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Imagining the State and Building the Nation: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Argentina

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Abstract

This work analyzes the interplay between the development of the state in nineteenth-century Argentina and the attempts to forge a sense of nation within a significant portion of the population. By distinguishing between the two concepts – state-building and nation-building – the study follows their different developmental paths. The historical literature is reviewed revealing two themes: a record of great economic and cultural development made possible by an elite inspired by liberal ideas derived principally from Europe, as contrasted with a conservative and nationalist view that celebrated the rural and native cultural norms. Regardless of their ideological perspectives, however, both sides shared a great deal of authoritarian traits and implemented measures aimed at establishing and maintaining social control through force.

Introduction: State and nation in the historians' imagination

This work will review the development of the Argentine state and nation over the course of the nineteenth century. It will emphasize the recent historical literature dealing with interpretations of state- and nation-building projects from the start of the independence era to the close of the nineteenth century. The historical processes proved significantly contentious, involving both political and military domains, as federalist and centralist views on the role and scope of government clashed over the rights and obligations involving state authority, on one hand, and provincial relations, on the other. Despite significant differences, and the violence they engendered in discourse and action, both sides broadly shared beliefs regarding the role of the masses and the legitimacy of authoritarian means to deal with perceived threats to the social order.

For our purposes, the state is defined by functions associated with both military affairs and civilian oversight. The scope of state functions ebbed and flowed during the first half century of independence and would expand significantly thereafter, requiring an ever-increasing size of the public sector. Thus, the state's size for much of the period covered by this work

remained very modest. However, though modest in its non-military personnel, the state had a vast influence in four vital dimensions: as recruiting agent and organizer of forces of social control, including the military and the constabulary; as purchasing agent, particularly on behalf of military and security personnel; as collector of duties at port and at internal customs collection posts; and as articulator of its vision of nation.

Questions regarding the existence of nation, particularly during its formative stages, remain more elusive but equally central to understanding connections between state and society. The idea of "nation" contains elements of status along with the privileges accorded to members of the polity. The concept of nation suggests that its members share sentiments of solidarity, as distinguished from other groups. We note the Weberian distinctions between state and nation. For Weber,

> "nation" is, first of all, not identical with the "people of a state," that is, with the membership of a given polity. Numerous polities comprise groups among whom the independence of their "nation" is emphatically asserted in the face of the other groups; or, on the other hand, they comprise parts of a group whose members declare this group to be one homogeneous "nation."[1]

In Latin America, the recognition of a single homogeneous group sharing a national identity was frequently challenged throughout much of the nineteenth century.[2] This work highlights the developmental and contradictory nature of the historical state and its attempts to forge a nation.

A useful vantage point from which to observe the changing manner in which historians of Argentina have approached the concept of the state is the landmark 1946 work, *Las ideas políticas en Argentina*, by the noted historian José Luis Romero. It is remarkable, by today's expectations that the state should be a consideration of any study, that Romero barely mentioned the state. Instead, he conceptualized the activities and achievements of the most important historical actors in the second half of the nineteenth century, a period of feverish institution-building, as consolidating a "nation," or achieving "authority," or cohering the "government." As a concept, the "state" first appears in Romero's study only upon entering the twentieth century. In other words, the state exists as a specific entity with proprietary characteristics that obtain only when the forces of modernity and bureaucratized electoral practices are in play. Thus, writing of the victory by the Radical Civic Union Party over the oligarchic coalition in the 1916 presidential elections, Romero notes that the "oligarchy was neither conquered nor did it remain totally removed from control of the State."[3] Further reinforcing the underlying relationship between twentieth-century modernity and the existence of the state, such institutional development could only have been possible by the eradication of the "creole era" and its substitution by modern and bourgeois European immigrants who had demographically overwhelmed Argentina by the millions and, who, by the start of the twentieth century, had established a cultural beach head which

resulted in institutions that implemented effectively the program of liberal democracy. We see in Romero's views the causal relationship and positive association between modernization and the liberal democratic state that prevailed among scholars in the period following the end of World War II.

Subsequently, historians began to look at the state as a developmental feature that was observable early in Spanish America, as far back as the time of the institutional reforms implemented by the Bourbons, and continuing, with alternating setbacks and forward thrusts, throughout the nineteenth century. The state came to be seen as an entity whose existence was assumed but whose contours, which could not be taken for granted, had to be shaped by increasingly dominant forces. Thus, in a recent work, Roy Hora notes that the oligarchical government that began with Julio A. Roca's presidency in 1880 is defined by Roca's relationship to, and reconfiguration of, the state in the context of the nation's vital economic interests. "Roca's programme of 'peace and administration' sought to foster a state at the same time more autonomous from civil society and more attentive to the desires of its most powerful economic agents." This development presented a novelty in state-building. This new state was Janus-faced: dominance came by way of politicians from the interior, but they satisfied the needs and expectations of the pampean economic elite which, in turn, vested these new political leaders with the economic resources needed to enhance their power.[4]

In today's geopolitical paradigms, the concept of nation-building has blurred conceptual distinctions by re-inserting the historically accepted characterization of the state as the hegemon of coercive power.[5] By contrast, the concept of nation has, for much of the last century, taken on a sociological turn which positioned it on its own terms, not as objectively definable as the state, but instead as meaning something different from, though always in relationship to, the polity. In yet another context regarding the study of the nation, historians have taken note of the more recent anthropological turn. Benedict Anderson's analysis of nationalism greatly influenced historians looking for the elusive nature and boundaries of the formative stages of the nation in Latin American states. Anderson views the nation in "an anthropological spirit" as an imagined community. To be sure, Anderson did not subscribe to the view that the construction of nationalism is the consequence of devious calculation or that it results in a false reality. Instead, nation is imagined insofar as it enhances territorially and collectively the primordial links that had earlier connected people on the more limited territorial and demographic dimensions of kinship, familialism, and clientelism.[6] While many historians of Latin America, especially in the United Sates, have adopted Anderson's paradigm, Argentine historians have more recently raised doubts about the applicability of Anderson's anthropological approach insofar as it is dependent on forces closely associated with technological innovations, such as those that have accelerated the transmission of information over the course of the last two centuries. Anderson recognized the highly variable nature across countries in the intra-national reach and

political efficacy of transmitted information.[7] In that context, Spanish America experienced a much lower nation-building impact from the circulation of liberal or enlightened ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than its British North American counterpart.[8] But Ariel de la Fuente and Juan C. Chiaramonte, among Argentine historians, have pointed to the significant limits of Anderson's approach, noting its underlying presentism and awkward fit with the Argentine historical context. Chiaramonte, for example, notes that Anderson was "trapped" in a Romantic version of nationality that assumes pre-existent nationalities while ignoring the persistence of associations and solidarities based, instead, on natural law, and on rationalist, contractualist terms derived from the Enlightenment.[9]

In sum, the studies of the historical state in Latin America illustrate that its formative stages developed well in advance of the twentieth century, that it relied on a system of regulatory practices that ebbed and flowed in efficacy, that it was inconsistent in its receptivity to modernity, and that it was driven as much by popular participation as by the authorities' perceived need to establish and enhance mechanisms of social control.[10] State- and nation-building in Argentina were associated with leadership, popular participation, territory, and legitimacy. State governance and nation developed at different levels over a lengthy course of combative processes that, toward the end of the nineteenth century, culminated in codified law and institutional authority based on political practices mediated by an unchallenged state.

Competing historical interpretations

The subject of governance engendered questioned legitimacy. Who, for example, was government supposed to represent? The response remained elusive. For example, it was not clear to Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo y Cisneros, as he listened to Mariano Moreno, a leading member of the Buenos Aires Junta in 1810, the group that would ultimately oust him from office, as he aggressively pointed out that "The sovereign [king] did not confer upon Your Excellency the high dignity of Viceroy of these provinces in order to watch over the interest of the merchants of Cádiz but over ours."[11] Moreno's motivations were based as much by philosophical dispositions as by economic considerations; indeed, economic dimensions were central to the complex matrix of the independence movement and were codified as such by Ricardo Levene, the noted interpreter of the revolution.[12] Whose interests would be represented by the state remained a philosophical and practical quandary. How would members of deliberative bodies come to their decisions? Would those positions be seen as legitimate? Julián Segundo de Agüero, a deputy to the provincial legislature of Buenos Aires, rose to challenge those who insisted on a thorough political consensus on important issues: "Do we believe, by chance, that we should reconcile the interests of each and every one of the provinces? This is truly an error. . . . On the contrary, it is

necessary that there be sacrifice of interests for the sake of the general interest."[13] Another deputy, Manuel Antonio Castro, complained that, despite fears that the country would succumb to anarchy, "each person wants to have a constitution to serve personal or local interests."[14]

According to Levene, the undoing of the Spanish claim on the viceroyalty was based on its inability to provide a just and modern economic state, that is, a state where rational and up-to-date principles of commerce and institutions obtained rather than the historical residues and atavistic favoritisms of a mercantilist past. But economic dimensions and clientelistic practices did not represent the sole motivators for independence from Spain, as demonstrated by the definitive rejection of governance at the hands of the British, who failed to occupy Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807, but under whose leadership the economic potential was incalculably greater than what Spain could offer. Thus, Levene also presented the important contribution of nationalist patriotism in explaining the revolution. Such views resonated with the patriotic legacy of nineteenth-century Argentine historiography. Levene presented a teleological analysis of the popular desire for an Argentina independent of all foreign rulers – including Spaniards – independent of potential benefits to the political economy. "It is an error to affirm that the English invasions started the emancipatory movement in the colony of La Plata, for this movement had its origins in the first days of Spanish colonization. . . . The English invasions, like the events that occurred in Spain, only accelerated the preexisting tendency toward emancipation."[15]

Unlike other regions of South America, such as Lima, which gave a lukewarm reception to the independence movement, brought to Peru by the Argentine general José de San Martín and his seasoned Argentine and Chilean troops, creole residents of Buenos Aires (porteños) were generally more enthusiastic about breaking away from Spain.[16] While Peruvian leaders responded as much from their sense of apprehension about unleashing social forces dangerous to their well-being as from the intense nationalism that informed their views on trade and commerce, porteño elites, by contrast, demonstrated greater confidence in their political future under a republican form of government and liberal international trade.[17] They erred, however, in expecting their republican vision for the future would be easily shared by their countrymen in the interior.

