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Reflections on the Historiography of Twentieth-Century Mexico

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Abstract

This article examines the recent trend to create a new periodization that concludes that the revolution ended in 1920 and therefore the decades of the 1920s and 1930s should be identified as the post revolution. The article argues that using the label post-revolutionary ignores major revolutionary social programs during the 1920s and 1930s and disregards the revolutionary achievements of Presidents Alvaro Obregón, Plutarco Calles, and Lázaro Cárdenas. The article proposes that recent studies of women during the revolution, and social programs in the cities both suggest a different periodization, but one that includes the disputed decades of the 1920s and 1930s, reaching instead to 1953, 1958, or perhaps best, 1982.

Murals from the era of the revolution embellish the public buildings across Mexico. In the offices of the Ministry of Public Education, Diego Rivera painted two sets of panels on the second floor of the Ministry's Courtyard of Fiestas in 1928. His murals illustrate two popular songs, called corridos, from the era, entitled 'The 1910 Mexican Agrarian Revolution', written by José Guerrero, and 'That is How the Proletarian Revolution Will Be' by Alfredo Ramos Martínez.[1] The lyrics to these songs appear on cartoon-like ribbons above the life-sized images that illustrate the nation's agrarian revolution in the first set of panels and the promise of the proletarian revolution to come in the second. Coincidentally, the murals visually express a good deal about the historiography of the nation's revolution.

Historians writing about the revolution generally agree about its focus on agrarian reform, but increasingly they have become dismissive of the efforts by the revolutionaries to achieve social change in the city and for organized workers in particular. In this analysis, the revolution ended because it did not result in the proletarian revolution that many expected, that historians wanted, and that Rivera portrayed. This is indeed rather curious.

The losers, in a sense, have been the subject of the history of the revolution, focusing on the countryside and ignoring the cities that did not produce the revolution as expected. Historians, politicians, and artists have concurred that along with the horrific, spasmodic violence that began in 1910, the revolutionaries carried out social programs inspired by the

Constitution of 1917 that focused on the countryside, even though the spokesmen for rural people, Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, lost to Venuestiano Carranza and Alvaro Obregón. This analysis allowed scholars, politicians, and artists all to recognize the upheaval as the first of the great social revolutions attempted in the twentieth century. It permitted many as well to explain the rural revolution as only a precursory step, or an interrupted movement, or a populist stage, or a political phase that should serve as an antecedent to the proletarian uprising that would fit these rebels into the global revolution. Eventually, many of these intellectuals argued the revolution did not fulfill its promise, because Alvaro Obregón made a deal with the oil companies, or Plutarco Calles focused on attacking the church, rather than developing benefits for labor, or the official party under Lázaro Cárdenas, pressured by world events and United States officials, placed the government in the conservative hands of Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940. The proletarian revolution remained only an image of the unfulfilled future as predicted and depicted in Rivera's murals.

Despite real disagreements among scholars (especially Knight, Hart, Córdoba, Meyer, Guerra, and Gilly, among others) about the causes, nature, and termination of the revolution, a rough consensus has existed in the discussion of rural programs, especially land redistribution. Recently a contradictory and rather fashionable turn has occurred in the historiography that draws on the jargon of post-colonial and post-structural studies, and the narrow interpretative focus of the New Cultural History. Authors of any number of recent monographs and articles published in the United States, and, increasingly elsewhere, including Mexico, have made an effort to reorganize twentieth-century chronology with a new periodization of the revolutionary era. They offer the following periods: 1910–20, the revolution, and then 1920 to either 1940 or 1968 or some other point, the era of the post-revolution.[2] This chronology declares that in 1920 the revolution had ended and this conclusion implies that in 1920 a new, stable regime had been established, that in 1920 the violence had ended, and that in 1920 the revolutionaries had all gone away or had been domesticated or had sold out the people. Perhaps these authors also want to argue that in 1920 some different political, social, or economic development had overwhelmed and replaced the revolution as the most dynamic force in society.

