


R. Dean Anderson Jr.

Glossary
of Greek
Rhetorical
Terms

R. DEAN ANDERSON JR.

GLOSSARY OF GREEK
RHETORICAL TERMS
CONNECTED TO
METHODS OF ARGUMENTATION,
FIGURES AND TROPES
FROM ANAXIMENES
TO QUINTILIAN



PEETERS
2000

Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology, 24

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ISBN 90-429-0846-7

D. 2000/0602/51

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INTRODUCTION

It is now more than 200 years ago that J. C. T. Ernesti published his *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae* (Leipzig, 1795). In all the intervening time it has never really been supplanted. The great Greek lexicon of Liddell and Scott, unfortunately, made no use of Ernesti's work and its value for technical rhetorical terms is severely limited. The latest supplement of 1996, whilst adding a few entries on rhetorical terms here and there, is not much better. Of course, the student of rhetorical theory may consult the relevant portions of R. Volkmann's *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer im systematischer Übersicht* (2nd ed. C. Hammer; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1885), J. Martin's *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 2.3; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974), and the initial volumes of the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* (ed. G. Kalivaoda and F.-H. Robling; Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992-) but such works in no way provide the kind of lexical help and references supplied by Ernesti. We do have the handy glossary of rhetorical terms in Philostratus' and Eunapius' *Vita Sophistarum* provided by W. C. Wright in his *Loeb* edition (Loeb Classical Library; London: Heinemann, 1921), and there are a few other works which give some aid, particularly with regard to figures, e.g. J. D. Denniston's *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). The innovative student will also gain some by using the Greek index to H. Lausberg's *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (2nd ed.; Munich, Max Hueber, 1973),¹ although the setup of this work and its penchant for utilising rather late sources can lead to faulty impressions concerning the diversity of rhetorical theory. All in all, the complexities of Greek rhetorical terminology are nowhere adequately dealt with in recent literature, unless it be via various detailed commentaries on *some* of the individual ancient theorists. A new "Ernesti" thus remains a *desideratum*.

The present work cannot claim to fill that need, nor is that the aim of this glossary, which is a product of my book *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (revised edition; Peeters: Leuven, 1998). The glossary is primarily intended as an aid to those attempting to use and apply Greek rhetorical

¹ Now available in English translation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998).

methods of argumentation, figures and tropes to literature of the Hellenistic and early Imperial period (i.e. down to the end of the first century AD), particularly the documents of the Greek New Testament.

That is, however, not to say that use of this glossary may not be handy for those wishing to utilise later sources. In fact, to a limited extent, later sources have been used in the preparation of the glossary where they may shed further light on terms or concepts originating within the target period. Use of the glossary in conjunction with the reading of later sources may aid the reader in determining where theoretical or terminological development is taking place, and where the sources are clearly relying upon traditional concepts.

A word, however, needs to be said about the parameters of the glossary. It should be noted that the concept “methods of argumentation” is limited to terms used in the sources to describe specific methods of argumentation, methods which were often rather generally classified among the stylistic figures. No attempt has been made to include terminology specific to *στάσις* theory which formed the backbone of argumentative theory in school rhetoric from the days Hermagoras (mid second century BC) onwards. Where discussion of certain methods of argumentation is specifically linked to *στάσις* theory, this has been noted.

Essentially *στάσις* theory was an intricate way of analysing the differences between various forms of judicial disputes. Each kind of judicial controversy (*στάσις*) was provided with a list of appropriate *τόποι* (i.e., ready-made arguments). Whilst this general approach became standard, the nature of such lists, their organisation within a treatise, and the classification of the *στάσεις* themselves varied. Whilst the details of *στάσις* theory vary among the rhetorical theorists, four *στάσεις* (or kinds of cases) were often identified: 1) *στοχασμός*, concerning the fact of the occurrence, e.g.; Did the accused actually commit the murder or not? 2) *ὅρος*, concerning the definition of the crime, e.g.; Did the accused commit the crime of sacrilege or the crime of theft when he stole sacred vessels from a private house? 3) *ποιότης*, concerning the quality of the crime, e.g.; Were there mitigating circumstances that justified the crime? 4) *μετάληψις*, concerning procedural objections, e.g.; Has the accused been brought before the appropriate court?

For several reasons (more elaborately worked out in my *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, [rev. ed.; Leuven: Peeters, 1999] 96-104) *στάσις* theory cannot be considered helpful in terms of analysing documents retrospectively from the perspective of ancient rhetorical theory. In the first

place, despite the simplified στάσις system described above, the theory was nowhere standardised. Each professor of rhetoric tended to teach his own system of στάσεις with their various lists of τόποι. The fact that most experienced speech-writers never slavishly followed such lists anyway makes it an impossible task to try and discover what particular theory of στάσις may underlie any given speech. For an extensive discussion on alternate views of στάσις classification see Quint. *Inst.* 3.4.29-62. Even the classifications in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *de Inventione* vary considerably, although they probably represent modified versions of the same ultimate source.

We may, in the second place, note that στάσις theory did not generally concern itself with the kind of *methods* of argumentation incorporated in this glossary. Lists of τόποι with ready-made arguments suited to the particular kind of judicial controversy were the goal of στάσις theory. The methods discussed here are those such as χειρήματα or ἐνθυμήματα.

In the third place, the τόποι of στάσις theory were specifically related to judicial disputes, and as such have little relevance to documents outside of judicial speeches themselves.

The parameters of this glossary are also restricted in another respect, namely, in the period within which the rhetorical works systematically investigated fall. Because of my own interest in analysis of the letters of the apostle Paul, the targeted sources are those extant treatises up to and including Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. One exception outside of this date range has been introduced, namely, Alexander's treatise *On Figures* (second century AD), since this is the first wholly extant Greek treatise dedicated to this subject and thus provides us with a wealth of Greek terminology almost certainly dating back to earlier centuries. As already stated, other later treatises have also been referenced when they are able to shed light on terminology in the targeted period. Our period is difficult for Greek rhetorical terminology because of the fact that Greek school rhetoric is best preserved in certain Latin treatises (e.g., the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*). It is not always easy to see which Greek terms may be underlying the Latin equivalents.

One further caution ought to be noted, that is, that the inclusion of earlier treatises such as that of Aristotle in no way should be taken to mean that his treatise is relevant to rhetorical analysis of documents from the first century AD. In fact, as the entries in the glossary will show, even much of the technical terminology used by Aristotle underwent

serious changes in meaning through the centuries. It is the intent of this glossary to keep an eye for the historical use of the terms described and to direct the reader back to the sources themselves. The reading of the respective treatises in their own context can never be supplanted by a work such as this. The entries are therefore mostly brief, although I have tried to be comprehensive in the references. It is assumed that the reader will have copies of at least the most important treatises beside him.

In line with the target period the following sources have been systematically dealt with in building the glossary:

- Alexander, *de Figuris*
- Anaximenes, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*
- Anon., *Rhetorica ad Herennium*
- Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica*
- Cicero, *Topica, de Inventione, de Oratione, Orator, Partitiones Oratoriae*
- Demetrius, *de Elocutione*
- Dionysius of Halicarnassus (genuine rhetorical works)
- Ps.-Longinus, *de Sublimitate*
- Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoriae*
- Rutilius Lupus, *Schemata Dianoemas et Lexeos*
- Theon, *Progymnasmata*²

The fragments on rhetoric from the following authors have also been incorporated:³

- Caecilius of Calacte, *Fragmenta* (ed. Ofenloch)⁵
- Hermagoras (ed. Matthes)
- Philodemus, *Volumina Rhetorica*⁴

² Spengel's text was used for the most part, although M. Patillon's new Budé edition has also been consulted (*Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata* [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997]). For reference purposes the page and line numbers of Spengel's edition have been retained (these are also given in the margin of Patillon's edition).

³ The fragments of Apollodorus and Theodorus published by R. Granatelli (Bretschneider, Rome, 1991) do not contain anything relevant to this glossary.

⁴ The text of Philodemus' treatise is not completely available in a recent edition (a new edition is, in time, to be published by Oxford University Press). I have used the editions of the fragments as itemised below (the numbering of the books follows the suggestion of F. L. Auricchio, "New Elements for the Reconstruction of Philodemus' *Rhetorica*," *Akten des 21. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses, Berlin 1995: Archiv für Papyrusforschung, Beiheft 3* [1997] 631-35).

Books one and two

Auricchio, F. L. (ed.), ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ *Libros Primum et Secundum* (Ricerche sui papiri Ercolanesi 3; Naples: Giannini, 1977).

Book three (= Sudhaus' *Hypomnematicum*)

Sudhaus, S. (ed.), *Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica* (BSGRT; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1892-1896) 2.196-239.

Stoic authors (in *SVF*, ed. von Arnim)
Theophrastus (ed. Fortenbaugh *et al.*)

For an overview of these works and their place and importance in the development of rhetorical theory the reader is referred to the standard works on rhetoric, and also to the second chapter of my *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, where the respective editions and commentaries are referred to.⁶

A word as to the nature of the entries is also appropriate. As a rule of thumb, discussion of a *concept* indicated by various *terms* is placed under that term first occurring in the target literature. Other terms used for the same concept are listed with a cross reference to the discussion. In order to enable the reader to gain some idea of the concept itself, a short discussion on how it is dealt with in the sources is provided, together with a rather full list of relevant references. Although omissions

Hammerstaedt, J., "Der Schlussteil van Philodems drittem Buch über Rhetorik," *Cronache Ercolanesi* 22 (1992) 9-117.

Book four

Sudhaus (ed.), 1.147-225

Book eight (= Sudhaus' book six)

Sudhaus (ed.) 1.270-89, 2.1-64

Book nine (= Sudhaus' book seven)

Sudhaus (ed.) 1.325-85

Cappelluzzo, M. G., "Per una Nuova Edizione di un Libro della Retorica Filodemea (PHerc. 1004)," *Cronache Ercolanesi* 6 (1976) 69-76.

Book ten (= Sudhaus' book five)

Sudhaus (ed.) 1.231-70

Ferrario, M., "Frammenti del V Libro della 'Retorica' di Filodemo (PHerc. 1669)," *Cronache Ercolanesi* 10 (1980) 55-124.

Fragmenta Incerta

Sudhaus (ed.) 2.168-195

⁵ Only the certain fragments have been used. Note that although Ofenloch's numbering has been used, more up to date texts have been consulted.

⁶ It is, perhaps, pertinent to point out that I would date Demetrius' *de Elocutione* to the first century BC or AD. Although I do not consider the treatise to be the work of Demetrius of Phalereus, it is not altogether improbable that real author's name was, nevertheless, Demetrius. Ps.-Longinus' *de Sublimitate* most probably belongs to the first century AD, as does Theon's *Progymnasmata*. Although Trypho's *de Tropis* may possibly go back as early as the first century BC, the work has only been used as a supplementary source. It is attributed in the mss tradition to the grammarian of the first century BC, cf. Suidas s.v.. This work together with [Greg.Cor.] *Trop.* probably go back to the original work of Trypho (see M. L. West, "Tryphon *De Tropis*," *Classical Quarterly* 15 [1965] 232). The treatise represents the work of a grammarian, not a rhetorical theorist. Grammarians concerned themselves with stylistic analysis of the poets and in this respect produced a number of works on tropes and figures. Trypho cites mainly examples from Homer.

will remain, I have attempted to provide for each term a complete list of relevant references from the target sources. Where Latin equivalents can be established for what are ostensibly Greek rhetorical concepts, these have also been included.⁷ A primary function of any given entry is to provide the reader with a brief overview of discussions of the concept indicated by a particular term, and (for the target sources) a complete list of references that may then be consulted. Where appropriate, extra references and discussion from other sources are provided to aid understanding of the concept. In a few cases, particularly where the nature of the concept concerned has been prone to misinterpretation (e.g. προσωποποιία), practical examples from ancient literature have been referenced. For the New Testament scholar a number of *clear* references to examples in the New Testament letters have also been included. These references are included for clarification and are by no means exhaustive. No attempt has been made to separate figures of speech from figures of thought, nor figures from tropes, or even figures from methods of argumentation. These classifications are, of course, prevalent in the sources and the interested reader will soon discover them by checking the references. However, he will also discover that there is a hopeless confusion in terms of such classifications, and that they are often quite subjective. In terms of methods of argumentation it ought to be noted that a number of abstract τόποι (i.e. set argumentative patterns) have been included in the glossary where these are referred to by particular terms in the treatises. Such τόποι are not infrequently also classified as figures (cf. διαίρεσις I., and ὁρισμός).

Abbreviations used are those of LSJ (with revised supplement, for Greek treatises) and the Oxford Latin Dictionary (for Latin treatises). Unfortunate abbreviations (e.g. Corn. *Rh.* for the *Anonymous Seguerianus*) have been retained, but where authorship is generally disputed for a particular treatise the abbreviation has been placed in square brackets. References to a number of treatises (e.g. Arist. *Rh.*) have been given by book, chapter, and/or section number, instead of reference to the page of a particular edition. [Aristid.] *Rh.* is cited by section number from the edition of G. Schmid (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1926), not by Spengel's edition (as

⁷ Terminology from the parallel lists of figures in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202-208 and *Orat.* 135-39 has been included only where there is reasonable certainty of the relevant figure denoted. Both lists seem to be based upon the same (Greek) source. The varied relation of the Latin treatises to Greek sources is discussed in the second chapter of my *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*.

LSJ). Philo's works have been itemised and cited by section number. In addition, the following abbreviations have been used:

Anon. *Poet.Trop.* – Anonymous, *Περὶ Ποιητικῶν Τρόπων* (ed. L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1856] vol.3, pp.207-14).

Aq.Rom. *Fig.* – Aquila Romanus, *De Figuris Sententiarum et Elocutionis Liber* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.22-37).

Aug. *Rhet.* – (Ps.?) Aurelius Augustinus, *Liber de Rhetorica* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.135-51).

Bion Borys. – Bion of Borysthenes, ed. J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary*, Uppsala, 1976.

Carm. – *Carmen de Figuris* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.63-70). Cited by line number.

Clod. – *Ars Rhetorica Clodiani de Statibus* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.590-92). Cited by page and line.

Fortunat. *Rh.* – Fortunatianus, *Artis Rhetorica Libri iii* (ed. L. Calboli Montefusco; Pàtron: Bologna, 1979).


Iul.Rufin. – Iulius Rufinianus, *De Figuris Sententiarum et Elocutionis Liber* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.38-47).

[**Iul.Rufin.**] – Ps.-Iulius Rufinianus (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.48-62).

Schem.D. – *De Schematis Dianoeas*

Schem.L. – *De Schematis Lexeos*

Schem.Dian. – *Schemata Dianoeas Quae ad Rhetores Pertinent* (ed. C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913] pp.71-77).



THE GLOSSARY

ἄθροισμός

Mentioned in passing at [Longin.] 23.1, definition uncertain, cf. συναθροισμός and πολύπτωτον II.

αἴνιγμα

“Riddle” – Arist. *Po.* 22.4 defines αἴνιγμα in terms of joining impossibilities to realities and further clarifies it as a statement written entirely in μεταφοραί (i.e. transferred senses, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.14), cf. *Rh.* 3.2.12. In *Rh.* 3.11.6 αἰνίγματα are regarded as ἀστεῖα (cultured/ elegant) because of their use of μεταφορά and their deceiving sense. Yet Aristotle clearly refers to such αἰνίγματα which after a moment’s thought may be perceived, cf. Anaximenes Lampsacus. *Rh.* 35.18 concerning the need to speak αἰνιγματωδῶς in vituperations. Αἰνίγματα in the more common sense of difficult riddles are shunned for their obscurity in *Po.* 22.5. Poll. 6.107 comments on αἴνιγμα in the context of symposia where it was popular to pose such a riddle and grant a gift of various meat dishes as a reward for its decipherment (cf. LXX *Jd.* 14.10-20 where the riddle is, however, translated as πρόβλημα). Pollux distinguishes the αἴνιγμα here from the γρίφος by suggesting that the former is posed in playfulness, the latter in all seriousness (τὸ μὲν [αἴνιγμα] παιδιὰν εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ γρίφος καὶ σπουδὴν). Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.51 discusses the αἴνιγμα in the context of jesting in rhetoric. Here it is classified as a kind of ἀμφιβολία (see s.v.). At *Inst.* 8.6.52 he notes that an ἀλληγορία which is rather obscure is called an αἴνιγμα, see s.v. ἀλληγορία I & II for other references categorising the αἴνιγμα under ἀλληγορία.

The term is also used at D.H. *Th.* 48 (p.407,14 U.-R.). Αἴνος can be used as a synonym (see s.v.).

αἴνος

Frequently used as a synonym for μῦθος (see s.v.). Theon *Prog.* ii, p.73,31-74,2 Sp. defines it as a fable with a moral, although admits that others use the term in the sense of αἴνιγμα (see s.v.).

αἰτιολογία

- I. The speaker, having made some statement, briefly asks a short inquiring question about it which he then proceeds to answer, *Rhet.Her.* 4.23-24 (*ratiocinatio*). *Rhet.Her.* notes that it is very well adapted to conversational style (*sermo*), and holds the audience's attention both by its *venustas* (charm) and by expectation of the reason to follow, cf. Iul.Rufin. 8. The first extant record of this figure in a Greek treatise appears to be Alex. *Fig.* 1.8 who cites an example from Demosthenes. It is frequently used by the apostle Paul, cf. *Ep.Gal.* 3.19; *Ep.Rom.* 3.1ff; 6.1-3, 15; 7.7, 13; 8.31; 9.14.
- II. Rut.Lup. 2.19 uses this term of a short and pithy statement prefaced to an argument that may appear doubtful in order to bolster it, e.g. praising the audience for the fact that the speaker knows they won't be influenced by arguments directed at their emotions, or encouragement to listen with a fair mind. Elsewhere the term προδιόρθωσις is used, cf. Alex. *Fig.* 1.3; [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.12. Both sources (Alex. *Fig.* 1.4; [Hermog.] *loc.cit.*) also mention επιδιόρθωσις, which is a similar statement made *after* the unpalatable comment/argument (cf. *Ep.Gal.* 5.10). When both προδιόρθωσις and επιδιόρθωσις are used, the figure is called ἀμφιδιόρθωσις (intended for exceptionally unpalatable statements), cf. Alex. *Fig.* 1.5.

Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.93 interprets Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 (*ad propositum subiecta*) to refer to this figure. Quintilian himself perhaps refers to it when he speaks of *praedictio*, a species of πρόληψις (*Inst.* 9.2.17, see s.v. προκατάληψις).

- III. The term is used in Suet. *Gram.* 4 and Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.3 of a kind of rhetorical exercise (προγύμνασμα) the precise nature of which is unclear, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 96.65.

ἀλληγορία

- I. Arist. *Rh.* 3.11.6-10, although not using this term, describes ἀλληγορία under the term τὸ προσεξαπατᾶν, i.e. temporary delusion. When something is described in oblique terms, whether by appropriate sayings (ἀποφθέγματα), riddles (τὰ εὖ ἠνιγμένα), puns (τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώματα) or ambiguity (ὁμωνυμία), there is a temporary delusion before the hearer realises what is really being said. Aristotle describes this as τὸ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν (*Rh.* 3.11.6) or λέγειν ἄλλως (*Rh.* 3.11.7, cf. ἀλλ-ηγορία). His discussion is subordinated to a consideration of what makes speech ἀστεῖον

(cultured). Demetr. *Eloc.* 99-102 (cf. 151, 243, 282-86), using the term ἀλληγορία, explains that it is μεγαλεῖον especially when used as a threat. Instead of telling the truth straight out, one uses an ἀλληγορία and so is more fearful and threatening, although also more ambiguous. However, it should not become an αἶνιγμα to us.¹ Demetrius (§243) also uses the term τὰ σύμβολα (symbolic expressions) to refer to ἀλληγορία (as does e.g. Corn. *ND* 35 and Ph. *Omn.Prob.Lib.* 82). At §286 Demetrius suggests that ἀλληγορία is essentially poetical. Indeed, Heraclit. (first century AD) *All.* 5-6 discusses the use of ἀλληγορία in various poets, and Tryph. *Trop.* 1.3 cites a good example from Il. 19.222, cf. Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 70.² Trypho (*Trop.* 1.4), like Demetrius, distinguishes the ἀλληγορία from the αἶνιγμα (defined as an expression whose meaning is hidden). It is discussed as a source of jesting in Cic. *de Orat.* 2.261-62 (*immutata oratio*) and Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.69 (ἀλληγορία).

D.H. *Dem.* 5 (p.138,1-2 U.-R.), cf. 7 (p.142,18-19) criticises Plato's use of ἀλληγορίαι as immoderate and untimely. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.81,6-7 Sp. speaks of ἡ τῶν ἀποκεκρυμμένων ἱστοριῶν ἀλληγορία which detracts from the clarity of a διήγησις.

- II. In a broader sense, the term ἀλληγορία could be used generically of a group of figures which say one thing but hint at another. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.58 discusses the problematics of this definition.

Phld. *Rh.* 1.164,20-22 S. defines ἀλληγορία as a trope. At 1.181 S. he says that ἀλληγορίαι are normally divided into αἶνιγμα, παροιμία and εἰρωνεία, a division which seems to be reflected in *Rhet.Her.* 4.46 where *permutatio* (ἀλληγορία) is divided into, *similitudo* (using a string of metaphors), *argumentum* (a kind of dark periphrasis used to amplify or denigrate) and *contrarium* (calling something by opposite terms, cf. under εἰρωνεία). Philodemus adds that hereby several other related figures are passed by, e.g. ὁ γρῖφος and ὁ ἀστεισμός. At 1.174,19ff he complains that the rhetors never explain when μεταφοραί or ἀλληγορίαι ought to be used.

¹ Demetrius does not really contradict Aristotle at this point. Aristotle makes it quite clear that τὰ εὖ ἡνικημένα are riddles which someone after a moment's thought perceives. Demetrius is warning against sayings which remain obscure to the audience. In this respect he agrees with what Aristotle says of the αἶνιγμα in *Po.* 22.5, a passage which cites the same example as Demetr. *Eloc.* 102, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.12.

² Both Heraclit. *All.* and Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* go on to argue that Homer deliberately spoke of philosophical doctrines using ἀλληγορία. This is of course rather far-fetched.

Cicero (*de Orat.* 3.166; *Orat.* 94, cf. *Att.* 2.20.3) speaks of ἀλληγορία in the sense of a string of metaphors (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.14).

Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.44-59 deals with the allegory in general, discussing under this term also αἰνιγμα, εἰρωνεία, σαρκασμός, ἄστεϊσμός, ἀντίφρασις, παροιμία and μυκτηρισμός. For use in jesting cf. Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.69.

- III. The term ἀλληγορία was also used in reference to an interpretative method applied to poets (especially Homer). It was used, for example, to show how they were really speaking about ethics or natural philosophy (in allegories). See my excursus on this method in *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (rev. ed.; Leuven: Peeters, 1999) 173-77.

ἀλλοίωσις

Lit. "difference"/ "otherness."

- I. A group of persons or matters are divided and their differences described, Rut.Lup. 2.2, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.92.
- II. A term used to describe the deliberate use of various unexpected grammatical phenomena. Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 41 uses the term τὸ ἄσύντακτον for this group of "figures," but adds that it is also called ἀλλοίωσις because a syntax/ disposition different from that which is customary is used (ἐπειδὴν ἡ συνήθης τάξις ἀλλοία γένηται).

Caecilius, *Fr.* 75 (= Tib. *Fig.* 47) briefly discusses examples relating to nouns, case (there is a lacuna in the text here), number, person, and tense. [Longin.] 23-27 (who uses the term ἐνάλλαξις) provides a good discussion of examples involving number, person, and tense (he also mentions the categories of gender and case, §23). Quintilian provides a much longer list of such "more grammatical" figures of speech (cf. *Inst.* 9.3.2 for this characterisation), the kind of figures which he characterises by the words *loquendi ratio* (*Inst.* 9.3.2). His list (*Inst.* 9.3.6-27) includes many kinds of deliberate grammatical irregularities as well as παρένθεσις (also παρέμπτωσις) and figures such as ἑτεροίωσις and ἀποστροφή (see the specific entries in the glossary for these terms). Quintilian does not use any Greek technical term to describe this list of "figures." The term ἀλλοίωσις (and ἀλλαγὴ) is used by Alex. *Fig.* 2.14 for his list of grammatical figures. An extensive list of these figures is provided in Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 41-64. Ps.-Plutarch adds that the use of such figures is not confined to poets, but that they are also commonly used by prose writers. See also D.H. *Th.* 24 (p.362,13-16 U.-

R. = *Amm.* 2, 2 [p.424,2-6]); 48 (p.407,2-5) of Thucydides' usage (the latter passage uses the term μεταγωγή, but not in a technical sense).

Instances involving number include the use of plural verbs with a collective singular noun, etc.. Those concerning person include ἀποστροφή (see *s.v.*) or any sudden change of person. The primary example of ἀλλοίωσις of tense is the use of the historic present (cf. [Longin.] 25; [Aristid.] *Rh.* 2.134 and Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.41 *s.v.* μετάστασις II.). For a discussion of ἀλλοίωσις involving case, see *s.v.* ἀνθυπαλλαγή.

Cf. also *s.v.* ἐξαλλαγή.

ἀμφιβολία – see *s.v.* ὁμωνυμία.

ἀμφίβολον – see *s.v.* ὁμωνυμία, cf. εἰρωνεία.

ἀμφιδιόρθωσις – see *s.v.* αἰτιολογία II.

ἀναγκαῖον

An argument showing some kind of necessity (e.g. of nature, time, or some person). It is discussed as one of the arguments useful for deliberative rhetoric in Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 1.4-24 (esp. 1.4, 12). If a policy cannot be argued to be easy to accomplish, then one should argue that it is both possible and necessary. It is clear from Cic. *Inv.* 2.170-75 and Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.22-25 that necessity remained popular as one of the arguments for deliberative rhetoric, although Quintilian argues that it has no place here and is better replaced by δυνατόν ("possibility," cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.12; 1.4.2). Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* also discusses necessity at §13.2 as one of the methods of ἐλεγχος (refutation). Arist. *Rh.* 3.15.3 suggests the ἀναγκαῖον as one method of refuting a slander against the speaker's person (dealt with in the προοίμιον). Three necessary forms of argumentation are discussed at Cic. *Inv.* 1.44-45, the *complexio* (cf. *s.v.* διλήμματον), *enumeratio* (cf. *s.v.* διαίρεσις I.), and *conclusio* (see below). At *Part.* 38 necessity is listed as one of the classifications of unintentional actions. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.12-14 discusses various forms of certainties in the context of the *argumentum*.

By the first century BC the ἀναγκαῖον was sometimes treated as a figure, cf. Rut.Lup. 1.20; Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.106; 9.3.99. Compare also *conclusio* at *Rhet.Her.* 4.41 and Cic. *Inv.* 1.45 (refutation at

1.86), defined as a brief argument deducing a necessary conclusion. It is clear from these references, and from Quintilian's denial that ἀναγκαῖον was a figure (Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.98), that certain Greek sources discussed *conclusio* as a figure. See also τεκμήριον II.

ἀναδίπλωσις

- I. /...x/x.../ i.e. the immediate repetition of a word or phrase. Synonyms are ἐπαναδίπλωσις, *regressio* and *reduplicatio*. See Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.44; [Corn.] *Rh.* 72; Alex. *Fig.* 1.13 (where it is described as a particular kind of ἐπανάληψις).
- II. Demetr. *Eloc.* 66, 140, 267 understands it to mean the repetition of a particular word or phrase not necessarily in any fixed pattern. Whilst its primary characteristic is forcefulness (δεινότης), it can also provide μέγεθος and even χάρις. *Rhet.Her.* 4.38 (*conduplicatio*) defines it similarly and adds that it is used either for *amplificatio* or *commiseratio* and produces an emotional jab (compare here the figure *traductio* in *Rhet.Her.* 4.20 which is the elegant use of the same word several times in the same clause, and compare 1 *Ep.Cor.* 9.20 for a Pauline example). Rut.Lup. 1.11 and Alex. *Fig.* 1.13 term this emphatic repetition of a word or words ἐπανάληψις (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.50-51, who also uses the term ταυτολογία, and Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.28-29). At Alex. *Fig.* 2.2 three synonyms are given, ἀναδίπλωσις, παλιλλογία (said to be used by Caecilius³), and ἐπανάληψις. It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.203 (= *Orat.* 135), 206 (= *Orat.* 137). See also s.v. ἐπιτίμησις. Compare and contrast πλοκή.

ἀνακοίνωσις

(Lat. *communicatio*) A figure whereby the speaker seems to consult with the audience or opponent, cf. Cic. *Orat.* 138 = *de Orat.* 3.204; Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.20-24. It may simply take the form of a short rhetorical question. The Greek term is first found in the extant literature in Iul.Rufin. 10 (early fourth century AD).⁴

ἀναστροφή

The transposition of two words in opposition to their natural word-order, *Rhet.Her.* 4.44 (*perversio*); Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.65; Alex. *Fig.* 2.24. It is discussed as a specific kind of ὑπερβατόν (used in a

³ *Fr.* 61, based on a critical emendation of Καρκίνος.

⁴ The only usage of this word recorded by LSJ is in the scholiast to Ar. *Pl.* 39. It is also found in Chrys. *serm.2.1 in Gen.* (4.652c).

general sense, see *s.v.*). Quintilian gives the example: *quibus de rebus* (instead of *de quibus rebus*).

ἀναφορά

/x.../x.../ A common synonym is ἐπαναφορά (cf. D.H. *Dem.* 40, p.217,11 U.-R.). Demetr. *Eloc.* 61-62, 141, 268 (with examples) classifies it under the μεγαλοπρεπής, χαρίεσσα and δεινή styles. *Rhet.Her.* 4.19 (*repetitio*) notes that the figure has much *venustas*, *gravitas* and *acrimonia* (cf. Demetrius) and recommends it for embellishment and amplification. Rut.Lup. 1.7 (who terms it ἐπιβολή) and Alex. *Fig.* 1.14 (using the term ἐπαναφορά⁵) note that the repetitions may either be identical words or synonym. Alex. *Fig.* 2.3 illustrates a more complex double form of ἐπαναφορά in succeeding κῶλα.⁶ [Longin.] 20.1-3 (using both ἀναφορά and ἐπαναφορά apparently synonymously) shows how Demosthenes uses this figure (in combination with others) for a continuous attacking effect.⁷ It is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.206 and Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.30-34. See further the endnote to the glossary. For examples see *Ev.Matt.* 5:3-11.

ἀνθυπαλλαγή

"Substitution." Demetr. *Eloc.* 60 uses this term to describe the substitution of case in a phrase, resulting in apposition, e.g. οἱ δὲ δύο σκοπέλοι [for τῶν δὲ δύο σκοπέλων] ὃ μὲν οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει. Demetrius classifies it with the μεγαλοπρεπής style. Such "substitution" of case is a specific form of ἀλλοίωσις (see *s.v.*), cf. Alex. *Fig.* 2.14. It is mentioned in passing in D.H. *Comp.* 3 (p.11,17 U.-R.).⁸

ἀνθυποφορά

An answer to an imaginary objection reiterating the truth of what one has just said. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.106; 9.3.87 mentions it very briefly as a figure discussed by *Rutilius sive Gorgias*. The extant text of

⁵ But ἀναφορά is used at *Fig.* 2.5.

⁶ It is difficult to see why Alexander classifies the simple form of ἐπαναφορά as a figure of thought, and the double form as a figure of speech.

⁷ He refers to the τῶ...τῶ and the ὅταν...ὅταν...ὅταν respectively.

⁸ On this figure in other authors see L. Radermacher (ed.), *Demetrii Phalerei qui dicitur de Elocutione Libellus* (SWC; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1901, repr. 1967) 79-80. Radermacher, "Zu Isyllos von Epidaurus," *Philologus* 58 (1899) 315 supplies several examples, especially from Ael. NA.

Rut.Lup. unfortunately does not contain it. *Carm.* 28-30 gives *rellatio* (*sic*) as the Latin equivalent, cf. D.H. *Dem.* 54 (p.246,15 U.-R.); Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 (*relatio*). See also ὑποφορά II.

Ruf.Rh. 39 and [Iul.Rufin.] *Schem.D.* 4 restrict the objection to that of an adversary (cf. s.v. ὑποφορά III.).

The term is used (without definition) in D.H. *Dem.* 54 (p.246,14-15 U.-R.).

ἀντανάκλασις

- I. The use of the same word twice in the same sentence with two different meanings, *Rhet.Her.* 4.21 (no technical term is used); Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.68 (who uses the Greek term); Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.206 (no technical term is used); Alex. *Fig.* 2.22 (using the synonymous terms ἀντιμετάθεσις, σύγκρισις and πλοκή). Rut.Lup. 1.12 uses the term διαφορά to describe the use of the same word twice, the first time in a specific sense, the second in a general sense.
- II. Rut.Lup. 1.5 contains the same example as Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.68 but defines the term (which in the mss is ἀνάκλασις) in terms of one person interpreting a word used by another in a different sense from that intended. This figure is discussed in the context of wit by Cic. *de Orat.* 2.273 and Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.84 (where it is appropriately grouped with the use of the unexpected, cf. s.v. παράδοξον).

ἀνταπόδοσις - Lit. "reciprocation." See s.v. ἀντίθεσις and εἰκόν.

ἀντεισαγωγή

This figure arises when a statement is compensated by contrasting an opposite thought, e.g. "to live is sweet, but to die for one's country provides eternal glory," Alex. *Fig.* 1.25, cf. *Ep.Phil.* 1.21.

ἀντεναντίωσις

The casting of a positive statement in a negative form, e.g. "not the smallest" for "the greatest," Alex. *Fig.* 2.23; *Carm.* 163-65; [Greg.Cor.] *Trop.* 19 (ἐναντίωσις), cf. Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.12. See also s.v. ἀντίφρασις I. For New Testament examples cf. *Ep.Rom.* 1.13; 11.25; 1 *Ep.Cor.* 9.25; 10.1; *Ep.Hebr.* 6.10.

Rhet.Her. 4.50 discusses "diminishment" (*deminutio*) intended to avoid an impression of arrogance when one speaks of some excellence of oneself or one's client (cf. Cic. *Part.* 22, in the context of

charm). The two examples provided are cast in the form of ἀντεναντίως.

ἀντίθεσις

Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 26 defines it as the placement of opposite terms or meaning (or both) in conjoined clauses, e.g. “It is not right that this man who has my possessions is rich, and yet I am impoverished having lent them out.” Aristotle (discussion in *Rh.* 3.9.7-8) distinguishes two forms of antithesis, i) that of two opposing clauses, ii) that of two opposing phrases joined by the same verb (a form of ζευγμα).⁹ In *Rh.* 3.9.8 he says that antithesis (of opposite terms) is pleasing because matters that are well known become better known placed next to their opposites, and because the antithesis is similar to a syllogism, for a refutative syllogism (ἐλεγχος, cf. *SE* 165^a 2) is really just a collection of antitheses. At *Rh.* 3.11.10 it is one of the things that makes speech ἀστεῖον (cultured/ elegant). He gives a good example, contrasting the rather flat “ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ μὴ ἐν ἀμαρτάνοντα” with “ἄξιον γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.”

Demetr. *Eloc.* 22-24, 247, 250 also speaks of antithesis of speech (i.e. parallel construction). He terms an exact antithesis in all respects ἀνταπόδοσις. *Rhet.Her.* 4.21 and 58 (*contentio*) also distinguishes between antithesis in words and in thought. He states that the use of antithesis makes the speaker both *gravis* and *ornatus*.

Ancient theorists also noted cautions on the use of antithesis. For Demetrius’ remarks see s.v. παρομοίωσις. Thphr. *Fr.* 692 FHS&G (= D.H. *Lys.* 14, p.23,16 - 24.20 U.-R.), advises that antitheses that are τὸ ἴσον and τὸ ὅμοιον are puerile and poetic. They are therefore less fitting for a serious purpose. He adds that this is because word-play in general destroys the πάθος of the style when engaged in serious matters. The audience is thereby distracted. Compare D.H. *Isoc.* 12 (pp.71,24 - 72,14 U.-R.) where Dionysius voices his disapproval of clever, theatrical and puerile stylistic devices. He is clearly thinking especially (but not exclusively, cf. *Isoc.* 15) of the multiplication of ἀντιθέσεις, παρισώσεις and παρομοιώσεις

⁹ Contrast the threefold division in Thphr. *Fr.* 692 FHS&G: ἀντίθεσις δ’ ἐστὶ τριτῶς, ὅταν τῷ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὰ αὐτὰ ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐναντία προσκατηγορηθῇ, translated, “Antithesis occurs in three ways: when opposites are predicated of the same thing, or the same things of the opposite, or opposites of opposites.”

(cf. *Isoc.* 2 [pp.57,20 - 58,3 U.-R.], 13, the analysis of Isocrates in §14, and *Comp.* 23, p.120,4-8 U.-R.). This kind of combination smacked of the theatrics of Gorgias (*Dem.* 25-26 including an analysis of this fault in Plato, cf. *Amm.* 2.2, p.424,11-16 U.-R.; 17, p.437,1-3). The point is reiterated in *Dem.* 4 (p.135,19-22 U.-R.): τὰ γὰρ ἀντίθετά τε καὶ πάρισα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις οὔτε μετριάζοντα οὔτ' ἐν καιρῷ γινόμενα καταισχύνει τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν, cf. the criticism of over-use of antithesis in Isocrates at *Dem.* 20. Philodemus also lists πάρισα, ἀντίθετα and ὁμοιοτέλευτα as figures belonging to epideictic (he uses the word panegyric) rhetoric where the audience concentrates on the sound of the speech, not on its usefulness or truth value (*Rh.* p.29 [*PHerc.* 1426, col.IVa] Hammerstaedt). Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.102, similarly, remarks that such figures are out of place when portraying great πάθος, and further states: *ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videatur*. See also the endnote to this glossary.