Only a few months after the forced resignation of Viceroy Hidalgo y Cisneros and his subsequent killing after fleeing to Córdoba – a psychologically shocking, even if not numerically significant loss of life – Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, the Buenos Aires Junta's emissary, succeeded in quelling that region's resistance by relying in part on repeated calls for the restoration of fraternal relations between Spaniards and creoles.[18] Appeals to ethnic harmony between Americans and Europeans were articulated early in the struggles for independence in the Río de la Plata.[19] The discourse used in support of independence in much of the Southern Cone tended to focus on competing theories to the Spanish royalist vision.

The initial focus in the revolutionary struggle in the Río de la Plata had to deal with constitutional principles and the configuration of a state optimally suited to serve civil and economic interests. Competing visions of the state's primary responsibilities, as regulator of civil and economic activities and as canalizer of material resources, vied for supremacy. For much of the century, the heated debates over the nature and scope of state responsibilities frequently telescoped into violent civic and military contention. If the rhetoric among the political and military principals can be seen in the records, more difficult to discern was the popular sense of who, exactly, was the state supposed to hold together, that is, which groups comprised the political nation. These are some of the questions that have recently received the attention of intellectual and political historians of the Río de la Plata.

The traditional view of the Argentine nation's formative stages holds that the rupture in monarchic rule, occasioned by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 and the subsequent displacement of Ferdinand VII from the throne, provided an opening for Americans to redress longstanding grievances against a historically tyrannical Spanish rule. This historiographic trend, which we can call patriotic creole literature, appeared early in the propaganda that accompanied the thinking on independence, and has proved durable. In 1887, Bartolomé Mitre, a major political actor and a historian of lasting influence, echoed an ideological consensus regarding the origins of independence and the nature of a colonial society depicted as ready for republicanism.[20] This creole patriotic and historical literature bemoaned the legacy of militarized conflict that accompanied the break with Spain. Juan Bautista Alberdi exemplified these sentiments when he wrote in the early 1870s that, as a consequence of independence, Spanish America's intellectual, commercial or industrial contributions to the world were not to be found. Instead, he noted, the republics of South America contributed war and the glory of military battles, which, if not constructive for the nation, provided leaders with profitable careers.[21] Indeed, early in the revolutionary phase, residents of Buenos Aires conducted their affairs with an eye to developments in the city's military barracks as the specter of the military loomed early over civil society.[22]

Patriotic creole literature dealing with the independence movement remained largely unchallenged until the late stages of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time of fast-paced and dramatic changes in Argentina's economic conditions and in the ethnic composition of its population – a time of questioned national identity and purpose. In his 1918 study of the Argentine revolution, the noted historian and philosopher, José Ingenieros pointed to the complex forces at play in the early 1800s and compared them to the simpler and long-held interpretation of consensual values that were said to have impelled the independence movement. Ingenieros fused Mitre's liberal-democratic interpretation with the traditional school of interpretation, which had been given form by both the historical

actors' rhetoric and a selective culling of the period's legislation. Such methodological approaches, emblematic of the historians' own ideological dispositions, had obscured the conservative realities of the independence era: "It is not possible to see the Cabildos as schools of democracy," wrote Ingenieros, "although looking at their laws would have one believe they were; it was, instead, the cradle of the municipal oligarchical spirit. . . . The colonial Cabildo . . . has been confused with the democratic municipality in the sense understood by modern political theory. Its legislation fooled many."[23] Furthermore, the revolution came to be seen as a process, not the result of individual acts of well-intended liberals. Further, this process involved the development of a conservative response that sought to limit the effects of liberal pronouncements while retaining privileges based on social, racial, and economic hierarchy. Thus, "the revolutionary crisis did not result from a convergence of similar ideas, but instead, from a convulsive struggle among disparate forces that could not find their own state of equilibrium."[24] Among the most frequently held explanations for nineteenth-century political instability – the cultural heritage of Iberian Catholicism, the structural weaknesses attendant the nature of the region's economic productivity, and the conflicting ideologies among groups associated with competing value-systems and social standing – Ingenieros's views represented the last one.[25]

Ingenieros's questioning of the *mitrista* consensus view appeared toward the end of World War I. The postwar period witnessed the end of the robust economic growth Argentina had experienced, with few interruptions, since the 1870s. Income levels fell; workers' real income as a share of GDP dropped to 20 percent in 1918 from 37 percent only four years earlier.[26] The decline in real wages had a special impact on Argentina, the recipient of massive immigration flows from Europe starting in the last third of the nineteenth century. This massive migration flow, however, had not resulted from labor elasticity, but rather from the wage differentials between Argentina and the sending countries. As this differential narrowed, immigration flows slowed down significantly.[27]

As the *belle époque*'s heady growth came to an end, the dynamic optimism that had accompanied the era dissipated; a questioning of national identity and purpose permeated the intellectual classes. New doubts arose as to the origins of the nation, the characteristics of its founders, and the purposes of their designs. Historians and social critics cast doubts on the accuracy and legitimacy of the intellectual tradition that avowed an Argentina born out of a liberal-democratic project. These critics included nationalists such as Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Rojas, Adolfo Saldías, and Julio Irazusta.[28] The new skepticism was not the result of a unified or intellectually cohesive movement, but instead, represented the consequence of a widespread questioning of liberal democracy in much of Western and Central Europe. The economic troubles of the 1920s and 1930s telescoped into generalized doubts about the continued viability of liberal democracy. These

intellectual currents resonated strongly in Argentina, where new competing theses regarding its historical antecedents and the country's cultural persona had long vied for acceptance: the liberal thesis and its conservative counterpart had become codified by historians and claimed by political figures. Proponents of each side used locational and ideological fault lines to strengthen their cases, although, as Jean H. Delaney pointed out in a recent study of the Argentine cultural nationalism, it should not be understood as merely a right-wing response to large scale immigration and rapid material change, but as an intellectual movement driven by a vision of Argentina as an organic, ethnocultural community and by a philosophy of history that rejected unilinear notions of historical development. Thus, the break between nationalists and previous generations, Delaney tells us, was not as profound as the former proclaimed.[29]

By contrast, the liberal position has been associated with the elitist, Buenos Aires-centered, internationalist, free-trading sectors, whose intellectual mentors championed broadly the ideas embedded in cultural and constitutional norms of the United States and Western European liberal democracies, even while their political practices limited their implementation.[30] The liberal tradition tended to cohere, albeit with important internal divisions, around intellectual interpreters of a metropolitan Argentina seen to be destined to join the ranks of the leading Western economic financial and commercial centers.[31] This represented a mind set of unbounded optimism, which was driven by externally oriented – and externally driven – commerce and culture. Inward-looking programs of economic integration were harder to find.

Conservative counterparts, led similarly by Buenos Aires-based intellectuals and social critics, presented a nationalist argument that linked Argentine identity to a celebration of native culture, legitimately guided by populist leaders who apprehended the traditions of the peoples who produced on the land, and who were committed to a federalist political system that protected provincial rights based on income derived from international free trade at the port city of Buenos Aires and disbursed equitably to less-developed provinces. In some variants of these views, conservatives included a greater emphasis on Catholic traditions along with limitations on secular cultural projects. Unlike the proponents of the liberal trope, however, conservatives did not manage to form a cohesive school of thought.[32] In contrast to liberal elitism, whose variants were not significant enough to derail its general objectives, no single idea gathered conservative sentiments sufficiently to win over generations across time.[33] Voices critical of Argentina's misguided liberalism advocated the need to return to the country's nationalist self.

Conservative and nationalist views were heard with greater frequency in the 1920s and 1930s, as the country – long a follower of European intellectual and cultural trends – underwent similar ideological debates heard across the Atlantic, representing the fraying of confidence in pluralist democracy and

a generalized liberal *ennui*.[34] The ideas presented by the nationalists were not new, that is, the debates over the nature of Argentine identities began as soon as contending advocates of independence envisioned different courses for their countrymen to follow.[35] Was the new nation to be an inward-looking pastoral economy founded on regional cultural tenets? Or was an independent state to be fueled as an economic extension of trans-Atlantic trade based on the habits of modern international commerce, rooted in metropolitan centers and committed to the secular, humanist cultural patterns found in those urban venues? Here, then, at the intersection of commerce and belief, is where we find the underlying ideological competition threading through the realms of economic performance and cultural tenets, and the historians' competing models to explain the bases for the Argentine nation.

