Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights

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Research on human rights consistently points to the importance of democracy in reducing the severity and incidence of personal integrity abuses. The prescriptive implications of this finding for policy makers interested in state building have been somewhat limited, however, by a reliance on multidimensional measures of democracy. Consequently, a policy maker emerges from this literature confident that “democracy matters” but unclear about which set(s) of reforms is likely to yield a greater human rights payoff. Using data from the Polity IV Project, we examine what aspects of democracy are most consequential in improving a state’s human rights record. Analysis of democracy’s dimensions elicits three findings. First, political participation at the level of multiparty competition appears more significant than other dimensions in reducing human rights abuses. Second, improvements in a state’s level of democracy short of full democracy do not promote greater respect for integrity rights. Only those states with the highest levels of democracy, not simply those conventionally defined as democratic, are correlated with better human rights practices. Third, accountability appears to be the critical feature that makes full-fledged democracies respect human rights; limited accountability generally retards improvement in human rights.

For those interested in state building and human rights in states such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq, the most prescriptively provocative finding in the emerging research literature on human rights is the importance of democracy (Poe and Tate, 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Davenport, 1995, 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Apodaca, 2001; Keith, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, and Siverson, 2003). The significance of democracy as a way to promote respect for human rights resides in the fact that it offers the promise of providing short-term strategic guidance for reformers and policy makers. Of course, other factors such as increasing the per capita income of a developing state can also have an important impact on the respect for human rights, but the realization of significant economic changes takes years to accomplish, while some institutional reforms can be launched or even accomplished in the space of one or two years. Unfortunately, we will see that incremental, near-term institutional reforms do not...
improve protection of personal integrity rights. It takes full-fledged democracy, culminating in a system with multiparty competition, before there is reliable improvement in respect for human rights.

The prescriptive utility of the democracy finding is often limited by the fact that democracy is a composite variable made up of a number of conceptually distinct properties that must be present before a polity can be declared fully democratic or a mature democracy. This is completely consistent with the vast theoretical literature on the topic, but it leaves the policy maker at something of a loss as to how best to proceed. Some authors report that one or another dimension of democracy is more strongly related to the provision of human rights while disagreeing about which components are most essential (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Keith, 2002). We ask whether it makes any difference in which order reforms take place. We also investigate whether there are critical threshold effects in institutional changes before any improvement in respect for human rights is achieved. There is little or no evidence that directly bears on these issues.

This essay is an effort to redress this shortcoming. We rely both on theory and evidence to guide our investigation. The central focus of our study is to ascertain what, if any, specific aspects of democracy are necessary or sufficient to achieve improved quality of life in terms of diminishing, or even eliminating, human rights violations. The conclusions that emerge from our analysis of data compiled from 1976 to 2001 are somewhat melancholy ones from the standpoint of state building and human rights. While we report substantial evidence that some aspects of the democratization process, namely the presence of party competition, yield greater human rights returns than others, a finding that echoes earlier research by Linda Camp Keith (2002), we also find that progress in human rights can only be achieved after there has been substantial progress on other dimensions that appear to function as necessary but not sufficient conditions.

States cannot rapidly improve human rights conditions by focusing on particular aspects of the democratization process at the expense of other aspects that appear less strongly related to the protection of personal integrity rights. These more weakly associated reforms must be in place before other reforms yield improvements. Still more disconcerting is the finding that the process of democratization does not consistently produce human rights benefits until it is virtually complete. The early progress in democratization likely to be achieved during the initial years of state-building has little, if any, impact. Elections, for instance, can be held at the earliest stages of nation building, but elections without multiparty competition and constrained executives, as we will see, can make matters worse rather than better (Davenport, 1998). Multiparty competition and executive constraints take considerably longer to institutionalize than does an electoral process.

**Composite Definitions of Democracy**

Most definitions of democracy are self-consciously multidimensional. They typically enumerate a number of conceptually distinct properties or characteristics that must be present before a polity can be declared fully democratic. Lasswell (1950:234–235), for instance, defines democracy as consisting of seven characteristics: (1) an allocation of power that is inclusive; (2) a scope of power that is liberal; (3) a balanced and dispersed distribution of power; (4) elite recruitment that is egalitarian and open; (5) a sense of widely diffused self-responsibility; (6) impartiality; and (7) decisions that are challengeable. Similarly, Dahl argues for a multidimensional conceptualization of democracy in his classic work, Polyarchy (1971).

Theorists interested in a conceptualization of democracy that can capture gradations in political development follow a similar tradition. Linz and Stepan (1996:7–15) list five arenas that are present in a consolidated democracy. These
include a free civil society, an autonomous and valued political society, the rule of law, a relatively effective bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society. Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994:100–101) point to the critical dimensions of contestation, constitutionalism, and inclusiveness.

Jaggers and Gurr’s (1995:474–475) survey of quantitative estimates of democracy makes it clear that an aggregate multidimensional approach is the rule rather than the exception. They note that Gasiorek's (1990, 1996) measurement of democracy is based on an estimate of three characteristics: regular and extensive competition that is free of any coercion; a high and inclusive level of political participation; and a level of civil liberties sufficient to insure this level of competition and participation. Bollen (1993, 1980) focuses on political liberty and political sovereignty. The first is operationalized by freedom of the press, the strength of the opposition, and level of government sanctions. Political sovereignty is operationalized by the openness of elections, the openness of the executive selection procedures, and the openness of legislative selection procedures. Arat's (1991) index of political rights, often employed to measure democracy, is based on multiple indicators of political participation, the inclusiveness of the political process, the degree of party competition, and the protection of civil liberties. Similarly, the popular Freedom House index for political rights (Gastil, 1984, 1988b, 1989), also commonly used to measure democracy, relies on a seven-point composite score that is calculated by the freeness and fairness of elections, electoral law, and campaigning for the executive and legislature as well as political competition, political participation, and minority protection.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) propose a two-dimensional conceptualization of governance institutions, including various forms of democracy. The first dimension is the selectorate and reflects the proportion of a state’s adult population that has a formal role in selecting the leadership that rules it and, more importantly, that has the prospect of gaining membership in the privileged, winning coalition. The second dimension, referred to as the winning coalition, represents the minimum proportion of the selectorate needed to attain the office of chief executive and to remain in power. A central result of the selectorate theory shows that as a polity’s coalition size increases, leaders who want to retain office must rely increasingly on generating public goods that benefit all in society, coming close to Lasswell's (1950) idea of impartiality. Conversely, as the required coalition becomes smaller, it becomes more efficient for survival-oriented leaders to depend upon the use of private rewards to their coalition members as the means to retain loyalty and stay in power. This turns out to have theoretical implications with regard to the promotion of human rights protection. Oppression, repression, and confiscation of the wealth of citizens are incentive-compatible in small coalition systems in which great special benefits accrue to leaders and coalition members who remain in their privileged positions. This is considerably less true in large coalition environments.