Antithesis is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.205 (*contentio*); *Orat.* 135, 165 and Rut.Lup. 2.16. It is further discussed at Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.81-86 and Alex. *Fig.* 2.21. Its use in jesting is illustrated in Cic. *de Orat.* 2.263.

ἀντιμεταβολή

- I. *Rhet.Her.* 4.39 (*commutatio*) best explained by an example: “you must eat to live, not live to eat.” See also Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.85, cf. Rut.Lup. 1.6. Possibly this is what is meant by *conversio* in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207. For a New Testament example see *Ev.Marc.* 2:27.
- II. The first extant Greek treatise to mention this term appears to be Alex. *Fig.* 2.22 where he uses it to describe a chiasm utilising the same terms.

ἀντιμετάθεσις – see s.v. ἀντανάκλασις.

ἀντιπαραβολή

A comparison of one's own arguments with those of the opponent. It is classified as a method of recapitulation in Arist. *Rh.* 3.19.5. At *Rh.* 3.13.3-4 it is mentioned as a form of αὔξησις of one's proofs, cf. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 3.8. Quint. *Inst.* 7.2.22-23 (*comparatio*) mentions this as an aspect of argumentation applicable to the στάσις *coniectura* (= στοχασμός). It may be considered a specific form of σύγκρισις.

ἀντιστροφή – see *s.v.* ἐπιφορά.

ἀντίφρασις

- I. A figure involving the use of opposite terms. According to Tryph. *Trop.* 2.15 (cf. Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 25; [Greg.Cor.] *Trop.* 18¹⁰) there are two kinds: i) ἀντίφρασις διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου which is elsewhere termed ἀντεναντίωσις or ἐναντίωσις (see *s.v.* ἀντεναντίωσις). ii) ἀντίφρασις διὰ τοῦ παρακειμένου which refers to the use of a euphemism, cf. Corn. *ND.* 5 (p.5,4 L.); 32 (p.69,17-18 L.); 35 (p.74,19), and see further *s.v.* εὐφημισμός.
- Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.57 notes that some classify ἀντίφρασις as a kind of ἀλληγορία. The term is, however, not defined here.
- II. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.47 speaks of ἀντίφρασις as a figure *quae dicitur a negando*, and classifies it as a kind of εἰρωνεία. His examples, however, show that he is thinking more in terms of παράλειψις (see *s.v.*), cf. [Iul.Rufin.] *Schem.D.* 12.

ἀντονομασία

An expressive periphrasis (either a word or phrase) used instead of a proper name. See *Rhet.Her.* 4.42 (*pronomination*); Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.29-30; Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 24. Tryph. *Trop.* 2.17 adds that some classify it under συνεκδοχή. The term is also used in D.H. *Comp.* 2 (p.7,7 U.-R.); 5 (p.26,13); *Th.* 37 (p.389,17). For examples see *Ev.Matt.* 26.48.

ἀπαρίθμησις

The enumeration of various matters in order, i.e. πρῶτον μὲν ... δεύτερον δέ, etc.. Both Hermog. *Id.* 1.11 (p.288 R.) and [Aristid.] *Rh.* 1.70 place this figure in the context of περιβολή (prolixity). It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 (*dinumeratio*) and Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.91. For a Pauline example cf. 1 *Ep.Cor.* 12.28.

ἀπόδειξις

Although this term is usually used in the general sense of “proof” (which does not concern us here), Caecilius (*Fr.* 31) used it for a kind of argument differing from an ἐπιχείρημα in the kind of

¹⁰ The text is confused here and M. L. West (ed.) rightly brackets 18b.

conclusion it has. He defined it as an incomplete ἐπιχείρημα. Others defined ἀπόδειξις as that part of the ἐπιχείρημα containing the proof (Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.7).

ἀπορία

- I. This figure occurs when the speaker asks what or how he should speak and admits not knowing the answer, Rut.Lup. 2.10. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.19 (who calls it *dubitatio*) makes the point that this doubt is feigned but has the effect of producing some credibility of truth, cf. *Inst.* 9.2.60; Alex. *Fig.* 1.21 (using the term διαπόρησις). At *Inst.* 6.1.3 he suggests its use in the *peroratio* of a speech. It is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 = *de Orat.* 3.203, cf. 207.

Related to this is διαλογίζεσθαι at Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 20.2-3 which is described as a form of recapitulation and involves the speaker debating with himself. The example given involves the speaker being at a loss (ἀπορέω) with respect to a certain theoretical outcome.

- II. *Rhet.Her.* 4.40 uses the term *dubitatio* in a more specific way, i.e. when the speaker appears to ask which of two or more words he might best use, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.88; [Hdn.] *Fig.* iii, p.98,21 Sp..

ἀποσιώπησις

Often classified as a form of ἔμφασις (see *s.v.*). It is mentioned but not explained in Demetr. *Eloc.* 103 as a method of συντομία (see *s.v.*) by omitting words. It is made more clear at §253 (under δεινότης) by an example in terms of beginning to state something but cutting oneself off before it has been said. At §264 it is classified as a figure of thought. *Rhet.Her.* 4.41 (*praecisio*) notes that the silent suspicion of what might have been said is fiercer than a detailed explanation (cf. 4.67 where it is termed *abscisio*). Rut.Lup. 2.11 terms it παρασιώπησις and notes that it is used either when the matter which would be said is known to the audience or to excite greater suspicion. Alex. *Fig.* 1.16 gives as reasons for its use either that the matter is known, or too shameful to be spoken of. It is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 (*ut aliquid relinquat ac neglegat*); 138 (*ut aliquid reticere se dicat*) = *de Orat.* 3.205 (*reticentia*). See also Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.54-57; 9.3.59-61. Quintilian adds that it may be used of anxiety or scruple. For an example see, D.Chr. 45.1-2.

ἀποστροφή

- I. Lit. “a turning away from” and thus in rhetoric, turning away from someone to address someone else specifically. It may be considered a specific form of μετάβασις (see *s.v.*) or of παρένθεσις (see *s.v.*). It is also often classified as a form of ἀλλοίωσις of person (see *s.v.* ἀλλοίωσις II, cf. D.H. *Th.* 24, p.362,13-14 U.-R.). [Longin.] 16.2-4 uses this term to describe the rhetorical use of an oath. Ps.-Longinus is concerned with a sublime use of this figure and thus gives an example from Demosthenes who turns to make an oath not to the gods but to those who fought in the battle at Marathon. He thus both deifies the former Greek victors and enables his audience to identify with them in the fight against Philip. Ps.-Longinus adds that one’s timing and sense of placement need to be just right. Although under a different heading (that of shifts of person), this figure is again dealt with at §27.

Quintilian deals with ἀποστροφή both as a figure of thought and a figure of speech (*Inst.* 9.2.38; 9.3.24-26). It may take the form of an attack on one’s opponent, or even an invocation. Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.63-69 notes that many rhetoricians agree that it is inappropriate to the προοίμιον. Quintilian himself, however, argues (with examples) that it may sometimes be used here. It should generally not be used in the *narratio* (*Inst.* 4.2.103, 106-107), but may effectively be used in the *peroratio* (*Inst.* 6.1.3). The figure is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 = *Orat.* 135 (*exclamatio*). For an example, see *Ep.Rom.* 2.1.

See also *s.v.* ἐμβόησις.

- II. Alex. *Fig.* 1.20 defines ἀποστροφή as an accusation laid against one person but really intended for another. It may be used either to soften or heighten the accusation.¹¹
- III. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.39 maintains that *aversio* (which in §38 he called ἀποστροφή) also has a broader definition. It may denote any kind of utterance that diverts the attention of the audience from the topic in hand (contrast *Inst.* 4.1.63). In Cicero this seems to imply even the introduction of some kind of deliberate mistake, but his meaning remains very vague, cf. *de Orat.* 3.205 (*erroris inductio*) = *Orat.* 138 (*ut ab eo quod agitur avertat animos*).

¹¹ Alexander’s first example (from II. 2.284-286) does not completely conform to his definition, since Odysseus here, instead of addressing the Greeks with his accusation against them, addresses Agamemnon with his accusation against the Greeks. The person addressed is changed, but the persons accused remain the same.

ἄστεϊσμός

- I.** In the broad sense, a “witticism,” Demetr. *Eloc.* 128, 130; [Longin.] 34.2; D.H. *Dem.* 54. For a discussion of the Latin equivalent, *urbanitas*, as “witticism” in general, see Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.17, 102-112.
- II.** More specifically, ironical self-depreciation, cf. Tryph. *Trop.* 2.24. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.57 notes that some define it as a kind of ἀλληγορία, cf. Phld. *Rh.* 1.181 S.. Alex. *Fig.* 1.18 classifies it as a kind of εἰρωνεία.

ἀσύνδετον – see s.v. διάλυσις.

αὔξησις

“Amplification,” a broad term covering various methods of promoting or conversely denigrating any given matter. These methods may be considered to be most suited to epideictic rhetoric since the subject matter is here not in dispute (cf. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 6.2; Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.40; 3.17.3). Αὔξησις, however, is also generally applied in other rhetorical genres to promote points that have already been demonstrated (often found as a standard element of the ἐπίλογος, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.19.1-2; *Rhet.Her.* 2.47-49; 3.15 [compare Cic. *Inv.* 1.100-105]; Cic. *Part.* 52-58). Theon *Prog.* ii, p.65, 2-4 Sp. sums up the work of a rhetor as follows: τοῦ ῥήτορος ἔργον ἐστὶ τό τε ἀποδείξει τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα καὶ τὸ αὐξῆσαι τὰ ἀποδεδειγμένα (cf. p.107, 22-26 Sp.).

Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 3 lists seven methods of αὔξησις or ταπεινώσις (which is just the opposite application of the same method).

- 1) enumeration of good things that arose because of x. (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.38)
- 2) comparison with a previous favourable judgement. (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.38)
- 3) contrasting the proposition to the least of those things in the same class. (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.9.39)
- 4) mention of the opposite to discredit something.
- 5) arguing that x acted *intentionally* (in various ways).
- 6) building up a series of logically related comparisons. (see s.v. ἐποικοδόμησις)
- 7) consideration as to whether it is better to show x as a whole or in parts. (Arist. *Rh.* 1.7.31)

Aristotle's handling of αὔξησις is somewhat more complicated. On the surface he seems to deal with the matter in precisely the same manner as Anaximenes. Like Anaximenes, Aristotle appears to give his select list of methods of αὔξησις under a discussion of the epideictic genre (*Rh.* 1.9.38-40). He lists six:

- 1) εἰ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν
- 2) τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν
- 3) εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατῴρθωκεν
- 4) εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὑρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη
- 5) εἰς ὃν πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη
- 6) πρὸς ἄλλους (esp. ἐνδόξους) ἀντιπαραβάλλειν

On the one hand, these methods of αὔξησις are closely related to τόποι for epideictic rhetoric provided in later rhetorical tradition (cf. s.v. τόπος III.). On the other hand, they are also very similar to Aristotle's third κοινόν, namely, that of the great and the small (incorporating the greater and the lesser) (cf. *Rh.* 2.19.26-27).¹² In fact Aristotle makes it clear that this third κοινόν is identical to αὔξησις (cf. *Rh.* 2.18.4-5; 2.19.26).¹³ This κοινόν is applied in some detail to the deliberative and judicial genres in *Rh.* 1.7 and 14, and there is naturally some overlap with methods outlined for epideictic (cf. *Rh.* 1.9.38 & 1.7.32; 1.14.4). At *Rh.* 2.24.4 one of the fallacious ἐνθυμήματα is described as magnifying (i.e. by αὔξησις) a point that has not yet been proven.

Note that a number of things listed under αὔξησις in Anaximenes reappear in Aristotle's discussion of the third

¹² W. M. A. Grimaldi has aptly described Aristotle's κοινά as "necessary preconditions to all rhetorical discourse" (*Aristotle, Rhetoric: A Commentary* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1980/88] 1.349). I follow Grimaldi's interpretation of Aristotle's terminology here. E. M. Cope (*The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary* [rev. & ed. J. E. Sandys; Cambridge: University Press, 1877] *ad loc.*) incorrectly called the three κοινά, the κοινοὶ τόποι. But the κοινοὶ τόποι are quite clearly those τόποι of *Rh.* 2.23. The three κοινά are common aspects necessary to any argumentation, namely, that one must know 1) whether something is possible or impossible, 2) whether something did/will occur, and 3) whether it is great or small.

¹³ The word ἐνθυμήματα in the second sentence of *Rh.* 2.26.1 causes considerable problems in interpretation and is rightly bracketed by most editors (including Kassel), see W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Commentary*, 2.366-67 and *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Hermes Einzelschriften 25; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), 49. Aristotle is explaining how αὔξησις is not the same as τόπος ἐνθυμήματος. If the bracketed word is maintained then Aristotle is inexplicably stating that methods of αὔξησις (which he has already explained as the third κοινόν) are ἐνθυμήματα.

κοινόν (compare Arist. *Rh.* 1.7.31 and Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 3.11-12).

Later rhetorical tradition often terms these methods of αὔξεις, τόποι. Their level of abstractness tends to vary but the various lists of methods (τόποι) are generally similar. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.106,5-6 Sp., for example, defines τόπος as λόγος αὔξητικὸς ὁμολογουμένου πράγματος (cf. *Prog.* ii, p.120,16-17 Sp. ὁμολογουμένου πράγματος αὔξεσις). He adds at line 26 that τόποι are χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως. A list of eight τόποι is provided of which many are identical to those present in lists of abstract argumentative τόποι (see s.v τόπος III.).¹⁴ *Rhet.Her.* 2.47 (cf. 3.15), similarly, defines *amplificatio* as *res quae per locum communem instigationis auditorum causa sumitur*. This definition is clearly formulated with specific reference to the function of the ἐπίλογος (i.e. *instigatio*), where, as we have noted, *amplificatio* is generally situated.¹⁵ *Rhet.Her.* 2.47-49 lists ten *loci communes* for amplifying an accusation. These *loci* tend to be more concrete (in the sense of set arguments) than those of Theon. Cic. *Inv.* 1.100-105 also lists these *loci* found in *Rhet.Her.* and adds five more, but does *not* identify them with *amplificatio* as such.¹⁶ *Amplificatio* may be used in connection with them. At *Inv.* 2.48 (cf. 2.68) Cicero argues that some *loci communes* contain *amplificatio* (if the proposition has been proved) but that others are used to prove the proposition. He also notes that those containing *amplificatio* should only be used after the case has been properly proven. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.106-108 also discusses *loci* in connection with *amplificatio* (cf. *Orat.* 126).

¹⁴ Although not appearing to use the term τόπος, Theophrastus' six methods of αὔξεις (*Fr.* 679 FHS&G) are also less specific than those of Anaximenes or Aristotle and quite similar to those found in Theon. He lists: τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς καὶ κρίσεως, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ πάθους.

¹⁵ *Rhet.Her.* 2.9-12 deals with the kind of αὔξεις used to bolster points which have been proven (within the context of the proof section of a speech falling under the στάσις *coniecturalis*). This, however, is not called *amplificatio* but *approbatio*. Both *loci proprii* and *loci communes* are listed. The former are set arguments specific either to the prosecution or the defense, and seem to encompass the *loci* of virtues and vices (cf. τόπος I.). The latter are set arguments for or against the various kinds of proof.

¹⁶ In the same way that Cicero provides 15 *loci* for *indignatio* (the second part of the ἐπίλογος, equivalent to the *amplificatio* of *Rhet.Her.*), he also provides 16 *loci communes* for the *conquestio* (the third part of the ἐπίλογος, equivalent to the *misericordia* of *Rhet.Her.*).

It is clear that the τόποι defined as methods of αὔξησης are generally select τόποι which may be used after one's case has been proven. Some of the same τόποι may also, however, be used to prove one's case, and are thus also found in the, generally longer, lists of τόποι for argumentation (see s.v. τόποι III.). So much is actually said in Cic. *Part.* 55 which notes that *amplificatio* is taken from the *loci* which are used *ad fidem* (cf. §45). The ensuing list combines the abstract τόποι listed at §7 with several forms of argument (e.g., to use their Greek equivalents, παραβολή, παράδειγμα, προσωποποιία).

Not all later rhetorical treatises call the methods of αὔξησης, τόποι however. Ps.-Longinus discusses αὔξησης in general in §§11-12. At §11.2 he provides a select list of methods of αὔξησης as follows: τοπηγορία, δεινώσις¹⁷, ἐπίρρωσις (ἢ πραγμάτων ἢ κατασκευῶν) and ἐποικοδομία (ἔργων ἢ παθῶν),¹⁸ cf. his own definition at 12.1-2 where he contrasts αὔξησης with ὕψος. Quint. *Inst.* 8.4.3 defines four basic methods of amplification: *incrementum*, *comparatio*, *rationcinatio* and *congeries*. His discussion of *amplificatio* is located under the virtue of *elocutio* known as *ornatus* (as also Cic. *de Orat.* 3.104-108). His four methods are not called *loci*.

The term is also used (in the general sense of this entry) in D.H. *Lys.* 19 (p.31,22 U.-R.); *Isoc.* 11 (p.71,1 U.-R.); *Dem.* 54 (p.246,15 U.-R.), 58 (p.252,5 U.-R.); *Th.* 19 (p.353,14 U.-R.); *Imit.* 31 (p.205,5 U.-R.), cf. Phld. *Rh.* 1.217,6-10 S..

See also s.v. ὑπερβολή.

ἄφοδος

Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.87 uses this term to describe a statement of the speaker calling himself back to the subject (after a digression). The figure is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.203 (*reditus ad propositum*) = *Orat.* 137 (*ut se ipse revocet*).

¹⁷ Meaning "exaggeration" here, not "by being powerful" as J. A. Arieti & J. M. Crossett translate (*Longinus: On the Sublime* [trans. with commentary; Texts and Studies in Religion 21; New York: Edwin Mellen, 1985]), cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.24.4; D.H. *Lys.* 19 (p.31,22 U.-R.); *Imit.* 31 (p.205,5 U.-R.) where δεινώσις is more or less synonymous with αὔξησης.

¹⁸ Jahn/ Vahlen⁴ reads with the mss ἐποικονομία, a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον. But we should probably read ἐποικοδομία, a term equivalent to κλίμαξ or ἐποικοδόμησις. The cognate verb is used at §39.3. This reading (ἐποικοδομία) is adopted by Russell who also notes it in the margin of one of the mss (K).

βαρβαρισμός

The opposite of a trope (τρόπος), i.e. the unnatural use of a single word in a way that harms the effect of the prose. For discussion see Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.5-33; Alex. *Fig.* 1.1; cf. Diog.Bab. *Stoic. Fr.* 24. Phld. *Rh.* 1.154-55 S. shows that there was not complete agreement as to the exact definition of βαρβαρισμός. Some, for example, apparently included mistakes in aspiration and accents while others did not.¹⁹ Philodemus goes on to discuss the topic of obscurity (ἀσάφεια) and distinguishes those who use it intentionally and unintentionally. Factors involved in both uses are βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός, which Philodemus (who approved only a “natural” style) always regards disapprovingly (see *Rh.* 1.156-59 S.).

βραχυλογία

Rut.Lup. 2.8 describes this figure in terms of an orator who runs ahead of the expectation of his audience by means of the brevity of his thought. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.82 describes it as a figure in which only that is stated which is absolutely necessary. The term is also mentioned in a difficult sentence at *Inst.* 9.3.50 midst a discussion on ἀσύνδετον.²⁰ At *Inst.* 9.3.99 it is said to be no figure at all, despite its inclusion in the treatise of Rutilius. See further s.v. συντομία.

βραχύτης – see s.v. συντομία and ἔμφασις.

γνώμη

“Maxim.” Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 11 classifies γνῶμαι into two kinds, that generally accepted (ἐνδοξος) and that counter to common opinion (παράδοξος). Anaximenes classifies three sources: i) ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως, ii) ἐξ ὑπερβολῆς (exaggeration), iii) ἐκ παρομοιώσεως (comparison). See s.v. ἐνθύμημα for its proper use.

¹⁹ The distinction which had become fairly standard by the first century between βαρβαρισμός as the opposite of a trope, and σολοικισμός (see s.v.) as the opposite of a figure, was not always made. D.H. *Comp.* 18 (p.82,5-7 U.-R.) cites a passage from Hegesias where the strange use of a single word is called a σολοικισμός.

²⁰ M. Winterbottom (*Problems in Quintilian* [University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970] 167), suggests that the text might be read: *Hoc genus et βραχυλογίαν vocant, quae potest esse copulata <vel> dissolutio*, i.e. possibly referring to the last example from Cicero (*Qui indicabantur, eos vocari, custodiri, ad senatum adduci iussi; in senatum sunt introducti...*) Quintilian makes the point that this sort of narration is called βραχυλογία although it may or may not use connecting particles.

Arist. *Rh.* 2.21 is devoted to the γνώμη. Aristotle defines it as a declaration concerning a general matter related to human action (cf. Thphr. *Fr.* 676 FHS&G), or as the major premise or conclusion of a rhetorical syllogism (ἐνθύμημα) standing alone (i.e. a single proposition). He distinguishes four forms (in two categories): Those that are παράδοξοι or ἀμφισβητούμενοι and need an explanation, of which some become ἐνθυμηματικάι but others merely add a reason (αἵτιον). The latter are the most popular. The second category are those which are quite clear and thus need no appendage, of which some are known beforehand and others are self-evident. Riddles or enigmatic expressions may also be used as γνῶμαι though the explanation should be short. Aristotle recommends that γνῶμαι should be used for older audiences and concerning subjects they are familiar with. When complaining or exaggerating one may use generalising statements (γνῶμαι) which are only partially true (cf. Κρήτες ἀεὶ ψεύσται, *Ep.Tit.* 1.12 and compare Quint. *Inst.* 11.1.86). Aristotle also notes that some proverbs (παροιμιαί) are also γνῶμαι. One may also deliberately contradict well-known γνῶμαι with effect, but a reason must be added (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.13 where two ways of doing this are suggested).

Aristotle notes two general uses of γνῶμαι. Firstly, the effect of a speech is greatly increased when the audience can (at least partially) sympathise with the sentiment expressed in the γνώμη. This should therefore be aimed for. Secondly, γνῶμαι give speeches an ethical character because they make the moral choice or purpose clear.

Quint. *Inst.* 8.5.1-8 deals with γνῶμαι in a similar manner, preferring a division into simple γνῶμαι and those requiring the addition of a reason. He also notes the common practice of introducing *sententiae* at the close of passages (cf. *Inst.* 8.5.11, 13-14).²¹ Demeir. *Eloc.* 110-11 also clearly implies that γνῶμαι were often placed last in an argumentative context. At 170 he argues that in certain contexts (e.g. loose parties) the γελοῖον can take the place of the γνώμη and χρεία. See further s.v. ἐπιφώνημα.

²¹ S. F. Bonner ("Lucan and the Declamation Schools," *American Journal of Philology* 87 [1966] 264-65) rightly points out that Quintilian is here referring to the end of a whole passage by the word *clausula*. He adds that at *Inst.* 8.5.11 Quintilian "speaks of an *enthymema* as *addita in clausula*." This translation makes eminently more sense than "the close of a period." For many examples of such *sententiae* in declamations see Seneca's *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae*.

Rhet.Her. 4.24 (*sententia*) notes the use of antithetical maxims (with or without a reason attached). He pleads for a sparse use, variously interspersed (thus not specifically as the conclusion of an argument).

Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.3 briefly mentions the *sententia* (defined as *universalis vox*) in the context of progymnasmatic exercises. Sen. *Ep.* 33.7 notes that boys were expected to learn both *sententiae* and *χρεῖαι* by heart.

For γνῶμαι used in jesting, see Cic. *de Orat.* 2.286.

The term is found frequently in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

γρίφος

Lit. "fishing basket" and so anything intricate, "dark saying." Demetr. *Eloc.* 153 defines it as a series of statements with no relation to each other. In Phld. *Rh.* 1.181 S. we learn that it was sometimes classified as a particular kind of ἀλληγορία. See also s.v. αἶνγμα.

διαίρεσις

- I. Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.10 terms one of the (abstract) κοινοὶ τόποι, ἐκ διαιρέσεως. It occurs when several possibilities are listed and all but one are eliminated, cf. Cic. *Top.* 10, 33-34 (*enumeratio/partitio*); *de Orat.* 2.165 (*partitio*). It is listed as a figure in *Rhet.Her.* 4.40-41 (*expeditio*) and a form of argumentation in Cic. *Inv.* 1.45 (*enumeratio*) with refutation at 1.84. Quintilian describes it as a form of *divisio* (*Inst.* 5.10.66-67, cf. 7.1.31-33). He notes that this form of argument is risky as it fails when but one alternative is omitted.
- II. *Rhet.Her.* 4.47 speaks of *distributio* which occurs when the speaker addresses various groups of persons in succession assigning them their respective roles or duties with respect to the matter in hand. From the third example we may deduce that a distribution of tasks to various groups is to be used as part of an argument in support of one's case. *Distributio* is not used here in the general sense of ethical mandates given to different categories of people (as, for example, in *Ep.Eph.* 5.22 - 6.9 or 1 *Ep.Pet.* 2.18 - 3.7). This also seems to be what is meant by Cic. *de Orat.* 3.203 (*distributio*) which appears to be equivalent to *Orat.* 138 (*ut aliud alii tribuens dispertiat*). Very close to this definition is what [Iul.Rufin.] *Schem.L.* 23 defines as

διαίρεσις, noting that the Latin equivalents are *distributio* or *designatio*.

διαλλαγή

A figure where various words with different (similar and related) meanings are used to drive home a point, Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.49, cf. D.H. *Lys.* 3 (p.10,20 U.-R.).

διάλογος

"Dialogue." *Rhet.Her.* 4.65 (*sermocinatio*) first gives a lengthy example where a narrative is told with the words of the particular characters put in the first person. He also describes another kind of dialogue wherein the speaker answers his own hypothetical questions (see s.v. ἐπερώτησις II.). At 4.55 it is described as one of the methods of *expositio* (see s.v. ἐξεργασία) where, again, it concerns putting the matter into the first person achieving the effect of *προσωποποιῖα*. According to Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.31 some (including Quintilian himself) consider διάλογος an aspect of *προσωποποιῖα* (see s.v.). At *Inst.* 9.2.36 he mentions the example of introducing an imaginary interlocutor to raise an objection. D.H. *Th.* 37 uses the terms διάλογος and *προσωποποιέω* in reference to Thucydides when he reports an exchange of speeches recording the words of the participants in the first person. (The term διάλογος is further not infrequently used in D.H., e.g. to refer to Plato's dialogues.) For an example from Cicero, see *Clu.* 70-72 (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.107). Two further examples are *Mur.* 62 and *Quinct.* 71-72 where Cicero converses with others, but these may be Cicero's representation of real dialogue which took place in the courtroom.

διάλυσις

"A looseness in terms of sentence construction" and so equivalent to ἀσύνδετον. Arist. *Rh.* 3.12.2, 4 argues that whilst ἀσύνδετον is suitable to rhetoric, it is not suitable to the written style, which ought to be accurate and cannot not be acted/ delivered. Ἀσύνδετον needs to be acted/ delivered (it is ὑποκριτικόν), and that in a varied way. He also notes that it has the effect of making several things seem more when listed without conjunctions (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.50). When joined by conjunctions such a list is brought together into one group and the effect of many items is lost. It is thus an effective means of αὔξησις. Demetr. *Eloc.* 61 (cf. 64) classifies

ἀσύνδετον with the μεγαλοπρεπής style, and at §269 with δεινότης. At §§192f he argues that it is totally unsuited to the simple style (ἰσχνότης) because of its inherent unclarity (clarity being the ruling virtue of this style). It is thus also unsuitable to letters (§226). He adds that ἀσύνδετον is a very dramatic figure, veritably forcing dramatics upon the speaker. [Longin.] 19-21 (the first part of the discussion is unfortunately missing) describes it as giving a hint of a struggle. The flow of words pursuing each other can be used to good effect with an appropriate subject. He also describes its effective use in combination with other figures (e.g. ἐπαναφορά), and argues that if conjunctions are added in such passages the πάθος is lost. *Rhet.Her.* 4.41 appears to distinguish between ἀσύνδετον of phrases (*dissolutum*, 4.41, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.50), which he argues has edge and is very forceful, and ἀσύνδετον of individual words (*articulus*, 4.26) which has rapidity. This way of speaking seems at least partially to be reflected in Hermog. *Id.* 2.4 (p.316 R.) who distinguishes ἀσύνδετον of short phrases (τὸ ἀσύνδετον κομματικόν [σχῆμα]) and of individual words (τὸ κατ' ὄνομα κομματικόν [σχῆμα]). See further Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.23; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.90 Sp.; Rut.Lup. 1.15; Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.207; Alex. *Fig.* 2.12 (using ἀσύνδετον and διάλυσις as synonyms).

διαπόρησις – see *s.v.* ἀπορία.

διασκευή

Mentioned as a figure, but not defined, at Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.107. A full explanation is given in [Hermog.] *Inv.* 3.15 (cf. 2.7). There it is a technical term for the descriptive portrayal of a matter (ἡ διατύπωσις τοῦ πράγματος), as opposed to its argumentative narration. See *s.v.* διατύπωσις.

διασυρμός

“Disparagement.” A figure in Caecilius (*Fr.* 72), cf. [Longin.] 38.6; Cic. *Orat.* 137 (*ut irrideat*) = *de Orat.* 3.202 (*inlusio*); Alex. *Fig.* 1.26.

διατύπωσις

“Portrayal.” *Rhet.Her.* 4.51 (*descriptio*, cf. the 10th *locus communis* at 2.49) presents this as a figure defined in terms of a vivid and

serious description of the consequences (of an action). It is also often used to describe in vivid detail the committing of the crime being prosecuted (Theon, Quint.). There is always a moral connotation present, hence the comment in *Rhet.Her.* that it is used to arouse either indignation or pity. In fact it is this moral connotation which Theon uses to distinguish the *τόπος* (under which category he places the *διατύπωσις*) from the *ἐκφρασις* (*Prog.* ii, p.119,7-14 Sp.). Theon's discussion of *διατύπωσις* (*Prog.* ii, pp.108,32 - 109,11 Sp.) makes it clear that the portrayal is designed to arouse the emotions, bringing the *πάθη* to bear. Quintilian discusses "portrayal" (using the Greek term *ὑποτύπωσις*²²) at *Inst.* 9.2.40-44 (cf. 4.2.123-24 and the discussion of *ἐνάργεια* at 8.3.61-71).²³ See *s.v.* *μετάστασις* for one of the techniques he describes. He interprets Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202 (... *inlustris explanatio rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub aspectum paene subiectio*) as referring to this figure, cf. *Orat.* 139 (*rem dicendo subiciet oculis*) although Cicero is probably referring more generally to *ἐνάργεια*. At *Inst.* 4.2.3 *ὑποτύπωσις* is distinguished from the *narratio* of a speech.

Διατύπωσις is briefly defined with examples at Alex. *Fig.* 1.24. It is mentioned in [Longin.] 20.1. See also *s.v.* *διασκευή*.²⁴

διαφορά – see *s.v.* *ἀντανάκλασις* I.

διεζευγμένον

Rhet.Her. 4.37-38 (*disiunctum*) defines it as two or more (parallel) clauses, each ending with a separate verb with related meaning (i.e. nearly synonymous). He notes that since it is suited to *festivitas*

²² This term is also used in [Hermog.] *Prog.* 6 (p.12,10 R.) where, as in Theon's treatise, it is classified under *τόποι*. Ps.-Hermogenes uses the term *ὑπογραφή* as a synonym (p.14,8 R.). Note that LSJ *s.v.* *ὑποτύπωσις* cite this reference in the wrong place. It belongs under section 3.

²³ The words "*ἐν διατυπώσει*" at *Inst.* 9.2.41 ought to be considered an early gloss in the text, see M. Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* (University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970) 157.

²⁴ Interesting is the report of the vivid descriptions in the history of Phylarchus who always sought *πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινὰ* (Plb. 2.56). Polybius speaks disapprovingly of historians who enumerate consequences of actions (cf. the definition given by *Rhet.Her.*) just as tragedians do. This definition and the examples listed by Polybius show that he is thinking of descriptions designed to make a moral point and to sway the audience. What he says of their effect in tragedy may equally be applied to rhetoric: *ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπληξαι καὶ ψυχ-αγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας*.

(gaiety), it should be used sparingly. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.45 discusses this figure as *disiunctio* noting that some call it συνωνυμία. Aq.Rom. *Fig.* 43 discusses the same figure noting διεξευγμένον as the Greek equivalent. He adds that the use of such distinct (but virtually synonymous) verbs helps separate the various clauses from each other. This figure is possibly what is meant by *diiunctio* in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207.

Most examples of διεξευγμένον refer to distinct but essentially similar actions, often undertaken by the same subject, e.g. *Populus Romanus Numantiam delevit, Kartaginem sustulit, Corinthum disiecit, Fregellas evertit* (cited in *Rhet.Her.*). Quintilian's examples, however, also include a series of clauses referring to the same action. In this respect Arist. *Rh.* 3.12.2-3 also discusses repetition of the same thought. He notes that such repetition ought to be varied (μεταβάλλειν), e.g. by using (nearly) synonymous verbs. He adds that when the same thought is repeated several times, such variation in language paves the way for an effective (varied) delivery. It should be added that Aristotle considers such repetition to be inappropriate to writing, precisely because it needs the accompaniment of delivery.

See also *s.v.* ζεύγμα.

διηρημένη (περίοδος/ ἔρμηνεία)

Lit. "divided." A term used in both Aristotle and Demetrius (in different ways) in relation to a discussion on περίοδοι (see *s.v.*).

δικαιολογία

Rut.Lup. 2.3 defines it as a brief appeal to the equity (justice) of one's case. Two examples are given. It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.205 and is possibly equivalent to *Orat.* 138 (*ut medeatur*).

διλήμματον

Cic. *Inv.* 1.45 (*complexio*) defines it as a form of argument in which two alternatives are offered, both of which are refuted. The same kind of argument is termed *partitio* in Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.66 (in connection with jesting). The Greek term appears to be first extant in rhetorical theory in [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.6, who suggests that it has a reputation for sharpness and truth (δριμύτητος δὲ δόξαν ἔχον καὶ ἀληθείας). Refutation of διλήμματα is discussed at Cic. *Inv.* 1.83-84, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.65.

διλογία

Stating a word or phrase twice for the sake of clarity when strictly speaking it could be left out the second time. Demetr. *Eloc.* 103 says it contributes to μέγεθος (and thus shows that συντομία does not always guarantee μέγεθος). At §197 it is extolled for its σαφηνεία and at §211 for ἐνάργεια (see *s.v.*) where it is contrasted with τὸ ἅπαξ λέγειν. See also *s.v.* ἀναδίπλωσις II.

εἰδωλοποιῖα = φαντασία (see *s.v.*).

εἰκασία – see *s.v.* εἰκῶν.

εἰκονισμός – see *s.v.* χαρακτηρισμός I.

εἰκός

Lit. “likeliness” or “probability.” Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 7.4 defines this as a statement or argument which listeners are likely to believe because they know examples (παραδείγματα) of the matter mentioned. If such examples are not known then the orator must supply them to make the matter “probable.” The εἰκός is divided into three ἰδέαι involving, i) the use of τὰ πάθη which are natural to man in one’s argument (for everyone can empathise with them), ii) the use of ἔθος, and iii) the use of κέρδος. *Rhet.Her.* 2.3-5 discusses this under *causa coniecturalis* (στοχασμός) (as does Cic. *Part.* 34-38) and divides it into i) *causa* (αἰτία) which is the motive (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.23) and ii) *vita* (ἀγωγή), i.e. manner of life (e.g. past convictions, etc.). Cic. *Inv.* 1.46-50 has a broad discussion of what he calls the *probabile* (= εἰκός?). At *Inv.* 1.47 it is divided into four subdivisions, i) *signum* (cf. *s.v.* σημεῖον), ii) *credibile* (= πίθανον?), iii) *iudicatum* (cf. *s.v.* κεκριμένον), and iv) *comparabile* (cf. *s.v.* ὁμοίωσις). Of these, the second subdivision corresponds to what is commonly called εἰκός. Cic. *Part.* 40 speaks of ways of making a probability persuasive: (in order) by *exemplum*, *similitudo* and *fabula*. D.H. *Lys.* 19 (p.31,3-4 U.-R.) distinguishes the εἰκός from the παράδειγμα (following Aristotle), and at *Amm.* 1.2 (p.258,12 U.-R.) from the σημεῖον. At *Is.* 15 (p.113,16-17 U.-R.) he speaks of refutations from probabilities (οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἔλεγχοι). Phld. *Rh.* 1.369-70 S. (cf. 372-73) lists τὸ εἰκός, together with τὸ σημεῖον and τὸ τεκμήριον, as ἔντεχνοι proofs (over against the ἄτεχνοι

proofs²⁵), but disputes that they are the special province of rhetoric. At *Rh.* 1.285 S. he contrasts more or less probable arguments (εἰκότα) with the truth and seems to parallel this with the contrast between ἐνθυμήματα (= arguments from probability) and τὰ ἀληθοῦς σημεῖα (see also *s.v.* ἐνθύμημα). At *Rh.* 1.245-49 S. he contrasts the sophists' use of probabilities (εἰκότα καὶ εὐλογα) with the logical syllogisms (συλλογισμοί) of philosophers. In Quint. *Inst.* 5.9.8 the εἰκός is a kind of non-necessary σημεῖον. At *Inst.* 5.10.15-19 (in the context of the *argumentum*) he discusses probability (distinguishing three degrees).