Territory, legitimacy, and representation

The contested notions that challenged authority for much of the nineteenth century revolved around not only who the ruler might be, but also around defining and delimiting constituencies. Studies of political and military leaders abound, but less is known about the connections between those leaders and the people they claimed to lead.[36]

Political legitimacy involved territorial and legal considerations. Legitimacy emanated from the social body, and that body was contained by geographic boundaries. Argentina typified the "political precocity" of the early Spanish American republics by declaring national sovereignty as the legitimizing principle and the republican structure as the governmental form, but that form did not lead to consensus on the nature of compacts between leaders and the people.[37]

Colonial authorities in the Río de la Plata normally dealt with the defense of local interests, but with the challenge that independence presented to the regional balance of powers, comprehensive territorial domination took on political urgency. Concerns for regional autonomy were enhanced as the decoded language of a liberal unified state pointed to the supremacy of the port-city of Buenos Aires.[38] The Bourbons' attempts at centralizing authority, which had become a source of concern for traditional forms of regional governance in the late eighteenth century in South America, took on greater dimensions with independence.[39] Resistance to Bourbon administrative reforms aimed at centralizing authority did not augur well for independence-minded revolutionaries, whose goals aimed at unifying their republics. Thus, the nineteenth century was marked by acts of resistance to central imposition over interior territories and counters by officials in Buenos Aires, in turn, to regional autonomy. The legitimacy of Platine postcolonial authorities were sharply bounded by the association between peoples and territories.[40]

Natural law had provided the guiding principles for governance during the colonial period, but had not delved into the relationship between political

constituency and spatial boundaries. Birthplace had had little role to play in distinguishing from among the Crown's subjects until late in the colonial era. Territoriality had not formed part of the mental map associated with a global Spanish Crown supported by a universal Roman Church. The intellectual and affective associations between territory and citizenship developed, finally, with the independence movements. Social privileges, not geographic identity, differentiated from among groups. With the struggles for independence, however, regional affiliation acted as the gravitational center for heated political debates which frequently morphed into military actions as armed attempts at secession invited military responses in repeated cycles of violence. At the heart of these rhetorical and armed conflicts was the contested nature of legal and political meanings, including the definition of political people (*gente política*).

The meanings of political people

It did not take long for revolution in the Río de la Plata to turn into civil war. Political aspirations to independence and nation-building dissolved into widespread political fratricide. How were enemies defined? How to account for the violence that spread among people who heretofore had appeared to share the same language, modes of production, religion, and system of colonial governance? These questions contain a logic of their own: we formulate them, in part, not only because of our disposition to conceive of independence and republican forms of government as natural outgrowths of nineteenth-century revolutions, but also because of preconceived ideas that a nation lay underneath the carapace of the colonial state. In practice, however, the revolutions uncovered the differentiations among regions and peoples who saw opportunities for their development in contradistinctions to unitary formulations of nationality. Recent work on the definitional distinctions of fundamental terms that obtained in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras – such as *nación*, *nacionalidad*, *pueblo*, and *estado* – have helped us to re-think the causes behind protracted dissension. The work of Juan Carlos Chiaramonte, for example, points to the ambiguous nature of such terms and the staggered times of arrival and acceptance of new ideas related to governance. For example, "nationality" was a byproduct of the Romantic era, too late in the context of Latin American independence movements, and not related to *nacionalidad* or the group of people living under the same geopolitical boundaries and legal system. Indeed, not only did independence arrive in Latin America prior to the Romantic ideals of nationalism, but the latter, when it arrived, had a distinctly extroverted quality, contrary to the European version; that is, "the republican nationalism of nineteenth-century Latin America was uncompromisingly outward-looking."[41] The theoretical bases for coherence among new Latin American states in the early nineteenth century revolved around contractualist notions, that is, on the principle of consent as a centuries-old understanding of political

legitimacy and not as the recognized sense of a coherent nationality.[42] Argentina would have to wait until the very late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before nationality in the form of an essentialist Argentine sense of being came into the national consciousness.[43]

Pueblo and *nación* were now melded into postcolonial political identities that asserted the right of selecting leaders on the basis of recognition of rights and obligations peculiar to the different sets of political peoples. Corporatism, previously associated with common interests among members of specific and privileged social unit, such as guilds or ecclesiastical orders, was now extended to an entire population in recognition of regional characteristics and internal solidarities. Paradoxically, this behavioral proclivity toward segmentation coexisted with the discourse of national unity embedded in republican forms of government which, in theory, threaded together a common, singular population. It is the coexistence of the discourse of modernity and unity with traditional practices and multiple understandings that characterizes post-revolutionary Argentina. "People" and "nation" shared pride of place in both their old and new usages long after the initial stirrings of independence.[44] The idea of a singular and unified Argentine people had not yet been developed. On the contrary, the notion of community was more closely identified with a confederation of communities while appeals to patriotism were circumscribed to local affinities.[45]

In the second half of the 1830s, a young vanguard of intellectuals in Buenos Aires embarked on a comprehensive critique of the region's historical fabric, woven from its social, cultural and economic dimensions. The members of this Generation of 37 had become aware of the European Romantic movements and went about producing intellectual blueprints which they hoped would lead to Argentine nation-building. Indeed, these were some of the group's most significant contributions. They shared with their European contemporaries the rejection of the Enlightenment notions associated with universalist and teleological development models, and insisted instead on working with the cultural peculiarities and particular needs of their own peoples. An emphasis on historical particularity set them intellectually apart from their revolutionary predecessors' beliefs in universalities. While they shared with their liberal predecessors the aspiration of joining the world of modern nations in Europe, they cast aside political abstractions that were devoid of historical Argentine contexts.

This, in turn, allowed them to approach matters of liberty, along with citizens' rights and obligations, from a pragmatic perspective, articulating modern constitutional principles and eventually codifying them in law, but also curtailing or suspending their implementation under the premise of needing to implement sorely needed social control measures when they came to power in the 1850s.[46] "Platine thinkers' embrace of the political community," notes Jeremy Adelman, "meant that the fundamental goal of statehood had very little to do with transcendental ideals, whether arrived at by divine dialogue or by secular and modern reason. The first goal became

not justice, but order."[47] Thus, intellectuals like Juan B. Alberdi and Domingo F. Sarmiento saw no contradiction in soliciting the aid of caudillos or in the establishment of illiberal states.

From municipal nation to provincial state

In contrast to Western Europe's more linear paths to development, the state in Argentina experienced a more jagged route which involved both development and devolution, in alternating turns, along with dispersal and centralization. By 1820, the Río de la Plata experienced the urban-based and relatively more complex state characteristics, coexisting with the personal, immediate, and more rustic modes of administration found in rural settings. Chiaramonte points to the spatially confined nature of the first stage of state-building as independence came to be presented largely as an urban phenomenon. "States" were first staged in the cities, which, along with their hinterlands, were converted into "sovereignties" under the form of new provincial states with different degrees of "estatidad." Autonomous states continued to coexist with constitutional experiments that attempted to set the stage for nationwide state responsibilities, but which invariably failed prior to the 1860s.[48] The existence of these provincial states depended on the support of caudillos, who, in turn, depended on the provinces' economic resources – more aptly put, on the areas' wealthy families – for their survival. In light of limited resources, the survival rates of these strongmen were highly variable. Their performance was normally wrapped within the institutional framework presented by legislative, municipal, and judicial agencies acting as the strongmen's institutional auxiliaries. It was a division of labor, of sorts, between raw, military actions of caudillos and civil institutional interlocutors, codified by Tulio Halperín Donghi as the distinction between owners and administrators of power.[49]

The defeat of the Buenos Aires-led centralist forces in February 1820, at the hands of the federalist armies at the Battle of Cepeda ended more than the hegemonic aspirations of the *porteño* leadership over an Argentine union. Cepeda signalled to Buenos Aires a much-diminished territory of state authority and the elimination of the control that had been arrogated in 1810 by the Cabildo of Buenos Aires from its colonial superiors and which had delusionally claimed domain over the entire Río de la Plata. This municipal equivalency with statehood was ultimately broken by the formal elimination of the Cabildo of Buenos Aires in 1821. This suppression signified two major changes. First, it represented a displacement of raw power, a recognition of the loss of municipal authority, and the political ascendancy of the rural sector, particularly by the wealthy *estanciero* class, whose members had dedicated so many of their resources to the military struggles of the revolutionary decade of the 1810s. Second, it had become clear to everyone in the former viceroyalty that the revolution, along with the seemingly unending and costly political conspiracies it had engendered, had emanated

largely from a leadership reflective of political and commercial interests within the city of Buenos Aires. However, newly ascendant political sectors, including the power brokers with economic roots in the pampas, were not going to be subsumed under the machinations of the old revolutionary actors, who had unleashed the revolution from within their urban confines.[50]

The state and public opinion

Much of the writing on the political history of nineteenth-century Argentina revolves around two issues: provincial rights – with the emblematic dyad represented as the struggle between centralism and federalism – and the contested culture of leadership, represented by violent oppositions and abstracted into civilization's battle against barbarism. Equally contested were notions of the state's relationship to the people, in particular, as represented by popular opinion. The idea that popular opinion possessed its own domain developed out of the eighteenth century, and was reified by the proliferation of printed materials, especially periodical publications that appeared in the major metropolitan centers. These newspapers commented on the state of political, cultural, and social affairs.[51] The press in Buenos Aires took on a rich and, at times, even aggressive role, early in the nation's political life. Buenos Aires had its share of officialist and oppositional press up until the mid-1830s. The Rivadavian model of government reinforced the revolutionary idea that the state and public opinion shared a continuum, but operated as two separate, sometimes adversarial, domains. That is, the state's functions did not generally include the overt shaping of public opinion and, in no case, was the state considered to be hegemonic in the public space of contested opinion. However, the relationship between state and public opinion that prevailed under Rivadavia changed under the Rosas regime.

Rosas expanded state responsibilities related to public perception in an important way. The state was now seen as an active architect of propaganda and producer of public opinion; that is, the state arrogated the use of formal and informal outlets to express and impose its views dealing with matters of governance. State-sponsored propaganda found its way both officially and through a variety of surrogate cultural venues and actors. Further, Rosas blurred the Rivadavian lines that had separated public opinion from the state, eventually monopolizing the public space of discourse in urban and rural areas alike and displacing alternatives.[52] Rosismo was more conscious of the power of propaganda than any previous nineteenth-century Argentine regime. Official discourse related to the vision and shape of the state was, of course, not new – it had been widely used in the Rivadavian era – but Rosas narrowed the spectrum of legitimate articulators of opinion to only two groups: those directly serving within his own office, along with carefully selected sycophants.[53] Not surprisingly, an important distinction of the Rosas state was its hypervalued unanimity of public opinion, a consistency in

belief-systems and expressions not usually seen in the otherwise fractious Argentine governments.