Advantages and Disadvantages of a Multidimensional Approach to Democracy

The characterization of democracy as a composite concept consisting of multiple dimensions has a number of advantages. For instance, it accurately reflects the belief of many modern democratic theorists such as Dahl (1971) and Lasswell (1950) that democracy is a compound concept whose component dimensions are not (or are only partially) substitutable for each other. That is, not only does no single institutional characteristic, such as the presence of elections or a particular executive constraint, denote the existence of democracy, but a very high level of a particular characteristic such as political participation cannot substitute for the scarcity of fair elections or an absence of openness in the recruitment of candidates. Additionally, the composite nature of measures of democracy enables researchers to finesse the so far unsolved problem of how to characterize the causal relationships
among different aspects of democracy. We do not know a great deal about the extent to which legislative recruitment affects political participation (two of the subdimensions of the popular Polity scale) or vice versa, much less the direct and indirect impact of each on such policy considerations as economic growth or the degree to which higher education is publicly provided.

Yet, inevitably, the focus on aggregate indicators to assess the multidimensional aspects of democracy also creates problems. How components of democracy are aggregated into a single indicator can be as important—or even more important—than the choice of components to aggregate. The creation of a composite index out of component dimensions raises issues of additivity as well as substitutability. Is progress toward full democracy a gradual, continuous process; a step function that reflects real democratization only when crucial thresholds are passed; a monotonic process; or one with gains and retreats as dimensions are added?

Scholars, when looking at composite measures of democracy, have a natural inclination to treat two countries with the same aggregate score as if they are equivalently democratic. But if the behavioral consequences that follow from different dimensions of democracy are themselves different, then it is problematic to interpret a given score achieved through different means as being equivalent. Despite having the same score, these countries can be interpreted as being equivalently democratic or autocratic only if there is a high degree of substitutability among the various subdivisions of democracy. While this might be the case, it is not consistent with the arguments of Dahl (1971) and Lasswell (1950), which are often used to justify a multidimensional conception of democracy in the first place. If they are right, the mix of dimensions is important. But what is the correct mix? And what are the properties that make it so important?

Associated with questions of substitutability across dimensions are difficulties that arise when interpreting research findings without knowing the precise effects of individual components. Davenport (1999), for instance, argues that democratic systems are more accountable to citizens, elites, and groups, which means that they are less willing to engage in activities that invite reproach, and they are able to block any minority group advocating the use of coercion. Poe and Tate (1994:855), like Davenport, focus on accountability, emphasizing the power democracy provides to ordinary citizens to “oust potentially abusive leaders from office before they are able to become a serious threat.” Similarly, Poe et al. (1999) not only emphasize the key role of elections in making it too risky and too costly for democratic leaders to use coercion as a means of attaining political quiescence or suppressing the opposition, but also emphasize the division of power, which limits the access of any single actor to the means of repression and forces compromise. Keith (2002) specifically singles out party competition as critical to improving respect for individual integrity rights. This is consistent with the focus on accountability and inclusiveness mentioned as core components of democracy by Lasswell (1950), Hartlyn and Valenzuela (1994), Gasiorowski (1990, 1993), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), and others.

Henderson (1991), however, looks at similar analyses based on equivalent aggregate indicators of democracy, but he interprets democracy in terms of norms of compromise and negotiation rather than in terms of structures of accountability. He contends that the bargaining and compromise that are embedded in mechanisms of democratic decision making provide a non-coercive way to handle conflict that diffuses before it boils over and invites repression. His perspective is consistent with Lasswell’s (1950) dimension of impartiality, Linz and Stepan’s (1996) idea of a free civil society, and Gastil’s (1984, 1988b, 1989) specification of protection of minority rights. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that to sort out the differences in emphasis and interpretation between, say Davenport (1999) and Henderson, we must disaggregate democracy into its constituent parts so that we can parse out the separate effects of different dimensions of democracy.
All of this leaves human rights advocates, especially those interested in improving human rights in a particular country such as Iraq, in a frustrating position. On the one hand, they hear over and over that the best thing that they can do is to make states more democratic and that they should be sensitive to the fact that this invariably involves not one or two reforms but many different reforms. On the other hand, they are also told that there is a strong sense—that far unsupported by much evidence—that some reform steps are more likely to be effective than others. One objective of this study is to help clarify which institutional reforms are more likely to promote protection of human rights, thereby complementing research by others (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Keith, 2002). Another objective is to ascertain whether the most significant of such reforms themselves require prior institutional or behavioral changes before they are likely to be adopted. To accomplish this, we will focus on a number of hypotheses that guide our empirical investigation:

**Hypothesis 1:** Theorists are correct in suggesting that the components of democracy are not substitutes with respect to their impact on human rights outcomes as well as other policy outcomes.

**Hypothesis 2:** Increasing degrees of democracy do not lead smoothly to improved human rights; rather, it depends on the mix of scores on the various dimensions that compose a particular scale.