The revolution did not end in 1920, certainly not in the minds of the people of the time about whom historians write, such as the revolutionary leaders, Obregon, Calles, Cárdenas, and many others. Only with teleological blinders (that is looking ahead to the authoritarian success of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional from 1972 to 2000) can one say that a new stable regime had been established in 1920. The members of the Sonora Triangle hoped they had created a stable regime, but they faced the prospect of a Villista rebellion, continuing Catholic opposition, agrarian rebels struggling in the Zapata tradition, and internal revolutionary rivalry. All of

these threats raised intense and continuing questions about the survival of the regime. Moreover, violence was endemic throughout the country during the 1920s and the 1930s, and featured continual rebellions (Delahuerta, Cristeros, and Escobar, to name three major examples), revolutionary caudillo-inspired battles with the national revolutionaries (Cedillo and others), agraristas fighting white guards, militant revolutionaries using violence to impose iconoclastic policies and fervent Catholics using violence to resist, and all villagers across the country who rejected the many efforts at implementing different revolutionary programs. Moreover, the nation witnessed if not an unparalleled era of assassination, with the murder of Obregon, Villa, Escobar and dozens of others, a time at least equal to the decade from 1910 to 1920 with the murder of Madero, Pino Suárez, Carranza, and dozens of others. Moreover, the post-revolutionary periodization creates the puzzling interpretation that Lázaro Cárdenas, regarded by revisionist historians and popular memory as the epitome of the revolution personified, not as a revolutionary; this periodization makes him somehow merely the master of a Mexican New Deal.

This post-revolutionary periodization might be accepted as just fashionable use of terms, except that it ignores the revolutionary achievements of Obregón (gaining control of the revolutionary army and land reform), Calles (major educational programs, implementation of constitutional provisions into law, and anti-church campaigns), and Cárdenas (land and labor reforms and nationalization of railroads and oil, despite the effects of the world depression). In fact, the post-revolutionary interpretation dismisses the very programs that created a social revolution. The use of post-revolution, and this seems to be the point for some of the authors, reinterprets the revolution as merely a struggle for political power and not a social revolution at all. This interpretation seems to result, in many instances, from the numerous authors who have used a narrow economic explanation to examine the revolution, revolutionaries, and revolutionary programs. This point of departure in some instances utilized Marxist or neo-Marxist theoretic analyses, but many non-Marxist writers also turned to a limited, even reductionist, economic explanation. These conclusions posited a relationship between revolutionaries and producers, especially point of production workers in agriculture, but also others outside the cities, including miners, railroad hands, cowboys, and even mill workers since the factories such as Rio Blanco were located in the countryside.[3] This proposition either ignores or disregards as bourgeois and elite issues such consumption concerns as housing rents, food costs, and transport charges as merely urban problems. This analysis posits consumer culture as an urban development, as though rural people with their subsistence small or communal holdings did not represent a group of self-conscious consumers. Perhaps the issue here is that many rural women were both the venders and consumers in village markets, so that overlooking consumer issues in the countryside is yet another dismissal of women in the past.

This economic explanation has been used to explain political, that is power, relationships. That has been the general theme of much recent cultural history of twentieth-century Mexico. Well, not the cultural history, but the new cultural history. No need exists here to repeat or renew the new cultural history debate portrayed appropriately in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*[4] as a lucha libre contest. The new cultural history blends and twists James C. Scott's *Everyday Forms of Resistence*, Guja's *Subaltern Analysis*, and, above all, a meta-reading of Antonio Gramsci's *The Prison Notebooks*. The result, in a simplified way, is that Mexican subalterns negotiated with the agents of the national government to work out the implementation of social programs and the control of power relationships, that, when combined, resulted in a revolutionary culture.

