RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Residential Segregation in Comparative Perspective

Making Sense of Contextual Diversity

Edited by

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Contents

List of Figures and Maps *vii*
List of Tables *xi*
Notes on Contributors *xv*

1 Introduction: Residential Segregation in Context 1
Thomas Maloutas

2 Residential Income Inequality in Tokyo and Why it Does Not Translate into Class-based Segregation 37
Kuniko Fujita and Richard Child Hill

3 The Impact of Housing Tenure on Residential Segregation in Beijing, China 69
John R. Logan and Limei Li

4 Residential Segregation in an Unequal City: Why are There No Urban Ghettos in Hong Kong? 91
Ngai-ming Yip

5 A Portrait of Residential Differentiation in Taipei City (1980–2010) 113
Chia-Huang Wang and Chun-Hao Li

6 Residential Segregation and Social Structure in São Paulo: Continuity and Change since the 1990s 137
Eduardo Marques, Renata Bichir and Celi Scalon

7 Segregation, Social Mix and Public Policies in Paris 155
Edmond Préteceille

8 The Solidity of Urban Socio-spatial Structures in Copenhagen 179
Hans Thor Andersen

9 Residential Segregation in Budapest before and after Transition 199
Zoltán Kovács

10 The Limits of Segregation as an Expression of Socioeconomic Inequality: The Madrid Case 219
Marta Domínguez, Jesus Leal and Elena Martínez Goytre

Proof Copy

Maloutas book.indb 5 5/16/2012 11:59:53 AM

11 Changing Dynamics of Residential Segregation in Istanbul 239
Tuna Taşan-Kok

12 Social Polarization and De-segregation in Athens 259
Thomas Maloutas, Vassilis Arapoglou, George Kandylis and John Sayas

13 Conclusion: Residential Segregation and Urban Theory 287
Kuniko Fujita

Index *325*

Proof Copy

List of Figures and Maps

Figures

1.1 A simplified mapping of the causal mechanism in the reproduction process of residential segregation 12

2.1 Housing and commercial land value per square meter in Tokyo, 2010 40
2.2 Per capita and per household income inequality among Tokyo's 49 local districts (23 central city wards plus 26 suburban cities), 1971–2005 44
2.3 Per capita income inequality among Tokyo's 23 central city wards, 26 suburban cities and Tokyo (23 wards plus 26 cities), 1971–2005 46
2.4 Per capita income inequality among 23 central city wards, with and without Tokyo's four core wards (Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato and Shibuya), 1971–2005 47
2.5 Correlation between per capita income and housing land value per square meter among Tokyo's 49 local districts (23 central city wards and 26 suburban cities), 2005 48
2.6 Percent distribution of professional and managerial jobs, and production and laborer work among 2970 chomes of Tokyo Central City, 2005 52
2.7 Percent occupational mix of Tokyo Central City residents among higher, middle and lower income wards 55
2.8 Percent occupational mix of Tokyo Central City residents among higher, middle and lower income chos (based on average figures of 2 chos from each ward) 55
2.9 Percent occupational mix of Tokyo Central City residents among higher, middle and lower income chomes (based on average figures of 4 chomes from each ward) 56
2.10 Tax and income inequality among Tokyo's 49 local districts (23 central city wards plus 26 suburban cities), 1970–2005 61

4.1 Distribution of household income in Hong Kong, 1996 and 2006 97
4.2 Distribution of selected variables by areas with and without public housing in Hong Kong 105

5.1 A conceptual framework of the residential distribution patterns in Taipei City 114
5.2 Average yearly household income in Taipei City 120
5.3 Occupational distribution of residents in Taipei City 121

6.1 Total income by social class, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 1991/2000 148
6.2 Years of schooling by social classes, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 1991/2000 149
6.3 International Index of Socioeconomic Occupational Status (ISEI) by social classes, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 1991/2000 150
6.4 Distributions of the average income of the area/average metropolitan income in São Paulo, 1997/2007 151

Proof Copy

8.1 Occupational categories in jobs located in City of Copenhagen: a) 1981–1996 and b) 1997–2009 190
8.2 European countries at risk of poverty rate before and after social transfers, 2007 192
8.3 Type of ownership in multi-storey housing, City of Copenhagen, 1981–2010 (percent) 194
8.4 Number of residents in social housing sector in Copenhagen distributed by income deciles, 1986–2001 194
8.5 Number of residents in detached ownership housing in Copenhagen distributed at income deciles, 1986–2001 195

9.1 Transformation of Budapest Metropolitan Area after 1990 210
9.2 Ratio of university and college graduates in different urban zones of Budapest (1990, 2001) 213

10.1 Distribution of Madrid's total and foreign population by household size (2007) 235

12.1 Census tracts in the metropolitan area of Athens according to the percentage of Large employers and higher grade professionals and managers (ESeC 1) and Lower technical and routine occupations (ESeC 8 and 9) within the active population (2001) 263
12.2 Census tracts in the metropolitan area of Athens according to the percentage of immigrant and native population (2001) 264
12.3 Percentage of major occupational categories in the active population in Athens (1961–2001) 265
12.4 Percentage of households in Athens by social rank of head of household and floor of residence (1998) 274
12.5 Percentage distribution of Greek and foreign citizens in Athens by floor of residence (1998) 275

Maps

2.1 Tokyo Metropolitan Government: Central city (23 wards) and suburbs (26 cities, 5 towns and 8 villages) 39
2.2 Tokyo's 23 central city wards and four core wards 41

3.1 Distribution of migrants with urban registration in Beijing, 2000 83
3.2 Distribution of migrants with rural registration in Beijing, 2000 84
3.3 Distribution of people with tertiary education attainment in Beijing, 2000 85
3.4 Distribution of government employees in Beijing, 2000 86
3.5 Composition of housing tenure in Beijing, 2000 87

4.1 Distribution of the richest and poorest 10 percent of households Hong Kong, 2006 95

5.1 Metropolitan Taipei (Taipei City and Xinbei City) 116
5.2 Higher vs. non-higher education in Taipei City (1990 and 2000) 117

Proof Copy

Maloutas book.indb 8 5/16/2012 11:59:53 AM

6.1 Average International Index of Socioeconomic Occupational Status (ISEI) in the survey areas, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 2000 143
6.2 Distribution of the high level professional class, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 2000 144
6.3 Distribution of unskilled manual workers, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 2000 145

7.1 Paris metropolis 1999—Cluster analysis of the socioeconomic profile of neighborhoods (IRIS) 162
7.2 Paris metropolis 1999—share of immigrants from Maghreb and South-Sahara Africa in the total population of neighborhoods (TRIRIS) 166

8.1 Copenhagen's urban structure (simplified) 181
8.2 Location of high-income persons in Metropolitan Copenhagen (9th and 10th deciles) 2007, location quotient 183
8.3 Relative distribution of unemployed persons in Metropolitan Copenhagen, 2007, location quotient 185
8.4 Spatial distribution of persons with academic degrees (master level) in Metropolitan Copenhagen, 2007, location quotient 186
8.5 Distribution of ethnic minorities in Metropolitan Copenhagen, location quotient 187

9.1 Structure of Budapest 201
9.2 Percentage of university and college graduates in Budapest urban planning districts (1990) 204
9.3 Percentage of university and college graduates in Budapest urban planning districts (2001) 209

10.1 Socio-spatial inequality in Madrid Metropolitan Area: Census tracts classified according to their distance from the mean socioeconomic profile (2001) 229
10.2 Proportional distribution of managers and high civil servants in Madrid Metropolitan Area (1991) 232
10.3 Proportional distribution of managers and high civil servants in Madrid Metropolitan Area (2001) 233

11.1 Districts of Istanbul in the historical peninsula and the city center 247
11.2 Squatter areas (unauthorized settlements) with and without improvement plans 248
11.3 The distribution of new housing, renewal and transformation projects by HDA, metropolitan municipality and district municipalities 253

12.1 Social types/clusters of residential areas in Athens, census tract level (2001) 266
12.2 Relative concentration of immigrants in the residential space of Athens by census tract (2001) 269

Proof Copy

Maloutas book.indb 9 5/16/2012 11:59:53 AM

Proof Copy

List of Tables

2.1 Per capita and per household income inequality among Tokyo's 49 local districts (23 central city wards plus 26 suburban cities), 1971–2005 (unit: 10,000 yen) 43
2.2 Per capita income inequality among Tokyo's 23 central city wards and 26 suburban cities, 1971–2005 (unit: 10,000 yen) 45
2.3 Per capita income among Tokyo's four central core wards and the rest of 23 central city wards, 1971–2005 (unit: 10,000 yen) 46
2.4 Occupational inequality among Tokyo Central City's 23 wards, 877 chos, and 2,970 chomes, 2005 51
2.5 Tokyo Central City's chomes with over 50 percent residents employed in professional, technical and managerial (P&M) jobs, and industry with highest percent P&M, 2005 53
2.6 Ten chomes with highest housing land prices by percent professional, technical and managerial (P&M) and percent employed in finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) industries, 2005 53
2.7 Occupational mix of residents at Tokyo Central City's ward, cho and chome levels, 2005 54

3.1 Housing tenure composition in Beijing, 2000 73
3.2 Locational attainment model predicting distance (ln) from the city center in Beijing 78
3.3 Individual-level regression analysis of distance to central city in Beijing 79
3.4 Regression analysis of distance to central city with neighborhood variables in Beijing 81

4.1 Segregation patterns in Hong Kong 1996–2006 (education, occupation and employment) 99
4.2 Segregation patterns in Hong Kong 1996–2006 (income, family type and housing) 101

5.1 Housing prices in Taipei City (2008–2010, thousand new Taiwan dollars and percentage) 119
5.2 Housing prices in New Taipei City (2008–2010, thousand new Taiwan dollars and percentage) 119

6.1 Global Moran Index and Dissimilarity Index, São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 2000 142
6.2 EPG class distribution (%), São Paulo Metropolitan Region, 1991/2000 146

7.1 Paris metropolis—active persons by occupation (CS) 159
7.2 Paris metropolis—segregation index for detailed occupations (CS) 160

Proof Copy

7.3	Paris metropolis—dissimilarity index between immigrants and native French born in mainland France	164
8.1	Occupation categories, index of segregation 2009	191
8.2	Occupation categories, index of dissimilarity 2009	191
9.1	Changing income inequalities in Hungary (1972–2004)	206
9.2	Gini coefficient of income distribution in Hungary by settlement categories (1987–2004)	207
10.1	Proportional distribution of Socioeconomic Categories (CSE) in Madrid Region 1996–2010	222
10.2	Percentage salary increases by National Occupation Categories (CON) in Madrid (1995–2006)	223
10.3	Income inequality indices based on average household expenditure in Madrid (1990/91–2005)	225
10.4	Correlation coefficients of socioeconomic categories with the first factor of a principal components analysis of their distribution in Madrid's census tracts (2001)	228
10.5	Segregation indices for socioeconomic categories in Madrid Metropolitan Area (1991 and 2001)	230
10.6	Segregation index by immigrant origin in Madrid Metropolitan Area (2001 and 2009)	234
11.1	Changing dynamics of residential segregation in Istanbul	242
11.2	The change of the occupational composition in Istanbul from 1980 to 2000	252
12.1	Social typology of residential space in Athens (2001), cluster composition in terms of major occupational groups (values above average in bold)	267
12.2	Percentage of the 10 major groups within the immigrant population in Athens (2001)	268
12.3	Indices of dissimilarity (ID) for occupational categories in the Athens Metropolitan Area; census tract level in 1991 and 2001	270
12.4	Percentage point difference of dissimilarity indices between occupational categories (1991–2001), positive values (in bold) denote the increase of spatial distance	271
12.5	Dissimilarity indices (ID) for ESeC classes in Athens (2001), total active population and Greek population	272
12.6	Dissimilarity indices for selected immigrant groups in the Athens Metropolitan Area (2001) in respect to the Greek population and to each other	273
13.1	Cities grouped by levels of residential segregation and class inequality and by the forces that intensify or counteract them	294

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Maloutas book.indb 14 5/16/2012 11:59:53 AM

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Residential Segregation in Context

Thomas Maloutas

Introduction

This book is about the great variety of patterns and trends of social and ethnic segregation in cities nested in different regions of the world. It is also about the limited impact this contextual variety has had on the dominant explanatory schemes in urban theory and, about the shortcomings of the latter in making sense of contextually diverse forms of segregation. Its chapters challenge primarily the vision of the dual and polarized city as a fitting description of current socio-spatial divisions in large metropolitan areas around the world and its projection as their unavoidable future under the pressure of capitalist globalization. They challenge, in fact, the depictions and predictions about increasing segregation and spatial polarization founded on essentially mono-causal explanations, such as the social polarization thesis (Sassen 1991), by drawing attention to outcomes and processes that are not in line with, and often contradict, theoretical expectations. By doing so this book brings to the fore the double contextual blindness of such theoretical approaches: blindness in terms of the contradicting empirical evidence from diverse contexts; and blindness due to their implicit attachment to specific contexts. Contextual blindness in the latter sense is not new. It is an issue with early approaches and tools of segregation research as well. Since, the major theoretical assumptions—old and new—about segregation were formulated in the US and, to a much lesser extent, in the UK, the focus of this book lies outside the Anglophone world, seeking to avoid the interpretative limitations and misconstructions resulting especially from universalizing the American experience.

