The program of interaction ritual theory is to take the intellectual tools that we have, and to apply them: to all situations, all emotions, all symbols, all thinking, all subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Intellectual life is an exciting adventure when we try to push it as far as we can. There is surely more emotional energy in exploration than in conservatively standing pat and trying to avoid extending our understanding beyond the boundaries set up by intellectual taboos. IR theory, as an intellectual enterprise, is a set of symbolic representations riding on its surge of emotional energy; it is the intellectual version of effervescence that gave élan to Durkheim and his research group, to Goffman and his followers, and to today's sociologists of emotion and process in everyday life. What I attempt to show in this book is some vistas that open up as we ride this intellectual movement into the future.

Chapter 2

THE MUTUAL-FOCUS / EMOTIONAL-ENTRAINMENT MODEL

AT THE CENTER OF AN INTERACTION RITUAL is the process in which participants develop a mutual focus of attention and become entrained in each other's bodily micro-rhythms and emotions. This chapter will present the details of this process in an explicit model of processes that take place in time: a fine-grained flow of micro-events that build up in patterns of split seconds and ebb away in longer periods of minutes, hours, and days. Rituals are constructed from a combination of ingredients that grow to differing levels of intensity, and result in the ritual outcomes of solidarity, symbolism, and individual emotional energy. This model enables us to examine carefully each part of the process. We will see what contingencies and variations can occur in each segment, and what effects these have on the outcomes. There are many different kinds of collective consciousness or intersubjectivity: different kinds of group membership, of symbolism, and of emotional tones of social experience. I will put forth a theory of how variations in interaction rituals generate the myriad varieties of human social life.

At a number of points, it is possible to bolster the theoretical model by empirical evidence from contemporary microsociology, notably studies of verbal conversation and studies in the sociology of emotions. As an illustration of what we can get from theoretical analysis of live video recordings of natural human interaction, I will present an analysis of a documentary film of firefighters and street crowds in the September 11, 2001 attack on New York City. This raw data brings out vividly how some IR conditions lead to merely momentary, others to long-term, effects.

RITUAL INGREDIENTS, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES

Figure 2.1 depicts interaction ritual as a set of processes with causal connections and feedback loops among them. Everything in the model is a variable.

Interaction ritual (IR) has four main ingredients or initiating conditions:


RITUAL INGREDIENTS
RITUAL OUTCOMES
common action or event (including stereotyped formalities)
transient emotional stimulus
group assembly (bodily co-presence)
barrier to outsiders
mutual focus of attention
shared mood
feedback intensification through rhythmic entrainment
collective effervescence
group solidarity
emotional energy in individual
symbols of social relationship (sacred objects)
standards of morality
righteous anger for violations

Figure 2.1 Interaction ritual.

1. Two or more people are physically assembled in the same place, so that they affect each other by their bodily presence, whether it is in the foreground of their conscious attention or not.
2. There are boundaries to outsiders so that participants have a sense of who is taking part and who is excluded.
3. People focus their attention upon a common object or activity, and by communicating this focus to each other become mutually aware of each other's focus of attention.
4. They share a common mood or emotional experience.

These ingredients feed back upon each other. Most importantly, number 3, the mutual focus of attention, and number 4, the common mood, reinforce each other. As the persons become more tightly focused on their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and more aware of each other's awareness, they experience their shared emotion more intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness. Members of a cheering crowd become more enthusiastic, just as participants at a religious service become more respectful and solemn, or at a funeral become more sorrowful, than before they began. It is the same on the small-scale level of a conversation; as the interaction becomes more engrossing, participants get caught up in the rhythm and mood of the talk. We shall examine the micro-empirical evidence on this later. The key process is participants' mutual entrainment of emotion and attention, producing a shared emotional / cognitive experience. What Durkheim called collective consciousness is this micro-situational production of moments of intersubjectivity.

There are four main outcomes of interaction rituals. To the extent that the ingredients successfully combine and build up to high levels of mutually focused and emotionally shared attention, participants have the experience of

1. group solidarity, a feeling of membership;
2. emotional energy [EE] in the individual: a feeling of confidence, elation, strength, enthusiasm, and initiative in taking action;
3. symbols that represent the group: emblems or other representations (visual icons, words, gestures) that members feel are associated with themselves collectively; these are Durkheim's "sacred objects." Persons pumped up with feelings of group solidarity treat symbols with great respect and defend them against the disrespect of outsiders, and even more, of renegade insiders.
4. feelings of morality: the sense of rightness in adhering to the group, respecting its symbols, and defending both against transgressors. Along with this goes the sense of moral evil or impropriety in violating the group's solidarity and its symbolic representations.

These are the basic elements of the theory.[1] In the following sections I will examine the evidence on how each of these operates.

Formal Rituals and Natural Rituals

At first glance, what seems to be missing in this list are just those items that make up the usual definition of "ritual." In common parlance, a ritual is a formal ceremony, the going through of a set of stereotyped actions: reciting verbal formulas, singing, making traditional gestures, wearing traditional costumes. As we have seen from Durkheim's analysis of religious ritual, the formality and the stereotyped activity are not the crucial ingredients; they only contribute to the core process of intersubjectivity and shared emotion, which is to say to the experience of collective consciousness and collective effervescence, insofar as they contribute to a mutual focus of attention. This is indicated on the far left side of figure 2.1, where a dashed arrow flows from "common action or event (including stereotyped formalities)" to "mutual focus of attention." Stereotyped formulas can generate a socially successful ritual, if indeed the participants also experience a shared emotion, and if they go on to heighten their sense of mutual participation by becoming strongly aware of each other's consciousness. Without this, the ritual is merely "formal," an empty going through of the forms, even a dead ceremonialism.

Mutual focus of attention is a crucial ingredient for a ritual to work; but this focus may come about spontaneously and without explicit concern that this is happening. Goffman's examples of the little interaction rituals of everyday sociability are generally of this sort. Whether you call people by their first names or not is usually not a matter of conscious attention, but it is a small-scale ritual nevertheless; and as we shall see, the difference between high-solidarity conversations and low-solidarity conversations happens on the level of rhythmic features that have no formally recognized rules attached to them. Goffman's examples come from the small scale of momentary social encounters, but spontaneously enacted rituals occur also on a larger scale of public groups, as in the examples Durkheim gives of political and military situations parallel to religious rituals. The crowds gathered during the French Revolution were often improvising new rituals. These were highly effective, even at their first moment without the resources of stereotyped activities, because they had a high degree of mutual focus and shared emotion. Out of such situations, as Durkheim was fond of noting, new symbols are created.

We may refer to those interactions as "natural rituals" that build up mutual focus and emotional entrainment without formally stereotyped procedures; and to those that are initiated by a commonly recognized apparatus of ceremonial procedures as "formal rituals." From the point of view of what makes an interaction ritual work, the core ingredients, processes, and outcomes are the same. Both natural ritual and formal rituals can generate symbols and feelings of membership, and both can reach high degrees of intensity. Beyond this commonality, not all symbolic memberships are of the same kind, and the details of how rituals are put together will affect the kind of membership categories that result. As we shall see, rituals initiated by formal procedures have a stronger effect on broadcasting and affirming a rigid sense of group boundaries than do rituals that begin spontaneously by a naturally occurring focus of attention and shared emotion. The latter give a more fluid sense of membership, unless they become crystallized and prolonged in symbols, which thereby tend to make subsequent IRs more formal. (We will examine the evidence for this pattern in chapter 7, "Situational Stratification.")

Failed Rituals, Empty Rituals, Forced Rituals

Not all rituals are successful. Some fail dismally, even painfully; some mercifully fade away. Some are rebelled against as empty formalities, undergone under duress, gleefully discarded when possible. These variations are useful for refining our theory, and for testing the conditions that make rituals operate. Unsuccessful rituals are important substantively as well, for if every social encounter of everyday life from the most minor up to the major public gatherings is to be put in the scale and weighed against the standard of ritual intensity, we would not expect ritual intensity to be the same everywhere. Since I am going to argue that life is structured around the contrast between successful, socially magnetic ritual situations with their high degree of emotion, motivation, and symbolic charge, and situations of lesser ritualism, it is necessary to sharpen our eyes as to what makes the difference between rituals that are strong and those that are weak. Individuals are attracted to the most intense ritual charges they can get, indifferent to lesser rituals, and repelled by others; we see best what is doing the attracting if we look at what is causing the indifference and the repulsion.

Failed rituals are easiest to see in the case of formal rituals, since there is a public announcement and widespread understanding that a ritual is being attempted. Then we shall cast a glance at natural rituals that fail: political or other gatherings that don't click, demonstrations that don't come off; and at the little Goffmanian rituals of everyday life that don't work.

What is to be our criterion of ritual success or failure? In the case of formal rituals, we have terms that participants will use: "an empty ritual," "merely ceremonial," "fell flat." Figure 2.1 allows us to state a broader criterion that will work for natural as well as formal rituals: most immediately, there is a low level of collective effervescence, the lack of momentary buzz, no shared entrainment at all or disappointingly little. There are further signs of failure on the output side: little or no feeling of group solidarity; no sense of one's identity as affirmed or changed; no respect for the group's symbols; no heightened emotional energy—either a flat feeling unaffected by the ritual, or worse yet, a sense of a drag, the feeling of boredom and constraint, even depression, interaction fatigue, a desire to escape. These imply a continuum of just how badly rituals fail, from mildly missing the mark down through strong ritual abhorrence. These strongly negative states are as important as the highly positive ones. Think of historical events—such as the smashing of icons in the Reformation—as well as moments in personal chains of life experiences—such as a rebellion against a kind of formality that one wishes never to go through again.[2]

In this respect, natural rituals fail for much the same reasons that formal rituals can be empty: the political crowd that mills around aimlessly, its members' attention distracted to things happening outside the person making the speech or away from the enemy symbol to be confronted—individuals and little subgroups drifting away until those who are left are caught up in a deflationary emotion like rats leaving a sinking ship; the party that remains mired in little knots of perfunctory conversations and never builds up a collective effervescence. Here the missing ingredients are both a lack of shared attention—since duos are too fragmented from the larger group—and lack of a shared initial emotion that can be built up and transformed into a sense of collective participation. Low-intensity, perfunctory, or halting conversations exist in abundance, and in obvious contrast to those conversations that are engrossing. Although our normal form of attribution is to regard the conversations as indicators of the personalities one is encountering, these are situational outcomes that can be explained, as we shall later see in more detail, by the differing matchups of stocks of significant symbols to talk about, and by the level of synergy among the emotional energies of the parties to the conversational situation.

A nice contrast of successful and unsuccessful interaction rituals may be seen in the variety of New Year celebrations: some have a peak moment of genuine enthusiasm at the stroke of midnight (in this respect these celebrations are a mixture of traditional forms and natural, unscripted interactions)—while others consist in flat and prefunctory greetings for the new year. What makes the difference? My observation is that New Year celebrations that work are ones in which, in the hour or two before midnight, people in an assembled crowd start making noise—with the usual whistles, rattles, perhaps firecrackers—but above all making noises at each other, in their direction, better yet, in their face. This leads to entrainment; people start making noises and throwing streamers at each other, often breaking down barriers of acquaintanceship by drawing strangers into interaction. Notice that this interaction has no cognitive content; it is very much like small children running around and making noises at each other. In the context of the New Year celebration, this intruding noisily into someone else's personal space, sometimes even bodily in the mild and playful form of throwing streamers or confetti at them, is taken as friendly and not hostile or deviant. This mutual entrainment in noise-making builds up to a crescendo of noise as everyone is focused on counting down the seconds to midnight; when the anticipated focal point is reached, there is a burst of solidarity gestures, people hugging and kissing each other, even strangers. Compare the more staid New Year party: Individuals continue in normal conversations, saying intelligible things. This keeps them in distinctive little pockets of shared mentality, cutting them off from a larger intersubjectivity that might encompass the whole group. Interactions have not been reduced to the lowest common denominator, as in the mutual noise-making ties; shared emotion does not build up; and the climax of the stroke of midnight is given only perfunctory acknowledgment, immediately after which many participants say they are tired and want to go home. Successful rituals are exhilarating; failed rituals are energy draining.

An additional type may be called forced rituals. These occur when individuals are forced to put on a show of participating wholeheartedly in interaction rituals. Forced rituals appear to be especially draining when persons are impelled by their own motivation, rather than by external social pressure, to throw themselves enthusiastically into interaction rituals, taking the lead in attempting to make the rituals succeed. Such forced rituals may even succeed, in the sense that other people do become entrained into showing greater level of animated involvement. But they feel forced insofar as the level of collective effervescence is higher than it would be normally given the existing ingredients of shared attention and emotional stimulus; the mutual entrainment has an element of deliberation and self-consciousness rather than a natural flow. It can take considerable effort to be the convivial host or gracious hostess, the life of the party, the spark plug of the political rally. The energy-draining effects of forced rituals are widely known from the aftermath of job interviews, especially in the round of sociable visits accompanying academic job talks, where they are referred to colloquially as "interaction fatigue." Where the individual's social position is such that they feel motivated to take the lead in a continuous round of interactional conviviality, the cumulative affects of energy drain can be considerable.[3]

Forced rituals are energy draining, not EE creating, and the experience of going through many forced rituals will tend to make individuals averse to those kinds of ritual situations, even creating what appear to be anti-sociable personalities. But forced rituals differ from successful IRs precisely by having an unnatural, overly self-conscious, mutual focus and emotional entrainment. Thus, instead of participants becoming naturally charged up by emotional entrainment, they have to put energy into giving the impression that they are charged up. Even those same individuals who are turned off by forced rituals, I suggest, generally undergo some other kinds of ritual interaction that do succeed and that produce positive emotional energy. The difference between forced rituals (along with other kinds of failed rituals) and successful rituals is what steers individuals' IR chains away from the former and toward the latter.

Is Bodily Presence Necessary?

Ritual is essentially a bodily process. Human bodies moving into the same place starts off the ritual process. There is a buzz, an excitement, or at least a wariness when human bodies are near each other. Goffman (1981, 103) noted that even "when nothing eventful is occurring, persons in each other's presence are still nonetheless tracking one another and acting so as to make themselves trackable." From the point of view of evolutionary theory, humans as animals have evolved with nervous systems that pay attention to each other: there is always the possibility of fighting, or spreading an alarm; or, on the positive side, possible sexual contact and more generally sociable gestures.[4] On the whole, the latter kind of evolved orientation toward positive interactions appears more central, since it helps explain why human bodies are so sensitive to each other, and so readily caught up in the shared attention and emotional entrainment that generates interaction rituals.

Yet isn't it possible to carry out a ritual without bodily presence? In modern times we have long-distance communications: by telephone, by video representations such as television, by computer screen. Is it not possible to generate mutual focus and emotional entraiment through these media of communication? In principle, these are empirical matters that can be studied experimentally: we could compare the amount of shared attention and emotion generated by these various interactional media, and their outcomes in level of solidarity, respect for symbolism, and individual EE. In lieu of systematic evidence, I suggest the following patterns.

First, can formal rituals, such as a wedding ceremony or a funeral be conducted over the telephone? The very idea seems inappropriate, and it is unclear that this has been attempted except in the rarest instances. What would be missing? The lack of feedback, of seeing the others present and being seen by them, would surely diminish the sense that one is paying one's respects. Without bodily presence, it is hard to convey participation in the group and to confirm one's identity as member of the group. Especially lacking would be the micro-details of the experience. A funeral is less meaningful without immediate visual cues from the other participants: the uncomfortable body postures, seeing faces tearing up, all the contagious emotional behaviors that pull one one deeply into the mood and start the watering in one's own eyes. In some kinds of ritual occasions—mainly commemorative celebrations congratulating an individual—persons will phone in their greetings, which may even be broadcast to the assembled crowd. But this is a relatively small segment of interaction, and such an action should be expected to bring only a partial feeling of participating: it would seem highly inappropriate at a funeral or a wedding, where the assembly's role is to stand by and witness, or to engage in collective responses. As an experiment, one might rig up the ritual equivalent of a conference call, in which every participant has their apparatus for communicating with everyone else at a distance. My hypothesis is that a conference call ritual would feel quite unsatisfactory to everyone, because the deliberate vocal messages are only a small part of what generates the feelings of participation. Presumably the effect would be stronger if most the participants, although wired-up, were actually together carrying out the ritual, while the distant participant was wired to all the others and could eavesdrop on at least the sounds they make as they orient to each other—a stronger effect, but one that still does not provide the full sense of emotional participation.

Is the visual mode better? It is possible to watch a funeral or a wedding on television, usually that of a famous public figure. During the fall of 2001, for example, there were sometimes moving TV memorials for 9/11 victims. These long-distance rituals can give a sense of shared emotion, solidarity, and respect for symbolism. Examing this more carefully: what details give these effects? The main effect appears to come from camera close-ups of the faces of members of the crowd, rather than of the ceremonial formality itself. Television here approximates bodily feedback, in effect allowing members of the remote audience to see others like themselves, picked out in the moments when they are displaying the most emotion and the most engrossment in the ceremony. Conversely, we would expect that where the TV cameras focus on disaffected members of the audience, who are looking bored or away from the scene, the remote audience would feel greater distance, witnessing a failed ceremony.

Television is a combination of picture and sound, and these need to be teased apart. The reader may easily perform the experiment. Turn off the sound of the TV while watching a ritualistic event, such as an athletic contest. Alternatively, move away from sight of the screen, leaving the sound on. Palpably, the stronger sense of involvement, of being pulled into the action, is from the sound. A burst of cheering from the crowd, the mood of anticipation of upcoming celebration, will pull the absent viewer back to the screen. Compare the situation where one is watching the picture without the sound: if the action seems to heat up—the team is making its drive, the clock is running down, the baseball team has men on base—there is an irresistable tendency to turn the sound back on. What is missing is not primarily the verbal explanation of the meaning of what is happening, the voices of the announcers, since the experience of watching verbal captions on the screen is not a substitute for the sound; above all, one seeks the sound of the crowd, to share fully in the sense of excitement. This is essentially what the lure of the game-spectacle is all about: the pleasure of those moments of having one's own emotions raised by a noisy crowd expressing the same thing.

Two further observations confirm the preference for bodily participation within an assembled group. After a particularly exciting or up-



Figure 2.2 Celebrating victory by ritualized full-body contact. U.S. and Russian troops converge in Germany (April 1945).

lifting moment of vicarious participation, one wants to seek out someone else to tell about it. Thus, if one had been alone watching a game, a political election, or other engrossing public event, one wants to find someone else to share one's excitement with. If the excitement is strong enough, it isn't sufficient merely to tell the news, even in a loud, enthusiastic, repetitive voice. At peak moments of victory, or suspense followed by dramatic success, the excited viewer reaches out to touch, hug, or kiss someone. IR theory suggests testable details: the IR payoff should be highest in talking excitedly with someone who is also excited by the event; whereas viewers' own enthusiasm for their experienced drama ebbs away proportionately if the person they try to convey it to is less enthusiastic, passive, or remains uninvolved.

The same pattern is visible in sports celebrations and in other victory celebrations, as depicted in the famous photos of kissing and hugging on the street at the announcement of victory in World War II. Sports victory celebrations are events of predictable intensity, since there is a regular schedule leading up to championship games. At peak moments, built up emotionally in proportion to the amount of tension through the series of previous contests, there takes place an informal ritual in which the players touch each other repeatedly while repeating

Figure 2.3 Marking the end of World War II (August 14, 1945).

a few simple words or cries of victory. The bigger the victory and the more the suspense, the more body contact, and the more prolonged contact: the range goes from slapping hands, to body hugs, to piling onto a heap of bodies at the playing field.[5] This is a stratified ritual, since the fans would also like to participate not only with their voices but by getting bodily as near to the players as possible. They are usually prevented from approaching them, thus leaving the high degree of bodily contact as a solidarity ritual reserved for the elite in the center of the ceremony; the fans can only watch, vocally participate, and engage in some bodily contact with each other.

Another observation supporting the preference for bodily present rituals is that attendance at sports events and other mass audience occasions has not declined with the availability of television. This is so even though, for many sports, television provides a better view of the action and the details of the athletes' performance. But people nevertheless prefer to go to the game, especially if it is a "big game"—that



Figure 2.4 A ritual victory pile-on: high school hockey championship (2002).

is, a game in which the consequences are considered important and hence one can confidently expect to be part of an excited crowd. Watching on television is a second best if one cannot get tickets; and in that case, the preferred spectator experience—again, related to how much emotional intensity the game is expected to generate among its spectators—is to assemble a group of fans, a mini-crowd that provides its own resonance for building up shared excitement. Even for games that are routine—without important implications in the league standings, or other such significance—a large part of the pleasures of attending consists in just the moments when the crowd collectively builds up a sense of anticipation and its shared enthusiasm over the flow of events.

Games are rituals, contrived to produce situations of dramatic tension and victory; the rules of scoring and moving into position to score have been tinkered with over the years in order to make it "a better game"—which is to say, to provide moments of collective emotion. It is perfectly in keeping with such developments that sports emblems become sacred objects, venerated and treated with respect. Sports celebrities are themselves sacred objects, in just the same manner that Durkheim (1912/1965, 243–44) describes a political leader becoming an emblem for the crowd of which he is a center of attention (see chapter 1). The overt intent of the game—to win victories by following certain rules of competition, or to display athletic skill—is merely the surface content. What motivates people to witness games is primarily the experience of being at a highly successful ritual: successful because it has been contrived so that the ritual ingredients will all be present to a very high degree, especially the occurrence of strong emotion in a setting where it can be amplified by bodily interaction within the crowd focusing attention on the action of the game. The leisure time of modern societies—since the mid-nineteenth century when a sufficiently large group of spectators became available, free from the constraints of household and work—has become dominated by this species of deliberately invented ritual, designed to provide moments of ritual solidarity that previously would have been provided by religion, warfare, or political ceremony.

Sports events do not have the same recognized status as other formal rituals, but are generally regarded as a form of play, of the non-serious part of the world. Nevertheless, they are eminently successful in providing high points of ritual experience, and for many people they are preferred to participating in religious rituals (as evident when games compete with church services on Sundays). Games are natural rituals insofar as they unconsciously or nondeliberately bring about the ingredients for a successful ritual. But they are scheduled, predictable, and contrived (using a ritual technology to generate what might be considered an artificial ritual experience), and they bring together a community that has no other coherence, and no other purpose, than the experience of the peaks of ritual emotion itself.

