Ethnomethodology's Program
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ETHNOMETHODOLOGY’S PROGRAM

1.1 What Is Ethnomethodology?

Ethnomethodology gets reintroduced to me in a recurrent episode at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association. I’m waiting for the elevator. The doors open. “Oh, Hi Hal!” “Hi.” I walk in. THE QUESTION is asked: “Hey, Hal, what IS ethnomethodology?” The elevator doors close. We’re on our way to the ninth floor. I’m only able to say, “Ethnomethodology is working out some very preposterous problems.” The elevator doors open.

On the way to my room it occurs to me that I should have said that ethnomethodology is respecifying Durkheim’s lived immortal, ordinary society, evidently, doing so by working out a schedule of preposterous problems. The problems have their sources in the worldwide social science movement. They are motivated by that movement’s ubiquitous commitments to the policies and methods of formal analysis and general representational theorizing and by its unquestionable achievements.

Formal Analytic (FA) technology and its results are understood worldwide. Almost unanimously for the armies of social analysts, in endless analytic arts and sciences of practical action, formal analytic procedures assure good work and are accorded the status of good work. FA’s achievements are well known and pointless to dispute. FA technology exercises universal jurisdiction in targeting phenomena for analysis. Phenomena of order are made instructably observable in formal analytic details of concertedly recurrent achievements of practical action. These range from the conduct of war to the transient pause before an invitation is refused. Phenomena made instructably observable in formal analytic details of concertedly recurrent achievements of practical actions are so provided for by FA that a phenomenon, whatever the phenomenon and whatever its scale, is made instructably observable as the work of a population that staffs its production. Populations are usually treated as straightforward counts of bodies. The proposal here is instead that it is the workings of the phenomenon that exhibit among its other details the population that staffs it.1 This population is exhibited in surveyable particulars of body counts and dimensionalized demographics. These are elucidated with variable analysis, quantified arguments, and causal structures. Such analytic descriptions are available in all administered societies, contemporary and historical.

That these achievements are unquestionable is assured by being subordinated to FA’s premier achievement, the corpus status of its bibliographies. By corpus I mean (1) its investigations, always accompanied by textual accounts that describe, specify, make instructably observable, satisfy, and are exhibits of adequate grounds of further

* Acknowledgements: There are many people whose contribution to this work need to be acknowledged, not least those many students and colleagues whose ethnomethodological studies have provided the catalogue of investigations, discussed here, without which the original promise of “Studies” would have remained unfulfilled. Ethnomethodology is after all, and necessarily, an unrelievedly empirical enterprise. I thank also Doug Maynard and Lucy Suchman for their steadfast friendship and for their generosity with their time and their hard won knowledge in shoptalk. I am deeply in debt to Anne Rawls. Years ago she was briefly my student. Now she is my teacher, esteemed colleague, and rare friend. She sustained our discussions through the writing and took the time to carefully edit this manuscript for publication.

Because of many people who have taken up an interest in ethnomethodology it is impossible that one description will encompass the vast array of studies going by that name. However, I hope that there is room in this discussion for those studies which take the importance of witnessable recurrent phenomenal fields of detail seriously and as a primary issue, in whatever other respects we may differ.

1 It is the workings of the traffic that make its staff available as “typical” drivers, “bad” drivers, “close in” drivers and anything else the demographers need to have to administer a causal account of the driving. Endogenous populations are a topic of recurring ethnomethodological interest. You don’t start with bodies. The Conversational Analysis of talk provides another example. It starts with conversation which exhibits its speakers as typical recurring, doing it again in the same way, staff.
inference and action. (2) These are adequacies of an investigation’s origins and problem specification, and of the problem’s essential history, descriptive coverage, facticity, relevance, and, as contingencies in an actual occasion of inquiry may have required, any of the rest. (3) The adequacies are instructably reproducible. (4) The foregoing are satisfied in actual worksite achievements. (5) Investigations at all levels of findings in these respects can be taken on these grounds seriously to define a current situation of inquiry.

Ethnomethodology (EM) is proposing and working out “What More” there is to the unquestionable corpus status of formal analytic investigations than formal analysis does, did, ever did, or can provide. EM does not dispute those achievements. Without disputing those achievements as unquestionably demonstrable achievements, EM asks “What More” is there that users of formal analysis know and demand the existence of, that FA depends upon the existence of for FA’s worksite-specific achievements in carefully instructed procedures, that FA uses and recognizes everywhere in and as its lived worksite-specific practices. There are practices that FA practitioners just in any actual case know and recognize are unavoidable, without remedy or alternatives. The practices are indispensable to practitioners. Just as in any actual case the practices specify practitioners’ work and make it instructably observable.

“What More” has centrally (and perhaps entirely) to do with procedures. I have given procedural EM’s emphasis on work. By procedural, EM does not mean process. Procedural means labor. That emphasis is exemplified in the probative descriptions by David Sudnow. At the worksite—playing hearably improvised jazz at the piano keyboard; enactedly solving the problem, at the computer console, of getting a high score in “Breakout,” the video game—progressively and developingly coming upon the phenomenon via the work in and as of the unmediated details of producing it (Sudnow, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1996).

The central obsession in ethnomethodological studies is to provide for what the alternate procedural descriptions of achieved and achievable phenomena of order—methodologies—could be without sacrificing issues of structure. That means without sacrificing the great achievements—of describable recognizable recurrencies, of generality, and of comparability of these productions of ordinary activities—activities that carry with them the recognizable achievements of populations that staff their production, along with the interchangeability and surveyability of those populations. This is not an indifference to structure. This is a concern with structure as an achieved phenomenon of order.

EM is concerned with “What More,” in the world of familiar, ordinary activities, does immortal, ordinary society consist of as the locus and the setting of every topic of order, every topic of logic, of meaning, of method respecified and respecifiable as the most ordinary Durkheimian things in the world.

Ethnomethodology’s fundamental phenomenon and its standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of immortal familiar society’s most ordinary organizational things in the world, and to provide for them both and simultaneously as objects and procedurally, as alternate methodologies.

The identity of objects and methodologies is key. These methodologies are incarnate in familiar society. Therein they are uniquely adequate to the phenomena whose production they describe substantively, in material de-
tails. The competence of their production staffs consists of the unique adequacy of methods. The competence of their production staffs is, it exists as, it is identical with, the unique adequacy of methods.\(^3\)

EM addresses these provisions as empirically adequate descriptions. It carries them out by eschewing the methods of formal analysis. This is done without loss or sacrifice of issues of structure, and without bowdlerizing or ignoring issues of structure or changing the subject.

