Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 322–339, 2006

Resisting the Global Slum: Politics, Religion and Consumption in the Remaking of Life Worlds in the Twenty-First Century

JOHN GLEDHILL
University of Manchester, UK

The volatility of Latin American society is producing political challenges to neoliberal capitalism, but these are complicated by the transformations neoliberalism has wrought in everyday social life. This paper explores tensions between movements to 'democratise democracy' and politics orientated to controlling the national state, while also considering apolitical forms of 'resistance' to humiliating conditions of life and the impact of new religious movements. I argue that although no instant utopias are likely, there are positive as well as negative possibilities in the way that apparently contradictory developments are combining to transform the established historical contours of hegemony in the region.

Keywords: politics, neoliberalism, religion, consumption, hegemony, resistance.

Introduction

Latin America presents an apparent paradox. Despite profound 'neoliberalisation' of the political field and everyday life (Gledhill, 2005; Goldstein, 2005) the region is producing strong counter-movements to neoliberal capitalism. Analysing multiculturalism as an artefact of the diffuse powers of neoliberal governmentality, Hale suggests that this reflects general historical differences between North Atlantic and Latin American social formations, since 'it seems likely that the neoliberal model in Latin America confronts considerably more autonomy, variability, and volatility in the civil society groups that purportedly serve as agents for individual subject formation' (Hale, 2002: 497). National histories nevertheless remain crucial for understanding the causes, nature, distribution – and limits – of the counter-movements themselves. Venezuela, for example, reflects exhaustion of the hegemonic possibilities of a particular exclusionary political pact and ideologies of racial democracy (Coronil, 1997;

Cannon, 2004; Buxton, 2005), while also fitting a broader pattern of 'organic crisis' in established systems of political, social and cultural domination.

Yet the significance of any 'shift to the left' remains unclear. 'Volatility' does characterise the responses of 'civil society' to the social polarisation and pervasive insecurity provoked by neoliberal transformation, but its underlying contours need further exploration. I seek to do this by combining two approaches: an analysis of politics that looks at national differences; and an analysis of what 'ordinary people' do when they 'resist' the effects of neoliberal capitalism. If we assume that what people 'resist' in everyday practices are the hardships and humiliations of their condition of life, it becomes easier to understand the paradoxes.

That everyday life has become 'neoliberalised' in ways that disappear from sight if we only focus on collective identity politics or campaigns against privatisation and transnational corporations, adds to the social costs of political failure to reduce inequality. There is also a danger of exaggerating the amount of mobilisation taking place. Comparing Brazil and Chile, Foweraker argues that 'democratisation' transformed the profile of grassroots mobilisation during the 1990s. 'Organisation' grew at the expense of 'autonomy', producing 'tensions between leaders and base, elite and mass, professionals and volunteers' to which the response was yet more organisation and institutionalisation, condemning the represented to 'political silence' and renewed 'clientelisation' (Foweraker, 2001: 864–865). Foweraker stresses the continuing strategic role of the state in a scenario shaped by reduction of public services and fiscal and administrative decentralisation. The importance of this is illustrated by Kirchner's efforts to disarticulate the movement of the unemployed in Argentina by convincing some of its leaders to participate in administration of funds and distribution of work (Zibechi, 2004: 4). Although few societies are as mobilised as Argentina, with its factory occupations and struggles for autonomous trade unionism, these movements now seem resigned to a long war of position.

The incorporation of social movement and NGO activists into state institutions also figures in Silva's (2004: 71) recent analysis of 'depoliticisation' in Chile. Yet Silva (2004: 73) stresses that, by undermining party loyalties and encouraging Chileans to be consumers rather than citizens, the military prepared the ground for a 'mediatisation' of politics that prompted all democratic politicians to market their individual virtues via television, led, from the Right, by Joaquín Lavin. Although voting in Chile is mandatory, he presents ample evidence of public indifference towards the parties a decade after the end of authoritarian rule (Silva, 2004: 67), arguing that 'collective values' continued to be supplanted by individualised, consumerist desires even while Chile combined strong economic growth with some redistribution through a progressive tax regime. Nevertheless, *Concertación* did retain power in the 2006 elections. Even if the media helped to construct a positive image of Michelle Bachelet's personal history and qualities, these clearly resonated with a good deal of public opinion as well as with the increasing efforts of *Concertación* to demolish Pinochet's remaining political capital by adding corruption to human rights charges, a precondition for ending the advantages that right-wing parties still gain from the electoral system. Although Bachelet sought to conciliate the military, favours the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and promises 'change with continuity' in her proposals for diminishing social

inequality and empowering women and indigenous people, it seems difficult to ignore the shifts towards less socially conservative values in Chilean society that her electoral success indicates. Even if they remain consistent with those of neoliberal market society based on the 'life-style politics' and 'technologies of the self' of cultures of consumerism, all that is solid does not entirely melt into air, not least because the danger in mourning lost collective values and loyalties to party is in forgetting how competition within the 'popular movement' undermined grassroots solidarities (Castells, 1982).

Nevertheless, even if we accept more positive readings of NGOs pursuing a 'rights-based' agenda (Molyneux and Lazar, 2003), and believe that the outcomes of elections remain consequential, Silva is clearly right to observe that alienation from political parties, mediatisation of electoral contests, and pervasive impacts of consumerism are not uniquely Chilean problems, and the same must be said of those that Foweraker highlights. Let us consider attempts to break the mould.

Anti-Politics-as-Usual: Autonomy Projects

At the beginning of 2006, the twelfth anniversary of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, *subcomandante* Marcos left the EZLN stronghold of La Garrucha riding a motorbike, accompanied by a convoy of supporters. Their initial destination was San Cristóbal de Las Casas, where Marcos, renamed Delegate Zero, launched 'The Other Campaign', an attempt to build a nation-wide coalition of dissident forces outside the present party framework. Those who see the Zapatistas as 'postmodern' were no doubt delighted as the 'sub' on his motorbike took on attributes of Che Guevara in Walter Salles's movie, and symbolic playfulness continued to surround his public appearances. He removed his woollen ski mask in Campeche with an invitation to Mexico's political class to take off their own masks as well – only to reveal a face still covered by a thin black cloth. Nevertheless, *La Otra Campaña* marked continuity and change in EZLN strategy. Anti-capitalism is top of the agenda, recalling the original EZLN declaration of war 'against neoliberalism and for humanity', but now emphasising the need to build a new, inclusive and non-sectarian, left. The Other Campaign is unsupportive of the Presidential bid of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, candidate of the centre-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), attacked as incapable of transforming the economic model or transcending the backstage compromises that permeate a corrupt political life. This prompted some left intellectuals to complain that Marcos's 'baroque discourse' promoted neither consciousness nor organisation (*La Jornada*, February 22, 2006), although Marcos himself had already assured *perredista* activists that he was not calling on voters to abstain, in contrast to EZLN positions in earlier conflicts with the PRD in Chiapas.