The mechanism operates in the case of other forms of entertainment. Attending a concert has little advantage over listening to recordings as far as hearing the music is concerned; generally one hears it best on recordings. It is the experience of belonging to a focused crowd that provides the lure of a popular entertainment group; all the more so if the entertainers already have the status of being a sacred object, giving fans the additional excitement of being close to them—even if it is hundreds of feet away in a big arena. The main experience of the pop concert is the mood of the other fans; this is a textbook case of mutual buildup of emotion through bodily feedback in all its modalities. The same applies to a classical music performance, although the mood is more sedate, in keeping with the difference in social-class tone and atmosphere. Here, too, it is the experience of being at a special event—the hush of attention before the orchestra starts, the collective focus on the musicians—that makes the experience at the opera or the symphony a more significant experience than listening to the same music privately at home. This is not simply a matter of being seen by other people at a high-culture event—since under contemporary conditions these crowds are typically anonymous, in contrast to the more enclosed high-status communities in previous centuries who recognized each other at the opera—but comes from the subjective feelings of the ritual experience. The hypothesis is that participants have a stronger identification as persons attached to high culture if the crowd has been enthusiastic in response to the performance, than when the collective response is weaker; and that the effect of ritual intensity is stronger than the effect of being recognized by other people.

Televised and radio-broadcast concerts have such effects only weakly. The same holds for political and religious gatherings. Politicians' campaign speeches, nominating conventions, and important official addresses are televised and can be experienced at a distance. Nevertheless, persons who are strong partisans want to be physically present, confirming a reciprocal relation between identity and physical presence. The hypothesis is that attending political events in person increases partisanship, to the extent that the speech is a "good one"—in other words, that it involves the interplay of speaker and crowd that builds up shared enthusiasm; and reciprocally, those persons who already have an identification with the political leader or faction have a stronger desire to take part. The running off of these repetitive relationships is a self-reinforcing IR chain.

Religious ceremonial, too, can be broadcast by radio and television, and ministers (primarily in the United States) have made their reputation as media evangelists (Hadden and Swann 1981). Nevertheless, broadcast religious services do not displace personal attendance, but reinforce and enhance it. The successful media evangelist broadcasts not just the preaching or the events at the altar, but a large crowd at the worship service: the cameras make an effort to portray the congregation into which the remote viewers and listeners can project themselves. Broadcast evangelists become media stars; this further enhances their draw as sacred objects that audiences want to be close to. There is a rush to attend the service in person, indeed precisely when it is being broadcast, as if this amplifies the halo of being in the center of religious action. The draw of close personal contact—as close as big crowds allow—operates for traditional as well as evangelical churches; tours of the pope draw enormous crowds.

Religious services, like other collective experience of ritual, vary in their intensity. Distance media can provide some of the sense of shared attention and emotion, which give a feeling of attraction, membership, and respect. The strongest effects are reserved, however, for full bodily assembly. Conversion experiences—coming forward to be born again, or otherwise committing oneself to a life of religious dedication—happen primarily at big evangelical meetings (Johnson 1971). Personal presence in a crowd, worked up collectively to a strong shared emotions, gives the impetus for reshaping one's identity. The downside of religious conversion confirms the pattern as well. A considerable proportion of persons who are born again drop out of religious participation within a year; many persons are born again numerous times (Bromley 1988; Richardson 1978). It is the big, intense religious gatherings that bring forth the emotion and the shift in membership attachment; as one settles back into the routine of smaller and less collectively emotional church services, and then drifts away from attending, the identification and the emotional energy also fade.



Figure 2.5 The preacher as a sacred object: Billy Graham and admirers (1962).

I have drawn these comparisons from large-scale, for the most part formal ceremonial gatherings, and conclude that remote communications give some sense of ritual participation—if at a lower level of intensity—especially through hearing the voices of the audience and through visuals that focus on audience members like the viewers themselves. Does this hold for small-scale natural rituals such as sociable gatherings? In principle, one could hold a party via a conference call, but I have never heard of anyone doing it. At most, I have suggested, a missing guest might phone in to a celebration that is taking place, to address those who are bodily present; but this confirms the sense that the one on the phone is the one who is missing, and indeed the content of the message generally mentions that voice contact is a poor substitute for being there in person. The same is true of appearing by remote visual, such as sending a video tape. When video conferencing becomes widely available, there will be opportunity to test the intensity that can be reached in social rituals carried out by a combination of remote voice and picture. My prediction is that parties and visits will not go away; that remote hookups however vivid will always be considered weak substitutes for the solidarity of actual bodily presence (Turner 2002 reaches similar conclusions). People will go on meeting for a drink or for coffee when they have something important to discuss, or want to establish or express a personal tie. One difference between remote communication and bodily presence is that the former does not usually involve taking refreshments; although there is no reason why persons could not have a drink vicariously, telling each other over the phone what they are drinking, even toasting each other. But this is almost never done; it seems a violation of the spirit of the drinking ritual not to be drinking together, touching glasses, raising them to one's mouth together.[6] The physical substance ingested—the alcohol, coffee, tea, soft drinks, the party cake, the shared dinner, or, in older times, a shared smoke—of course have some sensory character of their own. But they are not solitary pleasures, of the kind they would be if several persons tried to carry out a dinner party by telephone, with each eating their own meal while talking on the line. The ingestion of food and drink is part of the bodily coparticipation; these are ritual substances when they are consumed together in the atmosphere of a sociable occasion.[7] If, we should admit, some degree of intersubjectivity and shared mood can take place by phone, and perhaps by remote video (although the effect would be diminished by lack of reciprocal communication), this nevertheless seems pale compared to face-to-face, embodied encounters.

On the whole, it appears that large-scale, relatively formal rituals come off better by remote communication than do small-scale natural rituals. This seems to be so because large-scale rituals are working with established symbols, already build up through previous iteration of an IR chain. Relatively impersonal rituals convey membership in large groups, only part of which ever assembles in one place; and thus distance communication gives a sense of something large that one belongs to. But this is effective only if there is at least intermittent personal contact with some other members, worshipers of the same symbols. And the remote broadcast must convey the audience's participation, not merely its leaders or performers.

How then do we assess recent forms of communication, including email and the Internet? For the most part, these lack the flow of interaction in real time; even if electronic communications happen within minutes, this is not the rhythm of immediate vocal participation, which as we shall see, is honed to tenths of seconds. There is little or no buildup of focus of attention in reading an email, no paralinguistic background signals of mutual engrossment. A written message may attempt to describe an emotion, or to cause one; but it seems rare that email is used for this purpose. A hypothesis is that the closer the flow of emails is to real conversational exchange, the more possibility of a sense of collective entrainment, as in a rapid exchange of emails in a period of minutes or seconds. But even here it is dubious that strong feelings of solidarity can be built up, or the charging up of a symbol with collective significance.

My main hypothesis is to the contrary: the tendency to drop ceremonious forms in email—greetings, addressing the target by name, departing salutations—implies a lowering of solidarity. Email settles into bare utilitarian communication, degrading relations, precisely because it drops the ritual aspects.

The electronic revolution under way since the mass computerization of the 1980s and 1990s will no doubt bring further elaborations of distance communications. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of IR theory is that face-to-face communications will not disappear in the future; nor will people have any great desire to substitute electronic communication for bodily presence. People will still prefer to assemble for little social gatherings with intimates, for parties with friends; entertainment and sports events will still be considered most satisfying through attendance at live performance; political gatherings will generate more enthusiasm than their remote images. Occasions with a strong sense of sacredness will be those where people want to be there in the flesh in the presence of the spirit; weddings, funerals, high religious experiences will be attended in person or, if not, will be felt second rate.

Similarly for the inculcation of culture. Teaching by remote television hookup, already used for mass education, will be felt to be an inferior form to student-teacher contact in the same room, even if this is confined to the mutual flash of recognizing attention or inattention, and the adjusting of mood by speaker and audience.[8] For the same reason, electronic shopping, despite its convenience, is unlikely to make shops and shopping malls disappear. The experience of being in the store itself is an action on a stage, enhanced amidst the buzz of other people (Ritzer 1999; Miller 1998). Shopping in well-appointed settings is a combination of show, museum, and crowd experience, part of the "bright lights" and the action of urban experience. Buying something may be regarded as paying the price of admission to the experience, as much as or more than paying for the utiliarian value of the object purchased. For some people, and on some occasions, shopping is a utilitarian act; but the component of social ritual is a considerable part of its allure.

Not to say there may not be a great increase in the use of distance media, and that sheer economic and practical pressures may not squeeze out face contacts as inherently more troublesome and expensive. IR theory has a prediction here too: the more that human social activities are carried out by distance media, at low levels of IR intensity, the less solidarity people will feel; the less respect they will have for shared symbholic objects; and the less enthusiastic personal motivation they will have in the form of EE.

There is a special proviso. It is possible that electronic media of the future might be designed just so that they can target those aspects of human physiology that make IRs work. IRs build up high levels of focused attention and emotional entrainment; conceivably communications devices of the future could attempt to send, from nervous system to nervous system, just those signals that most enhance these shared experiences. There might well be something dangerous in such devices. For if high levels of IR intensity are the peak experience of human lives, electronic devices that send such signals would be tremendously appealing, especially if they could artificially raise such experiences to a high level on demand. IR-producing equipment might well create an extreme form of addiction. In another variant, if the devices could be manipulated by an external agent rather than by the receiver, they would be enormously powerful devices of social control. These possibilities, although perhaps still remote, are worth considering as implications of a mature IR theory. The advance of microsociology suggests dangers ahead; against these, theoretical understanding provides our best forewarning.

The main point of these comparisons is to show what bodily presence does for the intensity of IRs. Bodily presence makes it easier for human beings to monitor each other's signals and bodily expressions; to get into shared rhythm, caught up in each other's motions and emotions; and to signal and confirm a common focus of attention and thus a state of intersubjectivity. The key is that human nervous systems become mutually attuned; the comparison of various distance media shows the importance of the vocal modality, and that visual focus operates above all through monitoring other audience participants. If nervous systems could become directly entrained at long distance, the effects would be the same as bodily presence.

The Micro-Process of Collective Entrainment in Natural Rituals

The IR model is not just a theoretical construct; it describes, with greater or lesser precision, what observably goes on in social encounters. Durkheim was, of course, laying out the initial concepts, and Goffman never stated very systematically just what were the processes of everyday interaction ritual, much less examined the causes and effects of their variations. I have attempted to do this, guided in part by the implicit logic of Durkheim's analysis, while suggesting refinements according to what subsequent micro-interactional research has turned up. Some of the most useful evidence has been gathered by microsociological researchers following the ethnomethodological program, by sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists, and by psychologists. These research schools have their own theoretical agendas, and thus for my purposes it has been necessary to take their findings out of the theoretical context in which they were presented, and reinterpret them in the light of how they fit or modify (or possibly reject) IR theory. On the whole, the fit has been encouraging. Now there is also microsociological research carried out by Scheff and coworkers with an explicitly Durkheimian orientation; and micro-situational work in the sociology of emotions. I will argue for the coherence of many lines of work with a refined model of mutual focus and emotional entrainment.

A good micro-conversational example of the buildup of collective effervescence in natural rituals is shared laughter. The sounds of laughter are bodily produced by a rhythmic repetition of breaths caught and forcefully expelled; at the height of hilarity, this happens involuntarily. Most laughter (and its strongest intensity and pleasure) is collectively produced. Once laughter begins, it can feed upon itself.

Here is an example where one young woman is telling her sister about swimming in the nude (Jefferson 1973):

Olive: . . . . there's two places where the hot wahder comes in'nyih g'n get
right up close to'm en ih yuz feels like yer [takin a *douche*]

Edna: [huh huh huh] ahh
hah hah=

Olive: =[HUHH HUHH HUHHH HA HA uhh ha-uhh ha: : ha: :] huh

Edna: . . .[hhh HUH HUH HAHH HA HA HA HA HUH HHHHEH!]

The brackets [indicate where both persons are vocalizing at the same time. Here Edna starts to giggle as Olive builds up to her punch line; the underlining of *douche* indicates vocal stress, but looking at this closely we see that Edna already anticipates something is coming. The equal sign = indicates precise turn-taking, with no gap between the utterances; Olive starts laughing just as Edna very briefly pauses in giggling. Now Olive has raised the volume (indicated by capitalization), and Edna, after a brief pause and one more light giggle, follows her. A few moments later Olive starts to quiet down and gradually decelerate (the colons : indicate that the syllable is drawn out); Edna is still laughing very hard in the normal gasping rhythm, but when Olive has decelerated almost all the way down, Edna brings her laugh to a halt abruptly.

Laughter may start with a humorous remark or incident, but can be prolonged thereafter by further remarks or gestures, which in themselves are not funny, but in the context of the rhythm contribute to further outbursts of collective breath expulsion.[9] One further example (from Jefferson 1985):

Joe: Yih'n heah comes the inspecta.
Carol: eh-huh-huh-huh-[huh HA HA HA HA] HA *HA HA HA*
[ha ha ah!
Mike: [Uh- It's Big Daddy]
James: [*Oh* : : let's seh let's seh . . . .

Mike's remark "It's Big Daddy" comes in just on the beat when Carol is stepping up from giggling to loud laughter, and it has the effect of making her emphasize even more strongly the next series of *HA HA HA*. She quiets down when James intrudes a different kind of speech act (suggesting what they should do now), whereupon Carol abruptly forces her laugh to an end (the exclamation mark).

Laughter illustrates both the collective and rhythmically entraining aspect of micro-interactional ritual.[10] It also points up a central reason why people are attracted to high-intensity interaction rituals: perhaps the strongest human pleasures come from being fully and bodily absorbed in deeply synchronized social interaction (McClelland 1985). This is why shared laughter—otherwise merely an uncontrollable interruption of breathing patterns—is so pleasurable. It exemplifies the more general pattern of collective effervescence, and explains why people are attracted to high-intensitly interaction rituals, and why they generate feelings of solidarity. The symbols that represent these interactions hold deep connotations of pleasure for group members, and this helps make them sacred objects to defend, as well as reminders of group interactions that members would like to reestablish in future encounters.

Conversational Turn-Taking as Rhythmic Entrainment

Collective effervescence in natural rituals is not confined to momentary bursts like laughter. There is a longer process of building up a heightened mood, which can be seen through the methods of analyzing micro-details of conversation pioneered by ethnomethodologists. As we shall see, entrainment occurs especially through falling into shared rhythms—in fact shared rhythms at different periodicities in time, from the level of the speaker's turn, down to the level of fine-grained resonances that make up the paralinguistic pitch of the vocal tones.[11]

Ethnomethodology began as a theoretical program of radical micro-reductionism, emphasizing the local—which is to say, situational—production of the sense of social structure. Ethnomethodology fostered ultra-micro-empiricism, investigating social interaction in hitherto unparalleled detail, especially by using the new portable recording devices that were just then becoming available in the 1960s and 1970s. The theoretical orientation for this research was to ferret out ethnomethods: that is, the devices by which actors sustain a sense of social structure, the tacit methods of commonsense reasoning. Thus ethnomethodology cuts at a rather different angle than the Durkheimian IR theory: the former is concerned with cognition and structure (even if structure is taken in some sense as an illusion, a mere collective belief), the latter with emotion and solidarity.[12] Nevertheless, it is easy to demonstrate that the most important research findings of ethnomethodologically inspired researchers display the central mechanisms of the rhythmic entrainment model.

The most common type of everyday interaction is the ordinary conversation. This has been studied since the 1970s with great precision by conversation analysists using tape-recordings. Here we find a very high degree of social coordination, indeed at the level of tenths of seconds. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) specified a set of turn-taking "rules" by which conversation appears to be governed. These may be recast as a Durkheimian process once we note that the "rules" are not always followed, but that interactions break down in particular ways when particular patterns are violated.[13]

The key turn-taking rules are as follows: one person speaks at a time; when the turn is finished, another person speaks. The full force of this is not apparent until we see the minute coordination of tempos with which this is carried out. In a successful conversation, the gap between one person ending their turn and the next person starting is typically less than 0.1 second; alternatively there are very slight overlaps (ca. 0.1 sec.) between speakers.

As an example, consider the following (from Heritage 1984, 236):

E: = Oh *h*oney that was a lovely *l*uncheon I shoulda *ca*:lled you
s:soo[:ner but *I:*] l:[lo:ved it. It w's just deli:ghtfu[:l.]
M: [((f))Oh:::] [( ) [Well]=

M: = *I* w's gla[d you] (came)]
E: ['nd yer f:]*f*riends] 're so da:rl*i*:ng,=
M: = *Oh*:::[: it w'z:]
E: [e-that *P*]*a*:t isn'she a do:[:*l*l?]
M: [iYe]h *i*sn't she pretty,
(.)
E: *Oh*: she's a beautiful girl.=
M: = Yeh *I* think she's a pretty gir[l.
[En' that Reinam'n::
(.)
E: *She* SCA:RES me.=

Two women have just left a luncheon party, chatting enthusiastically. The reader might read the transcript out loud several times to get the rhythm. The underlinings (Oh *ho*ney that was a lovely *lu*ncheon I shoulda *ca*:lled you s:soo:ner) are emphases. The colons (:) mean that the sound is prolonged. Parentheses that are empty ( ) or that contain an unintelligible sound (f) indicate that the speaker's voice is too soft to articulate anything. Parentheses containing a word (came) indicate that the speaker is fading, usually when someone else is speaking at the same time.

Evelyn (E) is in a rhythm, and Marge (M) is like a counterpoint in a singing duet, following along with her. Nothing very important is being said here, but a strong social meaning is conveyed. The rules of turn-taking are being adhered to very closely. The equal sign (=) is used to indicate that as soon as one person stops the other starts. Virtually every new utterance is right on the beat. The parenthesis with a dot in it (.) indicates a gap of 1/10 second or less; these are the only breaks in this conversation, and these are so small that they cannot actually be noticed. In the conventions of conversation analysis, a parenthesis containing a number indicates the amount of silence between utterances. For instance (1.0) means a 1-second gap. These are miniscule bits of time, but they are socially very significant. Humans can perceive what happens in units down to about 0.2 seconds; below that they blur together and are unconscious. That means that a gap of 1.0 seconds is actually about 5 beats of consciousness, bam-bam-bam-bam-bam. If there is a gap in a conversation of 1.0 second, it tends to feel like a deafening silence; and even a smaller gap feels like the smooth flow is broken.[14]

A more sociological way to state the turn-taking rule is: successful talk has no gaps and no overlaps; no embarrassing pauses between speakers or within utterances, and a minimal amount of struggle over who gets the floor to speak at any one moment. What we mean by successful talk here is that it is socially successful, a conversational ritual generating solidarity among the speakers. The success of conversational turn-taking, like the degree of solidarity in IRs generally, is variable. Some conversations are awkward, lacking in solidarity because they are full of pauses, and other conversations are hostile and mutually at loggerheads because the participants keep interrupting one another and struggle to keep the other from speaking. The point that stands out is that successful conversational ritual is rhythmic: one speaker comes in at the end of the other's turn with split-second timing, coming in right on the beat as if keeping up a line of music.

We may characterize conversations that follow this pattern as high-solidarity conversations: friendly chatting or animated discussions among friends. But solidarity is a variable; not all conversations are of this sort, and in fact this variability is just what we want to explain. Some interactions are more solidary than others, thus producing the differentiated field of social encounters that make up real life. The turn-taking "rules" can be violated in two directions. Two (or more) persons could all speak at the same time. Or turn-taking can fail because one person stops talking and the other person does not pick up immediately. In fact, the gaps need not be very large in order to signal that there is a breakdown in solidarity; what is colloquially known as an "embarrassing pause" is often on the order of 1.5 seconds or less. The baseline of normal solidarity conversation is that turns are coordinated at tempos of tenths of seconds; anything as long as 0.5 second is already missing several beats, and longer periods are experienced subjectively as huge gaps.

For this kind of failure of solidarity, consider the following example (Heritage 1984, 248):

A: Is there something bothering you or not?
(1.0)
A: Yes or no
(1.5)
A: Eh?
B: No.

This is obviously a strained relationship. A and B could be a parent and child, or two spouses who are not getting along. What is striking here is that the gaps are, after all, not really very long. But in conversational time, 1.5 seconds seems like an eternity. Even a shorter break is noticed by conversationalists, because it seems like an "embarrassing pause." And embarrassment, as Goffman (1967) noted, is a sign that the social relationship is not working as expected.

The other way solidarity can break down is through a violation of "no gap, no overlap" in the other direction. This is the pattern that we find in angry arguments, when both participants try to talk at the same time, typically speaking louder and faster in an effort to override the other. "Having the floor" is a tacit agreement as to where the focus of attention will be; a conversation is an IR that moves the focus of attention, according to these agreed-upon "rules," from one speaker to another. Ritual solidarity breaks down when no one wants to talk; the focus of attention evaporates into thin air. It also breaks down when the participants want to maintain a focus of attention, but they dispute who is going to be in the focus, and thus whose words are going to be the symbolic object that will receive ritual attention and endorsement.[15]

Consider the following example (Schegloff 1992, 1335):

A: . . .we have a concern for South Vietnam's territorial integrity which is why we're the:re. But our primary concern regarding *our* personnel, *any* military commander has that primary *loyal*[ty.
B: [No? Are:n' we there because of U.N. uh—doctrine?
A: [*No*:::
B: [Aren't we there under the [the (   ) -
A: [*Where* didju ever get *that* cockeyed idea.
B: Whaddya *mea:n.*
A: *U*.N. doctrine.
B: We're there, representin' the U. *N*. No?
A: Wouldu- You go ask the U.N., and you'll get laughed out. *No*..
B: We're there because- of our interests.
A: [Yes.
B: [We're not there wavin the U.N. flag?
A: We're- There's no U.N. flag *there*. Thet's not a United Nations force. The United Nations has never taken a single action on this.
((pause))
A: [I-
B: [*No*. I think (this ti::me)- I think you're *wrong*.
A: Sorry sir, I'd suggest yuh check yer facts.
B: I think y- I uh [(   )
A: [I will refrain from telling you you don't know what cher talking abou[t,
B: [I [wish you *would*.
A: [I just suggest you [talk- you check yer facts.
B: [I wish you *would*.
B: Because this's what I read in- in the *news*papers.
[That we represent-
A: [Well, then you been reading some *pretty ba:d* newspapers.
B: [We represent the U.*N*. there.
A: [F'give me, but I gotta go.
A: Sir, I would suggest thet if that's the case you switch newspapers.
B: Well I hope I c'n call you ba:ck an' cor*rect* you.
A: L'k *you* check it out. 'n call me.
B: I'll do [so.
A: [Okay?
B: I certainly *will*.
A: Mm *gu*'night.

As the argument builds up, the speakers interrupt each other, then talk over each other for extended periods. Even as they attempt to close off the discussion at the end and return to normal politeness, they can't refrain from additional digs and overlaps. The pattern of emphases throughout also conveys a series of vocal jabs.

