

COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS

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State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe

The Theory of Stein Rokkan

Based on his collected works.
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The following is intended as an *introduction* to the work of Stein Rokkan and should therefore be read *first*, at the same time, it is an *interpretation* of his theory which should be better read *after* Rokkan's text. I leave it to the reader to decide.

This volume presents Rokkan's theory by bringing together many different writings in a *systematic* perspective, neglecting the timing and context of their origins. Since this is of course not unproblematic, the Introduction provides a more *chronological* perspective.

Rokkan's writings on the *process of democratisation* form the core of his 'first period' and in the Introduction are thus examined first, in Part A. In Rokkan's text, however, they are placed at the end, because they are more narrowly focused, in terms of content and of temporal and spatial reference, than the writings on *state- and nation-building* from his 'second period'. These are more fundamental in concept formation and model-building, and thus appear at the beginning of the Rokkan text, whereas in the Introduction they are dealt with in Part B.

In Parts A and B of the Introduction, I have attempted to clarify concepts used by Rokkan, to systematise his often widely-dispersed statements, and to interpret his often highly complex diagrams. These central parts are preceded by a chapter on Rokkan's basic concepts and fundamental approach.

My interpretation of Rokkan's theory proceeds from two basic convictions: first, we need a historical-comparative macrosociology today more than ever, and Rokkan provides one of the few systematic approaches for such an undertaking: a foundation to build on that deserves our careful study. Second, it is a very consistent approach, though this has largely gone unnoticed, strewn as it is throughout so many different writings.

I have therefore tried to emphasise the basic unity of Rokkan's theory as much as possible, and to single out the ideas, insights, and methods that we can use—and perhaps continue to develop—in our own work. For this reason I have largely restricted myself to a text-immanent interpretation and have taken into account Rokkan's critical reception only in a few cases.

Figures in the Introduction are numbered differently (Figure 11, etc.) to distinguish them from Rokkan's own figures in the main text (Figure 1, etc.) and the notes (Figure n1, etc.). References to Rokkan with page numbers refer to his original publications as listed in the bibliography.

Table of Contents: Introduction

1.	Rokkan's theory: a research programme	4
1.1	Basic concepts: structuring and boundary-building	5
1.2	The basic approach: modelling structural configurations	10
A	THE STRUCTURING OF MASS POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE	17
2.	Democratisation and its breakdown	22
2.1	The four thresholds of democratisation	23
2.2	Survival or breakdown of democratisation	29
3.	Cleavages and organisational responses	33
3.1	Critical junctures and political cleavages	34
3.2	Cleavage structures and party systems	40
3.3	Corporate pluralism and <i>verzuitling</i>	49
B	STATE FORMATION AND NATION-BUILDING IN EUROPE	54
4.	Nation-states as units of comparison	62
4.1	Territoriality and membership	62
4.2	States and nations, nations versus states	64
4.3	Nation-states and citizens	68
5.	Conditions of state formation and nation-building	70
5.1	Fragmentation and reorganisation	71
5.2	The four master variables and the conceptual map of Europe	76
5.3	The four processes of system-building and the model of Europe	82

ments and to the extent to which this system was subject to the trans-territorial influence of the Catholic Church. Distance from the city belt and Protestant nationalisation of the territorial culture facilitated external boundary-building and the control of *exits*, thus indirectly favouring the channelling of *voice* and with it the internal democratisation of the systems, as stated in one of Rokkan's main theses.

Rokkan's new perception of this aspect, which owes much to Hirschman, led to a shift in emphasis from his earlier work. The originally independent variable in Figure 18, the *maintenance or disruption of channels of representation during the crucial period of territorial consolidation from 1600 to 1800*, turns into either a dependent variable, explainable by the different problems of external boundary-building, or an intervening variable in relation to the democratisation process that set in with the French Revolution (see Figure 24).

Rokkan now no longer characterises the national differences in this process solely in terms of period and form of suffrage extension. He takes additional account of the relative momentum of mobilisation processes *from below* and *from above*, as well as the degree of violence accompanying the democratisation process, thus preparing for the question as to why some Western European mass democracies collapsed after the First World War while others remained stable.

The Protestant nationalisation of the territorial culture favoured the mobilisation of *voice from below*, first through the nationalisation of the Church and then through early literacy. By contrast, the continued dominance of the trans-territorial Roman Catholic Church favoured mobilisation *from above* (Rokkan no. 154: 52), due to the conflicts between Church and State and late literacy. In Figure 18 the group of countries with a representative tradition is largely identical with the (predominantly) Protestant states, whereas Catholicism and absolutism tend to coincide, so that it is difficult to isolate the respective influence of the two variables. However, a number of Catholic countries have a more representative tradition (Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland), while a number of Protestant countries have a history of absolutism (Prussia, Denmark, to some extent Finland). The former can be explained more generally as instances of Catholic regions that seceded from Protestant dominance (Britain, The Netherlands) where the Catholic Church was indeed operative in favouring mobilisation processes *from below*.

