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my work possible. Research among the Flathead was carried out first in 1950 under a grant from the Montana State University Music School Foundation, and further work was made possible in 1958 by the Graduate School of Northwestern University. Among the Basongye, research was supported in the Bala village of Lupupa in 1959-60 by grants to me from the National Science Foundation and the Belgian American Educational Foundation, and to Mrs. Merriam from the Northwestern University Program of African Studies. Of major importance also was the close cooperation of l'Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale (IRSAC) and l'Université Lovanium. Final typing of the manuscript of this book was made possible by a grant in aid of research from the Graduate School of Indiana University.

It seems fashionable to use a Preface to thank one's wife, who is almost inevitably pictured as long-suffering; indeed, one might be tempted to suspect either that most authors' wives lead lives of pain or that they are shrewish to a remarkable degree and must be carefully appeased. But I am as certain as any man can be that Barbara has enjoyed the writing of this book almost as much as I, and that we stand firmly together in the sharing of whatever may have been achieved by it. She has taken full part in all field research, and read and criticized this manuscript; I am grateful for all these things, and many more.

This book is dedicated to the memory of Melville J. Herskovits, who was first my teacher, then my colleague, and always my friend. My respect, admiration, and affection for Mel are a matter of written record; let it here suffice to say again that I shall always owe him debts of intellectual stimulation that can only be repaid by my attempts to stimulate others. If this book stands as an effort in that direction, then I am satisfied.

APM

Bloomington, Indiana
October 13, 1963

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solution of a broad spectrum of problems both in the humanities and in the social sciences.

In last analysis, the aims and purposes of ethnomusicology do not differ markedly from those of other disciplines. Music is, after all, a universal human phenomenon and thus in the Western philosophy of knowledge, deserving of study in its own right (Clough 1960). The ultimate interest of man is man himself, and music is part of what he does and part of what he studies about himself. But equally important is the fact that music is also human behavior, and the ethnomusicologist shares both with the social sciences and the humanities the search for an understanding of why men behave as they do.

TOWARD A THEORY FOR ETHNOMUSICOLOGY

The dual nature of ethnomusicology is clearly a fact of the discipline. The major question, however, is not whether the anthropological or the musicological aspect should gain ascendancy, but whether there is any way in which the two can be merged, for such a fusion is clearly the objective of ethnomusicology and the keystone upon which the validity of its contribution lies.

Neither Western musicology nor Western cultural anthropology holds the final answer. There are few musicologists, indeed, who have interested themselves in the broader study of music as a human phenomenon, as opposed to the more limited study of music in a single Western culture. Those who have been involved in such study have usually restricted themselves to very specific and limited purposes. The music of other peoples is sometimes used vaguely as an introduction to courses in the "history of music" and, more particularly, as an example of what is "primitive" in music, fitting thereby into a deductive schemata organized around invalid concepts of cultural evolution. It is also sometimes used by Western musicologists to support theories of the supposed origin of music, and on occasion it has formed the basis for melodic or rhythmic materials used in composition. But broadly speaking, Western musicology has been preoccupied with the study of the history of Western music and there has been little room either for other music of the world or for the investigation of broadly based problems which might lead to better understanding of music as a worldwide human phenomenon.

Similarly, the potential contribution of anthropology, while substantially broader in nature, has not been exploited to any marked extent.

While anthropologists in the earlier history of the discipline almost always included music in their ethnographies, the tradition has become steadily less practiced, particularly over the past decade or two. This decrease in attention to music has been due, partly at least, to the fact that anthropologists have recently felt a need to emphasize the "science" in their discipline and have thus come to deal more with the social than with the cultural facts of man's existence. The result is an enormous amount of attention given to studies of social structure couched in terms of science, and to economic and political studies as well. Anthropology has learned much from this relatively recent emphasis, and will continue to learn much, but in the process it seems to have forgotten that it has a foot in two camps—the social and the humanistic.

If ethnomusicologists are to develop their discipline to the point at which a fusion of the musicological and ethnological becomes a reality, it seems clear that they will have to generate their own framework of theory and method. This is not a simple achievement, for it means that the student who enters ethnomusicology from music must also be well trained in anthropology, and that he who enters from anthropology must be prepared to handle problems of music sound and structure. But it is clearly only through the fusion of these aspects of knowledge, and probably in single individuals, that the problem will be solved.

If this be the case, and if fusion is the goal, are not the problems insurmountable? Is there any hope of putting together the humanities and the social sciences, areas of study which are considered to lie planes apart? Is there any means of treating the social sciences humanistically, or the humanities in terms of social science? In order to approach a theory for ethnomusicology, this barrier must be surmounted.

The humanities and the social sciences have been differentiated in the past on five major bases: the differences between the artist and the social scientist, and those between the methods, results, activities, and content of the two fields. If the areas are to be distinguished and, more important, if the similarities between them are to be assessed, each of these points must be resolved.

Harold Gomes Cassidy (1962) argues that the difference between the artist and the scientist lies in what each communicates, and he poses the distinction in the form of a question.

More generally, is communication of knowledge a primary function of the artist and the scientist? The answer I should like to give is, "yes," for the scientist, "no," for the artist; it is a primary function of the scientist to contribute to the body of knowledge, whereas it is *not* a primary function of the artist, though he may, incidentally, do so. (p. 12)

Cassidy draws his concept of knowledge from Bertrand Russell, and defines it as "true beliefs based on sound reasons (not on lucky guesses) and displayed in statements" (p. 13), and he continues:

Nor would I class what is communicated by music as knowledge, even though the notes are strung out along a strand of time and certain musical phrases have come to be closely associated with a theme or message. . . . I would then say that conveyance of knowledge is not the primary concern of the nonlinguistic arts. (p. 13)

In some ways it is correct to say that what the scientist communicates is primarily knowledge while what the artist communicates is primarily feelings. Both try to exclude the irrelevant, but neither has any way of knowing whether he has missed something relevant, and neither excludes the other. Yet the aspect of reality which each investigates is in many ways different from that of the other. (p. 35)

If we accept this point of view, it is clear that in ethnomusicology the basic problem is not the artist versus the social scientist, for since the artist is not concerned primarily with communicating knowledge, he is not concerned primarily with ethnomusicology. Ethnomusicology is not creative in the same sense that the artist is creative; it does not seek to communicate emotion or feeling, but rather knowledge. Cassidy, again, emphasizes this point of view:

Of course, one can have knowledge in the restricted sense *about* painting, music, the dance, and so forth; and artists and critics . . . may contribute to this part of the body of knowledge. . . . But the artist is not, in the same sense as the scientist, *primarily* concerned with developing and communicating knowledge through the work of art. If he conveys knowledge, it comes as a bonus. (p. 14)

The artist as such, then, plays little part, so far as his creative capacities are concerned, in ethnomusicology, for it is not involved in creating works of art. Its concern lies in the problems of the artist, in how he creates the work of art, the functions of art, and so forth. Thus the process of creating art differs from the study of that process, and ethnomusicology is concerned with the latter—the accumulation and communication of knowledge about music. In this sense, its studies fall on the scientific rather than on the artistic side.

It can be fairly argued that the basic methods of investigation in the social sciences and the humanities have much in common. Both use

discovery, invention, experiment, isolation of variables, and other techniques, and these problems will be discussed in the following chapter. More important are the possible distinctions to be drawn between the results aimed at and achieved through the combination of basic approach and method.

It is possible to create, as Cassidy has done (pp. 72-103) a long series of dichotomies between the results aimed for in the social sciences on the one hand, and the humanities on the other. Among these dichotomies are: objective—subjective; quantitative—qualitative; presentational—discursive; theoretical—esthetic; ratio-analogy—metaphor; general—particular; assent—dissent; repeatable and general—unique and individual. While Cassidy argues persuasively that these distinctions are not really as great as is usually assumed, it is clear that, broadly speaking, they do exist.

The conclusion is almost inescapable that what the ethnomusicologist desires is not the subjective, qualitative, discursive, esthetic, and so forth, but rather the objective, quantitative, and theoretical, wherever this is possible. There is a valid distinction to be drawn between the process of creating art and the artistic outlook, as opposed to the study of such processes. The ethnomusicologist seeks knowledge and seeks to communicate that knowledge; the results for which he aims are more scientific than artistic.

A further question is whether a difference exists between the activities of the arts and the sciences, and again Cassidy argues that any such distinctions are minimal. The activity in both may be characterized as tripartite:

. . . analytic, synthetic, and reduction to practice. Every man, whatever his vocation . . . is engaged in these activities. . . .

The analytic activity involves accumulating data: increasing specific knowledge or particular experience. It is analytic in the sense that it involves making distinctions, dividing, classifying. In both arts and sciences it includes making collections, naming, observing, and reporting observations in detail. . . .

The second kind of activity, the synthetic, occurs when connections are sought among data, among theories, and among theories of theories—when trends, hypotheses, theories, and laws are derived. . . .

The third kind of activity . . . is reduction to practice: the activity which returns from the general or theoretical to the particular or practical, the activity which puts to use on a particular occasion the general or theoretical. (pp. 21-23)

In the study of the arts the activity processes follow this three-part division.

Let us turn now to the question of the content of the social sciences and the humanities, a problem of central concern to this discussion. The core social sciences are sociology, cultural and social anthropology, political science, and economics. To these might be added some parts of other disciplines: social psychology, social history, human geography, and perhaps some others. On the other hand, the humanities are usually held to include the arts—music, dance, drama, literature, the visual arts, and architecture—and philosophy and religion. While there may be some specific differences of opinion concerning this categorization, the distinctions made do seem to correlate with the general understanding of the two broad areas of study. Given these two fields, what are the crucial differences between them, or indeed are there any crucial differences? In order to answer this question in terms of the content of the social sciences as projected against the content of the humanities, it is necessary to turn to some basic concepts of cultural anthropology.

The central concern of cultural anthropology is with what is called "culture." Man moves in time; that is, he has a sense of the past, the present, and the future, and he is intellectually aware of himself as existing in time. From man's standpoint, so do all other animals, though it is doubtful that we can attribute an intellectual time sense to them. Man also moves in space, and this he quite obviously shares with all other living organisms capable of movement. Man moves, too, in society; he identifies himself with his fellows and cooperates with them in maintaining his group and assuring its continuity. But man is not unique in this respect either, for other organisms such as ants, bees, and the higher primates also arrange themselves into societies. In moving through time, space, and society, man is not unique, but there is one sense in which he is unique, and this is the fact that he has culture. Anthropologists have rightly given a great deal of attention to the definition of this core concept but have never come to a universally acceptable definition; for present purposes we can speak of it here simply as "man's cumulative learned behavior."

If we accept the fact that man has culture, then we should be able to account both for his culture and for its various parts. But this is not so simple a proposition as it might first appear to be. We know, for example, that certain physical characteristics man has acquired through evolution *enable* him to have culture. That is, without his upright posture, his expanded and centralized nervous system and brain, and his capacity to use language, it seems doubtful that man could have culture. But this does not necessarily tell us *why* man has culture; it tells us how man is *able* to have culture. Genetic studies have shown us how man's physical

characteristics are inherited and passed on from generation to generation, but geneticists have never found a gene or chromosome which accounts for the fact that man is a culture-bearing animal.

Bronislaw Malinowski has given considerable attention to the problem of why man has culture (1944), and in this search he compiled a list of seven basic needs and their cultural responses; the needs are such items as metabolism, reproduction, and bodily comfort, while the corresponding cultural responses are a commissariat, kinship, and shelter. Malinowski held that the basic needs in turn set up a series of derived needs which result eventually in a group of cultural imperatives reflected in the institutions of any and all cultures. Thus, for example, "the cultural apparatus of implements and consumers' goods must be produced, used, maintained, and replaced by new production," which leads to the response of an economic system. Working in this manner, Malinowski felt that he could account for economics, social control, education, and political organization, all of which derive ultimately from the basic needs of the human organism itself.

The difficulty of this, as well as of other similar schemes, is that Malinowski was apparently unable to account for the speculative and creative aspects of culture, for he nowhere included either religion or artistic behavior, both of which are universals in human experience. Thus, while Malinowski felt he could derive certain aspects of universal human behavior and organization from the needs of the organism as an organism, and thus account for part, at least, of culture, he did not account for man as an artistic animal.

What is most important here is that the things which Malinowski did derive from human biosocial needs are precisely those aspects studied by the disciplines we call the social sciences. He accounted for man's need of an economic organization—studied by the field of economics; for man's need of political organization—studied by political science; for man's need of social control—studied by sociology and cultural and social anthropology; and for man's need of education in order to be able to transmit his knowledge to succeeding generations—studied by sociology and cultural and social anthropology under the rubrics of socialization or enculturation. If we are willing to accept Malinowski's formulation of the derivation of certain aspects of culture from the basic biological needs of the human organism, we find that what we call the social sciences are devoted to the study of precisely these same things.

But apparently the humanistic aspects of culture cannot be accounted for through utilization of the same technique of analysis. The humanistic aspects are, by the same token as the social, universal phenomena of human existence; that is, everywhere we find men, we find not only social,

economic, and political systems, but also what we call artistic, religious, and philosophical systems. All men everywhere include all these aspects of learned behavior in the organization of their lives.

In sum, it appears that a crucial difference between the social sciences and the humanities lies in the fact that we can apparently derive the subject matter of the former from the basic needs of the human biosocial organism, while we cannot do the same for the latter. This indicates that the content of the two fields of investigation is of a sharply different order. But if the humanities cannot be derived from the simple fact of biosocial existence, then what remains is obviously to find what their essential nature is, and it is here instructive to turn to the words of some scholars who have approached the problem.

In an article dealing with anthropology and the humanities, Ruth Benedict speaks of "human emotion, ethics, rational insight and purpose" (1948:588), and, later, of "man's emotions, his rationalizations, his symbolic structures"; in both cases she is referring, though not directly, to what she apparently considers to be the essentially humanistic things about man. It is to the single word "purpose," however, that attention must be drawn, for there is an intimation here that the humanities may represent man's expression of the purposes he sees in his life.

Melville J. Herskovits speaks consistently about the "creative and speculative" aspects of man's existence, and groups the aspects of culture here called "humanistic" under the "creative" as opposed to the "institutional" (1948).

George Caspar Homans supports, in part at least, the view that ". . . the humanities are more concerned with human values than are the social sciences, which are more concerned with a value-free description of human behavior" (1961:4), and while this may be generally true, it returns discussion to questions of method rather than to those of the content of the fields. Still, it is important to say that the humanities by their very nature involve values, and this may be a key point.

One of the sharpest distinctions drawn between the two areas is that made by Carl J. Friedrich who, drawing upon Hegel, says: "Thus, the focus of the humanities is upon critical examination and evaluation of the *products* of man in cultural affairs (art, music, literature, philosophy, religion), whereas the focus of the social sciences is upon the *way* men live together, including their creative activities" (Parker, 1961:16). There will be occasion to return to this distinction later.

In assessing these four approaches to the content of the humanities, it is clear that the separate thinkers hold some things in common. All seem to be drawing a distinction based upon means of living as opposed to means of enriching living; all seem to indicate that the humanistic aspects

of culture allow man to go beyond the problems of continuing to exist. Put another way, it may be suggested that the social sciences deal with the way man conducts his life, while the humanities deal with what he thinks about it. The humanistic aspect of culture, then, is man's comment on and interpretation of his total environment, and his commentary is expressed in creative and emotional terms. Through the humanistic elements of his culture, man seems to be making pointed commentary on how he lives; he seems in the humanities to sum up what he thinks of life. In short, man lives as a social animal, but he does not live as a social animal alone, for his social life apparently brings about conditions under which he is unable to restrain himself from commenting upon himself and enunciating and interpreting his actions, his aspirations, and his values. Thus the social sciences deal with man as a social animal and the ways in which he solves his biosocial problems in daily living, while the humanities take man beyond his social living into his own distillations of his life experiences. The social sciences, then, are truly social; the humanities are primarily individual and psychological.