This sounds like a quite reasonable, and probably an accurate and useful analysis, unless we, to use an old fashion term, unpack the significant words. First, we find that subaltern is a label synonymous at times with peasants, or agrarians or organized, but non-Catholic workers, or women, or Indigenous as long as they profess Leftist politics.[5] Second, the authors often use negotiation as a synonym for what is described as one of the weapons of the weak, that is, resistance. Certainly popular truculence to both official programs and government officials may have forced policy modification, but this is not quite the same thing as negotiation, which at the very least refers to the suggestion of alternatives.[6] Refusing to send one's children to school often represented stubborn opposition to the local teacher, not what can be described as either resistance or negotiation. Third, in working out the nature of the revolutionary programs, these authors adopted the general Gramscian interpretation that culture forms another arena of politics. That is to say, the analysis begins with the theorem that cultural and social relationships are always about power, and after an exposition, featuring circus-like acrobatic feats of jargon, then reaches the conclusion that indeed these relationships are always about power. Even those studies that take an expanded Gramscian approach end by concluding with Gramsci that the masses had become accomplices in their suppression. They reach this conclusion based on two broad gauge social stereotypes, the duplicitous government agents and the naive, or worse, proletarians and peasants. At best, there is a contradiction between the subalterns exercising agency and the proletarians engaged in complicity. This is a tattered analysis, starting with the application of the meta-Gramscian Law that it is always about power relations to reach the conclusion that it is always about power.

This approach to an analysis of the revolution has left unpursued several rather interesting clues, in the sense that Carlo Ginzburg spoke of them[7] that might lead to more challenging interpretations. Two significant historiographical developments have occurred in the last two decades. One has examined women in modern society, and the other has identified revolutionary programs in the city, especially the capital. Both of these trends challenge prevailing interpretations of the revolution. If the

post-revolutionary advocates dismiss too much, these scholars for the most part claim too little. Asking the question what difference do the recent studies of women and urban events make results in significant and surprising responses.

One place to start considering women and gender is with Susie Porter's recent book[8] on women workers. She reaches conclusions that have implications for general analysis and periodization. The struggle by women for recognition of their rights as workers that often included family responsibilities climaxed not in the outbreak of the revolution in 1910, or the Constitution of 1917, but in the Penal Code of 1930 and the new Labor Code of 1931. Both these codes resulted from the demands of women made to revolutionary veterans (a decade it should be noted after 1920) and the codes recognized for the first time that women were adults, who had rights as workers and contractual rights in relationships such as marriage. Among other recent publications that support a similar periodization, one should mention especially Patience Shell's examination of primary education in Mexico City[9] that demonstrates as well the focus by the revolutionaries on education, women, the family, and the city. These concerns and policies extend well beyond 1920, and moreover find expression in the new penal code. Where is the study of this penal code that clear defines an era in which the laws governed Mexican society existed between 1871 and 1930?

Stephanie Mitchell and Patience Schell have just published a collection, *The Women's Revolution in Mexico, 1910–1953*[10] that proposes a periodization for the revolution that concludes when women achieved voting rights in 1953. In making their argument, neither the editors nor the contributors offered a compensatory feminist history, but rather an integrated analysis of women's revolutionary efforts, often quite different from those of their male counterparts, into a richer, fuller history of the era. Much of the focus of their books comes during the thirty years glibly called the post revolution. The periodization suggested by both these books raises issues of understanding and interpretation of the revolution that need serious consideration.

These studies, moreover, ask questions that suggest other significant studies of women as yet undone: what about domestics in the city? Of course, they are widely mentioned, but they remain unstudied. Unorganized, because they represented perhaps the largest part of the informal economy, it is of course a difficult study. The largest group of female workers beyond domestics were the young women who went to work in the 1920s and beyond as operators or office help for the two telephone subsidiaries of ATT and Ericcson. A study of these young women has some difficulties (knowledge of Spanish and Swedish to work in the Ericcson archives being the most obvious), but offers some arresting possibilities. Consider that the young women who went to the telephone company were middle class, literate, urban females; like teachers and prostitutes, they were professionals in the public sphere. The women telephone workers formed largest group

of female workers in the formal economy, yet they remain unstudied, despite their potential to tell stories of upward social mobility, activities outside the home, and their organized activities, including several prominent strikes, during the period of revolutionary social campaigns.

