



Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy

Author(s): E. Bradford Burns

Source: *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1967), pp. 195-212

Published by: [Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165093>

Accessed: 20/06/2013 17:29

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Journal of Inter-American Studies*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

TRADITION AND VARIATION IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

I

MOUNTING ANXIETIES, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President João Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.

Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government.¹ He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, self-determination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development. A practical way to realize that goal would be through trade. Brazil was ready to trade with anyone, even with the East so long as such commerce "did not serve as the vehicle for unacceptable influences." In another part of his address, the

¹ Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, *A Diplomacia da Revolução Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1964).

president let it be known in unmistakably clear terms that Brazil identified with the Western World in its struggle to protect its values threatened by the Soviet sphere. He committed Brazil to closer Pan American relations and especially to a firmer friendship with the United States. Thus, this policy, at least according to its author, was a return to more established patterns of international behavior. For that reason, Castelo Branco concluded for the young diplomats present that the nation's exterior policy followed the dictums enunciated by the founder of its modern foreign policy, the Baron of Rio-Branco. He advised, "In order to worthily represent Brazil abroad, you need to have nothing more before you than the teachings of Rio-Branco."

II

Brazilians of the twentieth century have regarded those teachings as sacrosanct. The influence of Rio-Branco on diplomacy has been profound. In fact, to understand the diplomacy of the largest Latin American nation during this century it is essential to know that statesman and to understand his work. The Baron of Rio-Branco assumed the portfolio of foreign relations in 1902 and held it for a Latin American record of ten years, during the administrations of four different presidents, until his death in 1912 at the age of sixty-seven. In every respect his long administration was a period of transition, the pivotal point upon which modern foreign policy turned.

His first accomplishment was to settle the four-hundred-year-old boundary disputes between Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking South America by definitively delineating the frontiers. Since remote colonial times, the vague and extensive frontiers had preoccupied Brazil. In the years between discovery, 1500, and the foundation of Belém at the mouth of the Amazon River, 1616, the Luso-Brazilians had conquered the long coastline between the equator and 26° south latitude. In so doing, they expelled foreign interlopers from those domains. With the coast secured, the missionaries, cattlemen, Indian slave hunters, and mining prospectors fanned out into the interior, eventually reaching the foothills of the Andes. Their rapid and deep penetration into the heartland of South America is the most epic chapter of Brazilian history. The Spaniards, more stationary in their mining centers high in the Andes, realized too late that they had forfeited half of the continent to the more restless Luso-Brazilians. In a rare moment of fraternal Iberian sentiment, they agreed in the Treaty of Madrid, 1750, to the principle of *uti possidetis*, thereby conceding to Brazil a frontier similar in its broad outlines to the modern one. The years after 1750 were spent

trying to work out the details as to precisely where the boundaries should fall. The newly emergent states of South America inherited that search.

The able diplomats of the empire (1822-1889) devoted most of their energy to those boundary problems. Their work was facilitated by a strong continuity of policy, a characteristic noticeably absent in the neighboring Spanish American republics. They slowly prepared the necessary groundwork upon which future agreements were to be made, always insisting on the principle of *uti possidetis*, which, needless to say, favored the empire's claims. Rio-Branco continued in the best traditions of the empire to attempt to come to boundary agreements with the neighbors. Thanks to his intimate knowledge of South American history and geography and to considerable patience and skill, he won a series of brilliant victories beginning with the arbitration award of the Missions territory made by President Grover Cleveland in 1895 and ending with the agreement with Peru in 1909. The "Golden Chancellor" delineated nearly nine thousand miles of frontier and bloodlessly won for his country approximately 342,000 square miles of territory, an area larger than France. In that way, he brought to a successful and peaceful conclusion more than four centuries of expansion and consolidation, as well as concern with just and legal recognition of that expansion and consolidation. An era in diplomatic history ended.

The Baron's second accomplishment during his long tenure was to set the course for a new foreign policy. Under his direction, Brazil lifted its eyes from the more limited horizons of the frontiers to the world beyond. At peace with its neighbors, enjoying unprecedented prosperity at home thanks to increasing coffee sales abroad, Brazil was ready to play a new role on a larger international stage. Rio-Branco's new foreign policy for the nation consisted of four related goals.