There is a second major difference which exists between the social and humanistic aspects of life and which is thus reflected in the content of the two areas of study. The social sciences, as we have seen, are devoted to the study of man's social institutions. A social institution exists in order to regulate the behavior of the people who comprise it. But in humanistic endeavors the aim is not to regulate behavior, but rather to produce something which is visually or aurally tangible, an art product. In these terms, the intent of the musician is sound, and it is not to organize musicianly behavior; on the other hand, society is behaving. We deal here with a matter of goals. The goal of man's biosocial life is the regulation of behavior to provide for biosocial needs in order to assure the continuity of existence. The goal of man's creative behavior is a product which exists to give satisfaction for other than biosocial needs. The distinction recalls Friedrich's statement that "the focus of the humanities is upon . . . the products of man . . . whereas the focus of the social sciences is upon the way men live together . . ."

Given these differences, as well as similarities between the social sciences and the humanities, is there anything which ties the two together? Can there truly be an ethnomusicology in which both function, and if so, by what means can the "scientific" and the "nonscientific," the "social" and the "individual" be considered in a single study? There are two answers to this broad problem, so crucial to ethnomusicology, which are neither particularly complex nor lost in a welter of obscure meaning.

In the first place, both social scientists and humanists are interested in what man does and why. The methods and direction of their approaches

may differ, though not so much as it sometimes seems, but in the end both seek an understanding of man, and this is a clear and ever-present bridge between them.

In the second place, it is extremely important to note that although the goal of the artist or musician is a product which is visually or aurally tangible, he must behave in order to produce that product. An understanding of the product therefore inevitably involves an understanding of the behavior of the artist. Thus the social scientist and the humanist are tied together in that both must consider human behavior if they are to understand the art product.

We are faced with the inevitable conclusion that what the ethnomusicologist seeks to create is his own bridge between the social sciences and the humanities. He does so because he must be involved with both; although he studies a product of the humanistic side of man's existence, he must at the same time realize that the product is the result of behavior which is shaped by the society and culture of the men who produce it. The ethnomusicologist is, in effect, sciencing about music. His role is not to discuss the art product in terms familiar to the humanist, but rather to seek knowledge of and regularities in artistic behavior and product. He does not seek the aesthetic experience for himself as a primary goal (though this may be a personal by-product of his studies), but rather he seeks to perceive the meaning of the aesthetic experience of others from the standpoint of understanding human behavior. Thus the procedures and goals of ethnomusicology fall upon the side of the social sciences, while its subject matter is a humanistic aspect of man's existence. Ethnomusicology endeavors to communicate knowledge about an artistic product, the behavior employed in producing it, and the emotions and ideation of the artist involved in it.

Is ethnomusicology, then, a social science or a humanity? The answer is that it partakes of both; its approach and its goals are more scientific than humanistic, while its subject matter is more humanistic than scientific. Even when its studies are restricted to analysis and understanding of the product alone, the goal is not couched in primarily humanistic terms. The ethnomusicologist is not the creator of the music he studies, nor is his basic aim to participate aesthetically in that music (though he may seek to do so through re-creation). Rather, his position is always that of the outsider who seeks to understand what he hears through analysis of structure and behavior, and to reduce this understanding to terms which will allow him to compare and generalize his results for music as a universal phenomenon of man's existence. The ethnomusicologist is sciencing about music. If he is to do this successfully, it is clear that his prior knowledge must come from both fields. It is impossible to study the

structure of music without a prior knowledge of music; it is equally impossible to study music behavior without a prior knowledge of social science; and the best results derive from those studies which utilize a knowledge of both.

This problem of how to categorize a discipline is not a new one in the history of science, nor is it surprising to find that it has from time to time been a major preoccupation of anthropology. Oscar Lewis has phrased the problem clearly in noting:

On the one hand, there are those who would underscore the kinship of anthropology with the natural sciences, would stress the need for quantification, objective tests, experiments, and a general development and improvement of techniques which might lead to a greater precision and objectivity in the gathering, reporting, and interpreting of field data. On the other hand, there are those who, though not denying for a moment the kinship of anthropology with the sciences, believe that what needs to be stressed at this time is the kinship of anthropology with the humanities, and, accordingly, they would emphasize the need for insight, empathy, intuition, and the element of art. Moreover, they are much less sanguine about the contribution to anthropology which can come from quantification, control, and experiment, and they point out that some of our most adequate and insightful anthropological monographs were written by missionaries who had had no technical training. (1953:453)

The controversy is an old one in anthropology, and equally old is the debate over whether anthropology is properly history or science (Boas 1948; Radin 1933; Herskovits 1948). The problem that has led to the debate is singularly like that which has plagued ethnomusicology; it stems from the historic fact that to anthropology, as to ethnomusicology, was left the total study of almost all mankind outside the Western stream. Faced with the enormity of the field, there was and is bound to be some ambiguity in the interpretation of what is to be done with it and what approaches are to be stressed. It is therefore perhaps of less concern than might appear to decide precisely under what rubric ethnomusicology must be classified in terms of the taxonomy of sciences. What it has done thus far indicates clearly that it is attempting to understand and communicate knowledge about a humanistic phenomenon in the terms of science.

I

In order to approach the study of music from the standpoint of scientific analysis, it is necessary to establish the bases from which the

ethnomusicologist works. The most fundamental consideration involved here is the question of what music is and what relationship it has to the concept of culture.

The *Oxford Universal Dictionary* (Third Edition, 1955) defines music as "that one of the fine arts which is concerned with the combination of sounds with a view to beauty of form and the expression of thought or feeling." The *American College Dictionary* (Text Edition, 1948), says that music is "an art of sound in time which expresses ideas and emotions in significant forms through the elements of rhythm, melody, harmony, and color." It is significant to note that both definitions proceed from the premise that music need only be defined in Western terms. Music in other cultures is not necessarily concerned with beauty as such; the problem of the expression of ideas and emotions through music is definitely one which has not been finally solved; and many musics do not use the element of harmony. Neither are the definitions useful from the standpoint of the social scientist, for they tell us nothing about the element of social agreement which plays a major part in shaping sound.

More to the point is a definition whose origin is unknown to me: "Music is a complex of activities, ideas and objects that are patterned into culturally meaningful sounds recognized to exist on a level different from secular communication." Of a similar nature is a definition offered by Farnsworth (1958:17): "Music is made of socially accepted patterns of sounds." What is held in common in these two definitions, and what is of particular importance to the social scientist, is that the sounds of music are shaped by the culture of which they are a part. And culture, in turn, is carried by individuals and groups of individuals who learn what is to be considered proper and improper in respect to music. Each culture decides what it will and will not call music; and sound patterns, as well as behavior, which fall outside these norms are either unacceptable or are simply defined as something other than music. Thus, all music is patterned behavior; indeed if it were random, there could be no music. Music depends upon pitch and rhythm, but only as these are agreed upon by members of the particular society involved.

There are other social characteristics of music as well. Music is a uniquely human phenomenon which exists only in terms of social interaction; that is, it is made by people for other people, and it is learned behavior. It does not and cannot exist by, of, and for itself; there must always be human beings doing something to produce it. In short, music cannot be defined as a phenomenon of sound alone, for it involves the behavior of individuals and groups of individuals, and its particular organization demands the social concurrence of people who decide what it can and cannot be. Indeed, John Mueller points out that in our own

culture, even the institution of the symphony concert “. . . is not exclusively, nor in one sense primarily, a musical event.” Rather, he says, “it is . . . a psychological and sociological truth, that music is often secondary to nonmusical considerations” (1951:286). Music is also a universal in human culture, though not an absolute, and the fact that it is found everywhere is of great importance in reaching an understanding of what it is and does for men.

But cultural and social factors shape music to an even greater extent than is implied in the fact that music sound accords with peoples' ideas of what is right and wrong in music. Thus Herzog, for example, writes:

Acceptance or rejection of composition or performance may hinge much more on cultural and social matters *per se* than with us. For example: a single mistake in a single song of many hundred that form an essential part of Navaho Indian curing rituals invalidates the whole performance so that it has to be repeated, from the beginning, after due purification. The question we might like to raise—how far is it the esthetic sense and how far the ritualistic sense that is outraged—is meaningless for the Navaho and may not become clear to him at all. (1936b:8)

A far more radical and deterministic position is taken by William G. Haag, who holds that:

Art is not free. Artists are relentlessly grasped by the strongest but subtlest force that moves the world, that is, cultural determinism. Every change in the artistic taste of the times is engendered and nourished in a realm beyond the “minds” of artists. . . . That place, of course, is the culture—the normative, stylistic, consistent behavior of which the artist is a participant and a partaker. (1960:217)

While such a position is so deterministic and simplistic that it fails to communicate usefully, it does stress the importance of the role that culture plays in shaping music.

Paul Farnsworth describes an experiment which further illustrates the relationship between music and culture.

Some years ago a Duo-Art player-piano, made by the Aeolian Corporation, was used in an attempt to learn if college students had one specific tempo well fixed in mind for waltz time. The subjects were blindfolded and told to move back and forth a large speed lever until the playing of the composition they were hearing was at the rate they deemed proper. The lever settings given by

this group were generally in the neighborhood of 116 quarter-notes to the minute, just what the Aeolian Corporation regarded at that time as proper. The fox-trots were usually set at a considerably faster tempo, at approximately 143.

Further research on dance tempo was carried on six years later by Lund with a similar sample of college students. Lund found that faster speeds were by this time considered proper, 139 for the waltz and 155 for the fox-trot. (1958:69)

Such a change in “correct” tempo over time can in no way be attributed to factors inherent in the music structure or sound itself, for in taking such a position we would be forced into the attitude that music has some sort of existence by and of itself, as well as the tautology that music sound causes change in music sound. On the contrary, the factors which operate to make such a change in music are matters of taste and preference which derive from culture patterns that may have very little if any direct relationship to music tempo as such.

Yet the history of ethnomusicology sometimes seems to indicate that it has proceeded from assumptions very similar to these. The multiplicity of studies of music structure divorced wholly or to a great extent from cultural context indicates that ethnomusicologists have placed the greatest value on the structure of sound as an isolable value in itself. Indeed, music sound has been treated as a closed system which operates according to principles and regularities inherent in itself and quite separate from the human beings that produce it. But it is questionable whether music can be studied satisfactorily in this way, and indeed whether music sound is itself a system at all. A system involves a group of things or ideas whose parts fit and work together by means of their own internal logic and structure, and it implies that because of this intimate relationship, a change in part A will produce a corresponding change in part B. Thus, in music a change of, let us say, rhythm A should produce some sort of corresponding change in melody B; or an X-type melodic phrase should inevitably be followed by a Y-type phrase with the assumption that if X changes, so will Y. It may be that music does operate in this fashion, but if so we have yet to learn it, and in any case we find in our own music system that our melody B can be successfully played in rhythm A or C or D, and that the Y phrase does not at all inevitably follow the X phrase.

Even assuming, however, that music sound is a system, there is little validity for treating it as though it were divorced from social and cultural considerations for, as has been noted, music is inevitably produced by humans for other humans within a social and cultural context. The preoccupation with music sound alone means that much of eth-

nomusicology has not gone beyond the descriptive phase of study. We may here recall Cassidy's division of activity in the arts and sciences into the analytic, synthetic, and reduction to practice, with the analytic devoted to accumulating data and the synthetic concentrated upon seeking connections among the data; what Cassidy calls the analytic has been referred to above as the descriptive. Cassidy is extremely emphatic about the dangers of stopping with the analytic:

Failure to distinguish between analytic and synthetic functions, accompanied, often, by a "preference" for one or the other, is one of the chief causes of schism between scientists and humanists. . . . This is an example of the common error of considering a part of science (analysis) to be all of science. I wish to emphasize that analytic science and art is only partial science and art. . . . All three activities—analysis, synthesis, and reduction to practice—must go together for science or art to be healthy. (1962:23)

Leonard Meyer speaks to the same point when he says:

Without belittling the importance and the many contributions of descriptive ethnomusicology, the nature and limits of information it can yield need to be understood. For it has at times employed concepts and reached conclusions which were unwarranted because they rested upon unrecognized or untested assumptions of a psychological sort. (1960:50)

And finally, McAllester attempts an explanation for the high degree of emphasis upon descriptive studies in ethnomusicology:

This insistence on the relationship of music to culture should be unnecessary and would be if it were not for a peculiar trait in our own Western European culture: the bifurcation of the concept of culture. We *can* think of culture in the anthropological sense of the total way of life of a people, but we also think of culture in the sense of "cultivated," with a particular emphasis on art forms and art for art's sake. The result of this cultural trait of ours has been a separation of art from culture-as-a-whole. We are more likely to discuss the creative periods of Picasso than Picasso as a manifestation of the social, religious and economic pressures of his times, or, in other words, Picasso as a manifestation of his culture.

Similarly, in music, we are very prone to a consideration of music *qua* music outside of its cultural context. We are most likely to discuss a song as an art form, as pretty or ugly and why, and in many other ways outside its principal cultural function. (1960:468)

This reaction against studying music from the descriptive point of view alone is perhaps not so much an indictment of the approach as it is an indictment of what appears to be a faulty methodology—the substitution of a single kind of study for what must clearly be a multifaceted approach. Music can and must be studied from many standpoints, for its aspects include the historical, social psychological, structural, cultural, functional, physical, psychological, aesthetic, symbolic, and others. If an understanding of music is to be reached, it is clear that no single kind of study can successfully be substituted for the whole.

There is another objection to exclusive or almost-exclusive preoccupation with the descriptive in ethnomusicology, and this concerns the kinds of evaluative judgments which are necessarily made when the structure of the music is the sole object of study. In such a case the investigator proceeds from a set of judgments derived from the structure itself unless he happens to be working with one of the relatively few cultures of the world which has developed an elaborate theory of music sound. This means that his analysis is, in effect, imposed from outside the object analyzed, no matter how objective his analytic system may be. In itself, there is no objection to this, since any analysis involves this kind of structuring of view. But in the case of any man-made object or idea, the investigator has another available source of analysis which must not be overlooked; this is the evaluation of the object or idea by the people who created it.

Paul Bohannon (n.d.) has given us a useful set of concepts which apply directly to these two kinds of information sources; he calls them the "folk evaluation" and the "analytical evaluation." Folk evaluation refers to the fact that "when people speak or act to make something, they . . . evaluate their own statements and acts and usually . . . have an end in view. The mere assigning of words to acts and things is one form of cultural valuation. To hold moral, economic or religious ideas about them is to evaluate them further." Thus the people who create things and ideas do so for a reason and assign values to their actions. At the same time, the outside observer—the anthropologist or the ethnomusicologist—" . . . analyzes a culture not merely in order to act in it. . . . Rather, he analyzes that culture in order to classify it, understand it according to more or less scientific principles, and communicate it to colleagues, students and readers who have no experience in it and are, concomitantly, blocked to at least some degree by their own culture from understanding any other one." In other words, the folk and the analytical evaluations proceed from different premises and because of differing obligations. The folk evaluation is the explanation of the people themselves for their actions, while the analytical evaluation is applied by the outsider, based

upon experience in a variety of cultures, and directed toward the broad aim of understanding regularities in human behavior. Bohannan continues:

In such a situation, the cardinal sin is to confuse the evaluation of the speaker, the actor or the doer with the evaluation of the analyst. . . .

The distinction between folk evaluation and analytical evaluation is necessary because only if we know the folk evaluation can we be sure we are analyzing what is actually present in the data. Once we have determined that, the analytical evaluation can range widely and can find regularities which are unknown to the actors, without making the error of assigning the analytical evaluations to the actors in the situation. (pp. 1-3)

The specific application to ethnomusicology is clear. The folk evaluation is a necessity to the investigator, for without it he cannot know whether his analysis is present in the data or whether he has himself inserted it. This is not to say that the investigator puts nothing more into his materials than he takes out from the folk evaluation; to the contrary, it is his job to do so. But what he puts into the data must be built upon what he first learns from the culture at hand about its music and its music system, taken in the broadest sense. He is then in a position to generalize about that system from his broader knowledge of music systems in general.

II

Since all these factors must be considered in studying the music of any given people, the immediate problem is whether a theoretical research model can be constructed which will take all of them into account. Such a model must consider folk and analytical evaluation, the cultural and social background, the relevant aspects of the social sciences and the humanities, and the multiple facets of music as symbolic, aesthetic, formal, psychological, physical, and so forth.

The model proposed here is a simple one and yet it seems to fulfill these requirements. It involves study on three analytic levels—conceptualization about music, behavior in relation to music, and music sound itself. The first and third levels are connected to provide for the constantly changing, dynamic nature exhibited by all music systems.