**Hypothesis 3:** Democracy is reliable as a means of reducing human rights abuses only when institutional reforms pass thresholds that ensure accountability, thereby translating institutional changes into behavioral changes.

**Measurement of Variables**

To test the above hypotheses, and associated ideas, it is necessary to identify and measure the critical dimensions of democracy. Fortunately, just as democracy is widely conceived of as multidimensional, it is also characteristically measured as a composite variable made up of indicators designed to tap the subdimensions identified by theorists. In practice, this means that many measures of democracy are relatively elaborate indices made up of formal institutional characteristics, aspects of political behavior, and rights protection.¹

To test whether human rights performance is continuously responsive to progress toward full-fledged democracy or is responsive to passing critical thresholds on specific dimensions of democracy, we examine both aggregate and disaggregated indicators. At the aggregate level, we investigate two indicators of the degree to which a state is democratic. Each is based on the Polity IV data. Many studies estimate a country’s degree of democracy as the difference between the democracy and autocracy scales developed by Polity. Subtracting Polity’s autocracy measure from its democracy measure creates a 21-point scale that we refer to as Democracy–Autocracy. For ease of interpretation, we normalize the 21 points so that they fall between 0 (most autocratic) and 1.0 (most democratic).

Many researchers define a state as democratic if its democracy–autocracy score is at least 6 out of a non-normalized upper bound of 10 (equivalent to 0.80 on the normalized 0–1 scale we use). We will investigate whether human rights abuses diminish steadily as democracy–autocracy rises or whether human rights improve markedly when democracy–autocracy passes the conventional threshold for democracy of 0.80. Thus, we estimate democracy–autocracy and a dummy variable

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¹ Landman (1999: 613) notes that while a few operationalizations of democracy emphasize one aspect of democracy, most do not.
called Democracy (80), which equals 1.0 if Democracy–Autocracy is greater than or equal to 0.80 and is coded as zero otherwise.

Of course, to compare the impact of individual subcomponents of democracy with the composite measures just specified, we must also identify the subcomponents to be evaluated. Polity IV’s Democracy–Autocracy scale is composed of five subcomponents: the competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP, which includes four steps or degrees of competitiveness of executive recruitment), the competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP, with six steps), executive constraints (XCONST, containing seven steps), the openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN, which includes five steps), and the regulation of participation (PARR-EG, based on five steps).² 

Broadly speaking, the openness of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of executive recruitment measure the opportunity for executive selection and the means through which it occurs, whereas the regulation and competitiveness of participation describe the degree to which rules structure “when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002:24) and the degree to which “alternate preferences can be pursued in the political arena” (25).³ Because at its highest level, competitiveness of participation reflects societies that have multiparty systems, we sometimes refer to this variable as multiparty competition. The variable that evaluates executive constraint (XCONST) examines the degree to which there are limits on the executive and executive decision making.

Democracy–Autocracy reaches its maximum value of 1.0 only when each of the five subcomponents has achieved its highest score. These five subdimensions are closely associated with component parts of the definitions of democracy offered by Lasswell (1950), Dahl (1971), and others. For instance, Lasswell’s open elite recruitment is well captured by Polity’s openness of executive recruitment just as Lasswell’s dimension “challengeable decisions” or Hartlyn and Valenzuela’s (1994) notion of contestation are closely related to competitive participation.

In addition to the five Polity indicators, we add four additional dummy variables, each of which is coded as 1.0 if the relevant Polity subdimension is at its maximum value and coded as 0 otherwise. We call these dummy variables Constraint (XCONST = 1); Open (XROPEN = 1); Election (XRCOMP = 1); and Competition (PARCOMP = 1). We exclude a dummy variable based on the regulation of participation (PARR-EG) because such a dummy variable is perfectly correlated with Competition. Thus, while regulation of participation and participation competitiveness vary considerably in terms of which steps each has reached below the maximum, they are perfectly correlated once either has reached the maximum.

The dependent variable is the score that a state receives in a given year on the five-point political terror scale (PTS), in which higher scores indicate a higher level of human rights violations. Although this indicator is not uniformly accepted (the most notable exception and critique is by McCormick and Mitchell, 1997), the PTS is the most frequently invoked rating system (e.g., Stohl, Carelton, and Johnson, 1984; Stohl and Carelton, 1985; Carelton and Stohl, 1987; Gibney, 1988; Gibney and Stohl, 1988; Poe, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Keith, 1999, 2002; Poe et al., 1999).

Because we are interested in how institutional dimensions shape subsequent protection or violations of human rights, we examine the dependent variable 5 years later than we observe the independent variables. A 3-year lead does not alter the results but seemed to us too soon for countries to respond meaningfully to changing institutions, and contemporaneous effects, if any, do not allow one to sort

² We normalize each institutional subdimension so that each ranges between 0 and 1.0. This facilitates the comparability of coefficients in interpreting empirical results.

³ Competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP), especially at the highest level, measures the presence of freely competing political parties rather than broader concepts of contestation.
out the direction of causality. In fact, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate for economic growth and some other variables that it takes about 4–5 years to respond in a stable and lasting way to changes in institutions of governance. We use the most up-to-date PTS coding currently available. It covers the years 1976–2001. Widely used in quantitative research, the PTS has been used to code both Amnesty International and State Department country reports according to the following criteria:

(1) “Countries . . . under secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional . . . political murders are extremely rare.”
(2) “There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional . . . political murder is rare.”
(3) “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.”
(4) “The practices of (Level 3) are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life . . . In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.”
(5) “The terrors of (Level 4) have been expanded to the whole population . . .. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gastil, 1980, as quoted in Stohl and Carelton, 1985).

Evaluating the Impact of the Dimensions of Democracy: A First Cut

Taken together, the various theoretical, prescriptive, and technical limitations of the standard multidimensional measures of democracy all argue for shifting analysis away from the composite measures and toward examining the impact of their various subcomponents. To gain a first glimpse at what is to be gained by decomposing the concept democracy, we compare four models, two of which assess the composite effect of democracy (Democracy–Autocracy, Democracy (80)) and the other two assess the disaggregated impact of the constituent parts of democracy. In each analysis, our interest is in the impact that these aspects of governance have on human rights violations. However, before examining the impact of the individual subdimensions of democracy, it is useful to look at the extent to which they are related to each other.