3. CLEAVAGES AND ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES

The following attempts at systematisation and interpretation concern mainly on Part IV of this volume. The three chapters in this part contain Rokkan's central ideas regarding

- cleavage types and their 'politicisation' in the process of democratisation (Chapter IV.1),
- critical junctures as historical origins of cleavages, and their translation into parties in a process of alliance- and opposition-building (Chapter IV.2), as well as
- the explanation of the rise of specific party types using his 'model of Europe' (Chapter IV.3).

These three chapters are made up of various original texts (above all Rokkan nos. 88, 100, 107, and 133, and with shorter excerpts from nos. 136, 152, 185, and 215). Again, to aid understanding they should be read in conjunction with Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.

Section 3.1 begins by discussing Rokkan's concepts of cleavage and critical juncture, before systematising his ideas on the interrelations of the national and industrial revolutions with the basic cleavages (see Figure 19). Finally, the section provides a critical commentary of Rokkan's 'combinatorics of cleavages' in the comparative analysis of country-specific cleavage structures.

Section 3.2 attempts to systematise the highly complex relationships between critical junctures in European history with the cleavage structures in the various European countries, as well as their 'translation' into specific party types (see Figure 110). Next, Rokkan's model of democratic alliances and oppositions for the analysis of the 'translation process' is discussed. The section concludes by summarising Rokkan's ideas regarding this process in the form of eight generalisations.

Although parties may be the most important product of historical cleavages in the democratisation process, they are not the only 'organisational response'. Rokkan distinguished between various channels of citizen influence and decision-making, above all: an 'electoral-territorial channel' with parties as the most important actors, and a 'corporate-functional channel' with source-controlling corporate groups. He proposed a programme for comparative research of the varying structures of mobilising networks, which however was never put into prac-

tice. Section 3.3 therefore concentrates on systematically comparing Rokkan's ideas to the 'two-tier system of decision-making' (see Figure 111) in Chapter III.3 which mainly consists of parts from two original texts (Rokkan nos. 179 and 181).

3.1 Critical junctures and political cleavages

In the course of democratisation, the political systems of Western Europe developed highly diverse party systems that maintain their differences to this day, despite general levelling processes such as industrialisation and secularisation. Rokkan attempts to explain this rather remarkable fact using the term *cleavage structure*: he sees the original differences in party systems as deriving from different underlying cleavage structures, themselves the products of state formation and nation-building processes.

Although the term *cleavage structure* is central to Rokkan's thinking, he never really tried to define it explicitly, and we can only infer its meaning from his usage. *Cleavage* is not synonymous with *conflict*: 'Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarise the politics of any given system' (Rokkan no. 100: 6). This indicates that in his view cleavages are particularly strong and long-term conflicts rooted in the social structure, but it does not tell us which conflicts become polarising under what conditions.

The distinction between *cleavage structures* and *party systems* is not purely analytical, analogous to the distinction between 'latent' and 'manifest' conflicts. Cleavage structures existed for Rokkan well before the appearance of party systems, and they can manifest themselves in a variety of ways which Rokkan however never analysed systematically. Only after the introduction and extension of suffrage are already-existing cleavage structures transformed into nascent party systems. It is this *transformation* that interests Rokkan most of all, though he analyses it not primarily as a *process* but as a *correspondence* of structural characteristics, linked by a *model of alliance and opposition formation*.

For Rokkan the origin of cleavage structures is bound up both conceptually and historically with the development of territorial political systems. The concept of cleavage structure allows him to link the his-

torically remote processes of state formation and nation-building with the later processes of democratisation. Thus in Rokkan's usage the term 'cleavage structure'

- is a *conceptual link* between social structure and political system, and between structuring and boundary-building;
- links these in *both directions* and is hence not 'sociological';
- is *dynamic* in that it interprets cleavage structures as a product of developmental processes and problems.

In its dynamic character, Rokkan's conception is similar to Marx's, for whom the emergence of classes and the 'class struggle' was the result of the system-specific evolution of industrial capitalism. But Rokkan goes beyond Marx and sets different accents: as shown above, he proceeds from a recognition of three different (economic, political, cultural) systems with different boundaries, system-specific developments and hence cleavages of their own. But these only become cleavage *structures* in the framework of territorial political systems which Rokkan invariably takes as his point of departure.