First, he sought to increase national prestige abroad. The newly renovated and augmented navy called at more foreign ports to show the flag. The number of diplomats in Rio de Janeiro and the number of Brazilian diplomats abroad increased. The government invited distinguished foreigners, such as Elihu Root, Georges Clemenceau, and Julio Roca, to visit Brazil. Brazilian representatives made their debut at world congresses. Indeed, nothing revealed the new international interests better than the attitude toward the two Hague peace conferences. Brazil declined an invitation to attend the first one claiming that no questions of national interest would be discussed. Eight years later, clearly under the influence of Rio-Branco, Brazil not only eagerly accepted an invitation to the second conference but sent one of the

largest delegations (larger than that of the United States for example) under the leadership of an outstanding jurist, Ruy Barbosa, who played an active role in the discussions and held the position of *president d'honneur* of the commission responsible for arbitration.

Second, he wanted Brazil to exercise a leadership role in Latin America in general, but in South America in particular. Diplomatic missions were established in those capitals which hitherto had lacked Brazilian representation. Rio-Branco coordinated the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican recognition of Panama. Ruy Barbosa spoke with the support of all of Latin America when he demanded the equality of nations on the arbitration court debated at The Hague. The foreign office helped to mediate the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, found a solution for the impasse over the Alsop claims threatening Chilean-United States relations, and urged the United States to send a permanent diplomatic representative to Paraguay.

Third, the Baron placed a new emphasis on Pan Americanism. Brazil, set apart from the rest of the hemisphere for nearly a century because of its unique monarchical institutions, joined the fraternity of republics in 1889, the same year in which the modern Pan American movement got under way. The amicable settlement of the frontier problems put to rest the major potential source of conflict between Brazil and its neighbors so that inter-American friendship could become a reality. Whatever the personal feelings of the Brazilians toward their sister republics, all responsible leaders understood the importance of friendly relations with them. On Pan Americanism, Rio-Branco wrote, "I express the deep hope which we have that the spirit of cooperation and good will manifested in the American conferences will produce the practical results we all ought to desire to see realized in America."² He organized the highly successful third Pan American conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, which consolidated and gave permanence to the Pan American movement.

Fourth, he closely aligned his country with the United States, thereby shifting Brazil's diplomatic axis from London to Washington. Throughout the nineteenth century Great Britain enjoyed a commercial and financial monopoly over Brazil, and the English government served as the unofficial model for the Second Empire. In contrast, the republican constitution of 1891 was based heavily upon that of the United

² Rio-Branco to Domício da Gama, Sept. 28, 1911, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (hereafter cited as AHI), Despachos 235/2/8.

States, the new political mentor. Also, by the last decades of the century, the North American market was by far the prime purchaser of Brazil's exports. And furthermore, the elite had been prepared to accept such a shift because of the convincing arguments put forth throughout the nineteenth century by such precursors of the idea of approximation as the Marquis of Aracati in 1827, Sérgio Teixeira Macedo in 1848, Tavares Bastos in 1862, and Salvador de Mendonça in 1891.

There existed then a political, economic, and psychological gravitation of Brazil toward the United States. Rio-Branco foresaw that the newly emergent world power, if properly cultivated, could serve well Brazilian interests. He classified Washington as the "number one" post of importance for Brazilian diplomacy and counseled his diplomats there to maintain the closest contact with the State Department.³ In its turn, Washington seemed delighted with the overt friendship of the largest Latin American republic. The two nations exchanged ambassadors in 1905; Washington thereby received the first Brazilian ambassador, the distinguished and pro-American Joaquim Nabuco, and Rio de Janeiro welcomed the only United States ambassador accredited to South America. The visit of Elihu Root to Rio de Janeiro in 1906—the first visit of a secretary of state abroad—climaxed the growing *entente* between the two giant republics and served notice to the rest of the hemisphere of the special relationship existing between them.

Close relations with the United States, Pan Americanism, Latin American leadership, and international prestige were the four major points of the new foreign policy. Those goals were being implemented at the same time that Itamaraty, as the Ministry of Foreign Relations is known, was bringing frontier diplomacy to a successful conclusion. That foreign policy constituted the legacy of the Baron of Rio-Branco.

III

In the five decades following the Baron's death, his policies became traditional and his successors proudly carried them out. His exalted position in diplomatic history, or, for that matter, in national history, placed him beyond the pale of criticism. To question the wisdom of his policies would have been—perhaps still is—tantamount to treason.

