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From Involution to Revolution in Mexico: Liberal Development, Patriarchy, and Social Violence in the Central Highlands, 1870–1915

John Tutino*
Georgetown University

Abstract

Forces loyal to Emiliano Zapata rose to demand land and community autonomy in the revolution that brought destruction and transformation to Mexico after 1910. Men fought to right historic wrongs, land losses that began in the colonial era and political exclusions that mounted during the nineteenth century. Yet those historic grievances were already deeply felt and clearly expressed during the political and social conflicts of the 1860s and 1870s. Revolutionary mobilization did not surge until 1911, after three decades of political stability and commercial development under the authoritarian liberal regime of Porfirio Díaz. This article examines the social consequences of that dynamic liberal development in the highland basins south of Mexico City, the Zapatista heartland after 1910. It argues that population growth, land concentration, and mechanization fueled a commercial expansion that led to proliferating insecurities among the rural majority, insecurities lived by young men as threats to the patriarchal roles they presumed their birthright – their one advantage in communities defined by dependence and hard labor. The first result was a rising tide of violent crime within families and communities during decades of political stability. Then, after the political break of 1910, villagers refocused their rage outward in revolutionary assaults on those who presumed to rule and profit. Young men from communities south of Mexico City turned to revolution only after successful liberal development undermined their chances to live as patriarchs, even as dependent laboring patriarchs. They fought for land, community – and patriarchy.

Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico from 1876 to 1911. He oversaw a political consolidation that ended decades of early national political instability and social conflict; his regime's liberal visions fueled a development boom then and now celebrated as the beginning of modern Mexico. Yet the era of Porfirian political peace and commercial acceleration collapsed into a violent decade of revolution beginning in 1910. The relationship between Porfirian development and the violent political and social conflagration that followed is hotly debated. To simplify, some see a time of economic success, an era of modernizing progress that collapsed because enduring

authoritarian and corporatist political legacies sustained a personal regime that failed when an aging dictator faced the problem of succession amid demands pressed by new social forces (commercial elites, middle classes, and industrial labor) created by the regime's economic successes.[1] Others emphasize the expropriation and exploitation of the rural majority, generating mounting agrarian grievances that were unleashed by the political crisis that began in 1910.[2]

This article aims to recast the question and offer a new vision of the grievances that drove rural people, especially men, to revolution after 1910.[3] It focuses on key zones south of Mexico City, where the successful commercialization of agriculture after 1870 transformed production, labor relations, community ways, and family life. It recognizes the early flexibility and later rigidity of the Porfirian regime, leading to the political crisis that set off the revolution. It emphasizes that the political crisis would not have become a revolutionary crucible had not tens of thousands of rural people, mostly young men, joined the movement led by Emilio Zapata and demanding land and community autonomy. And it argues that the grievances that fueled popular participation in the agrarian revolution were not provoked primarily by crude exploitations and expropriations by grasping landlords. Rather, it places the accelerating commercialization of land, production, and labor relations – the heart of the good in the liberal economic model – at the root of the grievances that drove so many to revolution.

The link between successful liberal reforms, commercial advance, and social and revolutionary violence became clear as I began to understand how patriarchy – the structural (and culturally legitimated) primacy of men in politics, production, social relations, and family life – had been a key to the orchestration of agrarian life for millennia.[4] In Mexico's central highlands, Porfirian development promoted a culture of patriarchy, yet it assaulted the ability of young men to claim patriarchy in families and communities. The first result was escalating violence within communities and families – including a rising tide of infant deaths plaguing newborn girls. The Diaz era perhaps brought political peace. But it was a time of violence within families and communities. When regime stability gave way to enduring political conflict after 1910, the violence already rising within families and communities turned outward against those who ruled.

Successful liberal development after 1870 brought an involution of social violence; the breakdown of the regime beginning in 1910 allowed that violence to turn into revolution. Both violent involution during the Porfiriato and violent revolution after 1910 were driven by men who lived liberal development as challenges to patriarchy – their one advantage in lives defined by difficult, dependent, insecure, and increasingly scarce labor. When we understand patriarchy as the social cement that historically organized production and sanctioned inequalities in agrarian communities, we can begin to analyze the complex changes that first stimulated destructive waves of violence within communities and then fueled revolutionary conflicts.

If assaults on working men's patriarchy drove social violence after 1880 and revolutionary mobilizations after 1910, some of the oft-asserted moral basis of popular resistance may seem blunted. If men, especially young men, fought to preserve or regain patriarchy, they fought to hold power and precedence in families and communities. Such motives appear less idealistic than the defense of land and liberty proclaimed amid revolutionary conflicts and honored by so many subsequent analysts. Still, the contrast was less than stark. Most popular revolutionaries in the central highlands did fight for land and liberty – land and liberty organized by patriarchy in communities and families. It is important to remember that social organizations that proclaim unity of purpose – families, communities, even nations – are structured internally by power, inequality, even exploitation. When revolutionary ideologues defended community land and liberty, they also defended the local power of community notables. When, village men rose to defend patriarchy, they defended family, household production – and patriarchy. Moral utopias may legitimate and stimulate revolutionary conflicts; deep contradictions organize historical families, communities, and nations grappling with the challenges of liberal development.

Colonial Republics, Symbiotic Exploitations, and Liberal Challenges

Landed communities formed the foundation of society in Mesoamerica from the invention of agriculture in a distant and dimly seen past until the explosive urbanization that transformed Mexico (and most of the world) in the second half of the twentieth century. Mesoamerican states rose and fell; Europeans conquered and built a colonial society; Mexicans claimed independence after 1810, struggled to build a liberal capitalist nation – and beginning in 1910 lived a violent decade of revolution in which rural communities demanded land and autonomy. In the face of that history, land has held a central place in communities' and scholars' understandings of Mexico. They (we) are not wrong. By diverse means over changing centuries, land has been the base of family sustenance, community autonomy, and the ability to negotiate with and against those who presumed to rule and profit.

Only recently has patriarchy claimed attention as equally pivotal to families, communities, and structures of social power. Essential, enduring, and little contested – at least in public – core characteristics of social relations and cultural understandings are often masked or assumed in the historical record. What is contested comes to the fore. Land has been contested across Mesoamerica since time immemorial. Patriarchy has been presumed (by some as good, by others as inevitable) by Mesoamericans, Europeans, and Mexicans even as they disputed its meanings and implementations. Only recently has it been fully challenged. Said differently, patriarchy has persisted (as it has changed) as a key relationship organizing

power, land, and labor. This article builds on recent studies of communities in the Mexican highlands and analyses of gender across Mexico to open new perspectives on the profound challenges stimulated by liberal development in communities that lived decades of violence within – and then turned to revolution.[5]

Patriarchal landed communities have been the bedrock of Mesoamerican society for millennia. In the regions that are now central and southern Mexico and extending into Guatemala and beyond communities of cultivators rose with the invention of agriculture and persisted while indigenous states and empires came and went. Land was usually community domain. Local lords held large shares. Cultivating commoners held plots presumed sufficient for sustenance, and to provide surpluses in goods and labor to sustain lords, priests, and overlords. Lands were also allocated to sustain local worship and major temples. Patriarchy infused everything. Lords and priests were normally men; plots for sustenance went to men as they became heads of households. Power in production and warfare were male domains. Women were producers and reproducers – culturally honored in subordinate roles. Powerful lords might have multiple wives; peasants who were often mobilized as soldiers had one. In rare instances, military success could lead to social ascent – bringing a male commoner noble status, multiple wives, additional lands, and tributes from commoners working to sustain families. In everyday life, the male heads of producing households gained access to land in culturally sanctioned exchange for service as peasant-soldiers, ruling families while serving overlords. Thus patriarchal hierarchies structured inequalities in Mesoamerican states and communities.[6]

The Spanish conquest of the early sixteenth century set off processes that reconsolidated patriarchal families and communities, even while changing them. In fundamental ways, the encomiendas that organized Spanish power in the decades after the conquest aimed to maintain prevailing means of power and ways of production. Favored Spaniards gained rights to take tributes in goods and rotating labor service from indigenous communities subject to an indigenous lord – whose domain often defined the grant and who often continued to serve as an intermediary. Encomiendas presumed the persistence of peasant family production and local markets, and a continued stream of tributes to overlords now Spanish at the highest level.[7] Yet while Spaniards worked to benefit from indigenous systems of production and tribute, change struck indigenous communities and their patriarchal traditions. Smallpox and other disease brought devastating depopulation and cultural uncertainties. Except on the northern frontier, where wars with stateless Chichimecas kept Otomí and other indigenous peoples in arms as Spanish allies into the late sixteenth century, in the heartland of Mesoamerica the Spanish regime reserved warfare to colonial newcomers, ending the martial roles of native lords' and commoners. Christianization demanded an end to indigenous lords' rights to multiple

wives; marriage sanctified monogamous unions shaped by patriarchy. In the aftermath of conquest patriarchy persisted in peasant families and communities, yet lost its military aspect. Indigenous lords lost the claims to extended patriarchy inherent pre-conquest access to multiple wives.

Change accelerated and patriarchy reconsolidated when indigenous communities were reconstituted as *Republicas de Indios* (Indigenous Republics). By the 1550s, depopulation left radically diminished native populations scattered across the countryside. Clergy argued it was difficult to teach and oversee scattered survivors. Meanwhile, the discovery of silver in the Mesoamerican highlands at Taxco and Pachuca and to the north at Zacatecas stimulated commercial acceleration. In that context, the new regime orchestrated a colonial reconstruction. Indigenous survivors were congregated into communities, vacating vast lands then allocated to Spaniards who began to develop commercial estates that raised wheat and grazed livestock to sustain and to profit from the dynamic economy fueled by silver and focused on growing urban administrative-commercial centers led by Mexico City, the colonial capital.[8]

Shrunken and congregated Mesoamerican communities gained lands just sufficient to sustain the household production of the majority, the market production of local notables, and the needs of local government and religious life. Male heads of commoner households retained rights to lands for subsistence production, while the vagaries of widowhood and inheritance ensured that a few women always held plots. A Governor and council, elected by a larger (but still minority) group of notable men, ruled local affairs under the oversight of Spanish District Magistrates and Priests who usually lived in regional head towns. Congregations were inevitably expropriations. Still, the Republics allowed indigenous survivors space to adapt to depopulation and the emerging commercial economy, to create community Christianities, to maintain native languages and sociabilities – to survive at the foundation of the colonial order.[9]

Around Mexico City, the largest metropolis in the Americas, most indigenous republics were founded in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as population neared its lowest level. The silver economy boomed; vacated lands went to favored Spaniards who built commercial estates focused on sugar in the hot, wet Cuautla and Cuernavaca basins to the south, on wheat where irrigation allowed in the southern Valleys of Mexico and Toluca, and on sheep, hogs, cattle, and goats in uplands everywhere and on the dry lands extending north into the Mezquital.[10] Early estates produced old-world staples to supply Spanish cities and the silver economy. Indigenous staples – maize, chiles, beans, and the fermented beverage pulque – remained the province of native producers in indigenous republics from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries.

The economies of the Mesoamerican communities reconstituted as indigenous republics focused on sustenance and local trade. The colonial silver economy sought profit in an Atlantic world. They developed in

parallel after 1550, yet they were never separate. The colonial regime demanded tributes from male heads of commoner households; colonial cities sought indigenous produce, often grown by native notables; commercial estates coveted the labor of indigenous men and boys. The tribute, market, and labor relations that linked indigenous republics and the commercial economy would shape life in the highland basin around Mexico City for centuries.

During the colonial reconstruction of 1550 to 1650, shrunken populations ensured most indigenous families land sufficient to sustenance and to trade in local markets. Meanwhile, the commercial economy boomed, creating a growing demand for workers. Landed villagers had little incentive to provide that labor. The regime, aiming to sustain the indigenous republics and to promote the commercial economy, responded with a labor draft, a *repartimiento*. Indigenous notables were ordered to provide gangs of workers weekly to estates and other enterprises designated by Spanish District Magistrates. Employers were required to pay a standard daily wage. Meanwhile, the regime converted tributes from goods to cash – creating a tax that became an incentive for indigenous men to labor for cash. Everything reinforced patriarchy: only men sat on indigenous councils; only men voted as notables; notable and commoner men had priority in landholding; and only men and boys gained wages in the commercial economy. Of course, only commoner men owed tributes – one price of their patriarchal rule in producing households.[11]

The structure consolidated in the colonial reconstruction endured for centuries, with adaptive changes. In the basins around Mexico City, the repartimiento draft faced resistance after 1600 and ended in the 1630s. As population reached its nadir the regime failed to coerce community notables to deliver the expected work gangs. But the labor relation survived the end of the draft. Villagers still sought wages to pay tributes and to purchase goods in the commercial economy; local notables negotiated the provision of gangs to their own financial benefit – and to adapt the provision of workers in estate fields to the production cycles of local communities. An institutional symbiosis linked commercial estates and indigenous republics: estates needed seasonal workers only available in the communities; villagers worked to meet family and community needs in the commercial economy. Indigenous notables ruled the republics, worked larger farms that often supplied maize and other indigenous products to city markets, profited from providing work gangs to estates, and consolidated roles as essential brokers in the colonial order. Patriarchy shaped notables' power and working families' lives. Inevitably there were conflicts over land, labor, and family life. Yet through the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, the structure held and defined colonial life across the highland basins around Mexico City.[12]

The eighteenth century brought new pressures: the silver economy boomed again, first at Taxco just beyond the sugar basins, later at Real

del Monte in the Mezquital, always at Zacatecas and Guanajuato to the north. Meanwhile, population growth accelerated again in indigenous communities, often doubling before 1750, tripling by 1800. Indigenous republics with lands once sufficient to local sustenance began to face shortages just as the demand for produce in cities and mining centers expanded. Families and communities consumed more of their produce, leaving little for outside markets. Commercial estates responded by increasing production of sugar and wheat, and after 1725 turning to maize, pulque, and other indigenous staples. As land shortages struck growing indigenous families, and landlessness proliferated after 1770, estates in the cereal zones of the southern valleys of Mexico and Toluca and the sugar basins just south expanded production and thus the demand for seasonal hands.[13]

Institutional symbiosis became symbiotic exploitation. Village men depended more and more on wages gained in estate fields to sustain families; local notables became more pivotal as labor brokers; community economies and cultural life depended on the commercial economy; and patriarchal claims to priority in family and community life depended more and more on linking household production and wage labor. Symbiosis endured and perhaps became more structural; it also became increasingly exploitative as estate operators claimed unprecedented profits while village men and boys labored more in estate fields for minimal wages to sustain families and claims to patriarchy. By the late eighteenth century, disputes over land and labor escalated. So did conflicts within families and communities over patriarchal claims, often fueled by wives' protests that men failed to provide, thus were not owed deference and service.

