A History of Islamic Societies

Third Edition

Ira M. Lapidus

A History of Islamic Societies, Third Edition

This third edition of Ira M. Lapidus's classic *A History of Islamic Societies* has been substantially revised to incorporate the new scholarship and insights of the last twenty-five years. Lapidus's history explores the beginnings and transformations of Islamic civilizations in the Middle East and details Islam's worldwide diffusion to Africa; Spain; Turkey and the Balkans; Central, South, and Southeast Asia; and North America. The book has been updated to include historical developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The narrative is unified by its focus on the organization of primary communities, religious groups and states, and the institutions and cultures that define them.

The history is divided into four parts. The first part is a comprehensive account of pre-Islamic late antiquity; the beginnings of Islam; the early Islamic empires; and Islamic religious, artistic, legal, and intellectual cultures. Part II deals with the construction in the Middle East of Islamic religious communities and states to the fifteenth century. Part III includes the history to the nineteenth century of Islamic North Africa and Spain; the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires; and other Islamic societies in Asia and Africa, situating them within their global, political, and economic contexts. Part IV accounts for the impact of European commercial and imperial domination on Islamic societies and traces the development of the modern national state system and the simultaneous Islamic revival from the early nineteenth century to the present. Organized in narrative sections for the history of each major region, with innovative, analytic summary introductions and conclusions, this book is a unique endeavor. The informative and substantial update, balanced judgment, and clarity of presentation – which readers have come to expect of this work – ensure that it will remain a classic in the field.

IRA M. LAPIDUS is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of California, Berkeley. Throughout his long and illustrious career he has published extensively. His abiding interest has been the relationships among families, tribes, religious communities, cities, and states. This is exemplified in his current work and previous publications, including *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (1967, 1984); *Middle Eastern Cities* (edited, 1969); *Contemporary Islamic Movements in Historical Perspective* (1983); *Islam, Politics and Social Movements* (co-edited with Edmund Burke, 1988); the two previous editions of *A History of Islamic Societies* (1988, 2002); and *Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century: A Global History* (2012).

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Third Edition

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Preface

Islam is the religion of peoples who inhabit the "middle" regions of the planet from the Atlantic shores of Africa to the South Pacific and from the steppes of Siberia to the remote islands of South Asia: Berbers, West Africans, Sudanese, Swahili-speaking East Africans, Middle Eastern Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Turkish and Persian peoples of Central Asia, Afghans, Pakistanis, many millions of Indians and Chinese, most of the peoples of Malaysia and Indonesia, and minorities in the Philippines – some 1.5 billion people adhere to Islam. In ethnic background, language, customs, social and political organization, and forms of culture and technology, they represent innumerable variations of human experience. Yet Islam unites them. Although Islam is not often the totality of their lives, it permeates their self-conception, regulates their daily existence, provides the bonds of society, and fulfills the yearning for salvation. For all its diversity, Islam forges one of the great spiritual families of mankind.

This book is the history of how these multitudes have become Muslims and what Islam means to them. In this book we ask the following questions: What is Islam? What are its values? How did so many peoples, so different and dispersed, become Muslims? What does Islam contribute to their character, to their way of living, to the ordering of their communities, and to their aspirations and identity? What are the historical conditions that have given rise to Islamic religious and cultural values? What are the manifold ways in which it is understood and practiced? To answer these questions, we shall see how religious concepts about the nature of reality and the meaning of human experience, embedded at once in holy scripture and works of commentary and as thoughts and feelings in the minds and hearts of Muslim believers, have given shape to the lifestyles and institutions of Muslim peoples, and how reciprocally the political and social experiences of Muslim peoples have been given expression in the values and symbols of Islam. Our history of Islam is the history of a dialogue between religious symbols and everyday reality.

This book covers the history of the Islamic world from its beginnings in the seventh century to the present day. It is based upon the original *A History of Islamic Societies*, first published in 1988. A second edition, revising and bringing contemporary history up to date, was published in 2002.

Reviewing this work only a few years later, it is striking not only that recent events call for a still further updating but that as a result of scholarly research the past is changing too. The changes are generated in some instances by the discovery of new sources, but more commonly by new historical methods and theories that lead to both controversy and fresh insights.

To take account of these changes, the editors of Cambridge University Press and I have decided to modify the format of this work. This new edition will be published as three books. The first, already published, contains a very substantially revised history of Islamic societies from their beginnings in early seventh-century Arabia to the eve of the modern era. This is the second book, and it contains the entire work, recounting the history of Islamic societies from their beginnings to the present. The part devoted to modern history is updated on crucial issues, such as contemporary Islamic movements, the recent uprisings in the Arab world, the place of women in Muslim societies, and Islam in Europe and North America. The first book, *Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century: A Global History*, will serve the needs of students and others interested in the early foundation and worldwide diffusion of Islam. This book, *A History of Islamic Societies*, is directed to readers who would like the entire history in one volume. The third volume, tentatively titled "Islamic Societies in the Modern Era," will appear in the near future.

These books share two goals. One is to tell the history of each particular population, country, or region of the Islamic world. The second is to identify the themes that give cohesion to the concept of Islamic societies. In this book, history is understood not as a sequence of stories but as an integral process in which state, religion, community, and cultures are related in many variable but definable ways. In all periods, Islam has to be understood in the

context of previous and contemporary cultures. Islamic cultures are shaped by their connections to the ancient world before it; to other contemporary Islamic societies; to non-Islamic cultures; and to economic, technological, and political conditions that are not connected to religion and culture. In the present era, it has become debatable as to whether Islamic societies will continue to develop in their historic forms.

Although there are many controversies among Muslims and others over the correct version of Islam, this book attempts to recognize, depict, and respect its enormous richness and diversity.

The Beginnings of Islam in the Middle East

The first part of this book deals with the beginnings and early development of Middle Eastern Islamic societies. The new edition emphasizes how early Islam was a part of and a continuation of the civilizations that preceded it. We review the basic structures of ancient empires, including a new section on women and family, tracing the precedents set by ancient norms for Islamic laws and values. The controversial historiography of the last thirty years dealing with the "origins" of Islam, the validity of the early sources, and the authenticity of the Quran is reevaluated, and new perspectives are incorporated into the text. There are important changes in the study of architecture as a display of imperial legitimacy. A revised history of early Islamic law and the veneration of the prophet give new perspectives on early Islamic religiosity. A new chapter situates the non-Muslim minorities under Muslim rule.

These new themes are integrated into an overall perspective on the interconnections of ancient, Mediterranean, and early Islamic cultures. Although bedouin elements made pre-Islamic Arabia different from many of the settled regions of the Middle East, in politics, trade, material development, and religious cultures, Arabia was already closely connected to the larger Middle Eastern region. Pre-Islamic Arabian religious and literary culture not only stemmed from bedouin practices but was modeled on the general system of culture found in the cities of the Middle East since the third century.

Cultural interactions continued and were intensified after the Arab-Islamic conquests. Arab-Muslim participation in the antique heritage continued approximately to the eleventh century. Islamic civilization developed out of a cultural matrix that included Arabian tribal culture and religious practices; Jewish beliefs, religious practices, and community institutions; Christian theology and eschatology; and Roman and Sasanian arts, literatures, legal systems, and political institutions. Pre-Islamic cultures were adapted through specific texts and translations, oral recitations, and ordinary social and business contacts among peoples with different backgrounds. Arab-Muslims shaped the linguistic and religious cultures of the region, while the emerging Islamic civilization was itself shaped by the earlier Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. I call this phase the Arab-Islamic renaissance, a period of assimilation, adaptation, and creative transformation of previous, late antique Middle Eastern cultures into an Arabic-Islamic form.

Similarly, political, economic, and social institutions were carried over from the ancient into the Islamic epoch. The modes of production in agriculture, trade, services, and taxation remained the same – indeed they were ratified in Islamic law for commerce and property. The caliphate understood imperial rule as it was understood and proclaimed by the Roman-Byzantine and Sasanian emperors and similarly defined and legitimated its rule through architecture, art, and the patronage of literary and religious activities. Family life and the position of women in society carried on the concepts and practices of late antique societies.

The religion of Islam itself, although newly revealed, shared the theology of its predecessors and provided similar codes for ritual and social behavior and communal loyalties. The Quran presents Islam as a correction and the true version of corrupted older religions. Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Muslims all believed in God, the angels and the prophets, the last judgment, and the purpose of human existence as being the fulfillment of God's commands and faith in his truth. Early Islam also shared folk traditions and popular spirituality with non-Muslims. Eastern Syriac Christians who believed in the human nature of Jesus had common ground with Muslims.

Jews were, like Muslims, committed monotheists. Sufism drew inspiration from the Quran and from neo-Platonism and Hindu mysticism. To all Middle Eastern peoples, similar beliefs implied a community, and all believed that religious communities had a founding prophet. Gnosticism, messianism, magic, mysticism, science, and philosophy were also found in all the Middle Eastern religions.

The distinctive cultural achievements of the early Arab-Islamic era linked Islamic civilization to its predecessors. Philosophy was translated from Greek and Syriac into Arabic, and Muslim theology (*kalam*) was built on the same dialectics and concepts as Christian theology. Islamic law (*fiqh*) was a continuation of Roman provincial law, canon law, Talmudic law, and Persian law, progressively integrated with the teachings of the Quran and hadith to form what we now know as Islamic law. The Arabian poetic forms (*qasida*) became the basis of classical Arabic poetry. Persian literature (*adab*) was translated into Arabic. Poetry and *adab* became the basis of the literary "formation" of the cultivated gentleman. In architecture, the basics of the design and decoration of mosques and even their placement in the urban environment created a distinctive Arab-Muslim presence, although based on an older visual vocabulary. A substantially new chapter deals with the interactions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians in Spain.

In all these respects, a new civilization had come into being, one that was creative and distinctive and yet a continuation of the basic institutional structures and cultural forms of previous Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations – an innovative expression of the historic Middle Eastern cultures. Over centuries, however, the process of assimilating, Arabizing, and Islamizing historic cultures led to the consolidation of a distinctively new civilization whose ancient sources were forgotten, concealed, and perhaps obliterated, and whose roots can now only be uncovered by scholarly investigation.

Thus, Islam is part of a common Eurasian civilization. It continues directly from Roman, Byzantine, and Persian late antiquity. Islam integrated the existing political forms, modes of economic

production, religious values, and family structures. It shares the conceptual world of Judaism and Christianity, although there are major differences due to the accidents of language and vocabulary and of historical and cultural references. Islam did not change the fundamental institutions of civilization so much as it changed languages, ideologies, and identities.

In Part II we see how this distinctively Middle Eastern Islamic civilization achieved dominance in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. In the midst of repeated nomadic invasions from the east and Crusades from the west, a new quasi-imperial, quasi-feudal system of political institutions was consolidated. Nomadic forces and military slavery supported by the assignment of benefices and fiefs became the regional norm. Muslim communities were organized into Sunni schools of law, Sufi fraternities or brotherhoods, and Shiʿi sects. This was the era of the cultural consolidation of "normative Islam" based on the integration of law and Sufism and of alternative forms of Muslim belief based on philosophy, theosophy, and the popular veneration of saints. In this era, a political ethic was defined. Most important, there grew up alongside Arabic literatures a new Persian literary and poetic culture that became the dominant language and culture for the eastern regions of the Muslim world. Henceforth, Islamic culture would be expressed in both Arabic and Persian media (and later in Turkish media and that of other languages). This new edition contains newly written or extensively reworked chapters on the Timurid Empire and its political and cultural importance, the development of Persianate Islam, the social structure of Middle Eastern communities, and women and family.

The Global Diffusion of Islam to the Nineteenth Century

The third part of the book describes how Arab–Middle Eastern Islam was the paradigm for the recreation of Islamic societies in other languages, cultures, and regions of the world. Everywhere Islam took shape as a hybrid of local cultures and Middle Eastern Islam.

From the seventh to the tenth centuries, Arab conquerors brought Islam and the Arabic language and culture to North Africa and Spain, Iran and Transoxania. Persians, Turks, and Soghdians in the east and Berbers and Goths in the west were incorporated into the Arab-Muslim empire. Merchants and missionaries, often Sufis, brought Islam to the steppes of Inner Asia. From Egypt, the Sudan, and North Africa, Islam and Arab culture reached Saharan and Sudanic Africa.

After these direct contacts, Islam was carried further by newly Islamized Persian, Turkish, and African peoples. Arab-Islamic culture followed later conquests, colonization, missionary proselytization, and commerce. On the mainland of Eurasia, migrating, conquering, and empire-building Turkish peoples brought Islam westward into Anatolia, the Balkans, and southeastern Europe, eastward into Inner Asia and China, and southward into Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. Here, they established the Mongol, Timurid, Shaybanid, Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman empires. The new empires patronized Muslim schools, courts, Sufi hospices, and other religious and communal institutions. The empires are newly described in terms of recent scholarship. The Ottoman chapters have been expanded to discuss women, family, and religious minorities. The three great early modern Muslim empires – the Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal empires – are discussed in terms of processes of decentralization and networking among central and local elites. The Muslim empires are presented in the context of the worldwide development of early modern empires and are compared with one another.

In the Indian Ocean region, merchants and Sufi missionaries carried Islam from Arabia to India and East Africa (tenth to twelfth centuries). From Arabia and India, Islam reached the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries). From the coastal zones, it spread to the interior of the islands and continents.

In Africa, Arab and Berber traders and settlers in the Saharan and Sudanic regions, Arab and Persian settlers on the East African coasts, and Dyula communities in West Africa were the nuclei of

Muslim influences. Often, colonies of Muslim traders allied with local political elites and induced the rulers of the states of Ghana, Mali, Kanem, Songhay, Hausaland, and Dogomba to accept Islam. African history chapters have been expanded and updated to deal with not only Islam but also slavery and European colonialism.

The global diffusion of Islam is discussed in the context of the rising power of Europe and in terms of the regional interconnectedness of Muslim societies – in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the great inner "seas," the Taklamakan desert in Inner Asia, and the Sahara in Africa.

As I explain later in this volume,

By the nineteenth century, Islamic societies the world over had acquired similar types of Muslim elites, beliefs, religious practices, and social organizations. In each Muslim region, we find not one but several variant types of Islam. There were the scholars who represented formal learning, organized education, and judicial administration, affiliated through schools of law. There were also the scholars-cum-Sufis, who combined legal learning with mystical discipline and contemplation, in an effort to live their lives in imitation of the Prophet. Such religious teachers perpetuated a tradition of learning that combined law, theology, and Sufi wisdom representing Sunni–Shariʿa (orthoprax)–Sufi Islam. There were ecstatic visionary Sufis in the tradition of Ibn al-ʿArabi and the gnostic forms of Islamic mysticism, as well as the popular forms of Sufi Islam expressed in veneration of saints, faith in their charismatic powers, and belief in the magic of their shrines. Throughout the Muslim world, Sufism in all its forms became the most widespread and popular expression of Islam.

The Beginning of the Modern Era

By the eighteenth century, Islamic societies had begun to decline in political power. The Safavid state had been defeated by Afghan invaders and, deserted by its tribal vassals, disintegrated completely.

The Ottoman Empire went through a period of decentralization that impaired the imperial state. The Mughal Empire disintegrated into numerous competing provincial and feudal regimes. In Southeast Asia, a centralized regime had never been established over the Indonesian archipelago or the Malay Peninsula. In North Africa, Muslim states were being subverted by their declining commercial position in the Mediterranean while provincial, tribal, and Sufi resistance was on the increase. The Sudanic states had long passed the peak of their commercial prosperity, although Muslim communities were growing in influence.

A critical, but hardly the only, factor in the political decline of many Muslim regimes was the rising power of Europe. European societies were generating technological inventions, economic wealth, and military power that would profoundly change the conditions of life not only for Muslims, but for all the world's peoples. On the northern flanks of majority-Muslim areas, the steppes of Inner Asia came under Russian control. China established its suzerainty in eastern Turkestan; Russia and China took control of most of the Muslim populations of Inner Asia.