Another possible explanation for the misleading use of the term post-revolutionary for the decades after 1920 is because some authors want to imply that there was some other social development that had overwhelmed the revolution as the primary force changing society. This possibility needs to be placed in historical context. For example, for the era that Daniel Cosio Villegas first labeled as modern Mexico, from 1867 to 1911, he and his team of co-authors identified a number of developments as the characteristics of modernity. They focused on the economy, especially the production of goods aimed at the limited domestic and expanding export markets and on the politics that arranged for secularization of both the economy and politics. The revolutionaries in this argument continued the struggles to increase production (giving land to those who worked it, for example) and to complete the secularization of society (implementing anticlerical legislation to eliminate the church from public life). This interpretation seems excellent as far as it goes, but it just may be that there was something more. Maybe social secularization and economic development in the words of Butch Hancock, the great writer and performer of Texas music, are just the waves and not the water.[11] If so, what was the water? The answer for the years of the Porfiriato and the revolution (let's say 1876 to 1980) could well be urbanization.

Consider the hypothesis that the decision to move to the city was the single most common and most challenging decision made by Mexicans from 1867 until the 1980s. Especially after 1876, hundreds and perhaps even more individuals made this choice in search of a better life. This was not the result of the tremendous transfer of land titles during the Porfirian years. That change in land tenure was not an enclosure movement that forced huge numbers off of the land, but a change of ownership, in which many campesinos found themselves working the same land, not as owners, but as laborers. Different opportunities, not loss of land, drew Mexicans to towns, factories, mines, and railroad camps throughout the Porfirian years. The debt peonage system was created to stop the flow of workers off the land.

Beginning in 1910, the revolutionary fighting encouraged a rush to cities. Whatever the number was for population loss for the decade of the 1910s, from 500,000 to 2.1 million persons,[12] second in significance only to this staggering loss of life was the fact, that Mexico City, Puebla, Guadalajara, Oaxaca, and a half dozen other cities all grew in size during the same decade, and they continued to grow throughout the twentieth century. The nature of this movement needs careful analysis.

Understanding this possibility and the interpretation of the years after 1920 requires a discussion of the porfirian regime and rural revolution that began in 1910. The historians resorting to the post-revolutionary argument

recognize the rural nature of the country in 1910, in which the majority of the population lived in the countryside, but those who argue this case to a certain extent have frozen in place the nation's rural character, ignoring the population shifts already underway before 1910 and greatly accentuated with the initiation of the revolution. The population of Mexico City proper grew from 345,000 in 1900 to 471,000 in 1910. Moreover, despite the heavy population losses on the national level associated with revolution fighting and fleeing into exile, and the Spanish flu, the capital city continued growing to 615,000 in 1921. For the Federal District, the numbers were 542,000 (1900), 730,000 (1910), and 903,000 (1921). Moreover, as the national population declined, the population of other cities, such as Guadalajara and Monterrey, sprouted, in the words of Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, 'like mushrooms after a rain'.[13] The few scholars who have noted the rush of urban migrants, pushed to the city by revolutionary violence, have been those studying culture.[14] This population change accelerated Mexico City's growth and its political dominance and cultural leadership over the rest of the country during the 1920s and 1930s.[15]