So it was, then, that Brazil took an active part in the increasingly

³ Rio-Branco's statements to this effect were frequent. As examples see: Rio-Branco to Brazilian Minister, Washington, Jan. 5, 1903, AHI, Teleg. Exp. 235/3/15; or Rio-Branco to American Legation, Feb. 20, 1903, AHI, Rep. Americanas, Notas, EUA, 208/3/15.

frequent Pan American conferences, more often than not expressing ideas harmonious with those of the United States. There were ample opportunities to demonstrate leadership of the Latin American community: in the peace conferences following both world wars, at the League of Nations, in the Leticia affair, and in the settlement of the Chaco War. International prestige continued to be a desired if somewhat nebulous goal. The Brazilians left the League of Nations because they received no permanent seat on the council; decades later Brazil was elected for the fifth time to the Security Council of the United Nations, a vote of confidence pleasing to its quest for international recognition.

The single most important question which arose over the proper interpretation and execution of the Rio-Branco policy concerned the degree of cooperation Brazil should give to the United States. That question was settled soon after the Baron's death. Domício da Gama, whom Rio-Branco appointed ambassador to Washington in 1911, grew increasingly suspicious of "dollar diplomacy," and there is reason to believe that the chancellor himself developed a distaste for it just before his death.⁴ Distracted at the unfavorable attitude of the United States government toward the valorization scheme his government had adopted to save the falling price of coffee and at the impending anti-trust suit against the storage of coffee in the United States, Ambassador da Gama chose the usually cordial dinner of the Pan American Society in New York City to criticize, in the presence of the Secretary of State, American policy:

My hopes for a new era in our commercial relations received a heavy blow with the endorsement by the Government of the United States of the somewhat arbitrary and quite revolutionary doctrine of paying for other people's merchandise not the price they ask for it, but the price the United States, I mean the American merchants, want to pay for it. It is a brand-new doctrine, and the United States seemed disposed to enforce it even to the sacrifice of long standing international friendship. In their eagerness to establish their right to meddle with the property of a foreign state certain officials of this government went as far as to proclaim before an American court of justice the forfeiture of the sovereignty of that foreign state and this with an unthoughtfulness of the consideration due to a friendly government which confines with the boundaries of international discourtesy. So you see, Mr. Chairman, we, the South Americans, have still much to learn of the new American ways in dealing with foreign

⁴ Rio-Branco to Brazilian Embassy, Washington, Nov. 22, 1909, AHI, Teleg. Exp. 235/4/1; Da Gama to Rio-Branco, Jan. 31, 1912, AHI, Ofícios 234/1/3.

countries, as well as Americans have still to learn the way to our hearts.⁵

Da Gama had reached the conclusion that cooperation with the United States was good policy only so long as it demonstrated advantages. Otherwise he favored friendship "without any dependency" and recommended a more independent course for Brazilian foreign policy.⁶

The new Minister of Foreign Relations, Lauro Muller, thought his ambassador's gratuitous remarks prejudicial to Brazil's ultimate goals. He reprimanded him.⁷ Here was the essence of the struggle over the interpretation of Rio-Branco's intentions. Ambassador da Gama was pro-American but felt that friendship and cooperation with the United States should extend only to the point where national interests were clearly benefited. Minister Muller was willing to give unrestricted cooperation and friendship, feeling that in the end the benefits would outweigh any transitory inconveniences. Muller's interpretation triumphed. Da Gama later left his Washington post for the Court of St. James.

Not even the usual historical dividing line, the Revolution of 1930, which diminished the power of the coffee interests and put Getúlio Vargas in the presidential palace, marked a change in foreign policy. Diplomacy took a slightly greater interest in commerce after 1930, but that was the only modification in the established pattern. Proof of the continuity is evident in Jayme de Barros's book, *A Política Exterior do Brasil*, a summary of the diplomatic history of the first decade of the Vargas rule. The author devoted 304 pages to hemispheric relations and only six to "relations with the countries of Europe and other continents." Clearly Brazilian interests continued to be with the Pan American community, in particular with the United States. Foreign Minister

⁵ Da Gama to Lauro Muller, Anexo 1, May 30, 1912, AHI, Offícios 234/1/13. The speech given on May 27, 1912, was widely reported and commented on in the American press.

