Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition

Christian Davenport

The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 92-116.

Stable URL:

The Journal of Conflict Resolution is currently published by Sage Publications, Inc..

Human Rights and
the Democratic Proposition

CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT

Department of Political Science
University of Colorado at Boulder

Autocratization is expected to worsen human rights conditions; democratization is frequently heralded as a means for improving them. Unfortunately, neither relationship has been subjected to empirical investigation. The causal linkage between regime change and state repression is examined in the current study with a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of 137 countries from 1950 to 1982 ($N = 4,521$). Four aspects of change are considered: (1) direction, (2) magnitude, (3) "smoothness" of the transition, and (4) duration of time at particular regime types. The results support the anticipated escalatory effect of autocratization for the magnitude variable, revealing influences that persist for 4 years. Additionally, there is support for the pacifying effect of democratization with regard to magnitude for the same 4-year time period. Direction, smoothness, and duration are found to be unimportant, but regime change does matter.

INTRODUCTION

There have been many attempts to understand human rights violations, that is, restrictions placed by governments on citizens' political and civil liberties. Political leaders, activists, reporters, and academics alike have given two factors in particular the most consistent attention: democracy (achieving status as a full democratic political system),[1] and democratization (moving toward full democracy in some manner). I label these collectively the democratic proposition.[2]

The logic of this proposition lies in the belief that democratic or democratizing governments stress "compromise in conflict and participation and responsiveness in relations between rulers and ruled, traits that are inconsistent with reliance (on repressiveness) as an instrument of (influence/power)" (Gurr 1986; or similarly Russell [1938] 1988; Dahl 1971; Powell 1982; and Rummel 1997). Thus, whether a particular nation-state is fully democratic or merely becoming more so, government leaders in this situation are expected to be more tolerant of citizens' rights and relax (i.e., withdraw) previously imposed repressive activities. Correspondingly, whether a particular

1. For a working definition of democracy, see Dahl (1971, chap. 1), Vanhanen (1990, chap. 2), and Gleditsch and Ward (1997).
2. One might consider this part of the domestic democratic peace argument (Rummel 1984, 1997).

nation-state is fully autocratic or merely moving in that direction, the opposite effect is anticipated (Laswell 1941; Huntington 1968; Linz 1988). Within these contexts, we can expect government leaders to be more restrictive of political and civil liberties and the rate of applied repression to increase.

Although the democratic proposition has had profound effects on the lives of millions of people, closer examination of the literature illustrates that empirical evidence supports only one aspect of the argument. In particular, only the degree of full democratic status held by a nation (i.e., the level of democracy at time t) has been examined by scholars as to how it effects repressive behavior (also at time t).[3] Almost every important investigation of the subject (Hibbs 1973; McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Goldstein 1983; Ziegenhagen 1986; Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; Francisco 1996) has used this state characteristic as a primary explanatory variable. Furthermore, several analyses have given it exclusive attention as the most important factor one could consider (Rummel 1984, 1997; Fein 1995; King 1997; Tate and Poe 1997). In all cases, the level of democracy decreases the rate at which repression is applied, directly supporting the first part of the democratic proposition.[4]

Although existing literature does tell us something about the relative propensity of democracies versus nondemocracies to employ repression in a static manner, it tells us essentially nothing about whether movements toward or away from democracy (i.e., instances of regime change) influence state uses of repressive behavior in a more dynamic fashion. This omission is extremely important for human rights research. It provides a more rigorous investigation of the democratic proposition, as it explicitly addresses the relationship between regime type and repression across various authority patterns (i.e., state-societal contexts). Other arguments regarding regime change and repression suggest that human rights violations increase amidst government changes (Przeworski 1986; Tarrow 1989). Albeit somewhat indirectly, this issue is directly comparable to the research put forward by Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Ward and Gleditsch (1998), Krain and Myers (1997), and Hegre et al. (1998). These works found that periods of change in regime type increase the likelihood of conflict: the first two authors address interstate coercion,[5] whereas the latter two address civil war (another component of the domestic realm).

Does democratization increase or decrease political repression? Does autocratization increase repressive behavior, as one is led to believe given the arguments within the literature? To shed some light on these questions, I explicitly investigate the behavioral linkage between regime change and repression. The analysis itself is composed of several elements.

3. Davenport (1996) has examined lagged effects and found them to be significant.
4. The sole deviant case here is an article by McCormick and Mitchell (1997). This work found no relationship between repression and democracy. At the same time, it should be noted that many countries (including numerous democratic ones) were left out of the empirical analysis, and thus the results are questionable.
5. Enterline (1998) finds that democratization has no effect on war, while finding support for the escalatory influence of autocratization.

First, I discuss the literature on human rights violations, identifying important similarities and developments across different traditions within the subfield. I then outline the relationship between regime type, regime change, and state repression. I next address the data used for the analysis and the particular methodological technique employed. Specifically, I use yearly data on 137 countries from 1950 to 1982 with a pooled cross-sectional time-series design ($N = 4,521$). In the fourth part of the study, I attempt to resolve the current deficiency within the literature by examining the relationship between regime change and repression across contexts (regime type or the level of democracy, four measures of political dissent, and lagged repression), types of change (direction, magnitude, "smoothness" or variance, and duration), and types of effect (short and long term).

The relationship between regime change and repressive behavior is generally supportive of the existing literature, although not always in ways that one would expect. Considering the magnitude of change in regime type (the only significant aspect of change identified), autocratization increases the imposition of censorship and political restrictions immediately (within the same year that change takes place) and over a 4-year lag. After 10 years, however, movements toward autocracy lead to withdrawals in repressive behavior. Democratization increases the relaxation of these sanctions immediately as well as over 5 years after the initial change occurs. The democratic proposition is therefore supported in an important way.

THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF REPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

The study of state repression constitutes one of the core themes of political science from Aristotle to the present. This particular interest became extremely prominent at the time of the American, French, and Haitian revolutions (Patterson 1991), but even before this time one could find a few relevant discussions of the issue (De la Boetie [1559] 1975; Machiavelli [1515] 1980; Hobsbawm 1965; Moore 1966; Ishay 1997).

Despite the attention given to state repression, however, the frequently cited passage of John McCammant (1984) well captures the status of the literature up until the early 1980s.

> One searches in vain through the thousands of articles and books written by political scientists, political sociologists, economists, and anthropologists for references to the awful and bloody deeds of governments and for explanations of how and why these deeds are done. (P. 11)

Since the early 1980s, rigorous/systematic investigation of the subject has increased.[6]
Within this area, there are now three distinct traditions:

6. I do not mean to suggest that before this time no research had been conducted. Indeed, there are several analyses prior to the early 1980s worthy of discussion (Hibbs 1973; Snyder 1976; Goldstein 1978; Jackson et al. 1978). On the contrary, I wish merely to identify that after the early 1980s, the study of political repression appears to increase significantly and develops as an area of research in and of itself.

1. *State terror,* which generally concerns violent state behavior from the perspective of those who study authoritarian, totalitarian, and communist ("closed") political systems as well as those who study political-economic dependency (e.g., Moore 1954; Walter 1969; Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Gurr 1986; Petras 1986; Giddens 1987; Duvall and Stohl 1988; Mason and Krane 1989; Bushnell et al. 1991; Krain 1997).
2. *Negative sanctions,* which generally concern nonviolent restrictions on political and civil liberties from the traditions of social movements, "closed" political systems, and those who study coercive agents (e.g., Hibbs 1973; McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Pirages 1976; Jackson et al. 1978; Tilly 1978; Goldstein 1978, 1983; Muller 1985; Ziegenhagen 1986; Park 1987; Gibson 1988; Franks 1989; Lopez and Stohl 1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; Francisco 1996; Rasler 1996; Franklin 1997; King 1997; Moore 1998).
3. *Human rights violations,* which generally concern violent state behavior from the perspectives of international/domestic law and political deviance (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Richards 1997; Tate and Poe 1997).