On the southern flanks of majority-Muslim areas, European expansion began with Portuguese, Dutch, and British merchant adventurers, who won naval and trading empires in the southern seas and ended by establishing colonial regimes. The Portuguese were displaced by the Dutch, who took control of the Southeast Asian trade in the seventeenth century, made themselves suzerains of Java by the middle of the eighteenth century, and conquered the rest of the Indies in the course of the nineteenth. The British also began by establishing trading bases and ended by conquering an empire in India. They took control of the Indian Ocean – with bases in Malaya, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and East Africa – and Egypt. The French took territorial control of North Africa. Africa was the last region with a large Muslim population to be subjected to colonial domination. All of Africa except Liberia and Ethiopia came under European rule by World War I. Only the Ottoman Empire and Iran maintained their political identities without experiencing direct colonial rule.

By the nineteenth century, Europe was not only seizing the trade and the territory of Muslim states, it was beginning to seize the imagination of Muslim peoples. European military and technological efficiency and artistic styles, as well as political (especially nationalist) concepts and moral values, began to influence Muslim populations. These influences opened the modern era in the history of Muslim peoples. Part IV continues the regional histories of Islamic societies from the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European imperialist and commercial interventions until the present. The central theme is the response of Muslim elites and populations, in each region and country, to the impact of Europe. There were two principal worldwide Muslim responses. Muslim religious leaders attempted to revise and reform Islam itself. They wanted to return to the pristine Islam bequeathed by the Prophet Muhammad. This was to be found in the Quran and in the earliest and most valid sayings of the Prophet (hadith). The reformers rejected later accretions of story and myth, folk practices, and superstitious and magical beliefs. They rejected Sufi veneration of saints' tombs, and beliefs in mystical and spiritual transcendence. The more radical reformers disavowed Islamic law as well. By return to the true Islam the reformers believed that they would restore the integrity, the viability, and indeed the power of Islam and Islamic societies.

The second response came from the political or former political elites, and from a newly developing modern educated intelligentsia of soldiers, administrators, professionals, and intellectuals. They believed that their societies had to adapt to the power of Europe and the conditions of the contemporary world, and that the basic principles of Islam could and should be the foundation of rational, scientific, and patriotic modern societies. The Islamic modernists advocated for scientific education, economic development, and reformed political institutions. The two responses were often combined by modernists committed both to the reform of religious belief and practice and to the adaptation of Islamic societies to the contemporary world.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the government elites and intelligentsias turned from Islamic modernism to secular nationalism.

After World War I, Turkey and Iran became independent nation-states. After World War II, nationalist movements overthrew European rule and established independent states throughout Africa and Asia. Most of the new Muslim-majority states declared themselves secular national states. Pakistan, Morocco, Sudan, Iran after the revolution of 1979, and Afghanistan after the rise of the Taliban in 1991 became Islamic states. The Muslims of India, the Soviet Union, and China, and other smaller Muslim populations remained minorities within non-Muslim ethnic-majority states. In each case we explore the political context, the emergence of new elites, and the Islamic and secular national ideologies that defined the struggle for independence and national identity.

In turn, the formation of nation-states set the political framework for Islamic religio-communal and political movements and identities in the present era. Starting in the 1970s, in reaction to political oppression, economic exploitation, and conflicting cultural values, Muslims everywhere began to reassert their Islamic identity. The Islamic revival was in part personal and communal; in part it was a political effort to transform nation-states into Islamic states. The struggle between secular, often military, elites and Islamic parties goes on to the present.

As a work of history this book is shaped by its source materials. The history of each region is based on the prevailing scholarship for each area; the literature of each region emphasizes different concerns. For example, the literature about the Middle East lays heavy emphasis upon questions of women and family. The literature on Central Asia emphasizes economic issues. Historical studies of the Indian subcontinent give prominence to communalism and communal conflict. Here I try to look beyond local issues, and to integrate regional histories with the common themes that define the global impact of Islam, Islamic movements, and Islamic identities.

The scope of the book itself implies that it is not a narrative history, a telling of stories, but history seen as a holistic process in which the relations among and the variations in state, economic, religious, communal, and cultural forms help us to analyze both the

organization and the evolution of societies. It is not a history of events, but a history of civilizations.

As a historian, however, my primary interest is not in theory but in the adaptation of theory to the needs of a coherent and meaningful exposition. The central problem of this book is how to present a history of enormous diversity – the history of societies that to sight and sound are utterly different – and yet preserve some sense of their historical and institutional relatedness. For the reader, this book is intended to provide a coherent overview of Islamic history. As a teacher, I think that the endless everyday flow of events and news confuses rather than enlightens us and that a large "map" of the subject as a whole is essential to the understanding of particular occurrences. Only from an overall point of view can we acquire the poise, distance, and perspective that make it possible to identify basic contextual factors and long-term historical trends, and to distinguish them from accidental and short-term considerations.

The reader should be cautioned, however, that the factual narrative approach of this book conceals great uncertainties of historical judgment, incomplete knowledge, conflicts of opinion and interpretation among experts, and constantly changing research that brings new knowledge and new points of view to the fore. Little has been said about the degree of reliability or the margin of error in the presentation of information, but the book is based on the most reliable research and interpretation. The reader should be aware that parts of the work are provisional and exploratory in nature and represent the author's best judgment about particular subjects.

A few comments about the organization of the book may help readers find their way through this large volume. The book is divided into four parts, each of which has an introduction and conclusion that deal with the organizing concepts on which the book is based and summarize the important themes implied in the narrative chapters. For an overview of the transformation of Islamic societies, these introductory and concluding chapters may be read separately or in conjunction with selected period or regional histories. The table of contents and the index are of course the reader's guide, but the reader or teacher using this book as a text could also create an

alternative table of contents, following particular regional or state histories – Middle Eastern, South Asian, African – through successive periods, or following such themes as the roles of religious elites ('ulama' and Sufis), women and family, and religious and ethnic minorities. For convenience the medieval and early modern histories of the Arabian Peninsula, Libya, and Afghanistan are combined with their modern histories and are located in Part IV.

The definition of geographic regions requires some arbitrary simplifications. Muslim world areas are by and large defined in regional terms such as Middle East, North Africa, Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and West and East Africa. For convenience of reference, and despite the obvious anachronism, these areas or parts of them are commonly identified by the names of present national states such as India, Indonesia, or Nigeria. This is to simplify identification for readers unfamiliar with the geography of these vast regions and to avoid such cumbersome locutions as "areas now part of the state of ___," but it should be clear that the use of these terms does not necessarily imply any similarity of state and social organization or of cultural style between pre-modern and contemporary times.

Transliterations from the numerous native languages of Muslim peoples have been simplified for the convenience of English readers. In general, I have tried to follow standard scholarly usage for each world area, modified by the elimination of diacritical marks and sometimes adapted to give a fair sense of pronunciation. Certain standard Arabic terms and names are given in their original, usually Arabic, literary form despite actual variations in spelling and pronunciation the world over. Dates are given in the Common Era.

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Acknowledgments

The preparation of this new book has provided me with two great joys for nearly five years. One is the joy of learning, catching up and coming to terms with recent scholarship. The other, even more important, is the collaboration of young scholars who contributed their erudition, their methodological sophistication, and their friendship and encouragement. I value them for the opportunity to know and work with them as much as for the work itself.

For the long duration of this project, Lena Salaymeh has contributed her great knowledge of the early Islamic sources and the late antique, early Islamic history; her understanding of Islamic law; her methodological sophistication; and her exacting standards for historical rhetoric. She has reviewed, commented on, and edited the entire book, with a view to each of these considerations. She has done wide-ranging research on women, family, and law, and she is the co-author of new and revised sections and chapters on these subjects. Her practical know-how has been invaluable with computer-connected matters and with the preparation of the text for publication. Our conversations have informed me, sharpened my judgment, and stimulated my interest. I am very grateful for her colleagueship. She is writing an innovative and deeply researched book on Islamic legal history.

David Moshfegh has briefed me on the history of Jews in Muslim lands with a sensitive ear for historiographical controversies and the influence of political positions on historical writing. His own dissertation concerns early European orientalism and shows a keen sensitivity to the conjunction of personal needs, cultural controversies, and political engagements in the shaping of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century orientalist scholarship. He is the co-author of the sections on Jews in the early Islamic era and in Spain and has contributed to the history of Jews in the Ottoman Empire.

Kevin Schwartz was my informant about new writing on Persian and Indian history, and the construction and diffusion of Persianate culture throughout western, Central, and southern Asia and in the Indian Ocean region. He was an alert and forthright critic of the previous versions of these topics and helped bring me up to date with current scholarship.

Heather Ferguson provided a fresh orientation to the new historiography on Ottoman history and helped me interpret it and integrate it into the revised account in this volume. She alerted me to the new historiography on empire formation in the early modern period. Her dissertation on the circle of justice gave me a fresh conceptual approach to understanding Ottoman government.

Murat Dagli provided me with valuable important insights from his rich knowledge of Ottoman history, brought me up to date in the new historiography, and read my draft chapter with an informed and critical eye.

Nadia Nader did research on the position of women, especially in Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and provided me with valuable materials from her reading of the Egyptian press, TV, and her personal experiences.

The important contribution of Lisa Pollard to the study of women and family in the second edition carries over to this volume. Lisa also reviewed the revised chapter on women in the modern Middle East and made helpful suggestions for its improvement.

I want to thank Hannah Jewell for her contribution to the modern and especially to the recent history of Islamic societies. Hannah began with her knowledge of Arabic and Middle East affairs and branched out to other world regions. She identified the relevant literature, and summarized and interpreted it in her intelligent reports. She read a draft of the modern history sections of the book and made many helpful corrections and suggestions. Hannah tracked down population and other data for the text. In our many conversations she has contributed her insights and helped me shape

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Ira M. Lapidus
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Ira M. Lapidus
Berkeley, California, 2002

Publisher's preface

The Press Syndicate originally commissioned Ira M. Lapidus to write *A History of Islamic Societies* as a supplement to *The Cambridge History of Islam*, which was published in 1970 in two volumes. His would be a unique enterprise, a monumental work with the status of a Cambridge History, but by one hand and integrated by one coherent vision. Since its publication in 1988, it has surpassed all expectations. The book has become a classic work of history. This volume brings a revised version of this definitive and best-selling book to a new generation of readers.

Introduction to Islamic societies

The history of Islamic societies will be presented in two dimensions: one historical, an effort to account for the formation of Islamic societies and their change over time; the other analytic and comparative, which attempts to understand the variations among them. Three methodological and historical assumptions underlie these approaches. The first is that the history of whole societies may be presented in terms of their institutional systems. An institution, whether an empire, a mode of economic exchange, a family, or a religious practice, is an activity carried out in a patterned relationship with other persons as defined and legitimized in the mental world of the participants. An institution encompasses at once an activity, a pattern of social relations, and a set of mental constructs.

The second assumption is that the history of Islamic societies may be told in terms of four basic types of institutions: familial, including tribal, ethnic, and other small-scale community groups; economic, the organization of production and distribution of material goods; cultural or religious, the concepts of ultimate values and human goals and the collectivities built on such commitments; and political, the organization of conflict resolution, defense, and domination.

The third assumption is that the institutional patterns characteristic of Islamic societies had their origin in ancient Mesopotamia in the third millennium BCE. The constellation of lineage and tribal, religious, and political structures created by the Mesopotamian city-states and empires set the foundations for the later development of Middle Eastern societies before and during the Islamic era. Later Middle Eastern Islamic societies were built on the infusion of ancient institutions with an Islamic cultural style and identity. These Middle Eastern Islamic institutions and cultures in turn interacted with the institutions and cultures of other world regions to create a number of variant Islamic societies. In the modern era these variant societies were again transformed, this time by interaction with Europe. Modern Islamic countries are each the product of the interaction of a particular regional form of Islamic society with different European

political, economic, and cultural influences. Thus, the variation among modern Islamic societies may be traced to older patterns.

Parts I and II of this book examine the formative era of Islamic civilization from the revelation of the Quran to the fifteenth century. Part I begins with the Prophet Muhammad and continues through the classical Islamic era. This era gave rise to Arabic literature, Islamic religious teaching, and cosmopolitan artistic achievements – a complex of tribal-ethnic, religious, and courtly-aristocratic cultures from which all later versions of Islamic civilization derive. Here I attempt to explain the development of Islamic civilization in terms of its relationships to past patterns of Middle Eastern societies, and in terms of the cultural effects of urbanization, social change, and the formation of new empires. Part II discusses the history of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries and attempts to explain the transformation of Islam from a complex of doctrines and cultural systems into the operative principles of Middle Eastern societies. In this period, Islam became the religion of the masses of Middle Eastern peoples, who formed new state and communal institutions (Shiʿi "sects," Sunni schools of law, and Sufi brotherhoods) and redefined the relations of political regimes to religious bodies.

The emergence of Islamic civilization is striking for its basic continuity with late Roman and Persian antiquity. In political forms, modes of economic production, religious values, and family structures, it is basically similar to its predecessors. It shares the conceptual world of Judaism and Christianity. The major differences are the accidents of language and vocabulary, and historical and cultural references. Thus, Islamic civilization is not a different civilization from our own, but part of a shared European–West Asian heritage.

In its turn Middle Eastern Islam became a paradigm for the creation of similar societies in other parts of the world. Part III traces the diffusion of the Middle Eastern Islamic paradigm. From the seventh to the nineteenth centuries, Islam became the religion of peoples in the Middle East, North Africa and Spain, Anatolia and the Balkans, the Indian subcontinent, Inner Asia and China, Southeast

Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. In Part III we consider the forces behind the diffusion of Islam, and the interaction between Islamic religious values and existing cultures and societies. We see how Islamic cultural and political norms were subject to change and transformation as they interacted with already-established non-Islamic societies. We also examine the consolidation of Islamic regimes, including the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires, and Islamic states in Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, and their varied ways of integrating political regimes, Islamic religious institutions, and non-Islamic values and forms of community.

By the eighteenth century the Middle Eastern paradigm for an Islamic society had been replicated, multiplied, and modified into a worldwide family of societies. Each was a recognizable variant on an underlying structure of familial-communal, religious, and state institutions. Each also represented a version of the various ways in which Islamic belief, culture, and social institutions interacted with the still-broader complex of human organization – including the non-Islamic institutions of political regimes; systems of economic production and exchange; non-Islamic forms of kinship, tribal, and ethnic communities; and pre-Islamic or non-Islamic modes of culture. We explore the relation of Islamic to pre-Islamic institutions in these regions. What were the similarities and differences among these numerous Islamic societies?

Part III concludes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when Islamic societies were profoundly disrupted by the breakup of Muslim empires, economic decline, internal religious conflict, and the establishment of European economic, political, and cultural domination. These forces would lead to the creation of national states, to the modernization of agriculture, to industrialization, to major changes in class structure, and to the acceptance of secular nationalist and other modern ideologies. Part IV presents the successive phases of state formation and ideological development in the modern era. It shows how Muslim religious and political elites developed alternative responses to the challenges of Europe. Islamic reformism was the primary response of the religious elites starting in the eighteenth century and continuing to the present

day Islamic revival. The reformist program appears in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in the forms of neo-fundamentalist Salafi and Wahhabi movements, in both political and apolitical community building movements. It competes for the allegiance of Muslims with Sufi and neo-Sufi movements, and with Islamic liberalism. Apart from organized movements and articulated religious and intellectual positions, the Islamic revival is also marked by a diffuse Muslim identity built on political sympathies, internet contacts, and youth sub-cultures. The book concludes with an assessment of the different types of Muslim identities and of the institutional interactions of states and religious movements.

This is not, it should be clear, an effort to define an essential Islam, but rather an attempt to develop a comparative method for assessing the role of Islamic beliefs, institutions, and identities in particular historical contexts. The mechanism I have adopted to do this – the expository framework – is based on the assumptions that Islamic societies are built on institutions and that these institutions are subject to internal variation, to variations in the relationships among them, and to variations over time. The limited number of institutional factors imposes a constraint that allows us to conceive this large subject in some ordered way, but also allows for the depiction of individual societies as concrete and different entities. By exploring the variation of institutions in differing contexts, we may be able to comprehend why Islamic societies are similar in general form and yet differ so much in specific qualities.