In other respects *La Otra Campaña* renews earlier EZLN efforts to build broader coalitions. Its politics also remain consistent: no one is seeking political office, and all differences of opinion will be respected. The vision of democracy embodied in the Zapatistas' 'Good Government Councils' (*Juntas de Buen Gobierno*) was strongly articulated in an internet broadcast speech by a young official at La Garrucha on the

eve of Marcos's departure. Reminding listeners that the authorities of the Juntas receive no salary and rotate regularly in office to eliminate the traditional vices of 'bad' government, he also emphasised that one did not have to be a Zapatista sympathiser to receive attention from the authorities in rebel-controlled territory, who would continue to 'govern by obeying'. Although the speech also stressed that this was the achievement of indigenous people, it was directed outwards to 'civil society'.

Delegado Zero's meetings were soon mapping out the diversity of local movements. Some were repeats of longstanding problems, such as poorer victims of Hurricane Wilma waiting for aid to rebuild their homes while money poured into the reconstruction of hotels and tourist facilities. Some reflected historically rooted conflicts over land, often with 'ethnic' dimensions, often legacies of the agrarian reform. Others were reactions to contemporary capitalist transformations of the countryside and environmental impacts of the oil industry. Inclusion also extended, however, to a group of sex-workers in Tlaxcala who had declared support for the Sixth Lacandón Declaration. Marcos hoped to increase the weight of urban residents and international migrants as he moved northward, an essential condition for reaching what long since became the majority of Mexicans.

The Zapatista project for indigenous autonomy in Chiapas rejects relations with the state, including its social development funds. This stance is not replicated by most indigenous movements in Mexico, and has divided many communities that originally supported the EZLN (Leyva, 2001). The Zapatistas have, however, influenced other movements that question the adequacy of the democracy that Mexico has achieved through a reform of electoral politics that permits genuine party competition and offers scope for minority parties to secure legislative seats. Two celebrated examples are both campaigns against development projects backed by big money: the movement against the construction of a golf course in Tepoztlán, Morelos, in 1995, and within President Fox's sexennial, the 2001–2 campaign of the land reform farmers of Atenco, in the state of Mexico, against expropriation of their lands for a new Mexico City airport, a mega-project backed by investors enjoying substantial backstage political influence.

The activists who mobilised Tepoztecos to oust their municipal government after it approved the project replaced them through an extra-official election that combined local *usos y costumbres*, associated with the organisation of religious festivals, and neighbourhood assemblies for candidate selection, with respect for federal electoral law at the voting stage (Stolle-McAllister, 2005: 21). National political parties were excluded from the creation of this *Ayuntamiento Libre*, but the desire to secure government funding brought concessions on this principle when its term ended in 1997. The PRD obliged opponents of party interference by allowing candidates selected by neighbourhood nomination to use its official registry, although debate continued after their victory on whether what radicals perceived as an emulation of the Zapatista autonomous municipality should build relations with the national PRD (Stolle-McAllister, 2005: 22–23). Although the 2000 elections brought a greater diversity of party banners into Tepoztlán, even activists aligned with Fox's National Action Party (PAN) knew little about its national history, had scant sympathy with its economic policies, and were principally using the PAN label to contest the conduct of the PRD-dominated administration, whose own militants saw little prospect of that

party contesting the power of global money at the national level and continued to insist that true democracy had to be locally based (Stolle-McAllister, 2005: 24).

As a community that still reproduces elements of its 'indigenous' traditions of land tenure and organisation despite substantial twentieth-century social transformation, Tepoztlán grounds its local politics on that form of historical identity, but the Atenco movement involved land reform beneficiaries who could re-identify themselves as descendants of an autochthonous population but largely based their claims on their forebears' rights to the land through participation in the Mexican Revolution (Stolle-McAllister, 2005: 26). That polls gave them massive public support also reflected the way they presented themselves as people facing destitution at the hands of a government serving the interests of transnational capitalists. Despite the fact that the Atenco farmers responded to police aggression by kidnapping state officials and there were concerns about establishing a precedent, Fox decided to cancel the project, but arrest orders remained in force against several Atenco militants. They proceeded to declare an autonomous municipality and organised a boycott of the 2003 elections, emphasising that 'the parties and the elections only serve capitalism' (Stolle-McAllister, 2005: 29). Their militancy remained undiminished at the start of 2006, when continuing skirmishes with the state of Mexico authorities again led to the seizing of a senior functionary.

Mexico's 'democratic transition' has therefore sewn together the national[1] and global processes that made the politics of indigenous rights increasingly central to politics in general in the 1990s, reworked revolutionary nationalist symbols and an even older ideal of the 'free municipality'. Yet these examples are clearly land and place-identity based. One might see local 'autonomy' as consistent with the reduced public service commitment of neoliberal states and the enthusiasm of multilateral agencies for fiscal and administrative decentralisation, cost-cutting targeted anti-poverty programmes and encouragement of 'self-help'. Yet there are unintended political consequences. Decentralisation may intensify challenges to 'politics as usual' at the national level and perceived predation of national resources by foreign capital as mediated through the state's eminent domain over the subsoil. Nevertheless, the fact that these movements are 'rooted' raises the question of how people living more mobile lives can participate in movements to 'democratise democracy'.

