A sudden upsurge of interest in "the state" has occurred in comparative social science in the past decade. Whether as an object of investigation or as something invoked to explain outcomes of interest, the state as an actor or an institution has been highlighted in an extraordinary outpouring of studies by scholars of diverse theoretical proclivities from all of the major disciplines. The range of topics explored has been very wide. Students of Latin America, Africa, and Asia have examined the roles of states in instituting comprehensive political reforms, helping to shape national economic development, and bargaining with multinational corporations.¹ Scholars interested in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe, North America, and Japan have probed the involvements of states in developing social programs and in managing domestic and international economic problems.² Comparative-historical investigators have examined the formation of national states, the disintegration and rebuilding of states in social revolutions, and the impact of states on class formation, ethnic relations, women’s rights, and modes of social protest.³ Economic historians and political economists have theorized about states as institutors of property rights and as regulators and distorters of markets.⁴ And cultural anthropologists have explored the special meanings and activities of “states” in non-Western settings.⁵

No explicitly shared research agenda or general theory has tied such diverse studies together. Yet I shall argue in this essay that many of them have implicitly converged on complementary arguments and strategies of analysis. The best way to make the point is through an exploration of the issues addressed in a range of comparative and historical studies—studies that have considered states as weighty actors and probed how states affect political and social processes through their policies and their patterned relationships with social groups. First, however, it makes sense to underline
the paradigmatic reorientation implied by the phrase "bringing the state back in." 

From Society-Centered Theories to a Renewed Interest in States

There can be no gainsaying that an intellectual sea change is under way, because not long ago the dominant theories and research agendas of the social sciences rarely spoke of states. This was true even — or perhaps one should say especially — when politics and public policy making were at issue. Despite important exceptions, society-centered ways of explaining politics and governmental activities were especially characteristic of the pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives predominant in political science and sociology in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. In these perspectives, the state was considered to be an old-fashioned concept, associated with dry and dusty legal-formalist studies of nationally particular constitutional principles. Alternative concepts were thought to be more compatible with scientific, generalizing investigations. "Government" was viewed primarily as an arena within which economic interest groups or normative social movements contended or allied with one another to shape the making of public policy decisions. Those decisions were understood to be allocations of benefits among demanding groups. Research centered on the societal "inputs" to government and on the distributive effects of governmental "outputs." Government itself was not taken very seriously as an independent actor, and in comparative research, variations in governmental organizations were deemed less significant than the general "functions" shared by the political systems of all societies.

As often happens in intellectual life, the pluralist and structure-functionalist paradigms fostered inquiries that led toward new concerns with phenomena they had originally de-emphasized conceptually. When pluralists focused on the determinants of particular public policy decisions, they often found that governmental leaders took initiatives well beyond the demands of social groups or electorates; or they found that government agencies were the most prominent participants in the making of particular policy decisions. Within pluralist theoretical premises, there were but limited ways to accommodate such findings. In the classic pluralist studies of New Haven politics, Mayor Richard Lee's strong individual initiatives for urban renewal were extensively documented but not grounded in any overall state-centered analysis of the potential for certain kinds of mayors to make new uses of federal funding. In major works about "bureaucratic politics" such as Graham Allison's Essence of Decision and Morton Halperin's Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, government agencies were treated individually, as if they were pure analogues of the competing societal interest groups of classical pluralism. The structure and activities of the U.S. state as a whole receded from view and analysis in this approach.

Like the pluralists, yet on a broader canvas, when structure-functional-
ist students of comparative political development set out to "apply" their grand theories to Western European history or to particular sets of non-Western polities, they often found poor fits between historical patterns and sequences and those posited by the original concepts and assumptions. "Political development" (itself found to be an overly evolutionist conception) ended up having more to do with concrete international and domestic struggles over state building than with any inherent general logic of socioeconomic "differentiation." Most telling in this regard were the historically oriented studies encouraged or sponsored by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics toward the end of its life span of 1954–72. In many ways, the ideas and findings about states to be reviewed here grew out of reactions set in motion by such confrontations of the committee's grand theories with case-study and comparative-historical evidence.

Especially among younger scholars, new ideas and findings have also arisen from an alternative theoretical lineage. From the mid-1960s onward, critically minded "neo-Marxists" launched a lively series of debates about "the capitalist state." By now, there are conceptually ramified and empirically wide-ranging literatures dealing especially with the roles of states in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, with the socioeconomic involvements of states in advanced industrial capitalist democracies, and with the nature and role of states in dependent countries within the world capitalist economy. Neo-Marxists have, above all, debated alternative understandings of the socioeconomic functions performed by the capitalist state. Some see it as an instrument of class rule, others as an objective guarantor of production relations or economic accumulation, and still others as an arena for political class struggles.

Valuable concepts and questions have emerged from these neo-Marxist debates, and many of the comparative and historical studies to be discussed here have drawn on them in defining researchable problems and hypotheses. Yet at the theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply embedded society-centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production. Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat. Furthermore, neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize – often in extremely abstract ways – about features or functions shared by all states within a mode of production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world capitalist system. This makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations in state structures and activities across nations and short time periods, thereby undercutting the usefulness of some neo-Marxist schemes for comparative research.

So far the discussion has referred primarily to paradigms in American social science in the period since World War II; yet the reluctance of pluralists and structure-functionalists to speak of states, and the unwilling-
ness even of critically minded neo-Marxists to grant true autonomy to states, resonate with proclivities present from the start in the modern social sciences. These sciences emerged along with the industrial and democratic revolutions of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their founding theorists quite understandably perceived the locus of societal dynamics – and of the social good – not in outmoded, superseded monarchical and aristocratic states, but in civil society, variously understood as “the market,” “the industrial division of labor,” or “class relations.” Founding theorists as politically opposed as Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx (who now, not entirely inappropriately, lie just across a lane from one another in Highgate Cemetery, London) agreed that industrial capitalism was triumphing over the militarism and territorial rivalries of states. For both of these theorists, nineteenth-century British socioeconomic developments presaged the future for all countries and for the world as a whole.

As world history moved – via bloody world wars, colonial conquests, state-building revolutions, and nationalist anticolonial movements – from the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century to the Pax Americana of the post–World War II period, the Western social sciences managed to keep their eyes largely averted from the explanatory centrality of states as potent and autonomous organizational actors. It was not that such phenomena as political authoritarianism and totalitarianism were ignored, just that the preferred theoretical explanations were couched in terms of economic backwardness or the unfortunate persistence of non-Western “traditional” values. As long as capitalist and liberal Britain, and then capitalist and liberal America, could plausibly be seen as the unchallengeable “lead societies,” the Western social sciences could manage the feat of downplaying the explanatory centrality of states in their major theoretical paradigms – for these paradigms were riveted on understanding modernization, its causes and direction. And in Britain and America, the “most modern” countries, economic change seemed spontaneous and progressive, and the decisions of governmental legislative bodies appeared to be the basic stuff of politics.

As the period after World War II unfolded, various changes rendered society-centered views of social change and politics less credible. In the wake of the “Keynesian revolution” of the 1930s to the 1950s national macroeconomic management became the norm and public social expenditures burgeoned across all of the advanced industrial capitalist democracies, even in the United States. The dismantlement of colonial empires gave birth to dozens of “new nations,” which before long revealed that they would not simply recapitulate Western liberal democratic patterns in their political organization or policy choices. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by the mid-1970s, both Britain and the United States were unmistakably becoming hard-pressed in a world of more intense and uncertain international economic competition. It is probably not surprising that, at this juncture, it became fashionable to speak of states as actors and as society-shaping institutional structures.
Social scientists are now willing to offer state-centered explanations, not just of totalitarian countries and late industrializers, but of Britain and the United States themselves. Fittingly, some recent arguments stress ways in which state structures have distinctively shaped economic development and international economic policies in Britain and America and also ponder how the British and U.S. states might fetter or facilitate current efforts at national industrial regeneration.\textsuperscript{18} In short, now that debates about large public sectors have taken political center stage in all of the capitalist democracies and now that Britain and the United States seem much more like particular state–societies in an uncertain, competitive, and interdependent world of many such entities, a paradigmatic shift seems to be underway in the macroscopic social sciences, a shift that involves a fundamental rethinking of the role of states in relation to economies and societies.

