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Rioting for Dignity: Masculinity, National Identity and Anti-US Resistance in Panama

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As he held tightly to a corner of his beloved Panama's flag, the diminutive seventeen-year-old César Villareal held his head high and his chest out. It was 9 January 1964, and Villareal and his high school classmates were marching out of the Republic of Panama and into the neighbouring US-controlled Panama Canal Zone to contest a US decision not to fly Panama's banner in the zone. Minutes later, Villareal and his friends clashed with US teenagers hoisting the Stars and Stripes, and in the scuffle the Panamanian flag was torn. That tearing catalysed the riots of 1964, a four-day chaotic exchange of taunts, Molotov cocktails and gunfire. When it ended, twenty-one Panamanians and four US soldiers lay dead and hundreds more were wounded.

Recalling the events a generation later, Villareal swore that his own life was never in danger from US forces. 'The bullets of imperialism could not kill me', he declared, even after those bullets had felled classmates. He had achieved a sort of dissociation of mind from body – a persistent masculine ideal.[1] Even if he had died, Villareal continued, he would have proven himself a man through 'self-immolation for the Fatherland . . . I was ready to die for that flag'. Despite his bravado, Villareal also remembered that after scuffling with the US teens he ran back in tears to his peers. 'Look what they did to the flag!' he cried out, 'deeply ashamed' for failing to protect it. Humiliated and angry, the Panamanians fled the zone and told the story of the 'violation' of the flag to others. It spread like wildfire and ignited the riots of 1964.[2]

Villareal's account of that harrowing day bore traces of practically all the masculine *and* feminine virtues long associated with national greatness: moral courage, physical exertion and self-abnegation for the former, and devotion, mourning and purity for the latter. This dual masculine–feminine imagery pervaded not only the riots of 1964 but also many aspects of Panamanian relations with the United States in the twentieth century. The sixty years before the riots must be understood as a gendered context for that watershed event as metaphors of feminine powerlessness and masculine redemption for that powerlessness were ubiquitous during that period.

Based on evidence from the United States and Panama, and drawing from the disciplines of diplomatic history, cultural anthropology and literary criticism, this article explores the continuities and transformations in Panama's gendered national identity and evaluates its role in the riots of 1964. It argues that, when analysed along with other articulations of nationality such as anti-colonialism and race, gender allows historians

to isolate a distinguishing discourse by and about Panamanians. To be sure, in some of gender's intersection with politics, the small republic at the base of the Central American Isthmus proved similar to other Latin American countries. But Panama had a particularly feminised self-image: a nation run by men, but subordinated to other men – men from the United States. This humiliating tension in Panama's self-perception reached a breaking point in 1964 and propelled young men such as Villareal to stand ready to give their lives for national dignity. The defence of masculinity helped drive Panamanians to riot against the United States because it proved a unifying identity that overshadowed more divisive social indicators such as race and class.

Building blocks: manhood, imperialism, Latin America and resistance

Scholars of masculinity have done significant work in articulating the relationships between the cultural pillars of manhood and the histories of international politics and nationalism. They have most usefully traced the causal links between gendered metaphors in language and actual policy. The best of their studies encoded this causality as the accumulation of three building blocks that organise the rest of this article.

First among these was the long-term impact of traumatic experiences such as wars of independence, which usually provided a country with foundational myths and heroes, and these in turn established or reinforced core national values. This initial social construction often led to what George Mosse called 'normative masculinity' – a cocktail of masculine values including willpower, courage, honour, discipline, sangfroid, competitiveness, quiet strength, stoicism, persistence, adventurousness, independence, dignity and sexual virility tempered with restraint.[3]

A second building block linking culture to action was the male institutions such as political machines or military schools that, through indoctrination and ritual, reproduced and reshaped the meanings of masculinity to bind them ever more tightly to the nation. These institutions systematised the subsuming of the individual into the nation, the exaltation of national symbols and what David Gilmore has called 'performative excellence', the doing of deeds that foreground the manhood of a person within a group, such as the display of sexual prowess or physical strength – even the ability to drink heavily.[4]

Third and final among these building blocks was the shorter-term influence of world events. Traumatic external factors tended to elicit some or all of the core national values of men as mediated through the nation's institutions – for example, a financial crisis prompting self-abnegation and discipline through the school system. Kristin Hoganson published one of the seminal works in this vein, arguing that Spanish atrocities and weakness in 1898 transformed an existing domestic crisis of US masculinity into a belligerent US foreign policy. She was among the first to demonstrate that ideas about manhood were not simply a reflection of policy but a cause of it.[5]

Since the 1990s, scholars of Latin America have devoted more sustained attention to the study of masculinity.[6] But still strikingly absent from studies of manhood in Latin America is any sustained work on nationalist resistance to US power. To be sure, many works have discussed how Latin Americans have portrayed their national identities through women – real or symbolic.[7] Others – most notably Mary Renda – have made the case that notions such as paternalism have often acted in concert with the cultural identifiers of age, race and class to justify US ventures in Central America and the

Caribbean.[8] But few of these studies have explored how men used gendered imagery to redefine their national identity so as to resist US imperialism more effectively. It is not clear why. Perhaps one assumption is that men's nationalism and men's anti-Yankee sentiment were so intertwined as to obviate their study. Yet it is not obvious at all how the clash between US and Latin American cultures might enrich the study of manhood politics. The existence of the US 'other' adds a potentially dramatic factor to the shaping of nationalist manhood, because it is a 'supra-manhood' from abroad that forces Latin American manhood into a liminal status between the all-powerful *gringo* taskmaster and the women and non-whites who are generally subordinated to white males in Latin America.

Finally, no major work on masculinity in Latin America published so far has focused exclusively on Panama, featured Panama as the subject of a chapter or even included Panama in its index.[9] Panama's absence is to be regretted because its case is ideal for an interdisciplinary approach to masculinist anti-US resistance in Latin America. Its distinctive self-feminisation demonstrates an unusually compelling causal line between masculinist constructs and political actions such as the riots of 1964.

Foundations of emasculation: the canal, the Zone and duelling nationalisms

From 1903 to the 1930s, when Panama was a protectorate of the United States, Panama's lack of sovereignty created a national identity that shaped a uniquely feminised narrative of victimisation. The memory of a US-shepherded independence, the legally encoded US control of the canal and the presence of a community of US citizens in the Canal Zone made it particularly challenging for nationalists to celebrate their republic as robust, independent and dignified. Panamanians understandably described early twentieth-century Panama as suffering from an acute 'dependent society complex' or 'national inferiority complex'.[10]

In nationalists' eyes, the root of the 'complex' was that the Republic had been emasculated at the moment of its birth. Panama's US-protected rebellion from Colombia in 1903 allowed Washington to dictate the Republic's future, thereby keeping the country from asserting full sovereignty. US control materialised in several ways, the first being military intervention. Even when Panama was still a department of Colombia, US troops landed there regularly – fourteen times between 1856 and 1903, for a total of 200 days. In 1903, it was US gunships off the coast that made possible the revolution that separated Panama from Colombia, and the treaty that followed encoded the US right to keep intervening in Panamanian affairs. Citing that treaty, US troops landed again in 1908, 1912, 1918, 1921 and 1925. The second manifestation of US control over Panama was the taking of land. The treaty of 1903 established US control of a sixteen-kilometre-wide territory slicing through the heart of the nation – 145,748 hectares in all – a 'zone' for which President Theodore Roosevelt planned an inter-oceanic waterway. That canal opened in 1914, and its maintenance meant that tens of thousands of US citizens and other foreigners would establish themselves permanently on its shores. 'Nowhere else in the Caribbean Basin', historian Steve Ropp has observed, 'was the United States literally present at the creation of a new state or so continuously and directly involved "on the ground"'.[11]

However, since these US practices – invasions, land grabs, protectorates – were fairly common in the Caribbean basin, why would Panama be less 'masculine' in its nationalism than its neighbours? The main reason was that Panama did not wage a war of national liberation, nor did it launch an offensive against the US presence after independence. This lack of a legacy of martial sacrifice deeply emasculated the first generation of Panamanians. Cuban patriots, in contrast, fought a decades-long violent struggle against Spain, and they could feel victory within their grasp in 1898. When US troops hijacked their effort, a substantial number of Cubans opposed the process, and the Cuban members of congress who accepted US control over Cuba's foreign affairs did so only with heavy hearts.[12] Similarly, Mexicans, Haitians, Dominicans and Nicaraguans all fought back when US troops occupied their shores in the 1910s and 1920s. That they rarely prevailed did not matter. What mattered was the fight, which called forth self-sacrificing devotion, allowed men to demonstrate leadership and bravery and produced martyrs. Panama experienced none of this, and thus found itself in the company of Puerto Rico as a protectorate shepherded into republicanism by the United States without offering much resistance. Panama's 'revolution' of 1903 was bloodless. The only casualties were infamous: a dog, a donkey and a Chinese citizen mistakenly killed by a shell (the fact that he was Chinese seemed to add to his dissociation from Panamanian national identity).[13]

Early on after 1903, these foundational facts divided Panamanian nationalism. On one side of this divide were European-descended urban elites who profited from selling services and goods to US citizens, held the bulk of political power within the Conservative and Liberal parties and often overtly called for US military intervention to protect their fraudulent electoral victories. These men embraced positivism and foreign investment and they looked upon Panama's peaceful birth as a positive sign for a nation that saw its role in the world as a global emporium of trade and transportation – what historian Peter Szok has called the 'Hanseatic' ideology of early Panamanian leaders.[14] One of these early leaders, Ramón Valdés, president from 1916 to 1918, called the United States a 'natural and admirable protector'.[15]

When the Marines landed again and again during Panama's protectorate, they did so unopposed – except for the occasional street fight or bar brawl. Remaining under US protection even after its official protectorate ended, Panama never had a major military conflict with a neighbour, nor did it ever witness concerted guerrilla activity. As a result, the twenty-one Panamanians who died during the riots of 1964 were practically the first to fall to a foreign enemy since the founding of the Republic in 1903.[16] Until 1964, then, Panama remained a nation with no foundational romance, no warrior myth and no narrative of martyrdom to set the standard for men in a subaltern society.