Residential segregation no longer attracts interest as an independent issue, but mainly as part of urban social changes related to the post-industrial metropolis and the globalization era. According to Hamnett (2001: 163–4) interest in segregation declined with David Harvey and radical geography and reappeared with William Julius Wilson and the underclass debate and, further, it shifted from segregation patterns to conceptions of duality in world/global cities. The strongest theoretical assumptions involving segregation are certainly related to the world/global city model (Friedman and Wolff 1982, Sassen 1991, Knox and Taylor 1995, and in more nuanced terms Mollenkoprf and Castells 1991, Fainstein et al. 1992) produced by global forces unleashed by neoliberal deregulation. The social polarization thesis (Sassen 1991) is probably the most direct claim about the relation between social and spatial trends: Social polarization is the assumed outcome of economic restructuring for global cities, which become the strategic spaces for global capitalist management; this role entails the rapid development of high-end producer services that generate high profile and highly paid jobs and attract a highly skilled workforce from all over the world. The growth of the upper occupational pole is complemented by the simultaneous growth of menial jobs related to the low level tasks in the expanding sector of producer services, but also in the service of the expanding occupational elite, while the loss of secure and averagely paid jobs in industry completes the polarization trend by depleting the middle of the social hierarchy. According to Sassen (1991: 251) social polarization leads also to spatial polarization: gentrification, supported

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by the housing demand for the new occupational elite, and the appropriation of prime space for corporate use, both lead to increased segregation for the lower social strata.

The social polarization thesis endorses the perception of cities as increasingly socio-spatially divided under the changes brought about by globalization that pull away all stops and leave no margin for political intervention. It treats segregation as a simple and homogeneous negative social outcome deriving almost automatically from changes in the socioeconomic structure and does not adequately corroborate its theoretical claims by empirical evidence. I claim that both of these shortcomings are, partly at least, related to the contextual blindness of the polarization thesis, which assumes general validity in spite of the contextual attachments to the Anglophone world—and to US global cities in particular—it implicitly carries.

The social polarization thesis has been criticized on many grounds: The lack of corroborating evidence for social polarization in *par excellence* global cities like London, Paris or Tokyo (Hamnett 1994, Préteceille 1995, Fujita 2003, Hill and Fujita 2003, Hill and Kim 2000); the inadequacy of duality as the essence of socio-spatial division that should be replaced by the more nuanced descriptions and assumption of the quartered or layered city (Marcuse 1989, 2002, Marcuse and van Kempen 2002a: 265–6); the neglected importance of politics and the state, with particular reference to the welfare state (Hamnett 1996, Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, Musterd et al. 2006, Marcuse and van Kempen 2002); its explanatory inadequacy for regional metropolises around the world etc. (Baum 1997, 1999, Wessel 2000, Walks 2001, Vaattovaara and Kortteinen 2003, Maloutas 2007a, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 2009).

Other approaches to urban socio-spatial processes and outcomes under conditions of capitalist globalization put much more emphasis on contextual causality. Brenner and Theodore (2002, 353) stress the different pathways that lead to different forms of "actually existing neoliberalism" related to the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects within "a historically specific, ongoing, and internally contradictory process of market-driven sociospatial transformation (…)." Hill and Fujita (2003) insist on the nested structure of urban, national and regional systems that reduce the influence of global forces and contribute significantly in shaping socio-spatial outcomes. Following an institutional approach, adapted to his focus on European cities, Kazepov (2005: 6) stresses the open-ended and path-dependent character of socio-spatial outcomes within different contexts, stemming from processes configured as "a set of alternatives made of constraints and enablements within which individual (or collective) actors can or have to choose." Swyngedouw et al. (2003) emphasize the local crafting of emblematic urban development projects producing a kind of unexpected expectedness in the outcome of the interaction between global forces and local factors.

Without denying the existence and the importance of global forces that push toward increasing inequality and segregation, the contributions of this book try to illustrate that in cities around the world there are often alternative outcomes. These outcomes are significantly affected by targeted national and local policies in the North and West-European welfare states or the East Asian developmental states; they follow the dynamic of market forces in the transition economies of Eastern and central Europe; they appear as the unintended outcome of policies related to other issues in the clientelist and family-centered regimes in Southern Europe. They also appear related to private housing production structures, which in some cases are too weak to enhance division and sometimes so powerful and centralized that they tend to mitigate the dividing impact of their product in their own business interest. In most cases, these alternative outcomes are largely influenced by processes and structures originating long before the emergence of new global forces, like the local long-lasting social division patterns and the spatially uneven distribution of quality in the housing stock. Contextually varied situations offer different possibilities for policy intervention, and

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empirical findings show that policy impact in tandem with unintended consequences from policy and business decisions, and inertia in the reproduction of urban structures can seriously impede global forces from leading to “a new spatial order” of increasingly clear socio-spatial division that Marcuse and van Kempen (2002) have not identified across several cities either.

Segregation is a context-bound concept. For this book, context is important in two ways: first, in the form of varied urban settings around the world involving multiple versions of segregation that are not amenable to simple and universal explanations regarding their formative processes, their patterns and their impact; second, as the context-bound, and therefore limited, “shared understanding of reality” (Kazepov 2005: 6) which derives from the binding of the concept of segregation to the context of the US metropolis of the first half of the twentieth century that has to be considered when the concept travels worldwide.

“Context” is used here in a more mundane manner than in Wittgenstein’s or Frege’s philosophical elaborations concerning the (im)possibility of meaning or truth/falsity claims outside the (contextual) frames of propositions. It is mainly used to remind us that expected outcomes deriving from theoretical claims are often contradicted by outcomes whose understanding entails taking into account contingencies not included in theoretical models. Concepts and theories are always context-dependent and the degree of this dependency varies in relation to their specific object. Urban segregation is context-dependent in the sense that its patterns and social impact are determined by the combined effect of mechanisms and institutions involving the market, the state, civil society and the specific and durable shape of local socio-spatial realities. Theoretical models usually take into account part of this interrelation and, to a large extent, disregard the rest. The market is usually privileged as the focus of theoretical constructions with a particular focus on economic restructuring during the last decades.

By “context” this book refers to the specific intertwining of four major spheres: (1) the economic sphere (exchange) that mainly focuses on labor market conditions and on market access to housing; (2) the state sphere (redistribution) that covers housing and public services allocation, and local regulation regimes; (3) the social sphere (reciprocity) that includes social and family networks, churches and other local voluntary organizations. “Context” also extends to (4) the specific and durable shape of local socio-spatial realities, i.e. built environments, social relations inscribed in property patterns, urban histories and ideologies. The three first derive from Polanyi’s (1944) modes of economic integration[1] while the fourth involves the physical support of segregation processes and the social relations directly inscribed in it. This understanding of contextual elements is not fundamentally different from the ‘contingencies’ identified by Marcuse and van Kempen (2000a, 266) affecting the impact of global forces on socio-spatial urban forms, and from Hill and Fujita’s (2003) or Kazepov’s (2005: 6–7) elaboration of urban systems’ embeddedness in wider contexts of social, institutional and economic relations.

There should be no question by now whether residential segregation can be adequately de-contextualized and assumptions about it formulated in market—or state-related mono-causal terms or if a less de-contextualized plural causality should rather be adopted. There are two different, but interconnected, ways to proceed with the construction of such a causal plurality. The first is to elaborate on causal mechanisms and processes using a hypothetico-deductive approach; the second is inductive and could rely on building a large database relating contextual features to specific segregation processes and outcomes on the basis of a number of initial theoretical assumptions. This introduction, as well as the city chapters, are steps in both directions.

1 See the adaptation of Polanyi’s ideas in urban studies by Kesteloot and others (Meert et al. 1997, Kesteloot 1998, Kesteloot et al. 2006).

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Definition and Etymology

Segregation indicates the spatial separation of two (or more) population groups; here this separation is understood as residential, but it may also refer to separation in schools, in the workplace, in transportation or in leisure activities. Segregation can vary from complete separation to completely even distribution of population groups in the spatial units of study areas. Highly segregated areas are those where the distribution of population groups is particularly uneven. Although in the recent literature there are attempts to re-focus segregation studies either in terms of effective life experiences (Schnell 2002) or in terms of a simultaneous layering of different activities and functions (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002a: 266) the focus remains on traditional understanding of residential segregation.

The term originates from nineteenth-century genetics and refers to the separation of allelic genes that occurs during meiosis (Mendel's 1st law). In the early twentieth century the Chicago School drew explanatory inspiration from analogies with the vegetable kingdom and segregation was adopted by *human ecology* as a metaphor for the residential separation of ethno-racial groups (Park 1936 [1957]). This metaphor subsequently became segregation's dominant meaning.

The definition of segregation in *The Dictionary of Human Geography* is very brief—"The residential separation of subgroups within a wider population" (Johnston et al. 1986: 424)—and is followed by references to the degree of segregation and to its measurement techniques using various segregation indices. However, as I will subsequently stress, despite its apparently simple definition, the social and political content of segregation becomes relatively ambiguous; and this is mainly due to the understanding of segregation as exclusively related to the lower social strata and as an unequivocally negative social condition disregarding the complex relations between spatial and social distance, especially across different contexts. Segregation is imbued with connotations—acquired through its long history as a social and political issue and a research object and practice—that continually add new meaning and make this concept rather imprecise.[2] It is therefore imperative to start by elucidating how the definition of segregation is operationalized within the practice of segregation research.

The Practice of Segregation Research: Choosing Population Groups and Measurement Techniques

The simple definition of segregation leaves a number of important issues to be resolved through practical decisions, sometimes in *ad hoc* ways. Such decisions involve the choice of population groups who come under scrutiny or the methods that will be used to quantify the level of segregation and reveal its shape.[3] The choices made in terms of these issues add further meaning and reshape the definition of segregation in ways that are not always explicit. In this book we consider mainly segregation research that deals with city-wide patterns and trends; therefore, we focus on quantitative and broad urban area research rather than on localized neighborhood studies that may be appropriate to dissect segregation processes, but often project out of proportion the extreme social condition of particular neighborhoods onto the cities they belong to.[4]

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2 See Brun (1994) on the fluid meaning of segregation.

3 See Préteceille (2004) for a thorough presentation of these issues; this section is largely inspired from his text.

4 For a more comprehensive account of segregation research see van Kempen 2002, Boal 1987 and

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Population Groups and Spatial Units

Theoretically, all kinds of population groups (ethnic, racial, social, age, …) can be the object of segregation. However, segregation research and literature have focused on groups whose spatial separation created a social and political problem, i.e. on those identified by race or ethnic origin and on social groups, mainly identified by occupational status or income. Racial and ethnic groups have been the primary object for the pioneering segregation studies in the United States, where they continue to constitute the main concern. This focus is related to the context of American cities in the early twentieth century, in which the legacy of the slavery regime and the very important immigrant inflow were regulated through institutionalized discrimination against specific racial and ethnic groups that involved, among other things, their residential segregation. Even though this situation has gradually changed after the Second World War with the high social mobility and de-segregation of most immigrant groups, and the progressive abolition of discriminatory legislation, the long established segregation patterns along ethno-racial lines have not been fundamentally reshaped. This is especially striking for *hypersegregated*[5] metropolises, like Chicago or New York, where the index of segregation for African-Americans remained extremely high (over 0.80[6]) until 2000, even though it had slightly decreased after 1980 (Logan et al. 2004).

