This article reviews the evolution of foreign policy analysis (FPA) in Latin America since the 1970s, when these studies began to grow and incorporate theoretical approaches coming mostly from the United States or mainstream FPA (Gámez 2005:132). But, though the models were imported, the issues of interest to Latin Americans—development, autonomy, the state—acquired specific traits and led to the need to adapt imported approaches, producing Latin American hybrids (Tickner 2003). Along time, Latin American FPA emphasis on the approaches employed and in issue areas has changed. It is hard, however, to generalize for the region without taking into account national variations that influence the way academics see foreign policy.

In this sense, Jorgensen’s (2000) ideas about European FPA provide an interesting framework for understanding the Latin American experience. Jorgensen (2000:10) criticizes the fact that theoretical developments in IR/FPA are presented as the result of external events (the end of the cold war, for example) or of epistemological progress (so every wave of new theory relegates previous ones), and that those results are considered “universal,” implicitly assuming that there is no difference among cultural contexts. In order to question this vision, Jorgensen traces the participation of European scholars in FPA debates, considering those debates as defining moments of the discipline.

In the first post World War II years, mainstream FPA was characterized by the dominance of realism as a result of the first debate, but Continental Europe followed a different path. In a divided, defeated, and weakened Germany—where that paradigm had been dominant before the war—scholars moved instead from realism to liberalism. Additionally, Scandinavian scholars remained immune to realism and continued to prefer more liberal-minded interpretations, due to cultural factors (Jorgensen 2000:14). Thus, political and cultural domestic circumstances influenced the way in which authors interpreted IR and foreign policy.

Regarding the debate between “traditionalism and behaviorism” (or second debate), after a few attempts to introduce statistical analysis and game theory,
Jorgensen concludes that European FPA remained impervious to behaviorism, frustrated by the scarcity of results and also influenced by the feeling that this was an alien debate. In the debate between positivist and post-positivist theories (or third debate), European concerns again move in a different direction. Jorgensen (2000:17) attributes this to the different level of importance of the rational choice model—while American post-positivists are reacting to its central role in US FPA, in Europe it has never been considered the dominant theory.

But, if mainstream debates have had little impact on European FPA, theoretical concerns have not been absent and have generated their own debates among European authors (Jorgensen 2000:28). To illustrate national variations in those debates, Jorgensen (2000:15) explores the case of the French academic community, following Giessen’s (1995) characterization of French IR literature. According to him, French scholars write for two different audiences—the domestic and the international; connect to dominant general approaches rather than to marginal new models applying to specific issue areas, and since the end of World War II, write within a context dominated by the ideas of Aron (1963) and Renouvin and Duroselle (1964) (Jorgensen 2000:24). This way, Giesen provides insights into the different academic milieu and their status-seeking devices (Jorgensen 2000:25).

Though Giesen considers French IR as a language area, this approach can be applied as well to national traditions, within which academic organizational culture and the habits, attitudes, and professional discourse of social sciences scholars constitute the cultural-institutional context of IR/FPA (Jorgensen 2000:11, 30). In another article, Jorgensen (2004:27–28, 35) remarked that academics may be affected by “implicit assumptions, intuitive comparison, propositions that are taken for granted and unquestioned points of departure,” so their understandings may have an impact on our understanding of the observed.

In our perspective, Jorgensen’s contribution lies in the following: (i) demonstrating that FPA may develop outside mainstream studies, something that may be inferred by the pursuit of its own debates; (ii) extending Giesen’s interpretation of the French case study to different IR/FPA national academic traditions; and (iii) emphasizing the role of the cultural-institutional context in FPA. Thus, it is possible to justify a revision of Latin American FPA enriched by Jorgensen’s contribution. In order to do this, the following section explores the evolution of FPA in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile, linking that evolution with external theoretical influences and cultural-institutional contexts. In the third section, we discuss our findings while looking for broad general trends.

Case studies

Brazil

According to Miyamoto (1999:86), until the mid-1970s, academics skirted studies of Brazilian international behavior due to the fact that information from governmental archives was practically off limits at the beginning of the military regime and self-censorship led to avoid debate over current events. During the 1980s, the emphasis of Brazilian FPA was on relations with Argentina. Only in the 1990s, the analysis of Brazilian foreign policy toward the rest of the world gained academic attention. Until then, FPA studies have dealt, first, with historical,

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1 Thies (2002:148) considers that disciplinary debates help forge and maintain a social identity for members of academic communities.

2 These are the Latin American nations with high levels (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina) and medium levels (Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) of academic production (Albornoz 2006:94). Peru was omitted due to problems while gathering data.
political, and geopolitical issues, and secondly, with economic and cultural ones (Miyamoto 1999:96). Cervo (1994:12–13) also claims that before the 1980s, there was mostly diplomatic history—centered in subjects of historical or juridical importance, describing isolated facts from the perspective of national foreign ministries, and lacking overall explanation.