The role of shaping public opinion fell, in Sarmiento's view, to a state that would mediate the political process through the educational system. That is, an educated public would be able to see past the state's excesses. In this regard, the roles of the *rosista* and post-*rosista* states stood in sharp contrast. While the *rosista* machine made sure that its propaganda would be broadcast in different contexts of patriotic political solidarity, one of the principal agents of the post-Rosas engine shaping public opinion in the face of mortal enemies, and supported by a web of daily rituals of political obeisance, came by way of educational institutions. While school curricula after Rosas were largely devoid of forcefully articulated rituals of political loyalty, schools remained equally centralized within executive authority.

Similarly, Rosas attempted to use the military as an educational institution aimed at teaching social discipline and at changing habits of minds, especially on the part of gauchos and rural workers at large.[54] For his part, Sarmiento, who, as a young man in 1839, had found satisfaction in the freedom to create rules and educate girls in a school in the province of San Juan, implemented much greater security mechanisms when, as a mature political figure, he institutionalized educational norms from the center of power in Buenos Aires.[55] Sarmiento could not abide the possibility of sharing the construction of one of the state's principal responsibilities with provincial partners in a decentralized governance model. As Natalio Botana noted, this was one of the contradictions in Sarmiento's plan to adopt norms from the United States to the Argentine setting.[56] The *sarmientista* state required a repudiation of earlier models, considered to be unredeemable for their association with an allegedly dark, Catholic, Iberian heritage. Thus, Sarmiento, who so admired the United States and, in particular, its educational system predicated on Horace Mann's notion of the public school as the great leveler, could not delegate educational policy and responsibilities. Sarmiento envisioned a national system of education established and monitored by the central state; the alternative to this centralized system involving provincial autonomy was not considered conducive to desired social and attitudinal changes.

The praetorian state

The single greatest responsibility of the state dealt with security, defined at the macro-territorial level as safety from invading armies or dangerous bands of marauding troublemakers, and at the micro level, as personal safety, that is, as protection from criminal elements in one's own home. One cannot help but be struck by the constancy of concern for safety. It was as if the disappearance of the Crown's rule laid bare the citizenry's insecurity, which was expressed regularly in demands for an ever more vigilant state. Indeed, independence itself acted as a sort of ideological fault line dividing those

who saw in the revolution a liberation of the republican spirit and those who faulted it for breaking the traditional lines of authority and deference. The state fashioned by Rosas was the clearest reflection of the latter view. From Rosas's decidedly anti-Romantic perspective, this breakdown within civil society required the re-imposition of traditional hierarchies. At risk were the two generally recognized responsibilities of the state: the maintenance of order, that is, security, and the enforcement of contracts, specifically in the context of labor obligations. Rosas was particularly troubled by the perceived erosion of respect for – and deference to – private property.[57]

Was Rosas's state significantly different in substance than its predecessors, or are we confusing different governing styles with meaningful differences in policies? At no time in the first half of the nineteenth century, was the state a closer reflection, indeed an extension, of its leader than under Rosas. His personal belief-system, which emphasized hierarchies of authority and deference, along with his disposition toward administrative frugality, led to an ideologically conservative state with a significantly diminished fiscal capacity in non-military domains. Rosas equated fiscal restraint in civil divisions with patriotic duty: in 1836, he declared that any additional paper emission would be considered the equivalent of treachery.[58] While subsequent military campaigns provided Rosas with a rationale for ignoring his own decree, the *rosista* state maintained a significantly lower profile of responsibilities than its liberal Rivadavian predecessor.

The first few years of Rosas's rule witnessed a secular decline in military expenditures. However, this condition would change, starting in 1837 and continuing up until the regime's end in 1852, as Rosas faced internal and external threats that occasioned the significant increases in military expenditures. The period 1837–40 witnessed an increase in the average yearly military assignations of 92 percent over the averages during the 1835–36 period. In 1840 alone, the *rosista* state increased its military expenditures by 55 percent. Yet, what held steady throughout the Rosas period was the state's fiscal neglect of civil and judicial administration, in comparison to the military.[59] Budget reductions in the civil administration declined steeply, while militia expenditures grew by over 165 percent in 1830–34, and only minimal reductions were registered thereafter. By contrast, the costs of civil administration were cut to half of what they had been in the first part of the 1820s, during the liberal Rivadavian era. This highly differentiated fiscal treatment between military and civilian sectors would remain the hallmark of a *rosista* state that did not believe that it needed to secure public employees' loyalties. Instead, he demanded obeisance, expecting it as part of his traditionally hierarchical view of authority and obligations. Little or nothing was done to raise salaries of civil administrators or officers of the judicial system. If the *rosista* state chose to maintain this neglectful, distant attitude toward civil administrators, "it was undoubtedly because it did not seek their support, but expected, instead, the disciplined obeisance

of its corps of officials." By 1850, the state was spending only half of what it had spent in the Rivadavian period, approximately 25 years earlier.[60]

Here, then, we discern some of the fault lines that distinguished competing visions of state limits and responsibilities. The pre-Rosas vision of the liberal state, as exemplified by the Buenos Aires provincial governments during the 1820s of Martín Rodríguez, a military hero of the revolution, and Bernardino Rivadavia, a revolutionary liberal who had participated in the political activities of the junta in 1813, indicated a certain level of state intervention in both economic and cultural areas. The liberal state asserted for itself an expanded role as an agent of change, initiative, and legitimacy. It presented programs designed to expand production, even if it did not expand the number of property owners. However, it initiated and supported educational measures. And, finally, the state provided legitimacy to civic initiatives through partnerships, subsidies, and the participation of the highest authorities in the functions of civic organizations. Thus, the pre-Rosas state saw itself as an agent of change consistent with the era's profile of conventional Western liberal leadership.[61]

The state of nurture

The Rosas state pulled back from the Rivadavian notion of promoting public institutions as vehicles designed to foster credit.[62] Both the liberal and conservative states were strongly committed to free trade; for example, Rivadavia's involvement with the customs regimen was designed to raise revenues and did not result from any commitment to protect native producers.[63] Customs receipts continued to furnish the subsequent conservative state with its principal source of income. No matter its ideological strain, the state resorted to a regimen of indirect consumer taxation rather than direct levies on income or property values. In 1817, 82 percent of Buenos Aires state income was derived from foreign trade and 85 percent of this was coming from imports. In the Rosas era, customs receipts from 1841–44 also came from the import trade (88 percent), while exports represented only 8 percent of customs receipts.

Liberal and conservatives states shared similar views regarding the use of this income and its primary beneficiaries. Military costs represented 60 percent of the state's expenditures from the 1820s to the 1850s, and merchants by far represented the principal winners in these transactions.[64] Military expenditures reinforced two points: first, the constancy and centrality of the military's role as an extension of the state, and second, the increases that Rosas invested in those mechanisms of discipline and social control while depressing the state's non-military responsibilities and personnel. In fact, recent scholarship has pointed to state budgets and questioned the extent of public employment outside of the military domains, that is, the degree of dependency on state wages, a feature which has been traditionally assigned to Latin Americans since independence, may not have always been high.[65]

In the end, Rosas's regime did not raise funds abroad, limiting itself to the vicissitudes of the import and export trade and to the onerous weight of property confiscations from perceived enemies. Indeed, if the state lacked sufficient leverage to raise funds and sustain payments on debt for much of the nineteenth century, it expended considerable efforts in disciplining its population through physical punishment, exile, confiscations of property, and embargoed goods.[66] The *rosista* state's contribution to the educational budget of the Province of Buenos Aires diminished significantly from its earlier liberal administration. When faced with military threats, the already slender non-military budgets were either virtually or completely eliminated from the state's operations.[67] Issues related to secular culture and institutions of learning mattered more to the liberal state than to its conservative counterpart. If more common ground was found on issues of security and social control, on the one hand, and free trade policies, on the other, cultural affairs indicated clear differences. In general, liberals were more disposed toward a more secular state, while affording special status to the Catholic Church, while conservatives, such as Rosas, invested more political capital in traditional ecclesiastical institutions. Thus, the Church was given a more central role in Rosas's government, but it was also held accountable for giving it support and for observing political behaviors on behalf of this monitorial state.

The liberal state that developed in Buenos Aires following its defeat by federalists in 1821 took cultural matters as a signifier of its mission as a civilizing agent, promoting education and the arts in various forms. Building on the creation of the University of Buenos Aires in 1819, elementary schools received special attention in the 1820s. In addition to providing oversight to the city's elementary schools, wresting their administration from the Church, Rivadavia's government chartered a voluntary association, the *Sociedad de Beneficencia*, headed by some of the city's most prominent society ladies to oversee the well-being of girls and young women. With state subsidies and private donations, it managed a school for orphan girls and another for daughters of indigent families.[68] Education and the arts would not become centerpieces of state responsibilities until a new liberal regime that came to power after the fall of Rosas in 1852. Then, as members of the Generation of 37 served in different administrative capacities, but principally through the efforts of Domingo Sarmiento, public education received new level of interest and support. Eventually, the state's commitment to education culminated with the federal law which established compulsory education in 1884.

Education was only one of the state's responsibilities that underwent a sea change in the second half of the nineteenth century. The accumulation of responsibilities signified the resurgence and ultimate triumph of an idea, the hegemonic state. By the 1880s, many of the issues regarding the state's role and scope had been settled, sometimes by the involvement of military force, on other occasions by the negotiations among political actors. The

process took time, as the federalist cause that had been championed in interior provinces by Rosas underwent challenges. In the end, the type of Argentine union that had been envisaged by the early federalists, which involved provincial autonomy as a base element in a loose confederacy, became a tightly controlled unitary state but with the significant new factor: the forced federalization of the city of Buenos Aires in 1880, which thereby brought its port revenues into the nation's coffers, not the provincial treasury.