Despite the diverse array of state behavior examined within these research traditions (violent as well as nonviolent behavior, political and civil rights as well as personal integrity rights), differences in substantive focus (dissent, democracy, development, etc.), methodological techniques (case study, statistical, or computer simulation), measurement strategies ("standards-" as opposed to "events-based"), and case selections (single countries, regions, or global analyses), all of the work identified above is relevant to the study of political repression. Three similarities deserve mention.

First, each tradition highlights government behavior used to regulate activity within its territorial jurisdiction. This type of behavior is labeled many things and discussed within several different contexts, yet they all refer to the same general phenomena—political repression (i.e., coercive governance).

Second, each tradition develops similar explanations. Political repression is usually viewed as a strategic choice that governments make among numerous options in an attempt to bring about and maintain political quiescence (Walter 1969; Tilly 1978; Duvall and Stohl 1988; Gurr 1986; Davenport 1997; Poe, Lantrip, and Tate 1997). Drawing upon rational choice theory, there are three categories into which most explanatory variables fall: (1) the value attached to a particular outcome (e.g., quiescence), (2) the probability of repressive behavior being successful (e.g., the likelihood that quiescence will be achieved), and (3) the costs incurred by using repression (e.g., economic, physical, or political). From this view, governments are expected to employ repressive behavior when the value for quiescence and the probability of success are high and costs are low. Governments are less likely to violate human rights, however, when the value of quiescence and the probability of success are low and costs are high.

Each tradition also highlights the same explanatory factors as important. Specifically, five variables have been used within this area, although the first two and the fifth garner the most consistent and compelling support (both statistically and substantively). These variables include *political dissent,* which increases the value attached to political quiescence by directly unsettling that condition; *lagged repression,* which decreases the costs of using repression by enhancing the central authority's familiarity with this type of behavior; *economic development,* which decreases the cost of

applying repressive behavior; and *dependency*, which increases the value attached to quiescence. The fifth explanatory variable is addressed below.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROPOSITION AND
THE EFFECT OF REGIME TYPE

Within the area of research concerned with political repression, by far the most attention has been extended to the level of democracy as a causal determinant. This variable has featured prominently in all of the empirical literature on the subject (Hibbs 1973; McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Goldstein 1983; Ziegenhagen 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; Fein 1995; Francisco 1996; King 1997; Tate and Poe 1997). The expected causal relationship has been supported in every case. Specifically, findings show that when states have higher levels of democracy, they tend to use political repression less frequently.[7]

Two factors account for the logic of this relationship. First, because democratic leaders are more accountable to everyday citizens as well as elites and interest groups, they become less willing to provoke the wrath of these constituents (which theoretically could result in their removal from power). The institutions of democracy as well as the norms (of compromise, toleration, and facilitation)[8] accompanying these institutions influence the decisions that rulers make with regard to state-societal relations, increasing the costs of human rights violations as well as decreasing the value of quiescence. These elements reduce the likelihood that repressive behavior will be applied within democratic contexts, and they even go so far as to suggest that democrats will withdraw those coercive acts already extended.

Second, coercive agents within democracies are generally less inclined to opt for repression for three reasons. They learn to prefer less coercive means of conflict regulation (i.e., discussion, voting, etc.). They wield less power within these types of political systems and therefore have less influence over policy makers. Democracies usually block any one group (including those advocating coercion) from pushing forward what they might wish to impose without the consent of those affected. Here (again), the costs of repressive behavior increase and in an effort to establish/maintain societal influence, coercive agents withdraw from such activity because it endangers their position within the nation-state.

The other aspect of the democratic proposition, the one usually ignored, amends the basic argument just identified by focusing on change within regime type. This variant of the proposition suggests that moves toward democracy decrease political repression (for example, Goldstein 1983; Garon 1995). The reason for this causal linkage

---

7. This is not to say that those governments considered fully democratic do not use this behavior. There is a significant amount of evidence available to indicate that they do (Van den Berghe 1990; Goldstein 1978, 1983; Franks 1989; Francisco 1996; Newton 1996). However, they apply repression at a reduced rate relative to more "closed" political systems.

8. Rummel (1997, chap. 10) presents a very good discussion of this referring to them as "second-level explanations."

generally follows from the logic outlined above: changes in the level of democracy increase political tolerance of decision makers who are held accountable, and increased democracy decreases the willingness and influence of coercive agents to push for repressive applications because of their altered relationship with the government as well as the citizenry. The sole difference from the discussion about levels of democracy (identified above) is that in this case the variable of interest is the movement from some level of democracy to some other level. The expected relationship should be stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Democratization decreases state repressiveness.

As mentioned earlier, others have suggested that democratization does not decrease repression but, rather, enhances it (Przeworski 1986; Goodin 1988; Linz 1988; Tarrow 1989).[9] Here, increased communication and competition between societal actors (including the state) raise the likelihood of contention. In consequence, leaders will opt to apply coercion (Snyder 1976; Pirages 1976; Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981). Accepting this as a possibility, I consider the following relationship as well:

Hypothesis 2: Democratization increases state repressiveness.

By similar logic, movements away from democracy may likely increase repressive behavior (for example, Laswell 1941; Linz 1988). When autocratization takes place, respect for and observance of political and civil liberties diminish. Two factors explain this. The desire for and actual practice of tolerance decreases, and the willingness to use repression increases as the potential influence of coercive agents is enhanced and the military's propensity to impose control over society becomes more reasonable (Laswell 1941; Huntington 1968; Randle 1981; Goldstein 1983). Simply put, the norms and institutions associated with this political system militate against tolerance and noncoercive rule. This relationship will be stated as:

Hypothesis 3: Autocratization increases state repressiveness.

Hypothesis 4 challenges the basic argument of the democratic proposition. From this perspective, the issue of coherence within authority patterns is crucial to understanding how changes within regime type influence repressive behavior. According to Eckstein and Gurr (1975), "authority patterns" refer to "a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit" (p. 22). The patterns themselves are categorized/described along several dimensions. "Coherence" within authority patterns becomes especially relevant to the present discussion because Eckstein or Gurr do not believe that all positions within the various dimensions (i.e., high or low values within each dimension) "fit" or "align" together. Some combinations are "incoherent"; that is, they place together elements

---

9. Still others have suggested that democratic change might increase or decrease repression depending on political-economic context (Huntington 1990, 123, 198-200; Hibbs 1973; Dahl 1971, 15; Arat 1991, 9).

that undermine or contradict other aspects of authority patterns and create problems (i.e., they facilitate instability), whereas some combinations are more coherent and thus more "compatible, consistent and in harmony with others" (Lichbach 1984, 6).