\textit{The Revival of a Continental European Perspective?}

In the nineteenth century, social theorists oriented to the realities of social change and politics on the European continent refused (even after industrialization was fully under way) to accept the de-emphasis of the state characteristic of those who centered their thinking on Britain. Even though they might positively value liberal ideals, Continental students of social life, especially Germans, insisted on the institutional reality of the state and its continuing impact on and within civil society. Now that comparative social scientists are again emphasizing the importance of states, it is perhaps not surprising that many researchers are relying anew – with various modifications and extensions, to be sure – on the basic understanding of "the state" passed down to contemporary scholarship through the widely known writings of such major German scholars as Max Weber and Otto Hintze.

Max Weber argued that states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them.\textsuperscript{19} Administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations are the core of any state. These organizations are variably structured in different countries, and they may be embedded in some sort of constitutional–representative system of parliamentary decision making and electoral contests for key executive and legislative posts. Nevertheless, as Alfred Stepan nicely puts it in a formulation that captures the biting edge of the Weberian perspective:

The state must be considered as more than the "government." It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well.\textsuperscript{20}

In this perspective, the state certainly does not become everything. Other organizations and agents also pattern social relationships and politics, and
the analyst must explore the state's structure and activities in relation to
them. But this Weberian view of the state does require us to see it as much
more than a mere arena in which social groups make demands and engage
in political struggles or compromises.

What is more, as the work of Otto Hintze demonstrated, thinking of
states as organizations controlling territories leads us away from basic fea-
tures common to all polities and toward consideration of the various ways
in which state structures and actions are conditioned by historically chang-
ing transnational contexts. These contexts impinge on individual states
through geopolitical relations of interstate domination and competition,
through the international communication of ideals and models of public
policy, and through world economic patterns of trade, division of produc-
tive activities, investment flows, and international finance. States neces-
arily stand at the intersections between domestic sociopolitical orders and
the transnational relations within which they must maneuver for survival
and advantage in relation to other states. The modern state as we know it,
and as Weber and Hintze conceptualized it, has always been, since its birth
in European history, part of a system of competing and mutually involved
states.

Although a refocusing of social scientific interests significantly informed
by the Weber–Hintze understanding of states may be upon us, the real
work of theoretical reorientation is only beginning to be done. This work
is understandably fraught with difficulties, because attempts are being made
to think about and investigate state impacts against a background of deeply
rooted theoretical proclivities that are stubbornly society-centered. Recent
attempts by neo-Marxists and (what might be called) neopluralists to theo-
rize in very general terms about "state autonomy" have not offered con-
cepts or explanatory hypotheses rich enough to encompass the arguments
and findings from various comparative-historical studies.

Rather than dwell on the shortcomings of such general theories, how-
ever, the remainder of this essay will be devoted to an exploration of what
some selected historical and comparative studies have to tell us about states
in societal and transnational contexts. Two somewhat different, but equally
important tendencies in current scholarship will claim our attention. First,
we shall examine arguments about state autonomy and about the capacities
of states as actors trying to realize policy goals. Then we shall explore ar-
guments about the impacts of states on the content and workings of politics.
The overall aim of this exercise is not to offer any new general theory of the
state or of states and social structures. For the present, at least, no such
thing may be desirable, and it would not in any event be feasible in the
space of one essay. Rather, my hope is to present and illustrate a concep-
tual frame of reference, along with some middle-range issues and hypo-
theses that might inform future research on states and social structures
across diverse topical problems and geocultural areas of the world.
The Autonomy and Capacity of States

States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by "state autonomy." Unless such independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors. Pursuing matters further, one may then explore the "capacities" of states to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances. What are the determinants of state autonomy and state capacities? Let us sample the arguments of a range of recent studies that address these questions.

States as Actors

Several lines of reasoning have been used, singly or in combination, to account, for why and how states formulate and pursue their own goals. The linkage of states into transnational structures and into international flows of communication may encourage leading state officials to pursue transformative strategies even in the face of indifference or resistance from politically weighty social forces. Similarly, the basic need of states to maintain control and order may spur state-initiated reforms (as well as simple repression). As for who, exactly, is more likely to act in such circumstances, it seems that organizationally coherent collectivities of state officials, especially collectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to currently dominant socioeconomic interests, are likely to launch distinctive new state strategies in times of crisis. Likewise, collectivities of officials may elaborate already established public policies in distinctive ways, acting relatively continuously over long stretches of time.

The extranational orientations of states, the challenges they may face in maintaining domestic order, and the organizational resources that collectivities of state officials may be able to draw on and deploy – all of these features of the state as viewed from a Weberian–Hintzean perspective can help to explain autonomous state action. In an especially clear-cut way, combinations of these factors figure in Alfred Stepan's and Ellen Kay Trimbberger's explanations of what may be considered extreme instances of autonomous state action – historical situations in which strategic elites use military force to take control of an entire national state and then employ bureaucratic means to enforce reformist or revolutionary changes from above.

Stepan's book *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* investigates attempts by state elites in Latin America to install "inclusionary" or "exclusionary" corporatist regimes. A key element in Stepan's explanation of such episodes is the formation of a strategically located cadre of
officials enjoying great organizational strength inside and through existing state organizations and also enjoying a unified sense of ideological purpose about the possibility and desirability of using state intervention to ensure political order and promote national economic development. For Brazil’s “exclusionary” corporatist coup in 1964 and for Peru’s “inclusionary” corporatist coup in 1968, Stepan stresses the prior socialization of what he calls “new military professionals.” These were career military officers who, together, passed through training schools that taught techniques and ideas of national economic planning and counterinsurgency, along with more traditional military skills. Subsequently, such new military professionals installed corporatist regimes in response to perceived crises of political order and of national economic development. The military professionals used state power to stave off or deflect threats to national order from nondominant classes and groups. They also used state power to implement socioeconomic reforms or plans for further national industrialization, something they saw as a basic requisite for improved international standing in the modern world.

Ellen Kay Trimberger’s *Revolution from Above* focuses on a set of historical cases – Japan’s Meiji restoration, Turkey’s Atatürk revolution, Egypt’s Nasser revolution, and Peru’s 1968 coup – in which “dynamically autonomous” bureaucrats, including military officials, seized and reorganized state power. Then they used the state to destroy an existing dominant class, a landed upper class or aristocracy, and to reorient national economic development. Like Stepan, Trimberger stresses the formation through prior career interests and socialization of a coherent official elite with a statist and nationalist ideological orientation. She also agrees with Stepan’s emphasis on the elite’s concern to contain any possible upheavals from below. Yet, perhaps because she is in fact explaining a more thoroughly transformative version of autonomous state action to reshape society, Trimberger places more stress than Stepan on the role of foreign threats to national autonomy as a precipitant of “revolution from above.” And she highlights a structural variable that Stepan ignored: the relationship of the state elite to dominant economic classes. As Trimberger puts it, “A bureaucratic state apparatus, or a segment of it, can be said to be relatively autonomous when those who hold high civil and/or military posts satisfy two conditions: (1) they are not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial, or industrial classes; and (2) they do not form close personal and economic ties with those classes after their elevation to high office.” Trimberger also examines the state elite’s relationship to dominant economic classes in order to predict the extensiveness of socioeconomic changes a state may attempt in response to “a crisis situation – when the existing social, political, and economic order is threatened by external forces and by upheaval from below.” State-initiated authoritarian reforms may occur when bureaucratic elites retain ties to existing dominant classes, as, for example, in Prussia in 1806–1814, Russia in the 1860s, and Brazil after 1964. But the more sweeping structural
changes that Trimberger labels "revolution from above," including the actual dispossession of a dominant class, occur in crisis situations only when bureaucratic state elites are free of ties or alliances with dominant classes. As should be apparent, Trimberger has given the neo-Marxist notion of the relative autonomy of the state new analytical power as a tool for predicting the possible sociopolitical consequences of various societal and historical configurations of state and class power.