Much has been said recently about the conservative nature of the Spanish American revolutionary movements.[69] David Bushnell reminded us that historians disillusioned with Latin America's performance after independence have decided that either separation from Spain was premature, a view held by conservative revisionists, or that dark intrigues, both foreign and domestic, prevented the full realization of national independence, a popular view among leftist writers and nationalists of all stripes.[70] Yet, regardless of where along the ideological spectrum one may place the rise of an independent Argentina, we have little doubt about the understanding of the idea of a state in the modern, not traditional, sense of the term. This means, for example, the recognition of bureaucratic state entities even while notions of country and nation lagged behind in their evolution. This in itself is a significant innovation insofar as it inverts the idea, common throughout the colonial era, that the state gave shape and endowed with legitimacy the different groups it held to represent.[71] Instead, it appears that competing groups tried to give shape to the state while, at the same time, state agents attempted to delineate the boundaries that defined the political legitimacy of different groups. Much less consensus revolves around whether a shared concept of nation existed as a set of affective and ideological principles guiding common bonds and political actions.

From provincial state to state of national domination

From the 1860s to 1880, the movement toward a more unified Argentina was accompanied by an increasingly dominant central state authority. The process involved a combination of economic and military mechanisms brought to bear on interior provinces by an increasingly strong Buenos Aires. But it also included the processes attendant civic politics; that is, this period witnessed a renewal of the vibrant and meaningful electoral competitions that had not been seen since the 1820s. Recent studies of electoral practices in nineteenth-century Latin America have focused the attention of scholars on the role and scope of popular participation in the public sphere and on the ensuing relationships between state and society. In other words, an informative way to understand the state over the course of the nineteenth century involves assessing civil society's interaction with state authorities. What responsibilities does the state have and which segments of civic society does it define as a component of its legitimate constituency? Whose interests are deemed essential for the state to preserve

and advance? How do political actors reconcile their aspirations with the evolving forms of political modernity? Recent historical scholarship has been focusing on these questions, part of the renewed emphasis on political history, overlaid on social and cultural foundations.[72]

The differences between the two liberal states of the pre- and post-Rosas era, on the one hand, and the illiberal *rosista* state interregnum, on the other, had more in common than is generally recognized, although significant differences are discernible in governing styles. First, threading through all of them was a commonly understood recognition of the virtues of republican forms. Second, they all conceived narrowly, albeit to different degrees, the scope of legitimate public participation. The historiographical distinctions depicting the Rosas state from its preceding and subsequent regimes have been presented more sharply in the past than in the more recent literature. Here we return to the work of José Luis Romero, whose portrayal of the Rosas regime as an "inorganic democracy" presents more than simply another euphemism in the rich array of elliptical descriptions found in the Argentine historical argot.[73] Its inorganic quality referred to an apparent absence of a regimen of law (*estado de derecho*) and the abhorrent whimsy of political decision-making in the hands of a conservative tyrant. But Romero equally recognized *rosismo's* democratic characteristics insofar as Rosas ruled with cross-class and inter-regional support, even if not normally expressed in electoral processes, ranging disproportionately from the urban lower classes, the gaucho population in the provincial hinterland, and a significant component of the well-heeled estanciero class whose interests were protected, first, by the defense of property rights over and against recalcitrant workers whenever needed, and second, by a largely unquestioned commitment to free trade with a Europe able to absorb the abundant pastoral production from the Buenos Aires pampas. However, more recent scholarship holds that, while undeniably authoritarian in his mode of thinking and frequently ruthless in meting out punishment, Rosas did not abolish the principles of republicanism, or the tenets of institutional organisms, particularly judicial authority; he did, however, capitalize on a penchant for ambiguity in order both to blunt significant advances along the road to institutionalized democracy and to maintain a seemingly inorganic state based on personal, unilateral rule.[74] But even Rosas hearkened to his popular support, evident in his original election by the provincial legislature and, subsequently, by referendum. Thus, elections and popular participation help us to understand the form and substance at the interstices between state and society even in cases of personalist governance and crony capitalism.

The state of ballots

The subject of elections during the nineteenth century has recently attracted the interest of historians who realize that voting was an important component of the era's political cauldron. The role of politics and the shape of the

electoral battlefield were determined, in part, by the characteristics and functions that political leaders assigned to constituents. The manner in which political authorities defined and envisioned constituencies becomes fundamental in understanding interactions between state and society. Among Argentine cities, Buenos Aires demonstrated a substantial record of political and electoral participation. From the start of the revolutionary process leading to independence, popular participation in political movements was widespread, involving the vote by free males. As was the case in Mexico City, for example, during the early years following independence, voting in Buenos Aires crossed the wide spectrum of socioeconomic standings and ethnic groups.[75]

In fact, voting became a feature of Argentina's political life leading to the formal declaration of independence. Elections resulted in the designation of members of the *Junta Grande* who oversaw governmental affairs in 1810, the constitutional assembly of 1813, and the Congress that met in Tucumán in 1816, which culminated in the formal declaration of independence. Residents would gather in the cabildo or in meetings within each of the city's administrative districts to select representatives to political bodies. In Córdoba, regulations enacted in January 1821 provided free males above the age of 18 with the right to vote. Included were foreign men who had been in the country a minimum of four years and black men born in Argentina to free fathers. Free black men could also be elected to municipal offices in the Province of Córdoba if they were grandchildren of free blacks, a condition that reduced significantly the list of potential officers of color. Córdoba's vote was indirect and did not contain literacy or property restrictions. In 1821, Buenos Aires established the right to direct vote to free men above the age of 20.[76] As originally conceived, elections conditioned the political space given to provincial and municipal authorities by providing accountability to a significant cross-section of their male populations.

A generation later, Sarmiento would look at the municipal system of governance and elections as an American version of Athenian democracy. Rivadavia's Buenos Aires was to him the archetype of the ancients' virtues, an equalizer of social standings. Urban virtue was manifested by the electoral spirit, it united civilians and military personnel in the common pursuits of progress and freedom.[77] The republican city held the promise for the rest of the nation. It was there that men were elected to lead on the basis of recognized abilities and virtues, while the ignorant populace living in villages and in the countryside risked easy persuasion by the demagoguery of authoritarians, caudillos to greater and lesser extents, keen on furthering their selfish interests in opposition to the republic's well-being.

By contrast, Rosas saw in the rural setting the purest of democratic venues and – this was an important consideration for anyone fearful of lost social control – free from the discord and political coarseness that emanated from the cities. The rural order had the virtue of being pre-revolutionary; it was a fair agrarian democracy, just in its own way, and, according to Jorge Myers,

analogous to the Jeffersonian vision, that is, peaceful even if not egalitarian. To opponents of urban cosmopolitanism, peace and justice emanated from commonly shared views on social place and mutual rights and obligations, not formulaic and legislated processes of equality.[78] Problematically, Rosas left out any discussion of leadership or the requisite qualities of leaders, leaving such thorny issues for others to decide after his fall in 1852 and, paradoxically, in the much less idyllic environment of urban politics. In some very basic ways, Rosas was respectful of rural traditions; by contrast, his opponents, Europeanized social critics who came to office after his fall, assigned country dwellers the dubious position of a pre-political folk having few or no political rights. Furthermore, it would be up to this urban tutorial elite to determine when such rights, essential for the full implementation of popular democracy, would be accorded.

Thus, the democratic state envisioned by Sarmiento was synonymous with the republican city-state, not with the nation-state, and required vanquishing the regressive pastoral republic of gauchos and local potentates. He was not alone: in fact, ancient Greek and Roman ideals of republicanism had been influential among the early revolutionary elites.[79] Not surprisingly, then, municipal elections in the early nineteenth century were associated with a vision of "local democracy" and the memory of its ancient origin. As David Bushnell first observed and Xavier-François Guerra expanded on more recently, the first electoral system in Hispanic America was "a modern embellishment of a traditional system."[80]

But even if local and provincial voting often yielded vigorous, albeit restricted affairs, the concept of a national electorate that would determine the political shape of a national state remained elusive. And while elections took place in Buenos Aires even during Rosas's regime, they lacked the spontaneity and pluralist characteristics of the early revolutionary period and 1820s. By the late 1820s, political and financial figures were more concerned with how to stabilize the social order than with the heated public debates that normally accompanied political contests. In the event, and as concerns grew over the fragility of social control, elections in Buenos Aires took on more form and less substance as electoral contests were substantially eliminated in favor of predictable outcomes favorable to the regime. The most important challenges to the political order involved the guarantee of property rights and restored respect for authority, all without entering into divisive deliberations.[81] Strong consensus, and indeed, virtual unanimity became equated with patriotism. Thus, Rosas was elected in December of 1829 by the vote of all the members of the provincial legislature save one.[82] Similar elections and plebiscites would be conducted spottily by Rosas, invariably with the same unanimous results, including the vote to enhance boundlessly his rule. From the 1830s up to the 1850s, municipal and provincial elections had been eroded in both frequency and democratic effectiveness. The constricted nature of voting was emblematic of the seemingly insuperable obstacles to forging an effective national state. The

earliest debates over the nature and scope of state responsibilities toward the public were subsumed by the fractious debates over the constitutional configuration of the post-colonial entity that would become Argentina. The highly contested boundaries of state authority and legitimacy took center stage and lasted for decades. But after the fall of Rosas in 1852, Buenos Aires experienced an explosion of political activity. It was no longer possible, after the long hiatus of representative bodies, to impose rule unilaterally. Legitimacy now required competitive electoral processes.

Elections thus became strongly identified with rehabilitating the state. Hilda Sábato's work points out the centrality of the electoral process, at least in Buenos Aires, in the context of broadening the public sphere and popularizing the sense of politics as derived from a growingly inclusive definition of the people.[83] New political clubs mediated the views of leaders and nurtured those who aspired to leadership. Clubs served as publicity mechanisms and mobilization instruments, which, in turn, served to expand awareness of the political process and its participants. Finally, the political club also served to take politics out of the traditionally private domain of the gentry's parlors into the streets. These civil associations raised *civismo* to its highest and clearest representation in the nineteenth century. The political club served as the precursor of the political party that would become normative in the 1880s, but that would also close ranks and narrow significantly the public aspects of competitive electoral politics. In the event, the state grew in power and authority after 1860, but ultimately on a much narrower electoral base and at the cost of a significantly weakened legitimacy.