Table 1 contains the estimated pseudo-$R^2$ for four sets of ordered logit analyses. In the first set, each subdimension of the Polity index in turn serves as the dependent variable, with the remaining Polity subcomponents included as independent variables. In the second set, the independent variables consist of the same variables from the first set plus the dummy variables reflecting the relevant set of threshold effects, excluding the threshold dummy for the democracy component being assessed as the dependent variable. The third set includes the dummy threshold variable excluded in each of the tests in the second set. The fourth set of tests replicates the third set, but uses the 5-year lagged components and their 5-year lagged threshold dummy variables to evaluate the extent to which current scores on each component are determined by prior scores on the other components. These tests assess how well the conceptually independent subcomponents of democracy do at explaining each other.6

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4 We are especially grateful to Steve Poe and Mark Gibney for making the latest PTS data available to us.
5 It is evident from the findings reported in Table 1, based on result columns 1, 2, and 4, that the individual components of democracy used to construct the Polity index are to a large degree independent of one another. Column 3, however, reflects a high degree of multicollinearity for some components. The multicollinearity reflected...
It is evident from Table 1 that multicollinearity among the individual components that make up the Polity democracy score is not a problem, although it becomes an issue if we consider the inclusion of threshold dummy variables that are defined by the maximum value for each democracy component. Table 1 provides us with some initial justification for examining the individual impacts of these components as distinct features of democracy. It follows that it is unlikely that two countries with the same Democracy–Autocracy score are truly equivalent in their governance structure if their scores were achieved by different combinations of values on the ordinal components in the Polity schema.

To further minimize problems in interpreting our statistical results, when we report substantive findings about human rights abuses, we are careful to examine robust standard errors, clustering on country code so that we control for the unspecified effects of each individual country. This, of course, makes our tests of the effects of individual dimensions extremely demanding.

We estimate four statistical models that relate institutions to human rights violations. In models 1 and 3, in addition to the institutional variables, we also control for the logarithm of population size and the presence or absence of a war, whether civil or interstate. These two variables have been identified as exerting a consequential, independent influence on human rights performance. Models 2 and 4 replicate models 1 and 3, but add as a further control the residual part of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Components + Threshold Variables (Not Including Dependent Variable’s Components)</th>
<th>Components + All Threshold Dummy Variables, All Lagged by 5 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraint</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Competition</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation Competition</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of Participation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Recruitment</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The above variables serve in the first column of results as independent variables for the test, minus the variable listed as the dependent variable. In the second column, each ordered logit equation also includes the threshold dummy variables (i.e., a dummy scored as 1 if the maximum value on the component was met) for the democracy component variables included as independent variables (that is, all of the threshold variables except the one that matches the dependent variable). Column 3 replicates column 2 while adding the threshold variable excluded from column 2. The added variable must be collinear with the dependent variable by definition as it is coded as the maximum score on the dependent variable. For this reason, we believe that this column, as it imposes multicollinearity by construction, is relatively uninformative about the extent to which the democracy dimensions are correlated with each other. The final column replicates the test in column 3, but uses as independent variables the 5-year lagged version of the independent variables in column 3. This test allows us to see the extent to which knowledge of prior values on the components of democracy or their threshold values helps predict future values. It is evident from columns 1, 2, and 4 that the components of democracy are not so highly multicollinear as to create serious problems with the reliability of standard errors except when multicollinearity is introduced by construction.
logarithm of per capita income in the year in which we observe the dependent variable, that is, the observation year \( t + 5 \) that is not explained by a regression analysis in which the independent variables are the values on the institutional variables in year \( t = 0 \), including their threshold dummies. In this way, we control for possible income effects that are independent of the state’s prior institutional structure. Each of these variables is known to have an impact on the level of social conflict that is likely to exist in a state and a state’s need and/or willingness to engage in tactics that repress human rights.\(^6\) Values of these control variables are not strongly associated with earlier scores on the institutional governance dimensions. Previous research has shown that the presence of a civil or interstate war provides political elites with an incentive to suppress their opposition, to control the flow of information, and to acquire intelligence through every means possible. All other things being equal, more populated states are likely to have more human rights violations in the aggregate because there are more opportunities and targets for abuse (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994).\(^7\) States with higher per capita incomes generally experience low levels of human rights violations, perhaps because democratic states tend to be wealthy or because wealthy individuals can find avenues to persuade the government to respect individual rights. Conversely, as several studies suggest, when a state’s level of economic development is low, citizens have a greater incentive to resort to conflict in order to improve their lot, and they have less to lose by doing so than when development is higher (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), however, demonstrate theoretically and empirically that per capita income levels are endogenous to political institutions. By using the residual of per capita income, we partially separate the direct effects of income from indirect effects through the endogenous impact of institutions on income. While we control for these effects, we barely discuss them in the body of the text as they are not the central concern here.

Lastly, the use of cross-sectional time-series data raises an important issue, namely autocorrelation. To correct for this, it is a standard practice to include a lagged measure of the dependent variable. As such, our ordered logit model assumes the following form:

\[
PTS_{t+5} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PTS + \beta_2 \text{War} + \beta_3 (\log(\text{Population})) + \beta_4 (\text{Per Capita Residual Income}) + \beta_i \text{Institutional Dimension}_i + u.
\]

This form allows us to assess the extent to which human rights performance 5 years down the road is related to current levels of democratization based on aggregate scores (models 1 and 2) or disaggregated scores (models 3 and 4). As such, it provides a way to estimate the likely future consequences of current reforms.

Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 evaluate the explanatory power of the aggregated institutional dimensions Democracy–Autocracy and Democracy(80). The results of the subcomponent analyses are presented in Table 2, models 3 and 4. By comparing these models, we can assess the marginal gains in information by investigating the individual subdimensions of democratic governance as compared with the composite concept of democracy. We can also assess whether human rights improve appreciably once conventional notions of democracy are satisfied or whether gains in human rights await a higher level of democratization. The assessment of the impact of the conventional threshold for defining democracy is

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\(6\) War is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a civil war or interstate war occurred in a given year based on the coding from the Correlates of War Project. Population data are also drawn from the Correlates of War and are calculated as the logarithm of total population. Per capita income data are from the World Bank and are available only for the years 1950–1992.

\(7\) Henderson (1993) also argues that more populous states are more repressive because they are more likely to face problems of limited resources that lead to more conflict with government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Terror Scale (Year + 5) (Model 1)</th>
<th>Political Terror Scale (Year + 5) (Model 2)</th>
<th>Political Terror Scale (Year + 5) (Model 3)</th>
<th>Political Terror Scale (Year + 5) (Model 4)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probability</td>
<td>Probability</td>
<td>Probability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amnesty International ($t = 0$)</td>
<td>1.247 (0.117) 0.000</td>
<td>1.256 (0.144) 0.000</td>
<td>0.990 (0.105) 0.000</td>
<td>0.894 (0.133) 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War (civil or interstate)</td>
<td>0.723 (0.266) 0.007</td>
<td>1.008 (0.508) 0.001</td>
<td>0.776 (0.284) 0.006</td>
<td>1.162 (0.338) 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>0.217 (0.062) 0.000</td>
<td>0.217 (0.069) 0.002</td>
<td>0.309 (0.058) 0.000</td>
<td>0.351 (0.070) 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income residual</td>
<td>– 0.132 (0.115) 0.251</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.047 (0.137) 0.731</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.067 (0.791) 0.993</td>
<td>1.479 (1.066) 0.165</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation Regulation</td>
<td>– 0.575 (1.074) 0.592</td>
<td>0.342 (1.217) 0.778</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Constraint</td>
<td>– 0.053 (0.666) 0.937</td>
<td>0.174 (0.753) 0.817</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Competition</td>
<td>– 1.993 (1.068) 0.062</td>
<td>– 1.432 (1.497) 0.339</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness of Competition</td>
<td>1.300 (0.959) 0.175</td>
<td>1.382 (1.307) 0.290</td>
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<td>Election (Executive Competition Threshold Dummy)</td>
<td>1.923 (0.684) 0.005</td>
<td>2.199 (1.042) 0.035</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Constraint Threshold Dummy</td>
<td>– 1.011 (0.506) 0.046</td>
<td>– 1.836 (0.682) 0.007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation Competition Threshold Dummy</td>
<td>– 1.993 (1.104) 0.071</td>
<td>– 3.934 (1.247) 0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Competition Threshold Dummy</td>
<td>– 1.144 (0.633) 0.071</td>
<td>– 1.396 (0.896) 0.119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy–Autocracy</td>
<td>– 0.574 (0.500) 0.251</td>
<td>– 0.524 (0.574) 0.361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy(80)</td>
<td>– 0.488 (0.462) 0.291</td>
<td>– 0.264 (0.550) 0.631</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Code Robust Std. Errors</td>
<td>Wald $\chi^2 = 256.80 \ N = 1384$</td>
<td>Wald $\chi^2 = 165.37 \ N = 900$</td>
<td>Wald $\chi^2 = 368.41 \ N = 1384$</td>
<td>Wald $\chi^2 = 294.02 \ N = 900$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
based on the significance of the coefficient associated with Democracy(80). If it is significant and negative, then the conventional threshold (Democracy–Autocracy = 6 in the non-normalized version) predicts improved human rights behavior, but if it is insignificant, the conventional view of democracy does not translate into a better human rights record. Whether gains in human rights await a higher level of democratization is indicated by the sum of the coefficients for Constraint, Election, Competition, and Open in models 3 and 4. If the sum is negative and significant, then gains arise when Democracy–Autocracy reaches its maximum value of 1. This is true because Democracy–Autocracy is 1 only if each of these dummy variables equals 1.

The first thing to note is that models 3 and 4 predict human rights violations much better than do models 1 and 2, as seen by the difference in chi-square. Although models 3 and 4 consume 7 more degrees of freedom than models 1 and 2, respectively, the differences in the respective chi-square values would arise by chance less than once in many more than a million trials. This result strongly encourages greater confidence in the effects of the individual dimensions of democracy than it does in the aggregate indicators. Coupled with the generally modest association among the subdimensions of democracy reported in Table 1, the comparison of models 1 and 2 with 3 and 4 further discourages confidence in the idea that the subdimensions of democracy are interchangeable substitutes for one another. That is, H1 is strongly supported. This means that it is unlikely that progress toward democracy is equally well achieved by equal magnitudes of progress on any given dimension. In fact, the aggregate democracy indicators prove to be statistically insignificant in models 1 and 2.

At least as noteworthy are the effects on human rights violations associated with the scaled values of democracy reflected by the five dimensions drawn from the Polity Democracy–Autocracy scores as compared with the dichotomous, threshold-based institutional effects evaluated at the maximum values of the Polity components. The hypothesis that human rights violations are not mitigated until complete democracy is achieved is bolstered by the results in models 3 and 4. The total effect of the five “continuous” subdimensions on human rights violations is not meaningfully different from the null hypothesis of no effect: that is, χ² = 0.48, p = .487 for the sum of the coefficients for Participation Competition, Participation Regulation, Executive Constraint, Executive Competition, and Openness of Competition in model 3. In model 4, the comparable statistics are χ² = 0.76, p = .382. Conversely, the sum of the coefficients of the four individual threshold measures for model 3 indicates that they significantly diminish human rights violations (χ² = 4.86, p = .028). The comparable statistics for model 4 are χ² = 13.59, p = .000.