εἰκών

"Simile," see also *s.v.* μεταφορά and ὁμοίωσις for discussion of other theorists.

Aristotle deals with similes (using the term εἰκών) in three separate places of book three of the *Rhetoric*. At 3.4 he describes the simile as a kind of metaphor. The simile, however, should not be too often used in prose as it is basically poetical. Many examples are provided. At 3.10.3 Aristotle argues that similes, like metaphors, produce a pleasurable learning experience (see comments *s.v.* μεταφορά). The simile may thus be characterised as cultured (ἄστετον), although it is slightly less effective than the metaphor because of its added length. Aristotle would seem to include the lengthy Homeric similes under the term εἰκών, at least, this is suggested by the allusion to Il. 20.164ff in *Rh.* 3.4.1. Further discussion is given at 3.11.11-13.

Unlike Aristotle, Demetrius distinguishes between a short simile (εἰκασία) and the long (Homeric) simile (παραβολή).²⁶ Demetr. *Eloc.* 80 notes that the use of a simile (εἰκασία) is "safer" than the use of a metaphor (cf. Arist. *Fr.* 131 Rose; Thphr. *Fr.* 690 FHS&G). At §89 he adds that when a metaphor is turned into a simile brevity should be aimed at, for otherwise one runs the risk of turning it into a poetic comparison (παραβολή), cf. §160 for witty similes, and §273 on the forceful simile. *Rhet.Her.* 2.26 briefly lists

²⁵ These were proofs which were considered not to be in need of any skilful method, such as the use of witnesses, documents etc.. The distinction is Aristotelian and was not common in school rhetoric (see R. D. Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, [rev. ed.; Leuven: Peeters, 1999] 47). Philodemus understands the distinction to be between proofs common to all and proofs specifically belonging to the province of rhetorical theory – a point he disputes.

²⁶ For Aristotle's use of the term παραβολή, see *s.v.* παράδειγμα.

faults in constructing similes. At 4.62 he states that similes are used either for praise or censure.

D.H. *Is.* 4 (p.96,5-15 U.-R.); *Dem.* 50 (p.237,1-11 U.-R.) and *Comp.* 11 (p.40,2-16 U.-R.) use the term εἰκὼν of extended comparisons. In *Comp.* 11 the εἰκὼν is used as proof (τεκμαίρομαι) of the point for which Dionysius is arguing.

εἰρομένη λέξις

Lit. “strung-on style.” Aristotle’s term for a paratactic style. See s.v. περίοδος.

εἰρωνεία

“Mock modesty.” Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 21 (cf. 33.3) and Arist. *Rh.* 3.19.5 describe it as a method suited to recapitulation. Anaximenes uses the term to describe, i) παράλειψις (see s.v.), and ii) calling something by opposite terms (e.g. This *good* man has stolen my horse, cf. s.v. ἀντίφρασις I.). The latter is recommended in vituperations (*Rh.Al.* 35.19). He also recommends the use of εἰρωνεία when attempting to increase goodwill in an audience that is already well-disposed to the speaker (*Rh.Al.* 29.7). Arist. *Rh.* 2.2.24 notes that εἰρωνεία produces anger because it is a kind of despising (cf. *EN* 4.7.14-16 [1127b 22ff] where he discusses εἰρωνεία as a character trait). Cic. *de Orat.* 2.269-72 (cf. 262) discusses *dissimulatio* of words and thoughts in the context of wit, i.e. when one speaks solemnly of something in such a way as that it is clear that he is jesting, cf. *Brut.* 292-99 (*ironia*/ ὁ εἴρων) where it is described as witty but not always appropriate.²⁷ At *Ac.* 2.15 *dissimulatio* is identified with εἰρωνεία. It is further mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 and *de Orat.* 3.203.

Quintilian defines εἰρωνεία in terms of saying something contrary to what ought to be understood (*Inst.* 9.2.44). At *Inst.* 8.6.54 he introduces *ironia* as a trope classified as a kind of ἀλληγορία. Its nature is further discussed at *Inst.* 9.2.44-51 where the difference between εἰρωνεία as a trope and as a figure is discussed. As a trope it involves the use of certain words contrary in meaning to what is intended. But the context always makes clear what is meant so that there is no real pretense. As a figure εἰρωνεία can be used to disguise one’s whole meaning, since the conflict is not only of words

²⁷ At *Brut.* 292 Epicurus is said to have censured the use of irony.

but of sense. Whole passages of a speech or even a speech in its entirety may take the form of irony.²⁸ A number of specific forms of irony are also discussed (cf. *s.v.* ἀντίφρασις II.). At *Inst.* 6.2.15 he notes that irony is more suited to the character of a good man than *derisus*.²⁹ For use in jesting, see Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.68, cf. 91.

Alex. *Fig.* 1.18 defines it in terms of pretending to say the opposite and notes that there are four kinds of εἰρωνεία, namely, ἄστεϊσμός, μυκτηρισμός, σαρκασμός and χλευασμός (see the respective entries).

Demetr. *Eloc.* 291 describes ἀμφίβολον (ambiguity, cf. *s.v.* ὁμωνυμία) as having a hint of irony (εἰρωνείας ἔμφρασις). D.H. *Dem.* 23 (p.178,19 U.-R.) uses the word, but not as a technical rhetorical term. Phld. *Rh.* mentions that εἰρωνεία was classified under ἀλληγορία, see further *s.v.* ἀλληγορία II. The term is once again used at *PHerc.* 1004, col. XL Cappelluzzo.

ἔκφρασις

"Description." Theon treats this as a separate progymnasmatic exercise (*Prog.* ii, p.118,6ff Sp.) defining it as a descriptive treatment bringing that which is pictured vividly before the eyes (of the hearers), cf. *s.v.* ἐνάργεια. He distinguishes it from the τόπος (and here we may think especially of the διατύπωσις = dramatic description of an event, see *s.v.*) by stating that while both are general in scope (i.e. not concerning definite objects), there are two differences. Firstly, the τόπος concerns matters where moral choice is involved, whilst a description, for the most part, concerns inanimate objects and those things incapable of choice or purpose. In the second place, in a τόπος one describes the matters and adds one's personal opinion whether it is good or bad, but an ἔκφρασις is simply a description.

The term is also used in D.H. *Imit.* 31.3.2 (p.209,8-9 U.-R.), cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.205 (*descriptio*).

ἔλεγχος

"Refutation." Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 13 discusses refutation in terms of arguments based on ἀναγκαῖον (by nature or in our

²⁸ On the text of *Inst.* 9.2.46 see M. Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* (Institute of Classical Studies Bulletin Supplement 25; London: University Press, 1970) 157-58.

²⁹ On the text, see M. Winterbottom, *op.cit.*, 105.

experience), and on ἀδύνατον (by nature or in relation to our opponent's argument). Arist. *Rh.* 2.22.14-15 speaks of ἐνθυμήματα which may be either δεικτικά or ἐλεγκτικά. This distinction is, however, not further developed in his treatise. Later rhetorical treatises generally devoted some discussion to methods of refutation, although the details do not concern us here further than those methods falling under the purview of this glossary (see introduction), cf. Cic. *Inv.* 78-96; *Part.* 44; *de Orat.* 2.215, 331ff; Quint. *Inst.* 5.13-14; 6.1.4; 6.3.72-78 (*refutatio* in connection with jesting); D.H. *Is.* 15 (p.113,16-17 U.-R.). The term appears to be used in this (technical rhetorical) sense in Phld. *Rh.* at *PHerc.* 1004, col. LXXXIII Cappelluzzo.

ἔλλειψις

"Ellipse," i.e. the omission of a word(s) that needs to be understood for the sense. Tryph. *Trop.* 2.17 notes that it is sometimes classified under συνεκδοχή. Alex. *Fig.* 2.13 states that this figure emphasises emotion.

ἐμβόησις

An emotional interjectory exclamation. *Rhet.Her.* 4.22 (*exclamatio*) restricts such an exclamation to a kind of ἀποστροφή (see s.v.) which may be addressed to a person, city, place or object. He notes that it is used to express grief or indignation and should be used sparingly when the importance of the subject requires it. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.26-27 (*exclamatio*) does not restrict the exclamation to an address, citing examples such as "*liberatus sum: respiravi*" and "*bene habet.*" Of course even these examples may be considered a form of ἀποστροφή directed at oneself. Such emotional outbursts are termed ἐμβοήσεις in [Corn.] *Rh.* 19 and 237, a term used together with σχετλιασμοί (referring more specifically to exclamations of indignation). They are said to be most suited to the emotional character of the ἐπίλογος in a speech.

A well-known Pauline example is to be found in *Ep.Rom.* 7.24.

ἔμφασις

This term is used in the sense "hint" or "suggestion." It is related to ἔμφασις as an image or reflection, e.g. in a mirror. *Rhet.Her.* 4.67 (*significatio*) divides it into five kinds: i) by *exsuperatio* (cf. s.v. ὑπερβολή) which increases a certain suspicion, ii) by

ambiguum (cf. s.v. δμωνυμία), i.e. use of a double meaning, iii) by a given consequence, i.e. when something is said which logically follows from something else, iv) by *abscisio* (cf. s.v. ἀποσιώπησις), v) by *similitudo* (cf. s.v. ὁμοίωσις), i.e. laying a brief comparison beside the matter in discussion without comment, e.g. “Do not, Saturninus, rely too much on the popular mob – unavenged lie the Gracchi” (trans. Caplan). Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.67 is unclear, but cf. 8.2.11; 8.4.26; 9.2.64. At *Inst.* 8.3.83-86 he discusses two kinds: i) a word used which means more than it says, e.g. Od. 11.523 “the Greeks descended into the wooden horse,” the word “descended” showing at the same time the size of the horse (further illustrated at Tryph. *Trop.* 2.2 and [Corn.] *Rh.* 78); ii) a word deliberately omitted, either by stating that you omit to say something, or by what is actually ἀποσιώπησις (which he admits). Demetr. *Eloc.* 288-90 gives examples of both these kinds amidst a discussion on figured speech (in the forceful style). Although he does not specifically term these examples ἔμφασεις, yet he indicates in his introduction to the discussion (287) that ἔμφασις is an important aspect of his topic. Further see Demetr. *Eloc.* 57, 130-31, 171, 282-86, etc.. At §286 he suggests that it is primarily poetical. Phld. *Rh.* 1.177 S., discussing the views of other rhetorical theorists, mentions ἔμφασις in connection with the use of metaphors.³⁰ Ἐμφασις is further mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 139 and *de Orat.* 3.202.

The use of ἔμφασις in terms of a word meaning more than it says can also be used to produce wit, Cic. *de Orat.* 2.268; Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.69.

D.H. *Th.* 16 (p.349,2 U.-R.) uses the word, but not as a technical rhetorical term.

³⁰ At 1.176 (col. XVII,14-17) he sets about mentioning at least three purposes of the metaphor according to “some.” However, the text breaks off after the mention of brevity and clarity. After two lines from which no sense can be made, we encounter the second half of a sentence concerning what must be a comparison to the task of a poet. The genitive construction οὐ [μόν]ης τῆς τ[ὸ] σαφὲς] ἐχούσης would appear to have referred back to the noun ἔμφασις, as we may gather from the following sentence: Πλανῶσ<ιν> δ[ὲ] τῆς ἐμφάσεως ὡς οὐσης σαφηνείας ἢ σ[υ]ντελοῦντος τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καλουμένην [ἐνέ]ργειαν τοῦ μεταφέρειν διὰ παντός (I have substituted ἐνέργειαν for Sudhaus’ ἐνάργειαν). The next sentence makes it clear that Philodemus is still speaking about proposed purposes for using metaphors. The otherwise unexpected introduction of the notion of ἔμφασις would suggest that the third purpose of the metaphor belonging to the sentence broken off at 1.176 (col. XVII,17) is ἔμφασις.

Similar to ἔμφασις is βραχύτης in Tryph. *Trop.* 2.9 defined as a pithy statement (e.g. ἀπόφθεγμα) with a meaning beyond that of the literal text, see further s.v. συντομία.

ἐνάλλαξις – see s.v. ἀλλοίωσις II.

ἐναντιότης – see s.v. ἐνθύμημα.

ἐναντίωσις – see s.v. ἀντεναντίωσις and ἀντίφρασις I.

ἐνάργεια

“Vividness.”

Ἐνάργεια is the art of vivid expression, often described in terms of setting matters before the eyes of the audience (cf. *Ep.Gal.* 3.1) and including all manner of detail. It was variously discussed by the theorists as a figure (*Rhet.Her.* 4.68-69 using the term *demonstratio*), a trope (Tryph. *Trop.* 2.3³¹), a virtue of the *narratio* (διήγησις, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.63; Cic. *Top.* 97) or more generally an important quality of style, especially in description. As such it is foundational to the more specific devices of διατύπωσις (cf. διασκευή), ἔκφρασις and φαντασία (see their separate entries).³²

Demetr. *Eloc.* 208-220 discusses vividness as an important quality of the plain style, noting that it is achieved by attention to detail, repetition (cf. s.v. διλογία), use of harsh sounding letters, and onomatopoeia (cf. s.v. ὀνοματοποιΐα). D.H. *Lys.* 7 describes the ἐνάργεια of Lysias as a virtue (ἀρετή) of his style (cf. *Isoc.* 11, p.70,23 U.-R.; *Dem.* 58, p.252,5; *Imit.* 31.2.5; 31.5.2). Ἐνάργεια is defined as a certain power which brings that which is said under the senses. It arises from a grasp of the circumstances/ consequences (ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρακολουθούντων λήψεως). At *Pomp.* 3.17 ἐνάργεια is described as the first of the supplemental virtues.³³

³¹ W. Kroll rightly emends the ἐνέργεια in the text to ἐνάργεια (“Rhetorik” in *Pauly’s Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Eds G. Wissowa et al. Supplementband 7. [Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1940] 1112).

³² According to [Longin.] 15.2 ἐνάργεια is the goal of φαντασία (where a matter is not only vividly portrayed before the eyes of the audience, but the speaker himself appears to see the very events taking place before his *own* eyes – as if in a prophetic trance, see s.v.). According to Theon *Prog.* ii, p.119,28-29 Sp. it is one of the virtues of ἔκφρασις and defined in terms of almost being able to see that which is spoken of.

³³ The three necessary virtues are pure language, clarity and brevity (ἡ καθαρὰ διάλεκτος, σαφήνεια, and συντομία). The supplemental virtues are manifold.

It is also a virtue of style in Cic. *Part.* 20 (*illustre*). Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.63-65 discusses ἐνάργεια (*evidentia*) as a virtue of the *narratio*. At *Inst.* 8.3.61-71 it is categorised under the virtue *ornatus* as a stylistic quality. Various methods are discussed (e.g. expression of a total picture; description of many different details; impression of truth). Both *Rhet.Her.* 4.69 and Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202 state that “vividness” is useful in amplification (αὐξησις). *Rhet.Her.* 4.45 notes that metaphors may also be used *rei ante oculos ponendae causa*.

Although Aristotle does not use the term ἐνάργεια in his *Rhetoric* he does discuss the use of vivid metaphors (*Rh.* 3.10.6-3.11.5), lit. metaphors that are set πρὸ ομμάτων (before the eyes). This “setting before the eyes” is defined at *Rh.* 3.10.6 as seeing matters as they are happening instead of as future occurrences, and at *Rh.* 3.11.2 in terms of signifying ἐνέργεια (activity/ energy).

Setting a matter before the eyes is described as a figure in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202 (... *inlustris explanatio rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub aspectum paene subiectio*), cf. *Orat.* 139 (*rem dicendo subiciet oculis*). In Cic. *Inv.* 1.107 the fifth *locus* or method by which to induce pity is that of setting all one’s misfortunes individually before the eyes so that the judge(s) seems to see before him what he hears, cf. *Rhet.Her.* 4.69. At *Inv.* 2.78 setting a matter *ante oculos* is given as one of the *loci communes* for the στάσις *comparatio* (*Inv.* 2.72).

At Cic. *de Orat.* 2.264 *narratio*, described in terms of setting matters *ante oculos*, is discussed as a device for jesting.

ἐνθύμημα

Lit. “consideration.” Compare ἐνθύμιον “scruple,” ἐνθύμιον ποιεῖσθαι τι = ἐνθυμέομαι, “have a scruple about.”

A primary part of rhetoric for Aristotle is argumentation as embodied in the ἐνθύμημα. It is well known that Aristotle developed his own theory concerning the ἐνθύμημα by basing himself on an analogy to his *Analytics*. It is not necessary to describe the theory in full here, suffice it to say that at *Rh.* 1.2 an ἐνθύμημα is described as the rhetorical equivalent of the συλλογισμός (syllogism) in dialectics just as the παράδειγμα (example) is equivalent to the ἐπαγωγή (induction) (*Rh.* 1.2.8). Aristotle recognises that in rhetorical practice there are two kinds of ἐνθυμήματα, namely, those whose προτάσεις (premises) are founded upon established

views or facts and those which rely on particular methods of argumentation (τόποι). Only the latter are proper rhetorical syllogisms (ἐνθυμήματα, discussed in full at *Rh.* 2.18-26). The former actually engage one in other disciplines to establish the necessary προτάσεις.³⁴ The ἐνθύμημα is thus a deductive process of reasoning, a version of the three step syllogism (major premise, minor premise, conclusion). Παράδειγμα and ἐνθύμημα are the two kinds of logical proofs (πίστεις) available to the orator. The rhetorical ἐνθύμημα, however, is not a συλλογισμός in the technical sense. An orator never spells out a formal syllogism, but the elements should all be present or at least clearly implied. With this definition Aristotle is able to effectively organise various kinds of (ἐντεχναι) proofs (which in rhetorical theory are usually treated separately) under the head of the ἐνθύμημα. Thus probabilities (εἰκότα), signs (σημεῖα), evidences (τεκμήρια, i.e. necessary signs) are all materials of ἐνθυμήματα. At *Rh.* 2.21 even γνῶμαι are classified as parts of ἐνθυμήματα. *Rh.* 2.21-25 deals more fully with rhetorical (syllogistic) ἐνθυμήματα.

In book three of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle comments further on ἐνθυμήματα. Firstly, when speaking of speech that is cultured and popular (τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα), he notes that ἐνθυμήματα should not be so superficial as not to teach anything, nor should they be incomprehensible. He follows this up by noting that the use of antithesis and vivid metaphor aid in making ἐνθυμήματα so. In the section on τάξις dealing with the proofs, Aristotle makes a few general comments on the appropriate use of ἐνθυμήματα (*Rh.* 3.17.5-9). One must, for example, not string them one after

³⁴ W. M. A. Grimaldi (*Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* [Hermes Einzelschriften 25; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972], cf. *Aristotle, Rhetoric: A Commentary* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1980/88] on 1.2.20-21) argues that Aristotle means to say that the specific material for ἐνθυμήματα will be discussed first, and then the forms of inference in which this material may be cast. On his interpretation there are not two distinct kinds of ἐνθυμήματα. Whilst this interpretation seems attractive, for my part, I cannot but think that Aristotle is indeed distinguishing two kinds of ἐνθυμήματα at *Rh.* 1.2.20-21. He seems to be saying that some ἐνθυμήματα depend for their argumentative structure upon the knowledge of several different disciplines. Others depend upon a more general argumentative structure as treated in the κοινοὶ τόποι. Nevertheless, this could be considered one of a number of inconsistencies contained in the *Rhetoric* in which case Grimaldi may be still be correct. In any case, it is quite possible that later rhetorical theorists read this treatise in another way, overlooking what Aristotle says at this point, especially given his emphasis on the ἐνθύμημα as the equivalent of the dialectical συλλογισμός in *Rh.* 1.2 generally.

another nor use too many. They should be relevant. When exciting emotion (πάθος) or portraying trustworthy character (ἥθος), ἐνθυμήματα should not be used, for the one will cancel out the other.

Demetrius' discussion of the ἐνθύμημα at *Eloc.* 30-32 is clearly related to the Aristotelian tradition, although his material seems to have been drawn from an intermediary source common to Quintilian (see below). Aristotle's theory has been somewhat adapted. Demetrius defines an ἐνθύμημα as a kind of unfinished syllogism that is found in two forms, namely, ἐκ μάχης λεγομένη and ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι.³⁵ Firstly, whilst Aristotle certainly permitted ἐνθυμήματα to exist in the form of unfinished syllogisms, he did not restrict them in this way. It is clear from his explanation as a whole that by ἐνθύμημα he generally meant a kind of syllogism in three parts (major and minor premises, and conclusion).³⁶ Secondly, on the surface Demetrius' two forms seem to correspond to Aristotle's demonstrative and refutative ἐνθυμήματα (cf. *Rh.* 2.22.14-17; 2.25.1; 2.26.3; 3.17.13). Demetrius does not explain them any further. Yet we have in Quint. *Inst.* 5.14.1-4 (cf. 5.14.24-26; 5.10.2; 9.2.106) an explanation of these forms clearly relying upon the same source. We learn there that these two forms are two quite specific kinds of rhetorical syllogism, the one reasoning from consequences employing a simple proposition with a reason attached, the other employing contraries, i.e. using an antithetical form of reasoning showing the proposition to be in conflict with another consideration.³⁷ Quintilian goes on to add what seems to be another version

³⁵ I accept here (following L. Radermacher [1901] and D. C. Innes [1995]) Finck's addition of ἦ in the text. The text thus reads: τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα διάνοιά τις ἦτοι ἐκ μάχης λεγομένη <ἦ> ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι. The ἦ is surely required by the ἦτοι and the text represents a simple case of haplography. Furthermore, this addition brings the text into line with the interpretation in Quintilian (see below) clearly based upon the same source. Yet it should be noted that [Anon.] *Fig.* iii, p.111,25-26 Sp. (fourth century AD or later) gives evidence of a different interpretation: διάνοια γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἐκ μάχης λεγομένη ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι. The discussion in this treatise would appear to be based upon an already corrupted text of Demetrius.

³⁶ See also W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies*, 87-91.

³⁷ H. E. Butler (in the *Loeb* translation) consistently translates *ex consequentibus* as "from denial of consequents." The term "denial" does not come from the text, nor is it suggested by the underlying Greek (from Demetr. *Eloc.* 30) ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι. It seems influenced by the explanatory note of A. Wolf (*Loeb* ed. vol. 2, p.524) who provides a dialectical interpretation of the two kinds of ἐνθυμήματα. I am not convinced that Quintilian had such a dialectical interpretation in mind. His own explanation does not seem to reflect this.

of the second form, namely, when a reason is added to a proposition which is contrary or dissimilar to the point of the opposition. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.2 (cf. 8.5.9-10) rightly notes that the term ἐνθύμημα was often restricted to this latter form (the former being denoted an ἐπιχείρημα). This represents a rhetorical definition of the ἐνθύμημα predating Aristotle.

Aristotle's definition of the ἐνθύμημα did not become standard within rhetorical circles. That is not to say that a kind of rhetorical syllogism was not further developed in rhetorical theory, but the rhetorical syllogism after Aristotle went under the term ἐπιχείρημα. The standard definition of an ἐνθύμημα in rhetorical theory remained what it had already been before Aristotle, namely, a short argument or consideration based on contraries.³⁸

This seems to be reflected in the definition provided by Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 10 (cf. 5.1-4), namely, a short consideration as to whether any matters under discussion are in opposition to any of the τελικά κεφάλαια (e.g. δίκαιος, νόμιμος, σύμφορος, etc., cf. s.v. κεφάλαιον III.) or their opposites, or the ἥθος τοῦ λέγοντος or ἔθος τῶν πραγμάτων. Such considerations, together with γνῶμαι, are used to conclude any line of argumentation (e.g. argumentation by εἰκότα or by παραδείγματα, cf. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 32.6, 8; 34.11; 35.12, 15f; 36.18). Cic. *Top.* 55-56 likewise argues that the ἐνθύμημα is a short proof from contraries used as a conclusion (example provided). The same kind of argument seems to be intended in *Rhet.Her.* 4.25-26 (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.2) where it is termed *contrarium*, e.g. "why should you think that one who is a faithless friend can be an honourable enemy?" He states that it ought to be one short sentence. It provides a forcible proof refuted only with difficulty, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 (*contrarium*) which Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.90 appears to have interpreted in this sense (also using the term ἐναντιότης, cf. 9.2.106).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term ἐνθύμημα in the general sense of "argument," but at *Is.* 16 (p.114,20-22 U.-R.) and *Din.* 6 (p.305,14-15) he contrasts the ἐνθύμημα with the ἐπιχείρημα. Neither term is explicitly defined but the contrast is clearly between a simple form of argument and a syllogistic pattern of reasoning, see s.v. ἐπιχείρημα.

³⁸ This fact seems not to have been noticed by W. M. A. Grimaldi who inappropriately cites Cic. *Top.* 56 as if it were dealing with the same matter as ἐνθύμημα in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (*Studies*, 56).

Philodemus (*Rh.* 1.285-86 S.), in his critique of Nausiphanes, contrasts ἐνθυμήματα with τὰ ἀληθῆ σημεῖα ἢ πιστώματα (“true indications or pledges”). In the same context he speaks disparagingly of κενὰ ἐνθυμήματα when one is looking to treat of matters with respect to the truth (and not mere probability): Ἐνθυμήματα would appear to be used here in the sense of arguments from probability (εἰκότα) as over against necessary σημεῖα (see *s.v.*) which indicate the truth. His critique of rhetorical ἐνθυμήματα surfaces again at *Rh.* 2.40 S..³⁹

Of further interest is a comment in Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.51 where it is noted that some theorists considered the ἐνθύμημα as more fitting in a written speech, the παράδειγμα as more fitting in a spoken speech.

ἐξαλλαγή

A term described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as the radical departure from common idiom (τὸ ἐξαλλάττειν ἐκ τοῦ συνήθους, *Dem.* 10, p.148,18 U.-R., cf. for the noun p.149,1; *Dem.* 13, p.157,10; 158,6; 56, p.249,23; *Th.* 42, p.397,19; 47, p.404,22; 55, p.417,12; *Amm.* 2.3, p.425,16; *Imit.* 31, p.204,17). The virtue (ἀρετή) of ἐξαλλαγή in composition (σύνθεσις) is said to be one of the distinguishing marks of Demosthenes (cf. *Dem.* 50, p.239,16-23; *Din.* 7, p.307,1-2; 8, p.308,18-20).

The term is similarly used at Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.12. Cf. also *s.v.* ἀλλοίωσις.

ἐξεργασία

A term used in connection with the practical working out or elaboration of some rhetorical exercise or argument. Such methods of “elaboration” are often quite detailed, outlining a step by step procedure.

The earliest example of such an ἐξεργασία is found in *Rhet.Her.* 4.54 (*expolitio*). The treatise refers here to the working out of a matter in general (*res*).⁴⁰ Three ways are described in which a matter can be varied when dwelling on the same point in the same place;

³⁹ In *PHerc.* 1674 (col. XLIV,16 Auricchio) we learn that Epicurus mentioned the traditions and rules of ἐνθυμήματα in his work Περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

⁴⁰ It has not infrequently been suggested that *expolitio* here should be likened to the exercises prescribed in conjunction with a χρεία. *Expolitio* is itself, however, not a χρεία, which is something much more specific, and always related to a particular *person*, cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.96,18ff Sp..

by the words, delivery and treatment. Treatment is further subdivided into the use of the first person (*sermocinatio*) and the deliberate arousal of the emotions of the audience (*exsuscitatio*). At 4.56-57 a sevenfold step by step procedure is provided, consisting of: i) a simple statement of the matter, ii) the addition of a reason, iii) a restatement of the matter (with or without reasons), iv) the use of a *contrarium*, v) a *simile*, vi) an *exemplum*, and vii) a conclusion. This procedure is in many respects similar to the ἐργασία outlined for the χρεία and the γνώμη in [Hermog.] *Prog.* 3 (p.7,10-8.14 R.) and 4 (p.9,18-10.21 R.). Compare the ἐργασία for the ἠθοποιΐα, [Hermog.] *Prog.* 9 (p.21,19-22,3 R.). A less procedural ἐργασία for ἐπιχειρήματα is supplied in [Hermog.] *Inv.* 3.7. Dionysius of Halicarnassus also uses the term (ἐξ)ἐργασία for the working out of ἐπιχειρήματα/ ἐνθυμήματα or more generally of κεφάλαια, e.g. *Lys.* 15 (p.26,4-5, 12 U.-R.); *Isoc.* 4 (p.60,14-15), 12 (p.71,16-17); *Is.* 3 (p.95,17, 22); *Din.* 8 (p.309,1); *Th.* 13; cf. *Alex. Fig.* 1.11. D.H. *Th.* 9 (p.335,18-20) treats τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐξεργασίας as one of the three departments of οἰκονομία (the duty of the orator concerning the organisation of his materials).

Theon *Prog.* also contains a short chapter on ἐξεργασία preserved only in Armenian (there is a French translation in Patillon's Budé edition).

ἐπακολούθησις – see s.v. ἐπιχείρημα III.

ἐπαναδίπλωσις – see s.v. ἀναδίπλωσις.

ἐπανάληψις

I. Repetition of a particular particle to remind the listener of where one began, e.g. of μέν, Demetr. *Eloc.* 196. It provides an indication of clarity appropriate to ἰσχνότης because of its effectiveness in avoiding ambiguity. Compare the repetition of τούτου χάριν in *Ep.Eph.* 3.1 and 14.

II. = ἀναδίπλωσις II.

ἐπαναφορά – see s.v. ἀναφορά.

ἐπάνοδος

“Return.” An explanatory comment clarifying and distinguishing a statement using two nouns (usually names) connected to one verb,

e.g. Νικίας καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπὶ Σικελίας τὴν στρατείαν διέφθειραν. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν εὐτελῇ τὸν πόλεμον καταλιπών, Νικίας δὲ ἄργον στρατηγήσας, Caecilius *Fr.* 73. Neither the definition in Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.35-36 nor Alex. *Fig.* 2.7 demand a common verb.

ἐπανάρθωσις – see *s.v.* μεταβολή I.

ἐπεζευγμένον

Rhet. Her. 4.38 discusses *adiunctio*, a figure involving a series of phrases governed by one verb placed either at the beginning or the end. When the verb is placed somewhere in the middle of the phrases the figure is called *coniunctio*, which may indicate that his source used the term συνεζευγμένον (although I am not aware of an extant rhetorical theorist using this term in this sense). He suggests that *coniunctio* will be used more frequently than *disiunctum* (see *s.v.* διεζευγμένον) on account of its brevity. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.62 also discusses ἐπεζευγμένον, although it is unclear whether he intends this term to cover cases when the verb assumes the middle position (9.3.63-64).⁴¹

Arist. *Rh.* 3.9.7 mentions this (using the verb ἐπιζεύγνυμι) as a way in which ἀντίθεσις can be achieved. He notes a form of solecism in connection with this figure at *Rh.* 3.5.7 (when a verb is used which is inappropriate to one of the phrases).⁴²

Tib. *Fig.* 36 terms the use of one verb governing two antithetical clauses συζυγία.

See also *s.v.* ζεύγμα. For a Pauline example cf. *Ep. Rom.* 5.3b-4.

ἐπεισόδιον

“Episode,” a term taken from poetic theory indicating some kind of parenthetical narrative. See further, *s.v.* παράβασις.

ἐπενθύμημα

“Supplemental argument.” Thphr. *Fr.* 675 FHS&G would suggest that he may have used this term. He is said to have defined it as ἐξ

⁴¹ If so, then it would imply that the other variants discussed in this section also fall under ἐπεζευγμένον, i.e. i) understanding both sexes when using a masculine noun, and ii) the interchange of singular and plural.

⁴² This form of solecism is commonly called “zeugma” in modern grammatical terminology (σύλληψις in Tryph. *Trop.* 2.10).

ἐπαγωγῆς ἐνθύμημα (an enthumeme by induction). The reading of the codices in Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 32.1 is dubious.

ἐπερώτησις

“Rhetorical question.” See also *s.v.* ἐρώτημα and πύσμα.

- I. Those left unanswered by the speaker: Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 20.5 (the prefix προσ- is used at 20.1) lists it as a method of recapitulation (whether of parts or of the whole of a speech), as does Arist. *Rh.* 3.19.5 (ἐρώτησις). Similarly, *Rhet.Her.* 4.22 (*interrogatio*) suggests that it is best used as amplification when points against the adversaries have been summed up. The recommendation that ἐπερώτησις be used in recapitulation is most probably connected to the element of πάθος in its use (rhetorical theorists generally recommended the building up of πάθος in the ἐπίλογος). This is confirmed by Demetr. *Eloc.* 279 (τὸ ἐρωτῶντα τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἕνια λέγειν) who classifies it under the style δεινότης. He notes that the listener appears to be like someone under cross examination who has nothing to answer. It is thus a rhetorical question which expects no answer. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.6-11 emphasises that such a question is not for gaining information but *instandi gratia* (for the sake of insisting on our point/ threatening). It may also be used to invoke pity, admiration, etc. (i.e. other πάθη). For an example see *Ev.Marc.* 12.24.
- II. Those answered by the speaker: [Longin.] 18 (πεῦσεις καὶ ἐρωτήσεις)⁴³ deals with questions posed by the speaker which he answers himself. He means rhetorical questions often accompanied by their own answer. Even if the matter is rather inferior, the quick fire question and answer in meeting objections makes what is said both loftier (ὕψηλότερος) and more persuasive (πιστότερος), and both ἔμπρακτος and σοβαρός (effective and impulsive). He notes that they should come across as unrehearsed and thus fit the emotional moment. Ps.-Longinus also notes that the speaker himself appears to be under cross-examination. For πεῦσις as a rhetorical term (unexplained), cf. D.H. *Dem.* 54 (p.246,14 U.-R.).
Rhet.Her. 4.33-34 speaks of *subiectio*, i.e. when the speaker asks the opponents either what they would say in their favour, or what they would say against himself, and then provides the appropriate

⁴³ Perhaps it is better to read πεῦσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις (cf. the apparatus of Jahn/Vahlen⁴).

answer. He adds that this makes it easy to amplify the indignity of the act. Alternatively the speaker can ask a similar question of himself. Such questions may be accumulated. (At 4.65 [*sermocinatio*] the possibility of answering such questions in a hypothetical first person is suggested.) Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.14-16 also mentions this, cf. the remark at *Inst.* 9.2.36. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.5 shows how such questioning can be used as an inductive argument. At *Inst.* 9.2.15 he notes that some call this figure *suggestio*, which should be considered a Latin equivalent of ὑποφορά. Indeed Tib. *Fig.* 39 defines ὑποφορά in just this way, emphasising the dialogue-like character of question and answer. For broader definitions of the term ὑποφορά (not restricted to the question form) see *s.v.* ὑποφορά.

Two good examples of ἐπερώτησις from Isaeus and Demosthenes are cited by D.H. *Is.* 12-13. The figure is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 = *de Orat.* 3.203, cf. 207. For Pauline examples see *Ep.Gal.* 1.10; *Ep.Rom.* 3.1-9, 27-31 etc..

ἐπιβολή – see *s.v.* ἀναφορά.

ἐπιδιόρθωσις – see *s.v.* αἰτιολογία II.

ἐπίzeugis

Cic. *de Orat.* 3.206 (*adiunctio*) and *Orat.* 135 seem to imply the repetition of a word either at the beginning or end of a clause, cf. [Hdn.] *Fig.* iii, p.99,22-25 Sp..

ἐπίθετον

“Epithet.” Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.14 treats of the sources of ἐπίθετα, and *Rh.* 3.3.3 of frigidity in ἐπίθετα where he notes that prose needs to be more restrained than poetry. At *Rh.* 3.7.11 he notes that the use of ἐπίθετα is most suited to someone speaking emotionally (παθητικῶς). *PHamb.* 128 fr. a (= Thphr. App. 9 FHS&G), attributed to Theophrastus, defines the ἐπίθετον as τὸ μετὰ κυρίων ὀνομάτων λεγόμενον (“that which is used in conjunction with ordinary words,” transl. FHS&G), e.g. σίδηρος αἶθων (“blazing” iron) and χρυσὸς αἰγλήεις (“dazzling” gold). Three special kinds of epithets are then illustrated, the double (e.g. σακεσφόρος “shieldbearing”), the triple (e.g. ἀστερομαρμαροφειγγές “star-crystal-bright”), and the privative (e.g. ἄπτερον “wingless”). Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.40-43 distinguishes the ἐπίθετον from ἀντονομασία. The

former is a short descriptive phrase standing next to the noun in question, whilst the latter substitutes for the noun. He stresses that in oratory use of the ἐπίθετον must add something to the meaning and should not be redundant (as often in poetry). The term is also used (in this sense) in D.H. *Dem.* 5 (p.137,18 U.-R.); *Th.* 29 (p.375,11) and more strictly grammatically in *Comp.* 5 (p.26,12).⁴⁴

Note that ἐπίθετον and ἄντονομασία are also discussed in grammatical treatises (as “adjective” and “pronoun” respectively).