European cities, on the other hand, are much more homogeneous in terms of ethnic and racial composition (Kazepov 2005, Musterd 2005, van Kempen 2005, Musterd and van Kempen 2009) and have been so during most of the twentieth century; and those that were traditionally varied in terms of ethnicity—especially in Central and Eastern Europe—have usually become homogeneous as a result of wars and ethnic cleansing. Segregation studies in continental European cities, that started developing in the early post-war decades as an export product from the Anglophone world,[7] focused on social class as the prime identifier for residential segregation. The UK and the continental European industrial core encouraged immigration toward their Fordist labor markets from former colonies and Southern Europe since the early post-war period. Outside these regions, ethnic and racial minority groups have substantially developed as an important component of cities' populations during the last decades of the twentieth century, following the strong and lasting wave of international immigration, and only subsequently have they become an important item on the segregation research agenda.

Focusing on ethno-racial rather than social segregation (and vice-versa) and on discriminatory rather than market mechanisms of segregation are options related to context, in the sense that research and policy attention is primarily turned to what constitutes a social and potentially a political issue. Within each one there are further options related to the specific designation of groups to be studied; these options are not free from theoretical and methodological assumptions, and are not devoid of consequences when transferred to different contexts. The focus, for instance, on the residential segregation of an oppressed Black minority by a White majority, frames segregation

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Hamnett 2001; See also Préteceille (Chapter 7 in this volume) and Kesteloot et al. (2006) for the impact of neighborhood focused research on the perception of segregation.

5 The high degree of segregation on five different dimensions (evenness, exposure, clustering, centralization and concentration) in several US cities was defined as *hypersegregation* by Massey and Denton (1989). The *hypersegregated* metropolis contains *hyperghetto* areas where the extreme segregation of mostly African-American population is coupled with the dismantling of local institutions and networks, representing a regression compared to the traditional Black ghetto (Wacquant 2008).

6 See the meaning of segregation indices in the following section on segregation measures.

7 See, for example, McElrath (1962) attempting a social area analysis of Rome in the early 1960s; see also Robson (1969) and a brief overview in Robinson (1998: 137–41).

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as the problematic condition of the former versus the "normality" or mainstream condition of the latter. Eventually, policies designed to redress segregation ills considered under this light are limited to devising ways of socially integrating the groups, or spaces, mostly victimized by segregation. Segregation becomes, thus, a problem at the margin, less visible as a process operating across urban society, which contributes to reproducing social inequality at all levels of the social hierarchy and throughout urban space. Following this contextually specific perception of segregation, the specter of the Black ghetto sets the political and research agenda about segregation even where there is no evidence to justify it (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002b, Kesteloot et al. 2006, Wacquant 2008).

The choice of relevant social groups to investigate segregation in Europe and other parts of the world is usually much more complex than the reading of racial segregation, in the sense that racial division is much clearer—even visually—and the categories used for its registration are much simpler and fewer than those necessary to designate social hierarchy. The categories used to register social hierarchy are usually based on occupational positions, which are then aggregated into broader hierarchical classes. More detail can reveal particular category patterns and levels of segregation whose relevance, however, depends on the theoretical importance of such categories as class constructs and on the use of specific spatial scales.

The detailed or aggregate grouping of social categories is bound to lead to different findings: for example, professionals and managers related to corporate activities may show quite dissimilar location patterns and segregation indices from the same categories occupied in the public sector (Préteceille, Chapter 7 in this volume). Distinguishing these different patterns would not be possible with the use of categorizations that aggregate the relevant occupations.[8]

Moreover, census variables are configured in relatively diverse ways in different countries rendering comparative research more complex. They often contain different types of information (as in the case of race which is registered in some countries but not in others) while they may also register the same information using a different protocol. Occupation, for instance, is used as a fundamental index of social hierarchy but with substantial national variations: most countries register occupational information using the ISCO standard (International Standard Classification of Occupations) of the ILO (International Labour Office); often this information is subsequently recoded into socioeconomic class categories according to more elaborate theoretical assumptions. Some countries use their own classification standards that may be quite distant from the standard provided by the ILO—France being the outstanding case with its *catégories socioprofessionnelles* that rely on different theoretical assumptions (Desrosières and Thévenot 1988). All these national differences in terms of availability and quality of data have an impact on both the analyses that can be carried out locally, and on the reliability and relevance of international comparisons.

Choosing a particular model of grouping occupations or an alternative variable—like income or education level—to express social hierarchy is related to methodological and ideological preferences and may have an impact on research results.[9] These choices are also related to context:

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8 Such aggregations are the outcome either of practical considerations or theoretical choice: in the *European Socioeconomic Classes* (ESeC) for example—a classification of occupations inscribed in the Weberian tradition (Rose and Harrisson 2007)—the delimitation of categories depends exclusively on the *employment relationship* (Goldthorpe 2000) for which the distinction between employment in the public or private sector is not relevant. Such classifications are not context-free either: The ESeC are, for instance, much less suitable for Southern or Eastern Europe compared to Western or Northern Europe where they were devised (Maloutas 2007b).

9 The choice of occupational categories instead of income classes to investigate social segregation, frames the problem in terms of class relations (therefore considers important the position within the relations of production) rather than in terms of a mere indicator of individual placement within an internally undifferentiated

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the production of socioeconomic categories like those used in France would be rather astonishing in a country whose political tradition is characterized by class cooperation rather than class struggle.

The focused interest of segregation research on lower socioeconomic strata and discriminated ethno-racial groups, even though in most cases it is the higher social groups that are the most segregated (White 1984: 156–8 and Préteceille 1993), seems to be a long-lasting feature of the perception of cities and their problems in countries like the UK, France, Germany and the US throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century (Lees 1985). Limiting the focus of segregation research to the lower and discriminated groups is reducing its scope and exonerating broader mechanisms and groups whose choices are far more enabled than constrained and are in fact much more responsible for the constrained choices of others (Pahl 2001). Studying segregation as the uneven spatial distribution of *all* social groups in the city is therefore a prerequisite to understand socially or spatially more localized phenomena and trends.

The choice of spatial units is much less related to context, but the size and nature of spatial entities used for segregation analysis are very important since different options can lead to different results. The optimum spatial units are neither too large nor too small. Large units have the disadvantage of hiding potential segregation pockets within their space; on the other hand, very small units—city blocks, for example—may not be relevant for groups' effective isolation, since the spatial range of everyday activity and that of social networks largely exceed their confines.

The optimum size of spatial units in segregation analysis is that of a neighborhood. In practical terms, the ideal size of spatial units for neighborhood segregation analysis is close to that of census tracts with a population close to 1,000 inhabitants. This should cover the largest part of the local web of social networks and most of the important local services. Moreover, spatial units should be of rather uniform size in order to avoid measurements in different parts of the study area that are in fact incompatible. In this sense, municipalities and other forms of local administrative units should be considered rather unfit for this type of analysis due to their variable size and population, and in spite of the convenience they usually offer in terms of data availability.

Segregation Measures: Indices, Multivariate Analysis and Autocorrelation Models

There are several ways to quantify segregation. The older and simpler ones consist of segregation indices that calculate segregation levels. The *index of dissimilarity* (ID) is the best known and most popular segregation index (Duncan and Duncan 1955; see also Robinson 1998, 257–60). It measures the dissimilarity between the spatial distributions of two groups within a study area. In case the second group is the whole population, the index measures the first group's segregation level. The ID is easy to calculate: it is equal to half the sum of the absolute differences of the percentage of the group under scrutiny from the percentage of the whole population (or of another group) within each spatial unit of the study area. It is expressed as a percentage, with values ranging from 0 to 100 percent, and indicates the percentage of members of the first group that would need to relocate to different spatial units in order to obtain a similar distribution to the reference group. Other indices measure the degree of a group's isolation or exposure by calculating the possibility of its members having encounters with members of other groups. Indices of isolation come also in percentage form and express the likelihood for a member of the first group to interact with members of another group (Coulter 1989: 149).

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continuum of socioeconomic hierarchy. However, the practical outcome in terms of identifying segregation patterns and levels may not differ substantially when using variable expressions of social hierarchy, especially if the investigation is not carried out using detailed sets of social categories.

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The indices of segregation have been devised and widely used in the US since the 1950s. They were adequate for measuring the segregation/isolation of the Black from the White population and, at the same time, were simple to understand and easy to communicate. Their simplicity, however, glosses over certain important aspects, like the spatial structure of segregation, as these measures are not affected, for instance, by the spatial aggregation or the dispersion of segregated units within the study area. Moreover, the comparability of segregation indices across cases is undermined to some extent by the effect of unit size—smaller units, and therefore spatially finer analysis, usually yield higher index values—as well as by the effect of group size, especially in respect to very small groups for which even a random distribution can produce significant levels of segregation (Robinson 1998: 260). The more elaborate the assumptions about segregation become, the harder that task faced by simple segregation indices.[10]

More elaborate measures of segregation, involving multivariate statistical techniques, are suitable to examine its spatial structure and to address more complex segregation aspects, like its multidimensionality (i.e. the different spatial forms and degrees of separation in respect to different groups of variables). Multivariate techniques synthesize large amounts of tabulated data and reveal their underlying structure (if there is one).[11] The application of multivariate statistical techniques in segregation research developed under the name of *factorial ecology* and was inspired by *social area analysis* (Shevsky and Bell 1955) which described the expected shapes of segregation in respect to social rank, family status and ethnicity. The empiricist foundation of *social area analysis* led inevitably to crude Americanocentric generalizations. It is not a paradox that these techniques were mainly used in the US to illustrate this particular structure of multidimensionality—sometimes in comparison to other parts of the world where the analysis revealed fewer dimensions[12]—and much less in Europe, where they were mostly used to reveal the multidimensionality within the social rank dimension.

10 The investigation of the five dimensions of hypersegregation following Massey and Denton (1989) or of the four types of processes (assimilation, pluralism, segregation and polarization) related to ethnic segregation according to Boal (1999, cited in Johnston et al. 2002) needs at least the combined use of a host of different indices.

11 The synthesis is operated on the basis of co-variance patterns between the initial variables (the way that is that their values are distributed in the different spatial units) and takes the form of new variables called *factors, components, dimensions or axes*. If the initial dataset possesses an underlying structure, a relatively small number of such factors will account for a substantial part of the variance in the initial dataset, and in this sense they may be considered an adequate summary of the information contained in that dataset. Then, each of the few important factors is given content derived from that of the initial variables with which it is highly correlated. Having determined the content of factors, the analysis turns to the *factor scores* (or coordinates) of the spatial units that were used in the analysis, which position them on each factor. If, for instance, a factor stands for social hierarchy, factor scores will determine the relative position of spatial units in this hierarchy. They can thus be used to produce maps summarizing the relation between spatial units and factors and, therefore, to reveal the spatial structure produced by population groups' distribution in residential areas according to each factor. Further use of factor scores can lead to the clustering of spatial units according to their scores on all (or on a selected number of) important factors in order to create a typology of residential spaces. This typology can be mapped and reveal the spatial structure produced synthetically from all retained factors, while the different clusters can be studied in terms of their specific population features (social, racial, demographic etc.) and of the change these features present over time.

12 See Abu Lughod's (1969) analysis of Cairo, where the dimensions of social rank and family status appeared to be collapsed due to Egypt's lagging position in the modernization process (family status—accounted for by family size—appeared highly correlated with social rank since polygamy was a privilege of wealthy men). Berry and Rees (1969 cited in Robinson 1998: 137) made similar observations for Indian cities.

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Factor and clustering techniques may be used to identify and map social and ethno-racial patterning of segregation and change over time, and they can be powerful tools if they serve theoretically informed inquiries. The fact that they usually lacked a solid connection with social theory, does not diminish their potential usefulness. On the other hand, they may be helpful in revealing the spatial structures characterizing the distribution of different population groups within a study area, but they do not take account of this structure in their algorithms (Sharre 1995). The factorial or clustering algorithms operate independently of contiguity or dispersion between similar types of spatial units (i.e. of spatial autocorrelation). There are, however, other techniques that combine—through the use of GIS—measures of spatial autocorrelation (like Moran's *I*[13]) with multivariate statistical techniques of segregation analysis (Wong 1993, Robinson 1998: 270–80).

The main problem with multivariate techniques, and even more so with those that are sensitive to spatial autocorrelation, is that their output is not easily grasped by those unfamiliar with their logic; confusion may easily infiltrate between the characterization of factors and spaces on the basis of their relative composition in respect to cities' averages and their actual composition which is usually much less distinctive.