Instead of a self-conscious nationalism based on manly resistance or conquest, therefore, Panama's dominant early national identity subtly based itself on subservience – a far from masculine virtue. Panama's geographic destiny as a hub of commerce since colonial days gave it the motto 'service to the world' (*pro mundi beneficio*). After the canal opened in 1914, that destiny seemed to be firmly entrenched. Panamanian men found themselves robbed of the opportunity to play any of the roles that sanctioned manhood in politics. They were not *providers*. Instead, the canal and the US-owned banana plantations became the most vibrant sectors of the economy, and, to add injury to insult, the best jobs went to US citizens or West Indians. Neither were Panamanians *protectors*; Article 136 of the Treaty of 1903 gave that job to the United States. And

Panamanian men were often not even *impregnators*; they stood by while countless US citizens fathered Panamanian children. Panama soon became the most US-dependent nation in the world.[17]

The other side of the national identity divide emerged slowly to encompass many mixed-race, rural and younger Panamanians led by intellectuals such as José D. Moscote and José Daniel Crespo. These men argued that the truncated sovereignty of the Republic of Panama was humiliating, corrupt and much less materially beneficial than US administrators had promised in 1903. They decried the 'black legend' that now surrounded Panama, which told of an 'artificial' 'pseudo-republic' kept alive uniquely by the will of the United States.[18] 'The United States mutilated Colombia', is how one Panamanian summarised it in 1914.[19] Another made the point that Panamanians had revolted against Colombia at least fifty-three times before 1903 – not exactly the behaviour of 'an artificial creation'.[20] Philosopher Eusabio Morales, a member of this younger generation, explained the resulting long-term 'weakness in our sense of nationality, the lack of faith in our sovereignty, the failure to trust our own ability to act independently and the pessimism regarding our national destiny':

> The ease with which the Isthmus obtained . . . its emancipation from Colombia in 1903, we have paid dearly for this with a national organism that remains anaemic, spiritless, weak and faithless . . . Panama [is a] country born into independence without struggles or blood, without acts of heroism, without the sacrifice of a single martyr.[21]

For that reason, wrote novelist Erasmo de la Guardia in 1938, 'the world does not take us very seriously'.[22]

Identities of class and race also marked this first generation, adding to the divide. Arnulfo Arias, a populist – nicknamed 'El Hombre' – who rose to prominence in the 1930s saw in Panama a society endangered by Chinese, Jewish and especially West Indian immigrants. Canal administrators had hired over 100,000 West Indian workers in the decade before the waterway's opening in 1914, and by the 1920s as many as 60,000 remained. West Indians' perceived behaviour – choosing to live in the zone, making little effort to learn Spanish, praying in Protestant churches, identifying with British and American culture and, worst of all, monopolising the blue-collar jobs offered by the canal – made them second-class citizens in the eyes of nationalists, who resented their unwillingness to assimilate, yet also made it more difficult for them to do so. Laws passed in 1926, for instance, blocked non-Spanish-speaking immigration and required businesses to hire more Panamanians.[23] Later, when Arias rose several times to the presidency, he limited the freedom of immigrants and the use of English.

West Indians could be said to comprise a sub-stratum of Panamanian masculinity, particularly threatening because of their supposed working-class brawn and untrammelled sexuality. Panamanians associated hard work with West Indianness, but in a negative way. A common saying early in the century, 'he works like a *chombo* [nigger]', was not a compliment. Moreover, black Panamanians – those who had assimilated by speaking Spanish and adopting Catholicism – were believed to be physically different from West Indians: 'the Panamanians proffer to find the features of the old Panamanian Negro more refined and delicate, his body more slender and graceful, his hair smoother', noted anthropologists John and Mavis Biesanz at mid-century. West Indians were disparaged for having masculine features that Panamanians considered too barbaric – curly hair, flat noses and wide lips. Paradoxically, West Indians were also

allegedly not masculine *enough* in their politics, failing to resist Yankee imperialism. 'The Panamanians', noted the Biesanzes, 'point with pride to the historically rebellious nature of the native Negro and sneer at the West Indian respect for authority, dubbing it servility'. Finally, Panamanians also resented intermarriages with West Indians, intermingling as they did tensions of race, class and sexuality. One female schoolteacher in the 1950s disparaged 'girls from the interior with good features and smooth hair who marry *chombos* because of their steady wages'.[24] Light-skinned Panamanians, therefore, found themselves emasculated both from 'above' by white Americans who represented wealth, arrogance and superior technology and from 'below' by West Indians' alleged self-isolation and superior physicality.

However, Arias and his peers could do little to alter the basic US–Panama relationship. During the Second World War, the US government pressured Arias to accept 134 US military installations and 67,000 troops on his territory.[25] Moreover, the ruling elite remained uninterested in confronting US power in anything but the most gentlemanly forms, a strategy in which the poor or blacks could not possibly participate. Throughout the twentieth century, as a result, Panamanians of various political stripes used gendered metaphors to bemoan Panama's shame. One writer in 1933 summarised the country's humiliation among other Latin American nations: 'we are charged with two offenses, of having abandoned the lap of the tender and loving mother for the first gallant to seduce us with his gold and power and of having betrayed the cause of Spanish America with this separation'.[26] By mid-century, one socialist Panamanian deputy called her country the 'bastard daughter' of the canal.[27] Conservative diplomats similarly belittled their nation. Fernando Eleta, Minister of Foreign Relations in the 1960s, spoke in this way of his compatriots with US officials: 'we've been a good mistress, very faithful, always ready for love when you needed us. But now we're getting old. We need a place to stay, some nice clothes, maybe somebody to cook for us. You know we don't want the big house. We don't want you to leave your wife. We just want a little something for old times' sake'.[28] Thirty-five years later, without prompting, Eleta used similar language: 'the same way a man treats a woman who bears complexes is the way foreigners should treat Panama: "You're so pretty" – you know – "I love that skin colour". You don't want her to feel inferior because she's a little dark skinned'.[29]

The existence of a colony of US citizens in the Canal Zone – the 'Zonians' – reinforced this unique framework of hegemony by adding layers of masculinist representations to the bilateral relationship. Zonians did so partly because their own behaviour was so circumscribed. They typically worked for the military or for the canal administration, both of which required a regimented, military-base-like lifestyle set in a comfortable, suburb-like environment. 'We on the Zone seem to be a self-isolated community', one Zonian complained anonymously to a local newspaper. 'It is clearly indicated to us that our personal lives are expected to be above suspicion. One of the responsibilities of our jobs is to live up to the ideal of what an exemplary American should be'. Deviations from that ideal that might prove grounds for dismissal included extramarital affairs, illegitimacy and homosexuality.[30]

Regimentation affected men and women differently. Since so many Zonian men were soldiers, the contacts they had with Panamanians tended to be domineering and offensive: soliciting prostitutes and drinking hard were not the kind of experiences that would normalise Panama's gendered identity. Private 'Johnny Hazard', for

instance, wrote to a local paper to confess the myriad of sensual joys offered beyond the manicured lawns of the Zone: 'the neon lights, painted girls, blaring music and liquid refreshments are the only hint [*sic*] of welcome we lonely hearts can perceive. We are killers, sir, and as such, need a rough and tough place to give vent to our passions'.[31] Another US citizen described how 'Panama has its share of these huge, hairy Anglo-Saxons, who sprawl in the warm sunshine . . . flirting with the brown-eyed "cholitas"'.[32]