This is not a full-scale treatise on sociolinguistics, so we will have to forego many complexities.[16] But let us note a few objections. "No gap, no overlap" may be culturally variable. That is, the generalization is based on tape-recordings made among native English speakers in the United States and Britain, and may not be valid everywhere. Thus there are tribal societies (according to comments made by participants at symposiums where this conversational model has been presented) where typically there are fairly long gaps between one speaker and another; indeed, speaking too quickly after another is regarded as a violation. This suggests a reformulation, but not necessarily a rejection of the model of conversation as solidarity-producing rhythmic coordination.[17] The key process is to keep up the common rhythm, whatever it may be. Where this is done, the result is solidarity; where it is violated, either by speaking too soon or too hesistantly, the result is felt as aggressive encroachment, or as alienation, respectively.[18]

An advantage in getting beyond the rule-following frame of reference is to see how conversations have to be built up over time; thus they go through crucial passages where the conversation (and hence the social relationship) may or may not come off. Many conversations do not get off the ground; opening gambits are not taken, or do not hook into sufficient response to start building up the rhythmic coordination. Once a conversation takes off, it builds a self-sustaining momentum; as is clear from everyone's experience, this varies tremendously from one combination of interlocutors to another. Indeed, this is a principal way in which lines of social cleavage are enacted; one can say, as a crude approximation, that members of the same status group are those who are able to sustain highly entraining conversational rituals whereas members of different status groups are those who cannot. This captures part of the ingredients that make or break a conversational IR. But there are also instances in which the flow can go either way, given the same participants.

An example easy for academics to observe is the question period at the end of a lecture or conference presentation. Frequently this begins with a long pause; the subjective experience of members of the audience at that moment is that they can think of nothing to say. Yet if the pause is broken, usually by the highest-status member of the audience asking a question, the following question tends to come after a shorter pause; and by the third or fourth question, multiple hands go up. This shows that the audience was not lacking in symbolic capital, in things to talk about, but in emotional energy, the confidence to think and speak about these ideas; not that they had nothing to say, but that could not think of it until the group attention shifted toward interaction including the audience. Nor is this a matter of the speaker being uninteresting; often an especially successful speaker is the biggest show-stopper. This is best understood as a process of monopolizing the focus of attention; the speaker is elevated into too remote a realm, surrounded by too much of an aura of respect (Durkheimian sacredness) to be approached.[19] Once the approach has been made (high-status members of the audience are best positioned to do so because of their store of EE), and the focus of attention shifted to a back-and-forth exchange, the momentum flows another way, and questions seem to be pulled in as if by magnetism.

This flow of initiative from one speaker to another is the turn-taking process again. The classic conversation analysis model of Sacks et al. expressed this in a simplified way: the last speaker gets to determine the next speaker, either by addressing someone or by taking another turn him / herself. David Gibson (1999, 2001) provides a more refined model, based on examining the sequence of turn-taking in a large number of management meetings in a large corporation. Gibson shows that there are a few typical ways in which turns pass from one speaker to another, while other possible sequences of turns are extremely rare, and may be negatively sanctioned. Most typically, one person speaks, then another answers (in Gibson's representation AB:BA, A speaks to B, then B speaks to A). If this goes on at length, it constitutes a kind of conversational ping-pong game, in which two persons monopolize the conversation and everyone else is reduced to spectators. We can understand the situational force in this when we note that the spectators often chafe in the role but cannot find a way to break in once the pair has the momentum. Other typical patterns are for the speaker to address the whole group (or make an undirected remark into the air). Gibson gives this as AO:XA, indicating that the most typical next turn is for someone in the group to take the floor but direct a comment back to A. Even when there is an interruption (instead of AB:BA, there is AB:XA, where X is someone who wasn't addressed), typically the interrupter breaks into the ongoing conversation, usually speaking to the last speaker (AB:XA) or to the last person addressed (AB:XB), but not to someone completely new. I would say that a group conversation is like passing a ball around, where the ball consists of the focus of attention. This focus entrains everyone present to follow its progress around the room; when someone breaks in, it is done by latching onto someone who either immediately or very recently was in the focus. The metaphor of passing a ball isn't quite right; it is more like the image of a ball on a screen in time-lapse leaving a trail of electronic particles just behind it. Once again we see conversational IR as a flow of entrainment in a focus of attention; this remains so even when there is a struggle over getting into that focus. As Gibson emphasizes (2001), the structural constraints on getting the floor—getting into a temporally limited attention space—are a major determinant on how influence is situationally enacted, even in formal organizations.

A similar process operates in large public gatherings such as political rallies and debates. A rousing political speaker draws interruptions of applause; but the audience starts to build up its applause in the seconds preceding the speaker coming to his / her punch line; viewed on video tape, it looks as if the crowd is making the speaker say the words that they will greet with their peak of coordinated noise (Atkinson 1984; Clayman 1993). Examining the sequence in micro-detail, we see that both speaker and audience are caught up in a rhythm; the speaker's rhetorical utterances have a pattern of stresses and pauses, repetitions, and accretions (this is what gives public speaking a distinctive rhetorical tone), which let the audience know that something is coming, and at what moment they can join in with maximal effect. Similarly on the audience side: recordings of applauding or booing show that the audience builds up its noise in a distinctive rhythm; a few initial voices or handclaps unleash a rapid acceleration of noise as the full audience joins in; whereas abortive applause fails at a certain moment in this temporal sequence if this rapid acceleration has not taken off, tacitly signaling to others that if they join in they will be exposed in an isolated minority instead of joining triumphantly in a shared focus of attention. For similar reasons, booing is harder to bring to a critical mass of participation, and drops off in a shorter time than applauding. As is generally the case in micro-interaction, solidarity processes are easier to enact than conflict processes. As I will show elsewhere, the implication is that conflict is much easier to organize at a distance, against unseen groups, than in the immediate interactional situation.

In the following example (from Clayman 1993, 113), bbbbbbbb indicates sustained booing; xxxxxx indicates applause; zzzzzz indicates a buzz of uncoordinated audience sounds. Capitals (XXXXX; BBBBBB) indicate loud applause or booing; x-x-x-x-x-x and b-b-b-b-b-b indicate weak noises, and x x x x or b b b b are isolated single hand claps or boos:

DQ: . . .and if qualifications a*lo*::ne (.) .h are going to *be*: the *is*sue in this
cam*pa*ign. (1.0) *Ge*orge *Bu*sh has more qualifications than Michael
Dukakis and Lloyd Bentsen com*bi*ned.
(0.6)
AUD: xxx-xxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX[XXXXXXXXXXX=
AUD: [b-b-b-b
AUD: XXXXX[XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx[xxxxxxxxxx-x-x-x h x h x x x x (8.5)
AUD: [bbbbbbbBBBBBBBBBB[BBBBBBBBbbb-b-b (2.9)
MOD: [Senator Bentsen-

Here the applause, after a scattered beginning, successfully accelerates, and continues for a typical rhythmic unit for applause consisting of about eight seconds (very strong applause responses go on for another one or even more such eight-second units). Halfway into the applause segment, there is a failed effort to get booing going; a second effort successfully builds up to loud booing toward the end of the applause segment, and even overtakes the applause at just the moment when the moderator attempts to return to the debaters. Even with this momentary triumph, the booing quickly subsides thereafter while the applause fades more slowly. As we see from the numbers in parentheses, the booing lasts for a much shorter time (2.9 vs. 8.5 seconds).

These processes of rhythmic coordination are almost always unconscious. The success or failure of a natural ritual is felt rather than thought, at least initially; although, of course, reflective persons could comment on it, to others or to themselves, thereby putting a verbal interpretation upon it. There is a repertoire of cultural symbols that make up the content of these conversations; and we shall examine later just where the significance of symbols arises and how it is propagated from one IR in the chain to another. Possession of a stock of shared symbols is one of the ingredients that goes into the success (and lack of such possession is a condition for the failure) of an IR to build up collective effervescence. What we are examining here, in analytical separation, is the micro-mechanism by which situational solidarity occurs; this is what charges up the ongoing social significance of a stock of verbal symbols, or dissipates them into meaninglessness.

Experimental and Micro-Observational Evidence on Rhythmic Coordination and Emotional Entrainment

Besides turn-taking, other aspects of interaction become rhythmically coordinated, some to a very fine degree. Films of conversations show that speakers and listeners both tend to time their bodily movements to the rhythm of the words being spoken (Condon and Ogston 1971; Kendon 1970, 1980; Capella 1981). The body movements are rapid and subtle: nodding the head, blinking eyes, and other gestures. Often they are too rapid to be seen by the normal eye and become visible only when a film shot at 24 frames per second is played back frame by frame. Much of this research has centered on interactions between mothers and babies, the epitome of a high-solidarity situation. Neonates as young as a few weeks or months synchronize vocalizations and movements with those of adults (Condon and Sander 1974a, 1974b; Contole and Over 1981), long before they learn to talk. This suggests that rhythmic synchronization may be the basis of talking—an outgrowth of naturally occurring IRs. Infants in hospital nurseries often engage in contagious crying; they also match the pitch level of voices that they hear (Hatfield et al. 1994, 83). Electroencephalograph (EEG) recordings reveal that synchronization can occur between the rhythmic brain waves of adults who are conversing, as well as between infants and adults (Condon and Sander 1974a, 1974b). When EEG synchronization does not happen, there are typically group boundaries; it is less likely in conversations between black and white adults than among whites.

Besides the timing of gestures and brain waves, conversationalists synchronize various features of their voices: pitch register and range, loudness, tempo, accent, duration of syllables (clipped or drawled sounds) (Gregory 1983; Hatfield et al. 1994, 28). As a conversation goes on, partners tend to adapt their speech patterns and rhythms to one another (Gregory 1983; Jaffe and Feldstein 1970; Warner 1979; Warner et al. 1983). Erickson and Shultz (1982, 72) sum up: "Whereas there is no metronome playing while people talk, their talking itself serves as a metronome." In some conversations, synchronization comes and goes, building up and fading at different moments; but especially among couples engaged in lengthy conversations, synchrony built up and stayed high (Capella and Planalp 1981; Capella 1981).

Rhythmic synchronization is correlated with solidarity. Psychologists have shown this for several kinds of micro-behavior. On the vocal dimension, where conversations are closely coordinated in rhythm, the speakers like each other better (Hatfield et al. 1994, 29, 41–44). This is also true for bodily movements; among young couples, those who felt the most rapport were the ones whose videotaped movements had the greatest degree of mimicry and synchrony. The most striking synchrony is found among male / female couples in the process of moving from acquaintance to courtship, where the pair gradually turn more and more of their bodies toward each other, mirroring each other's gestures and touches, becoming absorbed in gazing at each other. Synchronization builds up from momentary and partial to full body synchronization, and new lovers can stay locked into this mode for hours (Perper 1985, 77–79).

Psychological experiments and detailed observations have shown that fine-honed mimicry and synchronization occur quite widely among humans. There is nevertheless a limitation on much of this research thus far. We know that synchronization and emotional contagion often happen, but there is less evidence on when it happens more, less, or not at all. Psychologists have tended to approach this issue by comparing individuals to find what character traits are related to being more susceptable or less susceptable to emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994); what we miss is the dynamics that make some situations build up to high synchronization, while others fail. The experimental method fosters an orientation to individual traits, especially when research subjects are administered questionnaires asking them to describe their typical behavior and feelings, a method that abstracts away from the flow of situations. The radical microsociologist, on the other hand, is inclined to think that anyone can be molded into anything, given a strong enough situational process (or chain of such situations). In terms of figure 2.1, psychological experiments and micro-observational analysis alike have piled up evidence for shared mood, action in common, and, to some extent, rhythmic entrainment. What is largely missing is the mutual focus of attention. I suggest that this is what makes the difference between situations in which emotional contagion and all the other aspects of rhythmic entrainment build up to high levels, and those in which they reach only low levels or fail completely. This is above all what rituals do: by shaping assembly, boundaries to the outside, the physical arrangement of the place, by choreographing actions and directing attention to common targets, the ritual focuses everyone's attention on the same thing and makes each one aware that they are doing so. This is the mechanism that needs more fine-grained research.

A convenient instrument for gauging the degree of solidarity that exists in an interaction is provided by the sociologist Stanford Gregory: a device for analyzing tape recordings of the sounds people make during conversation. By applying instrumentation for Fast Fourier Transform analysis (FFT) to conversation recordings, Gregory and his colleagues (1993, 1994) show that acoustical voice frequencies become attuned as conversations become more engrossing. This is rhythmic synchronization at a level much more fine-grained than the 0.2-second segments of which humans can be consciously aware. The micro-frequencies of voice tones in high-solidarity conversations converge on a fundamental frequency in a region of the sound spectrum below the range in which cognitively meaningful information is carried. If the higher-pitched frequencies are electronically removed (the ones that carry the content of what is being said), the recording sounds like a low-pitched buzz; it is quite literally this humming sound that is the "sound of solidarity." This suggests a nonintrusive, nonverbal means of researching solidarity in situations.

Synchronization of bodily movements has been found in large groups mobilized for collective action. One study of a macro-ritual, a political demonstration, found that the micro-coordination of movements among the demonstrators was much higher than a comparison group of ordinary pedestrians, and greater even than a marching band (Wohlstein and McPhail 1979). This is what we would expect if the demonstrators had the highest degree of emotional arousal and solidarity of these social groupings, feeding back into their shared actions and mutual focus of attention.

On the extreme micro-level, this synchronization must be unconscious. Synchronized gestures occur within time segments as rapid as 21 milliseconds (0.02 seconds), but humans are capable of overtly reacting to a stimulus only in 0.4 or 0.5 seconds, with some athletes capable of responding in 0.250 ms. (Kendon 1980; Hatfield et al. 1994, 38). Only slow playback of film frames reveals these patterns; indeed, people in conversation can synchronize their gestures in half of a film frame (42 ms.). Other synchronized behaviors, such as brain waves, or voice pitch range (how narrowly or widely the micro tones vary) are not even noticeable without specialized instruments. How, then, are people able to synchronize? The implication is that they have fallen into the same rhythm, so that they can anticipate where the next "beat" will fall. Chapple (1981) has called this *rhythmic entrainment*. Individuals who get into the flow of an interaction have made a series of adjustments that bring their rhythms together; hence they can "keep the beat" with what their partner is doing by anticipation, rather than by reaction.

It is because of these shared rhythms that turn-taking can be so finely coordinated, so that in a high-solidarity conversation the gaps are less than 0.1 second, less than we can perceive without instruments. "I say: 'I'll talk to you *la*-ter,' and as I especially delineate the pacing of '*la*-ter,' with a precisely accented undulation, you tightly latch on to the pulsing of my moves and place your 'Goodbye' on the next downbeat to end the phone call" (Sudnow 1979, 114). In his book *Talk's Body* (1979), the ethnomethodologist David Sudnow compared the experience of learning to play jazz piano with the experience of producing a flow of words at a typewriter keyboard. Both, he noted, are bodily activities that become successful when it is no longer a matter of transcribing notes (either musical or verbal) but of throwing oneself into the rhythm of making musical phrases or sentences. Thus adults encourage small children in learning to talk, not by explaining what words mean, but by joining with them in a speech rhythm; initially this consists largely of nonsensical sounds or the same words playfully repeated over and over.

Emotional contagion is a socio-physiological fact. Sociophysiology (Barchas and Mendoza 1984) shows how an individual's physiological condition is affected by current and recent social experience. Face-to-face social interaction takes place among physiological systems, not merely among individuals as cognitive systems or bodily actors. From an evolutionary perspective, it is not surprising that human beings, like other animals, are neurologically wired to respond to each other; and that social situations that call forth these responses are experienced as highly rewarding.

Sociable conversation—talking just for the sake of keeping up friendly contact—is the most basic of all interaction rituals; and that solidarity is constructed and intensified within a ritual by rhythmic coordination. If the key process is to keep up the conversational flow, then what one says is chosen in order to keep up one's expected participation, not because one necessarily believes it, thinks it important, or has anything worthwhile to say. Conversation is thus doubly ritualistic: formally in the sense of following the patterns of the interaction ritual model; and substantively ritualistic (i.e., closer to the ordinary, pejorative use of the term) in the sense of going through the motions for the sake of the activity, rather than for its apparent content. The content of talk is chosen for the sake of the rhythms of interaction. In William Butler Yeats's phrase, these are "songs rewritten for the tune's sake."

Joint Attention as Key to Development of Shared Symbols

Rhythmic coordination and emotional entrainment are necessary ingredients of an IR; but it also requires a mutual focus of attention. This is what George Herbert Mead (1925, 1934) called taking the role of the other, and he proposed that it is the key to what makes human consciousness. The importance of mutual focus is demonstrated by a considerable body of research on cognitive development. Tomasello (1999) marshals evidence from experiments and observations on small children, chimpanzees and other primates, other mammals, as well as from comparisons with autistic children.

Human infants from soon after birth engage in turn-taking pseudo-conversations with adult caretakers; these interactions have the same finely modulated rhythmic back-and-forth flow of turns as high-solidarity talk. Infants also engage in affect attunement, matching and building up emotions. In our terminology, several components of the IR model are operative: bodily assembly, emotional entrainment, collective effervescence. We can also infer that one important outcome is present, a solidarity tie, at least in the form of attachment to a particular adult parent or caretaker. It seems also the case that infants are acquiring a level of emotional energy from these interactions. We can infer this from the negative case, where infants raised without much interaction with caretakers are deeply depressed (see research on WWII orphanages, and on monkeys fed by wire-dummy mothers rather than live mothers: Bowlby 1965; Harlow and Mears 1979). In terms of Mead's model of the "I," "me," and "Generalized Other," the infant engaging in this kind of rhythmic and emotional entrainment with an adult has none of these components of the self. There is an action component that Mead called the "I," but the baby's action is strongly entrained toward the adult, and thus consists largely in the emotional energy that is in the pattern of social solidarity. There is no cognitively independent "I."

Around nine to twelve months occurs a momentous change, which Tomasello refers to as "the nine-month revolution." Now the child is able to engage in joint attention with an adult, a scene in which both point to or carry out an action toward an object. This is a three-component interaction, involving two persons and the object to which they are jointly paying attention. The child now is showing not just an awareness of the object or of the other person, but an awareness that the other's focus is the same as his / her own focus. This is what IR theory calls the mutual focus of attention. The pointing or gesturing toward the object is often vocal—the act of naming and referring to the object; it is the beginning of language as a use of symbols that have shared meaning (Bruner 1983). These vocal gestures are genuine symbols, not just "signs." They embody practical procedures for getting things done that have become habitual through the experience of practicing with a particular other person; they are mental references. From this time onward, children begin to learn to talk in the shared adult language. In contrast, autistic children, who have difficulty learning to speak, also have great difficulty with joint attention, as well as in playing with other children.

Tomasello interprets the process of joint attention as emerging from the child ascribing a sense of intentions to the other person, a desire that precedes the action; not that this is a consciously represented notion of the child as having an intentional self, which is projected onto the adult—since there is as yet no symbolic apparatus in which a child could formulate such a representation—but a recognition by the child that the other is "like me."

The full-scale IR model is now complete: on the ingredient side, there is now mutual focus of attention, joining and enhancing the already existing emotional entrainment; on the outcome side, shared symbols are now being created. There is another change in the child's behavior at this point. After age 1, shyness starts to emerge, as well as coyness around others and in front of mirrors; the child is developing a self-image from the viewpoint of other people. In the terminology of G. H. Mead, the child's self now has a "me," going along with the capacity to take the role of the other.

For the IR model, the "nine-month revolution" via joint attention or mutual focus is the crucial turning point, launching the child into the full-fledged human world of shared symbols. There remain many different ways in which persons can orient toward symbols, so let us trace the child's development, using Tomasello's summary, one stage further. Around age 3 to 5, children come to see other persons not only as intentional agents but as mental agents; that is, not only do they recognize that other people have an intention behind their actions, but they recognize them as having mental processes that are not necessarily expressed in action. The child at the "nine-month revolution" carries out joint attention with an adult and perceives the verbal gesture not merely as a physical movement that the adult is making with his / her mouth (similar to a physical gesture with a finger) but as an intentional reference, an action of communicating. The child is entering into a world of shared symbolic gestures, taking completely to heart what meaning the adult is communicating. The child at the three-to-five-year transition is now perceiving that what other persons say is not necessarily what they actually believe or what they will actually do; the child's universe has expanded to include the possibility of false beliefs and lying. Put more positively, the child perceives that other people do not always see the world the same way they do, and that there are a variety of perspectives from which it can be seen.

The change is easiest to encompass in Mead's term, the "Generalized Other." This change makes the self's representation of the world more abstract; in addition to taking the perspective of particular other people and aligning oneself with them, the child now can take the perspective of other people in general, an intersection or resultant of all these perspectives. This changes the child's inner self as well. It is now possible both to internalize rules and increase the amount of self-direction under social influence, and simultaneously to have a stronger sense of self as an autonomous, self-reflective agent. These are the years that children become deliberately willful, the "terrible twos" and "terrible threes," when children show or flaunt increasing autonomy from parents' demands; this stage is a shift away from the very strong social embeddedness that follows directly from the joint attention consciousness in the "nine-month revolution."

And this is also the period when external talk begins to be internalized; children talking to themselves out loud, or to imaginery playmates, and then increasingly in subvocal self-talk, internal conversation. What is emerging is the additional level of reflexivity in Mead's theory of the self, in which the "I" can now deliberately manipulate symbolic representations, distancing itself from the here-and-now and from immediate social demands, to think of alternative pathways out of the situation. In this sense, Mead's conception of the "I" is an adult "I"; it emerges in this full reflexive sense as an independent agent only after the Generalized Other has crystallized.

SOLIDARITY PROLONGED AND STORED IN SYMBOLS

High levels of emotional entrainment—collective effervescence—are ephemeral. How long will the solidarity and the emotional mood last? This depends on the transformation of short-term emotions into long-term emotions, which is to say, the extent to which they are stored in symbols that reinvoke them. Symbols, in turn, differ as to what kind of group solidarity they invoke, and thus what symbolic / emotional memories or meanings will do in affecting group interactions, and personal identities, in future situations.

Consider a range of situations where collective emotion is generated. At the lowest level are situations where a number of people are assembled, but with a very low focus of attention. Such would be people in a public waiting place like an airport departure lounge, or a queue lined up for tickets. Here there is little common mood, possibly even impatience and annoyance because the focus of different individuals and subclusters are at cross purposes. Nothing is prolonged from these situations except the fleeting desire to get it over with and get out of there.

At a higher intensity are situations with a buzz of excitement: being on a busy street in a city, in a crowded restaurant or bar. There is a palpable difference between being in an establishment where there are lots of people and one that is nearly empty. Unfocused crowds generate more tacit interaction than very sparse assemblies, and thus give a sense of social atmosphere. Even though there is no explicit interaction or focus of attention in such places, there is a form of social attraction to being there. Being in a crowd gives some sense of being "where the action is," even if you personally are not part of any well-defined action; the lure of the "bright lights of the city" is not so much the visual illumination but the minimal excitement of being within a mass of human bodies.[20] As Durkheim indicates, the first step toward building up the "electricity" of collective effervescence is the move from sparse to dense bodily assembly. But in this alone there is little sense of solidarity with a recognizable group, and nothing that can prolong a sense of identification. What is lacking are symbols by means of which one could identify who was there, and that could reinvoke a sense of membership upon seeing them at another occasion.