Among the different dimensions, which relationships are most coherent? In line with Eckstein and Gurr (1975) as well as Lichbach (1984), I believe that coherence increases as one approaches either pole of the conventional measures of regime type. Authority patterns appear to be more internally consistent when the political system is either purely democratic or purely autocratic.[10] This is as much a theoretical statement as an understanding of political history. As Gurr (1974, 1504) suggests,

> The most durable political systems (i.e., those that persist over time) are those which have responded to the stress of socio-economic change by assuming the task of managing it, whether directly by state control of the institutions of socialization of production, or indirectly by regulation and support of allied quasi-autonomous institutions. The "totalitarian" and "social-democratic" polities, in short, seem to be variant means to the same end of political survival through managed change.

Following this argument, the relationships between authority coherence, regime change, and human rights violations are quite straightforward. Change in regimes that are "coherent" should significantly magnify the perceptions of threat experienced by political leaders, subsequently increasing the use of repressive behavior.[11] Changes taking place within mixed polities (i.e., those that possess both democratic and autocratic authority patterns), however, should manifest less severe perceived threats and desires to keep order, because these regimes are more unstable ("incoherent") to begin with. As a consequence, there should be little (if any) effect of changes within these contexts on political repression. The anticipated relationship would be as follows:

> *Hypothesis 4:* Regime change within coherent polities should illustrate Hypotheses 1-3 more acutely, whereas regime changes within mixed polities should show them weakly (if at all).

The fifth and last hypothesis considers the nature of the relationship between regime change and repression from a different perspective. Specifically, it addresses the issue of endurance over time. Similar to long-term effects of regime type and other contextual variables (Davenport 1996), it may be the case that

10. A few of the dimensions highlighted by Eckstein and Gurr (1975, 206), Lichbach (1984, 110) provide several examples that illustrate the point:

An example of a coherent polity with a high score on democracy is provided by contemporary Switzerland. The (collective) executive is effectively elected (the "boundary exchange" dimension), is coequal to the legislature (the "structures and processes of direction" dimension), and intimately tied with institutionalized party politics (again the "structures and processes of direction" dimension). There are several types of coherent polities with high scores on autocracy. Absolute monarchies, for example in pre-revolutionary Russia, were notable for their ascriptive patterns of executive selection (the "boundary exchange" dimension), no limitations of the monarch's decisions politics (the "structures and processes of direction" dimension), and non-existent or repressed political participation politics (again the "structures and processes of direction" dimension).

11. This is similar to the arguments made by Ward and Gleditsch (1998) and Hegre et al. (1998, 4-9) about interstate coercion and civil war, respectively.

Hypothesis 5: When regimes change, the use of political repression is influenced for several years after the change itself has taken place.

This hypothesis considers the possibility that the institutional/normative influence of regime change lasts for several years after the initial alteration has taken place.[12] Alternatively, of course, the institutional/normative influence of the previous regime characteristics might persist despite change, sustaining the repressive activities of the prior government. Both are possible.

The claim being made here about change is not without precedent. Much research suggests that new democracies might be more dangerous in terms of their willingness to employ repressive behavior than regimes that have been democratic for some time (Linz and Stepan 1996; Krain and Myers 1997; Zakaria 1997). This hypothesis investigates the historical importance of regime change to immediate as well as delayed applications of political repression. It attempts to estimate its weight, both empirically and substantively.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To examine the relationship between regime change and human rights violations, I observe 137 countries from 1950 to 1982 ($N = 4,521$) where nation-years are used as the unit of analysis. This particular data set was used to capture a wide variety of countries, while simultaneously allowing observation over a relatively significant amount of time. The particular 33 years examined are important, for they encompass much of the second and third waves of democracy as well as many democratic reversals and instances of autocratization. Huntington (1990, 16) identifies the following years as encompassing various waves. First Democratization Wave: 1828-1926 (Reverse Wave: 1922-1942); Second Democratization Wave: 1943-1962 (Reverse Wave: 1958-1975); Third Democratization Wave: 1974-present. It would, of course, be interesting to observe changes in regime type taking place after this time, but the data are not available, and there is no comparable alternative across as many countries or as many years.

OPERATIONALIZATION

Measurement of the dependent and independent variables is consistent with the existing literature identified above, so my discussion of them is relatively brief. I will address only the measurements of repression, level of democracy, and regime change in detail. For a more thorough discussion of the other variables, see Poe and Tate (1994) and Davenport (1995). Basic diagnostics (means, standard deviations, and high and low values) for all variables are provided in Appendix A.

---

12. The value of political quiescence and the costs involved might be altered enduringly, at least until the effects of the regime change wear off and re-equilibration of authority patterns occurs.

In the previous literature on repression, from the events-based perspective (Hibbs 1973; Timberlake and Williams 1984; Muller 1985; Ziegenhagen 1986; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; Arat 1996; King 1997; Franklin 1997), Taylor and Jodice's (1983) indicator of imposed negative sanctions is used to measure repressiveness.[13] This measure encompasses discrete events of various political restrictions (limitations placed on individuals or organizations; i.e., the imposition of martial law, banning political parties, mass arrests, and so forth) as well as discrete instances of censorship (closing newspapers, reducing news coverage, and so forth).

Upon considering the democratic literature more thoroughly and reflecting on what the measure actually captured, this approach seems inappropriate. The literature on democracy suggests that governments of this type will use less repression. It also maintains that these regimes are more likely to withdraw sanctions and become what Tilly (1978, 106-15) calls "facilitative" (i.e., they will allow, cultivate, or promote certain types of behavior through the removal of obstacles). Indeed, the basic argument of the democratic proposition is to bring forth just this type of government, and existing uses of events-based repressive measures cannot accommodate these concerns.[14]

To capture this repressive-facilitative spectrum, repressiveness is measured by the number of imposed negative sanctions subtracted by the number of sanctions (also found in Taylor and Jodice [1983]) relaxed during a nation-year. High values of this measure depict contexts within which significant amounts of negative sanctions are being applied (the highest value observed within the sample is 722,980 in Hungary, in 1957). Low values depict contexts within which significant amounts of withdrawals are taking place (the lowest value observed here is –17,000 in Cyprus, in 1957).[15]

To measure the level of democracy (or regime type), Gurr's (1974, 1990) authority indicator is employed (as provided within the most recent version of Polity III).[16] Specifically, the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score.[17] These measures represent cumulative indices that include the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the chief

13. Criticisms of these data can be found in Snyder (1976) and Jabine and Claude (1992). Problems normally revolve around several factors: (1) data availability (given that the subject matter is politically sensitive), (2) data reliability (given that information is hard to come by), (3) an anti–third world bias (given that some regions of the world are more likely to be covered than others by news sources), and (4) an urban bias (given that activities taking place in remote locations are less likely to be reported). Understanding these deficiencies, the key is to select data that are as valid as possible.

14. This also addresses the fact that states can select different strategies of political control (i.e., negative as well as positive sanctions) that represent distinct strategies of governance.

15. Because of the change, the variable is no longer censored on the left. Krain (1997) raises the issue of left-censoring (i.e., nonexistence of negative values) in investigations of political repression/state terror. If this is the case, he argues, then it might be more appropriate to use event-count models for estimation. Upon further reflection, it occurred to me that "negative repressive events" were actually withdrawals, the opposite of imposition.

16. Version 5 (1996) is available at http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html.

17. There is a .99 correlation between this variable and the democracy or autocracy scores by themselves. The latter variables are normally used within the repression/comparative literature. Additionally, there are several codes used by Polity III to designate different circumstances that account for patterns with data availability: –99 (missing data, which accounts for 15% of the cases examined), –88 (planning of transitions, which account for 1% of the cases examined), –77 (interregnums, which account for .75% of the cases

executive. Full democracies are denoted by a score of +10 (e.g., the United States or Costa Rica for the full time period), whereas authoritarian political systems are indicated by a score of −10 (Poland for the full time period or the Dominican Republic from 1948 to 1965).