While men cavorted, Zonian women suffered from isolation, and the containment enforced by Zone authorities made them especially bored and hostile towards Panamanians. A rare US novel set in the Zone, entitled *A Song in Their Hearts* and meant as a light-hearted romance, presented the wives of Zonian workers as unremittingly domestic, upbeat and loyal. But they also were intensely lonely and impatient with Panamanians.[33] Meanwhile the army wives' newsletter, *Tropi-call*, suggested that many chose to drown their problems in alcohol. One contributor's 'Tropical New Years Resolutions', for example, included 'to fix tomato juice and Alka-Seltzer instead of runny eggs for my husband the morning after stag nite'. She also vowed, 'along with countless others, to swear off the "stuff"'. Another Zonian wife, Dianne Christian, complained about the difficulties of maintaining a napkin wrapped around a condensing highball glass in sweltering Panama. 'After two or three drinks taken like this', she wrote giddily, 'I don't bother with the napkin at all and just let it fall to the floor. Sometimes the glass falls to the floor, too'.[34] Finally, few Zonian women appreciated going to Panama City or dealing with Panamanians. One of them complained to a newspaper about the little things that made contact with Panamanians disheartening for women: they spoke Spanish even when they knew English, traffic cops targeted Zonians and service was slow and rude. And the meat in Panama, 'it's just not eatable'. Several other women complained that maids did their chores badly or not at all.[35]

The self-isolation of the Zonians was one thing, but the knowledge that Panamanian women served as prostitutes for American men constituted an additional affront to masculine pride in Panama. Panamanian men commonly resented US soldiers who 'took our women', and radio commentators suggested that Panamanian women who attended dances at US posts were disloyal to their nation and most likely prostitutes.[36] Moreover, men held *el trato hidalgo* in high esteem. *El trato hidalgo*, vital to the Hispanic concept of honour, translates as 'gentlemanly courtesy', and Panamanians understood it in gendered terms, as a behavioural code of egalitarianism between men of all social classes. Panamanians often commented on Zonians' failure to uphold that code.

One popular image of the Zone was the forbidden fruit – plentiful and promising but unknown and dangerous. The Zone's jobs, commerce and women seemed to be reserved for US whites or West Indian blacks, and that lack of courtesy was endlessly insulting to Panamanian pride. Young Panamanian boys made the theme of the forbidden fruit literal when they tried to pluck ripe mangoes from the Zone's trees but were chased away by Zone police. Teenagers who sparked the riots of 1964, interviewed decades later, all remembered bitterly these mango episodes. By disrespecting Panamanians, as one former student put it, Zonians made them feel colonialism 'in flesh and blood'.[37]

Two novels in particular, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, expressed how the humiliation of Panamanian men fuelled a desire for rebellion. One of these was the

first novel to be set in the Canal Zone, Joaquín Beleño's award-winning *Luna verde*.[38] A desire to regain lost national honour burns within *Luna verde*'s protagonist, Ramón de Roquebert. As a teenager, he leaves the interior for Panama City when the building of a US base threatens his grandfather with expropriation. De Roquebert finds that he, too, must swallow his pride, and takes a job alongside Zonians. But he cannot stomach the moral indecencies of the Yankee economy and dies at the hands of US-armed Panamanian police during a protest. To nationalists, the message was clear: young men who sought peer approval could find it through anti-imperialist protest. *Luna verde* became compulsory reading for high school students, notably including those who started the 1964 riots.[39]

Luna verde at first glance seems merely a call to nationalist action. But its gender symbolism is obvious right below the surface of its misogynist story line.[40] For de Roquebert, it is women who mediate all his emotions against the United States. For instance, he resents the depravity of Yankee men, who simultaneously lack virility yet also spread licentiousness by fathering illegitimate children. He has no qualms, however, about objectifying women as go-betweens in his power relationships with Zonians. To gain a Zonian's favour, de Roquebert arranges to have him frequent his sister. He also falls for a US woman, who treats him coyly, and whom he desires with a hurtful hatred. He wants to possess her 'until my blood [*raza*] infects your blood and wipes off your dominant, powerful Saxon smirk'. He wants to violate her as the United States has his country. In the end he is disaffected with regard to all women, who lack the virtues of political struggle: 'women have no conscience, no morality, nor any sense of dignity', he scowls.[41]

Gil Blas Tejeira, a journalist, educator and statesman, inserted a similar frustration over an emasculated Panama into his equally popular *Pueblos perdidos*, published in 1962. One of its main characters is María de los Angeles, one of the 'lost people' of the title: virtuous and pure, but uprooted from her native Guatemala to live in the still-Colombian department of Panama in the nineteenth century. Orphaned at a young age, she flourishes under the pious, platonic protection of a Colombian politician, Pedro Prestán. Soon enough, however, as France attempts to build a canal through the Isthmus, a French engineer named Camilo Rostand asks for de los Angeles's hand. It is Prestán, not his protégé, who warns Rostand: 'you feel only an animal attraction to María de los Angeles and want to possess her for yourself without considering the consequences'. But Prestán also knows he cannot deny her to Rostand, perhaps just as Colombia cannot deny the Isthmus to France. And perhaps just as France's progeny in the region – the canal project – failed and left behind a half-dug ditch, so the Frenchman leaves de los Angeles with an illegitimate child.[42] In comes the United States to revive the project, and while there is rejoicing among Panamanians, the racism of US officials, especially towards the heroic mixed-race Prestán, is shocking to them.

Like Beleño, Tejeira explicitly addressed the racial identity of Panama but not its gender identity. Throughout *Pueblos perdidos*, de los Angeles, the embodiment of the Panamanian nation, is a more positive and active character than the women in *Luna verde*. But the men who vie for her attention – the Panamanian peasants who resist expropriation by canal builders and even her son – enjoy more agency than she does. Tejeira makes a valid nationalist point that Panama has been long without choosing its own destiny, but he never questions his own technique of feminising the nation.

Nationalists reproduced these relationships in real-life responses to US imperialism. They often decried the 'rape' and 'humiliation' of Panama by the United States, but when that rape was literal they dwelled mostly on the symbolic harm to US–Panama relations.[43] Historian Michael Donoghue came to these conclusions in his work on a little-known rape case involving two US troops and two Panamanian sisters in 1955. At stake for Panamanians, he noted, were not the rights of these women but rather concepts of 'national dignity and victimization in the face of US power'. In press depictions of court testimony, 'Panamanian observers feminized their country . . . as virtuous, dignified, and pure in the face of predatory and depraved US masculinity'. After the accused received a light sentence and a $100 fine, Panamanians erupted in protest, but no one asked how the women felt. Instead, in a symbolic effort to restore purity to the nation by covering its flesh, Archbishop Francis Beckman banned bathing suits from Panamanian beauty contests and threatened to excommunicate women who wore them. Miss Panama also withdrew from the Miss Universe Contest in Long Beach, California, a move that pleased nationalists.[44]

Institutions of manhood: the military and students

The National Guard (Guardia Nacional, or GN) and two public educational institutions in Panama City, the University of Panama (Universidad de Panamá, or UP) and the National Institute (Instituto Nacional, or IN) were the mini-societies that emerged from the 1930s to the 1960s to prepare a gendered turnaround, transforming an inchoate sense of feminised national inferiority into a 'remasculinised' drive to confront the United States and thus heal the wounded manhood of national identity. The military and the schools produced what Wendy Brown has described as institutionalised ideals of manhood, allowing middle-class boys (and some girls in education) to climb up institutional ladders through performative excellence, the most exalted form of which was to sacrifice their bodies in the name of national dignity.[45] In the riots of 1964, these two institutions were central: the students started the riots and the soldiers deliberately failed to stop them. It was the first time both institutions acted on the same side, and a common gendered national identity was their rhetorical vehicle.

'Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed', wrote David Morgan, 'those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct'.[46] Several scholars have observed the strong links between military institutions and the masculinist articulations embedded within national identities.[47] In Panama, the police and military were neither more nor less masculinist than in other Latin American nations, but the existence of a force of thousands of US soldiers in the Canal Zone deepened their feminised sense of inferiority and exacerbated their desire to rebel.

Early in Panama's history, the Panamanian military lived what could only be described as a humiliation for Latin American men. On the eve of independence, the department of Panama had a respectable army of the Republic of 500 men headed by Colombian general Esteban Huertas. When the revolution came, however, the army folded. Panamanian separatists bribed Huertas not to oppose their plans, and the US government duped his replacement by convincing him to cross the Isthmus on a comfortable train separately from his troops, from whom he was then permanently separated.[48] Though the event helped usher in independence, it became a metaphor for Panama's

first generation of leaders – cajoled into comfort and security rather than thrust into heroism through duty and risk.