State Autonomy in Constitutional Polities

Stepan and Trimberger deal in somewhat different, though overlapping, terms with extraordinary instances of state autonomy – instances in which nonconstitutionally ruling officials attempt to use the state as a whole to direct and restructure society and politics. Meanwhile, other scholars have teased out more circumscribed instances of state autonomy in the histories of public policy making in liberal democratic, constitutional polities, such as Britain, Sweden, and the United States. In different forms, the same basic analytical factors – the international orientations of states, their domestic order-keeping functions, and the organizational possibilities for official collectivities to formulate and pursue their own policies – also enter into these analyses.

Hugh Heclo's *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* provides an intricate comparative-historical account of the long-term development of unemployment insurance and policies of old-age assistance in these two nations. Without being explicitly presented as such, Heclo's book is about autonomous state contributions to social policy making. But the autonomous state actions Heclo highlights are not all acts of coercion or domination; they are, instead, the intellectual activities of civil administrators engaged in diagnosing societal problems and framing policy alternatives to deal with them. As Heclo puts it:

Governments not only "power" (or whatever the verb form of that approach might be); they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing. The process of making pension, unemployment, and superannuation policies has extended beyond deciding what "wants" to accommodate, to include problems of knowing who might want something, what is wanted, what should be wanted, and how to turn even the most sweet-tempered general agreement into concrete collective action. This process is political, not because all policy is a by-product of power and conflict but because some men have undertaken to act in the name of others.

According to Heclo's comparative history, civil service administrators in both Britain and Sweden have consistently made more important contributions to social policy development than political parties or interest groups. Socioeconomic conditions, especially crises, have stimulated only sporadic demands from parties and interest groups, argues Heclo. It has been civil
servants, drawing on "administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise" who have framed the terms of new policy elaborations as "corrective[s] less to social conditions as such and more to the perceived failings of previous policy" in terms of "the government bureaucracy's own conception of what it has been doing." Heclo's evidence also reveals that the autonomous bureaucratic shaping of social policy has been greater in Sweden than in Britain, for Sweden's premodern centralized bureaucratic state was, from the start of industrialization and before the full liberalization and democratization of national politics, in a position to take the initiative in diagnosing social problems and proposing universalistic solutions for administering to them.

Heclo says much less than he might about the influences shaping the timing and content of distinctive state initiatives. He does, however, present evidence of the sensitivity of civil administrators to the requisites of maintaining order in the face of dislocations caused by industrial unemployment. He also points to the constant awareness by administrators of foreign precedents and models of social policy. Above all, Heclo demonstrates that collectivities of administrative officials can have pervasive direct and indirect effects on the content and development of major government policies. His work suggests how to locate and analyze autonomous state contributions to policy making, even within constitutional polities nominally directed by legislatures and electoral parties.

Along these lines, it is worth looking briefly at two works that argue for autonomous state contributions to public policy making even in the United States, a polity in which virtually all scholars agree that there is less structural basis for such autonomy than in any other modern liberal capitalist regime. The United States did not inherit a centralized bureaucratic state from preindustrial and predemocratic times. Moreover, the dispersion of authority through the federal system, the division of sovereignty among branches of the national government, and the close symbiosis between segments of the federal administration and Congressional committees all help to ensure that state power in the twentieth-century United States is fragmented, dispersed, and everywhere permeated by organized societal interests. The national government, moreover, lacks such possible underpinnings of strong state power as a prestigious and status-conscious career civil service with predictable access to key executive posts; authoritative planning agencies; direct executive control over a national central bank; and public ownership of strategic parts of the economy. Given such characteristics of the U.S. government, the concept of state autonomy has not often been used by scholars to explain American policy developments.

Nevertheless, Stephen Krasner in his *Defending the National Interest* does use the concept to explain twentieth-century continuities in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy about issues of international investments in the production and marketing of raw materials. A clever heuristic tactic lies behind Krasner's selection of this "issue area" for systematic historical in-
vestigation: It is an issue area located at the intersection of properly geopolitical state interests and the economic interests of (often) powerful private corporations. Thus, Krasner can ask whether the short-term push and pull of business interests shapes the definition of the U.S. "national interest" with respect to raw materials production abroad or whether an autonomous state interest is consistently at work. He finds the latter pattern and attributes it to actors in a special location within the otherwise weak, fragmented, and societally permeated U.S. government:

For U.S. foreign policy the central state actors are the President and the Secretary of State and the most important institutions are the White House and the State Department. What distinguishes these roles and agencies is their high degree of insulation from specific societal pressures and a set of formal and informal obligations that charge them with furthering the nation's general interests. 34

Unfortunately, Krasner does not expand on the concept of "insulated" parts of the state. In particular, he does not tell us whether various organizational features of state agencies make for greater or lesser insulation. Instead, Krasner primarily emphasizes the degree to which different parts of the federal executive are subject to Congressional influences. 35 And he cannot fully dispel the suspicion that the Presidency and the State Department may simply be subject to class-based rather than interest-based business influences. 36 Nevertheless, he does show that public policies on raw materials have been most likely to diverge from powerful corporate demands precisely when distinctively geopolitical issues of foreign military intervention and broad ideological conceptions of U.S. world hegemony have been involved. Thus, Krasner's study suggests that distinctive state-like contributions to U.S. policy making occur exactly in those instances and arenas where a Weberian–Hintzean perspective would insist that they should occur, no matter how unpropitious the overall governmental potential for autonomous state action. As J. P. Nettl once put it, "Whatever the state may or may not be internally, . . . there have . . . been few challenges to its sovereignty and its autonomy in 'foreign affairs.' " 37

My own work with Kenneth Finegold on the origins of New Deal agricultural policies also suggests that autonomous state contributions to domestic policy making can occur within a "weak state." Such autonomous state contributions happen in specific policy areas at given historical moments, even if they are not generally discernible across all policy areas and even if they unintentionally help to create political forces that subsequently severely circumscribe further autonomous state action. 38 Finegold and I argue that, by the period after World War I, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was "an island of state strength in an ocean of weakness." 39 We attribute the formulation of New Deal agricultural interventions – policies that responded to a long-standing "agrarian crisis" but not simply in ways directly demanded by powerful farm interest groups – to the unique resources of administrative capacity, prior public planning, and practical
governmental experience available to federal agricultural experts at the dawn of the New Deal. Our argument resembles Hugh Heclo's findings about innovative civil officials in Britain and Sweden. Essentially, we found a part of the early-twentieth-century U.S. national government that allowed official expertise to function in a restricted policy area in ways that were similar to the ways it functioned in Sweden, or in Britain between 1900 and 1920.

In addition, however, we trace the political fate of the New Deal’s administrative interventions in agriculture. We show that, in the overall context of the U.S. state structure, this initially autonomous state intervention inadvertently strengthened a particular lobbying group, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and gave it the final increments of electoral and administrative leverage that it needed to “capture” preponderant influence over post-1936 federal agricultural policies. Subsequent state planning efforts, especially those that implied redistribution of economic, racial, or social-class power, were then circumscribed and destroyed by the established commercial farming interests championed by the Farm Bureau.