Changes in regime type are measured in accordance with the strategies put forward by Ward and Gleditsch (1998): direction, magnitude, and smoothness (variance). Additionally, I have included a measure of regime duration (i.e., the amount of time a particular nation-state has existed at a specific level of democracy, as discussed above).

To generate values of direction, I merely observe whether the change in regime type is toward or away from democracy at time t from time t − 1, classifying movements to democracy as +1, measures away from democracy as −1, and no movement as 0. Within the sample of countries used here, there are 117 instances of democratization, 149 instances of autocratization, and 4,255 instances of no movement whatsoever. Changes are identified by country and nation-year in Appendix B.

Magnitude is measured by identifying the degree of movement between different levels of democracy between time t and time t − 1. Similar to Ward and Gleditsch (1998), the variable is signed so that movements toward democracy are positive and movements toward autocracy are negative. From the data, it is clear that most changes in regime type are relatively small in nature (positive or negative 1 having the largest amounts), with progressively fewer occurring at the extremes (i.e., positive or negative 19). Additionally, autocratization occurs slightly more often than democratization.

Smoothness (or variance) in change is determined by the level of magnitude at time t minus the sum of magnitudes (i.e., the number of regime changes) over the previous 5 years squared.[18] The underlying logic here is that "rocky" transitions in regime characteristics (i.e., where large changes take place[19] or when characteristics move back and forth between autocracy and democracy[20]) should lead to greater applications of political repression because rulers are believed to be more threatened/unstable in these contexts. From the data, most transitions are relatively smooth; only a few regimes are confronted with "rocky" ones.

Finally, the duration of time a regime stays at a particular level of democracy is also used as an explanatory variable. This indicator is added to the analysis because, if included together without considering this factor, it is possible that some regimes, which last only briefly, are being compared to polities that have existed for up to a century. In line with the coherence argument, this is inappropriate because it is generally accepted that long-lasting governments are less likely to use repression. Perhaps they are even more likely to withdraw sanctions because, out of sheer longevity, they have

---

examined), and −66 (interruptions, which account for .24% of the cases examined). For the empirical analysis, dummy variables are created for each condition and placed into the equations estimated. (Results are available from the author upon request.) Dropping these cases from the analysis does not affect the results.

18. Ten-year windows did not reveal any significant differences in the results.

19. For example, the Republic of Korea in 1960 underwent a change in polity score of 18 points from −8 (near-full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).

20. For example, in 1972 Argentina was coded as a −9, a full autocracy. In 1973, the polity score moves to 6, a mid-level democracy, and returned only 3 years later in 1976 to −9 again. Across these various years, the transitions are quite dramatic, and consequently, the values for "rockiness" are quite large: 1972, 0; 1973, 225; 1974, 225; 1975, 225; and 1976, 900.

been able to generate some normative influence or alternative mechanisms of political control. As a result, some attention should be given to polity duration.

To measure this variable, the number of years a government exists at different levels of democracy are counted. For example, in 1950 the United States had been at level 10 for 79 years, and in 1961 Rwanda had been at level –5 for 1 year. Each subsequent year without change would then be added to this duration score, and this number would continue to increase until a change was identified.

In addition to these variables, I consider two controls for the empirical analysis: political dissent and lagged repression. Past research has identified both as important determinants of state repression. Their incorporation into empirical investigation is now relatively standard.[21]

All studies have found that political dissent increases political repression (Hibbs 1973; Ziegenhagen 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; Francisco 1996; King 1997; Poe and Tate 1994; Tate and Poe 1997). The logic here is that when confronted with political dissent, the value of quiescence is increased and repression is applied in an effort to bring about this particular situation. Some debate exists, however, about what exactly constitutes a challenge to a regime and how this challenge should be measured. Some use a dichotomous indicator of whether or not dissent (usually civil war) is present (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994); some use the number of political deaths (e.g., Muller 1985); others use frequency counts of multiple conflict events (e.g., Hibbs 1973). I deviate slightly from these practices and employ the indicators initially developed by Ziegenhagen (1986) and later modified by myself (1995).

Within my article, several dissident events (i.e., strikes, guerrilla warfare, riots, and protest demonstrations) were used to construct four measures: (1) *cumulative frequency* (i.e., the number of dissident events taking place during a particular year), (2) *degree of variety* (i.e., the number of different types of conflict events), (3) *degree of violence* (i.e., whether or not guerilla warfare or riots take place), and (4) *deviance from the cultural norm* (i.e., the degree to which cumulative dissent within a particular year deviated from the mean of the country's experience over the full time period under investigation). Using this measurement procedure, domestic threats to political authorities were not unidimensional in nature (exclusively measured by frequency counts). Rather, domestic threats appear as multidimensional phenomena better captured (both theoretically and empirically) by considering all four of the different indicators together. The data used for the construction of these measures are obtained from Banks's *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (1990).

Finally, let us consider the effect of *lagged repression*. Called many things, by many different authors ("the law of the instrument," "institutionalized repression," or "habitual coercion"), the underlying logic of this relationship is rather simple. Once used or withdrawn, repression develops its own perpetuating dynamics by enhancing the

---

21. Other variables have, of course, been analyzed previously (economic development, dependency, military influence, population, and so forth). After examining the results from empirical investigations that used these variables, however, it is clear that repressive behavior is principally driven by regime type, dissent, and lagged repression. I thus employ an admittedly more parsimonious, but empirically powerful explanatory model.

familiarity of those involved with its aftereffects and promoting the lobbying efforts of coercive or noncoercive agents. To measure this systemic characteristic, I merely lag the dependent variable one observation.

STRATEGY OF INVESTIGATION

The particular methodological technique employed here, a pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCTS) analysis, is also now relatively standard within research concerned with human rights violations (Hibbs 1973; Muller 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 1996, 1997; King 1997; Richards 1997; Tate and Poe 1997). Many have identified the positive characteristics associated with PCTS designs that provide investigation of time and space simultaneously. Two common shortfalls confront these strategies: heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Stimson 1985; Kennedy 1994). Generally the same diagnostics and remedial strategies have been applied to contend with these difficulties. I stay within the parameters of these suggestions.

With regard to heteroscedasticity, the White technique is used. As designed by Beck and his colleagues,

> the White technique was adapted to the (Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series and) . . . the equation represents the estimated covariance matrix of the country errors used in feasible generalized least squares analyses of pooled cross-sectional time-series data sets. . . . This procedure does not affect the OLS coefficients, but it does estimate more consistent standard errors. (Poe and Tate 1994, 870)

Analyses were also conducted using an ordinary least squares (OLS) with a panel corrected standard error model (STATA 1997, 619, 623-24).[22] Neither of these estimation procedures significantly differed from the results obtained by the equation identified above. Thus, I use the OLS with robust standard error model.[23]

To test for autocorrelation, an Arima model is used as well as a Durbin-h statistic.[24] For the Arima model, a basic OLS regression with robust standard errors is estimated and the error structure is observed. This information is assessed by the criteria put forth within McCleary and Hay (1980) to identify irregularities within the data (i.e., serial dependencies) and guide corrective measures. Estimating the following equation,

Repression = intercept + β1 Democracy + β2 Directional Change in the Level of Democracy + β3 Magnitude of Change in Democracy Level + β4 Smoothness in Transition + β5 Dura-

---

22. This particular model is generally recommended when the number of time periods is greater than the number of panels. There is nothing that suggests that it is not also applicable within the opposite situation. GLS estimators are frequently recommended when the number of time periods is as great as the number of panels. In either case, the results were not significantly affected.