When the United States took over Panama as a protectorate, it further emasculated the military by disarming it – literally. In 1904, the US minister to Panama City observed 'that there were too many young officers strutting around Panama' and counselled taking away the army's weapons. A law in March 1904 halved the army, to 250 men, and in November of that year Panamanian leaders dissolved the military completely and left in its stead a National Police that would not threaten, but rather protect, the rule of European-descended urban elites.[49] But even that limited role proved an annoyance to US soldiers stationed in the Zone – and especially to sailors on shore leave – who often quarrelled with the National Police in the red light district of Panama City. In 1916, after one too many of these confrontations, the order came down from Washington to strip the police of their high-powered rifles. A final humiliation came in 1917 when the United States assigned a Washington, DC, policeman as instructor of the National Police and then as police commissioner.[50] During these years, the urban elite remained uninterested in joining the National Police, which remained low-paid, mixed-race and working-class.

Paradoxically, it was the US desire for heightened security in the Cold War that remasculinised the security force. By the early 1950s, the police more than ever provided upward mobility for modest but ambitious Panamanian men. One of these was José Antonio Remón, who rose from an impoverished family to become the head of the National Police and a wealthy man with ownership of or rackets in cattle, gas stations, bus routes, apartment houses, farms, racehorses, a newspaper, a house of prostitution and the flow of narcotics from Bolivia to the United States.[51] Soon after the elevation of Remón to the presidency in 1952, the National Police became the National Guard, an anti-communist quasi-army now 2,500 strong. The law creating the GN also expressly restored its symbolic manly pride by decreeing military honours for guards who 'met death in acts of heroism' and punishing citizens who verbally 'mocked, insulted or offended' guards, including those who used a GN whistle without authorisation.[52] By the eve of the 1964 riots, the GN was fully integrated into Washington's continent-wide anti-communist security force.[53] As the mid-1960s approached, it remained perched between its feminised past and masculinised future – between remaining subservient to US security desires and asserting itself as a force for Panamanian nationhood.

Alongside the national security forces emerged the students. Especially notable were two educational institutions that often opposed the influence of the military on politics but that, more importantly, joined the military in restoring Panama's national pride. George Mosse singled out public schools for their 'vital role in projecting masculinity as necessary to the working of a modern society'. The National Institute and University of Panama did just that, shaping young middle-class Panamanians into a 'nonaristocratic elite that could lead society and the state'.[54]

The IN and UP grew out of a generational shift towards more radical political ideas. The 1920s and 1930s not only saw the ascent of Arnulfo Arias but also the birth of several socialist parties and workers' groups.[55] All of these were highly critical of the *entreguismo* (deferring to the United States) of the first generation of Panamanians, and students grew increasingly influenced by these new political movements. In 1918, students also witnessed the invasion of Panama City by US troops during an election, and in 1921 they organised against the two-year US occupation of Chiriquí. As a result,

in the 1930s students integrated the new groups and, influenced by the South American student movement, formed the Revolutionary Alliance of United Youth.[56]

The National Institute emerged as the first institution pledged to this activism and, though only a high school, it remained the most important educational institution for rehabilitating Panama's self-image. The IN was founded in 1909 as a prestigious public secondary school that had US instructors and even the former US commissioner of the Puerto Rican educational system as its rector.[57] Gradually, IN instructors became mostly Panamanian, and its pupils increasingly diverse and ambitious. In one poll, 73 per cent of its students categorised themselves as 'lower/working class', yet 93 per cent planned to attend university. The IN eventually graduated some of the most important men in Panama: statesmen such as Juan Antonio Tack, Jorge Illueca, Manuel Solís Palma, Ernesto de la Guardia and the infamous Manuel Noriega were all alumni. The high school clearly prepared its boys for politics. Proudly assuming male personas as the 'sphinxes' or the 'eagles' of the nation (two concrete lions also greeted students at its front steps), IN graduates ritualised reverence for the nation's symbols: civic education taught the singing of the anthem and the handling of the flag, and the daily raising and lowering of the banner became a solemn ritual.[58] In the 1960s, one researcher polled hundreds of IN and Zonian students and found 'Panamanian students to be far more politicized that the American students in the Canal Zone'.[59]

The growing radiance of the IN and of radical movements in the 1920s and 1930s led to the creation of the University of Panama in 1935. President Harmodio Arias, Arnulfo's brother, supported its foundation so as to cement the growing political consciousness of students to his own party. Mainly populated by students not wealthy enough to study in the United States, the UP formed a Federation of Panamanian Students in 1944, and its law students led demonstrations and developed an ability to argue the finer points of US–Panama treaty history.[60] The venerable founder and dean of the UP until his death in 1954, Oscar Méndez Pereira (Harmodio's brother-in-law), kept students focused on creating a permanent 'state of rebellion' against US imperialism.[61]

Soon, Panamanian students shared a vibrant culture of political protest that was highly masculinised. The Panamanian state made a clear choice to promote youth activism, spending at mid-century a greater percentage of its gross domestic product on education than any other nation in the hemisphere, including the United States.[62] The result was that, in the 1950s, researchers John Biesanz and Luke Smith described how Panamanian politics placed a great premium on 'virtuoso achievement by the adult male'. Student protesters were celebrated for 'getting jailed, setting up barricades, baring their breasts to the police and daring them to shoot, and sometimes getting injured or killed by the police'.[63]

The first major opportunity for Panamanian society to identify students with national dignity came in 1947. That year, public school students led a nationalist movement against the extension of a 1942 Defense Site Agreement that allowed the United States to build wartime military installations in Panama. As the Panamanian legislature debated ratification, widespread violence erupted in the capital. During the debate, the president of the National Assembly announced that '10,000 boys with knives' waited outside for anyone who dared approve the extension. President Enrique A. Jiménez nevertheless unleashed his police force on the students, wounding dozens and killing one. In an unprecedented response, public demonstrations supported the students so overwhelmingly that they compelled legislators to vote down the extension.[64]

As the 1950s wore on, students and members of the military gained power and prestige. The military increased its technological prowess and legal authority and indicated its desire to have more say in who ruled Panama. Students, meanwhile, grew more confident as bearers of the nation's sovereignty. The archives of Panama's Foreign Ministry hold several documents showing how high officials resented the ability of students to monopolise nationalist protests. In November 1958, for instance, the ambassador to Chile bemoaned the students' tendency to take over patriotic celebrations. 'I see that the illustrious students surpassed themselves once again on Panama Day', he observed sarcastically. 'What imbeciles – and I am being polite. The blame for these excesses should be laid at the feet of past Administrations, who injected these young punks with too much belligerence'.[65]

Despite the parallel growth of the military and educational opportunities, students and soldiers were never united behind any nationalist project between 1947 and 1964. The student-led violence of 1947, after all, had turned from being anti-US to being anti-oligarchy and fighting the police, and the Guard and students kept on clashing in subsequent events during the 1950s. To break the institutional tension, students and the military needed just the right issue – an event in which students would not simply die in protest against the GN (which happened in 1947) or simply confront US forces with no fatalities (that happened in 1959; see below), but an event in which death would come at the hands of the United States. Only when the two conditions intersected could masculinised courage be juxtaposed with feminised martyrdom. The riots of 1964 provided these conditions.

Conjectures of manhood: the riot generation

Scholars of masculinity have coined a phrase that expresses well what happened to Panama in the late 1950s and early 1960s: the 'flight from femininity'. This term refers to the most important cultural rule of masculinity – learning to despise attributes associated with femininity such as physical weakness or homosexuality.[66] In Panama's case, decolonisation prompted the flight from emasculation. The growing realisation of the nation's neo-colonial status clashed with a rising generation of young men institutionalised into a form of nationalism predicated upon the assertion of masculine prerogative. The result was to promote flag-planting as the consensual articulation of revolt against emasculation.

In Latin America, it was the Cuban Revolution that recalibrated manhood and politics in the age of decolonisation. The heroics of Fidel Castro in the late 1950s inspired young men around the hemisphere. What captured their imagination, as historian Van Gosse has written, 'was Fidel's virility as much as anything else'. Virility made Castro and his *barbudos* (the 'bearded ones' – the name itself celebrated masculinity) the 'bad boys' that men aspired to be as they negotiated their place in their societies.[67] Castro's masculinity, moreover, was pointedly political: he was neither a 'rebel without a cause' nor a pleasure-seeking beatnik. Rather, in the face of corruption and complacency, the Cuban rebels revived rather traditional male virtues: the sacrifice of more lucrative careers for the uncertainty of guerrilla struggle, persistence despite daunting odds, stamina in battle and speeches, a personal touch with common folk and asceticism whether in the Sierra Maestra or the Presidential Palace. In addition, the 'new man' of which Castro aide Ernesto Che Guevara preached wedded this

politicisation of masculinity to the emerging socialist state: this man was strong and silent and sacrificed his talents for the greater good.[68] The Castro myth stirred men and boys alike. In the early months of the Cuban Revolution, boys in the United States played with Castro dolls, beards and hats as if he were a modern-day cowboy.[69] Soon a more serious game of guerrilla warfare spread through Latin America following the cultural codes of the Cuban Revolution.[70]

Panamanians were influenced by the Cuban Revolution, as were all Latin American nationalists, but Panamanians also sought special guidance from movements for decolonisation in Africa and Asia. Panamanians identified uniquely with Egyptian nationalists' claims to their own canal at Suez and would respond to writer Frantz Fanon's call for psychological catharsis through violence. 'At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force', wrote Fanon. 'It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect'.[71] Inspired by Cuba, Egypt, Algeria and other anti-colonial struggles, Panamanians now needed their own strategy of performative excellence, one that would draw on revolutionary masculinity as it spoke to Panama's history of emasculation and made good use of its institutions of manhood.