ἐπιμονή

“Lingering.” Demetr. *Eloc.* 280 appears to define it as a longer expression of the matter, i.e. dwelling on a point. He adds that it may greatly contribute to δεινότης. Hermog. *Id.* 1.11 (pp.285-86 R.) also characterises this figure as belonging especially to δεινότης. He states that one should use ἐπιμοναί when dealing with a particularly strong point, repeating it several times. He goes on to refer to a passage in Demosthenes and remarks that there the same thought is restated more than four times in the same place. Alex. *Fig.* 1.10 defines it as dwelling upon the same thought with αὔξησις. He gives several short examples. In this respect it may be noted that [Longin.] 12.2 uses this term to describe the effect of αὔξησις.

Rhet.Her. 4.58 discusses *commoratio* which he explains in terms of dwelling long and often on the strongest point in the whole speech and often returning to it. This is somewhat different from ἐπιμονή proper, which designates lingering on the same point *in the same place*, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.203. I am not aware of an extant Greek source which makes this distinction.

The figure is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 = *de Orat.* 3.202. Cf. s.v. λεπτολογία.

For a possible Pauline example, see *Ep.Rom.* 1.24-32.

ἐπιπλοκή – see s.v. ἐποικοδόμησις.

ἐπιτίμησις

A phrase used to heighten the intensity of a particular word, Alex. *Fig.* 2.28. Alexander suggests three ways in which this might be

⁴⁴ The term is found once in Philodemus, in a fragment without context (fr. 20a,5 Ferrario).

accomplished, i) by repeating the same word (= ἀναδίπλωσις II.), ii) by using a word which emphasises the difference in intensity (e.g. οὐ φιλία, ἀλλ' ἔρω), iii) by using the strongest possible term to describe the concept (e.g. ὠργίζετο, οὐ μὲν οὖν, ἀλλ' ἐμαίνετο). The last two methods are hardly distinguishable and form a special case of μεταβολή I. Alexander notes ὑπαλλαγή as a synonym.

ἐπιτροπή

In *Rhet.Her.* 4.39 *permissio* occurs when the speaker surrenders the whole matter (or himself) to the will of another. It is used especially to invoke *misericordia*. Rut.Lup. 2.17 identifies this figure as ἐπιτροπή, cf. [Hdn.] *Fig.* iii, p.98,21 Sp.⁴⁵. It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.25 (*permissio*).

ἐπιτροχασμός

Reference to a number of various matters in rapid succession without detailed description. Alex. *Fig.* 1.17 likens it to συναθροισμός and ἐπιτροπή, but notes that the difference is that it brings together very separate matters which are stated for the sake of credibility. Wherein this credibility lies is not said, but the example provided shows that this figure may be used when quick reference to a number of varying examples may be deemed expedient. It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202 (reading *percursio*, cf. Aq.Rom. *Fig.* 6), where it is contrasted to a vivid description (cf. s.v. ἐνάργεια).

In the nature of the case, when παράλειψις (see s.v.) is used to surreptitiously refer to several matters briefly, the figure of ἐπιτροχασμός is present, cf. *Schem.Dian.* 9.

ἐπιφορά

/...x/...x/ A common synonym is ἀντιστροφή, cf. Alex. *Fig.* 2.4; D.H. *Dem.* 40 (τὰ ἀντιστρέφοντα, p.217,11 U.-R.), 50 (ἀντιστροφή, p.125,18). It is further mentioned at *Rhet.Her.* 4.19 (*conversio*); Rut.Lup. 1.8; Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.206; Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.30-34. See further the endnote to the glossary. For a Pauline example see 1 *Ep.Cor.* 13.11.

⁴⁵ ἐπιτροπή δὲ ὅταν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐπιτρέψωμεν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ὀνομάτων ἐξουσίαν, ὥς παρὰ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ παρειαγεται ἡ Ἀνδρομέδα λέγουσα τῷ Περσεΐ,
 ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ ξέν', εἴτε πρόσπολον θέλεις,
 εἴτ' ἄλοχον, εἴτε δμωίδα.

ἐπιφώνημα

A maxim added as a finishing touch. Demetr. *Eloc.* 106-111 defines the ἐπιφώνημα in terms of a phrase added for decoration (and thus not necessarily connected to the foregoing argument or narrative, cf. §114). It is distinguished from the γνώμη in that a γνώμη does not always take the final position.

The ἐπιφώνημα is thus a γνώμη used to close a passage or argument. That all manner of arguments were frequently closed in this way is clear from the sources, cf. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 32.3; Quint. *Inst.* 8.5.11, 13-14. See further *s.v.* γνώμη. Quintilian complains that such closing maxims were popularly used in the schools to function as *transitus* (μεταβάσεις) thus obscuring somewhat the transition from one section to another (*Inst.* 4.1.77-79, see *s.v.* μετάβασις).

[Longin.] 4.3, using the verb form, criticises an ἐπιφώνημα from the history of Timaeus as frigid. Timaeus' ἐπιφώνημα takes the form of an impossible ἐτυμολογία based on proper names. Plu. *Nic.* 1 adds another example from Timaeus. Theon notes that τὸ ἐπιφωνεῖν is not fitting for history or political speech but is more suited to the theatre or stage (*Prog.* ii, 91,12-14 Sp.), although he admits its use if it is not too obvious (*Prog.* ii, 91,23ff Sp.). The effect is then graceful (ἐπίχαρις).

In Theon's chapter on the χρεῖα (*Prog.* ii, p.103 Sp.) ἐπιφωνεῖν is introduced as one of the ways in which χρεῖαι can be practised, namely, by briefly and suitably saying some approving words about it, e.g. that it is ἀληθές, καλόν, συμφέρον, or approved by other reputable men. Similarly, the chapter on διήγησις describes ἐπιφωνεῖν as one of the exercises for a διήγησις (*Prog.* ii, pp.91-92 Sp.). Theon suggests adding a γνώμη in connection with each part of the διήγησις. Without explicitly using the same noun or verb, the same exercise is applied to the fable (μῦθος). He speaks here of adding the moral (γνωμικὸν λόγον = ἐπίλογος) to a fable, *Prog.* 3 (ii, p.75,19-76,5 Sp.).

See further D.H. *Th.* 48 (p.407,21 U.-R.); [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.9; S.E. *M.* 2.57 and possibly Phld. *Rh.* 1.173 S..

ἐπιχείρημα

Although this term may simply mean "argument" (as it often does in later authors), we refer here to more specific definitions in rhetorical theory.

We know from D.L. 5.43, 47, 49 that already Theophrastus had written separately on ἐπιχειρήματα and ἐνθυμήματα (cf. *Fr.* 666, 673ab FHS&G and cf. *s.v.* ἐπενθύμημα).⁴⁶ The essence of the rhetorical ἐπιχείρημα can be traced in early Latin treatises:

- I. *Rhet.Her.* 2.28-30 (the Greek term is cited at §2.2) divides it into five parts: *propositio*, *ratio* (briefly giving a causal basis), *rationis confirmatio*, *exornatio* (including amplification), and *complexio* (a brief summary conclusion – called *conclusio* at 3.16). The last two parts are optional. Faults applicable to each part are described in 2.31-47. According to W. Kroll this non-syllogistic definition of the ἐπιχείρημα was frequently maintained by later writers, but represents a poor reproduction of the (same) Greek theory underlying both *Rhet.Her.* and *Cic. Inv.*⁴⁷
- II. A form of rhetorical syllogism most often divided into five parts. Note that already in the *Topica* of Aristotle an ἐπιχείρημα is defined as συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικός, that is, a syllogism based on generally accepted premises (as opposed to the φιλοσόφημα = συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικός, i.e. a syllogism based on necessary premises, cf. *Top.* 162a, 100a). In this sense the ἐπιχείρημα is a rhetorical adaption from dialectics.

Cic. Inv. 1.57-77 (*rationis confirmatio*, cf. *Quint. Inst.* 5.10.5-6) reproduces this five part division as follows: i) major premise (*propositio*), ii) supporting argument (*propositionis approbatio*), iii) minor premise (*assumptio* = πρόσληψις, cf. *Div.* 2.108), iv) supporting argument (*assumptionis approbatio*), v) conclusion (*complexio*). He notes that some treat parts i-ii and iii-iv as inseparable entities resulting in a three part division. He adds that if one of the premises is a necessary argument, then it obviously needs no supporting argument. A variety of ways of formulating the conclusion are discussed at 1.73-74. Refutation is discussed at 1.87-89. *Quint. Inst.* 5.14.5-23 discusses the ἐπιχείρημα in similar fashion, arguing for the tripartite division.

It is clear that this syllogistic approach to the ἐπιχείρημα was standard in Hellenistic rhetoric. As such, the doctrine of the ἐπιχείρημα clearly corresponds to what Aristotle was getting at with the

⁴⁶ The long list of the works of Theophrastus in Diogenes is actually a composite of four different lists. The reference to a work on ἐπιχειρήματα at # 37 is probably the same as that of # 270.

⁴⁷ "Das Epicheirema" (Adademie der Wissenschaften in Wien: Philosophisch-historische Klasse; *Sitzungsberichte* (1936) 216.2, pp.5-8.

ἐνθύμημα. Aristotle's idiosyncratic use of the term ἐνθύμημα did not catch on, but his concept of rhetorical syllogistic reasoning did. Apparently the first extant Greek rhetorical theorist to clearly distinguish between ἐνθύμημα and ἐπιχείρημα is Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Din.* 6, p.305,15-16 U.-R. where the ἐπιχείρημα is clearly considered to be an expanded form of ἐνθύμημα, cf. *Isoc.* 12, p.71,16-17 U.-R.; *Is.* 16). In *Is.* 16 the terms are not explained but a good example of the syllogistic ἐπιχείρημα is given. At *Is.* 17 a citation from Isaeus provides an excellent example of an ἐπιχείρημα, where the major premise (p.116,9-13 U.-R.) is cast in the form of a διλήμματον which is then refuted (p.116,13-18). The minor premise follows with reference to its proof (p.116,18-21), and then the conclusion (p.116,21 – p.117,1). Other examples follow.⁴⁸ The term is elsewhere used at *Lys.* 23 (p.26,5 U.-R.); *Isoc.* 4 (p.60,15); *Is.* 3 (p.95,22); *Dem.* 46 (p.231,7); 55 (p.248,8-9); *Amm.* 1.8 (p.266,17); *Din.* 8 (p.308,21, p.309,1).

Related to the ἐπιχείρημα is Cicero's discussion of the *argumentatio* in *Part.* 46. He divides it into two forms, direct and emotional. The direct argumentation puts forward a proposition which is then proved, supported, and returned to by drawing a conclusion. The emotional form of argument first takes up the supporting arguments and then, having excited the emotions, throws in the proposition at the end. If the conclusion is obvious it need not be explicitly drawn.

A later treatise dedicated to the ἐπιχείρημα is Minucianus' *περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων* (probably third century AD).

- III. For another, apparently common, definition of ἐπιχείρημα as an argument from consequents see Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.2 (cf. s.v. ἐνθύμημα). Note that at Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.106 (cf. 103) it appears that Celsus thought the term ἐπακολούθησις used by Gorgias the Younger (first century BC) probably synonymous with ἐπιχείρημα in this sense.

ἐπικοδόμησις

A figure wherein the principal word(s) of each clause is repeated in the next and used to build an argumentative chain, e.g. οὐκ εἶπον

⁴⁸ In this respect I am less inclined than W. Kroll (*Epicheirema*, 17) to think that the rhetorical syllogistic ἐπιχείρημα was pure theory with no practical significance. This more especially when due consideration is given to what is said in the theorists concerning various ways in which the "standard" (or perhaps better, "theoretically ideal") five part division may be shortened.

μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ· οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ· οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μὲν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δέ Θηβαίους (D. 18.179). It is defined in Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 3.11 (with an example – one of the seven τρόποι αὐξήσεως); Arist. *Rh.* 1.7.31; *GA* 1.18.34; and Rut.Lup. 1.13 (who uses the term ἐπιπλοκή). Both Anaximenes and Aristotle argue that the original subject appears much greater because it is the cause of so many things. It was used both in serious and comic contexts (cf. Aristotle's citation of Epicharmus, and D. 18.179). Demetr. *Eloc.* 270 prefers the term κλιμαξ (“ladder”) and compares it to one stepping up to greater and greater things. *Rhet.Her.* 4.34-35 (*gradatio*) notes that it has a certain attractiveness (*lepor*). [Longin.] 23.1 classifies κλιμαξ together with ἀθροισμός and μεταβολή (II.) as forms of πολύπτωτα.⁴⁹ All three are said to be πάνυ ἀγωνιστικά. At §11.2 ἐποικοδομία (an equivalent term) is listed among the methods of αὕξησις.⁵⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.54-57 recommends sparing use because of its affected nature. The figure is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 135 and possibly intended at *de Orat.* 3.207 (*gradatio*). Alex. *Fig.* 2.8 allows that the repeated word in the κλιμαξ be a synonym. For Pauline examples see *Ep.Rom.* 5.3-5; 8.29-30; 10.14-15.

ἐποικοδομία – see the note *s.v.* αὕξησις on [Longin.] 11.2, and the entry *s.v.* ἐποικοδόμησις.

ἐργασία – see *s.v.* ἐξεργασία.

ἐρώτημα

Alex. *Fig.* 1.22 defines it as a question requiring only a yes or no answer. Contrast πύσμα, and cf. *s.v.* ἐπερώτησις.

ἐρώτησις – see *s.v.* ἐπερώτησις.

ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος

“Figured speech.” In rhetorical theory the term “figures” (e.g. of speech) often had the same meaning as it has in English, but it could also refer to a more specific use of figures often referred to as ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος. In this case the term σχῆμα took on

⁴⁹ But see *s.v.* πολύπτωτον for a suggestion on the text of Ps.-Longinus at this point.

⁵⁰ See *s.v.* αὕξησις for a note on the text of Ps.-Longinus at this point.

another connotation, best indicated by the definition of the cynic philosopher and rhetor Zoilos (fourth century BC): σχῆμά ἐστιν ἕτερον μὲν προσποιεῖσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ λέγειν (L. Radermacher, *Art. Script.* B XXXV Fr. 2). Demetr. *Eloc.* 287-98 notes that this more specific use of the term refers to the use of figures to hide or cover what one actually wants to say. It is a way of softening one's critique especially if that critique was to be presented to people high in authority. Two reasons for using figures in this way are given, ἀσφάλεια and εὐπρέπεια ("caution" and "propriety"). [Longin.] 17, however, warns against too obviously cloaking everything in figures in these situations as this arouses suspicion. One must use figures in such a way that they appear not to be figures. This is best achieved by ensuring that the figures are sublime for then their sublimity strikes one so much that the fact that a figure is used recedes into the background.⁵¹ Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.65-107 discusses figured speech under three uses, caution (9.2.67-75), propriety (9.2.76-95), and charm (*venustas*, 9.2.96-107). The famous Asianist orator of the late first century AD, Scopelian, is said to have excelled in this kind of figured oratory (Philostr. *VS* 519), as are later orators. Two treatises probably to be dated to the early third century AD (wrongly attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, cf. Radermacher, pp.xxiii – xxiv, Teubner ed.) deal in detail with this kind of figured speech, [D.H.] *Rh.* 8 and 9, cf. [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.13; Aps. *Prob.*. The treatises clearly presuppose earlier discussion (no longer extant), cf. *Rh.* 8.1.

ἑτεροίωσις

A term used at Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.12 of phrases which depart from normal idiom for the sake of novelty and usually also brevity. Quintilian notes that this term is not dissimilar to ἐξαλλαγή (see *s.v.*). He lists it together with that group of "grammatical" figures elsewhere known as ἀλλοιώσις (see *s.v.*).

ἐτυμολογία

The use of an (often suspect) etymology in terms of definition, e.g. Cic. *Top.* 10, 35-37; *de Orat.* 2.165; Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.29; 5.10.55, 59; 7.3.25. With respect to names (including puns) see also the τῶπος in Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.29; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.111,4-11 Sp.; Quint.

⁵¹ The notion of concealing one's craft in speech-making was a general commonplace among the theorists. For a long list of references see Caplan's note to *Rhet.Her.* 4.10 (pp.250-51 Loeb ed.).

Inst. 5.30-31. See also συζυγία I. and ὀνοματοποιῖα II. For a New Testament example see *Ep.Hebr.* 7.1-2.

εὐφημισμός

"Euphemism," cautiously classified under the style δεινότης at Demetr. *Eloc.* 281, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.92 (under a discussion of ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος). It is also termed ἀντίφρασις διὰ τοῦ παρακειμένου (see s.v. ἀντίφρασις I.).

ζεύγμα

Although there is a lacuna in the text, it seems clear that Alex. *Fig.* 2.17 uses this term to cover cases of διεζευγμένον, ἐπεζευγμένον and "συνεζευγμένον," cf. the concluding remarks to the discussion of *disiunctum*, *coniunctio* and *adiunctio* in *Rhet.Her.* 38 where he states that these three figures belong to one genus.

ἠθολογία

See s.v. χαρακτηρισμός III. It is a doubtful reading in Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.3 and Suet. *Gram.* 4 (instead of *aetiologia*).

ἠθοποιῖα

I. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58-59 uses this term to describe descriptions of others' characteristics (*imitatio morum alienorum*), either in terms of words or actions (he gives μίμησις as a synonym). Such descriptions go back at least as far as Theophrastus' work ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες.⁵² *Rhet.Her.* 4.63-65 (*notatio*) also notes the description of particular kinds of character (e.g. the boastful man) by means of describing various things that such a man would do. He adds that such descriptions have great attraction. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.204 (= *Orat.* 138, cf. 139) states that such descriptions have the effect of either calming or exciting an audience. See also χαρακτηρισμός III.

Rut.Lup. 1.21 unfortunately does not define the term ἠθοποιῖα but gives two examples. These examples both clearly describe a particular character, but their descriptions are at the same time essentially couched in language given in the first person. Rutilius thus seems to form a bridge between definition I. and definition II.

⁵² Note that Arist. *Rh.* 2.12-17 gives an analysis of characters in terms of four factors: πάθη, ἕξεις, ἡλικίαι and τύχαι.

- II. The exercise termed ἡθοποιία in the later προγυμνάσματα is essentially a form of προσωποποιία. Strictly speaking ἡθοποιία is προσωποποιία of a human person, whether a specific person, or a kind of person (e.g. a painter). When used in this sense, the term προσωποποιία is restricted to exercises in which non-human persons are made to speak (mostly abstract qualities). For such ἡθοποιία see [Hermog.] *Prog.* 9 and *Lib. Eth.* Alex. *Fig.* 1.15 restricts ἡθοποιία to existing persons. Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.17 seems to be referring to general ἡθοποιῶν (i.e. of *kinds* of people) when he speaks of the ἡθῆ practiced in the schools.⁵³ In the general sense, this meaning is identical to ἡθοποιία I.
- III. D.H. *Lys.* 8 uses ἡθοποιία of providing a *favourable* presentation of the character of the speaker throughout the speech (a term, he claims, that is used by many in this sense). Dionysius, admiring this virtue (ἀρετή) in Lysias, breaks it down into the common analytical trio διανοία, λέξις and σύνθεσις (cf. the structure of Demetr. *Eloc.*). Ἠθοποιία here refers to the portrayal of a character both suitable for the speaker for whom the speech is written, and a character which makes a positive impression upon the audience. At *Lys.* 19, Dionysius analyses the way in which Lysias uses three kinds of proofs (derived from Aristotle, cf. *Rh.* 1.2), proofs from the matter, from the character of the speaker (ἥθος) and from emotions (πάθος). His discussion of proofs derived from the character of the speaker is related to his earlier discussion of the virtue of ἡθοποιία. Here he explicitly suggests that the character of the speaker should be made trustworthy (p.31,11 U.-R., cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.4). The term is further used at *Isoc.* 11 (p.71,5); *Imit.* 31 (p.205,5). See also s.v. ἥθος.

ἥθος (and πάθος)

- I. "Character" and "emotion."⁵⁴ Although often used as technical terms in secondary literature, these terms are not generally used in a specifically technical sense in the rhetorical treatises.

ἥθος and πάθος are sources for two of the three kinds of proofs outlined in Aristotle's treatise (*Rh.* 1.2 and ἥθος 2.1.1-7, πάθος

⁵³ M. Winterbottom (private letter dated 4 July, 1995) would interpret these ἡθῆ as *controversiae* involving characterisation (ἡθικαί).

⁵⁴ The following description is in large part indebted to J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1989) to which the reader is referred for a detailed examination of the subject.

2.1.8-2.11 and a supplementary analysis of the various characters of people at 2.12-17). Proof through ἥθος concerns the enhancement of the trustworthiness of the speaker, whilst proof through πάθος concerns the effecting of the whole range of emotions.⁵⁵ Aristotle classified proofs through ἥθος and πάθος together with more strictly rational argumentation as the three kinds of proofs available to the orator.

This classification was not followed in rhetorical theory generally, which relegated portrayal of character to the προοίμιον, and excitement of emotion to the ἐπίλογος. Even Aristotle himself introduces again both portrayal of character and excitement of emotion in his discussion of the parts of a speech. Aristotle, however, places both concepts in the ἐπίλογος (*Rh.* 3.19), and he does *not* explicitly use the term ἥθος here, although he discusses topics which are generally associated with proof through character portrayal, i.e. making the audience favourable to oneself and unfavourable to the opponent. Anaximenes, whilst not using these terms, places the concept of effective character portrayal in the προοίμιον of both deliberative and judicial speeches (Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 29.1, 6-9; 36.3-6) and the concept of exciting the emotions in the conclusion of a judicial speech (*Rh.* 36.29). The concept of character portrayal is also found in the conclusion of a defense speech (*Rh.* 36.45). Both *Rhet.Her.* 1.6, 8; 2.47-50 and Cic. *Inv.* 1.20-22, 100-109 include the effective character portrayal and excitement of the emotions respectively in the προοίμιον and ἐπίλογος of a judicial speech.

The terms ἥθος and πάθος can be found throughout the rhetorical treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus who adopted them along Aristotelian lines, cf., for example, *Lys.* 19 for an analysis of Lysias based on the Aristotelian scheme.⁵⁶

In [Longin.] 9.15 (cf. 9.13-14) we see πάθος (emotion) contrasted with ἥθος (narrative-like characterisation).

Cicero in the *de Oratore* returned to the threefold classification of proofs deriving from Aristotle, thereby emphasising the use of character portrayal and excitement of emotion throughout a speech, not only in passages specifically designed to effect the one or the other

⁵⁵ For Anaximenes' classification of the argumentative use of πάθη as a kind of εἰκός, see s.v. εἰκός.

⁵⁶ Dionysius is one of the few authors from the first century BC of whom we can be sure that he personally studied the treatise of Aristotle on rhetoric.

(*de Orat.* 2.310). However, the content of his remarks on these subjects (*de Orat.* 2.178-216, 310-12) shows that he defined proof through character portrayal in terms of the effecting of those *mild* emotions which produce *benevolentia* (goodwill or sympathy) in the audience with respect to either the orator or his client (reflecting the Roman practice of advocacy).⁵⁷ Proof through the excitement of emotion involves the effecting of the *violent* emotions. Note that Cicero studiously avoids the use of technical terms in this treatise, and never specifically uses the terms ἥθος or πάθος or any *technical* Latin equivalent.

Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.8-9 appears to go one step further in terms of definition. In a difficult passage he notes that the term ἥθος in rhetorical contexts appears to mean more than just character (*mores*), but *morum quaedam proprietas* ("certain properties of character" or, perhaps, "a certain appropriateness of character"?)⁵⁸. He goes on to suggest that more cautious writers explain πάθη and ἡθη in terms of violent and mild emotions respectively. His discussion of ἥθος and πάθος is placed under his treatment of the ἐπίλογος (admitting that their use is also important in the προοίμιον and, although less so, in other parts of the speech).

Demetr. *Eloc.* 226 suggests that ἥθος is especially important in letters, where a letter is described as "virtually an image of the soul of the writer."⁵⁹ Further comments are found at *Eloc.* 28.

Both πάθη and ἡθη are mentioned at Phld. *Rh.* 1.164 S. as εἶδη ἐγκατασκευῆς λόγου (forms of elaborate speech) but not explained.

See also s.v. ἡθοποιΐα III..

II. See s.v. ἡθοποιΐα II..

θέσις

An argumentative treatment of a theme which lacks the specifics of person and circumstances, e.g. whether one ought to marry. The term ὑπόθεσις is used for a specific case, e.g. whether Cato should marry (on θέσις/ ὑπόθεσις generally, see Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.5-18). A θέσις may include indefinite persons or circumstances, e.g. whether

⁵⁷ D.H. *Lys.* 19 (p.31,15-16 U.-R.) also thought that for the presentation of a trustworthy character (ἥθος), the application of mild emotions (πάθη μέτρια) were appropriate.

⁵⁸ The latter possibility is suggested by J. Wisse (*Ethos*, 5) who in turn references G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (London: Methuen, 1965) 291.

⁵⁹ This seems to be an adaption of a common saying, cf. D.H. 1.1.

a king should marry; whether those under siege ought to send an army abroad. Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.11 also mentions another (less commonly accepted) way of defining the difference, which explains the *θέσις* as contemplative (e.g. whether Orestes was rightly acquitted) and the *ὑπόθεσις* as active (e.g. that Orestes did not commit the crime). In this sense, the *ὑπόθεσις* deals with the case actively, whilst the *θέσις* looks back on it.

The use of *θέσεις* has its background in philosophy, particularly the Peripatetic and (especially since the turn to scepticism) Academic schools (cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.109-110; *Orat.* 46, 127; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.69,1-4 Sp.; Phld. *Rh.* 2.173 (fr. 12) S.; Quint. *Inst.* 10.2.25).⁶⁰

Certain Hellenistic rhetorical theorists from the time of Hermagoras (second century BC) incorporated *θέσεις* into their systems, but there is evidence that *θέσεις* were sometimes little more than mentioned (cf. Cic. *Inv.* 1.8; *de Orat.* 2.78).⁶¹ Rhetorical theory was more concerned with *ὑποθέσεις*. Cicero, in accordance with the attempt to synthesize rhetoric and philosophy in his later rhetorical treatises, championed the value of *θέσεις* for the training of the orator. He also incorporated an expanded discussion of the analysis of *θέσεις* given in *de Orat.* 3.109-119 into *Part.* 61-68 (and again later, more briefly, in *Top.* 79-90).⁶² The inclusion of *θέσεις* into rhetorical theory from the second century BC on was probably to deliberately incorporate philosophy into the scope of rhetorical education.

Although we cannot be sure how school rhetoric dealt with *θέσεις* in the first or second centuries BC (did they do anything more than mention them?), by the first century AD we find the

⁶⁰ See further, H. Throm, *Die Thesis: Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und Geschichte* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1932) 171-83.

⁶¹ Cic. *Inv.* 1.8 is itself evidence that this trend was not universal. He denies that *θέσεις* have a place in rhetorical theory. Apollodorus (c. 104-22 BC), who taught at Rome, is also known to have criticised Hermagoras on this point, arguing against the distinction *ὑπόθεσις*/ *θέσις* altogether (see Aug. *Rhet.* 5). On the other hand, we know that Athenaeus (second century BC, a rival of Hermagoras) emphasised the close connection between the *ὑπόθεσις* and *θέσις* by calling it *pars causae* (cited in Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.5). Theodorus of Gadara (fl. 33 BC) called the *θέσις*, *κεφάλαιον ἐν ὑποθέσει* (cited in Theon *Prog.* ii, p.120,19 Sp.). This is probably to be connected with Theodorus' *στάσις* theory, see *κεφάλαιον* I.

⁶² Cicero's discussion in *de Oratore* differs in one respect, in that he asserts that his analysis applies to both *consultationes* (*θέσεις*) and *causae* (*ὑποθέσεις*), *de Orat.* 3.111-12.

θέσις grouped among the various preliminary exercises commonly known as προγυμνάσματα. That θέσεις became a standard exercise among the προγυμνάσματα is clear from Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.24-32 and Theon *Prog.* ii, p.120,12ff Sp.. Theon's treatment of θέσεις is quite clearly very rhetorical, and also polemical against philosophy. He divides θέσεις into those which are θεωρητικάί and those which are πρακτικάί (*Prog.* ii, p.121,6-17 Sp.). Although this seems to reflect the division in Cicero (*Part.* 61-68; *de Orat.* 3.109-119; *Top.* 79-90) into the θέσις *cognitionis* and *actionis*, the analysis is quite different. Theon refers to the θεωρητικάί as philosophical and the πρακτικάί as rhetorical. However, he goes on to argue that rhetoric is just as able to treat of philosophical as rhetorical θέσεις. He provides a detailed list of τόποι for dealing with θέσεις and adds remarks on the ordering of material, αὔξησις, and other typical rhetorical methods. Cicero, on the other hand, deals with the θέσις *cognitionis* in terms of a simple application of στάσις doctrine. The θέσις *actionis* is divided into that concerning instruction in duty (e.g. to parents) and that concerning the calming or arousing of emotions (explained as incorporating various kinds of consolation or exhortation in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.118).⁶³ Clearly both kinds of θέσεις in the *Partitiones* are philosophical in origin.

In Cic. *Orat.* 125 the θέσις, along with αὔξησις, are described as two important forms of *ornatus* (rhetorical ornamentation). Cicero is referring to the discussion of a general question in the midst of a speech. This reflects his views as outlined in *de Orat.* 2.133-47; *Top.* 80 (cf. *Part.* 61) and *Orat.* 45-46 that every concrete case (ὑπόθεσις) may be brought back to a general theme underlying it (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 10.2.18). This concept is not only useful in terms of investigating possible arguments (by way of abstract τόποι), but the general underlying theme may also be separately handled in one's speech (*de Orat.* 3.120; Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.13 and see D.Chr. 38 for an example).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not use the term θέσις in the sense discussed here, but the term ὑπόθεσις (in terms of the concrete case or subject in question) is frequent.

For θέσεις described as τόποι, see s.v. τόπος IV.

ἰσόκωλον – see s.v. παρίσωσης.

⁶³ Compare Sen. *Ep.* 94-95.

κατάχρησις

Aristotle (cited in Cic. *Orat.* 94) terms it a kind of metaphor involving a misuse of words (*abusio*). Cicero gives the example of *minutus animus* instead of *parvus animus*, and adds that the misuse of related words can be used for pleasure or because it is appropriate, cf. *de Orat.* 3.169; *Rhet. Her.* 4.45 (*abusio*). Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.34-36 (*abusio*) gives similar examples, e.g. *equum divina Palladis arte aedificant* ("they built a horse by the divine art of Pallas"), cf. *Inst.* 10.1.12. He defines it, however, as the use of the nearest term for a matter where no proper term exists (cf. *Inst.* 8.2.6, and also Cic. *Orat.* 82, 92 who classifies this figure under metaphor and not κατάχρησις). It is in this respect distinct from a metaphor which uses another word where a normal word exists (similarly Tryph. *Trop.* 1.2), though he admits that the poets frequently use κατάχρησις where other terms do exist. How is this then distinguished from metaphor? It would seem only by a use that strikes one as incorrect. He also distinguishes it from the substitution of words with quite different meanings, e.g. *virtus* instead of *temeritas*. Κατάχρησις is thus the substitution of a closely related word that is nevertheless wrongly used. It is mentioned as an acceptable figure of speech in D.H. *Comp.* 3 (p.11,17 U.-R.).

K. Barwick argues that κατάχρησις in the strict sense (a conventional word used wrongly to indicate something for which there is no conventional word) was the definition developed by the Stoa⁶⁴. This kind of κατάχρησις is one of several solutions when an author is looking for a word to describe something for which there is no conventional term. Two other solutions would be either to coin a new word, or to use περίφρασις. Both of these other options are also discussed by rhetorical theorists.

Κατάχρησις thus lies on the border between barbarism (βαρβαρισμός) and the effective use of a trope, a distinction also recognised as difficult by the ancients, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.5. It is a particularly difficult trope for us to isolate, depending upon a very precise knowledge of the kinds of contexts appropriate to any word. In general we rely upon the suggestions of ancient authors. Gregory of Nyssa (*hom. in I Cor.* 15:28 M. 44.1324) considers Paul's use of κεκένωται πίστις at *Ep. Rom.* 4.14 to be an example of κατάχρησις (*in malam partem*).

⁶⁴ *Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik*, Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig: Philologisch-historische Klasse Bd. 49 Heft 3 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1957) 90-91, 96-7.

κατεστραμμένη (λέξις/ ἑρμηνεία)

Lit. "turned-down style." A term used in both Aristotle and Demetrius for periodic style (though defined somewhat differently). See s.v. περίοδος.

κεκριμένον

A judgement of popular opinion or some other authority used to buttress an argument. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 1.13-24 discusses it as one kind of argument to be employed in conjunction with the τελικὰ κεφάλαια (a later term, cf. §1.4-12, and s.v. κεφάλαιον III.). Four classes are distinguished (§1.13), judgements made by gods, men, reputable judges, or our opponents. This argument is an (abstract) κοινὸς τόπος in Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.12 (it is also one of the τόποι in Theon *Prog.* ii, p.108,29-32 Sp.). Arist. *Rh.* 3.15.8 mentions the refutation of a use of a κρίσις as a slander against the speaker. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.36-44 also uses the term κρίσις, but restricts it to popular sayings or opinions. Judicial decisions are discussed at *Inst.* 5.2. Cic. *Inv.* 1.48 divides this argument into three classes: i) those with religious sanction, e.g. made under oath; ii) from the common practice of mankind; iii) an approved judgement (made, for example, by some special vote). Refutation of κρίσεις is discussed at *Inv.* 1.82-83. See also *Rhet.Her.* 2.19-20 (*iudicatum*) who notes that such judgements may often contradict each other, requiring a comparison of the judges, times, and number of judgements. For the relation of κεκριμένον to ὁρισμός see Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.8 (the third and fourth examples of ὁρισμός) and Rut.Lup. 2.5.

Philodemus, although he does not use these terms in respect of rhetorical theory, does use the term κεκριμένον of popular opinions (*PHerc.* 1674, col.XXV,21-22 Auricchio) which the rhetors seek to follow (instead of philosophical truth). The term κρίσις is used of a judgement or opinion from authorities (*PHerc.* 1674, col.XXIII,22; LII,32; LVII,33 Auricchio).

For a New Testament example compare Paul's reported use of quotations from Greek poets, *Act.Ap.* 17.28.

κεφάλαιον

- I. The school of Theodorus apparently used the term κεφάλαιον in many different senses (Quint. *Inst.* 3.11.27). In terms of στάσις theory, Theodorus seems to have spoken of κεφάλαια γενικώτατα

instead of στάσεις.⁶⁵ Subordinate στάσεις were termed *capita specialia* (Quint. *Inst.* 3.6.2; 3.11.3, 27; Aug. *Rhet.* 12).⁶⁶ Quintilian also notes that he used the term κεφάλαιον to designate the *propositio cum affirmatione*. We learn from Theon (*Prog.* ii, p.120,19 Sp.) that Theodorus designated the θέσις as κεφάλαιον ἐν ὑποθέσει and he seems to equate it with Hermagoras' designation of the θέσις as τὸ κρινόμενον.⁶⁷ These definitions are probably to be connected with Theodorus' στάσις theory, but if we compare Theon *Prog.* ii, p.69,1-6 Sp. it is just possible that Theodorus meant a thetic section in a speech (i.e., a treatment of the theme in a generalised way, cf. s.v. θέσις).

- II. In later rhetorical treatises (as already in the fourth century BC orators) the term κεφάλαιον was commonly used for the heads (arguments to be developed) of a proposition (πρότασις), cf. D.H. *Is.* 14 (p.112,1 U.-R.); *Th.* 19 (p.353,18-21); *Comp.* 1 (p.6,3); Theon *Prog.* ii, 121,6 Sp.; Phld. *Rh. PHerc.* 1674 (col.XXXVII,5; LIV,12-13 Auricchio), 1672 (col.VIII,31-32; XXII,27; XXXII,22-23 Auricchio), 1506 (col.XL,14 Hammerstaedt); etc..
- III. Related to II. is the use of this term to indicate an available line of argument (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 3.11.27; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.69,1-6 Sp. where θετικὰ κεφάλαια are spoken of, see τόπος IV.), or even for abstract argumentative patterns, commonly called κοινοὶ τόποι in earlier philosophically influenced treatises. For this last use of κεφάλαιον see [Hermog.] *Inv.* 3.4 (and following); [D.H.] *Rh.* 10.5-6, cf. Str. 1.2.31.

A particular kind of argument especially related to deliberative rhetoric was the τελικὸν κεφάλαιον. Such τελικὰ κεφάλαια (arguments of purpose) were arguments related to such concepts as justice, legality, advantage, etc.. Whilst the discussion of such arguments in relation to deliberative rhetoric goes all the way back to Anaximenes (cf. Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 1.4-24; Arist. *Rh.* 1.6; *Rhet.Her.* 3.3-6; Cic. *Inv.* 157-76; Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.22-35), the first use of this term for them appears in Hermogenes (Hermog. *Stat.* pp.52,20 – 53,1 R.; cf. [Hermog.] *Prog.* p.14,6-12; pp.25,22 – 26,6 R.).