Segregation and Contextual Difference

The simple definition of segregation as the spatial separation of population groups has permitted this concept to appear decontextualized, i.e. sufficiently abstract and therefore of general validity. However, behind this simple definition lies a concept that is rather *halfway decontextualized*,[14] since it continues to carry numerous contextual attachments that remain implicit to a large extent, and is imbued with the connotations it has acquired through decades of segregation research and urban policy-making. Thus, even though segregation appears, by definition, to be a simple notion, its comparative study presents several problems illustrated by the practical difficulties of measurement across contexts.

In fact, a fundamental problem stems directly from its very definition, which leads to considering segregation much more as an *outcome* than as a *process*. This means that attention is focused on degrees of segregation rather than on its formative processes and on its effective impact. The simple definition implies, in a sense, that the content of segregation is self-evident; but the reality of segregation across contexts proves to be much more complex and less prone to immediately meaningful comparison. It is much more meaningful to compare segregation as a *process*; to examine, that is, whether it is generated by similar causes and whether similar mechanisms are mediating its development, whether it has similar social consequences, whether segregation is increasing or decreasing across contexts, whether it is framed in similar ways as a political problem and whether similar policies are devised to regulate it. As an outcome, segregation is inevitably much more embedded in the particularities of local contexts—i.e. much more dependent on contextual causality—while as a process, it may be more relevantly related to global, inter-contextual, forces and tendencies.

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13 Moran's *I* is an index based on the Pearson correlation coefficient, which relates the variance of a variable with its spatial autocovariance (i.e. with the contiguous or dispersed form of its distribution). Values higher than zero indicate similarity, regionalization, smoothness and clustering, while values below zero indicate independence, randomness and dissimilarity (Robinson 1998: 276–7).

14 See Maloutas (2012) for a more elaborate argumentation along this line regarding gentrification.

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Segregation as a Process

Invoking contextual diversity may seem sometimes to be an excuse for avoiding comparison, abstraction, generalization and theory. Every city is unique in its detail and, at some level, non-comparable with any other. In this sense, our approach to contextuality, even if limited to state (redistribution)-market (exchange)-civil society (reciprocity) combinations and their interrelation with durable urban structures, histories and ideologies, creates a very large variety of potential contextual situations that cannot be productive if context is to be used as a differentiating parameter in a systematic way. Ideally, we would be aiming to construct a typology of contexts that could be related, more or less, to different forms and degrees of segregation in a theoretically meaningful way. The data we have from the 11 cities of this volume and from previous works can bring us closer to such a target, although they are far from sufficient. Fujita (see conclusions to this volume) elaborates on varieties of capitalism that could be used as basic referents for contextual difference and then tries to fit bottom-up groupings of the 11 cities included in this volume following the logic of these varieties. Here, I try to map residential segregation as a process—i.e. not only as an outcome—and to pinpoint the parts of the process where contextual variation seems particularly important.

Residential segregation is an outcome and, at the same time, a part of the process that reproduces inequality and discrimination in capitalist societies. Urban segregation is older than capitalism in the sense that cities were socially partitioned since their first appearance (Marcuse 2002a) and they remained so in the short lived state socialist societies (Pickvance 2002). The distinctive feature of segregation under capitalism is that—like inequality—it is mainly a product of economic mechanisms rather than the outcome of other forms of social violence.

As an outcome, segregation is fed by economic inequality and discrimination and shaped by their filtering through space-related mechanisms and structures and, especially, by the shifting and sorting of housing allocation processes. This shifting and sorting is mainly operated by the housing market on the basis of households' unequal ability to pay; it is usually complemented by administrative allocation that may counteract or reinforce the effect of market mechanisms, as well as introduce different dimensions to the shifting and sorting process (i.e. enforcement of discriminating—or anti-discriminating—rules against groups defined otherwise than by economic condition). Individual choices of residential location—more or less constrained or enabled within different contexts—are systematically aggregated into unequal social and ethno-racial distributions within cities (van Kempen 2002: 46–7). The established reproduction of residential segregation and the neighborhood or area effects it generates—i.e. the effects not attributable to personal and household characteristics, but the additional spatial effects related to the social composition of residential areas, to their intrinsic qualities (e.g. pollution level, quality of services) and their comparative status (Buck 2001, Atkinson and Kintrea 2001, Lupton 2003)—make it part of the structures and mechanisms that reproduce urban social inequalities.

Class segregation is fundamentally a market driven process theoretically starting as economic inequality produced in the labor market and transformed to segregation through the housing market. Ethno-racial segregation is mediated by economic inequality—with ethno-racial difference being translated to ethno-racial hierarchy in both the labor and housing markets—and also derives directly from discriminatory rules and practices[15] in housing allocation.

15 Such rules and practices do not need to be official and explicit as in the case of "redlining" or "blockbusting" (Knox and Pinch 2006: 140–43).

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The state may be intervening at one or more parts of segregation processes and in one way or another. State intervention may alter considerably the outcome of the segregation process, opposing or reinforcing the expected outcomes of market mechanisms and of discriminatory predispositions and arrangements. This alteration may affect the form and degree of segregation and/or its impact on people's lives. Expected outcomes may also be altered by the impact of reciprocity networks that civil society builds independently of the state and the market, due to the capacity of these networks to alleviate conditions of poverty and deprivation or to reinforce situations of privilege and advantage. Furthermore, the spatial fixation of these networks—especially those of the lower social strata—may impede the otherwise free shifting and sorting by the market. Finally, the expected outcomes of market mechanisms in terms of socio-spatial separation are influenced by the characteristics of recent and inherited durable urban structures (Vaughan and Arbaci 2011), including the social relations they carry (e.g. property rights or tenure patterns).

It is important to stress, therefore, that segregation may be more or less severe—as several segregation indices can indicate—but this severity is not an unequivocal index of its social role. On the one hand, spatial distance cannot be a reliable measure for social distance because proximity does not necessarily reduce social distance (Chamboredon and Lemaire 1970) and, on the other, public policies can reduce the impact of spatial distance on the reproduction of inequality and discrimination, and mitigate its socially negative impact.

Schematically the processes that lead to residential segregation and to its reproduction may be depicted as a sequence of systemic causal relations mediated and modified by institutional interference and local historical inertia under the form of durable urban structures, social relations and ideologies (Figure 1.1). Institutional interference has been abstracted from the schematic depiction of the reproduction process of residential segregation since it may occur at all its levels.

The first part of the causal mechanism identifies the labor market and the unequally accumulated wealth that jointly generate and reproduce economic inequality as an expected—and often intended—outcome in capitalist societies. The degree of inequality is often assumed to be related to the exposure or insertion of local labor markets to globalized economic processes, even though the exposure to such processes is not necessarily positively correlated with the degree of inequality produced by the labor market. Theoretical schemes, like the global city thesis (Friedman and Wolff 1982, Sassen 1991) give some insight regarding the unequal pressure that urban labor markets experience toward more inequality, and especially polarization, depending on their position in the global urban hierarchy. It is widely contested, however, that a polarized social structure, with a distribution shaped like an hourglass rather than an onion (Pahl 1988), is causally related to segregation, since simple inequality can also fuel segregation under the same conditions (i.e. when housing allocation mechanisms do not operate against free shifting and sorting) (Hamnett and Cross 1998, van Kempen 2002: 49).

Ethno-racial discrimination is less directly related to systemic causal relations even though capitalism tends to transform any form of difference into hierarchy and inequality. Consolidated ethno-racial hierarchies embody the translation of accumulated discriminations into inequality, while the dominant ideological frames pertaining to alterity affect discrimination norms and arrangements. The extent of ethno-racial diversity and the degree of ethno-racial discrimination are both important contextual characteristics, as well as institutional intervention to impose and solidify discrimination, or to reduce it through positive discrimination measures.

Finally, different modes of social regulation, ranging from extreme laissez-faire that favors the growth of inequalities in the name of economic efficiency, to situations where restraining inequality is an explicit social and political objective, can frame the functioning of the labor market and the reproduction of accumulated wealth in significantly different ways and produce very

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

Figure 1.1 A simplified mapping of the causal mechanism in the reproduction process of residential segregation

diverse outcomes in terms of inequality. Esping-Andersen's (1990) types of welfare capitalism have provided a theoretically informed insight on how to group cases following the degree of decommodification that different welfare regimes attain in their social regulation. However, this does not do justice to the redistributive functions of the Asian developmental state, which affects the labor market much more directly (e.g. by imposing a compressed wage system) than the European welfare state that mainly tries to redress inequalities produced by a less constrained labor market. Exploring further the distinction between stronger and weaker government—suggested by van Kempen and Murie (2005: 384)—or among varieties of capitalism (Hill and Fujita 2003, Kazepov 2005: 11 and Fujita, conclusion to this volume) may be productive options.

In this first part of the causal mechanism, therefore, the important contextual characteristic is the degree of income inequality, generated by the labor market, and ethno-racial discrimination both potentially mitigated by state regulation, leading to the distinction between rather equal and rather unequal cities.

In the second part of the mechanism, inequality and discrimination are translated into social and ethno-racial segregation through a series of space related structures and mechanisms that act

as filters in the process of housing allocation, i.e. as specific enabling and constraining conditions for the housing choice of households. In a capitalist society housing allocation may justifiably be expected to function by market criteria. Therefore, it is also expected that the housing market will shift and sort the unequal individuals and households into unequal places. Institutional intervention at this level has been important and multifaceted in different contexts, ranging from minimum intervention to full-blown policies of social housing, greatly affecting the shape of segregation patterns although not always in the desired way. North European welfare states with a universalistic distribution of services show much lower levels of segregation compared to the residual welfare regimes of the US and increasingly of the UK (Domburg-De Rooij and Musterd 2002). The production of a large volume of social housing projects in the developed welfare societies of Western and Northern Europe has contributed to tackling the housing problem on the short to medium term in the early post-war decades, and to keeping segregation at rather low levels (van Kempen (2002a) but has also, unintendedly, led to producing the main physical support of residential segregation in the long term (Andersen 2004, Marcuse and van Kempen 2002a).

History endows cities with different building stocks. The diversity in the quality of the housing stock—and therefore the socially diversified access to it—as well as the spatial distribution of this diversity are important parameters for shaping residential segregation. Equally important is the diversity in the spatial distribution of other attributes of the housing stock, such as unit size, that may exclude certain types of households from certain areas or, on the contrary, compel them to choose among very few areas offering the required size. The legal and social relations that tie people to housing and neighborhoods (in the form of property rights, tenure and social networks) are also of great importance. It may be expected that cities with a relatively uniform distribution of housing stock in terms of quality and sizes, with strong property rights, high rates of homeownership and extensive solidarity networks based on family or common origin ties usually entail low levels of residential mobility and inhibit shifting and sorting, and segregation.

In the third part of the mechanism, residential segregation feeds back inequality and discrimination through the positive or negative area effects produced by the diversified social composition of neighborhoods. Institutional intervention may mitigate or exacerbate these effects by confronting segregation in different ways (e.g. policies for social mixing or policies guaranteeing similar quality of schools across neighborhoods).

A typology of contexts where residential segregation is reproduced could be constructed using a number of empirical measures in order to control whether certain types of context are systematically related to different degrees of segregation.[16]

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16 A measure for income inequality—a *gini* coefficient of income distribution for example—would be useful to appraise the degree of inequality as a fundamental indicator of unevenness characterizing the demand for housing. The percentage of the dominant ethno-racial group in the city's population and the difference in average salaries for the same jobs between the dominant and the other main groups may account for the importance and magnitude of discrimination in the labor market. The impact of the exposure of the local labor market to globalized economic processes on the housing market and segregation could be measured by the percentage, on the one hand, of foreign-born managers and higher grade professionals and, on the other, of foreign born routine job holders. The effectiveness of social regulation can be measured by the percentage point reduction of poverty rate after social transfers, and the general level of redistributive justice by an indicator like child poverty rate. The percentage of people in decommodified tenure and a *gini* coefficient for the distribution of house prices and rents could add some insight into the role of housing allocation mechanisms. Networks and attachment to place are much harder to approach by easily accessible data; the ties to housing and neighborhoods can be roughly assessed through the rate of residential mobility, while the average age of leaving the parental house can serve as an indicator of the impact of social networks—especially

Such measures are certainly not sufficient to address segregation issues in a particular city; they are certainly not the most pertinent, but they are relatively accessible approximations of the relevant information, and combined they could help to broadly map contextual diversity in a rather organized and tangible manner. In fact, such measures can lead to a city typology that takes into account the breadth of inequality created by the labor market, the importance of ethno-racial discrimination, the extent of the mitigating effect of the welfare state on inequality, the degree of commodification of housing provision and the degree of unevenness in the distribution of housing prices, the level of residential mobility and the possible existence of solidarity networks. Eventually, this typology can be related to the intensity of social and ethno-racial segregation and their tendency to increase or decrease. This means that the typology could distinguish between more or less equal cities, with a more or less pronounced element of ethno-racial discrimination, with a more or less effective welfare—or otherwise interventionist—state, with more or less commodified and unequal housing provision, with more or less residential mobility, with indications for the existence of solidarity networks and, finally, relate the different types with more or less intense and increasing or decreasing social and ethno-racial segregation. Multiple measures would permit to include the time dimension and assess the dynamics of the typology.