Recent studies of the impact of the revolution in the city, such as Drew Wood's study of the rent strike in Veracruz,[16] pose questions about revolutionary programs in the 1920s. Two generalizations seem to apply: First, those who had fought, endured, or suffered through the heaviest fighting in the previous decade, during the 1920s believed they had earned certain rights and entitlements, including reasonable rents, affordable food, and access to public services including education and health. Second, revolutionary leaders and bureaucrats in addition to their clear and demonstrated concern about national control of both human and natural resources, also intended under the constitution to provide housing, health care, food, education, and work for the population. A measure of these two generalizations can be made through the number of recent and intriguing monographs, but they need to be pulled together in some general synthesis that incorporates the critical restatement of the commitment of revolutionaries to implement these achievements in the 1934 six-year plan of the Partido Revolucionario Nacional (PRN – the official government party) and the continuing presidential efforts to implement revolutionary programs in both the city and the countryside until at least 1946.

The cultural studies that have taken up the intersection of urbanization spurred by the revolution and social demands and programs for women also resulting from the revolution have yielded fascinating results. Katherine Bliss and Ann Blum in their essay, 'Dangerous Driving: Adolescence, Sex, and the Gendered Experience of Public Space in Early-Twentieth-Century Mexico City',[17] make a sophisticated analysis of the adolescent population in the revolutionary capital city, and the changing opportunities for recreation in public places. Other writers also have examined other new groups in the revolutionary city.

Curiously, with all the interested in negotiation, reframing, and working out of revolutionary politics and policies, the arena where this development was expected to take place, the national congress remains unstudied at this point. In a promising, and suggestive dissertation, Glenn Avent shows that the negotiation took place, not with the weapons of the weak, but with the political strategies and on occasion with blazing pistols in the legislative chambers.[18]

Finally, consider the end of the revolutionary era, especially because this article categorically rejects 1920. I have argued in the textbook I wrote with Colin MacLachlan, *El Gran Pueblo*, that the revolution as a movement to seize national power, establish a new regime based on one-term presidential authority, and accomplish social and economic reforms for the general population concluded in 1937–38, when Cárdenas was forced to focus his regime's attention on internal unity because of global events and some sense of having achieved the revolution's basic goals.[19] Several scholars, and I was one of them for a time, point to 1968 as the end of the revolution as even a rhetorical statement that Mexicans would accept, but now the events of the 1968 massacre at Tlatelolco seem more and more to be largely a Mexico City event, while the rest of the nation had already rejected the revolutionary rhetoric and in many cases its programs as well.[20]

The studies mentioned earlier on the women and urban developments have forced a reconsideration of the revolution's periodization. Rethinking this has led to two conclusions. It seems we gain a good deal if we think about the revolution as the political, economic, and social programs initiated and carried forward by the generation of Mexicans who participated in the revolutionary fighting, and when these veterans were gone from national leadership – that is in 1946 when the succeeding generation took power – a different dynamic dominated in politics and society.

Or, we might follow the implication of Claudio Lomnitz's provocative essay entitled 'Time of Crisis: Historicity, Sacrifice, and the Spectacle of Debacle in Mexico City',[21] that focuses on the economic disaster that climaxed in 1982 and to which Mexicans referred simply as 'La Crisis'. Recall that in this time of disaster, President José López Portillo told the nation that he recognized the extreme economic difficulties created by the global collapse of oil prices, the domestic hardship of record inflation, and the wholesale flight of money abroad. Nevertheless he reassured the nation that, like a dog defending a bone, he would protect the peso against devaluation. Within weeks, he devalued the peso. Immediately Mexicans concocted and repeated jokes about the Hound of Los Pinos (the presidential residence in Mexico City) and wherever he appeared in public he was greeted with barking and howling to recall his broken promise. Other jokes reflected the binational character of Mexican society. For example, one joke alleged that the new pesos would carry the slogan 'In Dog We Trust'. This episode of sarcastic humor aimed at a political leader was certainly not unusual in national politics,[22] but the economic crisis and its attendant poverty

certainly was. It irrevocably changed things in Mexico because it ended the Mexican revolution. At least it ended the revolution, if we regard the revolution as a pattern of individual behavior inspired and taught by revolutionaries.