In short, “state autonomy” is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go. This is true not only because crises may precipitate the formulation of official strategies and policies by elites or administrators who otherwise might not mobilize their own potentials for autonomous action. It is also true because the very structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time, as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both internally and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government. Thus, although cross-national research can indicate in general terms whether a governmental system has “stronger” or “weaker” tendencies toward autonomous state action, the full potential of this concept can be realized only in truly historical studies that are sensitive to structural variations and conjunctural changes within given polities.

Are State Actions “Rational”?

An additional set of comments must be made about the rationality of autonomous state actions. Often such actions are considered more capable of addressing “the capitalist class interest” or “society’s general interests” or “the national interest” than are governmental decisions strongly influenced by the push and pull of demands from interest groups, voting blocs, or particular business enterprises. In such perspectives, state officials are judged to be especially capable of formulating holistic and long-term strategies transcending partial, short-sighted demands from profit-seeking capitalists or narrowly self-interested social groups. But scholars skeptical about the notion of state autonomy often respond that state officials’ own self-legitimating arguments, their claims to know and represent “general” or “national” interests, should not be taken at face value. State officials have no privileged claims to adequate knowledge of societal problems or solu-
tions for them, argue the skeptics. Besides, their legitimating symbols may merely mask policies formulated to help particular interests or class factions.

Surely such doubts about the superior rationality of state actions deserve respectful attention; yet we need not entirely dismiss the possibility that partially or fully autonomous state actions may be able to address problems and even find "solutions" beyond the reach of societal actors and those parts of government closely constrained by them. Partly, the realization of such possibilities will depend on the availability and (even more problematically) the appropriate use of sound ideas about what the state can and should do to address societal problems. Partly, it will depend on the fit (or lack thereof) between the scope of an autonomous state organization's authority and the scale and depth of action appropriate for addressing a given kind of problem. Planning for coordinated systems of national transportation, for example, is unlikely to be achieved by state agencies with authority only over particular regions or kinds of transportation, no matter how knowledgeable and capable of autonomous official action those agencies may be. In sum, autonomous official initiatives can be stupid or misdirected, and autonomous initiatives may be fragmented and partial and work at cross-purposes to one another. Notwithstanding all of these possibilities, however, state actions may sometimes be coherent and appropriate.

Still, no matter how appropriate (for dealing with a given kind of crisis or problem) autonomous state activity might be, it can never really be "disinterested" in any meaningful sense. This is true not only because all state actions necessarily benefit some social interests and disadvantage others (even without the social beneficiaries' having worked for or caused the state actions). More to the point, autonomous state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce the authority, political longevity, and social control of the state organizations whose incumbents generated the relevant policies or policy ideas. We can hypothesize that one (hidden or overt) feature of all autonomous state actions will be the reinforcement of the prerogatives of collectivities of state officials. Whether rational policies result may depend on how "rational" is defined and might even be largely accidental. The point is that policies different from those demanded by societal actors will be produced. The most basic research task for those interested in state autonomy surely is to explore why, when, and how such distinctive policies are fashioned by states. Then it will be possible to wonder about their rationality for dealing with the problems they address—and we will be able to explore this issue without making starry-eyed assumptions about the omniscience or disinterestedness of states.

Can States Achieve Their Goals?

Some comparative-historical scholars not only have investigated the underpinnings of autonomous state actions, but have also tackled the still more challenging task of explaining the various capacities of states to imple-
ment their policies. Of course, the explanation of state capacities is closely connected to the explanation of autonomous goal formation by states, because state officials are most likely to try to do things that seem feasible with the means at hand. Nevertheless, not infrequently, states do pursue goals (whether their own or those pressed on them by powerful social groups) that are beyond their reach. Moreover, the implementation of state policies often leads to unintended as well as intended consequences, both when states attempt tasks they cannot complete and when the means they use produce unforeseen structural changes and sociopolitical reactions. Thus, the capacities of states to implement strategies and policies deserve close analysis in their own right. Here, I will not attempt any comprehensive survey of substantive findings in this important area of research. Instead, I shall simply indicate some promising ideas and approaches embodied in current investigations of state capacities.

A few basic things can be said about the general underpinnings of state capacities. Obviously, sheer sovereign integrity and the stable administrative–military control of a given territory are preconditions for any state’s ability to implement policies. Beyond this, loyal and skilled officials and plentiful financial resources are basic to state effectiveness in attaining all sorts of goals. It is not surprising that histories of state building zero in on exactly these universal sinews of state power. Certain of these resources come to be rooted in institutional relationships that are slow to change and relatively impervious to short-term manipulations. For example, do state offices attract and retain career-oriented incumbents with a wide array of skills and keen motivation? The answer may well depend on historically evolved relationships among elite educational institutions, state organizations, and private enterprises that compete with the state for educated personnel. The best situation for the state may be a regular flow of elite university graduates, including many with sophisticated technical training, into official careers that are of such high status as to keep the most ambitious and successful from moving on to nonstate positions. But if this situation has not been historically established by the start of the industrial era, it is difficult to undo alternative patterns less favorable to the state.

Factors determining a state’s financial resources may be somewhat more manipulable over time, though not always. The amounts and forms of revenues and credit available to a state grow out of structurally conditioned, yet historically shifting political balances and bargains among states and between a state and social classes. Basic sets of facts to sort out in any study of state capacities involve the sources and amounts of state revenues and the degree of flexibility possible in their collection and deployment. Domestic institutional arrangements and international situations set difficult to change limits within which state elites must maneuver to extract taxes and obtain credit: Does a state depend on export taxes (for example, from a scarce national resource or from products vulnerable to sudden world
market fluctuations)? Does a nonhegemonic state's geopolitical position allow it to reap the state-building benefits of military aid, or must it rely on international bankers or aid agencies that insist on favoring nonpublic investments and restrict the domestic political options of the borrower state? What established authority does a state have to collect taxes, to borrow, or to invest in potentially profitable public enterprises? And how much "room" is there in the existing constitutional-political system to change patterns of revenue collection unfavorable to the state?

Finally, what authority and organizational means does a state have to deploy whatever financial resources it does enjoy? Are particular kinds of revenues rigidly "earmarked" for special uses that cannot easily be altered by official decision makers? Can the state channel (and manipulate) flows of credit to particular enterprises and industrial sectors, or do established constitutional-political practices favor only aggregate categorical expenditures? All of these sorts of questions must be asked in any study of state capacities. The answers to them, taken together, provide the best general insight into the direct and indirect leverage a state is likely to have for realizing any goal it may pursue. A state's means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any other single factor about its existing (and immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen state organizations, to employ personnel, to coopt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises, and to fund social programs.

State Capacities to Pursue Specific Kinds of Policies

Basic questions about a state's territorial integrity, financial means, and staffing may be the place to start in any investigation of its capacities to realize goals; yet the most fruitful studies of state capacities tend to focus on particular policy areas. As Stephen Krasner puts it:

There is no reason to assume a priori that the pattern of strengths and weaknesses will be the same for all policies. One state may be unable to alter the structure of its medical system but be able to construct an efficient transportation network, while another can deal relatively easily with getting its citizens around but cannot get their illnesses cured.

Those who study a comprehensive state-propelled strategy for change, such as a "revolution from above" or a major episode of bureaucratically sponsored reforms, may need to assess the overall capacity of a state to realize transformative goals across multiple spheres. Moreover, as Krasner points out, it may be useful to establish that "despite variations among issue areas within countries, there are modal differences in the power of the state among [for example] the advanced market-economy countries." Nevertheless, such overall assessments are perhaps best built up from sectorally specific investigations, for one of the most important facts about the power of a state may be its unevenness across policy areas. And the most telling result,
even of a far-reaching revolution or reform from above, may be the _disparate_ transformations produced across sociopolitical sectors.