In this volume primary emphasis is placed on the communal, religious, and political institutions of Islamic societies rather than on technologies and economies. I subordinate economic to noneconomic institutions because the distinctive historical developments in Islamic societies in the last millennium have been cultural and political, and because differences of culture and institutions differentiate Islamic societies from one another and from other human civilizations. In Muslim societies the basic forms of economic production and exchange were set down in the pre-Islamic era. The forms of agricultural and pastoral production, handicrafts, manufacturing, prevailing systems of exchange, and technological

capacities are all older than, and continue through, the Islamic era in their inherited forms. This is not to deny that there has been considerable variation in economic activity in and among Muslim societies – such as in the relative role of pastoral, agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing activities; or in degrees of poverty and prosperity; or in the distribution of wealth – or that these differences have important cultural and political implications, or that economic considerations are an essential aspect of all human values and social action. Still, the fundamental modes of economic production and exchange were basically unaltered until the modern era, and economic and technological changes were not the primary sources of political and cultural variation or of changes in class structure and social organization. Until the modern era economic activity remained embedded in communal and political structures, and class divisions in society did not determine, but were inherent in, state and religious organizations. Although cultures, sociopolitical institutions, and economic and technological forces can be autonomous causal factors in historical change, in the history of Islamic societies, cultural and sociopolitical forces have been the significant loci of historical individuation. Whether twentieth-century technological and economic change now calls into question the existence of an Islamic group of societies is an open question.

Part I The Beginnings of Islamic Civilizations

The Middle East from c. 600 to c. 1000

Chapter 1 Middle Eastern societies before Islam

Islamic societies were built on the framework of already established and ancient Middle Eastern civilizations. From the pre-Islamic Middle East, Islamic societies inherited a pattern of institutions that would shape daily life until the modern age. These institutions included small communities based on family, lineage, clientage, and ethnic ties; agricultural and urban societies, market economies, monotheistic religions, and bureaucratic empires. Along with their political and social characteristics, Islamic societies also inherited many of the religious, literary, and artistic practices of the pre-Islamic past. The civilization of Islam, although initiated in Mecca, also had its precursors in Palestine, Babylon, and Persepolis.

Islamic societies developed in an environment that since the earliest history of mankind had exhibited two fundamental and enduring qualities. The first was the organization of human societies into small, often familial groups. The earliest hunting and gathering communities lived and moved in small bands. Since the advent of agriculture and the domestication of animals, the vast majority of Middle Eastern peoples have lived in agricultural villages or in the tent camps of nomadic pastoralists. Even town peoples were bound into small groups by ties of kinship and neighborhood, with all that implies of strong affections and hatreds. These groups raised the young, arranged marriages, arbitrated disputes, and formed a common front vis-à-vis the outside world.

The second was the creation of unities of culture, religion, and empire on an ever-larger scale. In pre-modern times, this tendency was manifested in the expansion of trade and the acceptance of common decorative styles and religious ideas, but its most important early manifestation was the emergence of the city-state in ancient Mesopotamia (3500 BCE–2400 BCE). The formation of cities in

lower Iraq was a revolution in the history of humankind: it brought about the integration of diverse clans, villages, and other small groups into a single community. It led to new cultural and artistic achievements such as the invention of writing, the creation of great works of myth and religion, the construction of architectural masterpieces, and the fashioning of sensuous sculpture.

The first cities developed from the integration of small village communities into temple communities built on shared commitment to the service of the gods. The Sumerians, the people of southern Iraq, believed that the lands they inhabited were the property of the gods and that their primary duty was the construction of a great temple to worship the forces of the universe. The priests who presided over the worship were also judges and "political" chiefs. Moreover, the temple-cities were necessarily communities of economic as well as religious interests. The construction of the great temples required masses of organized workers; their rituals required specialists in administrative, professional, and artisanal activities. The earliest cities were communities in which religious leaders and religious ideas governed the economic and political affairs of the temples' adherents.

Ancient, Roman, and Persian empires

Beginning about 2400 BCE, the temple-cities of Mesopotamia were superseded by new unifying institutions – kingship and empires. Kingship in ancient Mesopotamia emanated from two sources: the warrior or warlord houses of the ancient Sumerian cities and the tribal peoples of northern Mesopotamia. Between 2700 and 2500 BCE, city kings established ephemeral states among their neighbors. About 2400 BCE, Sargon of Akkad, the chief of pastoral peoples in northern Mesopotamia, founded the first of the world's empires. Sargon's empire soon failed, and the temple-cities temporarily regained their independence. From Sargon to Hammurapi, the great lawgiver (d. 1750 BCE), Mesopotamian empires rose and fell, but each one, although relatively short lived, reinforced the institutions of kingship and of multicity regimes.

Kingship as it developed from Sargon to Hammurapi increasingly assumed a sacred aura. Kings usurped the authority of priests and became the chief servants of the gods. They took over the priestly functions of mediating between the gods and the people. Kingship was justified as the divine plan for the ordering of human societies. Sacralized political power, as well as religion, became a vehicle for the unification of disparate peoples.

The successive empires of this ancient period also established the institutions that would henceforth be the medium for imperial rule. At the center was the ruler's household; the king was surrounded by his family, retainers, soldiers, servants, and palace administrators. Standing armies were founded; feudal grants of land were awarded to loyal retainers. Governors, administrators, and spies were assigned to control cities and provinces.

The superimposition of empires on smaller communities transformed local life and fostered the emergence of social individuality by providing the linguistic, religious, and legal conditions that freed individuals from absorption into clans, temples, and royal households. Temples were reduced to cogs in the imperial machine, and priests lost their judicial and political authority. The empires also intervened in small communities by freeing individuals from their commitments to clans and temples. To defend, administer, and maintain communications across wide territories required some decentralization of authority and greater mobility and autonomy for individuals. Warriors and administrators were assigned land and became independent proprietors. Merchants became entrepreneurs working with their own capital. Craftsmen began to work for the market rather than for the temple or royal household. A market economy emerged to facilitate exchanges among independent producers and consumers and progressively supplanted the older forms of household redistributive economy. The spread of markets and the introduction, by the seventh or sixth century BCE, of money as the medium of exchange transformed the economic structures of the ancient world. For increasing numbers of people, the cash nexus replaced patrimonial authority as the mechanism that regulated the way they earned a living.

Furthermore, the language of the dominant elites became the language of the cosmopolitan elements of the society; the remote and powerful gods of the king and the empire – the gods of the cosmos, organized into a pantheon – superseded the intimate gods of individual localities. Imperial law regulated the distribution of property, economic exchange, and relations between the strong and the weak. Ancient empires, then, not only were political agencies but provided the cultural, religious, and legal bases of society.

For ancient peoples, the empires symbolized the realm of civilization. The function of empires was to defend the civilized world against outsiders, often called barbarians, and to assimilate them into the sphere of higher culture. For their part, the so-called barbarians, mostly nomadic peoples, wanted to conquer empires, share in their wealth and sophistication, and join the ranks of civilized peoples. Empires commanded allegiance because they were thought to represent civilized peoples. They commanded allegiance because kingship was perceived as a divine institution and the king a divinely selected agent, who – if not himself a god – shared in the aura, magnificence, sacredness, and mystery of the divine. The ruler was God's agent, his priest, the channel between this world and the heavens, designated by the divine being to bring justice and right order to men so that they might in turn serve God. The king thus assured the prosperity and well being of his subjects. Magically, he upheld the order of the universe against chaos.

From these earliest empires to the eve of the Islamic era, the history of the Middle East may be summarized as the elaboration and expansion of the institutions formed in this early period. While parochial communities and local cultures were a continuing force in Middle Eastern society, empires grew progressively larger, each wave of expansion and contraction bringing new peoples into the sphere of imperial civilization. Empires came and went, but the legacy of interchange of populations – the movement of soldiers, administrators, merchants, priests, scholars, and workers – left a permanent imprint of cosmopolitan culture and a heritage of shared laws, languages, scripts, and social identity.

From Sargon to Hammurapi, Middle Eastern empires were restricted to Mesopotamia, but later Hittite, Kassite, and other "barbarian" empires brought Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and Iran into a common network. The empire of Assyria (911–612 BCE) brought Iraq, western Iran, and, for a time, Egypt into a single state. The Achaemenid Empire (550–331 BCE) incorporated eastern Iran and formed the first universal Middle Eastern empire – the first to include all settled peoples from the Oxus River to the Nile and the Dardanelles.

The Roman Empire

With the destruction of the Achaemenid Empire by Alexander the Great, the Middle East was divided into two empires. In the west, the successor states to the empire of Alexander became part of the Roman Empire. In the east, Iraq and Iran as far as the Oxus River became part of Persian empires – the Parthian Empire (226 BCE–234 CE) and its successor, the Sasanian Empire (234–634 CE).

The Roman Empire encompassed the whole of the Mediterranean basin from Spain in the west to Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt in the east. Rome was its capital, but in the fourth century a second capital was founded at Constantinople. With the fall of Rome to "barbarian" invaders, the remaining provinces, governed from Constantinople, constituted the late Roman or Byzantine Empire and continued to rule the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, and some of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and North Africa. Its official language until the reign of Heraclius (610–41 CE) was Latin, although the ordinary language of Constantinople was Greek.

The emperor stood at the apex of government, in theory an absolute authority in all matters of state, law, and religion. Considered divine in the pre-Christian era, emperors after Constantine (306–37 CE) were thought to be representatives of God on earth. The ruler maintained the cosmic order and suppressed the evils that come from men.

In practice, emperors were not omnipotent. They were dependent on subordinates to carry out their decisions and were strongly

influenced by their families and other aristocrats, advisors, and courtiers. The bureaucracies might not implement their wishes; their subjects might circumvent them. To help make their authority effective, emperors tried to rotate appointments and cultivate patronage networks and popular factions. To enhance their prestige, they sponsored court ceremonies and public festivals and placed their portraits on coins.

The Roman Empire ruled its diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious populations through a political machine centered on the emperor, supported by his armies and bureaucratic connections to the cities. Local notables, wealthy and educated landowners, administrators, and lawyers governed the cities. Cities controlled the land and the taxation of the countryside and supplied a portion of its revenues to the center. A shared Greco-Roman culture linked the elites and provided the rationale for the legitimacy and authority of the empire.

In the sixth and seventh centuries, however, this system was transformed. Professional bureaucrats were replaced by imperial favorites who undermined the civic notables by acquiring large rural estates. Great landed estates and large rural villas were established in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Asia Minor. The church and its bishops took on ever-larger administrative roles. The new social regime was linked by a Hellenistic Christian – rather than by a Hellenistic pagan – culture.

In Egypt, aristocratic landowning families directly managed some of their estates using peasant labor, leased some to tenants under contract, and used sharecroppers on still other portions of their holdings. As the power of the aristocratic landowners grew, the regional economies declined. Still, a rural bourgeoisie encompassing lower landed gentry, entrepreneurial farmers leasing land, peasant village collectives, and merchants and artisans continued to exist in Egypt and Syria. The peasants and the poor, however, were alienated from the empire and ever more closely attached to their churches. The center was losing power in the periphery.

The consequences of these political and social transformations were marked in the economies and even in the physical appearance

of the cities. As town councils lost control over taxes and land, cities lost their classical form. The agoras were turned into churches; the street grid pattern was cluttered with shops; theaters and baths gave way to houses built with enclosed courtyards walled off from the outside world. Churches remained the only public facilities.

The Sasanian Empire

The Sasanian dynasty was founded in 224 CE. The Sasanians grounded their authority in the symbols of ancient Iranian monarchy. Early emperors were considered divine, an echo of Hellenistic and Old Persian ideas of kingship. The themes of Assyrian palace reliefs – the ruler enthroned by the gods, the protector of the fertility of the realm, the heroic warrior – were repeated in Sasanian palaces. Everything from cylinder seals to gardens proclaimed the grandeur of the emperor.

The Sasanian Empire has been described either as a centralized state or as a feudal confederation. In fact, it was a hybrid regime. The power of the Sasanian dynasty was grounded in Iraq and southern Iran, where the state drew its revenues from cities, the taxation of agriculture, land reclamation, and the international Indian Ocean trade. Extraordinary Sasanian development projects – the Nahrawan canal and Diyala basin development, the canalizations of southern Iraq and Khuzistan, the development of Isfahan and the Helmand basin, the fortifications of Ctesiphon, the Darband and the Gurgan walls defending against nomadic invaders – are evidence of a strongly centralized state. Similarly, a hierarchical tax and civil administration, a justice system, an organized Zoroastrian priesthood, and a rigid class hierarchy imply a state with monetary revenues and centralized direction. The power of this regime was manifest in great military victories over the Romans that indicate a large standing army as well as feudal levies.

In Iraq, the state drew its power from the *dihqans* (landowners), soldiers, and courtiers, who manned the Sasanian army and tax administration. They were united by a shared eclectic culture, combining Greek philosophy and medicine, Byzantine architecture,

Indian tales, and sports and games such as chess, polo, and hunting. This hybrid culture would flourish again in the ʿAbbasid age.

At the same time, the Sasanian Empire was a confederacy in which the Sasanians, as the Kings of Kings, ruled in conjunction with an aristocracy of Parthian clans. The great Parthian families were subordinate kings or feudal lords, rulers of vast provinces to the north and east of the Iranian plateau – from Azarbayjan to Gilan and Tabaristan to Khurasan – with royal and noble powers based on landownership. Whereas the Sasanians were Parsi speaking and Zoroastrian in religion, these families spoke Parthian languages and worshiped the god Mithra. The Sasanians relied on the military contributions of the Parthians and maintained their supremacy largely because of the rivalries among the Parthian dynasts. Conversely, Parthian revolts and collaboration with the Byzantines led in 628 to the defeat of the Sasanians in the great Roman-Persian wars and soon after to the extinction of the dynasty by the Arab conquests.

In sum, the Byzantine Empire was built on urban elites, bureaucracy, and a standing army. The Persian Empire was built on an alliance of a warrior, landed, horse-borne fighting aristocracy, with lower-ranking landowners (*dihqans*) as the base of the Sasanian army and tax administration.

Religion and society before Islam

The development of more encompassing empires and empire-wide civilizations paralleled the transformation of religions. The earliest religions were based on nature and associated with small communities. The gods of Middle Eastern peoples were the gods of families, tribes, villages, and towns; but with the growing connections among peoples through empire and trade, universal gods came to be recognized. Polytheism evolved toward monotheism. The gods of empires, the gods of dominant peoples, and the gods of conquerors, travelers, merchants, and priests whose activities were not circumscribed by a single locality came to be worshiped over large areas. Mithraism, for example, was a pagan religion uniting soldiers

and officials of all races across the Roman Empire, providing uniform places for the worship of a supreme god. Sacred places, such as Rome and Alexandria, allowed the worshiper to be in contact with all the gods at once. The tendency toward unification was expressed by the idea of a pantheon and hierarchy of gods, which allowed different peoples to share in the same universe while preserving local cults and forms of worship. Local gods came to be seen as the manifestations of a universal god.

The concept of the universality of the great gods evolved into a belief in one god, who was the god of the whole universe and of all mankind. The oneness of God was preached by the prophets of ancient Israel and, in the seventh century BCE, by the Iranian prophet Zoroaster. Christianity, and later Islam, would also teach the unity of God, the universality of his sway, and the obligation of all of mankind to acknowledge his glory.

Between the third and seventh centuries, the missionary force of the new ideas and doctrines, the widening net of contacts among Middle Eastern peoples, and especially the support of the great empires made Christianity and Zoroastrianism the dominant religions in the Roman-Byzantine and Sasanian empires. Empires promoted religious conformity to help overcome ethnic and provincial differences. The boundaries between paganism and monotheism disappeared as pagans adopted monotheistic ideas about God and as the confessional religions incorporated pagan practices. Each of these confessional religions was defined by faith in an absolute truth, the possession of a holy scripture, a learned or priestly authority, and communal organizations in the form of congregations, churches, and sects.

Although different in orientation, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity shared a common vision. All were transcendental. They held that beyond the world of this life there is a higher world, the realm of the divine, to be attained either through ethical action or through faith in God. Through sacrifice, prayer, and sacrament, they sought salvation from sin and death, and entrance for men into the eternal reality beyond the ephemeral appearances of this world. Furthermore, they were universal religions, believing that God

created and governed the whole universe and all people. Believers are thus brothers in a common religious way of life and a common quest for salvation.