This interpretation discounts the contribution of authors who saw autonomy as the key to escape the determinism of dependency theory, born in the 1960s as a combination of Marxism and the global system theory (Cardoso and Faletto 1969; Santos 1969). In IR, dependency established as the dominant trait of dependent states their lack of sovereignty, which could only be altered by breaking with the developed center nations through revolution ("confrontational autonomy"). The main contribution of dependency was to link the IPE concepts of development and underdevelopment with IR, but the link between economic dependency and foreign policy does not allow for specific hypothesizing (van Klaveren 1984:8–9 in Gámez 2005:137). Dependency can explain why states with diverse national characteristics act similarly under the same external limitations, but it cannot explain why states with similar international power act differently or alter their foreign policies, in response to the same external events (Lasagna 1996).

Against dependency determinism, Jaguaribe (1979) considered that to change the situation national elites should maintain good relations with the center, while supporting their own development projects. This reformist alternative disregarded the dependency notion that socialism was necessarily associated with the possibility of reaching "national autonomy" but retained development as a precondition of autonomy (Packenham 1992:127). Jaguaribe established a four steps international scale for autonomy—international supremacy, regional supremacy, autonomy, dependency, and the existence of sector supremacy, as the one that oil resources granted Venezuela. Nations could move from dependency to autonomy by combining static and dynamic elements, so autonomy was a capacity and an exercise demanding the combination of elements (Tokatlian 1996:39).

The autonomy debate in Brazilian IR/FPA revolved around the concepts of "confrontational autonomy" and "national autonomy," while mainstream FPA was immersed in the second debate, so scholars remained tied to realism. Regarding the academic context, during the 1970s, Brazilian autonomists considered that, after the military coup of 1964, US economic and political influence had considerably grown. At the same time, they found a more positive situation outside Brazil because other governments were entering the nonaligned movement away from the US.

Both the late military governments—after steep oil prices threatened the Brazilian economy in 1974—and the democratic ones after 1985 linked autonomy with the development model, implementing Jaguaribe’s ideas (Drekonja 1986). The democratic governments also moved from "autonomy through distance" to "autonomy through participation", which meant going from a policy of not automatically accepting international regimes to another of trying to influence their formulation (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007:1313). The existing development model—based on industrialization by import-substitution—was affected by the need to renegotiate the huge external debt contracted by Brazil. Accordingly, since the end of the 1980s, the governments of Fernando Collor de Melo/Itamar Franco (1990–1994) and Fernando H. Cardoso (1995–1999) submitted to the conditionality of the International Monetary Fund/IMF, while looking for rapprochement with the United States. Brazil, however, objected to the Free Trade Area of the Americas/FTAA, in the 1990s, with IPE arguments regarding Brazilian level of industrialization and the need to protect its Latin American export markets (Bandeira 2005).
In parallel, after redemocratization, the pluralist approach enriched Brazilian FPA by including perceptions of the intentions, capabilities, and actions which inspired states (Vaz 2005). Relations between state and society were incorporated to FPA, with the state at the center of a competition among interests groups. Cervo and Bueno (1992) privileged multiple causation and levels of analysis, but retained the notion of the unitary state as international actor (Dos Santos 2005:26). Soon Silva (1995) added perceptions, beliefs, and ideas, incorporating cognitive elements.

The pluralist analysis led to study IR as an arena in which diverse political discourses combat each other, and FPA began to be understood at the level of political discourse and the mutual perceptions of nations born from them, with emphasis on constructivism among the approaches stressing ideational explanations (Bernal-Meza 2006a). Cervo (1998, 2001), for example, considers that foreign policy is supported by a paradigm shared by the governing elite, implying a set of values that in Brazil have been the preference for economic development via industrialization and the search for a peaceful international environment (Bernal-Meza 2006b:71).

For Cervo (2008), theories of international relations apply to developed nations and, in developing nations, should be replaced by concepts. He sees social constructivism as the most important contribution of the postmodernist debate because for Wendt concepts are conscious historical social constructions, with national or regional roots, that acquire importance when theories no longer facilitate general explanations. Concepts express the culture of a nation and its academic community, and, once constructed, become incorporated to the corpus of knowledge of that nation, helping to provide explanations and make explicit national values. The difference between his ideas and Wendt’s is that Cervo (2008:22–23) considers ideas objects that influence foreign policy, and Wendt sees them as research variables.

Concepts are apprehended through empirical observation of a foreign policy history, so they are inductively developed (Cervo 2003:7). Through observation, analysts can reconstruct the main ideas behind a foreign policy and see whether they originate from national identity, collective interests, an international vision or these three elements. Concepts become paradigms (or “ideas fuerza”) when applied to foreign policy, and they include ideology and politics, national interest, and economic relations.