In Oaxaca, state law already allows indigenous communities to elect their political representatives by *usos y costumbres* and prohibit (overt) participation by political parties, a result, Anaya (2004) argues, of the specific 'governability' crisis faced by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the state. Factions organised by migrants in

1 The national dimension is an unintended consequence of Mexico's nationalist project. The assimilationist model of *mestizaje* placed value on past indigenous contributions to the fusion constituting Mexican uniqueness, while acknowledging the present distinctiveness of 'the Indian', making future re-evaluation possible. Bilingual schoolteachers trained as state agents of community 'modernisation' proved a Trojan horse as they began to contest the local hegemony of non-indigenous politicians even when they remained loyal to the PRI. Such actors have greater scope for colonising bureaucratic and political niches within the system under neoliberal multiculturalism, but oppositional activist roles remain attractive, especially with NGO financial support, not least because it is possible to move from the latter into the former.

the United States sometimes lead struggles to oust local bosses and transform 'traditions' such as the exclusion of women from the public political arena, while efforts have been made to devise new forms of transnational 'membership' in communities (Besserer, 2004). Yet the quality of community democracy remains variable with regard to the rights of migrants, women and religious minorities. There is already enough internal disputation on these issues to suggest that progress is possible on the problems that so exercise critics of indigenous autonomy (Hernández, 2005). Yet the state has also shown an increasing interest in indigenous migrants within Mexico. By permitting self-identification as a basis for recognition of indigenous status, the Fox government's much criticised indigenous legislation does appear helpful, for example, to the workers from the Mixtec regions of Oaxaca and Guerrero who live in Baja California (Martínez, 2004: 357). While the budgets for the state agencies handling indigenous affairs have been cut, their transformation into the functional equivalent of rights-based NGOs assisting migrants to claim their citizenship rights also looks positive, particularly when those running them have strong activist track-records. Yet there are other readings of the strategies of the National Indigenous Institute (now replaced by the *Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de Pueblos Indígenas*, CONADEPI).

Training to 'empower' indigenous workers to defend themselves offers no direct challenge to agribusiness companies that routinely flout Mexico's labour laws (Martínez, 2004: 363). Official insistence that migrants register and obtain identity cards in order to guarantee their access to public services may offer them some protection against abuse by the police and military, but also makes it easier to separate Mexicans from undocumented Central American migrants (Martínez, 2004: 360). Although the INI encouraged consolidation of ethnic identity and political organisation amongst the migrants, not only did this make it less likely that they would join autonomous militant movements, but the focus on conserving the ethnic identity of the agricultural migrants reproduced the very criteria of distinction that justified low pay and, through racial stereotyping, sub-standard living conditions (Martínez, 2004: 364). Although the concept of ethnic identity promoted by INI was not essentialist or restrictive, it seemed significant that its programmes were targeted at farm workers and not at the indigenous population in Tijuana (Martínez, 2004: 358), while any 'fixing' of indigenous identity actually conflicted with the desire of many migrants 'to assimilate to the mainstream in the north of Mexico to move up the socio-economic ladder or, perhaps, to articulate themselves to the "modern" as they perceive it' (Martínez, 2004: 374).

Tensions between subaltern ethnicities and dreams of becoming 'modern' are also relevant to the question of whether the EZLN's Other Campaign is an attempt to escape from an impasse. Without a new initiative, the Zapatistas seemed imprisoned within an indigenous rights debate in which other actors sometimes deploy the language of *usos y costumbres* and ethnic identity in an exclusionary way – thereby undermining the EZLN's efforts to redefine Mexican nationalism from below by deconstructing the state's separation of mestizo and indigenous identities (Stephen, 1997) – and by a vision of indigenous empowerment premised on reproduction of local agrarian societies. Emphasising the incapacity of the Selva Lacandona to sustain even its present population on the basis of peasant agriculture and animal husbandry,

Viqueira (2002: 84–86) has argued that indigenous autonomy can only create indigenous 'reservations' that will reproduce histories of exploitative ethnic stratification.

This argument is in danger of ignoring how autonomy might mean greater control over, and greater material benefits from, the development of a region that is rich in non-agricultural resources and cheap female labour. Regional radical democracy read as a challenge to Plan Puebla-Panama (Villafuerte, 2001) may have little to do with putting more cows into an unsuitable environment and much more to do with avoiding premature death from chemical poisoning in a plastic tent growing transgenic tomatoes; not working for an infra-subsistence wage in a local plant that enables Wal-Mart to supply goods at prices even the poorest US workers can afford; or trying to avoid being shot by the border patrol or dying of dehydration in the desert while crossing from Mexico to the USA to become a super-vulnerable undocumented worker of the kind that Haliburton's subsidiary, Kellog, Brown and Root, hired but failed to pay in the clean-up and ethnic cleansing through redevelopment of New Orleans.[2] Against that global race to the bottom, indigenous movements appear in a different light. Nevertheless, given that what the EZLN has actually achieved to date is the reproduction of a semi-subsistence enclave economy, Viqueira (2002: 87) is correct in his observation that its base has begun to 'vote with their feet'. Migrant remissions are increasingly important in rural reproduction in Chiapas, where the taste for *norteño* music now seems as strong as in Baja, while the NGO presence has encouraged some young community activists to seek different lifestyles elsewhere.

Facing up to Power

The Other Campaign has both a utopian quality and a contradictory dependence on the charisma of the media-friendly Marcos. One reason why earlier efforts to build alliances foundered was that working class urban Mexicans found it hard to identify with indigenous people from Chiapas. As Gutmann (2002: 136) points out, the fact that people see themselves as 'different', see their problems as 'different', and advocate different strategies for solving them, does not mean that they cannot have debates about politics and social justice that slowly transform political culture. The Other Campaign's 'let us respect difference' posture seeks to tap the rich vein of what Gutmann calls the 'compliant defiance' permeating grassroots sentiment. Yet even the EZLN has had to face up to the responsibility of acting *like* a government within Chiapas, while other sectors of the actually existing Mexican Left retain a more comprehensive will to power, seeing Bolivia as exemplifying the breakthrough required.

Some leftist intellectuals deny that Evo Morales's electoral triumph represents a breakthrough (Petras, 2006). Even if some of the 54 per cent who voted for the MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) simply wanted to end blockades and demonstrations, most were clearly strongly attached to the idea of nationalising Bolivia's gas reserves. This would problematise any concessions Morales might make to keep on board Brazil's

2 See http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/11/15/halliburton_katrina/index_np.html [accessed 4 December 2005].