In the 1950s, Panamanians, especially students, developed that strategy: planting flags in the Canal Zone as a symbol of sovereignty over the disputed territory. Flag-planting arose from the frustrations of a generation-long diplomatic effort to secure for Panama greater recognition of its sovereignty over the Zone. Even since the Republic had been a protectorate of the United States, statesmen as anti-US as the Arias brothers and as pro-US as Remón had gained greater control over the waterway. The latest revision had occurred in 1955 under Remón, whose negotiators obtained more access to the Zone and greater benefits from it for Panamanians.

But by the late 1950s, this incremental strategy – an often humiliating ritual of begging while pretending not to beg – proved unsatisfying to a new generation of men whose ambitions aimed higher and whose strategy of flag-planting forced more direct, immediate confrontation. In this atmosphere, flag-planting took hold of Panamanian politics. In 1958, nationalists and students joined to plant flags in the US-controlled Canal Zone and it proceeded without incident. In November 1959, however, the boys of the IN attempted to do the same thing, but this time, nine months into the Castro revolt, they encountered massive resistance on the part of US troops, and a clash resulted in eighty to 120 wounded. The fighting began when a sixteen-year-old Panamanian wrapped his flag around the head of a Zone policeman and shouted, 'it's dirty, now!' President Ernesto de la Guardia had given the demonstrations his silent acquiescence, and after the riots the Palace accused Zone police of having 'desecrated' the flag by plucking it out of the ground and possibly dropping it or trampling it.[72]

The flag had such political heft for several reasons. Legally, its presence in the Zone implied some sort of sovereignty over the area, and US administrators had removed it from the Zone early in the century for that reason.[73] If it now flew on US bases, the Pentagon argued, Panamanians might demand a say in defence decisions. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy both ordered the Panamanian flag to be flown, but in early January 1964, after Kennedy's death, one high school principal barred the flying of any flags on his lawn. That high school was the target of the IN students on 9 January.[74]

Luna verde's Ramón de Roquebert cursed how *la Zona* emasculated him. 'Canal Zone: I entered you and you shredded my manliness. You are egotistical; you never understand; you are tyrannical and despotic; you humiliate!'[75] The image of the Zone as a man-eater helps explain how the flag became a cultural fetish with immediate aesthetic and emotional resonance for redeeming Panamanian manhood. The flag was doubly gendered. On the one hand, it was a feminine object, to be admired for its fragility, handled with care and protected at all costs. Panamanians widely and immediately interpreted its tearing on 9 January as a 'violation' or 'outrage' committed against the nation itself. Yet the flag was also a masculine symbol, and as such allowed a reversal of self-feminisation. Panamanians carried it reverently, paraded it and penetrated, uninvited, into the forbidden area to drive the staff of national affirmation into the pristine lawns of Zonians. The move was perilous and irreversible. Its peril enabled Panamanian men to demonstrate performative excellence, and its irreversibility symbolised a 'taking' back of the Zone. As the daily *El Día* proclaimed in 1960, 'sovereignty, like virginity, is or is not – there is no halfway measure'.[76] Flag-planting, finally, had a social benefit, that of blurring the lines of race and class and promoting the unity of rich and poor, black and white as anti-imperialist men above all. In short, flag-planting proved simple, easy, cheap and democratic.

When the riots exploded and the first fatalities occurred, Panamanians were united in portraying themselves with both feminine and masculine ideals, victimised yet redeemed. One nationalist called Panama 'our weak *and* valiant Fatherland'.[77] All seemed to agree that Zonian teenagers had committed an 'assault' on the Panamanian flag by tearing it (although it could not be proved who tore it) and that US police and soldiers had then fired on 'defenceless' Panamanians. Less than a day after the start of the riots, the Panamanian daily *El Panamá-América* editorialised that Panamanian sovereignty had been 'ferociously violated' by US troops who had unleashed their firepower 'against children, teenagers, youths and the elderly, men and women, all armed with nothing more than their patriotism'.[78] The press made martyrs out of men who were either shooting at Zonians or looting while they died, and used hyperbolic words like 'massacre', 'genocide', 'holocaust' or 'hecatomb' to express Panama's persecution.[79] Several overturned traditional US–Latin American perceptions by marking *US* citizens as uncivilised: 'shooting children, assassinating old men and women, disrespecting all of humanity, the barbarians of the North . . . uprooted forever the seed of respect and admiration that we Panamanians had for them deep in our naïve, innocent hearts'.[80]

Feminising the United States also allowed for a remasculinisation of Panama. To create that effect, Panamanian rhetoric held that the US forces unevenly arrayed against Panama proved a sign not of strength but of cowardice. A typical editorial claimed that 'nothing, no one, will ever be able to erase the cowardice of the most powerful army of the world towards the smallest and noblest nation of the universe. The blood of the loving sons of this country who were massacred will rise in the face of this cowardice'.[81] The accusation of spinelessness was overtly gendered in an effort to turn the rhetorical tables on the US government and portray it as weak in using violence rather than diplomacy to address Panamanian claims. Driving home the point none too subtly, a photomontage in *La Prensa* had the US president's wife, Lady Bird Johnson, with President Johnson on her arm, saying to a friend, 'and I told Lyndon many times

. . . not to negotiate' with the Panamanians. The artwork suggested that Johnson took orders from his wife not to speak to Panamanians 'man to man'.[82]

Perhaps the most common masculinist word used by politicians and the media during the riot crisis was 'virility', a signifier understood by all audiences as representing the virtues of the rioters. A few days into the fighting, the Christian Democratic Party applauded 'the virile and patriotic act of the Panamanian people'.[83] A few days later *Crítica* editorialised that the riots were 'the first virile cry of true independence'.[84] 'Panamanian territory has been stained', declared the president of a journalists' syndicate; in response, 'we will oppose our virile and determined fighting force towards the full enjoyment of Panamanian dignity'.[85] Another organisation asserted that a 'virile attitude' of self-determination was exactly what the United States feared most from Panama.[86] Virility communicated courage, strength, persistence and unity. For this reason, novelist Joaquín Beleño, now head of *La Prensa*'s editorial pages, wrote that 'the virile and determined position of our government must be supported by all citizens'.[87] And so a normally uniquely masculine quality was now the property of all Panamanians – rich or poor, women or men, people or government.

Masculinity also expressed itself as stoicism. As César Villareal's testimony about 'self-immolation' suggested, the violence of the riots was an occasion to elevate pain as a national virtue. Doing harm to one's body or 'repudiat[ing] the earthly ties, needs, and physicality of human life' had long been a staple of manhood, as Wendy Brown has explained. In Panama, not only individuals but the nation as a whole had to be stoic: the riots led to the breaking of relations with the United States, which meant the loss of millions of US dollars in economic aid and revenue to Panama from the canal. In the face of such a hardship, Panamanians pledged to 'eat dignity', which meant to gain sustenance from the ideal of true independence rather than to remain fat from collaboration with US imperialism.[88] One militia group from the interior applauded the 'Spartan attitude' of the Panamanian people 'in defence of its legitimate and sacred rights of sovereignty'.[89] At the height of the riot, there was an almost ecstatic satisfaction in finally suffering loss of life at the hands of foreigners. 'Never has the grief of the Fatherland been more sublime, more glorious', editorialised *La Prensa*.[90]

Confirming the importance of new masculinist institutions, leaders exalted all students who died in the riots. Unlike in previous confrontations, when elites and the media saw students as hotheaded nuisances, young men now hit by US bullets were the benefactors of glorifications usually reserved for fallen soldiers. As *El Panamá-América* wrote, all agreed that Panamanian youths were imbued with 'the purest ideals'.[91] Immediately after the riots, President Roberto Chiari invited student leaders to the Presidential Palace and posed for photographs with the torn flag.[92] Secretary of Education Manuel Solís Palma called on educators to propagate 'the dignification of the Fatherland' in every school in honour of the dead students.[93] *El Día* even suggested that the entire diplomatic corps be replaced by fresh university graduates.[94]

The greatest sign that rioting had become a legitimate display of masculinist nationalism by 1964 was that the state sanctioned the behaviour. Before the riots, according to one student, the dean of the IN gave students permission to use the revered 1947 banner for the march, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations also knew about the students' intentions to march into the Zone.[95] As noted above, the president also symbolically backed the rioters by receiving their leaders in his palace. It was Foreign Minister Galileo Solís who, despite the hundreds of US citizens attacked and

Zone homes burned, propagated the myth of a one-sided US massacre by circulating the accusation that 'the armed attacks suffered recently by peaceful and defenceless Panamanian citizens . . . were unleashed without any hostile act whatsoever on the part of Panamanians'.[96] It was a testament not merely to the capacity of the government to lie but to the society's need to believe.