Cervo has influenced studies emphasizing identity, collective mentalities or “ideas fuerza” as the basis for autonomous foreign policies in Latin America (Lafer 2002; Colacrai and Lorenzini 2005). Bernal-Meza (2006a,b) considers this the expression of an IR School of Brasilia because Cervo teaches at the University of Brasilia, a public university consulted by policymakers due to its prestige and physical proximity to the seat of the national government (Botto 2007:110). For Bernal-Meza, the School of Brasilia is the most important contribution to FPA in the region, but, without ignoring the high quality of works by Vaz (2002), Bandeira (2003), and Cervo (2003, 2008), Cervo’s “ideas fuerza” are similar to the “profound forces” inspiring state behavior during crisis situations, according to French IR historian Renouvin (Renouvin and Duroselle 1964; Dos Santos 2005). Thus, Cervo’s contribution seems to be the adaptation of European historical methods and notions. As Giessen (1995) in Jorgensen 2000:23–24) considers that the dominant influence of Renouvin in French-speaking IR was due to the fact that it was seen as “a strategy of self-reliance against the Americanization of the field,” this element may also exist in Brazil.

In the 2000s, there has also been a rebirth of “confrontational autonomy” studies. For Saraiva (2010), the intellectual premises of Brazilian foreign policy are autonomy and the feeling that Brazil must fulfill a central role in the global arena, but its manifestations are realist—economic development and power.
During the 1990s, autonomists and pragmatic institutionalists confronted each other in the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Itamaraty). Meanwhile, the opening of the economy turned foreign policy into an issue of interest for different social groups, and Itamaraty lost its exclusive role in its formulation.

A different interpretation (Lima 2000, Veiga 2007 in Epsteyn 2009) credits the politicization of the FTAA discussion as the fact that led to Itamaraty’s loss of power, due to the activation of those who opposed and supported the agreement. If business had an enhanced role in the 1990s, the Lula Da Silva administration (2003–2010) re-concentrated decision-making power in the state. Brazilian foreign policy is determined by the political and institutional structure of the state, which regulates interactions with social actors, and the conceptual framework of decision makers based on previous interactions (Epsteyn 2009); in this case, the conceptual framework of the Lula administration was based on autonomy.

Brazilian autonomists in the 2000s followed the 1970s interpretations—predominance of external events, mainly actions and policies by the United States, and the need to adopt a confrontational stand (Guimaraes 2003). This traditional and nationalist line of thought marked the return to elements of non-intervention and sovereignty and the weakening of "autonomy by participation" in international regimes, an approach that supports international values (democracy, human rights, etc.) (Saraiva 2010). As the autonomists took control of key positions in Itamaraty with Lula, Brazilian academics got polarized into divergent interpretations of contemporary foreign policy.

Regarding the cultural-institutional context, during the Brazilian military regime there was a relative moderate repression of academics, who, when targeted, migrated from public to private institutions inside the country (Trindade 2005). This explains why academics forced into exile, after 1973, by the Chilean military government chose to settle in Brazil (Trindade 2005:316, 322). The slow and gradual transition to democracy was another reason why social sciences scholars were not as negatively affected in Brazil, as they were in the rest of the Southern Cone (Trindade 2005:328).

During the military regime, academics developed links with opposition politicians, both from the centrist PMDB and the leftist PT, and after redemocratization this allowed the formation of a Brazilian foreign policy community including them (Lima and Hirst 2006). Members of this community share consensus regarding Brazil’s aspiration to play an influential international role but are divided about the means to reach that goal: one group considers that Brazil should increase its capacity by cooperating in the creation of global rules and institutions; the other emphasizes the search for autonomy by collaborating with similar countries of the region (Lima and Hirst 2006).

Since the creation of the first undergraduate course in IR in the 1970s, FPA production increased aided by the institutionalization of the field, the growth of the labor market for IR/FPA academics, and government financing of study centers and investing in postgraduate studies and a program of international scholarships (Rosar 2002:112–120; Souza 2011). This way the cultural-institutional context was positive for disciplinary expansion and research.

**Argentina**

Most reviews of theoretical foreign policy studies in the 1970s include Puig (1975). He developed the notion "heterodox autonomy," which allows a dependent state to accept the strategic leadership of a center state and also to diverge in internal model of development, nonstrategic international linkages and national interests (Corigliano 2009a). During the military regime in Argentina, Puig exiled himself in Venezuela and published Doctrinas internacionales y
autonomía latinoamericana (1980), presenting a typology of autonomy in dependent nations (Corigliano 2009b).

Under the military regime, Argentine academics turned to the study of bureaucratic politics and made an intensive use of archives, abandoning theoretical generalizations for concrete and specific studies (Rappoport 1990 in Simonoﬀ 2003:5). The academic community was negatively affected by the resignation and emigration of university professors and the closing of the career of political science.

The defeat of Argentina in the Southern Atlantic War (1982), the return of democracy (1984), and the end of the Cold War have been credited with enhanced interest on internal factors and ways of international insertion. As a consequence, instrumental questions have had the upper hand since then (Simonoﬀ 2003:6), though the autonomy debate coexisted with this trend until the 2000s.

Redemocratization and the return of academics schooled in American and European universities contributed to FPA along the 1980s and 1990s (Corigliano 2009b). During the 1980s, Argentine FPA was influenced, at the macrolevel by the Marxist-Gramscian approach of Cox, the complex interdependency model of Keohane and Nye, the classic realism of Morgenthau, and the structural realism of Waltz, while at the microlevel, the dominant influences were Graham Allison (bureaucratic politics) and Charles and Margaret Hermann (decision-making processes) (Colacrai 1992). Also, Rapoport (1984) and Escudé (1983) criticized dependency, questioned the concept of the state as a rational actor, explored the incidence of individual factors, and called attention to gray areas in interbureaucratic relations (Corigliano 2009b).