Petrobras and the Spanish transnational Repsol-YPF, whose government was courted, along with that of China, in Morales's post-election international tour to seek a counter-weight to Washington. Nevertheless, the new government offered immediate indications of an intention to play hardball by accusing Repsol of accounting fraud.[3] Much will hang on the success of the Constituent Assembly: this will test not merely the possibilities of effecting fundamental reform of the Bolivian state, but also the prospects of maintaining enough convergence amongst social movements to enable that state to pursue new strategies.

One difficulty is the tension between the Aymara organisations led by Felipe Quispe and the MAS, given the former's frequent, though not absolute, rhetorical resort to an exclusionary model of ethnic identity and a rural communal vision seemingly ill-adapted to contemporary socio-economic realities. Another is that movements for 'autonomy' in the resource-rich Santa Cruz and Tarija departments are led by right-wing business elites eager to avoid the consequences of further empowerment of the nation's indigenous citizens in the rest of the country (Assies, 2004: 36). Nevertheless, Bolivia has a history of radical political movements that seek to transcend ethnic boundaries, and some successes in making local governments more accountable (Albó, 2002). The question is whether a reconfigured national state can build on these foundations.

The case of Ecuador suggests that removal of elected governments by mass uprisings does not in itself create conditions for changing de-legitimated institutions, nor produce rapid decomposition of the established political class. As Pallares (2006: 23–24) shows, each of the three governments removed in Ecuador since 1997 was overthrown by a different coalition of forces: the professional middle class, supported by some sectors of the working class and indigenous activists in the case of Bucaram; indigenous mobilisation by the Confederation of Ecuadorian Indians (CONAIE), backed by urban movements and taxi unions, plus some sectors of the military, in the case of Mahuad in 2000; and middle class professionals, local politicians, students and NGO and movement activists from Quito in the case of Gutiérrez. Although the growing national weight of CONAIE and its entry into the electoral arena as the Pachakutik Party was the big counterweight to the familiar pattern of NGOisation of established social movements during the 1990s, eight months of participation in the Gutiérrez administration proved deeply damaging to CONAIE's public image and internal coherence (Pallares, 2006: 25). On the basis of this experience, Pallares argues that the state may be more effectively rebuilt through a bottom-up strategy of forging accountability at the local level and networking forces with shared democratic commitments.

Yet sustained work at the grassroots does not guarantee success either, since the achievement of national power produces new dilemmas. Brazil provides a dramatic illustration, since the PT (Workers' Party) won its political capital from the efforts of its city administrations to foster local democratisation and treat the poor as true citizens (Caldeira and Holston, 2004), even if closer examination of its past practice in local government already suggested some convergence with neoliberal logics (Gledhill, 2005).

3 See http://www.erbol.com.bo/opinion.htm [accessed 26 February 2006].

Four years on from Lula's overwhelming national victory the activists who worked so hard to make it possible remain profoundly disappointed, the PT suffered major losses in the municipal elections of 2004, and the Landless Movement found the Lula government more favourable to agribusiness than land reform as it prioritised debt repayment, new irrigation and hydro-electric projects, and the development of bio-diesel. In truth the PT never sought to encourage the expectations that for some are embedded in the name of Evo Morales's party, but the problems of the Lula presidency go beyond those associated with being 'realistic' about heterodox economics. The 'corruption scandals' that have dogged the PT reflect the problems of managing a highly competitive and regionalised political market in which governments are coalitions of ideologically heterogeneous forces with diverse constituencies to satisfy. Nevertheless, alternative economic policies are inhibited by the fact that anything that worries the international markets may produce an instantaneous economic meltdown. Even when government can blame imperial aggression, maintaining a coherent political base is seldom aided by conditions of crisis and austerity. Despite the advantages of oil price hikes, opposition blunders, and heavy-handed US intervention, not merely diplomatically but through the gauche efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy, even Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution has tempered the radicalism necessary to sustain popular support with ongoing negotiation with international corporations and national capitalist sectors willing to practice co-existence.

The use of state power to push towards more radical policies has been the outcome of a cautious and not always coherent politics. Issues such as trade union reform and the best strategy for cleaning-up the state oil company, PDVSA, provoked divisions on strategy within the pro-Chávez camp (Ellner, 2005: 58). It was more the logic of events than the majority view within Chávez's party, the MVR (*Movimiento Quinta República*), that drove the government towards replacing managers and trade unionists in the oil industry with *chavista* loyalists, since parts of the coalition of labour organisations supporting Chávez feared a return to the clientelistic vices of the old regime (Ellner, 2005: 66–67). The range and class composition of the movements supporting Chávez remain diverse, with different histories and ideological commitments. Valencia (2005: 95–96) argues that the government is acting as an ally of largely autonomous 'resistance movements' which it neither created nor controlled, fostering genuine commitment to new forms of politics that constitutes a process of 'negotiating hegemony with the state'.

There are, however, alternative readings of the trends. In a study of the *Círculos Bolivarianos*, the voluntary citizens' organisations that Chávez called into existence in 2000 to bring out the vote, facilitate access of the poor to social programmes, and mobilise 'civil society', Hawkins and Hansen (2006: 110) find that their members were generally activists with above-average levels of education whose type of residence did not match their frequent self-description as 'workers'. Although they do not dispute these activists' commitment to participatory democracy, they argue that dependence on Chávez's charisma undermined their capacity for institutionalisation, while their actions often reinforced clientelistic relations with voters. The *Círculos* subsequently disappeared from the *barrios* because they could not compete with better-financed service, education and employment programmes directly run by government agencies.

Yet although activists became disillusioned with top-down organisation and bureaucratisation, they did not demobilise but redirected their efforts into 'local networks that disregard or distrust the actions of national leadership' (Hawkins and Hansen, 2006: 124–125).

Yet it seems clear that widespread desires for grassroots democracy emerged in opposition to a system in which the realities of power at all levels were antithetical to such practices. It would have been remarkable had established ways of doing politics and administration disappeared overnight as the Bolivarian Revolution entered a more organised phase following Chávez's consolidation of his grip on the state apparatus, but it seems significant that the return of old vices remains a matter of active contestation. One might also question the legitimacy of evaluating Venezuelan experience by standards of 'civil society autonomy' drawn from a somewhat idealised model of the United States of North America.