The military also redeemed itself within the dual gendered national identity of Panama by sanctioning the riots. Always closer to US power than were the students, the National Guard nevertheless used the violence to contest its continuing subaltern position within the neo-colonial relationship. When the riots broke out, US administrators in the Canal Zone chose not to send US troops beyond the Zone's boundaries and into the Republic of Panama lest it be accused of an act of war, and so it relied on its proxy, the GN, to suppress those who threw Molotov cocktails into the Zone or climbed over its fences to plant flags.[97] But the proxy was in a bind. According to its commander, Colonel Bolívar Vallarino, crowds clamoured at its arsenals demanding that the GN hand out weapons for a people's war against the United States. Vallarino refused, but he also refused to intervene against rioting mobs. Zone officials made eight calls to Panamanian officials, including Vallarino and the president's aides, all of whom either promised action or remained non-committal and then did nothing.[98] Zonians provided the GN with tear gas that went unused.[99] The GN promised to pinpoint snipers but never did.[100] One month later, Vallarino explained his inaction:

> The students had been insulted, and the flag had been insulted by the Zonians and the American students, [so] if we had sent out troops to the border, the Guardia would have clashed with the Panamanian people, who at that time were acting patriotically and trying to plant flags around the Zone. They would have accused us of being traitors and anti-patriots. The Guardia's situation was very difficult.[101]

Here was the dilemma of Panama's gendered nationalism deployed as military policy: the GN did not want to appear weak before the Panamanian people but neither did it surrender its authority to them. At the same time, it did not want to appear subservient to US administrators but neither would it confront them directly. Panama's military remasculinised itself by doing nothing, a bold move given the context.

Reflecting on the riots shortly after their end, nationalists argued that January 1964 marked a turning point for national identity. On 4 March, a columnist for the Panamanian daily *El Día* asserted that Panama was in the process of ridding itself once and for all of its 'collective inferiority complex' and acquiring a self-confidence 'with neither hatreds nor complexes'.[102] Soon after the riots, commentator César de León published a book in which he argued that, before 1964, Panama 'appeared to Latin American observers as a nation without personality, lacking any dignity or self-esteem'. Now, however, Panamanians would go on the offence against Washington's colonialism.[103] Another Panamanian commentator wrote a few years later that in 1964 'a small people made itself a moral giant and sacrificed itself in a holocaust for the fatherland'.[104] Historian Carlos Bolívar Pedreschi agreed that, before 1964, 'for many our nationality seemed an anaemic nationality, without vigour, incapable of patriotic and heroic action'.[105] After the riots, he noted that the previously radical desire to force Washington to devolve the canal to the Republic of Panama now became a mainstream assumption.

That may have been – no polls from the time exist to confirm or deny whether most Panamanians wanted the canal to be theirs. Regardless, US administrators of the canal, along with their Panamanian friends in the oligarchy, showed little willingness to give away such a precious resource over a simple riot. US officials continued to disparage politics in Panama by noting its feminine side: its ambivalence, weakness, irrationality and emotion. US citizens expected gratitude from its servant, and blanched from shock when gratitude did not materialise. When Panamanians protested the US refusal to fly their flag, US officials fumed that, like a nagging mistress, 'the Panamanians are at it again'. Right after the riots, an editorial that enjoyed circulation in several US newspapers, entitled 'Panama Emotionalism', bemoaned that Panama had a 'sentimental case' that would unfortunately win adherents worldwide.[106] Reflecting that view about sentimentalism, Secretary of State Dean Rusk framed US–Panamanian relations as 'a kind of minuet' in which Washington maintained the illusion of parity between hegemon and dependent by ritualistically asking Panama to dance – for instance, by increasing Panama's share of canal wealth.[107] The strategy strongly suggested that Washington perceived Panama City's actions as symptomatic of trickery and coquettishness – female rather than male characteristics, and unflattering ones at that.

Perhaps most important, Panama's united front against emasculation lasted only a few months, demonstrating the volatile political nature of a dual-gendered national identity. Once Washington and Panama City reached an agreement in April 1964 to discuss their differences, and especially after President Johnson announced in December that the United States would consider giving the canal to Panama, the consensus between oligarchy, students and the military collapsed. The December announcement was the most divisive: while Johnson foresaw that Panama would one day run the canal, he made no hard promises, and more importantly he vowed to build a second canal, at sea level, but possibly somewhere else in Central America. The slow pace of the negotiations that followed dismayed Panamanians, who used language that suggested a return of the feminised self-image of pre-riot days. *Crítica* wrote, for instance, that 'our recent attitude in Washington confirms the black legend that weighs on Panama, of being the *gringos*' most submissive satellite . . . To *outrage* and *humiliation*, we have answered with *servility*'.[108]

Conclusion

The eventual outcome of the riots was beneficial for Panama: in 1977, the United States agreed to hand over the canal to Panama in 1999. Perhaps not surprisingly, that 1970s negotiation occurred under the most celebrated *macho* in Panamanian history, President Omar Torrijos, whose overt display of masculine behaviour – wearing military fatigues, drinking hard, womanising in public – one historian explains as the increasing masculinisation of Panamanian politics after 1964.[109] But the accusation about *entreguismo* goes much farther to explain why poverty and corruption, not to mention military dictatorship from 1968 to 1990, plagued Panama after the riots of 1964. The construction of a national identity that was unusually gendered allowed Panamanians to suspend all of their other disputes – especially those between white, urban, Europeanised elites and intellectuals on one side and mixed-race, rural, indigenous farmers and workers on the other. These two groups agreed that a feminised self-image was unacceptable

when laid bare, and that masculine honour had to be defended when directly challenged. The recurring themes of emasculation, self-feminisation and remasculinisation together shaped a narrative arc in Panama's national identity that compelled its most masculine institutions into a violent clash with the United States. Yet when the crisis passed, Panamanians failed to confront any of their other divisions.

For scholars of gender and history, Panama–US relations reveal the potential in cross-breeding the discipline of US foreign relations history with the still-nascent field of masculinity studies. Perhaps because Panama presents an exaggerated case of the gendering of Latin American resistance leading to actual violence against US citizens, it clarifies the scholarly roadmap for ongoing explorations into masculinity, nationalism and US foreign relations. The methods and insights of masculinity studies suggest that the causal links between ideals of manhood and material policy are not too obvious to argue but rather subtle and fascinating to chart.

Notes

1. Wendy Brown, *Manhood and Politics: A Feminist Reading in Political Theory* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), pp. 25–6.
2. César Villareal, interview by author (hereafter Villareal interview), Panama City, 15 October 1999. All interview transcripts in the author's possession.
3. George Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15.
4. David D. Gilmore, *Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 30. See also R. W. Connell, *Masculinities: Knowledge, Power and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 71–3.
5. Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish–American and Philippine–American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Amy Kaplan, another leading scholar of gender and nationalism, has explained the link between culture and action as the former providing a 'cognitive and libidinal map' for politics, in Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 106–11.
6. See, e.g., Doris Sommer, *Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Steve J. Stern, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Matthew C. Gutmann, *The Meanings of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Ian Lumsden, *Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); Alfredo Mirandé, *Hombres y Machos: Masculinity and Latino Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Carlos Monsiváis, *Aires de familia: Cultura y sociedad en América Latina* (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2000); Matthew C. Gutmann (ed.), *Changing Men and Masculinities in Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
7. Lauren Derby, 'The Dictator's Seduction: Gender and State Spectacle during the Trujillo Regime', *Callaloo* 23 (2000), pp. 1,112–46; Lara Putnam, *The Company They Kept: Migrants and the Politics of Gender in Caribbean Costa Rica, 1870–1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
8. Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 15. Other examples include Catherine LeGrand, *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia, 1850–1936* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986); Eileen J. Findlay, 'Love in the Tropics: Marriage, Divorce, and the Construction of Benevolent Colonialism in Puerto Rico, 1898–1910', in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore (eds), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 139–72; Emily S. Rosenberg, 'Revisiting Dollar Diplomacy: Narratives of Money and Manliness', *Diplomatic History* 22 (1998), pp. 155–76; Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Eileen J. Suárez Findlay, *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870–1920* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Heidi Tinsman, *Partners in Conflict: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, and Labor in the Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1950–1973* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

9. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott (eds), *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), has chapters on Argentina, Mexico and Guatemala. Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger (eds), *Nationalisms & Sexualities* (New York: Routledge, 1992), has chapters on Argentina, Cuba and Disney cartoons in Latin America.
10. Authors who used these words include Presciliano Barrios, *Identidad nacional: Fantasía y verdad* (Panama City: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1993), p. 13; Carlos Arosemena Arias, 'Una visión sociológica de nuestras relaciones con los Estados Unidos', *Lotería* 16 (March 1957), pp. 10–18, here p. 14; José Isaac Fábrega, 'Se va produciendo un cambio en la psicología de panameño', *Lotería* 366 (May–June 1987), pp. 104–13, here p. 104.
11. Steve C. Ropp, 'Panama: Militarism and Imposed Transition', in Thomas W. Walker and Ariel C. Armony (eds), *Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), pp. 111–30, here p. 112.
12. Louis A. Pérez, Jr, *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. 111–12.
13. Walter LaFeber, *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 33.
14. Ropp, 'Panama: Militarism and Imposed Transition', pp. 116–17; Peter A. Szok, '*La última gaviota*': *Liberalism and Nostalgia in Early Twentieth-Century Panamá* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp. 5–8. Even in 1961, some Panamanians still celebrated their peaceful traditions: 'Panama', said Prospero Melendez, 'has never considered force as a way to have its rights recognised', in 'Panamá y El Canal', *Lotería* 62 (January 1961), pp. 78–100, here p. 98.
15. Ramón Valdés cited in Szok, '*La última gaviota*', p. 33.
16. In 1921 there was a minor altercation with Costa Rica, and in 1959 an effort by a small group of Panamanian nationalists to invade their own country failed miserably. Additionally, some died in rent strikes in 1925, but it is unclear if US troops were responsible. Significantly, since this was an anti-elite movement, the dead were not elevated as national martyrs.
17. O. Pérez, 'Public Opinion and the Future of U.S.–Panama Relations', *Latin American Politics and Society* 41.3 (1999), pp. 1–33.
18. For versions of the 'black legend', see Rufino Blanco Fombona, *Letras y letrados de Hispanoamérica* (Paris: Sociedad de ediciones literarias y artísticas, 1908); Isidro Fabela, *Los Estados Unidos contra la libertad* (Barcelona: Talleres Gráficos 'Lux', 1920). The major work that gathered together these 'redeemers' was Catalino Arrocha Graell's *Historia de la independencia de Panamá, sus antecedentes y sus causas, 1821–1903* (1933; repr. Panama City: Litho-Impresora Panamá, 1973).
19. Salvador R. Merlos, *América Latina ante el peligro* (San José: Imprenta Nueva de Gerardo Matamoros, 1914), p. 120.
20. Carlos Bolívar Pedreschi, 'Negociaciones del canal con los Estados Unidos: 1904–1967', in Alfredo Castillero Calvo (ed.), *Historia General de Panamá*, vol. 3, part 2 (Panama City: Comité Central del Centenario de la República, 2004), pp. 25–42, here p. 25.
21. Eusebio Morales cited in Gregorio Selser, *El rapto de Panamá: De cómo los Estados Unidos inventaron un país y se apropiaron de un canal* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Alcándara, 1964), pp. 167–8.
22. Erasmo de la Guardia, *La tragedia del Caribe* (Panama City: Imprenta Nacional, 1938), p. 45.
23. Michael Conniff, *Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904–1981* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), pp. 22, 65–6. See also Rhonda D. Frederick's '*Colón Man a Come*': *Mythographies of Panama Canal Migration* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).
24. John and Mavis Biesanz, *The People of Panama* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 223–5, 229.
25. Biesanz, *The People of Panama*, p. 111.
26. Guillermo Andreve cited in Szok, '*La última gaviota*', p. 42.
27. Thelma King, *El problema de la soberanía en las relaciones entre Panamá y los Estados Unidos de América* (Panama City: Ministerio de Educación, 1961), p. 18.
28. Fernando Eleta cited in Harry McPherson, *A Political Education* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 223.
29. Fernando Eleta, interview by author, Panama City, 21 October 1999.
30. 'U.S. Citizens Eye Zonians' Attitude', *Panama American*, 24 February 1960.
31. '"Johnny Hazard" letter to the "Mail Box"', *Panama American*, 10 August 1958, p. 2.
32. John Hall cited in Szok, '*La última gaviota*', p. 61.
33. Janet Lambert, *A Song in their Hearts* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1956).
34. Kathy Guyton, 'Tropical New Years Resolutions', p. 5; Dianne Christian, 'Who's Nervous?', p. 9, both in *Tropi-Call*, Albrook Officers Wives Club, Canal Zone, Republic of Panama, January 1961.

35. '"American Mary" letter to the "Mail Box"', *Panama American*, 5 May 1958, p. 2.
36. 'Radio Digest No. 1', 13 November 1956, folder 1956-USI.A., box 3, lot 60D667, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Record Group (RG) 59, US National Archives, College Park, Maryland (NARA).
37. Villareal interview; also Luis Vergara, interview by author, Panama City, 27 October 1999.
38. Joaquín Beleño, *Luna verde* (Panama City: Manfer, [1950]). Some Panamanians have hesitated to accept Beleño as a representative national author because of critic Rodrigo Miró's suggestion that Beleño's usually black protagonists were of 'questionable Panamanianness'. *Luna verde*, in contrast, had a narrator who was not West Indian. See Salvador Arias, 'El Canal y su reflejo literario en algunas novelas de la década del 70', *Lotería* Special Edition I (July 1999), pp. 145–72, here p. 155; Zenaida Pérez de Sánchez, 'Prólogo', *Lotería* 373 (July 1988), pp. 16–19; Ismael García S., *Historia de la literatura panameña* (Panama City: Manfer, 1986), pp. 172–5.
39. Julio Ortega, interview by author, Panama City, 26 October 1999.
40. Scholars of the novel have overlooked its gendered aspects. The only exception is Rosa Itzel De Beermann and Ernestina Orocú S., 'La preocupación político-social en la novela canalera de Joaquín Beleño C.' (unpublished undergraduate dissertation, Universidad de Panamá, 1989). Françoise Perus, in 'Crisis, identidad y diálogo en *Luna verde* de Joaquín Beleño', *Tareas* 72 (1989), pp. 121–38, notes how *Luna verde* highlights the more egregious US influences like materialism, racism and violence, but also the fragmentations within Panamanian society: old versus young, police versus students and indigenous versus Hispanic Panamanians. She never mentions confrontations between men and women.
41. Beleño, *Luna verde*, pp. 139–40, 194.
42. Gil Blas Tejeira, *Pueblos perdidos* (1962; repr. Panama City: Editorial Universitario, 1995), p. 26.
43. See, e.g., Isaias García, *Naturaleza y forma de lo panameño* (Panama City: Ministerio de Educación, 1956); Diego Domínguez Caballero, 'Motivo y sentido de una investigación de lo panameño', *Presente* 7 (July–September 1966), p. 10.
44. Michael E. Donoghue, 'Rape and Murder in the Canal Zone: Cultural Conflict and the US Military Presence in Panama, 1955–1956', unpublished paper, Culture and International Relations 2 conference, Stiftung Leucorea, Wittenberg, Germany, 18–20 December 2002. Cited with the permission of the author.
45. Brown, *Manhood and Politics*.
46. David H. J. Morgan, 'Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities', in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds), *Theorizing Masculinities* (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 165–82, here p. 165.
47. Eric Roorda, for instance, has traced how the military in the Dominican Republic, especially the air force, acquired its associations between technological prowess and masculinity from US models and then took those associations several steps further to assert 'the creed of Dominican nationalism and potency beyond the republic', in Eric Paul Roorda, 'The Cult of the Airplane among U.S. Military Men and Dominicans during the U.S. Occupation and the Trujillo Regime', in Joseph, LeGrand and Salvatore (eds), *Close Encounters of Empire*, pp. 269–310, here p. 275. See also Donald Mrozek, 'The Habit of Victory: The American Military and the Cult of Manliness', in J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (eds), *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800–1940* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 220–41.
48. Carlos Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism: A Historical Interpretation* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1996), p. 48.
49. Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, p. 52.
50. Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, p. 56. On disarming see also Víctor Ávila, 'Del tratado colonialista de 1903 a la insurrección patriótica de 1964', *Tareas* 97 (1997), pp. 37–50, here p. 38; on fights, see Marta Chiari, *Historia de las relaciones de Panamá con los Estados Unidos* (Panama City: Universidad de Panamá, 1983).
51. Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, pp. 67, 81; Thomas Pearcy, *La generación del 31: Patriotas y pretorianos*, tr. M. A. Pantaleón García (Panama City: Universidad de Panamá, 1997), p. 22.
52. Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, p. 82; 'Plan of Action for Period from Present to October 1964', 26 December 1963, folder Panama Vol. 1 12/63–1/64, box 63, Latin America, Country File, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (LBJL). On Remón, see also Larry LaRae Pippin, *The Remón Era: An Analysis of a Decade of Events in Panama, 1947–1957* (Stanford: Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1964); Steve C. Ropp, *Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Nation to National Guard* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Steve C. Ropp, 'Military Reformism in Panama: New Directions or Old Inclinations', *Caribbean Studies* 12.3 (1972), pp. 45–63.
53. In 1960, Panama got its first $100,000 Military Assistance Program grant from the United States (grants grew to $3.1 million by 1968). That same year, 195 Panamanians trained at what would soon be called

the School of the Americas, and by 1964 the GN had increased its troop level to 3,400. Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, pp. 86, 88.