A somewhat higher level of solidarity becomes possible in crowds that are focused by acting as an audience. Here the momentary sense of solidarity may become quite strong, insofar as the crowd takes part in a collective action—clapping, cheering, booing. These momentarily shared events, as we have seen, involve considerable micro-temporal coordination, a condition of collective entrainment that has very strong boundaries, intensely palpable when they are violated: one feels embarrassed when clapping at the wrong time or booing when others do not join in. The sense of collective solidarity and identity is stronger to just the extent that the crowd goes beyond being passive observers to actively taking part. This is an experience not only of responding to other people in the crowd (and to those on the stage, the playing field, or the podium) but of affecting them, thus becoming more of a part of the mutual entrainment by throwing oneself into it more fully.[21] Thus applause is no mere passive response; the pleasure of the performance is to a considerable degree created in those moments when one has the opportunity to applaud, and from the audience's side the performer or the political speech-maker is being used to facilitate one's own feeling of collective action. Such effects are visible in a very high degree in collective experience where the crowd becomes very active, and especially in destructive or violent acts. Thus taking part in an ethnic riot (Horowitz 2001) is not simply a way of acting out a preexisting ethnic identity, but a way of strengthening it, re-creating or even creating it. The greater the entrainment, the greater the solidarity and identity consequences; and entrainment reaches much higher levels by activity than passivity.[22]

Often these focused crowds acquire a symbol that can prolong the sense of the experience: usually this symbol is taken from whatever it was that the audience was consciously focused upon. For sports fans, this is the team itself, usually encapsulated in shorthand emblems; for entertainment fans, it is the performers, or possibly the music, play, or film itself that becomes the Durkheimian sacred object. But focused crowds nevertheless have rather weak long-term solidarity; their symbols, although charged up by the crowd's moment of collective effervescence, do not reinvoke the crowd itself, which on the whole is anonymous to most of its participants.[23] There is no way for members of the group to recognize each other or identify with each other, except via what they clapped for. Those who happened to be together at an exciting moment at a sports stadium do not have much of a tie afterward. They may share some collective symbols, such as wearing the same team emblem, but their solidarity is rather situationally specific, reserved for those occasions when they happen to be at another sporting event, or in some area of conversation around just those symbols. These are examples of secondary group identities: groups whose members do not know each other personally. Benedict Anderson (1991) famously called them "imagined communities," but this is not quite accurate. What they imagine—what they have an image of—is the symbol that they focus upon, and the "community" is a volatile and episodic experience that comes out just at moments of high ritual intensity.

Focused crowds develop their collective effervescence in those moments when they are active rather than passive spectators. But since their feeling of solidarity is prolonged by symbols that are for the most part presented to them from outside, they do not have much opportunity to use those symbols in their own lives, as ingredients for constructing similarly engrossing IRs. These are passively received symbols that must wait to be recharged when there next occurs a performance of the concert, the game, or the political assembly. At best, they can recirculate the symbols in a second-order, conversational ritual, a reflexive meta-ritual referring to these primary rituals.

In contrast to these situations where symbols are charged up by anonymous crowds, are situations that charge symbols with specific group membership. On the level of individualized encounters, personal ties are generated and enacted through IRs that produce a momentary level of intersubjectivity that is attractive enough to be repeated. I have already noted how the use of personal names is a ritual affirming the individual character of the relationship. Calling someone by their name during the course of an encounter is not just a demonstration that one knows that person's name; these rituals of personal address are typically carried out repeatedly, in virtually every encounter, even where it should be obvious from earlier encounters that the person's name is known. What is communicated is that one thinks of that person as an individual, and that this is a situation in which he or she is being treated as an individual, with a biography, a past history of relationships, in short, an IR chain. And the ritual of personal address is collective (at least in sociable situations), carrying the sense that it ought to be reciprocated, that each should call the other by his / her name; it is the enactment of a tie, individual person to individual person. An illuminating contrast is tribal societies where members of the same kinship group often do not know each other's personal names: they refer to each other, and address each other, by a title or relationship term—wife, sister's brother, second son.[24] There are corresponding situations in Western societies where individuals are referred to not by their names but by their title or position. These encounters are further down the continuum of relationships from the ritually marked meshing of individualized IR chains, but not all the way down to merely situationally anonymous coparticipation like members of a momentarily focused crowd; these are intermediate situations where there is recognition of where one fits in a group, but not of what distinguishes oneself as an individual within it.

Personal name-address rituals are a version of symbols that are used to prolong membership from one situation to the next. They also illustrate the point that the greater degree of symbolic memory and membership prolongation is connected to a greater degree of personal identification with those symbols. For a modern Western person, there is generally nothing more intensely personal than one's own name. But as our cross-societal comparisons show, there is nothing inherent or natural in identifying oneself and others as a unique individual; it is the ongoing flow of everyday name-addressing rituals that keep up these identities both as to our selves and as to others.

Contributing to a similar level of prolonged personal membership identities are the everyday conversational rituals of personal narratives. The contents of this talk are such things as what one did that day, or stories about one's experiences from the past. Much of the exchange of friendly relationships is the willingness for both sides in turn to act as a sympathetic audience to these stories, and also to take one's turn on the stage and offer some narratives of one's own. We may think of this as a circulation of particularistic cultural capital, in contrast to the generalized cultural capital that is widely available and known to larger groups, who do not necessarily know each other as personal identities. No doubt, much of the content of talk in these personal narrations is "filler," material to fill up the time spent together so that there is something to talk about. These personal narratives do not have to be true, they need mainly to be dramatic, to blow up the little mishaps of everyday life into adventures or comedies, minor adversities into martyrdoms and local scandals, in order to become good raw material for the dramatic performances on the conversational stage that make for a lively and engrossing conversation. What Goffman noted about staged performances in general holds here for conversational ritual in particular: the audience enters into the spirit of the performance by not questioning it but by taking it in a situational mood, whatever will build up the highest level of momentary collective effervescence. Successful conversations of this sort generate and cement social ties, which by the particularistic nature of their contents are ties into particular social relationships.

Sociable talk also typically involves talking about third persons, especially those known to the participants. These narratives expand the dramatic material that can be used for enhancing the success of the conversational ritual. They have a further effect, structurally very important for the prolongation of group membership: these third-person narrations, or gossip, circulate the identities of individuals within the network of those who talk to each other (Fuchs 1995). Both individual names and narratives about them are symbols, which get charged up with significance through the amount of momentary effervescence of the conversations in which they play a part.

Thus a person can become a symbol both by direct observation—the way a politician, a religious leader, or a sports figure can become an emblem for those who have seen this person in the focus of a collective ritual—and by indirect observation, by having stories and qualities attached to that person's name insofar as they are subjects for lively conversations. Whether they are positive or negative does not matter so much as the intensity with which the name figures in these conversational dramas. The accuracy of these accounts is a minor consideration in successful conversational ritual, and the further the network goes from the source, the less of a consideration it becomes at all.

This pattern applies not only to the famous, widespread reputations known among persons anonymous to each other, but also to persons whose reputations are merely local, confined to particular networks of persons who have personal links with the person being gossiped about. In the latter case, the circulation of reputation plays back into face-to-face encounters; when you meet someone of whom you have heard stories or descriptions, or who has heard about you, you are now participants in a conversation that has an additional layer of depth. It is not just the immediate symbol-repertoire that each person has to talk about with the other that determines what will be said and what kind of relationship will be enacted, but the halo or penumbra of reputation that each has in the mind of the other figures into what conversational moves will be made and how those moves are interpreted.

I have couched the analysis in terms of sociable conversations, in relationships that are friendly and casual. The same kinds of creation and prolongation of membership and identity goes on in more serious interactions, including the utilitarian encounters of business and professional life. Encounters in the world of work also have the structure of IRs, charging up cultural items with membership significance. These items include the communication that is part of the work itself, as well as work-related discussions that go on in backstage debriefing and strategizing, and that carry over into quasi-sociable shop talk. The cultural symbols thus given significance consist both in the occupational lore in a more general sense—the technical jargon that engineers use about their equipment, the financial shorthand of stockbrokers and investment bankers, the style of negotiating among business executives in a particular branch of industry—but also of the particular information that people in that network talk about. Entrée into and success within a particular occupational network is not only a matter of having the generalized cultural capital of that group—that which is known widely among persons who may not be acquainted with each other—but also of having particular knowledge of who did what, who has what track record, who has been connected to whom, "where the bodies are buried." The latter form of knowledge or particularized cultural capital or symbolic repertoire may well be the most important kind, especially for the dynamics of fluidly moving situations, such as business transactions where time is of the essence, or analogously for scientists or other intellectuals attempting to innovate on the cutting edge before someone else does so. Here too, as in the world of private sociability, symbolic reputations are amplified to higher levels in networks that have enough redundant social ties so that symbols circulate in at least some closed loops, reinforcing the significance of a symbol because it is heard from all sides, and probably exaggerated in the retelling.[25] What needs emphasizing is not simply that these are specialized languages or local knowledge, but that these are membership symbols that are effective to just the degree that they have an emotional loading. The concept of utilitarian communications at work might seem to rule out their having an emotional quality, but this is a mistake. It is precisely those business or professional encounters that have a special excitement, tension, or enthusiasm to them that turn those items of communication into charged symbols; they become "buzzwords" in the original, nonpejorative sense, items that carry a buzz of cutting-edge significance.

In sum, there are several distinctive ways in which symbols circulate and prolong group membership beyond ephemeral situations of emotional intensity. One is as objects that are in the focus of attention of emotionally entrained but otherwise anonymous crowds. The second is as symbols built up out of personal identities and narratives, in conversational rituals marking the tie between the conversationalists and the symbolic objects they are talking about.[26] These symbols generally operate in two quite different circuits of social relationships; typically, the symbols of audiences, fans, partisans, and followers circulate from one mass gathering to another, and tend to fade in the interim; the symbols of personal identities and reputations are the small change of social relationships (and of business relationships), generally of lesser momentary intensity than audience symbols but used so frequently and in self-reinforcing networks so as to permeate their participants' sense of reality.[27]

Both the generalized symbols of mass audiences and the particularized symbols of personal networks prolong the emotional loadings of IRs. They do so in differing time-patterns and subject to differing contingencies. Generalized mass-audience symbols are dependent upon the reassembling of big groups, and individual members of those groups usually have little initiative in whether the big assembly will come about or come off. And since these generalized symbols do not usually get a comparable recharging of their emotional level through the ordinary interactions of everyday life, they are prone to greater volatility. This is what characterizes political and religious movements; and insofar as there are generally shared economic symbols (a stock market index; the prestige of a particular hot-selling product), these too are subject to volatile swings in their collective significance, and hence in their social and economic value.[28] On the other hand, particularized symbols of individual identities and memberships in networks personally known to their participants have greater inertia. That does not mean they are fixed; identities and reputations are capable of changing, especially if the links among particular persons who make up a network change, and all the more so if the network shifts between more redundant and more sparsely linked forms. These changes in membership and reputation are especially important in the realm of professional and business relationships; indeed, it is just these shifts that make up a career.

The Creation of Solidarity Symbols in 9/11

The contrast between personal membership ties and impersonal symbols of anonymous crowds can be observed quite starkly in a single event: the destruction of the World Trade Center towers in the September 11, 2001 attacks. The case also shows the dynamic and emergent quality of symbols, the further layers in which they can be circulated, and the uses to which symbols can be put once they have been created. I base the analysis on "9/11," a documentary film consisting of live footage of firefighters and street crowds during the attack (Naudet and Naudet 2002).

Applying IR theory, it is apparent that for the anonymous crowds in and near the towers, the destroyed towers themselves did not become a symbol of group solidarity, but the firefighters became their symbol; whereas for the firefighters, the destroyed towers became their symbol. Let us see how this came about.

The video shows people in the streets in the moments after the first plane hit the towers and during their collapse. What was an unfocused crowd becomes a focused crowd, or set of crowds—not particularly dense, but comprising clusters of ten or twenty people visible at the same time in the film. The smoke draws their attention; they stare in the same direction, utter exclamations, align themselves more closely together. The early mood that they express is wonder, surprise, an increasing sense of shock. Aside from the shared focus, there is not much interaction or talk in the street crowds. From the lack of Goffmanian tie signs, it appears that the crowds are made up of strangers to each other, drawn together only by the shared event. At first, they are passive spectators. Later, as debris fills the air and the buildings begin to fall, they run away; their action spreads the crowds out even more; we see individuals here and there darting down the street. Many of those who are nearest to the towers, or who had come out of the buildings, display expressions of being stunned.

For the most part, the video does not show strongly expressed and socially communicated emotion. There are not even very frequent expressions of fear. There are some scenes of workers inside one of the towers coming down from the stairs above and passing through the upper lobby on their way outside; they appear quiet and orderly, not panicking, scrambling, or pushing. It appears here that the very orderliness of the crowd has set the contagious mood, and keeps down the experience of fear. (This would follow from William James's theory of emotions: running away makes one afraid; and a crowd running will make its members even more afraid.)



Figure 2.6 NY City firefighter in process of becoming hero symbol (September 14, 2001).



Figure 2.7 Street crowd running from World Trade Center area as first tower collapses (September 11, 2001).

The only expressions of fear visible on the film are occasionally by persons in the street crowd. Looking at these instances in detail we see that these are physically isolated individuals, not those who are close together and talking to each other, but bodily separated on the fringes or in sparser parts of the crowd on the street.

Compare the firefighters, whom we see during their prior routine in the firehouse, in vehicles on the way to the towers, inside the tower lobby, and finally upon returning to the firehouse afterward. The firefighters show no overt expression of fear on the film. Nor do they show any expression of "courage" as a special emotion; this is just an interpretation placed on their behavior after the fact. The firefighters follow the normal routine of doing their job. This is what enables them to be unafraid, since it gives them something to do other than to flee; and they are doing it collectively. It is also the case that they have no sense, at least at first, that anything unusually dangerous is happening; i.e., there is a special difficulty in that the fire is seventy stories high in a building in which the elevators are not working and so they have to climb stairs to get to the fire. But this is their normal job, to get to a fire and put it out. There is no indication at the command post (which is where most of the firefighters on the video are shown) that anyone thinks there is danger of the building collapsing, since the fire is far above. Even after lights go out, electricity is off, debris starts falling, and the commanders order firefighters to evacuate, the commanders still act calmly looking for exits, not hurrying, not panicking.

One might argue that the firefighters are trained, and experienced, at doing this sort of thing—confronting fires in big buildings; occasionally there must be danger of a building collapsing, but that seems to be a remote issue not much considered. There is presumably a routine concern over becoming burned or asphyxiated, but these are normal dangers, and the sheer size of the World Trade Center building does not add anything different to their subjective experience. But it should be emphasized that "training" per se does not guarantee performance in situations of stress; there is considerable evidence that police and army training does not prevent a large proportion of soldiers from freezing up in combat, or police officers from firing wildly and incompetently (Keegan 1977; Collins forthcoming).

"Training" is not simply a matter of learning; it is above all establishing identity with the group who carry out their skills collectively. Maintaining collective identity is an ongoing activity, an IR chain; and it is this that we see in the video of the firefighters. The "courage" that outsiders interpet the firefighters as having is a version of Chambliss's (1989) "mundanity of excellence"—the sense that members of an elite occupation have that their situation, for themselves if not for outsiders, is a routine one, where they can accomplish what others cannot, by focusing carefully on their skills and not being distracted by anything else. In this case, they are not being distracted by fear; their collective focus and their routine excludes it from the center of their experience. IR theory adds that the mundanity of excellence is based on group participation, collective focus and mood, keeping each other calm and focused on the routine task. Doing one's job collectively under stress is the result, and it feeds back into their group identity and solidarity.

The video shows considerable indications of solidarity among the firefighters both before and after the attack. Prior to going out to the towers, the filmmakers had filmed the group's routine for a month. They had concentrated on the induction of a new, probationary firefighter into the group, who goes through mild hazing rituals such as doing the scut-work of the fire station, and who is given encouragement by experienced firefighters as they look forward to his real initiation when he would take part in his first big building fire. The video also shows group solidarity at the end of the day, when firefighters come back to the station, hug each other, greeting each other warmly for having survived and returned. From subsequent footage we see that the firefighters treat the stationhouse as their home; this is where they prefer to gather after the disaster, rather than individually with their families.

The contrast between the firefighters and the street crowds shows a highly focused, high-solidarity group drawing emotional strength—not blatant enthusiasm, but a quiet form of EE—from going on together with a difficult task; while less focused, low-solidarity crowds show shock, and in the thinnest parts of the crowd, fear. The solidarity that the firefighters already have, and that they recycle and increase through their experience of working together in the disaster, is just what is lacking among the crowds in the streets, the latter have no prior identity, only the momentary focus on the building they see on fire, and later on, collapsing. They lack social strong support, and lack anything to do that has ongoing collective significance.

Nevertheless the crowd has many of the ingredients of a natural IR: bodily assembly, mutual focus of attention, shared mood. Why don't individuals in the crowd transform the shared shock and fear into solidarity? Rituals are emotion transformers, and can turn negative emotions into positive ones. The members of the crowd are all focused on the towers, which they see burning and collapsing; why don't the towers become a symbol of membership? The towers represent a very negative experience, but that in itself is not a bar to becoming a group symbol. The symbol of Christianity, the cross, is an emblem of an extremely negative event, a crucifixion; it is a symbol of undergoing suffering as a form of ritual consecration and emerging through it strengthened and triumphant. In fact something like this emerges from the 9/11 disaster, too, with the great upsurge of national solidarity in the following days and months. The image of the towers burning and collapsing is an ephemeral event in time, but it was recorded and repetitively displayed on television and in news photos during the subsequent hours and days. The image was available to become transformed into a symbol, but it was not—at least not for the crowd of witnesses, both those nearby and those further away who witnessed it through the mass media.

Structurally, the street crowds had no way to reassemble, to bring itself back together as a group. They had no identity as a group, except as those who were eyewitnesses to the disaster. But this itself was a group with vague boundaries, made up of those in the towers themselves, those nearby on the streets experiencing different degrees of awareness of what was going on, and shading into those who were watching or hearing about the events on the mass media or by hearsay as they unfolded. This group never crystallized an identity. What did crystallize was the dual identities of "New Yorkers"—an encompassing membership of everyone in the city, even though the vast majority were no more closely involved in the disaster than people outside the city; and "Americans," as the national unit who was the target of the attack. Thus during the coming days and weeks people began to display symbols combining those two identities: hats, shirts, and other emblems of New York, and American flags. Above all, what tied together these symbols, was the main emergent symbol of the event: the firefighters, as emblems of solidarity and courage.

The video shows, however, that the firefighters do not see themselves in the same light as the crowds of spectators, and later admirers. In the firefighters' self-perception, they have failed: they did not reach the fire, nor put it out, nor save anyone from the fire. They have renewed their solidarity through their greetings to each other when they arrived back at the station, but there is no feeling of triumph. The collapsed buildings are a strong focus of attention for them; a negative symbol that draws them back. They display a strong desire to go back to the site and start digging through rubble for survivors; a need to feel that they have accomplished something. They are affirming their identity as the group that worked through the disaster, in a symbolic way taking possession of the disaster.

The digging through the ruins is to a considerable extent a ritualistic action. Given the scope of the damage, it is extremely unlikely that anyone will be found alive, and no one is. Nevertheless it is an obsession to be there, and to go through the motions, the action itself keeping hope alive. The video shows their collective focus while digging in rubble, heightened at moments when they cry "quiet!" and pass along the cry; ostensibly this is in order to listen for possible victims, but it has the effect of focusing the attention of the group, giving themselves more collective energy. They pass the buckets of rubble rapidly at first, but in subsequent clips they are working more slowly. The initial emotion gradually wears off. Nevertheless, seven-and-a-half weeks later (New York Times, Nov. 3, 2001) when in a more realistic and utilitarian attitude, the mayor's office declares the site closed to any further spontaneous, voluntary action by the firefighters so that it can be cleared by heavy equipment, there are emotional fights that take place between firefighters and the police attempting to enforce the closure order. The firefighters treat the site as a sacred place that belongs to them, and react with outrage that they are being excluded from it.

Two kinds of ritualistic actions go on in the 9/11 event, and one plays into and becomes the symbolic material for the other. The firefighters already have ritual solidarity and group identity; but they have suffered losses to their ranks, and perhaps even more, to their sense of professional pride; hence they seize upon the demolished buildings as a symbolic place to affirm their collective participation.



Figure 2.8 NY firefighters struggle with police over access to WTC site. Firefighters wear full paraphernalia for symbolic effect, although salvage work had previously been done in casual work dress (November 2, 2001).

Their ritual is to go back to the demolition site and look for dead bodies; since the site implicitly belongs to them alone—they are the only ones who are allowed to be there—it strongly affirms their identity as exclusively at the core of the event, and at the center of its emotions.

The passive crowd of witnesses, nearby and more remote, have no strongly organized basis for identity; but their attention is drawn from the initial focus, the buildings, to the firefighters and their symbolic activity. In the hours and early days after the collapse, coming back from digging, the firefighters are greeted by crowds lining the streets waving American flags. These are the images picked up by the media and broadcast widely, adopted nation-wide as symbols. On the video, the firefighters say they don't feel like heroes—since they haven't done anything, haven't accomplished anything, in fact have failed to do their job. From the inside, in their subjective experience, they are not symbols for themselves; what they see as a symbol is something outside themselves, their collapsed towers.[29]

Occupying another layer of social reality is the experience of the spectators. In seizing on firefighters as heroes, the crowd is focusing on the persons with the most EE, confidence, and purpose; they make them emblems of their own collective solidarity in the face of the disaster; and they participate with them by cheering them. They also associate the several emblems together: American flags, New York City emblems,[30] and firefighters. These symbols are repeatedly brought together over the coming weeks and months, as large-scale ritual gatherings are enacted: at sporting events, music concerts, as well as political assemblies. At this point, the symbols are circulating in a chain of self-reinforcing IRs; the presence of symbols charged up with emotion, fresh in memory, motivates and facilitates creating these new ceremonial gatherings; and the renewal of emotion by the crowd's focus of attention at those ceremonies charges the symbols again, making them ready for the next round of use.

These video recordings, together with subsequent reporting of events, document the successive layers of short-term and long-term effects of IRs. There is the raw experience, which we have seen through two vantage-points, the perspective of the onlooking crowds and that of the firefighters called into action. Next comes the transformation of those experiences into symbols; here the different kinds of participants choose different aspects of what they witness to make into emblems of emotional remembrance and group solidarity. The first of these is momentary, situational intersubjectivity; the second is the prolongation and re-creation of experience on another order, as symbolically crystallized intersubjectivity. Yet more temporally remote, and more remote, too, in the kinds of social networks involved, is a second order of circulation of newly created symbols among persons who are far away from the initial experiences. Further out in time, the reflexive use of symbols becomes more contrived, more overlaid with the practical contingencies of staging ceremonies, increasingly entwined with the politics of self-display and factional advantage as the new symbols sediment onto the layer of old symbols already in normal social routine. In this larger context of use, the emotional intensity that the symbols had while fresh begins to cool, their life dependent, like all symbols, on the intensity of the gatherings in which they will again be invoked.