For the purposes of convenience, we can begin with the third level, that of the music sound itself. This sound has structure, and it may be a system, but it cannot exist independently of human beings; music sound must be regarded as the product of the behavior that produces it.

The level out of which this product arises is behavior, and such

behavior seems to be of three major kinds. The first is physical behavior, which in turn can be subdivided into the physical behavior involved in the actual production of sound, the physical tension and posture of the body in producing sound, and the physical response of the individual organism to sound. The second is social behavior, which can also be subdivided into the behavior required of an individual because he is a musician, and the behavior required of an individual non-musician at a given musical event. The third is verbal behavior, concerned with expressed verbal constructs about the music system itself. It is through behavior, then, that music sound is produced; without it, there can be no sound.

But behavior is itself underlain by a third level, the level of conceptualization about music. In order to act in a music system, the individual must first conceptualize what kind of behavior will produce the requisite sound. This refers not only to physical, social, and verbal behavior, but also to the concepts of what music is and should be; involved are such questions as the distinction between music and noise, the sources from which music is drawn, the sources of individual musical ability, the proper size and involvement of the singing group, and so forth. Without concepts about music, behavior cannot occur, and without behavior, music sound cannot be produced. It is at this level that the values about music are found, and it is precisely these values that filter upward through the system to effect the final product.

The product, however, has an effect upon the listener, who judges both the competence of the performer and the correctness of his performance in terms of conceptual values. Thus if both the listener and the performer judge the product to be successful in terms of the cultural criteria for music, the concepts about music are reinforced, reapplied to behavior, and emerge as sound. If the judgment is negative, however, concepts must be changed in order to alter the behavior and produce different sound which the performer hopes will accord more closely with judgments of what is considered proper to music in the culture. Thus there is a constant feedback from the product to the concepts about music, and this is what accounts both for change and stability in a music system. The feedback, of course, represents the learning process both for the musician and for the non-musician, and it is continual.

If we view music study in the broad perspective of this simple model, our attitude is not exclusively that of social science or the humanities, of the cultural and social or the structural, of the folk or of the analytic, but rather a combination of them all. Further, it leads inevitably to the consideration of such matters as symbolism, the presence or absence of an aesthetic, problems of the interrelationships of the arts and of the reconstruction of culture history through the use of music, and the

question of culture change. Instead of focusing attention upon a single aspect of music study, it enables and even forces the investigator to seek an integrated understanding of the human phenomenon we call music.

The proposition may be restated once more: we hear a song; it is made of sound ordered in certain ways. Human beings produce this song and in so doing they behave, not only when actually singing the song but also in their way of life, either as musicians or as people listening to music and responding to it. Since they are musicians or non-specialists responding to music, they conceptualize the musical facts of life, which they then accept as proper to their culture. And finally, they accept or reject the product because it does or does not accord with what they have learned to be proper music sound, thus inevitably affecting concept, behavior, and sound again.

The model presented here has not, to the best of my knowledge, been suggested previously in specific detail or in connection with music, although some parallels to it are found in other fields of study. Perhaps the closest parallel comes from the field of visual art, as suggested by Vinigi Grottanelli, who writes:

Apart from its aesthetic evaluation, the study of any art object or class of objects should be carried out following three distinct though interrelated lines of analysis. The first is iconographic, i.e. at the same time morphological, technological, and historical, and concerns the nature of the objects *per se*, their formal characters, the technique of production, their distribution in space and time, and their stylistic affinities to similar productions elsewhere. The second is iconological, and has to do with the meaning of the representation, the nature of the beings it purports to portray, and the underlying system of conceptions and beliefs in which it is integrated—the world of ideas and symbols in a given culture. . . . The third approach . . . deals with the impact of those ideas and of their concrete symbols on the everyday life of the society concerned and with their influence on the ritual and social behaviour and thought of individual men and women. Only a combination of these three approaches can give us a true picture of the phenomenon we are called upon to investigate. (1961:46)

Cornelius Osgood, in investigating material culture, reached less exact but still similar conclusions in his theoretical framework for study. His aim was to work on three levels of what he called "ideas":

1. Ideas about objects external to the mind directly resulting from human behavior as well as ideas about the human behavior required to manufacture these objects.

2. Ideas about human behavior not directly resulting in the manufacture of objects external to the mind.

3. Ideas about ideas involving no human behavior (apart from speech) nor objects directly resulting from such behavior.

Category one roughly corresponds to what is apparently generally thought of as material culture. It includes all data directly relating to visible or tangible things such as tools, clothing, or shelter which a person or persons have made.

Category two roughly corresponds to what is apparently generally thought of as social culture and includes all data about human behavior which does not directly result in the manufacture of things. . . .

Category three pertains only to ideas. . . . To it one would refer the tremendous sphere of ideas which are termed religious. . . . Also all philosophy and speculation belong in category three. The principal difficulty in comprehending this conceptualization involves the definition of behavior as exclusive of the ideational content of speech. It seems quite possible, however, to regard ideas (an ego's) about a person speaking wholly from the point of view of the speaker's non-ideational behavior. (1940:26-7)

In this approach Osgood's category one closely approximates what has here been called the music product, and category three what has been called conceptualization. Category two, however, is not precisely the same as what has here been called behavior, though it appears to be somewhat similar. Since Osgood was apparently not attempting to present a dynamic model, the factor of feedback based upon learning is not present in his scheme.

Finally, there is a relationship between the model and some contemporary views of anthropology, in that the conceptual level corresponds to what might be called the cultural or ideational aspect of human organization; the behavioral to the social; the product to the material; and the feedback to the personality system and to learning theory.

It should be emphasized that the parts of the model presented above are not conceived as distinct entities separable from one another on any but the theoretical level. The music product is inseparable from the behavior that produces it; the behavior in turn can only in theory be distinguished from the concepts that underlie it; and all are tied together through the learning feedback from product to concept. They are presented individually here in order to emphasize the parts of the whole; if we do not understand one we cannot properly understand the others; if we fail to take cognizance of the parts, then the whole is irretrievably lost.

METHOD AND TECHNIQUE

Problems of methodology in ethnomusicology have not been widely discussed in the literature although it is apparent that one means, at least, of characterizing a discipline is through an understanding of the method of study and analysis it employs. Method depends, however, upon theoretical orientation and basic assumptions, particularly those which concern the aims of the discipline, and because such assumptions may well vary from individual to individual, it is wise to make them explicit at the outset.

My first assumption is that ethnomusicology aims to approximate the methods of science, insofar as that is possible in a discipline which deals with human behavior and its products. By scientific method I mean the formulation of hypotheses, the control of variables, the objective assessment of data gathered, and the grouping of results in order to reach ultimate generalizations about music behavior which will be applicable to man rather than to any particular group of men.

My second assumption is that ethnomusicology is both a field and a laboratory discipline; that is, its data is gathered by the investigator from among the people he is engaged in studying, and at least part of it is later subjected to analysis in the laboratory. The results of the two kinds of method are then fused into a final study.

My third assumption is a practical one dictated by what has hitherto been done in the field, i.e., that ethnomusicology has been concerned primarily with non-Western cultures and most specifically with nonliterate societies in North America, Africa, Oceania, South America, and Asia, as well as folk cultures of Europe. There have been a number of studies as

well of the art music of the Near and Far East, and fewer studies we would be willing to call ethnomusicological of music in Western cultures.

The fourth assumption is that while field techniques must of necessity differ from society to society and, perhaps more broadly, between literate and nonliterate societies, field *method* remains essentially the same in over-all structure no matter what society is being investigated.

These four assumptions are essentially neutral in nature; that is, they refer simply to the background out of which all ethnomusicologists work. The three remaining assumptions, however, are essentially critical in that they refer to problems which have not been clearly understood in the past.

The first of these is that ethnomusicology has for the most part failed to develop a knowledge and appreciation of what field method is, and has thus not applied it consistently in its studies. While there are obvious exceptions to this, it seems clear that we have been beset by two major difficulties. One is that our field studies have been couched in general rather than specific terms; that is, to a considerable extent they have been formulated without precise and clear-cut problems in mind. The other is that ethnomusicology has suffered from the amateur field "collector" whose knowledge of its aims has been severely restricted. Such collectors operate under the assumption that the important point is simply to gather music sound, and that this sound—often taken without discrimination and without thought, for example, to problems of sampling—can then simply be turned over to the laboratory worker who will "do something with it."

This leads to a second critical assumption which is that ethnomusicology in the past has devoted itself primarily to fact-gathering rather than to the solution of broadly based problems couched in terms of the study of music as a part of human culture. This is emphasized in the literature of ethnomusicology, which tends to be devoted in greatest part to the analysis of the sounds of music without reference to their cultural matrix, to the physical description of music instruments as physical forms, and very seldom indeed to what music is and does in human society. Ethnomusicology has to this point been primarily concerned with descriptive materials and studies; it has emphasized the what of music sound rather than the broader questions of why and how. This has not been ethnomusicology's exclusive preoccupation, of course, but it has taken a primary role in our studies.

My third critical assumption again derives to some extent from those which have already been noted. Despite the fact that ethnomusicology is both a field and a laboratory discipline, and that its most fruitful results must inevitably derive from the fusion of both kinds of analysis, there has been both an artificial divorcing of the two and an emphasis on the

laboratory phase of study. Reference is made specifically to the regrettable tendency to resort to armchair analysis. There is, of course, no objection to thinking, speculating, and theorizing from hunches, intuition, or imagination, for this is all a vital part of the development of a discipline. However, two kinds of armchair analysis are objectionable: the failure to take theories to the empiric test of the field materials, and the analysis by the laboratory technician of materials collected by others in the field. To make the latter point as clear as possible, the analysis of music materials which one has not himself collected can and does provide us with certain kinds of valuable information, but this is subject to two sharp limitations. The analyst in all too many cases has no means of knowing the kind and extent of the sample with which he is dealing; and he cannot draw upon an intimate knowledge of the broad musical scene which must inevitably be of deep concern if the formation of music sound is to be accurately understood. There have in the past been extended studies in ethnomusicology based upon a small sample of commercially issued materials; while the proof of the accuracy of such studies remains to be ascertained, it seems extremely doubtful that we can give them much credibility. Armchair ethnomusicology is, I hope, a thing of the past, at least insofar as it is not very closely controlled and used only for the limited kinds of studies where it may be useful.

In sum, ethnomusicology is both a field and a laboratory discipline; the laboratory phase must flow out of the field phase, and we must seek to achieve a balance between the two rather than exclusive or almost exclusive stress on either. Ethnomusicology has always been troubled by the dual nature both of the materials of which it is composed and the aims toward which it is directed, and there will always be some students who emphasize one aspect and some who emphasize the other. The ultimate goal, however, must be the fusion of the two into a broader understanding which encompasses both.

I

There is a valid and important difference between field technique and field method. "Technique" refers to the details of data gathering in the field, that is, to such questions as the proper use of informants, the establishment of rapport, the importance of vacation periods both for the investigator and for those he investigates, and so forth. Field method, on the other hand, is much broader in scope, encompassing the major theoretical bases through which field technique is oriented. While the two are inseparable in the actual pursuit of a field problem, they are quite different when one is considering the formulation of that problem: technique, then, refers to the day-by-day solution of the gathering of data,

while method encompasses these techniques as well as the much wider variety of problems involved in creating the framework for field research.

Materials concerning field method in ethnomusicology are relatively rare. Jaap Kunst, in *Ethnomusicology*, speaks fleetingly of what one does in the field, based upon his own experience in Java (1959:14-16); the International Folk Music Council has issued a booklet concerned with problems of field collection (Karpeles 1958); and Helen Roberts (1931) makes various suggestions to the field worker; but all of these are concerned more with techniques than with method, and none makes mention of research design, problem, or any one of a number of other basic considerations. David McAllester, in an appendix to his *Enemy Way Music*, speaks briefly of his research plan, presents the questionnaire he used to give direction to his study, and comments both on the application and success of that questionnaire (1954:91-2). But field method involves much more than the techniques of gathering data, for before data gathering can proceed the investigator must face the fundamental problems of hypothesis, field problem, and research design, and in all of these, the relevance of theory to method.

To a considerable extent, it is the last—the relevance of theory to method—which is the most important and perhaps the least understood, for no problem can be designed in terms of basic hypotheses without consideration of theory. Herskovits has expressed this with great cogency in noting that “. . . the conceptual scheme of the student deeply influences not only the execution of a given field problem but also the way in which it is formulated and planned” (1954:3). Although Herskovits was speaking specifically of anthropological field method, and not of ethnomusicology, it is worthwhile to draw attention to his examples, particularly since some of the approaches utilized in ethnomusicology have been drawn directly from anthropology.

Herskovits contrasts the underlying assumptions which characterize the studies of those who are interested in trait lists as opposed to those whose theoretical orientation is shaped by the functionalist approach. For the former:

The significant factor . . . was the hypothesis that culture is an historical phenomenon which can be understood if the contacts of peoples, as reflected in similarities and divergences in the component elements of their respective ways of life, are reconstructed, and that these ways of life consist of items sufficiently discrete to be set down separately and manipulated in mathematical terms.

On the other hand:

. . . the theoretical position of the functionalists, which maintains that the fabric of a culture is so tightly woven that to separate

a single strand from it is to do violence to the whole, meant that the very concept of the trait was inadmissible, since the aim was to gather materials which revealed the totality of the existing patterns of behavior. Here, therefore, the aspect becomes the unit of study.
(p. 4)

A difference of the same order is pointed out in the approaches of those who emphasize the concept of society as opposed to those who emphasize the concept of culture; in this case, the former “. . . will pay more attention to data obtained in response to the ‘What?’ questions than the one who centers his attention on dynamics and seeks answers to questions which lie in the ‘Why?’ category” (p. 5). Such differences do not indicate that either theoretical approach is necessarily better than the other, except in solving particular kinds of problems; what is important is that theoretical orientation inevitably affects point of view, approach, hypothesis-formation, problem orientation, and all the other considerations which go into field method, and these in turn affect field techniques.

As we look into past ethnomusicological studies, it is evident that considerations of this kind have helped to shape the discipline, and that in many cases it has been anthropological theory which led ethnomusicologists toward particular kinds of studies. Thus when Ekundayo Phillips postulates stages in the development of music from what he calls impassioned speech tone and draws examples from the contemporary Yoruba (1953), or when Balfour sees stages in the development of the African friction drum (1907), each is drawing heavily upon the classic theory of social evolution as formulated in the late nineteenth century. Or when Frobenius develops four culture circles in Africa, based partly on distribution of music instruments (1898), the *Kulturhistorische Schule* of German and Austrian anthropology in the early twentieth century has obviously been a prime source. Again, Sachs's formulation of method in constructing twenty-three strata of music instrument development on a worldwide basis (1929:1940) involves theoretical formulations both of *kulturkreis* and early American diffusion studies.

The important question is what theoretical bases at present contribute the background for the formulation of problems in ethnomusicology. This is not a simple question to resolve, for ethnomusicologists have rarely, if ever, examined their basic assumptions in this light. However, there are at least two, and possibly three, approaches implied in the literature, the acceptance of any one of which inevitably shapes the work of the field investigator. Each of these can be expressed in terms of a dichotomy, although it is my view that no single dichotomy is immutable and that all are susceptible of resolution.

The first of these involves the single most difficult problem in

ethnomusicology: whether the aim of our studies is to record and analyze music, or whether it is to understand music in the context of human behavior. If the former point of view is taken, then the primary orientation of the field worker will be toward recording an adequate sample of music sound in order that this may be returned to the laboratory for analysis. The basic aim is to produce an accurate structural analysis of the music taken, and the study is primarily based upon a fact-gathering, descriptive approach. If, on the other hand, the aim is to understand music in the context of human behavior, the field worker becomes almost automatically an anthropologist, for his concern is not more upon the recorded sample than it is upon much broader questions of the use and function of music, the role and status of musicians, the concepts which lie behind music behavior, and other similar questions. Here the emphasis is upon music but not upon music divorced from its total context; the investigator attempts to emerge from his study with a broad and generally complete knowledge both of the culture and the music, as well as the way music fits into and is used within the wider context. It is eminently clear that the orientation of the student in respect to these approaches will enormously affect not only his results but his field methods and techniques as well.

