

Introduction

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This book analyses government and public policies in São Paulo, one of the largest and most complex cities in the world. We are interested in understanding how this city is governed, what kinds of policies and services its governments construct and deliver, and, more importantly, under what conditions they produce policies to reduce its striking social and urban inequalities. In more general terms, what explains the emergence and production of redistributive change in a vast Southern metropolis like São Paulo?

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As Ugalde and Le Galès (2017) discuss at length, large cities have usually been considered ungovernable, or almost, even in cases known for their robust policies and excellent average urban conditions, such as New York (Yates 1977), Boston and San Francisco (Ferman 1985), London (Gordon and Travers 2010) and European metropolises (Lefebvre 2010). Authors have highlighted deficits in the political authority and coordination capacity of city governments, advocating institutional reforms that could provide them with stronger powers. Interestingly enough, the excessive power of mayors was at the heart of political machine critiques in the United States. Transferring their power to councils and managers was the goal of urban reform in the early 1900s (Stewart 1950).

In large metropolises of poor and middle-income countries, the theme of ungovernability is not cyclical nor framed as a question of institutional reform, but prevalent and generalized. Ungovernability in these cases is supposedly due to their excessive sizes, inequalities, urban precarity, fragile political institutions, incapable bureaucracies, and corrupt and clientelist politicians, leading to precarious services, lack of planning, weak governments, policy failures and low policy innovation (Gilbert and Gugler 1982; Reddy and Rao 1985; Auyero 2000; Keefer 2005; Zunino 2006; Gilbert 2013; Oliveros 2016; Novaes 2018). For some, these challenges could be resolved through decentralization (Faguet and Pöschl 2015), increased participation (Goldfrank 2011), accepting these cities' informalities (Roy and Al Sayyad 2004), applying policy solutions produced elsewhere (Campbell 1997), or changing voting behaviors or political elites themselves (Gilbert 2013).

Indeed, the challenges of governing a city such as São Paulo are not small. In 2019, it had a population of 11.8 million inhabitants in a metropolitan region of 39 municipalities with just over 21 million inhabitants (about 10% of the country), roughly the size of metropolitan Mexico City or New York. Although it is the biggest and most important in the country, it has never been Brazil's national capital and was of little importance until the 1930s. Its urban inequalities are striking, with more than 3 million people living in favelas and irregular settlements, as well as extended peripheries with inadequate quality services and terrible accessibility conditions (Caldeira 2016; Marques 2016a; IBGE 2020). A similar scale is present in the daily tasks of policy provision: 20 100 tons of solid waste to collect, 7000 km of streets to sweep, 9.4 million bus journeys to provide (in almost 15 000 buses), around 110 km of traffic jams every afternoon and 2.9 million children to teach (in around 2700 public schools).¹

In order to face these challenges, the city maintains a sizable administrative machine, which in 2018 amounted to approximately 122,600 active employees, most of them undertrained and underpaid. In fact, although its municipal budget is the largest of all Brazilian cities

(corresponding to US\$ 14 billion in 2020), this represents 17% of New York City's expenditure (US\$ 82 billion in 2017) or 45% of what the London boroughs receive (US\$ 30 billion in 2016) for much smaller populations of around 8.5 million inhabitants each.² Institutional responsibilities indeed vary, but municipal responsibilities in Brazil are higher than in the United Kingdom or the United States due to its decentralized federalism. Additionally, political coordination is difficult considering the three tiers of government, as well as the horizontal negotiations between the 39 municipalities of the metropolitan region of São Paulo, not to mention the highly fragmented party system that amounted to no less than 17 political parties on the São Paulo municipal council in 2020.³

However, regardless of the many challenges faced by large-scale metropolises such as São Paulo, they are governed day-to-day, and their governments deliver policies regularly, albeit with quite different qualities, periodicities, and coverage. Additionally, governments very often do not only govern but also produce and change policies in directions that help reduce inequalities, as well as increase government capacities, even if through conflictual, slow, and incremental trajectories. These involve not only State actors, but also several others who – simultaneously – govern the city through policy-specific governance patterns (Le Galès 2011).

This has been the case of São Paulo since the country's return to democracy in the mid-1980s. The consideration of a broad set of urban policies and their programs over almost four decades shows a slow but incremental process of policy change that has allowed a reduction in inequality and a building of State capacity, although with different rhythms by policy area, despite the city's many urban, political and institutional challenges. This path of change becomes even more impressive when we consider that it happened in a relatively politically conservative city.

This book aims to understand these trajectories of change, as well as the processes and actors that produced them. To investigate this, we provide a broad account of the policies and politics that construct, maintain and operate a massive Southern metropolis, covering bus and subway transportation, traffic control, waste collection, development licensing, public housing and large urban projects, in addition to the topics of budgeting, electoral results and government formation. These policies are mainly developed by the municipality of São Paulo, except for the subway, presently developed by a state-level public company. We also examine the large-scale regeneration project Porto Maravilha in Rio de Janeiro. We included former policy among the ones examined here due to its importance to the construction of São Paulo's urban structure, while the latter comprises Brazil's most significant urban renovation project, developed mainly on instruments created in São Paulo (and discussed in a separate chapter). These two cases allow us to understand

better the effects of the variation of political and institutional conditions in the municipality of São Paulo.

The list of policies studied omits some critical State actions usually performed by local governments such as education and healthcare, as well as by state governments such as policing. We took this decision for two reasons. First, we decided to focus on policies in which local governments exert ample discretion, leaving aside policies that are intensely regulated by the federal government through federal policy systems in Brazil as we will see later in this introduction, even if with essential municipal participation. Additionally, we decided to center the book on the policies directly associated with the production of the urban fabric itself, to be able to explore better the relationships between politics and policies on the one hand, and space on the other. As a result, we analyze through the book the main State activities developed worldwide for the construction and operation of cities.

These policies form a heterogeneous group that varies substantially in terms of its general features (regulatory frameworks, service provision and space production), financing (budget, fees, and fares), relations with urban land (creating demand for land or not) and formats of provision (directly implemented, through contracts, concessions, among others). These policies vary considering the actors, institutions and governance patterns that produce them, as well as the legacies that have shaped them. Irrespective of these differences, however, they all share the specificity of being embedded in urban spaces through locations, contiguities, and distances, embedding them in historically constructed spatial configurations. These spatial elements specify urban policies and politics concerning the national level, but also other scales of subnational politics (Le Galès 2020) since they interact with spatialized interests forged by the city's segregation patterns in path-dependent ways. In the case of urban politics, Harold Lasswell's 1936 formulation of politics as the process that defines "who gets what when and how" needs to be complemented with a "where" (Marques 2017). Studying this broad set of policies allows us to investigate their general trajectory in a large metropolis and the effects of their variation simultaneously.

In the following pages of this introduction, we establish the book's main points of departure and discuss its findings in dialogue with existing debates, as well as summarize its chapters. As we shall see, the book represents an interdisciplinary exercise that faces the challenge of connecting arguments and concepts of political science with urban studies. In so doing, we run the risk of being too basic for some readers and utterly alien for others, but this seems a small price to pay for inciting this necessary dialogue.

Urban Politics and Policies in Urban Studies and Political Science

The task of developing a grounded analysis of urban policies is relatively challenging because of the lack of dialogue between political science and urban studies until recently (Judd 2005; Sapotichne et al. 2007) and also because of the emphasis on normative interpretations in the recent comparative literature.

Cities were at the origin of some of the key controversies in political science during the 1950s, including the so-called community power debate, involving Floyd Hunter, Robert Dahl and Charles W. Mills. However, the discipline lost this attention to the urban, and until recently considered cities unimportant, relying on the migration of models for the study of national and international politics to the urban, stretching theory excessively (Giraudy et al. 2019). Urban studies, on the other hand, largely disregarded the political institutions of cities, privileging the study of power in society, outside political institutions, with very few recent exceptions (Bhan 2012). This emphasis stretches a long way back from the Chicago school, passing through the French Marxist sociology of the 1970s, critical geography, Lefebvrian or Foucauldian studies, and the more contemporary Deleuzian and postcolonial approaches. Even urban political economy studies devoted to urban politics – growth machine (Molotch 1976) and urban regime (Stone 1993) theories, for example – incorporated urban political institutions and policy production timidly.