In that atmosphere, Escudé (1988, 1989) developed the concept of peripheral realism. The main foreign policy objective of dependent nations is economic development, and gestures of autonomy should be abandoned if they run against that objective and contribute to isolate or marginalize them. A dependent, vulnerable, and little strategically valued state should formulate foreign policy on the basis of two objectives—politically, to reduce costs and risks by cooperating with center powers in areas that do not endanger national interest; economically, to limit and desideologize confrontation in order to achieve development. Autonomy can only be constructed by internal economic development and not by foreign policy maneuvering.

During the 1970s, dependency theory had stressed the dominant position of the United States as the regional hegemon and made confrontation the alternative. The autonomists presented the possibility of exercising heterodox autonomy through the actions of national elites with their own development projects. Escudé (1995) produced something different—autonomy in foreign policy should be weighed against the costs in terms of economic development (Tickner 2007).

In Argentina, the discussion of peripheral realism dominated the late 1980s and the 1990s, and implied an autonomy debate which had been delayed by the military regime. Criticism of Escudé’s concept focused in its determinism, its utilitarian character (Russell and Tokatlian 2001), and the lack of an ethical component (Souto Zabaleta 2004). Escudé and his critics saw change in foreign policy as a product of the overall structural transformation of Argentina. If the transition to democracy made the first democratic administration (Raúl Alfonsín, 1983–1988) concentrate on domestic political change, the second one (Carlos Menem, 1989–1999) emphasized economic problems and considered that confrontation was dysfunctional in a context of domestic hyperinflation (Noto 1995). The debate became politicized after the Foreign Minister employed Escudé’s arguments to justify rapprochement with the United States. But peripheral realism was developed along the 1980s, after Argentina had suffered military
defeat and needed to reinsert itself into the international system, so the concept followed an independent evolution from the government (Souto Zabaleta 2004).

Though Vásquez (1989) developed the notion of “realist autonomy,” exemplified by Argentine attempts at autonomy in regional matters, the axis of the debate ran between “peripheral realism” (Escudé) and “peripheral neo-idealism” (Russell 1991). The second considered that the foreign policy of a dependent nation cannot be limited to economic matters, and should not support actions of center nations which oppose national interests or violate international law. This concept, however, did not reach the same level of attention as peripheral realism.

In the 2000s, the factor that made academics look for new approaches to FPA was the financial *debacle* of Argentina (December 2001) close after the September 2001 events in New York (Corigliano 2009b). Russell and Tokatlian (2001) created “relational autonomy” to explain the reorientation of Argentine foreign policy from alignment with Washington to enhanced friendship with Brazil, which had become an example of the possibility of developing an autonomous foreign policy. For them, total dependency and autonomy are ideal types or poles in a continuum, while relational autonomy depends on the capacities, capabilities, and power resources of a state and the complex external landscape. The main characteristic of these factors is that they are not fixed.

Regarding the cultural-institutional context, Russell (http://fvaccarezza.wordpress.com/2006/12/01/el-desarrollo-de-la-teoria-de-lasrii [accessed February 2011]) has stated that the production of theoretical studies on foreign policy in Argentina is almost nil, and the little that exists is rather poor. Merke (2008) links this to the fact that IR academic programs in Argentina teach realism and liberalism, in a second place world theory, dependency and neo-Marxism, and recently, constructivism. The space devoted to theory in published studies is small, so most of them are empirical case studies with little possibilities of contributing to generalizations (Merke 2008:3). Also the political agenda of the government affects FPA, which concentrates on subjects of contemporary interest (Merke 2008:13).

**Mexico**

The first Mexican foreign policy studies had a pragmatic and empiric character (Borja Tamayo 1992). But, though juridical and normative studies had dominated the field before, during the 1970s, realist studies (Ojeda 1976), IPE studies (mostly with a Marxist or dependency theory orientation, like Meyer 1972) and internal causation studies (Pellicer 1980) appeared. Thus, in Mexico, studies of foreign policy incorporated theory in the 1970s, though there was not a big upsurge of contributions until the beginning of the 1980s. At that time, bureaucratic politics studies and complex interdependency became the favorite approaches of Mexican foreign policy researchers (Peña Guerrero 1981; Chanona 1984; Green 1986; Heredia 1986; Casar and González 1990).

Though IR/FPA development was clearly linked to the application of American theoretical models, Gil Villegas (1989:668) considers that Mexican FPA shows more affinity with similar studies in Latin American nations than with US FPA. This can be seen in the importance granted to autonomy, development, and relations with the United States. Against “structural or Marxist dependency”, Domínguez (1978) postulated “nonorthodox dependency,” a concept equally applied to countries under the American and Soviet areas of influence, which emphasized the need to diversify dependency from one to many centers. Garza Elizondo (1984:450, quoted in Gil Villegas 1989:673–674) questioned the value of autonomy *per se*, and considered this to get meaning by its link with development. This also appeared in Ojeda (1964), for whom an autonomous
Mexican foreign policy was meaningful if it puts an end to economic underdevelopment. “Relevance” (meaning pertinence or connection with the matters at hand) is, for Gil Villegas (1989:681), the key element determining the issues of interest to Mexican and Latin American FPA and explaining the lack of efforts at developing a theoretical Mexican IR/FPA school.