The assumption is that more unequal and discriminating cities, within less developed welfare states, with a more commodified housing provision, with high residential mobility and with less solidarity networks are expected to be highly and increasingly segregated. And since capitalist globalization drives toward more inequality, less welfare state and more commodification of housing, it may reasonably be expected that segregation should be found to be on an increasing trend.

In this book we do not have information from a sufficiently large number of cities to create such a typology; the different contextual dimensions we have identified will serve, however, as broad guidelines to assess the profiles of segregation in the 11 city chapters as a first step to such a typology and a complement to other works that have investigated the causality of segregation levels and trends.

Most of the works challenging mono-causal interpretations of segregation focus on differences and difficulties of comparison between the US and Western/ Northern Europe, both because of their significant differences and of the fact that they are the most researched areas in this respect. In the following I briefly discuss the contextually embedded nature of segregation, first, as a path dependent process whose specificity is illustrated by the comparison between segregation in the US and the (West) European metropolis; second, as an ideological and political issue whose contextual variegation entails significantly different approaches to its nature as a problem and to the ways it is addressed; and, third, as a contextually diversified social impact in terms of neighborhood effects.

Distinct Segregation Paths: The US and Western Europe

The comparative understanding of urban segregation on the two sides of the Atlantic is that on the one side segregation is high and mainly ethno-racial while on the other it is substantially lower and mainly social (i.e. based on occupation and income).

These differences are probably responsible for the small number and the rather unsatisfactory character of comparisons between segregation in US and European cities. Sako Musterd (2005)

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family networks—on residential mobility and, potentially, segregation. Finally, the dependent variables—i.e. the level and trend of both social and ethno-racial segregation—can be assessed through segregation indices while the existence (or not) of explicit anti-segregation policies can function as a dummy variable.

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attempted to gather comparative evidence in order to illustrate the expected differences between the two, but found the European evidence wanting and fragmented due to different standards and categorizations among European countries or simply to missing information. Lack of adequate data is always a problem, but, in this case, it is probably not the most important one.

Simple segregation measures are not sufficient to convey the different nature of segregation processes in Europe and the US. In this sense, comparative readings of dissimilarity indices in Chicago and Paris, for example, may not be very meaningful if essential contextual information is missing; and this is not simply a question of difference regarding the choice of segregated groups or the size of spatial units.

Segregation in the modern metropolis developed initially on the patterns of socio-spatial division inherited by pre-modern cities. The great leap forward in the development of segregation occurred when rapid urban growth stimulated spatial expansion under the form of suburbanization. This pattern—clearly depicted in Burgess's model and in its subsequent modifications by Hoyt and others (Timms 1971: 211–29, Badcock 1984: 8–10, Knox and Pinch 2006: 161–3)—characterized initially, and mainly, the Anglo-American world, where the elites massively opted for suburban residence, especially after the First World War, in response to the rapid growth of manufacturing activities and the concentration of working class groups around the core of industrial cities (Fishman 1987). The mechanisms through which suburban residential space was produced (large developments corresponding to specific segments of the housing market) resulted in making suburbanization the *par excellence* process generating socially homogeneous spaces and, therefore, an important mechanism of segregation. Marcuse (2002: 27) characterized the evolution of the suburbs as "the sharpest representation of the increasing division of urban space."

In the US, at least during the first half of the 20th century, this mechanism worked in tandem with the racist regulation of residential space producing a social hierarchy of spaces within a clearer and more severe separation founded on ethno-racial discrimination and ghetto formation, especially for the African-American population in downgraded inner-city areas with the sharpest dividing lines created where the lines of race and class overlapped (Marcuse 2002a). At the same time, the melting-pot side of the American dream was working for most immigrant groups that were less racially distinct from the White majority than African-Americans. The relatively rapid socio-spatial assimilation of immigrant groups rendered the segregation of the Black population even more severe, and indicated that social mobility was immediately leading to the decrease of segregation. Decrease in social distance meant decrease in spatial distance as well.

It was in those conditions that segregation was coined as a term for urban sociology. Its simple definition reflected these clear-cut spatial outcomes and gave the impression of a full correspondence between social and spatial distance. Within that context, Robert Park and the Chicago School were impelled to consider segregation and spatial distance a direct and adequate measure for social distance and inequality.

> It is because geography, occupation, and all the other factors which determine the distribution of population determine so irresistibly and fatally the place, the group, and the associates with whom each one of us is bound to live that spatial relations come to have, for the study of society and human nature, the importance which they do. It is because social relations are so frequently and so inevitably correlated with spatial relations; because physical distances so frequently are, or seem to be, the indexes of social distances, that statistics have any significance whatever for sociology. And this is true, finally, because it is only as social and psychical facts can be reduced to, or correlated with, spatial facts that they can be measured at all. (Park 1916 [1957]: 177)

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European cities, on the other hand, have not developed a similarly clear ethno-racial and social segregation pattern. In terms of ethno-racial composition, most of them were dominated—until recently at least—by one ethnic group, while the specific weight of outcast groups—like travelers—remained relatively marginal wherever they were present. The phenomena of ghettoization and white flight have not shaped, therefore, their socio-spatial structure, even though ghettoes were first instituted in the European continent (Wacquant 1997). In terms of social segregation, welfare policies have effectively opposed the development of high levels of spatial division.

The second important parameter differentiating the pattern of segregation in continental European cities is that suburbanization has not been an equally strong generator of socially homogenous space. The relatively belated suburban expansion and the much greater reliance on public transport systems and spatial planning has produced less suburban sprawl and less social homogeneity in suburban spaces, while the attachment of ruling classes to central areas in major cities like Paris, Vienna or Madrid gave substantially less propensity to suburban expansion. As a result, cities in Europe remain more compact than their American counterparts; and since suburbanization was much less the choice of social elites who did not abandon city centers, they—as most cities around the world—were led, according to Timms (1971) and Leontidou (1990), to an 'inverse Burgess model'. Moreover, cities in Europe, compared to those in the New World, rarely developed *ex nihilio*; their development patterns were usually grafted onto urban tissues inherited from the pre-industrial city whose spatial division was characterized, to a large extent, by the occupational maze corresponding to the spatial organization of the guild system (Sjoberg 1960, Vance 1971) rather than by clear segregation lines.

In this sense, the definition of segregation corresponding to the context of the booming and racially divided American metropolis of the mid-west in the early twentieth century, has not been directly relevant for European cities. The same applies to measurement tools (especially segregation indices) and to research agendas of the Chicago School and the early post-war segregation research, which ignored politics and the state (Pahl 1975: 236–40, van Kempen and Murie 2009: 378) developed on the basis of this contextual model. Indices of segregation and factorial ecologies of European cities have never revealed clear images of shifting and sorting directly attributable to discrimination practices and unleashed market forces. They rather revealed complex and mitigated situations involving the interplay of inherited, socially mixed urban structures, of social structures and networks with increased spatial embeddedness and low residential mobility and, often, of policies directly checking the development of segregation.

Thus, a staggering segregation index of 0.80 for African Americans in Chicago creates a clear, powerful and to some extent self-explanatory image, compared to a relatively modest 0.35 for high status professionals in Paris, Madrid or Athens, which reveals that the degree of isolation of the highest and most segregated occupational categories in these cities is nowhere near that of racially discriminated groups in the US.

The significance of segregation as a major issue and a measure of urban social inequality has diminished for the Anglo-American metropolis in recent decades since urban socio-spatial change progressively depended less on expansion (suburbanization) and more on the 'new urban frontier' (Smith 1996) of gentrification. Gentrification is the dominant way of remodeling central urban areas affected by deindustrialization. It is leading to the attraction of more profitable land uses, higher status residents and the displacement of working class and marginal groups following neoliberal urban policies focused on commodification and competitiveness. Urban segregation and gentrification are particular spatial manifestations of ethno-racial and social inequality since they are both related to specific processes within particular contexts. They have respectively emerged out of the extremely clear ethno-racial division based on racial discrimination in the modern

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American metropolis of the early twentieth century, and of the massive socio-spatial remodeling of city centers in the post-industrial metropolis of the Anglophone world. It is no wonder then that they are most clearly expressed in those contexts rather than anywhere else in the world (Maloutas 2012). Gentrification has not left segregation unaffected. As a process of (re)appropriation of central city spaces by middle and upper middle-classes at the expense of working class groups it may be assumed to lead eventually to more segregation, but, for some time at least, it increases the social mix in gentrified areas and may reduce segregation indices.[17] Moreover, gentrification changes the scale of segregation by diversifying spaces at the micro-level. Further complexity stems from the uneven use of local services (e.g. schools)[18] by different social groups, which develops as segregation is reduced, and blurs the correspondence between residential spaces and social profiles.

Therefore, the simple and seemingly universally applicable definition of segregation—as well as of gentrification[19]—and the tools to measure it come bundled with implicit contextual assumptions (Butler 2007: 162) that may distort the analysis of socio-spatial inequality within different contexts.

Perceptions of Segregation and Policy Responses

The perception of segregation as a social issue has been constructed in strikingly different ways following the diverse paths and content it acquired in different contexts, its contextually differentiated effects and mainly the ideological substratum on which it stands. Again, the difference observed between the two sides of the Atlantic is informative.

On the American side the perception of segregation is founded on the dominance of economic liberalism, personal merit and on a very high rate of residential mobility.[20] From the era of Chicago School's *natural areas* the high rates of social and residential mobility led to intense shifting and sorting on the housing market, and the relation of people to places became increasingly fluid and temporary. People and places formed two distinct, even though interrelated, hierarchies: places according to quality, accessible by people according to merit. As the market became dominant in the allocation of housing, there was a widespread belief—illustrating its ideological dominance—

17 In most cities of the advanced capitalist world gentrification runs parallel to the declining numbers of the working class, and to some extent at least, it leads to the replacement rather than displacement of the working class (see Hamnett 2003 about London, and Slater 2006 for a different approach). In both cases, however, the effect of first or second stage gentrification (Smith 1987)—i.e. of the phase in which pioneer groups, like artists, start living in an area and setting a trend to be followed by a second phase when affluent groups corroborate the trend—is the mitigation of working class segregation in gentrified areas, which serves to legitimate gentrification policies. Otherwise, gentrification increases overall working class spatial retrenchment even in the case of replacement: the spatial distribution of the working class becomes more uneven as its vanishing part is not replaced by middle class groups in working class strongholds and in gentrified or socially mixed areas at the same rate.

18 See van Zanten (2001) and Butler et al. (2006) on strategies of school choice, especially concerning middle-class groups.

19 Clark (2005: 258) has proposed a simplified definition of gentrification which should serve its universal use: "a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated reinvestment of fixed capital."

20 Comparative data show that cities of the New World were the champions of residential mobility in the 1980s with annual rates between 15 percent and 20 percent. European cities were much lower with rates around 5 and 10 percent (Knox and Pinch 2006: 252). More recent figures for Southern Europe show rates clearly below the European average (Allen et al. 2004).

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that where people live reflects where they deserve to live and hence that whatever residential segregation exists should not be considered a social problem.

Racial discrimination, however, has been distorting the image of the meritocratic system obstructing potentially deserving African Americans (and others) from accessing better places, while the cracks of the market produced barriers to deserving poor (Whites as well). Following the same ideological doctrine, segregation becomes an equal opportunity problem limited to the lower social strata. Policies devised to confront it aim at providing opportunities to escape from bad areas rather than to improve them, and people may be moved to less segregated residential areas or to non-segregated schools. Policies like *Moving to Opportunity*,[21] the HOPE program [www.thehopeprogram.org/] or school bussing are within such a conceptual and contextual frame.