Comparative politics debates on Southern cities in the 1990s and 2000s failed to solve the problem either, since they were polarized between pessimistic accounts of clientelism, patronage and government failures, and optimistic interpretations of decentralization and participation, especially in Latin America.⁴ By different routes, both views have tried to make sense of the unsolved problems of the quality (Diamond and Morlino 2004) of the “third wave” of democracies (Huntington 1991). However, although the analyzed processes are real, the broader consequence of these emphases is a theoretical dichotomization, as if the processes behind the politics and policies of Southern cities (not to mention their heterogeneity) were intrinsically different from those found elsewhere. This involves at least two opposite interpretations of local political mobilizations.

On the one hand, this literature has frequently treated clientelism imprecisely, including any kind of contact between politicians and citizens, individually or in groups, and concerning any State policy, service or public good. In its better versions, an effort has been made to separate: (i) policy

representativeness (when the representative follows her constituency position), (ii) *service representativeness* (when she ensures benefits to it), (iii) *allocation responsiveness* (when she provides particularized benefits), and (iv) *symbolic responsiveness*, or public gestures that create trust and support (Elau and Karps 1977). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Stokes et al. (2013) added further conceptual clarity to the field, differentiating *pork barrel* – when public or club goods are delivered to a constituency without individualization or monitoring – from *clientelism* – when individualized, or club goods are delivered in politically contingent exchanges with the monitoring of voters by brokers. Weitz-Shapiro (2014) added another dimension by exploring variations at the local level in the same country (Argentina) and arguing that it is the combination of intense political competition with large middle classes (reduced poverty) in some places that leads politicians to drop clientelist relations, rather than each element in isolation, as usually considered by the literature.

Despite the significant contributions of this literature, though, by directly associating ground-level political mobilization with distributive electoral politics, it became blind to processes between elections, as well as inside governments. Additionally, the usual normative point of departure of clientelism makes it challenging to distinguish from constituency services, also widely present in Europe and the United States (Dropp and Peskowitz 2012), with very few exceptions (Bussell 2019), as well as to incorporate the role of organizations (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015). Above all, definitions of clientelism tainted by normativity have a particular difficulty in understanding the subtle and dubious strategies found within the relations and political networks that connect political parties with daily urban life in places like Latin America and India (Auyero 2000; Rivadulla 2012; Auerbach 2016; Bussell 2019). We shall return to these processes in Chapter 2 while discussing the role of councilors in territorial political mobilization.

Interestingly enough, other widely disseminated views sustain that these same cities are arenas of decentralization, participation, and activism (Lopez 1996; Chaves and Goldfrank 2004; Holston 2009; Goldfrank 2011; Carrión and Ponce 2015), as well as innovative producers of institutionalized social participation (Cleary 2007; Baiocchi et al. 2011; Carmona 2012). As we shall see later, at least in Brazil's case, decentralization and the construction of participatory institutions have indeed been among the main features of policy reform since redemocratization (Arretche 2012), although mainly in social policies (education, health, social assistance) and much more rarely in urban policies due to the presence of federal incentives for the former (Gurza Lavalle 2018).

Brazil indeed experienced significant reforms in urban policies after redemocratization. These were produced from the bottom up, starting with local government innovations entangled with actors from the urban reform

movement (Marques 2019) at the municipal level in the 1990s, and became national with the creation of the City Statute in 2001 and the Ministry of Cities in 2003 (Rolnik 2009; Klintowitz 2015). Reforms included new policy solutions with enlarged social participation, although more rarely than in social policies. The wide dissemination of analyses on Participatory Budgeting experiences led the international literature to consider these as a predominant and encompassing format of urban policy deliberation in Brazilian cities. However, while policy solutions spread in the country, these participatory arenas were rarer and less effective in budget allocation and policy formulation than considered by the first glance of the literature.

Only recently a new generation of studies in political science has been “bringing the city back in” to urban political institutions (Post 2019), departing both from a comparative ontology and from empirically grounded perspectives remote from normative premises. These include studies on the historical convergence of reform and political machine strategies in the United States (Trounstine 2009b), the diversification of machine politics in competitive environments in Bogotá, Naples and Chicago (Pasotti 2010b), differences in sanitation policy reforms in light of bureaucratic insulation and participation in Mexico (Herrera 2017) or the different local embeddedness of private providers in Argentina (Post 2014), the redistributive activism of judicial agents in São Paulo policies (Coslowsky 2016), the regressive effects of the judiciary in evictions in India (Bhan 2012), the role of local networks in the access to housing policies in Africa (Paller 2015) or in rooting party mobilization and policy production in India (Auerbach 2016, 2017). Even closer to the approach taken by this book, recent studies have focused on the governance of several policies in Mexico City (Ugalde and Le Galès 2017), Paris (Le Galès 2020) and Milan (Andreotti 2019).

Therefore, a fortunate contemporary convergence is identifiable, potentially enhancing our understanding of how city politics and policies work worldwide. While urban studies were expanding their comparativism (Robinson 2011), comparative political science has been rediscovering subnational politics (Giraudy et al. 2019). This book intends to contribute to this ongoing debate while constructing bridges between these fields at the same time as emphasizing the specificity of city politics and policies within subnational politics.

City Studies, International Comparisons, and Urban Theories

This book is a city monograph with nested comparisons between policy sectors mainly within this city. However, it departs from a comparative ontology and forms part of a broader international comparison between Paris,

London, Mexico City, Milan, and São Paulo.⁵ The production of city comparisons has moved to the forefront of contemporary international debates (Robinson 2011), attaining general acceptance among urban scholars. Essential agreements were also reached about the importance of avoiding the imposition of theoretical models produced solely from cases in the Global North (Scott 2012). The consequences of comparisons for theory production, however, remain contested, leading to polarized debates between generalizations in urban theory (Scott and Storper 2015) and about postcolonial ontologies (Roy 2016).

In an unusual convergence, political science has also been revitalizing its approach to comparisons. Nation-state comparisons are a classic subject of studies in comparative politics (Evans et al. 1985; Levitsky and Roberts 2011) and methods (Tilly 1992; Ragin 1987). The field has also compared cities for a long time (Ruchelman 1969; Ferman 1985), as well as subnational variations more recently (Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Lately, however, comparisons between multi-scales in different countries (Pasotti 2010b; Holland 2018a) have also been incorporated in what Giraudy et al. (2019) call subnational research (SNR) and Sellers (2019) transnational comparisons. In this case, variations in national features may be simultaneously analyzed with local processes and with the connections between national and subnational politics (Sellers and Kwak 2010), renovating our models about political processes and avoiding *theory stretching* (Giraudy et al. 2019).

Reviewing the positions of these debates lies way beyond the scope of this introduction, but it is important to state our substantive point of departure vis-à-vis comparisons and theory building, to make clear our claims of generalization from São Paulo.

This book adopts a one city-many-policies design, studying one of the most important megacities in the world with democratic institutions recently consolidated within a federalist and highly unequal late-industrialized country. In this sense, although all these features are present in many other places, their combination is unique. Consequently, we by no means consider São Paulo representative of Southern cities or metropolises, nor its political institutions as examples of local governments. However, our subject – urban politics and policies – mainly involves the same types of actors and processes present everywhere, even if produced by different historical processes and embedded in diverse contexts. As in any large metropolis, State and non-State actors such as politicians, political parties, bureaucracies, private companies and community organizations interact strategically to make their interests prevail and to influence policies. Since these actors occupy homologous positions in political relations worldwide, it is reasonable to deduce that their interests have the same natures. Similarly, institutions (and policies themselves)

frame politics and influence behavior as in any other city. These commonalities could lead us to search for a universalizing logic of theory building, or at least a variation-finding one (Tilly 1992), moving toward the production of one single generalizable theory of urban politics.

