3: CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURIES

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INTRODUCTION[1]

Phoenician colonization of the western Mediterranean from the eighth century B.C. was never a coordinated movement under the direction of a single mother country or state. If therefore Tyre, who was most prominent of the Phoenician colonizers, exercised no direct control over the Phoenician diaspora, neither did Carthage, the new Tyre in the West, inherit any hegemonial role. Carthage began as merely one of a number of colonies, founded almost certainly after Gades and Utica but, like other western Phoenicians, in response to pressures at home and in quest of land on which to settle in the West. Tradition, which is probably correct, gave to Carthage only one distinctive feature from the rest - a restricted territory. From the start Carthage was bound by a compact with her Libyan neighbours to remain confined to a narrow neck of land, the Megara, and checked from expanding into her natural hinterland of Cape Bon (e.g. Justin 18.5.14; Livy 34.62.12).

For a long period this was the condition which pertained. As the colony grew in size she was compelled to seek beyond her confines for food and for land for her surplus population. Already in the mid-seventh century B.C. archaeology has revealed that she established a trading presence on the corn-rich Syrtic coast of Africa. And according to Diodorus (5.16), she sent out her own first colony to Ibiza in 654 B.C.

In the next century, even though Carthage broke out of her narrow territory into the *peraia* of Cape Bon, native Libyans still resented and resisted Carthaginian expansion inland. Meanwhile social and political norms had become established over a period of two hundred years. The result was that Carthage, more than her sister colonies, looked towards the sea for her livelihood. The Carthaginian aristocracy discovered profit and prestige from long distance trade - principally in corn and precious metal - as well as from the land they held in Carthage itself. Shipping and

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overseas interests, long familiar to Phoenician grandees, because they too had suffered restricted access to their Lebanese homeland, became an inherited tradition and a way of life among the nobility of Carthage. In the Mediterranean Carthage was a force to be reckoned with by the Greeks and Etruscans.

The aim of this paper is to examine how far Carthage's overseas interests and the actions she took to maintain them can be categorized as 'imperial' from the late sixth century, when she first took a hand in Sicily, until the fourth century when Agathocles invaded Africa. By the latter date Carthage had expanded into a territory beyond Cape Bon and, although there were never the same social barriers as in Greece or Rome against participation in trade, the aristocracy had begun to return to the land. As landowners their values changed, so that in the third century a new attitude to empire and territorial expansion developed just as Rome appeared in Southern Italy.

What I shall argue is that up to the third century imperialism by most criteria cannot, as is generally believed, be proved by the evidence or argued on *a priori* grounds. Only in one or possibly two respects can imperial control be detected: one is emigration under what might be considered privileged conditions to states who owed obligations to Carthage, although it is difficult to prove that these colonial settlements maintained formal political bonds with Carthage; the other is in the control of ports of trade. But that control must be carefully understood. It was not through colonization nor through territorial annexation but - as far as one can judge - through grants of privileged treaty status in foreign ports, not unlike what later came to be called 'Capitulations'. The third century, however, was a different story of land empires and annexation and one that will not be told here. The concern in this paper is the period when Carthage, like Venice before the fifteenth century, still remained 'bride of the sea'.

THE TRADITION AND LANGUAGE OF IMPERIALISM

The 'imperialism' of Carthage is more or less taken for granted by both ancient and modern writers.[2] As early as the sixth century, according to Justin (19.1.1, 18.7.19), the great dynast Mago, following the campaigns of the mysterious 'Malchus', laid the

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foundations of the *imperium Poenorum*; and this process was supposedly carried on by the Magonid house in the fifth century, particularly in Sardinia and Sicily. Diodorus Siculus, too, writing of the archaic period of Sicily, speaks of Carthaginian 'hegemony of the Phoenicians' (4.23.3, 10.18.6, 12.26.3) and the whole ideological presentation of the Battle of Himera, as first reported by Herodotus, was based on the presumption that Carthage in the fifth century intended the enslavement of the Sicilian Greeks - just as Persia had intended to enslave the mainland Greeks (e.g. Hdt. 7.158 and 166).

There is therefore a powerful and early historiographic tradition of Carthaginian imperialism which derives its strength from the supposed ambition of Punic barbarians to dominate the civilized Greeks. A Platonic epistle of the mid-fourth century specifically warned of the dangers of Sicily being transformed into a Phoenician or Opician 'empire' (*dynasteia kai kratos*, *Ep*. 8.353e). Even if the hostility and chauvinism stemmed more from Greek aggressiveness and their fierce inter-city rivalries in Sicily than from any clearly revealed Carthaginian design,[3] in the end there were no pro-Carthaginian historians whose work survives, nothing to redress the balance. And these distortions continued. Under the Romans there is a spate of horror stories illustrating the supposed Punic lust for power which justified the initiative of her enemies. One thinks of Roman claims of attacks by Carthaginians upon their shipping to justify their annexation of Sardinia, which even Rome's best propagandist, Polybius, found impossible to defend (3.28.1-2). Strabo's story of how Carthaginians used to drown all strangers attempting to sail to Sardinia or Gibraltar is another tale from the same book (17.1.19).

The problem then resolves itself into two strands. First, how much of the historiographic tradition of a Carthaginian empire, including the semantics of imperialism, must be saved? And secondly, assuming there is something to preserve, how can ancient views of Carthaginian imperialism be conceptualized?

It is plainly impossible to reject a Carthaginian 'empire' out of hand. The weight of Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Diodorus and Polybius is more than we can resist. If Thucydides, through the mouth of Alcibiades, could speak of a Carthaginian *arche* (6.90.2) and through Hermocrates could declare Carthage 'more powerful than

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any other people of her day' (6.34.2), contemporary readers must surely have imagined some resemblance, however remote, to the Athenian empire of the time. The question is, What?

The same question attaches itself to that other favourite word of ancient authors, *epikrateia*. The term was first employed in relation to Carthaginian power in Sicily by Plato (*Ep*. 7.349c) and subsequently adopted by Aristotle to describe Carthaginian control over some miraculous source of oil (*de mirac. ausc*. 841a; cf. 837a). It then became the word regularly used by secondary sources, such as Diodorus and Plutarch, as the technical term for Carthaginian presence in Sicily in the fourth century B.C. Since it is unclear what these varied authors meant by the term - whether vaguely 'influence' (as in Xen. *Hiero* 6.13) or more generally 'power' (as Polyb. 2.39.7) - it cannot be simply assumed they intended the sense of an imperial province of the later, Roman sort, for which the normal Greek word was *eparchia*.

On the other hand, Diodorus at least would appear to convey something rather more formal by *epikrateia* than the word *hegemonia* by which he regularly and deliberately characterized the much less coherent Carthaginian relations in Sicily in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. (e.g. 10.18.6, 12.26.3). Diodorus, or his source, had presumably come to the conclusion that Carthage by the fourth century had become in some sense a counterweight and similar to the expansionist power of Syracuse under Dionysius I and his successors, who are said to have 'used fear of Carthage to be masters of the other cities without risk' (Diod. 13.112.1-2; cf. 13.91.1). But Diodorus is far from unambiguous about his terms. In Sardinia he says that Carthage had from a very early date 'possessed' (*krateo* is his word) the island (5.15.3-5; cf. Strabo 5.2.7), yet in a subsequent passage, in which he probably derived his information from the historian Timaeus, he calls this Carthaginian control in the fourth century no more than *hegemonia* (15.24.2).

Finally we come to Polybius, whose major concern was the anatomy of Roman imperialism in the second century B.C. Polybius had no hesitation in employing terms like *eparchia* of Carthaginian territorial relations in Sicily (e.g. 1.15.10, 1.17.5) and *eparchousi* to translate an archaic Latin verb that described Carthage's control of Sicily under the terms of the treaty of 509 B.C.