What Chávez is trying to do is exactly what previous regimes failed to do: to 'sow the oil' (Coronil, 1997). His charisma and political adeptness in twisting the tail of the imperial dragon may well be essential to managing negative reactions to deployment of 'harder' forms of state intervention and the feelings of some supporters that his increasingly anti-capitalist rhetoric is still not matched by sufficient radicalism in action, despite moves forward on land reform. Yet much of that charisma seems to rest on making *los de abajo* feel valued. This may legitimately be painted as a negative 'populist' characteristic within a system of rule that in reality serves other interests, has no deep redistributive intent, and seeks to demobilise grassroots organisations. Yet it is conceivable that the strategic organisation necessary to coordinate and implement redistribution of social wealth and power can co-exist in creative tension with strivings for greater democracy, not least because demands for participation are more easily pressed from the grassroots by people who are not living in everyday conditions of fear of violence on the margins of economic survival. The question is whether Chávez can (not simply will) use his charisma to promote rather than block a long-term transformation of state institutions that would consolidate the democratic impulses within the movements that have kept him in power.[4]

The Personal is not Always Political

Having examined different ways in which change might prove possible, it is time to consider the costs of failure. Neoliberal immiseration notwithstanding, Latin American social structures cannot be reduced to an undifferentiated 'people' confronting a tiny elite. My earlier references to 'middle class' activists have hopefully not painted actors

4 It is, however, difficult to build democracy where the opposition simply refuse to participate in elections. Such tactics of sabotage can be implemented in other settings, such as indigenous communal assemblies. In one Michoacán community, unable to win elections or carry votes in the assembly, a faction linked with the PRI ordered its supporters to withdraw, rendering assemblies inquorate under the Agrarian Reform laws that govern their conduct, thereby subjecting the elected authorities, aligned with the PRD, to charges of arbitrary rule if they acted without a mandate or of leadership failure if they failed to act.

enjoying intermediate social positions in an excessively negative way, despite the contradictions that may arise from the perpetuation of professional, racial and gender hierarchies within movements, NGOisation and incorporation into government. Yet the fact that Latin American elites combine indifference to chronic poverty with forms of social segregation and privatisation of their personal security that further weaken public authority and a precarious fabric of sociability adds additional contradictions.

As Caldeira (2000) demonstrates in her studies of São Paulo working class attitudes towards *favelados* [slum dwellers] and 'police who kill', lower class people differentiate themselves in ways that disarticulate a notional 'popular subject' and reinforce the violence with which class domination is maintained. Educated middle class people lament limited 'popular' enthusiasm for human rights and often act, through politics, churches, charities, NGOs and citizens' groups, to build a more caring society. Yet they also defend their own class interests – in urban redevelopment, for example (Fix, 2001: 54) – and have their own prejudices about the denizens of urban 'brown areas'. Everyday violence ultimately reflects enforcement of the right to accumulate, but its effects are complex. One may be votes for authoritarianism; another, in contexts of social dislocation and senses of violated boundaries, vigilantism or the lynch mob. Small towns in Mexico state have produced more lynchings than autonomous governments in recent years. The 'popular victory' in Cochabamba's 'Water War' against Bechtel's contract to manage the city's supplies also coincided with an upsurge in lynchings in which poor people of indigenous origin killed other poor people of indigenous origin (Goldstein, 2005: 405).

Daniel Goldstein (2005: 406) argues that Cochabamba shows how the same people who stridently contest the restructuring of their lives by transnational capital and the neoliberal state simultaneously adopt practices that 'clearly express and enact' the neoliberal rationality that now pervades 'civil society'. Similar arguments can be made about drug-trafficking gangs. Donna Goldstein suggests that gangs substitute for a state that now expresses its own ordering force – to the extent to which this is possible at all – through a police force that combines violent interventions with negotiation with the gangs themselves. Some police earn 'respect' and the local gang offers its community protection against invasions by rivals (Goldstein, 2003: 225). Some gang bosses earn a reputation for administrating justice. In 2004, residents of a poor neighbourhood in Salvador, Bahia, protested vociferously about the police shooting of a boss, described by a young man studying part-time for a legal career as practising a better system of justice for poor people than the official courts. Yet this case shows how the rise and fall of local gangs reflects wider interests (and political complicities) and why violence may escalate. The toll of young men dying from gunshot wounds between sixteen and 21 years of age in just four months during 2005 in the Salvador poverty belt was 45, mostly directly drug related, though the twenty per cent that were not included men returning late at night from work (*A Tarde*, 22 May 2005). As Goldstein shows for Rio, once a revenge killing cycle escalates, even female kin and partners of the men involved may be at risk (Goldstein, 2003: 217).

Although, as Goldstein stresses, most of her ethnographic subjects were engaged in gruelling working lives that demanded flexibility of strategies simply to put food on the table, let alone cope with emergencies, it is necessary to acknowledge the social actor

that Briceño-León and Zubillaga (2002: 27) name 'the young man from a marginal neighbourhood'. Their analysis links a rising tide of violence to a context in which one commodity, the gun, is ever more accessible, while other commodities, whose value is produced by a globalising culture of consumerism, branding and style, are not.

In Salvador, some young men from marginal neighbourhoods still try to achieve social mobility through education. There are courses sponsored by the *Ministério Público* and Bahia's Federal University to promote this alternative. Combative residents' associations fighting for both social dignification and public services also still attract young people. Yet as Sansone (2004) shows, 'unemployment' has become a positive status for many young black men, who reject casualised jobs that are worse paid than those their fathers attained, opting for other ways of participating in a globalised black consumer culture. While access to education has improved, labour market conditions raise the qualifications employers demand and create frustrated expectations (Sansone, 2004: 52). For men and women with little schooling, the 'ideal' job is working in a shopping mall fashion store close to what remain, on regular wages, unattainable symbols of global cool (Sansone, 2004: 56). It is the involvement of adolescents rather than violence as such that is increasing in the poorest zones of Salvador, reflecting the way young people are deserting both school and the labour market in pursuit of desires that bring more 'respect'.