On the other hand, it is also true that these actors, institutions and processes have quite different features and appear in varying combinations due to the specific historical processes that produced their States, societies and cities. Radicalizing the argument, for example, large cities of the North are studied with a focus on planning, technical capacities and substantive agendas of strong political parties. At the same time, Southern metropolises are usually characterized by the literature in terms of corruption in State contracts, the prevalence of clientelism, the absence of party ideology, or, contradictorily, by vivid civil society dynamics. These differences could persuade us to accept the presence of ontological differences, making knowledge produced from the South substantively different from the kinds produced elsewhere. This would mean that theories have merely regional validity, or, in a more radical version, that theorization is impossible.

We believe that both these epistemological positions are partly right (and wrong). There are commonalities in processes and actors, but also particularities that must be considered. Many features of Southern cities indeed challenge traditional interpretations, but it is also true that what happens in the former has the same nature of what happens anywhere. This implies that such differences are not ontological. At least for urban politics and policies, the incorporation of Southern cities as 'normal' cases – that is, capable of being understood by mobilizing the same elements as other cities – brings into consideration the full variation of the phenomenon in question (local institutions), thus contributing to substantially broader theories, but not substantively different ones.

This book sets out, then, from the understanding that comparisons will not lead to a theory of general validity, but to elements and processes that explain specific classes of cases through their (historically constructed) combination. In this case, the search for generalization is based not only on multiple conjunctural causations (Ragin 1987) in which several causal mechanisms operate together but especially on plural causality (Pickvance 2001) in which groups of causal mechanisms operate differently in different subclasses of subjects. The challenge becomes how to explain not only variation (considering general claims) but more particularly the variation in the causal mechanisms themselves between groups of cases.

This task calls not just for comparisons in general but for detailed comparisons of widely different settings, such as between Southern and Northern metropolises. Similarly, this comparative goal can only be achieved from

detailed knowledge of the processes and actors involved, as well as their order and combination, which requires dense case study designs (Ragin 1987). By combining these features, our analysis intends not only to explain the trajectory of urban policies in São Paulo – and especially the construction of redistributive policies – but also to elaborate an analytical framework with actors, processes and governance patterns that can be used, tested and expanded in other large metropolises worldwide.

Explaining Urban Policy Change and Capacity Building in São Paulo

When we mention policy changes, the reader may call to mind the need for cities to have creative and innovative policy (and technical) solutions, such as light railways, cable cars, advanced public lighting, computerized traffic control, dedicated corridors, among others. The idea that technological developments are the key to resolving city problems is widely diffused. However, public policy studies have already demonstrated that while good solutions are essential, public policies are in fact about the production and delivery of services, goods and actions. From this point of view, great ideas for policy designs and solutions are only effective if they reach their users, which depends on the local configurations of actors and resources, as well as on the processes that produce policies. This is not to say that inventive policy solutions are not necessary, both in terms of policy products and concerning delivery structures and strategies. Therefore, solutions tend to travel badly and must be both appropriate, in the sense of fitting the situations at hand, and appropriated by the processes and actors involved. Policy change, in this sense, does not equal new policy solutions, although it may include them, as was the case of many policies in São Paulo. In all situations, however, they were accompanied by and/or embedded in public policy programs and delivered through policy processes. Unfortunately, these are much more difficult to produce and deliver than merely technical solutions and depend on the government and the coordination of multiple processes and actors.

Against the expectations of many, this book shows that São Paulo has indeed been governed since the return to democracy in Brazil, regardless of all its problems. More importantly, our cases show a slow trajectory of conflictual but incremental expansion of services and policies, along with an increase in their quality and government capacities over time, even though deep and durable inequalities remain. This incrementalism was punctuated several times by political decisions and conflicts that changed rhythms and directions of policy, and, more rarely, produced some reversals. Furthermore, different

policies followed different paces, determined by their sectoral dynamics and actors, as well as their centralities within political agendas. Despite localized setbacks, however, the general pattern has been toward the creation of innovative redistributive policies with more and better services and regulation, as well as broader social participation. This is not to say that policies in the city are now accessible and of good quality to all citizens, but they have changed in positive directions across a broad set of policy fields. This outcome is especially intriguing since São Paulo is far from being a progressive city, whether measured by its electorate or by its political elites. In fact, since the return to democracy, mayoral elections have been won three times by the right, three times by the center-right and three times by the left, while council elections have always tended to favor right and center-right parties. Center-right or right-wing candidates also prevailed in the city in the most recent national elections.

A combination of political competition and policy production processes explain São Paulo's incremental trajectory of policy change. Each of these processes alone would probably lead to very different results. The comparative literature suggests that political competition alone may lead to a race to the bottom of clientelist practices (Herrera 2017), while, despite the hopes of many authors, civil society activism alone may produce visible mobilizations but rarely produces policy change without the necessary embeddedness in policy processes (Banaszak 2010; Abers 2019; Gurza Lavallo et al. 2019). On the other hand, the authoritarian experiences in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s confirm that strong and insulated State actors by themselves may imply technocratic reasoning and bureaucratic capture. It was the combination of these features that led policies in São Paulo toward incremental progressivism.

Political competition triggered two combined mechanisms that explain the actions and strategies of mayors and other local elite political actors: namely, partisan politics (Hubber and Stephens 2013) and median voter (Meltzer and Richard 1981) mechanisms. However, policies were produced and delivered in processes that involved local agencies, bureaucrats, private contractors and activists in different combinations according to policy. This foregrounds processes and feedback mechanisms not foreseen by traditional policy theories (Kingdom 1984; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) to explain different policy rhythms and resilience. It is worth detailing each of these mechanisms before discussing the actors and processes involved in them in the next section.

Partisan politics theory suggests that increases in redistributive policies and State capacities under democracies usually occur during left-wing governments due to their ideology (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Hubber and

Stephens 2013). This would explain the development of social and redistributive policies and the decline in inequality in Latin America during the so-called “pink tide” in the 2000s. Similar results were found for urban policies in the United States by Hajnal and Trounstein (2017) and Einstein and Glick (2018) and road infrastructure policies in São Paulo by Marques (2003).

We define redistributive urban policies as those that reduce inequalities in access to services and amenities, improve service quality, and enhance the wellbeing of the poor. Obviously, financial and contributory (or not) features of policies influence their degrees of redistribution, but these go far beyond economic factors alone. Therefore, it is the overall design and functioning of policies that define their redistributive features. In mobility policies, for example, bus fare prices are essential, but the existence of smart cards is even more central since these allow multiple journeys with just a single fare or fares, irrespective of the traveled distance. Likewise, dedicated bus lanes or corridors can reduce the otherwise absurd travel times to segregated poor peripheries. Sometimes expanding services and improving quality are indissociable, but in other cases, these may advance separately or even at the expense of each other.

The presence of redistributive policies under specific governments clearly challenges classic public choice interpretations (Peterson 1982), which maintained that mayors would systematically seek to promote growth and avoid redistributive policies, in a fortunate convergence with political economy growth machine predictions (Molotch 1976). The lack of choices in local politics, however, has already been confronted by the urban regime and governance typologies that anticipated the existence of several types of regime, including redistributive (Stone 1993; Pierre 2011), depending on the composition of the electorate, local bureaucracies, and political conjunctures.

The policies we analyze here confirm the relevance of local politics, showing that redistributive policy changes, especially the more conflictive ones, mainly occurred under left-wing administrations. Also in line with this theory, center governments produced a much lower but intermediary number of redistributive programs, while right-wing administrations an almost negligible amount. Additionally, to be able to produce and implement these policies, left-wing governments enlarged State capacities, creating reinforcement mechanisms in favor of these policies, as we discuss later.