Still, the structure held, mediated by local notables, rural clergy, District Magistrates, and colonial courts. Villagers in the Valleys of Mexico and Toluca and the sugar basins just south rarely joined the popular insurgencies that began in the Bajío with the Hidalgo revolt 1810, and persisted there and in the dry Mezquital north of Mexico City for years. Across the Bajío, indigenous republics were scarce and most rural families struggled as estate dependents; in the decades before 1810, population pressures there led to evictions and declining earnings, simultaneously threatening working men's patriarchy and families' security of sustenance. In the Mezquital, the shift to commercial pulque failed to offer wage work sufficient to compensate the worsening shortage of lands as population grew in a dry basin, threatening village men's patriarchy and family and community autonomies.

In contrast, across the highland basins east, south and west of the colonial capital, symbiotic exploitations sustained patriarchy and social stability into the nineteenth century. Local conflicts persisted and sometimes found links to calls for independence after 1810. They rarely become long insurgencies pressing for social change. Meanwhile, liberal political participations came to rural communities in a program that aimed to

reinforce Spanish rule. The Cádiz constitution of 1812 offered indigenous republics across the Valley of Mexico and nearby basins opportunities to become multi-ethnic municipalities, with rights to vote open to nearly all adult married men. New liberal participations thus reinforced patriarchy. Cádiz liberalism also aimed to privatize village lands – but authorities in New Spain refrained from implementing a reform that might provoke new and more widespread resistance. And when the return of Bourbon rule ended the liberal municipalities in 1814, indigenous communities across the Valley of Mexico were encouraged to form local Patriotic Militias to defend the regime from the continuing threat of insurgency. Ironically, insurgency in the Mezquital and counter-insurgent militias in the Valley of Mexico both allowed indigenous men the military roles denied them since the conquest era. Ultimately, peace and persistent production across the basins west, south, and east of the capital helped sustain the counterinsurgency that defeated insurgents in the Mezquital by 1815 and to the north across the Bajío by 1820. Notably, insurgency and counterinsurgency, Cádiz liberalism and restored absolutism all reinforced rural men's patriarchy.[14]

The time of conflict that began with the fall of the Spanish monarchy to Napoleon in 1808, accelerated with the insurgencies that began in 1810, and persisted after independence in 1821 opened a new era of opportunities and uncertainties for highland communities. The decade of insurgency in the the Bajío, home to Guanajuato's rich silver mines, a vibrant textile industry, and New Spain's most commercial, often irrigated agriculture, undermined the commercial economy there. Revival proved slow. Silver production across Mexico only regained late colonial levels in the 1840s; estate profits were limited and insecure into the same decade.

For decades after 1810, landlords in the central highland basins faced uncertain markets, political conflicts, and recalcitrant workers. Unable to control markets or political instability, they increasingly blamed their difficulties on villagers who demanded higher wages for seasonal labor, sent produce to glutted markets, and went to court to claim estate lands – with famous success in the southern valley of Toluca in the 1820s. The symbiotic exploitation linking estates and villages became less stable, sometimes shifting to favor villagers; some landlords lashed back by trying to usurp village lands – provoking more conflict. Persistent uncertainties of profit and labor in the 1840s led many growers to let out once commercial fields to villagers in share tenancies. Landlords got income without facing the costs of labor; village men got use of land – reconsolidating household production and patriarchy. Amid tensions and uncertainties, during the early decades of national life highland villagers often strengthened their economic roles and their negotiating power with struggling estates.[15]

Meanwhile, liberalism revived after independence in 1821 as a program of reform that simultaneously proclaimed and challenged community autonomy. With the inauguration of the federal republic in 1824 and the

Constitution of the State of Mexico (based on the Bourbon Intendancy of the same name, including the Valleys of Mexico and Toluca, the Mezquital to the north, the Cuautla and Cuernavaca sugar districts, and the rugged country extending south to the Pacific) in 1827 came attempts to limit the municipal rights offered broadly if briefly under Cádiz. Councils were allowed only to towns of 4000 or more inhabitants. Many historic indigenous republics and recent municipalities faced dependence on regional centers dominated by Spaniards and mestizos. Changing combinations of property, income, and literacy qualifications and indirect ways of voting ensured that the indigenous majority heard proclamations of popular sovereignty, voted locally – but were excluded from most municipal, state, and federal offices. Lands long held by indigenous republics to sustain local government, worship, and household cultivation passed to municipal governments that limited indigenous participation. Liberals in the state of Mexico discussed ending corporate land rights. They refrained for decades, fearing mass resistance. With independence, indigenous republics no longer existed legally. Yet they endured in many highland communities, adapting to survive as they could within municipalities. Indigenous people grasped the ultimate meaning of liberal proclamations of popular sovereignty. They interpreted municipal rights in ways that might allow the persistence of landed communities. They negotiated to preserve village ways: they pressed demands in municipal offices and district courts; they protested in town plazas and estate fields when local officials and judges failed to respond.[16]

Conflict escalated in the 1840s, especially after the war that saw the United States occupy Mexico City and take Mexico's vast northern territories. During the war and after, indigenous peoples in Yucatán, the Sierra Gorda, Tehuantepec, and elsewhere fought for local rights rather than against the invaders. Men who aimed to build a nation and a commercial economy blamed indigenous communities for persistent troubles. Politics polarized, landlords pressed against communities, and the State of Mexico tried to build rural police as a bulwark of social control. Yet landlords resisted the taxes needed to make police effective. In the sugar basins, landlords claimed village lands to increase production. Across Chalco, estate operators experimented with new crops and expanded irrigation. Everywhere, estates let maize fields to village sharecroppers. Pressing villagers for land and labor while reinforcing their subsistence production, employers struggled to control workers who remained strong in their communities and pressed back in waves of local resistance that often became violent in the late 1840s and into the 1850s.[17]

In 1855, liberals took national power led by southern strongman Juan Alvarez, who mobilized men with a brand of liberalism open to community lands and autonomies. Once in power, however, national liberals ousted Alvarez and pressed an agenda that led in 1856 to the Ley Lerdo, privatizing corporate landholding. The decree was incorporated in the Constitution

of 1857 that also denied legal personality to communities. It pressed a vision of law as uniform, codified by state legislatures, and implemented by local officials (soon designated Jefes Políticos, the feared and resented enforcers of state policies in local communities). The liberal nation turned away from the colonial practice of judicial mediation between diverse visions of right – including indigenous visions. The national liberal charter pressed the State of Mexico to abolish the remnants of indigenous republics, to end mediating justice, and to privatize community lands – while allowing it to continue to limit indigenous participation in municipal life.[18]

Communities began to resist at Chalco and elsewhere. Opposition by the Church (also facing privatization and eventually nationalization of its income properties) led national Conservatives to mount a three-year war against the reform. Liberal victory was followed by French invasion in 1862 and the imposed empire of Maximilian of Hapsburg. During a decade of conflict, the privatization of community lands proved difficult. Liberals could not risk provoking mass resistance while fighting Conservatives. When they turned to fighting the French, liberals led by President Benito Juárez and General Porfirio Díaz took a nationalist stance and worked to recruit indigenous fighters against the invaders and the Maximilian's monarchy. Indigenous men also were dragooned into liberal armies, where proclamations of popular sovereignty and individual liberty aimed to legitimate bloody conflicts. Others supported (or were levied to fight for) Maximilian's empire from 1864 to 1867, an experiment laden with contradictions. The Hapsburg was too liberal for his Conservative Mexican allies, yet he legitimated his right to rule by offering special protections and justice to indigenous communities. From 1856 to 1867, ideological and international conflicts generated waves of violence that polarized debates yet inhibited effective rule, to say nothing of reform.[19]

The departure of the French and the defeat of Maximilian in 1867 left liberals in control of the national state. Led by Juárez, a Oaxacan of Zapotec birth, the restored Republic turned again to privatizing community lands, limiting municipal participations, proclaiming that rights belonged only to individuals, and mandating that justice become the implementation of codified law. At Chalco, villagers took arms in resistance. Their leader, Julio López, had fought against the French; in 1868 he fought for community autonomy and against privatization and landlord power. Effective repression crushed the rising. Widespread rebellions to the east around Puebla, north in the Mezquital, and in more distant Nayarit and Chiapas persisted into 1869, when most faced defeat. Still, they demonstrated that indigenous communities heard liberal proclamations of popular sovereignty, municipal autonomy, and national unity – and expected their support for the liberal nation to be rewarded by policies that protected community lands and local autonomies. When the Juárez government resumed privatization, continued to limit the municipal rights of indigenous communities, and pressed a singular justice perceived as favoring the powerful,

waves of resistance threatened the liberal restoration. The implementation of land privatization and other liberal reforms in rural regions became a long, slow, localized process that peaked only in the 1880s, often contested and never completed.[20]

After independence symbiotic exploitation became unstable; landlords pressed for land and labor; villagers pushed back, demanding higher wages while taking estate lands as sharecroppers. Indigenous men cultivated, labored, and negotiated new ways to assert and sustain patriarchy. They reclaimed the right to bear arms, the military aspect of patriarchy denied them since the aftermath of conquest – in wars for independence, in political fights, in local rebellions, and in wars against invaders that peaked from the 1840s through the 1860s. Meanwhile, diverse regimes relied on police, militias, and the military for social control, confirming and legitimating coercion as a key aspect of patriarchy. Production and violence reconsolidated as twin pillars of men's claims to rule in production, family life, and communities affairs – even as liberal reforms challenged indigenous communities' rights and roles.

Many indigenous men and communities across the central highlands supported Porfirio Díaz when he took arms to claim power in 1876. The celebrated general, earlier had led the fight to oust the French; he promoted commercial development, promised municipal autonomy, and demanded 'effective suffrage, no-relection'. His local commanders in the State of Mexico also promised that Diaz would right injustices in land privatization; many proclaimed that he would redistribute estate lands. They knew how to mobilize popular support. Yet once in power in 1877, Díaz turned against the radical leaders who helped bring him power and away from the promises of municipal autonomy and land redistribution that had mobilized community support. The late 1870s were again years of deep political conflict. Diaz worked to consolidate liberal programs and exclusions. Many former supporters – generals, ideologues, and indigenous communities – demanded individual liberties and municipal autonomies along with community rights to land and legal personality. They organized leagues of communities; they pursued a hybrid vision of sovereignty and justice that might be called liberal communalism. Landlords and the regime maligned it as communism. Officials repeatedly saw rebellion and threats of 'caste war'. Most violence was pre-emptive repression by local and state powers.

By 1880, Díaz had consolidated a liberal authoritarian regime: liberal in social and economic policies; authoritarian in political ways. How was the widespread community resistance of the 1860s and 1870s so effectively contained? Perhaps, highland communities were exhausted by decades of violence that began in the 1840s. Perhaps too, amid all the assaults on indigenous traditions and community rights, the liberal assertions of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s inevitably saw the 'individual' – the basis of society, the locus of rights – as the 'jefe de familia', the man who ruled

a patriarchal household. The liberal reforms of the middle decades of the nineteenth century challenged community rights, yet reinforced patriarchy.[21]

After 1880, national politics stabilized; entrepreneurs, growing urban middle sectors, rural big men, and some factory workers found new prosperity. In highland villages, the stabilized Porfirian regime continued to press the liberal agenda of privatization, individualism, and codified law – all proclaimed to reinforce patriarchy. But also after 1880, villagers lived a liberal economic boom that brought unprecedented challenges to family production, community unity – and to working men's patriarchy. When political crisis again led to regime breakdown in 1911, highland villagers would lead a social revolution.

Liberal Development

While liberals fought the conflicts that led to the stabilization of the Díaz regime by the 1880s, transforming changes were already underway. The sugar basins left the State of Mexico in 1868 to become Morelos, where sugar ruled production and politics. The national regime promoted market production and private investment, Mexican and foreign. It subsidized railroads, privatized public and community lands, and promised education. By the 1880s, success seemed everywhere. Rail lines drove across the landscape; industry proliferated, creating new laboring communities; commercial cultivation boomed. Mexico City and many provincial towns reveled in urban improvements: new shops, services, and schools.[22]

The gains of liberal development were there for all to see. Yet for the rural majority, most benefits went to others, while they struggled to find ways to produce, sustain families, and, for men, to hold the patriarchy they believed their birthright. Boom and modernity, struggle and uncertainty came together in the success of liberal development. Nowhere was that clearer than in the southern basins of the State of Mexico and nearby Morelos. There, liberal development succeeded so well it generated deepening social crises, waves of violence within families and communities – and eventually a revolution.