Rules for Unraveling Symbols

The world is full of symbols. Some are our own, meaningful to ourselves in one degree or another. Some are markers of other groups, sharply visible where they mark boundaries against enemies or distrusted outsiders, or exclusions upward or downward in felt rank. Others are only episodically or dimly perceived. We are surrounded by a vast spectrum of symbols and group identities, some living, some dying or dead; some are living but their significances are invisible to us in our particular locations, since we are not close enough to feel what they convey.

It is a fallacy to take symbols at face value, as if we can read their meaning from what participants say they mean. It is as naïve as a child who thinks that "How are you?" means a request for information about their health; or an awkward teenager who treats "How are things going?" as calling for a simple reassurance instead of as a ploy to find a topic to chat about. We are in much the same position if we treat religious symbols as if they were a self-sufficient explanation of what people who invoke them do.

The tribes of the Baliem valley of highland New Guinea say they will not fight at night because spirits of the dead are out after dark, and so they must stay in their huts (Garner 1962). But this is hardly an adequate explanation in the context of the tribe's normal routine. The tribes, engaged in endless feuding with their neighbors in raids and set-piece battles at their frontier, limit the amount of fighting in many ways. They settle for one death or serious injury at a time, which suffices to end the battle and start off into a round of ceremonies in the villages. Even when no one is hurt, they take tacitly agreed upon rest breaks during a day of battle; they call off a battle when it starts to rain, in order not to spoil their war make-up; they do not attack during days when the enemy is carrying on a funeral or a victory celebration. The spirits of the dead that are invoked in explanation of why they do not fight at night are part of a larger routine of agreements and justifications that limit most of their fighting to particular times and places. The gatherings of the tribes to fight one another are the most intense and most important membership rituals of the group, and it is from and around this that other symbolic representations are formed and sustained. The spirits who are supposed to be out at night occupy a similar part of the symbolic universe, as does the spirit of the last dead person to be killed by the enemy, whose restlessness is regarded within the tribal culture as impelling the warriors to go back to the battlefield for revenge. More simply put: their battles are chained together as a series of rituals reaffirming membership through enmity; their religious symbols are reminders of the emotions felt during each battle, and especially in their high points where someone is killed, which operate to reinvoke the next ritual in the chain.

Contemporary evidence confirms the dependence of religious beliefs upon social interaction (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Persons who join religious cults typically are not to any great extent acquainted with, nor committed to, the beliefs of the cult before they join it. They are initially attracted to the cult because they are brought by friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Their belief grows as they take part in the cult activities. In mainstream churches as well, those who have the strongest adherence to its doctrines are those who have the most personal friends who are also members; social ties brings ritual participation, and this brings belief. And those without close ties in a cult or church tend to drop out, and their belief fades away.

To invoke the content of an item of culture gives us a description of some cognitive aspects of a chain of social situations. The cultural framing or native justification of the action is at best an ad hoc explanation of it. Why do they do it? Because they say X; or because that is the way that people do things in X part of the world. This may be on the way to an explanation, but it is no final resting place for a sociological theory.

In support of a cultural approach, Garfinkel's (1967) statement is often quoted, that the person is not a "judgmental dope." If this is taken to mean that the person is not simply pushed around by shared cultural rules, that is accurate enough. But if it is set forth as a claim that persons are aware of the sources of their own behavior, or even their own thoughts and emotions, it is surely wrong. We operate through an emotional magnetism toward and repulsion from particular thoughts and situations in the flow of everyday life; we are seldom reflective about this, and are often grossly inaccurate in our assessments when we are reflective.

Social action has a very large unconscious component. It is unconscious precisely because by focusing our attention upon a collective object of action, or upon symbols derived from it, our attention is defocused from the social process in which we are entrained while doing so. To be sure, on special occasions we may move into the observer mode, and make an object of attention out of the very social action that we were once unreflectively embedded in. But this puts us into a different situation, that of the second-order observer, where we are no longer an actor.[31] Action itself always reduces reflexivity, and induces a belief in the symbols and symbolically framed objects that fill out attention at that moment.

Thus I conclude with some rules for unraveling symbols. Sociological research works best if we can start with interaction rituals and move forward, witnessing how the intensity and focus of the interaction generates symbols to be used in subsequent interactions. But there are times when we are confronted with the symbol already made. How are we to go about interpreting its social meaning?

To begin, judge how intensely symbolic the item is. Is it treated with respect, as a sacred object, as a realm apart from ordinary life? Is it given a spatially separate zone, a special physical location that is approached only with care? Are there special qualifications as to who can approach, and who is excluded? Is it emotionally and vehemently and self-righteously defended? Conversely, does it attract vehement attackers, also self-righteous in their attacks? Is it treated as an item of more than personal value, proclaimed as a value that is or ought to be widely shared? Is it regarded as incommensurate with merely utilitarian values? Such claims to far-reaching value are equally characteristic of positive and negative symbols; especially intensely charged are those symbols that are positive to some persons, negative to others.

Our analysis is usually attracted to those symbols most highly charged in these respects. But we may notice as well what appear to be bygone symbols, neglected sacred places, vestiges of once-frequented emblems now in decay, like monuments in public parks covered with pigeon droppings, or defaced with graffiti, an overlay of one emblem upon another.

Next, reconstruct as best as possible what IRs have surrounded that emblem. Who assembled, in what numbers, with what frequency or schedule? What emotions were expressed, what activities brought a focus of attention, what intensity of collective effervescence was generated? To what degree were individual participants charged with emotional energy; and what did it motivate them to do? What were the barriers to participation: who was divided by the ritual from whom? Who was thereby ranked over whom?

We attempt to put together a history of ritual participation around the symbols that we see surviving today, or sticking up in the distance from the sands of social interaction where we do not ordinarily tread. Sometimes this becomes an ideal for historical reconstruction; if need be, a conjectural history, since even a hypothetical scheme of who did what ritual action is a better guide to conceptualizing the meaning of symbols than taking those symbols as freestanding and unaffected by social process. For the most part, except when dealing with remote history, we are in a better situation as researchers, and the rules for unraveling symbols becomes a guide to a research program.

Further, our task does not end at reconstructing those primal moments when the ritual was in full blast, at its most intense. We are concerned too with tracing the secondary circulation of symbols. Who uses these emblems (including their verbal representations and other emblems-of-emblems) for other interactional situations beyond the actual gathering of the group of ritual participants? What are the range of situations in which these symbols circulate? Do they become topics for rounds of conversation with acquaintances; for injection into other public ceremonial; for debate with opponents of those ritual practices? We have, in short, a primary realm of living rituals and the symbols that they charge with significance; and a secondary realm where those symbols become circulated in the IRs that make up the surrounding social networks, whether taken as positive or negative emblems, or just treated reflexively as items of news, gossip, reputation. They become representations of groups who are somewhere else, at a distance.

Finally, there is a further, third order in which symbols circulate: what individuals do with them when they are alone, outside the presence of other people. Do they physically carry the symbols around with them, or access them alone, like a religious person carrying an emblem or visiting a shrine? The most intimate level of circulation is inside individuals' minds, in the inner conversations that make up thinking, in the fantasies that make up the inner self. This third order of symbolic circulation is even harder to get at than the second order; but we may as well list it here, since I am laying out a maximal program, an ideal for the sociology of rituals and symbolic life to aim at even if it may be largely unattainable for the present state of research. We might as well say that this is a sociology to dream about, and indeed, it encompasses a sociology of dreams. For if dreams take place in images, those images are internalized or synthesized out of pieces internalized from the circulation of symbols on the first and second orders of social interaction, and from the thinking that takes place in the waking mind. Let us go all the way in our ambitions: a complete sociology of the circulation of symbols would be a sociology of humans' inner lives as well as their external lives. The research task is to move forward, from what evidence we have of where charged up symbols exist publically, to fill in more and more of the histories of how they have been formed and circulated.

To end with a brief illustration: In late-twentieth-century America, guns in the hands of civilians became an object of widespread public attention. Many of their proponents treat guns in just the way that we would consider, under the above criteria, as symbolic objects—that is, as a gun cult. Their opponents too treat them as abnormally negative, as emblems of evil. From either side, guns are treated with special respect, given as special status. They occupy distinctive places: on gun racks in trucks, in display cases in homes. The very efforts of opponents to keep them locked up, fitted with trigger guards, kept apart from children, have the effect of further emphasizing their special character and the special status of those who have access to them. To be sure, these restrictions and the physical segregation of guns are often consciously motivated in utilitarian terms, as safety practices; but utilitarian justifications often overlay symbolic practices and reinforce rather than undermine them.

Considerable discourse is devoted to justifications of guns, and to critiques of those justifications. Guns are justified because it is the constitutional right of Americans to possess guns; because they are part of the American heritage of liberty, and represent a stand against the encroaching power of the government; because they are used for sport shooting and hunting; because they are weapons of defense against criminals, a bolster to the forces of good against the already well-armed forces of evil. The sociologist of rituals does not take these arguments at face value. Aside from various inconsistencies in the arguments and practices themselves,[32] it is not a sociological explanation of behavior to invoke the reasons given, especially on occasions of public justification and debate over already existing practices. Instead we should ask, Why do particular people come to believe in these reasons, or rather, in what circumstances do they invoke them? Did they have these beliefs first and as the result of so believing did they decide that they should acquire guns? Or did they acquire the guns first—if religious practices are any clue, because of induction from friends and acquaintances who already had guns—and then acquired the verbal justifications?

Then we must ask, What is it that possessors of guns do? Is their activity intensely ritualistic enough so that we might call them members of the gun cult (or indeed, of different kinds of gun cults)? Are guns put in the center of attention of group assemblies, surrounded with a shared mood? Here we may investigate the primary ritual that goes on at gun shows, firing ranges, gun dealers' shops. Examine the ritualistic aspects of hunting, with special traditions and procedures of the male outdoors-expedition. Intermediate on a continuum of group exclusiveness and identification would be gun theme parks, fantasy exercises with pseudo-weapons (such as paintball fighting ranges). Most intensely cultist of all are paramilitary groups and their war exercises.

We would want to study, too, the second-order circulation of gun symbols. On the most banal level: When do people talk about guns, and with whom?[33] Is there a sharp disjunction in the form of talk between those who possess guns (i.e., those who take part in primary gun rituals) and those who do not? Further out in the symbolic circulation are the ways in which emblematic representations of guns are publicized in the news, in statements of politicians, and, of course, in the mass media of entertainment.[34] All these can recirculate back into the immediate conversational circles of people who have guns, shaping or reinforcing their emotional resonances with their weapons. In general, we might expect that the existence of a vehement public discourse, the political controversy pro and con guns, will intensify the boundaries; outside opposition would encourage a stronger sense of membership inside the gun cult, perhaps making some old-fashioned hunters into more intensely ritualistic supporters of guns as symbolic emblems.[35]

Finally, there is the third level of circulation of symbols, their use by individuals privately, alone. Some of this is visible in ritualistic action, insofar as there are actual objects that can be manipulated: guns that people spend their time holding, taking apart, cleaning and reassembling, looking at and admiring. Many individuals who are intensely involved with guns spend much of their leisure time reloading ammunition; a large part of the display at gun shows are equipment and supplies for reloading spent shells with live charges. There is some utilitarian element in this, insofar as reloading one's own ammunition is cheaper than buying it fresh; but the long hours that gun cultists spend on reloading ammunition suggests that this is a ritualistic affirmation of their membership, something like a member of a religious cult engaging in private prayer, in actual physical contact with the sacred objects, like fingering the beads of a rosary.

On the most intimate level of symbolic circulation, we would like to know who thinks about guns, and in what kinds of inner conversations, or imaginery situations? In what chains of interactions are these thinking-occasions embedded? And what are the consequences of these inner thoughts and fantasy scenarios? For which people—for which kinds of IR chains—do gun thoughts remain inward and harmless; and for which chains of inner and outer interactions do gun symbols reemerge into action? An extreme instance would be the brooding of the teenager who takes the gun to school to avenge an insult, acting out the practices that he has gone through before on the firing range.

These are difficult questions to research, but from the perspective of IR theory, not impossible ones. Thoughts are internalized from the symbols of first-order and second-order rituals; and they are charged up with emotional energy from what happens at each moment of flow in that chain that makes up an individual personality. A sociology of thinking is just another component problem, if an especially difficult one, for a sociology of IR chains.

Much of the symbolic experience of everyday life is not so dramatic as the examples I have sketched here. But our aim throughout is the same: to keep the action of IRs in the center of analysis, whether we can observe it easily, or whether we must reconstruct it from any and all available clues. We will see how this is done in subsequent chapters, including the formation of sex symbols in chapter 6, and of tobacco symbols in chapter 8, where we can observe not only the creation of symbolic practices, but their rise and fall.

Chapter 3

EMOTIONAL ENERGY AND THE TRANSIENT EMOTIONS

EMOTION IS A central ingredient and outcome of IRs. It is time now to examine emotions more closely. Among other benefits of doing so is to highlight the contribution that sociology of emotions makes to macro-sociological theory. And we shall see, via a circuitous route, the emotion-laden view of macro-sociological structure and hence of the place of individuals within it will give us some leads for a sociological theory of differences in personality.

Emotion implicitly occupies a crucial position in general sociological theory. As we attempt to make sociological concepts more precise and more empirically grounded, we find that many of the most important rest to a considerable extent upon emotional processes. Durkheim raised the central question of sociology: What holds society together? His answer is the mechanisms that produce moral solidarity; and these mechanisms, I have argued, do so by focusing, intensifying, and transforming emotions. Parsonian sociology, which took the most reified, agentless side of Durkheim, put the argument in equivalent terms: society is held together by values. But values, to the extent that they exist (and leaving open the issue of how far they are shared, and under what conditions), are cognitions infused with emotion. On the conflict side of sociological theory, Weber's central concepts also imply emotion: the legitimacy that underlies stable power, the status group ranking by which stratification permeates everyday life, the religious worldviews that motivated some crucial periods of economic action. When we attempt to translate any of these concepts into observables, it is apparent that we are dealing with particular kinds of emotions. Marx and Engels are perhaps furthest away from theorizing about emotional processes: in their analysis, everything is structural (even alienation, which for Marx is an ontological relationship, not a psychological one). But it is apparent that in Marxian analyses of class mobilization and class conflict, emotion must play a part—whether it is the mutual distrust within fragmented classes that keeps them from mobilizing, or the solidarity that dominant classes have and that oppressed classes acquire only in revolutionary situations. In these respects, Marx and Engels's conflict theory comes close to a dynamic version of Durkheim's themes.

The sociology of emotions thus bears upon the central questions of sociology. What holds a society together—the "glue" of solidarity—and what mobilizes conflict—the energy of mobilized groups—are emotions; so is what operates to uphold stratification—hierarchical feelings, whether dominant, subservient, or resentful. If we can explain the conditions that cause people to feel these kinds of emotions, we will have a major part of a core sociological theory. There is, of course, a structural part of such a theory, and a cognitive part; but the emotional part gives us something essential for a realistic theory—its dynamics.[1]

These classic sociological theories implicitly concern emotions, but they do not usually refer to them explicitly. This is because our theories have a macro-primacy, or at least deal with social life at a level of considerable abstraction and aggregation. We are told of something called "legitimacy," and of "values," floating somewhere in a conceptual sky beyond the heads of real people in ordinary situations. If we attempt a micro-translation of sociology—not a micro-reduction, but a grounding of macro-concepts in real interactions across the macro-dimensions of time and space—we are led to see the importance of emotional processes. In other words, the micro-translation of macro-concepts yields emotion.

For the most part, this is not what most micro-theories have stressed. Mead and symbolic interactionism emphasize process, emergence, and cognition; Schutz and phenomenology emphasize routine and cognition; exchange theory emphasizes behaviors and payoffs; expectation states theory again stresses cognition. Emotion of course could be brought into these theories, but it is central to none of them.[2] On the other hand, there is a burgeoning field of sociology of emotions, but until recently it has been largely treated as a specialized enclave, cut off from general issues of sociology.[3] But several prominent versions of microsociology do not have to be pressed very far to yield the central micro-dynamics of emotion as a social process—a process that will serve to unpack the macro-sociological issues mentioned at the outset.

One of these is Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. At first sight, it seems to be pitched on a different level. With its concern for the construction of mundane reality, and its heavy use of phenomenological abstractions, it seems to be essentially a cognitive theory. Cicourel (1973) even called his own version "Cognitive Sociology." Nevertheless, I want to suggest that ethnomethodology reveals emotion at its core. Garfinkel's most important contribution is to show that humans have intrinsically limited cognitive capabilities, and that they construct mundane social order by consistently using practices to *avoid* recognizing how arbitrarily social order is actually put together. We keep up conventions, not because we believe in them, but because we studiously avoid questioning them. Garfinkel demonstrated this most dramatically in his breaching experiments, in which he forced people into situations that caused them to recognize indexicality (i.e., that they rely on tacit acceptance of what things mean contextually) and reflexivity (that there are infinite regresses of justifying one's interpretations). Interestingly enough, the reactions of his subjects were always intensely emotional. Usually it was an emotional outburst: becoming nervous and jittery, shaken, displaying anxiety and sometimes shock (Garfinkel 1967, 44, 221–26) Sometimes it was depression, bewilderment, or anger at having been put in a situation where they constructed a reality they later discovered to be false. In short, when people have to recognize that they are tacitly constructing their social worlds, and in an arbitrary and conventional way, rather than simply reacting to a world that is objectively there, they show intense negative emotions.

Garfinkel's breaching experiments reveal something very much like Durkheim's world. In this case, conventional social reality is a sacred object. Garfinkel's experiments, violating the sacred object, call forth the same effects as violating a ritual taboo would have for a tribal member, desecrating the Bible for a Christian, or defaming the flag for a patriot. In Durkheim's theory, moral sentiments attach to sacred objects. When they are violated, this positive sentiment of moral solidarity turns negative, into righteous anger directed against the culprit. Just so in Garfinkel's experiments: there is outrage against the violator of everyday cognitive conventions. Garfinkel's strategy parallels Durkheim's: to show the conditions that uphold a social fact by revealing the opposition that occurs when it is broken. Durkheim used suicide and crime as means of highlighting the social solidarity that is their opposite; Garfinkel extended the method to reality-construction as a whole.

Ethnomethodology's lack of explicit focus on emotions is misleading. One could well say that everyday life reality-construction is an emotional process, and that the emotions that uphold reality come forth in intense form when the social reality is broken. Furthermore, Garfinkel has shown that human cognition is limited; social order cannot be based on rational, conscious agreement. Durkheim (1893/1964) argued the same, but in the context of criticizing utilitarianism. If cognition does not hold society together, then, what does? Garfinkel tends to leave this on the level of cognitive practices (mostly borrowed from Schutz); but it is a peculiar form of cognition—cognitive practices for how to get by without too much cognition. Ethnomethodology seems to have a mysterious x-factor underlying social order, which the very notion of indexicality prohibits us from probing. But let us take the plunge: leave the cognitive plane, and recognize the x-factor as emotion.

Interaction ritual theory gives the most fine-grained picture of how emotions are transformed in the process of interaction: rituals begin with emotional ingredients (which may be emotions of all sorts); they intensify emotions into the shared excitement that Durkheim called "collective effervescence"; and they produce other sorts of emotions as outcomes (especially moral solidarity, but also sometimes aggressive emotions such as anger). This puts us in a position to use the flow of emotions across situations as the crucial item in the micro-to-micro linkage that concatenates into macro patterns. The most important of these patterns of IR chains is what from a macro viewpoint appears as stratification. Social order is produced on the micro level: that is to say, all over the map, in transient situations and local groups, which may well be stratified by class, race, gender, or otherwise divided against each other. Interaction ritual produces pockets of moral solidarity, but variably and discontinuously throughout a population. Now if we trace individual human bodies moving from one encounter to the next, we see that the history of their chains—what sociologists have conventionally referred to as their positions in the social structure—is carried along in emotions and emotion-laden cognitions that become the ingredients for the upcoming encounter. And then as the IR does its work, it intensifies, transforms, or diminishes those emotional ingredients so that those human bodies come out of the situation charged with emotional outcomes, which in turn set up what will happen in their next situations.[4] In what follows, I will show that research on stratification gives us clues as to how emotional ingredients and outcomes are shaped. Stratification theory contributes to a theory of the distribution of varying emotions; and the microsociology of emotion contributes to the patterns of stratification.

DISRUPTIVE AND LONG-TERM EMOTIONS, OR DRAMATIC EMOTIONS AND EMOTIONAL ENERGY

A necessary first step is to widen our conception of emotion. Ordinary usage refers to emotions as experiences that are, for the most part, sudden and dramatic. "Don't be so emotional" is advice predicated on this conception. The famous emotions are the most dramatic ones: fear, terror, anger, embarrassment, joy, and so forth. Some people and some cultures are regarded as too "unemotional" (as in the late-twentieth-century disparagement of "WASP" culture). But both Goffman and

Garfinkel force us to see that there are also emotions that are undramatic; they are long-lasting, underlying tones or moods that permeate social life. Garfinkel's mundane reality, for example, is characterized by the feeling—I stress that this is a feeling rather than an explicit cognition—that "nothing out of the ordinary is happening here." This is an uninteresting emotion, from the point of view of the actor; but if Garfinkel is right, considerable work went into producing that feeling of ordinariness, and, into keeping ourselves from seeing that work itself. Mundane reality is a members' accomplishment.

In Goffman and Durkheim, the ordinary-life, long-lasting feelings are more apparent. These theories stress solidarity, feelings of membership, and in Goffman's case, feelings about one's self. These are, if everything goes well, smoothly persistent sentiments; though in some important cases they may have an "up" feeling tone, or a "down," depressed tone. Solidarity feelings, moral sentiment, the enthusiasm of pitching oneself into a situation, or being carried along by it, and, at the other end, depression, alienation, embarrassment—these are recognizably longer-lasting kinds of emotions. Garfinkelian mundanity is merely a generic emotional quality at the middle of the plus-minus scale.

My aim is not to enter into terminological controversy. It would be useless for us to define emotions in such a way that we can talk only about the dramatic, disruptive emotions. Whatever we call them, we must also be able to talk about the long-term emotional tones, even the ones that are so calm and smooth as not to be noticed. In theoretical terms, it is the long-lasting ones (that I discuss as emotional energy, EE) that are of greatest importance. But I will also attempt to show that the dramatic, short-term emotions are best explained against the backdrop of the long-term emotions.

There are four emotions that virtually all researchers agree are found in all societies, and that may be considered the primary emotions (for a summary of research, see Turner 2002, 68–79). These four are anger, fear, happiness, and sadness / disappointment. Mammals share with humans the primary emotions of fear and anger / assertiveness. In humans, these emotions have their physiological base in the amygdala, an evolutionarily primitive part of the brain. Happiness, however, is not based in a particular part of the brain, but is spread out, not only in the primitive amygdala, but in the cortical and subcortical areas, which are evolutionarily later; that is to say, happiness is physiologically generalized, across the major regions of the brain including those involved in human symbolic functioning. Similarly for sadness, which has no distinctive brain location; it operates physiologically through the failure of neurotransmitters and in the flow of hormones in the endocrine system.