Thus, in a provocative article, "Constitutionalism, Class and the Limits of Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy," Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt show how U.S. policies toward Latin America have been partly conditioned by the uneven capacities of the American national government: strongly able to intervene abroad, yet lacking the domestic planning capacities necessary "to direct the internal distribution of costs entailed by a less imperialist foreign policy." To give another example, Alfred Stepan draws many of his most interesting conclusions about the contradictory and unintended results of Peru's episode of "inclusionary corporatism" from a careful analysis of the regime's uneven successes in restructuring the political involvements of various social groups and redirecting the course of economic development in various sectors.

Many studies of the capacities of states to realize particular kinds of goals use the concept of "policy instrument" to refer to the relevant means that a state may have at its disposal. Cross-national comparisons are necessary to determine the nature and range of institutional mechanisms that state officials may conceivably be able to bring to bear on a given set of issues. For example, Susan and Norman Fainstein compare the urban policies of northwest European nations with those of the United States. Accordingly, they are able to conclude that the U.S. national state lacks certain instruments for dealing with urban crises that are available to European states, instruments such as central planning agencies, state-controlled pools of investment capital, and directly administered national welfare programs.

Analogously, Peter Katzenstein brings together a set of related studies of how six advanced industrial-capitalist countries manage the international trade, investment, and monetary involvements of their economies. Katzenstein is able to draw fairly clear distinctions between the strategies open to states such as the Japanese and the French, which have policy instruments that enable them to apply policies at the level of particular industrial sectors, and other states, such as the British and U.S., which must rely on aggregate macroeconomic manipulations of fiscal and monetary parameters. Once again, as in the Fainstein study, it is the juxtaposition of different nations' approaches to a given policy area that allows relevant policy instruments to be highlighted. Neither study, however, treats such "instruments" as deliberate short-term creations of state managers. Both studies move out toward macroscopic explorations of the broad institutional patterns of divergent national histories that explain why countries now have, or do not have, policy instruments for dealing with particular problems or crises.
States in Relation to Socioeconomic Settings

Fully specified studies of state capacities not only entail examinations of the resources and instruments that states may have for dealing with particular problems; they also necessarily look at more than states as such. They examine states in relation to particular kinds of socioeconomic and political environments populated by actors with given interests and resources. One obvious use of a relational perspective is to investigate the power of states over domestic or transnational nonstate actors and structures, especially economically dominant ones. What capacities do states have to change the behavior or oppose the demands of such actors or to transform recalcitrant structures? Answers lie not only in features of states themselves, but also in the balances of states’ resources and situational advantages compared with those of nonstate actors. This sort of relational approach is used by Stephen Krasner in his exploration of the efforts of U.S. policy makers to implement foreign raw materials policy in interactions with large corporations, whose preferences and established practices have frequently run counter to the state’s definition of the national interest.  

This is also the sort of approach used by Alfred Stepan to analyze the successes and failures of Peruvian military leaders in using state power to change the patterns of foreign capital investments in their dependent country. Stepan does a brilliant job of developing a consistent set of causal hypotheses to explain the diverse outcomes across industrial sectors: sugar, oil, and manufacturing. For each sector, he examines regime characteristics: degree of commitment to clear policy goals, technical capacities, monitoring abilities, state-controlled investment resources, and the state’s international position. He also examines the characteristics of existing investments and markets as they impinge on the advantages that either Peru or foreign multinational corporations might hope to attain from any further investments. The entire argument is too complex to reproduce here, but its significance extends well beyond the foreign investment issue area and the Peruvian case. By taking a self-consciously relational approach to the balances of resources that states and multinational corporations may bring to bear in their partially symbiotic and partially conflictual dealings with one another, Stepan has provided an important model for further studies of state capacities in many policy areas.

Another, slightly different relational approach to the study of state capacities appears in Peter Katzenstein’s Between Power and Plenty, where (as indicated earlier) the object of explanation is ultimately not state power over nonstate actors, but nations’ strategies for managing “interdependence” within the world capitalist economy. One notion centrally invoked in the Katzenstein collection is that of a “policy network” embodying a patterned relationship between state and society. In Katzenstein’s words:

The actors in society and state influencing the definition of foreign economic policy objectives consist of the major interest groups and political action groups. The for-
mer represent the relations of production (including industry, finance, commerce, labor, and agriculture); the latter derive from the structure of political authority (primarily the state bureaucracy and political parties). The governing coalitions . . . in each of the advanced industrial states find their institutional expression in distinct policy networks which link the public and the private sector in the implementation of foreign policy. 57

Katzenstein argues that the definition and implementation of foreign economic policies grow out of the nexus of state and society. Both state goals and the interests of powerful classes may influence national policy orientations. And the implementation of policies is shaped not only by the policy instruments available to the state, but also by the organized support it receives from key societal groups.

Thus, policy objectives such as industrial reorganization might be effectively implemented because a central state administration controls credit and can intervene in industrial sectors. Yet it may be of equal importance that industries are organized into disciplined associations willing to cooperate with state officials. A complete analysis, in short, requires examination of the organization and interests of the state, specification of the organization and interests of socioeconomic groups, and inquiries into the complementary as well as conflicting relationships of state and societal actors. This is the sort of approach consistently used by the contributors to Power and Plenty to explain the foreign economic objectives of the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, France, and Japan. The approach is also used to analyze the capacities of these nations' policy networks to implement existing, or conceivable alternative, economic strategies.

The relational approaches of Stepan's State and Society and Katzenstein's Power and Plenty drive home with special clarity some important points about all current research on states as actors and structures. Bringing the state back in to a central place in analyses of policy making and social change does require a break with some of the most encompassing social-determinist assumptions of pluralism, structure–functionalist developmentalism, and the various neo-Marxisms. But it does not mean that old theoretical emphases should simply be turned on their heads: Studies of states alone are not to be substituted for concerns with classes or groups; nor are purely state-determinist arguments to be fashioned in the place of society-centered explanations. The need to analyze states in relation to socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts is convincingly demonstrated in the best current research on state capacities. And we are about to examine yet another cluster of studies in which a fully relational approach to states and societies is even more essential.

States and Patterns of Politics

The previous section focused on the state as a set of organizations through which collectivities of officials may be able to formulate and implement
distinctive strategies or policies. When the state comes up in current social scientific discourse, non-Marxists, at least, are usually referring to it in this sense: as an *actor* whose independent efforts may need to be taken more seriously than heretofore in accounting for policy making and social change. But there is another way to think about the sociopolitical impact of the state, an alternative frame of reference not often articulated but perhaps even more important than the view of the state as an actor. This second approach might be called "Tocquevillian," because Alexis de Tocqueville applied it masterfully in his studies *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* and *Democracy in America*.58 In this perspective, states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).

To be sure, the "strengths" or "weaknesses" of states as sites of more or less independent and effective official actions constitute a key aspect of the organizational configurations and overall patterns of activity at issue in this perspective. This second approach is entirely complementary to the ideas we explored in the previous section, but here the investigator's modus operandi is not the same. When the effects of states are explored from the Tocquevillian point of view, those effects are *not* traced by dissecting state strategies or policies and their possibilities for implementation. Instead, the investigator looks more macroscopically at the ways in which the structures and activities of states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society. Thus, much of Tocqueville's argument about the origins of the French Revolution dealt with the ways in which the French absolutist monarchy, through its institutional structure and policy practices, unintentionally undermined the prestige and political capacities of the aristocracy, provoked the peasantry and the urban Third Estate, and inspired the intelligentsia to launch abstract, rationalist broadsides against the status quo. Effects of the state permeated Tocqueville's argument, even though he said little about the activities and goals of the state officials themselves.