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(3.22.10, 3.24.12). In Roman parlance the terms ought to correspond to *provincia* and some such word as *imperare*, meaning 'to rule over' or 'control'. So on the face of it this appears to mean a good deal more than simply alliances or hegemony. But the oddity is that the terms are conspicuously not employed in the treaty to define Carthage's relations with either Sardinia or Libya which were, if any, 'ruled over' by Carthage. To say that the whole of Sicily was some sort of direct Carthaginian province as early as 509 B.C. was in any case preposterous, as Polybius himself realized when he explained that the clause must refer only 'to as much of Sicily as falls under Carthaginian control' (3.23.5). But that was not what the treaty itself said, and we must either accept that Carthage really ruled over all Sicily or the terms do not mean rule at all. Since the treaty which Polybius saw was in archaic Latin, we can only speculate about what Latin words Polybius saw which led him to his Greek translation. But this and the treaty of 348 B.C., which Polybius also recorded, were drawn up long before Rome herself did control *provinciae* in a territorial sense. Could it be therefore that the term *provincia* did actually appear in the treaty but only in the original latin sense of 'sphere of influence',[4] which Polybius wrongly assumed to mean what it did in his own day? Perhaps all the treaties were really saying was that Rome would recognize certain regions over which Carthage had influence.

If the language of the ancient writers is ambiguous or unclear, we must now ask how far the evidence of historical events will support the reality of a Carthaginian empire - the reality, that is, in terms of domination, control or manipulation of one previously autonomous agency by another by whatever mechanism, whether political, moral or economic. Since this control need not be to the disadvantage of the weaker party, all question of the willingness of the subject and the popularity of the imperial power, even if it could be measured, is an irrelevancy. For this judgement I shall examine Carthaginian power under the following headings, any one of which, if present, must be regarded as a mark of imperialism: direct territorial conquest and annexation, a system of provincial administration, the levying of tribute, a method of exploiting land, unequal alliances and, lastly, trade monopolies and controls.

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CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION

Most explicit of all the ancient evidence is the contrast and implied parallel between Carthage and the imperial ambitions of the Sicilian tyrants culminating in the open rivalry between Dionysius I of Syracuse and Carthaginian interests in the fourth century B.C. There is no doubting Carthaginian intervention in Sicily over a long period from at least the later sixth century B.C. and it was in this context that Thucydides described Carthage as a force to be reckoned with. Whether or not Malchus in the sixth century was the name of a historical person, or a title, or even a corruption of the name Mago (since his name appears in one manuscript as 'Mazeus'), and whatever his intentions in Sicily,[5] in the end it is impossible to show that Carthage was either the only resistance or even the main Phoenician resistance to the early encroachment and attacks mounted by Greek cities and adventurers. Presumably all Phoenician colonies in Sicily had an interest in the supply of silver and in the ports of trade in Sicily; certainly all had armies of their own, even if Carthage was among the more powerful. Their call to Carthage for aid probably derived from a straightforward need for manpower, since the Phoenician colonies in Sicily were not only smaller than their Greek counterparts at the time of their foundation but did not increase significantly in size from the continuous flow of immigrants that was characteristic of cities like Syracuse. But why should the effort to resist be thought primarily Carthaginian? In both the Pentathlus episode at the beginning of the sixth century and in the Dorieus episode at the end the evidence is less than unanimous as to whether Carthage even participated, and there is perhaps a natural tendency among Greek authors to think of all Phoenicians as Carthaginians.[6]

There were of course Carthaginians resident in Sicily by the beginning of the fifth century B.C. and their close ties with some of the Phoenician and Greek colonies are discussed later. But this does not make an empire. It is not too difficult to see how the rise of the turbulent Deinomenids in the early fifth century and the arrival of Greek refugees in eastern Sicily might upset some of the trade agreements and in particular the safety and accessibility of ports such as Syracuse or those on the Straits of Messina (e.g. Hdt. 6.17; see below, p.84). So it is not surprising that *emporia*

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figure as one important issue in this period (Hdt. 7.158). The Magonids, whose political power in Carthage was dominant, were also enmeshed into Sicilian and Syracusan politics (Hdt. 7.166-7) and were naturally interested parties in these developments.

But having said all that, we must recognize once again that Carthaginian merchants were not likely to have been the only or even necessarily the main defenders of port of trade rights and reciprocity agreements in Sicily. At Himera in 480 B.C. Herodotus pointedly speaks of other allied forces, with Phoenicians as well as Libyans ranged against Syracuse, even though their leader was Hamilcar, the Magonid king (7.165). Carthage, that is, played a role of one among many of the Phoenician colonists and seems to have been present at Himera largely through the mediation of the Greek tyrants Terillus of Himera and Anaxilas of Rhegium, who must surely have supplied some of the funds. It is typical of the historiographic tradition that the huge quantity of silver and gold taken after Himera should be said to have been taken from the defeated Carthaginians in spite of the known wealth and probable access to silver of Selinus, Motya and others of the allies.[7]

After this it is the supposed cataclysmic size of the disaster of Himera which has frequently been adduced as the event which reduced Carthage to economic impotence and isolation for the rest of the fifth century, thereby checking the imperial designs of the Magonids. But, as it turns out, the propositions upon which the hypothesis was based have been eroded. Politically the Magonids were not immediately discredited and economically it is unbelievable that Carthage suffered economic isolation while other Phoenician cities such as Motya or even Kerkouane on Cape Bon flourished.[8] Yet it is worth reminding ourselves that the existence of the theory of recession was in order to explain the objective fact of the lack of aggressive action or opportunism by Carthage in Sicily during the rest of the fifth century - including her failure to take advantage of the Athenian invasion of Sicily in 415 B.C. If now by contrast we regard Magonid policy in Sicily as one not of territorial imperialism but of alliance and the preservation of independence for those cities who offered them rights of access and protection for their trade, then Himera, for all its losses, was not an unmitigated disaster. For it was in fact a warning to Acragas and Syracuse and it

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preserved Carthaginian trade and alliances in Sicily. In spite of the barrage of Greek propaganda, it now becomes intelligible why Hamilcar, the dead general, was honoured in every Phoenician city (Hdt. 7.167); the proof of his success was nearly seventy years of uninterrupted freedom, peace and prosperity in Sicily. The fame of Carthage's supply of gold and silver by 415 B.C. is matched by the wealth of Motya in 397 (Thuc. 6.34.2; Diod. 14.53.3). But neither Carthage nor the Phoenician cities needed territorial empires to achieve this. What they needed was peace.

The real puzzle is why Carthage should have abandoned this beneficial quiescence in Sicily at the end of the fifth century for a more active policy which served her rational interests less well. The theory of Magonid revenge for Himera (Diod. 13.43.6) loses its force if what was said earlier was correct. The theory in any case finds little support in the narrative of 410-409 B.C. Renewed Carthaginian intervention, for instance, came at the request of Segesta and it was an Elymian general who commanded the first battle (Diod. 13.43.4, 13.44.4). Every effort was made to avoid rousing Syracuse (Diod. 13.43.6, 13.54.5) and in 406 Carthage made an offer of an alliance and neutrality to Acragas in spite of earlier Greek hostility (Diod. 13.85.2). On the Greek side, the attacks upon Panormus and Motya in 408 by Hermocrates were not supported by Syracuse in spite of Hermocrates' efforts to legitimize his position. Thus far there was little to show a radical departure from earlier Carthaginian policy and nothing to explain the massive display of force in 406 - certainly nothing to justify Diodorus' words that Carthaginians were 'eager to be overlords of the island' (13.80.1). No doubt there was a degree of war hysteria in Carthage and an impetus produced by the events themselves into which Carthage was sucked, where it is easy to understand Magonid interests in revenge, among other things, pressing for intervention. And no doubt there was the inducement of the massive booty which Carthage did in fact gain by the virtual annihilation of Himera, Acragas and other Greek settlements. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the real reason behind Carthage's greater involvement in Sicily in this century was more directly a response to the truly dominating position of Syracuse, which began with Hermocrates and Dionysius I, than the result of some radical reappraisal of Carthaginian interests.