On the other hand, median voter theory predicts that in democratic countries where most of the population is poor, or, put more technically, where median voter income is below the average income, all politicians will try to please poor voters, since they constitute the majority (Meltzer and Richard 1981). Both left and right-wing administrations would converge,

therefore, on producing redistributive policies, improving their quality, or at least avoiding policies that could harm these voters.⁶ Obviously, this convergence represents a tendency, and social mobilization and political pressure from above or below can reduce or intensify this tendency (Fairfield and Garay 2017), at the same time that institutional and economic constraints may reinforce this convergence independently of political ideology (Pasotti 2010a), such as balancing the budget or providing poor relief policies during periods of profound economic and social crisis, respectively.

In São Paulo, politicians and parties of different ideologies⁷ fiercely competed in majoritarian elections over an electorate mostly composed of low and mid-low income voters, not to mention the pressures applied by social movements, especially those targeting housing and transportation. Consistently with median voter predictions, therefore, all governments tended to maintain policies that reduce urban inequalities (although still with higher intensity among the left), especially in less conflictive policy areas, such as expanding infrastructure to peripheral spaces, mostly inhabited by the poor due to urban segregation.

Some redistributive policy changes were more resilient, however, and survived under right-wing administrations, while others were discontinued or severely reduced. The policies that became a permanent item on the agenda include, for example, public transportation innovations and slum upgrading, while discontinued policies include mainly those initiatives that impact land values, such as active planning, redistributive land use, and social housing for rent. These different trajectories are explained not only by the actors involved but also by the distinct policy processes that produced them.

However, before discussing the policies themselves, it is useful to begin with the distinction between easy and hard redistribution made by Holland and Schneider (2017). This concept sought to explain the limits of the “pink tide” in Latin America in the 2000s, distinguishing widely expanded non-contributory social benefits (easy) from much rarer labor decommodification policies (hard). In urban contexts, it is reasonable to consider hard redistribution policies as those that influence land values (and thus the wealth of land and homeowners, as well as developers), create zero-sum games with the well-being of elites and the rich, or actively interfere in the interests of private service providers. Easy redistribution involves policies that improve the quality of life of the poor and their access to services but without impacting the wealth of the rich. The case of São Paulo suggests that easy distribution policies may be implemented under any government (although they are usually also first developed under left-wing administrations), while hard distribution only happens during left-wing governments.⁸

With this distinction in mind, we can return to policy production processes. Once decisions are made, policies must be produced and delivered, which brings bureaucrats, private contractors and policy community actors to center-stage. These actors interact with politicians within policy-specific governance patterns (Le Galès 2011) and are involved in the production and operation of all policies, irrespective of producing easy or hard redistribution.

Concerning median voter mechanisms, once easy redistribution policies are in place, they tend to continue regardless of changes to who controls the executive.⁹ The production of hard redistributive policies, however, shows a different trajectory. These policies are interrupted or sharply reduced during right-wing administrations, but they do not die completely, showing different degrees of resilience. Instead, they enter a kind of latency period and may be reanimated later, after the next government swing. This process is not entirely compatible with current agenda-setting theories, which are produced by advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) or by combinations of politics, problems and solution streams aligned by political leaders (Kingdom 1984). It is true that, as these theories predict, São Paulo's policies involved several political actors and groups strategically defending their interests and ideas, surrounded by institutions and historical legacies, as well as dealing with socially constructed problems and mobilizing existing solutions. However, traditional agenda theories suggest that policies that enter the agenda have "won" and tend to stay (like easy redistribution initiatives). In contrast, our cases show that many others (hard redistribution) follow a winding trajectory, shrinking or being discontinued, entering latency and being reanimated in the next friendly government.

These latencies and latter reanimations were made possible because the memory and organizational/operational capacities of these policies remained within the policy community, migrating inside and outside the State in the hands of bureaucrats, but also activists, academics and professionals who entered and left government. By policy communities, we mean the relational and issue-based fields in which the actors of a policy sector interact (Marques 2003) beyond State and societal borders (Sellers 2010), not cohesive and unified actors amalgamated through collective action. In many cases, it is difficult to draw a hard line between State and society since actors circulate between many roles within these communities (Banaszak 2010; Abers 2019), reflecting the proximity between the urban reform movement and technicians in many municipalities. In the case of São Paulo, this has been the most critical influence/presence of civil society actors in policy production, participating in essential feedback mechanisms of policy change that connected State capacity building and policy production in non-Weberian

ways (Sellers 2010). The former process empowered actors central to the resilience of the latter, allowing policies to be reanimated from latency in subsequent governments.

However, these processes worked differently according to governance patterns, multiplying the variations between policy sectors. Several policy-specific elements help to explain different rhythms and resiliences that reinforce or hamper latency. The presence of actors and finance from higher levels – both federal and international – create more resilience and make the return from latency easier, along with policy institutionalization (in laws, administrative procedures and organizational structures). Highly capacitated bureaucracies and conditions of institutional insulation also contribute to resilience. The effect of policy instruments works along the same lines, as micro-institutions that operationalize policies and depoliticize implementation once in progress, regardless of their intrinsically political character, sustaining the policy's logic even in the absence of concrete actors (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). One of the most critical elements to reinforce resilience and allow reanimation from latency, however, is the fit (Skocpol 1992) and embeddedness of policy actors in the bureaucracy and society, mainly in civil society organizations and academic circles. Finally, policies that hurt the interests of elite actors, as well as those of service providers, tend to be less resilient, as programs that produce hard redistribution. As we shall see in the following chapters, these processes operate differently by policy area, contributing to various degrees of resilience and different rhythms into and out of latency.

Although the chapters will develop a detailed account of policy changes, Table I.1 below summarizes the trajectories of the most relevant 30 urban redistributive programs.¹⁰ Each line represents a program within the studied policies, indicating their starting moments, latencies and reanimations through time, as well as the adopted intensities for their implementation (shown in grayscale). Columns represent governments, except for the last two, which classify the initiatives in terms of the types of redistribution (easy or hard) and trajectories (oscillated, came to stay or failed).

We can not only see that many redistributive programs were developed, but also that these became increasingly common as time passed. Among the policies, bus and waste collection services form the more significant proportions of recent changes, both areas consolidating changes that would remain in place for at least four administrations. Housing was the policy with the most significant number of innovations shifting back and forth from latency, while the same trajectory also characterizes traffic control and development regulation. Urban renewal presents increasing stability over recent years,

TABLE I.1 Trajectories of redistributive policy changes.

Policies and programs	Administrations (Mayors, classified by ideological block - Left; Centre-Right; Right)										Easy or Hard	Trajectory	
	Covas (CR)	Jania (R)	Erundina (L)	Maluf (R)	Pitta (R)	Suplicy (L)	Serra (CR)	Kassab (CR)	Haddad (L)				
Traffic control												H	oscilated
												H	came to stay
Buses												E	came to stay
												H	oscilated
												H	oscilated
												H	oscilated
												E	came to stay
												E	came to stay
												H	oscilated
Waste management												E	came to stay
												H	came to stay
												E	came to stay
												H	oscilated
												H	failed
Housing												E	came to stay
												H	failed
												E	came to stay
												E	came to stay
												H	oscilated
												H	oscilated
												H	oscilated



Development regulation	better regulation/less corruption	Administrations (Governors, classified by ideological block - Left; Centre-Right; Right)										oscilated				
		Montoro (CR)	Quêrcia (CR)	Fleury (CR)	Covas (CR)	Covas (CR)	Alekmin (CR)	Serra (CR)	Alekmin (CR)	Alekmin (CR)	Alekmin (CR)					
Urban renewal O/UO	include social housing													H	came to stay	
	heterogeneous perimeters														E	came to stay
	extract larger surpluses														H	came to stay
	more participation														H	oscilated
Policies and programs																
Subway (State level policy)	single fare (not by distance)														E	came to stay
	build new lines to peripheries														H	oscilated
	smart card (integration)														E	came to stay
	creation of free passes														E	came to stay

Intensity of implementation:  Strong  Medium  Weak  inexistant

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associated with the learning process and the institutional consolidation of its main instrument. The subway, the only state-level policy on the table, also presents changes, sometimes connected to municipal changes (and vice-versa). Free passes, for example, were either produced by legislative initiatives (by the municipal council or the state legislature) or introduced following their establishment on municipal buses (and the other way around), as was the case of the integrated smart card. In any case, the main redistributive policy change in the subway was the construction of new lines to peripheries, which tended to be rare.