The number of voters participating in elections in Buenos Aires in the 1860s was modest, but the impact of those elections on the popular mind was significant. Perhaps 20 percent of the Buenos Aires electorate, Argentine men over the age of 20, participated in elections. Their socioeconomic representation continued to be reasonably inclusive, with middling sectors participating in greatest proportions. These included salaried employees, white-collar workers, and shopkeepers. The elites and the poor participated in lower numbers. Unlike the previous eras in which politics regularly mixed with military campaigns, elections became the established procedures by which political disputes were settled in Buenos Aires.[84] Provincial governorships and presidential elections garnered more attention than congressional or senatorial races.

One of the least studied aspects of the relationship between elections and the state was the effect of state growth and public employment on the electoral processes. If the revolutionary state had been too strapped for funds to enlarge the public sector, it nonetheless produced state dependency by its contracting capabilities, particularly in the sectors related to the provisioning of the military.[85] Even its machinery of military recruitment resulted not only in a redistribution of political wealth from the civic to the praetorian sectors, but also in a distribution of capital from the gentry to the dependent classes.[86] Subsequently, Rosas's fiscal conservatism narrowed

further the possibilities for direct public employment during his authoritarian version of the hegemonic state. By contrast, the liberal state that followed witnessed a virtually uninterrupted secular growth of public enterprise and employment that signalled the greater importance of state employees in the electoral process. Importantly, this process became normative in several provinces. For example, the city of Rosario's electorate in 1870 combined municipal employees with rural gauchos to mobilize voters. Public employees would continue to serve the needs of political competitors at various levels of government.[87] Patronage, one of the elements that had bound together the relatively narrow circles of colonial administrators in the Spanish Crown's viceregal centers, and which had never disappeared from the nexus of state relations with discrete social sectors, was now expanding to include a more ample and diverse slice of the popular constituency, in keeping with the state's growth and development.

But even during this more civic-minded post-Rosas period, electoral participation did not entail fully democratic practices. Sarmiento dismissed criticisms of non-democratic mechanisms, reminding critics that barbarism remained an imminent threat which only a civilized tutelary leadership could control while simultaneously working to mold the people at large into a responsible political partner. Freedom and, eventually, democracy depended on the ability of a people to conduct politics; in the absence of such characteristics, the liberal elite was required to contain popular excess. Economic liberalism was now joined to intellectual progressivism, but, combined with conservative principles, participatory politics remained constrained. Among the electoral constraints was the eventual elimination of the old acceptance by the early revolutionaries of the multiplicity and heterogeneity inherent in the political peoples of the Río de la Plata, the acceptance of the ideal of *pueblos*, in the self-consciously articulated plural sense. By the early twentieth century, claims within the electorate to special attention on the basis of class position, occupational level, or any social distinction invited the accusation by the political elites of divisionism harmful to the nation. Matthew Karush's study of electoral practices in Rosario points to the suppression of interest-group politics by political leaders intent on casting the image of an integrated people weaved together into a single nation and responsive to emblems of national folkloric values.[88] Appeals to electoral modes of nativism served to distance legitimate participants from troublemakers who did not have the nation's best interests at heart.[89] Karush argues that such rhetoric and emblematic devices reflected the predominance of a non-pluralist democratic ideal. These strategies resonated with the political theories of Alberdi, Sarmiento, and others: democracy required the evolution of a virtuous body of citizens who could ignore private interest in the pursuit of the common good. Indeed, Sarmiento shared Guizot's political theory that society explains politics, not the other way around.[90] Such patrimonial views of state responsibilities for the public would hold sway even among reform-minded political elites and were embodied in the ideas behind the democratically-oriented electoral laws of 1912.[91]

The state of control

The prevailing sense among state leaders regarding the nature of Argentina's development had changed in important ways over the course of the century. From the optimism shared by members of the revolutionary vanguard that all peoples throughout the old viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata would consensually rally around the ideals of life, liberty, and the common well-being, the elite moved to a gloomy sense of the dangers posed by the seemingly perpetual danger of the masses. This was the underlying theory that motivated much of Rosas's thinking about the nature of political leadership: in the absence of a strong, even lethal hand, chaos. Rosas's Hobbesian view of a potentially explosive relationship between the state and its people in the absence of an efficiently authoritarian leadership figured prominently in his refusal to form a constitution and codify law, leaving colonial legal practices to weigh in alongside opportunistic rulings by courts and special judicial panels. Plans to produce consistency in legal determinations crashed against apparent whimsy and contingency; these antinomies eroded the sense of purpose among state administrations for much of the nineteenth century.

The contradictions between legal formulations and political practices crossed time and ideological spaces. Jesse Hingson's study of Córdoba's *juntas clasificadoras* illustrates the indeterminacy of a system that investigated people accused of disloyalty during the Rosas era.[92] These juntas, headed by jurists, were charged with identifying those found to be guilty of unitarian sympathies and strip them of citizenship rights and property. *Clasificados* were condemned, in essence, to a social and legal limbo, to poverty and the loss of access to patronage or protection. It often resulted in exiling heads of households and forcing them to search for livelihoods in order to remit resources to dispossessed family and kin left behind. However, political identity was extremely fluid and juntas remained under pressure to revisit criteria and procedures as appeals kept coming from those claiming to have been falsely accused. Classification and successful appeals leading to restitution depended more on individual and personal considerations than on codified political misbehavior. As more qualifications were considered for both classification and restitution, the policy of oversight the juntas were designed to achieve became unsustainable, ultimately calling into question the categories of loyalty and treason.[93] In addition to undermining political categories, many judges also had their competence questioned, and ultimately, confidence in law itself was eroded, which, once again, raised the historical problematic of perceived legitimacy. Here, Rosas, the source of the law of classification, was not questioned, but the way the law was experienced – that is, not as law, but as individual and seemingly whimsical actions – detracted from its legitimacy. As Córdoba's state authorities were increasingly seen to be lawbreakers themselves in the latter 1840s, the system showed signs of collapse.

The harshness of some of Rosas's penalties echoed the philosophy of earlier authorities in Buenos Aires who, after the Revolution's most idealistic moments had passed, believed that crime could be stamped out by handing out the most severe penalties, including death. In October 1811, the Junta had decreed that, in order to stem the wave of home robberies, anyone caught with pick locks, master keys, or similar instruments would be put to death.[94] Subsequently, Rosas shifted the state's purpose in the use of capital punishment so that it would serve as a tool against political enemies. By contrast, crimes against the social and economic order were handled by, as Ricardo Salvatore noted recently, a logic that responded to a spectrum of penalties in proportion to the offenses. Terror and intimidation served as the tools of the punitive state against political actors, while a graduated system of pain, often publicly dispensed, along with forced military recruitment was applied to criminal indigents. This was the strategic application of the conservative authoritarian state's punitive system, designed to correct and keep in check the legacy of the previous years of liberal "anarchy."[95]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the post-Rosas version of the liberal state aimed at a different mix of authoritarian practices and liberal ideas. It aimed at increasing administrative centralization and expanding political debate, but it also called for limiting popular representation through interventionist state practices whenever necessary to maintain its adherents in control. Thus, as David Rock notes in his recent study of state formation, the presidential election of 1868, won by Sarmiento, served as the example of an "unsophisticated display of force."[96] This, then, was a new generation of political leaders who continued the historical distrust of the unruly lower classes. But it would be a mistake to equate it with Rosas's methodology for containing the common folk, the rural workers or *paysanos* and the urban rabble. Rosas was fundamentally a fatalist on the subject of political development. He was not only Machiavellian in his approach to both his supporters and enemies: he was convinced of the immutable nature of the Argentine human condition. His world-view consisted of binary oppositions – federalists and unitarians, friends and foes, God-fearing Catholics and heretics – without considerations for change or progress. "His mind was fixed in a rigid mould," writes John Lynch, "he allowed nothing for chronological movement or historical change, and his thought was sealed from the influence of time and place."[97] While Rosas was Machiavellian and saw the world as immutable, the subsequent political elites, by contrast, invested the state with the mission of change, albeit under their own terms of implementation modes and pace. In important ways, this amounted to an interpretation of John Stuart Mill's approach to the issue of security and well-being. These men, many of whom had been members of the Generation of 37 and victims of Rosas's brutality, believed in the study of the influences that shaped the national character – what Mill referred to as Ethology – and then acting to alter the environment needed to achieve social

improvement. Auguste Comte also looms large among these men, as was the case with Mill, who, in addition, was a faithful believer in Bentham's Utilitarianism, and thus regarded character as the product of circumstances. Change the circumstances and the national character is altered. Furthermore, post-Rosas liberal elites invested heavily, both intellectually and fiscally, in education to effect the transition from the undesirable state of affairs they observed to one that resembled the ideal nation, based on the productive forces of its ideal people.

For Rosas, the role of the state – given that the past and the future were represented by the present – was to secure the social control that allowed for private property to produce and earn. For the liberals who followed, the modifiability of human nature by changes in the environment required the state to be the agent of new circumstances. Yet, this newly optimistic temperament coexisted with a familiar heavy-handedness, although, to be sure, there was little of the previous political thuggery, property confiscations, or murder directed at the political class. Instead, authoritarian techniques of social control after the 1850s were aimed principally at the rural poor, itinerant country laborers, and the few remnants of recalcitrant provincial leaders in the country's interior. Thus, while economic circumstances were indeed changed as the result of new state development programs, social control practices were reminiscent of the praetorian measures used by Rosas, particularly in the countryside and among gauchos.