Jews believed that there was a single god of the universe who commanded his people (Israel) to fulfill his holy law and who would judge them in this world and the next. Judaism, however, was not a universal religion but was the religion of an ethnic group or nation. After the Romans destroyed the Jewish state in Palestine in the second century, Jewish communities were scattered throughout both the Roman and the Sasanian empires. Judaism had no political structure but was organized in numerous small communities that shared faith in the Torah (the holy scripture), a national history and law, and similar legal, educational, and charitable institutions. Jews did not have a hierarchical ecclesiastical organization but were linked by informal ties to and respect for the great academies of learning.

Under the Sasanians, Jews had their own law courts, schools, and synagogues. The exilarch was the civic chieftain officer of the Jewish community. He collected taxes and represented the Jews at the imperial court. Rabbis interpreted Jewish law and were employed by the exilarch as judges, market inspectors, and tax collectors.

Jews emphasized the observance of religious law and fulfillment of God's commands in everyday life. There were also mystical, spiritual, and eschatological elements to Judaism. In the seventh century, perhaps in response to the Sasanian-Roman wars, messianic and apocalyptic Jewish sects, including Rabbinites, Karaites, Samaritans, ʿIsawiyya, and gnostics, proliferated. There were "hybrid" Jewish-Christian sects that accepted Jesus as a human prophet but maintained Jewish practices. In Iran and Inner Asia, a region with a long tradition as a refuge for deviant groups, there were numerous Jewish communities.

Christianity was in principle not the religion of a particular people but was universal, a religion for all mankind. The central Christian doctrine is faith in a triune God – God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Son is the Logos, the word of God, Christ incarnate,

who was crucified so that believers might be saved. Christians developed a strong ethical strand, but their central aspiration was salvation through faith in Christ from the evil and suffering that is inherent in the material world and in man's nature.

By the sixth century, however, Christians differed profoundly among themselves about the nature of Christ's being. Was Christ human or divine, man or God, and how were the two aspects of his being related? Most Christians believed that Christ was both fully divine and fully human, but they disagreed over how to express this. The church Council of Nicaea ruled in 325 CE that Christ was not only human but also unbegotten and consubstantial with God, divine in his being. In 451 CE, the Council of Chalcedon explained that Christ had two natures, divine and human, expressed in one concrete instance (hypostasis) and in one person (prosopon); this was the position of the Orthodox Church. The Miaphysites held that Christ has one nature, one hypostasis, and one prosopon. The Nestorians held that he had two natures, two hypostases, and one prosopon. These arcane distinctions spelled out rivalries among clerics and jurisdictional and regional conflicts, as well as differences in spiritual vision.

These different religious beliefs were the foundation of the various Christian churches. Modeling themselves on the empires, the churches were territorially organized hierarchies in which the highest authority in both doctrinal and organizational matters belonged to popes and patriarchs who appointed the bishops, the heads of provinces called dioceses, who in turn appointed the local parish priests.

Parishes implemented church teachings at the local level in what we would now consider secular as well as religious matters. Bishops were sometimes the governors and administrators of the cities in which their dioceses were located. Formal ecclesiastical courts came into being in the fourth century and had jurisdiction in family, property, and commercial matters, and even in some matters of criminal law. They were also important educational institutions.

Furthermore, Christian affiliations were closely tied to political identifications. The Byzantine Empire enforced the Chalcedonian creed as its official doctrine. Miaphysitism was the religion of the Aramaic-speaking village populations of Syria and of the Coptic-speaking (the Egyptian language written in modified Greek script) peasants of Egypt. Minorities loyal to Chalcedon, known as Melkites or Eastern Orthodox Christians, however, were also found in Egypt and Syria.

Miaphysitism was also the religion of Georgia and Armenia. In the sixth century, Axum (Ethiopia) and Himyar in southern Arabia became Miaphysite. Miaphysites evangelized Nubia in the sixth century. Arabs on the edge of the Syrian desert patronized Miaphysite holy men and clerics. The Ghassanid princes on the Arabian borders of the Byzantine Empire were Miaphysites. (The Lakhmids, on the Arabian borders of Sasanian Iraq, were Nestorians.) Miaphysitism was an expression of provincial autonomy and resistance to Roman-Byzantine suzerainty.

Despite these doctrinal and organizational differences, Christianity created a common culture in multiple languages: Greek or Aramaic in Syria, Persian or Aramaic in Iraq, Greek or Coptic in Egypt. Christian Greek literature influenced and was influenced by Syriac, Armenian, Coptic, Georgian, and Arabic literature, thereby generating a shared cultural heritage.

The spread of Christian culture, however, marginalized Greco-Roman culture. Notables and the people came to share a common Christian culture. In the fifth and sixth centuries, the clergy took over many of the functions of the declining town councils. This introduced a period of lavish church constructions and decoration in the village societies of Egypt and Syria.

While urban and rural clergy were implicated in the world of power, holy men, shrines, and monasteries became the popularly accepted intermediaries between humans and God. Holy men and ascetics popularized the spiritual purity of the desert. Pilgrimage to the column of St. Simeon Stylites became a form of mass worship. In the seventh century, veneration of icons and the cults of saints and the

Virgin became alternatives to the authority of the emperor and the church. In Egypt, wealthier peasants and townspeople introduced the veneration of icons. Syrian merchants developed fine stone carvings; bands of Syrian monks were noted for their musical litanies. Music, holy relics, and Christian ceremonies became the means of cultural transmission. Personal access to God displaced imperial and church-defined religious ceremony. Throughout the old Roman Empire, east and west, culture and identity were recast in Christian terms.

In the Sasanian Empire, Zoroastrianism was the religion of the political and social elites. Zoroastrians believed in a supreme god, Ahura Mazda, the creator of the world, a god of light and truth. At the creation, however, there were two independent powers: Ohrmazd, the god of goodness and light, and Ahreman, the god of evil and darkness. There was also a third principle, a mediating figure, Mihr, and other gods of the pantheon.

In Zoroastrian eschatology, the destiny of the world was to be decided by God's struggle with the forces of evil and darkness. Zoroastrian teachings included a cosmic struggle for redemption culminating in the coming of the messiah, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment. Human beings are part of this cosmic struggle. Both gods and demons reside in the human soul: the goal of human existence is to make the divine prevail over the demonic. Human beings must contribute to the victory of the Good and Light by their actions and beliefs and will be judged at the day of judgment. The fate of the wicked is either to be damned for eternity or to be purified by punishment and accepted into universal salvation at the end of the world. In the end, Ahura Mazda will prevail, evil will be eliminated, and human beings will be transformed into spiritualized bodies and souls. Zoroastrianism, like Judaism, emphasizes individual ethical responsibility.

Zoroastrian worship turned around the mobads (magi) or fire priests, who at some time in the third century acquired a chief mobad, and thus a hierarchy of clergy. The fire temples, tended by the magi, kept alive the flame of purity. In the fourth century, Zoroastrians collected their scriptures into the Avesta. The magian

legal system helped diffuse a magian way of life, parallel to Judaism and Christianity.

Zoroastrianism, however, had no unified tradition and no identifiable orthodoxy, but many varieties of belief and practice. Elite religion involved spiritual programs of self-transcendence. Popular religion included demon worship and magical practices to propitiate the demons. Ritual religious practices included astrology and divination. Mazdakism was a reform movement within Zoroastrianism advocating communal property and marriages.

The Parthian nobility, however, were devotees of Mithra. Mithra was the god of contracts, alliances, pacts, and justice, fighting on the side of goodness and light. Mithraism was the religious heritage of northern and eastern Iran – Khurasan, Tabaristan, Gilan, and Azarbayjan – and of popular opposition to the Sasanians and the mobads.

The Sasanian Empire was also home to numerous other religions and cults, including Judaism, Christianity, Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and gnostic sects. In Mesopotamia there was no congruence of language or religion between government and the town populations. Parsi-speaking Zoroastrians ruled Iraq, but the local populations were Aramaic-speaking Nestorians and Jews. Jewish communities were also found in Armenia, Azarbayjan, and Isfahan. Christians were settled in Marw and Soghdia, where they spread their religion among the Turkic nomads. Transoxania also harbored a great diversity of religions, including Nestorianism, local Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and colonies of Jews and Hindus.

Under the Sasanian Empire, from the fourth century, religious communities were organized as legal corporations owning property; maintaining courts; regulating marriages, divorces, and inheritances; and through their chiefs, holding responsibility to the state for taxes and discipline. In 410 CE, Shah Yazadgard recognized the administrative autonomy of the Christians and the bishop of Seleucia-Ctesiphon as the head of the church. Bishops began to preside over legal cases. The Sasanians appointed a catholicos or patriarch and a metropolitan to preside over the bishops in parallel

with the Sasanian administrative hierarchy. Magians had a hierarchy parallel to that of the state, a hierarchical judicial administration specifically for Zoroastrians, a cult, scriptures, religious laws, and distinctive customs. It was the religion of the elite and rulers.

In the fifth century, the Nestorian Church was reinforced by the migration of persecuted Christians from the Roman Empire. The emperors allowed the transfer of the theological school of Edessa to Nisibis, bringing Christian theology into the Sasanian domains, fortifying the Nestorian Church, and preparing the later amalgamation of Christian theology and philosophy with Arab-Islamic thought. Scholars from Edessa also established a medical school at Gundeshapur.

In the sixth century, Nestorians extended church government and canon law to deal with marriage, inheritance, and property. Unlike the Syriac Church, which referred to Roman codes for civil issues, the Nestorian Church did not distinguish between civil and religious law. Competing clerical and lay factions invoked royal support and brought the government into church decisions. Royal permission was required for the election of the head of the church, construction of buildings, burials, and even the establishment of monastic rules.

Alongside the monotheistic religions, numerous sects and cults continued to flourish. Manichaeanism, a universal dualist religion asserting separate cosmic forces for good and evil, was a heresy to both Christianity and Zoroastrianism and flourished in Iraq and Iran. Its founder, Mani (216–76 CE), preached the division of the universe between spirit and matter. Manichaeans believed that spirit was good, but that matter was derived from Satan and was evil. Manichaeanism was never attached to a particular ethnicity nor organized as a church. It spread to Iran, India, Central Asia, and North Africa; its texts were translated from Aramaic into Greek and Pahlavi.

In this religious environment, paganism also remained important. Pagans adopted monotheistic ideas about God, and monotheistic religions incorporated pagan practices. In Iraq, there were Marcionites who believed in three principles – good, evil, and the

demiurge of justice. Pagan Hellenistic cults – Hermetics, Elkasaites, Mandeens, gnostics, Chaldeans, astrologers, occult scientists, and others – flourished. In Syria, Hellenism was a powerful influence: many towns still had cults of Apollo, Hermes, Ares, and other gods. Even Christians used Greek mythology to decorate homes and churches.

Religions and empires

The relations between religious elites and imperial administrators were ambivalent. Each laid claim to an absolute truth and a universal authority. In principle, they were competitors in representing the highest values, but simultaneously they could be uneasy allies. Empires gained legitimacy and administrative help from cooperative religious elites; religions gained protection, material assistance, power, and glory from the support of empires. Each could either deliver or withhold popular support from the other.

The Roman Empire made Christianity a state religion. Constantine, the first Roman emperor to convert to Christianity, enforced orthodoxy and attempted to punish heretics. He thereby joined the emperor and the empire to Christianity, merging a universal religion with missionary goals and a strong scriptural authority to the political and military apparatus of the state. Empire and Christianity under the theme of one God and one empire were united in opposition to heresy and to provincial independence.

After Constantine, the Roman state considered itself the domain of the chosen people, and the emperor considered himself representative of God and defender of orthodoxy. Royal decrees regulated the organization of the church. Roman emperors called convocations of bishops, supplied them authority, and enforced their decisions. False belief was defiance of imperial authority. Emperor Justinian (r. 527–65 CE) persecuted pagans, heretics, homosexuals, and Jews. Emperor Heraclius (r. 610–41 CE) tried to force Chalcedonian doctrine on all Christians.

The Byzantine Empire, however, never succeeded in consolidating its religious domination. Local power holders, including archbishops

and bishops, used doctrinal differences to contest the authority of the emperor. Miaphysitism articulated both a doctrinal opposition to the Chalcedonian doctrine and provincial resistance to imperial power. The struggle between competing doctrines and competing political powers resulted in the establishment of several forms of regional Christianity.

The Sasanian Empire sometimes promoted a centralized state collaborating with Zoroastrian clergy in imitation of Byzantine Caesaropapism. There were periods of religious repression – against Manichaeanism in the fourth century, Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries, Mazdakism in the late fifth century, and Judaism in the third and fifth centuries. In general, however, unlike the late Roman Empire, the Sasanian Empire accepted its diverse Zoroastrian, Nestorian, and Jewish communities as legitimate social bodies. The Sasanians surrounded themselves with the Nestorian catholicos and the Jewish exilarchs as well as Zoroastrian mobads. Nestorian and Zoroastrian communities had a bureaucracy and system of titles parallel to that of the state. Royal permission was required for the election of the heads of churches, for construction of buildings, for burials, and even for the issuing of monastic rules. Competing clerical and lay factions invoked royal support and brought the government into church decisions. The Sasanian state used the churches as intermediaries to regulate and tax the population. The long-term Sasanian policy was to accept and to utilize all religious communities as instruments of rule.

Thus, Byzantine and Sasanian religious policies differed. The late Roman Empire strove for religious uniformity as a basis for imperial rule. It was prepared to punish and persecute religious deviants. But the rising power of religion as the principle organizing forces in the lives of masses of peoples gave power to bishops, saints, holy men, and icons. The growing importance of religion limited the effective authority of the emperors. By contrast, the Sasanian Empire maintained a preferred cult and, despite episodes of persecution of Jews and Christians, tolerated and utilized all the major religious communities as vehicles of state control. Churches and religious

communities saw themselves as both potential collaborators and potential opponents of the empires.

Women, family, and society (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

Empires and religions were the great overarching institutions, but the fundamental units of society were families living in small communities. Unfortunately, we know very little about the legal and social institutions or the patterns of daily life that regulated family behavior and the relations of men and women in late antiquity. Most of what we know comes from the records of royalty and aristocracy and from legal texts; little is known about the populace as a whole. Thus any account of families in antiquity is tentative and must be taken with great reserve.

Still, it appears that all the pre-Islamic Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies had, with variations, similar family institutions and norms for the relations of men and women. In ideology – and to a large degree in behavior – late antique societies made a sharp distinction between men's and women's roles. The middle- and upper-class ideal was the isolation of women from the marketplace, politics, and social life with men. Generally, in the upper classes, war, politics, and worship were men's work, although the wives of kings, public officials, and warriors occasionally rose to unofficial prominence and substituted for men in moments of crisis. In the ancient Persian empires, women of royal and noble rank owned and administered landed estates. In the lower classes, men did craft work and trading, hard labor and heavy agricultural work, including plowing and irrigation. Women of the lower classes were engaged in household and domestic craft work, care of children, light agriculture, and stock herding.

In extended families and lineages, women were subject to the authority of fathers, brothers, husbands, and husbands' male kin. It is probably fair to say that in the pre-Islamic Mediterranean and Middle East men looked on women as inferior in rational, moral, and physical capacities, and as requiring the support, supervision, and

control of men. In ancient Greece, women were wards of their fathers and then of their husbands. In early Roman law, only men were considered citizens empowered to act in the political arena and as the heads of families. According to the Jewish scholar Flavius Josephus, "Woman, the Law says, is inferior to man in all things. Hence she must obey not force but authority, because God has given power to man." Although women were subordinated to men, their social, economic, and marital functions were highly valued. Women were socially weak, but men were obliged to be considerate, protective, and solicitous of their women. In all the regional pre-Islamic societies, the authority of men and their social and economic advantages were institutionalized in the arrangements of marriage and divorce, sexual morality, property, and engagement in public life.