Accordingly, every cleavage is part of a structure of cleavages and can only be sensibly studied in this overall context. Hence it is important to ask:

- what cleavages occurred earlier, influencing the form and significance of later cleavages (*timing of cleavages*);
- what cleavages are to be regarded as dominant or secondary in terms of intensity and duration (*hierarchy of cleavages*);
- what cleavages coincided, thus mutually reinforcing each other, and what cleavages cut across each other, thus creating difficult mixed positions (*cross-cutting of cleavages*).

Historically, the first cleavages occurred in the process of system formation, in state formation and early nation-building, frequently in the form of an accumulation of territorial and cultural cleavages: resistance from peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened population groups against the bid for centralisation and standardisation on the part of central national elites and their bureaucratic machinery.

Abstracting from the historical context, Rokkan defines the cleavage structure of a territorial political system as a two-dimensional space (see Figure 33). One of these dimensions is called the *territorial axis*,

a term that has two related but distinct meanings which Rokkan does not always delineate clearly. He uses this term to refer both to *centrality* of *periphery relations* that constitute a cleavage, and to the *centrality* of a cleavage in the sense of its localisation on the territorial axis (see Figure 34).

Territorial-cultural cleavages can delay the process of system formation or even make it permanently precarious. A certain degree of consolidation of national territory and legitimisation of national boundaries is necessary to form cleavages that, metaphorically speaking, cut across the territorial axis. Here individuals or households in similar situations or with similar orientations unite to form communities transcending the purely local level. Rokkan calls this second dimension the *functional axis*; situating purely 'cultural' and purely 'economic' cleavages at its opposite ends (see Figure 33). In his central publications on this point (Rokkan nos. 89, 100), he attempts to derive his two-dimensional analysis of cleavage structures from Parsons' systems theory, but would almost certainly have arrived at the same result without it.

Actual cleavages occurring in history are of course never purely 'territorial' or 'functional', 'cultural' or 'economic'. They are invariably hybrid, and their character changes over time. Hence 'the model essentially serves as a *grid* in the comparative analysis of political systems' (Rokkan no. 100: 11), and cleavage structures vary from system to system. If Rokkan still distinguishes certain general types of cleavages, he does so on the basis of a fundamental unity of European history. His conception of four *master variables* (see Section 5.2) in the evolution of territorial political systems, however, contains the seeds of a more general theory of cleavage structures that transcends the boundaries of Europe.

Taking Rokkan literally, we see that he distinguishes at least four (see Figure 34), usually five, and sometimes even seven (see Figure 37) cleavages. This inconsistency arises on the one hand from the fact that in his early writings his concept of *nation-building* is not yet fully formed, and on the other from his concept of *critical junctures*. The latter concept assumes that in the development of political systems cleavages emerge at critical junctures where basic decisions are made concerning external boundaries and internal structures which then are frozen over long periods of time.

The critical junctures are periods of radical change, but they can take two rather different forms, being either revolutions and (civil) wars of limited duration or long-term structural changes. In Rokkan's model the first category includes the religious wars from the Reformation to the Peace of Westphalia, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and the Russian Revolution. The second category includes the expansion of the bureaucratic territorial state and of industrial capitalism. Rokkan makes no statements on the consequences for cleavage formation that result from these two different forms.

At the heart of his analysis we find four basic types of cleavages interpreted as products of the two major revolutions in the 'long nineteenth century' (Mann 1994): the *National Revolution* and the *Industrial Revolution* (see Figure 19). The first two cleavages are linked to the French Revolution and its consequences: the resistance from peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally-threatened population groups against the bid for centralisation and standardisation on the part of central national elites and their bureaucratic machinery (cleavage I); and the conflicts between the aspirations of the nation-state and the corporate claims of the churches, above all over the control of education (cleavage II).

The links are not unambiguous, however. On the one hand, the French Revolution certainly had immediate as well as long-term effects on all national movements, particularly on those leading to the unification of Italy and of Germany and the disintegration of the eastern empires. It was also a major trigger for fierce State-Church conflicts in the Catholic and religiously-mixed countries. On the other hand, Rokkan himself often locates the origins of the two cleavages much earlier, interpreting them just as much as products of the early process of state formation and of the Reformation, the religious wars, and the final religious partition of Europe in the Peace of Westphalia (see Figure 19 and also Figure 110 below).

Rokkan's various statements are not necessarily contradictory. The nation-state with its claim to popular sovereignty, supreme loyalty, and conformity of culture and territory is a modern phenomenon, a product of the French Revolution. But the often so bitter conflicts connected with the idea and reality of the nation-state built on cleavages which had already emerged in the earlier processes of state formation and nation-building.