The second dichotomy appears in the difference of aim between what can be called extensive as opposed to intensive studies. By extensive studies, I mean those in which the aim of the investigator is to travel widely through an area, staying in no single place for any extended period of time, and recording as quickly and as widely as he can. The result of such a field design is the rapid accumulation of large quantities of relatively superficial data from dispersed geographic areas. The utility of the method is that it achieves a broad view of a given area, expressed primarily in music structural terms. The investigator can see at a relatively swift glance the outstanding characteristics of the music and the ways in which variation is manifested within the area. This approach emphasizes the general survey and can, of course, lead to future research of a more detailed nature where the most interesting problems are indicated. The intensive study, on the other hand, is one in which the student selects a particular limited area and gives his entire attention to it. This is depth study in which the aim is to exhaust the materials concerning music in a restricted area, insofar as this is possible. Again, the assumption of either of these approaches leads to the formulation and prosecution of very different research design, method, and technique.

A third kind of dichotomy, although not nearly so explicit in the ethnomusicological literature, is that which concerns the ultimate aim of any study of man. This involves the question of whether one is searching

out knowledge for its own sake, or is attempting to provide solutions to practical applied problems. Ethnomusicology has seldom been used in the same manner as applied or action anthropology, and ethnomusicologists have only rarely felt called upon to help solve problems in manipulating the destinies of people, but some such studies have been made (Weman 1960) and it is quite conceivable that this may in the future be of increased concern. The difficulty of an applied study is that it focuses the attention of the investigator upon a single problem which may cause or force him to ignore others of equal interest, and it is also difficult to avoid outside control over the research project. Although this problem is not yet of primary concern, it will surely shape the kinds of studies carried out if it does draw the increased attention of ethnomusicologists.

These three sets of problems are clearly among those which can, and sometimes do, have a major effect upon the investigator's approach to his work. The relationship between theory, conceptual framework, and method is a close one; no field work exists in a vacuum, and its very nature is definitely shaped by the basic orientation of the researcher.

Given this background, it is clear that in some ways any research problem is circumscribed, but this in no way means, of course, that the field worker can simply fall back upon his general orientation and rely upon it to take automatic care of his research project. Quite to the contrary, each specific item of research requires careful planning and the formulation of an over-all research design. Raymond V. Bowers has suggested four major criteria which serve as guides to good design; although he is speaking explicitly about research methods in sociology, his criteria apply equally well in ethnomusicology (1954:256-59).

Bowers' first point is "the criterion of research feasibility," which refers to the fact that every research undertaking is a risk of time and effort and thus "should be as calculated a risk as possible . . ." Here the student must consider the relevant data already published, including materials which bear upon the particular hypothesis he has formulated and, in the case of research in cultures other than his own, the ethnographic literature. If the project is to be a team effort, questions of available personnel must be considered. Applicable research techniques are of special importance, as is the question of whether there is enough prerequisite knowledge to enable the researcher to formulate his hypotheses.

The second criterion is that of "explicit formulation of research objectives," and this is an area in which ethnomusicology has been somewhat lax, substituting undifferentiated and vague statements of purpose for precise research objectives. As has already been pointed out at some length, the statement of objectives determines in great part field method and techniques, as well as analysis of materials gathered. Bowers

notes cogently that the difference between precise and imprecise formulation is the difference between scientific and prescientific investigation, and adds that "the probability is high that those who have only a vague understanding of what they are after at the beginning of a project will have an equally vague understanding of what they get at the end."

The third criterion is that of "methodological explicitness," which Bowers cites in connection with ongoing research. Two major reasons are given for keeping close track of methodology: first, that whatever results are reached have been achieved through the application of specific methodology and are thus intimately tied to it; and second, that through the recording of methodology, "research experience can more adequately be reviewed, appraised, and shared with others." To these there should be added a third: acquaintance with methodology and a clear understanding of which methods can contribute most precisely to the problem at hand contribute substantially to the achievement of significant research results.

Finally, Bowers notes "the criterion of specifying the research outcome," and says in explanation:

Presumably results are the aim of research—a new item of knowledge, a new methodological tool, or a technique for resolving practical problems. The objective has raised questions, and the methodological design has selected and funneled empirical data appropriate to these questions. The researcher's job is not over until he has made the most of this activity. . . . His responsibility cannot end at hurried cataloguing of his results. He must come to his most considered judgment as to their significance in the light of his research operations and his professional background. He must tell what the study failed to accomplish as well as what he thinks it accomplished, and both must be stated in as precise, formal terms as the context permits. (1954:258-59)

Field method, then, is as broad and complex a problem in ethnomusicology as it is in other areas of research. It is intimately tied to the question of theoretical orientation and encompasses research design, including problem, hypothesis, objective and methodological techniques. Careful and detailed consideration of these problems is essential to the prosecution of field research in ethnomusicology.

II

What the ethnomusicologist does in the field is determined by his own formulation of method, taken in its broadest sense. Thus one project may be directed toward the specific task of recording music sounds alone, another toward problems of music aesthetics, and still another to the

question of the sociological role of the musician in society. If, however, the project is conceived as a depth study in a single locale, and if the student views the study of ethnomusicology as one in which music is considered not only from its aural aspect, but from the social, cultural, psychological, and aesthetic as well, there are at least six areas of inquiry to which attention will be turned.

The first of these has been called the musical material culture, and it refers primarily to the study of music instruments ordered by the investigator in terms of the recognized taxonomy based on division into idiophones, membranophones, aerophones, and chordophones. Also, each instrument must be measured, described, and either drawn to scale or photographed; principles of construction, materials employed, decorative motifs, methods and techniques of performance, musical ranges, tones produced, and theoretical scales are noted. In addition to these primarily descriptive facts about music instruments, however, there is a further range of more analytic questions of concern to the field worker. Is there present in the society a concept of special treatment of music instruments? Are some revered? Do some symbolize other kinds of cultural or social activity? Are particular instruments the harbingers of certain kinds of messages of general import to the society at large? Are the sounds or shapes of particular instruments associated with specific emotions, states of being, ceremonials, or calls to action?

The economic role of instruments is also of importance. There may be specialists in the society who earn their living from instrument construction, but whether or not these exist, the production of an instrument inevitably involves the economic time of the producer. Instruments may be bought and sold; they may be commissioned; in any event, their production is a part of the economics of the society at large. Instruments may be considered as items of wealth; they may be owned by individuals; their ownership may be individually acknowledged but for practical purposes ignored; or they may constitute an item of village or tribal wealth. The distribution of instruments has considerable importance in diffusion studies and in the reconstruction of culture history, and it is sometimes possible to suggest or to confirm population movements through the study of instruments.

A second category of study is that devoted to song texts, and this involves the texts as linguistic behavior, the relationship of linguistic to music sound, and questions of what the texts reveal in what they say. The problem of text-music relationship is one which has long been contemplated in ethnomusicology because of its obvious significance, but it has not been until recently that specific studies have been undertaken using modern linguistic and ethnomusicological techniques.

Song texts reveal literary behavior which can be analyzed in terms both of structure and content; song text language tends in many cases to differ from ordinary discourse, and in some instances, as in the case of praise names or drum languages, to be a "secret" language known only to a certain segment of the society. In song texts, language is often more permissive than in ordinary discourse, and this can reveal not only psychological processes such as the release of tension, but information of a nature not otherwise readily accessible. For similar reasons, song texts often reveal deep-seated values and goals stated only with the greatest reluctance in normal discourse. This may lead, in turn, to the discernment of an available index of the prevailing ethos of a culture, or to a sort of national character generalization. An understanding of ideal and real behavior is often accessible through song texts, and, finally, texts are used as an historic record of the group, as a means of inculcating values, and as a mechanism for enculturation of the young.

The third aspect of study comprises the categories of music, envisaged by the investigator for convenience but, more important, by the people themselves as various separable types of songs. It is in this connection, of course, that the student orders his recording program, arranged to include an adequate sample of all types of music, both in controlled and in actual performance situations.

The musician forms the fourth point of interest for the ethnomusicologist. Of great importance are the training of the musician and the means of becoming a musician. Is the individual coerced by the society or does he make a free choice of his future career? What is the method of training—is the potential musician left to his own resources, does he receive a basic knowledge of his instrument or of singing technique from others, or does he undergo a rigorous course of training over a stated period of time? Who are his teachers, and what are their methods of instruction? This leads to considerations of the problem of professionalism and economic reward. A society may distinguish among levels of competence, classifying them through the use of distinct terms and reserving the highest accolade for what it considers to be a true professional; or the musician may be virtually ignored as a specialist. Forms and methods of remuneration differ widely from society to society, and in some cases the musician may not be paid at all.

Of equal interest and importance are such questions as whether the musician is considered to be an outstandingly gifted individual, or whether all members of the society are considered to be equally potentially gifted. Does the musician inherit his ability, and if so, from whom and by what means?

As a member of society, the musician may view his specialty as setting

him apart from other persons, and therefore he may see both himself and society in a special light. Non-musicians also hold concepts of what is and what is not acceptable musicianly behavior, and form attitudes toward the musician and his actions on this basis. Indeed, musicians may be set apart as a class and may form associations based on their mutual skills within the society. They may own the music they produce, thus again raising questions of economics, in this case in respect to intangible goods.

It is in this connection, too, that cross-cultural tests of music ability enter; although no culture-free tests seem to have been developed, their formulation would be of exceedingly high interest in assessing latent and manifest abilities of musicians and non-musicians, both as these are judged by society and in terms of the individual.

A fifth area of study concerns both the uses and functions of music in relation to other aspects of culture. The information we have at hand suggests strongly that in terms of use, music cuts across all aspects of society; as human behavior, music is related synchronically to other behaviors, including religion, drama, dance, social organization, economics, political structure, and other aspects. In studying music, the investigator is forced to move through the total culture in search of music relationships, and in a very real sense he finds that music reflects the culture of which it is a part.

The functions of music in society are of a different level of investigation from that involved in determining use, for here the search is directed toward much deeper questions. It has been suggested that one of the primary functions of music is to aid in the integration of society, a process of continual concern in human life; another suggestion is that music is primarily a means of release of psychological tension. The distinction between use and function has not often been made in ethnomusicology, and studies in this general area have tended to concentrate on the former to the exclusion of the latter, but studies of function are potentially the more exciting of the two since they should lead to the deeper understanding of why music is a universal in human society.

Finally, the field investigator studies music as a creative cultural activity. Basic here is the phase of music study which concentrates on the concepts of music held in the society under investigation. Underlying all other questions is that involved in the distinctions made both by musicians and non-musicians between what is considered to be music and what is considered not to be music, a subject little touched upon in ethnomusicology. What are the sources from which music is drawn? Is music composed only through the agency of superhuman assistance and sanction, or is it a purely human phenomenon? How do new songs come into existence? If the composer has a recognized status in the society, how

does he compose, and what does he say, if anything, about the process of composition? The standards of excellence in performance are of great importance, for through the understanding of such standards the investigator can throw light on good and bad music and on the ways in which the standards are enforced in the society. Such problems lead both to folk and analytic evaluation of a theory of music in the society at hand, to the specific problems involved in the extent to which form is visualized as something which can be manipulated, and to whether such aspects of form as music intervals or particular core rhythm patterns are reified in the thinking of musicians and non-musicians.

The answers to such questions lead to still broader problems. Is music conceived to be an aesthetic activity or is its main orientation toward the functional? Is it seen as intimately related to other artistic activities in graphic and plastic arts, in literature, dance, or drama—or, conceptually, does it stand alone?

These then are some of the things the ethnomusicologist looks for in the field phase of his study. That there are other specific problems is obvious, but in general outline the field phase of study must lead the student through all aspects of the culture at hand, for the objective of the ethnomusicologist is to understand music not only as structured sound but as human behavior as well. Thus music must be approached in terms of the tools used in its production, the expressive language employed, the kinds of music produced, the musician as a member of society, the uses and functions of music, and its creation, as well as in terms of its aural sound.

III

If, again, we assume that ethnomusicology originates in field study, that music is a part of culture, and that the societies which ethnomusicologists study have historically been those outside the Western stream, we are led almost inevitably to the further assumption that field method and field technique must be derived from cultural anthropology. Although this has seldom been specifically acknowledged by ethnomusicologists, it is in fact the case. Perhaps more precisely, field method in ethnomusicology has derived from the social sciences in general, while field technique is borrowed most widely from the particular social science of anthropology.

As is the case in ethnomusicology, anthropologists began to discuss specific aspects of field technique rather late in the history of the discipline, but much material is now available. It is generally conceded that the first concrete and detailed discussion of field technique to accompany an ethnographic field report in anthropology was contributed by Bronislaw

Malinowski as the Introduction to his *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, the first volume of his monumental study of the Trobriand Islanders published in 1922. In this Introduction, Malinowski laid down three criteria of field work:

. . . First of all, naturally, the student must possess real scientific aims, and know the values and criteria of modern ethnography. Secondly, he ought to put himself in good conditions of work, that is, in the main, to live without other white men, right among the natives. Finally, he has to apply a number of special methods of collecting, manipulating and fixing his evidence. (1950:6)

The first of these criteria is as clearly applicable today as it was in 1922, and it subsumes broadly the questions discussed here under the rubric of "field method." The second precipitated considerable controversy in anthropology, which continues to the present day; the question is how far, how long, and to what extent the ethnographer can be a participant observer, and whether the rewards outweigh the disadvantages. The third point concerns precisely what has here been called "field technique," and Malinowski continued his discussion to include various specific techniques which he considered most rewarding.

Since Malinowski's initial formulation, many other anthropologists have written on general problems of method and theory (Radin 1933), on field method and technique in particular investigations (Mead 1940b), on specific suggested techniques (Herskovits 1950), and on various other problems. The most detailed discussions of field method have probably been those contributed by Paul (1953) and Oscar Lewis (1953), although others could be cited.

Benjamin Paul, for example, organizes his contribution under a series of headings and sub-headings which deal with such problems as introductions, establishing a role, ethics of role-playing, types of participation, the informant, interviewing, taking notes, and so forth. Herskovits, on the other hand, divides the problems of field research into those of duration, communication, rapport, comparison, and historic depth, of which the first three are considered to be common to any field project, while the two latter depend upon the particular problem and approach (1954:6). There is no need to enter here into details of field technique, for these are discussed at length in the various writings noted above. There are, however, some special problems which have not been widely considered in ethnomusicology and which bear some discussion here.

The first of these is the problem of what in anthropology has been called "ethnographic truth." This refers to the fact that within any given culture there is what often seems to be almost infinite variation in the

details of any given behavior or belief, and this applies as well to music as to any other aspect of culture. Given the fact that the investigator cannot possibly consider every minute variation because of the simple limits of time, how can he ever know what is the "proper" or "correct" version of a song? The answer lies in the distinction to be made between an absolute correctness and an understanding that such an absolute probably does not exist. What is important is not the search for a single truth, but rather "the limits within which a culture recognizes and sanctions variations in a . . . given mode of behavior" (Herskovits 1948:570). That is, the ethnographic or ethnomusicological "truth" is not a single fixed entity, but rather a range of entities within a particular distribution of variation, and it is the limits of the variation, rather than a supposed absolute, which lead to an understanding of the phenomenon.

This problem of variability and ethnomusicological "truth" has been considered infrequently in ethnomusicology. Helen Roberts was aware of it in her study of variations in Jamaican folk song (1925), and A. M. Jones makes an extended analysis of two versions of the same Ewe song (1959:234-45). One of the most interesting discussions, however, has been contributed by John Blacking, who proposes the use of transcriptions which are syntheses of several performances. His argument is that,

Unless we are specifically studying interpretation, we want to know what a musician sets out to do each time he plays a certain piece of music, not *exactly* what he did on one particular occasion. "Time-pitch" graphs and other mechanical devices may be helpful and necessary for the ethno-musicologist in the course of his analysis, but the final transcription should, if possible, be as straightforward and as easy to read as a standard musical score, which in any case is only a guide to musical performance and an approximation of the sounds produced.