**Comparative Studies of State Structures and Politics in Industrial-Capitalist Democracies**

A good way to demonstrate the contemporary fruitfulness of such macroscopic explorations of the sociopolitical effects of states is to sketch some of the findings of comparative-historical scholars who have focused on differences among and within Western advanced industrial-capitalist nations. Analogous effects have been, or could be, found among other sets of countries – for example, among peripheral or "newly industrializing" capitalist nations or among the "state-socialist" countries – but the analytically rele-
vant points would be similar. Thus, I shall confine myself to comparisons among the United States and some European nations, drawing on a number of works to sketch ideas about how the structures and activities of states affect political culture, group formation and collective political action, and the issue agendas of politics.

In a highly unusual and path-breaking essay for its decade, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," J. P. Nettl delineated a series of institutional and cultural differences in the "stateness" of the United States, Britain, and the continental European nations. Some of his most telling contrasts referred to dimensions of political culture, that is, widely held ideas about the nature and locus of political power and notions about what can be attained in politics and how. In their essay entitled "Constitutionalism, Class, and the Limits of Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy," Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt apply and extend some of these ideas from Nettl.

Owing to the different historical paths their governmental systems have traversed, argued Nettl, continental Europeans think of "sovereignty" as residing in centralized administrative institutions; Britons focus on political parties in Parliament; and U.S. citizens refuse to designate any concrete body as sovereign, but instead attribute sovereignty to the law and the Constitution. In Europe, according to Nettl, the administrative order is instantly recognizable as an area of autonomous action, and both supporters and opponents of the existing order orient themselves to working through it as the agent of the public good. But in the United States, as Katznelson and Prewitt nicely spell out:

The Constitution does not establish . . . [an administratively centralized] state that in turn manages the affairs of society toward some clear conception of the public welfare; rather, it established a political economy in which the public welfare is the aggregate of private preferences. . . . The United States is a government of legislation and litigation. . . . Politics becomes the struggle to translate social and economic interests into law. . . . The political culture defines political power as getting a law passed.

Dissatisfaction most frequently takes the form of trying to force a new and more favorable interpretation of the Constitution. . . . Never in this endless shuffling does the Constitution itself become the target. Rather, constitutional principles legitimate claims for a fair share of "the American way of life," and constitutional interpretations and reinterpretations are the means for forcing reallocations.

In short, various sorts of states not only conduct decision-making, coercive, and adjudicative activities in different ways, but also give rise to various conceptions of the meaning and methods of "politics" itself, conceptions that influence the behavior of all groups and classes in national societies.

The forms of collective action through which groups make political demands or through which political leaders seek to mobilize support are also partially shaped in relation to the structures and activities of states. This point has been richly established for Western countries by scholars dealing with causes and forms of social protest, with "corporatism" as govern-
mentally institutionalized interest consultation, and with political parties as mediators between electorates and the conduct of state power.

Charles Tilly and his collaborators have investigated changing forms of violent and nonviolent collective protest in France and elsewhere in the West since the seventeenth century. In the process, they have pointed to many ways in which state structures, as well as the actions of state officials, affect the timing, the goals, and the forms of collective protest. Inexorable connections between war making and state making in early modern Europe meant, according to Tilly, that most “collective contention” in those days entailed attempts, especially by regional elites and local communities, to defend established rights against royal tax collectors and military recruiters.61 Later, nationwide networks of middle- and working-class people in industrializing Britain created the innovative protest forms of the associational “social movement” through interactions with the parliamentary, legal, and selectively repressive practices of the British state.62 Variations on social-movement “repertories” of collective action, always adapted to the structures and practices of given states, also spread across many other modern nations. Many additional examples of state effects on collective action could be given from Tilly’s work. For many years, he has been a powerful proponent of bringing the state back in to the analysis of social protest, an area of political sociology that was previously dominated by social systems and social psychological approaches.63

If studies of collective action are a perennial staple in sociology, studies of interest groups have a comparable standing in political science. Recently, as Suzanne Berger points out, students of Western European countries have ceased to view “interest groups as reflections of society.” Instead, they find that “the timing and characteristics of state intervention” affect “not only organizational tactics and strategies,” but “the content and definition of interest itself,” with the result that each European nation, according to the historical sequence and forms of the state’s social and economic interventions, has a distinctive configuration of interests active in politics.64 In addition, students of interest groups in Western Europe have vigorously debated the causes and dynamics of “corporatist” patterns, in which interest groups exclusively representing given functional socioeconomic interests attain public status and the right to authoritative participation in national policy making. Some scholars have directly stressed that state initiatives create corporatist forms. Others, more skeptical of such a strong state-centered view, nevertheless analyze the myriad ways in which particular state structures and policies foster or undermine corporatist group representation.65

Key points along these lines are driven home when the United States is brought into the picture. In a provocative 1979 essay, Robert Salisbury asked, “Why No Corporatism in America?” and Graham K. Wilson followed up the query in 1982.66 Both scholars agree that such basic (interrelated) features of the U.S. state structure as federalism, the importance of geo-
graphic units of representation, nonprogrammatic political parties, fragmented realms of administrative bureaucracy, and the importance of Congress and its specialized committees within the national government’s system of divided sovereignty all encourage a proliferation of competing, narrowly specialized, and weakly disciplined interest groups. In short, little about the structure and operations of the American state renders corporatism politically feasible or credible, either for officials or for social groups. Even protest movements in the United States tend to follow issue-specialized and geographically fissiparous patterns. State structures, established interest groups, and oppositional groups all may mirror one another’s forms of organization and scopes of purpose.

Along with interest groups, the most important and enduring forms of collective political action in the industrial-capitalist democracies are electorally competing political parties. In a series of brilliant comparative-historical essays, Martin Shefter demonstrates how such parties have come to operate either through patronage or through programmatic appeals to organized voter blocs. Shefter argues that this depended in large part on the forms of state power in existence when the democratic suffrage was established in various nations. In Germany, for example, absolutist monarchs had established centralized administrative bureaucracies long before the advent of democratic elections. Vote-getting political parties, when they came into existence, could not offer the “spoils of office” to followers, because there was an established coalition (of public officials tied to upper and middle classes oriented to using university education as a route to state careers) behind keeping public bureaucracies free of party control. Thus, German political parties were forced to use ideological, programmatic appeals, ranging from communist or socialist to anti-Semitic and fascist. In contrast, Shefter shows how the territorial unevenness of pre-democratic central administration in Italy and the absence of an autonomous federal bureaucracy in nineteenth-century U.S. democracy allowed patronage-wielding political parties to colonize administrative arrangements in these countries, thereby determining that voters would be wooed with nonprogrammatic appeals, especially with patronage and other “distributive” allocations of publicly controlled resources.

The full scope of Shefter’s work, which cannot be further summarized here, also covers Britain, France, and regional contrasts within the twentieth-century United States. With analytical consistency and vivid historical detail, Shefter shows the influence of evolving state administrative structures on the aims and organizational forms of the political parties that mediate between public offices, on the one hand, and socially rooted electorates, on the other. Unlike many students of voting and political parties, Shefter does not see parties merely as vehicles for expressing societal political preferences. He realizes that they are also organizations for claiming and using state authority, organizations that develop their own interests and persistent styles of work. Lines of determination run as much (or more)
from state structures to party organizations to the content of electoral politics as they run from voter preferences to party platforms to state policies.