FIGURE 19. Critical junctures and cleavages: the interaction of the National and Industrial Revolutions

These older cleavages fed into the two new cleavages produced by the Industrial Revolution in the course of the nineteenth century: the increasing conflicts between rural and urban areas generated by the growth of world trade and industrial production (cleavage III) and the (usually later) conflict between the rising masses of wage-earners and the employers and propertied classes in general (cleavage IV).

Again, however, the link between the two cleavages and the 'critical juncture' is far from being unambiguous. On the one hand, the character of the rural-urban cleavage was shaped, in Rokkan's view, by the land tenure systems that emerged long before the Industrial Revolution as well as by older, pre-industrial urban-rural relationships. On the other hand, the pure 'class' character of the worker-employer cleavage was overlaid by another conflict between proletarian internationalism and nation-accepting socialism, related to a further critical juncture which Rokkan calls the 'International Revolution'. Although conflicts between commitments to the historical nation versus international class solidarity emerged early in the history of the working-class movement, the Russian Revolution was crucial for this division. Rokkan is not always consistent with respect to this critical juncture and cleavage: sometimes he incorporates it into his model-building; at other times he ignores it.

Linking cleavages with critical junctures is just the beginning, however; Rokkan's ultimate goal is to provide a comparative analysis of the country-specific cleavage structures arising from the combination of the various cleavages. Rokkan's typology of cleavage structures in Figure 38 is a step in this direction, even though (as Rokkan himself realised) it remains a rather schematic exercise in 'combinatorics': dichotomising the characteristics of each of the four cleavages, he arrives at a total of 16 types of cleavage structures, of which only eleven have actually appeared in the course of European history.

This typology suggests a sequence of choice points, without however analysing causal links between cleavages; Rokkan mentions these links in his historical comparisons but does not systematise them. They are given as arrows in Figure 19, which illustrates two points: how strongly the state-church cleavage left its mark on the other cleavages, and how decisively the standard class cleavage between workers and employers was influenced by the difficulties of national integration and the conflict between Church and State.

3.2 Cleavage structures and party systems

In view of the complex relations between the various cleavages on the one hand and the limited number of historical cases on the other, a systematisation of Rokkan's ideas about variations in cleavage systems appears possible only by means of spatial and temporal differentiation, as attempted in Figure 110. There, three broad areas of Europe are distinguished, for which the development of 'typical' cleavage structures is analysed, in a sequence of choices at subsequent critical junctures from the Reformation to the 'International Revolution'. The main goal here cannot be to describe details of any single case, but to bring out main contrasts among systems.

The upheavals of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War divided Western Europe in three broad areas: a predominantly Protestant 'North-west' Europe, the Counter-Reformation countries of Central and Southern Europe, and the religiously mixed countries of the European city belt. There are problematic cases, to be sure, above all the classification of Britain-Ireland as a Protestant and not as a 'mixed' country and the inclusion of France among the Counter-Reformation countries. Such problems do not obscure, however, the main purpose of the territorial division: to throw light on the different 'typical' alliances and oppositions which were the outcome of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and which in turn shaped the alliances and oppositions during the National Revolution after 1789, and later—though more indirectly—the cleavage structures emerging until the early twentieth century.

In the 'Northwest', the Reformation led to a basic alliance between the 'nation-builders' and the established state churches. This produced a variety of conflicts with religious dissenters, but over the long term prevented the development of an anti-religious 'Left' after the French Revolution, as happened in most Catholic countries. The dissent-establishment cleavage rarely gave birth to specific Christian parties; more often it merged with a centre-periphery cleavage, laying the basis for the later division between 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' parties.

An almost complete lack of Christian parties in 'Northwest' Europe corresponded with a widespread existence of agrarian parties. In general, according to Rokkan, the emergence or non-existence of an agrarian party depended on three 'factors': the organisation of the rural society, the cultural barriers between countryside and cities, and the church

structure. As to the first factor, the most important difference was between an agriculture dominated by large-scale estates where it was easier for the landowners to control the rural votes, and a system in which freehold family farmers predominated, with cultural and economic organisations able to become major agencies of rural mobilisation. With this difference *and* the importance of the centre-periphery cleavage, Rokkan tries to explain why agrarian parties emerged in all Scandinavian countries but not in Britain or East-Elbian Germany.

The tenure system, however, is a factor for explaining differences only among the Protestant countries. In a Europe-wide perspective, the religious cleavage as the third factor was more decisive. Throughout the continent the Roman Catholic movements proved able to cut across the rural-urban cleavage and to prevent the emergence of agrarian parties, except in Ireland where a minor peasant party existed for some time. Rokkan explains this exception by the lack of a Catholic party, which in turn was a consequence of the predominance of the territorial-cultural conflict.