Marriage, divorce, and sexual morality

The authority of men was clearly expressed in the institutions of marriage. Ancient Iranian, Greek and Roman, and Jewish and Christian communities had similar concepts of marriage. Marriage was a mechanism for producing children who would carry on the family name and family fortunes. Betrothal and marriage agreements were entered into by families. Marriages were regulated in the interests of families and their property and were not an expression of the sentiments of the couple. Normally, a father negotiated a betrothal for a female child, possibly before the child had reached puberty. Ancient Roman women, for example, could not marry without the consent or representation of a guardian. According to Sasanian law, a woman had to give her consent before marriage, but her father had to represent her in drawing a marriage contract. However, she had the legal right to keep her wages after marriage. For a Jewish marriage, consent was required, but a woman's consent could be tacit. In general, a very young woman was expected to accept her parents' wishes – silence was considered consent. Women were expected to be faithful and loyal, to bear children, prepare food, and keep house. A bride would ordinarily move to the house of her husband and reside with his kin, but her male guardians were ultimately responsible for her welfare.

In later centuries, a more egalitarian ideal based on mutual affection emerged. By the early Roman Empire period, people above the age of puberty could declare a marriage by mutual consent without parental permission. Upper-class women owned property, were entitled to the return of their dowries if divorced, and attended social and public events without restriction. Women's funeral steles were inscribed with loving sentiments by their husbands. This was the beginning of the ideal of marriage as a monogamous loving union. However, divorce was common, especially in the upper classes.

Throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East, men had privileges and powers regarding divorce that women did not. Mesopotamian, Sumerian, biblical-era, and pre-Islamic Arab practices indicate that men generally had unrestricted rights to divorce, although they had to announce it publicly. According to Sasanian law, divorce occurred either through mutual consent or the husband's repudiation of a wife for committing a sin (adultery, ignoring purity rules, etc.). Sasanian women of the lower classes could not divorce their husbands, whereas upper-class women could.

In early Roman law, only a husband could make a declaration of divorce, but by the time of Constantine (fourth century), either spouse could unilaterally end a marriage. Emperor Constantine at first tried to forbid divorce, but he was unsuccessful. He then ruled that wives or husbands could divorce in cases of grave misconduct. If the wife were responsible for the breakup of the marriage, the husband could retain money from her dowry and take custody of any children. If the husband were at fault, he would have to repay the dowry. In actuality, there was considerable leeway for individual cases.

In rabbinic law, a husband, but not a wife, could end a marriage at will, but he was required to return the dowry – unless the wife was judicially found to be at fault. The rabbis, however, differed on the legal rights of women to initiate divorce. The majority of Babylonian Talmudists gave a woman the right to divorce in the case of a major

flaw in the husband, such as impotence or a serious disease. The Palestinian Talmud suggests that Jewish women had the right to sue for divorce. Rabbis acknowledged divorce by mutual consent. A widow or divorcee could remarry after a waiting period to ascertain that she was not pregnant by her previous husband.

The spread of Christianity modified perceptions of divorce. Christian values prohibited divorce except in cases of adultery and prohibited remarriage after divorce. By the eighth century, marriage was widely accepted as an indissoluble sacrament, although this did not enter canon law until 1563.

Late antique sexual morality was governed by a double standard. All late antique societies denounced adultery by women but in practice condoned nonmarried sexual opportunities for men. Roman law recognized concubinage as a long-term relationship between people whose social status precluded the legal arrangements of a marriage; the law permitted concubines in addition to a wife. Although adultery and premarital sex were condemned, the relations of married men with slaves, prostitutes, or other less than respectable women were not considered adultery. Roman society expected unmarried women to be chaste. The distinctions between wife, concubine, and mistress were ambiguous.

Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian traditions all required virginity in a bride. The Avesta (Zoroastrian scripture) encouraged chastity and forbade sex outside marriage. The Bible (Leviticus) orders that women who have had premarital sex should be stoned to death, and a Jewish bride found not to be a virgin was subject to punishment. In practice, however, Palestinian rabbis developed a process by which a woman could prove that she was still a virgin despite having a "damaged" hymen. Until the tenth century CE, if not later, Jews also practiced polygyny. Rabbinic law permitted multiple marriages if a man could fulfill his commitments to each of his wives. Still, there were hesitations among Palestinian rabbis who recommended that a man divorce his first wife before remarrying. Also some rabbis granted a first wife the right to divorce or to put a provision in the marriage contract to prevent her husband from marrying a second wife.

Early Christians also condemned premarital sex but pardoned the offense if the couple married. Although opposed in principle to extramarital relations, Christians in late antiquity did not in fact penalize a married man's extramarital relations with women of low status. It was most severely reproved if a man tried to bequeath property to illegitimate children.

Property and inheritance

In late antique societies, women could own property and acquire it by gift, dowry, inheritance, or work. Commonly, however, fathers, husbands, and other guardians were empowered to control their assets. In ancient Greek law, a woman retained legal ownership of her property, but her husband was the manager of his wife's dowry and received its income as long as the marriage lasted. He had to represent her in court cases and in drawing of contracts in much the same way as he was the guardian of his children. Roman law did not recognize women as legally independent. Their property came under the control of their *patras familias* – father, husband, or other guardian. A woman could own and bequeath property, but her choices had to be approved by her guardian and her heirs. Many Roman jurists believed that these restrictions were justified by women's weakness of mind. Despite such limitations, women in the Roman Empire often managed their own properties and entered into legal arrangements. Sasanian women had the right to own property, but – because they were not considered full legal persons – a male relative or spouse would administer the property. Jewish husbands acquired control over their wives' property, because the rabbis reasoned that a husband was entitled to the profits of some kinds of property because he was obligated to ransom her if she were taken captive.

In late antique law, with the possible exception of Roman law, women did not inherit equally with men. However, families commonly arranged to transfer property to wives and daughters by gifts or wills. Under Sasanian rules wives of full legal status could inherit the same portion as sons, but lower-status wives and their children could not inherit. Unmarried daughters received half of a son's share in an

estate; married daughters could not inherit, because, presumably, they had received a dowry equivalent to their share. Under Sasanian law, however, wills and dowries were often used to alter inheritance shares. Biblical laws prevented widows (unless childless) from inheriting and allowed a daughter to inherit only if there was no male heir or if she married within the same clan. By late antiquity, however, it was common for Jewish fathers to give daughters bridal dowries to compensate for their omission from inheritance.

The limitations on women's control of property extended to their participation in the judicial system. The dominant pre-Islamic norm was to limit women's testimony or involvement in court proceedings. The Emperor Constantine disapproved of women being present in court. The Zoroastrian clergy did not allow women's testimony in a court of law. Rabbis considered women incompetent to testify in court, but they appear to have accepted women's testimony in matters considered under their purview (such as purity).

Seclusion and veiling

Although it is not possible to assess the extent of gender segregation across classes and communities in pre-Islamic Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies, the lives of women in the ruling classes were generally marked by seclusion and veiling. Textual evidence from the mid-Assyrian period (1132–1115 BCE) indicates that women lived in separate areas and were guarded by eunuchs. Elite Greek women were absent from public life. Jewish women in the time of Jesus were admonished to stay within the household. Seclusion may have been related to ritual and social restrictions placed on women during menstruation. In the Zoroastrian tradition, menstruating women were considered polluted and could not perform temple rituals. Rabbinic law also restricted women from social activities during menstruation or after childbirth, even though marriage and sexuality were seen as positive.

The seclusion of women, however, was by no means absolute. Women appeared in public to work. Some Jewish women were educated. Christian and pagan women in Byzantium appear to have studied the classics, but they studied different texts than men and

were expected to speak in a distinctive manner. Christian women also played an important role in the church, as patrons, as teachers for women who could not read the gospels, as assistants in the baptism of women, and as caregivers of the sick and the needy. Through their contacts with other women, Christian women could help promote conversions to Christianity or adherence to Christian social and moral norms.

Veiling was widely practiced throughout the pre-Islamic Mediterranean and Middle East. It is known that a style of clothing that covered women from head to toe existed in ancient Mesopotamia around 3000 BCE. The oldest statute regarding the veiling of women known today is in middle Assyrian law (c. 1300 BCE). The pre-Islamic inhabitants of the Iranian plateau practiced veiling of women. Elite Sasanian women (and Sasanian kings) were veiled. Jewish women were required to cover their heads and faces when in public. Some passages in the Talmud indicate that the rabbis associated a woman's hair covering with piety and chastity.

Women in ancient Roman society wore a long cloth called a *palla*, which may have changed into veils of different sizes around the second century BCE. Later, early Christian churches requested women to cover their heads in the chapel, and Tertullian (a second-\third-century Christian writer), in his essay "On the Veiling of Virgins," declared that unmarried women must wear the veil.

There are many different interpretations of veiling. In late antiquity the veil, generally, represented high status. The veil distinguished respectable women from slaves and prostitutes. Numismatic and other evidence from the sixth century BCE to the seventh century CE suggest that veiling may also have been decorative or fashionable. In some contexts, it may have signified that a woman was the ward of her husband or father. Still, how widely veiling was practiced, in what circumstances, or how the veil was actually worn is not known.

The fragmentary evidence suggests that women in third-century Sasanian communities, or fourth-century Jewish societies, or sixth-century Byzantium lived in worlds of similar values and similar social

and legal practices. These values and practices would be perpetuated in the Muslim era.

Conclusion

On the eve of the Islamic era, the Middle East was divided into two great realms of polity and culture (Byzantine and Sasanian) and two main spheres of religious belief (Christian and Zoroastrian, with Jewish minorities). Religion and empire were intertwined. The empires sustained, patronized, endowed, and enforced organized worship. In turn, the religious communities legitimized the emperors' reigns and helped govern the subjects in their name. Alternatively, Miaphysite churches embodied political as well as religious resistance to the state. Within each society, a myriad of small communities retained their social and cultural distinctiveness. Their headmen, chiefs, and elders mediated their integration into the overarching realms of common religion and empire.

These two political and religious regions – with their common institutional forms and overlapping popular cultures – would become part of a single Middle Eastern civilization. (See Table 1.) In the late sixth and early seventh centuries, the two empires fought exhausting wars for the control of Syria and Egypt, which paved the way for the Arab-Muslim conquests and the formation of an Arab-Islamic empire in the former domains of both. The new empire preserved the continuity of Middle Eastern institutions. The basic forms of state organization – including the emperorship, the bureaucratic administration and large-scale landownership, and the predominant style of religious life focusing on universal and transcendental beliefs and a parish-like community organization – were maintained.

Table 1. *Islam in world history*

Early village farming communities	c. 7000 BCE
Cities	c. 3000 BCE

Empires	c. 2400 BCE
Axial-age and monotheistic religions	c. 800 BCE
Muhammad	c. 570–632
Middle Eastern Islamic societies	622–c. 1200
Worldwide diffusion of Islam	c. 650 to present
Rise of European world empires	1200–1900
Modern transformation of Islamic societies	1800 to present

Early Islamic societies adapted both the Roman model uniting imperial authority and religious identity and the Sasanian model of religious pluralism. As in the late Roman and Sasanian empires, culture and identity came to be defined in religious terms – Muslim identity would also be defined by religious affiliation. Both the hierarchical Christian churches and the decentralized Jewish communities would be precedents for the later organization of Muslim religious associations. Just as Christianity had created a translinguistic religious culture, Islam would be expressed in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and many other languages. The basic structures of empire, economy, religion, society, and family continued, but they were gradually redefined in terms of a new religion, new cultures, and new social identities.

Similarly, the regional ecology continued to be based on agrarian and urban communities, and the economy functioned on the basis of marketing and money exchanges. Ancient cultures – philosophy, literature, law, and art – continued to flourish and would be carried on in the Arab-Islamic era.

Family, lineage, clientele, and ethnic communities also continued to be the building blocks of society. Just as the institutions of empire and state and of religious-communal organization descended from the pre-Islamic era and continued to be the governing template for the Muslim era, so too were ancient patterns of family and gender relations – revised, modified, freshly detailed, and given a new religious and cultural context – carried over from the ancient to the Islamic era.

The progressive transformation of late antique societies into Islamic societies took place in three main phases: first, the creation of a new Islamic community in Arabia; second, the conquest of the Middle East by this new Arabian-Muslim community; and third, the generation in the period of the early caliphate (to 945 CE) of an Islamic empire and culture. In the post-imperial or sultanate period (945–c. 1200) the institutional and cultural prototypes of the caliphal era were transformed into new types of Islamic states and religious communities. In the first phase, we see the emergence of Islam in Arabian society. In the second, we consider Islam as it became the religion of an imperial state and urban elite. In the third phase, we see how Islamic values and elites transformed the lives of Middle Eastern peoples.

The Preaching of Islam

Chapter 2 Historians and the sources

For more than a century, Western scholarship on the "origins" of Islam – Arabia, the life of Muhammad, the Quran, and the Arab conquests – was based on the traditional Arabic sources. Western scholars added commentaries on themes important in Anglo-European historiography such as the psychology of the Prophet Muhammad, the social and economic environment, and the relationships of early Islam to Judeo-Christian and Arabian cultures. The theme of political and religious leadership was particularly prominent.

In recent decades an intensive reexamination of the Arabic sources has challenged the traditional narratives. A number of scholars have argued that we do not and cannot know much about the early Islamic era. Every aspect of the "origins" of Islam – the paganism of Arabian society, the advent of the Prophet Muhammad, the provenance of the Quran, and the story of prophecy, community, and state formation in early seventh-century Arabia, and many aspects of the Arab conquests – has become the subject of scholarly controversy. The skeptics point out that the sources did not begin to be transcribed from oral to written form until a century or so after Muhammad's death. Texts in hadith, law, theology, and history were not compiled in written form until the late seventh century, when oral reminiscences began to be written down, scraps of documents collected, stories assembled, biographies remembered, exploits celebrated, and chronologies worked out, decades and even a century after the events in question. These materials were not organized into books until the middle decades of the eighth century and often as late as the ninth century. The historical record could not but be shaped by later political, social, and religious commitments; factional, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries; the interests of caliphs and scholars; and the competition among elites for political and religious authority.

Because the Arabic-Muslim accounts of the Prophet and early Islamic history are based on later materials, some scholars reasoned that the only way to know the true history is to use non-Muslim sources. One result was an account of the origin of Islam as a messianic Jewish sect in Palestine and North Arabia that much later was redefined as a new religion. In general, however, this effort has failed, because the non-Muslim sources are themselves fragmentary, poorly informed, and prejudiced.

Other scholars argued that the traditional story of the origins and the early history of Islam was a later invention intended to demonstrate, via historical narrative, the mythical, doctrinal, and other beliefs of Muslims and their superiority to religious rivals, including pagan Arabians, Jews, and Christians. Thus, they see the materials in the biography of the Prophet not as a factual history but as part of later interconfessional polemics, and as designed to explicate the Quran, validate Muhammad's historical role, establish legal precedents, and reinforce the Muslim religious beliefs and community identity of a later era. The biography of Muhammad is an expression of the superiority of Muslims to Jews and Christians. For this reason we have traditions about his perfect character, his appearance, his miracles, and his triumphs over infidel Arabs and Jews. In the revisionist view, the story of Muhammad is a creation of literary history rather than the documentation of a life. It embodies the construction of a religion rather than a biography.

These interpretations – modeled after biblical criticism and other forms of literary analysis – make a valid point. Given the compositional history of the biography of Muhammad (*sira*), the traditions of his sayings (hadith), his campaigns (*al-maghazi*), and Quranic exegesis (*tafsir*), the intrusion of a later mentality and later religious, political, and social concerns was unavoidable – as it is for any literary tradition in any time period.

This skepticism was part of a larger cultural and political tendency. A far-reaching critique of "orientalist" scholarship rejected the attitudes and the findings of earlier generations of Anglo-European scholars as prejudiced and distorted. This critique merged with a

"post-modernist" phase in academic scholarship in which scholars in literature, history, and anthropology began to examine the hidden political and cultural motivations for the production of academic scholarship. Feminism and third world studies were the leaders in this movement. Texts could no longer be taken as objective accounts of reality. We know what people said and we try to decipher what they thought, but we do not know what "actually happened." In early Islamic studies, radical skepticism has sharpened our minds to the importance of careful questioning of the sources, but it goes too far in its root and branch criticism of the traditional story. From a healthy skepticism the radical view eventuates in the outright rejection of the only historical material we actually possess. It excludes epoch-transforming events from history and makes the origins of a worldwide civilization incomprehensible.