⁶ The context in which the quoted phrase appeared was as follows: "We do not need a hypothetical protection, but we do want a friendship without any dependency In such a way we would soon reach the stage where we could deal with the Americans as equals." Da Gama to Lauro Muller, Jan. 18, 1913, AHI, Offícios 234/2/1. On March 3, 1912, Da Gama sent a long letter to Foreign Minister Muller recommending an independent foreign policy "which will allow us to appear before the world as a self-made nation . . . conscious of our responsibility and zealous of our sovereignty." AHI, Offícios 234/1/13. Two Brazilian scholars have commented on the implications of this course of action suggested by Da Gama: Renato de Mendonça, *Fronteira em Marcha. Ensaio de Geopolítica Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Americana, 1956), p. 262; and José Honório Rodrigues, *Interesse Nacional e Política Externa* (Rio de Janeiro. Civilização Brasileira, 1966), pp. 31-32.

⁷ Da Gama to Lauro Muller, May 30, 1912, AHI, Offícios 234/1/13.

Oswaldo Aranha stated the government's position tersely in Washington in 1939: "Your policies are the same as ours."⁸

The Vargas government may not have been revolutionary in its international orientation but it did introduce a new ingredient which, in time, when added to that mixture producing foreign policy, would precipitate changes. The new ingredient was nationalism.

Foreign policy had been the domain of the elite, unchallenged by any public opinion. It is not surprising to find that until the fall of the monarchy in 1889, a majority of the foreign ministers and certainly a considerable number of diplomats came from the sugar-producing provinces of the northeast, an area which dominated the politics of both empires. During the Old Republic (1889-1930), when political power shifted to the south-central, coffee-producing states, a majority of the foreign ministers came from that area. The elite of both areas had much in common, such as a concern with national unity and the frontiers. They had differences as well. The sugar barons eyed England fondly. The new coffee class sold most of its product to the United States and was eager to please—at any rate not to alienate—its best customer. The shift of the diplomatic axis from London to Washington came significantly at the same time that internal power shifted from the sugar to the coffee interests. In general, however, it can be concluded that the governing groups representative of the elite were more in harmony than in conflict over foreign policy matters. Few and mild were the debates which beset the makers of foreign policy until the 1950's.

It was in that decade that the seeds of nationalism cultivated by Vargas began to bear fruit. Until the Vargas regime, the intellectuals had monopolized whatever nationalist sentiment there had been. They gave a tremendous impetus to its growth during the Modern Art Week in 1922 when they sought to define the indigenous elements of national culture. Increasing industrialization, seriously underway since World War I, and the resultant urban growth provided the fertile ground upon which nationalism grew. The working and middle classes in the burgeoning metropolises were increasingly exposed to the nationalistic ideas of the intellectuals through the expanding networks of press and radio. Vargas saw the advantages of combining and utilizing the political potential of the rapidly increasing working class and the growing popularity of nationalist doctrines. He gave the workers their first voice in government and infused in them a pride in being Brazilian. National-

⁸ *Correio da Manhã* (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 11, 1939, p. 3.

ism for the first time had a broad base. The intellectuals could speak for someone besides themselves.

Like their counterparts everywhere, the Brazilian nationalists emphasized the fatherland's welfare—their own definition of it, of course. They became suspicious of foreigners, particularly of foreign interests in Brazil. To be truly independent politically, they affirmed, it would be necessary to declare their economic independence. Brazil must control its own resources, produce its own power, manufacture its own steel and automobiles. Symbolically of greatest importance, it must exploit its own oil reserves. The nationalists sought to remake their country along grander lines which meant in practical terms economic development. In the process of agitating for that goal, they questioned traditional concepts which they felt were retarding Brazil.

One such concept which came under sharp criticism was the by then traditional foreign policy. The nationalists condemned it as not serving Brazil's best interests. They accused it of sterility. One prolific nationalist writer, José Honório Rodrigues, remarked, "The classic diplomacy was a kind of pasteurized product, very pure, very white, but hardly national."⁹ The nationalists formulated another. They not only had the opportunity to express their ideas, but in January of 1961, with the inauguration of Jânio Quadros as the new president, they were given the opportunity to put their plans into action.

IV

The foreign policy of the nationalists paid homage to a number of ideals which served as guiding principles. Reduced to their briefest, those ideals consisted of five major points. First, the nationalists pleaded for the preservation of peace. Second, they put great hope in the United Nations as an instrument of peace as well as a balance to regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, which they felt to be too much under the influence of the United States. Third, they urged a program of world-wide disarmament with the use of some of the resources thus freed for the development of the less favored countries. Fourth, they supported the traditional principles of self-determination and non-intervention. And finally, they pledged support to those colonies which sought independence.¹⁰

⁹ *Interêsse Nacional*, p. 91.