The tendency to dissociate, in policy terms, the fates of people and places in the US should certainly be related to the contradictory coexistence of a long history of racial discrimination—that flagrantly obstructed access to the land and housing markets for a substantial part of the population—with the high rates of social and spatial mobility for the numerous others that participated in the American dream. Thus, an important difference between the US and European constructions of segregation as a social and political problem consists of the still paramount presence of radicalized segregation in the former. This begged for the liberalization of residential mobility for the racial groups victimized by discrimination, and made their unrestricted participation in the housing market an obvious improvement over normative, or otherwise imposed, discriminatory residential space allocation on the basis of racial hierarchy (Massey and Denton 1993). At some point, the free movement of individuals for residential location anywhere they could afford became at the same time a recommendation of economic liberalism and a progressive claim for the civil rights movement. However, this liberalization of residential mobility, combined with urban structures inherited from a long period of racial discrimination and to the impact of economic restructuring, has led according to Wilson (1987: 49–56) to further segregation of the African-American poor in increasingly jobless and socially disorganized inner-city ghettos following the flight of Black middle class and working class households.

In Europe, on the contrary, concern for segregation developed regarding the negative impact of the freely relocating individuals and households through the mechanisms of land and housing markets that produce an uneven spatial distribution of social groups and, at the same time, uneven living conditions and life prospects in different localities. The major policy response in Western and Northern Europe has been the extensive investment in the social housing sector that, for some decades at least, has opposed segregation, especially wherever it was addressed to a wide social range of beneficiaries in a rather oecumenical welfare state spirit.

The perception of segregation in the European city is substantially different and the life itineraries of people are much more tied to places, regardless of whether they become attached to them or feel entrapped. This is practically expressed by much lower residential mobility and is mainly founded on the comparatively reduced ideological influence of economic liberalism during long periods. Questions of residential area quality are constitutive parts of social equality in the French republican ethos or of the socialist tradition[22] and social rights in Scandinavian welfare

21 MTO is a pilot project in the US whose rationale is to move people from downgraded social housing projects and control how they fare in less disadvantaged surroundings (Orr et al. 2003, Goering and Feins 2003). As a pilot program it had rather limited size and impact, while its basic procedures in terms of choice of households to be supported, and of the fate of those left behind, are questionable. According to Lupton (2003) such a policy rationale would be out of context in the UK.

22 See, for example, Halbwachs's attention to the improvement of working class areas in the municipal socialism spirit (Topalov 2001).

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societies and, therefore, segregated areas are a problem to which organized society must provide answers. Socially mixed residential areas have resulted from policies founded on strong welfare states in Western and Northern Europe (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, Musterd et al. 2006, van Kempen 2002a). Häussermann (2005) claims that the interventionist welfare state originates from the autonomy of European bourgeoisies in the 19th century and represents the main legacy of the European city. Scandinavian cities have been accustomed to the regulation of both labor and housing markets in ways that used to avoid segregation.[23] Such framings of segregation tend to devise policies targeted to places apart from people and were, partly at least, the grounds on which area based policies were developed as a way to combat segregation in several countries around Europe (Burgers and Vranken 2003, cited in Musterd and Murie 2006). In certain countries and namely in France, the UK and Netherlands, there is considerable emphasis on anti-segregation policies, related to social issues and strong mobilizations considered to emanate from negative neighborhood effects. However, the emphasis on area based policies and, particularly, on social mixing in a receding welfare state can be associated with policies that are displacing the focus from social to spatial issues, are legitimating different objectives—like gentrification (Lees 2008)—and may eventually lead to increased segregation.

Contextual diversity in terms of the ways segregation is perceived is also an issue within Europe. In Southern European cities, for example, segregation has not been until lately on the political agenda. Relatively low segregation indices, infrequent social unrest related to segregation, family centered social organization and very low residential mobility are probably part of the explanation. In the family centered welfare regimes of this region, people's fates are even more tied to their place of residence than in Western or Northern Europe, but not due to increased public responsibility and policies. On the contrary, public intervention is much less developed and legitimated, and it is expressed in less direct ways, with less public housing among other things (Allen et al. 2004). Families cater for their weakest members' needs and, since family networks have to coalesce in space in order to be effective, the resulting reduced residential mobility tends also to reduce the visibility of segregation as a social problem.

However, even though ideological frames in Europe have been different from the US, the increasing dominance of neoliberalism in the last three decades has produced approaches and remedies to segregation that follow the American way, i.e. they promote the spatial redistribution of poverty and consider gentrification an effective way to improve social mixing (Ostendorf 2002, Lees 2008). The receding welfare states of Western and Northern Europe, the collapse of state socialism and the progressive decline of clientelism in Southern Europe have weakened—in different ways—the defenses against increasing inequality and its spatial expressions.

Segregation Impact: Contextually Different Neighborhood Effects

Contextual parameters that affect the ways segregation is constructed as a social and political problem also affect its impact and the solutions devised to combat it in terms of anti-segregation policies. Segregation is generally considered as an important issue due to its assumed impact on living conditions and on chances of social mobility. There has been a substantial growth in the literature addressing the impact of segregation, i.e. the *neighborhood* or *area effect*. This literature

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23 There are claims, however, that even though policies of the Danish welfare state prevent social polarization, recent housing policies have increased segregation (Andersen 2004 and Chapter 8 in this volume); segregation appears also to be an issue for Sweden (see Holgersson et al. (2010) on Gothenburg) and Finland (Vaattovaara and Kortteinen 2003).

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has mainly been developed in the US (Ellen and Turner 1997) focusing on social isolation and ghetto culture; on the lack of role-models, related to the absence of successful middle class groups; on forms of social capital that constrain rather than enable social mobility; on poor quality of services and reduced access to new jobs (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001: 2278).

The central issue is whether there are specific spatial effects on peoples' lives and life prospects "over and above non-spatial categories such as gender and class (…)" (Atkinson and Kintrea 2001: 2277). These additional effects may originate from the different socio-demographic composition of neighborhoods, from their intrinsic quality—e.g. the quality of their environment or of the locally provided services—and from neighborhoods' comparative status, ranging from privileged to stigmatized (Buck 2001). Does living in an area of concentrated poverty raise the chances of not finding a job or of not doing well at school compared to someone equally poor living in a mixed or a middle class neighborhood, and to what extent? Is there a linear relation between area effects and the intrinsic characteristics of neighborhoods or are there thresholds after which things change dramatically? Even though such questions about neighborhood effects can be formulated rather clearly, the research design for their empirical investigation is quite complicated because it is difficult to disentangle the complex ways in which individuals interact with neighborhoods (Buck 2001, Lupton 2003). The question of neighborhood effects is further complicated by the fact that they may refer to different spatial scales, they may be negative or positive and they are not necessarily the same for different class categories. According to Gordon and Monastiriotis (2006) neighborhood effects in education performance in the UK appear more important as a middle class advantage than as a disadvantage of working class groups. Research from the UK (Buck 2001, Atkinson and Kintrea 2001, Buck and Gordon 2004) and Netherlands (Ostendorf et al. 2001, Ostendorf 2002) reveals a relatively low, but significant level of neighborhood effects compared to individual/household characteristics. Musterd and Murie (2006) found effects of varying magnitude from a number of European city neighborhoods that were not always what was expected according to the local welfare regime; these effects were considered important—even though not fundamentally important for people's lives—and not necessarily either positive or negative.

Proving the existence and importance of neighborhood effects does not seem necessary in order to convince policy makers in the UK, France or Netherlands, as they seem already convinced of their existence and for the need to develop area based policies or initiatives (Lupton 2003). This conviction stems from the fear—substantially echoed by the media—that poverty in Europe is getting Americanized, with increased ghettoization and racialization. Musterd and Ostendorf (1998a: 6–7) criticized the paradoxical media suggestion to fight Americanization in Europe the American way, i.e. by converging to a workfare system and cutting welfare benefits. To some extent, however, these paradoxical media suggestions have been implemented by several European countries in the meantime, and the current sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe imposes discipline and punishment along this line.

The neighborhood effects literature is unevenly developed geographically, and this partly reflects the unevenness of these effects in different contexts. Enforced and strict spatial isolation, as in the excluded black ghetto, obviously reduces opportunities for social mobility to a much higher degree (Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987) than spatial separation in comparatively low segregation environments and relatively evenly serviced residential areas, as in Dutch cities. In the latter, neighborhood effects may be found to be of considerably less importance for social mobility than the personal/household characteristics of the relatively isolated and deprived groups (Ostendorf et al. 2001, Musterd et al. 2003). Neighborhood effects in Southern European cities can be expected to be somewhere in the middle due to the contradictory influence of, on the one

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hand, the absence of highly segregated areas and groups and, on the other, the relatively poor and unevenly distributed social services.

Overview of the 11 Cities: Segregation in Context

The profile of segregation patterns, levels and trends for the 11 cities discussed in this book is very diverse. The same applies to these cities' contextual features. Each one combines a different degree of inequality and discrimination, with strong or weak state intervention, with more or less socio-spatially dividing house allocation mechanisms, with strong or weak social networks, and forms a contextual profile which corresponds to segregation patterns, levels and trends that cannot be directly derived from any of these contextual parameters in isolation.

Tokyo, in spite of its magnitude and importance for global financial and other circuits and Sassen's contentions about its socio-spatial polarization, is a rather equal city with highly mixed residential areas. Fujita and Hill describe the unequal distribution of income among the city's spatial units, which, however, is not accompanied by a similarly unequal spatial distribution of occupational categories. This paradox is explained by the outstanding functional primacy of its four central wards, in respect to the rest of the units in the central city as well as the suburbs, that were the object of intense investment leading to two real estate bubbles in the last 35 years. The owner-residents of these wards have gained much during the rising price periods, and lost much during the falls.

What comes out of Fujita and Hill's analysis is that the unequal spatial distribution of income in Tokyo is not a product of the labor market, but of the rocketing prices of landed assets in the four central wards that boosted the income of the local owner-residents and pushed others to different areas. Otherwise, the city has inherited a socially mixed urban structure since the end of feudalism, and has been reproducing its social structure in rather egalitarian patterns following the developmental state model. The latter involves features like the compressed wage system, which keeps low wage differentials even between managerial and production jobs; the corporate community ethos, which leads corporations to behave in a very protective way toward their employees, mitigating the imperatives of profit making and stakeholders' interests; the long-term investment against the short-term profit making approach, which is coupled with a collectivist spirit in terms of accomplishments and rewards that blurs the limits between public and private; the highly redistributive tax policies that prevent wealthy communities from using their richer tax bases selfishly; and finally, the egalitarian education system and the non-residual character of public housing that promotes social mix and is present in all parts of the city—even in the four most exclusive central wards. The developmental state model checks in fact the inegalitarian impact and the spatial shifting and sorting of liberally regulated capitalism, leading to similar outcomes with the European welfare state. The difference is that the latter intervenes mainly through redistribution to redress the impact of the labor market, which is left more or less free to operate on market principles, while the former imposes stricter norms on the labor market and its inequality generating mechanisms. Both the welfare state and the developmental state are receding, but their regulating effects are still considerable and bear witness to the continuing power of politics at different levels.

Segregation in Beijing, following Logan and Li, seems still mainly influenced by the previous decades of socialist regulation. Social inequality—measured by broad education and occupation categories—is growing, but the spatial separation of these categories remains quite limited. This is because although different forms of housing tenure correspond to different forms of building

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stock with quite distinct spatial patterns, and to different processes of production and allocation, they correspond to only moderately different social groups of potential occupiers. The growing commodification of housing, illustrated by the impressive increase of owner-occupation to 72 percent in 2000 from 20 percent within 20 years, has been dominated by the subsidized process of selling public housing units to sitting tenants, which means long established social segregation patterns have remained unchanged, especially since the new homeowners do not have any particular reason to move.

Ethno-racial discrimination is traditionally important in China, but it applies to a relatively small part of the urban population and affects negatively only those with non-urban residence status (see also Chaolin and Kesteloot 2002).