Although these patterns will undoubtedly become more evident throughout the chapters, the table provides a first glimpse of essential regularities. Some preliminary caution is necessary, however, to make the cell of the table more easily comparable. Although the table includes 30 programs, the comparison becomes more direct if we just consider municipal programs and disregard those that existed almost always (single bus fares and construction of new housing units) as well as the one that existed only in one government (the creation of a waste collection tax), reducing the universe to 24 programs. Since the municipal administration includes the same number of left-wing, center-right, and right-wing municipal governments (three each), simple comparisons are already illustrative of the incidence of political ideology.¹¹ As predicted by partisan politics theories, most changes in municipal policies started and/or were reanimated in left-wing administrations: 79% of the programs, while 15% of the programs started or restarted in centre-right governments and just 7% of them in right-wing governments, considering all intensities of implementation.¹²

However, when municipal programs were already underway, the difference between governments of different ideologies did not disappear but was sharply reduced. Among the 131 urban redistributive programs implemented by São Paulo's municipal governments since the return to democracy with any intensity, 67 (51%) occurred in left-wing governments, compared to 38 (29%) in center-right and 26 (20%) in right-wing administrations. In this case, then, even though the left is still more prone to develop redistributive policies,¹³ the center-right and the right have also done their part. These proportions change only slightly if we include the subway (governed all the time by the center-right) or consider other intensities of implementation. Median voter mechanisms explain this since, given the composition of the São Paulo electorate, politicians from all ideologies try at least to avoid harming the interests of the poor and the lower middle classes. The effects of policy resilience reinforce this pattern, considering policy institutionalization and the participation of external actors.

On the other hand, the policy trajectories discussed in the following chapters suggest that during center-right and right-wing administrations, redistribution policies are usually sharply reduced or go into latency to be reanimated under the next left-wing government. In fact, during the period, 35 municipal programs were interrupted or strongly reduced,¹⁴ 23 of them in right-wing governments and 12 with the shift to center-right administrations and none to left-wing administrations. Among the interruptions, 21 impacted hard redistribution programs, while just 14 easy redistribution programs were affected. In both cases, right-wing governments interrupted more programs, 13 hard and 10 easy redistribution ones.

There is also a strong association between easy redistribution and stable trajectories (13 of the 17 stable trajectories) and between hard redistribution and oscillating trajectories (11 of the 12 oscillating trajectories and the two failures).¹⁵ There is, therefore, an association between the kind of redistribution involved and policy resilience. Table I.2 at the end of this introduction provides essential documentation of these programs, but the chapters will discuss them in detail.

Governance and Political Actors Governing São Paulo

These changes characterize the trajectory of incremental progressivism in São Paulo over the last 30 years. This trajectory was produced by the actions, strategies, and interactions of political actors and institutions already studied by both political science and urban studies. In this section, we return to these elements and discuss how they participate in the aforementioned political competition and policy production mechanisms, organizing the analytical framework used throughout the book's chapters. As already mentioned, this framework is of potential use to studies of other contexts, since these actors and institutions are present in many policy sectors and cities, albeit with diverse characteristics and in distinct configurations.

Given precisely this variability, a useful analytical point of departure is the idea of governance patterns (Pierre 2011). As is widely known, the concept of governance is highly polysemic (Stoker 1998; Rhodes 2007), but if well defined, it can help us frame the different configurations of State and non-State actors connected by diverse types of ties (formal and informal, legal and illegal) and surrounded by institutions responsible for the policymaking processes. In a broad sense, this allows a decoupling between who governs what and who governs what the government does not govern (Le Galès 2011). In this sense, different governance patterns can coexist and even contradict

one another in policy areas, meaning that there is no sense in looking for an all-encompassing logic of governance in a metropolis of such complexity. Technically, depending on the complexity of the situation, network analysis techniques may help map the relational tissue of the State that lies behind governance patterns (Marques 2012). There are at least four groups of actors within these governance patterns: politicians, bureaucracies/State agencies, contractors, and civil society organizations.

Politicians have been at the center of urban politics since the pluralist and elitist debate on community power in the 1950s. They are the most visible actors and are supposedly those behind the main policy decisions. As we discuss in Chapter 1, local political leaders participate in critical decisions and have individual characteristics, but are grounded in political contexts and relational settings. Their decisions reflect their general interest in winning and holding office, but also express their support for different political projects, as sustained by partisan politics theory. Regardless of these projects, they all depend on elections, making them subject to median voter mechanisms and the so-called electoral connection, their constituencies and distributive politics (Fiorina 1989; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). This is even stronger locally than in national politics since the higher tiers of local administrations are more exposed politically to citizens, who have known spatialized interests.

Consequently, local politicians face higher costs for conflictive policies, increasing their care and reliance on geographically-bounded constituencies. Local politicians thus try even harder to create connections with the executive and appoint their political brokers to crucial positions (Kuschnir 2000), as well as controlling pork-barrel distribution through works and services (Rocha and Silva 2017). This reinforces the spatial voting patterns of municipal elections present even in countries like Brazil with proportional representation in large size districts (Limongi and Mesquita 2011). On the other hand, mayors and policymakers rely on local politicians to politically mobilize their territories for policy delivery, not only in elections but during governments too, as we discuss in Chapter 2. All these elements mark the specificities of urban politics concerning other levels of subnational politics.

The second type of actor is directly associated with policy production and was already studied by a vast neo-institutionalist literature: bureaucracies, agencies, their structures, but also their fit in society (Evans et al. 1985; Skocpol 1992). They always participate in policy production but are far from homogeneous. They tend to be highly heterogeneous considering their position within the State and their views about their work and policies, very often in connection with groups in society. Different parts of bureaucracies, therefore, are commonly engaged in political disputes within and around the State,

supporting and advocating different policies. In many cases, since local policy cycles tend to be closer to implementation, street-level agents become empowered. Important feedback mechanisms are created between institutions, capacity building, and policy production, contributing to resilience but also helping explain the difference in policy latency from policy to policy. As already mentioned, this also involves policy institutionalization, the multiple connections between State actors and societal groups, and policy instruments.

The third set of actors includes the many private providers of services, equipment, and management operations that construct and manage the city day-to-day. This group includes companies that differ substantially in terms of their valorization processes and their relations with the State and with urban space, although they tend to be considered generically by many authors. At least four entirely different types of companies need to be differentiated, including building companies (physically constructing buildings and infrastructures), development firms (developing new buildings and neighborhoods), urban service contractors (providing urban services) and management and consulting firms (hired for policy design and management itself). Each of these types of companies depends on urban space in different ways for their production processes and also relate differently to the State (selling to it or just being regulated by it) and under diverse formats (through localized or broad contracts, concessions, public-private partnerships [PPPs], among other formats). All these elements lead to truly diverse political strategies, usually not accounted for by the literature (Marques 2016b). They contribute to policy resilience since they also have vested interests in the continuity of the policies they produce. On the other hand, especially in services, actions that strongly hurt their interests tend to be less resilient and face more difficulties in being reanimated from latency.