⁶⁵ Compare Clod. p.590,4-5 H. where it is said that the Greeks either use the term στάσις or γενικὸν κεφάλαιον.

⁶⁶ Compare Hermogenes' use of the term κεφάλαια to designate subordinate στάσεις (Hermog. *Stat.*).

⁶⁷ It is not clear whether Theon is referring to Hermagoras of Temnis or Hermagoras, the pupil of Theodorus.

κλίμαξ – see *s.v.* ἐποικοδόμησις.

κοινότης

/x...y/x...y/ Rut.Lup. 1.9 explains it as a combination of ἐπιβολή and ἐπιφορά. Alex. *Fig.* 2.5 terms it συμπλοκή and notes σύνθεσις as a synonym. It is further mentioned at *Rhet.Her.* 4.20 (*complexio*);⁶⁸ Cic. *de Orat.* 3.206 and Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.31. For a Pauline example see 2 *Ep.Cor.* 9.6.

κόμμα

A short clause. A building block of the sentence, or περίοδος. The κόμμα is generally defined as distinct from the κῶλον (Thphr. *Fr.* 701 FHS&G; Demetr. *Eloc.* 9; *Rhet.Her.* 4.26; Cic. *Orat.* 222-23) due to the fact that it is shorter (Demetr. *loc.cit.*; cf. D.H. *Comp.* 26, p.136,9-10 U.-R.). *Rhet.Her.* 4.26 (somewhat unusually) defines it in terms of single words following each other in asundatic fashion (see *s.v.* διάλυσις), cf. Hermog. *Id.* 2.4 (p.316 R.) who speaks of τὸ κατ' ὄνομα κομματικόν (σχῆμα).

Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.122 states that “most people” define the κόμμα (*incisum*) as part of a κῶλον (*membrum*). This definition is, however, not found outside of Quintilian in the sources under purview here. Quintilian himself defines the κόμμα as a phrase lacking rhythmical completeness.

See further *s.v.* περίοδος.

κομμάτιον

A short κόμμα (see *s.v.*). Used in D.H. *Comp.* 26 (p.139,16 U.-R.).

κρίσις – see *s.v.* κεκριμένον.

κύκλος

“Circle.”

I. [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.8 uses this term to describe the sequence: /x...x/.

II. The term is sometimes used in describing the circularity of περίοδοι, e.g. Demetr. *Eloc.* 30, 31, cf. 11, 20; D.H. *Comp.* 19 (p.87,14 U.-R.); 22 (p.97,13); 23 (p.120,2-3), cf. *Pomp.* 6 (p.247,18-19). At Philostr. *Dial.* 1 it is used as an equivalent for “period.”

⁶⁸ A lacuna in the text of *Rhet.Her.* in the definition of *complexio* is filled conjectually by Marx with *ut et conversione et repetitione [utamur]*.

κῶλον

“Clause.” A building block of the sentence or περίοδος (see further *s.v.* κόμμα and περίοδος).

λεπτολογία

“Detailed discourse.”⁶⁹ A detailed working out (ἐξεργασία) of each of several circumstances relating to the subject under discussion. It may be used to highlight the contrasting elements in a comparison, to show swiftness or slowness, etc.. Two examples are briefly discussed in *Alex. Fig.* 1.11. Cf. *s.v.* ἐπιμονή.

λύσις

Used by Demetr. *Eloc.* (*passim*) as a synonym of διάλυσις (see *s.v.*).

μακρολογία see *s.v.* πλεονασμός.

μερισμός

The arrangement of (related) individual matters separately showing their particularity, *Rut.Lup.* 1.18, cf. D.H. *Lys.* 15 (p.25,18; p.26,6 U.-R.); *Isoc.* 4 (p.60,14); 12 (p.71,16); *Is.* 3 (p.95,15-16, 20); 15 (p.113,20). Rutilius describes this as effecting both utility and clarity. Compare the seventh method of αὔξησης listed by Anaximenes (*s.v.* αὔξησης). This is probably what is meant at *Cic. de Orat.* 3.205 (*digestio*) which seems to be equivalent to *Orat.* 137 (*dividat in partes*).

μετάβασις

“Crossing over.” *Rut.Lup.* 2.1 uses this as a general term to describe the crossing over from one subject to another, either by the introduction of an ἀποστροφή (cf. *Quint. Inst.* 9.3.25), or by summoning oneself back to the original topic of discussion. Compare *Rhet.Her.* 4.35 on *transitio* where the speaker makes a transition to his next point, e.g. “we have spoken of x, now we shall speak of y.” The figure is mentioned at *Cic. Orat.* 137 and *de Orat.* 3.203 where the speaker is expected to announce what he will next speak upon and distinguish it from what has gone before, cf. *Quint. Inst.* 4.1.74. At *Inst.* 76-79 Quintilian complains of the use of γινῶμαι in the

⁶⁹ The term λεπτολογία is also used in this sense (though not as a rhetorical figure) in *Hermog. Id.* 1.12 (p.309,2 R.).

schools to mark a transition (see further *s.v.* ἐπιφώνημα). At *Inst.* 9.2.62 he denies that *transitus* is a figure. See further Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 55 for remarks on the μετάβασις between the προοίμιον and διήγησις of an historical work.

μεταβολή

“Change” or “reversal.”

- I. Demetr. *Eloc.* 148-49 (under the γλαφυρά style) describes it as a kind of reversal of one’s thought, or recantation. He gives two examples, the first involving the use of a more realistic description following a ὑπερβολή, the second involving the speaker/ author changing his intention (in this case whether or not to tell the reader the names of two dogs which the author has mentioned). The result of such a “correction” is to make the audience favourable (i.e. provide χάρις, cf. *gratia* in *Rhet. Her.* 4.36).

This figure would seem more or less equivalent to *correctio* (ἐπανόρθωσις, cf. [Iul. Rufin.] *Schem. L.* 17) as defined by *Rhet. Her.* 4.36 (cf. Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.207 – *reprehensio*; *de Orat.* 3.203 – *correctio*). He notes that the initial use of the “incorrect” formulation helps to highlight the following “correction,” and thus impresses the correct formulation upon the hearer. The examples provided show that the initial statement does not have to be considered completely false, but that the *correctio* may only provide a different perception of the matter. Rut. Lup. 1.16 calls such a self-correction μετάνοια, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.17 (*emendatio*, a species of πρόληψις); 9.2.18 (*reprehensio*, a form of πρόληψις, being self-correction related to the meaning and propriety of one’s words); 9.2.60 (*quasi paenitentia*); 9.3.89 (*correctio*). Compare also Anaximen. Lampsac. *Rh.* 18.9 who advises that if in court the judges *en masse* make some kind of objection to you speaking, then you should rebuke yourself, not the judges (*vice versa* if it is only a minority of the judges).

For a specific kind of μεταβολή in this sense, see *s.v.* ἐπιτίμησις.

It seems to have been common to employ a short apologising statement after the use of ὑπερβολή or an especially bold metaphor, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.7.9; Cic. *de Orat.* 3.165; Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.37.

For Pauline examples see *Ep. Gal.* 1.6-7; 3.4; 4.9; *Ep. Rom.* 8.34.

- II. Caecilius (*Fr.* 69 = Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.38) seems to have used this term in the same way as Alex. *Fig.* 2.16 (cf. Tib. *Fig.* 38), namely, of a kind of πολύπτωτον where successive clauses differ, not only in terms of their cases, but also in terms of their content, e.g. D. 18.311 (as cited by Alexander): τίς γὰρ συμμαχία σοῦ πράξαντος γέγονε τῇ πόλει; τίς δὲ βοήθεια ἐκ τῆς σῆς εὐνοίας καὶ δόξης; τίς δὲ πρεσβεία; τίς δὲ διακονία, δι' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἐνδοξότερα; τί τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἢ τί τῶν οἰκείων ἀπλῶς ἐπηνώρθωται διὰ σέ; ποῖαι τριήρεις; ποῖα βέλη; ποῖοι νεώσοικοι; etc. This may also be the meaning at [Longin.] 23.1 (and probably also §5, cf. 20.3), see s.v. πολύπτωτον. Ps.-Longinus claims that it is πᾶν ἀγωνιστική. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.39 adds that when such diverse matters are more briefly noted we have the figure which Cicero called *dissipatio* (cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207). It would appear that *continuatum* (Cic. *loc. cit.*) corresponds to this figure, using unbroken language.
- III. In a more general sense D.H. *Comp.* 19 (cf. *Comp.* 11-13) and *Dem.* 47-49 (p.232,15ff U.-R.) speak of μεταβολή (variation) as the third factor (of four) which contributes to both ἡδεία and καλὴ ἁρμονία. With respect to prose he speaks of variation in terms of periods, cola, rhythms and the pitch of the voice. At *Dem.* 49 (p.235,22 U.-R.) this third factor is described as τὰ ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς σχήματα. See also *Isoc.* 4 (p.60,16 U.-R.); *Dem.* 20 (p.172,1); *Th.* 53 (p.413,4-5); Cic. *de Orat.* 2.177; 3.100, 192 and of history in general D.H. 1.8.3; *Pomp.* 3.12 (p.237,2 U.-R.); D.S. 20.2.1.

μετάληψις

This figure arises when a particular word in a standard phrase is substituted for a less common synonym, Tryph. *Trop.* 1.5. Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.52-53 (cf. 9.2.106) notes that it makes a poor form of jest, although at 8.6.37-39 he sees no other use for it than comedy. D.H. *Th.* 31 (pp.376,21-377,4 U.-R.) gives an example of poetic μετάληψις in Thucydides.

μετάνοια – see s.v. μεταβολή I.

μετάστασις

- I. Cic. *Orat.* 137 mentions the figure whereby the speaker transfers the accusation against himself onto his opponent. This is one method of μετάστασις according to Alex. *Fig.* 1.27, who notes that

the blame may also be transferred to others, e.g. the audience, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.204 (*traiecto in alium*).

- II. Of the transfer of time. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.41 uses this term in a description of techniques for the composition of a ὑποτύπωσις (see s.v. διατύπωσις). The term refers to the vivid presentation of some real or fictive action from the past or future to the audience as if it were happening before their eyes.⁷⁰

μεταφορά

“Transfer.” Aristotle generally treats this term in its literal sense. It signifies a transferred meaning of some kind. Μεταφορά is therefore much broader than the English term “metaphor.” Any verb, noun or even phrase which has some kind of transferred sense is a μεταφορά. Thus besides metaphors, also metonymy, similes, hyperbole and proverbs are considered μεταφοραί. Arist. *Po.* 21.7-15 defines four kinds of μεταφοραί, i) ἀπὸ τοῦ γένου ἐπὶ εἶδος, ii) ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, iii) ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος, iv) κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον (consult the context for an explanation of the various kinds). These four kinds are alluded to in *Rh.* 10.7, where the fourth is particularly recommended. Broadly speaking μεταφοραί are handled twice in *Rh.* 3.1-12 (περὶ λέξεως). Under the section on the ἀρετὴ λέξεως⁷¹ (which is essentially clarity and propriety), Aristotle describes the particular qualities of the μεταφορά as τὸ σαφές, τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ ξενικόν. In prose the μεταφοραί must be appropriate. Aristotle thereby rejects μεταφοραί which are too obvious, e.g. “lording it over the oar.”⁷² The μεταφορά should also be a related concept.⁷³ “Lording” has nothing

⁷⁰ It ought to be noted that M. Winterbottom (*Problems in Quintilian* [University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970] 157) considers the word “μετάστασις” to be an early gloss.

⁷¹ Ἀρετή is here in the sense of an attribute enabling something to fulfill its function (ἔργον).

⁷² In this respect our sensitivities are significantly different than those of the ancient Greeks, who generally looked upon bold metaphors in prose as examples of *poor* taste, Phld. *Rh.* 2.26 S. (a quotation from Nausiphanes?) who speaks disparagingly of metaphors detached from what is ordinary (ἀπητημέναι τοῦ χυδαίου μεταφοραί). Compare the two examples from Gorgias condemned in [Longin.] 2.2 (cf. Hermog. *Id.* 1.6 [p.249 R.]): Ξέρξης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεὺς and γυπες ἐμνηχοὶ τάφοι.

⁷³ In this connection compare *PHamb.* 128 fr. a, attributed to Theophrastus (= Thphr. Appendix 9, FHS&G), where μεταφορά is defined as “the transfer of unchanged substantival or verbal composite expressions from something similar to another thing” (translation FHS&G). Examples are given such as old age being “the setting of life” or the king being the “shepherd of the people.”

to do with an oar. Good examples are when actors are called either *διονυσοκόλακες* or *τεχνίται*. These terms are both clear and make an effect due to the fact that they are unusual terms for actors (*τὸ ξενικόν*). They also contain a connotation of praise or blame (in this respect cf. 2 *Ep.Cor.* 2.17, *καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον*). Although not stating it in so many words, Aristotle seems to be pointing to the *functions* of *μεταφοραί* in argument. If the last example was of praise or blame, he also adds an example suitable to judicial oratory when *ἁμαρτάνω* ("make a mistake") is used instead of *ἄδικέω* and *vica versa*. Given such an argumentative function, his insistence that a *μεταφορά* should be concealed (*κέκλεπται* 3.2.10), i.e. not overly obvious, makes sense.⁷⁴ It is unfortunate that Aristotle only hints at this question of function and does not really develop it.

The second place *μεταφοραί* are dealt with is in the discussion of the sources for elegant speech (*ἄστεϊον*). At *Rh.* 3.10.2 Aristotle notes that we experience something as pleasant when we learn something easily. Concerning words, this is especially the case with *μεταφοραί*. The point is that foreign words being unknown convey no information, normal words convey no new information, but *μεταφοραί* always imply something extra.⁷⁵ At *Rh.* 3.10.7 Aristotle begins a longer section on *μεταφοραί*, giving many examples, particularly of those which are vivid (another important quality which is separately discussed at *Rh.* 3.11.1-5). Vividness (*ἐνεργεία*) is best expressed in a metaphor which makes something inanimate alive (cf. *Demetr. Eloc.* 81; *Quint. Inst.* 8.6.11-12). *Rh.* 3.11.11-15 is a brief discussion of similes, proverbs and hyperbole as "metaphorical" sources of elegance.

Demetr. Eloc. briefly mentions the *μεταφορά* under the *ἐρμηνεία γλαφυρά* (§142) and *δεινή* (§272). When treating it as

⁷⁴ This probably also lies behind Aristotle's description of *μεταφοραί* unsuitable in prose (*Rh.* 3.3.4). They should not be laughable as in comedy, nor too excessively solemn as in tragedy, nor again far-fetched. These factors all reinforce the point that *μεταφοραί* should not be recognised as such. Even such a common metaphor as sowing and reaping (used throughout antiquity) is banned as too poetic!

⁷⁵ This very general point is related to discussion in later rhetorical theorists of *ἔμφασις*. A related idea was expressed by Nausiphanes (born c. 360 BC, teacher of Epicurus) who in his rhetorical style only allowed for metaphors which helped express a matter difficult to understand. He speaks of *τὴν λαλίαν ὡς συνεστῶσαν ἄκρως κατ' εὐδοίαν τῶν ὠμίλημένων καὶ μεταφοραῖς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον πρᾶγμα ἄριστα μετενηγεμένον* (*Phld. Rh.* 2.27 S.). He appears to have despised the customary metaphors of rhetors (*Phld. Rh.* 2.26 S.).

part of the μεγαλοπρεπής style he enters into some discussion (§§78-88). His use of the term generally corresponds to our English "metaphor" (although he subsumes a discussion of similes and comparisons under this general heading). A metaphor provides ἡδονή and μέγεθος. Like Aristotle, a metaphor should not be too bold, but a related concept (a commonplace, cf. D.H. *Dem.* 5 [p.137,19-138,1 U.-R.]; Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.37; [Longin.] 31.1). If a metaphor seems daring it should be changed into a simile (εἰκασία, defined as an expanded metaphor), or an adjective should be added to help the understanding (e.g. φόρμιγγα ἄχορδον referring to an arrow). He reminds us that many metaphors are so customary in usage that they are just like using normal adjectives. Technical terms, however, coined because of their likeness to other objects are not real metaphors (e.g. ἡ κλεῖς as "collar bone"). There is no hint of argumentative value in Demetrius' discussion.

Phld. *Rh.* 1.164-81 S. critiques various rhetorical theories concerning μεταφοραί, and at 1.170 S. mentions τόποι which the writers of rhetorical treatises provide for composing metaphors. The text is, however, quite fragmentary. Whilst references to comments from Philodemus are generally interspersed in the text, we may at this point note that at *Rh.* 1.171 S. (col. 11,15-22b) he provides us with two methods of classification for metaphors found amongst the theorists. The first is very close to that of Arist. *Po.* referenced above (instead of κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, Philodemus has [ἀπὸ γένους] ἐπὶ [γέ]νους). The second classification is as follows: [τὰς μὲν] (*sc.* μεταφορὰς) ἀπ' [ἐμ]ψύχων ἐπὶ [ἔμψυχα, τ]ὰς δ' ἀπ' ἀψύχων [ἐπ' ἄψυχα, τ]ὰς δ' ἀπ' [ἐμ]ψύχων ἐπ' ἄψυχα, τ]ὰς δ' [ἀ]π' ἀψύχων ἐπ' [ἔμ]ψυχα. This classification is also found in Tryph. *Trop.* 1.1⁷⁶ and Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.10. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.13 adds the further sub-classification: *a rationali ad rationale et item de irrationalibus, et haec invicem.*⁷⁷ According to [Hermog.] *Inv.* 4.10 the classification according to animate and inanimate subjects belongs to the grammarians, as does the term μεταφορά! Ps.-Hermogenes does not think this classification suitable for rhetorical

⁷⁶ A further relation between Philodemus' discussion of μεταφοραί and that of Trypho is seen at Phld. *Rh.* 1.177 S. where the discussion moves from ἔμφασις to ὁμοίωσις as the purpose of metaphors. These are precisely the two purposes discussed in Tryph. *Trop.* 1.1.

⁷⁷ The last words of the sentence, *et a toto et a partibus* probably ought to be deleted, cf. M. Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* (University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970) 145.

theory. We may note that Trypho's treatise, possibly dating as early as the first century BC, is surely that of a grammarian, given that he only discusses τροπαί in relation to Homer.

[Longin.] 32.1 mentions that many theorists (including Caecilius) ruled that no more than two or three metaphors should be used in the same place. However, he cites Demosthenes to disprove this. He adds that Aristotle and Theophrastus also recommended changing daring metaphors into similes or adding an apologetic statement (Arist. *Fr.* 131 Rose; Thphr. *Fr.* 690, cf. *Fr.* 689A-B FHS&G). With this he agrees, but adds that they may be used at the right moment in case of extreme passion or genuine sublimity. Continuous tropes may be used in commonplaces and descriptions. *Rhet.Her.* 4.45 (*translatio*) also notes that theoreticians in general say metaphors should be modest. He gives a number of possible uses: *rei ante oculos ponendae causa, brevitatis, obscenitatis vitandae, augendi, minuendi, ornandi*.

Cic. *de Orat.* 3.155-65 devotes an extended discussion to the metaphor (*translatio*). Certain tenets already seen in Aristotle's theory are again stressed, e.g. the fact that a metaphor ought to be a related concept (3.155-56, 162-63; cf. *Orat.* 92), though bolder metaphors are not condemned, but said to provide *splendoris aliquid* (3.156). Cicero (in the mouth of Crassus) isolates three functions of the metaphor as follows: i) to make the meaning more clear (metaphors based on related concept); ii) to better express the whole matter (of deed or thought) in view; iii) occasionally for the sake of brevity.⁷⁸ Yet Cicero goes on to discuss the sheer pleasure occasioned by a good metaphor (cf. *Orat.* 134). Several comments on bad metaphors are made (3.163-64), e.g. they ought not to contain ugly ideas nor ideas out of proportion to what they are describing (this latter comment seems to be in opposition to *Rhet.Her.*, as noted above, who argued that the metaphor can be used *augendi et minuendi causa*). A harsh metaphor may be softened by a small apologetic introduction (e.g. "what one may call..."), 3.165 cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.37. In *Orat.* 65 far-fetched metaphors are said to be the provenance of the (Gorgiastic) sophists rather than orators.

The importance of μεταφοραί not being too harsh and preserving a relation with their reference is also emphasised in D.H. *Dem.* 5

⁷⁸ Cf. Phld. *Rh.* 1.176 (col. 17,14-17) S. who speaks of "some" who give the purpose of metaphors as συντομί[ας] χάριν καὶ σαφηνείας καὶ [lacuna]. Going by what follows (1.177) I would suggest that the third purpose was probably ἐμφασις, see s.v. ἐμφασις.

(pp.137,19 - 138,1 U.-R. = *Pomp.* 2.6)⁷⁹. Although Dionysius also mentions μεταφοραί in relation to other authors (*Lys.* 3, p.10,17 U.-R.; *Amm.* 1.8, p.266,21-22; *Th.* 24, p.362,15 [= *Amm.* 2, p.424,4-5]; *Comp.* 3, p.11,16; *Imit.* 34; *Orat.Vett.* bk.2, fr.2), he does not discuss this figure any further.

Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.4-18 discusses metaphors, arguing that they may be used either because there is no other appropriate term (necessary metaphor) or for clarity's sake or as ornamentation. At *Inst.* 4.1.58 he adds that rather bold metaphors should be completely avoided in the opening. For the relation of metaphor to *similitudo* in Quintilian see s.v. ὁμοίωσις. For use in jesting cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.262; Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.68.

μετωνυμία

Use of one term (of a related object or concept) for another, e.g. substitution of Greece for Greeks, container for contents, *Rhet.Her.* 4.43 (*denominatio*). Cic. *Orat.* 93 states that μετωνυμία is the term among grammarians for which the rhetorical equivalent is ὑπαλλαγή. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses both terms, cf. *Dem.* 5 (μετωνυμία, p.137,18 U.-R. = *Pomp.* 2.6); *Comp.* 3 (ὑπαλλαγή, p.11,17). It is further mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.167, 207 (*transductio, immutatio*). Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.23-27 cautions lest its use be too poetic. For common Pauline examples cf. *Ep.Gal.* 2.7.

μίμησις

See s.v. μιμητικόν and ἡθοποιῖα I. The broader concept of stylistic μίμησις is not dealt with here.

μιμητικόν

As a figure, the term is used by Demetr. *Eloc.* 226 (synonym = μίμησις) to describe the imitation of one's own words, an imitation occurring only shortly after the original words were stated. Demetrius notes that this is more suited to a speech (ἁγών) than to a written work (it is thus also inappropriate for letters).

μῦθος

"Fable." For Aristotle's comments on fables (λόγοι) see s.v. παράδειγμα. Demetr. *Eloc.* 157-58 speaks of the μῦθος under the

⁷⁹ The word μεταφοραῖς is rightly added to the text by Radermacher.

γλαφυρά style and notes that if used at right moment it can be quite εὔχαρις (a word which in Demetrius has connotations of humour). He notes that fables may be invented or taken from existing stock. Cic. *Part.* 40 suggests that a *fabula* can be used to lend credence to a probable argument even though it be itself *incredibilis*. The point is that it moves people (cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.76,6-7 Sp.). Theon *Prog.* ii, p.72,28 Sp. gives the following definition: μῦθος ἔστι λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν ("myth is fictional discourse reflecting reality"). He suggests that μῦθοι be used in a speech after the setting out (ἐκθεσις) of the matter (pp.72-73). They may concern living creatures, inanimate objects, or be possible or impossible stories. When using them we add some comment before and after, noting what the μῦθος resembles (pp.74-75). Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.2 and 2.4.2 mention the μῦθος as part of the προοιμνάσματα. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.19-21 discusses the use of αἶνοι as examples. He refers to the famous example of Liv. 2.32 (cf. 1 *Ep.Cor.* 12). Whilst the term μῦθος is not outside of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' vocabulary, he does not mention μῦθοι in connection with rhetorical theory.

μυκτηρισμός

"A sneering remark." Tryph. *Trop.* 2.21 explains it as that (comment) which attends a certain movement and drawing together of the nostrils (μυκτῆρες). It is mentioned at Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.59 who describes it as *dissimulatus quidam sed non latens derisus*. Alex. *Fig.* 1.18 classifies it as a kind of εἰρωνεία.

ὁμοιόπτωτον

Rhet.Her. 4.28 (cf. 4.18) speaks of *similiter cadens* which he defines as various words of the same case and similar endings placed near each other. At 4.32 he suggests sparing use because of the obvious artificiality, cf. under παρονομασία. Rut.Lup. 2.13 uses the term both for words having the same case and words ending in the same syllable (the term may thus be used for verbs with identical endings, cf. *Ep.Rom.* 1.31 [-ουσιν]). The figure is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.206 = *Orat.* 135 and, perhaps, at Phld. *Rh.* 1.162 S. (in the context of artificial figures to be avoided). Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.78-80 defines it a little differently, namely, in terms of various words in the same clause rendered in the same case, though identical termination is not necessary. See also Alex. *Fig.* 2.19.

ὁμοιοτέλευτον

Lit. "similar ending." The term is used to refer to phrases containing words with similar endings. Rut.Lup. 2.14 notes that it has less effect than ὁμοιόπτωτον. *Rhet.Her.* 4.28 distinguishes *similiter desinens* (ὁμοιοτέλευτον) from *similiter cadens* (ὁμοιόπτωτον) by restricting the former to words without case endings. At 4.32 he suggests sparing use because of the obvious artificiality. According to Cic. *Orat.* 84 it should be avoided in the plain style. Phld. *Rh.* (p.29 [*PHerc.* 1426 col.IVa] Hammerstaedt) places ὁμοιοτέλευτα in a list of figures belonging to panegyric speeches, cf. s.v. ἀντίθετον and also *Rh.* 1.162 S.. See further Demetr. *Eloc.* 26, 268; Cic. *de Orat.* 3.206 = *Orat.* 135; Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.77 (as a kind of παρονομασία); Alex. *Fig.* 2.18. See also s.v. παρομοίωσις and παρονομασία.

ὁμοιότης – see s.v. παρομοίωσις.

ὁμοίωσις

Ὅμοιωσις is used as a generic term in Tryph. *Trop.* 2.5 to cover tropes of similarity (cf. D.T. 642b §6). Trypho distinguishes three such tropes: εἰκὼν (simile), παράδειγμα (historical example) and παραβολή (hypothetical example). This same division is found in Cic. *Inv.* 1.49 and *Rhet.Her.* 4.59-62.⁸⁰ There is clearly a common source to all three treatises at this point (cf. Iul.Rufin. 22 which uses the term ὁμοίωσις similarly, but only discusses two kinds, παράδειγμα and παραβολή).

Cic. *Inv.* 1.49 deals with likenesses under the general term *comparabile* (which functions as an argument of probability, cf. s.v. εἰκός), listing the three kinds as *imago* (cf. s.v. εἰκὼν), *collatio* (cf. s.v. παραβολή, correctly interpreted by Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.23), and *exemplum* (cf. s.v. παράδειγμα). Refutation of the *comparabile* is discussed at *Inv.* 1.82.

At *Inv.* 1.46-47 Cicero discusses the *similitudo* as an abstract concept of likeness. He provides a division obviously dependant (probably secondarily) upon Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.1-3 (from the κοινοὶ τύποι). Even the same examples are adapted. Aristotle's terminology is given between brackets. i) by contraries (ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων), ii) by equivalents (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων), and iii) by those cases

⁸⁰ Although *Rhet.Her.* does not use a generic term as do Trypho and Cicero, it is to be noted that he goes on next to describe *effictio* which is the same as Trypho's next trope, χαρακτηρισμός.

coming under the same principle (ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλα). Compare Cic. *Top.* 15-18, 41-50 and Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.73-79. It is further mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 2.168 and 3.205 = *Orat.* 138.

At *de Orat.* 2.265-66 Cicero discusses the *similitudo* as a source for jesting. Here it is divided into two kinds: the *collatio* (a brief comparison) and the *imago*. The *imago* is not here used in the strict sense of an image of things or persons provided by a likeness (i.e. a simile, cf. s.v. εἰκών), but of a characterisation, which (going by the examples) may be non verbal or also metaphorical in nature.

Rhet.Her. 4.59-62 does not use a generic term for likenesses but discusses the same three kinds together (though in another order). He uses the term *similitudo* for παραβολή, then discusses *exemplum* (cf. s.v. παράδειγμα) and *imago* (cf. s.v. εἰκών). Similar to Cic. *Inv.* 1.46-47, he analyses four ways in which the *similitudo* (which for *Rhet.Her.* is, of course, restricted to the notion of a hypothetical example) is presented: by contrast, negation, parallel, and with brevity. He also identifies various uses, i) for embellishing the style, ii) as a proof, iii) for the sake of clarity, iv) for presenting a vivid picture (*ante oculos ponendi negotii causa*, cf. διατύπωσις).

The second use identified in *Rhet.Her.* 4.59 is also to be found in Cic. *Inv.* (see above) and *Part.* 40 who suggests that the *similitudo* be used to give credence to a probable argument. At *Part.* 55 he lists it as a *locus* for *amplificatio* (αὐξησις).

Rhet.Her. 4.67 discusses the use of *similitudo* as a specific method of *significatio* (see s.v. ἔμφασις). Given that the example quoted uses an historical comparison, the term *similitudo* is not here used in the restricted sense of 4.59-61.

Quintilian, like Cicero, uses the term *similitudo* generically of all kinds of "likenesses." In fact he even classifies the metaphor as a *brevior similitudo* (*Inst.* 8.3.8). This is also clear from *Inst.* 6.3.57-62 where he discusses the use of *similitudo* in jesting. *Similitudo* is here classified in a twofold way, there is the *similitudo* spoken "openly" (i.e. as a metaphor), and that spoken as a παραβολή (i.e. as a simile).⁸¹ Quintilian's main discussion of *similitudo* (under *elocutio*) is found at *Inst.* 8.3.72-81. Here he isolates two functions: i) to illuminate a vivid description, and ii) to support a

⁸¹ The operative sentence is, unfortunately, corrupt in the manuscript, although the meaning is clear. M. Winterbottom (*Problems in Quintilian* [University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970] 109-110) suggests the following restoration: *Adhibetur autem similitudo interim palam, interim sicut parabola.*

proof. His discussion here concerns the former kind and equates to the simile. Although no Greek equivalent for *similitudo* is given here, Quintilian uses the term εἰκὼν for this kind of *similitudo* at *Inst.* 5.11.24 where he suggests that it is less suitable in oratory than that kind of *similitudo* which functions to support a proof. At *Inst.* 8.3.77 (within his discussion of the *similitudo* as simile) he speaks of the παραβολή (literally referring to placing things side by side each other) as comprising both the *res* and the *similitudo* which are placed beside each other (either the *res* or *similitudo* may come first). Thus for Quintilian (here at least) the term *similitudo* refers to the item to which something is compared, whilst the term παραβολή refers to the whole simile (i.e. the thing which is compared and the comparison itself). Quintilian also distinguishes between a simile whose point of comparison is quite remote (*libera et separata*, *Inst.* 8.3.77) and that which is reciprocal, which he says the Greeks call ἀνταπόδοσις. His discussion at this point may be compared with Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 84 where παραβολή is defined as the laying alongside each other of similar matters which are reciprocal (i.e. παραβολή has by definition ἀνταπόδοσις in Ps.-Plu.).

At *Inst.* 5.11.22-31 Quintilian deals with *similitudines* which support a proof (discussed under the general rubric of examples to which their effect is likened). Such “likenesses” we would tend to call comparisons. From *Inst.* 5.11.22-24 it appears that the εἰκὼν (simile) is a subset of the παραβολή, which in turn is a kind of *similitudo* which compares things with a rather remote likeness. Here we would seem to come close to the definition of παραβολή as a hypothetical example (as opposed to an historical example). This notion would seem to be supported both by the examples Quintilian provides and by *Inst.* 5.11.1.⁸²

ὁμωνυμία

- I. “Ambiguity.” Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.7 notes that ambiguous words (ὁμωνυμία τῶν ὀνομάτων) are used by the sophists for specious ends. At *Rh.* 2.23.9 he briefly mentions an (abstract) κοινὸς τόπος from homonymy (ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς), and at *Rh.* 2.24.2 he describes the fallacious ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. Examples of fallacious

⁸² On this passage see M. Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* (University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970) 95.

etymology (cf. *s.v.* ἔτυμολογία) and fallacious argument by homonymy are given. At *Rh.* 3.5.4 he discusses ἀμφίβολα in terms of language. Demetr. *Eloc.* 291 defines ἀμφίβολον as a particular method of ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος whereby one deliberately speaks so that there is doubt as to the intent of the words (e.g. whether they are intended as wonder or sneering). *Rhet.Her.* 4.67 mentions the *ambiguum* as one of the methods of producing *significatio* (see *s.v.* ἔμφασις). Cic. *de Orat.* 2.250-54 discusses *ambigua* in connection with jesting, as does Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.47-51 (who uses the term ἀμφιβολία), but Quintilian does not recommend it (although see also 6.3.62 and 87). Theon *Prog.* ii, pp.129,11 - 130,36 Sp. discusses the ways in which νόμοι may be unclear (resulting from various forms of ambiguous phraseology). Phld. *Rh.* 1.185,18-20 S. lists the use of ambiguous metonymy (το[ι]αύτας ἀμ[φι]βολίας ἐλεῖν μ[ε]τ[ωνυμικῶν) as a fault of style.⁸³

- II. For the more specific sense of homonymy, cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.129,28-130,1 Sp. (re: lack of clarity in νόμοι).

ὀνοματοποιῖα

- I. "Onomatopoeia." *Rhet.Her.* 4.42 (*nominatio*) suggests that such terms may be coined to better signify the matter, though neologisms should be used sparingly. D.H. *Comp.* 16 (pp.61,20 - 63,3 U.-R.) discusses the phenomenon without specific advice as to usage. He speaks of μιμητικὰ ὀνόματα. Demetr. *Eloc.* 94-95, 220 uses the term τὸ πεποιημένον ὄνομα to indicate the coining of onomatopoeic words (although he also uses this term elsewhere of word-coinage in general). Onomatopoeic coinage is said to contribute to μεγαλοπρέπεια (§95) and to ἐνάργεια (§220). The term πεποιημένον is also used in this sense in D.T. 637b (p.42,3-4 Uhlig) and Tryph. *Trop.* 1.8. The term ὀνοματοποιῖα is used in this sense in Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.72; 8.6.31-32 (cf. 8.3.30); Str. 14.2.28 and Plu. *Mor.* 747d. Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.72 advises against the use of words imitating sounds unless they are commonly accepted. He notes that the practice of coining onomatopoeic words is more acceptable in Greek than in Latin.

The idea that all or most words were originally imitative (and so at least partially onomatopoeic) in origin seems to have been not

⁸³ In book 2, Philodemus complains of the ἀμφίβολοι λέξεις of his opponents, and also speaks of ἀμφίβολον in Epicurus (*PHerc.* 1672, col.XVI,22, 30-31, col.XIX,15, 18, pp.195, 197, 207 Auricchio).

uncommon, and especially prominent among the Stoics, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.1.8; *Stoic.* 2.146; D.H. *Comp.* 16 (pp.62,9 - 63,3 U.-R.).

- II. Of word coinage in general. Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.5 (using the term *πεποιημένον*) suggests that its use will be infrequent since it goes beyond propriety. Several examples of all too poetic compound coinages are given at *Rh.* 3.3.1, cf. Isoc. 9.9-10 who maintains that coinages belong to poetry not prose. Tryph. *Trop.* 1.8 uses the term *ὀνοματοποιΐα* in this sense, dividing it into seven methods: *ἐτυμολογία* (a word coined on the basis of a root form), *ἀναλογία* (by analogy to another word), *παρονομασία* (by minor modification of an existing word), *σύνθεσις* (by coining a new compound word), *ἐναλλαγή* (interchange in a compound word, e.g. *γύνανδροι* for *ἀνδρόγυνοι*), *διαίρεσις* (using two words separately which normally form a compound, cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 92), *πεποιημένον* (onomatopoeia). Cic. *Part.* 16 briefly mentions words coined either by *similitudo* (cf. *ἀναλογία*), *imitatio* (probably meaning imitation of Greek words), *inflexio* (cf. *παρονομασία*) or *adiunctio* (cf. *σύνθεσις*). Demetr. *Eloc.* 91-93 speaks of the coinage of new compound words which may produce variation and even *μέγεθος*. Such compounds may also produce *δεινότης* and are said to be popular amongst orators (*Eloc.* 275). At §§96-98 he speaks of word coinage in general, distinguishing coinage of entirely new words and coinage by *παρονομασία*. Although various examples from prose are given, Demetrius views word coinage as precarious even in poetry. A coined word ought to be clear, customary, and Greek- (not foreign) sounding (cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.170 and Theon *Prog.* ii, p.129,22-27 Sp. on the lack of clarity of such words). Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.30-37 whilst dismissing onomatopoeia as an option, speaks of two kinds of word coinage: *in iungendo* (cf. *σύνθεσις*) and *derivando*. The latter (by expansion or variation of an existing word) may be formed from general words or even proper nouns. To these two categories is added that of words formed by imitation of Greek. Quintilian notes that many Roman rhetorical theorists banned or at least severely restricted word coinage in Latin (as opposed to Greek), cf. *Inst.* 8.6.32-33. See also Cic. *de Orat.* 3.154.