¹⁰ An excellent outline of their ideas is contained in "Apresentação" *Política Externa Independente*, No. 1 (May 1965), p. 7.

On a more practical level, the foreign policy of the nationalists pursued two basic interests: increased development—both economic and social—and greater diplomatic independence. Pursuit of those interests coupled with allegiance to the above-mentioned ideals promised, among other rewards, increased prestige and leadership. Both Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart accepted those goals and in varying degrees contributed to the realization of them. They were aided by two able foreign ministers, the first by Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco and the second by Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas.

To carry out this new foreign policy, the government thought it necessary to disengage Brazil from the “cold war.” It had been, of course, firmly committed to the Western bloc. Rigid adherence to that bloc and subservience to the leadership of the United States the nationalists believed inhibited Brazil’s scope of action. The doctrines of neither the West nor the East served Brazil’s best interests. Expanded trade was one of the primary means of reaching the desired goal of development, and trade knew no ideology. Although traditional markets must be maintained, it was imperative to open new ones as well. The nationalists envisioned eager markets awaiting not only Brazil’s agricultural products—coffee, sugar, cocoa, and tobacco—but also the increasing array of its industrial products. President Quadros sent a trade mission to Red China with the hope of interesting that potential consumer. It was from that mission that Vice President Goulart was summoned to assume the presidency in 1961. Goulart continued the foreign policy of his predecessor by welcoming a Chinese trade mission to Rio de Janeiro and by establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow, suspended since 1947, and with other Eastern countries. Trade was obviously only one of the purposes of this recognition. The desire to exert independence of action was a compelling psychological motive. Augmented prestige through increased diplomatic representation both abroad and in Rio de Janeiro cannot be overlooked as a motive either.

The disengagement from the “cold war” not only brought Brazil at least formally closer to the East but, of at least equal significance, it put Brazil into close contact with the countries of Asia and Africa. Many of the countries of those two continents likewise felt that development should take precedence over alliances which caused the bipolarization of the world into two war camps. Brazil shared much in common with those countries. They suffered from similar social and economic problems. They sought a better life. United in their common concern for development, they could demand what they considered a fair price from the industrialized nations for their raw products and could regulate

capital investment more to their own advantage. Of course, Brazil also saw for itself a unique opportunity for leadership among the underdeveloped nations which it could not hope to enjoy in the more traditional alliance with the Western World. Such a leadership role appealed mightily to nationalist pride.

In particular, Quadros saw an opportunity to exert Brazilian leadership among the newly emergent African states.¹¹ Geography and history provide a convincing rationale for his hopes. The Brazilian subcontinent juts out into the South Atlantic providing the closest point of physical contact between the Western Hemisphere and Africa. Furthermore, during the three centuries in which the slave trade flourished between the two areas, Africa supplied a large percentage of Brazil's population. The African presence is very much a part of contemporary Brazil. Whoever reads Gilberto Freyre's brilliant study, *The Masters and the Slaves*, understands fully the African contributions to the new tropical civilization. Based on these considerations, President Quadros saw Africa as a new dimension in his foreign policy. He believed his country could serve as a link between the newly independent Africa and the Western World because Brazil was closely connected to both. Accordingly, he recognized the new states, exchanged ambassadors with them, dispatched trade missions, offered fellowships to African students, established the Afro-Asian Institute, and denounced Portuguese colonial policies. The program was broad and audacious. The Brazilian Negro community welcomed and approved the new attitude toward the African states.¹² At least one African leader, Joseph Medupe Johnson, Minister of Labor of Nigeria, stated that Brazil became known in his country only after the election of Quadros.¹³

Quadros and Goulart widened Brazil's diplomatic vision to its maximum. The whole world fell within its scope as Brazilian diplomatic missions sprang up in such unlikely places as Albania, Algeria, Ceylon, and Thailand. Brazil was not only disengaging itself from the "cold war," it was forming a part of the "Third Force," the growing alliance of neutralist nations.

There was much that was old as well as much that was new in the nationalists' foreign policy. It supported the traditional policies of peaceful solution of international disputes, non-intervention, self-deter-

¹¹ Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1961), p. 24.