Hong Kong presents, following Yip, the unexpected combination of extremely high levels of income inequality and rather low levels of segregation, especially between middle and lower occupational and income groups for reasons connected mainly with planning and housing policies. With a recent colonial past that largely predefines the enclaves of the rich, and rather limited space that has to be densely built up, Hong Kong has to spatially accommodate a highly unequal social structure deriving from its position and great dynamism within global and regional financial and other key economic processes. In the last two or three decades the city has shifted very rapidly from manufacturing to services and its occupational structure was affected, accordingly losing skilled and semi-skilled workers and gaining higher-end jobs (managers and professionals). Even though occupational polarization has not developed—since middle status jobs in the services have also increased substantially (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 2009)—income inequality, as well as polarization, have grown, especially since the mid 1990s. However, the high level of inequality and polarization does not translate into segregation, except for the richest decile, whose dissimilarity index is high and increasing. For the rest, segregation indices are relatively low and decreasing.

This seems to be the outcome of planning and housing policies, with the very high specific weight of public housing affecting the private sector in a decisive way. Public housing is not only quantitatively important, of relatively good quality and attractively priced; it has also been targeted on a much broader clientele than the neediest groups, leading to reduced segregation that becomes more sustainable following the disincentives to homeowners—who purchased their house from public authorities—to resell it in the free market. On the other hand, the scale of housing operations is extremely large and the conditions usually imposed on developers are such that the latter have to diversify their housing supply in order to guarantee their investment. As in Beijing, the population is much more segregated by tenure than by socioeconomic characteristics; however, tenure categories are internally very diversified and this mitigates the importance of tenure segregation in socioeconomic terms. In contrast with Copenhagen and other Scandinavian cities, where effective policies for income equality are no longer accompanied by effectively egalitarian spatial policies (Andersen 2004 and Chapter 8 in this volume), Hong Kong applies anti-segregation policies—although they are not termed and intended as such. Finally, as in Athens, Madrid and other Southern European cities (Arbaci 2007, 2008, Arbaci and Malheiros 2010) the low degree of segregation may not be a cause for celebration, as it does not preclude deprivation for the vulnerable groups even if they are not spatially distanced from the rest.

Taipei shows a low level of residential segregation in terms of class, while ethno-racial segregation is rather insignificant due to the homogeneous constitution of its population. This virtual absence of working class segregation in particular should be attributed, according to Wang and Li, to the workings of the developmental state that produced this effect through its industrial, and mainly through its planning and housing policies during the last 30 years. Local policies and conditions have led to weak segregation in a path dependent way, and the influence of global forces

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seems rather reduced as well as the explanatory power of theoretical schemes stressing the effect of globalization on socio-spatial outcomes. There is a broad differentiation between Taipei City and its periphery (Xinbei City) with a higher concentration of upper social positions in the former. At the same time, failures and weaknesses of the housing and planning systems have permitted land speculation and housing price increases that have affected certain quarters of Taipei City and its immediate periphery, putting them out of reach for lower socioeconomic groups. However, the defects of planning and housing policies have unintendedly induced lower levels of segregation by not producing massive social housing projects concentrated in particular areas and leaving large numbers of the city's population to be accommodated with alternative solutions or moving to the periphery and to neighboring cities.

São Paulo is a very unequal and segregated city with a long tradition of inequality and segregation. According to Marques et al. its *Centro Expandido* has always been, and continues to be, the area of the higher social categories, while the peripheries—near as well as distant—are where the lower status groups are located. This dichotomy is not only spatial, but denotes also the strong historical unequal division in access to jobs, goods and services. The center/periphery dichotomy has been fed by the intense internal migration of the 1960s and 1970s, when industry was developing and those seeking working class jobs found residence in irregular settlements produced by private developers without state regulation and infrastructure, and with poor access to public services (see also Schiffer 2002). The poor were hardly becoming part of the city in a period otherwise characterized by rapid economic growth.

The city's occupational structure is characterized by a rather small top (low percentage of higher categories) and a much bigger bottom; the trend in the 1990s was relative growth at the top and stability at the bottom, therefore without any particular polarization tendency. In terms of income, however, inequality has been growing and polarization cannot be ruled out. At the same time, democratic change brought a better distribution of services, and schooling has increased and benefited almost all categories, especially the lower ones. Increased economic inequality, however, has not been translated to increased segregation. The strong center/periphery segregation division has been preserved with a decrease of homogeneity within each part, especially in the peripheries where the lower middle-classes have been increasing their presence. Another trend that reinforces the mosaic pattern is the location of gated communities near poor neighborhoods leading to a more complex combination of spatial proximity and social distance. Overall, the high level of inequality and segregation in São Paulo cannot be attributed to global forces, whose influence affected the city mainly after the 1980s. Inequality and segregation are persistent features of Brazilian cities on which globalization has had a certain effect together, however, with opposite effects related to the country's democratization.

Paris, according to Préteceille, is a comparatively unequal city in a not so unequal country due to its appeal for the very rich—natives and foreigners—and its position in global financial and other business networks. Residential segregation is, however, less marked than portrayed in the media and expected by certain researchers, even though the city is clearly divided into socially diversified spaces following decades and even centuries of upper categories' residential choices, and urban planning. Social segregation is mainly defined by the opposition between the location of the higher categories of business managers and professionals and that of the working class; an opposition which is mitigated, however, by the existence of very substantial socially intermediate and mixed spaces that comprise almost half of the city's population. The importance of these mixed spaces is concomitant with the growth of several middle social categories in the service sector that also contradicts the dual city model.

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On the other hand, the exclusive focus on the problematic areas of the *banlieues* glosses over the fact that the most segregated categories are those of the rich, especially the professionals and managers in the private sector; who are not only the most segregated, but whose spatial isolation increased in the 1990s, contrary to the decrease for most other social categories. At the same time, other high occupational categories—like teachers, professors, artists and journalists—are getting less segregated following different location patterns. It may be true that spaces at the extremities of the social hierarchy get respectively richer and poorer, but the exclusive focus on them (and usually just on the poorer segment) leaves most of the city fabric out of the picture.

Ethno-racial segregation has become stronger than social segregation in Paris. However, it remains relatively moderate compared to Chicago or New York, with 70 percent of immigrants living in areas where the natives dominate. The unequal spatial distribution of ethno-racial groups cannot be entirely explained by their members' class affiliation; the rest of the explanation should be attributed to various forms of discrimination and to practical necessities that bring immigrants of the same groups closer, especially when they are first established in the city. Préteceille concludes that we need to avoid fascination with the social and spatial extremes as well as with mono-causal explanations based on globalization trends. The global forces that affect the labor and housing markets do not necessarily produce the outcomes theoretically expected in terms of segregation since the outcomes are filtered by the inertia of the urban structure and the enabling or constraining effect of related policies. Urban policies in Paris have changed several times over the past decades until they became openly anti-segregation in the 1990s and, even though they have remained far from fully implemented, they have definitely had an impact on outcomes. This impact should not be taken at face value: social housing estates, for example, depending on their location and quality, may either promote or oppose segregation.

Andersen argues that Copenhagen is certainly outstanding for its low level of social inequality, which is the outcome of the very high Danish employment rate and high wages that prevent poverty among the employed, and of the Scandinavian Social Democratic welfare state that protects effectively all individuals and households with no income from work. The current social structure derives from a growth period led by the service sector after the deindustrialization and economic restructuring of the 1980s. An important component of this structure are the immigrants who represent 22 percent of the city's population, even though half of them originate from developed economy countries. Segregation, however, can be developed even when inequality is relatively reduced and Copenhagen—as well as other cities in the same welfare regime, e.g. Gothenburg (Holgersson et al. 2010)—is socio-spatially divided along lines inherited from the nineteenth century and steadily reproduced since. In comparative terms, segregation in Copenhagen remains limited and, as in most cases, the highest occupational or income categories are the ones that are most distant from the rest. Two mechanisms that induce socio-spatial change are depicted by Andersen: the first is the breaking of the traditional life cycle in many western cities, that involved suburban living for young households, leading to smoother age segregation patterns—i.e. less clear concentration of young couples with children in the suburbs returning at a later stage in the center—but also to gentrification pressure.[24] The second is the "paradoxical impact of welfarism": on the one hand, vulnerable groups are relieved of the burden of housing deprivation, but on the other, they become spatially isolated in residualized public housing estates due to the flight of other groups and their own increased presence. Housing policies seem to have lost their egalitarian effect

24 See also Marcuse and van Kempen (2000: 11–12) who argue that these changes increase the complexity of spatial divisions.

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as well as education services which—even though distributed equitably—have much less effect than they used to in bridging inequalities in social mobility.

Segregation in Budapest appears extremely path dependent according to Kovács. Following the city's initial rapid growth in the late nineteenth century, which endowed the city center with good quality buildings and rather low segregation, there developed the dominant segregation pattern between a privileged center and a deprived periphery as a result of the massive settlement of rural migrants in the latter. Segregation was again remodeled after the Second World War under the socialist regime that attacked both income inequalities and socio-spatial separation by policies that downgraded the center and created modern housing projects in the periphery. Inequalities and segregation started to grow again after the relaxation of socialist regulation in the late 1960s and more markedly after the collapse of state socialism (see also Ladányi 2002). The current East/West division of the city, with particular affluent enclaves within both the center and the periphery, developed as a result of reforms both in the labor and housing markets. The liberalization of the former, accompanied by unrestricted openness to foreign investment, led to the rapid growth of income inequality. The liberalization of the housing market was decisive in boosting segregation as it was implemented in conditions of housing shortage and in the presence of considerable demand for upscale housing from foreign citizens. Thus, the subsidized privatization of public housing turned out to be an unequally profitable operation; those occupying higher value units and having the required resources were given the opportunity to gain much more than the rest. The re-valorization of properties in the center, the degradation of outdated and poorly maintained public housing projects in the periphery and the growing demand for quality housing accelerated the shifting and sorting, while the loose regulation of the market permitted the development of new processes—like "organised gentrification" by municipalities, "white flight" from social housing, filtering-down in certain areas of the center and mushrooming of "gated communities"—all of which have also boosted segregation tendencies.

Madrid is a large metropolis of the European South, very well inserted in the globalized corporate networks and having experienced substantial economic growth from the late 1990s to the eve of the current crisis in 2007. According to Domingez et al. economic growth was accompanied by the rapid growth of higher occupational categories as well as of certain intermediate ones and by the decrease of those at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. The range of income inequality increased with those with higher incomes increasing their distance from the rest. However, the group of those with minimum earnings has decreased. Thus, neither the occupational nor the income hierarchies have become polarized. In fact, income has increased for top categories and lower ones, while for the broad upper and upper-middle category of professionals it remained rather stable, partly due to their own over-fast growth—leading to considerable unemployment and precariousness—as a consequence of rapid intergenerational social mobility. This mobility has depleted lower occupational positions that were filled to a large extent by immigrants whose services became consequently more in demand. During the same period the importance of accumulated wealth has increased in respect to income from work: income from real estate and business grew much faster than income from salaries, pensions or unemployment benefits from 1994 to 2006. Under these circumstances, with housing prices increasing very fast and mortgages being extended ever longer, it makes a big difference—in terms of income—whether a homeowner has finished paying for his/her house or not. These social and economic trends were accompanied by demographic diversification, especially in terms of household structure that complicated even further the spatial impact of socioeconomic changes.

Madrid seems to offer plenty of evidence that segregation is not a very pertinent indicator of urban social inequality. On the one hand, increased inequality has not been followed by

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increased, but rather by decreased segregation and, on the other, the new immigrant population is characterized mainly by housing deprivation rather than segregation. The clear division between a bourgeois center and a working class periphery in the 1950s and 1960s has been complemented by a broad North-South division and, although they both remain clear, there are internal diversification processes of different sorts that reduce segregation without leading necessarily to reduced social distance. Thus, the higher occupational categories, who have the higher segregation indices, have also presented the sharpest decrease in segregation levels. This was the result of their numeric growth and their expansion to residential areas where they were not previously present, through processes of *embourgeoisement* or gentrification. Another process that, temporarily at least, reduces segregation also takes place in lower status peripheral areas where the upwardly mobile offspring of working class parents remain in new improved housing projects in order to continue benefiting from family solidarity networks. Finally, there is a similar desegregation impact from immigrant housing strategies of overcrowding rented, or of subletting part of owner-occupied accommodation in intermediate or higher status areas due to the scarcity of adequate housing supply in traditional working class areas. Reduced segregation, therefore, should not be taken at face value since it glosses over different forms of inequality including, mainly, a substantial degree of housing deprivation for the immigrant population (see also Arapoglou 2006, Arbaci 2007, 2008, Arbaci and Malheiros 2010, Maloutas 2007a).