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It may be therefore that Diodorus and his sources were right to select a different word, *epikrateia*, to describe this new Carthaginian presence in Sicily. It was a more formal acknowledgement of Carthage's role as protector of Phoenician interests. Several agreements and treaties, beginning with that of 405 B.C., recognized a territorial region, eventually marked off by the River Halycus, of Carthaginian paramountcy (Diod. 13.144, 14.96.4, etc.), and this corresponds to the Carthaginian 'sphere' of Sicily within which Romans were offered the same facilities as Carthaginians by the treaty of 348 B.C. (Polyb. 3.24.12). This is important because it shows that Carthage could now in some respects speak for the communities of western Sicily. But does it go further than the system of alliances in the fifth century? Although Diodorus talks of cities 'drawn up under Carthage' (15.15.1), the actual relationship was in fact still determined by bilateral agreements. Halicyae, Solus, Segesta, Panormus, Entella and others, including native Sicani, were all called 'allied cities' (*symmachousai poleis*) in 397 (14.48.4) and this term continued to be applied to the cities in the *epikrateia* (e.g. 13.62.5, 14.55.7, 14.85.4). The description in itself need not, of course, mean any more real independence for Phoenician and Elymian cities than Athenian 'allies' possessed in the Delian League. To some extent that impression is borne out when we read that Segesta 'put herself into the hands' of Carthage in 410 in return for her aid (Diod. 13.43.3-4). But the parallel with Athens ceases when we read that Carthage in 345/4 had to 'court' her allied cities in Sicily for their support (Diod. 16.67.1).[9]

It is furthermore quite wrong to regard the military resistance to Syracuse as conducted solely by Carthaginian armies. No doubt again Carthage's repeated expeditions created a confusion between 'Phoenician' and 'Carthaginian' which could be exploited. In 396 B.C., for instance, the fleet is described by Diodorus in alternative sentences as Carthaginian or Phoenician (16.60). But in fact the massive fleet on that occasion could not conceivably have been all Carthaginian, if the figures provided by Ephorus and Timaeus are anywhere near correct (Diod. 14.54.5 and 59.7 - one thousand ships, or perhaps half that number). In 409 B.C. Hermocrates' attack on the western Phoenician cities encountered local armies who

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were manifestly not Carthaginian (Diod. 13.63.4), and it was presumably these forces which turned up alongside the Carthaginians at Cremisus in 338 (Diod. 16.79.6-80.1). As before, money would certainly have been provided for military pay by all the Phoenician cities, who struck silver coin.

The strangest of all features of Carthaginian behaviour in Sicily in the fourth century is explained by this ambivalent relationship. In spite of the undoubtedly increased military activity of expedition and counter expedition from Carthage and Syracuse, Carthaginian aggression time and again faltered just at the critical moment of success. In 405 B.C. Dionysius I was even politically embarrassed by Hamilcar's failure to pursue him and his offer of alliance at the very gates of Syracuse (Diod. 13.112.2 and 114.1-3). In 397 the Carthaginian force was totally unprepared to assist Motya and ended by simply running away (Diod. 14.48.1 and 50.4). Diodorus himself is astonished at Himilco's withdrawal from Syracuse in 396 and his explanation is a devastating plague (14.70.4). In 383 (or perhaps 374), after defeating Dionysius I at Cronion, Carthage tamely agreed to more or less the *status quo ante* (Diod. 15.17.5). In 344, after failing to dissuade Timoleon's force from entering Sicily, the Carthaginians 'unaccountably' withdrew from Syracuse (Diod. 16.69.5). To those Greeks who proclaimed the chronic, imperial machinations of Carthage the explanation had to lie in barbarian cowardice (e.g. Diod. 16.79.2) or plagues and Pyrrhic victories. The chain of mishaps is decidedly suspicious.

Sardinia too was a region colonized by early Phoenicians where also Carthage intervened. There is no difficulty in finding an historical context for Carthage's proprietary interest. The Phoceans, with more than a penchant for piracy, colonized Alalia and possibly Olbia too in about 565 B.C., thereby provoking the retaliation of Carthage and Etruscan Caere about 535 (Hdt. 1.166-7). It makes sense to connect this event with the presence of 'Malchus' whom tradition brings to Sardinia after his Sicilian escapades (Justin 18.7).[10] And after him there was Magonid activity on the island in the early fifth century (Justin 19.1.6).

Archaeologists have been quick to detect confirmations of these episodes from the signs of destruction at inland Phoenician forts and their subsequent restoration.[11] But the precise dates

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of the various phases offer by no means conclusive support, since the archaic period is deemed to end in the sixth century B.C. but the so-called 'Punic' phase does not start till the fourth century.[12] That is one difficulty. The other is whether this Punic evidence really does amount to what Moscati says was 'without doubt' a permanent Carthaginian occupation from the fifth century onwards.[13] All it really proves is that there was a close similarity between Carthaginian culture and that of many Phoenicians in Sardinia. But that would not be surprising if close trade and exchanges, including colonization, existed and need not imply a loss of autonomy by the Phoenician cities. As we have already seen, Diodorus, where he deals with better documented periods than the archaic, uses a term, *hegemonia*, which in the Sicilian context seems to mean no more than assistance and alliances with other Phoenicians. The considerable and early independent development of archaic Phoenician foundations like S. Antiocco, Tharros and Cagliari, whose exploitation of the agriculture and minerals of the hinterland have been demonstrated by the excavations at Monte Sirai, make one wonder about the extent to which Carthage could have actually controlled them or closed their ports.[14]

Then again in the early fourth century Dionysius I probably provoked the Carthaginians into sending some sort of help to protect Sardinian Phoenicians by his activity in the Tuscan Sea, an attack on Pyrgi in Etruria in 384 B.C. and an attempt to set up a base in Corsica (Strabo 5.2.8). The details are obscure but it may have been these events which were connected with a rebellion of Sardinian natives that forced Carthage to 'win back' the island (Diod. 15.24.2).[15] The circumstances explain the proprietary interest of Carthage, particularly if she relied on Sardinian corn. But it should perhaps be seen on a political level too, akin to the Carthaginian action to restore Hipponium on the Bruttian coast after it had been wiped out by Dionysius (Diod. 15.24.1); that is, measures specifically provoked by Dionysius and an attempt to neutralize his aggressiveness. It need not however (as we can be sure of in the case of Hipponium) mean Carthaginian occupation.[16]

In Spain the Carthaginian flag was never as prominent as in Sardinia. Once one accepts that Gades and other Phoenician colonies from the start had an independent life of their own and were not

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simply part of a great web of Tyrian commerce that fell into Carthage's lap when Tyre declined, the scrappy literary and archaeological evidence for the classical period does not amount to very much.[17] There were pressures on Gades and the far-western Phoenicians from the sixth century onwards, which were to some extent linked with the maritime activities of the Phoceans. Obscure records have survived of Phocean or Massiliote clashes with both Gaditain and Carthaginian ships (Justin 43.5.2; Paus. 10.8.6, 10. 18.7; Thuc. 1.13.6; cf. Strabo 4.1.5), as well as the mysterious disappearance of Greek Meinake (Strabo 3.4.2) and an otherwise unknown battle of Artemisium.[18]

But Carthaginian activity and interest in the West at the same time as her other ventures in Sardinia and Sicily are not at issue. The point is, does this amount to an imperial take-over of the Phoenician colonies? The closest we come to that notion is in an undatable passage from Justin, which reads that Gades, being under pressure from her neighbours, was assisted by her kinsmen, the Carthaginians, who then added a part of this 'province' to their 'empire' - *partem provinciae imperio suo adiecerunt* (44.5.3; cf. Macrob. *Sat.* 1.20.12).[19] Certainly there is reason to suppose that the sixth century was not an easy period for Phoenicians in Spain. The last dated evidence from the sites of Toscanos and Trayamar on the Malaga coast, for instance, fall in this century and thereafter they were abandoned. There are also distinct breaks on the west African coast between the archaic Phoenician pottery, generally thought to emanate from Gades, and the later 'Punic' pottery, which may not date before the later fifth century. All that suggests the ending of Gades as an independent trading city.[20]