In the 1990s, the debate on peripheral realism found echo in Mexico because this nation was experiencing, like Argentina, a major shift in its foreign policy toward the United States (Anzelini 2008:103), exemplified by the negotiation of the NAFTA. It added to the realist notion of Ojeda (1976:80), who considered that Mexico could not oppose its neighbor too much, and that the situation between the two had developed into “an agreement to disagree,” with Mexico following a legalistic international foreign policy and avoiding direct conflict (Gil Villegas 1989:672). Dominguez (1996:22) emphasized the government need to lock in domestic economic and political reforms through an international agreement, at a time when Mexico was experiencing the end of more than 50 years of government control by the PRI.

During the 1990s, there was also a debate between realism and interdependency and efforts to develop new notions to translate the experience of Mexican foreign policy. Thus, Chabat (1996) called “imperfect interdependency” the way in which Mexico inserted itself at the global level. Geographic proximity to the United States, strategic natural resources, the possibility of producing massive migrations to the North and drug trafficking problems determined Mexican fragmented insertion, according to which its interdependency is larger in certain areas than in others.

Though Mexican FPA got closer to external theoretical trends, not all approaches attracted the same attention. Mexican authors used sparingly until 1992 individual psychologic approaches, analysis of negotiation processes, and combined analysis of external and internal factors (Borja Tamayo 1992). As only in 1964 Ojeda had argued in favor of considering IR a separate and autonomous field of research, this short time span should be taken into consideration when assessing the state of the art (Gil Villegas 1989).

During the 2000s, Mexican academics used theoretical FPA approaches with unexpected results. Gámez (2001) applied Allison’s model to the Salinas de Gortari administration (1989–1994). Though bureaucratic politics imply negotiation among groups holding diverse positions—and as a consequence, the result is not necessarily rational—the Mexican foreign policy assumed (NAFTA and entry into the OECD) turned out to be the most rational option due to the internal cohesion of the technocratic group in charge of policymaking and its isolation from political and social pressures.

González (2005) analyzed patterns of continuity and change in Mexican diplomatic strategies toward Latin America, looking at the impact of systemic variables on regional foreign policy. By comparing two moments—one during the Cold War and another after its end—she showed more continuity than difference in regional policy and that the realist systemic approach failed to explain the persistent gap between rhetoric and action in that policy.

A revision of articles published in the first 100 issues of the academic magazine Relaciones Internacionales (UNAM)—founded in 1973—(Cid Capetillo 2008:48) shows that, though there is a constant dialog with American approaches, Mexican authors are also comfortable applying Spanish, French, and English normative approaches with historical and sociological roots. This may explain the number of Marxist and neo-Marxist-oriented studies published in the magazine (Cid Capetillo 2008:35). The revision added that there is not an

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3 Mexican policy toward the Cuban revolution shows its ability to disagree in specific issues (Dominguez 1996).
IR academic community or Mexican school of IR, due to the lack of debate about shared concepts or approaches.

At the end of the 2000s, the autonomy question mainly appeared in radical studies dealing with globalization and regional integration and the postmodernist debate was limited to the opposition between material and ideal influences (constructivism). In 1989, Gil Villegas had reached a different conclusion—in Mexico recurrent themes of interest were the possibility of exercising an autonomous foreign policy, foreign policy as a tool of national development, and relations with the US, the same lines identified by Muñoz (1987) as dominant themes in Latin American FPA. Regarding this affirmation, however, national variations have always existed.

**Venezuela**

During the 1980s and the 1990s, special attention was paid to foreign policy toward Central America and the Caribbean. An annotated bibliography about Venezuelan foreign policy (Gamus 1997) included 13 pages of references for Central America and the Caribbean in comparison with four for relations with the United States and four, with the rest of Latin America, including Brazil. Approaches varied from decision-making analysis (Cardozo 1992) and game-theory (Romero 1983) to realism (Gamus 1993) and Marxism (Carrera 1988). Security and defense considerations (Muller Rojas 1986) also attracted attention, while frontier matters were still dominated by traditional studies (Carpio Castillo 1981; Morales Paul 1983), and some Venezuelan academics cooperated with their Colombian colleagues on FPA comparative studies (Lanzetta Muttis 1997; Grupo Académico Binacional 1999).

Most theoretically oriented studies can be credited to the return of researchers formed abroad, who had benefitted from a Venezuelan government-sponsored program of international scholarships during the oil boom years (1974–1979), and to political exiles from the Southern Cone. The autonomy debate did not bloom among Venezuelan authors due to the pragmatism and optimism generated by the boom in the international price of oil (Romero 2003) combined with the influence of American FPA. Only the Binational Academic Group/Grupo Académico Binacional (1999:59) launched the notion of “concerted autonomy” between Colombia and Venezuela in their relationship with the United States, albeit in imprecise terms (Russell and Tokatlian 2003:104).