The term *πεποιημένον* was also used of word coinage in general, cf. Arist. *Po.* 1457b 33f; *Rh.* 3.2.5; Demetr. *Eloc.* 98; Cic. *Orat.* 80; Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.32-33; D.H. *Dem.* 4 (p.135,6-7 U.-R.); *Th.* 24 (p.363,24), 35 (p.383,10); *Comp.* 3 (p.11,19), 25 (p.124,15); and Theon *Prog.* ii, p.81,9-13 Sp..

Of course word coinage could also occur for other than rhetorical or poetic reasons. Gal. vii, p.417 K. mentions the coining of technical terms συντόμου διδασκαλίας ἔνεκεν. See also *s.v.* κατάχρησις.

ὁρισμός

A short, clear definition, *Rhet.Her.* 4.35 (*definitio*). It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 2.164 (cf. *Orat.* 116-17 on the usefulness of the theory of definition from dialectics) and Rut.Lup. 2.5. Whilst the above cited sources treat it as a figure, it is also treated as an abstract τύπος, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.8; Cic. *Top.* 9, 26-32 and Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.54-64. Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.65 discusses definitions in jesting. For the relation of ὁρισμός to κεκριμένον see Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.8 (the third and fourth examples) and Rut.Lup. 2.5. For a possible New Testament example cf. *Ep.Hebr.* 11.1.

ὄρκος

"Oath." The oath (when used spontaneously in a speech) was sometimes discussed as a kind of figure, cf. [Longin.] 16.2-4 where it is discussed in connection with ἀποστροφή, and Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.98 as a form of ἐσχηματισμένος λόγος to be used for the sake of eloquence.⁸⁴ A curse (*exsecratio*) is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 2.288 as a possible source of jesting.

The oath (as part of the judicial process) was also categorised as one of the non-technical proofs, which do not really concern us in this glossary. Discussion may be found in Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 17; Arist. *Rh.* 1.15.27-33 (an extremely elliptical paragraph)⁸⁵; Isoc. 1.22-23; Cic. *Part.* 6 and the discussion in *Off.* 3.102-115; and Quint. *Inst.* 5.6 who discourages proffering an oath to the opponent. Phld. *Rh. PHerc.* 1426, col.IIIa, 22ff (pp.27-8 Hammerstaedt, cf. *PHerc.* 1674, col.XI,1-3 Auricchio⁸⁶), citing Epicurus, mentions

⁸⁴ Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not discuss oaths in connection with rhetorical theory.

⁸⁵ The interpretation of this passage is difficult. The term διδόναι usually refers to giving another person an oath to swear (i.e. dictating the terms of the oath). The term λαμβάνειν usually refers to taking an oath dictated by another. For discussion see W. M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Hermes Einzelschriften 25; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972) *ad loc.*; D. Mirhady, "Non-Technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes," *American Journal of Philology* 112:20-27; and cf. G. A. Kennedy, *Aristotle: A Theory of Civic Discourse on Rhetoric* (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) *ad loc.*

⁸⁶ J. Hammerstaedt ("Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch über Rhetorik" *Cronache Ercolanesi* 22 [1992] 68) restores this passage differently whereby the oath is made ὑπὲρ τοῦ ζῆν, although I cannot read this into the drawing of the papyrus provided by Auricchio.

the oath made by orators for judicial (but not epideictic) speeches to judge rightly.

πάθος – see s.v. ἥθος.

παλιλλογία

See s.v. ἀναδίπλωσις II., but note that in Anaximenes this term means “recapitulation,” i.e. a short summary of what has been said (Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 20-21).

παράβασις

“Digression.” Arist. *Rh.* 3.17.11 recommends episodes (ἐπεισοδιόω) of praise in epideictic oratory.

[Longin.] 12.5 notes that a digression (παράβασις) is one of the suitable places for a Ciceronian profusion of αὔξησις. Certainly Cicero’s theoretical rhetorical works do connect αὔξησις with digressions (cf. *Part.* 128; *de Orat.* 2.80, 312)⁸⁷ as does Theon *Prog.* ii, p.78,7-9; 106,2-3; 128,7-8 Sp. (using the term παρέκβασις). At §15.8, whilst speaking of φαντασία, Ps.-Longinus states that digressions should not be poetic or on impossible eventualities such as are so popular in his own day(!). However, the term παράβασις may simply mean “deviation/ transgression” here. In this connection it is interesting that Cicero also mentions the purpose of embellishment, cf. *de Orat.* 2.80, 312; 3.203 (*delectatio*); *Brut.* 82. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.312 notes that those cases which admit the most amplification and embellishment have the most scope for digression.

Hermagoras had argued for placing a digression (e.g. expanding on the atrocity of a crime being prosecuted) immediately before the conclusion of a speech (*Fr.* 22 Matthes, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.80). Cic. *Inv.* 1.27 (cf. *Rhet.Her.* 1.12) states that one kind of *narratio* concerns itself particularly with *digressio* (a number of suggestions for digression are listed). At *de Orat.* 2.311-12 Cicero suggests that a digression to arouse the emotions might be placed either after the *narratio* or before the conclusion, or in fact anywhere in a speech.

⁸⁷ For a useful discussion of digression in Cicero’s speeches see, H. V. Canter, “Digressio in the orations of Cicero,” *American Journal of Philology* 52 (1931) 351-61. Canter briefly summarises rhetorical theory on digressions and then analyses in how far Cicero’s practice conforms to the theory. Surprisingly, [Longin.] 12.5 is not mentioned.

Quint. *Inst.* 3.9.4 refuses to reckon *egressio* as a separate section of a speech. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.103-105 argues that it is generally unsuitable to the *narratio* (cf. *Rhet.Her.* 1.14; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.80,27-81,4 Sp.). He provides one example and goes on to discuss digression extensively, with examples, at *Inst.* 4.3 (παρέκβασις), advising that in principle a digression may occur anywhere in a speech (*Inst.* 4.3.12). Theon (*Prog.* ii, p.71,5 Sp.) directs the teacher to show his students the appropriate moment for, among other things, digression (παρέκβασις).

Use of digressions is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 137 and *de Orat.* 3.207. A synonymous term taken from the analysis of poetry is ἐπεισόδιον, cf. [Longin.] 9.12 (in Homer); D.H. *Comp.* 19 (p.87,6 U.-R.); *Isoc.* 4 (p.60,16); *Th.* 7 (p.333,24). Dionysius also uses the term παρέκβασις at D.H. 1.53.4 and *Imit.* 31.3.3, as does Philodemus (*Rh.* 1.157 S.) who notes that many digressions can be a cause of obscurity.

Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.107 mentions that some considered παραδιήγησις a figure. Elsewhere, this term is used of a digression during the *narratio* of a speech, see Ruf.*Rh.* §23; [Corn.] *Rh.* §§57-61 (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.16.5). In §61 ps.-Cornutus (= Anonymous Seguerianus) states that, although some authors consider παρέκβασις synonymous to παραδιήγησις, they are to be distinguished. Παραδιήγησις is a digression on matters not pertaining to the case, παρέκβασις is a digression which provides a likeness or imitation to the events described in the *narratio*. At §62 he notes that Alexander (son of Numenius) ridiculed the whole idea of engaging in digressions (παρέκβασις – but not in the specific sense of §61).

παραβολή

Lit. “a placing of things side by side each other.”

- I. “Hypothetical example.” The ancients often distinguished between the παράδειγμα as a concrete example, and the παραβολή as a hypothetical example, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.20 discussed s.v. παράδειγμα; Tryph. *Trop.* 2.5 (iii, pp.200,31 - 201,2 Sp.); Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.22-24 with discussion s.v. εἰκόν; [Ammon.] *Diff.* 374; Iul.Rufin. 22. See for further discussion s.v. ὁμοίωσις.

The παραβολαί of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels may be classified here.

- II. Demetr. *Eloc.* 89 effectively defines a παραβολή as an extension of an εἰκασία which is a short simile. A longer (poetic) simile is a

παραβολή which can also take the form of a proverb (cf. *Ev.Luc.* 4.23). At §89 Demetrius suggests that only with great care can a παραβολή be used in prose, but at §§146-47 he identifies it as a source of witty language (cf. *Cic. de Orat.* 2.265). At §274 he notes that it is not suitable in forceful language because of its length.

Ep.Hebr. 9.9 (cf. 11.19) may use the term in this sense, cf. *Ep.Jac.* 3.4-5a for an example.

- III. The term could also be used in a more generalised way, see, in particular, the discussion of Quintilian's use *s.v.* ὁμοίωσις.

The term is used in a fragmentary context at *Phld. Rh.* 2.186 S. (*fr.* 11).

παράδειγμα

"(Concrete) example." Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 8 states that examples (παρδείγματα) are used to bolster arguments considered by the listeners to be improbable (cf. εἶκος and *Cic. Part.* 40). Examples can also be used to make an opponent's argument seem improbable. Although Anaximenes does not say so, he gives examples of παρδείγματα which show that they can also be used to reinforce an argument which may already be considered probable. *Arist. Rh.* 2.20 divides the παράδειγμα into two forms, namely, historical examples, and invented examples. Invented examples are further divided into the παραβολή (hypothetical example), and the λόγος (fable). He uses the term δημηγορικός to describe the λόγος, but notes that it is easier to find fables to support one's argument than historical examples (*Rh.* 2.20.7), cf. *s.v.* μῦθος. If no ἐνθυμήματα are available, then examples must be used *as proofs*, that is, they are to be put first and one's argument seems to be a proof by induction (cf. *Cic. Inv.* 1.51-56; *Top.* 42; *Quint. Inst.* 5.10.73; *D.H. Amm.* 1.7).⁸⁸ This requires the use of multiple examples, but is only rarely suitable to rhetoric. If ἐνθυμήματα are used then the function of examples becomes supporting testimony (μάρτυρες) which is placed after the main arguments (ἐνθυμήματα). In this case, only one example is necessary.⁸⁹ *Rhet.Her.* 2.46 briefly

⁸⁸ *Phld. Rh.* 2.41, 45 S. seems to contrast argument by induction with the use of a παράδειγμα.

⁸⁹ Contrast *Plin. Ep.* 2.20.9 who suggests that later theorists stipulated three examples to be necessary, although I am not aware of such a stipulation in the extant treatises, cf. *Quint. Inst.* 4.5.3.

lists faults made in using examples. At 4.62 he suggests the same four purposes are possible as listed for the *similitudo* (παραβολή), namely, embellishment, clarity, proof, or vividness. Cic. *Part.* 55 lists the use of *exempla* as a *locus* for *amplificatio* (αὐξησις). Cic. *Inv.* 1.49 briefly argues that examples are a subset of probable proofs. Use of examples is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 138 = *de Orat.* 3.205. D.H. *Lys.* 19 (p.31,3-4 U.-R.) distinguishes the εἰκός from the παράδειγμα (following Aristotle, cf. *Amm.* 1.7). Quintilian (*Inst.* 5.11.6-21), like Aristotle, discusses παραδείγματα in connection with comparisons and fables. Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.15-16 distinguishes between relating an example in-depth and merely referring to a (known) example. Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.51 notes that some theorists considered the ἐνθύμημα as more fitting in a written speech, and the παράδειγμα as more fitting in a spoken speech.

See further *s.v.* ὁμοίωσις.

παραδιαστολή

Rut.Lup. 1.4 defines it as the distinguishing of two or more terms which appear to have the same meaning, often accompanied by a statement on how they differ, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.65.

παραδιήγησις – see *s.v.* παράβασις.

παράδοξον

“Surprise.” Demetrius (*Eloc.* 152-53) discusses the introduction of the unexpected (παρὰ προσδοκίαν) as one of the τόποι from which charm (χάρις) may be produced. It is discussed in the context of jesting by Cic. *de Orat.* 2.255, 284-85 and Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.84 (in connection with what is elsewhere called ἀντανάκλασις, see *s.v.*), cf. 6.3.24. A more negative view of παράδοξα may possibly be discerned in D.H. *Din.* 8 (p.308,18-23 U.-R.). Τὸ παράδοξον is discussed as a figure in Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.22-24. It is achieved by raising a particular expectation, for example, that one will next speak of something much more (or much less) serious than the foregoing, and then doing the opposite. Cf. D.H. *Lys.* 24 (p.35,21-23 U.-R.). See further *s.v.* γνῶμη.

παράλειψις

Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 21 (who classifies it as a form of εἰρωνεία) defines it as saying something whilst pretending not to (e.g.

“I will not talk about...”). Such an introductory sentence is always present. Anaximenes further describes it as ἐν προσποιήσει παραλείψεως λέγοντα. Demetr. *Eloc.* 263 defines it similarly in terms of deliberately mentioning something whilst stating that you will not mention it but pass it by. *Rhet.Her.* 1.9 mentions it as one way of making an introduction (to a juridical speech) by *insinuatio* (ἔφοδος). He deals with it as a figure (*occultatio*) at 4.37 and notes that it is used when, a) it is not pertinent to call the matters in question to the attention of the audience, b) there is advantage in an indirect reference, c) a direct reference would be long and undignified, or not able to be made clear, or easily refuted. Παράλειψις is also briefly defined with an example in Alex. *Fig.* 1.19. Two good New Testament examples of this figure are to be found in *Ep.Philem.* 19 and *Ep.Hebr.* 11.32ff.

See also *s.v.* ἀντίφρασις II.

παρασιώπησις – see *s.v.* ἀποσιώπησις.

παρέκβασις – see *s.v.* παράβασις.

παρεμβολή – see *s.v.* παρένθεσις.

παρέμπτωσις – see *s.v.* παρένθεσις.

παρένθεσις

A parenthesis containing some distinct thought not totally unrelated to the subject in hand. Rut.Lup. 1.17 warns that its use is dangerous, having either a wonderfully inept effect on the ears, or a forcibly pleasing effect. Among his examples he includes a case of ἀποστροφή. D.H. *Th.* 24 (p.362,18-22 U.-R. = *Amm.* 2.2, cf. 2.15, p.434,13-15) speaks of two kinds of parentheses (he uses the term παρέμπτωσις), τὰ τε σκολιὰ καὶ πολὺπλοκα καὶ δυσεξέλικτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ συγγενῇ τούτοις. An effective parenthesis must therefore be related to the subject in hand and not too involved, cf. *Pomp.* 6.11 and *Amm.* 2.9 (p.435,9 U.-R.) where the term παρεμβολή is used. Related to this is the advice of Quintilian (*Inst.* 8.2.15) who warns that it needs to be short to avoid obscurity, cf. *Inst.* 9.3.23 where the synonym παρέμπτωσις is given and it is listed among those “grammatical” figures elsewhere known as ἀλλοιώσις (see *s.v.*). Caecilius (*Fr.* 76) used the term παρεμβολή.

See also Alex. *Fig.* 2.25 and s.v. ὑπερβατόν. For Pauline examples cf. *Ep.Gal.* 2.6, 8.

πάρισον

I. = παρίσωσις (see s.v.).

II. = παρομοίωσις (see s.v.).

παρίσωσις

Anaximenes.Lampsac. *Rh.* 27 defines it as the presence of two balanced clauses (δύο ἴσα κῶλα), whether many small words are balanced with fewer large words, or whether their size and number are equal.⁹⁰ Arist. *Rh.* 3.9.9 simply defines it as ἴσα τὰ κῶλα. Demetr. *Eloc.* 25 (ἰσόκωλον) explains the equality in terms of number of syllables. *Rhet.Her.* 4.27-28 (*conpar*) allows for a *near* equal number of syllables and adds that a clause with extra syllables may be balanced by a clause with longer syllables. This appears to be the only source where the question of syllable length is brought into the discussion (otherwise only discussed by rhetorical theorists in connection with prose rhythm).⁹¹ See also Rut.Lup. 2.15 (ἰσόκωλον, defined in terms of two or more clauses); Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.80 (ἰσόκωλον); and Cic. *de Orat.* 3.206. Apparently Theon the Stoic used the term πάρισον (Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.76). Alex. *Fig.* 2.26 also discusses πάρισον, although the text is corrupt (see Spengel's critical apparatus). Alexander seems to want to say that πάρισον especially refers to clauses with an equal number of syllables, but if the number of syllables is not exactly equal, then other factors provide a balance. Dionysius of Halicarnassus mostly uses the noun παρίσωσις of balanced words and clauses (for comments, see s.v. παρομοίωσις) and in discussion distinguishes between words/clauses which are ἴσος (equal) and those which are πάρισος (near equal), cf. *Isoc.* 14. Occasionally πάρισον is used as a substantive, cf. *Dem.* 4 (p.135,20 U.-R.), 20 (p.171,12).

According to Cic. *Orat.* 84 such figures should be avoided in the plain style. Phld. *Rh.* (p.29 [*PHerc.* 1426, col.IVa] Hammerstaedt) places πάρισα in a list of figures belonging to panegyric speeches,

⁹⁰ I would be inclined to delete the added <καί> in Fuhrmann's text.

⁹¹ It may be that the term ἀριθμός (in opposition to συλλαβαί) in Alex. *Fig.* 2.26 refers to syllable length. The text is, however, uncertain and in its present form corrupt. The example quoted has neither equal syllables nor syllable length.

cf. *s.v.* ἀντίθετον. See also *s.v.* παρομοίωσις and the endnote to this glossary. For a Pauline example see *Ep.Gal.* 2.20a.

παροιμία

“Proverb.” For references in Arist. *Rh.* see *s.v.* μεταφορά. Demetr. *Eloc.* 156 treats it as the first source of witticisms: φύσει γὰρ χάριεν πρᾶγμα ἔστιν παροιμία (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.98). At §89 he notes that a παραβολή may take the form of a proverb. Proverbs are recommended in epistolary style (232) where they are said to be δημοτικόν τι and κοινόν. Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.57 (cf. 5.11.21) notes that some classify it together with σαρκασμός, ἄστεϊσμός and ἀντίφρασις as a kind of ἄλληγορία, cf. Phld. *Rh.* 1.181 S. and *s.v.* ἄλληγορία II.. A Pauline example of a proverb used as ἄλληγορία is found in *Ep.Gal.* 5.9.

παρομοίωσις

This figure is treated at Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 28 (called ὁμοιότης at 26.1⁹²) where the discussion concerns παράσωσις (balanced clauses) using like-sounding words (especially the ends of words, or similar syllables). There is no discussion of function. Arist. *Rh.* 3.9.9 defines it as two clauses (κῶλα) with similar sounding beginnings or endings. Demetr. *Eloc.* 25-29 (whose discussion is a revised version of Aristotle) refers to this as παρόμοια κῶλα and ὁμοιότης. It also includes alliteration. As sub-forms he discusses ἰσόκωλον and ὁμοιοτέλευτα (cf. Rut.Lup. 2.12 who defines παρόμοιον as similarity of words and notes that it does not differ much from ὁμοιοτέλευτον or ὁμοιόπτωτον). Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.75-80 discusses four kinds of *similium* of which the first (9.3.75-76) concerns like sounding words. In this connection he mentions the Greek term πάρισον, although he adds that Theon the Stoic⁹³ defines it in terms of not dissimilar clauses (cf. *s.v.* παράσωσις). The other three kinds are ὁμοιοτέλευτον, ὁμοιόπτωτον and ἰσόκωλον.

Demetr. *Eloc.* 27-28, cf. 247, notes that artful speech (including antithesis and wordplay) is precarious (ἐπισφαλής). It can easily dissolve the forcefulness of a passage. Demetrius warns against its use when speaking forcefully or when exciting emotion (πάθος) or

⁹² At *Rh.* 11 Anaximenes uses the term παρομοίωσις in the sense of comparison, cf. *s.v.* γνώμη.

⁹³ A probable conjecture in the text for the *cheostolcus* of the mss.

portraying the speaker's character in an effective way (ῥήθους).⁹⁴ "Anger has no need of art" (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.102). A passage from Theopompus is cited disapprovingly. This figure is approved by Demetrius at other times as something Gorgianic and Isocratic that provides elevated expression (μεγαληγορία).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus also argues that in political (= deliberative) and judicial discourse a natural style is to be preferred to well-rounded periods and juvenile figures of speech, *Isoc.* 12 (pp.71,24 - 72,6 U.-R., cf. *Amm.* 2.17; *Dem.* 20, p.171,12-13; 25, p.184,14-19). He goes on mention ἀντίθεσις, παρίσωσις, and παρομοίωσις specifically, adding that there is nothing wrong with judicious use of such figures, *Isoc.* 13 (pp.73,21 - 74,4 U.-R., cf. *Dem.* 40, p.217,7-13; *Lys.* 14, p.23,20-22). At *Isoc.* 20 (p.91,10-12 U.-R., cf. *Th.* 24, pp.362,22 - 363,4 [= *Amm.* 2.2]; 29, p.375,7-12; *Comp.* 23, p.120,4-8) παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις are classified as epideictic figures. The distinction made between παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις would suggest that the latter ought to be defined as clauses containing words with similar beginnings or endings. He regards πάρισα and παρόμοια κῶλα as inappropriate to the style of harsh harmony (ἡ αὐστηρὰ ἁρμονία), *Comp.* 22 (p.97,5 U.-R.), and such figures in general as inappropriate to grandeur (μεγαλοπρέπεια), *Dem.* 4 (p.135,19-22 U.-R.). The terms are further used at *Isoc.* 2 (p.57,20 U.-R.).

See also the endnote to this glossary.

παρομολογία

"Partial admission." The presentation of an equal or stronger argument after conceding some (lesser) point to the opposition, Rut.Lup. 1.19. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.99 denies that this is a figure, but compare *Inst.* 9.2.51 on *concessio* (a concession of something seemingly damaging to our case, which serves to prove our trust in the cause) and *confessio* (a confession of something innocuous by the person we are defending). *Confessio* is classified as a species of πρόληψις at *Inst.* 9.2.17 (see s.v. προκατάληψις). Cic. *de Orat.* 2.286 discusses a form of humorous admission of the accusation of the opponent against the speaker.

For a possible Pauline example, see 1 *Ep.Cor.* 10.23.

⁹⁴ Demetrius would seem to conceive of the portrayal of the speaker's character (ῥήθους) in terms of evoking pity in the audience. In the same paragraph πάθος is coupled with ἔλεον (instead of the expected ῥήθους).

παρονομασία

Rhet.Her. 4.29-32 (*adnominatio*) defines it as the use of very similar words in close collocation that mean quite different things. He discusses three kinds: i) the slight alteration of letters or vowel lengths, ii) words less immediately similar, iii) the same words in different cases (= Greek πολύπτωτον). He suggests sparing use because of the artificial character (i.e. it is obvious that effort has been expended beforehand to create the effect) and adds that it is more suited to entertainment, tending to lessen the speaker's *fides*, *gravitas* and *severitas*. The speaker's *auctoritas* is destroyed. Scattered infrequent use brightens the style. Similar criticism is voiced at D.H. *Th.* 48 (p.406,16-19 U.-R.) where Dionysius states that παρονομασία is ψυχρά (frigid) and contributes not πάθος but ἐπιτήδευσις ("studiedness"). At *Th.* 24 (p.363,1 U.-R., = *Amm.* 2.2) παρονομασία is listed along with other Gorgianic figures which are said to be "theatrical" (θεατρικός). Rut.Lup. 1.3 defines it in terms of five ways of slightly altering words, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.256-57 where the Greek term is used and the matter is discussed within the context of the use of wit (cf. also 3.206 and *Orat.* 135). At *Orat.* 84 Cicero calls the device of changing but one letter *quaesitae venustates* (affected/ studied charms). This is to be avoided in the plain style. Alex. *Fig.* 2.19 also defines it in terms of the use of words varying only slightly from each other in spelling. For several good Pauline examples, cf. *Ep.Rom.* 1.28-31 (ἐδοκίμασαν ... ἁδόκιμον; φθόνου, φόνου; ἄσυνέτους, ἄσυνθέτους).

Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.66-67 states that παρονομασία (*adnominatio*) is effected by either repeating the same words in different cases or by repeating the same word with intensified meaning. Its opposite is repeating a word which is used the second time to show its falseness, e.g. *quae lex privatis hominibus esse lex non videbatur*. At Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.69-80 similar words with dissimilar meanings are discussed without giving a technical term. These are divided into four kinds. i) = *Rhet.Her.* # 1 (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.99), ii) ὁμοιοτέλεστον of several clauses, iii) ὁμοιοπτωτον, iv) ἰσόκωλον. As can be seen, Quintilian's discussion is rather more broad than *Rhet.Her.*. At Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.53-56 this figure is discussed in connection with jesting in rhetoric, although it is described as a poor (*frigidus*) form of jesting. See also the endnote to this glossary.

Παρονομασία may also be brought about via word coinage, see ὀνοματοποιία II.

παρρησία

Rhet.Her. 4.48-50 (*licentia*) defines this as the figure whereby someone is reprehended to whom respect is due. This may be smoothed over either by flattering the audience first, or by suggesting that they may not like what you are going to say, but truth etc. compels you. The latter may be used effectively even when the speaker knows that the audience won't mind what he has to say, cf. *Rut.Lup.* 2.18. It is mentioned at *Cic. Orat.* 138 (*ut liberius quid audeat*) = *de Orat.* 3.205 (*vox quaedam libera atque etiam effrenatio augendi causa*). See also *Quint. Inst.* 9.2.27-29.

The notion of *παρρησία* (frank criticism) also received discussion in much wider circles. There are even significant portions extant of Philodemus' lecture notes under Zeno on this topic giving insight into Epicurean views on the subject.⁹⁵ Paul not infrequently appeals to his own use of *παρρησία*, cf. *2 Ep.Cor.* 3.12; *7.4 et al.*

πεποιτημένον (ὄνομα) – see *s.v.* ὀνοματοποιία.

περιαγωγή

A term used by Demetrius to describe the rounding of a *περίοδος* (*Eloc.* 19), and more generally of a *περίοδος* itself (cf. §§45-46, 202), cf. *ἀγωγή* in *D.H. Isoc.* 15 (pp.76,22 - 77,1 U.-R.).

περίοδος

"Period." In most rhetorical treatises this term indicates a form of carefully structured sentence wherein a certain balance is created by the word order or syntax which may be described in terms of a path "around" (*περι-οδος*), i.e. going in a circle and so ending up where one began. Such a balance may be created by such figures as *ἀντίθεσις*, or also by placing a certain syntactical or grammatical suspense in the sentence structure, e.g. by means of *ὑπερβατόν*. The suspense is resolved near the end of the sentence at which point the "circle" is completed.

Phld. Rh. 1.164-66 S. gives testimony to rhetorical treatises which discussed *περίοδοι*, *κῶλα* and *κόμματα* and the various ways they are weaved together and their qualities.⁹⁶ A discussion of the extant authors in our period follows:

⁹⁵ A. Olivieri (ed.), *Philodemi Περὶ Παρρησίας* (BSGRT; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1914).

⁹⁶ The term is also used at *Rh.* 1.198 S. and *PHerc.* 1426, col.IVa,21-22 (p.29 Hammerstaedt).

Aristotle's definition of the period in *Rh.* 3.9 is a difficult and controversial matter.⁹⁷ A basic problem is whether Aristotle conceived it in terms of prose rhythm as many interpreters have thought (his discussion of the period follows upon a discussion of prose rhythm). Recently, R. L. Fowler has cogently argued that Aristotle defined the period "logically" (i.e. of a pre-planned logical structure), and not with respect to rhythm.⁹⁸

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of styles, the one he terms εἰρομένη λέξις (strung-on) and the other κατεστραμμένη λέξις (turned down). The former is described as paratactic, i.e. the stringing on of thoughts one after the other connected by conjunctions. It has no end in itself, but goes on until the subject matter has run out. Its unlimitedness makes it unpleasant. The κατεστραμμένη style, on the other hand, consists of περίοδοι, i.e. self-contained sentences. Aristotle defines the περίοδος as λέξιν ἔχουσιν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον (a sentence/ style having a beginning and an end in and of itself, and a magnitude easily able to be seen). He goes on to note that a περίοδος also has a self-contained thought. It is pleasurable because the hearer knows where he is going (he can see the end in sight), and it is easily understood since it is memorable on account of its ἀριθμός (which should probably be interpreted in terms of balance and structure).⁹⁹

Aristotle remarks that the εἰρομένη style was common in the ancient writers, but that not many use it in his own day. It would seem, therefore, that Aristotle would consider any well-defined sentence to constitute a περίοδος. If one's prose is not simply strung

⁹⁷ Aristotle's text is also problematic. I follow Kassler's edition, agreeing with his indications of interpolations. In addition, as J. A. Kennedy (*Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* [New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991] 240) and R. L. Fowler ("Aristotle on the Period (*Rhet.* 3.9)," *Classical Quarterly* 32 [1982] 94-95) have argued, the quotation from Herodotus at 3.9.2 should be considered as a late interpolation (Kassel marks it as a later addition from Aristotle's own hand).

⁹⁸ *Op.cit.* 89-99. See also D. C. Innes, "Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle* (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities VI, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. C. Mirhady; New Brunswick/ London: Transaction Publishers, 1994) 37-38. For a recent attempt to define Aristotle's definition of the period in terms of prose rhythm, see T. Adamik, "Aristotle's Theory of the Period," *Philologus* 128 (1984) 184-201. Much of the older literature is referenced in these articles.

⁹⁹ Aristotle illustrates what he means by ἀριθμός, defined in terms of measuredness, by quoting examples of metred poetry.

together with simple conjunctions, then it consists, by definition, of περίοδοι.¹⁰⁰

He goes on to speak of two kinds of περίοδοι, the simple and the compound (lit. "divided," διηρημένη). The simple περίοδος is said to consist of only one κῶλον, the compound περίοδος of two κῶλα (or more?¹⁰¹). Compound περίοδοι are further divided into those with parallel κῶλα and those with antithetical κῶλα (i.e. arranged in terms of ἀντίθεσις, see s.v.). In this context Aristotle also discusses κῶλα arranged in terms of παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις (see s.v.).

Something of Theophrastus' discussion of the περίοδος is preserved in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.184-87 (= *Fr.* 701 FHS&G). There we are informed that prose is much more fitted together and pleasing if it is differentiated by *articuli* and *membra* (= κόμματα and κῶλα), and that such *membra* ought not to be shorter at the end, lest they break the *verborum ambitus* (= περίοδος). The final *membra* should thus be of equal length or even longer than the preceding *membra*. It would seem that Theophrastus is our first extant rhetorical source to speak of κόμματα as well as κῶλα as the building blocks of the περίοδος.

Demetrius' treatise on style (*Eloc.*) contains an extensive introduction on sentence structure (§§1-35). Here he discusses the κῶλον (§§1-9, §9 concerns the κόμμα as a short κῶλον), and then the περίοδος (§§10-35). He defines the κῶλον as a complete thought, or as one distinguishable part of a larger complete thought. A κῶλον should be neither too long nor too short (the Peripatetic mean), although long κῶλα may be suitable to elevated subject matter (μέγεθος, cf. §44ff, 204), and short κῶλα to slight and charming (cf. §§204ff), or also forceful (δεινότης) subject matter (cf. §§241-43). The περίοδος is defined as a combination of κόμματα and κῶλα ending in a thought which is well-turned (εὐκαταστρόφως). He speaks of the need for a bend (καμπή) at the end. Demetrius also quotes Aristotle's definition with approval, emphasising the fact that in a περίοδος ("a path circling around") one

¹⁰⁰ Of course, Aristotle has more to say on what an appropriate περίοδος is, which explains his comment at *Rh.* 3.9.6 that αἱ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι [*sc.* περίοδοι] οὐ περίοδος γίνεται: προπετὴ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατὴν.

¹⁰¹ Aristotle's text is difficult (*Rh.* 3.9.5). Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 34, and see Fowler, *op. cit.*, 93n for discussion.

knows, right from the beginning, where the end is. It is clear from the examples he provides, that this “turning back” or “bend” at the end of a περίοδος may be achieved by ὑπερβατόν, subordinated syntax where a key element is suppressed until the end, or, more simply, by balance in the clauses achieved by ἀντίθεσις, ὁμοιότης, ἰσοκῶλον, or ὁμοιοτέλευτον (the latter figures are discussed in §§22-29).¹⁰² He uses the image of a runner on a circular track where the race starts and finishes at the same point. Demetrius’ inclusion of the idea that a περίοδος should have a “bend” at its end implies that not every self-contained sentence can be termed a περίοδος. He makes this implicit by citing a περίοδος from Demosthenes (20.1) and then rewriting it so that the circularity or bend is removed (§§10-11). The rewritten version is said to be no longer a περίοδος.

Demetrius goes on to make a twofold division of prose style that, whilst using terminology also found in Aristotle, is significantly different. He distinguishes ἡ κατεστραμμένη ἔρμηνεία (prose completely written in περίοδοι) from ἡ διηρημένη ἔρμηνεία (prose written in κῶλα which are not fitted together in any way, whether by periodic form, or even by conjunctions). As can be seen, Demetrius gives no place to Aristotle’s εἰρομένη (strung-on) style. Because of his narrower definition of the περίοδος, the διηρημένη style is no longer considered periodic. Demetrius adds that good prose will use a combination of these two methods.

In speaking of what constitutes a good περίοδος (§§16-18), Demetrius suggests that it will have between two and four κῶλα (cf. §§34-35). He does accept the possibility of a “simple period” consisting of one long κῶλον, but such a κῶλον should be long and also have a bend (καμπή) at the end. Similarly to Theophrastus (noted above), he notes that the final κῶλον of a περίοδος should be longer than the preceding κῶλα. He then goes on to distinguish three kinds of περίοδοι associated with three different kinds of prose, ἱστορική, ῥητορική, and διαλογική. These kinds of περίοδοι are distinguished in terms of the degree of their “circularity” or bend. The rhetorical period is the most circular, the

¹⁰² A couple of examples taken from Demetrius (*Eloc.* 17) may illustrate: A single clause περίοδος with a bend caused by ὑπερβατόν is cited from Hdt. 1.1, Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασῆος ἱστορίας ἀπόδεξις ἦδε. Another example shows a bend caused by ἀντίθεσις (φράσις vs διανοία), ἡ γὰρ σαφὴς φράσις πολὺ φῶς παρέχεται ταῖς τῶν ἀκούοντων διανοίαις (source unknown).

conversational period is the most loose and is described as a cross between the διηρημένη and κατεστραμμένη style. The historical period stands inbetween these two kinds. At §244 he adds that περίοδοι tightly bound at the end (cf. the “rhetorical period”) are much more forceful than a loose sentence structure. Such endings would appear to need to be produced by ὑπερβατόν or syntax, since Demetrius rejects the use of figures connected with balanced clauses in the forceful style (§§247-50). The forceful style is the only one suited to a frequency of (appropriate, short) περίοδοι (§251-52, cf. 303).

We may also note that Demetrius says (§32) that περίοδοι (as opposed to ἐνθυμήματα) are used in every section of a speech. They may produce grandeur (§§45-47). In the simple style (ruled by the virtue of clarity) they should be short and clear (§§202-203). Of interest is the fact that whilst at §21 Demetrius described the kind of περίοδοι which are acceptable in conversational style, he states that periodising in letters is absurd (§229), even though he describes epistolary style as more studied than conversational style (§224).

Rhet.Her. is the first rhetorical treatise extant to deal with the κῶλον, κόμμα, and περίοδος as figures of speech. At 4.26-28 the following “figures” are dealt with, in order: *membrum* (κῶλον), *articulus* (κόμμα), *continuatio* (περίοδος), *conpar* (ἰσόκωλον), *similiter cadens* (ὁμοιοπτωτον), *similiter desinens* (ὁμοιοτέλευτον). Although the only internal connection made in the discussion of these figures is at *conpar* (where what is said of *membra* is referred to), the resemblance to the order in Demetr. *Eloc.* is clear and suggests certain connections which are not made explicit in the text of *Rhet.Her.*. Firstly, the isolation of *membrum* as a figure separate from *continuatio* suggests that *Rhet.Her.*, like Demetrius, has a restricted definition of the περίοδος. Not every complete sentence can be a περίοδος. Certain kinds of sentences, characterised by Demetrius as διηρημένη in style, are simply made of *membra* which are not moulded into a περίοδος (cf. the examples given in *Rhet.Her.* 4.26). Secondly, although *Rhet.Her.* does not say so, the period or *continuatio* is clearly considered to be made up of *membra* and *articuli* which are arranged in a certain way. His definition of the *continuatio* is vague, emphasising density and a crowdedness of words forming a complete thought. He does not mention circularity or the need of a “bend” at the end, although each of his three

examples contain such a “bend” (twice by the syntax, and once by ὑπερβατόν). He does suggest that the *continuatio* is best used in a *sententia* (γνώμη), *contrarium* (cf. s.v. ἐνθόμημα, in the sense of a short consideration from contraries), or *conclusio*. The discussion of certain “Gorgianic” figures immediately following upon the *continuatio* suggests that these may be considered ways of arranging a περίοδος (as in both Aristotle and Demetrius).

Cicero, *de Orat.* 3.191, following the Peripatetic mean, suggests that periods neither be too long nor too short. At §198 they are mentioned as something difficult, which some orators even in his day were not able to compose. In *Brut.* 33-34 he attributes the origin of the period to Isocrates. Other authors before him may only perhaps have chanced upon a periodic form by nature. Terminological equivalents in Greek and Latin are mentioned in *Brut.* 162, cf. *Orat.* 204.