Without sacrificing issues of structure or changing the subject? That means without sacrificing the ubiquitous achievements, in everyday life, of recognizable and accountable, observable recurrences of practical actions and practical reasoning in achievedly coherent, ordered, uniquely adequate details of generality, of comparability, of classification, of typicality, of uniformity, of standardization. These are recurrencies in productions of the phenomena of ordinary activities—traffic jams, service lines, summoning phones, blackboard notes, jazz piano in a cocktail lounge, talking chemistry in lecture format—phenomena that exhibit, along with their other endogenously accountable details, the endogenously accountable populations that staff their production.

What in the world do these achievements consist of? Where in the world are they found? How in the world are they found? What in the world of commonplace, local, immortal, ordinary society consist of as the locus and the setting of every topic of order, of logic, of meaning, of method, reason, rationality, science, truth, respecified and respecifiable as the most ordinary concerted lived organizationally enacted phenomena in the world?

### 1.2 There Is Order in the Plenum

According to the worldwide social science movement and the corpus status of its bibliographies, there is no order in the concreteness of things (Garfinkel, 1988). The research enterprises of the social scientific movement are defeated by the apparently hopelessly circumstantial overwhelming details of everyday activities—the plenum, the plenty, the plenilunium. To get a remedy, the social sciences have worked out policies and methods of formal analysis. These respecify the concrete details of ordinary activities as details of the analyzing devices and of the methods that warrant the use of these devices. They respecify the sheer circumstantiality of ordinary activities so that order can be exhibited analytically. It is essentially an empirical demonstration. The details found in the model reveal the essential recurring invariant features which are FA’s phenomena.

A Catalog of Ethnomethodological Investigations\(^4\) consists of evidence to the contrary. Indeed, there is order in the most ordinary activities of everyday life in their full concreteness, and that means in their ongoingly procedurally enacted coherence of substantive, ordered phenomenal details without loss of generality.\(^5\) It has to do with the unexplicated specifics of details in structures, in recurrences, in typicality, not the details gotten by administering a generic description. These details are unmediately experienced and experienced evidently.

Just-in-any-actual-case immortal ordinary society is a wonderful beast. Evidently and just in any actual case, God knows how it is put together. The principal formal analytic devices currently in hand, of paying careful attention to the use, the design, and administration of generic representational theorizing—models, for example, get a job done that with the same technical skills in administering them lose the very phenomenon that they profess.

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\(^3\) The unique-adequacy requirement of methods is explained briefly in Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992.

\(^4\) A Catalog of EM Investigations with Which to Respecify Topics of Logic, Order, Meaning, Method, Reason, Structure, Science, and the Rest, In, About, and As the Workings of Immortal, Ordinary Society Just in Any Actual Case. What Did We Do? What Did We Learn?

In A Catalog Statement, briefly annotated themes and topics, in various documents, are arranged in several collections of ethnomethodological investigations. Formatted as a directed review and understood as steps of an argument, these investigations, in several volumes, make up the EM Catalog.

\(^5\) I use generality as synecdoche for various features of lived phenomena that formal analysis collects and describes as structures. Structures are extensively discussed in Seven Cases With Which to Specify How Phenomenal Fields of Ordinary Activities Are Lost With Engineering Details of Recording Machinery: Rhythmic Clapping, Summoning Phones, Counting Turns at Talk, Scrubbing the Sink and Other Trivial, Unavoidably Sight-Specific Ordinary Jobs Around the House, Traffic Flow, Service Lines, and Computer Supported Real Time Occupations.
Enacted specifically ordinary organizational phenomena in ordered phenomenal details of structures evidently are strange. Immortal, ordinary society is strange.

Strange? In particulars, what’s so strange? What is strange is already well known and available.

Consider that immortal ordinary society evidently, just in any actual case, is easily done and easily recognized with uniquely adequate competence, vulgar competence, by one and all—and, for all that, by one and all it is intractably hard to describe procedurally. Procedurally described, just in any actual case, it is elusive. Further, it is only discoverable. It is not imaginable. It cannot be imagined but is only actually found out, and just in any actual case. The way it is done is everything it can consist of and imagined descriptions cannot capture this detail. Just in any actual case it is both vulgarly done and intractable when it comes to making it instructable. Absent that, and God knows how it is put together. More to the point of strange: In God’s silence, formal analysts, by exercising the privileges of the transcendental analyst and the universal observer, do not know; yet still somehow they know they need not hesitate to say.

More on “strange.” How immortal, ordinary society is put together includes the incarnate work by formal analysts of paying careful attention to the design and administration of generic representational theorizing. It is no news that that work is an enacted detail of the immortal society it learns about and teaches. In the social science movement the jobs of descriptive analysis get done with generic theorizing. The skills with which these jobs are done are everywhere accompanied by curious incongruities. These are well known, and even freely acknowledged, they include that with the same procedural skills of carrying out these jobs the phenomena they so carefully describe are lost.

Further, the procedure of generic representational theorizing puts in place of the enacted witnessable detail of immortal ordinary society a collection of signs. The FA procedure ignores the enacted, unmediated, directly and immediately witnessable details of immortal ordinary society. Then, analysts have only one option, in order to carry through their analytic enterprises, these being the careful enterprises of description that will permit the demonstration of the corpus status of ordinary actions; in order to do that, analysts become interpreters of signs. Following through consistently with this procedure, it is then argued that interpretation is unavoidable. That designing and interpreting “marks, indicators, signs, and symbols” is inevitably what sociologists and social scientists must do in order to carry out the corpus status of their studies of ordinary activities.

EM is not in the business of interpreting signs. It is not an interpretive enterprise. Enacted local practices are not texts which symbolize “meanings” or events. They are in detail identical with themselves, and not representative of something else. The witnessably recurrent details of ordinary everyday practices constitute their own reality. They are studied in their unmediated details and not as signed enterprises.

Is it then that ethnomethodology in its concerns with “What More” is critical of formal analytic investigations? Is it that ethnomethodology is one more in a familiar line of academic sociology’s in-house critics, stirring the waters the better to fish therein? There have been authors of ethnomethodological studies whose reputations were promoted by offering to the members of the worldwide social science movement ways of upgrading their craft. “Your science is cockeyed. We need to sit down and diagnose for you just where you’re going wrong.” Ethnomethodology has yet to deliver promised repairs to formal analytic social scientific enterprises without losing its own phenomena.

Ethnomethodology is not critical of formal analytic investigations. But neither is it the case that EM, and that means A Catalog of EM Investigations, has no concern with a remedial expertise and has nothing to promise or deliver. Ethnomethodology is applied ethnomethodology. However, its remedial transactions are distinctive to EM expertise. That expertise is offered for phenomena whose local, endogenous production is troubled in ordered phenomenal details of structures. EM does not offer a remedial expertise that is transcendental to these phenomena. In these the generality of EM’s remedial expertise is indifferent to (independent of) the use of policies of generic representational theorizing and methods of constructive analysis to specify the generality of remedial expertise.