When revolution came in 1910, famously led by Emiliano Zapata, popular mobilizations responded to an agrarian ideology that emphasized the historic loss of community lands – an ideology already in place in the conflicts of the 1860s and 1870s.[23] Ancestral holdings essential to families and communities had been taken by greedy landlords, perhaps in the colonial era, perhaps in recent years. There was truth in that ideology: land loss in sixteenth-century congregations; land disputes that lasted decades, sometimes centuries; machinations in the implementation of privatizations; land taking to expand irrigation and production in recent years. An ideology of right and loss was essential to draw men to the deadly risks of revolutionary insurrection.

The history that led to revolution was more complex. There were equally long histories of community resistance and survival. Around 1870, despite (or because of) recent conflicts, communities still held important lands, most families, and essential workers across the central highlands. Some would experience land loss during the era of liberal development. But losses to large estates were limited. What liberal development did bring was land privatization, land concentration within communities, population growth, and (labor-saving) mechanization. Large growers profited; local big men found new prosperity they used to buy the trappings of modernity; and growing generations of young men found land scarce and employment scarcer, except for seasonal work in estate fields. Insecure day labor proved no way to sustain a family – or a young man's claims to patriarchy.

The process is best known for Morelos, later the heartland of the Zapatista revolution.[24] There, the land in cane increased from 3500 hectares to 10,000 hectares between 1869 and 1909. Sugar harvests grew five times over from the 1860s to 1909. The increases did not come from radical extensions of estate landholding, but from expansions of irrigation – converting to cane lands previously allocated to maize (and often let to village sharecroppers). Estates did seek land to extend irrigation, often by purchasing recently privatized community properties – sometimes using pressure within the law, sometimes engaging in theft outside the law. The primary result of land privatization, however, was to concentrate holdings within communities. Local merchants and others with funds bought up the small plots of their poor neighbors, While the population of Morelos rose by 50 per cent and mostly remained in rural communities, the concentration of landholdings within communities combined with the loss of access to sharecropping (as estates turned milpas to irrigated cane fields) created a burgeoning population of young men without land – and with few prospects beyond seasonal labor in the cane fields.

The expansion of irrigation and cane planting was stimulated by the growth of the Mexico City market and facilitated by the construction of railroads that cheapened delivery there and across central Mexico. The collapse of Cuban sugar production beginning in 1895 with the war for independence (renamed the Spanish-America War by the US, when it intervened to end Spanish rule, yet prevent real independence) opened new export markets for Mexican growers along the gulf coast, allowing Morelos' sugar wider internal distribution. The industrialization of refining allowed processing to accelerate with markets and production.

Commercial cultivation boomed, sustained by new irrigation. Machines took over much of refining – saving labor. Railroads took over long distance transportation – saving labor. Those who did work the mechanized refineries and the railroads often came from outside, bringing, employers insisted, the skills essential to modern work. The sugar economy boomed – and generated unemployment and insecurity among growing generations

of villagers. The shift of estate lands to cane, the concentration of lands within communities, the mechanization of production, all while population grew – left labor demand to lag behind cane production. Most available work was seasonal day labor, harvesting cane for low wages during several months. And as we shall see, the men of Morelos faced new competition for that labor from others facing parallel challenges in nearby upland basins.

The social consequences of liberal development did not lead directly to revolution. While the boom held, men scratched, struggled, and negotiated ways to find work and sustain families. But when Cuban sugar exports revived around 1905 (ruled by US producers and favored in US markets), followed by the recessionary effects in Mexico of the US financial panic of 1907, and by Mexican drought in 1909 and 1910 – markets for Morelos sugar shrank. The harvest dropped 7 per cent from 1909 to 1910, bringing unemployment and exacerbating long developing social insecurities. Meanwhile, state elections in 1908 and a national presidential contest of 1910 raised sharp questions of equity and justice in the political arena. In that context, Emiliano Zapata led the men of Anenecuilco in a movement for local justice that grew to become an agrarian revolution.

If the Zapatista revolution had its root, base, and longest life in Morelos, it gained national importance because it incorporated wider zones, including Guerrero to the South, Puebla to the east, and the southern Chalco and Toluca basins in the state of Mexico. The latter were Mexico City's historic granaries, supplying the metropolis with wheat, maize, and others staples. Agrarian insurgencies there did not result from mere contagion flowing from Morelos. Rather, the southern valley of Toluca and the Chalco basin experienced transformations after 1870 that paralleled those in Morelos – in economic dynamism, in social insecurities, and in assaults on working men's patriarchy. One result was to send men from both regions to Morelos, seeking labor in the cane harvests. Parallel experiences of landlessness, insecurity, and challenges to patriarchy drove a common search for labor that brought men together in the cane fields of Morelos before 1910 – and in revolution soon after.

Liberal development and its social challenges at Chalco, Tenango del Valle, and across the State of Mexico broadly paralleled those in Morelos just south: population growth, land privatization and concentration, and the mechanization of commercial cultivation brought landlessness, unemployment, and insecurity – all threatening patriarchy in a generation of young men. There were also differences: commercialization was rapid at Chalco, slower at Tenango; men from the latter went earlier and more often to Morelos to labor. The modernizing State of Mexico also gathered and published information that documented the development boom, the challenge to communities, the assault on patriarchy, the rise of violence within families and communities, and an escalation of infant death that mostly struck newborn girls – all accelerating around 1900.

Table 1. Population at Chalco and Tenango del Valle, 1870–1900

Year	State of Mexico	Chalco	Tenango del Valle
1870	650,653	47,184	49,559
1877	703,309	54,460	54,501
1885	783,559	57,565	60,390
1890	826,166	63,065	66,420
1900	939,140	70,192	72,388
Per cent Increased	44	49	46

Source: *Memorias*, 1871, 1878, 1879, 1886, 1894, 1902; my calculations.

The State of Mexico compiled and published detailed information on population, production, labor relations, and crime sporadically through the middle decades of the nineteenth century, more regularly beginning in 1870.[25] Recent historical studies help set the quantitative materials in the context of liberal development.[26] Such works are more numerous and detailed for Chalco, but the imbalance is compensated by a collection of memories narrated by people who lived liberal development and then revolution at Xalatlaco, a town in the uplands between Tenango and the Morelos basin.[27] The juxtaposition of quantitative records of social change, crime, and violence with the memories of women and men who lived those difficult times allows a new analysis of liberal development and social change, patriarchy, violence – and revolution.

Sustained population growth, surely a good in communities that cherished families, underlay everything – growing markets, expanding labor availability, pressures on limited land. The State of Mexico grew 44 per cent from 1870 to 1900, Tenango 46 per cent, Chalco 49 per cent (Table 1).

The great majority remained in rural towns and villages: at Chalco 94 per cent in 1877, still 90 per cent in 1900. Towns became larger, but the largest, the district seat, barely exceeded 8,000 residents in 1900. The population at commercial estates fell from five to four per cent in the same period; smaller ranchos grew from one to two per cent. Two factory towns grew just before 1900 to include 4 per cent of Chalco's population, accounting for the small decline of the portion (not the numbers) in towns and villages that year. Overwhelmingly, Chalco remained a place of rural villagers in 1900.[28] Tenango was similar, but without the factories (and studied in less detail). Small towns and smaller villages had to accommodate most of the nearly fifty-per cent increase in population during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. No gain in access to arable land allowed a compensating growth of family cultivation.

Instead, privatization concentrated former community lands in fewer hands. Liberals decreed the end of corporate property in the 1856 Lerdo Law, incorporated it in the Constitution of 1857, and faced community

resistance during and after the political wars of 1858 to 1867 – delaying implementation to the 1880s in many places including Chalco. The goal, liberals insisted, was not to strip indigenous families of land; rather, it was to privatize holdings and mobilize them in a commercial economy. Villagers would gain title to plots planted for family sustenance. Lands worked in common or leased to generate income for local government would be auctioned; the proceeds would serve the same purposes. Villagers and outsiders could bid on commons, income lands, and the sodality lands that sustained local worship. After resistance peaked in the late 1860s, implementation was left to municipal initiative.

Many communities divided: prosperous locals, indigenous notables able to claim ample plots and others who might bid on commons or income lands, promoted privatization. Men with small subsistence plots – knowing the costs of surveying and titling, facing lost access to common woodlands and pastures, fearing the potential for future losses to debt, and understanding that the end of corporate property would leave them alone to defend against any who challenged their rights – often opposed privatization. While facing internal divisions, communities also learned that they could only privatize lands they held with uncontested title, or used without challenge. Liberal law prohibited communities (which no longer existed in the eyes of law) from going to court to pursue lands they saw as usurped by estates or rival communities. The general result was that privatization concentrated limited holdings. Local indigenous notables gained as property their ample shares of communal holdings; they and others bought lands formerly leased as income properties. Once privatization was completed, the market accelerated concentration as prosperous men bought poor neighbors' lands – or claimed them for debt. By the 1880s, lands were widely (never fully) privatized, sometimes with surveys and titles, often without such basic protections – and concentrating in ever fewer hands.[29]

Meanwhile, the explosive growth of Mexico City and the Federal District – a metropolis surrounded by the State of Mexico (and Morelos to the south) – stimulated markets and shaped production across the highlands. In 1877, the Federal District included 327,512 people, less than half the population of the State of Mexico. By 1900, it had grown to 541,516, almost 60 per cent of the surrounding state. In 1910, the metropolis reached 720,753, nearly 75 per cent of the population of the State. Villagers across Chalco, Tenango de Valle, and the rest of the state struggled to sustain themselves – while commercial estates and those who accumulated once community lands saw profit in feeding the growing population of the national capital.[30]

The broad shape of the outcome of the privatization of community lands at Chalco is clear, though awaiting a historian to plumb its local conflicts and complexities. A study of estate land titles and boundary maps revealed little expansion from the eighteenth century to 1890, and most estate surveys recorded significant areas of 'community lands' on their

boundaries – though such holdings were then legally private.[31] An analysis of land records kept for tax purposes in 1893 (tending to minimize estate holdings) and pueblo claims for land that began amid the revolution in 1915 suggests modest community losses and large estate gains.[32] The largest expansion of estate lands came with the drainage of Lake Chalco to create of the vast Xico property (discussed shortly). As in Morelos, estates sometimes bought or claimed former community lands to extend irrigation or add to cultivated fields. But there is little evidence of massive appropriations, legal or otherwise (and the conflicts the latter would set off) during the Díaz era. What is most likely is that, as in Morelos just south, local big men, often merchants and money lenders, accumulated plots by purchase and debt seizure from struggling neighbors – sometimes selling to larger commercial operators.

Local accumulation and market expansions were remembered sharply at Xalatlaco. There, in the highlands between the Tenango basin and the Morelos lowlands, families raised maize and barley and harvested the forests to make charcoal and shingles. The goal was sustenance – and sales to gain what they did not produce. Local traders and mule train operators bought up grain and wood products and sold them in Morelos. They returned with vegetables and *aguardiente*, cane brandy. It proved good business. The men who ran local stores and mule trains accumulated wealth and many of their neighbors' lands.[33]

Natalio Lorenzana remembered Dolores Reyonoso as 'The biggest of the *caciques* (bosses) . . . He had many hectares [*c.* 2.5 acres each]; most of the town was his farm'. He kept stores and ran mule trains; he sold on credit and claimed lands when customers could not pay; when others needed to sell plots in the face of need, he insisted that only he could buy. Natalio went on:

> Don Dolores did not dress like a *charro* [a Mexican cowboy], but in slacks, with a hat like a rich man, and I heard he carried a pistol . . . He was very respected; all the big shots were respected in those days.