¹² Clóvis Scarpino and Jorge Aguiar, "Brasil A Escalada do Negro," *Manchete* (Dec. 3, 1966), p. 75.

¹³ Rodrigues, *Interêsse Nacional*, p. 176.

mination, international order, and so forth. What was strikingly new was the determination to exercise leadership and to gain recognition on a much broader plane than ever before. If Rio-Branco had weakened Brazil's ties with Europe in favor of closer friendship with the United States, the nationalists were prepared to de-emphasize those connections in favor of a new southern hemispheric alliance among the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Brazil would be seeking its traditional goals of leadership and prestige but within a new context which seemingly, to the nationalists at any rate, offered more rewards.

V

Acceptance of the nationalists' foreign policy was by no means unanimous. Persuasive voices of criticism spoke out. Many questioned whether Brazil's primary interests would best be served by closer association with Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India.¹⁴ The critics argued that Brazil needed greater capital investments and despaired of seeing any forthcoming from either the eastern or neutralist countries. They agreed that new markets were also desirable but pointed out with irrefutable statistics that most of the nations of the southern hemisphere exported the same or similar raw products. In truth, as the world's economy was structured in the mid-twentieth century, the underdeveloped countries were more competitors of Brazil than potential customers. Decrying the unrealistic attitudes of the Quadros-Goulart policies and fearful of the damage they might inflict, the critics urged a return to more traditional patterns. Close Pan American relations and solidarity with the United States were the columns of support for the foreign policy they sought to reconstruct.

The coup d'état of April 1, 1964, provided the opportunity to reinstitute that policy. First, President Castelo Branco repudiated many of the concepts and certainly the emphasis of the nationalists. He repeatedly reprimanded the supporters of the Quadros-Goulart policy for being "false nationalists," out of contact with reality and out of

¹⁴ In this particular case, it was Assis Chateaubriand, head of a vast journalistic empire, who spoke out in an article whose content is summarized adequately in the title: "O nosso reino não é o deste mundo indú-árabe," *O Jornal* (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 12, 1961, p. 3. In part he said, "For the benefit of Brazil we cannot and we ought not to expect anything from the United Arab Republic, India, or Yugoslavia. The trips planned by the heads of government of those nations will be purely touristic excursions, devoid of any practical ends."

harmony with the well-being of their own country.¹⁵ Then, evoking the spirit of Rio-Branco to demonstrate the continuity of his policy with that of the great statesman at the opening of the twentieth century, he extended a warm *abraço* to the sister republics of the hemisphere in general and to the United States in particular. His foreign ministers acted accordingly. Vasco Leitão da Cunha stated that the objectives of the external policy were:

To defend the traditional policy of the good neighbor in America and the security of the continent against aggression and subversion, whether external or internal; to strengthen all the ties with the United States, our great neighbor and friend of the North; to broaden our relations with Western Europe and with the Western community of nations.¹⁶

Significantly he employed the phrase "the traditional policy." Nor was it surprising that, during his tenure, Itamaraty paid less attention to Africa, Asia, and the Eastern bloc.

His successor, Juracy Magalhães, formerly ambassador to the United States, in a major foreign policy speech on November 21, 1966, reiterated those guidelines.¹⁷ Most of that speech concerned relations with the nations of the Western Hemisphere. He acknowledged the United States as the "unquestionable leader of the Free World" and the "principal guardian of the fundamental values of our civilization." As an "ally for over 140 years," the United States was Brazil's best customer, largest investor, and foremost source of technical knowledge. Therefore, the relationship with the northern neighbor must be especially intimate and cooperative. The foreign minister regarded this hemisphere as the natural international stage of action for Brazil. Emphasis on fraternal relations with the other American republics was emphatic. Three Pan American themes received stress: 1) hemispheric unity, 2) collective security, and 3) economic solidarity. He mentioned only *en passant* relations with the non-Western world, a marked contrast to foreign policy statements during the 1961-64 interlude.

One of the most notable characteristics of this foreign policy as it is being implemented is the obsession with security. The military leaders who carried out the coup of 1964 and then assumed the reins of government brought with them a nervous fear of communism. It

¹⁵ President Castelo Branco frequently hurled the charge of "false nationalists" against his opponents. As examples see the *Brazil Herald* (Rio de Janeiro), June 14, 1965, p. 13; and *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), Dec. 4, 1966, p. 22.