Young black men from the poorest districts of Salvador are less deferential to their white social superiors than their parents, and less likely to seek solace in Afro-Brazilian religion (Sansone, 2004: 57). Yet their everyday struggles for recognition of 'personhood' do not strengthen 'oppositional' collective identity in relation to dominant social groups. Young men strive to mask their actual class status and present themselves in public space as co-participants in a modernity of shared consumer symbols, albeit with an inflection of black 'style' which other sectors of Salvador's society now find attractive. As a city whose elite revalued Bahia's African cultural heritage by de-proscribing *candomblé* and *capoeira* in a move to define regional identity that paralleled Getúlio Vargas's national efforts to make blackness part of a distinctive Brazilian identity (Ickes, 2005), and has subsequently built a flourishing tourist industry around black music and culture, Salvador offers an optimal environment for such developments, although the limited transformative impact of the Camaçari petrochemical complex established in the 1970s is another side of the coin.

Yet both Salvador and Rio illustrate that making claims to respect through style and gang membership are not the only ways in which people 'resist' the humiliations that socio-economic realities impose on them. Secularisation is far from being a dominant tendency. Another route out of everyday violence in Brazil is affiliation to one of the Pentecostal churches whose explosive growth (Kremer, 2005: 97–98) contrasts with the retreat of the Christian Base Community movement from this-worldly engagement towards defence of the faith during the 1990s (Hewitt, 1998). Since two-thirds of the members of these churches are women, Goldstein (2003: 219) argues that conversion is a 'gendered form of oppositional culture' that emerges in response to the male oppositional culture of the gang; while both are apolitical, the women's 'flight into a religious world that prohibits drinking, advocates moral redemption, and still believes in honest hard work' could save the lives of those men who followed them, even if it would not

get them stable jobs. Nevertheless, in the cases on which she focuses, two girlfriends of gang members under immediate threat of execution who feared for their own lives, becoming a *crente* could also be motivated by a desire to symbolise a non-participant identity that would win themselves security (Goldstein, 2003: 214) and a different kind of 'respect'. Although neither succeeded in persuading their men to follow them or became fully devoted members of their churches, their new clothing style produced a public persona resistant to the wider society's criminalising stereotypes.

Ethnographic studies illustrate the complexities that shape individual 'life style' choices, helping us to understand how personal biographies embedded in particular social situations underpin the fluidity with which people move in and out of different churches within a highly diversified 'religious market' (Kremer, 2005: 96). There are clear distinctions between becoming any kind of *crente* and remaining a nominal Catholic, which remains compatible with recourse to Afro-Brazilian ritual specialists (*Xangozeiros*) or Spiritualists (Novaes, 1994: 529). Yet it is developments within the Pentecostal family of churches that seem most significant for pursuing a sociological interpretation of religious change and its political significance.

Traditional Pentecostalism, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, is based on a culture of small chapels (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 147), and passed through two phases. The first emphasised the charismatic gift of speaking in tongues, separating Catholic religiosity based on priestly authority and 'tradition' from participatory Christianity in which congregants communicate directly with the divine, and fostering the other-worldly solidarity of a minority religious group (Novaes, 1994: 533; Kremer, 2005: 97). Second wave churches, expanding in the years of mass rural-urban migration from the 1950s to 1970s, emphasised divine healing and began to relax the rigidity of first wave asceticism (Kremer, 2005: 97). During the 1970s, however, a third 'neo-Pentecostal' wave produced the now transnational Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (*Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus*), which challenged the Catholic Church in architectural and organisational terms whilst introducing the spectacular enactment of 'spiritual warfare' through public exorcism and adopting a 'prosperity theology' that made it possible to market Pentecostalism to the upwardly mobile and middle classes (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 153; Kremer, 2005: 97). The tithes that the Universal Church extracts from its still overwhelmingly poor congregants have been invested in the means of marketing through the purchase of a TV network and prime urban locations where its imposing cathedrals rise up alongside shopping malls (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 148–149). Although the Universal Church has preached against voting for Lula, its political role has not generally been ideological, but one of building pragmatic alliances with municipal and state-level politicians to further its business interests and secure sympathisers elected office on party slates (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 148–149). Yet the Universal Church's break with the traditional low profile of Pentecostal Churches brings it denunciations from a range of other actors interested in cultural hegemony.

One dimension of conflict is the Universal Church's assault on Catholic 'idolatry' and toleration of Afro-Brazilian possession cults: this attacks the 'popular culture' based on positive evaluation of syncretism that formed part of the hegemonic strategy of twentieth century elites (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 156). In most respects, the Universal Church does not differ doctrinally from other neo-Pentecostal churches, yet it

presents a stronger hegemonic challenge as a transnational religious community with no need of the 'rooted' traditions of Brazil (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 158). Another way in which the Universal Church goes against the grain of both political and religious culture is that it does not promise the faithful that their contributions will be matched by a return (as in political patron-client relations or the notion of suffering as virtue leading to a heavenly reward). It tells the individual to transform his or her own life – into one that is not merely more prosperous, but will also be free of drugs and violence, and full of marital happiness and (heterosexual) pleasure (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 160–161). This may seem simply another face of 'neoliberalisation', but we must ask what the Universal Church's message means to the faithful, who seldom seem scandalised by media reports about its bishops arriving at airports laden with bags of poor people's cash.

The *Igreja Universal* exorcism process does not simply appropriate meanings embedded in older spirit possession traditions but externalises spirit entities to fit the Christian notion of the diabolic (Birman and Lehmann, 1999: 155; Kremer, 2005: 111). By naming them as Afro-Brazilian entities (Kremer, 2005: 115), the Universal Church can be both 'culturally sensitive' and absolutely exclusionary of rival popular religions. Its 'war' against mobile spirits that can attack anyone is a war against the everyday evils that assail lives, not conducted in the intimate space of a tiny chapel, but as grand spectacle in an institution that does not depend on the charisma of a pastor but manifests its global reach through its mass media apparatus (Kremer, 2005: 116). The officiating bishop or pastor does manifest prosperity in his person, a model for the consumer empowerment that comes from practising appropriate 'technologies of the self' (Kremer, 2005: 103). Yet those who will never attain such temporal success still find attendance at church satisfying, as an action through which they strike back against the sources of evil as part of a powerful movement. This is not to deny that some congregants gain useful 'connections' in the worlds of politics and business, but the Universal Church schedules services flexibly through the week to adapt to the irregular hours of the 'informalised' working poor (Kremer, 2005: 99).