Jaguaribe and Puig had called for the aggregation of strengths with equals (Colacrai 2005), which in the 1970s took the shape of participation in the non-aligned movement. In the 1990s, this notion reappeared, making regional integration the issue that attracted the largest number of studies, and launching a kind of delayed autonomy debate. This happened at the same time that governments attempted to coordinate positions in the FTAA negotiation, and shows the relationship between Latin American FPA and national foreign policies, which contributes to politicize academic debate.

Carvajal (1993:22–40) linked the rebirth of regional integration between Venezuela and Colombia to the pragmatism of Latin American foreign policies in the 1990s, deriving from the situation of the international system (realism), processes and actors other than politics and the state (interdependency), market considerations (IPE) and a diversity of identities and discourses (postmodernism). For Carvajal (1993:168–169), these elements led to deemphasize frontier problems between Colombia and Venezuela and replaced them by economic and political cooperation.

During the 2000s, the need to assess the drastic changes in Venezuelan foreign policy since 1999 became the dominant theme, with a second line about regional integration and a small group of more theory-oriented frontier studies.
Regarding theoretical approaches, those who support current Venezuelan foreign policy employ Marxism, “confrontational autonomy,” and the notion of collective ideas, while geopolitical elements appear under the guise of a reading of dependency as a political rather than economic problem (González 2001; Equipo de Investigación para la Nueva Integración del Sur 2007:69). Geopolitical factors are also incorporated by those who criticize present Venezuelan foreign policy. They link foreign policy to the strategic advantage of being an oil-exporting nation (Toro Hardy 2008) and stress the importance of oil as an element of continuity with past administrations, though accepting that the intellectual content and the practice of diplomacy have changed. Romero (2003) considers that Venezuelan FPA should incorporate nongovernmental actors, analysis of the presidential discourse, and obstacles to implementation. The cultural-institutional context has changed from the optimism and dynamism of the 1980s and 1990s to a polarized and fragmented situation.

In integration studies, as the current Venezuelan administration supports a nationalist-Marxist perspective, which is basically anti-capitalist and anti-US, this generates two types of debates—one theoretical, regarding ideas about democracy and development, and another political, regarding the capacity of Venezuela to reach integration (Romero 2007). While Cardozo and Romero (2001), Boersner (2008), and Giacalone (2008) focus on the conceptual aspects of Venezuelan foreign policy, Serbin (2009) looks at the domestic interests groups which influence that policy, and Ramírez, Romero, and Sanjuan (2005) continue the tradition of comparative studies between Venezuelan and Colombian authors.

Colombia

Realism was the first dominant approach, due to Colombian authors’ concentration on the state, the question of power, and the interpretation of the national interest (Tokatlian 1991:21–22). However, during the 1980s, Cardona (1990), Ardila et al. (1991), and Pardo (1987, 1988) began to apply new theoretical approaches from American FPA and from the dependency-autonomy debate. Pardo and Tokatlian (1988) developed “relative autonomy.” This is born through the interaction of external and internal factors, such as the capacity of dependent nations to maximize their negotiating power in specific areas by having power attributes in them, the willingness to exert it, and a conscious recognition of the risks involved. Tokatlian (1998:187) summarized this as capacity, willingness, and opportunity, ideas that are the origin of Russell and Tokatlian (2001) “relational autonomy.”

In those years, Cepeda (1982) linked Colombia’s entry to the nonaligned movement with the internal peace process, considering it an attempt of the government to isolate the external variable from a possible internationalization of the guerrilla conflict. Pardo (1988:180) analyzed Colombian participation in the Contadora Group as an effort to grant credibility to internal negotiation with guerrilla groups. Both established the relationship between the external and domestic policy spheres.

In the 1990s, the pragmatism that influenced Colombia to integrate with Venezuela also affected Colombian academics, as Drekonja (1993) reformulated his previous ideas about autonomy. For him, Latin American states should align with the United States, due to the loss of logic in the diversification of bonds with Europe, “the impossibility of gaining access to the middle class”—an unfulfilled goal of the 1970s autonomists—and the redesign of the world after the Cold War (Colacrai 2005). However, other authors tried to adapt the concept of autonomy to the new world context (Tokatlian and Carvajal 1995).

Two perspectives have dominated Colombian foreign policy—aligning with the United States or strengthening relations with Latin America—but even if the
latter allows a higher degree of autonomy, Colombia has never given up the former (Tickner 2003). Alignment (Tickner 2007:176) is not obligated but chosen by the dependent state (“intervention by invitation”), though when the center state changes its objectives it may desestimate its importance. This means that the success of dependent association hinges on the relative interest of a hegemon in a state or region. Cardona (2005) claims, however, that the importance of drug trafficking for the United States and the European Union has made them incorporate drug-related conditionality in negotiations with Colombia, exemplified with their Systems of Generalized Preferences. So Colombia accommodates itself to outside conditionality by powerful actors in order to reach economic development goals, especially since the 1990s.