¹⁶ Interview on national network of radio and television, July 6, 1964.

¹⁷ The speech was distributed in mimeographed form by the Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

would be difficult to exaggerate their concern with that doctrine. In their minds, Goulart was not only permitting communism to flourish in Brazil but he was encouraging it for demagogic purposes of his own. They felt that the government was being taken over at an increasingly accelerated rate by local communists, their allies, or their sympathizers. To avoid the Cubanization of Brazil, the military felt that there was no alternative but to overthrow Goulart. Once in control of the government, the officers set out to eliminate communist influence wherever they felt it existed. They instituted a great purge, the vestiges of which are still very evident. The reaction, then, to what the military hierarchy considered a communist threat was this unflagging concern with national security. Since communism was an international movement, the defense of the nation from communist subversion required appropriate external as well as internal policies.

In shaping their foreign policy, the new leaders viewed the international scene as a gigantic struggle between East and West. There could be no neutral position. Brazil must choose sides. Without hesitation, the leaders chose the West and acknowledged the United States as the leader of that bloc. It is for that reason that the recent policies of Brasília often reflect decisions made in Washington. Brazil promptly broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, although only a few years before Quadros had bestowed Brazil's highest order on Ché Guevara and Goulart had tried to serve as mediator between Havana and Washington. The Brazilian delegation voted against the seating of Red China in the United Nations, although Quadros had once ordered his delegation to do just the opposite. President Castelo Branco expressed his government's solidarity with the United States' position in Viet Nam, another complete about-face in policy. Brazilian troops took part in the intervention in the Dominican Republic. The Brazilian government was as convinced as the North American government that a communist take-over of the Dominican Republic was imminent. The influential officers saw in the Caribbean an opportunity to play an active role in the East-West struggle and accepted it with alacrity. As one *coronel* expressed it:

The Armed Forces brilliantly stopped communism from taking over Brazil. Another brilliant example is their participation in the Dominican Republic in the operation initiated by the American marines where they also stopped communism from taking over that country.¹⁸

¹⁸ Quoted in Mário Afonso Carneiro, "Opinião Militar," *Cadernos Brasileiros*, No. 38 (Nov.-Dec. 1966), p. 25.

Active participation in the fight against international communism pleased certain groups within the military as well as the government which sought to expand that participation or to institutionalize it.

Itamaraty emerged as the most enthusiastic supporter of a permanent Inter-American Peace Force. Washington first suggested such a force but then discreetly dropped the idea for lack of sufficient support. Brazil did not feel the same inhibitions as did the United States, universally suspected of imperialistic motives in Latin America. Foreign Minister Magalhães visited seven South American capitals to urge support for a peace force. The success of those missions has been negligible, but those reverses have only strengthened the dedication of Itamaraty.

The idea of collective security is certainly not a new one in Brazil, although the peace force must be considered as a different approach. The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro signed by the nations of the hemisphere in 1947 considers any armed attack on one of the American states as an attack on all. Two well-known foreign ministers of the post World War II era, João Neves da Fontoura and Raul Fernandes, called the nation's attention to the inevitable decline of sovereignty and the growth of interdependence in the modern world.¹⁹ It is only natural that a nation with extensive, underpopulated frontiers with ten different states or colonies must think realistically of cooperation. It must also think in terms of possible defense of those frontiers. Should one of the ten neighbors adopt communism or fall under communistic control, the present government would feel itself threatened. Therefore, there exists in the highest echelons of the government and military a climate of opinion favorable to the creation of an international police force which would diminish the threat (and here one must re-emphasize the intensity with which that threat is felt) of communist expansion in Latin America. Such a force would provide a measure of the security the present government desires.

A foreign policy dominated by a fear of communism and overly dependent on the United States has not been without its critics either. As could be expected, the nationalists attack it as unrealistic and subservient. The press in general is hostile to it. In particular of late, the newspapers have singled out the Inter-American Peace Force for

¹⁹ Delgado de Carvalho, *História Diplomática do Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1959), pp. 273, 276-7.

criticism.²⁰ In response to a questionnaire recently distributed by the *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, one state governor, one general, one bishop, and five federal deputies answered disparagingly about the present foreign policy.²¹ They lamented the overdependence of Brazil on the United States and the consequent loss of diplomatic independence. They emphasized that public opinion did not support the present foreign policy. It is significant to note that the magazine received no replies favorable to the present policy and that none of the leaders questioned, some of whom were high in the ranks of the government, felt obliged to come to the defense of the foreign policy.