On the other hand, it is extraordinarily difficult to authenticate actual Carthaginian occupation. The long-distance ships in the mid-fourth century which made the west African run were based on Gades not Carthage, according to Ps. Scylax (*GGM* I. p.94 (112)), and they are named as Phoenician not Carthaginian. That may mean nothing. But Gades did preserve its quasi-independent status right down to the last days of the Barca Spanish empire (*socius et amicus* - Livy 28.37.1). If the evidence from west Africa is anything to go by, the conclusion of the most recent and thorough study of the region is that 'Morocco knew the Carthaginians but it

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never belonged to them'.[21] Polybius' vague statement about the submission of much of Spain to Carthage by 265 B.C. (1.10.5) is completely contradicted by the fairly precise information given by Diodorus concerning the new conquests of Hamilcar Barca 'as far as the pillars of Hercules, Gadeira (Gades) and the ocean' just before the Second Punic War (25.10.1-4). That means either Spain was lost and won back in thirty years without a single comment from any source or that the nature of the relations with Spain and the western territories before the Barcas was of a much looser kind than is commonly admitted. Let it be conceded however that the information is so meagre that it could be interpreted in many different ways. But in general the evidence of actual conquest and annexation throughout the western Phoenician orbit is at best ambiguous and in many regions unlikely in the earlier classical period, at least, even if there was perhaps some change in the fourth century. That will be examined later.

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

In spite of the historiographic tradition which saw in Carthage a Persia of the West, the sources have produced no satrapy system, no governors of satellite territories like those of the Persian empire - or none, at least, before the third century B.C., which will be discussed later, when for very specific reasons a change took place in Carthage's political economy. Throughout the archaic and classical periods to the fourth century B.C. there is not a single reference to any known Carthaginian structure of imperial administration. About the closest we can get to an imperial bureaucracy in the literary sources are the various kings and generals fighting short-term wars abroad - like Mago, who was 'spending time' in Sicily in 393 B.C. (Diod. 14.90.2). It is significant that in the entire chapter assigned by Gsell to 'Administration de l'Empire de Carthage' he could find only one reference which looks anything like an imperial official before the third century B.C. This is an inscription from Tharros in Sardinia (*CIS* I 154) which records a scribe, whom Gsell believed to be similar to the *grammateis* or market officials who appear in the first Carthaginian treaty with Rome (Polyb. 3.22.8). Similar they may have been but there is absolutely nothing to prove this man was either Carthaginian or in Carthaginian employ and the

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chances against him being so seem quite high.[22] Even in the third century, outside Africa and the Barca empire in Spain, the only Carthaginian official that can be found is a military officer, a boetharch, in Sardinia; but that was after the First Punic War (Polyb. 1.79.2).

TRIBUTE

The nearest we get to imperial tribute and the first of such references, as far as I know, is after the sack and total destruction of Selinus in 409 B.C. (Diod. 13.59.3). Those Selinuntians who had not taken part in the siege were permitted to work the land on payment of *phoros* to Carthage. The second reference is in the treaty between Carthage and Syracuse in 405 B.C. which stipulated that Gela and Camarina must pay for their defeat a *phoros* which was in explicit contrast to the status of the Phoenician colonies, the Elymians and the Sicani (Diod. 13.114.1). The position of Selinus, Acragas and Himera, who also figure in the terms, is ambiguous as the wording stands and they might also be thought to be listed as tribute payers, although it seems easier to regard them as being recognized in this agreement as Carthaginian allies, which was reaffirmed later. The third and final reference comes in an imaginary speech by a Syracusan called Theodorus, who claims in 396 B.C. that, if victorious over Dionysius I, Carthage would impose upon them a 'fixed tribute' (*phoros horismenos*) (Diod. 14.65.2). In all the references the *phoros* seems to apply only to defeated enemies, not to allies and, unless it can be shown to be a permanent imposition, looks more like a war indemnity than regular tribute. That is very much the implication of Theodorus' speech. Perhaps the tribute was permanent for Selinus, Acragas and Himera, but, if so, this is not stated when they were redefined by treaty in 314 B.C. as somehow 'drawn up under Carthage' (Diod. 19.71.7). The subordination of Camarina and Gela cannot be documented beyond 397 and had ended by 383 B.C. (Diod. 14.47.5, 15.17.5). Further speculation about the existence of a full scale, imperial tribute, a pre-Roman tithe system and so on, is simply unsupported by the evidence.[23]

As far as Sardinia and Spain are concerned, the evidence of tribute is even less. It may be that Sardinian corn came to Carthage under some sort of tributary system. But we only hear about

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this source of supply when Carthage was faced with revolts by the Libyans of the interior.[24] So the record is irregular and, for all we know, the corn could have been paid for. In Spain, however much interest the Phoenicians and Carthaginians may have taken in mining the silver, we know nothing of any tribute paid in this medium to Carthage.

Tribute requires some sort of organization for collection and coercion; it may also produce a tendency towards a single coinage system, as in the Athenian empire. Yet, as we have already seen, there is no hint of an imperial civil service, inspectors and the like. Garrisons however are often thought to have existed. The standard example quoted is that of Heraclea Minoa, on the borders of the territory defined as the Carthaginian *epikrateia* in the fourth century. It was a city which Diodorus says 'was subject to' (*hypekouen*) Carthage in 357/6 (14.9.4). That looks clear enough. But in spite of mention of a 'prefect' or magistrate (*epistates* or *archon*) in the sources, there is nothing about a garrison of troops; and in the one case where we know of the officer he was not a Carthaginian but a Greek (Diod. 16.9.4; Plut. *Dion* 25). Certainly Heraclea was, like some other towns, used in the fourth and third centuries as a centre for mustering Carthaginian armies (as when Pyrrhus attacked, for instance, Diod. 22.10.2).[25]

Can we conclude from this a permanent network of imperial garrisons? In 409 B.C. Carthage retired from Sicily leaving behind some troops, but specifically for the needs of her 'allies', not to control her subjects (Diod. 13.62.6). In 404 B.C. too Campanian troops (in origin, presumably, mercenaries) were left at some unnamed place 'as a guard' (Diod. 14.8.5). But they promptly joined Dionysius I and, to judge by other Campanians settled at Entella, they were neither satellites nor a garrison but allies (Diod. 14.61.5, 14.67.3). A Carthaginian garrison in 278/6 at Enna - if the textual emendation is correct - was there explicitly at the wish of the inhabitants to protect themselves against the tyrant Phintias and they remained there until such time as the people voluntarily turned to Pyrrhus (Diod. 22.10.1). Thus the evidence of coercive control comes down to a garrison town without troops and troops who are not in garrison towns. Vague allusions to troops in Sicily cannot, in view of the contingents supplied by

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the Phoenician colonies, simply be assumed to mean garrisons of Carthaginian contingents (e.g. Diod. 15.17.2 - Lilybaeum in 368; 19.106.5 - in 311; both of which are quoted by Gsell[26]).

There did develop in the fourth century, or more precisely after 410 B.C., several coinage series in Sicily with the Phoenician legend *s.y.s.* whose provenance from cities such as Motya, Solus, Panormus and even Segesta suggests a cultural and perhaps some political unity. The question is whether this political and geographical solidarity among Phoenician cities adds up to an imperial province controlled by Carthage.[27] The so-called 'Carthage' types and the *s.y.s.* types were presumably struck for the military campaigns of this decade when there was indeed a united front in western Sicily against Dionysius. That does not prove a Carthaginian dictat existed. Indeed there is good reason to believe that the *s.y.s.* coins belonged only to Panormus, while die links are common among Greek cities with no more than friendly relations. The several sources of the coins and the linking of the dies between various Phoenician cities might indicate exactly the opposite - that Carthage was only one among many allies. The coins were certainly never an instrument and probably not even a symptom of imperialism.