In Istanbul, according to Taşan-Kok, the importance of ethnic diversity for segregation is not related to the city's present ethno-racial profile—apart from the Kurdish minority perhaps—but to a rather distant past when non-Muslim groups lived quite separately from the city's Turkish population. Ethnic cleansing in the southern Balkans after the First World War deprived the cities of the region of their multi-ethnic character. With the departure of non-Muslim groups, the privileged areas they were occupying became progressively derelict and inhabited by marginalized groups of poor rural migrants. However, the architecturally interesting building stock that survived many decades of dereliction and their privileged location has helped turn them to gentrifiable areas when social, political and economic conditions changed. During the same period of national consolidation, and in parallel with the dereliction of these areas, the city experienced large waves of rural migration that led to peripheral squatter settlements following family and common origin networks that enabled their settlement, survival and integration. Although poverty was a main feature of these areas, they have also been areas of social mobility, partly based on profit from the land and housing market dynamic and politically monitored by the clientelist legalization of illegal settlements in exchange for votes. The dynamic of these areas changed when Turkey became economically and politically outward-turned, and Istanbul became increasingly socially diversified attracting both unskilled and highly skilled labor. Some of these areas were progressively redeveloped targeting middle and upper-middle social groups, while lower-income social groups have often been displaced in the process. More recently, neoliberal policies have lowered the protectionist barriers of the previous period and brought foreign investors into land and housing development. Combined with the dual labor market and the residual welfare state, these policies deepened further the shifting and sorting of unequal social groups and the formation of socially very diverse spaces—like gated communities for the super-rich and deprived settlements for excluded groups—often close to one another. These processes have led to a broad segregation pattern in which higher income groups are mainly situated in central areas along the coast, lower income groups in the periphery, and middle income groups in between (see also Güvenç and Iştk 2002).

Athens, following Maloutas et al., is a rather large regional metropolis that, comparatively, is neither particularly unequal nor intensely segregated in class or ethno-racial terms. This seems to be the unintended consequence of the combined influence of a relatively non-polarized occupational

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structure with a long history of high social mobility in the post-war decades as well as of the rather limited integration of the city into the high-end of the global labor market and the ensuing limited presence of an international corporate elite exercising pressure on the higher end of the housing market. Reduced segregation is also related to the dominance of two housing provision systems that had an ambivalent impact on both class and ethno-racial segregation. These systems developed as parts of the family centered welfare model that, as in the rest of Southern Europe, has grown to depend on family solidarity networks, reducing both residential mobility and segregation. They were also constitutive parts of the clientelist/populist political system that relied on defending both high social mobility rates and massive access to homeownership for its reproduction, often at the expense of the free function of market mechanisms that could put them under threat.

However, residential segregation is a reality in Athens with the socially most extreme spaces becoming even more homogeneous and, as in most other cities, with the higher social categories more separated spatially than the lower ones. This is due to the gradual reversal of the dominant segregation divide between a bourgeois center and a working class periphery with the formation of extensive middle and upper-middle class suburbs in the eastern periphery that have since the late 1970s progressively become the city's most homogeneous residential spaces. At the same time, traditional working class suburbs have become more socially mixed—as in Madrid (Leal 2004)—following the spatial 'entrapment' of endogenous social mobility, i.e. the fact that the upwardly mobile next generation avoids moving to a better residential address in order to preserve the advantages from participating in kinship networks (Maloutas 2004). On the whole, desegregation was the trend for all major occupational categories in the 1990s, except the shrinking and aging skilled industrial workers who seem to be increasingly confined to their traditional strongholds. Immigration, on the other hand, has not boosted segregation in Athens. Due to the location of the available and affordable housing stock in the densely populated areas around the city center, the presence of immigrants has reduced occupational segregation as large numbers of migrants holding routine jobs were mixed with native middle and upper-middle occupational groups.

Reduced neighborhood segregation in Athens coexists, however, with other forms of socio-spatial separation, like 'vertical segregation' (the systematic class and ethno-racial division by floor of residence in densely built areas around the center) or school segregation, which seems to be a strategy of middle-class households to overcome what they perceive as negative effects of reduced residential segregation. Immigrants, on the other hand, may not be highly segregated, but nonetheless suffer significant housing deprivation. Overall, residential segregation may be of relatively low intensity in Athens, but it is accompanied by real barriers to effective social mixing and contact that create social distance in spite of spatial proximity and, lately, even conflict.

Summing Up

Most of the chapters included in this volume depict segregation as a complex process that usually contradicts the assumptions of the polarization thesis and the dual/divided city imagery. With our focus on contextual causality—and having defined context as specific articulations of market, state, civil society and durable urban structures including the social relations, practices and ideologies they carry—the contributions of this volume bring evidence from around the world about the importance of such articulations for the shape, intensity and social impact of residential segregation. We can summarize this evidence as follows:

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1. *We cannot assume that global forces induce unequivocally a high and increasing level of residential segregation in metropolitan centers around the world.* Even though global forces contribute to increasing inequality, they do not immediately affect residential segregation; their impact is mediated by a host of contextual parameters and, usually, this leads to variable outcomes. Capitalist globalization theoretically leads to increased inequality, and sometimes to social polarization and segregation. However, in some cases the growth of inequality is mitigated or even reversed—as in Copenhagen—and in many more—like Paris, Tokyo or Madrid—inequality does not lead to polarization; but, even where there is growth of inequality and polarization, increased segregation does not automatically follow. On the contrary, in almost all of the 11 cities segregation has been decreasing for most occupational and ethno-racial categories.
2. *Important socio-spatial dichotomies appear inherited from the past rather than the product of forces related to global economic restructuring.* Such sharp dichotomies are observed in some of the cities—mainly in São Paulo and Istanbul—but they were formed well before the recent period of economic restructuring. Moreover, all the cities discussed in the book are more or less clearly divided between areas of different status, with those for the rich having been established as such for many decades, if not for centuries. These divisions, produced under quite different circumstances from current conditions, testify much more to cities' path-dependent formation than of convergence to a global urban model. Global forces may be currently assisting the deepening of divisions, but the diversity of outcomes indicates that they do not determine the outcome on their own. An argument for dualization was identified in Paris and Athens, where socially extreme spaces have become more extreme during the 1990s. At the same time, however, the mode of socially mixed living was dominant (socially mixed areas cover half of these cities) and not regressing, while extreme spaces remained of rather reduced importance.
3. *Ethno-racial identity does not appear to be the primary axis of segregation outside deeply discriminating contexts, even though in several cities included in this book ethno-racial diversity is gaining importance with the increasing size of immigrant communities*. In most of the cities where ethno-racial diversity is not negligible, discrimination is not absent but socioeconomic position remains the main criterion for segregation. However, wherever anti-segregation policies are developed, they are almost exclusively related to ethno-racial spatial concentrations and are usually inspired by an unwarranted fear of US style ghettoization. The reality of segregation is, therefore, not necessarily related to the way it is socially and politically perceived.
4. *The rich are more segregated than the poor*. In almost all of the 11 cities, the higher occupational or income categories are the more segregated and the ones that often continue to increase their spatial distance from the rest; this happens at the same time that segregation for most of the other categories is decreasing. However, the seclusion of the rich is not regarded as constituting a political problem, and the focus remains exclusively on the segregation of the poor. Again, the social and political perception of segregation is dependent more on ideological *rapports de force* than on documented accounts of its condition and of its effects.
5. *There is increasing socioeconomic diversity in urban space following the subdivision of former broader social and functional divisions between Centre/Periphery, East/West or North/South, which does not necessarily lead to increased segregation.* There are multiple processes leading to the increase of socio-spatial subdivision in metropolitan space. Most of them involve some form of invasion of groups or functions into territories occupied

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by other groups or functions. Urban renewal and its potentially gentrifying outcome; the expansion of upper-middle classes into mixed and middle social areas leading to their *embourgeoisement*; "gated communities" implantation near lower status areas; the spatial 'entrapment' of socially mobile households in working class areas and overcrowding of large apartments by immigrants in high status areas etc. are all processes that socially subdivide urban space. Some see in these processes a further partitioning of urban space and the erection of new walls between social or ethno-racial groups (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002). In fact all these processes bring social and functional differences closer in space; they change the scale of segregation and decrease segregation levels—at least temporarily. What will come out of these processes represents an open social and political stake vested with contradictory interests and forces rather than a done deal; outcomes can reasonably be expected to be varied and to complicate further the relation between social and spatial distance.

6. *The level of segregation depends to a large extent on state policies and this has not fundamentally changed under conditions of capitalist globalization.* Energetic state policies usually oppose the increase of segregation. This is true of welfare state policies developed in Northern and Western Europe, even though their range and anti-segregation impact may be decreasing in Copenhagen or their implementation being segmented and problematic in Paris. In the case of the East Asian developmental state, the anti-segregation effect may be less intentional, but derives from the largely egalitarian regulation of the labor market. In Southern Europe the residual-clientelist welfare model impedes segregation through family centered practices and networks that inhibit to some extent the shifting and sorting by the housing market. There is an obvious decline in the impetus and effectiveness of policies and practices that have opposed segregation.
7. *Policies affecting segregation are not always planned with such an objective and, when they are, their objective is not necessarily attained. Moreover, similar policies may lead to different outcomes in different cities.* In different contextual conditions, similar policies appear to have dissimilar effects: the selling of social housing to sitting tenants, for example, has increased segregation in Budapest much more than in Beijing following the higher marketability of housing, the greater diversity of housing types that favors residential mobility, and the openness to foreign demand in the former. Another example is the impact of public housing on segregation, which has been changing over time in Europe especially as it lost its appeal to social groups other than the neediest, following the cutting of welfare expenditure (see also Marcuse and van Kempen 2002a, Andersen 2004). On the contrary, in Hong Kong and Tokyo public housing is targeted on a wide range of social groups and counteracts segregation, even though in the former it is spatially very unevenly distributed. In Hong Kong, the model of social housing and planning regulations affects the business strategy of the dominant private and very large housing projects that seek internal diversity to ensure their profitability, and produce social mixing as an unintended outcome. Social housing may, thus, affect segregation in different ways depending on its quality, spatial distribution and social targeting.
8. *Even the extreme commodification of housing provision does not necessarily lead to increased segregation*. Housing production and land development in Hong Kong are very large scale operations within a sector of highly concentrated capital that make housing production in Athens—where building operations rarely comprise more than one relatively small building—look like petty commodity production. However, in both cases the segregating potential of the produced stock is relatively reduced due to the social profile of

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the agents involved (Athens) and to business considerations affected by public housing and planning policies (Hong Kong).

9. *The decreasing segregation trend in many cities does not necessarily mean less inequality and more intense and effective social contact between different groups.* Less segregation is often combined with increased deprivation among lower social groups and minorities. It may be the outcome of gentrification processes or of the implantation of gated communities in lower status residential areas—as in Istanbul and São Paulo—or of the dominant mode of immigrant integration in the housing market in Southern Europe, where public housing is scarce and reserved for natives. Immigrants are compelled to find solutions in the private rented sector, in overcrowded apartments in middle and upper-middle class areas in Madrid or in lower floors and basements in Athens's apartment buildings. Moreover, in some cases the relatively low level of residential segregation is accompanied by a higher segregation of services (especially schools). Outside "American exceptionalism" (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000a) spatial distance remains a poor indicator of social distance and the relationship is becoming weaker.

Segregation, in its simple traditional definition as the spatial separation of population groups, was a concept devised to address the clear-cut separation of ethno-racial groups in the residential areas of the booming industrial metropolis of the US in the 1920s. For various reasons, it has progressively assumed general validity and has been applied in different contexts around the globe, in most cases taking with it the contextual assumptions it was bundled with, and in particular the confusion between spatial and social distance, the exclusive focus on lower status groups and the assumption of important negative effects. As a simple and stand-alone index it becomes poor and often misleading when used to make inferences about urban social inequality in settings where socio-spatial separation is more intricate, and social distances are far more complex than their spatial reflexion. Research on segregation continues, however, to provide important insight into cities' socio-spatial structures and into the ways urban social inequality is reproduced, provided that it is adequately informed theoretically and properly contextualized.

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