Sarmiento's goal of re-establishing and expanding the virtuous republic that had flourished with Rivadavia but was then aborted, would be made possible at the cost of gaucho blood. State subjection of the Argentine interior, which took place vigorously over the 1860s, along with its bloodily efficient repression of unsubmissive gauchos, resulted from a perception that equated federalism and its gaucho supporters with criminal deviancy. This signified an important change in strategizing the state's dominance. By attempting to vacate political theory from public debate, gauchos and others who, in sections of the interior, continued to resist the ways of the state, were no longer presented as advocates of political claims but, instead, as enemies of the common good, and obstacles to the integrated nation.

Sarmiento, who would become president of Argentina in 1868 and launch major educational, cultural, and economic initiatives, had headed the national government's occupation war in the interior in the early 1860s, overseeing some of the most brutal programs of repression under the directives of President Bartolomé Mitre. Yet, this repression was no longer operating under the historical concept of an ideological battle between federalism and centralism. Unlike the propaganda and military struggles that had pitted these two visions against each other from the 1810s through the 1850s, the national state now cast its challenge as a police action, requiring the heavy-handed measures of security forces facing violent and ruthless criminals. In a message sent to Sarmiento in March 1863, President Mitre instructed him to avoid prosecuting the war of occupation as a civil war. In the

Province of La Rioja, wrote Mitre, "I want a police war. La Rioja is a den of thieves." He further demanded that renegade gauchos be classified as criminals, thereby denying them political or ideological merits.[98] Mitre thus defined attempts at secession beyond the acceptable boundaries of politics, beyond the confines of elections, and instead, to be felonious acts actionable by military means and prosecuted by military courts. By the end of the 1870s, the Argentine state had succeeded in defining the legitimate political boundaries. To be sure, the debates over the relationship of the city of Buenos Aires to the nation required one last military confrontation, which in 1880 resulted in the city's federalization, thereby settling the matter of the city's financial supremacy once and for all. By then, however, it meant not only the end of those who had hoped to prolong the city's autonomy: it also narrowed the electoral space to a de facto single-party system that assured peaceful presidential transitions at the cost of legitimate and credible elections.

Modernizing institutions and forging the nation

The new political boundaries that came to define acceptable political debates replaced constitutional issues of state power and territorial reach with discussions that revolved around economic development. The post-Rosas activist state was ready to oversee the forging of a new nation by decisive executive actions ranging widely across military, judicial, social, and economic dimensions. By the 1880s, several landmark achievements paved the way to dynamic economic and demographic expansion. A vast amount of new land was brought into production, particularly south of Buenos Aires, thanks to the national army's successful subjugation of Indians during a year-long campaign in 1878–79. These new regions of production readily came under the administrative and judicial processes that had been established by the Rural Code of 1871, codifying property rights on the Pampas. Samuel Amaral's study of the development of the estancia economy points to the Code's adaptation of the habits and customs of pampean producers, rather than to administrative innovation, an example of the Generation of 37's preferences to build a nation based on actual Argentine experiences instead of on utopian or external (European) models.[99] Alberdi was particularly keen on having a national (one might even say "nationalist") approach to codification: the Civil Code, he wrote, "must follow from the social, historical, and environmental conditions of the people it serves; it should follow in climate, geography, governmental system, civil society, family, traditions, history, origins, ethnicity, language, etc."[100] In these matters, Alberdi, his colleagues, and the inheritors of their legacies followed the operating principles outlined in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*. Other foundational codification processes were completed over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, including the 1884 Compulsory Education Law, the National Civil Registry in1889, and the Penal Code in 1886. In the end,

the new shape of the state was coming into view and it reflected a mission far different than the original revolutionaries' lofty aspirations or than Rosas's views of a state responsible for stasis. The new liberal state was seen, instead, instrumentally, that is, as an engine of growth and development, as a catalyst of demographic change through mass immigration initiatives and land-colonization programs, as a fiscal steward responsible for accelerating national development and infrastructural priorities, and, finally, as the sole guardian of the national borders and guarantor of internal stability. No longer was the state seen by its architects as embodying transcendental values, as was considered to be the case in the 1810s and 1820s; it signified the definitive departure from what Jeremy Adelman calls "aspirational constitutionalism."[101] In narrowing the framework of politics to the instrumentalities of growth and the acquisition of derivative European material culture, the governing elites entered fully into the politics of pragmatism and transaction. The nation had finally arrived in the guise of modernity.

Notes

[1] H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, trans., ed. and intro., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 172.

[2] L. A. Bertoni, *Patriotas, cosmopolitas y nacionalistas. La construcción de la nacionalidad argentina a fines del siglo XIX* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001).

[3] J. L. Romero, *A History of Argentine Political Thought*, trans. T. F. McGann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 219. The English translation was based on the book's third edition, published in 1959 by Fondo de Cultura Económica in Mexico City in 1959.

[4] R. Hora, *The Landowners of the Argentine Pampas a Social and Political History, 1860–1945*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 223.

[5] For example, "the essence of nation-building," writes Michael Ignatieff about post-Taliban Afghanistan, "is getting the guns out of the hands of the warlords' hands and opening up space for political competition free of violence." M. Ignatieff, "Nation-Building Lite," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 28, 2002, 29.

[6] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[7] Among the more recent works on Latin America, see M. Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1997); M. Tenorio, *Mexico at the World's Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); T. M. Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's* El Teniente *Copper Mine, 1904–1951* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); R. D. Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos: State, Order and Subaltern Experience in Buenos Aires: The Rosas Era* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

[8] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 65.

[9] J. C. Chiaramonte, *Nación y estado en Iberoamérica. El lenguaje político en tiempos de las independencias* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2004), 161–5; Ariel de la Fuente, "Facundo and Chacho in Songs and Stories: Oral Culture and the Representations of Caudillos in the Nineteenth-Century Interior," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 80/3 (2000): 503–35.

[10] An early example of such inconsistency was Simón Bolívar's approach to the state, which was riddled with ambivalence. His allusions to modernism could not trump his vision of a state held together by ancient notions, and he never saw the contradictory nature of the ancient and the modern elements of his vision. A. Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 146.

[11] H. S. Ferns, *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 64.

[12] R. Levene, *Ensayo histórico sobre la Revolución de Mayo y Mariano Moreno: Contribución al estudio de los aspectos político, jurídico y económico de la Revolución de 1810*, 4th ed. (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1960); Levene, *La política económica de España en América y la revolución de 1810* (Buenos Aires: Coni Hnos., 1914).
[13] J. Alvarez, *Las guerras civiles argentinas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1976 [1912]), 82.
[14] Ibid., 83–4.
[15] R. Levene, *A History of Argentina*, trans. W. S. Robertson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 209.
[16] J. Fisher, "Royalism, Regionalism, and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808–1815," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 59/2 (1979): 245.
[17] P. Gootenberg, *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 138–42. For a recent view of the negotiated approaches to nation-building in the Andean region, see M.-D. Demélas, *La invención política: Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú en el siglo XIX* (Lima: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos/Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2003).
[18] C. A. G. Belsunce, "La Revolución de Mayo en Córdoba. Gobernación de Pueyrredón," *Historia*, 22 (1960): 76–100.
[19] For contrasting experiences in Mexico, see E. Van Young, "Islands in the Storm: Quiet Cities and Violent Countrysides in the Mexican Independence Era," *Past and Present*, 118 (1988): 130–55; Van Young, "The Raw and the Cooked: Elite and Popular Ideology in Mexico, 1810–1821," in M. D. Szuchman (ed.), *The Middle Period in Latin America: Values and Attitudes in the 17th–19th Centuries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 75–102; Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). See also P. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800–1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 233–40.
[20] B. Mitre, *Historia de San Martín y de la emancipación sudamericana* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1968 [1887]), vol. 1, 20–1.
[21] J. B. Alberdi, *El crimen de la guerra* (Buenos Aires: El Tonel, 1958 [1870]).
[22] *El Censor*, November 30, 1815.
[23] J. Ingenieros, *La evolución de las ideas argentinas*, vol. 1: *La Revolución* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Problemas, 1946 [1918]), 43–4 For historians' ideological dispositions in Latin America, see E. B. Burns, "Ideology in Nineteenth-Century Latin American Historiography," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 58 (1978): 409–31; Burns, "Bartolomé Mitre: The Historian as Novelist, The Novel as History," *Inter-American Review of Bibliography*, 32/2 (1982): 155–67.
[24] Ingenieros, *La evolución de las ideas*, 249–50.
[25] F. Safford, "The Problem of Political Order in Early Republican Spanish America," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24, Quincentenary Supplement: "The Colonial and Post-Colonial Experience: Five Centuries of Spanish and Portuguese America," Guest editor: T. H. Donghi (1992): 83.
[26] L. Randall, *An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 29.
[27] C. F. Díaz Alejandro, *Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); A. M. Taylor, "External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentine Economic Decline After the Belle Epoque," *The Journal of Economic History*, 52/4 (1992): 907–36.
[28] R. Rojas, *Las provincias* (Buenos Aires: Librería "La Facultad", 1927); J. Irazusta, *Vida política de Juan Manuel de Rosas a través de su correspondencia* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Albatros, 1941–61); Irazusta, *Influencia económica británica en el Río de la Plata* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Córdoba, 1968); M. Gálvez, *El solar de la raza* (Buenos Aires: "La Facultad", 1930); A. Saldías, *Papeles de Rosas* (Buenos Aires, 1907).
[29] J. H. Delaney, "Imagining *El Ser Argentino*: Cultural Nationalism and Romantic Concepts of Nationhood in Early Twentieth-Century Argentina," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 34/3 (2002): 625–58.
[30] Porteños showed a precocious disposition to describe their urban environment confidently as the leading intellectual and cultural center of republican Spanish America. See *El Censor*, January 2, 1817, p. 1.