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6 For a deep explication of that claim see Schegloff, 1987.
Having been found out, EM’s findings are described with the questions “What did we do? What did we learn? More to the point, what did we learn, but only in and as lived doings, that we can teach? And how can we teach it?” EM’s findings are tutorial problems. They are not different than pedagogies. They were learned in settings in which teaching and learning being done in concert with others were locally and endogenously witnessable by and “relevant to the parties.” In these respects they were essentially unavoidable and without remedy.

That EM’s findings are pedagogies has an obvious focus in ethnomethodological studies of work and occupations. Its findings are found there in the phenomena of two constituents of the Shop Floor Problem: (1) shop floor achievements and their accompanying careful\(^7\) descriptions, and (2) shop floor theorizing. They are found there also, and everywhere else, in careful\(^8\) descriptions; in the praxeological validity of instructed actions;\(^8\) and in one of EM’s distinctive results and its central phenomenon: The praxeological validity of instructed action is (i.e., “exists as,” “is identical with,” “is the same as”) the phenomenon. These results are collected in EM studies of work in the professions and sciences.

Flatly, none of EM’s questions are concerned with who is ahead in a contest between rival claims to adequate science in the social sciences. Instead, and just as flatly, the two disciplines, FA and EM, are both and simultaneously incommensurably different and unavoidably related. What do the two technologies have to do with each other? This is EM’s prevailing question. This question is the center of EM’s bibliographies.

1.3 Formal Analytic Literatures and Their EM Alternates

A collection of EM investigations establishes and specifies, by making instructably observable, a territory of new organizational phenomena. These consist of the paired achievements: 1) topical literatures of formal analytic investigations and theorizing, accompanied by 2) their ethnomethodological alternates. The collection’s empirical specifics are the work of an international company of authors of books, articles, dissertations, master’s essays, seminar papers, and occasional notes.

In the pairs that compose the collection, EM alternates to FA literatures are alternates, not alternatives. Case by case they are specific alternates. Members of a pair make demonstrably disjunct provisions for the corpus status of the ordinary activities that a pair describes. The EM alternates are incommensurable, asymmetrically alternate phenomena of order.

The achievements of formal analytic theorizing and investigations are always accompanied by ethnomethodological alternates, and they are accompanied everywhere. Wherever in an actual investigation one is found, the other is also found. Wherever the ground is analytically trampled, its specific ethnomethodological alternate is findable. The more heavily the ground has been trampled, and wherever it has been trampled for the longest time, the more certainly will its EM alternate be findable. When it is found, the more curious is its prior absence in mainstream literatures, for its absence is a positive phenomenon and an accomplishment of immortal ordinary society not less than are those described by FA investigations.\(^9\)

In order to describe FA literatures and their EM alternates I have appropriated the term coeval;\(^10\) where one arises, the other arises alongside and with it. Coeval brings to center stage and underlines ethnmethodology’s premier questions: What do FA literatures and their EM alternates consist of in any actual case? Just in any actual case? What do they consist of at the worksite, as the worksite, first time through?

FA investigations and EM studies are both and simultaneously incommensurably different and specifically related. EM knows this to be so, empirically and demonstrably, via the

\(^7\) Careful, spelled with an asterisk refers to descriptions that are available at the worksite to misreading as the first segment of an instructed action. This is explained further in 3.1 the Praxeological Validity of Instructed Action.

\(^8\) The following is an explicating phrase for the “praxeological validity of instructed action”: at and as the worksite misreading a description as instructably the work of following which exhibits the phenomenon that the text describes.

\(^9\) In an aspect of their curious absence, EM alternates are buried by the work of mainstreaming them. Like any other procedurally specified phenomena of order the work of mainstreaming is done in details of structures.

\(^10\) Maynard and Clayman (1991) first used this term to describe the alternates.
Catalog of EM Investigations. EM knows this in instructable ways that FA does not have empirical access to and that it CAN not get access to. EM has the unavoidable task of explaining these claims and demonstrating them. Do FA literatures and EM alternates arise together? Are they related? Then how do they arise together? How are they related?

Just what do they have to do with each other? But not as thought-full theory writing with which a theory writer, not being required to know at first hand or to be constrained by just what in its procedurally ordered phenomenal details he is talking about empirically, can have it in the way he can imagine and however it is needed to do his FA theorizing; doing with an imagined state of affairs whatever is needed to carry off an argument that is available in a Borgesian library of theories to choose whatever adds to a literature of topical controversies.

Durkheim’s aphorism is taught to graduate students from the first day of graduate work: “The objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle.” The aphorism is taken very seriously in both programs of investigations and by both technologies of analysis, FA and EM. Their takes are different; they are incommensurably different. Nevertheless they are inextricably related. For one thing—one organizational thing, and a social fact in its own right—they are asymmetrically alternate.13

That means that you can use ethnomethodology to recover in phenomenal ordered details—in a phenomenal field of ordered details the work that makes up, at the worksite, the design, administration, and carrying off of investigations with the use of formal analytic practices. You can’t do it the other way around. That is to say, you can’t use the methods of formal analysis to recover the work and the findings that ethnomethodology is coming up with. So their takes on Durkheim’s aphorism indeed are not only alternate; they are asymmetrically alternate, and that they are asymmetrically related is itself a social fact.

In the contemporary worldwide social science movement, “The objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle” is understood procedurally, although not as procedurally is understood in ethnomethodology. In the countless analytic arts and sciences of practical action of the worldwide social science movement, the aphorism in substantially explicated details consists of and is demonstrated in the corpus status of investigations carried out with the policies, methods, and results of formal analytic technology. Therein, too, the aphorism is variously understood according to need and occasion as FA’s aim, tasks, work, procedural demands, achievement, and fundamental phenomenon.

EM also accords the aphorism heavy procedural emphasis, but distinctively so. Ethnomethodologically the aphorism is understood like this. From the outset of its investigations, EM addressed various settings of immortal ordinary society whose particu-

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11 By way of a reminder, in ethnomethodology procedural means labor of a certain incarnate methodological sort: at the worksite progressively and developingly upon the phenomenon via the work in and as of the unmediated, immediately and directly observed phenomenal-field details of producing it.

12 Jorge Louis Borges talks about a “The Library of Babel.” We learned in graduate school that it is a free democracy of theories. You pick up whatever you need.

13 The EM Catalog describes this and other relations in a collection of “rendering theorems.” See Garfinkel and Weider (1992).
lar staffs so concerted their activities as to exhibit topics of order* as their activities' achieved phenomena of order* in and as real world settings, in real time,15 and therein as the most ordinary achieved organizational things in the world. Any and all topics of order*16 were taken to be eligible for ethnomethodological respecification as achieved phenomena of order*, commonplace achievements, seen but unnoticed, specifically uninteresting, and specifically unremarkable "work of the streets."

