power brought the civilian casualty issue into focus.

How air power would be used became a distinguishing mark of the pre-war debate. Within the administration, intense planning and much tension revolved around this question. There would be two dimensions to bombing policy: strategic bombing and theater bombing. The centerpiece of the strategic argument was the proposal developed by Colonel John Warden, an air force officer tasked with the problem of developing a strategy that avoided “gradualism” but would not provoke public reaction. Warden’s proposal, dubbed “Instant Thunder,” was designed as a counterpoint to
“Rolling Thunder” of Vietnam. Warden defined the strategy as “a focused, intense air campaign designed to incapacitate Iraqi leadership and destroy Iraqi military capability in a short time. And it is designed to leave basic Iraqi infrastructure intact” (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 86).

Warden’s definition of the strategy, designed in his terms to destroy “centers of gravity” in Iraqi leadership, did not explicitly attend to civilian casualties. But his superiors, both military and political officials, knew they had to address this question in theory and in practice. Several statements sought to preempt possible criticism based on civilian casualties. A mantra throughout the war was the assertion that this was a war against Saddam Hussein, not against the Iraqi people. General Buster Glossen, entrusted with the implementation of Warden’s plan, set out the initial guidance for the air strikes with the order that “targets and aimpoints will be selected to minimize collateral damage and limit the impact on the civilian population” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 312).

A vivid indication of the Bush administration’s awareness of the sensitivity of any claims about bombing civilian centers surfaced before the war began. General Michael Dugan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, having been briefed on “Instant Thunder,” gave a broad ranging interview to the press that included the statement, “If push comes to shove, the cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad . . . This wouldn’t be a Vietnam style operation, nibbling around the edges. The way to hurt you is at home.” (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 100). The quote led to Dugan’s dismissal as Chief of Staff and a statement from National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft that Dugan did not speak for the Bush administration.

Dugan, in fact, was playing to one side of the public opinion spectrum—how to use power effectively and decisively; the other side—how to avoid civilian casualties—was significant enough to require that the administration had to distance itself from any hint that “downtown Baghdad” would be a repeat of Dresden. Beyond these broad external pressures on policy, two questions remain: how was the strategic bombing conducted and what moral questions did the Gulf War produce?

While Warden’s strategy was modified by his superiors, his basic proposal was maintained. He identified five concentric “rings” or centers of gravity, running from the most valuable center ring of the “the command, control, communication and decisionmaking capability of the enemy” to the outermost rings of population centers and—surprisingly—the military forces of one’s adversary. This inside-out strategy was solely based on air power and even more narrowly based on “strategic” air power not theater support for ground troops. Because the inner ring, the vital center of attack, was to be the Iraqi leadership and its ability to command its troops and to
govern its society, Warden’s strategy did in fact plan to go to “downtown Baghdad” at the outset of the war (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 78–79). The issue of civilian casualties arose immediately. The response of the USAF was that a combination of precise targeting, precision-guided munitions, and early control of the air space over Baghdad would allow it to strike Baghdad but not target civilians. There is evidence that this strategy was followed in theory and in practice. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh’s detailed study of the war, *The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991*, makes two assertions:

There were no serious proposals to undermine Saddam’s regime through direct attacks on the civilian population and its morale, and all assumed relatively accurate strikes against military or military-related targets. (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 315)

This descriptive account is followed in their conclusion of the chapter on the air war with the following assessment: “The most precise Iraqi figures put the number of civilians killed at 2,278 and the number wounded at 5,965” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 329). Those are Iraqi numbers and the debate about civilians continues to this day. Freedman and Karsh (1993, 329) describe the civilian casualties as “remarkably limited when the scale of bombing is taken into account.” This analysis, while careful and useful, tends to submerge the civilian casualty issue into a judgment of proportionality, a move that always erodes the power of the principle of discrimination. As noted earlier, this style of argument is what Tucker and Hendrickson criticize in their moral assessment of the Gulf War.