While building power in Xalatlaco, Reynoso cultivated ties to other big men in the region:

> The rich also threw parties . . . They invited friends and allies from Toluca and other big towns. Dolores Reynoso had a friend and trading partner from Tacubaya [near Mexico City]. He gave Dolores the resources to set up his store, bread bakery, and butcher shop.[34]

Leonardo Ceballos offered parallel memories: 'It was in the years that Dolores Reynoso, a rich man, ruled; . . . He had many lands; he had more than twenty plow teams, many more'. Having accumulated perhaps 60 hectares (about 150 acres) of land, Reynoso also accumulated women. The dominant patriarch of Xalatlaco kept five women and their children in five households. 'In addition, he had a pulque tavern in his house; he had a mill powered by gasoline to grind maize for tortillas . . . he was the

richest man in town'.[35] Memories of Reynoso's wealth also came from within his family. His nephew Margarito Gaspar recalled: 'my uncle Dolores Reynoso had a lot of money, so much there was no place to put it. . . . he had a store, he had a dry goods store, he had a bakery, he had a pulque tavern'.[36]

The people of Xalatlaco, struggling while Reynoso accumulated wealth, land, and power, found a persuasive explanation for his sudden gains: he made a pact with the Devil. Leonardo Ceballos's memories were clear: 'his riches did not come from work, but from "The Other". Later, when he distributed his land among his sons, they all died in sadness, because the riches came from the Other'. Ceballos added,

> Dolores had poor men who worked for him, he had a lot of workers; because he had money, he deceived them. It was clear to me he had a pact with the devil, and that poor men went to work for him because they needed his wages, they needed work. But it is clear that he sold them, that they too went to the Other.[37]

Margarito Gaspar knew that his uncle was not alone in dealing with the Devil: 'they say that the Pastranas, from the town of Coatepec, enjoyed money they got from pacts'. He also knew how the Devil delivered money to Dolores: 'There are people in San Agustín who tell how at midnight a wagon descended, all illuminated and amid thunder; it brought money from the hill named Cuahuatl and deposited it in town'.[38]

Was the diabolical explanation absurd? The privatization of community lands – a liberal policy – and the acceleration of market production – a liberal goal – together fed accumulations like Reynoso's. Those liberal programs came linked – by liberals – to the privatization of church properties and the separation of church and state. The clergy and conservative ideologues replied loudly that such programs attacked the Church and religion, the pillars of God's work in the world. While most Mexican liberals believed themselves devout Catholics, they aimed to end the Church's temporal powers, its sway over education, and its promotion of (or acquiescence in) popular beliefs they saw as superstitious. Ironically, while big men like Reynoso took advantage of the market economy and the privatization of land to accumulate wealth and property, they joined in local arrangements that assigned the sodality lands that supported local worship to private owners (often women) who allowed continued communal cultivation to support local festivals and other worship.[39] Local religion carried on strong. The people of Xalatlaco surely heard preaching that equated liberalism and its programs with assaults on religion, on God. Who gained from assaulting God? The people of Xalatlaco tied liberal programs, market accelerations, and land concentrations to the Devil. They understood clearly – in their own religious idiom.

While populations grew and local big men accumulated lands, the commercial economies of Chalco and Tenango del Valle expanded.

Chalco experienced a more rapid acceleration. It lay just southeast of Mexico City in the Valley of Mexico, its fertile plains linked by canal to the markets of the metropolis since ancient times. Chalco also lay on the route of the railroad built in the 1880s to bring Morelos sugar to the city. The Chalco plains were ideally situated to supply wheat and maize to Mexico City's burgeoning population in the late nineteenth century. The challenge was to expand production. Estates had claimed most of the lands susceptible to stream irrigation in the colonial era. Many expanded water supplies by drilling artesian wells beginning in the 1840s. With market growth, lands let to village sharecroppers during the difficult middle decades of the century were taken back for commercial cropping after 1880. Where possible, irrigation was further expanded. The single greatest expansion of production of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century came with Díaz's grant of the marshy bed of Lake Chalco to the Spanish immigrant entrepreneur Iñigo Noriega, who drained the lake to create a vast irrigable plain. That project added nearly 10,000 hectares to commercial cultivation, increasing by more than 10 per cent the lands held by estates around 1900, providing a quarter of the lands that Noriega combined to build the great Chalco agribusiness he offered to investors, including many of Porfirian Mexico's leading capitalists.[40]

Meanwhile, Chalco's commercial growers turned to mechanization, importing planters, harvesters, and threshers from the United States – demonstrating modernity and the knowledge that labor-saving machines increased profits. They reduced demand for labor, thus production costs, while market demand soared.[41] Yet the turn to machines came not in the face of scarcities of workers, but as the combination of population growth and land concentration left growing numbers of men in search of wages. A state survey completed in 1893, after the railroad was completed, as mechanization began to accelerate, and before the drainage at Xico, reported that Chalco estates employed 1454 workers year round and 9747 seasonally to plant and harvest crops.[42] Day wages ranged from 31 to 37 centavos. For a district population approaching 70,000, such employment was minimal.

There were alternatives, but they were limited. The Miraflores textile mill had operated at Chalco since the 1830s. In 1893 it employed 150 men, 150 women, and 50 children – paying adult men and women a peso a day, the children 25 centavos. Two new mills created additional work: Tomacoco employed 60 men, 10 women, and 35 children – paying 85 centavos daily to the men, 50 to the women, 35 to children; El Caballito offered work to only 30 men at a peso daily and 4 women who earned from 25 to 75 centavos. The nearly 500 people working regularly at textile mills created a local 'labor aristocracy' (at least among adults). They added to those gaining regular employment in the region, bringing the total at estates and textile mills to nearly 2000 – an insignificant portion of the district's growing population. In the 1890s, the San Rafael paper

mill opened in the highlands above Chalco, using the rapid fall of the Tlalmanalco River to generate hydroelectric power (as did the Miraflores mill) and tapping the vast forests on the flanks of the towering Ixtaccíhuatl and Popocatepetl volcanoes.[43] Paper making also mechanized, creating only limited permanent employment; like the sugar mills of Morelos, San Rafael often recruited skilled workers outside the region. The plant did hire local men to cut and haul timber, another source of irregular income for growing numbers facing lives without land.

A survey of non-agricultural activities in 1900 revealed 376 commercial outlets, mostly small stores and shops – many the basis of the local wealth of the few who accumulated village lands. There were 176 artisan shops, with shoemakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, and tailors most numerous among them. They brought modest prosperity to a few families. And there were 150 industrial establishments listed, most small except for San Rafael and the three textile mills. There were 91 shops making pulque to supply local taverns, 14 bakeries, and 11 candle makers.[44] An estimate that nearly 650 small stores and shops employed five persons each (likely high), suggests that town activities supported 3200 workers – more than the permanent employees of the commercial estates, textile mills, and San Rafael combined.

It is hard to see what economic activities sustained Chalco's population passing 70,000 around 1900. Combining the 2000 workers permanently employed by estates and mills with the 3200 estimated sustained by town stores and shops indicates that just over 5000 found regular sustenance in the commercial economy. Estimating (again generously) that 2000 men found some work providing wood to San Rafael, and adding that to the nearly 10,000 estimated to find seasonal work in estate fields, indicates that another 12,000 men and boys gained irregular income in the same economy.

Many men struggled to support families by combining subsistence cultivation, seasonal labor at estates, and cutting timber for San Rafael – while caught in a tightening vise created by population growth, land concentration, and estate mechanization. How did they carry on into the early twentieth century? The railroad building of the 1880s created a brief boom in demand for hard labor – followed by the labor-saving impact of rail transport and mechanized cropping. Around 1900, the drainage of Lake Chalco brought another surge of labor demand – followed by more mechanized production and mostly seasonal labor demand. Young women left in uncounted numbers for household service in Mexico City. Young men left seasonally for difficult, often maiming work cutting cane in Morelos.[45] For decades the people of Chalco found ways to survive, but they proved irregular and insecure. They began to separate family members, to challenge patriarchy, to threaten community cohesion.

Were there no protests? The people of the lakeshore tried to resist the dessication of the marshes that had allowed them to gather aquatic life, to

little effect thanks to Noriega's ties to Díaz.[46] A zone famous for protests beginning in the 1840s and culminating in rebellion in 1868 offered little public resistance to transformations challenging everyday survival and patriarchal norms. Why? Part of the reason was the consolidation of government nationally and in the State of Mexico. The spaces that political conflicts had opened for popular resistance during the middle decades of the century closed with Díaz's authoritarian stabilization. Simultaneously, the regime promoted two programs of social control: education and police.

Mexican liberals offered education to cure cultural division ('indigenous backwardness') and to stimulate economic growth beginning in the era of independence.[47] They blamed decades of limited results on political conflict, clerical resistance, and indigenous reticence. With the return of liberal rule in 1868 and in the aftermath of the popular risings of 1868 and 1869, the State of Mexico made a concerted effort to build schools and increase enrollments. At Chalco the 32 schools and 1595 students of 1870 grew to 73 schools and 4328 students in 1877. Notable was the rise in girls' schools from 4 to 10, with enrollments jumping from 196 to 988 – real gains that revealed a persistent preference for educating boys. Schools and enrollments increased across Chalco, yet they concentrated in larger towns. In a telling transition as Diaz consolidated his rule, in 1878 the number of schools at Chalco increased to 85, but enrollments dropped to 3793. Girls' schools increased to 17, but their enrollments fell to 834. Boys' enrollments rose by 200.[48]

The educational offerings at Chalco were paralleled across the State. The number of schools increased from 439 in 1870 to 1050 in 1878, enrollments from 24,640 (3.8 per cent of population) in 1870 to 52,201 (7.5 per cent of population) in 1877, to then fall in 1878 and through the Porfiriato. By 1907, the number of schools in the state fell to 995, the number of students to 47,357 – while population increased by nearly 100,000, leaving enrollments under 5 per cent.[49] A recent analysis of education policies statewide reveals strong commitments to the promise of education, the concentration of schools and the best teachers in populous and prosperous head towns like Chalco, laments that the rural majority failed to respond to the promise, and grudging recognition that lives of poverty and insecurity left too many in need of children in the fields. An analysis of local debates over education in the pivotal late 1870s reveals that the state demanded head taxes to pay for education across municipalities while concentrating schools in head towns. Outlying villagers protested that they would not pay for schools too distant for their children to attend – and shaped by curricula they could not control.[50] Education reinforced the concentrations and exclusions already dominant in landholding and the commercial economy.

The state proved more effective at policing. It had promoted police as the solution to social problems from the 1840s, but had difficulty convincing landlords to pay essential taxes.[51] In 1870, after the risings of

1868, Chalco had a mounted force of only 16 men. The Porfirian state found an alternative. It created civilian police patrols called *veintenas* (they mobilized 20 men nightly in each sub-district, more when emergencies rose). In 1890 they enrolled over 4700 men across Chalco. By 1900 the patrol had become the Second Reserve of the Army, enlisting 11,153 men at Chalco (many more than found regular work). They were subject to periodic drills and monthly patrol duties – mobilizing 378 men daily across the district. They carried personal weapons, relieving the state of the cost of arms.[52] A majority of adult men at Chalco participated (nearly 80 per cent if we presume households of five; 65 per cent if they held near four). The (re)militarization of patriarchy that began with the fight for independence and persisted through political conflicts and mounting rebellions around mid-century gained sanction and organization under Porfirian rule. While growing numbers faced unprecedented difficulties asserting patriarchy as 'providers', they saw manly violence sanctioned in the service of social stability.

Parallel developments shaped the Tenango del Valle district, but with limited local commercial development. For 1890, the state estimated transactions at just over 200,000 pesos there, only 15 per cent of activity at Chalco. A rail line crossed the sierra to connect Toluca to Mexico City in 1882, but it continued west – providing little access for producers at Tenango and farther south. Industrial and commercial development concentrated along the line running through Toluca, stimulating textile mills, breweries, and hydroelectric plants that also benefited from tax exemptions encouraging new foundations and mechanization.[53] In the Tenango district, one small cloth factory operated at Santiago Tianguistengo in 1890, employing only 8 men, 5 women, and 5 children – far fewer that the nearly 400 in factory work at Chalco (before San Rafael opened). Not surprisingly, industrial wages were low, ranging from 18 to 30 centavos daily.[54] That left the majority of the district's growing population dependent on subsistence cultivation (as lands rapidly concentrated) and on work at eight haciendas and 25 ranchos. The estates offered regular work to only 463 people, leaving 13,908 seeking seasonal labor (at 18 to 25 centavos daily, again less than at Chalco).[55] Morelos became a growing escape. Cane workers became so common that they earned a label at Xalatlaco: they were 'morelianos'. Apolonio Flores remembered, 'tradition says they liked going to work in the cane'.[56] Given the harsh realities of cutting, necessity was surely the primary impetus.

Facing the vise of land concentration and population growth without even the limited expansion of local labor brought by factories, rail projects, and land drainage at Chalco, people at Tenango found other adaptations. After 1900, as more men became 'morelianos', women took over seasonal work in local fields – a response reported only at Tenango.[57] Families split for much of every year. Patriarchy persisted as a goal among men and a dominant way of life faced by most women. Yet it was

inevitably challenged by prolonged separations and women's new roles as wage workers. Local criminal records revealed a rising tide of violence among men, and by men against women – often their wives.[58]

The Involution of Social Violence

The violence recorded locally at Tenango del Valle was prevalent across the highlands, and intense at Chalco. State records document rising crime after 1870, followed by family breakdown and the escalating deaths of infant girls after 1885. Nineteenth-century states across the globe aimed to limit and punish activity contrary to law. They collected statistics to assist their efforts. The records must be read with care. They report acts of violence and expropriation – and the changing capacity of the state to engage citizens who broke the law. The State of Mexico created an irregular series of crime statistics from 1800 to 1900. Before 1870, they report crime in a state with shrinking borders and emerging powers; from 1870 on, they report crime in a state with set borders and more solid powers. For the first era, we may read the statistics to trace the emergence of state power; for the second we may read them to explore patterns of violence among citizens.

The State of Mexico emerged from the Intendancy of the same name, a colonial jurisdiction created by Bourbon reformers only in 1786. Nation builders extracted the city of Mexico, making it a Federal District in the 1820s, moving the state capital to Toluca. The original jurisdiction extended to regions later separated as the states of Guerrero, Morelos, and Hidalgo. The crime statistics for 1800 to 1829 are for the Toluca district, north of Tenango del Valle. They show a weak state during the last decade of colonial peace, wars for independence, and the first decade of nation making. Only 424 crimes reached Intendancy and then State courts over 30 years, most before the outbreak of insurgency in 1810 and in the late 1820s as the new regime began to assert power. It dealt mostly with homicide and other violence, seemingly little interested in property crime (Table 2).[59] Colonial courts designed to mediate among communities and estates, clergy and officials, had not yet turned to regulating everyday life.