23. The possibility of outliers was examined with added-variable plots as well as with DFBETAs. The following country dummies were applied to control for specific cases: United Kingdom 1981 and 1982; Hungary 1957 and 1958; Swaziland 1963; Indonesia 1955.

24. Breusch-Godfrey tests confirmed the results as well.

tion at Regime Type + β6 Cumulative Frequency in Dissent + β7 Variety of Dissent + β8
   Violent Dissent + β9 Cultural Deviance of Dissent + β10 Lagged Repression + error,

the error structure reveals that autocorrelation is not a problem. The Durbin-h statistic
(a variant of the Lagrange multiplier frequently recommended for diagnosing autocor-
relation within models including a lagged dependent variable [Harvey 1990, 275])
also supports this conclusion. These values are reported with each equation provided
below.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

   Estimating the basic model (equation 1, in Table 1), I find that despite the use of a
different dependent variable, the results are generally consistent with previous
research and the explained amount of variance is quite high at 65%. State uses of
repressive behavior are significantly influenced by all four variables used to measure
dissent: the variety of conflict increases repression by 3,488 events per unit change in
this variable, deviance from the cultural norm increases repression by 1,124 events, the
cumulative amount of dissent increases repressive behavior by 34 events, and the pres-
ence of violence decreases repression by 3,137 per unit change in this variable. The
last finding is different from previous research. Usually it is expected (and found) that
violence increases the rate at which political repression is applied because it threatens
political order. One interpretation of this analysis is that violence compels rulers to
withdraw from the application of repression in an effort to better regulate citizens'
behavior (removing a major source of dissatisfaction). Because the dependent variable
has not been used before, it is difficult to compare this finding to what has been identi-
fied previously. The interpretation provided is plausible given the political-historical
literature and by a theoretical argument provided by Lichbach (1987), which, if
applied to states, would explain their withdrawal strategy rather well.
   Other results are directly comparable to the existing literature. Repression is
increased by .32 events for every unit change in lagged repression and decreased by
113 events by a unit change in the democracy measure.[25] The last finding is particularly
important because it reconfirms the first part of the democratic proposition (albeit in a
slightly different manner). Here, it is found that democracy leads to withdrawals of
negative sanctions and more facilitative governance.
   Having identified the comparability between the basic model and previous
research, it is appropriate to ask if changes in regime type matter. Introduction of the
four regime change variables produces mixed results (equations 2 and 3 in Table 1).
Refuting Hypotheses 1-4, the direction of change in regime type, the smoothness of
transitions, and the duration of time spent at different levels of democracy are not
deemed important for understanding variance in state repression. These nonfindings

---

   25. Beta weights identify that the impact of lagged repression is actually higher than the other variables
at .32, as opposed to the .26 for cumulative conflict, .24 for variety, .20 for the level of democracy, .07 for the
presence of violence, and .02 for deviance from the cultural norm.

TABLE 1
Repression and Regime Change ($N = 4,380$)

Independent Variable	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3	Equation 4
Constant	−111 (195)**	−111 (195)**	−91 (195)	−102 (194)
Level of democracy	−113 (23)**	−104 (23)**	−98 (23)**	−97 (23)**
Variety of conflict events	3,488 (395)**	2,896 (328)**	3,469 (328)**	3,461 (395)**
Cumulative conflict frequency	34 (9)**	39 (10)**	34 (10)**	34 (9)**
Deviance from mean of experience	1,124 (519)*	1,159 (517)*	1,135 (517)*	1,115 (522)*
Violent conflict	−3,137 (551)**	−2,462 (560)**	−3,171 (549)**	−3,166 (550)**
Lagged repression	.32 (.0)**	.39 (.0)**	.32 (.0)**	.32 (.0)**
Direction of change	~	−1,368 (965)	~	~
Magnitude of change	~	−556 (194)**	−520 (136)**	~
Smoothness of change	~	−2 (3)	~	~
Duration at level of democracy	~	18 (11)	~	~
The magnitude of autocratization	~	~	~	586 (180)**
The magnitude of democratization	~	~	~	−432 (212)**
Durbin-h	.21	.19	.19	.20
R^2	.65	.67	.66	.66

NOTE: Dependent variable: political repression (equations estimated using ordinary least squares with robust standard error model). Numbers in parentheses are unstandardized parameter estimates. ~ = not examined.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

are particularly interesting because, unlike Ward and Gleditsch (1998), they suggest that rocky transitions are just as likely as smooth ones to result in repression. During large changes or frequent movements back and forth between autocracy and democracy, governments are not more likely to use censorship and political restrictions. Additionally, the results also suggest that the other measure of coherence (when gauged by the amount of time a particular nation-state exists at a level of democracy) is irrelevant for understanding repressive practices. In this case, whether a regime had been at a specific type of regime for 100 years or merely 5 does not affect the rate of repression-facilitation. Regime duration does not matter.

Supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3, the magnitude of change (i.e., the amount of change between time t and t − 1) is found to decrease the rate of applied repressive behavior by 556 events per unit change in this variable. The actual effects are more easily understood if one splits the variable into autocratization and democratization, as in equation 4.

Here, when autocratization takes place, the number of restrictive acts used by central authorities increases in the same year by 586 events. When democratization takes place, however, and more open political systems come into existence, 432 restrictive

TABLE 2
Regime Change and Long-Term Influences ($N = 4,380$)

Independent Variables	Equation 5
Constant	78 (304)
Level of democracy	−90 (28)**
Variety of conflict events	3,578 (237)**
Cumulative conflict frequency	36 (2)**
Violent conflict	−3,099 (591)**
Lagged repression	.28 (.0)**
Autocratization (contemporaneous effect)	−245 (171)
Autocratization (first degree polynomial effect)	557 (157)**
Democratization (contemporaneous effect)	−408 (185)*
Democratization (first degree polynomial effect)	381 (174)*
R^2	.66

NOTE: Dependent variable: political repression (Almon distributed lag model). Numbers in parentheses are unstandardized parameter estimates.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

acts are withdrawn in the same year. In line with the democratic proposition, autocracies make things worse for citizens' rights, whereas democracies make them better.

A QUESTION OF ENDURANCE

From the previous analysis, we now have some evidence that autocratization increases repression and that democracy decreases it (or rather that it increases the withdrawal of negative sanctions). We do not know, however, if the effect of regime change endures over time or whether repressive applications used prior to the change in regime type are resumed the following year (Hypothesis 5). In other words, we do not know the long-term effects of these systemic alterations.

To investigate lagged effects, I employ the Almon distributed lag model designed by Kristen Monroe (1981) and based on the work of Shirley Almon (1965).