Political and military leaders habitually employ a peculiar moral arithmetic in calculating the costs of war, in which the moral total of such costs largely depends upon the identity of those whose lives are being counted, but moralists are expected to assess war’s costs with a measure of impartiality. (Tucker and Hendrickson 1992, 136)

Tucker and Hendrickson themselves, in the end, give primacy to proportionality as the final principle of judgment about the Gulf War. In my view, neither their judgment nor Freedman and Karsh hold the principle of discrimination sufficiently independent to make an accurate moral assessment of the war.

This assessment of the war need not indict the strategy as purposely violating the principle of discrimination. All four of the authors, and other accounts of the war, would be in general agreement with the statement,
“a considerable effort was made to avoid direct attacks on Iraq’s civilian population” (Tucker and Hendrickson 1992, 137). How civilians suffered, however, must be assessed in light of a combination of both principles that comprise *jus in bello*. Civilians were not directly attacked, but targets that had “dual uses” in Iraqi society were hit. Primarily important in the latter category were electrical grids struck as part of the intended strategy to deprive Saddam Hussein of regular communication with his forces in Kuwait. Noting that 28 electrical power targets were struck during the war, Freedman and Karsh observed that “electrical power was the most severely damaged component of the whole Iraqi target system” (1993, 322). These were prototypically “dual-use targets,” undoubtedly important to the Iraqi military (hence legitimate targets to strike) with inevitably harmful effects on the civilian sector of Iraq. Reflecting on the problematical nature of these targets, General Schwartzkopf estimated that 25 percent of electrical generating facilities were completely inoperative, with another 50 percent suffering limited damage; then he went on to say the following: “We never had any intention of destroying 100 percent of all the Iraqi electrical power because of our interest in making sure that civilians did not suffer unduly” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 322). In spite of these sentiments, the striking of dual-use targets became the principal moral critique of the bombing policy.

There were in fact three major moral issues raised about the Gulf War bombing policy, two of which would carry over to debates about Kosovo in the 1990s. The first, dual-use targets, were judged by the principle of proportionality. It is very difficult to make the case that electrical grids do not fit the meaning of military targets in a modern war. This was particularly the case in the Gulf War in which part of the strategy was to deprive Saddam Hussein of contact with his forces in Kuwait. The same problem surfaced in the bombing of Serbian targets during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The primary evaluation of these problems must be some use of proportionality—always a less than precise measurement. Such a judgment might allow some targeting of this resource but not virtual destruction of its civilian role. An alternative judgment might include the updating of an ancient Just-War idea; to some degree electrical power is like agriculture—a necessary resource for the military and the civilian sector alike. The standard Just-War judgment about agriculture was that food was necessary for a society as a basic human good before it was needed as a military resource. Hence the bombing of farmers was prohibited—they were treated as civilians. Electrical grids could be assessed in the same way, putting them beyond the range of legitimate targets.

Second, a rarely expressed concern in the ethics of war surfaced in the Gulf War, namely the extent of *combatant* casualties. Extensive U.S.
bombing by B-52s of the frontline Iraq troops in Kuwait was the focus of this analysis. The consensual judgment that these Iraqi conscripts had few if any direct ties to Saddam Hussein enhanced the sense that they were bearing a disproportionate share of casualties. Traditionally, all military personnel, save for those who had surrendered, were regarded as “material aggressors” and could be targeted in a just war. Once again, the relevant Just-War criterion was that of proportionality. This principle applies in two senses to war: (1) the use of force should not produce more harm than good overall and (2) only as much force as required to achieve the objectives of a Just-War should be used. The concern about combatant casualties related to the second use of proportionality. Tucker and Hendrickson (1992) express the judgment made by some moralists: “There surely are limits—ill-defined though they may be—to the number of enemy lives that may justifiably be taken to avoid risking however small a number of one’s own.” This moral concern will (and should) always rank below that of civilian casualties, but its use within a broader framework of analysis is a legitimate concern for the basic purposes of the Just-War ethic: to humanize, as far as possible, the always destructive character of war.