Model 3 (reinforced by the results in model 4) further indicates that “progress” toward executive competition improves human rights records until a high threshold of electoral politics is achieved. At that high level, reflected by Election = 1, it appears that there is a significant reversal in human rights performance, nullifying any significant gains made at earlier stages in reform of executive competition. This simple interpretation, however, is misleading in two respects. First, as already noted, the total effect of the four threshold variables is significant in favor of improved human rights. Second, when Election = 1 and neither Constraint nor Competition equals 1, we are looking at a fairly small subset of interesting, important, but special cases. These cases assess human rights performance in countries—mostly from Latin America, but also including places like Thailand and Ghana—during periods when their Democracy–Autocracy score was around the Democracy(80) threshold but not much higher. That is, these countries held elections but generally restricted party participation or left the executive sufficiently unconstrained that elections did not necessarily translate into transitions in power. In these cases, institutions had not developed sufficiently to protect human rights even though elections—often
thought of as key to democracy—were routinely held. So, elections without a constrained executive or multiparty competition may signal an inferior human rights record, but elections in conjunction with executive constraints and multiparty competition enhance the protection of personal integrity rights.8

Models 3 and 4 make it clear that there is no nice, orderly, gradual progression in democracy accompanied by an improving human rights situation. Rather, crossing critical thresholds on individual dimensions is essential to achieving significant gains in a country’s human rights record. The statistical evidence supports the idea that dramatic improvement is unlikely before a government adopts a high degree of competitiveness in all aspects of political life, that is, executives are constrained and party competition is entrenched. This is, for instance, much more important than gradual improvement below the final step in how constrained the power of the executive becomes or the gradual opening of the system to competition. High levels of competitiveness are associated with accountability and the high-quality performance engendered by accountability. Except in the most extreme circumstances, there is little gain in harshly suppressing a political rival or the rival’s supporters when real competition implies that the rival may soon be in a position to suppress the current executive. Hence, once a political equilibrium of competition is firmly established, there is every reason to believe that a state will compile a good human rights record and maintain it. Of course, this line of reasoning tells us little about how this equilibrium evolves and the conditions that are necessary to create it, an issue that we revisit in the last section.

The analysis of the dimensions lends further weight to the plausibility of the democratic accountability interpretation of Poe and Tate (1994), Davenport (1999), Poe et al. (1999), and Keith (2002). Indeed, models 1 and 2 highlight this point rather dramatically. Contrary to common practice, a threshold value of 0.80 on the Polity normalized Democracy–Autocracy scale is not a harbinger of a dramatic shift in behavior. Polities achieving a score of at least 0.80 may commonly be referred to as democracies, but with regard to human rights, we do not observe significant improvement before the threshold dummy variables Competition and Constraint equal 1. Democracy–Autocracy fails to equal its maximum value only 26 times out of 2,042 observations when these two threshold effects are at their maximum. And these 26 exceptions disappear when these two threshold variables plus Elections are all met. The conjunction of these institutional factors all point to real political accountability.

Prescriptively, the findings are provocative but somewhat problematic, especially in the case of party competition. Dimensions such as party competition are difficult to evaluate from a prescriptive standpoint because they are made up of behavioral as well as structural characteristics. Structural characteristics are features that can (usually) be realized with a reasonable degree of reliability by a constitutional change or by passing a specific law. Prescriptions that fall into this category are reforms that call for a change in the frequency of elections and primaries, the breadth of the voter franchise, whether a state is organized federally or not, whether a government is a presidential or parliamentary system, and the number of chambers in a state’s legislature. Such reforms may not be easy to achieve—inducing a state to change its constitution or inducing a leader to pay attention to the new constitution can be a difficult task—but at least the researcher can provide a

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8 To further verify the robustness of these findings, we replicated models 3 and 4 while dropping first the threshold variable for openness of competition and then replacing that threshold dummy, dropping the threshold dummy variable for executive competition. Recall that Table 1, column 3, indicated that these two threshold variables introduced substantial multicollinearity. The findings remain robustly consistent with those reported in Table 2 for models 3 and 4. The results from these additional ordered logit analyses can be found on our web site at (http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data.shtml).
nearly exact description of what needs to be done and how it can best be accomplished.

What we are calling behavioral characteristics are less tied to particular specific legal reforms or constitutional changes and, as such, are more prescriptively elusive. Behavioral features include such things as the competitiveness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of participation, and level of participation. In these cases, we have a fairly good idea about what the outcome we want looks like and how we can measure the degree to which it has been achieved, and we know that each of these features improves human rights records. However, the process by which the goal can be achieved is relatively ill-defined. It is, for example, much easier to explain to someone what high voter turnout is than it is to tell a government how it can bring it about without coercion or bribes.

Examining Nonlinear Effects

Up to this point we have implicitly assumed that whatever the relationships were between the dimensions of democracy and human rights, they were linear. Yet, there is reason to question this assumption. Fein (1995) has advanced a non-linear thesis that she refers to as More Murder in the Middle (MMM), which builds on earlier work from Gurr (1986) and Muller (1985). The argument is that as states begin to democratize and new political space opens, those in power find themselves confronted by potential challengers who are eager to detract legitimacy from the regime and create a new one. Fearing a redistribution of resources and a new political order, governing elites resort to more violence to contain potential challengers than is characteristically necessary under a stable despotism or autocracy. Once democratization actually takes place, however, violence declines again to a level that is even lower than it was originally. The result is a curvilinear relationship or more MMM.