It is ethnomethodological about EM studies that they show for immortal ordinary society's substantive events in material contents just and only in any actual case, that and just how vulgarly competent members concert their activities to produce and display, to demonstrate, to make observably the case, locally, naturally accountable phenomena of logic and order, of cause, classification, temporality, coherence, consistency, and analysis, of details, of details in structures, of meaning, mistakes, errors, accidents, coincidence, facticity, reason, truth, and methods in and as of the unremarkable embodied ordered details of their ordinary lives together.

From time to time, in one publication or another, their relevance for sociology would be summarized with a restatement of Durkheim's aphorism. For its investigations, ethnomethodology took this to mean the objective reality of social facts, in that and just how every society's locally, endogenously produced, naturally organized, naturally accountable, ongoing, practical achievement, being everywhere, always, only, exactly and entirely members' work, with no time out, and with no possibility of evasion, hiding out, passing, postponement, or buyouts, is thereby sociology's fundamental phenomenon.17

EM took it18 that the workings of immortal, ordinary society are the origins, sources, destinations, locus, and settings of achieved phenomena of order*. Provisions for achievements of order, whether these provisions are vernacular or technical, lay or professional, begin, have their course, and finish in the midst of these ordinary workings.

EM takes it that immortal ordinary society exists as, consists of, is identical with achieved phenomena of logic, meaning, method, reason, rational action, truth, evidence, science, Kant's basic categories, or Hume's, or the primordials of anyone else, any of which is a lot of territory inasmuch as General Ideas of the Universal Observer are commonly used in the social sciences and humanities to topologize and justify valid knowledge of every possible thing in any possible world.19

Durkheim's aphorism "The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle" is specified in the investigations of the EM catalog. In the Catalog's investigations, the objective reality of the social facts is made instructably observable and instructably reproducible in and as the most ordinary and familiar organizational things in the world.

The different takes on Durkheim's aphorism by the formal analytic arts and sciences of the worldwide social science movement and seminars at UCLA since 1954 and in conferences at various universities. It is the explicit subject of various publications (e.g., Garfinkel, 1988; Garfinkel and Weider 1992, Chapter 10). It is explicitly thematic in dissertations for which I was chair at UCLA and UC Irvine, or on which I served there or elsewhere. It is specified in themes and topics throughout the EM Catalog of Investigations.

15 Various tutorial problems in the EM Catalog empirically respecify several meanings of standard time and various established literary meanings. In its concerns with time, Sudnow's work is particularly rich.

16 Order* spelled with an asterisk is a proxy for any and all topics of logic, meaning, reason, method . . .

17 I understand this restatement of Durkheim's aphorism to be EM's center. I understand this restatement and teach it as EM's distinctive and central statement of its aims, tasks, program, policies, methods, results, and teachings. It has been a recurrent theme in my courses produced, observed and observable, locally and accountably in and as of an "assemblage of haeccities." EM places heavy emphasis on "immortal." It is a recurrent theme in the EM catalog and a source of its topics.

18 Took it, that is, beyond hermeneutics, beyond interpretive sociology, certainly beyond Husserl's Lebenswelt or the matters debated by Schutz and Gwirwitsch, beyond writers of theory such as Parsons, Coleman, Foucault, or Merleau-Ponty. Possibly and most promisingly more than any of these, took it beyond Durkheim's socio-empirical epistemology that has been elucidated recently by Anne Rawls (1996).
and ethnomethodology are incommensurably different but nevertheless they are inextricably related. Just in case the members of a pair are compared procedurally, they present to EM a preposterous problem: The phenomenon of interest to EM is not that the FA literatures and their EM alternates make up a collection and its properties. The phenomenon of interest is this: The phenomenon of interest is the preposterous problem: namely, case by case, for each pair, the literature and its alternate: The phenomenon of interest is the disjunct corpus status of its respective bibliographies. This is an initial preposterous problem. Further preposterous problems flow from that. Case by case, the LITALT pairs are preposterous problems.

2.1 A Collection of FA Literatures and Their EM Alternates

EM alternates are specific alternates to the FA literatures with which they are paired. They are demonstrably alternate provisions for the corpus status of the ordinary activities that an FA literature describes. This claim is critical to the collection. A literature is ordinarily read for familiarly probative studies of its subjects. When its studies are read for that, the reading is apt to be looking in studies at hand to a well-known past (the reader's included), reviewing, collecting, and deepening established studies, promoting a tradition, renewing it by singling out a line of studies to find what next in line might look like, and perhaps so attaching a next study to the line as to continue the structure that was used to find what “next” could be and should be.

The EM reading is incommensurably different in material details in that instead of renewing a tradition, it deliberately searches a literature for news to carry further EM's previously uncovered and established markers of strangely new organizational phenomena in what nevertheless remains FA's familiar territory. The EM search is for “What More” the territory offers up in language to describe it as a literature’s very own subject; offers up, not in the ineffable seeing of something, but with a language that is itself part of the territory, but that in its matters can’t be imagined but is only discoverable. The EM reader, having caught on to something, wouldn’t want only to stipulate or imagine it. New directions would have already been taken, so why would one want to? And so on, and so forth.

Various EM authors have described worksite-specific, discipline-specific, procedural enactments of the “etcetera” clause, the documentary method of interpretation, indexical expressions and their essential ubiquity, reflexive body/world relations, details in structures, tacit knowledge, the essential mundanity of reason and calculative rationality, and oracular reasoning and its endless cognates. These subjects had their start in 1952 after I learned about the work of Calvin Mooers. Graduate studies with the use of Mooers’ “Zatocoding” and “Catalog” began at UCLA in 1954. They were developed in PhD dissertations at UCLA, and later by faculty and students at other universities: UC Santa Barbara, Irvine, San Diego, York, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Manchester, Boston, and elsewhere. They remain standing subjects for EM authors.

Another subject is familiar and prevalent in formal analytic literatures: the accomplished transparency and specifically unremarkable smoothness of concerted skills of “equipmentally affiliated” shopwork and shoptalk. These are respecified ethnomethodologically with “Heideggerian uses” of handicaps, illnesses, disability, and their affiliated equipmental “aids to independent living,” as well as with inverting lenses and other bodily, characterological, organizational, and procedural “troublemakers.” With these “troublemakers,” work’s incarnate social organizational details are revealed by overcoming their transparency in their topically ordinary concerted recurrencies of ongoingly developing phenomenal fields of ordered details of generality, uniformity, interchangeable populations, and the rest—i.e., in ordered details of structures.

Studies of many and various subjects concerned with the workings of organizational things, with or without their availability in FA literatures, were done while eschewing the policies and methods of formal analysis. Each investigation, for its empirical adequacy, described practices that are recognized by practitioners as doable, done, true, “relevant to the parties,” and even versimilitudi-
A very strong collection of studies was done with deliberate, clear, and targeted emphasis on ethnomethodological discipline-specific “hybrid” results. By “hybrid” I mean studies of work in which the analyst is uniquely and adequately competent to produce the phenomenon, the coherent uniquely adequate details of which his descriptions can be misread instructionally, as and at a worksite, to exhibit. Among EM hybrids, David Sudnow’s studies, particularly of improvisation in jazz piano playing and piano pedagogy, are *sine qua non*. Hybrid studies also come into strong focus in EM studies of discovering work in the natural sciences.