In a sense the argument here follows John Dewey's conclusion that social changes can never be effected as rapidly or as thoroughly as we think. Dewey was talking about formal education, but could well be applied to the informal education of social relationships. The behavioral relationship between hacendados and campesinos, changed in some regards (such as the end to the practice of the latter kissing the hand of the former), but not in many other ways, especially if the hacendado succeeded in holding on his land. New attitudes expressed in behavioral patterns in relationships between individuals, bosses, government bureaucrats, and new government representatives such as teachers and land reformer officials, or labor, or social assistance agents all took time to create. And, once in place, they were slow to change. New attitudes expressed in behavioral patterns about success in life that included delayed gratification and conspicuous consumption were also slow to gain widespread acceptance, but after World War II they were. The crisis forced them again to change.

And it is in this sense, as a way of life for individual Mexicans, that the revolution ended in the crisis of the 1980s. Saving money, for example, simply no longer made sense and trust in officials left one feeling betrayed or foolish or both. The peso's value eroded so completely and quickly that Mexicans had to spend their money immediately to prevent its value from disappearing. Moreover, as the crisis of daily life deepened normal patterns of planning and wishing for the future deteriorated, partly in response to increase in crime. For example, the desire to own a car seemed senseless if its purchase only offered a target to thieves. This attitude toward other goods, even on the more basic level of household appliances, shattered convictions about work, saving, and consumption.[23]

Exploring the questions about when and how the revolution ended demand more than simply offering 'another reading' of this major national event, or 'revisiting' what might be seen as another 'turn' in analysis as the historian uses something else from this 'toolbox' of theories.[24] With the possibilities for periodization offered by the recent historiography of the revolution, the only certain conclusion is that the 1920s and 1930s can in no way be considered the post-revolution.

Short Biography

William H. Beezley, professor of history at the University of Arizona, and co-director of the Oaxaca Summer institute in Modern Mexican History, is regarded as one of pioneers in writing the cultural history of Mexico, with his book *Judas at the Jockey Club.* He has just completed *Amended Memories and Silent Innuendos: The Popular Sources of Mexican National Identity*

(forthcoming). Currently, he is researching 'Notes from the Malbec Trail', a history of the Malbec wine, and 'Mexican Popular Culture in the 1950s'.

Notes

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[1] Desmond Rochfort, *Mexican Muralists: Orozco, Rivera, Siqueiros* (San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 1998), 63–7.

[2] Examples of monographs excellent except for this periodization include the interesting and significant studies: Christopher Boyer, *Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920–1935* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Ben Fallaw, *Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001). An example of a journal article that uses this baffling periodization is the otherwise well-done study dealing with 1925 by Andrew Grant Wood, 'Introducing La Reina del Carnival: Public Celebration and Postrevolutionary Discourse in Veracruz, Mexico', *The Americas*, 60/1 (July 2003): 87–107. A Mexican example of excellent work cast in this periodization is Rebeca Monroy Nasr, 'Fotografías de la educación cotidiana en la posrevolución', in Pilar Gonzalbo Aizpuru, ed., *Historia de la vida cotidiana en México*, tomo V, *Siglo XX. La imagen, ¿espeojo de la vida?*, Aurelio de los Reyes, ed. (México: El Colegio de México, 2006), 177–228.

[3] Certainly some small factories were opened in cities, especially the capital, but the larger ones were outside urban centers. See Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 44, fn. 6.

[4] *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 79/2 (1999).

[5] In David Espinosa, '"Restoring Christian Social Order": The Mexican Catholic Youth Association (1913–1932)', *The Americas*, 59/4 (April 2003): 451–74, makes several points that relate to this article. First, the organizer Bernardo Bergöend attempted to recruit youths from all levels of society, including the artisan class, and not just students who had attended Catholic schools but evening schools as well (457); Second, There is no hint in the article that the Catholics regarded the years after 1920 as the post-revolutionary era. Neither are the students, or artisans or opponents to the regime, such as the Mexican Catholic Youth, ever identified, or apparently regarded, as subalterns.