The distributed lag model assumes that an input X (regime change in this case) affects an output Y (repressiveness) and distributes its effects over time. If you change the value of X at time 0, Y will experience some immediate effect at time 0, and it will also experience a delayed effect at times 1, 2 and so on. The model is given by

$$Y_t = a + \sum_{i=0}^{p} b_i x_{t-i} + c z_t + u_t$$

where z_t is some regression covariable and u_t is an error term. The number of distributed lags is p, which must be finite. (SAS Institute 1989, 409)

This approach is useful here for several reasons. First, one is able to investigate lags of different structures (declining, increasing, or cyclical). Second, the loss of degrees of freedom, usually impinged upon with the use of multiple lags, is not problematic because investigations are conducted on Lagrangian interpolation coefficients, which

Figure 1:   Lagged Effects of Regime Change
$*p < .05. **p < .01.$

collapse the actual number of variables estimated in any one equation (Monroe 1981; Gujarati 1988, 534-41). "Unlike the Koyck technique, in the Almon method we do not have to worry about the presence of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the model and the problems it creates for estimation" (Gujarati 1988, 538).

The limitations of this approach are twofold. "First, the degree of the polynomial as well as the maximum value of the lag is largely a subjective decision.[26] Second, . . . the Z variables (the Lagrangian interpolation coefficients) are likely to exhibit multicol-linearity" (Gujarati 1988, 538).[27] With these caveats in mind, I proceed.

When the Almon model is estimated, the results are quite interesting (equation 5). First, it is clear that the basic model investigated above is consistent with the findings derived here in terms of the direction of effects and statistical significance. The level of democracy, the different indicators for dissent, and lagged repression all influence repression in the same manner identified above. Second, autocratization is found (again) to increase political repression in the same year that regime change takes place. Additionally, supporting Hypothesis 3, the escalatory effect of autocratization persists for 4 years, first increasing and then becoming fainter as time passes until the end of the lag estimated (lag 10), when the effect is again found to be statistically significant but in this case negative. Autocratization initially increases imposed repression, but after 10 years a movement to autocracy increases the withdrawal of sanctions. One could

26. As Judge et al. (1985, 359-60) suggest, there are numerous problems that can arise from misspeci-fying the lag length or polynomial degree. For the estimation of these characteristics, I relied upon what was provided within the empirical as well as the political-historical literature on repression, democracy, and dissent.

27. Gujarati (1988, 538) continues that "this does not necessarily mean that one or more of the original β coefficients will . . . be statistically insignificant. As a result, the multicollinearity problem may not be as serious as one might think."

interpret this as an indication of decreased necessity for repression enacted by a regime initially founded on it in terms of the significant amounts that are applied at its inception (Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981; Giddens 1987).[28] The results are displayed graphically in Figure 1.

Third, and most important for this study, democratization is found to decrease repressive behavior (i.e., it increases withdrawals) in the year that regime change takes place and over time. With regard to the lagged impact, it is identified that in the 1st through the 5th years after the regime has changed (see Figure 1), central authorities relax censorship and political restrictions. The first year reveals the strongest effect and the fifth the weakest. Democratization brings less repressive governance, and the democratic proposition is supported.

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND
REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PROPOSITION

This study set out to examine the more neglected component of the democratic proposition that change in regime type is an important determinant of state human rights practices. From the empirical investigation of 137 countries from 1950 to 1982, I support the claim that regime change is important for explaining variance in political repression. Results uniformly suggest that autocratization is likely to result in increased violations of human rights. Additionally, the derived effect of autocratization persists for several years after the initial change has taken place (until a moment of relaxation 10 years following the change). Empirical findings on democracy are also consistent across equations. Instances of democratization immediately lead to repressive withdrawals, and this effect lasts over the course of several years.

Certain nonfindings from the investigation were also important for understanding state-societal relations. It is interesting to note that the duration of time a government spends at a particular level of democracy is unimportant for understanding repressive practices. The implicit decay in coerciveness that is supposed to accompany the growth of normative influence derived from mere persistence does not exist. Repression appears to be an ever-present reality regardless of a regime's duration. Moreover, the statistical insignificance of smoothness in regime transitions is intriguing. From Ward and Gleditsch (1998), rulers appear to respond to uncertainty within their political environments, and uncertainty is linked to vacillations in political context (i.e., instances of regime change). My findings suggest that rulers ignore these perturbations.[29] Uncertainty or instability in the cues provided to rulers is less important than the current trajectory of change.

28. Because the appropriate lag length can be problematic, I investigated different lags between 10 and 15 years. When this is done, the first 4 years are consistently statistically significant and positive. The significance of the 10- to 15-year lags varies (sometimes the 10th year is significant, other times the 12th-14th years are significant).

29. One could tentatively conclude two things from this. First, with regard to this aspect of change, institutional instability of government seems secondary to the normative stability of repressive decision

What does this tell us about the democratic proposition? Cumulatively, it suggests that advocates are generally quite accurate in their understanding of what influences state-societal relations, although they are somewhat better at understanding some things than others. On one hand, the magnitude of change to autocracy is identified as negatively influencing citizens' rights. When regimes move away from democracy, one can expect substantive increases in censorship and political restrictions, both in the short and medium terms. Additionally, one can expect a decrease in these activities after a decade, following a period of autocratic consolidation. On the other hand, the magnitude of change toward democracy is quite good for liberalism. When regimes move toward democracy, one can expect immediate and lagged increases in the withdrawal of coercive strategies.

Despite these findings, a cautionary note must be made. One must remember that the effect of democratization does not significantly outweigh the effects of other important explanatory variables that address the very core of contentious politics (e.g., protest behavior and previous coercion). Additionally, it is clear that many other questions remain unanswered. Are all political perspectives equally likely to be repressed during transitions? Are the experiences of geographic neighbors (in terms of regime change and repression) important determinants of individual state behavior? Are other forms of behavioral control applied to take the place of repression, thus pacifying but not eliminating state uses of power? Does the character of political dissent that is altered by regime transitions (by changing political opportunity structures/perceived costs) in turn influence the rate of human rights violations (Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981; Przeworski 1986; Tarrow 1989)? How are average citizens affected by repressive transitions as one begins to consider the subject of regime consolidation? which in turn influences repressive practices? What is altered within the walls of government (i.e., within the "black box") during transitions in terms of beliefs, framing, and levels of stress? These are but a few of the questions to which we must now turn.

In a historical time period when democracy/democratization is widespread and the desire to pacify state power is equally prevalent, we should direct ourselves toward improving our understanding of human rights violations in a different way. We now have a fairly solid grasp of what the influences are—especially in a static manner. We do not know very much about the dynamic character of contentious politics: lagged effects, cycles, and/or evolutionary patterns. Only when this task is undertaken will we begin to understand the roles that regime type, regime change, and contentious politics play in our lives. Only when this has been done can we understand the implications of our choices and the forces to which we are subjected.

---

making and the institutional stability of the coercive apparatus. Rulers do not appear to respond to "rockiness." Second, some interesting insights on the diversionary theory of war are provided, as "rocky" transitions in regime type increase the likelihood of external coercion, whereas they have no effect on internal coercion. This is interesting because the external behavior may rely on the fact that the domestic coercive process is left unaltered. Many have suggested that early states involved themselves in external conflict only after the consolidation of power domestically. It appears that this relationship has persisted over time.