The four musical transcriptions in this paper do not represent the exact sounds that are made every time two Venda boys play ocarina duets, but are a synthesis of several performances of the same duets. Detailed transcriptions of every performance that I heard or recorded are not given, since I do not consider that the early stages of an analysis need be printed any more than the field-notes of an anthropologist. The transcriptions are intended to represent the musical patterns desired by any two Venda who set out to play the duets. (1959:15)

Blacking, then, considers two aspects of the problem. On the one hand, for purposes of analysis the ethnomusicologist must use his detailed, individual transcriptions, while on the other, an exposition of what is

striven for in sound and structure can be represented adequately by a synthesis of several performances. In this point of view, Blacking is indeed reflecting ethnographic practice, for the anthropologist, although careful to record the range of variation of any given phenomenon, seeks in his reporting to give a balanced synthesis of that range. The ethnographic or ethnomusicological "truth," then, results from the gathering of the widest possible range of data concerning the given question, and the reporting of the consensus of behavior with equal attention given to the limits of variation within that consensus.

A second problem of special concern lies in the use of what have been called "spot" studies, a technique of investigation which adds further reliability to the search for ethnomusicological truth. Quite simply, the spot study refers to the checks, made usually toward the end of the field stay, of the validity of data gathered to a wider context. That is, in a small undifferentiated society, the investigator may spend the bulk of his time in one village, but in the last few weeks travel to neighboring areas to check the information gathered with "outside" informants. In a larger, differentiated society, a spot check may be made in different classes or levels of society, and in a certain sense the cross-checking of information with different informants in the same class of the same society falls under the rubric of spot checking. The kind of information obtained through this technique is not primarily intended to reveal new facts, but rather to check facts already garnered and, particularly, to discover the extent to which the observer can generalize the information he already has on hand. The spot check technique has apparently not been widely used in ethnomusicology, or if it has, the results have not been reported in the literature.

A third point of particular importance concerns restudies, in which an area or a problem is checked a second time either by the same or by a different investigator. Oscar Lewis has given particular attention to this problem (1953:466-72) as it applies to anthropology, and he finds it possible to distinguish four types of restudies:

- (1) those restudies in which a second or third investigator goes to a community with the express design of re-evaluating the work of his predecessor;
- (2) those in which the same or an independent investigator goes to a community studied earlier, to study culture change, utilizing the first report as a base line against which to measure and evaluate change;
- (3) those in which one returns to study some aspect of the culture not studied earlier; and
- (4) those in which one studies more intensively and perhaps from a new point of view some aspect of the culture studied earlier. There is,

of course, some overlapping between these types. All restudies are additive in a sense. However, it is a matter of emphasis in research design. (pp. 467-68)

Lewis gives a number of examples of restudies in the anthropological literature, but the point here is that ethnomusicology does not seem to have given adequate consideration to the importance of the restudy. The restudy can help to provide checks on, and a better understanding of, methodology in ethnomusicology. The objective is not, of course, to point out the mistakes made in earlier studies, but, as Lewis puts it, to find out ". . . what kind of errors tend to be made by what kind of people under what kind of conditions. Given a sufficiently large number of restudies, it might be possible to develop a theory of observation which would help to evaluate the role of the personal equation, personality, and ideological or cultural variables" (p. 467). A second value of the restudy is the light it can cast on culture change.

There are, of course, some compelling reasons for the lack of restudies in ethnomusicology. One of these is the simple lack of available personnel, and another is the limited funds available for field research. Further, a certain pressure has been felt in ethnomusicology to study the music of peoples whose culture is changing rapidly, and of course there is a greater appeal in breaking new ground than in working with music which has already been the object of study. But ethnomusicology has already approached the point at which restudies would be extremely important and revealing, for we now have a time depth in published work which makes restudy feasible. The research of LaFlesche or Densmore among the American Indians, Hornbostel's analysis of songs from Ruanda, Herzog's early studies in the music of the Pacific are all base lines from which restudies could make significant contributions to the understanding both of methodology and of music change.

Finally, although it lies more in the realm of analysis of materials gathered than in the question of field technique, mention must be made of the comparative method, for if comparison is to be an aim of analysis, it must be considered in the research design. At the outset, a distinction must be clearly drawn between the comparative method as used by those who espoused the theory of social evolution in anthropology, and the comparative method as envisaged at present. The older comparative method was based essentially on a deductive theory which espoused stages of culture, the concept of the contemporary ancestor, and like formulations. Here, cultural facts were applied more or less indiscriminately to "prove" the already deduced theory; thus given the concept of stages of culture, the investigator had only to look around the world for facts that would fit into and support the conclusions already reached.

The comparative method as presently used, however, eschews the application of fact to support deductive theory, and instead aims at controlled comparison which, through inductive application, will lead to generalization on an ever-wider basis. In order to make such comparison, it is clear that the approach must be cautious, that like things must be compared, and that the comparisons must have bearing upon a particular problem and be an integrated part of the research design. It is assumed here that one of the aims of ethnomusicology is to produce data which can be compared and that therefore the broader aim is generalization about music which can be applied ultimately on a worldwide basis.

Thus comparison for its own sake is not the goal to be sought, for there are many ways in which a comparative method can be used. Herskovits has summed up some of the possible approaches:

Are we concerned with items of culture, perhaps in the tradition of the classical "comparative method"? Are we comparing cultural institutions, as in studies of totemism, or the market, or magical practices? Do we wish to draw comparisons between whole cultural aspects, as in general treatises on art, or social organization, or economics, or folklore? Or, as in the case of those concerned, for example, with national character, do we take a holistic approach and attempt to compare total cultures? Again, we may ask what we hope to achieve through our comparisons. Do we wish to establish the boundaries of cultural variation, so as to assess these in terms of limiting biophysical and ecological factors? Or, in philosophical terms, are we seeking to discern the universals in human behavior that give mankind a common basis for the differentials in perceptive and value patterns that guide action in each society? Are we attempting to establish contacts between peoples, and analyse the historical implications of these contacts? Is our aim to understand the dynamic processes which underlie cultural change? Moving to the methodological plane, we ask how we go about making our comparisons. Here classification is of the essence. Shall we draw our comparisons in terms of a particular phenomenon, or by historic stream, or by area?

All these, and others that could be indicated, are questions which must employ the method of comparison in some form, if they are to be answered. (1956:135)

Although Herskovits is speaking of the comparative method in anthropology, it is clear that his questions apply equally well to ethnomusicology. Ethnomusicology has more or less taken it for granted that comparison is one of its major aims, and indeed its early name,

"comparative musicology," stressed that conclusion, but there has been little awareness of the problems involved in comparison. Anthropology has paid more attention to the matter, and studies such as that of Herskovits, cited above, or Lewis (1961) can be of considerable importance in resolving the problem for ethnomusicology.

IV

It has been noted above that ethnomusicology is both a field and a laboratory discipline, and it is therefore clear that within the broad area of its method two kinds of techniques must be used. While it is not the intention here to describe in detail ethnomusicological methods of transcription and analysis of music sound, there are several problems which must be considered.

Cutting across the two areas of field and laboratory techniques is the extremely difficult question of what constitutes an adequate sample of the music of a community, tribe, or larger grouping. Theoretically, at least, the number of songs in any given song community is infinite, because it is hardly possible to know the total sample and because, so far as we know, creativity is a never-ending process under whatever cultural rules it is carried out; thus what might be conceived as a total sample one day may be lacking the next. What percentage, then, of an infinite sample constitutes reliability? The answer is that there is no answer.

It is obvious, however, that ethnomusicology must reach some workable definition of what constitutes an adequate and reliable sample, and there appears to be one reasonably simple solution. This consists of taking a single given song, chosen at random from a large song body, transcribing it, analyzing it, and scoring the results on an objective, arithmetic basis. This process would then be repeated, using a sample of five different songs from the same song body, and averaging the results. A further sample of perhaps twenty-five songs, and possibly a final sample of one hundred songs would probably be sufficient to complete the basic work. The results obtained for the different-sized samples could then be compared and subjected to statistical analysis with an aim toward assessing the significance of difference in the arithmetic figures obtained. It should be possible, then, to determine the sample point at which the results obtained do not differ significantly from one another, and this point may be found to occur at ten songs, or twenty-five, or perhaps even one hundred. In order to validate the results, it would be necessary to run the same kinds of tests on different song bodies, since the range of allowable variation in music may vary markedly from style to style. To the best of my knowledge, no such procedure has been applied to ethnomusicological studies, and yet it seems imperative that some certification of what

constitutes an adequate sample must be undertaken, for at present there is no assurance that our studies are reliable in giving us an accurate idea of the constituent parts of a music style.

This general problem of sampling is further complicated by the fact that we do not as yet understand clearly the extent to which the characteristics of the music of a single group can be generalized, or whether, conversely, sub-styles of a markedly different structure exist in any or all music groups. That is, given an over-all sample of the music of any group, do war songs differ significantly in structure and style from love songs, or from funeral, play, drinking, hunting, or other types of song? Again, the answer to the question seems to lie in a practical experiment in which the songs of a given group are subjected to analysis couched in comparable arithmetic terms, and the results compared.

George Herzog raised this problem in connection with North American Indian music as long ago as 1935, when he suggested that four kinds of songs seem to cut across tribal styles regardless of the "major" style of any particular group in which they exist; these included Ghost Dance, love, Hiding Game, and animal story songs. He says:

In the light of such findings, we have to reconsider the current notions of tribal or national styles as integrated, homogeneous pictures which tend after due time to assimilate new additions to their background, maintaining or restoring their "original" integrity. . . . Suffice it to say that often the description of a musical "style" is merely the enumeration of the traits of single disparate styles representing different categories of songs; or else of divergent types each of which offers numerous examples. (1935:10)

Herzog went on to suggest three possible reasons for the phenomenon of "style within the style," which he took as a given fact, and these were the possibility of an older stratum of music overlain by more recent additions, borrowing from another group, or ". . . psychological preferences which shape musical form to accord with psychological attitudes" (p. 10). Unfortunately, although a few music examples were appended to the article, Herzog apparently did not follow out the full implications of his suggestion, i.e., the submission of proof that styles within the style do actually exist. There seems to be very little question, however, that such is the case, and Nettl's study of the Shawnee, though perhaps not couched in sufficiently abundant detail to be finally conclusive, is certainly corroborative (1953a). Equally suggestive is Herskovits' discussion of Dahomean song:

It would be strange if a variety of types of songs such as has been indicated did not carry with it a variety of musical styles, and, as

a matter of fact, it is impossible to speak of "Dahomean music" as though it were a unit. Not only do the occasions vary for different types of singing, as do the songs sung on these occasions, but the forms of the songs, their duration, and the musical treatment of them show a wide range of variation. (1938b:II,321-22)

Herskovits describes the songs "which glorify the names and deeds of the dead kings and living chiefs" as highly polished in performance through rehearsal; these are contrasted with the songs for "dances in the market-places or certain songs of the ancestral and Sagbata ceremonies" in which the music "is less complex; its rhythms are more regular, its range narrower, its melody simpler. Indeed, the style of such improvised songs is in the main much more a unit than in the elaborately composed songs. . . ."

If it be the case, then, that some music styles are made up of a number of identifiable sub-styles, how does the analyst present the results of his research? Does this mean that any study of a music style must be presented in terms of sub-styles, or can the sub-styles in turn be lumped together into a single over-all style? If we assume the latter is feasible, it must be kept in mind that to seek an over-all style may distort specific portions of the more detailed picture and that the result may not conform at all to any single sub-style.

Such questions as these lead, in their turn, to further problems involved in the analysis of music, among the most important of which is determining what, precisely, are the points of structure which characterize a style. Ethnomusicologists consider a large number of stylistic elements in making their analyses, among them melodic range, level, direction, and contour; melodic intervals and interval patterns; ornamentation and melodic devices; melodic meter and durational values; formal structure; scale, mode, duration tone and (subjective) tonic; meter and rhythm; tempo; vocal style, and others. But which of these elements characterizes a music style? Is melodic range of equal importance to, or more or less important than, durational values? And further, is it not possible that one aspect may be of differing importance in different styles?

Again, the answers to such questions are difficult to make, but there does seem to be at least one way in which the validity of regarding certain elements as characterizing can be established, and this is through the application of tests of statistical validity. In 1956, Freeman and Merriam attempted to make exactly this kind of application, using Fisher's discriminant function in connection with a single structural measure, the relative frequency of occurrence of major seconds and minor thirds in two bodies of African-derived music in the New World, that of the Ketu cult of Bahia, Brazil, and the Rada cult of Trinidad. The conclusion was that

this simple measure alone serves to distinguish between the two styles with only a .09 error, and that had more variables been considered, the error would have been substantially reduced. In effect, then, the study indicated that the frequency of occurrence of two kinds of intervals in these song bodies is statistically significant to a remarkably high degree, and that this particular aspect of music structure is characterizing (Freeman and Merriam 1956).

This study does not give a final answer to the general problem, for its sample was limited to but two cultures, and only two simple measurements were employed. But there is a logical, though unproved, assumption that if the simple criterion of relative frequency of but two intervals gives such remarkably precise results, there must be other elements of structure that are equally diagnostic, and further, that the more elements considered in combination, the higher the accuracy of the result will be.

Underlying the problems discussed thus far is the assumption that the laboratory analyst has available to him accurate methods of transcribing music sound to paper, but this is a question that is far from resolved. Ethnomusicologists are agreed that the ultimate aim of translation to paper is to obtain an accurate picture of a song which can then be analyzed to reveal elements of structure and style. How this can best be done, however, and to what extent the details of sound must be faithfully recorded, is open to question.

Early in the history of ethnomusicology, transcriptions were made by ear in the field, but this method has long been eschewed because of its unreliability. Not only does song usually go too fast for the transcriber, but if repetitions are demanded, it is likely that variations may occur to such an extent that the transcriber receives a mottled version of the singer's efforts. Moreover, recorded material can be played over and over and the accuracy of transcription checked repeatedly in detail.

At least one student, however, has argued for the advantages of transcription by ear in the field. Helen Roberts notes:

Longhand notation is, of course, very much slower than record making, and requires patience in all concerned. On the other hand, it has many merits. It affords excellent opportunities to the recorder for observing the musical intelligence and ability of the singer, his variability from repetition to repetition in melody, form, text, etc., as would not be noted under the rather more strenuous and rapid recording by phonograph. It also affords an excellent chance for conversation by the way, for questions are bound to arise which would never occur to the collector in the more perfunctory process of making records, and would only too late be put by the transcriber. Moreover, in this more leisurely pursuit, an informant may

appeal to a bystander for assistance in recollecting, or arguments may arise which, to the alert collector, may furnish valuable additional data. Longhand notation is the best method possible for checking up on impromptu composing and frauds. Phonograph records and longhand notations of the same song may be compared with advantage.

Apparently any singers take almost as great an interest in the process of notation as in that of making records, and are particularly delighted when the collector, reading from the music, is able to reproduce, not only the text, but the melody of their own songs on so short an acquaintance. (1931:111-12)

Despite these arguments, ethnomusicologists are agreed that there is no substitute for recording, though a combination of techniques might prove rewarding. The development of recording apparatus—first disc, then wire, and finally tape, which is by far the most versatile—enables the ethnomusicologist to make a permanent record of music sound and to bring it back to the laboratory where much more precise transcription can be made. Even here, however, transcription itself depends upon the human ear, and accuracy varies from individual to individual.

It has normally been assumed that every transcription must be as precise and detailed as possible, but the advent of certain mechanical and electronic equipment seems to suggest that precision is a relative matter which can be interpreted in many ways. For example, the early development of such devices as the monochord coupled with the cents system (Kunst 1959:2-12, 231-32) made it clear that it is possible to ascertain measurements of pitch with a precision far exceeding the possibilities inherent in the human ear, and this is further borne out by the development of devices such as the Strobococonn (Railsback 1937).

More recently, Charles Seeger has developed a fundamental frequency analyzer known as the melograph which gives the most detailed graphic analysis yet possible of a single-line melody (1951: 1957: 1958). It is Seeger's contention that the conventional symbolic-linear music-writing used in Western notation, and by ethnomusicologists in general, is at best a relatively crude prescriptive tool which is not accurate for descriptive purposes.

It does not tell us as much about how music sounds as how to make it sound. Yet no one can make it sound as the writer of the notation intended unless in addition to a knowledge of the tradition of writing he has also a knowledge of the oral (or, better, aural) tradition associated with it—i.e., a tradition learned by the ear of the student, partly from his elders in general but especially

from the precepts of his teachers. For to this aural tradition is customarily left most of the knowledge of "what happens between the notes"—i.e., between the links in the chain and the comparatively stable levels in the stream.