Regarding postmodern approaches, Carvajal (2009:201) considers constructivism the most important contribution because, if international structure is the consequence of previous processes and the power politics of the international scene are socially constructed, they can also be deconstructed. Previously, Tickner (2002) had reflected on the role of Colombian identity based on constructivist assumptions. She showed that the Colombian state is not a monolithic actor but includes diverse identities and visions, such as those of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and those of the Ministries of Defense, the army and the police.

A study of the role of Colombian IR scholars in foreign policy formulation concluded that they have no links with the government, which considers them naïve or lacking realism and does not provide support for academic work on international issues (Obregón 2005:167). An exception to this trend has been academic participation in the process of designing Colombian foreign policy on migration (Ardila 2009). Tickner (2007) has complained about the scarcity of FPA academic works in Colombia in the 2000s, while Carvajal (2009) considers Colombian FPA parochial and limited, with few theoretically and conceptually structured studies.

**Chile**

Vidigal (2003) credits Chile and Mexico as the Latin American countries that first institutionalized IR studies. Chile benefitted from the creation of the Joint Studies of International Relations in Latin America Program (RIAL) (Herz 2006), in 1977, and, in 1984, of the Follow Up Program on Latin American Foreign Policies (PROSPEL). Both were funded by of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Development Program and the Ford Foundation, and helped produce quite a number of publications since the mid-1980s. Most of RIAL’s leadership was Chilean and its members hailed mostly from that country, Argentina, and Brazil, where military regimes made impossible for them to follow public careers (Tickner 2009:36, 49).

By the end of the 1980s, RIAL have produced FPA studies by Muñoz (1987a,b), Maira (1985) and Tomassini (1987). RIAL disappeared in the 1990s, because with the return of democracy in the Southern Cone and Brazil, most of its members became part of the foreign policy establishment. Some of them also pursued postgraduate studies in the United States and argued that, after the return to democracy, Chile could exercise national autonomy through a foreign policy based on democracy, respect for human rights, and adherence to the rule of law (Tulchin 2010), similar to Brazilian “autonomy through participation.”

In 1985, Quezada reviewed 100 Chilean publications on foreign policy and identified three trends that appeared one after another—diplomatic history, bilateral, and systemic studies. The first had diverse emphasis (juridical, political, and economic). In the second, he distinguished between studies of relations with neighboring nations and with the rest (rather incomplete). The systemic trend
included realist (geopolitics and national security) and IPE studies, together with political analytic studies (quantitative studies, bureaucratic politics, and perceptions). The last ones were in a primitive stage, and IPE studies were the most methodologically updated (Quezada 1985:55, 58–60).

General trends of FPA studies in Chile were (i) dispersion and heterogeneity; (ii) shallow and incomplete studies; (iii) emphasis in contemporary issues; (iv) descriptive and historical studies rather than theoretical ones (Quezada 1985:60). Twenty years later, on the fortieth anniversary of IR studies in the Universidad de Chile, it was noted that the postmodernist debate had been incorporated rather slowly and that researchers were not inclined to meta-theories but preferred more empirical and eclectic approaches (Sánchez 2006:24).

A longitudinal study of Chilean foreign policy (Durán 2009) stressed that since the mid-twentieth century, the professionalization of the Foreign Ministry had provided institutionalized continuity. But, later on, abrupt political change (the military coup of 1973) and the bureaucratic competition between the economic and the political-diplomatic dimensions dominated foreign policy, together with efforts at reconstituting a professionalized foreign policy structure after Chile’s return to democracy (1990).

IR scholars who had not emigrated under the military regime moved to private institutions and concentrated in the Catholic University. Today this academic community exercises little influence in the rest of Chilean IR scholars but has a high level of inter-penetration with governmental bureaucracy (Tickner 2003 quoted in Alvarez Valdez 2009:1). Valdivieso (2009) has also remarked the lack of links between the academic community and the legislative power, and the need to establish them as a way to improve their participation in the decision-making process. However, in Chile as in Colombia, foreign policy bureaucracies have consistently been recruited from universities, so academics may be integrated to foreign policy communities in a different way than in Brazil. In Chile, most foreign policy studies are made by think tanks, formed by former academics after they have left public service, but they deal with strategy rather than theory (Botto 2007:96–97).

General Trends and Cross-National Comparison

According to Vidigal (2003:158–159), the existence of a Latin American thought on IR derives from three factors: (i) the locus (place) of production imposes a certain hierarchy in issues; (ii) there exists a creative appropriation of American and European theoretical approaches; and (iii) the way in which Latin America became inserted in the international sphere determines common lines in these studies. The first factor is clear in Latin American interest in the role of the United States due to its geographic proximity and power; the second recognizes that Latin American IR was born in association with external theoretical influences. And the third factor is the one we explore in this section.