Under this heading therefore there are some signs of Carthage's growing concern in Sicily and perhaps even a willingness to contemplate the formal subjection of perennially troublesome enemies within what they regarded as their sphere of influence. But it is hazardous to go beyond that to postulate a regular system of garrisons, tribute and officials, who exacted money, men and obedience from friends and enemies alike.

LAND EXPLOITATION

It follows that, if there was no actual territorial conquest, land could be acquired by Carthaginians only by private purchase under some arrangement like *enktesis* or through colonization of some sort. But unless the colony can be shown to have preserved real ties with Carthage which the mother city could exploit to her own advantage then the foundation of colonies in itself is no more imperialistic than the movements from Greece had been in the archaic period.

Evidence of Carthaginian colonization is not hard to come by, directed to all the territories where Carthage was active. In

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Sicily, for instance, Diodorus describes Motya in the early fourth century as an *apoikos* of Carthage, and, although he is strictly wrong, he may be referring to reinforcements of colonists sent from Carthage (Diod. 47.4; Paus. 5.25.5).[28] After the destruction of Himera colonists were sent from Carthage to found the new city of Thermae in 407 B.C. (Diod. 13.79.8), although many Greeks from old Himera and elsewhere, including Agathocles' father, were included in the venture (Cic. II *Verr*. 2.35.86; Diod. 19.1.2). In Sardinia too we have a number of references to Carthaginian colonists, although some are quite certainly incorrect and confuse early western Phoenicians with Carthaginians (e.g. Paus. 10.17.9, attributing the foundation of Caralis and Sulcis to Carthage). We need not take Cicero at his word that all Sardi were in origin disgraced Punico-Libyan half-breeds (*pro Scauro* 42) to believe there is something behind the notion that here too some Carthaginians came to settle and reinforce the old Phoenician foundations.[29] In Spain it is significant that, apart from the references to innumerable Carthaginian *emporia*,[30] there is only one case of a colony - *apoikia* - cited in any author before the Roman period, when the distinction between Phoenician and Carthaginian seems to have been lost. The single colony is one mentioned by the fourth-century historian Ephorus of 'Libyphoenicians from Carthage, forming a colony' (Ps. Scymnus, *GGM* I, p.203; cf. Avienus, *Or.marit*. 421).

The term 'Libyphoenician' does however go right to the heart of the problem. It does not matter here what the ethnic mixture of these people was, since we are only concerned with their relations to Carthage. And for that we have Diodorus' statement that 'they share rights of intermarriage (*epigamia*) with Carthaginians' (20.55.4). If that were true of Libyphoenicians and if Libyphoenicians could be shown to have been scattered all over the Mediterranean littoral, it would go a long way to establishing the case for colonies formally tied to Carthage - much as the Latins were tied to Rome, said Mommsen[31] - and would support Weber's contention that all western Phoenician colonies assisted Carthage in 'the forceful monopolization of trade'.[32] There is a fair number of references to Libyphoenicians or the analogous Blastophoenices (Spain) and Sardolibes (Sardinia), of which the earliest is probably that describing the foundations on the west African coast in

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the periplous of Hanno (*GGM* I, p.1). But there are two points to observe: one, that by far the majority of references are late and seem to have had a geographic limitation to those who lived east of Cape Bougaroun in Algeria; the other is that Diodorus expressly limits his remarks about *epigamia* to 'the four categories who have divided Libya' - and by 'Libya' he almost certainly meant the eastern Maghreb. So the remarkable 'interwoven kinship' that he mentioned could have been something which grew up in the third century and the product of the African empire of Carthage, about which there is more to say later. But there is slender support in these Libyphoenician examples for a tight network of satellite 'Latin'-type cities scattered over the western Mediterranean.

If we now come back to the examples of *apoikiai*, is there any reason why we should believe they had more than sentimental links with Carthage? These might in some cases lead to bilateral alliances and even dependency, but not *qua* colony and not more than, say, in the case of the old Phoenician colonies or Elymian Segesta.

There are two curious passages in Aristotle's *Politics* which deal with Carthaginian colonization (1273b19, 1320b5). The first concerns the use of colonization as a social manipulator to prevent discontent against the oligarchy and the second deals with the provision of working capital to colonists 'whom they constantly send out to the surrounding territory'. This last phrase strongly suggests that Aristotle had in mind the African hinterland, although there is nothing to preclude overseas territories. It requires some stretch of the imagination, however, to perceive in this passage a system of rotating native commissioners, as Gsell believed (following Mommsen).[33] If it does refer to the overseas colonies noted earlier and if it means the Phoenician cities of Sicily, Sardinia and Spain were prepared 'constantly' to accept Carthaginian peasants and poor in return for the aid Carthage offered them against their neighbours, then here indeed is an instrument of imperialism which Carthage exploited to the advantage of her own political economy.

ALLIANCES

What has just been said raises the question of the *quid pro quo* of Carthaginian alliances. There is no denying the presence of

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Carthaginian forces nor their concern to keep the ports open - nor even their leadership from time to time in Sicily, Sardinia and Spain. The ancient evidence is unassailable on this point. To Greeks who viewed all Phoenicians in one light the question of whether Carthage herself was always involved perhaps seemed academic. But in the early stages and before the fourth century, at any rate, there is not enough to talk of an empire nor even, as Merante does, of 'domination'.[34] Diodorus deliberately spoke of *hegemonia* up to that date and there is nothing which happened which could not be explained in terms of a loose system of alliances and reciprocal treaties.

One aspect of the early alliances is a feature familiar enough in the study of Greek history, the exchanges of hospitality (*xenia*) and formal ties of friendship and marriage contracted between aristocratic families of different great houses across state barriers.[35] The Carthaginian dynast Mago, who was active in Sicily around the turn of the sixth century B.C., had married a Syracusan wife and his sons were heavily involved with other powerful families in Himera and Rhegium, who were themselves similarly bound by marriage ties (Hdt. 7.165). These were the men who emerged as tyrants in their cities and who stimulated Carthaginian intervention at Himera in 480 B.C.

These quasi-kinship relations continued throughout Carthage's involvement in Sicily. They are the sort of thing which is portrayed in the exchanges of *tesserae* recorded in Plautus' *Poenulus* (e.g. 955-60) and they lasted long after the growth of central state agreements. They characterize and underline the fact that Carthaginian foreign policy was conducted not so much in the abstract political atmosphere of state government but through the very personal interests and ambitions of its leading figures. There were numbers of wealthy Carthaginian merchants resident in the various ports of trade in Sicily (and we must presume elsewhere) and it is not surprising to find them on familiar terms with the tyrants' courts. In a dialogue of Heraclides of Pontus, for instance, there is a reference to 'a certain Magos' who claimed to have circumnavigated Libya and who is portrayed in discussion with Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse (Strabo 2.3.4). It would be pleasant if this Mago (as I take his name to be) were

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a member of the great house, but he represents a typical enough example.[36] Carthaginian interests in alliances for security and the benefits that accrued do not have to be explained in imperialist terms of crude annexation and booty. For the elite were often personally and directly involved in the success of the trade (see below p.87). As we saw earlier, the rational interest of these men was generally conditions of peace.

The Carthaginian dilemma was on the one hand to maintain the peace that produced economically profitable relations with many towns such as Acragas and Syracuse, which housed resident Carthaginian and Phoenician merchants (Diod. 13.81.5, 13.84.3, 14.46.1-2), and on the other to keep alive the alliances and treaty ports in Sicily upon which her merchants ultimately depended. A series of ambitious Greek adventurers, Hermocrates, Dionysius, Timoleon, Agathocles, Pyrrhus and finally Hiero, continually threatened to destroy the delicate balance of Carthaginian foreign policy and to lay bare its contradictions. In particular the total destruction of Motya and the expulsion of all Phoenician merchants from Syracuse and her allied cities in 389 B.C. by Dionysius I (Diod. 14.53 and 46.1-2) - the latter an action which, as far as I can tell, is unique in Sicilian history - hammered home the lesson that, if Carthage wished to maintain her interests in Sicily, a more active foreign policy of intrigue and interventionism was necessary in the fourth century.