In employing this mainly prescriptive notation as a descriptive sound-writing of any music other than the Occidental fine and popular arts of music we do two things, both thoroughly unscientific. First, we single out what appear to us to be structures in the other music that resemble structures familiar to us in the notation of the Occidental art and write these down, ignoring everything else for which we have no symbols. Second, we expect the resulting notation to be read by people who *do not carry the tradition of the other music*. The result, as read, can only be a conglomeration of structures part European, part non-European, connected by a movement 100% European. (1958:186-87)

Seeger contends that the melograph, used in conjunction with conventional notation, gives us a better understanding of those aspects of music which are not necessarily perceived by the ear, that is, elements of music which may characterize a style but which, because of the conventions of present music-writing, go un-notated.

The graphs produced introduce the ethnomusicologist to a level of analysis which differs markedly from that to which he is accustomed, and it is clear that if such "notation" is to be used, there will have to be an accompanying new system of analysis. Whereas a note in conventional notation presents a concrete entity which can be handled in a variety of ways, the melograph "note" is a continuous jagged line which may flow on virtually without interruption. Thus the question involves the nature of the unit which can be separated for study, or perhaps most accurately, whether units can or should be isolated. What the melograph appears to show us involves a level of interpretation markedly different from that achieved through the use of conventional notation.

This raises a whole new series of questions revolving around the central problem of how accurate a transcription should, can, and must be. The melograph is the most accurate transcription device presently available, and Seeger argues that such accuracy is necessary because conventional notation represents music through a screen of ethnocentrism and because it does not indicate certain very important aspects of the music. On the other hand, the question arises whether conventional notation does not tell us enough about music structure to allow a reasonably precise description and analysis of outstanding structural patterns. In other words, it may be that conventional notation simply gives us one kind of information

while the melograph gives us another, and that each of these is equally important.

If we accept this view, it still remains important to know how accurate conventional notation must be. Bartok and Lord (1951) have used what is perhaps the most elaborate system of descriptive accuracy in transcribing Serbo-Croatian folk songs, but the system is so detailed that it is sometimes difficult to read. Most ethnomusicologists use a much simpler system with fewer added markings, but is this accurate enough to delineate a music? And if two ethnomusicologists, as is so often the case, transcribe the same song and achieve slightly different results, how much does this alter the understanding of the over-all system? Is it a question of taking refuge in quantity in the hope that data numbering in the thousands will cancel out whatever errors may be made? And if so, we are led inevitably back to questions of sampling and, particularly, to what constitutes an adequate sample of the music of a given people.

Ethnomusicology, then, is faced with a large number of problems concerning method and technique. Solutions, or even partial solutions, to them will do much to strengthen the discipline and give it a wider and firmer grasp both of its aims and of the theoretical problems it wishes to pursue.

PART TWO

CONCEPTS AND BEHAVIOR

THE STUDY OF SONG TEXTS

The first two sections of this book have been directed toward the development of a definition and theory of ethnomusicology, a model for its study, and illustrations of the kinds of problems involved in and suggested by that model. It has been stressed that ethnomusicology involves much more than the structural analysis of music sound, for music is a human phenomenon produced by people for people and existing and functioning in a social situation.

We turn now to some of the major problems ethnomusicology must approach if it is to fulfill its promise as a discipline which attempts to make scientific analysis of its subject matter. We shall be searching not only for the motivations which lie behind music behavior as such, but also for the means of expanding knowledge of music to knowledge of other and wider human behavioral processes. What *do* we learn from music? What can we learn from the broad study of ethnomusicology viewed as a discipline which treats music as one further aspect of human behavior taking its place beside man's other multiple activities?

One of the most obvious sources for the understanding of human behavior in connection with music is the song text. Texts, of course, are language behavior rather than music sound, but they are an integral part of music and there is clear-cut evidence that the language used in connection with music differs from that of ordinary discourse.

It is a truism to say that music and language are interrelated, and that the study of this interrelationship is thus a task for the joint energies of the ethnomusicologist and the linguist. The exact nature of the problem, however, tends to be technical and structural in nature and is not of

primary concern here, although some aspects of it may be noted briefly. Language clearly affects music in that speech melody sets up certain patterns of sound which must be followed at least to some extent in music, if the music-text fusion is to be understood by the listener. Bright comments that "languages display regular patterns of high-pitched and low-pitched syllables, loud and soft syllables, long and short syllables; and different languages give different emphases to these factors. Since patterns involving these elements of pitch, dynamics, and duration are also among the basic elements of music, it is at least a reasonable hypothesis that there may be some cultures in which features of spoken languages have played a part in conditioning the musical patterns of song" (1963:27).

Music also influences language in that musical requirements demand alterations in the patterns of normal speech. Thus language behavior in song is a special kind of verbalization which sometimes requires special knowledge of the language in which it is couched. We have had occasion in the preceding chapter to comment upon some of the linguistic changes in song texts in connection with the processes of composition, but some further discussion may be entered into here.

In speaking of the Maori, Best notes that "a serious difficulty encountered in the translation of these songs is found in alteration of word forms for the sake of euphony. Thus vowels may be inserted, elided, or altered, or an extra syllable may be added to a word. Again, not only do song makers employ archaic expressions and resurrect obsolete words, but they also sometimes coin a word" (1924:139). In another work, he continues;

In order to render a line euphonious, words are altered in form to the confusion of the translator. Thus vowels may be inserted or elided, thus producing word forms which render the translator helpless. Thus, in one song, we find the phrase *te ahua o te kupu* (the aspect or character of the remark) is altered to *te ehū o te kupu*, and *ehū* means "turbid," and to bail out water, and to exhume, as bones of the dead. . . . In this case the desire was to shorten vowel sounds. *Kua* is sometimes lengthened to *koua*, all for the sake of euphony. In other cases a single vowel sound is drawn out, as in the *huatau*. In the legend of Rata occurs a charm that commences:

Rata wārē, Rata wā . . . a . . . a . . . re

In the word *wārē* both vowels are short, and it is so pronounced in its first occurrence; but in the second the *a* is drawn out as shown. (1925:107)

Such technical details of changing linguistic structure appear to be a common feature of song texts, and there is the further difficulty of the use of special kinds of language in song. Best points out that the Maori also use "metaphor, allegorical expressions, mystic and mythopoetic phrases and aphorisms" in their texts, and that "for these reasons the translation of native songs is almost invariably a difficult matter, unless one can obtain enlightenment from one who is acquainted with the figurative expressions, sacerdotal terms, old sayings, allusions to old myths, and cryptic utterances that they contain" (1924:136). Indeed, Best was particularly concerned with such problems of translation and devotes considerable discussion to them (1925:107-14).

Special language use is apparently a common feature of song texts. Migeod, speaking of the Mende of Sierra Leone, comments that "words are often slightly modified in pronunciation as well as shortened, and a further complication is that the singer is himself very commonly unable to give meaning. . . . The many meaningless words they will describe as 'song-words' . . ." (1926:289). Firth notes for the Tikopia:

As in the *uru* and other pivotal chants of the festival, the language of the *taume* is of a different character from that used in everyday conversation, and contains a number of words which are said by the natives to be of archaic form. Thus of some phrases it is said "speech of former times; it has disappeared." The absence of any very precise meaning for individual words and phrases, however, is not detrimental to them in native eyes. Their value is essentially symbolic and lies in the correct recital and conjunction of them, not in their individual significance to the people who sing them. (1940:II,264)

Titiev adds that the Mapuche of Chile ". . . employ a highly figurative style, full of nuances and subtle turns of expression. Then, too . . . they like to use phrases that are markedly elliptical and laconic, with very few words serving to suggest complete thoughts. Moreover, most of the references . . . derive so much of their significance from close familiarity with Mapuche culture, that outsiders are apt to find them meaningless or enigmatic" (1949:1).

The widespread difficulty of translation of texts due to linguistic change, particular forms of language, the insertion of archaic expressions, and so forth, is further emphasized by the statements of a number of writers concerning a number of widely separated cultures. Such comment is made, for example, by Birket-Smith for the Eskimo (1935:156),

Douglas L. Oliver for the Siuai of the Solomon Islands (1955:369), Voth for the Oraibi (1903:passim), LaFlesche for the Osage (1925:passim), and others. And this, of course, takes no consideration of the very special cases afforded by tonal languages (Marius Schneider 1961) and by drum signaling (Carrington 1949a&b).

We can say, then, that not only are music and language interrelated in the formation of song texts, but also that the language of texts tends to take special forms. Therefore we should expect that the language of texts would have special significance and would function in special ways, and this seems to be the case.

One of the most striking examples is shown by the fact that in song the individual or the group can apparently express deep-seated feelings not permissibly verbalized in other contexts. This phenomenon has been commented upon most frequently for Africa, although it apparently operates in other world areas as well. Hugh Tracey in speaking of the African Chopi says: "You can say publicly in songs what you cannot say privately to a man's face, and so this is one of the ways African society takes to maintain a spiritually healthy community" (1954:237). Margaret Green reports for the Nigerian Ibo that the women of the village occasionally come together in order to judge a woman suspected of stealing from another member of the group. In doing so, they gather at the home of the accused; Green notes that in order to summon all the women to the judging the group sang a song on a particular occasion she witnessed: "Women who will not come out in this place, let millipede go into her sex organs, let earthworm go into her sex organs." Green comments that "such things would be said on no ordinary occasion to a woman, but were used here to induce the women strongly to turn out in force" (1947:199-206). From a different part of the world, Devereux and La Barre report that "a Sedang Moi girl . . . once improvised a little song to tell me that they were tired and wished to go home. Asked why she did not tell me this in ordinary language, she replied that to do so would have been rude. Apparently, by expressing her wish in the form of a song, she left me free to decide whether to hear it only as a bit of vocal music, or to take cognizance also of its conceptual content" (1961:369).

Similar freedom in song is illustrated by an occasion witnessed by the author among the Bashi people of the Congo (Léopoldville). The songs were sung by a group of girls working at the time on a coffee and quinine plantation in the Kivu area. "The owner of the plantation was acting in the capacity of interpreter . . . and thus could not fail to follow the song texts; due to advances in prices he had recently stopped giving the workers a ration of salt and, particularly peanut or palm oil." The first song of the series spoke of a girl who was working on a plantation; it was made

abundantly clear that the Plantation was Bwana X's. In the second song, a mother says to her daughter:

"Go work in my fields."

The daughter refuses, saying:

"No, I want to work for Bwana X. I want to work for the white man where I have a task, for when it is finished I can leave."

The mother is angry, but the girl goes to work for X. One day while going to work, she comes to the edge of the Nyaberango river which is in flood stage.

"What shall I do? How can I cross the river and get to work? And if I cross and work all day then perhaps it will rain some more and I won't be able to get back again. But I will go, work quickly, finish soon, and come back before it has a chance to rain any more."

In the third song, the girls said:

"We don't work for Bwana Y. On that plantation, they just work taking out the bad coffee. They don't work with the fork. But here we work for Bwana X with the fork. Why do we come here to work when we could work for Bwana Y just picking out the bad coffee? It is because Bwana X is a good man. He gives us a task and we can do this task, and when we finish, we may go home. So we are good girls who are able to work like men."

In the fourth song, the point began to emerge more clearly.

"We come to work for Bwana X. We finish our tasks and we do good work. When it is pay day, Bwana X gives francs to all of us. We say: 'Well, that is good, but Pedro (Bwana X's headman) said that Bwana X said that if we worked well and finished our tasks, he would give us salt and oil.' Here we are, and we have the francs, but where is the salt? Where is the oil? We don't understand it because Pedro does not tell lies. But here it is. Why?"

And in the final song, the point is driven home.

"We have finished our work. Before, we used to get oil; now we don't get it. Why has Bwana stopped giving us oil? We don't understand. If he doesn't give us oil, we will all leave and go to work for the Catholic Fathers. There we can do little work and have plenty of oil. Be careful! If we don't get oil, we won't work here."

These five songs, of course, represent an organized plan to inform the plantation owner of the desires and intentions of the working girls. The discontent was unknown to the planter; while the girls were unwilling to express their doubts directly to him, they seized the opportunity which presented itself to inform him indirectly of the situation. The melodic lines of the songs were well established as Bashi melodies; the words were improvised on the spur of the moment, save for the last song which had been given the new text at the time X stopped giving oil to the girls (Merriam 1954).

Given the apparent freedom of song lyrics, one would expect to find considerable obscenity, not necessarily for its own sake but rather directed toward some aim or used simply to increase the effectiveness of the desired message; Green's citation to the Ibo, quoted above, seems to be of this type. Speaking of the Gros Ventres, Flannery expresses the same point in noting that "songs at the second and third circling had words, composed by enemy-friends of the scouts, the words usually being both derisive and vulgar" (1953:91). Unfortunately, there seems to be very little information concerning obscenity in song texts. Both Williamson, for the Mafulu of New Guinea (1912:215), and Ivens, for the Lau of the Solomons (n.d.:98), refer to vulgar songs but comment no further. McAllester notes the presence of a "few obscene songs" among the Apache, and adds that "they are very few as compared with our enormous body of such material. I was able to record only one which had reference to a man who ate too many cedar berries, had diarrhea and soiled his breech clout. There were similar references in some of the clowning that goes on during almost any kind of singing" (1960:472). Malinowski, speaking of the love-making expeditions of boys in the Trobriand Islands, says:

The adventurers would, therefore, usually steal out at night and put on their ornaments outside their village. But once on the main road, they became boisterous and defiant, for this is the proper behavior on such an occasion. There are even some special bawdy songs, called *lo'uwa* to which they keep time as they go along. (1929:264)

Finally, Demetracopoulou speaks of the use of obscene songs among the Wintu:

The obscene songs which are sung in the Bald Hills area are probably not strictly puberty songs. They are known as *sune* and are referred to as food-begging songs. In most sub areas of the Wintu territory they were sung only as a means of obtaining food at irregular intervals. A group from one village went visiting an-

other village. Upon their arrival, the visitors danced naked or raised their clothes to expose their sexual organs, singing obscene songs and making obscene gestures. They usually performed this before the houses of relatives by consanguinity or affinity. The hosts, in disgust, gave them food to get rid of them. In Bald Hills, these songs were sung at puberty ceremonies by the groups arriving from invited villages, probably because this was an occasion for receiving food. (1935:490)

It is impossible to make any sort of generalization from such a brief sampling, although it does seem probable that obscene songs are sung among almost all peoples. It is equally probable, however, that a distinction is made between pornography for its own sake and the use of obscenity in the licensed song situation to emphasize a point in a way not otherwise acceptable.

What is important in all the cases cited above is that song itself gives the freedom to express thoughts, ideas, and comments which cannot be stated baldly in the normal language situation. It appears, then, that song texts, because of the special kind of license that singing apparently gives, afford an extremely useful means for obtaining kinds of information which are not otherwise easily accessible.

One of the forms through which this is made most evident is the topical song such as the Calypso (Crowley 1959a), which has a very widespread distribution and which may well be found in almost every society. Topical songs take many forms, but in broadest application they may be characterized simply as songs of comment upon aspects of daily life. Speaking of the Chopi of East Africa, Tracey has perhaps best summarized the content of the topical song, although his reference is most frequently to a specialized variety, the song of social control:

The subject-matter may be gay, sad, or purely documentary. In every case it is highly topical and appropriate to the locality, so much so, in fact, that most of the allusions would be caught only by those in close touch with the villagers and the district. They are often highly critical of those in authority over them, white or black, and to a large degree it may be said that the poems reflect the attitude of the common people towards the conditions of their society. High good humour is a very prominent feature of most of their poems. Sly digs at the pompous, outspoken condemnation of those who neglect their duties, protests against the cruel and overbearing, outcries directed against social injustices as well as philosophy in the face of difficulties, are all to be found in their songs. . . . (1948:3)

Tracey expresses a very cogent point concerning the function of such song.

. . . it performs a highly social and cathartic function in a society which has no daily press, no publications, and no stage other than the village yard in which publicly to express its feelings or voice its protests against the rub of the times. It will be realized how important it is to keep open such a channel through which incidents perpetuated for a while in song express symbolically the plethora of similar incidents which gratify, amuse, exasperate, or sadden the common people—community expression through the self-expression of their composers. It might even be regarded as a form of theatre. . . . (*loc. cit.*)

There are a number of varieties of topical song which can be separated on the basis both of intent and content, including, for example, songs of insult, pure and simple. Crowley writes of the two major singing societies, La Rose and La Marguerite, in St. Lucia, whose members practice and parade on the appropriate day, "attending Mass in a body, parading through the streets carrying banners and wearing fancy dress indicative of . . . society status. The rest of the year the societies hold 'seances' or evening meetings where the members practice their songs . . . and deride the attributes of the opposite society.