Their studies established, among analytically familiar literatures of instructed actions, their EM alternate, “the praxeological validity of instructed action.” At and as the worksite, misreading a descriptive account instructionally, the work of following which exhibits the phenomenon that the text describes. The alternate was original with, first proposed, and elaborately developed by Britt Robillard and Christopher Pack in their joint program of medical research, pedagogy, and evaluation in the Pediatrics Department of Michigan State University from 1973–1984.

Their program was notable for working out and demonstrating the condition of EM adequacy: that the analyst’s *ethnomethodological* findings be taken seriously in the FA discipline that was studied. By being “taken seriously” I mean that at the worksite, practitioners will demand of EM findings just as they demand of FA findings that they satisfy the worksite-specific, discipline-specific corpus status of FA investigations, and that EM findings be incorporated in FA work at hand or reasons be given for not doing so.

2.2 A Collection of Pairs

The following is a list of FA/EM pairs that consist of topical literatures of formal analytic studies of work and their specific EM alternates. An enumerated list of briefly annotated subjects of formal analytic literatures [light text] and their ethnomethodological alternates [bold text] follows.

The premier achievement of FA studies of work is the generality of work and occupations, not in occupations’ aesthetics but as labor described in their generically represented details of structure: e.g., in their details of generality and comparability, staffed by interchangeable and surveyable populations, the descriptions being responsive across occupations, disciplines, and literatures to inductive inference without incoherence, etc. These are demonstrated with studies that are carried out with the policies of generic representational theorizing and methods of constructive analysis. Among the most powerful of these are the well-known and widely practiced analytic privileges of the transcendental analyst and universal observer. Their evident use provides to FA cases that describe achieved details of generality and other structures of work and occupations, their guarantee of adequate description and valid knowledge.

[1] Stacy Burns provides a specific ethnomethodological alternate. She describes the gap in conventional studies of lawyers’ work in law school training. After reviewing well-known social science studies of law school training, she writes: “These conventional studies broadly outline, but are ultimately independent of, the detailed
orderliness of how actual pedagogic inter-
change unfolds in real time, in real space
and in the first place in the law school
classroom. They are unable to specify what
connection, if any, there may be between
the observable detail and contingent order-
ing of pedagogic tasks in the law classroom
and the skills identifying of professionally
competent legal practice. . . . Hence the
lived and local orderliness identifying of
pedagogy in the law school classroom
remains predominantly unexplored ana-
lytic territory. What is reported in the
social scientific, educational, and jurispru-
dential literature leaves largely unad-
dressed many matters of central practical
concern, relevance, and consequentiality to
law professors and their students . . . ”
(Burns, 1995). To conclude her point,
Burns adds “As Heritage describes it,” this
gap “consists of all the missing descriptions
of what occupational activities consist of
and all the missing analyses of how
practitioners manage the tasks which, for
them, are matters of serious and pressing
significance . . . ” (Heritage, 1984:299).

<2> Practical action and practical reason
are vastly worked subjects. They range in
technicality from the alchemically arcane to
the commonplaces of pop technologies.
Subjects are centered academically in canoni-
cal investigations of Wittgenstein, Dewey,
Simon, Schutz, and Evans-Prichard, and,
most interestingly, in the ethnodisciplines in
anthropology (e.g., ethnoastronomy, ethno-
botany). In these literatures, recurrencies of
practical action and practical reason are made
instructably observable and exhibited just in
any actual case in the coherence of generi-
cally theorized, formal analytic details of
structures. Elaborate but separate topical
literatures of practical action are identifying
mainstays of the separate university depart-
ments of psychology and sociology.

[2] Calvin Mooers’ “Zatocoding” and
“Catalogs” respecify descriptions, rules,
definitions, glossaries, schemas, instruc-
tions, instructed actions, actions as a rule,
purposive actions, ends-means schemata,
procedural accounts, operational defini-
tions, context, science, oracular reason,
divination . . .

In 1952 Calvin Mooers, at the time a
recent graduate of MIT, had designed and
needed to sell and service to engineering
firms his “Catalog” and “Zatocoding”
system for the storage and retrieval of
small libraries of valuable documents. He
described, with marvelous delicacy of
experimental specifics gathered from his
jobs of selling and installing his system and
helping members of client firms to make it
work, that and just how context, practical
action, categorizing phrases, reasons,
search prescriptions, relevance, identity,
definitions, glosses, and glossaries were
renegade topics.

Mooers’ clients were engineers. “Con-
text” was an omnipresent renegade topic in
their in-house discussions about the Zatoc-
doding system and in, about, and as their
actual in-course work of naming docu-
ments, describing, filing, searching for
relevant texts but not being able or not
wanting to prespecify what it would have to
look like before it was found; or finding
just what they needed and discarding it as
garbage; or so naming, filing, searching,
and recovering documents that their com-
pjany library in any of these ways of
operating in it and with it would, to their
work satisfaction, have incorporated their
developing and changing interests.

A user of the dictionary would select an
itemized string of descriptors as a search
prescription. Upon the completion of a
search, the documents that dropped had to
be examined to learn what grammatic
readings the items could be found to have.
The examinable coherence of a first collec-
tion was often deliberately temporary,
undertaken just to see where it would lead.
Was the document relevantly a document
that the prescription had been directed to
find? These and densely affiliated other
“relevancies” could not be prespecified.
Context as a locally occasioned, instruc-
tably achieved, repeatedly and collabora-
tively achieved, and achievable local phe-

omenon by and for a firm’s particular
gang was indispensable to assure the
locally occasioned, locally achieved efficacy
as instructably reproducible recurrences
of worksite practices in details of storage,
numbers of documents, the “Catalog,” all
together with the “Zatocoding” proce-
dure—as an in vivo worksite achievement,
just in any actual case.

From 1952 until 1976 the Mooersian
catalog was used to add and procedurally
specify rules, rule-governed activities, in-
dexial expressions, objective expressions,
rational decision making in commonsense situations of choice, glossing as a way to talk plain English, methods, schemes of details, propriety classes of objects, and structure—structure in the way its use collects, and seeks to exhibit about practical action, details in patterns, generality, comparability, typicality, standardization, uniformity, coherence in accordance with the logic of inductive inference, and the existence copula “is” in the senses “there exists” and “is identical with.”