Structures of public administration and political party organizations, considered together, go a long way toward "selecting" the kinds of political issues that will come onto (or be kept off) a society's "political agenda." In his book on policy making in relation to air pollution in U.S. municipal politics, Matthew Crenson develops this argument in a manner that has implications beyond his own study.69 Boss-run, patronage-oriented urban machines, Crenson argues, prefer to highlight political issues that create divisible benefits or costs to be allocated differentially in discrete bargains for support from particular businesses or geographic sets of voters. Air pollution controls, however, generate indivisible collective benefits, so machine governments and patronage-oriented parties will try to avoid considering the air pollution issue. Entire political agendas, Crenson maintains, may be dominated by similar types of issues: either mostly "collective" or mostly "specific"/distributional issues. This happens, in part, because the organizational needs of government and parties will call forth similar issues. It also happens because, once political consciousness and group mobilization are bent in one direction, people will tend to make further demands along the same lines. Once again, we see a dialectic between state and society, here influencing the basic issue content of politics, just as previously we have seen state-society interrelations at work in the shaping of political cultures and forms of collective action.

States and the Political Capacities of Social Classes

With so many aspects of politics related to nationally variable state structures, it should come as no surprise that the "classness" of politics also varies in relation to states, for the degree to which (and the forms in which) class interests are organized into national politics depends very much on the prevailing political culture, forms of collective action, and possibilities for raising and resolving broadly collective (societal or class) issues. Marxists may be right to argue that classes and class tensions are always present in industrial societies, but the political expression of class interests and conflicts is never automatic or economically determined. It depends on the capacities classes have for achieving consciousness, organization, and representation. Directly or indirectly, the structures and activities of states profoundly condition such class capacities. Thus, the classical wisdom of Marxian political sociology must be turned, if not on its head, then certainly on its side.

Writing in direct critical dialogue with Marx, Pierre Birnbaum argues that the contrasting ideologies and attitudes toward politics of the French and British working-class movements can be explained in state-centered terms.70 According to Birnbaum, the centralized, bureaucratic French state, sharply
differentiated from society, fostered anarchist or Marxist orientations and political militancy among French workers, whereas the centralized but less differentiated British “establishment” encouraged British workers and their leaders to favor parliamentary gradualism and private contractual wage bargaining.

Analogous arguments by Ira Katznelson in *City Trenches* and by Martin Shefter in an essay entitled “Trades Unions and Political Machines: The Organization and Disorganization of the American Working Class in the Late Nineteenth Century” point to the specifically state-centered factors that account for the cross-nationally very low political capacity of the U.S. industrial working class.71 Democratization (in the form of universal suffrage for white men) occurred in the United States right at the start of capitalist industrialization. From the 1830s onward, electoral competition incorporated workers into a polity run, not by a national bureaucracy or “establishment,” but by patronage-oriented political parties with strong roots in local communities. In contrast to what happened in many European nations, unions and workers in the United States did not have to ally themselves with political associations or parties fighting for the suffrage in opposition to politically privileged dominant classes and an autonomous administrative state. Common meanings and organizations did not bridge work and residence in America, and the early U.S. industrial working class experienced “politics” as the affair of strictly local groups organized on ethnic or racial lines by machine politicians. Work-place struggles were eventually taken over by bread-and-butter trade unions. “In this way,” Katznelson concludes, “citizenship and its bases were given communal meaning separate from work relations. The segmented pattern of class understandings in the United States . . . was caused principally by features of the polity created by the operation of a federal constitutional system.”72

State structures influence the capacities not only of subordinate but also of propertied classes. It is never enough simply to posit that dominant groups have a “class interest” in maintaining sociopolitical order or in continuing a course of economic development in ways congruent with their patterns of property ownership. Exactly how – even whether – order may be maintained and economic accumulation continued depends in significant part on existing state structures and the dominant-class political capacities that those structures help to shape. Thus, in my 1973 discussion of Barrington Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, I argued that the “reformism” of key landed and bourgeois groups in nineteenth-century Britain was not simply a product of class economic interests. It was also a function of the complexly balanced vested political interests those groups had in decentralized forms of administration and repression and in parliamentary forms of political decision making.73 Likewise, much of the argument in my *States and Social Revolutions* about causes of revolutionary transformations in certain agrarian states rests on a comparative analysis of the political capacities of landed upper classes as these were shaped by the structures and activities of monarchical bureaucratic states.74
Again, the point under discussion can be brought home to the United States. Along with the U.S. industrial working class, American capitalists lack the political capacity to pursue classwide interests in national politics. This is one of the reasons invoked by Susan and Norman Fainstein to explain the incoherence and ineffectiveness of contemporary U.S. policy responses to urban crises, which northwest European nations have handled more effectively, to the benefit of dominant and subordinant classes alike. Historically, America's relatively weak, decentralized, and fragmented state structure, combined with early democratization and the absence of a politically unified working class, has encouraged and allowed U.S. capitalists to splinter along narrow interest lines and to adopt an antistate, laissez faire ideology. Arguably, American business groups have often benefited from this situation. Yet American business interests have been recurrently vulnerable to reformist state interventions that they could not strongly influence or limit, given their political disunity or (as at the height of the New Deal) their estrangement from interventionist governmental agencies or administrations. And American business has always found it difficult to provide consistent support for national initiatives that might benefit the economy as a whole.

Obviously, industrial workers and capitalists do not exhaust the social groups that figure in the politics of industrial democracies. Studies of the effects of state structures and policies on group interests and capacities have also done much to explain, in historical and comparative terms, the political involvements of farmers and small businesses. In addition, important new work is now examining relationships between state formation and the growth of modern "professions," as well as related concerns about the deployment of "expert" knowledge in public policy making. Yet without surveying these literatures as well, the basic argument of this section has been sufficiently illustrated.

Politics in all of its dimensions is grounded not only in "society" or in "the economy" or in a "culture" – if any or all of these are considered separately from the organizational arrangements and activities of states. The meanings of public life and the collective forms through which groups become aware of political goals and work to attain them arise, not from societies alone, but at the meeting points of states and societies. Consequently, the formation, let alone the political capacities, of such apparently purely socioeconomic phenomena as interest groups and classes depends in significant measure on the structures and activities of the very states the social actors, in turn, seek to influence.

Conclusion

This essay has ranged widely – although, inevitably, selectively – over current research on states as actors and as institutional structures with effects in politics. Two alternative, though complementary, analytical strategies have been discussed for bringing the state back in to a prominent
place in comparative and historical studies of social change, politics, and policy making. On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realizing them more or less effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings. On the other hand, states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society.

Given the intellectual and historical trends surveyed in the introduction to this essay, there can now be little question whether states are to be taken seriously in social scientific explanations of a wide range of phenomena of long-standing interest. There remain, however, many theoretical and practical issues about how states and their effects are to be investigated. My programmatic conclusion is straightforward: Rather than become embroiled in a series of abstruse and abstract conceptual debates, let us proceed along the lines of the analytical strategies sketched here. With their help, we can carry through further comparative and historical investigations to develop middle-range generalizations about the roles of states in revolutions and reforms, about the social and economic policies pursued by states, and about the effects of states on political conflicts and agendas.

A new theoretical understanding of states in relation to social structures will likely emerge as such programs of comparative-historical research are carried forward. But this new understanding will almost certainly not resemble the grand systems theories of the structure–functionalists or neo-Marxists. As we bring the state back in to its proper central place in explanations of social change and politics, we shall be forced to respect the inherent historicity of sociopolitical structures, and we shall necessarily attend to the inescapable intertwinnings of national-level developments with changing world historical contexts. We do not need a new or refurbished grand theory of "The State." Rather, we need solidly grounded and analytically sharp understandings of the causal regularities that underlie the histories of states, social structures, and transnational relations in the modern world.