On the register, it is the King
of the water—(nickname of
La Marguerite)
who is registered.
Go to other countries, it is
the king of the water
who is registered.
La Rose cannot have that
because they have too much noise.

Crowley also points out that in the past "such boasting and insults led to blows, court cases, and occasional street riots. . . ." (1957:7-8). Speaking of the "Nail," a type of facial marking introduced among the Nigerian Tiv in fairly recent times, Akiga reports that "the younger Tiv are split into two factions, and there is bitter feeling between them. Those with the lumps make up mocking songs about the Nail Men, and the Nail Men about the Lumpy-faced" (East 1939:46).

Another broad category of topical song is the more or less "neutral" comment on scandal; in this case there is no direct function of causing action, but rather the song simply takes note of what is going on. Crowley

reports on a St. Lucian *caliso*, giving the text of a song which comments on a "recent rum bonding scandal."

Some say they don't know at all
Some say it was just bòbòl ("graft")
But what I would like to know is
How the cask get out of the Government
bondhouse? (1957:13)

Speaking of the Australian Songman, Elkin says that songs are made up ". . . about everyday incidents, including love affairs. Frequently the patent meaning of the text is quite innocuous, but a second or latent meaning is understood by the hearers. . . . The Songman is careful that his allusions are not too direct" (1954:74). A. B. Ellis makes similar comment concerning the Tshi-speaking peoples of West Africa:

Frequently the words have reference to current events, and it is not uncommon for singers to note the peculiarities of persons who may pass and improvise at their expense. This is particularly the case when the strangers are Europeans, as the latter do not as a rule understand Tshi, and the singers can allow themselves greater latitude than would be the case if their remarks were understood. (1887:328)

Herskovits speaks of songs of gossip and scandal in discussing the work party in Haiti.

The *combite* songs are distinctive in Haitian music for their melodic quality. . . . At the *combite* a man not only learns all the gossip of the day, but enjoys learning and singing the songs which caustically comment on the shortcomings of neighbors, or evaluate the hospitality of those who have called *combites*, or detail scandal, phrased with sufficient directness to allow the reference of the song to remain clear, but warily, so as not to give the individual pilloried ground for direct recrimination. (1937:74)

Five texts are given, referring to "a miserly *combite* host," an affair of a first cousin with first cousin, "an impending quarrel where a suspicion of magic practices entered," a challenge of physical might, and "a composition which complains against a shirker who comes and eats, but does little work." Further information concerning the same song type comes from the Herskovitses' work in Trinidad:

A favorite method of comment is in song. The form is not one of narrative detail, but of deft allusion, of the suggestive image. The

pattern of putting into song important happenings of the day lies deep in the tradition of the group. . . . The pattern of comment on current happenings places emphasis on the humorous, the pretentious, the malicious. An occasional note of pity, or self-pity enters; and the more frequent theme of the braggard, or the strong, boastful fellow; and the love motif. But the principal effect sought for and achieved is laughter. (1947:276-78)

The examples of song texts given include decrying "the free and easy manner of the young girls," "taunting a rival," "the elderly woman who weds a man much younger than herself," "allusion . . . to the girls who love not wisely," "variations on the theme of the young girl who finds herself with child," love for a girl, and so forth (pp. 278-84).

Clyde Mitchell, writing about the Kalela dance in the towns of Northern Rhodesia, gives as examples texts concerned with self-praise, with lampooning the modern girl who uses powder and paint, the mercenary interest of parents in marriage payments, and other topics. The Lamba preoccupation with adultery cases is commented upon in the following song:

Mothers, I have been to many courts,
To listen to the cases they settle:
They settle divorce cases,
They talk about witchcraft cases,
They talk about thefts,
They talk about tax-defaulting,
And refusing to do tribute labour.
But the things I saw at Mushili's court,
These things I wondered at,
From nine o'clock in the morning,
To four o'clock in the afternoon,
The cases were only adultery.
Then I asked the court messenger:
"Do you have any different matters to settle?"
The court messenger said: "No,
There are no other matters,
It is just like this in Lambaland—
There are no assault cases,
There are no theft cases:
These are the cases in the courts of Lambaland."
(1956:7-8)

Topical songs such as these are a reflection of the concerns of the culture of which they are a part. While they may contribute to the

correction of those aspects of behavior to which they call attention, simply through the means of putting them in the public eye, their major function seems to be one of comment on various aspects of everyday life. At the same time, such songs exhibit a keen eye for scandal and gossip, and they lead quickly to a further subgrouping of the topical song.

This song group is concerned with direct social control, that is, songs are sometimes used, through admonition, ridicule, and in some cases even more direct action, to effect actual change in the behavior of erring members of society. Such songs may be directed toward a wide variety of social ills, among them sex offenses, such as the song in Dahomey heard by Herskovits and "sung against a young woman who had been careless with her favors and had in addition been guilty of theft" (1938b:II, 323). Burrows reports that on the Pacific islands of Uvea and Futuna:

A different kind of taunting song ridicules evildoers, particularly sex offenders. Though sexual intercourse before marriage, and even adultery, are regarded rather leniently, birth of a child to these unions is definitely a misdemeanor, as is the practice of *moe-tolo*, which is defined by Grezel as *aller a la recherche des femmes endormies pour faire le mal sur elles; faire de mauvaises actions sur des femmes endormies*.

Usually it is the man who is punished. The official punishment is a fine of cooked food; but no one who has seen how Polynesians wince under ridicule can doubt that these mocking songs are punishment too. (1945:74-5)

The rectification of wrong done through thievery may also be the object of such songs. Firth says that "one way of relieving the owner's feelings, and perhaps bringing disrepute and shame upon the thief, is to compose a song about the incident and have it chanted as a dance chorus in the ordinary way. Natives say that the thief, listening to this, is made to feel shame. The song thus becomes a kind of legal mechanism by which the ridicule of the community is mobilized and launched against the offender" (1939:269).

But song can be the vehicle for legal action in a much more direct fashion than this. Bohannan (1957:142-44) recounts in detail a legal case among the Tiv directly stimulated by the use of song. The principals in the case were Torgindi and Mtswen, and Bohannan states the background of the case as follows: "Mtswen was the secondary marriage guardian of the wife of Torgindi's son, and had been guilty of some rather highhanded tactics that caused the marriage to fall through. Mtswen had then refused to act as intermediary to get Torgindi's bride-wealth refunded, and the two men exchanged angry words." Torgindi's response to the exchange

was to return to his compound and make up a song commenting on "what a skunk Mtswen was." That night, he sang the song as loudly as possible, within Mtswen's hearing, and this was repeated the following night with the members of his lineage joining in. Mtswen, not being skillful in composition, then hired a composer to make up similarly scurrilous songs about Torgindi, who in turn hired his own composer. Both men were active in singing the songs every night, and each gathered food and drink in order to attract others to come and sing the songs and support their cause. Bohannan says:

There are some specific rules for these songs. Chenge told me that if an act attributed in such a song was possible of human performance, it should be true, or the slandered person could call a *jir*. However, if the act was not humanly possible anything could be said. In one of Mtswen's songs, he accused one of Torgindi's wives of stealing yams: this, by local consensus, was probably true because this particular wife was one of the Udam tribe, and widely thought to be a thief. But if it was not true, Chenge insisted, Torgindi and the wife could call a *jir* against Mtswen and the song-maker. Another song, and one of the catchiest tunes which the contest produced, told how Torgindi changed himself into a pig at night and made it unsafe for every sow in the countryside. The Shangev song-maker . . . said that since even Torgindi couldn't actually do that, such a song couldn't be the basis for a *jir*. The song-maker said that he had thought of some much worse things to suggest that it was in Torgindi's nature to do, if it were only humanly possible, but that Mtswen had stopped him saying that all he wanted to do was to win the contest, not to "spoil Torgindi's heart permanently." They were, after all, neighbors.

The singing and drumming continued every night for more than three weeks before the legal authorities took notice, but the two principals were finally informed that they were to appear at a certain time and place. Both men came with substantial groups of supporters, music instruments, and other paraphernalia, and the two groups performed for almost two hours before the authorities called for silence and announced that the case would be judged.

The case, which was a simple marriage case, was very quickly settled, and both men—anxious to be rid of the vast expense they were incurring—concurred in the judgment. After the case was settled on its jural points, the *mbatarev* announced the winner of the song contest: Torgindi won the case, but Mtswen had better songs.

They then advised both song-makers to go home immediately and not return to MbaDuku for a couple of months until the feelings which had been aroused had died down.

An apparently similar kind of formalized legal process among the Eskimo is reported by Holm, who says that murder, theft, or destruction of another's property may be the occasion, though cases involving women are most important:

The drum-matches are held both summer and winter. A match of this kind is not settled in one evening, but is continued for a number of years, the parties taking turns to visit one another. For each new meeting the parties prepare and practise new songs. In these songs the crimes are vastly exaggerated, and if they can find no other material, they father new crimes on their opponent, or reproach him for crimes he has merely intended but not committed. They also enumerate the faults of their opponent's family, and even of their dead ancestors. In the hands of malicious people these attacks may assume an exceedingly brutal form. . . .

The opponents stand facing one another. They sing one at a time . . . the other party standing quiet and apparently indifferent in front of him. The singer mocks the other in a great number of ways, as a rule by snorting and breathing right in his face and by striking him with the forehead . . . so that he tumbles backward.

The other party receives this treatment with the greatest composure, nay even with mocking laughter to show his audience his indifference to it. When his opponent is about to strike him, he shuts his eyes and advances his head to receive the blow. (1914: 127-28)

The singing may go on all night, and Holm reports that it is received with a high degree of interest by the audience. The opponents do not show hostility toward each other in the breaks between the songs.

There are several difficulties with Holm's description of these drum matches. We do not really understand why they are held, that is, what occasion arising out of the background of legal dispute causes the actual coming together of the opponents. Neither do we discover, unfortunately, what constitutes resolution of the conflict. Holm does say that "when one party dies, the other plumes himself on it and boasts over it to others," but there is no indication that any sort of judge is present or that the drum matches do anything save vent the feelings of the disputants (pp. 127-28).

Speaking of the same phenomenon, Thalbitzer gives somewhat more

was to return to his compound and make up a song commenting on "what a skunk Mtswen was." That night, he sang the song as loudly as possible, within Mtswen's hearing, and this was repeated the following night with the members of his lineage joining in. Mtswen, not being skillful in composition, then hired a composer to make up similarly scurrilous songs about Torgindi, who in turn hired his own composer. Both men were active in singing the songs every night, and each gathered food and drink in order to attract others to come and sing the songs and support their cause. Bohannan says:

There are some specific rules for these songs. Chenge told me that if an act attributed in such a song was possible of human performance, it should be true, or the slandered person could call a *jir*. However, if the act was not humanly possible anything could be said. In one of Mtswen's songs, he accused one of Torgindi's wives of stealing yams: this, by local consensus, was probably true because this particular wife was one of the Udam tribe, and widely thought to be a thief. But if it was not true, Chenge insisted, Torgindi and the wife could call a *jir* against Mtswen and the song-maker. Another song, and one of the catchiest tunes which the contest produced, told how Torgindi changed himself into a pig at night and made it unsafe for every sow in the countryside. The Shangev song-maker . . . said that since even Torgindi couldn't actually do that, such a song couldn't be the basis for a *jir*. The song-maker said that he had thought of some much worse things to suggest that it was in Torgindi's nature to do, if it were only humanly possible, but that Mtswen had stopped him saying that all he wanted to do was to win the contest, not to "spoil Torgindi's heart permanently." They were, after all, neighbors.

The singing and drumming continued every night for more than three weeks before the legal authorities took notice, but the two principals were finally informed that they were to appear at a certain time and place. Both men came with substantial groups of supporters, music instruments, and other paraphernalia, and the two groups performed for almost two hours before the authorities called for silence and announced that the case would be judged.

The case, which was a simple marriage case, was very quickly settled, and both men—anxious to be rid of the vast expense they were incurring—concurred in the judgment. After the case was settled on its jural points, the *mbatarev* announced the winner of the song contest: Torgindi won the case, but Mtswen had better songs.

They then advised both song-makers to go home immediately and not return to MbaDuku for a couple of months until the feelings which had been aroused had died down.

An apparently similar kind of formalized legal process among the Eskimo is reported by Holm, who says that murder, theft, or destruction of another's property may be the occasion, though cases involving women are most important:

The drum-matches are held both summer and winter. A match of this kind is not settled in one evening, but is continued for a number of years, the parties taking turns to visit one another. For each new meeting the parties prepare and practise new songs. In these songs the crimes are vastly exaggerated, and if they can find no other material, they father new crimes on their opponent, or reproach him for crimes he has merely intended but not committed. They also enumerate the faults of their opponent's family, and even of their dead ancestors. In the hands of malicious people these attacks may assume an exceedingly brutal form. . . .

The opponents stand facing one another. They sing one at a time . . . the other party standing quiet and apparently indifferent in front of him. The singer mocks the other in a great number of ways, as a rule by snorting and breathing right in his face and by striking him with the forehead . . . so that he tumbles backward.

The other party receives this treatment with the greatest composure, nay even with mocking laughter to show his audience his indifference to it. When his opponent is about to strike him, he shuts his eyes and advances his head to receive the blow. (1914: 127-28)

The singing may go on all night, and Holm reports that it is received with a high degree of interest by the audience. The opponents do not show hostility toward each other in the breaks between the songs.

There are several difficulties with Holm's description of these drum matches. We do not really understand why they are held, that is, what occasion arising out of the background of legal dispute causes the actual coming together of the opponents. Neither do we discover, unfortunately, what constitutes resolution of the conflict. Holm does say that "when one party dies, the other plumes himself on it and boasts over it to others," but there is no indication that any sort of judge is present or that the drum matches do anything save vent the feelings of the disputants (pp. 127-28).

Speaking of the same phenomenon, Thalbitzer gives somewhat more

detail, but again does not indicate clearly the resolution of the conflict. He does say, however:

Two men, or sometimes two women, having become enemies would once a year have a settlement with each other in a drum-fight where, in turn, they would give vent to their anger in a poetical form, one drumming and singing against the other. . . .

The songs were constantly renewed, as the hostility between the two opponents only in rare instances resulted in homicide (never during the drumfight itself), but only in a continuation of the fight at the next meeting, the following summer or winter. (1923a:166-69)

These passages seem to reinforce the conclusion that the drum contests were not truly juridical, for apparently no legal solution resulted; rather, they seemed to function as a means of public expression of hostility, continuing as long as the hostility remained. That drum contests do work in this manner in some Eskimo groups is indicated by Spencer (1959:176).

Another similar procedure is found in the "halo" competitions reported for the Ewe of Ghana. Gadzekpo says:

"Halo" is a kind of music competition in which two neighboring villages compete in making songs about each other. As a rule there are no judges at such competitions, but spectators often form their own opinion about the winners, who are determined by the effectiveness of their insult through songs. . . .

Songs of insult deal with the shameful history of individuals among the opponents. . . .

Often one side will invite the other to come and be insulted. They sing to each individual the songs composed about him, and he must muster courage to be able to stand the abuse in the presence of spectators. . . .

"Halo" matches last for a long time—anything from two to about ten years, and are terminated by order of the chiefs, who summon the competing parties to make peace. (1952:819)

A much shorter but essentially similar notice of halo matches is given by Gbeho (1954:62), but in neither case is the means of resolution of the conflict made clear.

Finally, it may be noted in considering action songs of a legal nature that Thurnwald, speaking of the Buin of the Solomon Islands, says that although formal legal action was not taken through song, the result might well be the same, for "in the old times a fight easily ensued from the

invectives of a smart song. Or a grieved woman committed suicide" (1936:6).

Song texts, then, can be used as a means of action directed toward the solution of problems which plague a community. While this can take the form of ridicule and shame, or sanctioned legal action, it is also apparent that song texts provide psychological release for the participants. Indeed, because of the freedom of expression allowed in song, texts seem clearly to provide an excellent means for the investigation of the psychological processes of the people who constitute a culture. Through the study of song texts it may well be possible to strike quickly through protective mechanisms to arrive at an understanding of the "ethos" of the culture and to gain some perspective of psychological problems and processes peculiar to it. Song texts have been used in this way by a number of authors.