[6] A good starting point for a critique of the resistance thesis is Michael S. Brown, 'On Resisting Resistance', *American Anthropologist*, 98/4 (1996): 729–49.

[7] Carlo Ginzsburg, 'Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method', *History Workshop Journal*, 9 (Spring 1980): 12–13.

[8] Susie S. Porter, *Working Women in Mexico City: Public Discourses and Material Conditions, 1879–1931* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2003).

[9] Patience A. Schell, *Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2003).

[10] S. Mitchell and P. Schell (eds.), *The Women's Revolution in Mexico, 1910–1953* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

[11] The actual line is 'you're just the wave, you're not the water', in his song 'Just a Wave'. One accessible version, is Jimmie Dale Gilmore, 'Spinning around the Sun' (Elecktra 961502-2).

[12] The most recent and most careful analysis of the human costs of the early stages of the revolution is Robert McCaa, 'Missing Millions: The Demographic Costs of the Revolution', *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicancos*, 19/2 (Summer 2003): 367–400. McCaa focuses on the years 1910–30, in order to conclude that the losses reached 2.1 million for the first decade.

[13] G. Bonfil Batalla, *Mexico Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization*, trans. P. A. Dennis (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996), 122.

[14] Alejandro Aura, *La hora intima de Agustin Lara* (Mexico: Cal y Arena, 1990), 27; June Kay, *Las Siete Vidas de Agustin Lara* (Mexico: El Universal Grafico, 1964), 144; Juan Ramírez, *Remembranzas de un hombre de Bajío* (Mexico City: Litografia Helio, 1995), 36.

[15] Population figures are conveniently located in Diane E. Davis, 'The Social Construction of Mexico City: Political Conflict and Urban Development, 1950–1966', *Journal of Urban History*, 24/3 (March 1998): 365, 370, 375, 376.
[16] Andrew Grant Wood, *Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in Veracruz, 1870–1927* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2001).
[17] The essay is included in William E. French and Katherine Elaine Bliss (eds.), *Gender, Sexuality, and Power in Latin America since Independence* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 167–86.
[18] G. Avent, 'Ballots and Blood: Controlling the Mexican Congress, 1917–1934', Ph.D. dissertation (University of Arizona, 2002). The only published work that I know on the congress is the article by Josefina MacGregor, 'Madero y los diputados: en busca de una nueva relación', *Memoria del Congreso Internacional sobre la Revolución Mexicana* (San Luis Potosí: Gobierno del estado de San Luis Potosí, 1991), 57–79.
[19] C. MacLachlan and W. H. Beezley, *El Gran Pueblo: A History of Greater Mexico*, 3rd edn. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2004).
[20] See example Nelly Blacker-Hanson, '¡*La Lucha Sigue*! The Continuum of Social Unrest in 20th Century Mexico', Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, 2003).
[21] Claudio Lomnitz, 'Time of Crisis: Historicity, Sacrifice, and the Spectacle of Debacle in Mexico City', *Public Culture*, 15/1 (2003): 135–6.
[22] For discussion of presidential humor, see William H. Beezley, 'Mexican Political Humor', *Journal of Latin American Lore*, 11/2 (1985): 195–223, and the volume on presidential caricatures, [Rogelio Naranjo], *Los presidentes en su tinta por Naranjo* (México: Ediciones *Proceso*, 1998), 29–71 deals with López Portillo. Miguel Díaz Barriga, discusses humor, popular culture, and modernization in 'El relajo de la cultura de la pobreza', *Alteridades*, 4/7 (1994): 21–6.
[23] Lomnitz, 'Time of Crisis', 132.
[24] For a discussion of jargon like these words see the entries 'jargon' and 'vogue words' in Bryan A. Garner, *Garner's Modern American Usage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 472–3, 821–2.

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