By contrast, in the religiously-mixed countries of the city belt, no or only weak agrarian parties developed. The only exceptions are found in the Alemannic-Protestant cantons of Switzerland. The same holds true for regions in Southern Austria, Styria and Carinthia, both with a strong anti-clerical tradition. Otherwise, the rural population was mobilised by Catholic/Christian parties which emerged *everywhere*. As a result of the Reformation, these countries were under Protestant dominance, but with strong Catholic minorities, and the conflict between the minorities and the Liberal and/or Protestant 'nation-builders' after the French Revolution created a lasting cleavage which shaped the whole party system.

In Central and Southern Europe, finally, the Counter-Reformation resulted in a basic alliance between the Roman Church and the forces of the *ancien régime*, which in turn, after the French Revolution, produced a basic split between an anti-clerical Radical-Liberal 'Left' and the Conservative-Catholic forces. Sometimes this led to the emergence of Catholic parties, sometimes to broader Conservative alliances. Rokkan tries to explain this by differences in state-church relationships: closer links on the one hand (Austria), intense and protracted conflicts on the other (France, Spain), which however fails to explain the case of Italy.




FIGURE 110. Cleavage structures and party systems




FIGURE 110 (cont.). Cleavage structures and party systems

The state—church and the rural—urban cleavages in some cases reinforced, and in others cut across the centre—periphery cleavage, the conflicts between mobilising elites and peripheral cultures. These conflicts were most likely to produce specific movements and parties of a federalist, autonomist or separatist, irredentist nature, if the counter-culture was territorially concentrated and if its ties with external centres were relatively stronger than with the political metropolis. It seems difficult to assign the centre—periphery or cultural—territorial cleavages to the three different ‘areas’ of Europe in Figure 10, i.e. to the different outcomes of the Reformation. This is obviously much more difficult than in the case of the state—church cleavages, but also more difficult than in the case of the rural—urban cleavages, though here more indirectly, through consequences of the religious conflicts.

The complexity of the European ethnic/linguistic map suggests that the centre—periphery cleavages resist any simple territorial classification. In Rokkan’s view, however, an earlier territorial consolidation made it easier to overcome cultural—territorial cleavages before the age of mass mobilisation, and the creation of ‘national’ churches in the Reformation facilitated early nation-building; these conditions varied systematically from the ‘Northwest’ to the south and east of Europe.

Like the other cleavages, the territorial—cultural conflicts fed into the overall cleavage structures of the various political systems, especially in those which became independent units only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In general, according to Rokkan, this cleavage was the more dominant the higher the dependence of the seceding unit and the more difficult the secession. Then, it influenced not only the religious cleavage, but also and to an even greater extent the fourth cleavage between workers and employers: the more recent the nation-building process and the less settled the issues of national identity, the greater the chance that the working class would be radicalised and fragmented. Furthermore, in the Catholic countries, the unity or division of the labour movement was also a consequence of the character of the religious cleavage: ‘the deeper and more persistent the church—state conflicts, the greater the fragmentation of the working class’ (Rokkan no. 107: 62). Thus, Rokkan reveals how the varying cleavages produced by the *National Revolution* fed into those which resulted from the *Industrial Revolution*, leading to a variety of ‘typical’ cleavage structures—and party systems.

Cleavages, however, are not automatically ‘translated’ (the term Rokkan uses most often) into party oppositions in the process of democratisation. Crucial for the *translation* were the opportunities, the pay-offs and the costs of mergers, alliances, and coalitions, favouring the aggregation of interests and outlooks within broader party fronts or their fragmentation between competing parties. These conditions referred, on the one hand, to the inherited hostility and distrust which made certain mergers or alliances impossible or hardly workable, and on the other hand to the rules of the electoral system which increased or decreased the net returns of joint action (see Section 2.1).

Rokkan tries to clarify the *logic* of his approach to the *translation* problem by developing a *model of alternative alliances and oppositions* (see Figures 41–42). The model consists of:

- a *sequence of alternatives* which represent alternative outcomes of cleavages at critical junctures,
- a *set of actors* who form alliances and oppositions in the process of democratisation,
- a *set of restrictions* on the formation of alliances and oppositions among these actors, and
- a *correspondence* between the alternative cleavage outcomes, the actors’ choices in alliance formation and empirical examples of party systems.

Rokkan’s thinking about the choices in the formation of alliances and oppositions reflects his ideas about the two dimensions of cleavage structures: the centre—periphery dimension and the economy—culture (religion) dimension. In principle, he argues in three steps: the choices of the centre determine the options of the periphery, the centre must make choices on the religious and the economic fronts, and these choices are closely linked to the ‘alternatives’ in the Reformation, the ‘Democratic Revolution’, and the Industrial Revolution with respect to the religious cleavage and the rural—urban cleavage.