The radical skeptical approach underestimates the abundance and variety of historical materials, culled and transmitted from the very earliest years of Islam and embedded in later texts. We know a great deal about the ancient history of Arabia from inscriptions and archeological findings and from Greco-Roman historical and ecclesiastical sources. Arabian tribal genealogies, poetry, and other lore were passed on in oral form at first and later in writing. Early written documents include contracts, treaties, and diplomatic correspondence such as the Constitution of Medina, the Treaty of Hudaybiya, and Muhammad's epistles to the tribes. The early written compilation of the Quran suggests that writing was a common method of transmission in the Prophet's lifetime.

Later in the first Islamic century, Arab scholars collected tribal lore, Judeo-Christian exegetical stories, Yemeni genealogies and battle tales, and the sayings and stories about the Prophet Muhammad and his battles. Materials embedded in later texts show that stories related to the Quran were compiled in the 650s and 660s, within a generation of the death of Muhammad. Tax and pay documents, records of public works, papyri, coins, inscriptions, monuments and archeological remains, and lists of caliphs add to the data. The abundance of data and the variety of sources make it possible to critically reconstruct many aspects of the early period.

Furthermore, the radical skeptical view neglects recent studies of late antiquity. Scholars of the late Roman period, especially versed in Syriac sources, are reexamining the cultural, social, economic, and political conditions of the eastern Mediterranean in the centuries before and after the Arab conquests. The new scholarship emphasizes cultural, social, and political continuities between late antiquity and the early Islamic era. This scholarship has had an important impact on the conception of early Islamic civilization presented in this book.

Finally, the radical skeptical approach is based on a misunderstanding of the transmission of knowledge in late antiquity and the early Islamic era, and on a misleading, anachronistic application of our own culture of book learning and book production to a different culture. In the seventh and later centuries, books – fixed texts transmitted in unchanging detail – were not the only or even the predominant mode of learning. Late antique and early Islamic cultures were neither book nor oral cultures, but rather a hybrid based on recitations, lectures, and note taking. In this system of learning, poets and scholars presented their work orally, either from memory or from written notes – likely with variations in each repetition. Students made notes during the recitation and/or reproduced the presentation from memory. To control the learning process, teachers might dictate, prepare scripts of their own lectures, or correct and authorize students' notebooks.

At a later stage, the material in notebooks would be compiled and edited into a text, which was still subject to new variations. The ninth century was rich in the production of compilations based on either one authority or an assemblage of earlier authorities. By the tenth century, definitive texts – books – became the norm. Thus, there was a sequence of narrator, note takers, successive compilers, and eventually the editors or authors of books. There was no single act of authoring. This process cannot be described by the dichotomy of oral and written and defies the notion of tracing all books back to an original source.

This system of lecturing and note taking had precedents in both Hellenistic and Jewish learning. The Greek language distinguishes between a mnemonic aid for a lecture (*hypomnema*) and a literary work (*syngramma*). The classical method of instruction was oral lectures and note taking. Galen's medical works were taught in this way into the Muslim era. There were also Jewish, Syrian, and Persian traditions for this type of knowledge transmission. In Jewish learning, Haggadoth (oral traditions) and Talmudic studies were *hypomnemata* (at least until and probably even after the codification of the Talmud in late antiquity). The Bible, however, was probably both read from the text and recited from memory.

In early Muslim culture this quasi-oral, quasi-written method of transmission was often preferred to fixed texts. Verified auditory transmission was regarded as more reliable than writing, which was easily manipulated. Before the era of mechanical reproduction of books, when texts had to be copied by hand, there was too much leeway for errors, distortions, and forgeries. The uncertainties of early Arabic orthography also led many scholars and poets to prefer recitation to texts. Poets were also suspicious of writing because it could distort the sensory impact of speech. To be accepted in court, legal documents required oral confirmation. Indeed, early Muslim scholars did not necessarily value ownership, originality, or fixity. The goal was not the literal preservation of the text, but continuity, correction, and improvement. Not the fixed text but the living, ongoing adaptation of tradition was the key to truth.

Withal, books did have an important and growing place in this system of transmission. The Quran was the earliest Muslim book. The early caliphs sponsored literary, theological, and historical writing. For example, Ibn Ishaq's biography of Muhammad was commissioned by the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur (754–75). Sibawayhi's (d. 796) grammar – perhaps too complex and theoretical for oral transmission – was composed as a book, and other books followed in the ninth century. The need for tax records, correspondence, and legal administration made writing ever more important.

Thus, the rich, vivid, and extensive materials in the early Arab-Muslim histories were not invented in a later period. Although the Arabic literary tradition was indeed shaped by the later eras in which it was compiled and edited, it embodies an historical recollection of the Arabian milieu and of Muhammad that preserves a core of genuine collective memory. The history of Arabia and the life of the Prophet were passed on by a variety of oral, quasi-oral, quasi-written, and written methods. These methods allowed for the preservation of a multiplicity of voices within the literary tradition and give the rich possibilities that diversity affords for historical reconstruction. A gradual, incremental process seems more realistic than to imagine the creation of a belated and elaborate myth out of whole cloth.

This is not to say that these sources – or any historical sources – can be taken at face value. In later eras historians wanted to explain the conquests as the outcome of Muhammad's teaching and career, and to depict them as both tribal heroism and pious commitment to Islam. The process of historical transmission allowed, indeed inevitably included, variations, selection, and reinterpretations influenced by the mentality, cultural and political contexts, and personal, factional, and sectarian interests of the transmitters and their patrons and students. Moreover, in the transmission of all historical narratives, variation is inevitable. Any history requires selection; combination; a chronological and causal framework; a narrative, dramatic, or thematic strategy; and fitting the data into a coherent narrative that alters and reshapes the story. History is not only a record of past events; it is a story about those events.

Chapter 3 Arabia

On the eve of the Islamic era, Arabia stood on the periphery of the Middle Eastern imperial societies. (See Map 1.) In Arabia, the primary communities remained especially powerful, and urban, religious, and royal institutions were less developed. Whereas the imperial world was predominantly agricultural, Arabia was primarily pastoral. Whereas the imperial world was citied, Arabia was the home of camps and oases. Whereas the imperial peoples were committed to the monotheistic religions, Arabia was largely pagan. The imperial world was politically organized; Arabia was politically fragmented.

Map 1. The Middle East on the eve of the Muslim era.

At the same time, pre-Islamic Arabia was in many ways an integral part, a provincial variant, of the larger Middle Eastern civilization. There were no physical or political boundaries between Arabia and

the larger region; no great walls, nor rigid ethnic or demographic frontiers. Migrating Arabian peoples made up much of the population of the desert margins of Syria and Iraq. Arabs in the Fertile Crescent region shared political forms, religious beliefs, economic connections, and physical space with the societies around them.

Arabia was also connected to the larger region by the interventions of the imperial powers. The Byzantines and the Sasanians disputed control of Yemen, and both were active in creating spheres of influence in North Arabia. They intervened diplomatically and politically to extend their trading privileges, protect sympathetic religious populations, and advance their strategic interests. The Ghassanid kingdom (in southern Syria, Jordan, and northwestern Arabia) and the Lakhmid kingdom (in southern Iraq and northeastern Arabia) were vassals of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, respectively. The client kingdoms, like the empires, had systems for rapid communications by couriers. From the Romans and the Persians, the Arabs obtained new arms and armor and learned new tactics, often through the enrollment of Arabs as auxiliaries in the Roman or Persian armies. As a result, Arabia was probably more politically sophisticated and institutionally developed than scholars have recognized. The later Arab-Muslim conquests were organized as armies and not as migrating tribes.

Furthermore, the diffusion of Judaism, Christianity, and gnosticism in southern, west-central, and northern Arabia made these regions parts of the Hellenistic world. In southern Arabia, Judaism was established in the fourth and fifth centuries. Monotheistic, probably Jewish, inscriptions in Yemen date to the fifth century, and there were many Jews in the Arabian tribes of Himyar and Kinda. In northern Arabia, there were Jews at Khaybar and Medina. Jewish Arab tribes in Medina were rich in land, fortresses, and weapons.

In the north, Christianity was established in the fifth century. Christian churches were active in eastern Arabia in the Sasanian sphere of influence, especially at Al-Hira (the Lakhmid capital). Christianity was also represented by merchants who traveled in Arabian caravans from Najran (in southern Arabia) to Busra (in Syria). The market fair at ʿUkaz attracted Christian preachers.

Extensive networks of monasteries, police posts, and markets carried Miaphysite literary and religious ideas from Edessa, Coptic culture from Egypt, and Ethiopian Christianity to Arabia. Many names, religious terms, and historical references also indicate Iraqi Aramaic influences in pre-Islamic Arabia. In the border regions of northern Arabia, Syrian and Iraqi holy personages, saints, and ascetics were venerated by pagan Arabs and Christians alike.

In the south, Christianity was established in the sixth century by intensive Byzantine missionary activity on both the Ethiopian and the Yemeni sides of the Red Sea. Abyssinians invaded southern Arabia in 525 and left Christian settlements in the small oases of Yemen. Nestorians returned to Najran with the Persian conquest of 570. Najran was also the home of Arians, Miaphysites, and Julianites who believed that not Jesus but a substitute died on the cross. This religious environment tended to emphasize the humanity of Christ.

Arabia included many economically developed, productive areas. Sasanians helped develop silver and copper mining in Yemen; copper and silver were also mined in eastern Arabia. Leather and cloth was produced in Yemen. ʿUman and Bahrayn were agriculture producers; Bahrayn exported grain to Mecca. At least one small town in north-central Arabia – al-Rabadha, on the Kufa-Medina road – produced metal, glass, ceramics, and soapstone wares. Internal Arabian trade linked all the regions together. Trade also linked Arabia with the wider region. Merchants brought textiles, jewelry, weapons, grain, and wine into Arabia. Arabia exported hides, leather, and animals. Arabian markets intersected with Indian Ocean commerce on the east and south coasts.

Thus, by the end of the sixth century, Arabia had experience in trade, stratified elites, royal institutions, and the capacity for large-scale political coalitions. Many Arabians shared the religious identities and cultures of the settled peoples. These political, economic, and religio-cultural contacts allowed for the eventual amalgamation of the empires and the outside areas into a single society. From one point of view, Islam was a foreign force bursting in from a peripheral region; from another, it originated within the framework of the existing Middle Eastern civilization.

Clans and kingdoms

In many ways, Arabian societies were defined by geography. The interior of Arabia is largely desert with scattered oases, and from the beginning of camel domestication (in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries BCE) the desert was inhabited by peoples who migrated seasonally in search of pasturage. They passed the winter in desert reserves, moving to spring pasturage at the first signs of rain. In the summer they camped near villages or oases, where they exchanged animal products for grain, dates, utensils, weapons, and cloth. They provided caravans with animals, guides, and guards.

We know from ancient poetry, from later histories, and from anthropological observation that the migratory peoples lived in tight-knit kinship groups – patriarchal families formed of a father, his sons, and their families. These families were further grouped into clans of several hundred tents, which migrated together, owned pasturage in common, and fought as one. Each clan was fundamentally an independent unit. All loyalties were absorbed by the group, which acted collectively to defend its individual members and to meet their responsibilities. If a member was harmed, the clan would avenge him. If he did harm, it would stand responsible with him.

As a consequence of this group solidarity (ʿ*asabiyya*), bedouin clans recognized no external authority. Each clan was led by a chief (*shaykh*), who was usually selected by the clan elders from one of the prominent families and who always acted in accordance with their counsel. He settled internal disputes according to the group's traditions, but he could not legislate or command. The chief had to be wealthy and show generosity to the needy and to his supporters; he had to be a man of tact and prudence – forbearing, resolute, and practical.

Bedouin poetry expressed absolute devotion to the prestige and security of the clan. Bedouins were probably animists and polytheists, believing that all natural objects and events were living spirits who could be either helpful or harmful to man. Demons (jinn) had to be propitiated or controlled and defeated by magic. Bedouins also worshiped their ancestors, moon and star gods, and gods in the

form of stones or trees placed in protective sanctuaries. The sacred was vested mysteriously in the plethora of forces that dominated the natural world and the being of man.

In contrast with the desert regions, the southwest, the northwest, and the northeast are agricultural regions. Although they were outside of the Roman and Sasanian empires, the oases of Yemen, the borders of greater Syria, and the borders of the Euphrates-Tigris water systems had a long history of agriculture, peasant societies, and monarchical governments. At the points of contact between the fertile parts of Arabia and the desert, the bedouins could be integrated into more inclusive, often stratified, bodies. In these areas, clan confederations organized caravans and trade. The formation of a haram, a common sanctuary, also allowed for worship of the same gods, economic exchange, sociability, and political bargaining. Monarchies were also established on the Arabian peripheries. In South Arabia, royal authority was first founded about 1000 BCE and lasted until the Muslim era. By the fifth century BCE, Yemen was organized into kingdoms encompassing agricultural, trading, and pastoral peoples, with monarchs, landed elites, a religious pantheon, and organized temple worship of the gods. The political elite was drawn from aristocratic tribes and controlled extensive landed estates. Temples also had substantial holdings, whereas the commoners were organized into clans that were obliged to provide agricultural and military services to the elites. South Arabian sedentary communities had a more elaborate institutional framework than tribal groups, including a council with a king and delegates from the principal tribes. Tributary and vassal tribes extended the power of the Yemeni kingdoms well into the interior of Arabia.

However, in the first century BCE, the opening of sea routes for international trade and the collapse of the overland trade routes from Yemen to the north brought financial and political disaster. The Yemeni kingdoms were weakened, and bedouins pushed in against agricultural areas and cut off Yemeni influence in the Hijaz and central Arabia. In 328 CE, Imru' al-Qays b. 'Amr seized control of Najran. An inscription, in Arabic language and Nabatean script,

refers to him as King of the Arabs; it is the oldest surviving indication of an Arab identity.

In the north, kingdoms were less fully institutionalized. The Nabatean kingdom (sixth century BCE–106 CE) was ruled by a king but really depended on a supporting coalition of clan and tribal chiefs. From 85 BCE, the Nabateans – their capital at Petra, in modern-day Jordan – controlled much of Jordan and Syria and traded with Yemen, Egypt, Damascus, and the coastal cities of Palestine.

The Nabatean kingdom was destroyed by the Romans in 106 CE. Palmyra, in the desert to the east of Damascus, succeeded Petra, extending monarchical control over the deserts and surrounding border areas. An urban capital, elaborate temples, a strong agricultural base, wide commercial networks, and Hellenistic culture marked Palmyran supremacy. Palmyra was destroyed in 271 CE – a victim, as were the Nabateans, of Roman efforts to incorporate northern Arabia directly into the empire.

Thus, from about 1000 BCE until about 300 CE, Yemen and the northern kingdoms organized the interior of the peninsula and kept the bedouins under the control of the agricultural and commercial economies of the settled kingdoms. By the end of the third century, however, the peripheral kingdoms had lost control of the center of the peninsula. Violent conflicts between clans and tribes became more frequent. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, bedouin marauders harassed the caravan trade, and bedouin migrations converted marginal regions in Yemen and on the borders of Iraq and Syria to pasturage. The bedouinization of Arabia was a gradual and cumulative process, shifting the balance between organized polities and clan societies in favor of the latter.

From the early fourth century to the end of the sixth century, there were several efforts to reestablish the dominance of the peripheral kingdoms and protect trade and oasis cultivation. In Yemen, the Himyarite kingdom was reestablished, and its influence – mediated by the tribal confederation of Kinda – extended over the bedouins of the Hijaz and central Arabia. But in the sixth century, after the

Abyssinians invaded Yemen in 525 CE and a civil war between Jews and Christians, South Arabian agriculture was again in ruins, and Arabian tribes were shifting from sedentary to nomadic life.

In the north, after the destruction of Petra and Palmyra, both the Roman and the Sasanian empires attempted to restore their spheres of influence. By the end of the fifth century, the Romans had come to depend on the Ghassanids, an Arab-Christian clan, to defend Syria and Palestine against the bedouins and the Persians. The Sasanian Empire also maintained a buffer state: a coalition of Aramean and Christian tribes along the border between Iraq and the desert, organized under the leadership of the Lakhmids, whose capital was al-Hira on the lower reaches of the Euphrates.