<3> A third topic of formal analysis includes occasion maps and their cognates: repair manuals, models, mock-ups, tour guides, assembly instructions, freeway signs, contractors’ path descriptions, medical decision trees, directions, rules, norms, games-with-rules, blueprints, musical scores, analytical cartography. FA is embarrassed by occasion maps and by the occasioned use of maps. Formal analysts don’t know what to do with them. The occasioned uses of maps are treated as mentalisms and turned into features of the perceiver, perceived features of a territory. For FA the “real” map is made useless, rendered merely perceived, by being made subjective.

[3] Occasion maps are low-cost, high-production gold mines. Whole libraries of analytic cartographical maps and their cognates offer in specific EM alternates the locally occasioned, endogenously achieved properties of logic, order, meaning, method, reason, rationality, effective procedure, followability, completeness, sufficiency, and the rest of occasion maps. These are the endlessly analyzed topics of intellectual history.

It is not possible to read from the map the work of following the map in a way-finding journey. The traveler’s work of consulting the map is an unavoidable detail in the lived, ongoingly, in-its-course, first-time-through, traveling body’s way-finding journey that the map is consulted to get done. Under that worksite condition, the map’s consulted, inspectable, relevant-to-the-user properties of logic, order, meaning, factual adequacy, followability, completeness of instructions, sufficiency of instructions, notational clarity, analyzable format, methodic procedure, and the rest are embedded in the territorially and equipmentally historicized practices of the traveling. Being so embedded they are salient, problematic, topical, unavoidable, and identifying of traveling’s practices in relentlessly chiasmically embodied details of those practices. The map’s properties of order are exhibited in and as territorial organizational things. These are the map’s very own territorial organizational things. As territorial objects in a phenomenal field, the map’s properties of order are chiasmically chained to the traveling body’s way-finding practices; they are made available to those practices, as those practices.

The map library at UCLA has a list of sketch maps that the Department of Defense publishes, called landing maps, approach maps, horizon maps, etc. From the point of view of embodied traveling, they must put in the hands of the troops ways of recognizing an actual shoreline so that they minimize their casualties. The maps have this occasioned character not because they are faulted, but because they are used.

Occasion maps are analytic cartography’s stepchildren. Formal analytic studies of occasion maps have missed these phenomena entirely. With the same careful technical policies and methods with which formal analytic studies have described occasion maps, these phenomena are lost.

<4> A fourth topic of formal analysis includes scientific demonstrations such as Galileo’s inclined plane demonstration of the

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26 In order to specify the literatures, Groups I and 3 of the eight sections of text in Cartographical Innovations (Wallis and Robinson, 1982) is a splendid source and guide. In addition, Norman Thrower’s classic on maps (recently revised to be published by University of Chicago Press) is indispensable, as is the canonical textbook by Arthur Robinson.

27 “Salience” is used in an EM respecification of Gurwitsch’s (1964) result; that is, the “coherence of a group of data.” He obtained this finding in his transcendental phenomenological criticism of the gestalt theory of form.

28 “Identifying” is misleading. I’m using it as a collector for other members of its family that are also misleading for EM studies—e.g., definitional, essential, genetically essential, paradigmatic, criterial, primitive, primordial, primary, schema, ideal, ideal type, Uhr-this-and-that, etc. “Identifying” is a temporary place holder for the work it describes when it is respecified ethnomethodologically. For the time being I am using it as a natural language descriptor. It alludes to the work it is used in vivo to describe. No one needs to be inevitably misled.
real motion of free-falling bodies in the literatures of science studies. It also includes models and analogies in the natural sciences, such as Rasmussen's use of maps to describe the development of methods in electron microscopy (Rasmussen, 1994) and studies of work in the natural sciences.

[4] In the phenomenal-field properties of Galileo's inclined-plane demonstration of the [real motion]²⁹ of free-falling bodies, the achieved coherence of objects has very much to do with naturally accountable work.³⁰ So do Louis Narens' "right hand" and "left hand" paths from instructions to the demonstrated [real motion] of free-falling bodies, described as $S/T^2 = K$.

"There's a gap in the literature" in science libraries. I made inquiries first to several librarians in the physics library at UCLA, and, when they couldn't help, to the library director. Were there descriptive materials available whose adequate pedagogic relevance consists in that and in the way that they specify the first and second segments of Lebenswelt pairs?³¹ These would be materials that are pedagogically relevant to teaching's worksites in physics. Were any materials available? Could any be found for any of physics teaching's worksites, from introductory labs for undergraduates to arcane settings of collaborating professional faculty? After he showed me several volumes and described several others, and after he listened to my reasons why they were not what I was looking for, the director replied, "There's a gap in the literature."

<5> Gestalt phenomena: Themes, topics, subjects, demonstrations, in gestalt psychology constitute an important FA literature: gestalt illusions, figural alternates in experimental perception (e.g., "ambiguities"), CAD models and modeling. A classic FA study was that of Heider and Simmel (1944), who, in order to study the psychology of person perception, developed a moving-picture film of 2 1/2 minutes' duration with various geometric figures (including a large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle) that moved around a space also occupied by a stationary rectangle. They asked subjects to view the film and answer questions such as "What kind of person is the big triangle (little triangle, circle)?" and they asked subjects to tell the story of the movie in a few sentences. In their analysis of subject's answers, Heider and Simmel proposed that subjects saw the figures in the movie in terms of distal stimuli that were mediated according to more proximal features of the field in which those stimuli were embedded. In his own book Heider argues that these mediating features were stages in intervening variables of various sorts. There are comparable examples and elaborations in various subjects and demonstrations—for example, in studies of gestalt illusions, in figural alternates (alternations).

[5] Visual horizons are perspicuous settings with which EM topics of figurations of detail, phenomenal fields, chiasmic relations of body/world pairs, rendering theorems, transcendental data, and the rest are made instructably observable as achieved phenomena, just in any actual case. By pointing out the social gestaltists, Heider and Lewin, Maynard lets a jinni out of the bottle. "With their film Heider and Simmel 'come so, so close' and lose the phenomenon" (Douglas W. Matnard, personal communication). His study is a propaedeutic case for a collection of FA investigations that come "so, so close" and lose the phenomenon. Maynard suggests that "within Heider's account are indications of how subjects actually perceive, not according to relatively inert and extrasensuous stages and variables that accord stimuli some transcendental meaning, but, perception occurs according to in situ, sensuously-produced, functional significations formed between the geometric figures, their parts, and additional constituents whose presentation unfolds in time as time itself is produced through the procedures of actors. Subjects see one thing preceding another and the other succeeding the one, thereby assembling a chronology out of an inextricably inner or endogenous order that then informs and is informed by just what a geometric figure might be as a type of person" (Maynard, 1995).

Indexing the classic gestalt domain of illusions and figural alternates in experi-

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²⁹ Square brackets in bold, [ ], mark off an EM procedural account of the phenomenon that is described with the name in the enclosed brackets.

³⁰ See my study of the phenomenal-field properties of Galileo's inclined-plane demonstration in Garfinkel (forthcoming).