54. Mosse, *Image of Man*, pp. 134–5.
55. Examples include the Panamanian Communist Group, the Stalinist Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Marxist–Leninist Party, the Federation of Panamanian Workers, the General Syndicate of Workers and the Renters' League. Thomas L. Pearcy, *We Answer Only to God: Politics and the Military in Panama, 1903–1947* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), p. 45; Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism*, p. 84. On the rent strike, see Alexander Cuevas, *El movimiento inquilinario de 1925* (Panama City: Universidad de Panamá, 1973).
56. Jorge Conte Porras, *La rebelión de las esfinges: Historia del movimiento estudiantil panameño* (Panama City, 1977), p. 10; Pearcy, *We Answer Only to God*, p. 74. On the Chiriquí occupation see Carlos Cuestas Gómez, *Soldados americanos en Chiriquí* (Panama City: Litho Impresova Panamá, 1990).
57. Szok, '*La última gaviota*', pp. 68–70.
58. Mary Alice Abrego Hayward, 'Political Opinions of Panamanian Elite High School Youth: A Comparison of 1961–63 Students to 1989 Students' (unpublished master's dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1990), pp. 27–9; Conte Porras, *La rebelión de las esfinges*, p. 9. For explicitly nationalistic teaching materials, see M. M. Alba, *Estampas panameñas* (Panama City: Ministerio de Educación, 1959).
59. Edward Scott, Jr, 'The Political Orientations of Panamanian and Canal Zone Students: A Comparative Case Study in the Political Socialization of Latin American and American Youth' (unpublished master's dissertation, Michigan State University, 1964), n. p.
60. For a narrative of student-led demonstrations in 1947, see LaFeber, *The Panama Canal*, pp. 100–03; Pearcy, *La generación del 31*, pp. 58–9. On the law school, see 'GI Friendship Spans Panama Gringo Gap', *Miami Herald*, 17 February 1963, p. 3AW; Daniel Goldrich, *Radical Nationalism: The Political Orientations of Panamanian Law Students* (East Lansing: Bureau of Social and Political Research, College of Business and Public Service, Michigan State University, 1962).
61. Pearcy, *La generación del 31*, p. 29. On Méndez Pereira (1887–1954) see also García S., *Historia de la literatura panameña*, pp. 92–5.
62. R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez, *In the Time of the Tyrants: Panama: 1968–1990* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 48.
63. John Biesanz and Luke Smith, 'Panamanian Politics', *Journal of Politics* 14 (1952), pp. 386–402, here pp. 389, 402.
64. Pearcy, *We Answer Only to God*, pp. 5–10, quotation on p. 128. See also Thomas L. Pearcy, 'Estudiantes y militares: 1936–1989', in Castillero Calvo (ed.), *Historia General de Panamá*, vol. 3, part 2, pp. 43–62, here p. 51. See also David Acosta, *Influencia decisiva de la opinión pública en el rechazo del Convenio Filós-Hines de 1947* (Panama City: Editorial Universitaria, 1994).
65. José Guillermo Batalla, Ambassador to Chile, letter to Foreign Minister Miguel Moreno, 12 November 1958, vol. 14, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Administración de Ernesto de la Guardia, Archivo de la Presidencia, Panama City, Panama. See also Minister of Foreign Relations Miguel Moreno to President Ernesto de la Guardia, memorandum, 12 July 1958, vol. 2, 1958–1959, Visitas Oficiales a Panamá, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Panama (AMRE).
66. Michael S. Kimmel, 'Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity', in Brod and Kaufman (eds), *Theorizing Masculinities*, pp. 119–41, here p. 127.
67. Van Gosse, *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left* (New York: Verso, 1993), pp. 54, 55.
68. This 'new' self-restrained man was in part a reaction to what Cubans perceived to be the moral laxity of men in the pre-1959 US-sanctioned sex tourism. See Lumsden, *Machos, Maricones, and Gays*. Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr (eds) (3rd edn, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997). This edition also contains case studies of guerrilla warfare in seven Latin American nations.
69. Untitled photo, *Bohemia* (Havana), 26 April 1959, p. 80; 'Castro-Bearded Babes in Woods', *Life*, 13 April 1959, p. 16.
70. On the 'New Man', Cuban masculinity myths and Latin Americans following them, see Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1991), esp. pp. 17–20 and 41–59; Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Mosse, *The Image of Man*, p. 128; Florencia E. Mallon, '*Barbudos*, Warriors, and *Rotos*: The MIR, Masculinity, and Power in the Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1965–74', in Gutmann (ed.), *Changing Men*, pp. 179–215.

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72. Alan McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 90–91.
73. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Report of Proceedings: Briefing by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the World Situation*, Washington, DC, 16 January 1964, reel 5, p. 36; John Major, *Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903–1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 47–8; Lester Langley, *The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century* (revised edn, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985), pp. 67–8; King, *El problema de la soberanía*, p. 52.
74. 'Resumen de los puntos planteados por el señor Presidente de la República de Panamá al Dr. Milton Eisenhower', 16 July 1958, Visitas Oficiales a Panamá, 1958–1959, vol. 2, AMRE.
75. Beleño, *Luna verde*, p. 42.
76. *El Día*, 12 December 1960.
77. Alessandro Russo Berguido, *Panama, nación mártir!* (Panama City, 1964), p. 1, emphasis added.
78. Editorial, *El Panamá-América*, 10 January 1964, repr. in *Lotería* 99–100, vol. 1 (February–March 1964), pp. 182–4, here p. 182.
79. In the months following the riots, *Lotería* published special issues that expressed a strong emotional consensus about the riots. A good sample of violent language can also be found in Russo Berguido, *¡Panamá, nación mártir!* See also Alan McPherson, 'Courts of World Opinion: Trying the Panama Flag Riots of 1964', *Diplomatic History* 28 (2004), pp. 83–112.
80. Jorge Prosperi, 'Y llegaron los bárbaros', *La hora*, 14 January 1964, p. 7.
81. 'Radio Musical', in 'Riot Incidents as Reported by Radio and TV Broadcasts from the Republic of Panama, January 9–10, 1964', box 15, Declassified General Correspondence, 1945–79, Internal Security Office, RG 185, NARA.
82. *La Prensa*, 31 January 1964, p. 6.
83. Partido Demócrata Cristiano letter in *La Estrella de Panamá*, 12 January 1964, repr. in *Lotería* 99–100, vol. 1 (February–March 1964), p. 218.
84. Editorial, 'El primer grito', *Crítica*, 15 January 1964, repr. in *Lotería* 99–100, vol. 1 (February–March 1964), p. 278.
85. Escolástico Calvo, president of the Sindicato de Periodistas de Panamá, 9 or 10 January 1964, repr. in *Lotería* 99–100, vol. 1 (February–March 1964), p. 202.
86. La Sociedad Cívica Soldados de Coto, in *Lotería* 99–100, vol. 1 (February–March 1964), p. 226.
87. Editorial by Joaquín Beleño, 'Se disipa la duda', *La Prensa*, 17 January 1964, p. 4.
88. Brown, *Manhood and Politics*, p. 26; Joaquín Beleño, 'Temas aridas', *La Prensa*, 8 February 1964, p. 7. Pressures to resume the flow of US dollars, however, quickly returned. Lobbying from the business community came early: CIA cable 01582, 19 January 1964, folder: Panama Riots, vol. 2, part D 1/64–2/64, box 64, Latin America, Country file, National Security File, LBJL; Fleming to Ailes, 19 January 1964, folder C/DEF 3–1/a Situation Reports – Panama 9 January 1964 to February 1964, vol. 1 (a), box 5, Declassified General Correspondence, Internal Security Office, RG 185, NARA; Cottrell telegram to Mann, and Bundy memorandum to Johnson, 5 March 1964, in Paul Kesaris and Robert Lester (eds), *Crises in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories, 1963–1969* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982), reel 1, pp. 422–43.
89. Soldados de Coto, *Lotería*, p. 226.
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92. Adolfo Ahumada, *9 de enero: Testimonio y significado* (Panama City: IURIS, 1999), p. 13; CIA cable 38298, 13 March 1964, folder Panama, vol. 3, Cables 3/64, box 65, Latin America, Country File, National Security File, LBJL. For images of students with Chiari, *Summary of Panama City Riots*, motion picture, 16 mm, NWDNM(m)–185.4, RG 185, NARA.
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