The fourth group of actors, also extremely heterogeneous, comprises civil society organizations and actors. In Brazil, urban social movements were very significant during redemocratization, then declined in the 1990s and 2000s, and returned to the public arena in the June 2013 protests, especially during their first phase, focused on transportation demands (Alonso and Mische 2017). Since the 1990s, however, civil society organizations more broadly have been influencing public policies in new participatory institutions, although less so in urban policies (Gurza Lavallo 2018). As already mentioned, civil society actors also played an essential role in many of São Paulo's policies during their production processes, not just advocating, but also safeguarding policy alternatives in a latent state during some governments in order to reanimate them later. In these cases, these actors had many connections with bureaucracies, policymakers and certain political parties,

and the more embedded policies tended to be those more affected. So while their importance in a more traditional social movement format of challenging the State has been reduced, their political importance remains very high, albeit mainly within policy sectors and in association with policy production.

The City and Local Brazilian Institutions

This book analyses urban policies and politics in São Paulo. We are not centrally concerned with the main social, economic, and spatial characteristics of the city and their contemporary transformations, something we already analyzed in detail recently in another book (Marques 2016a). That book and the present one complement each other, creating a broad picture of the social, spatial, and political changes of the city since the return to democracy.

It is essential to present, however, some necessary information about Brazilian municipalities and São Paulo, as well as some short working definitions of the elements under analysis. Urban policies are understood here as the State in action (Jobert and Muller 1987) in what concerns primarily the production of the urban fabric – the physical and social space of the city – as well as the production of urban sociability. Urban politics, on the other hand, is defined as the conflicts, alliances, strategies, and mobilizations for and around urban policies, and the institutions that produce them and regulate political conflicts in the city.

Some doubt exists over defining the urban as either “local,” “of the city” or “municipal,” although the former may also include state-level processes and the latter is too restrictive, excluding supramunicipal actions and processes. This imprecision is constitutive of the subject at hand, and the urban in this case is not merely a matter of scale, although it also encompasses elements of scale. Cities are both agglomerations and administrative jurisdictions (Post 2019) but incorporate actions and processes from other scales of governments (Le Galès 2020) whenever relevant.

However, most of the policies analyzed in this book are the responsibility of the municipal government of São Paulo. They are also, however, influenced by actions at other levels of the country’s federal structure. The Brazilian Constitution recognizes municipalities as the third level of government, giving them specific policy responsibilities such as urban planning, licensing for buildings and settlements, intraurban transportation, local parks and sanitation (mostly conceded to state-level public companies). Metropolitan railways, subways, and environmental control are state-level policies, and there are no metropolitan-level government structures. Policing is divided between the

states and the federal government, while in housing, education, health, and social assistance, all levels of government contribute in some form. This shows the importance of federalism in Brazil, especially considering the policy systems created since the 1990s, combining centralization and decentralization (Arretche 2012). In some policy sectors, institutionalized social participation has played an important role, although more rarely in urban policies (Gurza Lavallo 2018). Finally, municipalities follow one single institutional format, as will be detailed through a comparative analysis in Chapter 1. They are governed by mayors and municipal councils, directly elected for four-year terms since the mid-1980s.¹⁶ Municipalities have access to a reasonable proportion of the nation's public budget, although, as we shall see in Chapter 3, only a small portion is available for discretionary allocation.

In 2010, the metropolitan region of São Paulo was home to more than 20 million inhabitants. Like other Latin American metropolises, the city was expanded by the large-scale migration of poor people from less developed regions of the country during the decades of intense industrialization between the 1940s and the 1980s. Housing policies were fragile and selective, and in fact, the State did not provide even primary urbanization conditions for this population, who had to develop several types of precarious housing solutions to settle in the city. Between 1964 and 1985, the country was under authoritarian military rule with various regressive social effects. The redemocratization process was completed only in 1988 with the promulgation of a new, democratic constitution.

São Paulo's resulting urban structure was characterized until the 1980s by a well-equipped central region, where the elites lived and circulated and where opportunities were concentrated, and increasingly precarious peripheries, where most of the population lived, typically in self-built houses located in precarious settlements with a meager presence of State policies and equipment. The local literature (Kowarick 1979) analyzed classically these trajectories that became known internationally as informal housing and peripheral urbanization (Caldeira 2016). Migration processes and urban growth have both substantially reduced since the 1980s and essential political and economic transformations have been changing these spaces in the last decades. Formal housing market agents have expanded their production to these spaces (Hoyle 2016), made viable by the reduction in inequality occurring until 2015 (Arretche 2018), while wealthy residential enclaves were produced in these same peripheral areas (Caldeira 2000). The resulting segregation patterns, albeit transformed, still clearly present the durable superposition of class and racial inequalities in space (França 2016). Finally, the State became increasingly present in peripheries, providing infrastructure, services and policies, although usually of lower quality

(Marques 2016a). A substantial part of these transformations was caused by the policies analyzed in the chapters of this book.

The Book

This book is organized in 3 parts and 11 chapters, plus this introduction and the conclusion. The first part discusses urban politics, with a chapter on the executive, a second on the council and a third on the municipal budget. Parts II and III discuss urban policies and the governance of each policy area, considering various actors, capacity building, policy instruments and institutions. Part II is devoted to urban services, while Part III investigates housing and land policies. In the end, the conclusion compares the findings and discusses theoretical lessons. The chapters are summarized below.

Chapter 1 by Eduardo Marques and Telma Hoyer introduces the political background of the period by discussing and comparing municipal governments, mayors and administrations. The period was marked by substantial swings in local government, with three governments of the left, two of the center-right and another three of the right. The chapter summarizes the political environments and the characteristics of each government since the mid-1980s.

In the second chapter, Eduardo Marques and Telma Hoyer complement the background history through a discussion of government formation, the council and executive-legislative relations. Electoral results specify the formation of support coalitions under the influence of Brazilian multipartyism and coalition presidentialism. Locally, this leads to the formation of government and opposition blocks in which mayors started with just plurality support but in almost all cases created comfortable coalitions on the council. Coalition formation, however, came at the cost of pork-barrel expenditures, changing policies for special interests and primarily appointing political brokers to government positions. On the other hand, local councilors were key political mobilizers for mayors through their territorialized political machines, during elections but also throughout government mandates.

Chapter 3, written by Ursula Peres, studies the political economy of the public budget that frames policy production. The chapter highlights the key elements of its governance, including formal and informal rules, relevant actors, decision levels and institutions, especially after recent changes in federal rules. The chapter situates Brazilian local public finances comparatively and analyses the São Paulo budget from the early 2000s to 2015. The results show a highly rigid budget with a stable spatial distribution that crystallizes past social struggles and incentivizes incrementalism as a policy change strategy, at the same time as it reduces the discretionary decisions for

redistributive policies. Regardless of the budget's size, this rigidity creates conflicts, as well as incentives to search for less constrained resources, such as those provided by large projects, as will be seen in Chapters 10 and 11.

The second part of the book focuses on the primary urban services delivered through contracts or concessions with private companies such as mobility and waste management. For historical reasons, mobility policies in São Paulo are divided among several agencies, both municipal (buses and traffic control) and state-owned (a public subway company), while successive municipal institutions managed waste collection.

In Chapter 4, Carolina Requena studies traffic control policies since the 1970s. She argues that the insulation of the municipal traffic agency during its foundation period allowed it to establish and maintain an automobile priority paradigm that negatively impacted the performance of collective road transportation, run by a historically under-empowered bureaucracy. This paradigm was consistent with mayoral priorities during the military period but became increasingly outdated under democracy. Recent administrations have confronted the highly regressive automobile paradigm and induced the traffic and bus control bureaucracies to interact and change, but not without intense intra- and inter-organizational conflicts, giving rise to redistributive mobility policies that benefited mainly the poor, the majority of users of public transportation.