The significant innovation in the history of Brazilian diplomacy is that now for the first time there are two quite different foreign policies being advocated. On certain levels, they seem to offer much in common but that superficial similarity is highly deceptive. Both pay at least lip service to the Baron of Rio-Branco by claiming to be the modern interpreter of his ideas. The present government points out that it was Rio-Branco who intensified friendship with the United States, a policy which in that tradition receives current emphasis. The nationalists, on the other hand, believe that Rio-Branco's cordiality toward the United States was based upon the benefits Brazil could and did extract from it. They plead that the Baron always placed national interests above every other consideration and was never subservient to the United States. Rio-Branco, they assert, wanted to increase Brazilian leadership and prestige and was willing and able to use the United States as a means to obtain those ends. They accuse the present government of making friendship with the United States an end in itself.

Both foreign policies favor self-determination and non-intervention. The nationalists condemned participation in the occupation of the Dominican Republic on that basis. Just the opposite, the military argued that it participated in the Inter-American Peace Force to prevent extra-continental intervention and to guarantee the self-determination of the Dominican people. Both advocate the traditional policy of peace, essential for the mutually desired economic and social development. The present government would bring about that development through cooperation with foreign capital, always under the suspicion and

²⁰ For an example see the editorial in the *Jornal do Commercio* (Rio de Janeiro), Nov. 22, 1966, p. 4. It emphasizes that military force is a poor method of fighting communism in Latin America and that only economic development will insure the establishment and prosperity of democracy in this hemisphere.

²¹ "Questionário proposto pela Revista Civilização Brasileira a Personalidades da Vida Pública Nacional," *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, No. 7 (May 1966), pp. 15-73.

condemnation of the nationalists. Both deplore colonialism. The nationalists denounced Portuguese policies in Africa, voted against the former motherland in the United Nations, and supported the independence movement in Angola. The present government has been extremely cordial to Portugal. That cordiality coupled with a silence on Portuguese Africa has been interpreted as at least tacit support of Portugal in Africa.²² On these and other points there is an exterior verbiage common to the two foreign policies. Beneath the surface, as the examples above indicate, lies a wide variance in the interpretation of terms. Certainly then on the practical level of implementation, if not always on the subtler level of semantics, the different foreign policy philosophies of the nationalists and the present government are easily discernible.

A clash between the two foreign policies is nowhere more evident than in the international area of action each selects for itself. In effect, the present government would limit Brazil's role in international affairs to the Western Hemisphere or at most to the Western World. This government is enthusiastically pro-American. The nationalists see the whole world as their stage and covet a role of leadership in Africa and among the underdeveloped nations. They tend to be anti-American.

During this decade, Brazilian foreign policy is in an unprecedented period of fluctuation. Gone is the stability characteristic of a century and a half of diplomatic history. Missing too is much of the continuity long a trademark of Brazilian diplomacy. Never before have there been such well defined and divergent alternatives from which to choose. The principal reason for this new state of uncertainty is the infusion of nationalist ideology into the formulation of foreign policy, an innovation encouraged by Jânio Quadros. For the time being, the nationalists have fallen from power and, at least officially, their foreign policy has been disapproved. The new president, Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva, was handpicked by Castelo Branco, and the recently promulgated constitution was written for him. He seems disposed to follow the foreign policy of his predecessor. Consequently it is unlikely that there will be any major policy changes in the near future. But nationalism is far too strong

²² Recently there has been an adverse reaction to Brazilian policies from some African states. The diplomatic representatives of Algeria, Ghana, Senegal, and the United Arab Republic publicly asked for some clarification from the Brazilian government on 1) the declarations made in Lisbon by Marshal Artur Costa e Silva with respect to the Portuguese colonies in Africa; 2) the projected visit of Brazilian naval vessels to ports of Angola; and 3) the possible political implications of the increased Brazilian economic interest in Angola and Moçambique. *Correio da Manhã* (Rio de Janeiro), Jan. 7, 1967, p. 2.

a force to remain in the background for long. The nationalists continue to challenge the traditional ideas. The outcome of the clash of the forces of tradition and change will decide the new direction of policy. For the moment, Brazilian foreign policy is clearly in a period of transition.