It is this dilemma which accounts for the increase in political rivalries in home politics at Carthage during this century: the fall of the Magonid general, Himilco and his suicide in 396 (Diod. 14.76. 3-4); the rise of Hanno the Great and the disappearance of the last known Magonid in the early 370s, at about the same time as a terrible Libyan invasion and internecine fighting in the city (Diod. 15.24.2-3); the treachery of Hanno's rival Suniatus (Eshmunyaton?) in warning Dionysius I of an impending expedition (Justin 20.5.4; cf. Diod. 15.73 - 368 B.C.). All these were manifestations of a struggle for a fundamentally unattainable goal. Even the fall of Hanno the Great at some unspecified date after an attempted *coup d'état* (Justin 21.4; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1272b and 1307a) is probably linked to Sicily, since we hear of a certain Hanno in 345 who was replaced for his failure as a general (Diod. 16.67.2; Plut. *Timol.*

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19). But in 338, after the fearful defeat at the Cremisus, it was Hanno's son, Gisco, who was recalled from exile (Diod. 16.81.3, Plut. *Timol*. 30.3).

This does not mean there were clear-cut imperialist and non-imperialist parties in these rivalries, nor even a clash between African and Sicilian interests, although both these causes have sometimes been suggested.[37] The political struggles now, as always, were as much the product of personal rivalries and family intrigues as of fundamentally opposed policies. Gisco's return to favour after Cremisus was due to both the failure of his predecessors and the personal advocacy of his Sicilian friends, Mamercus of Catania and Hiketas of Leontini (Plut. *Timol*. 30.2); the latter was certainly a friend of Hanno, though Hanno was also known for his African achievements (Diod. 16.67.1-2). In all the intrigues for power there is never reported a hint of either withdrawal from Sicily or of total conquest (in spite of vague Greek propaganda); only of 'keeping a hand in Sicilian affairs' (Diod. 14.95.1). The problem of how to balance the twin themes of this policy was irreducible and led to constant fluctuation in one or other direction.

The truth is that the territorial ambitions of Carthage in the fourth century seem to be not much greater than before in Sicily. But there was a greater sense of insecurity in face of the now dominant power of Syracuse. The development of central, state institutions in both Syracuse and Carthage led to a shift in balance in interstate relations from the personal bonds of friendship between the great houses to the more impersonal, collective interests of the ruling elite, although never the elimination of the former. Both tendencies created a greater need for formal definitions of alliances and intercity relations, of spheres of influence and boundaries. That would explain why men looked at Carthage's 'province' in a different way, and why Carthage's allies became more dependent upon her aid and leadership, but it did not in itself change the structure of the Carthaginian alliances into a centrally organized empire of provinces and officials. To some extent this is quibbling with words, since the greater dependence of the allies made it less and less likely or possible that they should withdraw. And that was a form of imperialism.

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TRADE MONOPOLIES AND CONTROLS

Recent studies of the western Phoenicians in the archaic period, based upon the distribution of trade goods, now stress the polycentric character of archaic trading in the Mediterranean and the absence of any centralized and exclusive trade empire directed by Tyre or Carthage.[38] We are nevertheless confronted by the awkward fact that there are innumerable references in the sources to Carthaginian *emporia* or trading ports, particularly in Libya and Spain, of which the most prolific are perhaps those of the fourth-century Greek geographer whose *periplous* was attributed to Scylax.[39] We have the literary and archaeological evidence of trade down the *kolpos emporikos* (Strabo 17.3.2) as far as Mogador, if not further, which is reinforced by the celebrated voyages of Hanno and Himilco making their way past the Straits of Gibraltar.[40] And above all we have the treaties between Carthage and Rome: according to the first treaty of 509 B.C. the Carthaginians seem to be claiming control of ports of trade in both eastern Libya and Sardinia, which in the second treaty of 348 becomes a prohibition on all trading and settlement in those regions (Polyb. 3.22.9, 3.24.11). These provisions Polybius interpreted to mean that Carthage in some way regarded Sardinia and eastern Libya as their own or 'private'. The second treaty added a provision about Spain by defining a point, Mastia Tarseion, beyond which trade should not be conducted by Rome (3.24.4).

It has become accepted almost without question from all this that during the course of the fifth and fourth centuries Carthage increasingly exercised a trade blockade in the western Mediterranean. Stories of drowning of strangers or voluntary scuttling of ships to prevent the discovery of trade routes add to the impression (Strabo 3.5.11, 17.1.19). And yet questions arise. At the end of the fifth century, for instance, a Spartan fleet of merchantmen *en route* from Cyrene to Tunisia encountered no Carthaginian blockade and even put in at the Carthaginian *emporion* at Neapolis on the southern side of Cape Bon in supposedly forbidden territory (Thuc. 7.50). The condottiero, Ophelas, who marched from Cyrene to Carthage in the late fourth century, is probably the man who wrote a *periplous* of Libya (Strabo 17.3.1), which could have had more than academic interest for him. Herodotus seems to have received information about natives in the Libyan *emporia* district and about the gold

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trade of the far west (4.191 and 196). If all this information came from Carthaginian sources, which is by no means certain, it at least shows that it was not censored. So much so, that Gsell, unlike some of his successors, was forced to argue that Polybius' wording about the embargo on Libya in the 509 treaty must have meant Libya *west* of Carthage, even though Carthaginian special interest in the Algerian coast is inexplicable and unsupported in this or later centuries.[41]

In Spain, in spite of the treaty, there was no uniform trade embargo on foreigners either. Apart from Euthymenes of Massilia who sailed down the Atlantic coast of Africa at some unspecified date (*FHG* IV 408), the Massiliote explorer Pytheas claimed to have travelled to Britain some time in the late fourth or third century and he was not molested at Gades (Strabo 2.4.1-2). The Alexandrian admiral Timosthenes in the 280s had good information about the western Mediterranean, including the site of Gibraltar/Algeciras, for which significantly he gave a Greek name (Strabo 3.4.7).[42] And in Sardinia, where the approaches were supposedly completely banned, presumably for fear of native revolts, Eratosthenes actually says it was only 'strangers' (*xenoi*) who were so treated (Strabo 11.1.19) and he made his comment in the context of the ports of trade in Egypt, where we know access was certainly carefully controlled but never totally excluded (Hdt. 2.179). The presence of Massiliotes in Tharros at a date which could fall within the period under discussion (*IG* XIV 609-10) rather suggests that the same was true in Sardinia.

There is no need here to underline Carthage's continuous and predominant role in long-distance trade. In this respect Carthage, because of her restricted access to a rural territorium (Justin 18.5.14), differed from many of the other western Phoenician colonies in her early history, and this was doubtless the reason why she developed into the leading Phoenician naval state during the archaic period. It also explains why Carthage from an early date found it necessary to dispose of her surplus population by subcolonization and to seek food supplies outside her territory from districts such as eastern Libya and Sardinia. In Spain of course the attraction was silver and in west Africa gold. But nowhere in the archaic period or later is there anything to indicate this trade was conducted in a commercially open and competitive market

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responsive to price wars, supply and demand or diminishing marginal utility.[43] No one, said Xenophon, has got so much silver that he does not wish for more (*Poroi* 4.7). It follows that the Phoenician Spanish trade in silver was not undercut or dislocated by grants of port or trade facilities to Phoceans or other Greeks by the local rulers (e.g. Hdt. 1.163, 4.152). What did upset Carthage was piracy (Hdt. 1.166, 6.17; Arist. *Rhet*. 1.12.18), and this in turn provoked general hostility to the foundation of alien colonies within the limited range of raiding penteconters.[44] That had been the reaction of the men of Chios when Phoceans tried to settle on the adjacent Oenussae islands (Hdt. 1.165), and it was the same principle which provoked Carthaginian opposition to Dorieus' attempt to colonize the African *emporia* coast or the Phocean colonization of Alalia in Sardinia.