In Mexico, a still aggressive Catholic Church struggles to re-evangelise indigenous regions whose 'traditional religion' remains too heterodox for an 'inculturated' liturgy, but faces competition in both city and countryside from a range of non-Catholic movements, with Pentecostalist Churches providing a challenge that charismatic versions of Catholicism have failed to check (Garma, 1999). Mexico produced an early example of a Pentecostal church with a centralised hierarchic organisation, the Guadalajara-based Luz del Mundo. Yet Luz del Mundo, which depends on the charisma of the son of its founder, and has weakened through internal conflict (Garma, 1999: 142), is very different from the Universal Church, which has 48 churches in Mexico and is still expanding there and in California. Mexican Catholicism is also suffering from retreat towards defence of the faith. On the Michoacán coast I met nuns still nervously giving a Liberation Theology reading of the diocesan preference for 'integral development of the person' to indigenous women, by linking the struggles of the Zapatistas to a general critique of capitalism that invited them to link their situations to those of urban working class people and think more broadly about women's issues and domestic violence. Yet in the mestizo municipality of Coahuayana, long targeted by US-sponsored evangelical groups from Colima, a new

evangelical challenge was emerging from entrepreneurial pastors who visited wives of men absent in the USA in their homes with promises of healing. The most visible effects of religious change remain local conflicts related to minority persecution and occasional mobilisation of non-Catholics under local leaderships as radical rather than power-respecting movements. Yet it seems unlikely that the neo-Pentecostal wave has reached its apogee.

In the Brazilian case, Burdick (1999) argues that Pentecostalism has too readily been dismissed as reactionary, documenting how Pentecostal Churches are experienced as self-esteem enhancing by black people, especially women, and how black identity-based organisations have developed within an evangelical setting. In his most recent work, he links the latter to the frustrated expectations of upwardly mobile educated blacks and their heightened awareness of glass ceilings even within churches preaching equality (Burdick, 2005: 330). Black evangelicals in government have been prominent in advancing Lula's affirmative action policies (Burdick, 2005: 332). Religious change therefore creates a variety of possibilities, some of which stem from what those who embrace a faith actually make of it. As for *candomblé*, its political and commercial manipulation by conservative elites in Bahia has not entirely sapped its resilience, despite the high profile of the Universal Church in Salvador. Van de Port has described how the openness of *candomblé* to globalising forces has allowed 'rescripting' by gays and greens as well as its re-Africanisation. Yet the priesthood resists embracing a 'racialising' politics that might threaten the ties with whites that have proved so beneficial for the recognition of their religion, preferring to sponsor social programmes aimed at enhancing 'self-esteem' (Van De Port, 2005: 20). Salvador now offers *terreiros* to suit the tastes of diverse social classes, some run by bio-medical professionals in their off-duty hours.

Conclusion

All this might suggest the irreversible triumph of a market society that ties personhood to globalised consumption practices. Even activists within indigenous communities struggling for ethnic recognition may dream of entering this kind of 'modernity' and vote with their feet. In Baja California the neoliberal state has ironically abandoned assimilation for strengthening the ethnic consciousness of people who want to 'assimilate'. While some still opt to defend local – albeit increasingly 'glocal' – identities and modes of life against big capital, others are opting for de-localising identities as part of transnational religious movements that remake the world by telling the faithful to 'get their act together'. The number who chose routes to 'respect' that promise them an early death is still increasing.

Yet within this panorama we also see changes in the underlying contours of hegemony. Developments that seem 'apolitical' or reinforce market values may also erode cultures of social deference and the ideologies on which the region's hierarchies of class, race and gender were based. Yet consumption is not simply about consumerism, because poorer people face increasing difficulties sustaining reproductive consumption. Electricity and gas prices have become central to rebellious reactions. Not all manifest themselves as anti-imperialist: Heyman (2001: 126) shows, for example, how in the borderlands of Sonora rising electricity prices came to symbolise the 'bad

government' of the PRI but strengthened popular support for the right-wing PAN. Yet Cochabamba's 'Water War' illustrates another kind of moral argument: water is life and should not be a source of private profit. Consumption practice can also underpin 're-localising' forms of resistance, but battles around the basic conditions of reproduction of a market-dependent proletariat raise issues of collective consumption obscured by overemphasis on symbolic use of commodities. This is not to deny the political importance of seeing the bitterly ironic connections when a young man from a marginal neighbourhood kills for a pair of Nikes manufactured by a poor woman from a marginal neighbourhood in a sweatshop, at a cost that reflects their mutual 'classification' by racialised and gendered structures of domination. Yet we also need to see how apparently contradictory social processes may contribute to undermining those structures.

Disillusion with party politics is likely to be reinforced if reformist governments that have bucked that trend to secure large popular mandates fail to deliver. Not all 'popular' or 'autonomy' movements contribute to 'democratising democracy', but the resilience of those that do offers grounds for thinking that political practice might also slowly shift from its historical tracks. There can be no instant utopias, but hegemony is subject to negotiation.

References

Albó, X. (2002) 'Bolivia: From Indian and Campesino Leaders to Councillors and Parliamentary Deputies', in R. Sieder (ed.) *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*. Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York, 74–102.

Anaya Muñoz, A. (2004) 'Explaining the Politics of Recognition of Ethnic Diversity and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Oaxaca, Mexico'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **23**(4): 414–433.

Assies, W. (2004) 'Bolivia: A Gassified Democracy'. *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* **76**: 25–43.

Besserer, F. (2004) *Topografías transnacionales. Una geografía para el estudio de la vida transnacional*. Plaza y Valdés: Mexico City.

Birman, P. and Lehmann, D. (1999) 'Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **18**(2): 145–164.

Briceño-León, R. and Zubillaga, V. (2002) 'Violence and Globalization in Latin America'. *Current Sociology* **50**(1): 19–37.

Burdick, J. (1999) 'What is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil'. *Latin American Research Review* **34**(2): 109–131.

Burdick, J. (2005) 'Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing in Brazil?' *Journal of Latin American Studies* **37**(2): 311–332.

Buxton, J. (2005) 'Venezuela's Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Perspective'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **24**(3): 328–347.