From the 1830s to the 1850s the new state began to engage crime more actively and more broadly. The increase from 1421 crimes per year in 1834 (during the first liberal experiment in national government), to 1762 during and after the war with the United States is notable. The jump to 2639 per year in 1851 is striking, as vast if sparsely inhabited southern regions had left to become the new State of Guerrero. Amid political conflict and international war, the State of Mexico rapidly increased its capacity to engage its citizens. Deadly violence shrank as a portion of all violence; sexual crime shrank as a portion of all crime; property crime claimed an increasing portion of the courts' attention, peaking at over half of all crime reported around 1850. Was crime increasing?

Table 2. Crime in the Intendancy and State of Mexico, 1800–1851.

	1800–29	1834	1846–48	1851
Deadly Violence	30%	25%	10%	9%
Other Violence	34%	35%	29%	36%
Total Violence	64%	60%	39%	45%
Sexual Crime	15%	4%	8%	8%
Property Crime	20%	36%	53%	47%
Total Number	424	1421	3084	2639
No. per Year	14	1421	1762	2639

Source: For 1800–29, Téllez González, *La justicia criminal*, Cuadro 13, p. 287 (Toluca district only); *Memorias*, 1835, 1849, 1852, my calculations. The report for 1846–48 covers 21 months.

Table 3. Crime in the State of Mexico, 1846–1900.

	1846–51	1870	1877–78	1885	1899–93	1900
Deadly Violence	9%	11%	10%	8%	8%	9%
Other Violence	31%	45%	53%	55%	57%	55%
Total Violence	40%	56%	63%	63%	65%	64%
Sexual Crime	9%	10%	7%	7%	6%	5%
Property Crime	51%	33%	29%	29%	30%	30%
No. per Year	1153	2351	2782	3218	3378	3934

Source: *Memorias*, 1849, 1852 (including only jurisdictions later in the reduced State of Mexico, for 2.75 years); 1871, 1878, 1879, 1886, 1894, 1900; my calculations.

Perhaps, but most clearly the state was asserting its powers to address a broad array of acts it defined as crime (Table 2).

The State of Mexico consolidated its power to engage citizens in criminal courts between 1845 and 1870, while its territory shrank to the core basins of the Valleys of Mexico and Toluca and adjacent uplands. For the reduced jurisdiction, the State reported only 1153 crimes per year from 1846 to 1851, a level that nearly doubled to 2251 in 1870 (Table 3). Given the probability that the state had little ability to engage crime during the reform wars of 1858 to 1860 and the French invasion of 1862 to 1863, either Maximilian's regime of 1864 to 1867 consolidated rule better than we have imagined – or liberals proved exceptional state builders when they retook power in 1867.[60]

While increasing its capacity between 1850 and 1870, the state reported a jump in the percentage of violent crime, especially non-deadly violence, and a parallel decline in property crime (which did not decline in absolute number). From 1870 on, reports of violent, sexual, and property crimes held within limited ranges, indicating that the judicial interests and capacities

Table 4. Crime per Thousand Inhabitants, State of Mexico, 1870–1900.

	1870	1877–78	1885	1889–93	1900
Deadly Violence	0.41	0.38	0.34	0.34	0.39
Other Violence	1.64	2.11	2.37	2.31	2.32
Total Violence	2.05	2.49	2.71	2.65	2.71
Sexual Crime	0.38	0.29	0.30	0.24	0.21
Property Crime	1.19	1.18	1.19	1.19	1.26
Total Crime	3.62	3.96	4.20	4.08	4.18

Source: Population from Table 1, Crime from Table 3; my calculations.

of the state had reach a plateau, allowing analysis of the crime records from 1870 to 1900 to focus on changing trends in citizens' behavior more than changing state interests and capacities.

The availability of population counts allows calculation of crimes per thousand inhabitants beginning in 1870 (see Table 4). Clear trends appear. Deadly violence dipped after 1870, held low in the 1880s and early 1890s, they rose again around 1900. Non-deadly violence rose from 1870 to 1885, as Porfirian development took hold, then held near that high level to 1900. Total violence followed the same pattern. Sexual crime showed a steady decline – likely indicating the limited interest of the liberal state in such prosecutions. Property crime held steady – until it began to rise around 1900. Across the state, the trends are clear: an escalation of crime began with acceleration of liberal development, held high as it endured, and began a second increase as its disruptive social consequences took hold around 1900.

At Chalco, crime mirrored state-wide trends, with anticipation and acceleration – not surprising in a district where liberal development advanced rapidly (Table 5). Crime at Chalco was high and rising after the rebellion of 1868. Political pacification did not end social conflict – it turned it inward. As liberal development began in the 1880s and accelerated in the early 1890s, crime declined. Rising market demand, railroad construction work, and the opening of San Rafael helped calm local violence. But during the 1890s, land concentrations accelerated while population continued to rise, mechanization took hold on estates, Lake Chalco was privatized and drained to create the Xico estate – and crime, especially violent crime drove upward again toward historic peaks.

Crime at Tenango del Valle followed a different trajectory (Table 6). In 1870, the distribution there mirrored the larger state, but levels were low. The rapid rise of violence and property crimes to peaks far above levels across the state and at Chalco in 1885 is suggestive. Tenango experienced population growth and land concentrations without a parallel development of even temporary labor opportunities for men struggling to sustain

Table 5. Crime at Chalco, 1870–1900

	1870		1877–78		1885		1889–93		1900	
	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000
Deadly Violence	16	0.91	18	1.06	11	0.89	11	0.35	10	0.54
Other Violence	33	1.84	42	2.48	41	2.10	49	1.59	53	2.99
Total Violence	49	2.75	60	3.54	52	2.69	60	1.94	63	3.53
Sexual Crime	12	0.68	7	0.39	11	0.56	11	0.35	4	0.20
Property Crime	38	2.12	33	1.95	37	1.91	29	0.95	33	1.87
Total Crime	262	5.55	320	5.88	297	4.57	204	3.24	392	5.60

Source: Populations from Table 1; Crime reports from *Memorias*, 1870, 1877–78 (combined into a yearly mean), 1885, 1894 (four years combined into a yearly mean), 1900; my calculations.

Table 6. Crime at Tenango del Valle, 1870–1900.

	1870		1877–78		1885		1889–93		1900	
	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000	%	p/1000
Deadly Violence	11	0.30	10	0.50	6	0.58	8	0.35	3	0.10
Other Violence	41	1.11	52	2.62	49	5.10	67	2.86	60	1.78
Total Violence	53	1.41	62	3.12	54	5.68	75	3.21	63	1.88
Sexual Crime	13	0.34	6	0.31	5	0.48	11	0.45	3	0.08
Property Crime	35	0.93	32	1.58	41	4.34	14	0.60	34	0.99
Total Crime	133	2.68	273	5.01	634	10.50	283	4.26	214	2.95

Source: Same as Table 5; my calculations.

families and patriarchy. Crime soared. Then, the late 1880s and 1890s brought sugar boom in Morelos, drawing men to long absences of hard labor as 'morelianos'; women went to the fields in Tenango to gain low wages planting and harvesting grain. Long separations of men and women along with women's new income challenged patriarchy. But the opportunity for crime declined as men spent months in Morelos. Did crime spike there? We can only ask. Is it notable that sexual crime peaked at Tenango in the 1880s, as the transformation took hold? While crime at Tenango declined from 1885 to 1900, violence held well above the levels of 1870 while property crime fell only to the level prevalent when liberal development began. Local judicial records for the Tenango district reveal that violent crime, mostly by men against men, but also by men against women (usually wives or consorts, violence often underreported), rose again from 1900 to 1910. And most of that violence concentrated among the poor indigenous majority struggling to survive in the face of liberal development.[61]

Did wide participation in patrols facilitate and perhaps sanction violence by indigenous men, even while it limited their chances to attempt property crime?

One Xalatlaco memory links trade with Morelos, concentrating wealth, banditry, manhood, and police patrols. Margarito Gaspar narrated:

> The *retablo* [sculpted altar] in the chapel of Santa Teresa tells of a battle between muleteers and robbers in 1892. Up there in the high woods robbers blocked a mule train. The leader of the muleteers, at the head of the train, was don Juan Medina from the San Francisco *barrio* [neighborhood]. He sent for help from the chief of the *veintena* [the twenty], what we called later the patrol. They took their weapons and went; they marched into the woods. Before they got to where the muleteers were blocked, the bandits and their chief called out: 'Who goes there?' '*Sus padres*' [Your fathers], answered the men of the patrol, who then called back: 'Who goes there?' The bandits and their chief shot back: '*Sus padres*'. Then don Irineo Sánchez, chief of the patrol from the barrio San Agustín had the luck to mortally wound the bandit chief. They carried him off like an animal, tied hand and foot and hung from a branch.
>
> Arriving in front of the town hall, they dropped the bandit and the other prisoners and shouted victory. The men of the patrol arrived trembling with courage from all they had done. Hearing the racket, everyone came to see. One person saw the wounded bandit in front of the town hall, taunted him, 'Ah, this son of who knows, how far he has fallen', and kicked him. The bandit raised his head with a glare of hate and vengeance, but could not do anything'.

The prisoners were then paraded in chains through the uplands towns on the way to be arraigned at Tenango del Valle. There 'the bandit chief died, and they sent him back home; they say he was a *sacristán* [vestryman] from Amecameca, because he carried a big ring of keys'.[62]

There is much to contemplate here. Bandits aimed to claim some of the gains of the trade with Morelos. The Xalatlaco patrol mobilized to stop them. Both groups boasted of manliness – each were the other's 'padres'. The patrol won, asserting dominant manhood while maintaining a trade that allowed a few to accumulate wealth – and threatened the independent manhood of many others (including surely some in the patrol). The battle forged an identity among the lead muleteer, the head of the patrol (both honored as *don*), and local patrolmen (anonymous in memory). It was an alliance of manhood, integrating a community then dividing between a prosperous few and a struggling majority. The victory and the manly unity it forged were preserved and sanctified in a retablo, placed prominently in a local chapel. The defeated became 'boys', easily kicked. The bandit leader died – and was said to be from Amecameca, a prosperous town in the uplands between Chalco and Morelos. Were men in the highland towns bordering Morelos beginning to compete for access to the scarce spoils of the booming sugar basin?

The battle of 1892 gave way to ritual conflicts, often bruising, sometimes maiming, in the years before 1910. Natalio Lorenzano remembered:

> We fought battles; we fought here in Tzati against the boys from San Agustín. I remember that our leader was named Rocha, I don't remember who was leader in San Agustín. We fought every afternoon. On Sundays it was earlier and there were more people. The battles between barrios were fought with rocks and clods of earth; sometimes there were injuries. The authorities did not intervene. We also fought battles with boys from Tilapa. All of this was an omen of war, of the cruelty of war.

Felix Quieroz added:

> we had a war with the Otomí from Tilapa, with slings, *chinga* [curse] with stones. We fought the battles near Ocotenco, with fifteen on each side. All this fighting we knew, but it was nothing compared to what came later.[63]

Combats to test manhood pitted bands of youths from rival barrios of Xalatlaco against each other; bands from Xalatlaco also fought the nearby town of Tilapa, a rival distinguished in memory only by its Otomí identity. As it became more and more difficult for the young men of Xalatlaco to claim patriarchy as household providers, they warred with each other and their neighbors to prove manhood. Local officials let them fight. The combats were remembered as precursors of the more deadly war that came with revolution after 1910. Manhood and violence became ever more linked – in banditry, in state-sanctioned patrols, in locally honored combats, and in rising tides of crime – while liberal development made household patriarchy a distant ideal for a growing generation of frustrated young men.

Meanwhile, family structures based on church and/or state-sanctioned marriages began to break (Table 7). In 1885, 92 per cent of births across

Table 7. Legitimate and Illegitimate Births, 1885 and 1900.

Jurisdiction and Birth Status	1885 Births		1900 Births		Per cent Change	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
State of Mexico						
Legitimate	19,980	92	21,949	62	+10	–33
Illegitimate	1,854	8	13,210	38	+612	+375
Total	21,834		35,169		+61	
Chalco						
Legitimate	992	78	1,138	38	+15	–51
Illegitimate	273	22	1,841	62	+574	+182
Total	1,265		2,974		+135	
Tenango de Valle						
Legitimate	1,343	95	1,915	78	+43	–22
Illegitimate	75	5	536	22	+615	+340
Total	1,418		2,451		+73	

Source: *Memorias*, 1886, 1902; my calculations.

the state were recorded as legitimate, the product of a married couple. The percentage was higher at Tenango, 95 per cent, but had dropped to 78 per cent at Chalco. By 1900, only 62 per cent of births statewide were recorded as legitimate; at Tenango legitimacy had fallen to 78 per cent; at Chalco it plummeted to only 38 per cent. As men struggled to find combinations of land and labor that might allow them roles as heads of household, marriage became less and less common – a risky commitment not worth accepting, perhaps. At the same time, reproduction increased.

Comparisons between Chalco and Tenango del Valle are again revealing. At Chalco, where most men remained in the region while struggling to find ways to claim patriarchy, total births increased far more rapidly than across the state or at Tenango – while marriage collapsed as a dominant institution. Men apparently resisted marriage, yet engaged energetically in sex, asserting manhood by fathering rising numbers of children registered as illegitimate. At Tenango, where local opportunities were scarce and insecure and long absences in Morelos became common, the increase in births was far less (and nearer state averages). Marriage remained common; nearly 80 per cent of infants were registered as legitimate in 1900 (a decline since 1885, but less than across the State and far less than at Chalco). While men at Tenango spent much of each year in Morelos and women worked in local fields, marriage held strong yet reproduction lagged. Did long absences (across relatively short distances) strengthen marriages in times of deepening insecurities, while limiting conceptions?