Rokkan defines the centre as ‘a core of co-operating “nation-builders” controlling major elements of the “state” machinery’ (see Figure 41), but he does not say who these ‘nation-builders’ are and why they strive to ‘build a nation’. In forming ‘nation-building’ coalitions, according to him, they have to ‘choose’ on the religious front between an alliance with a ‘national’ church, the Roman Church, or a ‘secular

posture'; on the economic front they must choose between landowners controlling a substantial share of agriculture and entrepreneurs controlling the advanced sectors of industry.

The actual alliances of the centre determine the choices of the periphery, defined as 'a movement in the subject periphery against central national control'. As in the case of the central 'nation-builders', however, it remains unclear what kind of movement this is. It could be an ethnic/linguistic movement, because Rokkan specifies 'a dissident, non-conformist body of religious activists' as an actor separate from the peripheral movements. Due to the double meaning of 'periphery'—referring to the territorial as well as the social periphery (see Section 4.1)—the question cannot be decided unambiguously.

Rokkan was aware that on the economic front his model 'brutally reduced the options of the central elite to a choice between an alliance with the landed interests and an alliance with the *urban-financial-commercial-industrial*' interests, but was convinced that the simple dichotomy would 'bring out contrasts among systems in the relative openness to alliances in the one direction or the other at the decisive stages of partisan mobilisation' (Rokkan no. 133: 127).

Such simplifications in the definition of actors and their choices are certainly unavoidable in model-building, at least in a first step. The choices on the religious front, however, pose a further, more serious problem. There are three choices, as defined above, but only two actors. The choice of a 'secular posture' of the 'nation-builders' refers to an ideological orientation of the central elite, not to a potential coalition partner. The specific character of the state-church conflicts in most Catholic countries forces Rokkan to introduce this third choice. This points however to a more general weakness of his model of alliance formation: the neglect of the motives and aims of the actors involved, a criticism which was raised very early by Alford and Friedland (1974).

There is a further problem: how does the model link the choices in forming alliances and oppositions in the transition to mass politics to the older *cleavages* and *critical junctures* (see Figure 42)? It does so in different ways: through the emergence of new actors, their varying size and resources, their older conflicts and alliances.

The Reformation brought up a variety of new actors, churches, and sects spread very unevenly across Europe: in some cases, certain actors

were potential coalition partners; in others they simply did not exist. Rokkan rightly speaks here of 'alternatives' or 'alternative outcomes', and not of 'choices'. And he could have made the same arguments with respect to the links between the 'crisis of feudalism' and the alternative outcomes in the form of freehold family farms, capitalist farming, or neo-feudal estates.

The existence of certain actors, their relative size and resources influence the nature of cleavages and limit the options for alliances and oppositions. Here, however, an element of 'choice' appears: the nature and intensity of cleavages are not simply functions of the actors involved, but also of overall system developments and critical issues; and in the formation of alliances there may be real choices, at least from time to time.

The model thus tries to link the distribution of actors as the result of earlier developments to the basic conflicts and alliances in pre-democratic system-building, and then to the coalitions and oppositions in the emerging mass politics. These in turn are then related to the different party systems for which Rokkan gives the 'closest empirical examples'. They have a more illustrative character and will not be discussed here. Instead, I shall try to summarise the scattered generalisations about the 'translation' of cleavage structures into party systems. It should be remembered that these 'generalisations' are limited to a very specific historical context: to Western Europe in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This means that the 'translation' process occurred in a period in which suffrage was extended only a step at a time, when a change from majoritarian to proportional representation came only later, and when in many countries the process of industrialisation had hardly or only recently begun.

At least eight generalisations can be discovered of which the third and fourth, however, are more implicit:

1. *Early cleavages and contrasts among party systems*: the 'three first cleavage lines . . . account for most of the variance among systems: the interactions of the "centre-periphery", state-church, and land-industry cleavages tended to produce much more marked . . . differences among the national party systems than any of the cleavages brought about through the rise of the working-class movements' (Rokkan no. 133: 129–30). These variations refer above all to the existence or non-existence of certain types of (regional, Christian, or agrarian) parties.

2. *Class cleavage and (limited) convergence of party systems*: the *Industrial Revolution*, by contrast, produced working-class parties in every country of Europe, and in this sense contributed to a convergence of the party systems. At the same time, however, their strength and unity differed greatly, creating new contrasts that became even stronger as a result of the *International Revolution*.

3. *Relative predominance of cultural over economic cleavages*: there is an implicit tendency in Rokkan's writings to rate the impact of 'cultural' cleavages higher than that of 'economic' cleavages. This is most evident in the overriding importance he assigns to the National Revolution in shaping the overall cleavage structures, but it is also apparent when he points to the importance of conflicts about values and cultural identities *within* the cleavages created by the Industrial Revolution.