Caldeira, T. (2000) *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo*. University of California Press: Berkeley.

Caldeira, T. P. R. and Holston, J. (2004) 'State and Urban Space in Brazil: From Modernist Planning to Democratic Intervention', in A. Ong and S. J. Collier (eds) *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics and Ethics as an Anthropological Problem*. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, 393–416.

Cannon, B. (2004) 'Venezuela, April 2002: Coup or Popular Rebellion? The Myth of a United Venezuela'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **23**(3): 285–302.
Castells, M. (1982) 'Squatters and Politics in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Social Movements in Chile, Peru and Mexico', in H. Safa (ed.) *Towards a Political Economy of Urbanization in Third World Countries*. Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 249–282.
Coronil, F. (1997) *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Ellner, S. (2005) 'The Emergence of a New Trade Unionism in Venezuela with Vestiges of the Past'. *Latin American Perspectives* **32**(2): 51–71.
Fix, M. (2001) *Parceiros da exclusão: duas histórias da construção de uma 'nova cidade' em São Paulo*. Boitempo Editorial: São Paulo.
Foweraker, J. (2001) 'Grassroots Movements and Political Activism in Latin America: A Critical Comparison of Chile and Brazil'. *Journal of Latin American Studies* **33**(4): 839–865.
Garma, C. (1999) 'La situación legal de las minorías religiosas en México: balance actual, problemas y conflictos'. *Alteridades* **9**(18): 135–144.
Gledhill, J. (2005) 'Citizenship and the Social Geography of Deep Neo-Liberalization'. *Anthropologica* **47**(1): 81–100.
Goldstein, Donna M. (2003) *Laughter Out of Place: Race, Class, Violence and Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown*. University of California Press: Berkeley.
Goldstein, Daniel M. (2005) 'Flexible Justice: Neoliberal Violence and "Self-Help" Security in Bolivia'. *Critique of Anthropology* **25**(4): 389–411.
Gutmann, M. (2002) *The Romance of Democracy: Compliant Defiance in Contemporary Mexico*. University of California Press: Berkeley.
Hale, C. (2002) 'Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala'. *Journal of Latin American Studies* **34**(3): 485–524.
Hawkins, K. A. and Hansen, D. R. (2006) 'Dependent Civil Society: The *Círculos Bolivarianos* in Venezuela'. *Latin American Research Review* **41**(1): 102–132.
Hernández Castillo, R. A. (2005) 'Gender and Differentiated Citizenship in Mexico: Indigenous Women and Men Re-Invent Culture and Redefine the Nation', in W. Assies, M. A. Calderón and T. Salman (eds) *Citizenship, Political Culture and State Transformation in Latin America*. El Colegio de Michoacán and Dutch University Press: Amsterdam, 323–340.
Hewitt, W. E. (1998) 'From Defenders of the People to Defenders of the Faith: A 1984–1993 Retrospective of CEB Activity in São Paulo'. *Latin American Perspectives* **25**(1): 170–191.
Heyman, J. M. (2001) 'Imports and Standards of Justice on the Mexico-United States Border', in D. Miller (ed.) *Consumption: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences*: *Vol. II: The History and Regional Development of Consumption*. Routledge: London and New York, 102–132.
Ickes, S. (2005) '"Adorned with the Mix of Faith and Profanity that Intoxicates the People": The Festival of the Senhor do Bonfim in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, 1930–1954'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **24**(2): 181–200.
Kremer, E. W. (2005) 'Spectacle and the Staging of Power in Brazilian Neo-Pentecostalism'. *Latin American Perspectives* **32**(1): 95–120.
Leyva Solano, X. (2001) 'Regional, Communal, and Organizational Transformations in Las Cañadas'. *Latin American Perspectives* **28**(2): 20–44.
Martínez Novo, C. (2004) '"We Are Against the Government, Although We Are the Government": State Institutions and Indigenous Migrants in Baja California in the 1990s'. *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* **9**(2): 352–381.
Molyneux, M. and Lazar, S. (2003) *Doing the Rights Thing: Rights-Based Development and Latin American NGOs*. ITDG Publishing: London.

Novaes, R. C. R. (1994) 'Pentecostal Identity in Rural Brazil'. *Social Compass* **41**(4): 525–535.
Pallares, A. (2006) 'Mass Mobilization and Presidential Removal in Ecuador: *entre la ira y la esperanza*'. *LASA Forum* **XXXVII**(1): 22–25.
Petras, J. (2006) 'Evo Morales y Bolivia: gestos populistas y fondo neoliberal'. *Rebelión* [WWW document]. URL http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=25141 [accessed 7 January 2006].
Sansone, L. (2004) *Negritude sem etnicidade*. Edufba and Pallas: Salvador and Rio de Janeiro.
Silva, P. (2004) 'Doing Politics in a Depoliticised Society: Social Change and Political Deactivation in Chile'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* **23**(1): 63–78.
Stephen, L. (1997) 'The Zapatista Opening: The Movement for Indigenous Autonomy and State Discourses on Indigenous Rights in Mexico, 1970–1996'. *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* **2**(2): 2–41.
Stolle-McAllister, J. (2005) 'What Does Democracy Look Like? Local Movements Challenge the Mexican Transition'. *Latin American Perspectives* **32**(4): 15–35.
Valencia Ramírez, C. (2005) 'Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Who are the *Chavistas*?' *Latin American Perspectives* **32**(3): 79–97.
Van De Port, M. (2005) '*Candomblé* in Pink, Green and Black: Re-Scripting the Afro-Brazilian Religious Heritage in the Public Sphere of Salvador, Bahia'. *Social Anthropology* **13**(1): 3–26.
Villafuerte Solís, D. (2001) *Integraciones comerciales en la frontera sur: Chiapas frente al tratado de libre Comercio México-Centroamérica*. UNAM: San Cristóbal de Las Casas.
Viqueira, J. P. (2002) *Encrucijadas chiapanecas: economía, religión e identidades*. El Colegio de México: Mexico City.
Zibechi, R. (2004) 'Dangerous Liaisons: Center-Left Governments and the Grassroots'. *Americas Program, Interhemispheric Resource Center* [WWW document]. URL http://www.americaspolicy.org/reports/2004/0412movements.html [accessed 12 November 2004].