Bus services are the subject of Chapter 5 by Marcos Campos. This policy is a municipal responsibility and has been assumed by private companies under contract or concession since the 1950s, with secondary direct public participation. The chapter focuses on the system's transformations since the 1980s, when private providers were increasingly regulated by a series of bureaucratic objects and public policy instruments. Operating as material references for representations of transported passengers and bus fare revenues, objects such as smart cards and GPS instruments occupy a central position in regulation. The main changes in redistributive policy occurred under left-wing administrations, although sometimes using previous instruments created with other aims by right-wing governments. The accumulation of these instruments over time reduced opacity and strengthened regulatory capacities, complementing the change of mobility paradigms mentioned earlier, with significant redistributive effects.

In Chapter 6, Daniela Costanzo analyses the governance patterns present in the São Paulo subway since the 1970s, a policy that became exclusively controlled by the state government. Owing to its very high investments, the availability of federal and international resources has always been the critical factor for this sector. Several different periods were identified, with massive federal and international investments in the 1970s, a decline in investments

and technical capacities in the 1980s, and the entry of new (private) actors in the 1990s, not only as traditional consultants and builders, but also as partners in PPPs for construction and, more recently, operation. The same center-right coalition controlled the state executive in an environment of low political competition during this period. The few redistributive decisions concerning tariffs and line construction in peripheral areas were decided in relatively closed processes involving politicians, bureaucrats, and private companies, resulting in the low presence of redistributive programs and actions.

Chapter 7 concludes the study of services, where Samuel Ralize investigates the governance of waste management, with particular focus on its recent institutional reforms. The chapter characterizes the sector, summarizes its history and subsequently explores its institutional arrangements and private contractors. Through time, the municipality ceded the operation of services to increasingly more dominant private companies, but at the same time sought to strengthen its regulatory capacities by creating a concession model in which companies are forced to take more risks and make investments. The service is not charged directly, and redistribution may occur through service availability and quality, both heavily influenced by regulation. In general, state capacities and regulatory instruments were initiated under left-wing administrations, although also strengthened during right-wing governments, suffering the effects of differences in bureaucratic insulation and the scrutiny of controlling agencies.

The third part of the book discusses housing and land policies. In both cases, issues associated with the increase of land values through State actions are prominent, mobilizing the spatialized interests of developers, landowners, and local citizens. These policies have also mobilized social movements in the city.

Chapter 8, written by Eduardo Marques and Magaly Pulhez, discusses housing policies. The chapter shows a slow but noticeable diversification of housing policy solutions in the city, in part associated with the gradual consolidation of the urban reform agenda nationally. In a process that cuts across different governments, some programs (easy redistribution) became consolidated alternatives to the traditional construction of new units for homeownership in peripheries, particularly in situ slum upgrading and regularization of irregular settlements. At the same time, social housing in central areas, social rent and active planning policies (hard redistribution) were much more present in left-wing governments. This trajectory was marked by the slow accumulation of solutions, sometimes in latency, by actors within the community cutting across State and societal boundaries.

In Chapter 9, Telma Hoyler analyses the interactions between developers and public authorities, centered on the approval of development projects. The chapter identifies a recent change in land use approval in São Paulo,

moving from an arrangement based predominantly on corruption to an interactive arrangement in which developers became more competitive (and empowered). At the same time, the State has also expanded its potential capacities to regulate. This institutional reform, implemented by a left-wing administration, reduced information asymmetry to the State while providing a faster and more predictable approval process. Instead of structural capture, this trajectory represented the induction of governmental capacities by the private sector by placing the fight against corruption on the agenda.

Chapter 10 by Betina Sarue and Stefano Pagin studies the evolution of urban renewal in São Paulo, the most critical single vector of urban change in recent years. These projects mobilize a specific instrument called Urban Operations, oriented towards the increase of land values and air rights production. The State plays a fundamental role in these through governance arrangements with politicians, bureaucracies, developers and sometimes civil society actors. This instrument was initially created for removing centrally located “favelas,” thus contributing to segregation and intraurban inequality. Urban Operations Consortia created an innovative instrument for urban renewal linked to the financialization of land that produces not only additional financial resources but also more discretionary funds, creating incentives for disseminating their use throughout the country. Even when including social housing and social participation (their most potentially redistributive elements), these represent a residual part and entail a dispute over their location within the bounded perimeter. UOCs have changed in format and redistributive capacity over time, mainly in left-wing administrations.

Exploring this discussion of urban renewal, Betina Sarue analyses the governance of the Porto Maravilha project in Chapter 11. This is located in Rio de Janeiro and associated with the 2016 Olympic Games but was produced mainly through the use of instruments first created in São Paulo, as well as the London Olympics organizations. After several failed attempts, the project became viable in terms of its funding and policy coordination with the most significant public-private concession of public services in Brazil, intense (institutional and financial) federal participation, and an institutional design derived from São Paulo’s experiences. The chapter shows that focusing on large urban project institutions contributes to better understandings of their redistributive challenges, as well as enhancing comparative analyses of the mobilized policy instruments.

Finally, in the conclusion, Eduardo Marques compares the policy trajectories presented by the chapters and draws lessons for future analyses of urban politics and policies. Our conclusions challenge widely disseminated ideas about Southern city policies, usually based on the centrality of political

participation, or the effects of economic and institutional macro-processes, or combinations of clientelism, patronage, and corruption. Contrary to these notions, the São Paulo policies tended to follow incremental advancements that reduced inequalities of access, although differently by specific policies and governments, and marked by numerous conflicts.

This trajectory was a result of the slow but cumulative construction of government capacities, institutions and policy instruments within a highly competitive political environment that pushed mayors and parties to deliver more and better policies. Ideological differences between governments were central to explaining policy innovations and the differences between easy and hard redistribution policies. At the same time, policy production processes and their governance patterns help to explain the different paces of change, resilience and latency in distinct policy sectors.

In general, therefore, the trajectory of policy construction and change in São Paulo involved the same actors and mechanisms that explain policy production and urban governments elsewhere, although in locally specific combinations, as in any other large metropolis.

Notes

1. Demographic data relative to 2019 (Seade 2019) and all other data relative to 2018 (infocidade.prefeitura.sp.gov.br and observasampa.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/gestao-publica).
2. www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/node/31572 and <https://council.nyc.gov/budget/fy2016>.
3. www.saopaulo.sp.leg.br/vereadores.
4. The literature on service delivery, on the other hand, presents good accounts of the conditions under which services can be improved and delivered in Southern countries. However, these studies analyze national and regional transformations, indicators and processes in countries such as South Africa (Khosa 2000; McLennan and Munslow 2009; Palmer et al. 2017), India (Vivek 2015) and Brazil (Tendler 1997). This literature has illuminated several essential processes, but cities participate merely as scales of data aggregation, even in the case of indicators of their technical capacities.
5. The comparative network involves colleagues from University College London, Sciences Po, Colegio de México and the University of Milano Bicocca, with Professors Patrick Le Galès, Mike Raco, Claire Colomb, Vicente Ugalde and Alberta Andreotti, Tommaso Vitale, among others.