³¹ Lebenswelt pairs are discussed in 3.2 below.
of a phenomenon’s production exhibits its staff as a population.

The Dictionary of Occupational Titles is a premier collection of formal analytic studies of work, and an extraordinary achievement in the social sciences. In formal analytic studies of work, entries in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), on the one hand, and analytic ethnographies of work, on the other, can be adequately read and understood interchangeably either as synopses or as elaborations of each other. Their interchangeability is therein the subject of a massive literature in bibliographies of social analysis, for in that relation they specify, satisfy, and are exhibits of the corpus status of their details of structure.

Therein, DOT entries are sources for well-known advisories that serve across studies of work and occupations as analytic ethnographic detailing devices: e.g., “goal oriented behaviors,” “context-dependence,” “rational problem solving,” “local settings,” “tacit knowledge,” “skills,” “the village versus the city.” Course bibliographies offer technical guides to their existence and correct use in established topics of university departments and professional schools.

Various university departments teach ethnomethodological expertise in studies of work and occupations. Their required emphasis is on ineradicable, unavoidable, indexical properties of adequate descriptions of work, etc. They require that attention be paid to the uniquely adequate competence of the analyst/practitioner as a requirement for describing methods of work. This involves indifference to the transcendental analyst, and eschewing the universal observer. “Ethnographic descriptions” are accounts of worksite-specific “relevances” that consist in-course of occupation-specific, instructably observable, instructably reproducible coherence of ordered phenomenal details of structures. Remedial expertise is directed to elucidating, as its targets, generic representational theorizing, replacing it with the phenomenon as the origin and source of trouble.

2.3 Three Advisories

Advisories in EM studies of work are also available for use as ethnographic detailing devices. These are offered in various lists by
various authors as one or another agenda in the seminars at UCLA. Advisories were taped and developed to deliberately provide for and exhibit the relevance of uniquely adequate competence to the described work of its practitioners, who are also its analysts. Their descriptions are written by design to be read praxeologically—i.e., to be misread—as worksite-specific instructions for their observability, followability, completeness, sufficiency, their bodily/equipmental intertwining, their in-course evolving elaboration, their autochthonous coherence, their autonomous criticism, and the rest in procedurally enacted coherent details of structures.

I offer three examples of such specifically EM advisories: 1) the uses by practitioners/analysts of an “etcetera clause”; 2) their uses of the interpretive gloss described by Mannheim as the documentary method of interpretation; and 3) their uses of the properties of indexical expressions.

1) It was news that and just how an “etcetera clause” can be used to provide according to local occasion, for completeness and generalizability in a collection of rules. It can be used as well to provide for other properties of rules—e.g., followability, sufficiency, ideality of meaning, factual adequacy, universality, necessity, and any of the rest.

2) Another advisory is the documentary method of interpretation. The reader need only recall the vexed jobs of reading and writing careful, empirically adequate descriptions of work. The documentary method of interpretation is a convenient gloss for the work of local, retrospective-prospective, proactively evolving ordered phenomenal details of seriality, sequence, repetition, comparison, generality, and other structures. The gloss is convenient and somehow convincing. It is also very powerful in its coverage—too powerful. It gets everything in the world for practitioners/analysts. Its shortcomings are notorious: In any actual case it is undiscriminating and just in any actual case it is absurdly wrong.

3) From the beginning of EM studies, the well-known properties of indexical expressions have offered and continue to offer less heroic possibilities. The properties of indexical expressions are witnessable only locally and endogenously. This is known to one and all. Therein they are known and are available to one and all in that they consist of practitioners’ vulgarly competent skills. The properties are ubiquitous. They are essentially unavoidable and without remedy or alternative. They are also specifically ordinary and uninteresting, and in both of these respects, in assuring as achieved phenomena coherent sense, reference, and correspondence to objects, they do so achievedly in uniquely adequate details. These are uniquely adequate details of structures. By that is meant that these phenomena exhibit their locally staffed production as the commonplace work in details of populations.

These properties mark their observability as phenomena sine qua non in EM studies of work. Their existence is demonstrable—their existence is both instructably observable and instructably reproducible—in all studies of work. Their adequate observability is staff-specific, worksite-specific, discipline-specific.

These properties of indexical expressions are unique to incarnate investigations of immortal, ordinary society. They are not properly used as cognitive functions. They are improperly used as transcendentalized intentionalities of analytic consciousness. The phenomena that the devices are used to elucidate cannot be found or recovered if the devices are interpreted psychologically or if the ethnographic descriptions are explicated as psychologized activities. And, in any case where they are administered as predescribed codes, the result can be lucid, perfectly clear analytic ethnographic description, and the description will have missed the subject matter, its probity, and the point of the description, with no accompanying sign that they are misunderstood.

The lessons are clear: In order to lose the phenomena that the devices describe, give them over to the intentionalities of consciousness. And in order to assure their loss in any actual case, do so with the methods of generic representational theorizing.

In deliberately careful descriptions of their work, EM practitioners/analysts provided for the procedural presence of indexical expressions with respect to persons, biographies, identities, settings, equipment, costumes, gestures, architecture, and language, vernacular and technical, in unavoidable relevancies to the parties. By attention to these, practitioners/analysts in careful descriptive exposition make instructably observable work’s uniquely coherent definiteness of details; their clarity, consistency, coherence, and the rest
of work’s observable properties of logic, meaning, reason, and method. Their studies of work describe, specify, make instructably observable, satisfy, and are exhibits of the unique adequacy requirement of methods; the uniquely adequate competence of analysts/practitioners who can be taken seriously by local companies and by “our shops” of practitioners whose work the analysts describe; and the observable in-course, ongoing carrying out of descriptions in empirical, instructably observable details of structures while exercising ethnomethodological indifference to policies, methods, and the corpus status of formal analytic investigations. All this while making no use of the privileges of transcendental analysis and the universal observer, and without bowdlerizing issues of structure, while at every point satisfying the demands of empirical adequacy for claims of corpus.

3.1 The Praxeological Validity of Instructed Action

The many achievements by the worldwide social science movement in the uses of formal analytic technology are pointless to dispute. Among these achievements, FA technology’s premier achievement is the corpus status of its bibliographies of studies. From the outset of EM investigations, the corpus status of FA’s bibliographies has provided ethnomethodological investigations with themes of instructions and instructed actions in topics galore for respecifications as distinctively achieved phenomena of order* in and as the great recurrencies of immortal, ordinary society without sacrificing, downgrading, bowdlerizing, avoiding, or losing ordinary society’s endogenous, naturally accountable achievements of structure, or changing the subject, and without lip-synching the natural sciences.

EM does not deny FA’s achievements. Without denying FA’s achievements, the investigations of the EM catalog of radical phenomena of order* [repeatedly] pose the empirical question: “What more is there to instructions and instructed actions than FA does, did, ever did, or can provide?”