Happiness and sadness can be expressed in a number of terms: joy, elation, enthusiasm, effervescence—in contrast to disappointment, dreariness, and depression. These are related to the basic psycho-physiological pattern that I am calling high and low emotional energy. From the point of view of IR theory, it is not surprising that these two emotions lack a specific location in the brain. They are distinctively human blends of emotion and cognition, implicating the entire workings of the cognitive regions of the brain. High and low EE come from the entrainment of communicative gestures and emotional rhythms that are distinctive to human intersubjectivity; from an individual viewpoint, they are tightly woven together into the human self. Thus what from a narrower viewpoint may be considered an expression of joy—as a momentary emotional experience—is carried over as a long-term mood of emotional energy, of varying duration and degree of intensity. EE gives energy, not just for physical activity (such as the demonstrative outbursts at moments of acute joy), but above all for taking the initiative in social interaction, putting enthusiasm into it, taking the lead in setting the level of emotional entrainment. Similarly, sadness or depression is a motivational force when it is a long-term mood, reducing the level of activity, not only bringing physical listlessness and withdrawal (at its extreme, the avoidance of being awake), but making social interaction passive, foot-dragging, perfunctory.

Emotional energy, in IR theory, is carried across situations by symbols that have been charged up by emotional situations. Thus EE is a central part of the arousal of symbols that humans use to talk and to think with. Here again, the findings of physiological research bolster IR theory: "joy" in the narrower sense of short-run experience, high EE in the larger sense of long-term mood, is not a specific part of the brain firing but an overall activity of the brain's cognitive and emotional functioning. Similarly, "sadness," taken more broadly and in the long-term as low EE, is an overall decline in the functioning of the entire neuro-endocrinological system. To say that symbols are carried on EE is not merely a metaphor. The physiology buttresses the sociology.[5]

Interaction Ritual as Emotion Transformer

The basic model of ritual interaction (IR) is spelled out in chapter 2 as the mutual-focus / emotional-entrainment model. Let us review all the places that emotions occur in the model.

One initiating ingredient is that participants share a common mood. It is unessential which emotion is present at the outset. The feelings may be anger, friendliness, enthusiasm, fear, sorrow, or many others. This model posits an emotional contagion among the persons present:

because they are focusing attention on the same thing and are aware of each other's focus, they become caught up in each other's emotions. As a result, the emotional mood becomes stronger and more dominant; competing feelings are driven out by the main group feeling. On the ultra-micro level, this happens by the process of rhythmic entrainment physiologically. That is to say, activities and emotions have their own micro-rhythm, a pace at which they take place. As the focus of interaction becomes progressively more attuned, the participants anticipate each other's rhythms, and thus become caught up "in the swing of things." Participants feel sadder in the course of a funeral, more humorous as part of a responsive audience at a comedy show, more convivial during the buildup of a party, more engrossed in a conversation as its rhythms become established. All these are versions of "collective effervescence"—even if that has a connotation of happy excitement, the more general condition is a high degree of absorption in emotional entrainment, whatever the emotion may be.

The outcome of a successful buildup of emotional coordination within an interaction ritual is to produce feelings of solidarity. The emotions that are ingredients of the IR are transient; the outcome however is a long-term emotion, the feelings of attachment to the group that was assembled at that time. Thus in the funeral ritual the short-term emotion was sadness, but the main "ritual work" of the funeral was producing (or restoring) group solidarity. The emotional ingredients of a party may be friendliness or humor; the long-term result is the feeling of status group membership.

I refer to these long-term outcomes as "emotional energy" (EE). It is a continuum, ranging from a high end of confidence, enthusiasm, good self-feelings; down through a middle range of bland normalcy; and to a low end of depression, lack of initiative, and negative self-feelings. Emotional energy is like the psychological concept of "drive," but it has a specifically social orientation. High emotional energy is a feeling of confidence and enthusiasm for social interaction. It is the personal side of having a great deal of Durkheimian ritual solidarity with a group. One gets pumped up with emotional strength from participating in the group's interaction. This makes one not only an enthusiastic supporter of the group, but also a leading figure in it. One feels good with the group, and is able to be an energy-leader, a person who stirs up contagious feelings when the group is together.

At the low end of the emotional energy continuum, the opposite is the case. Low emotional energy is a lack of Durkheimian solidarity. One is not attracted to the group; one is drained or depressed by it; one wants to avoid it. One does not have a good self in the group. And one is not attached to the group's purposes and symbols, but alienated from them.

This is not the way the term "emotion" is commonly used, and commonsense categories have difficulty in grasping that EE is emotion at all. Folk-categories usually point at emotions only when they are dramatic shifts, disruptions of the normal flow of social energy. We are particularly likely to overlook middle levels of EE, in which the flow of energy toward social situations allows everything to proceed normally and hence is taken for granted. But without this emotional energy flow, social interactions could not take place.

There are more differentiated variants of emotional energy as well, besides this up / down, high / low in solidarity and enthusiasm. We will see that there are two major dimensions of stratification (power and status) that produce specific qualities of emotional energy. But while we are considering the main, generic level of emotional energy, I will mention one more Durkheimian feature. Emotional energy is not just something that pumps up some individuals and depresses others. It also has a controlling quality from the group side. Emotional energy is also what Durkheim (1912/1954) called "moral sentiment": it includes feelings of what is right and wrong, moral and immoral. Persons who are full of emotional energy feel like good persons; they feel righteous about what they are doing. Persons with low emotional energy feel bad; though they do not necessarily interpret this feeling as guilt or evil (that would depend on the religious or other cultural cognitions available for labeling their feelings),[6] at a minimum they lack the feeling of being morally good persons that comes from enthusiastic participation in group rituals.

Feelings of moral solidarity generate specific acts of altruism and love; but there is also a negative side. As Durkheim pointed out, group solidarity makes individuals feel a desire to defend and honor the group. This solidarity feeling is typically focused on symbols, sacred objects (like a tribal totemic emblem, a holy scripture, a flag, a wedding ring). One shows respect for the group by participating in rituals venerating these symbolic objects; conversely, failure to respect them is a quick test of nonmembership in the group. Members of the ritual group are under especially strong pressure to continue to respect its sacred symbols. If they do not, the loyal group members feel shock and outrage: their righteousness turns automatically into righteous anger. In this way, ritual violations lead to persecution of heretics, scapegoats, and other outcasts. Such events bring out clearly yet another transformation of emotion by rituals: from specific initiating emotions to their intensification in collective effervescence; from collective effervescence to emotional energy carried in individuals' attachment to symbols; and from symbol-respect to righteous anger.

Detailed microsociological evidence of such emotional transformations is provided in the work of Scheff and others (Scheff 1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Samson 1997). Scheff's theoretical model builds also on Durkheim, but gives emphasis to the emotions experienced by individuals as touching their selves. For Scheff, intact social bonds (which, from the point of view of IR theory, are the result of carrying out a successful IR) give participants a feeling of pride; broken social bonds (an unsuccessful IR) results in a feeling of shame. Scheff and his collaborators examine social interactions in micro-detail by using video and audio recordings (largely from marriage counseling sessions, as well as from family interactions). Pride and shame are documented in the patterns of body alignment, eye gaze, speech hesitations or flow, loudness as well as overt expression of emotions. These data show the ups and downs of mutual focus and emotional entrainment on the second-to-second level.

Scheff goes on to point out that shame—the sense of broken social attunement—can either be immediately expressed and brought into the interaction as a topic; or it can be by-passed, repressed from conscious verbal attention. By-passed shame, he argues, is transformed into anger. This sets up a cycle of repeated failed interactions: for example, a married couple or parent and child may shame one another by breaking the attunement of interactions, but ignoring the shame; it thereby comes back in angry moves later in the same encounter, or in later encounters. Emotional dynamics recycle through the IR chain, since each episode of broken attunement generates more shame and more anger, which comes out in yet further patterns of interaction.

The negative effects of broken attunement can also be read in a comparative light, as a demonstration of the importance of attunement. Scheff shows that Durkheimian solidarity, operating on the micro-level of situational encounters, is highly attractive to individuals, and is experienced as pride, a favorable social self. The failure of solidarity, down to the minute aspects of coordinating mutual participation in a conversation, is felt as a deep uneasiness or affront, which Scheff refers to as a feeling of shame. In the Durkheimian model, violation of solidarity brings the reaction of righteous anger; this results in yet another highly ritualized interaction, a ritual of punishment. Durkheim's theory of crime (1895/1982) holds that punishment has the effect of reinforcing the group's commitment to its symbolic ideals, whether or not it is successful in deterring the violator from future transgressions. In Durkheim's view, punishing criminals is carried out not as a utilitarian act to manipulate the reinforcement schedule of the criminal, but as a ritual to maintain the group's solidarity. Scheff shows a similar dynamic operating through individual emotions: violation of solidarity brings anger; but the ritual expression of anger does not bring a return of solidarity in an alienated relationship, but rather leads to a further round of shame, anger, and ritual retaliation. Durkheim stops his analysis at the point where the punishment ritual takes place, and does not inquire what it does to the criminal's future behavior. Scheff extends the Durkheimian model into a chain, a vicious cycle.

But there is yet another way in which the emotions might be transformed. The failed interaction—the breakdown of solidarity that generates shame—can be followed by a different sequence. The failure itself can become the explicit focus of attention for an interaction in which the shamed or violated person gets to express his or her feeling of outrage directly to the perpetrator; if the latter acknowledges it, social solidarity is reestablished. This is the model of "restorative justice" implemented by the criminologist Braithwaite and others (Braithwaite 1989; Strang and Braithwaite 2000). Criminals are confronted at group meetings by their victims as well as other members of the social networks on both sides. These encounters have often been remarkably successful in reconciling the contending parties and in reducing repeated offenses. In terms of IR theory, these reconcilation circles work because they are high intensity IRs; all of the ingredients of figure 2.1 are present to a high degree. The mutual focus of attention is enforced, in part, because a police officer makes the offender pay attention to what the victim is expressing. The initiating emotional ingredient is high: the strong feelings of shame and anger; these feelings are shared and transformed, because all the persons in the circle get to express their opinions and feelings, and are swept into a common mood. The result is that the offender is shamed and ritually punished, but then is reintegrated into the group by participating in the group emotion of collective solidarity. Restorative justice groups are a striking example of how an IR can take any topic and any initiating emotion, and transform it into solidarity.

STRATIFIED INTERACTION RITUALS

The model of interaction rituals gives us the general process of interaction. IRs themselves are variable, insofar as rituals can be successful or unsuccessful, that is, in terms of how much focus and emotional contagion actually takes place, and hence how strongly the participants become attached to membership symbols. Because of these variations, interactions are stratified: some persons have the power to control others through rituals, while others are passive or resistant; some persons are in the center of attention, while others are marginalized or excluded. These are the two dimensions of power and status. As we shall see, just where people are located in such IRs is a major determinant of individual personalities.

Power Rituals

Power operates on the micro-interactional level by all those factors that bring together individuals who are unequal in their resources such that some give orders and others take orders, or more generally dominate the immediate interaction. This is an interaction ritual, insofar as it involves focusing attention on the same activity, and becoming aware of each other's involvement; and it has a shared emotional focus, which builds up as the ritual successfully proceeds. (As always, it is also possible that the ritual will not proceed successfully, that it will break down into avoidance or conflict; but let us deal with that variant separately.) The focus of a power ritual is the process of giving and taking orders itself. As many organizational studies show (especially the classic studies of informal work groups, many of which are used as an empirical base by Goffman [1959]), the order-takers do not necessarily carry out the bosses' orders; for that matter, the bosses do not always expect them to do so, or do not even know very clearly what they want done. But the crucial item of attention is showing respect for the order-giving process itself. Order-givers are in charge of a Goffmanian frontstage performance; they take the initiative in it, and if they are successful, they uphold the organizational chain of command. For this reason, the order-giving classes have a Goffmanian "frontstage personality"; they are attached to their frontstage roles. In Durkheimian terms, order-givers enhance or sustain their emotional energy by dominating during power rituals; and their ritual stance makes themselves loyal to the symbols of the organization. Their cognitions are of the "official" sort (see evidence summarized in Collins 1975, 62–87).[7]

People who are order-takers participate in these rituals in a different way. They are required to take part: whether by the raw coercion of military force (as in the army, a prison camp, or in feudal / aristocratic societies), or by the slightly more long-range coercion of a paycheck, fines and privileges, or chances of promotion wielded by bosses, teachers, and other persons in authority. The situation of taking orders, of being coerced, is in itself alienating. But persons subject to authority usually cannot evade it directly; their resistance usually occurs in situations when they are out of the direct surveillance of an order-giver—for example, in Goffmanian backstages where they criticize or ridicule their bosses, or in their normal work routine, in which they put in a perfunctory performance. In this sense, the order-taking classes have a "backstage personality."

Order-takers nevertheless are required to be present at order-giving rituals, and are required to give at least "ritualistic" assent at that moment. They and their boss mutually recognize each other's position, and who has the initiative in the ritual enactment. Power rituals thus are an asymmetrical variant on Durkheimian interaction rituals. There is a focus of attention, in this case, on the order-giving process. But the emotions that are invoked are constrained; there is a tone of respect, of going along with what the order-giver is demanding. The more coercive and extreme the power differential, the more emotional contagion there is. The medieval peasant, or the child who is being beaten, is forced to put him or herself into a state of compliance, of going along with what the master / parent / authority figure wants. It is a coerced focus of attention; the order-takers have to try hard to anticipate what the order-giver wants. Conversely, the order-giver uses coercion precisely to feel this mastery over the subordinates' minds, to "break their will."[8] Less coercive forms of order-giving have correspondingly less powerful ritual effects.

According to this theory, a successful order-giving ritual coerces a strong mutual focus of attention, and produces a situationally dominant emotional mood. But it is a heavily mixed emotion. Insofar as there is successful role-taking on both sides (and that is at the core of any successful ritual), the order-giver feels both his / her own sentiment of mastery, and the order-taker's feeling of weakness. On the other side, the order-taker has a mixture both of his / her own negative emotions—weakness/ depression, fear—and the mood of the dominator, which is strong emotional energy, dominance, anger. This explains why persons who are severely coerced (concentration camp inmates, marine corps recruits, beaten children) tend on one level to identify with the aggressor, and will enact the aggressor's role when possible in the future: they have an emotional complex of fear and anger, although situationally the fear side is dominant when they are taking orders. Conversely, order-givers who use extreme coercion acquire sado-masochistic personalities, because of the role-taking that goes on, thus blending anger / dominant feelings with a sense of the fear and passivity that they invoke in their subordinates. Thus the experience of momentary, situationally dominant emotions gives rise to long-term emotional styles, which is a large part of what is meant by the term "personality."

Power rituals produce complex emotions. Order-givers and order-takers share the dominance / anger / fear / passivity complex, but in very different proportions. Considered analytically, power rituals appear to be less effective than status rituals in generating large amounts of EE for dominant individuals; for subordinates, on the other hand, power rituals have serious emotional consequences. Exercising order-giving power increases one's EE insofar as it coincides with being in the center of attention of a situation of emotional entrainment rising to a palpable level of collective consciousness, which is what I call a status ritual: intense versions of this coincidence include military officers in combat, athletic coaches in the course of a contest, and somewhat less dramatic occasions in business and professional activities where there is a shared level of intensity among the participants. When the power ritual does not coincide with a status ritual, the person exercising power does not usually experience much EE gain, but at any rate it keeps the power holder from losing EE. Order-takers, however, generally lose EE, especially when the power ritual does not bring about a solidarity ritual.

Order-givers and order-takers also share an orientation toward dominant symbols, but again with a different blend of emotions. Order-givers identify themselves with the sacred objects of their organization; they respect these symbols as ideals, and are foremost in requiring other people to kowtow to them too. This is the conservatism of dominant classes, their self-appointed motivation as upholders of tradition, as restorers of law and order, and as righteous uprooters of heretics and deviants.

Order-takers, on the other hand, have an ambivalent attitude toward the dominant symbols. They are alienated from these symbols, and privately speak and think of them cynically, if they can get away with it.[9] Thus the modern working class is generally alienated from the business ideals of their bosses, and troops ridicule the rhetoric of their commanders. These symbols become, so to speak, negative sacred objects; when and if rebellion is possible, a suddenly liberated order-taking class wreaks vengeance on the symbols that they formerly had to bow to. (Kids without career chances in the academic system, who are forced order-takers in schools, thus tend toward acts of vandalism and other forms of "deviance" directed precisely at the "sacred objects" in whose name they are subordinated: see Cohen 1955.) It is also possible that order-takers hold the dominant symbols in a kind of superstitious respect; that is, if they are so tightly coerced that there is little opportunity for distancing themselves, no backstages into which they can retreat from their masters' surveillance, they are ritually forced to show respect for the sacred symbols at all times. Thus arises the "loyal retainer" mentality, found among long-time servants and peasants (and in a different context, among children who are strongly coerced by their parents, but also strongly controlled, and given no opportunities to rebel). The difference between these two kinds of order-takers' attitudes—alienated or subservient—depends primarily upon ecological structures: whether coercive control is continuous, or allows breaks into backstage privacy.

I have schematically outlined two polar types of participation in power rituals: order-giving and order-taking. But power rituals are a continuum. There are several kinds of positions in the middle between the extremes: persons who are order-transmitters, who take orders from someone above them and give orders to others below; these persons tend to blend the order-givers and order-takers culture into a narrow and rigid "bureaucratic personality."

There is another kind of midpoint between extremes: the person who neither gives nor takes orders, but who interacts with others in egalitarian exchanges. Analytically, this is a point within the power dimension where there is no power; hence the effects of order-giving and order-taking are both neutral. To explain what will happen at this neutral level of power, in "horizontal" relations among equals, we must turn to the status dimension.

Status Rituals

I am using the term "status" not as a general term for hierarchical differences of all kinds, but in a restricted sense of belonging or not belonging. At the micro-level of the encounter, status is the dimension of inclusion or exclusion. This, too, is a continuum; in everyday life, it appears as popularity versus unpopularity.

This dimension of membership versus nonmembership is analytical, in the sense that any individual (and any interaction) can be classified both as to where it stands in terms of status membership, and in terms of power inequality. That means that every interaction is producing both status membership effects and power effects, and every individual is subjected to both of these kinds of effects from one situation to the next. The power effects, however, might be zero, if there is no order-giving and order-taking in that situation; on the other hand, even extreme situations of order-giving also have a status dimension, insofar as the group is assembled and some membership feelings are being generated.

In what ways can individuals differ in their status group participation? Here we need to tease apart four aspects. Two of these are characteristics of the micro-situation itself and the individual's location within it. Two are meso-level characteristics of the IR chains: what happens over time as situations repeat.

First, on the micro-level, we must ask, How successful is the interaction ritual? In other words, does it build up to a high level of collective effervescence, a moderate level, or little emotional entrainment at all? The higher the ritual intensity, the more emotion is generated both in the immediate present and for long-term effects. *Ritual intensity* thus operates as a multiplier for the other three aspects of ritual effects.

Again, on the micro-level: Where is the individual located as the IR takes place? There is a continuum from persons who are on the fringes of the group, just barely members, barely participating; others nearer the core; at the center is the sociometric star, the person who is always most intensely involved in the ritual interaction. This person is the Durkheimian participant of the highest degree, and experiencing the strongest effects of ritual membership: emotional energy, moral solidarity, attachment to group symbols. At the other end, there is the Durkheimian nonmember, who receives no emotional energy, no moral solidarity, and no symbolic attachments. This is the dimension of *central / peripheral participation.*

Next, on the meso-level, as IRCs string situations together: What proportion of their time do people spend in each other's physical presence? This is the dimension of *social density.* At one end of the continuum individuals are always in other people's presence, under their eyesight and in their surveillance; this leads to a high degree of conformity, a feeling of social pressure on onself, but also a desire to make other people conform as well. At the other end of the continuum individuals have a great deal of privacy (social and physical spaces where others do not intrude; Goffmanian backstages) or of solitude (other people are simply not around). Here pressures for conformity are low. Social density is a quantitative matter, an aggregate of a chain of situations over time. An individual might occasionally be in other people's presence, perhaps even in very intense IRs, but their effect is quite different than if he or she were almost always in such situations. That is to say, a person with a high degree of privacy or solitude (low overall *social density*) might treat these occasional high *ritual intensity* episodes as sharp breaks from ordinary consciousness, either as wonderful and longed-for experiences, or as unwelcome intrusions and threats to his or her privacy. Which of these is the individual's response depends on additional features (his or her peripheral / central position and location in the power dimension).

Again on the meso-level: Who are the participants who come together in the aggregate of IR chains? Is is always the same persons, or a changing cast of characters? This is the dimension of *social diversity,* which might also be called the dimension of *localism / cosmopolitanism.* Specifying the argument of Durkheim's *Division of Labor in Society,* low diversity should produce local solidarity, strong attachment to reified symbols, literal-mindedness, and a strong barrier between insiders and outsiders. There is high conformity within the group, along with strong distrust of outsiders and alien symbols. At the other end of this subdimension, there is participation in a loose network consisting of many different kinds of groups and situations. Durkheimian theory predicts the result of cosmopolitan network structure is individualism, relativistic attitudes toward symbols, abstract rather than concrete thinking.

Stated in terms of emotions, this implies that persons in cosmopolitan networks have relatively weak feelings of conformity to group symbols; emotional coolness of tone; and generalized trust in a wide range of interactions. When symbols are violated or ritual procedures go badly, members of tight, localized groups respond with anger and fear (especially if rituals are backed up by coercion on the power dimension). Can there be ritual violations in loose cosmopolitan groups, where there is less intensity and conformity? Yes, because there can be violations of the appropriately casual and sociable tone of interaction.[10] Goffman (1959, 1967) concentrated most of his analysis on situations of cosmopolitan interactions, and depicted just such violations and their sanctions. Following Goffman, I would suggest that persons in these situations respond by amusement to minor ritual violations by others, and with embarrassment, contempt, and a desire to exclude perpetrators of more serious violations of the sociable order. The persons who commit these Goffmanian sacrileges feel anxiety and embarrassment.

Durkheim's (1893/1964) pioneering analysis did not pull apart these various dimensions built around the mechanism of ritual solidarity. His terminology conflates all four into an overall level of what he called "moral density." His most differentiated argument distinguished "mechanical" and "organic" solidarity, which was a move in the direction of seeing multiple causes. In effect, "mechanical solidarity" is the overlap of high *social density* and low *social diversity* (localism), with an implication that there is also high *ritual intensity,* and that most individuals experience relatively *central participation*—which also seems to assume that the group is lacking in *power* differences. To be sure, this overlap would constitute extremely high degrees of solidarity, conformity, and attachment to the group as the sole source of emotional energy. "Organic solidarity" is a situation of high *social diversity* (cosmopolitanism; i.e., the modern division of labor, as contrasted to undifferentiated small tribal or rural communities); but he left it unclear what variation there might be in the other dimensions. Durkheim seems to have envisioned relatively high ritual intensity, so that organic solidarity would provide sufficient solidarity, morality, and conformity to keep modern society together. But he (and his followers and critics) were never satisfied with the organic solidarity theory. An underlying problem was the failure to distinguish enough subdimensions to recognize all the different combinations that might exist, and that indeed are found all across the historical landscape.