Notes

This chapter is a revision of "Bringing the State Back In: False Leads and Promising Starts in Current Theories and Research," originally prepared for a Social Science Research Council conference entitled "States and Social Structures: Research Implications of Current Theories," held at Seven Springs Center, Mt. Kisco, New York, February 25–27, 1982. I benefited greatly from conference discussions. Subsequently, reactions from Pierre Birnbaum, David Easton, Harry Eckstein, Kenneth Finegold, and Eric Nordlinger also helped me to plan revisions of the conference paper, as did access to prepublication copies of Stephen Krasner's "Review Article: Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (2) (January 1984), 223–46 and Roger Benjamin and Raymond


6. Sociologists may recognize that the title of this chapter echoes the title of George
C. Homans's 1964 presidential address to the American Sociological Association, "Bringing Men Back In." Of course, the subject matters are completely different, but there is an affinity of aspiration for explanations built on propositions about the activities of concrete groups. This stands in contrast to the application of analytical conceptual abstractions characteristic of certain structure–functionalist or neo-Marxist "theories."

7. Among the most important exceptions were Samuel Huntington's path-breaking state-centered book, *Political Order and Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); Morris Janowitz's many explorations of state–society relationships, as in *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), and *Social Control of the Welfare State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and James Q. Wilson's conceptually acute probing in *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973). In his many works in political sociology, Seymour Martin Lipset has always remained sensitive to the effects of various institutional structures of government representation. In addition, Reinhard Bendix consistently developed a state-centered Weberian approach to political regimes as a critical counterpoint to structure–functionalist developmentalism, and S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan elaborated creative syntheses of functionalist and Weberian modes of comparative political analysis.


9. Eric A. Nordlinger's *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) has stretched pluralist premises to their conceptual limits in order to encompass the possibility of autonomous actions by elected politicians or administrative officials. Tellingly, Nordlinger defines "state autonomy" purely in terms of the conscious preferences of public officials, who are said to be acting autonomously as long as they are not deliberately giving in to demands by societal actors. By insisting that public officials have wants and politically relevant resources, just as voters, economic elites, and organized interest groups do, Nordlinger simply gives officials the same dignity that all actors have in the fluid "political process" posited by pluralism. State autonomy, Nordlinger in effect says, is simply the creative exercise of political leadership. No matter what the organization or capacities of the state, any public official at any time is, by definition, in a position to do this. In my view, the value of Nordlinger's book lies, not in this rather insipid general conclusion, but in the researchable hypotheses about variations in state autonomy that one might derive from some of the typologies it offers.

Fougere's critical discussion in "The Structure of Government and the Organization of Politics: A Polity Centered Approach" (Department of Sociology, Harvard University, September 1978).


12. I have benefited from Stephen Krasner's discussion of the bureaucratic politics perspective in *Defending the National Interest*, p. 27. Krasner's own book shows the difference it makes to take a more macroscopic, historical, and state-centered approach.


16. The scope of many neo-Marxist propositions about states makes them more applicable/testable in comparisons across modes of production, rather than across nations within capitalism. Therborn, in Ruling Class, is one of the few theorists to attempt such cross-mode comparisons, however.

17. I do not mean to imply pure continuity. Around the World Wars and during the 1930s depression, when both British and U.S. hegemony faltered, there were bursts of more state-centered theorizing, including such works as Harold Lasswell’s “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46 (1941): 455–68; and Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957; originally 1944).


20. Stepan, State and Society, p. xii.


22. For discussion of the most important neopluralist theory of state autonomy, see note 9. The works by Poulantzas and Offe cited in note 14 represent important neo-Marxist theories of state autonomy. Poulantzas’s approach is ultimately very frustrating because he simply posits the “relative autonomy of the capitalist state” as a necessary feature of the capitalist mode of production as such. Poulantzas insists that the state is “relatively autonomous” regardless of varying empirical ties between state organizations and the capitalist class, and at the same time he posits that the state must invariably function to stabilize the capitalist system as a whole.


24. Trimberger, Revolution from Above.

25. Ibid., p. 4.

26. Ibid., p. 5.

27. Thus, in commenting on Stepan’s work, Trimberger argues that he could have
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explained the repressive and “exclusionary” nature of the Brazilian coup (in contrast to Peru’s “inclusionary” reforms, which included mass political mobilization and expropriation of hacienda landlords) by focusing on the Brazilian military’s ties to Brazilian and multinational capitalists. In fact, Stepan does report (“The New Professionalism,” p. 54) that Brazilian military professionals received their training alongside elite civilians, including industrialists, bankers, and commercial elites, who also attended the Superior War College of Brazil in the period before 1964.

28. Trimberger’s work thus speaks to the problems with Nicos Poulantzas’s theory discussed in note 22.

29. For France, there is an especially rich literature on state autonomy, its consequences and its limits. I am deliberately leaving it aside here, because France is such an obvious case for the application of ideas about state autonomy. See the works, however, by Birnbaum, Hall, Suleiman, and Zysman cited in notes 2 and 3, along with Stephen Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); and Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).


31. Ibid., p. 305.

32. Ibid., pp. 305–6, 303.

33. Krasner, Defending the National Interest.

34. Ibid., p. 11.

35. See also Krasner, “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy, pp. 51–87.

36. Thus, Krasner has the most difficulty in distinguishing his argument for “state autonomy” from the structural Marxist perspective according to which the state acts for the class interests of capital as a whole. His solution, to stress “nonrational” ideological objectives of state policy as evidence against the class-interest argument, does not strike me as being very convincing. Could an imperialist ideology not be evidence of class consciousness as well as of state purpose: One might stress, instead, the perceived geopolitical “interests” at work in U.S. interventions abroad. “Free-world” justifications for such interventions are not obviously irrational, given certain understandings of U.S. geopolitical interests.


40. In contrasting ways, both Krasner’s Defending the National Interest and Poulantzas’s Political Power and Social Classes exemplify this point.

41. Or perhaps one should say that any state or state-building movement preoccupied with sheer administrative–military control will, at best, only be able (as well as likely) to implement policies connected to that overriding goal. This
principle is a good guide to understanding many of the social changes that accompany state-building struggles during revolutionary interregnums.


43. See Bernard Silberman’s important comparative-historical work on alternative modes of state bureaucratization in relation to processes of professionalization: “State Bureaucratization: A Comparative Analysis” (Department of Political Science, the University of Chicago, 1982).

44. Windfall revenues from international oil sales, for example, can render states both more autonomous from societal controls and, because social roots and political pacts are weak, more vulnerable in moments of crisis. I argue along these lines in “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution,” Theory and Society 11 (1982): 265–83. The Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council currently has a project entitled “Social Change in Arab Oil-Producing Societies” that is investigating the impact of oil revenues on state–society relationships.

45. See Robert E. Wood, “Foreign Aid and the Capitalist State in Underdeveloped Countries,” Politics and Society 10(1) (1980): 1–34. Wood’s essay primarily documents and discusses the anti-state-building effects of most foreign aid, but it also notes that “the ‘overdeveloped’ military institutions fostered by aid can provide a springboard for statist experimentation unintended by aid donors” (p. 34). Taiwan and South Korea would both seem to be good examples of this.


48. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, p. 58.

49. Ibid.


51. Stepan, State and Society, chaps. 5–8.

52. This concept is discussed by Peter Katzenstein in Between Power and Plenty, pp. 16, 297–98.


55. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, especially parts 2 and 3.

56. Stepan, State and Society, chap. 7.

58. I am indebted to Jeff Weintraub for pointing out the affinities of this second approach to Tocqueville's political sociology.


62. Ibid., pp. 145–78.

63. For an overview of Tilly's approach to collective action in critical response to earlier sociological approaches, see *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).


68. In fact, Shefter shows ("Party and Patronage," p. 428) that parties in the Weimar Republic that might have preferred to use patronage appeals to garner peasant votes were prodded into ideological appeals because bureaucratic autonomy was so great. Thus, they resorted to anti-Semitic and nationalist "ideas" to appeal to the peasantry, a class that is often supposed to be inherently oriented to patronage appeals.


74. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
75. Fainstein and Fainstein, "National Policy and Urban Development."