For a time, the empires promoted sedentarization, trade, and the diffusion of cultural influences (especially Christianity), but the Arabian kingdoms of this later era were less powerful than the caravan city-kingdoms of earlier times. The early kingdoms were based on sedentary populations that were assimilated to Greco-Roman culture, earned a living in agriculture and trade, and sponsored art and architecture. The later kingdoms were tribal confederations, nomadic rather than agricultural. Then, in the late sixth century, the Romans and Persians removed their vassals altogether and attempted to partition northern Arabia and absorb it into their respective empires. By the early seventh century, the empires were at war with each other; the result was a breakdown of the Arabian economy and of political order on the Arabian frontiers of both empires.

Mecca

In the sixth century, only Mecca stood against the trend toward political and social fragmentation. Mecca remained the center of a tribal- and trade-oriented confederation and the most important place for Arabian cultural and religious life. A religious sanctuary whose shrine, the Ka'ba, attracted pilgrims from all over Arabia, Mecca became the repository of the various idols and tribal gods of the peninsula, and the destination of an annual pilgrimage. The

pilgrimage also entailed a period of truce, which served not only for religious worship, but also for trade, the arbitration of disputes, and the settlement of claims and debts. The annual trade fair at ʿUkaz and the pilgrimage to Mina and ʿArafat (near Mecca) were important commercial occasions.

In the fifth century, the Quraysh, an alliance of tribal groups, took control of Mecca. The Quraysh were united in a religious cult and defensive coalition, called the Hums, centered on the sanctuary (*haram*) and shrine of the Kaʿba. They governed Mecca through a council of clans (*mala*ʾ). The Quraysh further defined their identity by codes of diet, dress, domestic taboos, and endogamous marriages within the Quraysh confederation. United by religion as well as by kinship, the Quraysh had a social structure similar to that of Jews and Christians, albeit based on polytheistic rather than monotheistic religious beliefs.

The Quraysh were active in local fairs and regional trade. In the mid-sixth century, Mecca participated in the trade linking northeastern Arabia with Yemen or with Abyssinia by sea. The Quraysh were also engaged in trade with bedouin tribes on the borders of Syria and Iraq, exchanging textiles and oil for bedouin products. They ferried goods to the Byzantine frontier and were especially important in selling hides when demand for leather in the empires rose due to its military uses (such as saddles, bridles, body and horse armor, shields, belts, and straps). It is presumed that Mecca had also been engaged in the international spice trade from Yemen to Syria; however, by the sixth century, these routes had been severed.

Trade gave Mecca a sphere of political as well as commercial influence. Trade required treaties with Byzantine officials and with bedouins to assure safe passage of the caravans, protection of water and pasture rights, and guides and scouts. In association with the Tamim tribes, such arrangements gave Mecca a loose diplomatic hegemony in northern Arabia. With the decline of Abyssinia, Ghassanids, and Lakhmids, Meccan influence was the main integrative force in late sixth-century Arabia.

Language, poetry, and the gods

The political, social, religious, and economic complexity of the several Arabian societies implied a rich and sophisticated cultural environment. Arabia was multilingual. Although Aramaic was probably the most widely spoken language in pre-Islamic Arabia, by the sixth century Arabic was both written and spoken in the region. Arabic script appeared about a century before the Islamic era; it was derived from earlier writing in Aramean, influenced by Nabatean script, and then reshaped in al-Hira by Syriac-writing Christians or Aramean Jews. Arabic writing may have been stimulated by the patronage of the Arab client kings. There was also an Arabic poetic *koine* (a common dialect used by reciters of poems throughout Arabia) that fostered a collective identity transcending the individual clans. Pre-Islamic poetry cultivated an Arab identity manifest in the virtues of *muruwwa* – bravery, loyalty to kin, and generosity.

Arabic was also a language of religion. Iraqi and Himyarite Christians had Arabic translations of the Old and New Testaments as early as the fourth century. There were Christian liturgies and prayer books in Arabic. Arabs in Medina may also have studied Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebrew in Jewish schools.

The Meccan Kaʿba expressed this diversity in religious form. It was the sanctuary of numerous gods. Al-Ilah was the highest deity in the Meccan pantheon. Sacrifices of livestock and produce were made; individuals "called" on their god for help. The gods, then, were not simply identified with nature but were defined as distinct persons separate from the natural forces that, as willful beings, they controlled. Such gods had to be propitiated by sacrifices; one could communicate with them as persons. The formation of a *haram*, a shared sanctuary, allowed for worship of the same gods. The very concept of the worship of numerous gods at festivals or fairs indicates a Hellenistic connection and a parallel with religious practices in Syria.

In the shared sanctuaries, new conceptions of collective identity could emerge. The *haram* focused the worship of tribal peoples on common cults, allowed them to observe one another's mores, and

helped standardize their language and customs. Furthermore, Mecca was also one of the few places in Arabia to have a floating, nontribal population of individual exiles, refugees, outlaws, and foreign merchants. Arabian-wide commercial contacts and the very presence of different peoples and clans – people belonging to no clan, foreigners, people with diverse religious convictions – set some individuals free from the traditions of their clans, fostering new conceptions of personal worth and status and new social relationships. In Medina, the beginnings of a new society were based on geographical proximity rather than tribal ties. Individuals or groups from tribes living adjacent to one another began to coalesce into political groups, the "people of a locality."

Commerce, however, also brought economic competition, social conflict, and moral confusion. Commercial activities intensified social stratification on the basis of wealth and morally inassimilable discrepancies between individual interests and clan loyalty. The Quran would condemn the displacement of tribal virtues by the ambition, greed, arrogance, and hedonism of the new rich. Mecca, which had begun to give Arabia some measure of political and commercial order, was changing its moral and social identity.

Thus, Arabia was in ferment: a society touched by imperial influences but without a central government; marked by the monotheistic religions but with competing polytheistic and henotheistic beliefs; a prospering society caught in social and moral conflicts. Here Muhammad was born, was entrusted with the Quran, and here he became the Prophet of Islam.

Chapter 4 Muhammad: preaching, community, and state formation

The life of the Prophet

Prophecy is a rare phenomenon, and all the more extraordinary is the prophet whose influence permanently transforms the lives of his people and leaves as a legacy one of the world's great religions. Thus the life of Muhammad and the rise of Islam have to be understood in terms of both religious vision and worldly impact. In this chapter, I outline the Prophet's biography as reported in the earliest Muslim sources and review critical themes in the scholarly interpretation of Muhammad's life.

Compared with those of the founders of other great religions, the sources of our knowledge of the Prophet's life are abundant. The life of Muhammad is reported in *sira* (biographical narratives of the Prophet), *maghazi* (campaign and battle narratives of the early Muslim community), and hadith (narratives of the Prophet's words and deeds). They were first transmitted as quasi-oral, quasi-written materials, some of which can be traced back to the students of Muhammad's companions or the companions themselves. ʿAbdallah ibn Abi Bakr (d. 747–48 or 752–53) was the first to put them in chronological order. The earliest surviving biography, the *sira* of Ibn Ishaq (d. 768–69) dates to the middle of the eighth century. Ibn Ishaq located Muhammad in Near Eastern prophetic history and emphasized the religious and miraculous aspects of his life. Al-Waqidi (d. 822) highlighted the political and military dimensions of the early Muslim community. Ibn Hisham (d. 833–34) edited the work of Ibn Ishaq, leaving out biblical history from Adam to Abraham and poetry and stories in which the Prophet was not involved. Much of the material rejected by Ibn Hisham is found in the later work of al-Tabari and others.

From these works, we know that Muhammad was born in Mecca around 570 CE into the clan of Banu Hashim. (See Figure 1.) His ancestors had been guardians of the sacred well of Zamzam. Muhammad's father died before he was born. He was raised by his grandfather and then by his uncle, Abu Talib. Muhammad worked as a caravaner and at twenty-five married his employer, Khadija, a wealthy, older widow. They had four daughters and several sons; all the boys died in infancy. In the years before the revelations, Muhammad was wont to retreat to the mountains outside Mecca to pray in solitude. A tradition reported by Ibn Ishaq (but not found in Ibn Hisham's recension) indicates that Muhammad received advice and support from a *hanif* – an Arabian monotheist, a believer in one God, although not a Jew or a Christian – who taught him about the futility of worshiping idols.

Figure 1. The family of the Prophet.

About the year 610, this seeker of religious truth received his first revelations. They came upon him like the breaking of dawn. The first

words revealed to him were the opening five lines of chapter (sura) 96: "Recite! In the name of thy Lord who created, created man of a blood-clot. Recite! And thy Lord is the Most Generous, who taught by the pen, taught man that he knew not."[1] In the early years, the content of these revelations was the vision of a great, just God (Allah), who would on the day of judgment weigh every man's deeds and consign him to bliss or damnation. The early revelations emphasized the immanence and fear of the last judgment, piety, and good works and warned against neglect of duties and heedlessness of the final day of reckoning. Opposed to the worship of God and fear of the last judgment were presumption, pride in human powers, and attachment to the things of this world. Such was the false pride of the pagan Meccans that led them to neglect almsgiving and the care of widows, orphans, the weak, and the poor. Eschatological piety and ethical nobility were the bases of Muhammad's revelatory message.

For three years after the first revelations, Muhammad remained a private person, coming to terms with God's message. He related his experiences to his family and friends. A small group of people accepted his ideas and gathered around him to hear and recite the Quran. These were the first converts, and they included Khadija (his wife), as well as Abu Bakr and ʿAli, who later became caliphs, the Prophet's successors as leaders of the Muslims.

About 613 CE, Muhammad received the revelation that begins, "O thou shrouded in thy mantle, arise, and warn!" (sura LXXIV, verse 1). He began to preach publicly. Apart from a small following, Muhammad's preaching met with almost universal opposition. From the Quran and later historical sources, we know that the Quraysh – the traders who dominated Meccan life – belittled Muhammad's revelations. They scoffed at the bizarre notion of a last judgment and resurrection and asked for miracles as proof of his message. Muhammad's only response – still the Muslim response – was that the Quran itself, with its unique beauty of language, is a miracle and a sign of revelation. Nonetheless, the Quraysh denounced Muhammad as a soothsayer (*kahin*), a disreputable magician or madman. Then came insults, harassment of Muhammad and his followers, and an

economic boycott that extended to keeping his followers from purchasing food in the markets.

Quranic revelations provided Muhammad with a response to this opposition. He was justified in his preaching because he was sent by God to rescue his people from ignorance and guide them on the path to righteousness. He was a prophet in the long succession of Old and New Testament and Arabian prophets; he was a prophet sent to declare God's will in Arabic.

Nonetheless, his situation in Mecca began to deteriorate. In 615, a group of his followers departed for Abyssinia. Few Meccans were converting. By 619, his wife Khadija and his uncle Abu Talib were dead, and Muhammad's situation became precarious. He began to look for support away from home. He was rejected in al-Ta'if and by bedouins but finally found converts in Medina. In 620, six men of the Khazraj tribe accepted him as a prophet. In 621, a dozen men representing both Khazraj and Aws pledged to obey Muhammad and to avoid sin; in 622, a delegation of seventy-five Medinans paved the way for his coming to Medina by taking the pledge of al-'Aqaba – the pledge to defend Muhammad.

With the guarantees provided by the pledge, Muhammad and his followers made the journey to Medina – the most dramatic event in early Islamic history. The Muslim calendar dates the Christian year 622 as the year 1. The journey is called the *hijra* (meaning the migration) and signifies a change of place and entry into the community of Muslims. The *hijra* is the transition from the pagan to the Muslim world – from kinship to religious belief.

In Medina, Muhammad and his Medinan hosts came to a formal political agreement. The charter specified that all disputes would be brought before Muhammad, and he and his Meccan followers were to form one political group with the clans of Medina, called an *umma* (community).

From Medina, small parties of the exiled Meccans (*muhajirun*) raided Meccan trade caravans for booty. At first, only Meccans were involved in the raids, but in 624, Muhammad assembled a large force of Meccan exiles and Medinan supporters to attack an important

Meccan caravan. At the Battle of Badr, he defeated a larger Meccan force and decimated Mecca's leadership. The battle led to the defection of some of the bedouin tribes that protected Mecca's caravan lines, thus disrupting the major trade routes between Mecca and the north. In the following years, the initiative passed to the Meccans, who twice attacked Muhammad and Medina – first at the Battle of Uhud (625) and then at the Battle of the Ditch (627). The former was a defeat for Muhammad and the latter was a stalemate.

Within Medina, pagans and possibly some Jews accepted the politico-religious leadership of the Prophet. A critical issue, however, was the place of the Jewish clans. The early Meccan verses of the Quran presented Muhammad as a prophet sent by God to restore the purity of a faith already revealed, preach a renewal, and end the corruption that had crept into daily life. This implied a message to all Arabians – Jews and Christians, as well as pagans. In Medina, Muhammad instituted religious practices similar to the Jewish Day of Atonement and designated Jerusalem as the direction of prayer. Some of the Jewish clans, however, rejected Muhammad's claim to being a prophet in the Hebrew tradition; they disputed his accounts of sacred history. New revelations denounced the Jews for having broken their covenant and emphasized that Muhammad was sent to restore the pure monotheism of Abraham. These verses claimed that Abraham, already well known and considered the ancestor of the Arabs, was the prophet par excellence. He was depicted as the first nonsectarian monotheist (*hanif*) and the founder of the Ka'ba. The direction of prayer (*qibla*) was changed from Jerusalem to the Ka'ba. A new form of prayer was introduced that defined a Muslim community different from the others. The religious differences were amplified by political conflict. Allegedly, as punishment for desertion and betrayal in the war with Mecca, two of the larger Jewish clans were exiled, and the male members of a third were executed and their property confiscated.

In 628, Muhammad and a large group of followers made a pilgrimage to the Ka'ba and proposed adopting it as part of Islam. The Meccans intercepted him at a place called al-Hudaybiya, where he concluded a truce in which the Meccans agreed to admit the

Muslims for the pilgrimage and Muhammad dropped his demand that the Quraysh recognize him as the Prophet of God.

This proved to be a temporary agreement. Two years later, in 630, a dispute between client tribes of Mecca and Medina broke the truce, and Meccan leaders surrendered the city. Muhammad gave amnesty to almost everyone and generous gifts to the leading Quraysh. The idols of the Kaʿba were destroyed, and it was declared the holiest shrine of Islam. With Mecca finally subdued, many more Arabian tribes accepted Islam.

Muhammad died in 632. His life was at once a story of religious revelation, community building, and political expansion.

The Quran

The Quran (Muslim scripture) is believed by Muslims to have been revealed by God through the angel Gabriel and is the ultimate source of belief, the final revelation, which supersedes the previous Jewish and Christian versions.

Muslims believe in the Quran as a book of guidance. It begins:

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,
Praise belongs to God, the Lord of all Being,
the All-merciful, the All-compassionate,
the Master of the Day of Doom.
Thee only we serve; to Thee alone we pray for succor.
Guide us in the straight path,
the path of those whom Thou hast blessed,
not of those against whom Thou art wrathful,
nor of those who are astray.

(sura I, verses 1–7)

At the center of the Quranic guidance is a vision of the reality of God's being. God is transcendent, eternal, utterly other, unfettered in will or action, and the almighty creator of the world and its creatures. The Quran demands belief in God and submission to his will and carries strong exhortations to believe, as well as warnings, proofs,

threats of judgment, and appeals to gratitude to God. God will judge human beings at the end of days and mete out eternal reward or eternal punishment. The reality of the world to come is presented with potent eschatological symbols whose influence continues to be a living force in Muslim faith.

As guidance, the Quran teaches what people should believe about God, nature, and history. It gives rules about what people should and should not do in religious rituals and in relation to their fellow men. It prescribes the basic beliefs of Islam and the five pillars: profession of faith, prayer, fasting, the giving of alms, and pilgrimage. It sets out some basic laws of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and business matters. It also presents the spiritual qualities that should infuse ritual, social, and legal obligations. These qualities include gratitude to God for one's existence, repentance, moral earnestness, fear of the last judgment, loyalty to the faith, sincerity, and truthfulness. It condemns arrogance, thanklessness, and pride.