In Latin America, most theory-driven FPA studies appeared during the 1980s (van Klaveren 1984; Puig 1980; Mora and Hey 2003), but some attempts had existed during the previous decade. These mostly dealt with the possibility of exercising an autonomous foreign policy in order to upset its economic dependent insertion, and produced a regional debate aside from the ongoing debate in mainstream FPA.

Almost all authors agreed that an autonomous foreign policy was possible but differed in the way to achieve it, so the autonomy discourse can be de-constructed in several options: dependency/confrontation, national and heterodox, relative and relational, structural, nonorthodox and concerted autonomy. For dependency, autonomous foreign policy was impossible and this situation could be upset only by confronting the hegemon. In the 1970s, by combining association
with the center and the development goals of national bourgeoisies, autonomists inaugurated a concept of autonomy still widely accepted today. This explains why peripheral realism—which deviated from that expectation—did not find a positive reception by academics (Tickner 2003).

Lately, there has been a rebirth of “confrontational autonomy” studies, together with the adoption of 1970s autonomy notions by some Latin American governments. This has produced studies oriented to justify foreign policies of specific administrations, together with another set of studies which has assumed an adversary position regarding those policies. Though this factor has always existed, it means that more Latin American analysts have turned their attention away from theoretical elaborations to politically oriented studies.

By the mid-1990s, few Latin American authors have entered the postmodernist debate, with the exception of Tomassini (1991), Nasi (1998), and Petrash (1998). According to Salomón (2001–2002), the markedly philosophical character of the third debate and its fragmented nature have limited the interest of Latin American academics, more attracted by contemporary and concrete foreign policy problems.

In the 2000s though, more authors were employing constructivism, and Wendt became the most quoted author. Wendt appeals to them because together with the constructed role of institutions, he recognizes that nation states are the main actors of IR. In this sense, Tickner (2002) considers constructivism an intermediate road between state-centered theories and the postmodernist debate. Additionally, constructivism is based in the notion that nations do not have a static set of interests but that they vary, together with their identities and perceptions, following international or national circumstances. Luna Ramírez (2009:29) applies this to the transformation of Venezuelan foreign policy after its 1999 development plan included the objective of forming an anti-US axis. Puyo Tamayo (2009) proposes a constructivist interpretation of Colombian foreign policy since 1902. In Mexico, Toral Cruz (2006) analyzes social actors and the representations and preferences of the state in a situation of interdependency.

Herz (2009:5) remarks that, in Latin America, little interest in the third debate goes hand in hand with little reflection on the state of the discipline in the region. So, with the possible exception of Brazil, the last decade is characterized by disappointment about the quality of Latin American FPA. At the same time, it is clear that, at the end of the 2000s, Latin American FPA is framed by the association of external theoretical influences and domestic circumstances, which can be seen in the coexistence of analytical studies emphasizing constructivism and politicized studies of specific administrations.

Regarding the cultural-institutional context, in Latin American FPA we find most of the elements singled out by Jorgensen in Europe: (i) scholars prefer their own theoretical debates instead of mainstream ones; (ii) the cultural-institutional context admits national variations; and (iii) emphasizing the role of the academic community widens our understanding of FPA evolution. For example, external theoretical influences suffered an adaptation process because scholars not only constructed and maintained their own disciplinary debates—around autonomy—but they also framed them according to their academic and political domestic circumstances, and, in certain instances, influenced them.

Cross-national comparison shows, for example, that after the return of democracy, Brazil continued a nonaligned foreign policy because both military and democratic administrations supported an industrial development model, which had created ideas, interests, and institutions hard to dislodge (Lima and Hirst 2006). Even in the 1990s, when economic conditions produced a pragmatic foreign policy, Brazil did not abandon autonomy but changed it to “autonomy through participation,” substituting active participation in international regimes.
formation for its previous defensive positions (Lima and Hirst 2006). Along this process, Brazilian academics made part of the FPA community.

Argentine democracy instead was achieved after a military defeat, which delegitimized previous policies, and continued the oscillatory movement between development models within a highly controversial domestic setting (Botto 2007:87). For Miranda (2005:50–51), the most important difference between Jaguaribe’s and Puig’s ideas about autonomy is that, while the latter did not influence political, bureaucratic and academic circles in Argentina, the former did in Brazil. The success of Brazilian foreign policy and the failure of the Argentine one—manifested in the 2001 default—had an impact on Latin FPA by reviving interest on the autonomy question and delegitimizing peripheral realism.

The impact of domestic circumstances on Latin American FPA can be seen before. Until the 1980s, the autonomy debate suffered the effects of military regimes in the Southern Cone which produced the displacement of academics within the region. Later on, the external debt crisis of 1982 turned governments and academics’ attention to economic and pragmatic considerations, deemphasizing previous attempts at looking for autonomy.

If domestic political events have influenced the way in which politicians and academics see the foreign policy options available (Lasagna 1996), they also determine the issues of concern to scholars and their choice of theoretical models, besides pushing academics out and into different cultural-institutional contexts, and increasing or diminishing the politicization of debates. All these elements contribute to enhance our understanding of national variations in Latin American FPA as well as of how external theoretical influences and domestic cultural and political circumstances get connected.

References