Empirically, evidence of a quadratic relationship is strong at the composite level that assesses democracy as the indicator Democracy–Autocracy, but the evidence is decidedly mixed once the constituent subdimensions of the Polity indicator are disaggregated. An ordered logit analysis of human rights recording 5 years into the future, controlling for civil war, population, and current human rights violations, shows that Democracy–Autocracy has a significant parabolic effect. The crucial value at which Democracy–Autocracy appears to improve human rights performance occurs when this variable is 0.40 or larger.9 This is consistent with the claim that the greatest violations of human rights occur among countries with intermediate levels of democracy, that is, MMM. However, when we look at the effects of the “continuous” subcomponents and their squared values, we see a considerably more complex picture. Openness of executive recruitment has the predicted parabolic shape, but executive competition has the opposite, U-shaped effect. That is, human rights violations are minimized when executive recruitment achieves an intermediate level and maximized as it approaches the extremes. The other components are not significantly non-linear. These findings, in conjunction with the threshold effects observed through models 3 and 4 (Table 2), encourage a closer look at whether the effects of democracy on human rights violations are quadratic or reflect a step function that shifts markedly at a key threshold level. The evidence points toward the observation that there is a significant decline in severe forms of abuse only as states approach the highest levels of democracy, with other institutional configurations yielding high variance and high average abuse levels. This can be seen most dramatically by examining Figure 1.

Figure 1 displays six graphs. Each tells a dramatic story about the importance of achieving a high level of Participation Competition as a path to respect for human

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9 The same turning point is observed if we add the control for the residual of the logarithm of per capita income.
rights. The vertical axis in each graph plots the human rights record 5 years into the future (i.e., our dependent variable) against the value of the Polity’s Participation Competition at the same time (i.e., the horizontal axis is PARCOMP at \( t+5 \)), controlling for Participation Competition five years earlier (i.e., each graph shows the values of human rights violations and PARCOMP at \( t+5 \) controlling for a specific value for PARCOMP at \( t=0 \)).

Within each graph, the dark line at each value on the horizontal axis—the current PARCOMP score—shows the median human rights score given the PARCOMP value 5 years earlier, while the rectangle (if any) surrounding the dark line shows the 25th percentile through the 75th percentile values on the dependent variable. Finally, the “whiskers” show the range of contiguous values on human rights. The length of the rectangle and of the whiskers is indicative of the amount of variance in the human rights record across countries under each of the graphed conditions.

Thus, by looking across the graphs, we can see what happens if Participation competition at \( t+5 \) equals any given value, say 1.0, when Participation Competition at \( t=0 \) was 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0. That is, we are looking at what happens to the human rights record of a country as a function of maintaining or achieving different degrees of competitiveness (ranging from 0 = none, 0.2 = repression, 0.4 = suppression, 0.6 = fractional, 0.8 = transitional, and 1 = multiparty competition), with the competitiveness of participation being a key indicator of democratization. The graph, then, allows us to see how improvement or deterioration in Participation Competition is tied to human rights performance. For instance, looking at the fifth graph (the second graph in the second row of Fig. 1) and focusing on human rights violations (the vertical axis) 5 years down the road, when PARCOMP the same 5 years down the road equals 0.20 but was 0.80 5 years earlier (the defining condition of this fifth graph), we see that the erosion of Participation Competition was followed by a decidedly poor human rights record.
Looking across the six graphs, reflecting the six steps in competitiveness in the current year, reveals a striking pattern. Regardless of how uncompetitive the polity is in a given year, if 5 years later it has multiparty competition (PARCOMP at $t + 5 = 1$), it achieves an outstanding human rights record. Conversely, improvement in competitiveness (with all of its implications for accountability) short of a fully competitive participatory process does not imply a clear progression to fewer and fewer human rights abuses. Moreover, a decline in competitiveness away from its maximum value indicates a sharp increase in subsequent violations of human rights. This is seen dramatically in the sixth of the six graphs. In this graph, Participation Competition today equals 1.0 and in 5 years backslides to 0.8 or continues to be 1.0. We see that if competition in 5 years declines from 1.0 to 0.8, this is accompanied by a sharp rise in human rights violations. But if Participation Competition in 5 years remains at 1.0 (or moves to 1.0 from a lower level), then human rights violations drop to the lowest ordinal level in virtually all cases.

The evidence suggests that competitive participation is one of the last elements added when a society is becoming democratic. Table 3 provides a way to view the difference in (the perhaps nonlinear) impact on human rights associated with different levels of democratic institutionalization. Each row reflects the effect of a different institutional indicator. Each cell reports the average score on human rights abuse (PTS) for each level of institutionalization of the row’s democracy dimension. For the most part, we observe little change as one shifts from level to level on the subcomponents of democracy, at least as assessed by Polity. However, in the cases of participation competition (PARCOMP), regulation of participation (PARREG), and executive constraints (XCONST), there is a dramatic improvement in the average human rights score as a society moves from the second highest to the highest step. These three components show a sharp threshold effect that further reinforces our conclusion that real improvements in human rights do not occur smoothly but reflect a discontinuous step function achieved only when a society becomes fully democratic.

Democracy, Political Development, and Human Rights

The principal prescriptive message of the analysis appears to be that those interested in human rights should focus their time and effort on figuring out how best to promote broad-based participation and competition. In particular, the building blocks that help institutionalize democracy do not appear to yield major gains in respect for human rights until party competition is normalized. This means that patience is critical to improving human rights, but patience must be rewarded by the steady development of the institutions that can support multiparty competition in genuinely competitive elections. It is unlikely that one will see dramatic improvements in respect for human rights as the process of institutionalizing democracy unfolds. Rather, the payoff comes when the threshold has been passed in terms of party competition. More than 93 percent of cases fall into the two best human rights categories once that stage is reached. Executive constraints certainly help: 73 percent of the time when executives are maximally constrained, human rights records fall in the two best categories. But, when executive constraints are fully in place and multiparty competition is not, the average human rights score is a mediocre 2.77 ($N = 270$), while the average human rights score improves dramatically to 1.51 ($N = 382$) when both executive constraints and multiparty competition are in place.