This, then, is my set of hypotheses about how the various dimensions of interaction ritual affect emotions. By way of summary, let us recapitulate the model, first in terms of the effects on long-term emotions (emotional energy), and then in their effects on short-term, transitory emotions.

Effects on Long-Term Emotions: Emotional Energy

The IR chain model proposes that individuals acquire or lose emotional energy in both power and status interactions. Order-givers maintain and sometimes gain EE, order-takers lose it; being in the focus of attention and thereby successfully enacting group membership raises EE, experiencing marginality or exclusion lowers it. Interaction rituals are connected in chains over time, with the results of the last interaction (in emotions and symbols) becoming inputs for the next interaction; thus EE tends to cumulate (either positively or negatively) over time.

Emotional energy is an overall level of being "up" or "down," ranging from enthusiasm to depression. Between interactions, EE is carried in the individual's stock of symbols, in the cognitive part of the brain; it is an emotional mapping of the various kinds of interactions that those symbols can be used in, or that can be thought about through symbols. Thus emotional energy is specific to particular kinds of situations; it is a readiness for action, that manifests itself in taking the initiative in particular sorts of social relationships or with particular persons.[11] Thus there is EE specific to power situations—expecting to dominate, or be dominated—as well as an EE specific to status situations—expecting to be a central member, or a marginal one, or not to be accepted at all. Furthermore, these emotional energies tend to be specific to particular networks and groups, or to particular kinds of them: some persons feel full of confidence and initiative in a gathering of professional acquaintances, but not in a sexual situation; some feel confidence in a business negotiation, but not a political one; persons who dominate the center of attention in an intellectual gathering may fade into shyness at a drinking party. It is in this sense that, as we will see, sexual drive is a form of EE.

People move through the chain of encounters that make up their daily lives on an up-and-down flow of EE. They are more attracted to certain situations than others, and sometimes feel disinterest or repulsion. In each situation as it unfolds, their own emotional and symbolic resources, meshing or failing to mesh with those of the people they meet, determines to what extent the IR will be successful and unsuccessful. These outcomes, in turn, raise or lower EE. The end result is motivation to repeating those sorts of encounters with particular persons and to avoid them with others.

Emotional energy manifests itself both physically and psychologically; but its underlying basis—the form in which it is "stored," so to speak—is not as physical energy per se. EE has a cognitive component; it is an expectation of being able to dominate particular kinds of situations, or to enact membership in particular groups. The cognitive side of this is that symbols (particularized memories as well as generalized ideas or emblems) have emotional energy attached to them, in the sense that the symbols call forth a high or low degree of initiative in enacting social relationships using those symbols. But this is not ordinarily a process of conscious calculation, of the actor thinking "I will get a good feeling of power or status if I interact with so-and-so." Instead, certain symbols come to mind, or appear in the external environment, and spark off propensities (positive or negative) for social action. The "expectation" may work on a subconscious level. It is an anticipation of being able to coordinate with someone else's responses, of smoothly role-taking in the ongoing flow of the interaction, and thus anticipating the buildup of emotional force that goes on within a successful IR. The process of rhythmic entrainment of the ultra-micro aspects of interaction is the mechanism by which emotional contagion occurs within a successful interaction. Thus there is a very fine-grained, micro-anticipation that happens within the interaction itself (on a level down to fractions of a second), as well as a more long-term expectation of being able to enter into such micro-coordination with particular kinds of people. Emotional energy exists as a complex of these kinds of expectations, a priming for successful ritual interaction in particular settings.

The low end of EE is depression, manifested in withdrawal, both from expressiveness and activity. Depression appears to be a more complex process than high EE.[12] Experience at the low end of the power dimension brings depression: low energy, loss of motivation. But this may happen only when order-takers experience a strong degree of being under someone else's control. When their lack of control is only moderate, they may typically respond by anger—by a temporary increase in the output of EE, as vigorous reactance against the situation that is controlling them (Frijda 1986, 290). The middle level of negative interactional experience—in temporal terms, an episodic and atypical experience of being subordinated—thus has a distinctive emotional effect.

Negative experience on the status dimension has a similar contour: declining EE, with a flare-up of anger in the middle range and where the flow of emotional expectations from the IR chain is episodically dashed. Over the long run, I suggest that failure of membership in a group ritual brings a degree of depression commensurate with the degree of social exclusion. Kemper (1978), however, argues that low status brings anger as well as shame. Scheff (1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991) present evidence that exclusion on the micro-level of the encounter, breaking attunement, brings shame, which may get into a spiral with anger. From the point of view of IR theory, shame is a form of low EE, with a distinctive cognitive component directed toward one's social image (i.e., social membership) in a particular group. Anger occurs when there is an abrupt negative change in expected social membership feelings. It is a short-term emotion due to the disruption of expectations; the long-term effect of membership loss is nevertheless depression. Hence there is no long-term increase in vigor of the sort that an angry reaction brings for moderate levels of put-down on the power dimension, that is, when there are structural opportunities for mobilizing rebellion.[13]

Scheff's model is a valuable complement to IR theory because it specifies emotions generated by both high and low levels of Durkheimian solidarity. Successful interactional attunement or an intact social bond generates pride; breaking the bond generates shame. In the terms of IR theory, pride is the emotion attached to a self energized by the group; shame is the emotion of a self depleted by group exclusion.[14] As we will see below, nonverbal and paralinguistic measures of pride and shame can be useful as measures of high and low EE. Pride is the social attunement emotion, the feeling that one's self fits naturally into the flow of interaction, indeed that one's personal sense epitomizes the leading mood of the group. High solidarity is smooth-flowing rhythmic coordination in the micro-rhythms of conversational interaction; it gives the feeling of confidence that what one is doing, the rewarding experience that one's freely expressed impulses are being followed, are resonated and amplified by the other people present. When Scheff speaks of shame as the broken social bond, I take this to mean that the rhythm is impaired, that one's spontaneous utterances are choked off—even for fractions of seconds—that there is a hesitancy about whether one is going to be understood, and hence about whether it is possible to formulate a clear or understandable utterance at all. The shared rhythm is what enables each person to anticipate what the other will do, not in specific contents, but in rhythmic form: a certain rhythm of talk is launched, characterized by a certain energy, a certain emotional flow. The conversational ritual generates high solidarity to just the extent that its participants pick up the same rhythm, molding their utterances to the rhythm that they have established in the past few moments, and riding its waves to anticipate just how their next set of utterances will flow one upon the other. By observing these rhythms, we can see emotional energy in the process of being manifested in the micro-situation.

The main long-term emotional energies resulting from stratified interaction, then, are: high levels of enthuasiasm, confidence, initiative, and pride, resulting from controlling the attunement of interaction in either a power or status situation; low levels of the same (i.e., depression, shame), resulting from being dominated in a power situation, or excluded from a status situation. There is one other long-term emotional disposition: the amount of trust or distrust of other people. At the trust end of the continuum, this simply manifests itself as high EE, willingness to take initiative toward certain social situations. At the distrust end, it comes out as fear of particular situations. Distrust / fear is attached to particular structural configurations, namely distrust of those who are outsiders to the local group; it is the result of the structural subdimension of status group interaction, in which there is tight local closure of group boundaries.

Emotion Contest and Conflict Situations

In power situations, gains of emotional energy by one person and EE loss by the other person are reciprocally related. This may also happen in sociable situations. Some persons act as energy drainers, bringing other persons down while dominating the situation. Consider the micro-mechanisms of an interaction ritual: the common focus of attention, the rhythmic coordination that intensifies emotions. Persons who control the situation can frustrate this process. They can break the micro-rhythm, by not responding to the signals the other person is putting out (by changing or reframing the topic, starting new activities, ignoring and overriding nonverbal contact cues). This is one way that order-givers establish their dominance, perhaps most likely when there are signs of challenge to their control. It also makes up the substance of aggressive status contests that happen in sociable conversations (i.e., what Goffman [1967, 24–25] calls face-work contests).

Such contests are an activity that breaks the focus of ritual micro-coordination and prevents the circular buildup of anticipations on both sides. In smoothly running situations, one's own ability to use symbols in thinking and talking depends upon anticipating the other's reactions, and feeling the surge of symbolic group membership with each successful use of a commonly recognized symbol. Dominance contests break this down (whether by the deliberate intention of one person, or just inadvertent lack of interest in the other—i.e., the dominant or more attractive person's emotional energies are directed elsewhere). The result for the person who is unable to carry through their intentions and anticipations is that there is a blockage in the smooth flow of their own thoughts, words, and actions; they are unable to project a micro-future in this situation, and this is what it means to lose emotional energy.

If the failure of an interaction ritual to achieve coordination and emotional buildup debilitates one person, though, why shouldn't it bring down the other person emotionally too? According to the basic IR model, the emotional flow is a group process; what one side fails to get, the other side should fail to get also. But in some kinds of situations the result may be unequal. Consider larger group structures in which particular micro-interactions are embedded: the boss confronting a rebellious worker within an organization; or an athletic contest before a group of spectators. The person who dominates the micro-situation has the possibility (which may be overt or only subjectively felt) of gaining recognition in the larger group context. And conversely, this individual may bring along previously generated feelings of membership in the larger group structure, the emotional energy of being a dominant figure capable of mobilizing an enforcement coalition (in a formal organization), or of being a popular person (before an audience of fans).

Chambliss (1989) has studied this interaction in the case of athletic contests (competitive swimmers), and has found that there is a major difference in outlook between high-level performers (consistent winners) and lesser performers (losers). The difference is manifested in the details of behavior: winners are meticulous in performing their routines in ways that they have deliberately developed; they have built up their own rhythms and stick to them in the face of competitive opposition. The winners make themselves the focus of attention; they set the expectations around themselves. Losers, however, let the winners become the focus, and adapt their micro-behavior toward them. This implies that a winner (perhaps dominant persons generally, in dominance contests more widely as well as in athletics) has a sense of control throughout the situation: winners maintain and build up their own rhythmic coordination, their anticipation of what they will do, setting the micro-rhythmic pace. Losers (and persons who are subordinated in dominance contests) allow someone else to break their own flow of anticipation of what will happen in their own activities. These dominated persons can cope with the situation, can maintain some anticipa-



Figure 3.1 Winner focuses on the goal, loser focuses on the winner. Final lap of relay race, which runner E is about to win.

tion about what will happen only by focusing on the other person as the lead, rather than by projecting their own volitional future. In effect, such a person can recoup some emotional energy from the situation by becoming a follower, attaching themself to someone else's lead.[15] The more they resist such attachment, the less emotional energy they will have.

In terms of the IR model, one could also say that the dominant person makes oneself the focus of the interaction. He or she becomes, in some sense, a Durkheimian sacred object. Microsociologically, that is just what a "sacred object" means—it is the object upon which attention of the group is focused, and which becomes a symbolic repository of the group's emotional energies. When someone feels oneself in this position, they have a store of emotional energy for their own use; it makes that person "charismatic." For others, the person who is a "sacred object" compels attention. They become spectators to that person. Their attitudes as spectators can vary. If they throw themselves completely into acquiescence, they become compliant admirers, who want to attach themselves and draw some flow of the "sacred" emotional energy for themselves (like fans asking for an autograph).

At the other extreme, they may be resentful would-be or failed competitors. But even their resentment is a feeling based upon recognizing that the other person has a special status as "sacred object" that they do not have. Chambliss (1989) describes this difference as the "mundanity of excellence." Persons inside the social realm of winning / dominance experience a mere routine, in which they have smooth anticipated control of situations—that is, a great store of "emotional energy" available to them in contest situations. But persons on the outside looking in see a mystifying difference, a gulf to greatness that they feel they cannot cross. These differences are, of course, most exaggerated in highly publicized contest situations, like the Olympic athletes Chambliss studied. In lesser degrees, dominant persons are also little "sacred objects" at least in certain small local situations, while subordinated persons are left with the choice of being participating spectators of their dominant energy, or feeling the energy drain of opposing them.

There is fine-grained micro-situational evidence of this process in a study by Erickson and Schultz (1982) of video-taped interactions between junior college counselors and students. Typically, these dyads fell into the same rhythm of syllables by pitch and loudness, both in their own turns and in the turn-taking rhythm as they shifted from one speaker to the other; these beats were often synchronized on the microkinesic dimension with body movements. This pattern could be interpreted as a baseline of IR solidarity. At times, one person takes the lead in holding the rhythm, while the other person flounders for fractions of seconds (usually in small-scale upsets on the order of a few quarter-seconds) in an unrhythmic pattern, then follows the pattern maintained by the first. These recordings display situational dominance on the ultra-micro level of seconds. There are also instances where the tapes show the two persons' rhythms mutually interfering with each other; or where both go along in different rhythms, as if deliberately in opposition to one another. In follow-up interviews where the subjects were shown tapes of themselves and asked to describe what was going on, they tended to comment on the "uncomfortable moments" where the rhythmic coordination broke down, but not on the moments when their rhythms were in sync. It appears that the participants took solidarity for granted, and only noted its absence. For the most part, the subjects seem to experience the pattern of the interaction subliminally; it was only after repeated viewing of the tape recording, and repeated discussions with the experimenter about their reactions to "uncomfortable moments," that students began to become consciously angry about what they came to see as their dominated position in the interaction.[16]

Power derives from a variant on the basic IR model. In its Durkheimian formulation, successful rituals produce group solidarity. Teasing apart the mechanisms and fine-grained processes of an IR, we could say instead that successful IRs produce heightened mutual focus and bodily emotional entrainment. Power is an asymmetrical focus of attention upon such a situation, so that one side battens on the energy that all the participants have mutually produced. In a power ritual, the social battery is revved up, but the benefit goes largely to one side.[17]

SHORT-TERM OR DRAMATIC EMOTIONS

Most research on emotion has focused on the short-term, dramatic emotions: the "phasic" rather than the "tonic," the outbursts that disrupt the ongoing flow of activity (Frijda 1986, 2, 4, 90). My argument is that the short-term emotions are derived from the baseline of emotional energy; that it is against the backdrop of an ongoing flow of emotional energy that particular disruptive expressions are shaped. Surprise, for example, is an abrupt reaction to something that rapidly and severely interrupts the flow of current activity and attention. This is also the general pattern of more important short-term emotions.

The positive emotions become intense largely because of a contagious buildup during an interaction ritual. This is the case with enthusiasm, joy, and humor: all of these build up in social situations as the result of a successful ritual. Psychological analysis tends to take these emotions from the individual viewpoint. For example, joy is explained as the result of the momentary expectation of success in some activity (Frijda 1986, 79). This is sometimes true; but joy and enthusiasm are particularly strong when an assembled group is collectively experiencing this expectation or achievement of success (e.g., fans at a game, political partisans at a meeting). Further, the group itself by a successful emotional contagion can generate its own enthusiasm (which is what the flow of conversation at a party does).

These kinds of positive emotional outbursts are relatively short and temporary in their effects. They happen upon a baseline of previous emotional energy: for a group to establish this kind of rapport, its members need to have previously charged up some symbols with positive attraction, so that these symbols can be used as ingredients in carrying out a successful ritual. A previous cumulation of emotional energy is thus one of the ingredients in making possible the situational buildup of positive emotion. Frequently, the positive emotions (joy, enthusiasm, humor) are generated by a group leader, an individual who takes the focus, who is able to propagate such a mood from his or her own stores of emotional energy. This individual thus serves very much like an electric battery for group emotional expressiveness. Persons who occupy this position in IR chains are what we think of as "charismatic." In general, "personality" traits are just these results of experiencing particular kinds of IR chains. (This is true at the negative end as well, resulting in persons who are depressed, angry, etc.)

The negative short-term emotions are even more clearly related to the baseline of emotional energy.

Anger is generated in several ways. Psychologically, anger is often regarded as the capacity to mobilize energy to overcome a barrier to one's ongoing efforts (Frijda 1986, 19, 77). This means that the amount of anger should be proportional to the amount of underlying effort; and that is the amount of emotional energy one has for that particular project. High emotional energy may also be called "aggressiveness," the strong taking of initiative. This can have the social effect of dominating other people, of lowering their emotional energy, of making them passive followers. This implies that there is a connection between the generic quality of high emotional energy—especially the EE generated in power situations—and the expression of the specific emotion of anger.

The disruptive form of anger, however, is more complicated. That is because anger in its intense forms is an explosive reaction against frustrations. Truly powerful persons do not become angry in this sense, because they do not need to; they get their way without it. To express anger is thus to some extent an expression of weakness. However, persons who are powerful can afford to become angry; their power-anger is an expression of the expectation that they will get their way against the obstacle. In the case of a social obstacle—the willful opposition of some other person—it is an expression of the powerful person's confidence that he or she will be able to mobilize an enforcement coalition to coerce the opposition into compliance, or to destroy the resistance. Previous stores of EE thus determine when and how someone will express explosive anger.[18]

The most violent expression of anger occurs when one feels strong in overcoming a strong frustration. If the frustration itself is overwhelmingly strong, the feeling is fear, not anger. Persons who are weak do not manifest anger in the same way. It is only when they have enough resources to be able to mount some resistance (or at least some social privacy, a separate social circle in which they can utter symbolic threats) that weak persons, order-takers, have anger. This follows from the principle that the core of anger is the mobilization of energy to overcome an obstacle. It is only when there are enough social bases of support to generate EE that one can react to a frustration (in this case, being dominated) by mobilizing anger. Persons who are too weak (i.e., in their IR chains they lack resources or space in which to mobilize any other socially based EE), do not react angrily to domination but succumb to depression.

In between these two situations there are selective outbursts of anger. This is the targeted anger that individuals feel against particular other persons. It occurs because these individuals are structural rivals in the market of social relationships: for example, two women competing for the same man, or two intellectuals competing for the same audience. Here one does not feel angry against someone who is stronger than oneself (rebellious anger), nor against someone weaker (dominance anger); rather, this is a case of someone frustrating one's own projects. The anger here is not really "personal"; there is no role-taking (as in the dominance / subordination forms of anger), although the target is a person, and the underlying structure is a social one; it is only an accident that the obstacle to one's goals happens to be a person.

An especially Durkheimian form of short-term emotion is *righteous anger*. This is the emotional outburst, shared by a group (perhaps led by particular persons who act as its agents) against persons who violate its sacred symbols. It is group anger against a heretic or scapegoat. Such anger only happens when there is a previously constituted group. One can predict that righteous anger is proportional to the amount of emotional charge of membership feelings around particular symbols. The amount of such charge, in turn, is highest where the group has high social density and a local (rather than cosmopolitan) focus. Where the group networks are diffuse and cosmopolitan, on the other hand, the short-term emotion felt at disruption is embarrassment on behalf of the disrupter—resulting in status exclusion, unwillingness to associate with that person, rather than in a violent ritual punishment to restore symbolic order.[19]

Righteous anger has great importance in political sentiments as well as in the dynamics of local communities (scandals, witch-hunts, political hysterias). The theoretical difficulty is understanding just how this kind of anger relates to the power and status dimensions of group structure. In the Durkheimian model, it seems to be the group in general, and all its adherents, who are outraged at the violation of its symbols. But anger, and hence violence as a punishment (burning a witch or heretic at the stake, throwing drug dealers or gamblers or abortionists in jail) is related to the power dimension, since the use of violence is the ultimate sanction of power. To explain righteous anger, we need to observe the power and status dimensions in conjunction—in instances where the status group structure is dense enough and locally closed enough so that there is a strong sense of group membership, attached to reified symbols; and where this ritual community has a power hierarchy within it, which regularly exercises coercive threats to enforce obedience to orders. Under these circumstances ritual violations (violations of membership symbols on the status dimension) are taken as a threat to the power hierarchy as well.

Righteous anger is a particularly intense emotion because it is expressed with a strong sense of security: the individual feels that they have the community's support, and not merely in a loose sense. Righteous anger is an emotion that is an evocation of the organized network that has been previously established to use violence. Persons who feel righteous anger are evoking their feeling of membership in an enforcement coalition.

As evidence, I would point to the fact that the most violent punishments for ritual deviance (witch-burning, public tortures, and executions in medieval patrimonial states; violent atonement for taboo violations in tribal societies) occur where the political agents are both highly coercive in their ordinary operations, and are active in enforcing group cultures (Collins 1974; Douglas 1966). Heresy trials and violent ritual punishments have declined in keeping with the degree of the separation between church and state; it is where these spheres (the power hierarchy and the status community) are fused that righteous anger is most prevalent. In some degree, however, the political hierarchy still remains the focus of status rituals—through its claims to be a community as well as an organization for wielding power. This makes it possible to mobilize deviance-hunting as a form of status intrusion into the political sphere, even in relatively differentiated modern societies. And it is advocates of a return to the fusion of community with polity who are most strongly involved as "moral entrepreneurs" in modern deviance-hunting. Such advocates often come from the localized sectors of modern society, especially the remnants of traditional and rural communities. In addition, the attempt of socialist regimes to keep up a high level of collective solidarity helps to explain their concern for rituals of conformity.

Fear is another short-term negative emotion. The most intense and briefest forms of fear are those that most sharply disrupt activities; at the extreme, intense fear experience is next to a startle response. Crying is an expression of fear in a more complex sense: it is a social call for help in distress. Adults do not cry very much, because their horizon widens out. Instead of relatively short-term and simply physical threats or discomforts, the most important form of fear becomes fear of social consequences: fear of being coerced or fear of social exclusion, which are more long-term experiences. Furthermore, since the problem is itself the social situation, crying (which is a communication of helplessness) is subordinated by more complex adjustments of EE. One cannot usually so readily call on others for sympathy, if one is being coerced or excluded.[20] Crying, as a form of emotional communication, is upstaged by a more direct emotional response in the form of fear and avoidance.

In social relationships, fear is generally a response to someone else's anger. It is an anticipatory emotion, the expectation of being hurt. Thus it is most directly related to long-term emotional energy deriving from subordination on the power dimension. It occurs in similar circumstances to depression, but it has a more confrontational structure. Whereas depression is a withdrawal of EE (i.e., withdrawal of attention from particular activities), fear is a kind of social cringing before the consequences of expected actions. Depression is a sinking of EE level because of the bludgeoning effects of negative social situations;[21] fear is a negative anticipation of what will happen, which assumes enough EE to take some initiative, or at least remain alert to situations that carry social dangers. Hence one can experience fear of status loss (membership exclusion), as well as fear of power coercion. On the power dimension, fear is mobilized together with anger in cases where a person is able to mobilize anger, but has low confidence in being able to win positive results from its expression.