None of the memories from Xalatlaco recall the decline of marriage and the rise of illegitimacy, not surprising as the trend was limited there. Gregoria Camacho González did narrate with pain how she learned the necessity of a patriarch to family survival. Her father had been jailed, falsely she insisted (he was found with a piece of cloth made by a murdered shawl maker):

> Who would support us? My parents had seven children, but two died and only five, all women remained; there wasn't even a little man to help. My father left a little land and my mother tried everything to feed us.[64]

Her desperate memory told of a deep presumption that a man, a patriarch, was essential to family sustenance, to life.

In contrast, for many across the southern highlands of the State of Mexico, girls apparently became unwanted, even expendable as the social insecurities of liberal development proliferated. The state reported a rising tide of infanticide as the nineteenth century ended (Table 8). The numbers are small, even when combining crimes classed as infanticide and those called clandestine burial (identified by the author of the 1894 *Memoria* as a classification used when an infant was found buried and parents could not be identified). But the rise is precipitous; many cases went undiscovered or unreported. The trend is likely more accurate than the numbers.

Table 8. Infanticide (and Clandestine Burial), Annual Means, State of Mexico, 1846–1900.

Year	Infanticide	Clandestine Burial	Total
1846–48	3	0	3
1851	5	0	5
1870	10	0	10
1877	8	5	13
1878	9	2	11
1885	12	5	17
1889–93	12.5	10.5	23
1900	21	51	72

Source: *Memorias*, 1849, 1852, 1871, 1878, 1879, 1886, 1894, 1902; my calculation.

The rising incidence of infant death became an 'infanticide' problem in the eyes of medical professionals. They offered two solutions, public health education and criminalization. They never imagined that the growing numbers of infant deaths in cities and across the countryside might be linked to the social consequences of the liberal development most professionals celebrated as the essence of modernity.[65] Nor did they recognize that 'infanticide' is too simple a label for complex gendered social violence. In her study of women without husbands in a modern Brazilian shanty town, Nancy Sheper-Hughes documents cultural conversations in which some infants are identified as fated to die and then treated in ways that lead to death. There is no intent to kill, no active killing. Women facing motherhood in impossible social situations develop ways of life and understanding that enable some children to survive, while dealing with (perhaps hastening) the deaths of others they cannot sustain.[66]

The people of Xalatlaco offer no memories of infant death. Still, its increase there, at Chalco, and across the state emerges from birth records. Normally, more males that females are born, a ratio reversed in maturing populations as women die due to complications of childbirth. Late nineteenth-century birth records reveal a growing predominance of infant boys (Table 9). In 1885, deaths of infant girls were rising across the state, accelerating at Chalco, but not evident at Tenango. By 1900 female infant deaths were rising everywhere; registrations suggest that over 1600 newborns girls died that year across the State, including over 200 at Chalco and over 100 at Tenango. The trajectory of female infant death paralleled liberal development – accelerated at Chalco, limited at Tenango, and widespread across the State.

How men and women experienced and understood the deaths of so many daughters is not recorded. Hints emerge when we view the rising 'surplus' of registered boys in the context of the decline of marriage and the proliferation of illegitimacy (Table 10).

Table 9. Sex Ratios of Registered Births, 1885 and 1900.

Jurisdiction	1885			1900		
	Males	Females	M/F Ratio	Males	Females	M/F Ratio
State of Mexico	11,107	10,650	1.04	18,392	16,777	1.10
Chalco	667	598	1.12	1,590	1,384	1.15
Tenango del Valle	689	719	0.96	1,278	1,173	1.09

Source: *Memorias*, 1886, 1902; my calculations.

Table 10. Legitimacy, Illegitimacy, and the Sex Ratio of Registered Births, 1885 and 1900.

Jurisdiction and Birth Status	1885			1900		
	Male	Female	M/F Ratio	Male	Female	M/F Ratio
State of Mexico						
Legitimate	10,260	9,720	1.06	11,471	10,484	1.09
Illegitimate	924	938	0.99	6,918	6,292	1.10
Total	11,184	10,650	1.05	18,392	16,777	1.10
Chalco						
Legitimate	532	450	1.16	579	554	1.05
Illegitimate	135	138	0.98	1,011	830	1.22
Total	677	598	1.12	1,590	1,384	1.15
Tenango del Valle						
Legitimate	650	683	0.95	1,004	911	1.10
Illegitimate	39	36	1.08	274	262	1.05
Total	689	719	0.96	1,278	1,173	1.09

Source: *Memorias*, 1886, 1894; my calculations.

In 1885 statewide, an emerging excess of registered male births, thus of female infant deaths, concentrated among the great majority that remained legitimate – the product of formally married couples. The small number of births registered to unmarried women reported a female majority; single women kept their daughters alive. The pattern at Chalco in 1885 was parallel, but more extreme. Female deaths were greater and concentrated among formally married couples; single women having children outside marriage were more common there – and those single mothers also kept their daughters. At Tenango in 1885, marriage ruled and married couples kept daughters alive (illegitimate births were too few for three 'extra' males to mean anything).

By 1900 much had changed. Statewide, the death of female newborns generated a 10-per cent excess of males – and girls born outside marriage died at the same rate as those recorded as legitimate. Growing numbers

of single mothers were no longer able to save their daughters. At Tenango, where men and women lived more separate lives and births increased less rapidly, female infant deaths among married couples rose to statewide levels and became only slight less common among single mothers. At Chalco, where insecurities proliferated, men faced challenges claiming patriarchy, formal marriage became an option for only a minority, yet where births rates soared – female infant deaths dropped among the married minority, yet soared to historic peaks among the majority born outside marriage. Marriage likely remained common primarily among the prosperous minority at Chalco; people who could pay for weddings and state and/or church registration kept their daughters. Among the majority (over 60 per cent) of children born to unmarried mothers, female infant deaths soared. Here we encounter key yet unanswerable questions: did single mothers face lives of such desperation that they constructed cultural ways of denying their daughters sustenance? Were unmarried mothers linked to men so insecure in patriarchy they resisted marriage, fathered growing numbers of children, then created pressures and justifications that led to escalating female deaths? Both perhaps occurred simultaneously; with available sources we cannot know.

The utopian promises of liberal development became lived realities for only small minorities at Chalco and Tenango del Valle, as across the states of Mexico and Morelos. The privatization of land and the commercialization of production benefited powerful minorities nationally (and internationally) and favored a prosperous few in local towns. For the rest, privatization and Porfirian boom intersected with population growth to generate social insecurities lived by men as challenges to patriarchy and women as unprecedented desperations. The evident results were economic uncertainties, family breakdowns, and escalating violence – among men, by men against women, and by one or both upon newborn daughters.

A note on causation is in order. With limited sources, we cannot conclude that liberal development caused social violence. Still, they were socially and historically linked – they occurred in the same communities at the same time, lived by the same families. If it is difficult to assert certain causal links, it is untenable to presume separation. To join with the medical professionals of Mexico City and claim that the rising tide of violence, including what they saw as infanticide, resulted from lack of education and proliferating criminal tendencies – while people were losing control of lives, struggling to survive, and facing challenges to patriarchy – is to join in bigotries constructed and promoted by the few who gained from liberal development.

From Involution to Revolution

Mounting social pressures rarely lead directly to popular mobilizations. People struggling to survive hesitate to risk deadly repression until they

see evidence of division among power holders and a weakening or breakdown of state powers. The process that turned deepening grievances into agrarian revolution in Morelos is well known.[67] The years after 1907 brought commercial recession, drought, and a decline in sugar production and employment. Meanwhile, state elections in 1908 set a local candidate against an outsider tied to Díaz and the sugar entrepreneurs. The campaign inflamed issues of local rights and uncertain justice, until Díaz imposed his chosen Governor. Meanwhile, land conflict at the village of Anenecuilco brought Emiliano Zapata to local prominence as a defender of community rights. He remained an outlaw in 1910 when Francisco Madero challenged Díaz for the national presidency. When Madero rose to protest the outcome of Díaz's re-election, Zapata joined the alliance of national resistance.

The battles that sent Díaz to exile and brought Madero to power were fought far to the north. But when an interim President and then Madero refused Zapata's demand for land, and the federal army waged a scorched earth campaign against people who expected justice from a reformer they helped to power, Morelos became home to a popular rising demanding land and local autonomy in the fall of 1911. Zapata's revolution kept Madero weak. After General Victoriano Huerta ousted and killed the reformer early in 1913, Morelos villagers drove mass risings that turned national political conflicts into a social revolution. A generation of young men struggling to become patriarchs, unable to gain lands to cultivate sustenance, unable to find work steady and secure enough to provide for families, took arms to assert rights to community land and local independence led by Zapata and his Plan of Ayala.

Revolution came later to the State of Mexico. There, the gubernatorial election of 1908 proved a quiet affair. Fernando González, son of a former President and owner of the great Chapingo estate north of Chalco, was re-elected by a unified oligarchy tied to the national regime. Madero's campaign for effective elections in 1910 found little resonance, especially in the Toluca basin. At Chalco, where Díaz and his allies were an evident presence, having drained Lake Chalco to create Xico for Noriega, Madero raised hope and found some support. Still, the fall of Díaz and the resignation of Governor González led to change more apparent than real. The state oligarchy quickly 'elected' Manuel Medina Garduño as Governor. He was a landed entrepreneur, a textile mill owner, and a hydroelectric producer on lands west of Toluca. A quiet beneficiary of the Díaz regime, he had sat out of politics for years, more Catholic than the liberal authoritarians who ruled. Medina took power in 1911 backed by the Catholic elite, Maderistas, and (quietly) by Porfirians. He aimed to keep the Zapatistas in Morelos and to promote business.[68]

Effective elite politics kept the State of Mexico quiet while insurrection gained strength in Morelos. But the people of Chalco faced deepening insecurity, uncertain patriarchy, and escalating social violence in communities caught between political conflicts escalating in Mexico City and insurgencies

rising across Morelos. Revolution came soon enough. Chalco was on the route from the sugar basins to the capital. Local dissidents backed Madero and Zapata in 1911, provoking conflicts with those who backed Díaz and the policies that served Chalco entrepreneurs so well. With the aging authoritarian gone, local groups pressed for land and justice, focusing on Xico, Díaz's gift to Noriega, stark evidence of a development process that favored few and marginalized many. Conflict escalated again after Madero's ouster and death. Chalco became a Zapatista stronghold through the fight against Huerta in 1914. It held strong against Carranza and the northern constitutionalists into 1915. Those in power often held municipal seats; outlying villages and the countryside belonged to people demanding land and liberty, with Zapata their inspiration.[69] The social violence that struck inward to plague the communities and families of Chalco before 1910, turned outward during five years of intense revolutionary conflicts.

Revolution came later to Tenango del Valle, perhaps because local experiences of liberal development and social violence were less intense there, perhaps because the state regime based in nearby Toluca exerted more control in its neighborhood. Early correspondence among officials aiming to prevent popular risings reveals that those in power understood the underlying challenge: privatization had led to a concentration of former community lands while a growing generation faced dependence on estate labor – which was increasingly seasonal, insecure, and insufficient.[70] Still, a government of men who gained from those processes could (or would?) do nothing to reverse social dislocations entrenched for decades. After sporadic early conflicts, revolution expanded across the southern Toluca basin in the summer of 1913, as Zapatistas pressed for agrarian justice and Huerta militarized the old regime.[71]

The turning point at Xalatlaco came in July. Federal troops led by General Alberto Rasgado chased four rebels into town, killing two in a firefight in front of frightened town folk. The next morning – apparently presuming deep local Zapatista sympathies – Rasgado took over the community, jailed many local leaders, and sent nearly everyone else in flight.[72] As happened earlier in Morelos, federal repression turned rebel sympathizers into angry revolutionaries. The people of Xalatlaco would recall their revolution in stark detail; their memories conclude this analysis.

Gorgonio Zacarías recalled an early Zapatista raid, linking liberal development and revolution:

> On the 24th of September of that year 1912 the revolutionaries burned Santiago [Tianguistengo] and its factories. . . . They pulled out the spinning machines. Many from Xalatlaco worked in the mills. Ciriaco Mendoza lost an arm in the machines. Three Mendoza brothers later became Zapatistas: Hilario, Sixto, and Julio.[73]

To Zacarías industrialization maimed – and led to revolution.

Brígida Flores Monjardín, a girl of the generation of family breakdown, placed patriarchy at the heart of the conflict:

> I too was a poor little girl, I never knew my mommy and daddy; I lived with my aunt. Because of that when the revolution came I married this man. My aunt married me off so I would have someone to defend me, so I would have the help of a man. My aunt feared for me because the Zapatistas and the Carracistas were bad; they seized girls and took them off, they stole them; that's why she married me to that man.
>
> From what I know, the revolution began because of Zapata's little sister, because the girl went to buy a little maize from the *hacendado* [estate owner], and because she had no money to pay him the boss got mad, slapped her face and took back the maize, leaving her to run home. The little girl ran crying; Zapata got angry and said: 'Let's go to war so they can't slap our sisters, so their tears will not run any more'. So the war began.[74]

Brígida's aunt saw destructive reassertions of patriarchy in all combatants; a girl thus needed a husband to protect her. Brígida remembered Zapata as driven to war to preserve the protection good patriarchs provided to sisters – and surely she hoped to wives and daughters.