4. *Relative predominance of cleavages over electoral systems*: suffrage was a precondition for a 'translation' of cleavages into parties, and differences in electoral laws have certainly contributed to the contrasts in party systems. On the whole, however, Rokkan seems to give higher importance to the cleavages (see the last two parts of Chapter IV.1). First of all, the decisive contrasts tended to appear already before any lowering of the threshold of representation. Next, the effects of later changes in electoral laws are difficult to ascertain, because they were heavily influenced by the existing parties; and finally, even if electoral laws might have had an impact on organisational and electoral strategy, the degree of trust or hostility between leaders—a function of the intensity of cleavages—was more important.

5. *Successive narrowing of the mobilisation market*: cleavage structures and party systems developed over time, with earlier decisions limiting later options. According to Rokkan, a crucial mechanism in this process was 'the successive narrowing of the mobilisation market through the time sequences of organisational efforts' (Rokkan no. 100: 26). This mechanism was the more important the stronger the ties between parties and population groups became.

6. *Entrenchment of parties through barriers to representation*: the entrenchment of parties in the social structure was certainly a function of the nature and intensity of the respective cleavages, but Rokkan interprets this entrenchment also as a consequence of the 'high thresholds of representation during the phase of mass politicisation' which 'set severe tests for the rising political organisations' (Rokkan no. 100: 34).

In this sense, the strong ties between parties and social groups were for him also the result of the slow extension of suffrage and the late transition from majoritarian to proportional representation.

7. *Cultural cleavages and proportional representation*: Rokkan attributes the differences in the introduction of proportional representation to various factors. Central among them are the major cultural cleavages and the associated problem of political representation of cultural minorities: 'The pressures of PR will increase with the ethnic and/or religious heterogeneity of the citizenry' (Rokkan no. 133: 80). The introduction of PR fundamentally changes the institutional rules of 'translating' cleavages into parties, which led Rokkan to his perhaps best known hypothesis:

8. *Proportional representation and the 'freezing' of party systems*: 'The introduction of PR in the final phase of mass mobilisation helped to stabilise, if not ossify, the structure of partisan alternatives' (Rokkan no. 133: 90). Rokkan believed that the European party system of the 1960s reflected, with few exceptions, that of the 1920s, when most countries had introduced general suffrage and many had switched to proportional representation.

The question whether Rokkan was right on this point will not be discussed here, nor will the question as to how the 'unfreezing' of party systems since the 1960s fits into Rokkan's categories, since his thoughts on the 'translation' of cleavage structures into party systems are related to the developmental phase of European mass democracies. Later, after party systems and democratic institutions have become fully established, the question of the relations between cleavage structures and party systems doubtless takes a different form.

3.3 Corporate pluralism and *verzuiling*

Rokkan's comparative studies of the development of the Western European democracies concentrated exclusively on their electoral and party systems, leading Robert Alford and Roger Friedland (1974) to criticise his model set out in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*; specifically, they faulted him for failing to link the development of mass parties to the growth of other types of corporate actors in the political system.

But even early on, Rokkan was aware of the need for a broader perspective. Thus already in an early article on cross-national studies of

citizen participation in political decision-making (Rokkan no. 53), he distinguished between three 'channels of citizen influence on decisions for the territorial collectivity:

- the *traditional* channel, characterised by the recourse to kinship ties and local *notables*;
- the *electoral* channel, characterised by the recourse to formal rights of participation and standardised rules of representation; and
- the *organisational* channel, characterised by the recourse to collective action through functional associations organised across a variety of localities within the national or federal territory' (Rokkan no. 53: 132).

In another article he identified yet a further channel of influence on government decision-making: the mass media (Rokkan no. 96: 109–10). He nonetheless focused largely on the two channels that he later called the 'electoral-territorial' (or occasionally the 'territorial-numerical') and the 'corporate-functional', expressed in his concept of a 'two-tier system of decision-making' (see Figure i11).

Preliminary analysis of these two channels can be found in Rokkan's chapter on Norway (Rokkan no. 96) in the well-known volume edited by Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (1966), which appeared even before *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967). In this chapter, Rokkan is primarily concerned with the development of the Norwegian party system, with 'one major party facing four minor parties' (Labour vs. Liberals, Agrarians, Conservatives, Christians), which he explains as the eclipsing of an earlier territorial-cultural cleavage by a later class cleavage, generated by regional differences in the timing of the two decisive waves of mobilisation: first of the peasants, and later, of the workers. But to this extensive study of the party system, Rokkan adds an analysis of the Norwegian system of corporate groups (trade unions, farmers' organisations, smallholders and fishermen, and the employers' association) showing how Norway's political system was long able to maintain an equilibrium by balancing the government's institutionalised negotiations with these interest organisations against Labour's long-time dominance of Parliament and Cabinet.