In other words, none of these were examples of simple market competition. Trade under these conditions is basically a political activity between communities, like war, and conducted at the same level of management.[45] Guarantees of peace and friendship are more important than haggling for prices, which undermines security. Complete strangers are automatically suspect, since their purpose must be aggressive and their influence on peaceful natives disruptive. Even friendly traders are stereotyped as potential cheats, spies and pirates (e.g. Hdt. 1.1, 1.153), whose access to markets must be strictly supervised. Elaborate care was therefore taken to defuse potential conflicts, either by silent trade - for which we have the celebrated Carthaginian example in Herodotus (4.196) - or by agreed rights to ports of the sort granted by king Arganthonius to some Greeks at Tartessus (Hdt. 1.163).

It is the ports of trade, the *emporia*, which Polanyi first suggested should be regarded as the principal instrument of the Carthaginian political economy and (we may add *ex hypothesi*) of whatever degree of imperial control they may have exercised. The notion has been taken up by others, but with two important qualifications:[46] first, that the distinction between *emporia* and other urban centres is blurred, particularly in Sicily; and secondly, that the neutrality of ports of trade as a means of separating incompatible systems, which Polanyi emphasized, should not exclude the possibility of a more discriminatory, political use of ports

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in favour of friends and allies.

Carthaginian *emporia* must be regarded as falling into two categories. One type was in those regions where Carthaginian traders themselves operated under the licence of foreign powers, even though they often settled more or less permanently in the port. This was clearly true, for instance, of those many Carthaginian and Phoenician traders in Syracuse (Diod. 14.46.1), or in Acragas with its hundreds of 'resident aliens' in the fifth century (Diod. 13.81.4-5, 13.84.3 - the figures are surely exaggerated). The same was presumably the case with the Punic ghettos of *portum Punicum* and Pyrgi in the Etruscan ports of Caere and Tarquinia. It must also account for some of the many so-called 'Carthaginian' *emporia* listed by Greek geographers in Spain and Africa. They were not necessarily any more Carthaginian than the port where Homer's Phoenician merchants lived for a year (*Od*. 15.416ff.); nor, to judge by what we know of Arganthonius, were they limited to Carthaginian merchants. The independent Phoenician colonies of Spain, Sardinia and Sicily would not in principle have behaved any differently from Greeks or Iberians in their relations with Carthaginian merchants, although in practice a common culture and language must have created favourable conditions for trade agreements.

The second category of *emporia* consists of those under Carthaginian control, the most important of which was obviously Carthage itself. This was state administered trade, conducted in the presence of state officials (*kerykes* and *grammateis*), of the kind we have recorded in the Rome treaty of 509 B.C. in Libya and Sardinia (Polyb. 3.22.3). The presence of a Greek community in Carthage is attested on many occasions (e.g. Diod. 14.77.4-5 in 396 B.C.) and it was assuredly paralleled by an Etruscan settlement.[47] Nor was Carthage the only site known in Libya. Neapolis (Thuc. 7.50) and later Kerkina (Livy 33.48.3) were all very much Carthaginian.

It was presumably in Carthage's interest to determine the rights of access to ports of trade herself rather than to rely on the possession of such rights as were granted by other powers. Direct administration of the *emporion* was not only profitable for *vectigalia maritima* which went into the pockets of the *principes* of Carthage (Livy 33.46.8-47.1) but, as Xenophon's Simonides advised Hiero of Syracuse, it brought political prestige to the ruler (Xen. *Hiero* 4.7, 9.9). This means that user-rights in ports of trade were regarded as

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instruments of diplomacy and power as much as special economic advantages. According to an emotional speech given by Herodotus to Gelo of Syracuse in the early fifth century, Gelo had once asked the mainland Greeks for help against Carthage, 'To free the *emporia* from which you had great advantage and profit ... But for all you did they would still be in barbarian hands' (Hdt. 7.158). Whatever the historicity of the speech, the notion was feasible in Herodotus' day.[48]

But what control? And how was it operated? In the second category of *emporia* it was exercised by the presence of Carthaginian officials, payment of tolls to Carthage and perhaps territorial occupation by Carthage - the sort of thing that seems to have pertained in Leptis Magna in the second century B.C. But that kind of evidence is lacking for anywhere else among the dozens of *emporia* outside Africa, with the possible exception of Sardinia. The silence is here surely significant. The only other possibility is Carthaginian control by treaty and indirect pressure; perhaps also Carthaginian control of the semi-autonomous enclaves established in the ports. This would be rather like the right to appoint the wardens of the port granted by Egypt to select states at Naucratis (Hdt. 2.178), or the control of the segregated *karum* by Assyrian traders in the middle of a foreign Anatolian kingdom in the second millennium B.C.[49] In the Middle Ages and later such concessions were called 'Capitulations' and are recorded from at least the ninth century, when Harun-al-Rashid granted special commercial facilities to the Frankish subjects of Charlemagne.[50] They were in effect treaties which granted to a state extra-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals within the boundaries of a foreign port, and were based on the principle that the sovereignty of a state could extend to its overseas subjects but not to the port territory. It was thereby a convenience to both parties - to the home state by providing a measure of law and order among wealthy and often powerful merchants in the port, and to the foreigners in that they were protected in their transactions and usually given some reduction of port duties. The result was the formation of virtually a foreign enclave in the midst of an alien land, sometimes, although not necessarily, to the restriction of the host's sovereignty.

How far the Assyrian *karum* or the Capitulations were precisely

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paralleled in Carthage's extra-territorial relations is almost impossible to say with the limited information available. But the examples prove that territorial sovereignty was not a precondition of control of port operations. Nor were these conditions necessarily exploitative of the host country - what today we might call neo-colonialist - since in this kind of trade prices were fixed by non-commercial mechanisms. But politically such user-control was of immense value in the conduct of foreign affairs. In return for Carthaginian aid against mounting Greek or native pressures, the various Phoenician cities must have agreed to permit Carthage to dictate the terms under which the ports of trade extended its rights to users, but they did not necessarily forfeit their independence.

This political instrument of determining the approaches to the ports of trade (*epibathrai* is Polybius' word, 3.24.14) is always assumed to mean a policy of *mare clausum*, trade monopolies and closed markets, based on theories of formal economics. But in conditions of administered trade the logic is perverse. The Carthaginians were concerned not to limit the number of traders who came to their ports but to increase them. Strangers, unidentifiable penteconters of warlike appearance were potential enemies, raiders and kidnappers. It is significant that Polybius automatically interpreted the treaty of 509 to refer to Roman war ships (3.23.2).[51] They caused local shipping to suffer and the population was abducted as slaves (e.g. Plaut. *Poen*. 66). Adjacent ports of trade or colonial foundations were likewise threatening, apart from drawing off potential allies. The success of treaty trade depended upon the ability to offer protection and guaranteed prices. The aim was to direct shipping to suitable sites, to assist the trader with facilities for storage and judicial authorities to enforce contracts, to keep the foreigner under surveillance rather than encourage him to smuggle at unauthorized sites.[52] The 'running in' of ships (*katagein* is the Greek word) seems to have been a fairly common practice for compulsory sales both in this period and later.[53] The essential prerequisite for the port of trade was peace (Xen. *Poroi* 5.2), and this was what motivated Carthage in Spain, Sardinia and Sicily.