Transformations from Short-Term Emotions into Long-Term Emotional Energy

The results of various short-term emotional experience tend to flow back into the long-term emotional makeup that I have called "emotional energy." Emotional energy, though, does not have to depend upon the dramatic emotions; situations of uncontested domination or belonging add to one's store of confidence and sense of attraction toward particular kinds of situations; undramatic feelings of subordination and unpopularity have similar negative effects. The dramatic short-term emotions also spill over, though it is an unexamined question whether their very quality as dramatic makes them more important for long-term emotions, or brackets them as a sort of exception. In the case of positive short-term emotions (joy, enthusiasm, sexual passion), it seems likely that these experiences should build up the store of EE; although perhaps in a very situation-specific way (i.e., one becomes attached to repeating just those situations with particular partners).

In the case of negative emotions, there is a long-standing clinical tradition that sees traumatic situations as the major determinant of long-term social and psychological functioning. Particular experiences of intense anger, fear, or shame are regarded as controlling one's whole subsequent functioning. This may well be true, to a degree; but it should be seen against the background of the overall level of emotional energy. A person who generally has favorable, if undramatic, experiences on the power and status dimensions of their everyday interactions, will likely get over an episode of extreme anger, fear, or shame. It is only when the individual's overall "market position" of interactions is on the negative side that particularly intense dramatic experiences are stored up and carried over as "traumas," especially in highly charged memories of the sort that Freudian therapy is designed to ventilate. Max Weber's conception of stratification as inequality of life chances in the market thus extends not only to material economic chances but to the realm of emotional health.

Scheff's model reformulates Freudian theory as a carryover of emotions through an interactional chain. There is a shame / rage cycle in which an individual who experiences a shaming situation feels rage against the perpetrator, which can lead to further conflicts; these typically have unsatisfactory outcomes, resulting in further shame and rage. Rage at oneself can also become part of a self-reflective loop, intensifying this process. Scheff presents evidence that the traces of previous emotional arousals, especially anger, can remain at an unconscious, trace level; and that there are unconscious shame behaviors that are manifested in the micro-details of interactions. The limitation is that Scheff and Retzinger (1991) have chosen a sample of cases—couples in marital counseling—in which these shame / rage cycles are well established; but they have not considered the cases in which the cycle does not occur or quickly terminates. That is to say: Scheff concentrates on conflictual social relationships among individuals who are relatively equally matched, who are at the middle levels of dominance and popularity, such that they can continue long cycles of shaming and raging at each other. More extreme differences in power would not allow a conflictual cycle to go on; and if persons are not confined to the same network of status interactions (i.e., their market possibilities are more open) they may cut short a shame cycle by leaving that interaction and finding another where the resource lineups may be different.

The Stratification of Emotional Energy

IR chains often have a circular, self-perpetuating form. Persons who dominate rituals gain EE, which they can use to dominate future IRs. Persons who are at the center of attention gain EE, which they can use to convene and energize still further gatherings, thereby making themselves yet again the center of attention. In this way, powerful persons re-create their power from situation to situation, while those whom they dominate re-create the low energy level that makes them followers and subordinates. Status group leaders re-create the energy that makes them popular; groupies, fringe members, and outcastes are carried along in their positions by the repeated flow of lower EE.

Changes, of course, are possible chiefly if and when the composition of the persons encountering one another shifts, since in a perfectly closed cycle there would no way of getting out of a low-EE situation, or of failing to confirm one's high EE. Thus even high-EE persons (like political leaders, or sociability leaders, or in specialized kinds of EE, sexual stars or intellectual dominants) move into an arena where they become overmatched by someone else with still greater EE (and hence become a medium fish in a bigger pond); and low-EE persons may find a different arena where they avoid old situational match-ups and find others that generate more solidarity (e.g., by graduating from high school). These are matters of how the entire array of IR chains, which makes up the population of a society, are arranged across time and space; and thus we widen out perspective to relatively more meso- rather than micro-analysis.

We may visualize the stratification of society, not as a matter of who owns what material resources, or occupies what abstract position in a social structure, but as an unequal distribution of emotional energy. Positions in a social structure are macro-level abstractions; we can see stratification in a more empirically realistic way, as well as keep ourselves focused on its processual dynamics, by looking closely at exactly what stratification is enacted in micro-situations. Material "resources" are often repetitively available from one interactional situation to another, but what makes them "resources" hinges upon the micro-interactions that allow someone to appropriate them; and that is a question of who takes the initiative to take them and use them, and who passively accepts that these material objects are so used. Material property, as enacted in situations, is really the EE that particular persons have in acting upon those objects.[22] Where the right to property is conceded, the distribution of emotions is asymmetrical, in that someone's high EE in appropriating those objects is matched by someone else's low EE in allowing them to be appropriated or at least standing by watching the other person display them. Similarly, Bourdieu's "cultural capital" is too static a conception if it is taken merely as the counterpart in the hierarchy of culture to a hierarchy of economic capital.[23] Another way to say this is that the key to stratification is not material property, nor cultural differences, but inequalities in emotional energy. It is the processual flow of EE that enables people to wield material and culture, or lets others wield those over them.

The simplest version of stratification is an energized upper class, lording it over a depressed lower class, with moderately energized middle-class persons in between. Take this pattern as an ideal type; it does yield a crucial point, that stratification generally works because those who dominate have the energy to dominate situations in which they encounter other persons. The winning generals are usually the most energetic ones; so are the richest financiers; in the specialized realm of intellectual domination, the stars of world science, philosophy, and literature generally are what I have called "energy stars" (for evidence on generals, see Keegan 1987; on philosophers, Collins 1998). To say this is not to make a moral judgment about any of these people: first, because what they are doing may well be manipulative, destructive, or selfish; and second, because their energy is not their own, in the sense that it arises interactively from chains of IRs, and thus from the network positions that put them into a positively accumulating, upward series of EE-enhancing encounters. My argument is far from holding that the upper classes are uniquely energetic individuals; they are products of processes that affect all of us, and in which all of us (very likely) are pretty much interchangeable. About any such dominant energy star, it is possible to say, there but for the grace of God (i.e., the luck of IR chain trajectories) go you or I. Dominant persons are not intrinsically heroes, but it is socially significant that they often appear as such. Persons with lower amounts of EE are impressed by those who have accumulated a lot of it; such people have an EE-halo that makes them easy to admire. They are persons who get things done; they have an aura of success surrounding them. And since having high EE allows one to focus attention, one can get a certain amount of rise in one's own EE by following them, becoming part of their entourage, taking orders from them, or even viewing them from afar. Thus high EE gives dominant persons a kind of micro-situational legitimacy. This is not necessarily the same thing as the ideologies of legitimacy that Weber typologized (although it may undergird this formal legitimacy); I would hold that micro-situational legitimacy is by far the kind most worth having.

The stratification of EE thus makes the other aspects of stratification particularly solid and hard to dislodge. When the upper class has really high EE, no one even thinks of dislodging them, or even wanting to. That is, of course, an ideal type. A crucial point follows: A portion (perhaps a large portion) of what we conventionally call the "upper class" may consist of persons who have inherited their wealth, rest on their laurels from an earlier period of action, or otherwise not show very much EE. In such cases, the real distribution of EE differs from the formal, ideological conception of stratification. What we want to look for as sociologists is the real distribution of EE, and how it matches up against this surface appearance.

A perfectly self-reproducing stratification of EE is an ideal type. Patterns resembling this in degree have existed at various historical times. But these can break down in a variety of ways: some of these can shift very rapidly, since the mechanisms that generate EE are quite volatile, and conflict generates its own immediate patterns of EE. The mobilization of collective EE in social movements is a prime case of this. A stable hierarchy of EE can also break down in a different sense: not so much in the case of political action in which there are massive collective struggles, but in the case where energizing situations become fragmented. Instead of a hierarchy resembling the energized upper class, the depressed lower class, and a plodding middle class, we may get a purely local, episodically shifting situational stratification of EE in which almost any encounter is up for grabs. These topics will be taken up in later chapters.

APPENDIX: MEASURING EMOTIONAL ENERGY AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

It is sometimes raised as a criticism against IR theory that emotional energy is merely a hypothetical construct, or even a tautology. In reply, I wish to underscore the point that EE is an empirical variable.

We must be careful to distinguish EE from other kinds of emotions that are displayed. First, EE is not simply a matter of showing a lot of excitement, agitation, loudness, or bodily movement. These are characteristics of the dramatic or disruptive emotions: shouting or lashing out in anger, squealing and gesturing with joy, shrieking or running around in fear. EE instead is a strong steady emotion, lasting over a period of time, not a short-term disruption of a situation. A general characteristic of EE is that it gives the ability to act with initiative and resolve, to set the direction of social situations rather than to be dominated by others in the micro-details of interaction. And it is an emotion that allows individuals to be self-directed when alone, following a smooth flow of thoughts, rather than a jerky or distracted inner conversation. (For more detail on the latter, see chapter 5.)

Second, EE is a long-term consequence of IRs that reach a high degree of focused emotional entrainment, which we can also call attunement, collective effervescence, or solidarity; but EE is not the attunement itself. In figure 2.1, the ingredients and processes on the left side and middle of the diagram happen earlier than the outcomes on the right side; EE is a consequence that carries over after the individual has left the situation. Thus we must be able to measure it apart from the collective arousal itself. But it is also important for us to be able to measure the degree of collective effervescence or solidary entrainment within a situation, since this is the causal condition that produces EE.

Thus we wish to measure (a) the level of collective attunement reached at the height of an interaction, and see if it predicts the level of (b) emotional energy carried away by individual participants. With good measures of (b), we can also examine how long EE lasts, and test Durkheim's proposition that EE fades away over a period of time unless a sufficiently intense ritual attunement is reenacted.

The following briefly overviews the different kinds of verbal and nonverbal phenomena that we can use as measures of EE, and as measures of the chief causal variable, situational attunement or solidarity. A clue is that attunement is a collective pattern, EE an individual one.

Self-report. I have defined EE as the continuum from enthusiasm, confidence, and initiative at the high end, down to passivity and depression at the low end. EE exists empirically in one's flow of consciousness and in one's bodily sensations: it is the most important item in one's own everyday experience. It is not difficult to observe rises and falls in one's own EE in different situations; with close self-observation, one can notice it rise or fall in a matter of seconds within any particular situation. Patterns of EE could be systematically studied by having individuals give reports on their subjective experience in various kinds of situations.

EE can also be measured objectively, by outside observers. Here the best measures are for the most part unobtrusive, although they do call for close observation of micro-details.

Bodily postures and movements. High EE is generally expressed in an erect posture, moving firmly and smoothly, and taking the initiative in relation to other persons. Low EE is indicated in postures and movements that are shrinking, passive, hesitating, or disjointed. Since high EE is social confidence, it is manifested in movements toward other people, especially movements that take the initiative and that lead to establishing a pattern of rhythmic coordination. Low EE, conversely, is found in movements and postures of withdrawal, and low initiative; low-EE persons in a social situation show a pattern of following others' nonverbal leads, or a freezing of movement. Conflict at moderate levels of EE may be indicated by a rapid or jerky alternation between orienting toward and away from the others. Scheff and Retzinger (1991) describe this pattern, which they interpret in terms of the self-oriented emotions of pride (turning toward the other person) and shame (turning away).

We need to be careful to distinguish bodily measures of EE from those bodily movements that represent the process of collective entrainment within a social situation, although the one can lead directly into the other. High or low EE is visible in body postures and movements when an individual is alone. When an individual enters an interaction, EE is visible in the moments leading up to the high point of entrainment (whatever level that may be). That is to say, the high-EE person takes the initiative in setting the tone of the interaction, and the low-EE person lags behind or follows passively. EE must be observed in the dynamics of how the individuals lead or lag in the interaction, apart from the observation of how much entrainment finally results. This peak level of entrainment is a measure of collective effervescence.

At peak moments the pattern tends to be jointly shared among all participants: in high solidarity moments, bodies touch, eyes are aligned in the same direction, movements are rhythmically synchronized (see Figures 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 8.6, and 8.7). At moments of failure of the interaction, bodies turn away from each other, heads turn downward or inward toward one's body, eyes look down or away. (For an example, see Scheff and Retzinger 1991, 54–56.)

Bodily measures also express the dramatic short-term emotions, which need to be distinguished from high and low EE more generally. On specific emotions, see Ekman (1984) and O'Sullivan et al. (1985), who also indicate the extent to which the body can be controlled so as to mask emotions, and which body movements tend to be involuntary and thus are genuinely unguarded expressions of emotion.

Eyes. Solidarity is directly expressed in eye contact. As Scheff and Retzinger (1991) show, persons in a situation of high attunement look at each other. This occurs in a rhythmic pattern, viewing the other person's face, responding with micro-expressions, then periodically looking away (to avoid staring). In moments of intense solidarity (such as group triumph or erotic entrainment) the mutual gaze is longer and more steady. In a situation of low attunement, persons lower their eyes and turn away for prolonged periods. These are measures of high or low attunement or collective effervescence, and they tend to be symmetrical across participants. EE is seen in the eyes, as in the case of bodily postures and movements, as a temporal pattern for each individual as they approach the situation. Initiative or lack of initiative can be seen in establishing eye contact; high or low EE is manifested in dominating or avoiding mutual gaze (Mazur et al. 1980; Mazur 1986).

Voice. The amount of enthusiasm, confidence, and initiative (high EE) versus apathy, withdrawal, and depression (low EE) can be measured paralinguistically, that is, in the style rather than the content of talk. (See Scherer 1982, 1985, for studies of the emotional dimensions of recorded speech.) Since the flow of speech in an interaction is also a measure of the amount of attunement or collective solidarity, we must be careful to observe in micro-detail the patterns of the individuals as they approach the vocal interaction, as distinguished from the degree of attunement that is reached collectively.

A refined study that separates out these several aspects is Erickson and Shultz (1982: see especially 85–96, 103–117). This study demonstrates measures of voice rhythms charted at twenty-four frames per second, but typically visible at quarter-second intervals. These fall into five patterns: (i) a shared rhythm, with the beat falling at about one-second intervals; this may be interpreted as normal solidarity; (ii) "individual rhythmic instability," as one individual follows the previously set mutual rhythm while the other is momentarily disorganized: an indicator of dominance or interactional centrality on the part of one speaker in relation to the other; (iii) mutual rhythmic instability, as both speakers slow down or speed up the rhythm for a brief period before returning to the baseline rhythm: a temporary failure of the interaction ritual: a display of low solidarity; and (iv) mutual rhythmic interference and (v) mutual rhythmic opposition, which are two types of micro-interactional conflict: in (iv) the conflict is ongoing, whereas in (v) a dominance struggle is won by the speaker who overcomes the rhythm of the previous speaker and gets acquiescence to the new rhythm.

The characteristics of (iv) and (v) are worth quoting directly from the authors:

> *Mutual Rhythmic Interference* [iv] A kind of mismatch between the behavior of one individual and the other, lasting a few moments, involving the persistence by each party in rhythmic patterns that are regular for each individual but different across individuals, for example individual A's behavior is patterned in a rhythmic interval of 1 second duration, while individual B's behavior over the same period of time is patterned in a rhythmic interval of .75 second duration.
>
> *Mutual Rhythmic Opposition* [v] . . . . Momentary rhythmic disintegration between the behavior of one individual and the other, involving deviation of 4–5 twenty-fourths of a second from the previously established periodic interval. Coming in this much too soon or too late at turn exchange has the effect of "tugging" at the underlying rhythm. This tugging is seemingly competitive; at the very least it indicates a lack of cooperation or integration in the mutual behavior of speakers, since one speaker does not participate in the rhythm used by the previous speaker. After the momentary tug occurs, however, the previous speaker adapts to the new rhythmic interval, and so the lack of temporal integration between them involves momentary opposition rather than continuous interference (Erickson and Schultz 1982, 114–15).

The troubled moments (ii, iii, and v) also tended to coincide with shifts in body posture and proxemics, or, changes in body orientation between the speakers.

These voice rhythms thus show variations in solidarity, as well as fine-grained indications of who sets the rhythm and who follows it. For our purposes, (ii) and (v) indicate taking the initiative and setting the pattern, which are indicators of EE—high EE for the individual who sets the rhythmic pattern, low EE for the individual whose rhythm is determined by the other. Pattern (i) is an indicator of high solidarity; (iii) and (iv) are indicators of low solidarity.

Measures of interactional solidarity are also available from the ultra-micro analysis of the sound-wave frequencies at subliminal levels, using Gregory's (1994; Gregory et al. 1993) Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) analysis. FFT analysis finds rhythms of vocal coordination at a level below .5 KHz (KiloHertz, thousand cycles per second), a region in the sound spectrum that is heard only as a low-pitched hum. Although participants are not aware of the sounds they are making on this level, their voice rhythms converge in conversations that they subjectively rate as more satisfactory interactions with a higher level of rapport.

Comparing Gregory's measures at the level of thousands of cycles per second and Erickson and Schultz's measure at the level of quarter-seconds, it is apparent that several levels of rhythmic coordination overlay each other, at different orders of time-frequency. The relationships among these different time-orders are yet to be investigated, as well as their connection with IR ingredients and outcomes.

Other indicators of conversational attunement or solidarity have been displayed in chapter 2: a close pattern of turn-taking with minimal gap and overlap; rhythmic entrainment in shared laughter, applause, and other simultaneous vocalizations. Conversely, gaps between turns, and prolonged overlaps among speakers contesting the floor, indicate low solidarity.

Indicators of conversational solidarity are easier to tease out than indicators of EE, since the latter involves showing who takes initiative in establishing the pattern of the interaction. Some aspects of individual voices are probably not good measures: loudness of tone and speed of talking are too easily confounded with specific disruptive emotions such as anger. Better indicators of EE are fluidity, hesitation pauses, and false starts on the part of each particular individual. Ability to get the floor, versus incidence of contested speech turns, is another indicator; methods are demonstrated in Gibson (1999).

Hormone levels. Mazur and Lamb (1980; see also Kemper 1991) have shown that the experience of dominating an interaction has continuing effects upon hormone levels (especially testosterone). These hormones may provide a physiological substrate for medium-run flows of EE across situations. It should be noted that testosterone is found in females as well as in males, although in lower amounts (Kemper 1991); hence the pattern could be operating for both sexes. The important comparison is for shifts in hormone levels within the same person across situations, not necessarily for relative hormone levels across different individuals. Studying hormone levels requires intrusive measures, which are especially intrusive when this is done by drawing blood samples, and thus such studies have been done largely by volunteers who are trained medical personnel; saliva measurements have also been used. It would be worth seeing how shifts in hormone levels relate to shifts in other measures of EE. It is not clear whether EE shifts are related to absolute or relative levels of testosterone, and of other physiologically active substances. In any case, whatever physiological substrate is involved must interact with the cognitive components by which EE is carried along as a propensity to respond positively or negatively toward particular kinds of interactional situations; and with the level of mutual focus and emotional entrainment that constitute the immediate process of social action.

Facial expression. I do not place emphasis on facial expressions as indicators of EE. Ekman and Friesen's (1975/1984, 1978) manual shows the ways in which specific emotions are expressed in the several zones of the face, such as joy, anger, fear, sadness, and disgust. But these are indicators of the short-term, disruptive emotions. It is not clear that there are specific facial indicators for high and low EE. It is possible that facial measures of EE could be developed. High EE should be found in facial expressions of confidence and enthusiasm; low EE as expresssions of apathy and depression. These should be distinguished from facial indicators of momentary happiness and sadness, since high and low EE should be prolongations across situations.

Even if facial measures are not the best way to measure EE, I would urge microsociologists to study Ekman's facial indicators of emotions and make use of them in situational observations; they provide useful auxiliary information, and may show patterns of short-term emotional expression that are related in various ways with flows of EE across situations. Ekman's research (1984) is valuable also because it indicates which zones of the face are most easily controlled by deliberate efforts to mask emotions, while other zones tend to express spontaneous emotions.

It would be useful to study all or several of these measures simultaneously. Especially worthwhile would be to compare each of the objective measures—body posture and movement, eyes, voice, etc.—with self-reports of high or low confidence and initiative. Arriving at objective measures is desirable insofar as they are less intrusive, and thus easier to use in observational research. The result of such multi-measure studies should be to show which measures are redundant, and which are most highly correlated with long-term patterns (i.e., with the flow of EE across situations).

The two approaches to measuring EE—subjective self-observation and objective observation of other people—may also be used together. If subjective measures are pursued, persons can become better self-observers by training in objective measures, enabling them to attend to one's own bodily sensations, movements, and postures in detail, as well as to those around them.

What I would like to stress, in using either subjective or objective measures, is that these processes always happen in micro-interactional situations; the level of EE should always be studied in relation to the kind of situation that is occuring at the moment, and within the chain of situations from the immediate past. It is less useful, in using subjective measurements (such as questionnaires, interviews, or time-diaries), to ask for a global assessment: "how much enthusiasm, confidence, and energy (or depression, apathy) have you been experiencing in your life?" Such information gives an indication of the overall drift of situational outcomes, but it is more valuable to be able to show what the situational conditions are in which these observations take place.[24]

To study shifts of EE in real-life situations, it would be desirable to follow people's experiences across a chain of interactions. A medium-term design would be necessary. Possibly this could be constructed in a laboratory situation lasting several days. Observation in natural conditions would also be desirable, especially to estimate how long emotional effects of interactions may last. I suspect, however, that the time-decay of emotional energy, if it is not reinvested and reinforced by subsequent interactions, may be less than a few days.

Chapter 4

INTERACTION MARKETS AND MATERIAL MARKETS

Individuals move through their everyday lives encountering other people with whom they carry out some degree of interaction ritual, ranging from the barest utilitarian encounters and failed rituals to intensely engaging ritual solidarity. Who each person will interact with and at what degree of ritual intensity depends on who he or she has the opportunity to encounter and what they have to offer each other that would attract them into carrying out an interaction ritual. Not everyone is going to be attracted to everyone else, and these patterns thus take on the character of a market for interaction rituals. Sociologists have long made use of particular versions of interpersonal markets: the marriage market; the dating market; in recent history, the evolution of the latter into a market for various kinds of shorter or longer-term sexual liasons—or set of markets, subdivided for example into heterosexual, gay, bisexual, etc. (Waller 1937; Laumann et al. 1994; Ellingson and Schroeder 2000). By extension, we can conceive of a friendship market, which among other things accounts for the tendency for people to find their friends in the same social class and culture group (Allan 1979; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). With a further generalization, we arrive at a view of the entire macro-distribution of social encounters across time and space as a market for interaction rituals of varying degrees of intensity.

The market for interaction rituals provides a way of conceptualizing the connection between micro and macro. As critics of radical micro-sociology have pointed out, situations do not stand alone: any particular situation is surrounded by other situations that the participants have already been in; they may look ahead to other situations in the future, some of which are alternatives to interacting with the person one happens to have in front of him or her at the moment, like people at a cocktail party looking over the shoulder of their boring conversation partner to see who else they might talk to. This is just what makes interactions market-like. It also explains the quality that situations have: a degree of emergence, where things can happen that have not happened before and that an individual could not anticipate from his or her own experience alone; but also a degree of constraint or even coercion, such as in the feeling of being trapped because there are only certain people available whom one can talk with (or be friends with,