In *Orat.* 221-26, within a general discussion of prose rhythm, he contrasts speaking in *incisa* (κόμματα) and *membra* (κῶλα) with speaking in periods. Periods should be used only sparingly in judicial speeches. The norm is to speak in *incisa* and *membra*, i.e. disjointed *incisa* and *membra* which form complete thoughts in themselves. A full or complete period consists of approximately four *membra* which are knotted together. The shortest possible period is held to consist of two *membra*.

D.H. *Comp.* 2 (p.7,14-18 U.-R.) describes the building blocks of a speech as follows: the arrangement of the parts of speech (στοιχεῖα) produce κῶλα, the fitting together of κῶλα produce περίοδοι (cf. *Comp.* 19, p.85,8 U.-R.; *Dem.* 39, p.212,2; 40, p.217,2), which in turn complete the entire speech (ὁ σύπας λόγος).¹⁰³ This statement would seem to suggest that περίοδος is simply a term for “a complete sentence.” One of the tasks of σύνθεσις (composition or arrangement) is to mark off a speech with περίοδοι, i.e. (it would seem), arrange one’s clauses in clearly defined sentences (*Comp.* 2, p.7,18-21 U.-R.).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ At *Th.* 22 (p.358,15-16 U.-R.) he divides the parts of σύνθεσις into κόμματα, κῶλα and περίοδοι (cf. *Comp.* 26, p.136,9-10 U.-R.).

¹⁰⁴ The text reads: ἔστι δὴ τῆς συνθέσεως ἔργα τὰ τε ὀνόματα οἰκείως θεῖναι παρ’ ἄλληλα καὶ τοῖς κῶλοις ἀποδοῦναι τὴν προσηκούσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ταῖς περιόδοις διαλαβεῖν εὖ τὸν λόγον.

At *Comp.* 9 (p.35,17ff U.-R.) he speaks briefly of the tasks of σύνθεσις applied to περίοδοι, but essentially refers back to his discussion (in *Comp.* 9) on these tasks as applied to κῶλα. Dionysius adds that one needs to know when the use of περίοδοι are appropriate to a speech, how much to use them, and when they are not appropriate. It is clear that for Dionysius prose is not always organised into περίοδοι, and a certain amount of variation is to be desired (*Comp.* 19, p.86,12-14 U.-R.).

At *Comp.* 22 (p.97,9-18 U.-R., cf. *Dem.* 39, pp.212,17 - 213,5) he specifies the kind of περίοδοι appropriate to harsh harmony (ἢ αὐστηρὰ ἁρμονία). Such periods are characterised by lack of studiedness. The close of such a περίοδος does not necessarily coincide with the close of a thought. The circle (κύκλος) is not filled out by the addition of extra words, nor is the period measured according to the breath of the speaker.¹⁰⁵ He goes on to illustrate this by analysing the opening paragraph of Thucydides, dividing the paragraph into “περίοδοι” defined according to the breath of the speaker (πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα, p.111,1 U.-R.). The first complete sentence is thus divided into three separate περίοδοι. We ought to remember that a “good” period was considered to be a complete sentence able to be uttered in one breath (*Comp.* 23, p.113,3-4 U.-R.).¹⁰⁶

Smooth harmony (*Comp.* 23, cf. *Dem.* 40, p.217,2-6 U.-R.) requires that all the κῶλα terminate in a περίοδος which should be measured according to a full breath. The final clause ought to be rhythmical. Among other things, Dionysius rejects the περίοδος ἀκώλιστος in this style (p.113,5 U.-R.). This would seem to refer to a περίοδος consisting of one κῶλον.

Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.19-22 distinguishes two kinds of prose styles, the one bound and interweaved (*oratio vincita atque contexta*), the other loose (*soluta*) and therefore more suited to dialogues and letters. Interestingly, Quintilian tells us that the bound style is composed of the three elements: κόμματα (*incisa*), κῶλα (*membra*), and the περίοδος (*ambitus vel circumductum vel continuatio vel*

¹⁰⁵ What Dionysius precisely means by ὁ κύκλος is not clear. Compare *Comp.* 19 (p.87,14 U.-R.), where he criticises Isocrates and his followers for using only εἰς περιόδου κύκλος τις.

¹⁰⁶ Compare Philodemus’ complaint that the long periods of the sophists are difficult in terms of delivery, *Rh.* 1.198 S..

conclusio).¹⁰⁷ He therefore appears to suggest that the loose style has none of these elements (contrast Demetrius above), although this is not explicitly stated and seems rather unlikely.

At *Inst.* 9.4.122-130 Quintilian defines the κόμμα, κῶλον and περίοδος and discusses them in connection with rhythm. His definition of κόμματα and κῶλα compel him to define the περίοδος as any complete sentence. The κόμμα is a clause lacking a complete rhythm (*numerus*).¹⁰⁸ It may be as short as a single word, e.g. the word *diximus* in, "*Diximus, testes dare volumus.*" The κῶλον by contrast has a complete rhythm, but has no real meaning when isolated from the rest of the sentence. The περίοδος is a complete sentence and may take two forms, either simple, or complex. The complex περίοδος consists of κόμματα and κῶλα which have many thoughts. In other words, the complex sentence consists of subordinate clauses. Quintilian adds that the περίοδος consists of at least two κῶλα and averages four. At *Inst.* 4.9.125-130 he adds advice on the use of κόμματα, κῶλα and (complex) περίοδοι.¹⁰⁹

Alex. *Fig.* 2.1 defines the περίοδος as containing a complete thought in a well-circumscribed placement of κῶλα (cf. [Corn.] *Rh.* 242).¹¹⁰ In defining the κῶλον as a part of a περίοδος, Alexander would appear to have conceived of the περίοδος as any complete sentence. He allows for two to four κῶλα in the περίοδος. More than four κῶλα is considered to be an overstepping of the limit.

[Longin.] 40 mentions periods midst a discussion of ἐπισύνθεσις (fitting the parts together into a whole), however there is no precise definition or use of the term.

¹⁰⁷ Quintilian also uses the terms *comprehensio* and *circuitus* to refer to the period, cf. *Inst.* 9.4.121-22.

¹⁰⁸ Quintilian adds, however, that most people define the κόμμα as a part of a κῶλον (*pars membri*), as if the κῶλον were made up of κόμματα in the same way that a περίοδος is made up of κῶλα. None of the theorists within the purview of this glossary, however, appear to define the κόμμα in this way.

¹⁰⁹ At *Inst.* 4.9.128 he begins: *Periodos apta prooemiis maiorum causarum*.... But it is clear from the context that he must mean complex as opposed to simple περίοδοι. On the delivery of a complex περίοδος, see *Inst.* 9.3.39.

¹¹⁰ The text is problematic here. It reads: περίοδος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος ἄνευ περιγραφῶν καὶ κῶλων συνθέσει αὐτοτελῇ διάνοιαν ἐκφέρων. Spengel suggests εὖ περιγραφῶν instead of ἄνευ περιγραφῶν, but περιγράφω then lacks an object. We are, however, aided by the quotation of Alexander in Ps.-Herodrianus, *de Figuris* 93 which reads: λόγος ἐν εὐπεριγράφῳ συνθέσει κῶλων. Perhaps Alexander originally read: λόγος ἐν εὐπεριγράφῳ κομμάτων καὶ κῶλων συνθέσει (cf. Alex. *Fig.* iii, p.27,14-15 Sp.).

περισσολογία – see *s.v.* περίφρασις.

περίφρασις

The use of a phrase for a word, even a phrase that includes the word concerned, cf. *Rhet.Her.* 4.43 (*circumitio*) who gives embellishment (*ornandi ratio*) as the motivation for its use. [Longin.] 28-29 treats περίφρασις as an ornamental figure which engenders ὕψος, but warns that moderation is needed. *Alex. Fig.* 2.10 also suggests that it makes one's language more ὑψηλός and provides more ἔμφρασις. Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.6 defines it as including the word concerned. At *Inst.* 8.6.59-61 he adds that it may be used to avoid explicitly mentioning something indecent, or for *ornatus*, but that excessive periphrasis is called περισσολογία (cf. *Inst.* 4.2.43; D.H. *Dem.* 5 [p.137,7-16 U.-R. = *Pomp.* 2.5], 13 [p.158,6]). D.H. *Amm.* 2.4 provides examples of περίφρασις from Thucydides. The term is further mentioned at *Dem.* 7 (p.140,20 U.-R.); 29 (p.192,5); *Th.* 29 (p.375,7 of περίφρασις ποιητική), 31 (p.378,1). A common New Testament example is σάρξ καὶ αἷμα, cf. *Ep.Gal.* 1.16 *et al.*.

πεῦσις – see *s.v.* ἐπερώτησις II.

πλεονασμός

Fr. 64 of Caecilius suggests that he used this term, although *Fr.* 65 states that he called pleonasm by the term συνωνυμία. The following example is given: τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν. Similar examples are provided by D.H. *Dem.* 58 who discusses πλεονασμός and its opposite, βραχυλογία, in Demosthenes, but the term πλεονασμός is not really used as a technical term here or elsewhere in Dionysius. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.53-55 discusses it both as a fault and a virtue and also mentions the term μακρολογία which appears to be synonymous, though in a negative sense (cf. *Arist. Rh.* 3.17.16). *Demetr. Eloc.* 7 (cf. 242) uses μακρολογία of the lame and shrivelled speech found in prayers and laments, and of the long-windedness of old men caused by their weakness. *Alex. Fig.* 2.11 defines it as an addition to a statement which does not harm its sense. This may be done either for the sake of embellishment or emphasis. An example of each is provided. See also *s.v.* συντομία. For a possible Pauline example see *Ep.Gal.* 1.12.

πλοκή

- I. Generally a term referring to the combination of various figures such as ἀναφορά, ἐπιφορά or forms of repetition, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.40-42; D.H. *Th.* 29.
- II. A term used for bringing words or phrases of various different meanings together, Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.48-49.
- III. = ἀντανάκλασις (see *s.v.*).

πολύπτωτον

- I. Wordplay using different case-endings. *Rhet.Her.* 4.31 calls this a kind of *adnominatio* (see discussion under παρονομασία). It is mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 135 = *de Orat.* 3.207; and illustrated in Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.37 and Alex. *Fig.* 2.15. A good Pauline example is to be found in 2 *Ep.Cor.* 9.8 (παντὶ πάντοτε πᾶσαν), cf. 1 *Ep.Cor.* 9.20.
- II. Rut.Lup. 1.10 defines this in terms of stating the same thought in various ways (involving varied case-endings). The definition here, however, is broader than that above. In fact [Longin.] 23.1 classifies ἄθροισμός, μεταβολή (II.) and κλῖμαξ as forms of πολύπτωτον implying a broader definition yet. All three figures involve bringing various things together in one place. The term πολύπτωτον would at this point, therefore, seem to refer to cases of multiple arrangement (if the text is correct).¹¹¹ All three are said to be πάνυ ἀγωνιστικά.

πολυσύνδετον

The opposite of ἁσύνδετον, i.e. the use of many particles. Demetr. *Eloc.* 54 and 63 notes that συνάφεια (his term for πολυσύνδετον) can often make the matter in hand seem μέγεθος. Yet at §194 he argues that the addition of particles robs a dramatic phrase of its pathos, cf. [Longin.] 21. See also Rut.Lup. 1.14 and Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.50-54. For Pauline examples, cf. *Ep.Rom.* 8.38-39, 9.4-5.

πολυωνυμία – see *s.v.* συνωνυμία.

προδιόρθωσις – see *s.v.* αἰτιολογία II.

¹¹¹ Jahn/ Vahlen⁴, in the critical apparatus, note the conjecture of Martensius καθροισμοί which is not unattractive given that this broad sense of πολύπτωτον seems to be nowhere else attested.

προκατάληψις

Anaximenes Lampsacus. *Rh.* 18 defines it as anticipation and refutation of, i) possible objections in the minds of the audience regarding the speaker (18.1-10), ii) probable objections to be made by the opponent (18.11-15). Advice is also given on countering such anticipation by others. *Rut. Lup.* 2.4 and Quintilian use the term πρόληψις. Philodemus (in a short fragment) also appears to refer to rhetorical πρόληψις, *Rh.* 2.189 (*fr.* 3) S.. Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.49-50 discusses its usefulness in the προοίμιον, cf. 9.2.16. At *Inst.* 9.2.17 he discusses five species: *praemunitio* (dealing with possible objections before the presentation of one's own case, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.204 [*praemunitio*] = *Orat.* 137 [*ut ante praemunitur*]), *confessio* (see s.v. παρομολογία), *praedictio* (see s.v. αἰτιολογία II.), *emendatio* (see s.v. μεταβολή I.) and *praeparatio* (see s.v. προπαρασκευή). *Inst.* 9.2.18 follows this up with two methods of confirming the meaning and propriety of one's words, i.e. by *praesumptio* (Quintilian's term for πρόληψις in general) and *reprehensio* (self-correction, see s.v. μεταβολή I.).

This figure is further mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.205 (*anteoccupatio*) = *Orat.* 138 (*ut ante occupet quod videat opponi*) and discussed in Alex. *Fig.* 1.6. See also s.v. ὑποφορά.

For Pauline examples, cf. *Ep. Rom.* 9.19ff, 11.19ff.

προκατασκευή – see s.v. προπαρασκευή.

πρόληψις – see s.v. προκατάληψις.

προπαρασκευή

“Preparation.”

- I. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.17 mentions *praeparatio* as one of the species of πρόληψις (see s.v. προκατάληψις) and defines it rather generally as a full statement (*cum pluribus verbis*) explaining why we will do or have done something. The context suggests that the matter referred to is something connected with the presentation of the speech. *Praeparatio* is thus a statement of explanation made before or after a particular portion of one's presentation.
- II. Later rhetorical theorists define *praeparatio* as the preparing of the judge to listen to a *particular* subject by various means, cf. [Iul. Rufin.] *Schem. D.* 3 (who gives the Greek equivalent προπαρασκευή). Iul. Rufin. 32 gives the Latin equivalent of

προπαρασκευή as *praemunitio*, but his definition is more along the lines of this later form of προπαρασκευή than what is elsewhere termed *praemunitio* (see s.v. προκατάληψις). He gives the example of showing a witness to be trustworthy before introducing him, and then adds that this figure is thus like the use of a *generalis locus et tractatus communis*. He adds a citation from Cic. *Mil.* 7 where Cicero first deals with the general proposition that self-confessed killing is not *ipso facto* condemnable, before speaking with reference to the death of Clodius. Προϋπεργασία (apparently a *hapax legomenon*) is added as an equivalent term. Compare also Aps. *Rh.* i, pp.306,17 - 308,19 Sp.-H. who outlines in some detail how one should prepare the judge to be moved to pity (a function of the ἐπίλογος).

Προκατάσκευη is used, but not explained, probably in this sense at D.H. *Lys.* 15 (p.26,6 U.-R.); *Is.* 3 (p.95,20); *Din.* 8 (p.309,1-2). See also the references below (at definition III.).

- III. The term is also used, with a similar meaning (of the preparation of the judge to listen to a particular subject), to denote an added division of a speech (i.e. an optional *pars orationis*) coming between the introduction (*principia*) and the narration (*narratio*). A fuller explanation of this sense is given in Fortunat. *Rh.* 2.15 pp.121,15 - 122,3, cf. 2.20 p.127,5-8 Cal. Mont. (the mss vary between the Greek equivalent προπαρασκευή and προκατασκευή). Its position as one of the optional extra *partes orationis* is explained at *Rh.* 2.12. The term is also used in this way in Troilus' *Prolegomena* where he summarises the outline of a hypothetical speech, see H. Rabe (ed.), *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1931; repr. 1995) 52,8-20. Compare the comments at D.H. *Is.* 14 (p.111,17-19 U.-R.) and the discussion in §15. Dionysius here gives the possible purpose of προκατασκευή as rendering the narrative more credible, but suggests that there may also be other reasons for its use.

προσαπόδοσις

Rhet.Her. 4.52 speaks of *divisio* when a question is divided into two or more alternatives and immediately resolved by supplying a reason for each. The Greek term is used in Rut.Lup. 1.1, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.93-96 who doubts that it should be counted as a figure. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.65-70 uses the term *divisio* generically of any argument listing alternatives. The figure is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207.

προσδιασάφεις

The addition of a clarifying word to a phrase already complete in sense, Alex. *Fig.* 2.9.

προσυναπάντησις

A kind of chiasm in which after two nouns, two explanatory phrases (or words) appear of which the first phrase refers to the second noun, and the second phrase to the first noun, e.g. Il. 450-51, Alex. *Fig.* 2.27.

προσωποποιῖα

Demetr. *Eloc.* 265-66 defines it as introducing a specific character (person or thing) and letting it speak. It is not to be confused with personification. *Rhet.Her.* 4.66 suggests that it is most beneficial in αὔξησις (cf. Cic. *Part.* 55), and appeals to pity (which are treated as a form of αὔξησις in Cic. *Part.* 57). Both of these methods belong to the ἐπίλογος in *Rhet.Her.* (cf. 2.47-50). In this respect Theon *Prog.* ii, p.117,30-32 Sp. also notes that it is especially suitable to the portrayal of characters and emotions (ἡθῆ and πάθη), two concepts frequently associated with the ἐπίλογος. See also Cic. *Orat.* 85 and Rut.Lup. 2.6.

Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.29-37 notes that this term sometimes also covers what others distinguish as διάλογος (*sermocinatio*, see *s.v.*), restricting προσωποποιῖα to fictitious persons or things. Yet in *Rhet.Her.* 4.65-66 where this very distinction is made, *conformatio* (the term in *Rhet.Her.* for προσωποποιῖα) may still refer to real persons who are nevertheless absent. Quintilian's own interpretation of the figure is rather broad and one is inclined to say that he side-tracks somewhat, e.g. at *Inst.* 9.2.36 where he refers to the possibility of introducing an imaginary objector, which is really another figure altogether (cf. *s.v.* ἐπερώτησις). Quintilian also notes that the speaker may not always be specifically introduced, but it is notable that his only example is from epic poetry (Verg. *A.* 2.29), and even here he adds that omission of notification of the speaker is itself another figure, namely, *detractio*. Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.28 (cf. 6.1.3, 25-27) recommends use of προσωποποιῖα in the ἐπίλογος, where (unlike the προοίμιον) free range can be given to the emotions, although at 4.1.69 he cites an example of its use in a προοίμιον from a lost speech of Cicero (cf. also D. 1.2). Cic. *Inv.* 1.99-100 suggests using it in the recapitulation of the ἐπίλογος as a way of

varying presentation. His examples are of a lawgiver (dead person) or things (cf. Alex. *Fig.* 1.12). Cic. *Top.* 45 alludes to προσωποποιῖα and suggests that it is a device used by both orators and philosophers (cf. examples below). It is, however, to be avoided in the plain style (*Orat.* 85). It is further mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 138 = *de Orat.* 3.205. Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions use of προσωποποιῖα at *Th.* 37 (p.388,18-19 U.-R.) and *Imit.* 31.3.1 (p.207,22 U.-R.).

Προσωποποιῖα as a device is not only found in speeches. A particularly well-known example is to be found in Plato's dialogue *Crito* 50a – 54d. Socrates engages here in a dialogue with the laws. Plato seems to be deliberately playing upon how an orator might speak (cf. 50b). For good examples in the speeches of Cicero, see *Cael.* 33-34 (a dead person called up); *Catil.* 1.17-18, 27-29 (the *patria* speaks); *Planc.* 12-13 (the people speak – here the speech is interrupted with comment from Cicero himself). It also occurs in a philosophical dialogue, *Fin.* 4.61 (the pupils of Plato are called up). See further (the speaker is indicated in brackets) Pl. *Prt.* 361a-c (the result of a discussion); D. 1.2 (the present season); Bion Borys. *Fr.* 17 Kindstrand (poverty); Lucr. 3.931-62 (nature); Ph. *Cher.* 35-38 (vocations); cf. *Op.Mund.* 79 (nature); Plu. 2.1048f (life); Sen. *Ep.* 95.10 (philosophy); Arr. *Epict.* 3.1.23 (a choice example of some species); D.Chr. 45.5 (the noble man); Max.Tyr. 11.4 (the parts of the body, and, Asclepius); 17.3 (τέχνη); Babr. 71.5-10 (the sea).

Προσωποποιῖα was also taught as a progymnastic exercise, namely, the writing of a short speech in the style of some other (usually famous) person, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.49-54. Theon *Prog.* ii, pp.115-18 Sp. devotes a separate section to this but mainly discusses matters relating to appropriate language and possible forms of speech. He adds that the production of words of encouragement, protreptic and letters fall under this kind of exercise (*Prog.* ii, p.115,20-22 Sp.).¹¹² At *Prog.* ii, p.120,24-30 Sp. he shows (incidentally) that he includes διάλογος under προσωποποιῖα.

Later works on προγυμνάσματα distinguished between προσωποποιῖα and ἡθοιοποιῖα (see s.v. ἡθοιοποιῖα II.).

προϋπεργασία see s.v. προπαρασκευή.

¹¹² I follow here the edition of Patillon, reading τὸ τῶν παρηγορικῶν λόγων εἶδος (Spengel has πανηγυρικῶν). The manuscript tradition is divided.

πύσμα

Alex. *Fig.* 1.22 defines it as a question requiring an explanatory answer. Contrast ἐρώτημα, and cf. *s.v.* ἐπερώτησις.

σαρκασμός

"Sarcasm." Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.57 notes that some classify it as a kind of ἀλληγορία (Alex. *Fig.* 1.18 classifies it as a kind of εἰρωνεία). It is described as effected when someone is reproached using opposite terms with a false smile, cf. Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* 69; Tryph. *Trop.* 2.20.

σημεῖον

"Sign." Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 12 defines it as something which functions as a sign of something else because of a customary relation between them. Its effect is to produce either opinion or (certain) knowledge. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.16-17 understands σημεῖα as a source for ἐνθυμήματα. He has the same division, calling the σημεῖον producing certainty, (the ἀναγκαῖον) τεκμήριον (that upon which one can build a syllogism). At *Rh.* 1.2.18 he gives an example, showing that σημεῖα can be considerations of a certain kind: Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος might be considered a "sign" that οἱ σοφοὶ are δίκαιοι. Other examples are also given, e.g. that one frequently draws breath could be considered a "sign" that one has a fever (cf. *Rh.* 1.5.9; 1.9.14, 26, 32f; 2.2.12, 19, 20, 26; 2.3.5; 2.4.3; 2.5.2f, 14f, 21 – used with λόγια of divine signs; 2.6.7ff). Fallacious ἐνθυμήματα derived from σημεῖα are described at 2.24.5. Herma-goras (*Fr.* 8 Matthes) also used the term σημεῖον in a very general way. Quint. *Inst.* 5.9.12-14 complains against this general usage.¹¹³

Rhet.Her. 2.6-7 (in the context of the στάσις, *coniectura* = στοχασμός) defines *signa* a little differently, namely, as indications that the accused sought favourable opportunities for committing the crime. He gives six subdivisions. At 2.8 he discusses *argumentum* which conforms to the definition of Anaximenes on

¹¹³ Note that the phrase σημεῖον δέ was a standard way of introducing an argument in the Attic orators, cf. also Arist. *Rh.* 2.21.9; 3.2.1, 6; *Po.* 4.19; Demetr. *Eloc.* 31; 301 (introducing an example); Theon *Prog.* ii, p.126,11 Sp.; J. *AJ* 1.127; 2.86; Ph. *Det.pot.ins.* 3; *Migr.Abr.* 69; *Congr.* 92; *Fug.* 5, 204; *Mut.nom.* 164; *Abr.* 33; *Vit.Mos.* 2.18; *Spec.leg.* 1.26, 90; *Omn.prob.lib.* 39, 89; *Aet.mund.* 23; *Hypothetica* 8.7.17, 19. Similarly the phrase τεκμήριον δέ.

σημεῖον, and follows with *consecutio* (*signa* derived from subsequent behaviour).

Cic. *Inv.* 1.48 classifies the *signum* as a subdivision of the *probabile* (cf. s.v. εἶκος). It is defined as something perceived by one of the senses which also signifies something which seems to follow from it. His examples are blood, flight, paleness, dust etc. (cf. Cic. *Part.* 39, 114 discussed under the στάσις, *coniectura*). That a *signum* must be perceived by one of the senses is a restriction in the definition not present, for example, in Aristotle. At 1.81 Cicero discusses the refutation of a *signum*.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises Lysias for his ability to distinguish τὰ σημεῖα left behind by the actions and to elevate them to the status of τεκμήρια (*Lys.* 19, p.31,5-8 U.-R.).¹¹⁴ The σημεῖα may refer to indications left at the scene of the crime (e.g. blood, etc.) and τεκμήρια to (necessary) proofs constructed by argumentation based upon the σημεῖα. At *Is.* 15 (p.113,16-17) σημεῖα are coupled together with τεκμήρια and ἔλεγχοι.

Quint. *Inst.* 5.9 classifies three kinds of ἔντεχνοι proofs, namely, *signa* (= σημεῖα), *argumenta* (similar to ἐνθυμήματα in the Aristotelian sense) and *exempla* (= παραδείγματα). He argues against the Aristotelian notion of classifying *signa* under the *argumenta*. *Signa* are divided into those necessary (τεκμήρια), and those not necessary (either εἰκότα or *dubia*). The *dubia* need the support of *argumenta*.

Phld. *Rh.* 1.285 S. speaks of τὰ ἀληθῆ σημεῖα and contrasts these with ἐνθυμήματα (in the sense of arguments from probability), see s.v. ἐνθύμημα. At *Rh.* 1.369 S. he lists σημεῖον together with εἶκος and τεκμήριον as the ἔντεχνοι proofs, see s.v. εἶκος.

σολοικισμός

The opposite of a figure (σχημα), i.e. the unnatural use of a group of words in a way that harms the effect of the prose.¹¹⁵ For

¹¹⁴ This paraphrase is based on Usher's translation in the Loeb series. Perhaps, however, we should translate τὰ σημεῖα τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς πράγμασι more generally as "the σημεῖα (indications) attendant upon the matters." Might then Dionysius have been thinking of *Lys.* 4.12 (ἀξιῷ δ' ὅσον ἂν ἐγένετο σημεῖον τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν φυγόντος ἐμοῦ τὴν βάσανον, τοσοῦτον ἐμοὶ τεκμήριον γενέσθαι ὅτι οὐ ψεύδομαι ...)?

¹¹⁵ This is the definition generally used by the rhetorical theorists cited here. The terms βαρβαρισμός and σολοικισμός were, however, sometimes used interchangeably, see s.v. βαρβαρισμός.

discussion see Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.34-54; D.H. *Th.* 24 (p.362,13-16 U.-R.), cf. *Th.* 33 (p.381,6 U.-R.), 37 (p.389,7-10); Alex. *Fig.* 1.1; cf. Diog.Bab. *Stoic. Fr.* 24. For comments on Philodemus' discussion see s.v. βαρβαρισμός.

σύγκρισις

- I. This involves the presentation of a parallel case/ item which may be compared in some detail with the subject in hand in order to show how the one is better, worse, or equal to the other.

Among the Latin authors there are several passages which seem related to σύγκρισις. *Rhet.Her.* 2.6 lists *conlatio* as a form of argumentation to be used in the στάσις called *coniecturalis* (στοχασμός) providing several specific *loci*. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.100-101 discusses *comparatio* in the context of figures (σχήματα), but prefers not to consider it a figure.¹¹⁶ Quintilian mentions that both Celsus and Visellius regarded it as a figure, and in this connection also mentions Rut.Lup. 2.16 (ἀντίθετον). Rutilius Lupus' first two examples of ἀντίθετα are certainly cast in the form of συγκρίσεις.

Faults in comparisons (*vitiosa in comparandis rebus*) are listed in *Rhet.Her.* 2.45. [Longin.] 4.2 cites an example of σύγκρισις from the historian Timaeus which he considers representative of τὸ ψυχρόν (frigidity). Timaeus compares the time it took Alexander the Great to conquer Asia with the time Isocrates took to compose his *Panegyricus* (10 years). Ps.-Longinus mocks this as if the *tertium comparationis* is ἀνδρεία. The question here is what Timaeus intended to communicate by the comparison, and why Ps.-Longinus thought that it was so obviously frigid. Timaeus' comparison strikes us as funny and it is possible that such exaggerated humour was considered obviously out of place in history.

Theon *Prog.* ii, p.108,3-15 Sp. discusses σύγκρισις as one of the τόποι for αὔξησις, cf. Cic. *Part.* 55 (*similitudines*) and Quint. *Inst.* 8.4.9-14 (*comparatio*). This is the same as the abstract argumentative τόπος in Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.4-5; Cic. *Top.* 23, 68-71 (*ex comparatione*); *de Orat.* 2.172; *Part.* 7 (*rerum contentiones*); Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.86-93, cf. 6.3.66. It is categorised into three classes: comparison with greater, lesser, or equal.

¹¹⁶ On the text see M. Winterbottom, *Problems in Quintilian* (University of London Institute of Classical Studies; Bulletin Supplement 25, 1970) 161.

A somewhat less abstract approach to σύγκρισις is provided in Theon's chapter on σύγκρισις as a separate progymnasmatic exercise, comparing τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ χεῖρον (*Prog.* ii, p.112,19ff Sp.). He distinguishes comparison of persons and matters, and individual entities and classes of objects. Lists of τόποι (without using that term) are provided on πρόσωπα and πράγματα (cf. similar lists in Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23-52). The comparison of good and wicked men is treated as a προγύμνασμα by Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.21. In this context one should compare Plutarch's *Vitae Parallelae*. D.H. cites examples of συγκρίσεις from Isocrates (*Isoc.* 17; *Dem.* 17) and Demosthenes (*Dem.* 21).

For a New Testament example cf. *Ep.Hebr.* 1-2 (comparison between the son of God and angels).

For a specific kind of σύγκρισις see s.v. ἀντιπαβολή.

II. = ἀντανάκλασις (see s.v.).

συζυγία

I. An argument based on cognate words, Arist. *Rh.* 2.23.2 (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτῶσεων); Cic. *de Orat.* 2.167 (*coniuncta*); *Top.* 12 and 38 (*coniugatum/ coniugatio*); Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.85 (*coniugatum* – disapprovingly). The Greek term is first mentioned in this sense at Cic. *Top.* 12 and 38. See also the related concept, ἐτυμολογία.

II. = ἐπεζυγμένον (see s.v.).

σύμβολον – see s.v. ἀλληγορία I.

συμπλοκή – see s.v. κοινότης.

συναθροισμός

The bringing together of various things (words or phrases) in a list (using ἀσύνδετον), Rut.Lup. 1.2, cf. Cic. *Part.* 122 (*coacervatio*).¹¹⁷ This corresponds to Quint. *Inst.* 8.4.27, who notes that it involves the bringing together of various things which do *not* all concern the same matter. Similar is Alex. *Fig.* 1.9, where it is an argument (κεφάλαιον) constructed by bringing together various events or possible events. Arist. *Rh.* 3.24.2 classifies this kind of argument as a fallacious ἐνθύμημα (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν).

¹¹⁷ The term *coacervatio* is used by Aq.Rom. *Fig.* 6 of συναθροισμός (cf. Alex. *Fig.* 1.17).

Συναθροισμός is classified by [Longin.] 23.1 as one form of πολύπτωτον together with μεταβολή II. (with which it seems closely related), and κλῖμαξ.¹¹⁸ All three are said to be πάνυ ἀγωνιστικά.

συνάφεια – see s.v. πολυσύνδετον.

[συνεξευγμένον] – see s.v. ἐπεξευγμένον.

συνεκδοχή

Rhet.Her. 4.44-45 speaks of *intellectio* as the whole for a part, or part for a whole, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.168; Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.19-22. It has more scope in poetry than prose. See also s.v. ἀντονομασία and ἔλλειψις.

σύνθεσις – (as a figure of speech) see s.v. κοινότης.

συνοικείωσις

The bringing of things not normally associated with each other (e.g. opposites) into a positive relation, Rut.Lup. 2.9. Rutilius states that this has great force, for example, by portraying vice out of praise and *vice versa*, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.64. At Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 3.1 it is presented as a summary feature of encomia. This, however, seems odd and, given the generally problematic nature of the text, may be considered suspect.

συντομία

“Conciseness.” Arist. *Rh.* 3.6 discusses τὸ ὄγκον and its opposite συντομία as an attribute of λέξις. Conciseness is helped by the use of one defining word instead of a description or definition, placing an attributive adjective between the article and the noun (instead of repeating the article with the adjective), and using ἀσύνδετον. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 22.3-7 discusses lengthening (μηκύνω), abbreviating (βραχυλογέω) and measuring (μέσως λέγειν, the mean) one’s discourse. The methods for conciseness are similar to Aristotle, cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.84,5-17 Sp. on συντομία κατὰ τὴν λέξιν with respect to the διήγημα.

¹¹⁸ But see the note on the text at this point, s.v. πολύπτωτον.

Rhet. Her. 4.68 discusses *brevitas* as the figure of conciseness in the narration of a succession of events. Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.42, under the discussion of the *narratio*, mentions the fact that some Greeks distinguish between the *circumcisa* (σύντομος) and the *brevis expositio*, the former being free of superfluous matter, the latter possibly omitting necessary matter. Quintilian may be referring to the distinction made in Tryph. *Trop.* 2.8-9 between συντομία which refers to speech containing the necessary elements themselves (cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.83,14-18 Sp. on συντομία), and βραχύτης which is a short statement containing a message beyond the literal text itself, as in apothegms (cf. ξμφασις), cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 7-9, 241-43, and perhaps Thphr. *Fr.* 695-96 FHS&G (= D.H. *Lys.* 6 and Demetr. *Eloc.* 222). Trypho's distinction is, however, more closely paralleled in Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.82-83 where βραχυλογία is distinguished from ξμφασις.

Demetr. *Eloc.* 103, 137-38 and 253 discusses συντομία in relation to μεγαλοπρεπής, γλαφυρά and δεινὴ ἔρμηνεία respectively. Ἀποσιώπησις (see s.v.) is introduced as a particular form of συντομία. [Longin.] 42 discusses excessive συντομία, which he terms ἡ ἄγαν τῆς φράσεως συγκοπὴ, as a stylistic fault.

For brevity (συντομία/ *brevitas*) as a possible reason for the use of metaphors, see s.v. μεταφορά. For *brevitas* as a device used in jesting see Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.45-46. For methods of prolonging or abbreviating discourse see Theon *Prog.* ii, p.75,16-19 Sp. (of the μῦθος), p.83,14-84,17 (of the διήγημα), p.103,28-104,15 (of the χρεία).

See also Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202 (*distincte concisa brevis*) and *Orat.* 139 (*brevitas*). Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises conciseness (βραχύτης) in Lysias at *Lys.* 5 and in Demosthenes at *Th.* 55 (p.417,19 U.-R.). At *Dem.* 58 he discusses βραχυλογία and πλεονασμός in Demosthenes.

The fact that discussion on conciseness as a figure is often connected to narration is reflected in the fact that many theorists consider conciseness as one of the virtues of the *narratio* in a speech. See Anaximen. Lampsac. *Rh.* 30.4-5, 8-9; *Rhet. Her.* 1.14; Cic. *Inv.* 1.28; *de Orat.* 2.326-28; Theon *Prog.* ii, p.83,14-84,17 Sp.; Quint. *Inst.* 2.31-32, 40-51, cf. D.H. *Lys.* 18 (p.30,2-3 U.-R.). Arist. *Rh.* 16.4 denies that conciseness is a virtue of the *narratio* (διήγησις), substituting τὸ μετρίως (the mean). Cic. *Part.* 19 mentions *brevitas* as a stylistic virtue.

συνωνυμία

I. Arist. *Rh.* 3.2.7 briefly notes that whilst ambiguous words are useful to the sophist, synonyms are useful to the poet. The use of synonyms is further discussed in *Rhet.Her.* 4.38 (*interpretatio*); Theon *Prog.* ii, p.129,13-14; p.130,1-5 Sp. (termed πολωνυμία and explained as a possible cause of obscurity) and Alex. *Fig.* 2.6. See also s.v. πλεονασμός.

II. = διεξυγμένον (see s.v.).

σχετλιασμός – see s.v. ἐμβόησις.

σχῆμα

Figure, i.e. the unnatural use of more than one word (as distinct from one word only, cf. s.v. τρόπος) in a recognizable way to produce a certain effect. Contrast σολοικισμός. For discussion of definition see *Rhet.Her.* 4.18 (end); Quint. *Inst.* 9.1-9.2.5; 9.3.1-5; Alex. *Fig.* 1.1-2.

The earliest extant work to separately discuss figures is *Rhet.Her.* who separates figures of speech (*verborum exornationes*) from figures of thought (*sententiarum exornationes*). This work includes tropes under figures of speech, cf. §§4.42-46.¹¹⁹ The σχῆμα is distinguished from the τρόπος in Phld. *Rh.* 1.164 S., although Philodemus' only examples of what should fall under σχήματα are the discussion of περίοδοι, κῶλα, and κόμματα (1.164-65 S.). Figures of speech are mentioned at *Rh.* 1.372 S.. D.H. *Dem.* 48 (p.234,11 U.-R.) distinguishes σχήματα from τρόποι.¹²⁰ In fact, *Rhet.Her.* appears to be the only author under consideration here who clearly classifies tropes under figures of speech.