The brief analysis bears the provocative title 'Votes Count, but Resources Decide', which Rokkan uses again in a later publication (Rokkan

	Electoral - territorial channel	Corporate - functional channel			
Actors	<p>Formal equality ('one man - one vote') within territorially defined electorates</p> <p>↑</p> <p>Structuring of electoral alternatives: systems of <i>political parties</i></p>	<p>Inequality in the distribution of key resources (of citizens and foreigners)</p> <p>↑</p> <p>Structuring of resource organisations: systems of <i>corporate groups</i></p>			
Resources	<p>- capacity of enfranchised citizens to give or withdraw <i>electoral support</i>,</p> <p>- capacity of other citizens to activate <i>moral commitments</i> of enfranchised citizens,</p> <p>- capacity of all citizens to give or withdraw <i>loyalty</i> to the total political system.</p>	<p>to withdraw key resources: <i>commodities</i> (farmers and energy agencies), <i>labour and services</i> (unions/professional associations), <i>investments and technological innovations</i> (corporate business).</p>			
Government	<p>Interest of actual or potential office holders to maintain/gain the electoral support of voters as well as the attachment of all citizens to the polity.</p> <p>As the guardian of the rights of all citizens of its territory, the State enforces social and economic rights, legitimised through the electoral channel.</p>	<p>Interest of actual or potential officeholders to maintain/build up a stable economic basis for the state's staff and services, ultimately for its capacity of solidarity-building. As a member in the circuits of negotiations in the corporate channels, the State offers rights and rewards to groups controlling key resources.</p>			
State	<p>The State constitutes the crucial link between the two channels of decision-making, as it embodies the legal order of the territory and holds the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.</p> <p>- it claims the right to represent the solidarity of the citizenry, to embody a common identity</p> <p>- it claims legitimacy beyond and above all temporary bargains</p>				

FIGURE i11. The two channels of decision-making

no. 181). This title expresses a more general—and more sceptical—opinion of the democratisation process via the electoral–territorial channel and the accompanying possibilities for societal reform: ‘The extension of the franchise to all adults and the maintenance of a strict majoritarian rule of decision-making in the legislature made it possible for a movement of the hitherto underprivileged to rise to power. But the parallel growth of a vast network of interest organisations and other corporate bodies made it impossible to rule by any simple “50 per cent plus” principle’ (Rokkan no. 96: 106).

Thus despite his early reference to the fundamental significance of the corporate–functional channel, Rokkan accepted Alford’s and Friedland’s criticism that his model (in Rokkan no. 100) neglected the cross-national variations of this channel and was too heavily orientated toward variations in the territorial–electoral channel (Rokkan no. 192: 34–5). For this reason, in 1977 he defined as one of five high-priority fields for future comparison ‘comparisons of the *structure* of the *mobilising networks*: the tie-ins between parties, associations, corporations, the media. Here the task would be to identify dimensions of variation and to review alternative explanations of such variations: degrees of *verzuijing*, *ontzuijing*; types of organisational clustering; levels and modes of “corporatism”’ (ibid.: 37).

Unable to carry out his programme before his death, Rokkan left behind only two brief outlines generalising on the Norwegian case. In one of them he develops a ‘generalised concept of *verzuijing*’ (Rokkan no. 179) integrating *cleavage* and *response structures*. In the other (Rokkan no. 181), he turns once more to what he called the dialectics of territoriality versus functionality and the corresponding interaction between the numerical (one citizen, one vote) and the corporate arenas of decision-making, but now related to his later work on the problems of conceptualising territorial boundaries.

Although intended only as a ‘preliminary note’, the first of these contains a series of promising ideas. Rokkan uses the Dutch concept of *verzuijing* to designate a variable: ‘the degree of interlocking between cleavage-specific organisations active in the corporate channel and party organisations mobilising for electoral action’ (Rokkan no. 179: 565). In speaking of ‘cleavage-specific organisations’, he goes beyond a narrow concept of economic-interest organisations to include organisations associated with cultural and territorial cleavages. At the same

time, he expands the problem of translating cleavage structures into party systems to include all organisations as well as their interlinkages. To do so, he introduces the concept of ‘organisational response forms’, whose variations—as in the case of party systems—can be explained by differences in the cleavage structures and the timing of the translation processes.

This work remains preliminary. Taking into account that the dimensions of organisational *verzuijing* encompass in principle the entire spectrum of all possible interrelations of the individual organisations, on the various levels of leadership, active members, and mass support, it is readily apparent that developing these ideas would be a nearly impossible undertaking for comparative research and model formation.