[31] The press in Buenos Aires during the 1810s – especially after Argentine troops under General José de San Martín crossed the Andes in 1817, carrying the revolution to Chile and Peru – proclaimed a bright future under the guiding lights of Argentine ideas of liberty and economic enterprise, presenting a South American variant of the manifest destiny ideology that would be seen in the United States.
[32] On the limited sustainment of conservative thought, see D. Rock, "Intellectual Precursors of Conservative Nationalism in Argentina, 1900–1927," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 67/2 (1987): 271–300; S. McGee Deutsch and R. H. Dolkart (eds.), *The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present* (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 1993).
[33] N. Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 213.
[34] The literature on nationalists and conservatives has been growing. See L. M. Caterina, *La Liga Patriótica Argentina: Un grupo de presión frente a las convulsiones sociales de la década del veinte* (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1995); Delaney, "Imagining *El Ser*"; D. Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement and Its Impact* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Deutsch and Dolkart, *Argentine Right*.
[35] Shumway, *Invention of Argentina*.
[36] The bibliography dealing with political and military leaders is too lengthy to present here. A few examples of the better-known works would include: F. Luna, *Los caudillos* (Buenos Aires: A. P. Lillo, 1971); J. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829–1852* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); A. Palcos, *La visión de Rivadavia* (Buenos Aires: Editoriak "El Ateneo", 1936); D. Peña, *Juan Facundo Quiroga* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1968); Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800–1850* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1992); Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*; J. C. Nicolau, *Dorrego gobernador; economía y finanzas* (Buenos Aires: Sadret, 1977); C. Ibarguren, *Vida de D. Juan Manuel de Rosas* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoría, 1984); E. Ravignani, *Rosas: Interpretación real y moderna* (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1970); E. Celesia, *Rosas: Aportes para su historia* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Goncourt, 1969); R. Piccirilli, *Rivadavia y su tiempo* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Peuser, 1960); Levene, *Ensayo histórico sobre la Revolución*; B. Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano y de la independencia argentina* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1967).
[37] F.-X. Guerra, "The Spanish American Tradition of Representation, and Its European Roots," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26, Part 1 (1994): 1–2.
[38] J. C. Chiaramonte, "La cuestión regional en el proceso de gestación del estado national argentino. Algunos problemas de interpretación," in M. Palacios (ed.), *La unidad nacional en América Latina. Del regionalismo a la nacionalidad* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1983), 51–85.
[39] A. McFarlane, "Civil Disorders and Popular Protests in Late Colonial New Granada," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 64/1 (1984): 17–54; R. Earle, "Indian Rebellion and Bourbon Reform in New Granada: Riots in Pasto, 1780–1800," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 73/2 (1993): 99–124; K. W. Brown, *Bourbons and Brandy: Imperial Reform in Eighteenth-Century Arequipa* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).
[40] Bertoni, *Patriotas, cosmopolitas*, 18; A. de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo: Caudillo and Gaucho Insurgency during the Argentine State-Formation Process (La Rioja, 1853–1870)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). In South America, the Andean region underwent significant splits between coastal and highland regions, reflecting in part communal differences views; see F. E. Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860–1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Thurner, *From Two Republics*.
[41] C. Véliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 164.
[42] J. C. Chiaramonte, "The Principle of Consent in Latin and Anglo-American Independence," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 36, Part 3 (2004): 563–86.
[43] Bertoni, *Patriotas, cosmopolitas*.
[44] J. C. Chiaramonte, *Ciudades, provincias, Estados: Orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800–1846)* (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1997), 114–20.
[45] Ibid., 120–1.
[46] M. D. Szuchman, *Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810–1860* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
[47] J. Adelman, *Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 190.

[48] Chiaramonte, "La cuestión regional"; J. C. Chiaramonte, "Legalidad constitucional o caudillismo: El problema del orden social en el surgimiento de los Estados autónomos del Litoral argentino en la primera mitad del siglo XIX," *Desarrollo Económico*, 26/102 (1986): 176–96.
[49] T. Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra. Formación de una élite dirigente en la Argentina criolla* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972).
[50] T. Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del Estado argentino, 1791–1850* (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Belgrano, 1982), 149–50.
[51] An overarching discussion on the role of the press in the creation and shaping of the public sphere is found in Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. For a review of the public sphere in Latin America, see V. M. Uribe-Urán, "The Birth of a Public Sphere in Latin America During the Age of Revolution," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 42/2 (2000): 425–57 and C. A. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900: Volume I, Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).
[52] For the effects of guided discourse in the informal Argentine rural sector, see P. González-Bernaldo, "Social Imagery and Its Political Implications in a Rural Conflict: The Uprising of 1828–29," in M. D. Szuchman and J. C. Brown (eds.), *Revolution and Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776–1860* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 282. See also N. Goldman, *El discurso político como objeto de la historia. El discurso político de Mariano Moreno* (Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1989); Goldman, *Historia y lenguaje los discursos de la Revolución de Mayo*, Los Fundamentos de las Ciencias del Hombre (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1992) and more generally, P. Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge* (London: Polity Press, 2001).
[53] J. Myers, *Orden y virtud. El discurso republicano en el régimen rosista* (Bernal, Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1995), 21–23.
[54] R. D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarianización en la era de Rosas," *Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr. E. Ravignani,"* Tercera Serie, 5 (1992): 46.
[55] D. F. Sarmiento, *Constitución del Colegio de Señoritas de la Advovación de Santa Rosa de América* …. (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, Ltda., 1939).
[56] N. R. Botana, *La tradición republicana. Alberdi, Sarmiento y las ideas políticas de su tiempo* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984), 324.
[57] Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar," 28–31.
[58] Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 182.
[59] Ibid., 224.
[60] Ibid., 243–4. For an analysis of Rosas's belief-system regarding power and authority, see Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*.
[61] P. Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, trans. R. Balinski (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); A. S. Kahan, *Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); C. A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
[62] Adelman, *Republic of Capital*, 106.
[63] Ibod., 121.
[64] Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*; J. C. Garavaglia, "La apoteósis del Leviathán: El estado en Buenos Aires en la primera mitad del siglo XIX," *Latin American Research Review*, 38/1 (2003): 139–40.
[65] Garavaglia, "La apoteósis del Leviathán."
[66] J. C. Garavaglia, "Un siglo de estancias en la campaña de Buenos Aires: 1751 a 1853," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 79/4 (1999): 727–8; Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 225–26; Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*, 58–66; J. Hingson, "Savages Into Citizens: Families, Political Purge, and Reconciliation in Córdoba, Argentina, 1820–1862," PhD dissertation (Florida International University, 2003).
[67] Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 217.
[68] AGN. X-13-2-3. Beneficencia.
[69] The disorder unlashed by the independence processes led subsequent liberals to re-think their definitions of democratic participation. In Argentina, post-independence liberal thinkers, such as Esteban Echeverría, called for a democracy that was consistent with a generalized trend toward dampening the effects of revolution, and which narrowed the basis for claims to individual liberty

while rebuilding institutions that endorsed and protected property rights. In this context, the constitutional convention of 1852–53 was deeply conservative. Adelman, *Republic of Capital*, 178.
[70] D. Bushnell and N. Macaulay, *The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 13–14.
[71] T. Halperín Donghi, *Tradición política española e ideología revolucionaria de Mayo* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1985), 100.
[72] Demélas, *La invención política*.
[73] Romero, *History of Argentine Political Thought*.
[74] Myers, *Orden y virtud*, 16–18.
[75] On elections in Mexico, see R. A. Warren, *Vagrants and Citizens: Politics and the Masses in Mexico City from Colony to Republic* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001) and Forment, *Democracy in Latin America, 1760–1900*; V. Guedea, "The First Popular Elections in Mexico City, 1812–1813," in J. Rodríguez (ed.), *The Origins of Mexican National Politics, 1808–1847* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1997). Elections have been looked at more carefully recently as historians see in them important indicators of what democracy meant and how it was implemented in the nineteenth century. See Guerra, "Spanish American Tradition"; Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas* (Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, 1992); A. Annino (ed.), *Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica. Siglo XIX. De la formación del espacio político nacional* (Montevideo, 1995).
[76] F. Luna, *Fuerzas hegemónicas y partidos políticos* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1989), 30–1.
[77] Botana, *La tradición republicana*, 275–77.
[78] Myers, *Orden y virtud*, 46–7.
[79] Guerra, "Spanish American Tradition," 11.
[80] See D. Bushnell, "El sufragio en la Argentina y en Colombia hasta 1835," *Revista del Instituto de Historia del Derecho*, 19 (1968); and Guerra, "Spanish American Tradition," 14.
[81] Adelman, *Republic of Capital*, 150.
[82] Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 43.
[83] H. Sábato, *La política en las calles. Entre el voto y la movilización: Buenos Aires, 1862–1880* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1998).
[84] D. Rock, *State Building and Political Movements in Argentina, 1860–1916* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 28–30.
[85] Halperín Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*.
[86] T. Halperín Donghi, "Militarización revolucionaria en Buenos Aires, 1806–1815," in T. Halperín Donghi (ed.), *El ocaso del orden colonial en Hispanoamérica* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1978), 157.
[87] Rock, *State Building and Political Movement*, 68.
[88] M. B. Karush, *Workers or Citizens: Democracy and Identity in Rosario, Argentina (1912–1930)* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002).
[89] Ibid., 68–71.
[90] Botana, *La tradición republicana*, 279.
[91] Karush, *Workers or Citizens*, 15–19.
[92] Hingson, "Savages Into Citizens."
[93] Hingson, "Savages Into Citizens," ch. 4.
[94] J. M. Beruti, "Memorias curiosas," in *Biblioteca de Mayo*, vol. 4: *Diarios y crónicas* (Buenos Aires: Senado de la Nación, 1960), 3404–5.
[95] Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*, 232–42.
[96] Rock, *State Building and Political Movement*, 51.
[97] Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 353.
[98] de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*, 165–6.
[99] S. Amaral, *The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[100] J. B. Alberdi, *Obras completas* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de "La Tribuna Nacional", 1886–87), vol. 7, 125–6.
[101] Adelman, *Republic of Capital*, 190.

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