The probability that the human rights record is in the two best categories is relatively low when associated with other institutional changes that may, nevertheless, foreshadow improvements in critical areas. For instance, only 26 percent of the times when countries have open executive recruitment have they also institutionalized multiparty competition. But, if they have multiparty competition, then 97 percent of the time they also have open executive recruitment. Open recruit-
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation Competition</td>
<td>3.15 (13)</td>
<td>2.98 (952)</td>
<td>3.00 (477)</td>
<td>3.11 (473)</td>
<td>2.76 (404)</td>
<td>1.58 (454)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation Regulation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.87 (618)</td>
<td>3.10 (377)</td>
<td>2.99 (1,324)</td>
<td>1.58 (454)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Constraint</td>
<td>3.05 (659)</td>
<td>2.99 (294)</td>
<td>2.98 (641)</td>
<td>2.82 (73)</td>
<td>2.66 (269)</td>
<td>3.11 (185)</td>
<td>2.03 (652)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Competition</td>
<td>3.11 (459)</td>
<td>2.95 (1,073)</td>
<td>2.72 (281)</td>
<td>2.36 (960)</td>
<td>2.82 (483)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness of Competition</td>
<td>3.11 (459)</td>
<td>2.75 (48)</td>
<td>2.49 (145)</td>
<td>3.21 (24)</td>
<td>2.68 (2,097)</td>
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</table>

Note: The column labels refer to the non-normalized degree of attainment of institutionalization of the row subcomponent of democracy.
ment appears to be necessary but not sufficient for multiparty competition. Thus, structural change is necessary for behavior to change, but behavior does not change until enough structures are in place to make it compelling for political leaders to restrain themselves and to respect the rights of their subjects.

While these prescriptions seem reasonable enough, it is important to be cautious. Political development—especially to the level of the mature democracies that have the best human rights records—is a process that takes years, and the extent to which this process may be productively speeded up or strategically altered from an organic trajectory is far from clear. How confident can we be that at any stage in that development we can create an intervention strategy that will lead to the peaceful exchange of power between parties—a feature of competitive participation as it is defined by Polity? To what extent does it appear possible to achieve a high level of party competition in the absence of progress on other institutional reforms? No data set can give us a fully satisfactory answer to questions like these, but panel data such as the type we are working with suggest that multiparty competition is one of the last reforms polities institutionalize and, therefore, suggests that human rights reform is likely to be clearest at the end of a long democratization process and not at the beginning or along the way. Just consider that in the absence of openness of recruitment, executive constraints, and executive competition, there are only 66 cases of multiparty competition (PARCOMP = 1), compared with 2,016 such cases when those other dimensions are maximized. Yet, there are 4,089 instances of open executive recruitment without maximal executive constraints, executive competition, and multi-party competition. Clearly, it is very hard to have multiparty competition without the other dimensions, but it is not difficult to achieve thresholds on other dimensions without having multiparty competition.

This developmental analysis has two important implications for anyone interested in state building and human rights. The first implication is that at least from the standpoint of the historical record, there is strong evidence that building a good human rights record, like political or economic development more generally, is a complicated long-term process. Instead of concentrating on fostering party competition at the expense of basically ignoring the other dimensions of democracy, the analysis suggests that none of the dimensions can be ignored. If anything, a person interested in promoting human rights in a new democracy must first focus on ensuring that a substantial amount of progress is attained on each of the other subcomponents in order to create the kind of institutional foundation necessary to support party competition.

A second implication that is closely related to the first is that the creation of a government that effectively protects human rights can be a slow and frustrating process. It can be slow because it requires a substantial number of institutional reforms to be in place. And it can be frustrating because most of the reforms that are necessary will not immediately lead to better human rights protection. The payoff will only come after a number of reforms are made.

This leaves the human rights reformer with some difficult choices. If she has a high tolerance for delayed gratification, she can get in at the ground floor and labor in a newly democratizing state—possibly for years—in an effort to create the broad institutional foundation necessary for eventual progress in human rights. Once this has been accomplished, she can begin the task of trying to create the high level of party competition that seems likely to promote human rights. This formidable menu of tasks is further complicated by the fact that while she will know what needs to be achieved, she will have relatively little guidance about how to go about doing it.

Alternatively, the reformer can be more strategic. She can stand aside and wait until the institutional foundation for reform has evolved to the point where it appears “ripe” for the introduction of party competition. This decreases the time involved compared with the first alternative at the cost of restricting the range of choice in target states. Of course, the difficulty of being faced with creating a high
level of party competition—as defined by the Polity scale—without any guidance as to how this goal can be accomplished still remains.

If our reformer finds neither of these alternatives appealing, she can choose to ignore the path of democratization reform and focus on some different kind of reform strategy such as the training of indigenous human rights activists to launch a grassroots campaign for increased human rights protection or attempting to convince international NGOs located outside the target country to pressure officials in the state to improve their human rights record. The likelihood that these and similar strategies will be successful is unclear, however, as no one has yet brought any systematic evidence to bear on these topics.

Conclusion

Not all dimensions of democracy contribute equally to reductions in human rights abuses. Like Keith (2002), we find that party competition is most important in reducing human rights violations. More significantly, we have shown that party competition is unlikely to be achieved—or to be effective—unless the institutional foundations for true competition are first put into place. That is, the path to greater levels of competitive participation and ultimately the presence of a stable multiparty system occurs in tandem with greater levels of liberalization in other dimensions. Elections (indexed as the highest score on the executive competition dimension) neither make a democracy nor are they inherently the best place to begin state-building. Instead, elections are effective when other institutional changes that ensure accountability are put into place.

Moreover, although the path to greater respect for integrity rights appears to involve all of the dimensions of democracy, albeit to varying degrees, preliminary evidence suggests that simple increases in a state’s level of democratization do not lead to commensurate reductions in human rights violations. Instead, tangible advancement in the area of human rights occurs in countries located at the far right on the continuum between democracy and autocracy—not simply within those states that fall within the cutoff point or the conventional definition of democracy (Democracy–Autocracy = 0.80, or 6 in the non-normalized version)—suggesting that attainment of human rights may be a long and arduous process for a number of states and their citizens.

References


CIDCM, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Research Program, University of Maryland.