The third moral concern has become an abiding question when the United States goes to war: does the objective of limiting U.S. casualties play too large a role in the way the U.S. fights its wars? The question is to some degree a consequence of Vietnam; it continued after the Gulf War to the Kosovo strategy. It often focuses on bombing policy and what rules of engagement are followed by pilots. The assessment of the question should begin with the principle that commanders have a positive obligation to protect their troops. But the obligation is limited by discrimination and proportionality: protection of combatants should not be achieved by making civilians targets or by a strategy that yields disproportionate civilian casualties even if they were not purposely targeted. The U.S. dependence upon its qualitative advantage in air power and hi-tech warfare will keep these questions present in future debates on strategy and tactics.

**jus in bello: The State of the Question**

Since the Gulf War, both the several cases of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised issues of civilian casualties. Without pursuing these cases, what can be offered here is a description of the status of *jus in bello*.

1. **The Return of jus ad bellum:** The dominance of the *jus in bello* debates throughout the nuclear age from the 1950s through the 1980s has been eroded both by the challenges of humanitarian interventions and the war
on terrorism. In both examples of very different kinds of war, the primary issues have required a return to *jus ad bellum* principles. Arguments for a stronger interventionist policy to respond to genocide, ethnic conflict, and failed states always encountered claims of state sovereignty and obstacles in international law. It was possible to make a moral-legal case for intervention, but it had to be constructed anew each time. The lengthy debate in the UN Security Council prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was centered on issues of legitimate authority, just cause, and last resort. The nature of the contemporary international system, producing numerous cases of deep internal conflicts and now focused globally on terrorism will continue to raise *jus ad bellum* issues.

2. The age of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs): PGMs pose a double-edged question for *jus in bello*. On one hand, they do stand as an asset in the traditional quest to limit warfare; on the other hand, they provide a kind of temptation to a conception of antiseptic air war. The latter characteristic is the more complex reality. It presents a three-dimensional question: What percentage of weapons used in a war like the Gulf War are actually PGMs? What public expectations do PGMs create? And whether PGMs tempt strategists to bomb in the midst of civilians on the basis of what must always be fragile assurance that weapons and their masters will perform as expected?

3. Dual-use targets: This topic, a product of the Gulf War but one with roots in the bombing of German industrial centers of production, flows directly from an age of PGMs. Having offered two ways of evaluating strikes on Dual-Use Targets, my point here is to say that the topic needs much more work. The proportionality approach keeps such targets eligible in each conflict; I continue to find it the better approach. Seeking to classify all such targets as beyond consideration may advance a principle without any supporters in the strategic community. At times it is the moralist’s duty to argue and defend very unpopular principles. But at this stage of the debate my inclination is to say that we need a stronger case than we have to put dual-use targets in the same category as agriculture or medical centers.

**Notes**

1. Augustine’s conception of Just-War ethics was solidly rooted in religious-theological premises. On one hand his conception of human nature, sin and its historical manifestations provided the basis for his conviction that public authorities acted rightly when they used force to protect the political communities for which they were responsible. On the other hand, only
public authorities had the right to take life. Augustine did not have a doctrine of self-defense for individuals; that position is found later in Thomas Aquinas. Contemporary authors using the Just-War ethic often have no explicit context with the theological grounding of Just-War. But they do invoke and use the ethical prohibition and prescriptions found in the earlier religious traditions.

2. Particularly when strategic theorists or political analysts invoked Just-War criteria in the nuclear debate they focused on the overwhelming danger posed by the use of nuclear weapons and then often moved to an argument that accepted “deterrence” as the strategically and morally self-evident response to the problem of superpower strategic ethics. For some a purposeful countercity deterrent seemed to be the most effective—herefore most ethically appropriate response to the nuclear dilemma. Such an argument often turned the entire Just-War ethic into a purely consequentialist position, one not easily reconciled with the dominant version of the Just-War tradition.

3. A survey of the “cause and means” debate can be found in Falk (1976). In this section of the chapter I will draw from Hehir (1977).
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