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TOWARDS A MODEL FOR CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM

In Carthage, as in all pre-industrial and relatively undifferentiated societies of a precapitalist era, the economy was 'submerged in social relationships' and this characteristic predominated over such principles of formal economics as the theory of indifference, diminishing returns and economic maximization.[54] That means to say that, even if they had had the skill to calculate the strictly financial value of marginal production and exchange, the Carthaginians would not have had the will to create this as the overriding principle, to the exclusion of social and political gains. Perhaps that is true enough of any society, but in Carthage as in all face-to-face communities, economic rationality was modified by social prescription to a far greater extent than in modern industrial societies where social and economic spheres are largely segregated.

Price in other words was less important than goodwill or prestige, and external trade was merely a tool towards this end. Commerce, insofar as it is an appropriate term at all, was directed towards the socially necessary objectives of Carthaginian society, which had as much to do with moral obligations and status as with private money-making. This does not mean that economic rationality disappeared and played no part in determining Carthaginian behaviour overseas. Economic maximization is merely a tautology for saying that each man does the best he can in the circumstances. But it is the circumstances that matter. We are not dealing with prelogical mentalities but with priorities.[55]

In consideration of Carthaginian imperialism this means that, while we must not rule out the possibility of economically exploitative domination through territorial conquest or tied trade, socially oriented actions also provided opportunities for manipulation and self advantage that do not fit into a term like 'commercial empire'.

If the Carthaginian economy was thus embedded in the social and political fabric of the state, there was no clear dichotomy between the public and private sector. Personal bonds of *xenia* and *philia* predominated in such actions of foreign policy as Magonid support for Himera against Syracuse or in response to the kinship call for help from Gades.[56] Phoenician merchants of

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antiquity were princes and their traffickers 'the honourable of the earth' (Isaiah 23.8) - unlike those of Greece and Rome. Whatever the precise relationship between kings and the ruling 'order' at various periods, Aristotle and Polybius make it clear that wealth, largesse and conspicuous spending rather than birth were essential for control of political power (Arist. *Pol.* 1272b-1273a; Polyb. 6.56.4).[57] Since agrarian wealth and land were in short supply until at least the fourth century B.C., it follows that Carthaginian grandees derived their status and riches both from land and from trade and foreign adventures. King Hanno's voyage to the west African coast in search of gold (as we believe) was just such an example of state-cum-private enterprise and perhaps one more example of the interchangeable political and trading role by the ubiquitous Magonid family.

According to Cicero's biased view, commercial greed destroyed Carthage's will to fight (*de rep.* 2.4.7), which more or less corresponded to Aristotle's judgement that riches in Carthage were more honoured than merit (*Pol.* 1273a). In other words, prestige action lay more in trade than conquest and this, not surprisingly, baffled Cicero's agrarian sense of values. This does not mean that military prowess was wholly despised. If we can believe Justin, Mago, the founder of the dynasty, won great renown for *bellica gloria* (18.7.19) and the crack troops of the 'Sacred Band' in 339 B.C. were a political elite 'distinguished for bravery and reputation as well as property' (Diod. 16.80.4). But war in general, as we saw in Sicily, endangered the very basis of the economic and political welfare of the oligarchy, which was achieved through the careful nurture of administered trade in foreign ports and the extension of such facilities to their allies by private and state agreements.

And this brings us once again to the Rome-Carthage treaties, which are in many ways the best documents for understanding Carthaginian imperialism. The treaties, as many have seen, must be set in the context of the *symbola* and state agreements concluded by Carthage with several Etruscan cities (Arist. *Pol.* 1280a36). They were therefore agreements arising out of friendship not truces dictated from hostility. In matters of exchange and business the parties became 'like citizens of one city', says Aristotle.

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Strangers were in this fashion made like kinsmen so that they could be incorporated as trading partners through a political and social act outside the realm of pure market economics, and not restricted to commerce.[58] The important point is that *symbola*, which were similar to other types of exchange of rights, rights of sanctuary or alien residence which can be documented in Phoenician or Levantine trading history far back into the archaic period, were designed to assist traders and strangers, not to keep them out.[59] Such state agreements were closely related to and developed out of exchanges of *xenia*.

What this paper has sought to suggest is that such agreements of reciprocity, which began as deals between equal partners, could move into conditions of unequal domination for political as much as commercial reasons. The tone of the Pyrgi gold inscriptions, dating from near the time of the first Roman treaty, is deferential to Carthage.[60] The treaties with Rome defined political. spheres of influence where Carthage could, as it were, speak for others. And that redounded to Carthage's prestige. But Rome in 509, while speaking for the Latin cities, could hardly claim to control them at that date. No more could Carthage claim that Tyre was Carthaginian territory in 348, although she was included in the agreement (Polyb. 3.24).[61] So why should Utica or Mastia Tarseion in Spain have been any different in the same treaty? What had happened was that these cities under pressure of events were prepared to permit Carthage to define their foreign relations by jointly underwriting the protection of allied shipping in selected ports of trade. That was the attraction of the alliance and the nature of the Carthaginian empire.

A CHANGE IN CARTHAGINIAN IMPERIALISM

Carthaginian attitudes towards trade and overseas commitments were changing in the fourth century. This may have underlain their unwillingness to allow Romans to approach Libya and Sardinia, although they did not necessarily demand the same conditions from all their allies. It coincided with a change in the political economy of Carthage and the expansion of Carthage beyond the *chora* of Cape Bon. By the time of Agathocles' invasion in 310 B.C. Carthage controlled a territory some forty miles deep that extended

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westwards as far as Hippo Acra (Bizerta) and eastwards to Hadrumetum and Thapsus. This implies a growth of landed property ownership, control of labour and new relations of production, which were bound to alter the social and economic priorities as well as affecting the ideology of the ruling estate. It is at this time in the fourth century, for instance, that we hear of Hanno and his support from 20,000 'slaves', who must be labourers on the land (Justin 21.4.6). We have evidence of rich estates owned by the nobility (Diod. 20.8.4), which probably included the exploitation of the corn lands to the south-west and olive culture to the south-east.[62] The introduction of the *Ceres* cult into Africa (Diod. 14.77.5) and the export of corn in 306 B.C. (Diod. 20.79.5) are signals of the new economy. However scathing Cicero may have been about the relative absence of a purely land-owning class in Carthage, the large olive estates owned by the Barca family near Thapsus (Livy 33.48.1; Pliny *NH* 17.93) demonstrate the change.

The logic of this change, however small in the fourth century, was growing inequality among the population of the territory as the minority gained control of the means of production. That produced greater unrest among those who were increasingly exploited and therefore greater danger that foreign invasions might spark off native rebellion - just as Agathocles and Regulus calculated. The benefits of reciprocity agreements and foreign exchanges were outweighed by the disturbances caused by foreign contacts. The vulnerability of Africa led to a greater dependence on Sardinia for emergency imports and therefore the need to limit approaches even by allies. Sicily became less a field for enterprise than a security risk from her contiguity. Agathocles, it was said, at the time of his death in 289 B.C. was planning to control Carthaginian routes by holding strategic points in Africa with a large war fleet (Diod. 21.16.1).

By the end of the fourth century the stage was set for the new Carthaginian imperialism of the third century, which is not studied here. Basically it aimed to neutralize Sicily and produce equilibrium through chaos. It was only the Romans who claimed to perceive in this an aggressive intent, in order to excuse their own actions.[63] The complete loss of Spain and its silver supply made Carthage more than ever reliant upon Sardinia and Libya. So it was that in the

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third century the first extensive penetration deep into Africa took place followed by the full panoply of a provincial system, including governors, taxes and district organization of the territory.[64] This was the work of Hanno and Hamilcar Barca, further stimulated by the crippling blow to Carthaginian trade by the loss of Sicily and Sardinia in the First Punic War. Hamilcar then carried the empire westwards along the Metagonian coast and into Spain. The empire was described in the Macedonian treaty of 215 B.C. as 'those who are subjects of Carthage, who live under the same laws' (Polyb. 7.9.5). Polybius used the word *hyparchoi* for subjects, not the *eparchia* he had described before. The verbal shift is small but the real change great.

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