The long developing assaults of liberal development and its challenges to patriarchy intersected in 1913 with the promises and destructions of revolutionary warfare. Francisco Medina Mayo remembered: 'The men tell that Zapata promised that if he won, the poor would no longer pay taxes. So they followed him and became Zapatistas. From the beginning they killed *riquitos* [little rich men]'. The revolution promised the poor tax exemptions – what the Díaz regime had given investors whose projects concentrated wealth. Yet the revolution began by killing 'riquitos', local big men, not the great entrepreneurs who ruled and profited from a distance. Medina went on, remembering the federal raid on Xalatlaco: 'The federal General Rasgado came trying to draft even boys from twelve to fourteen years old. So my *patrona* [woman boss] dressed me as a girl so they would not take me'.[75] The avenging General tried to turn local boys into men fighting for the regime; to prevent such unwanted manhood, Medina's *patrona* dressed him as a girl. (Was he, too, a boy without a father present?)

Felix Bobadilla remembered the Zapatista promise of land:

> A general from Huichilac, Francisco Pacheco, under the command of Genovevo de la O, announced, 'I am going to distribute lands'. The people liked that, because in Xalatlaco ten rich families monopolized a lot of land.[76]

If liberal development brought land concentration and tax exemption to the rich and threatened patriarchy in a generation of poor and insecure young men (and women), revolution promised land redistribution and tax exemptions – and a chance to reclaim patriarchy in disarray.

Those who struggled to rule in Toluca and Mexico City imagined a revolutionary conflict brought to the State of Mexico by bandits mostly

from Morelos. The people of Xalatlaco remembered a revolution within the community. The leader was Regino Vega, made a general by his neighbors. Natalio Lorenzana recalled:

> The Vallejo boys made Regino Vega a General. They were the first to join, not as leaders, but just like any other fighters. They gave the lead to Regino. The other fighters said to him, 'you'll be the leader, and let's go'. Regino did not want to lead because he did not know much, but . . . well, they made him. So they named him and that's how it went . . . The Vallejos were from here, from the San Agustín barrio; they worked the fields; they worked for the *riquillos* [the local rich], not permanently but at planting and harvest time. The rest of the time they worked in the woods.[77]

Marginal and insecure men from a barrio that earlier had joined in fighting ritual battles began the insurgency. They chose their leader, pressing Vega to become the people's patriarch.

Leonardo Ceballos, of a prosperous local family that lost everything to the revolution, also remembered Vega:

> Regino Vega was a general from here, from the town of Xalatlaco, the real Regino Vega was from here, born and raised in the town. Manuel Camacho, Valentín Camacho, Benito Muciño were also Zapatistas; Feliz Navarrette also went along. They were authentic revolutionaries; their carbine rifles were bigger than they were, because they were poor and very small. Their camp was up there on the hill they call Vinatero.

Ceballos found pride in the local revolutionaries, even if they were not as big as their guns.[78]

Sympathizers saw a community in rebellion, linking people still in town and rebels camped in the hills above. Natalio Lorenzano offered vivid detail:

> I visited all the camps, because the people were in touch, connected. They were united as if they were a family, understand me? Non-combatants visited; so did Emiliano Zapata's troops. The camps were like little towns, like villages, complete, complete villages, except they planted nothing and had to go to town to get supplies to eat. Yet they had hogs, chickens, and turkeys. Everyone ate together. There was not so much selfishness; if you needed anything, here came help; if some one had nothing to eat, others gave part of what they had, so there was no hunger.[79]

The memory of shared communalism contrasts sharply with the acquisitive individualism of the liberal project so recently celebrated. Lorenzano continued:

> In the camps there was also justice. The captains did it, the colonels. The general told them, 'I may not be here, but you are'. If some one came to complain of something, they did justice. They also held weddings, because the young people married, and where would they marry if they could not go to the other side? They also registered newborns there; there was a secretary to do that. Religious weddings were done when the *padrecito* [priest, in diminutive] could come by.[80]

Xalatlaco's revolutionaries worked to reconstitute family and community – patriarchal families and communities. Yet there were challenges to patriarchy, or at least renegotiations. Natalio Lorenzana again remembered:

> There were also revolutionary women from Xalatlaco, like Margarita Miranda. First they were Maderistas, later they came as Zapatistas. The women were also brave; see, not all of them just left; they rose up, and see. Now among the fighters, now they chose a partner; now he was only their friend and helper as it were, and he was the one they cared for. Margarita ran almost everything, yet each one had her people. It was like a family.[81]

Margarita and other women refused to marry, joined rebel troops, and chose the men they would sustain in time of war. They took new control of the traditional role of sustaining men, now armed men. They gave essential support as if in a family – a renegotiated revolutionary family.

Of course, the greatest challenges came from the deadly conflicts of war – which led to Zapatista defeat, Carrancista rule and repression, deadly influenza in 1918, and struggles to disperse, survive, and reconstitute patriarchal families and communities while the Constitutionalist regime that had assaulted popular rebels in Morelos, at Chalco, and at Xalatlaco claimed to be The Revolution. New rulers worked to pacify rebels and reconsolidate a state with land reform, while they promoted commercial and industrial development – like their liberal predecessors.[82] The difficulties of fighting, losing, and then renegotiating a revolution are another history.

Successful liberal development in the Mexican central highlands threatened the sustenance of rural families and communities, undermined the patriarchy of a growing generation of men, and set off waves of violence within communities and families – until elite divisions and state breakdowns gave angry and frustrated young men the opportunity to turn their rage outward in revolution. Revolutionary mobilizations in central Mexico came not from backwardness or delayed or limited commercial development. They resulted from the social consequences of a dynamic liberal project, consequences that generated insecurity, challenged patriarchy, and stimulated violence within families and communities – until the collapse of the regime that promoted the project allowed men demanding land, patriarchy, and community autonomy to turn violence outward against those who expected to profit and rule.

The grievances that focused revolutionary ideology across the central highlands after 1910 emerged from long historic conflicts. The loss of ancestral community lands began in the colonial reconstruction of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Local political rights were contested – promised and constrained – beginning with the wars for independence. Community demands for land and political autonomy shaped ideologies of conflict by 1860s and 1870s – but they did not lead to social revolution

(even while elite factions fought for regime power and recruited popular support). What changed after 1870 was that dynamic commercial development threatened working men's patriarchy, leading a new generation to take the deadly risks of revolution.

The revolutionaries of Morelos, Chalco, and Tenango del Valle did not recreate the world they had lost. They did assert their anger with the world they faced. They forced the new regime to claim to be a revolution, to redistribute vast areas of land – to married men, in new *ejido* communities shaped by state power and stripped of political autonomy. A persistent if defeated revolutionary mobilization made a partial reconstitution of patriarchal families and communities the price of the commercial-industrial development that shaped Mexico after the revolution.[83]

Today, triumphant neo-liberalism and capitalist development accelerate across Mexico and North America (and the world). Wealth concentrates while growing populations struggle with landlessness, economic marginality, and mechanization that combine to limit labor, drive down wages – and send men (and increasingly women) on ever longer treks in search of earnings to sustain patriarchy, family, and community. Patriarchy is assaulted ever more broadly by economic processes that make household autonomy impossible and secure employment scarce – and by visions of gender equity that are justly liberating. Still, we are only beginning to grapple with the inequities and exploitations that structure a world of individualized and equalized rights. Those who benefit complain of rising crime and social insecurity; they call for more education and better policing. Could the Mexican state break again, and open another revolution? Probably not. The regime has learned electoral politics. Mexico has become an urban nation. Agrarian revolutions are remembered, yet when attempted they prove brief and contained.[84] As a result, concentrating wealth and power, proliferating marginality, and challenges to patriarchy join with political stability to make violence within families and communities a persistent plague on everyday life – in Mexico, the United States, and across the globe.

Appendix: Memorias of the State of Mexico

The tables on population, crime, births, and legitimacy, as well as materials on production, labor, education, and police derive from compilations published by the State of Mexico. All are in the Benson Latin American Library of the University of Texas at Austin. The full titles here allow short citations in tables and notes.

Memoria, 1835
Memoria de Hacienda, Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos, que el Secretario del Gobierno del Estado de México encargado de dichos ramos, leyó al H. congreso, en los días 4 y 5 del mes de abril de 1835. Toluca: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1835.

Memoria, 1849
Memoria de las Secretarias del Relaciones y Guerra, Justicia y Negocios Eclsesiásticos e Instrucción Pública, del Gobierno del Estado de México, leído a la Honorable Legislatura en sus sesiones de los días 1 y 2 de mayo de 1849, por el Secretario de esos ramos, c. lic. Pascual González Fuentes. Toluca: Imprenta de J. Quijano, 1852.

Memoria, 1852
Memoria de la Secretaría de Justicia e Instrucción Pública, leída ante su Honorable Legislatura en la session del 27 de marzo de 1852. Toluca: Tip. de Quijano, 1852.

Memoria, 1871
Memoria presentada a la H. Legislatura del Estado de México por el c. Gobernador del mismo, Mariano Riva Palacio. Toluca: Tip. del Instituto Literario, 1871.

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Memoria presentada a la H. Legislatura del Estado de México por el c. Gobernador Constitutional, general Juan N. Mirafuentes, correspondiente al primer año de su administración. Toluca: Imprenta del Instituto Literario, 1878.

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Memoria presentada a la H. Legislatura del Estado de México, por el C. Gobernador Constitucional, General Juan N. Mirafuentes, correspondiente al segundo año de su administración. Toluca: Imprenta del Instituto Literario, 1879.

Memoria, 1886
Memoria presentada a la XI legislagtura del Estado de México, por el c. Gobernador Constitucional del mismo, c. general Jesús Lalanne. Mexico City: Imprenta de I. Escalante, 1886.

Memoria, 1894
Memoria de la administración pública del Estado de México presentada a la XV Legislatura por el Gobernador Constitucional general José Vicente Villada, cuatrenio de 1889–1893. Toluca: Imprenta de la Escuela de Artes y Oficios, 1894.

Memoria, 1902
Memoria que el ciudadano general José Vicente Villada presenta a la Honorable Legislatura del Estado de México, acerca de sus actas como Gobernador Constitucional durante el cuatrenio de 1897 a 1901. Toluca: Oficina Tipográfica del Gobierno, 1902.

Short Biography

John Tutino is Chair of the History Department at Georgetown University. He received his Ph.D. in 1976 from the University of Texas at Austin.

Beginning as a social historian, over the years he has learned from his students and younger colleagues the importance of engaging state powers, ethnic relations, gender roles, and cultural understandings in analyses still grounded in production and labor relations. He has published *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750–1940* (Princeton University Press, 1986) and co-edited with Elisa Servín and Leticia Reina, *Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change: Crisis, Reform, and Revolution in Mexico* (Duke University Press, 2007). His research continues to focus on two Mexican regions: this article is the latest of many on the central highland basins around Mexico City; his work on Querétaro and the eastern Bajío, and is coming to fruition in *Making a New World: Forging Atlantic Capitalism in the Bajío and Spanish North America* (forthcoming, Duke University Press).

Notes

* Correspondence: Intercultural Center 600, Box 571035, 37th and 0 Sts. NW, Washington, Washington, DC, USA. Email: tutino@georgetown.edu.

[1] This view is developed in Francois-Xavier Guerra, *México: Del antiguo regimen a la revolución*, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988), and synthesized in Guerra, 'Mexico from Independence to Revolution: The Mutations of Liberalism', in Elisa Servín, Leticia Reina, and John Tutino (eds.), *Cycles of Conflict, Centuries of Change: Crisis, Reform, and Revolution in Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 129–52.

[2] This view began the era of the revolution. Its continuing resonance was ensured by John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1969). It also informs Alan Knight's monumental *The Mexican Revolution*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). My *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750–1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), leans in this direction, as I attempted to shift the understanding of popular grievances away from blunt expropriations.

[3] This is a substantially revised version of an essay published as 'El desarrollo liberal, el patriarcado y la involución de la violencia social en el México porfirista: El crimen y la muerte infantil en el altiplano central', in Romana Falcón and Raymond Buve (eds.), *Don Porfirio Presidente . . . nunca omnipotente* (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 1998), 231–71. I offered that vision based mostly on quantitative materials generated by the State of Mexico. Subsequently, a new historiography on the origins of revolutionary mobilization in Morelos, notably Felipe Arturo Ávila Espinosa, *Los origenes del zapatismo* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2001), my work in the group that produced Servín et al. (eds.), *Cycles of Conflict*, my continued thinking about the role of patriarchy in social relations, and my encounter with the voices of men and women who lived the transition from liberalism to revolution in Soledad González and Alejandro Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina: La historia de Xalatlaco contada por su gente* (Toluca: Instituto Mexiquense de Cultura, 1994) have allowed me to offer a more complex analysis.

[4] I began to see patriarchy as essential to understanding the independence-era insurgencies in the Bajío in 'The Revolution in Mexican Independence: Property, Production, and Patriarchy in the Bajío, 1800–1855', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 78/3 (1998): 367–418.