APPENDIX A
General Information about Variables Used

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Repression	6,345	19,824	−17,000	722,980
Lag of repression	6,459	20,082	−17,000	722,980
Variety of conflict events	1.25	1.36	0	4
Cumulative conflict	23.41	148.42	0	7,017
Deviance from mean	.27	.44	0	1
Presence of violent conflict	.50	.49	0	1
Level of democracy	−1.30	7.62	−10	10
Change in level of democracy	−.12	.99	−10	10
Direction of change	−.00	.24	−1	1
Magnitude of change	−.04	1.61	−19	18
Smoothness of change	13.94	54.72	0	1,369
Duration of time at level of democracy	14.04	19.07	0	134

APPENDIX B
Regime Changes by Country

Country Name	Number and Years of Democratization	Number and Dates of Autocratization	Country Name	Number and Years of Democratization	Number and Dates of Autocratization
Haiti	1 (77)	3 (58, 62, 71)	Zambia	1 (80)	2 (68, 72)
Dominican Republic	3 (62, 78, 82)	2 (55, 61)	Zimbabwe	1 (73)	
Cuba			Lesotho		1 (70)
Mexico	1 (78)		Swaziland		1 (73)
Guatemala	2 (57, 66)	5 (54, 70, 74, 78, 82)	Madagascar		2 (66, 72)
Honduras	3 (56, 71, 82)	1 (72)	Comoros		3 (76, 78, 82)
El Salvador	3 (56, 61, 64)	2 (72, 77)	Morocco	1 (77)	1 (65)
Nicaragua	1 (81)		Algeria		1 (65)
Panama	3 (56, 78, 82)	2 (68, 79)	Tunisia	2 (71, 81)	1 (72)
Colombia	2 (57, 74)		Sudan	1 (65)	2 (58, 71)
Venezuela	3 (58, 69, 70)		Iran	1 (79)	1 (55)
Guyana	2 (68, 79)	3 (67, 78, 80)	Turkey	2 (61, 73)	4 (53, 65, 71, 80)
Ecuador	2 (60, 80)	4 (61, 67, 70, 72)	Iraq		3 (58, 68, 79)
Peru	3 (58, 74, 82)	1 (68)	Egypt	2 (76, 80)	1 (53)
Brazil	3 (56, 79, 82)	3 (61, 63, 65)	Syria	1 (54)	4 (52, 61, 63, 70)
Bolivia		4 (64, 70, 71, 80)	Lebanon	1 (71)	
Paraguay	1 (67)	1 (54)	Jordan	2 (51, 52)	2 (57, 73)
Chile	2 (55, 63)	1 (73)	Israel		1 (67)
Argentina	3 (57, 73, 81)	2 (66, 76)	Yemen Arab Republic	1 (62)	3 (67, 74, 77)
Uruguay	2 (52, 79)	1 (73)	Yemen People's Republic		3 (70, 74, 80)
Ireland	1 (52)		Kuwait	2 (71, 81)	2 (65, 76)
France	1 (69)	1 (58)	Bahrain	1 (73)	1 (75)
Spain	1 (78)		Oman		1 (59)
Portugal	2 (76, 82)		Afghanistan	1 (65)	
German Democratic Republic		1 (60)	China	2 (70, 77)	
Poland	1 (80)	1 (82)	Mongolia	1 (52)	1 (65)

APPENDIX B Continued

Country Name	Number and Years of Democratization	Number and Dates of Autocratization
Yugoslavia	1 (80)	
Greece	1 (75)	1 (67)
Democratic Republic of Korea		2 (56, 66)
Cyprus	1 (74)	1 (68)
Rumania		1 (77)
USSR	1 (53)	
Gambia	3 (74, 78, 81)	1 (81)
Senegal	1 (70)	1 (64)
Benin/Dahomey		2 (65, 72)
Burkina Faso	3 (69, 70, 78)	1 (80)
Mauritania		1 (63)
Liberia		1 (80)
Sierra Leone	1 (68)	4 (67, 69, 71, 78)
Ghana	3 (66, 70, 79)	3 (62, 72, 81)
Togo		1 (67)
Cameroun	1 (82)	2 (66, 72)
Nigeria	1 (79)	2 (64, 66)
Gabon		1 (69)
Central African Republic	1 (79)	
Chad	1 (75)	
Congo		2 (63, 79)
Uganda	1 (81)	2 (67, 69)
Kenya	1 (79)	4 (66, 69, 70, 82)
Burundi		2 (63, 66)
Rwanda		1 (73)
Somalia		1 (69)
Ethiopia	1 (75)	

Country Name	Number and Years of Democratization	Number and Dates of Autocratization
Taiwan	1 (75)	
Republic of Korea	4 (60, 63, 73, 81)	3 (52, 61, 72)
India	1 (77)	1 (75)
Bhutan	1 (65)	
Pakistan	3 (52, 56, 62)	3 (58, 65, 77)
Bangladesh	1 (78)	3 (74, 75, 82)
Myanmar	2 (52, 74)	4 (58, 62, 63, 80)
Sri Lanka	1 (70)	2 (78, 82)
Nepal	3 (59, 62, 81)	2 (51, 60)
Thailand	3 (58, 71, 76)	3 (69, 75, 78)
Cambodia	1 (72)	2 (55, 76)
Laos		2 (59, 75)
Democratic Republic of Vietnam		
Malaysia	2 (60, 70)	1 (69)
Singapore	1 (71)	1 (65)
Philippines	2 (81, 82)	2 (69, 72)
Indonesia		4 (57, 59, 66, 67)

REFERENCES

Almon, Shirley. 1965. The distributed lag between capital appropriations and expenditures. *Econometrica* 33:178-96.

Arat, Zehra. 1991. *Democracy and human rights in developing countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Banks, Arthur. 1990. *Cross-national time-series data archive*. Binghamton, NY: Center for Social Analysis.

Bushnell, Timothy, Vladimir Shlapentokh, Christopher Vanderpool, and Jeyaratnam Sundram, eds. 1991. *State organized terror: The case of violent repression*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Cohen, Youssef, Brian Brown, and A.F.K. Organski. 1981. The paradoxical nature of state making the violent creation of order. *American Political Science Review* 75:901-10.

Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dallin, Alexander, and George Breslauer. 1970. *Political terror in communist systems*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Davenport, Christian. 1995. Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39:683-713.

———. 1996. The weight of the past: Exploring lagged determinants of political repression. *Political Research Quarterly* 49:377-403.

———. 1997. Zen and the art of political control: An inquiry into domination. Manuscript.

De la Boetie, Ettiene. [1559] 1975. *Politics of obedience: The discourse of voluntary servitude*. Montreal, Canada: Black Rose Books.

Duvall, Raymond, and Michael Stohl. 1988. Governance by terror. In *Politics of terrorism,* edited by Michael Stohl. 3d ed. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Eckstein, Harry, and Ted Gurr. 1975. *Patterns of authority: A structural basis for political inquiry*. New York: John Wiley.

Enterline, Andrew. 1998. Regime changes and interstate conflict, 1816-1992. *Political Research Quarterly* 51:385-409.

Fein, Helen. 1995. More murder in the middle: Life-integrity violations and democracy in the world. *Human Rights Quarterly* 17:170-91.

Francisco, Ron. 1996. Coercion and protest: An empirical test in two democratic states. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:1179-204.

Franklin, James. 1997. IMF conditionality, threat perception, and political repression: A cross-national analysis. *Comparative Political Studies* 30:576-606.

Franks, C.E.S. 1989. *Dissent and the state*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garon, Lise. 1995. The press and democratic transition in Arab societies: The Algerian case. In *Political liberalization and democratization in the Arab world*, edited by Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Gibson, James. 1988. Political intolerance and political repression during the McCarthy red scare. *American Political Science Review* 82:511-29.

Giddens, Anthony. 1987. *The nation-state and violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gleditsch, Kristian, and Michael Ward. 1997. Double take: A re-examination of democracy and autocracy in modern polities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4:361-82.