6. It is relevant to add Holland's (2018b) arguments refining this hypothesis for young democracies with the so-called truncated welfare states in Latin America. The author sustains that when welfare policies mainly and continuously benefit the middle classes and the rich more than the poor, the political calculus of each of these groups happens differently. The rich, and not the poor, would favor redistribution, changing the support for welfare state formation and political parties. The argument is compelling but seems more appropriate to Brazil before the 1990s when the so-called regulated citizenship (Santos 1979) was still central. Since then, many expansions of rights and policies have taken place, regardless of all the problems they still present (Arretche 2018). Therefore, it is the poor that recognize themselves in social policies in contemporary Brazil, as some studies have been showing (Arretche et al. 2016).
7. Despite a large number of political parties in Brazil, classifying them (and governments) within an ideological continuum is not tricky. We follow widely used classifications produced from party behavior in Congress. These are also consistent with surveys among politicians about substantive positions (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999).
8. This distinction can also be read using Lowi's (1972) classical definition, with all governments producing distributive policies (that apparently benefit all, and thus have low political costs), but just left-wing governments producing redistributive policies (that clearly benefit some at the expense of others).
9. Like many other processes, policy resilience is also influenced by actors and processes located at other levels, as we discuss later.
10. Table I.2, at the end of the introduction documents the information, already advancing details covered by the chapters.
11. To calculate the incidences cited here, we coded the information per policy and government into three different tables. All cells were initially coded 0 but were altered to 1 if that government: had initiated or reinitiated that policy considering all implementation intensities; considering only medium and robust implementation; as well as whether the program merely existed (with any intensity) during that government. For restarts from latency we considered as one both reinitiating with any intensity or jumping two points in implementation, from weak to strong. The coded information allowed the calculation of distributions by ideological blocks and the cited statistical tests.
12. All these differences between the left and any other block (or combination) were significant at 95% in tests of average difference.

13. Higher averages for the left continued to be significant at 95% compared to the center-right, right or both.
14. Considering all stops, additionally to reductions of intensity from strong or medium to weak implementation.
15. The cross-tabulation between trajectories and types of redistribution is significant at 95% considering several statistical tests and measures.
16. Elections for state capitals returned in 1985, but elections for other cities continued without interruption during the dictatorship. Before 1985, mayors of state capitals (along with some other special situations) were appointed by state governors.

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TABLE I.2 Selected information on redistributive programs/policies.

Policy	Program/Activity	Description	Source
Traffic control	Prioritize bus circulation	Covas implemented the first BRT corridor while Janio, Maluf and Pitta prioritized cars. Suplicy expanded networked BRT, but Serra and Kassab stopped building busways and opened lanes for cars. Haddad considerably expanded the bus-transit network.	Marcos (2020); Chapter 4; Almeida (2019)
Buses	Bike lanes and bikeways	Recreational weekend-only bikeways were created by Kassab, and Haddad implemented a lengthier network of permanent bike lanes.	Campos (2020); Lemos and Wicher Neto (2014); Chapter 4
	Single fare (not by distance)	Always present, since the 1970s.	Campos (2020)
	Improve lines	Started with Covas (OSO), was resumed under Erundina and again with Suplicy (Interligado), to stay effective afterwards.	Campos (2020 and Chapter 4
	Control over routes	This involves bus planning, monitoring and control. It started feebly with Covas, was resumed under Erundina, very feeble again with Maluf and Pitta, and very strong under Suplicy and afterwards.	Campos (2020); Chapter 4; Vasconcelos (1999)
	New dedicated lanes/corridors	Created in the Covas, Suplicy and Haddad (mainly) administrations.	Almeida (2019), Requena (2018), Vasconcelos (1999)
	Smart card (integration)	Created and implemented by the Suplicy government and maintained afterwards.	Campos (2020); Chapter 4

(Continued)

TABLE I.2 (Continued)

Policy	Program/Activity	Description	Source
	Creation of free passes	For the elderly in 1983 (but became a constitutional right in 1988), 1990 for the unemployed (Erundina), 1992 for the disabled (Erundina, but from a legislative initiative) and 2014 for students (Haddad). In 2016 Doria reduce the latter to only low-income students. Free passes at State and federal level became available on the subway before the buses..	Chapter 6
	Fare subsidies	Started with Erundina, were reduced under Maluf and Pitta, increased with Suplicy, maintained by Serra and Kassab and increased again under Haddad.	Constanzo (2020) and Campos (2020)
Subway	Single fare (not by distance)	Always present from the 1970s.	Chapter 6
	Start building new lines toperipheries	The first peripheral line (line 3) was built in the 1970s, before the period of this volume. During the period of this volume, only Line 5 - Lilac was constructed, its first phase in 1998 (Covas) and second in 2009 (Serra).	Chapter 4 and Chapter 6
	Smart card (integration)	Started under Alckmin, with Serra as mayor, when both the city and the State were governed by the same party.	Chapter 6
	Creation of free passes	Started in 1975 for students (50% discount). Then for the elderly in 1985 (Montoro, but later became a constitutional right in 1988), then in 1990 for the unemployed (Quercia), in 1992 for the disabled (Fleury) and in 2015 for low-income students (Alckmin). Free passes were issued on the subway before the buses, but also after them.	Chapter 6

Waste management	Reduce service inequalities	Covas started and Erundina boosted it. But it was the new concession format under Suplicy that established it and later maintained it.	Chapter 7
	Control over trucks and services	Started with the new concession under Suplicy and latter maintained.	
	Control over trucks and services	Maluf started telemetry for trucks and Pitta expanded it, although with suspicions over reliability. The new concession format under Suplicy brought GPS control and better service monitoring at landfills.	Chapter 7; Santos and Gonçalves-Dias (2012)
	Expansion to slums	Started under Erundina, reduced under Maluf and Pitta and boosted under Suplicy, remaining in action afterwards	Chapter 7; Marques and Saraiva (2005)
	Recycling with pickers	Started discreetly under Erundina, entered policy discussions under Suplicy but was never really structured as a strong program. In 2010, the National Solid Waste Policy created incentives and sanctions for the inclusion of waste pickers' inclusion, but still feebly and with few concrete results.	Chapter 7; Santos and Gonçalves-Dias (2012)
	Creation of a collection tax	Created with the new concession under Suplicy to finance the system, it was extinct by Serra. Since then, no mayor was capable of even bringing this subject up to discussion, although several Brazilian capitals have waste collection fares.	Chapter 7

(Continued)

TABLE I.2 (Continued)

Policy	Program/Activity	Description	Source
Housing	Construction of new units	Traditional solution developed in all governments. Under Kassab and Haddad, production increased due to the federal program Minha Casa Minha Vida.	Chapter 8
	Better located projects	The Erundina government had this as a main concern. This returned with less commitment under Suplicy.	Chapter 8; Bonduki (2000)
	Slum upgrading	Covas started it, but in a disjointed way. It became effective in slum upgrading with Erundina and worked that way under Suplicy. Kassab, Haddad Maluf (at the end of his administration) and Pitta developed a diminished and downgraded version of it.	Chapter 8
	Settlement regularization	Erundina started it, Pitta restarted it, and Suplicy continued it. Serra and Kassab strongly reduced it, but at the end of Haddad's administration it recovered speed.	Chapter 8
	Self-help coproduction projects	Erundina created it, Suplicy restarted it, as well as Haddad at the end of the government.	Chapter 8
	Central city housing	Erundina started it as a pilot, Suplicy resumed it, as Haddad at the end of his government. With Serra and Kassab, the state agency did some of it.	Chapter 8
	Social rent	Suplicy started it and Haddad also developed it, but it never became a regular and stable program.	Chapter 8

Development regulation	Better regulation/less corruption	Sectoral reform was discussed in the Suplicy government, but completely implemented under Haddad.	Hoyler (2020)
Urban renewal/IO/ UO	Include social housing	Suplicy started the 10% rule and Haddad increased it to 25%. Maluf and Pitta built projects in IO but they are included under the construction of new housing.	Chapter 10
	Heterogeneous perimeters	Erundina (Centro), Suplicy (Água Espraiada), and Haddad (Água Branca) all did it. Maluf did it in a lower degree (Faria Lima).	Chapter 10; Chapter 11
	Extract larger surpluses	Although always present, this was boosted with the development of the Cepacs in Suplicy's government	Chapter 10; Chapter 11
	More participation	Started under Suplicy (Água Espraiada) and it was boosted under Haddad (Água Branca).	Chapter 10
Road infrastructure	Street construction in peripheries	Covas, Erundina, Suplicy and Haddad undertook intense small road constructions dispersed throughout the peripheries. The other governments concentrated on road works in the Southwest region (especially Janio and Maluf), as well as in the duplication of large highways (Serra and Kassab).	Marques (2013)

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