Weston LaBarre has used limericks sung by American college students to make a Freudian analysis of the unconscious in a "normal" situation. The framework of his study was set in the context of obtaining materials from normal individuals in order to refute charges that Freudian analysis is too frequently based upon examples from those who are not normal. Noting that the super-ego is liquidated in ordinary drinking situations, LaBarre concludes:

We have presented a study of the "normal" unconscious, as its content is externalized in the relaxed social context of drinking, when the force of the super-ego is weakened somewhat as in the analytic situation of formally-permitted "free association." Abundant evidence of the presence of repressed polymorphous infantile perversities has been brought. . . . The fact that this state of affairs is demonstrably the case, is clear evidence that the Freudian theory of the genesis of the unconscious through repression is applicable to "normal" as well as to neurotic or psychotic individuals. (1939:212)

It is significant to note that LaBarre sought a situation in which normal individuals would be free of certain societal restraints, and that he found it in a music context, thus emphasizing again the importance of the fact that music provides situations in which language behavior is freed from the restraints imposed in normal discourse.

A similar kind of analysis from song texts, though not couched in Freudian terms or carried out for the specific purpose of proving a theoretical point, was made by S. I. Hayakawa concerning popular songs in the United States (1955). Wendell Johnson in his *People in Quandaries* (1946) formulated the concept of the IFD disease, which

Hayakawa defines as "the triple-threat semantic disorder of Idealization (the making of impossible and ideal demands upon life), which leads to Frustration (as the result of the demands not being met), which in turn leads to Demoralization (or Disorganization, or Despair)" (p. 84). In his study he points out that popular songs emphasize the I F D, that the ideals set are basically impossible ideals, that this idealization inevitably turns out to be disappointing, and that it finally leads to demoralization. In contrast to the popular song, Hayakawa finds that the blues have "a considerable tough-mindedness . . . a willingness often absent in popular songs to acknowledge the facts of life" (p. 93), and that they do not give "a false or misleading impression of what life is likely to be. . . ." This leads him to the following conclusion:

If our symbolic representations give a false or misleading impression of what life is likely to be, we are *worse* prepared for life than we would have been had we not been exposed to them at all. The frustration and demoralization of which Wendell Johnson writes are of necessity preceded by the expectations created by unrealistic idealization. This is not to say, of course, that idealizations are in themselves unhealthy; they are a necessary and inescapable product of the human processes of abstraction and symbolization, and without idealizations we should be swine indeed. But there is a world of difference in the semantogenic effects of *possible* and *impossible* ideals. The ideals of love, as depicted in popular songs, are usually impossible ideals. (p. 93)

Hayakawa is here concerned with a psychological situation and the possible results which may stem from it. Herskovits, on the other hand, in a particularly useful paper proposes "to indicate certain aspects of the psychology of . . . Negro cultural behavior which may be better understood when some of the broader simpler concepts of psychoanalysis are applied to their interpretation" (1934:76). Taking the concepts of repression and compensation, he points out a number of mechanisms in Negro cultures, both African and New World, and emphasizes that "there exists both a recognition of the neuroses as induced by repression, and of the therapeutic value of bringing a repressed thought into the open" (p. 77). His vehicle for the discussion rests partly upon an analysis of song and dance. He notes:

In Dahomey, the institution of the avogan, the dance in the marketplace, is . . . recognized by the natives as affording release for suppressed emotions. At stated periods the people of each of the quarters of the city of Abomey have in turn their opportunity to stage such a dance. Crowds come to see the display and to watch

the dancing, but most of all, to listen to the songs and to laugh at the ridicule to which are held those who have offended members of the quarter giving the dance. Names are ordinarily not mentioned, for then fighting may result. In any event, the African relishes innuendo and circumlocution too well to be satisfied with bald, direct statement. However, everyone who is present already knows to whom reference is being made. Thus the song might be:

Women, thy soul is misshapen.
In haste was it made, in haste.
So fleshless a face speaks, telling
Thy soul was formed without care.
The Ancestral clay for thy making
Was moulded in haste, in haste.
A thing of no beauty art thou,
Thy face unsuited to be a face,
Thy feet unsuited for feet. (pp. 77-8)

Such release is also given to co-wives who sing songs against each other.

The *lobi singi* of the Negroes of the coastal region of Dutch Guiana, especially of Paramaribo, is discussed at some length by Herskovits in the same article, as is the institution of *fiofio* in the same area, and he summarizes by saying:

What has been shown is that among the . . . Negroes, both in Africa and the New World, patterned types of psychic purges are recognized as valid; what is important for a psychoanalytic approach to the understanding of these social data is the fact that, in every case, the native explanation of the particular type of behaviour, though ordinarily couched in terms of the supernatural, can be restated in terms of the unconscious. (pp. 82-3)

The points made by Herskovits, and especially the situations he describes, are strongly reminiscent of the Eskimo song-battles, the halo institution of the Ewe, and the songs of social control cited earlier in this chapter. The same points are applicable to the Mapuche of Chile, described by Titiev (1949). In this case, unaccompanied songs are improvised at social gatherings by men or women "who take advantage of these occasions to 'blow off steam,' or to call general attention to some matter of personal concern to the singer. Songs of this kind are called 'assembly songs,' and their moods may vary from naive and joyful to slanderous, bitter, or ironic" (p. 2). Examples of texts, as well as their interpretations, indicate clearly that the songs must indeed afford release for suppressed emotions. In the interpretations, we find the following examples:

The singer complains that her husband is rapacious and inconsiderate. According to Collio, she is also implying that her spouse does not satisfy her sexual desires. . . .

In explaining this song my informant said that it is of the type sung by a young wife to call attention to the fact that her husband is sexually overactive. On hearing such a complaint, her relatives and friends try to advise her spouse to moderate his marital behavior. Sometimes a group of elderly men will arrange to meet the husband in private, without the wife's knowledge, in order to give him the benefit of their experience. Among other things they may tell the husband not to seek sexual satisfaction daily and to abstain from intercourse for at least twelve hours after a meal. . . .

The husband expresses remorse for his errors and promises to mend his way at once and henceforth to keep his mind only on his wife. . . .

In these words a girl expresses her unwillingness to set a definite wedding date. Her song implies that she may yet be willing to marry her suitor, but is not interested in a casual love affair.

The Mapuche songs function as a release mechanism but, coupled with what is clearly freedom of expression, they are a means of disseminating information which leads to redress of grievances and solutions of problems.

The use of texts as a means of escape and refuge has been commented upon by Opler and Obayashi (1945) in connection with Senryu poetry studied at the Tule Lake Relocation Center for people of Japanese descent during World War II. Senryu is a form of Japanese poetry first developed as Hai-ku about two hundred years ago; it is regarded by the authors as a "folk art." At Tule Lake there developed an association of Senryu composers who met regularly; analysis of the poetic materials revealed that about forty-eight per cent were devoted to abstract ideas such as Daytime, Making Money, The Act of Thinking, Scent, and so forth, and that the rest were approximately evenly divided between Topics Expressed by a Verb, Adverb, Adjective, and Preposition (Peeping, Too, Getting Ready, Careless), and Topics Expressed by a Common Noun (Wall, Ice, Father). The authors conclude that "the members preferred as subject matter topics unrelated to life at Tule Lake," and that "they desired to forget the drab existence in the Center, and as a matter of fact sought in Senryu a method of escape from it. . . . The cultural form itself provides the refuge, the recreation, and the escape. . . . It is also . . . an instrument of community expression" (p. 7).

We are drawn closer and closer here to the point of view that song texts

clearly reflect the culture of which they are a part. This has been tersely expressed by Burrows in speaking of Polynesia:

An important function of gatherings for community singing was to emphasize the values stressed by the culture. Songs in praise of chiefs fostered political loyalty. Songs in praise of places expressed the sentiment for the homeland. In a negative way, songs of ridicule and scandal were at once a punishment to culprits and a warning to others. Such songs constituted something very like a legal sanction through public opinion. (1940:339)

This expression of general cultural values revealed in song texts can be carried further to a study of the underlying psychological set or "ethos" of a particular culture. A study of texts of social songs among the Congo Bashi, for example, indicated what appears to be a deep-seated malaise characterizing the culture. One song perhaps summarizes the general flavor of the texts: it tells of a man who is very weak, both physically and mentally; his fields are not properly cared for, he is impotent, and basically ineffectual in all he undertakes. The singer shows no sympathy for these faults or for the tragic situations which inevitably result from them; rather he is contemptuous of the man and sings of his weaknesses. It is songs of this general type which mark the Bashi text; little patience is manifested with the social weakling, and indifference is displayed toward him as a person. But more important is the tendency toward social irresponsibility, perhaps leading to eventual social breakdown. Fighting, social rejection, acts against society, the abuse of authority, and all manner of similar situations occupy the major portion of the Bashi texts. Even in those texts in which authority is commented upon, the comments take the form of protest against the abuse of power, complaints against a job, boasts of powers held; in general, excesses of authority or power form the basic line of comment. The Bashi song texts seem to reflect a preoccupation with what may perhaps be called the less attractive side of social behavior. Not only deeds of violence, but social rejection and the indifference of society toward itself and its individual members appear as dominating themes. It is significant to note that very rarely is comment made upon the obvious injustices or distortions of perspective displayed by the individuals concerned; rather, the actions or thoughts are simply detailed, with little active comment or resistance offered. The society seems almost completely passive to what goes on within its limits.

These general attitudes stand in striking contrast to those evinced in the song texts of neighboring people. The Bahutu of Ruanda, for example, express in their songs a high degree of self-confidence and pride:

I am a brave man.
 I will not be shaken by anything.
 When we spend a day somewhere,
 the people are happy because
 we sing for them.

or

Because Kayijika was a brave man,
 they gave him Kiganda.
 All other young people must be
 brave like him.
 Gafurafura was the one who shot best.
 Because of this, the King gave
 him a gift.
 So let us, all young people,
 be like him.

Further examples could be cited, drawing the texts at random; the difference between the songs of the two groups is striking.

It may perhaps be argued that the Bashi texts, rather than indicating possible social disintegration, imply instead social criticism, that is, that the singers are highly sensitive to social behavior or misbehavior and through the medium of song are attempting to bring erring members of the society back into channels of acceptable behavior. If we are to accept this view, however, we must also accept the fact that approximately eighty per cent of the social songs of the Bashi are concerned with admonition and direction to those members of the society who are not following accepted patterns of social behavior. On the face of it this does not seem likely (cf. Merriam 1954).

Similar kinds of analysis have been directed in our own culture toward the blues, by Paul Oliver (1960), and Negro spirituals, by Fisher (1953), with revealing results. There is little doubt that song texts present an extremely fruitful potential for the understanding of deep-lying values and sanctions, as well as problems, of a given group of people.

Song texts are used in a great variety of ways in addition to those noted above. In Chapter VIII we have remarked upon the use of texts as a teaching device; Best, for example, comments on the teaching of "historical incidents, traditions, myths . . . so as to familiarize children with the names of characters, incidents, etc." among the Maori (1924:II,143), and Blacking notes the use of texts as teaching devices in Venda initiation (1957:passim). Outstanding examples of how texts are used for teaching and as a vehicle of legend and mythology are found in numerous sources

on Polynesia (Taylor 1870; Gill 1876, etc.). Texts may also serve as a vehicle of history; although this problem will be discussed more fully in Chapter XIV of this book, a single example can be noted here. Burrows, writing in 1945 about Uvea and Futuna, says:

Indeed, both Uvea and Futuna have songs about the World War. Several of the best remembered "ancient" Futunan songs . . . tell about the arrival of European boats, from the time when that was still a notable event. A Futunan song tells about the deposition of two kings in 1927 when their plan to control the copra beds led to conflict with the French authorities. (1945:67)

An extremely interesting use of song texts has been reported from Polynesia by Firth, who writes:

There is also a group of terms relating to men who are industrious, properly instructed, or technically expert. . . . Men who are generally recognized as appropriately described by such terms sometimes bring such recognition to public expression by composing dance songs, lauding their own virtues and achievements. Such songs are received by the community at large as appropriate compositions and come into general currency through being chanted by groups of people while dancing. A man who is recognized by his fellows as inefficient would have to face ridicule if he ventured to extol himself in this way. (1939:152-53)

Firth gives several examples of such songs, including one by a fisherman about himself, and another, composed under the general formula, by a wife in honor of her husband. The phenomenon of boasting in song appears to be fairly widespread (see, for example, Mitchell 1956:5, 8), but in the Polynesian case, song takes the somewhat different function of a legitimate tribute which apparently cannot be challenged under normal circumstances and thus is not truly boastful in intent.

We have seen that song texts are a reflection of the culture of which they are a part and that they are also a device for relieving psychological tension and for correcting erring members of society. In all these phases, song texts are essentially *post facto*; that is, they tend to arise out of situations which already exist. But song texts may also be considered to lead the way, both in rectifying unsatisfactory conditions and in crystallizing new demands. This is seen in the United States of 1963 in which desegregation demands are often put into the form of song, as in Bob Dylan's "Blowin' in the Wind." John Greenway (1953) has traced "American folksongs of protest" back as far as 1800, and his work concerns the songs of Negroes, textile workers, miners, migratory workers,

farmers, and laborers; actually, songs of this type could be traced back even farther in time.

Speaking of music as an agent of political expression, Rhodes points out that music has served in Southern Africa at least since 1899 as a rallying point for political expression. Thus a song composed in 1959 by Isaac Banda, "We Want Freedom Now, Just Now," proclaims the goals of the contemporary African political movement:

Whenever you people cast your votes
 For Harry Nkumbula of Africa
 You vote for freedom now.
 For Nkumbula is the truest Moses
 This country of ours ever had,
 The destroyer of Federation.
 We pay our respects to all
 Members of the Legico (Legislative Council)
 Those members siding with Nkumbula
 In the liberation of Africa.
 A black man is busy everywhere
 Preparing himself for freedom now.
 For this is truly African time,
 Whatever happens he will be free. (Rhodes 1962:20)

Song texts, then, provide a number of insights into questions of primary concern to students of human behavior. The area of music-language relationships is important to the ethnomusicologist and the linguist, as well as the student of poetry, for music influences language and language influences music. Given the fact that language in connection with music tends to have special features, it is not surprising to find that song texts provide a framework for permissive language behavior. One of the song forms in which this is most clear-cut is the topical song, of which there are a number of varieties. We find as well that song texts reveal a number of problems of a psychological nature, as they concern the individual and also the society at large. Texts reflect mechanisms of psychological release and the prevailing attitudes and values of a culture, thus providing an excellent means for analysis. Mythology, legend, and history are found in song texts, and song is frequently used as an enculturative device. Finally, songs lead as well as follow, and political and social movements, often expressed through song because of the license it gives, shape and force the moulding of public opinion. Song texts provide the student of human behavior with some of the richest material he has available for analysis, but their full potential remains to be exploited.

USES AND FUNCTIONS

The uses and functions of music represent one of the most important problems in ethnomusicology, for in the study of human behavior we search constantly, as has been pointed out time and time again in these pages, not only for the descriptive facts about music, but, more important, for the meaning of music. Descriptive facts, while in themselves of importance, make their most significant contribution when they are applied to broader problems of understanding the phenomenon which has been described. We wish to know not only what a thing is, but, more significantly, what it does for people and how it does it.

The title of this chapter implies that there is a difference of meaning between "uses" and "functions" and that the difference is a significant one. Ethnomusicologists in the past have not always been careful about making this distinction, and, indeed, the problem still exists to some extent in anthropology in which the concept of function has played an extremely important theoretical and historic role. In speaking of the meaning of these two words, it must be made clear that the concepts are complementary and are applied initially as they stem from within the society. While it is the outside observer who makes the judgments, using analytical evaluation, his frame of reference is not himself but rather whatever phenomenon he is studying in its own context. In observing uses of music, the student attempts to increase his factual knowledge directly; in assessing functions he attempts to increase his factual knowledge indirectly through the deeper comprehension of the significance of the phenomenon he studies. Thus music may be used in a given society in a certain way, and this may be expressed directly as part of folk evaluation.

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