[5] Key works bringing gender to the center of Mexican history are Heather Fowler-Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan (eds.), *Women of the Mexican Countryside* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1990) and Steve Stern, *The Secret History of Gender* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

[6] For an overview of pre-contact societies, see Alfredo López Austin and Leonardo López Luján, *El pasado indígena*, rev. ed. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001); for the role of gender see Inga Clendinnen, *Aztecs: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[7] My understanding of sixteenth-century developments in the central highlands reflects Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); José Miranda, *La function económica del encomendero en los origins del regimen colonial* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1965); G. Michael Riley, *Fernando Cortes and the Marquesado in Morelos* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1965); Margarita Menegus Bornemann, *Del señorío a la república de indios: El caso de Toluca, 1500–1600* (Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca, y Alimentación, 1991); René García Castro, *Indios, territorio y poder en la provincial Matlatzinca* (Zinacatepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 1999).

[8] I synthesized my understanding of the colonial reconstruction in, 'Urban Power and Agrarian Society: Mexico City and Its Hinterland in the Colonial Era', in *La ciudad y el campo en la historia de México*, vol. 2 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1992). 507–22.

[9] See James Lockhart, *The Nahuas after the Conquest* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

[10] See Herman Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucía, 1576–1767* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1980); Cheryl Martin, *Rural Society in Colonial Morelos* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); Elinore Melville, *A Plague of Sheep* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[11] On the central highland repartimiento and its demise, see Gibson, *Aztecs*.

[12] See Tutino, 'Urban Power and Agrarian Society'.

[13] My understanding of the central highlands in the late eighteenth century began with 'Creole Mexico: Spanish Elites, Haciendas, and Indian Towns, 1750–1810', unpub. Ph.D. diss. (University of Texas at Austin, 1976). It has been reshaped by Martin, *Rural Society*; William Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979); Taylor, *Magistrates of the Sacred* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Stern, *Secret History*; Claudia Guarisco, *Los indios del valle de México y la construcción de una nueva sociabilidad política* (Zinacatepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 2003).

[14] I have analyzed the differing experiences of the independence decade in 'Hacienda Social Relations in Mexico: the Chalco Region in the Era of Independence', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 55/3 (1975): 497–528; *From Insurrection to Revolution*, 139–51; 'Buscando independencias populares: conflictos sociales e insurgencias populares en el Mezquital mexicano, 1800–1815', in José Antonio Serrano and Marta Terán (eds.), *Las guerras de independencia en la América española* (Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2002), 295–321. On liberalism and village militias, see Alfredo Ávila, *En nombre de la nación* (Mexico City: Taurus, 2000); Guarisco, *Los indios del valle de México*; Antonio Annino, 'The Two-Faced Janus: The Pueblos and the Origins of Mexican Liberalism', in Servín et al. (eds.), *Cycles of Conflict*, 60–90.

[15] On the Bajío, see Tutino, 'Revolution in Mexican Independence'. On the central highlands, see Tutino, 'Hacienda Social Relations'; 'Agrarian Social Change and Peasant Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: The Example of Chalco', in Friedrich Katz (ed.), *Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 95–140; 'Family Economies in Agrarian Mexico, 1750–1910', *Journal of Family History*, 10/3 (1985): 258–71.

[16] The mix of participatory promises, exclusionary policies, and indigenous adaptations and resistance are detailed in María del Carmen Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad en los municipios del Estado de México, 1825–1880* (Zinacatepec, México: El Colegio Mexiquense, 1996).

[17] On the 1840s and 1850s, see Tutino, 'Agrarian Social Change'; Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995); Paul Hart, *Bitter Harvest: The Social Transformation of Morelos, Mexico, and the Origins of the Zapatista Revolution* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2005).

[18] Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad*; Romana Falcón, 'Indígenas y justicia durante la era juarista: El costo social de la "contribución de sangre" en el Estado de México', in Antonio Escobar Ohmstede (ed.), *Los pueblos de indios en los tiempos de Juárez* (México: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), 123–50.

[19] On the rise of liberalism see Peter Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of the Mexican National State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Richard Sinkin, *The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979). On community responses, see Leticia Reina, *Las rebeliones campesinas en Mexico, 1819–1906* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980); Tutino, 'Agrarian Social Change'. On Maximilian's Regime, see Erika Pani, *Para mexicanizar el segundo imperio* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2001).

[20] On restored liberalism and rural communities, see Tutino, 'Agrarian Social Change' and *From Insurrection to* Revolution; Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*; Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad*; Romana Falcón, *Las naciones de una república: La cuestión indígena en las leyes y el congreso mexicana* (Mexico City: El Congreso de la Unión, 1999); Marco Antonio Anaya Pérez, *Rebelión y revolución en Chalco-Amecameca, Vol. 1, Chalco 1868: Viva el socialismo!* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1997).
[21] This is evident throughout Salinas Sandoval, *Politíca y sociedad*.
[22] On the Díaz regime, Guerra, *México*; on liberalism, see Charles Hale, *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); on Railroads, see John Coatsworth, Growth against Development (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981); on rural change, see Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution*.
[23] Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad*, reveals the power of such ideology in the 1870s; Womack, *Zapata*, remains the best history of the movement after 1810. It captures brilliantly the prevailing ideology of loss.
[24] This synthesis of the social transformation of Porfirian Morelos reflects recent studies, notably Ávila, *Los orígines del zapatismo*; Horacio Crespo, 'Los pueblos de Morelos: La comunidad agraria, la desamortización liberal en Morelos y una fuente para el estudio de la diferenciación social campesina', in Laura Espejel López (ed.), *Estudios sobre el zapatismo* (Mexico City: INAH, 2000), 57–120; Hart, *Bitter Harvest*.
[25] The *Memorias* are listed by full title in the Appendix. All are held in the Benson Latin American Collection of the University of Texas at Austin. They are cited by *Memoria* and the date of publication.
[26] On Chalco: John Tutino, 'Entre la rebellión y la revolución: Compresión agrarian en Chalco, 1870–1900', in Antonio Tortolero Villaseñor (ed.), *Entre lagos y volcanes: Chalco-Amecameca, pasado y presente* (Zinacaptepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 1993), 365–412; Antonio Tortolero Villaseñor, *De la coa a la maquina de vapor: Actividad agrícola y inovación tecnológica en las haciendas mexicanas, 1880–1914* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1995); Anaya Pérez, *Rebelión y revolución en Chalco-Amecameca, Estado de México, 1821–1921, Vol. 2, Sublevación campesina en la Sierra Nevada*. On Tenango the key studies are Soledad González Montes and Pilar Iracheta Cenegorta, 'La violencia en la vida de las mujeres campesinas: El distrito de Tanango, 1830–1910', in Carmén Ramos Escandón (ed.), *Presencia y transparencia: La Mujer en la historia de México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1987), 111–42; Soledad González Montes, 'Trabajo femenino y expansion de las relaciones capitalistas en el Mexico rural a fines del Porfiriato: El distrito de Tenango del Valle, Estado de México, 1900–1910', in Manuel Miño (ed.), *Haciendas, pueblos y comunidades: Los valles de México y Tóluca entre 1530 y 1916* (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1991), 270–99. González Montes's work on Tenango pioneered the linkage of liberal development and violence against women in rural central Mexico.
[27] González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*. Again, the work of González and her collaborators have made my analysis possible.
[28] Tutino, 'Entre la rebelión y la revolución'; Cuadro 2, p. 377.
[29] For resistance at Chalco, see Tutino, 'Agrarian Social Change'; for an overview of liberal politics and local Conflicts, see Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution*; for a case study of a community in the Toluca basin, north of Tenango, see Margarita Menegus Bornemann, 'Ocoyoacac: Una comunidad agraria en el siglo XIX', *Estudios Políticos*, 6/18–19 (1979): 81–112. The conflicts and concentrations of early privatizations in the State of Mexico are detailed in Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad*, and broadened in Carmen Salinas Sandoval and Diana Birrichaga Gardida, 'Conflicto y aceptación ante el liberalismo: Los pueblos del Estado de Mexico, 1856–1876', in Escobar Ohmstede (ed.), *Los pueblos indios*, 207–51. The best history of privatization is Emilio Kourí, *A Pueblo Divided: Business, Property, and Community in Papantla, Mexico* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), a study focused on a community and region of limited colonial estate development and in the nineteenth century shaped by a vanilla export boom. Its local process are most revealing; the outcomes cannot be projected upon to historically distinct regions without careful research and comparative analysis.
[30] Ibid., Cuadro 4, p. 379.
[31] Gloria Pedrero Nieto, 'Un studio regional: Chalco', in Enrique Semo (ed.), *Siete ensayos sobre la hacienda Mexicana* (Mexico City: INAH, 1977), 99–150.

[32] Anaya, *Rebelión y revolución*, 38–42, attempts to calculate a vast shift of land from communities and small holders to large estates. But his sources are inconsistent, 20,000 hectares are unaccounted between 1993 and 1915, and the 10,000 hectares of drained lake were a common resource, not previously cultivated. I find Pedrero's emphasis on stability in estate land holding, plus the addition of Xico, the likely reality – with privatized lands concentrating within communities.
[33] González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*, 49–58.
[34] Ibid., 54, 56.
[35] Ibid., 57.
[36] Ibid., 59–60.
[37] Ibid., 58–9.
[38] Ibid., 59–60.
[39] Ibid., 61–2, 196.
[40] These developments are detailed in Anaya Pérez, *Rebelión y revolución*, 32–88.
[41] The simultaneous and parallel mechanization of sugar production in Morelos and cereal production at Chalco is the essential contribution of Tortolero, *De la coa a la maquina*. His work explodes the myth that Mexican estate agriculture before the revolution was somehow backward.
[42] *Memoria*, 1994, pp. 339, 655–67.
[43] See Rodolfo Huerta González, 'Agua, bosques, y capitalismo: La region de Chalco, 1890–1940', in Daniel Hiernaux et al. (eds.), *La construcción social de un territorio emergente: El Valle de Chalco* (Zinacatepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 2000), 65–85.
[44] Tutino, 'Entre la rebellion y la revolución'; Cuadro 12, p. 391.
[45] *Memoria*, 1994, p. 339.
[46] Gloria Camacho Pichardo, 'Los motines y la centralización de las aguas en el Estado de México, 1870–1900', in Guadalupe Zamudio and Gloria Camacho (eds.), *Estado de México: Experiencias de investigación histórica* (Toluca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 2002), 173–93.
[47] See Charles Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Mariano Otero, *Ensayo sobre el verdadero estado de la cuestión social y política que se agita en la Républica Mexicana* (México: Instituto Nacional de la Juventud, 1964).
[48] Tutino, 'De la rebellion a la revolución'; Cuadros 13, 14, 15, pp. 394–6.
[49] Ibid.; Cuadro 16, p. 398.
[50] Milada Bazant, *En busca de la modernidad: Procesos educativos en el Estado de México, 1873–1912* (Zinacatepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 2002); Salinas Sandoval, *Política y sociedad*.
[51] See Tutino, 'Agrarian Social Change', 117–18.
[52] Tutino, 'De la rebelión a la revolución', Cuadros 17, 18, pp. 399–401.
[53] María Eugenia Romero Ibarra, *Manuel Medina Garduño: Entre el porfiriato y la revolución en el Estado de México, 1852–1913* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1998), 33–64.
[54] *Memoria*, 1994, pp. 339, 351–2.
[55] Ibid., 351–2, 741–9, 804–6.
[56] González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*, 168.
[57] González Montes, 'Trabajo femenino', 281–99.
[58] González and Iracheta, 'La violencia'.
[59] These materials are compiled and analyzed by Mario Téllez González, *La justicia criminal en el valle de Toluca, 1800–1829* (Zinacatepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, 2001), 221–52; Cuadros 3–10, pp. 284–9.
[60] On state-building under the second empire, see Pani, *Para mexicanizar el segundo imperio.*
[61] González and Iracheta, 'La violencia', 114–15.
[62] González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*, pp. 51–52.
[63] Ibid., 64–65.
[64] Ibid., 162.
[65] María de la Luz Parcero, *Condiciones de la mujer en México durante el Siglo XIX* (Mexico City: INAH, 1992), 121.
[66] Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).

[67] See Womack, *Zapata*; Ávila Espinosa, *Los origenes*.
[68] Romero Ibarra, *Manuel Medina Garduño*, 85–113.
[69] The revolution at Chalco is detailed in Anaya Pérez, *Rebelión y revolución*, 2:110–80.
[70] José Angel Aguilar, *La revolución en el Estado de México* (Toluca: Gobierno del Estado de México., 1987), 88, 112.
[71] For state government as the revolution escalated, see Romero Ibarra, *Manuel Medina Garduño*, 115–96.
[72] Ibid., 264–5.
[73] González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*, 69.
[74] Ibid., 70.
[75] Ibid., 74.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., 75
[78] Ibid., 84.
[79] Ibid., 78.
[80] Ibid., 79.
[81] Ibid., 76.
[82] All that was also remembered at Xalatlaco; see González and Patiño (eds.), *Memoria campesina*, 85–151.
[83] Studies of post-revolutionary Mexico are legion. For the State of Mexico north of Chalco, see José Alfredo Castellanos Suárez, *Empeño por una espectative agraria: Esperiencia ejiudal en el municipio de Acolman, 1915–1940* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1998). For wider views, see Mary Kay Vaughan, *Cultural Politics in Revolution* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1997); Jennie Purnell, *Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).
[84] See J. Tutino, 'The Revolutionary Capacity of Rural Communities: Ecological Autonomy and Its Demise', in Servín et al. (eds.), *Cycles of Conflict*, 211–68.

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