Distinctive investigations in the EM catalog of achieved radical phenomena of order* bear particularly and uniquely on instructions and instructed actions. Cases of instructed actions from the EM catalog have been described in games-with-rules; in a game with rules, the completeness of its collection of basic rules; in any case of rule-governed actions, the completeness of a collection of rules; in the Mooersian catalog; in formatting in queues; in the local, occasioned, endogenously achieved properties of logic, reason, method, and structure of occasion maps; in EM pairs; in Lebenswelt pairs; and in the praxeological validity of instructed actions. In the EM catalog these are propaedeutic cases with which to emphasize, with studies of instructed actions, the enormously prevalent and commonplace skill of praxeologizing descriptive accounts.

3.2 Praxeologizing Descriptive Accounts

In endlessly many disciplines, as local occasion demands, practitioners are required to read descriptive accounts alternately as instructions. They do so occupationally, as a skilled matter of course, as vulgarly competent, specifically ordinary, and unremarkable worksite-specific practices. These are chained bodily and chiasmically to places, spaces, architectures, equipment, instruments, and timing. Within a discipline, practitioners require such competence of each other, not exclusively but centrally just in any actual case, and then unavoidably and without remedy, passing, evasion, or postponement. When occasion calls for a division of work, practitioners can be found to concert their efforts to assure a praxeological reading its recurrent, smooth, uninterrupted achievement by the culturally and organizationally local staff of its production.

The EM catalog examines, as astronomically, massively prevalent work, various ways in which an account that is readably descriptive—say diagrammatically, or as freeway signing, or as wall announcements, or in the prose of declarative sentences—can be read alternatively so that the reading provides for a phenomenon in two constituent segments of a pair: 1) the-first-segment-of-a-pair, which consists of a collection of instructions; and 2) the work, just in any actual case of following which somehow turns the first segment into a description of the pair.32

32 I emphasize of the pair. This is in contrast to a common and even hackneyed use that would read this passage like this: Following instructions somehow turns them—i.e., the disengaged and disengageable instruc-
Call 2) the-second-segment-of-a-pair. Call the pair an \textit{instructed action}, and call the work of reading a descriptive account, as related constituents of an instructed action “praxeologizing descriptive accounts.”

For both technologies of social analysis—for the administered policies, methods, and corpus of formal analysis (FA) and for those of ethnomethodology (EM)—\textit{somehow} is key. Both FA and EM are preoccupied with their technical jobs and as their technical jobs of empirically specifying praxeologizing’s work. Both seek to replace \textit{somehow} with an instructably observable \textit{just how}. Each does so with distinctive policies and methods of analysis in distinctive analytic formats.

Characteristically, FA does the specifying job by designing and administering generically theorized formats. Instructions \textit{< >} and instructions-in-use \textit{[ ]} are described in generically represented relations of correspondence. The analysis furnishes empirical descriptions of \textit{< >}, and \textit{[ ]}, in one or another of their relations. With these, the pair’s actual adequate correspondence is made decidable in any actual empirical case.

EM does the specifying job differently. In EM’s early interests, \textit{< >} and \textit{[ ]} in technically achieved relations were described as achievements of “interpretive work” such as “etcetera” and the documentary method of interpretation in ordinary fact finding. Later studies examined locally produced, endogenously achieved, naturally accountable coherent haecceities that constitute as coherent instructed actions the phenomenal fields of ordinary human “jobs.” These studies examined the two segments of docile instructions and their implementation when \textit{in vivo} they are distinguished and with the distinction they are provided for \textit{in vivo} in formal analytically and other classically specified, remedially sought relations of adequate description, adequate facticity, adequate followability, adequate completeness of instructions, and so on. Since 1972 EM studies of work in the professions and sciences have added to these previous EM fociings that instructions \textit{< >} and instructions-in-use \textit{[ ]} are related as EM asymmetrical alternates or EM pairs, as Lebenswelt Pairs, and as the praxeological validity of instructed actions.

It is with these later interests and with these later analytic formats that topics and themes of instructed actions are collected and come to focus in EM studies respecifying the natural sciences as discovering sciences of practical action.

Conditions of adequacy in EM investigations are used in each of these to respecify FA’s formats, \textit{< >} and \textit{[ ]}, and their relations. By “adequacy conditions” is meant that EM investigations, in each of the groups, ask “What did we do? What did we learn?”:

(i) What did we learn that is other than what FA does, did, ever did, or \textit{can} provide?
(ii) What did we learn that FA recognizes as massively and unavoidably prevalent and available to FA in worksite-specific details?
(iii) What did we learn that FA depends upon the existence of for FA’s worksite-specific achievements, for FA’s pride of profession and technical stock in trade of instructably observable adequate professions of worldliness and reality, and for the instructably observable \textit{corpus} status of its bibliographies?

(iv) What did we learn that FA uses and recognizes EM everywhere in and as its \textit{in vivo} worksite-specific practices?

These are practices that FA practitioners just in any actual case know and recognize are unavoidable, without remedy, and without alternatives. The practices are indispensable to practitioners, and practitioners demand them. Just in any actual case the practices identify FA practitioners’ work, they are known to FA’s practitioners, and are recognized by them to be that. In all these respects the practices are specifically uninteresting to practitioners and are ignored. Known to practitioners and recognized by them in all these respects, the practices are known to and recognized by them categorically.

\textit{And}, FA practitioners, being deeply careful in endless enterprises that for FA’s various disciplinary reasons must make the adequacies of their achieved professions of worldliness and reality instructably observable in generically theorized structures of practical action, therein do not know what to do with these practices.

EM catalog investigations respecify FA’s analytic formats. Each of the different groups of studies does so distinctively with its particular investigations. In each group of studies the practices that are specified EM-wise are known to and recognized by FA practitioners; their existence is demanded by
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them and depended upon; their existence is specified and made instructably observable in, about, as and in established languages, as of worksite-specific competent practices of shopwork and shoptalk; for FA's practitioners they are unavoidable, without remedy, without alternatives; they identify FA competent accounting practices in worksite-specific witnessable detail. And in worksite-specific detail they are specifically uninteresting and ignored.

EM asks: What in the world is so obstinately and relevantly omnipresent? What in the world is so unanimously known and recognized by FA practitioners? Where in the world is it found? And how?

The issue is this: In the entirety of FA's corpus, "What More" is nowhere specified or specifiable. Nor can "What More" to instructions and instructed action be found with FA's methods. Then just what in the world is being looked for? Just what is to be found? Just where? Just how?

The investigations in the EM catalog offer selected answers to these questions. The answers cover selected perspicuous settings from the EM catalog. What did we do? What did we learn? What can we do? And what can we learn? EM investigations, along with their accompanying EM policies and methods, compose a catalog of tutorial problems. Their epistemological and ontological status is that of a catalog of tutorial problems. These are grounds in EM investigations for replies to these queries.

REFERENCES


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