Going by the Latin "translation" of Gorgias the Younger's work περὶ σχημάτων (= Rut.Lup.), we may conclude that the figures here were not categorised into figures of thought as opposed to speech. Nevertheless, almost all theorists from this time and thereafter divide figures into these two common categories, see [Longin.] 16-29;¹²¹ Demetr. *Eloc.* 263-71;¹²² Cic. *Top.* 34; cf. *de Orat.* 3.200-208;

¹¹⁹ Compare Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.2 who mentions that C. Artorius Proculus, a theorist from the Republican period, (among others) included tropes among figures.

¹²⁰ The term σχῆμα is frequently used of figures in his writings, although σχηματισμός (see s.v.) is also used as a synonym.

¹²¹ The distinction is made at 8.1 and, although not mentioned again in the extant text, does serve as an ordering principle in §§16-29.

¹²² The division is made in the discussion of each style, but is most clear in the discussion of ἐρμηνεία δεινὴ §§263-71.

Orat. 134-39; *Brut.* 69;¹²³ Caecilius *Fr.* 50; D.H. *Dem.* 39 (p.212,10-13 U.-R.).

At *Inst.* 9.1.4-9 Quint. correctly admits that there is a certain fluidity between tropes and figures, and between figures of speech and figures of thought. At *Inst.* 9.1.22ff he argues against those Greeks who include the various emotions as figures, or such things as persuasion, threat, entreaty, or excuse. Quintilian, as most theorists, divides his discussion into figures of speech and figures of thought. The figures of speech are further divided into:

- 1) grammatical figures (*loquendi ratio*)
- 2) figures of addition
- 3) figures of omission
- 4) figures of similitude/ contrast

This division is common in later Greek theorists, but also found as early as Ps.-Plu. *Vit.Hom.* (second century AD).¹²⁴ This would suggest that Quintilian has borrowed the division from another earlier Greek rhetorical theorist. Cornelius Celsus apparently divided his discussion of figures into three categories, those of speech, thought, and colour (see Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.17-18).

Alex. *Fig.* 1.1-2 also admits that it is not easy to distinguish figures from tropes and figures of speech from figures of thought. He distinguishes the trope as that which makes a virtue (*ἀρετή*) out of one word (its opposite being the *βαρβαρισμός* which makes a *κακία*). The figure is a *κόσμησις* with more words, its opposite being the *σολοικισμός* which provides *ἀκοσμία*. He explains the difference between figures of speech and figures of thought by arguing that a change of words or word order dissolves the figure of speech but not the figure of thought (since the matter or meaning of the words remains the same). This explanation of the difference can already be found in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.200.

Alexander goes on to rebut the views of some (Apollodorus? cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.10-13) who argue that there is no such thing as a

¹²³ The distinction between tropes and figures is made at *Brut.* 69 and (without using technical terms) *de Orat.* 3.149 and *Orat.* 134.

¹²⁴ Ps.Pl. describes the categories as follows: 1) τὰ κατὰ πλεονασμόν (*Vit.Hom.* 28), under which category also fall τὰ κατὰ ἐναλλαγὴν (*Vit.Hom.* 30), 2) τὰ κατὰ ἔνδεον λέξεως (*Vit.Hom.* 39), 3) ἀλλοίωσις (*Vit.Hom.* 41). The book is dated to the latter half of the second century by its most recent editor, J. F. Kindstrand (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1990).

figure of thought since all thought contains some kind of form (σχῆμα) given that the soul is constantly on the move. Alexander distinguishes between that form which is according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), and that which is not. In the latter case only, are we confronted with a figure. A similar argument against the separate existence of figures of speech is refuted.

σηματισμός

D.H. *Comp.* 8 uses the term fairly broadly to refer to ways of fitting together κῶλα, but also speaks of σηματισμοὶ τῆς λέξεως and τῆς διανοίας (figures of speech and of thought), cf. *Comp.* 22 (p.98,1 U.-R.); 23 (p.120,5); *Dem.* 39 (p.212,10-11); *Pomp.* 6 (p.247,19-20).

τάξις

I. A term used by Rut.Lup. 2.20 to designate the figure involving the isolation and clear notation of but one matter when a group of things has been collectively mentioned.

II. "The structural ordering of a sentence," cf. *Demetr. Eloc.* 229. Quint. *Inst.* 7.1.1 defines the term *ordo* as *recta quaedam collocatio prioribus sequentia adnectens*. It is discussed at 9.4.23-32 and includes discussion of ἀσύνδετον, *naturalis ordo* (= φυσικὴ τάξις, cf. *Demetr. Eloc.* 199-200; D.H. *Comp.* 5) and ὑπερβατόν. *Ordo* is distinguished from *iunctura* (discussed at *Inst.* 9.4.32-44) which concerns what the Greeks called ἁρμονία (cf. D.H. *Comp.*).¹²⁵

It is impossible to say what Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 may have meant by *ordo*, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.91.

ταυτολογία

See s.v. ἀναδίπλωσις II. The term is used in the negative sense of "tautology" at D.H. *Comp.* 23 (p.117,9 U.-R.); Ph. *Congr.* 73 who calls it τὸ φαυλότατον εἶδος of μακρολογία, and Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.43, cf. Plu. 2.504d.

τεκμήριον

I. [Arist.] *Rh.Al.* 9 defines it as an inconsistency in fact or word detected in one's opponent (this is the same as Aristotle's 22nd [abstract] κοινὸς τόπος, *Rh.* 2.23.23).

¹²⁵ See R. D. Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (rev. ed.; Leuven: Peeters, 1999) 81-3.

- II. Arist. *Rh.* 1.2 and Quint. *Inst.* 5.9.3-7 define it as a necessary σημεῖον (see s.v. σημεῖον for further information).

τόπος

“Place” or “source.” See, for example, Demetr. *Eloc.* 136-62 where the various τόποι (i.e. sources) for αἱ χάριτες are given. Whilst τόποι were supplied for all manner of subjects in rhetorical theory, the term came to be used in several distinct ways.

- I. Τόποι of virtues and vices, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.22-23 (as προγυμνάσματα); 5.10.20; Phld. *Rh.* 1.226 S.. In Cic. *de Orat.* 3.106-107 Crassus distinguishes between *loci communes* i) concerned with certain vices and offences, whether magnifying or deprecating them or also appealing for mercy; ii) *disputationes de universo genere in utramque partem* which in context can only be a reference to θέσεις (see below *sub.* IV.). The subjects envisaged concern virtue, duty, equity, good, dignity, utility, honour, etc.. Crassus continues with a digression on philosophical oratory (*de Orat.* 3.109-25) wherein he describes the two kinds of θέσεις (*consultationes*), those *ad cognoscendum* (which are further analysed in terms of στάσεις) and those *ad agendum* (*de Orat.* 3.118) which concern the various virtues and vices.
- II. Τόποι as methods of αὔξησις (see s.v. αὔξησις).
- III. Τόποι of argumentation. These kinds of τόποι are discussed in various ways. The sources frequently make use of the designations specific and common τόποι, but these terms are not always used in the same way. Κοινοὶ τόποι are of course more broadly applicable than specific τόποι, but the way in which they are more broadly applicable varies.

In terms of the way τόποι were generally dealt with we may distinguish between the approach of philosophical rhetoric and school rhetoric. We begin with philosophical rhetoric.

Aristotle distinguished between set treatments of particular subjects (i.e. specific τόποι), which he called εἶδη (cf. *Rh.* 1.2.20, outlined for the three genres of rhetoric in *Rh.* 1.3-2.17), and (κοινοὶ) τόποι. He used the term (κοινοὶ) τόποι to refer to abstract argumentative patterns (e.g. if A is good, the opposite of A is bad), cf. *Rh.* 2.23-25;¹²⁶; *Top.*

¹²⁶ On Aristotle's distinction between the κοινά and the κοινοὶ τόποι (not reflected in later tradition) see footnote 12 s.v. αὔξησις.

Cicero, both in *de Orat.* 2.152, 160 and *Top.* 1-5 claimed to be going back to Aristotle's way of dealing with *loci*. Whilst the specific system he outlines is not identical to that of Aristotle, the concern for abstract argumentative *loci* in general certainly is. In *de Orat.* 2.121-77 he deals broadly with *loci*. Whilst considering the special topics not worth mentioning, he makes an interesting distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic *loci*, i.e. those related directly to the subject (2.164-72) and those not (2.162-63). Intrinsic *loci* conform to Aristotle's concept of κοινοὶ τόποι, and are also termed *argumentorum sedes ac loci* (2.166). The latter (2.173) are *loci* based on the ἄτεχνοι proofs.¹²⁷ The same distinction is made in both Cicero's later works, the *Topica* and *Part.* 5-8. In fact the lists of intrinsic *loci* in *de Orat.* 2.164-72 and the *Topica* are essentially the same. The list in *Part.* 7 is clearly related.¹²⁸ This tradition dividing a discussion of τόποι into abstract argumentative patterns and commonplaces on ἄτεχνοι proofs appears to be Peripatetic in origin, although it does not stem from Aristotle himself.¹²⁹ The evidence of *Part.* 7 would suggest that Philo of Larissa took over this tradition in his rhetorical teaching.¹³⁰

Under the influence of Cicero, Quintilian included a list of abstract *loci*, clearly related to Cicero's intrinsic *loci*, in his *loci argumentorum*. His organisation of *loci* (see below) is thus a hybrid of philosophical and school rhetoric.

As far as we can tell from the extant sources, school rhetoric commonly distinguished between a group of τόποι which concerned

¹²⁷ Such *loci* are discussed in Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.27-32 as part of his discussion of progymnastic θέσεις, see τόπος IV..

¹²⁸ *Part.* 7 contains two interpolations (bracketed text in most editions) listing *loci* identical to those in *Top.* and *de Orat.* (the first interpolation containing the first four *loci*, and then a complete list). After the interpolations a third list is presented which, although clearly related to the list from *Top.* and *de Orat.*, is not identical. We may assume that this is the list originally belonging to the treatise.

¹²⁹ The organisation of the abstract τόποι is also paralleled to a certain extent (independently of Cicero it seems) in the fourth century AD Peripatetic commentator and rhetor Themistius (in Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*, bk.2, see E. Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis* [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978]).

¹³⁰ Although we do not know the precise source of the *Partitiones*, we do know that it stemmed from the Academy (*Part.* 139). Philo of Larissa is the only known Academic who took up the teaching of rhetoric. His Academic rival Antiochus of Ascalon does not appear to have taught rhetoric, cf. Cic. *Brut.* 315. The Academy itself as a philosophical school seems to have ended with Philo, cf. J. Gucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Hypomnemata 56; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978).

the sources of argumentation, and τόποι which were more or less specifically related to certain kinds of cases. The latter group were divided among the various στάσεις in judicial rhetoric. For deliberative rhetoric τόποι concerning the τελικὰ κεφάλαια were listed (cf. *s.v.* κεφάλαιον III.), and for epideictic rhetoric τόποι of praise and blame.

The τόποι concerning sources of argumentation are called the *materia universa omnium argumentationum* by Cic. *Inv.* 1.34 (they are termed *loci* at 1.44), and are subdivided into those *loci* concerning *persona* and those concerning *negotii*. This seems to have been a standard division, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23-52; Theon *Prog.*, ii, pp.113,2 - 114,6 Sp.. In general these *loci* provide a checklist of subject areas to be considered when thinking of arguments (e.g. for *persona*, a person's birth, age, sex, etc.). Cicero's list in *de Inventione*, however, also includes a short section of abstract argumentative patterns along the lines of what he later called intrinsic *loci*. These *loci* are said to be *adiunctum negotio* (listed at *Inv.* 41-42). This fact would suggest that school rhetoric did not entirely neglect abstract argumentative τόποι. However, such τόποι do not appear to have received much emphasis, nor did they receive a separate place within the theory (in *Inv.* 41-42 they are merely one subdivision of the source-*loci* concerning *negotii*).

Quintilian's discussion of *loci argumentorum* differs somewhat from the above and represents a mixture of the more traditional rhetorical approach, with the philosophical approach adopted in Cicero's later treatises. Quintilian divides the *loci argumentorum* (which he distinguishes from the *loci* of virtues and vices) between those sources of arguments (*sedes argumentorum*) related to concrete persons (e.g. birth, nationality, etc.) and matters (e.g. place, time, resources), and those *loci communes* which are common to all cases (i.e. removed from concrete persons and matters). The latter group are clearly the same kind of *loci* as Cicero's later intrinsic *loci*. The former, however, conform to the source-*loci* of school rhetoric.

Lists of more specific *loci* related to the various kinds of oratory are provided in *Rhet.Her.* and Cic. *Inv.* under the section devoted to *inventio*. For judicial rhetoric *Rhet.Her.* 2.13-26 gives *loci communes* which are listed under the various other στάσεις with which they can be used. Cic. *Inv.* bk. 2 provides both *loci* specific to various cases within the στάσεις and *loci communes* which may be

applied to the στάσις concerned. The *loci communes* are defined at *Inv.* 1.48-50 in the sense of ready-made arguments able to be applied to many different cases. Quintilian places his discussion of *loci* specific to the various στάσεις under the section on *dispositio* (τάξις), *Inst.* 7.2-9. The discussion in Cic. *Part.* 34-43 is placed under the *confirmatio* of a speech and is separate from the treatment of the five *officia* of rhetoric. For deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, *loci* are provided under the section on *inventio* in Cic. *Inv.* 2.157-78; *Rhet. Her.* 3.3-7, 10-11; and in Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.7-28 (for epideictic τόποι which he terms *materia*) and *Inst.* 3.8.22-25 (for the τελικὰ κεφάλαια of deliberative rhetoric which he calls *partes suadendi* and out of which *loci* arise, cf. 3.8.27). Cic. *Part.* places the *loci* for these genres of rhetoric under a discussion of ὑποθέσεις (epideictic §§74-82, deliberative §§83-88). In addition, τόποι for epideictic rhetoric are provided by Theon *Prog.* ii, pp.109,28 - 111,11 Sp..

Dionysius of Halicarnassus also shows awareness of lists of τόποι, e.g. *Lys.* 15 p.25,13-19 U.-R. (cf. *Comp.* 5, p.24,15-20) where a list of typical τόποι is provided which is very similar to the list in Theon *Prog.* ii, p.78,16-20 Sp.. Both lists are introduced as στοιχεῖα (not τόποι). Elsewhere Dionysius uses the term τόπος in the sense here under discussion, cf. *Lys.* 17 (p.29,6-8 U.-R.) and *Amm.* 1.11-12 (of τόποι in Aristotle's treatise).

Phld. *Rh.* 1.203 S. speaks of the τόποι a philosopher would consult for refuting opponents.

- IV. The term τόποι is also used in connection with θέσεις. Strictly speaking θέσεις are properly distinguished from τόποι in that a θέσις refers to a disputed matter whilst a τόπος concerns the magnification of an agreed-upon matter (cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.120,16-17 Sp.). But when τόποι are presented *pro* and *contra* various subjects, a discussion of these pros and cons can be termed a θέσις (cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.107 of τόποι concerning virtue, duty, etc. in the context of *amplificatio*; Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.27 of τόποι concerning the ἄτεχνοι proofs, in the context of a discussion of θέσεις as προγυμνάσματα). Theon *Prog.* ii, p.69,1-6 Sp. terms such topical θέσεις used within a speech, θετικὰ κεφάλαια.
- V. Phld. *Rh.* 1.170 S. mentions τόποι which the writers of rhetorical treatises provide for composing metaphors. No such list is extant from the theorists under our purview here.

τρόπος

Trope, i.e. the figurative use of a single word (as distinct from several words, cf. *s.v.* σχῆμα). Contrast βαρβαρισμός. For discussion of definition see Alex. *Fig.* 1.1; Quint. *Inst.* 6.1-3; 9.1.4-9. Quint. *Inst.* 6.1 mentions that there was little agreement among theorists as to their classification or number. He discusses tropes under two headings, those used for the expression of meaning, and those used for ornamentation. At *Inst.* 9.1.4-9 he correctly admits a certain fluidity between tropes and figures.

The extant discussion (the first part of the section is missing) of τρόποι suitable to sublimity in [Longin.] 31-32 concerns only metaphors. Although Demetr. *Eloc.* discusses tropes separately from figures in connection with the four styles, he does not use the term τρόπος as a technical term. The term is used by Cic. *Brut.* 69; Phld. *Rh.* 1.164ff S.; D.H. *Dem.* 48 (p.234,11 U.-R.); cf. τροπικὰ (sc. ὀνόματα) D.H. *Comp.* 25 (p.124,14 U.-R.); 26 (p.137,7); Theon *Prog.* ii, p.81,9-18 Sp.; τρόποι at p.86.1.

ὕπαλλαγή

I. = μετωνυμία (see *s.v.*).

II. = ἐπιτίμησις (see *s.v.*).

ὕπεξαίρεσις

Lit. "removal." The figure is effected when claims are made on behalf of someone or something, having admitted (and thus removed from purview) that another has a better claim. The ranking of someone or something else next to a well-known claimant effects persuasion. Alex. *Fig.* 1.7 offers the following example: "Zeus rules all things, but I rule men."

ὕπερβατόν

This figure arises when certain words belonging together are grammatically separated by another word or phrase that doesn't belong, e.g. *Ep.Rom.* 1.11, ἐπιποθῶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν πνευματικόν (where τι χάρισμα πνευματικόν belong together). Certain forms of ὕπερβατόν are quite common in literary Greek, (e.g. when a verb is placed second to last in a clause, and a noun agreeing with some article or adjective earlier in the clause is placed after the verb, cf. the style of Ps.-Longinus who uses it so often that it becomes rather trite). Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.26 notes

that every sentence where the verb does not come last in sequence (in Latin) must contain some form of ὑπερβατόν. Apart from such standard forms of expression, ὑπερβατόν is normally considered poor use of language, leading only to ambiguity (cf. Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 25.1; Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.40; 8.2.14). Its rhetorical use reflects deliberate planning for a particular reason. [Longin.] 22 states that it reflects great emotional struggle. The audience's difficulty in grasping the statement reflects the emotional tension of the speaker. Ps.-Longinus includes the stating of a reason (with γάρ) before the proposition it supports. Phld. *Rh.* 1.160 S., in a difficult fragment, assumes that the use of ὑπερβατόν is sometimes necessary. Why this may be so is not apparent. He also notes that some rhetorical theorists claim the overuse of ὑπερβατόν (when not necessary) to be a fault. *Rhet.Her.* 4.18 states that it should be avoided unless it is elegant (*concinna*). At 4.44 he suggests its purpose lies in the ability to create suitable prose rhythm. Here, he terms it *transgressio* and divides it into *perversio* (transposition of two words placed next to each other, = ἀναστροφή, see s.v.) and *transiectio* (transposition occurring over a longer distance). The same twofold distinction is made by Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.65 and Alex. *Fig.* 2.24. Both authors suggest that ὑπερβατόν properly refers to a transposition over a greater distance (thus excluding ἀναστροφή).¹³¹ Alexander includes an example of parenthesis (see s.v. παρένθεσις) under ὑπερβατόν (generically considered), cf. *Fig.* 2.25.¹³²

Dionysius of Halicarnassus discusses ὑπερβατόν in Thucydides at *Th.* 31 (pp.377,19 - 378,5 U.-R.), cf. 52 (p.412,10). It is mentioned at Cic. *de Orat.* 3.207 (*verborum concinna transgressio*). See also Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.62-67.

ὑπερβολή

"Hyperbole."

Anaximen.Lampsac. *Rh.* 11.4-5 treats of the ὑπερβολή as a possible source for the composition of γνῶμαι (see s.v.).

¹³¹ Of interest is Philo's use of ὑπερβατόν in *de mut.nom.* 13 (p.580 M.) where he applies the figure to argue for an impossible interpretation of *Exodus* 6.3. See also Plin. *Ep.* 8.7.

¹³² Compare Origen's exegesis of *Ep.Rom.* 1.13-15 where he argues that Paul uses the figure of ὑπερβατόν when he parenthetically inserts the clause: καὶ ἐκωλύθη ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο (*comm. in Rom.* fr. 4 Ramsbotham).

Arist. *Rh.* 3.11.15 deals briefly with hyperboles as metaphors. He is careful to speak of *approved* hyperboles. They are described as characteristic of youth (μερακιώδεις) for they demonstrate vehemence (σφοδρότης) and are thus mostly used when one is angry. They are not suitable in the mouths of older men. Aristotle mentions the common practice of adding a short apology for using a ὑπερβολή (*Rh.* 3.7.9, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.37). Demetr. *Eloc.* 124-27 (cf. 161-62, 182-86) divides hyperbole into three categories, comparison of likeness (e.g. “to run like the wind”), of superiority (“whiter than snow”), or an impossibility (“her head was fastened to the sky”). But Demetrius adds that every hyperbole is impossible and is therefore the most frigid way of speaking of all. It is definitely not recommended! At §286 he suggests it is poetical.

Although the Aristotelian tradition seems to have been fairly negatively disposed to the use of hyperbole, Strabo indicates that he considered it a customary rhetorical feature. He says of Posidonius (in praise of mines) that he οὐκ ἀπέχεται τῆς συνήθους ῥητορείας, ἀλλὰ συνενθουσιᾷ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς (3.2.9).¹³³ Its acceptability is also reflected in rhetorical theorists. [Longin.] 38 (it is mentioned in passing at §5) treats it as something that can be sublime but should not be overdone.¹³⁴ It is at its best when it passes unnoticed, and is best used in conjunction with some great dramatic circumstance. Two fine examples are given, Th. 7.84 and Hdt. 7.225. Despite what is said in these passages, Ps.-Longinus correctly maintains that both examples are believable. He adds that it is only the tragic nature of the situations described that enable one to get away with such hyperbole.

Rhet. Her. 4.44 (*superlatio*) defines hyperbole as speech that exaggerates the truth either for the purpose of amplification or denigration (this definition is found verbatim in the Greek tradition at Tryph. *Trop.* 2.1, cf. Cic. *Top.* 45; *de Orat.* 2.267). He notes that it can either be used on its own (i.e. metaphorically) or with *comparatio* (i.e. as a simile, e.g. “his body was as white as snow”). *Comparatio*

¹³³ “He did not abstain from rhetorical custom, but was inspired with hyperboles.”

¹³⁴ At §9.5 he praises an exaggerated hyperbole in Homer (Il. 5.770-72). This is probably in connection with his treatment of the second source of sublimity, τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικόν, which probably began in the lacuna at 9.4. As noted above, Aristotle had already suggested that hyperbole exhibits σφοδρότης. Given that Longinus is at this point dealing at some length with Homer, his praise of such excessive hyperbole should probably not be interpreted to mean that he approved of this in prose.

is further subdivided into comparisons of equality and superiority. At 4.67 hyperbole (here termed *exsuperatio*) is described as one kind of *significatio* (cf. s.v. ἔμφασις).

Quint. *Inst.* 8.4.29 notes that ὑπερβολή is sometimes regarded as a method of *amplificatio* (αὔξησις), though his own discussion is located under tropes (*Inst.* 8.6.67-76). Here he classifies hyperboles as either (simply) going beyond the facts, or constructed in the form of a *similitudo*, *comparatio*, *signum* or metaphor. Quintilian admits that every hyperbole goes beyond what is credible and advises restraint. He notes that it is best used when the subject dealt with surpasses what is natural/ normal. Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.67 (cf. 8.6.74) discusses ὑπερβολή as a trope in connection with jesting, as does Cic. *de Orat.* 2.267. It is further mentioned at Cic. *Orat.* 139; *de Orat.* 3.203 and D.H. *Lys.* 3 (p.10,17 U.-R.).

For possible Pauline examples see *Ep.Gal.* 1.8; 1 *Ep.Cor.* 13.1.

ὑπόθεσις – see s.v. θέσις.

ὑποτύπωσις – see s.v. διατύπωσις.

ὑποφορά

- I. For ὑποφορά as rhetorical question(s) immediately answered by the speaker himself, see s.v. ἐπερώτησις.
- II. The term ὑποφορά (together with its correlative ἀνθυποφορά) could also refer to possible objections from opponents stated in non-question form. These two terms are so used in Ps.-Hermogenes' discussion of κεφάλαια (*Inv.* 3.4, cf. Fortunat. *Rh.* 2.27). A κεφάλαιον (in the sense of an argumentative *locus* such as those listed under the various στάσεις) derived from (possible or known) objections from opponents is organised into a four-part structure: i) πρότασις (introductory statement: e.g. "perhaps this argument will come from the adversaries"), ii) ὑποφορά (a short statement of the argument itself), iii) ἀντιπρότασις (introductory statement to the refutation), iv) ἀνθυποφορά or λύσις (the refutation).

See also s.v. ἀνθυποφορά.

- III. A different tradition is preserved in Ruf.*Rh.* 39 where a ὑποφορά is defined in terms of the speaker suggesting a certain thought and then refuting it. This is said to be appropriate to deliberative speeches. An ἀνθυποφορά concerns the statement of a thought used by the the opponent, and is suited to judicial speeches.

φαντασία

[Longin.] 15.1 defines it as: ὅταν ἃ λέγεις ὑπ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ πάθους βλέπειν δοκῇς καὶ ὑπ' ὧσιν τιθῇς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.¹³⁵ The speaker thus speaks as if he is seeing and experiencing at that moment what he is describing. Ps.-Longinus adds that in rhetoric the purpose is ἐνάργεια (vividness). In §15.8-12 he treats of the rhetorical φαντασία. His examples show him to be getting at the use of powerfully descriptive examples in one's argument (he uses the words ἐναγώνια καὶ ἐμπαθῆ). It is not the use of a descriptive example as such, but one with φαντασία, where the speaker paints a vivid picture placing himself in the very situation he is describing. The listener is dragged along from the mere point of persuasion into the fantasy. At §15.1 he notes that others use the term εἰδωλοποιῖα instead of φαντασία.

See also Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.29-36; cf. 9.2.33; 12.10.6.

χαρακτηρισμός

"Characterisation."

- I. A bodily description of someone, useful either for the purpose of designating him, or to represent someone with grace, *Rhet.Her.* 4.63 (*effictio*). Bodily descriptions could also be used to poke fun, cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.266 who terms this *imagines*. Related to Cicero's term is εἰκονισμός noted by Tryph. *Trop.* 2.6 as a synonym of χαρακτηρισμός, which he also defines in terms of a description of bodily characteristics.¹³⁶
- II. Rut.Lup. 2.7 describes χαρακτηρισμός as follows: *Quem ad modum pictor coloribus figuras describit, sic orator hoc schemate aut vitia aut virtutes eorum, de quibus loquitur, deformat*. It is thus the description of the virtues or vices (i.e. the character) of particular people.
- III. The term could apparently also refer to virtues and vices described abstractly (if Seneca has not confused two related concepts). Sen. *Ep.* 95.65 stated that *descriptio* (i.e. *signa et notas*) *cuiusque virtutis et vitii* was called by some χαρακτηρισμός, by Posidonius ἡθολογία. It is clear that this latter definition comes very close to ἡθοποιῖα I.

¹³⁵ "When you, under inspiration and emotion, seem to behold what you are saying and place it before the eyes of your hearers."

¹³⁶ For the relation of Tryph. *Trop.* and *Rhet.Her.* at this point, see s.v. ὁμοίωσις.

χαριεντισμός

Tryph. *Troph.* 2.22 defines it as a witty statement by which both the speaker and hearer are relaxed or put in a good humour, cf. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.99 Sp. where one of the twelve εἶδη of the χρεία is κατὰ χαριεντισμόν. Demetr. *Eloc.* 128 describes the γλαφυρά style in general as λόγος χαριεντισμὸς καὶ ἱλαρός. §§128-89 are devoted to an exposition of this style (§§128-35 concern τὰ εἶδη τῶν χαρίτων, 136-62 οἱ τόποι ἀφ' ὧν αἱ χάριτες, 163-72 concern the γελοῖον and σκῶμμα, 173-78 λέξεις, 179-85 σύνθεσις, 186-89 a related but faulty style).

D.H. *Isoc.* 15 (p.77,1 U.-R.) speaks of τῶν περιόδων ὁ χαριεντισμὸς which should probably be interpreted as "the playfulness of his (i.e. Isocrates') periods." At *Isoc.* 12 (p.72,12-14 U.-R.) he states that every χαριεντισμὸς is inappropriate to serious and difficult situations, and inimical to arousing pity, cf. also *Is.* 20 (p.123,10 U.-R.).

For rhetorical jesting in general see Cic. *de Orat.* 2.216-89 and Quint. *Inst.* 6.3 (cf. 6.2.46-49). The Latin equivalent *venustus* (Quintilian uses the adjective) is treated at Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.18. It is mentioned in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.205 (*ad hilaritatem impulsio*) = *Orat.* 138 (*ut in hilaritatem risumve convertat*), cf. 139 (*hilaritas*).

χλευασμός

"Mockery." Classified by Alex. *Fig.* 1.18 as a kind of εἰρωνεία. It is defined in Anon. *Poet.Troph.* 21 in a way almost identical to σαρκασμός, cf. [Greg.Cor.] *Troph.* 16 (on σαρκασμός).¹³⁷ Compare D.H. *Comp.* 18 (p.83,19 U.-R.), although the term is not used here as a rhetorical figure.

χρεία

Demetr. *Eloc.* 170 argues that in certain contexts (e.g. loose parties) the γελοῖον can take the place of the γνώμη and χρεία. This is probably the earliest reference to the rhetorical χρεία. Sen. *Ep.* 33.7 notes that boys were expected to learn both *sententiae* (i.e. γνώμαι) and χρεῖαι by heart. Theon *Prog.* ii, p.96,19-21 Sp. gives the following careful definition: χρεία ἐστὶ σύντομος ἀπόφασις ἢ

¹³⁷ A work attributed in the mss tradition to Trypho. The earliest ms is probably to be dated to the fourth century AD. This work together with Tryph. *Troph.* probably go back to original work of Trypho, the first century grammarian. See the edition of M. L. West, "Tryphon *De Tropis*," *Classical Quarterly* 15 [1965] 230-48.

πρᾶξις μετ' εὐστοχίας ἀναφερομένη εἰς τι ὁρισμένον πρόσωπον ἢ ἀναλογοῦν προσώπῳ.¹³⁸ The *χρεία* is then distinguished from the *γνώμη* and the *ἀπομνημόνευμα*. He goes on to divide the *χρεία* into three *γένη*, those dealing with sayings (*λογικαί*), those dealing with actions (*πρακτικαί*), and those which are mixed.¹³⁹ A number of subdivisions are also discussed. Exercises on *χρεῖαι* are discussed on pp.101-105 Sp.. These include retelling (*ἀπαγγελία*), varied use of grammatical forms (*κλίσεις*), *ἐπιφώνημα*, opposition from contrary considerations, expanding it or shortening it. On p.104 a section is added on various methods of criticising a *χρεία* (*ἀνασκευή*). A final paragraph is added on *τάξεις*. From here we understand that the full treatment of a *χρεία* includes a short introductory sentence (*προοίμιον*), the setting out of the *χρεία* itself, and then various treatments on it. At this point *αὔξησις*, *παρέκβασις* and *ἡθη* (? , cf. s.v. *ἡθοποιῖα* L.) are used. Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.3-5 also briefly discusses this exercise.

Endnote

D.H. *Dem.* 40 (p.217,7-13 U.-R.) in describing the *γλαφυρὰ ἀρμονία* notes that it makes use of those (poetic) figures which most move the crowds (*τὰ κινητικώτατα τῶν ὄχλων*). This comment would seem to give some indication of the popularity of artificial figures of speech among the kind of crowds that regularly attended orations in late first century BC Rome.¹⁴⁰ The figures listed in this category are: *παρισώσεις*, *παρομοιώσεις*, *ἀντιθέσεις*, *παρονομασία*, *ἀντιστροφή*, *ἐπαναφορά*, and *ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ποιητικῆς καὶ μελικῆς λέξεως ὄργανα*. They are elsewhere identified as Gorgianic figures, *Th.* 24.

Such figures are considered by Demetrius (*Eloc.* 27-29, 154, 247, 250) to be out of place in passages where forcefulness (*δαινότης*) is

¹³⁸ “*Χρεία* is a short and intelligent statement or action referring to some definite person or the equivalent of a person.”

¹³⁹ Theon gives the following example (from the first group) “Diogenes the philosopher, having been asked by someone how he might become famous, answered, ‘by thinking least of reputation.’”

¹⁴⁰ If Dionysius means to refer to crowds attending orations in court – and that may be doubted – we should note that such courtroom crowds were to vanish later during imperial times (Tac. *Dial.* 39, cf. 19-20). But the reference may be to crowds gathering to hear epideictic declamations. The popularity of such artificial figures in first century BC Rome may be suitably compared with Gorgias’ popularity in Athens some 400 years earlier.

desired, or where emotion or characterisation is evoked (πάθη καὶ ἥθη). "Anger has no need of craft." Such figures may, however, produce charm (χάρις, §29, 154) and dignified bombast (ὄγκος, §247) and are said to work in conjunction with elevated vocabulary (μεγαληγορία, §29). As such, they may be considered suitable to the μεγαλοπρεπής style (cf. §77), and probably also to the γλαφυρά style (cf. §154, and Dionysius above), although they are not explicitly mentioned in the discussion of either. Demetrius' considerations appear to be based upon an assessment of Aristotle's style.

Similar views are expressed by *Rhet. Her.* 4.32 who virtually restricts these figures to epideictic oratory (cf. *Cic. Part.* 72; *Quint. Inst.* 8.3.11-12), otherwise allowing only for a scattered use to brighten the style.

Cicero's approach to such figures is less negative. His comments are to be found in several places in the *Orator*, and are therefore probably bound up with his defense against the attack on his style by the proponents of a narrow Lysianic Atticism. *Cic. Orat.* 37-38 describes these kind of figures as most suitable to epideictic oratory (broadly defined so as to include history) where they are openly used (at §65 far-fetched metaphors are also grouped with these figures and several other characteristics of sophistic oratory are mentioned). Use of such figures provides *concinntas* and may even provide prose rhythm naturally, without deliberately aiming for such (cf. *Orat.* 164-67). Cicero notes that they are much less common in judicial oratory and even then are concealed (*Orat.* 38), although at *Orat.* 165 and 167 he provides two examples from his works which are hardly concealed (*Mil.* 10 and *Ver.* 4.115)! At *Orat.* 107 he cites a portion of an early speech containing such figures and notes that it gained great applause upon delivery (*S. Rosc.* 72).

Quintilian notes with disapproval how the kind of rhetorical display common in declamations found its way into the courts (cf. *Inst.* 4.3.2). He contrasts the concealed eloquence of former times with the ostentation (*iactatio*) in the courts of his own day (*Inst.* 4.1.9). The kind of bombast common in the courts and its hearty reception by the crowds is aptly described in *Inst.* 12.8.3 and more dramatically in *Plin. Ep.* 2.14. Yet the background here is somewhat different from the days of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, being influenced by the activity of the *delatores*.¹⁴¹ Quintilian himself cautions that when strong emotions are called for, artificial figures are quite out of place (*Inst.* 9.3.100-102).

¹⁴¹ See M. Winterbottom, "Quintilian and the *vir bonus*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 54 (1964) 90-97.

INDEX OF LATIN RHETORICAL TERMS AND PHRASES

This index only includes those terms which are related to scope of this glossary, namely, those connected to methods of argumentation, figures and tropes. The Latin phrases in Cic. *de Orat.* 3.202-208 and *Orat.* 135-39 which are intended to point to a particular rhetorical device have also been included and alphabetized according to the first word in the phrase.

<i>abscisio</i>	24, 42	<i>coniugatio</i>	111
<i>abusio</i>	66	<i>coniugatum</i>	111
<i>adiunctio</i>	50, 52, 60, 83	<i>coniunctio</i>	50, 60
<i>adnominatio</i>	93, 103	<i>coniunctum</i>	111
<i>ad hilaritatem risumve convertat</i>	126	<i>conlatio</i>	110
<i>ad propositum subiecta</i>	14	<i>conpar</i>	90, 98
<i>aetiology</i>	60	<i>comparatio</i>	123
<i>ambiguum</i>	42, 82	<i>complexio</i>	69
<i>ambitus</i>	96, 100	<i>consultatio</i>	64, 117
<i>amplificatio</i>	18, 28, 29, 80, 88, 120, 124	<i>contentio</i>	21, 22
<i>anteoccupatio</i>	104	<i>continuatio</i>	98-99, 100
<i>approbatio</i>	28	<i>continuum</i>	72
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<i>argumentum</i>	15, 17, 38, 108, 109, 118-19	<i>conversio</i>	22, 54
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<i>brevis expositio</i>	113	<i>definitio</i>	84
<i>brevitas</i>	113	<i>delectatio</i>	85
<i>causa</i>	64	<i>deminutio</i>	20
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<i>comprehensio</i>	101	<i>disiunctum</i>	35, 50, 60
<i>concessio</i>	92	<i>dissimulatio</i>	39
<i>conclusio</i>	17, 18, 99, 101	<i>distributio</i>	32, 33
<i>conduplicatio</i>	18	<i>dividat in partes</i>	70
<i>confessio</i>	92, 104	<i>divisio</i>	32, 105
<i>conformatio</i>	106	<i>dubitatio</i>	24
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