Goldstein, Robert. 1978. *Political repression in modern America: From 1870 to the present*. Boston: Schennckman/G.K. Hall.

———. 1983. *Political repression in 19th century Europe*. Totowa: Barnes & Noble.

Goodin, Robert. 1988. Rights and regimes: Comments. In *Human rights in perspective: A global assessment*, edited by Asbjorn Eide and Bernt Hagtvet. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.

Gujarati, David. 1988. *Basic econometrics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gurr, Ted. 1974. Persistence and change in political systems 1800-1971. *American Political Science Review* 68:1482-504.

———. 1986. The political origins of state violence and terror: A theoretical analysis. In *Government violence and repression: An agenda for research*, edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez. New York: Greenwood.

———. 1990. *The polity III: Political structures and regime change, 1800-1986*. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR.

Harvey, Andrew. 1990. *Time series models*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Nils Gleditsch, and Scott Gates. 1998. Towards a democratic civil peace? Opportunity, grievance, and civil war 1816-1992. Manuscript.

Henderson, Conway. 1991. Conditions affecting the use of political repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:120-42.

Hibbs, Douglas. 1973. *Mass political violence*. New York: John Wiley.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1965. *Primitive rebels*. New York: Norton.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

———. 1990. *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ishay, Micheline, ed. 1997. *Human rights reader: Major political essays, speeches, and documents from the Bible to the present*. New York: Routledge.

Jabine, Thomas, and Richard Claude. 1992. *Human rights and statistics: Getting the record straight*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Jackson, Steven, Bruce Russett, Duncan Snidal, and David Sylvan. 1978. Conflict and coercion in dependent states. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22:627-57.

Judge, George, W. E. Griffiths, R. Hill, Helmut Lutkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee. 1985. *The theory and practice of econometrics*. New York: John Wiley.

Kennedy, Peter. 1994. *A guide to econometrics*. 3d ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

King, John. 1997. Democracy, opposition, economic development, and political repression: Unobserved statistical interactions across forty-eight countries and thirty-four years. Manuscript.

Krain, Matthew. 1997. State-sponsored mass murder: A study of the onset and severity of genocides and politicides. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:331-60.

Krain, Matthew, and Marissa Myers. 1997. Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace proposition. *International Interactions* 23:109-18.

Laswell, Harold. 1941. The garrison state and specialists on violence. *American Journal of Sociology* 46:455-68.

Lichbach, Mark. 1984. Regime change and coherence of European governments. Denver: Graduate School of International Studies.

———. 1987. Deterrence or escalation?: The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31:266-97.

Linz, Juan. 1988. Types of political regimes and respect for human rights: Historical and cross-national perspectives. In *Human rights in perspective: A global assessment*, edited by Asbjorn Eide and Bernt Hagtvet. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lopez, George, and Michael Stohl, eds. 1989. *Dependence, development, and state repression*. New York: Greenwood.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. [1515] 1980. *The prince*. Irving, TX: University of Dallas Press.

Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the danger of war. *International Security* 20:5-38.

Mason, David, and Dale Krane. 1989. The political economy of death squads: Toward a theory of the impact of state-sanctioned terror. *International Studies Quarterly* 33:175-98.

McCamant, John. 1984. Governance without blood: Social sciences antiseptic view of rule; or, the neglect of political repression. In *The state as terrorist: The dynamics of governmental violence and repression*, edited by Michael Stohl and George Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

McCleary, Richard, and Richard Hay. 1980. *Applied time series for the social sciences*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

McCormick, James M., and Neil J. Mitchell. 1997. Human rights violations, umbrella concepts, and empirical analysis. *World Politics* 49:510-25.

McKinlay, R. D., and A. S. Cohen. 1975. A comparative analysis of the political and economic performance of military and civilian regimes. *Comparative Politics* 7:1-30.

Mitchell, Neil, and James M. McCormick. 1988. Economic and political explanations of human rights violations. *World Politics* 40:476-98.

Monroe, Kristen. 1981. Presidential popularity: An Almon distributed lag model. *Political Methodology* 7:42-69.

Moore, Barrington Jr. 1954. *Terror and progress—USSR: Some sources of change and stability in the Soviet dictatorship.* New York: Harper Torchbooks.

———. 1966. *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy.* Boston: Beacon.

Moore, Will. 1998. Repression and dissent: Substitution, context and timing. *American Journal of Political Science* 42:851-73.

Muller, Edward. 1985. Income inequality, regime repressiveness and political violence. *American Sociological Review* 50:47-61.

Newton, Huey. 1996. *War against the Panthers: A study of repression in America.* New York: Harlem River.

Park, Han. 1987. Correlates of human rights: Global tendencies. *Human Rights Quarterly* 9:405-13.

Patterson, Orlando. 1991. *Freedom.* New York: Basic Books.

Petras, James. 1986. Political economy of state terror: Chile, El Salvador and Brazil. *Crime and Social Justice* 27:88-109.

Pion-Berlin, David. 1989. *The ideology of state terror: Economic doctrine and political repression in Argentina and Peru.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Pirages, Dennis. 1976. *Managing political conflict.* New York: Praeger.

Poe, Steve, Julie Lantrip, and C. Neal Tate. 1997. Domestic threats and human rights violations. Manuscript.

Poe, Steven, and C. Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88:853-72.

Powell, Bingham. 1982. *Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and violence.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1986. Some problems in the study of the transition to democracy. In *Transitions from authoritarian rule,* edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Randle, Michael. 1981. Militarism and repression. *Alternatives* 7:61-144.

Rasler, Karen. 1996. Concessions, repression, and political protest. *American Sociological Review* 61:132-52.

Richards, David. 1997. Setting the score: Elections and governmental violations of physical integrity. Manuscript.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1984. Libertarianism, violence within states, and the polarity principle. *Comparative Politics* 16:443-62.

———. 1997. *Power kills: Democracy as a method of nonviolence.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Russell, Bertrand. [1938] 1988. *Power.* New York: Routledge.

SAS Institute. 1989. *SAS/ETS user's guide.* Cary, NC: Author.

Snyder, David. 1976. Theoretical and methodological problems in the analysis of government coercion and collective violence. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 4:277-94.

STATA. 1997. *STATA reference manual—Release 5.* College Station, PA: Stata Press.

Stimson, James. 1985. Regression in space and time: A statistical essay. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:914-47.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. *Democracy and disorder: Protest and politics in Italy, 1965-1975.* Oxford, UK: Clarendon.

Tate, C. Neal, and Steven Poe. 1997. Democracy and the human right to personal integrity: A causal model. Manuscript.

Taylor, Charles, and David Jodice. 1983. *The world handbook of political and social indicators.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From mobilization to revolution.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Timberlake, Michael, and Kirk Williams. 1984. Dependence, political exclusion, and government repression: Some cross-national evidence. *American Sociological Review* 49:141-6.

Van den Berghe, Pierre. 1990. *State violence and ethnicity.* Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado.

Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. *The process of democratization: A comparative study of 147 states, 1980-1988*. New York: Crane Russak.

Walter, Eugene. 1969. *Terror and resistance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ward, Michael, and Kristian Gleditsch. 1998. Democratizing for peace. *American Political Science Review* 92:51-61.

Wu, Jaushieh. 1995. *Taiwan's democratization: Forces behind the new momentum*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs* 76:22-43.

Ziegenhagen, Eduard. 1986. *The regulation of political conflict*. New York: Praeger.