Beyond precise specifications, the Quran leaves each individual to judge what constitutes proper fulfillment of God's command. For example, the law defining the supererogatory night prayers is given not as a rule but as permission to adapt the injunction to pray to individual circumstances:

> Therefore recite of the Koran so much as is feasible.
> He knows that some of you are sick, and others
> journeying in the land, seeking the bounty of God,
> and others fighting in the way of God.
> So recite of it so much as is feasible.
>
> <div align="right">(sura LXXIII, verse 20)</div>

Because the guidance is open, the boundaries of human responsibility are problematic, and the prospects of achieving eternal reward are uncertain. Some passages in the Quran stress the full measure of human responsibility. God is just and he will weigh every deed and thought on the day of judgment. Other passages, however, stress God's power, his predetermination of all events, and man's helpless insufficiency before his majesty.

Recent, conflicting, and controversial scholarship has raised questions about the composition and compilation of the Quran. There are several theories about the origins of the Quran. One is the traditional theory that Muhammad was the sole author, or the sole recipient of the Quranic revelations. A second is that the Quran is a compilation – including Christian hymns and prayers – composed a century before Muhammad and then rendered in Arabic. A third is that the Quran was the product of a much later Muslim community in dialogue with non-Muslims – perhaps as late as the ninth and tenth centuries – intended to validate Muhammad's credentials as a prophet and establish a direct line from Adam to Muhammad, bypassing Moses and Jesus. The definitive edition of the Quran is variously dated to the ninth and early tenth centuries.

The latter two theories are not widely accepted among scholars of the language and history of the Quran. The skeptics all have different theories, and all of them select only the passages that seem favorable to their case. The most persuasive view in my judgment is that of Neuwirth, who holds that the new scholarship has failed to discredit the authenticity of the Quran. The rhyme and literary structure of verses and suras indicate that the Quran has an inner intentional design and is the product of one voice. The Quran is also a dramatic text that bears the marks of direct communication with an audience. The audience responds as it is exhorted, encouraged, commanded, or rebuked. Moreover, reports or comments on contemporary events appear in the Medinan suras, thereby challenging the dating of the two aforementioned theories.

The style of Quranic verses and chapters differs from the Meccan to the Medinan period. The early Meccan suras, powerful short poems, were most likely recited; later Medinan suras, which are long and have multiple topics, were most likely written down or even composed in writing. The Meccan rhymes have the resounding voice patterns of the *saj* type of oral recitation; the late Meccan and Medinan verses are marked by a cadenza – a moral reflection on the significance of a narrative that marks the conclusion of a passage.

Nonetheless the text is unified. The Quran reads like a running commentary on the events of the time. Later suras sometimes

presuppose the existence of earlier ones and imply an ongoing discourse. Nothing about it suggests a deliberate literary work. If it were composed in later centuries, the Quran would presumably have had a more ordered narrative or more formal legal instructions.

The history of the text confirms its early origin. The Quran was probably presented as both recitation and text. Muhammad and the *qurra'* (Quran reciters, similar to the public poetry reciters) recited the Quran. The Prophet himself probably began compiling a written scripture by dictating to scribes and instructing them on how to order the verses of the revelation. In the Medinan period, passages in the Quran imply that it was beginning to be considered as scripture, a proper book (*kitab*), perhaps like the Old Testament. Later suras refer to a heavenly book from which the Quran is taken.

Muhammad did not himself leave a fixed text or book, but after his death a collection was made from oral witnesses and scattered records on slips of papyrus or parchment, chips of stone, bone, leather, palm stalks, or slates. Some traditions say that the first compilation was in the reign of Abu Bakr; other traditions claim that 'Umar and his daughter Hafsa made the first codex. Historical sources indicate that Caliph 'Uthman (r. 644–54) ordered a definitive codex in order to prevent the proliferation of variant versions. The existing materials were arranged in order of the longest suras first and the shortest last. 'Uthman's codex was supposed to be definitive, but many verses defended by their recipients as genuinely Quranic were not included. As many as fifteen major codices were collected by other companions of Muhammad and Quran reciters and were cherished in the garrison towns after the Arab conquests.

Moreover, the 'Uthmanic text was written in a still-incomplete Arabic orthography (related to Nabatean Syriac script), which left uncertainties in the readings of vowels and some consonants. Thus, the early Quran had the qualities both of a fixed text and of a variable recitation and left open a debate as to whether the text or the recited versions were more authentic. In 714, the Caliph al-Walid ordered the governor of Iraq, Al-Hajjaj, to improve the orthography.

Material evidence indicates that the Quran was in existence at the end of the seventh century. Surviving manuscripts are dated to the

end of the seventh century by the calligraphy of Arab coins and inscriptions. Inscriptions from the reign of the Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705), including the inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (692), quote or paraphrase the Quran.

In the ʿAbbasid period, a developing literature of exegesis, history, and law made a fixed text more important, and, in the late eighth and ninth centuries, a consensus was reached to unify the presentation to conform with the emerging standardized Arabic grammar. Finally, Ibn al-Mujahid (d. 935/6) established the seven canonical readings of the Quran on the basis of literary, lexicographical, and grammatical studies – although alternative readings remained in circulation.

The Judeo-Christian and Arabian heritage

The Quran was produced in a religiously and culturally rich environment; in language and in concepts, it bears the marks of the milieu in which it was delivered. Aramaic dialects were spoken in Arabia, and it is no surprise that the Quran contains many names, religious terms, and historical references derived from Aramaic.

Quranic teachings also resemble Judaism and Christianity, because the revelations came from the same God. Biblical tales were retold. Ideas similar to Judaism – such as uncompromising monotheism, belief in written revelations and divine guidance, the conception of a prophet sent to a chosen people, and religious practices such as regular daily prayer – are found in the Quran. Indeed, the idea of the Apostle is rooted in Jewish-Christian sects.

Christian beliefs and concepts are equally important. The Quran reflects Muhammad's encounter with Arabic-speaking Christian preachers from Najran. Parallels to the preaching of itinerant Christian monks are evident in the Quranic vision of the last judgment – the prediction that it would come with thunder, trumpets, and earthquakes; that the world would be destroyed and the dead resurrected; and that it would be a terrifying moment when, one by one, all men passed before God, the angels interceding only for the good. The Quranic emphasis on the humanity of Christ suggests the

influence of Arab-Christians, such as those in Najran – the home of Arabic-speaking Arians, Nestorians, and Julianites.

The Islamic way of praying may be an adaptation of Syrian monastic prayer – with its sequence of recitations, prostrations, and hand raising – simplified and limited in duration. Also, the month-long fast of Ramadan may be an adaptation of the practice of Syriac monks.

Ethiopian Christian influence was also strong in Mecca. There is a tradition that some Ethiopians read the Torah and Gospels aloud in Mecca. Muhammad must have had information about Ethiopia and contacts with Ethiopians in order to send some of his early followers there. The words "Jesus" and "Bible" appear in the Quran in Ethiopic form: ʿIsa and Injil.

There are also striking parallels to Manichaean beliefs. As in the tradition of Mani, Muhammad insisted on the historical unity of the prophetic messages. The concept of a chain of apostles appears in Manichaean writings. Mani was considered by his followers to be the apostle of his generation. The idea that earlier revelations had been corrupted is also found in Manichaean and Mandaean teachings.

There has been much scholarly debate about the sources of the Quranic versions of biblical stories. Some scholars point to textual sources: parallels to Quranic passages can be found in the Bible, in the Dead Sea Scrolls, and in Zoroastrian texts. Yet the Quranic telling of biblical tales does not match the textual sources in detail, for the Bible was not just a written book but an endless flow of stories told by Jews, Christians, Jewish-Christians, and Manichaeans. Scripture was understood not only as text but also as oral tradition. Muhammad had probably heard haggadic stories from Jews and learned about Jesus from Christians. Quranic stories show that there must also have been an Arabian culture of legends and stories about the origins of peoples and the histories of prophets.

Whatever the sources, biblical stories are retold with original variations and with new literary panache. In fact, even within the Quran, stories are amplified and retold from earlier to later verses.

The originality of the treatment is more compelling than the derivation of the materials.

The closeness of the Quran to Jewish and Christian beliefs and cultures is not surprising; it was intended. Islam is avowedly a continuation and renewal of the older monotheistic traditions. The Quran teaches the existence of a single God who requires human beings to live righteously and who will reward them with everlasting bliss or punish them with eternal misery. God has sent previous prophets to warn and to instruct his people, give moral guidance, and lay down laws and rules. The Quran tells the stories of the prophets who have preceded Muhammad, but now the divine mission is vouchsafed to him. The biblical elements in the Quran are part of a shared Jewish, Christian, and Muslim heritage. Islam is not "borrowed" from other cultural traditions but inhabits the same cultural world.

These connections are so close that many scholars see early Islam as a reborn version of the previous religions. Ruthven sees early Islam as a hybrid Hebrew monotheism with Christian, gnostic, and Arabian elements. Donner sees early Islam as a pan-religious movement. Muhammad's early followers were the believers (*mu'minun*), who share belief in one God, the soon-to-be last day, and the need for righteousness on earth. A Muslim, then, is someone who submits to God's will and his law – or to the law of the Torah or Gospels or earlier versions of revelation – and in particular those who submit to Quranic law.

Many verses in the Quran can be construed as including Christians and Jews in the Muslim community, because Muhammad saw himself at first as a missionary to all peoples but later narrowed his intended audience to pagan Arabs. Muhammad became disillusioned with the People of the Book and condemned them as "unbelievers." Conflict with the Jews led to the redefinition of Islam as a new confessional religion and led to new laws and rituals to provide Muslims with a separate identity.

Although identified with the monotheistic religions, the Quran also embodied a summation and transformation of traditional Arabian values. The Muslim *umma* redefined the meaning of the tribe as a

group that defended its brothers to include religious as well as blood brothers. The biblical and tribal law of blood revenge was accepted, but now the *umma* as a whole was substituted for the clan. In family life, the patriarchal clan was reaffirmed as the ideal Muslim family but redefined to include a new concern for women and children and the stability of marriages. In the Prophet's lifetime, acceptance of Islam was probably a gesture at once of political obeisance and of religious allegiance.

In the realm of individual morality, a similar reshaping of values took place. The traditional Arabian virtues were vested with new Islamic meanings. Bedouin courage in battle and reckless bravery in defense of one's tribe became persistent dedication to the new faith of Islam and the capacity for disciplined sacrifice in the name of the new community. Patience in the face of adversity (*sabr*) became unshakable faith in God in the face of trials and temptations. Generosity – shorn of its impulsive and ostentatious aspects – was transmuted into the virtue of almsgiving and care for the weak and the poor as part of a pious and restrained, but regular, commitment. The Quranic teachings and Muhammad's leadership extracted the virtues of the bedouin culture from the context of *jahl* (passion, ignorance, and thoughtlessness), to reestablish them on the basis of *hilm* (self-control) and *'aql* (rational judgment), based on *islam* (submission to Allah).

Thus, the new religion reaffirmed Arabian moral traditions by joining them to new concepts of brotherhood and authority. By giving old concepts new meaning, it made possible a new religious sensibility and the integration of disparate peoples into a new community.

Community and politics

Finally, Muhammad is seen as a warrior, a political leader defending a community's interests, expanding its domains, and propagating its truths. In the histories of Christianity and Buddhism, the founding teacher is portrayed as a spiritual person divorced from the concerns not only of politics but of everyday life. Muhammad, by contrast, was immersed in both. His teachings and the norms he transmitted bear

on the ethics of everyday behavior, marriage, family, commercial practices, tribal relations, politics, and war. Western scholars tend to emphasize the political over the moral and social aspects of Muhammad's teaching. For Muslims, he encompasses both the holy man engaged in the world and the ideal warrior-saint.

The worldly dimension of his life was implied at the very outset. When Muhammad began to recite his revelations in public, he had launched a worldly mission. Significantly, the first converts were rootless migrants, poor men, members of weak clans, and younger sons of strong clans – those people most dissatisfied with the hierarchical moral, social, and economic climate of Mecca.

Muhammad provoked fierce opposition because preaching was an implicit challenge to the existing institutions of the society: the worship of gods, the economic life attached to pagan shrines, the values of tribal tradition, the authority of chiefs, and the solidarity of clans. Religion, moral belief, social structure, and economic life formed a system of ideas and institutions inextricably bound up with one another. To attack them at any major point was to attack the whole society – root and branch.

As Muhammad's mission unfolded, it became clear that it involved not only the presentation of the Quranic revelation but also the leadership of a community. Prophecy implied eschatological vision and knowledge of God's will, which in turn entailed right guidance and social leadership. As early as 615, Muhammad had become the leader of a community. A group of his followers departed for Abyssinia. For the sake of their faith, they were willing to leave their families and clans and take up life together in a foreign land. For them, the bonds of common belief were stronger than the bonds of blood.

Opposition to Muhammad revealed yet another dimension of the relations between religion and society. It exposed the extent to which Muhammad's very survival in Mecca, to say nothing of his preaching, depended on his uncle Abu Talib and his clansmen, the Banu Hashim, who protected him because he was their kinsman. With their support, Muhammad could, despite harassment, continue preaching – although in the later Meccan years, the flow of converts dried up. To

protect himself and his followers, to overcome the resistance of the Quraysh, and to gain a hearing from Arabians beyond the small circles spontaneously attracted to him, some kind of political base was necessary.

Muhammad tried to win support at al-Ta'if and from some bedouins but was rebuffed. Then he turned to Medina, which, like Mecca, was inhabited by various clans; however, unlike Mecca, it was a settlement racked by bitter and even anarchic feuding between the leading tribal groups – the Aws and the Khazraj. Prolonged strife threatened the safety of men in the fields and called into question Medina's very existence. Unlike the bedouins, Medinans had to live as neighbors and could not move from place to place. Like Mecca, Medina was undergoing social changes that rendered obsolete the underlying bedouin form of kinship society. Agricultural, rather than pastoral, needs governed its economy. Its social life came increasingly to be dictated by spatial proximity rather than by kinship. Also, Medina had a large Jewish population, which may have made the populace as a whole more sympathetic to monotheism.

A coterie of Medinans invited Muhammad to Medina. This was based on a well-established precedent. Feuding clans often selected someone reputed to have religious vision and to be just, politic, and disinterested to be their arbitrator (*hakam*). It was common practice for a potential arbitrator to interview the disputants and assure himself that they would accept his decisions.

In Medina, Muhammad defined his powers as an arbitrator in the so-called Constitution of Medina. This was an agreement to fight together and to accept Muhammad's authority to resolve internal disputes. The treaty was drawn between the émigré Meccans and Medinans, the latter representing Jewish tribes in alliance with them. There are numerous Jewish tribes mentioned in the treaty, but the three largest Jewish clans (the Banu Nadir, Banu Qaynuqa, and Banu Qurayza) appear not to have been party to this agreement. The Jews who became allies were not expected to embrace Islam. Meccans and Medinans, including several of the Jewish clans, would act as one in the defense of Muhammad and of Medina against outsiders.

No clan would make a separate peace. No one would aid the Quraysh of Mecca, the presumptive enemy.

In the next few years, Muhammad consolidated his powers. His political work in Medina was to build the confederation that would extend his teachings and authority to Mecca and to the rest of Arabia. This was part of Muhammad's religious ambition, but it was also a matter of political necessity. If Mecca remained antagonistic, it might eventually defeat him. However, to bring Mecca under his influence required controlling the bedouin tribes whose cooperation was essential to Meccan trade. Both religious ambition and the political logic of Muhammad's removal to Medina required an Arabian confederation. Thus, Muhammad raided the Meccan caravans. In 624, he won a great victory at the Battle of Badr. In the Battle of Uhud (625) and the Battle of the Ditch (627), he successfully resisted Meccan counterattacks.

Within Medina, the pagan clans converted to Islam. Muhammad wanted to include the Jews in his nascent community, for he saw himself as sent by God to all Arabians – Jews and Christians as well as pagans – to restore the purity of the faith already revealed, preach a renewal, and end the corruption that had crept into daily life. Relations with some of the Jewish tribes, however, broke down because of disputes over the authenticity of Muhammad's teachings and competition over resources. Some of the Jewish clans rejected Muhammad's claim to be a prophet in the Hebrew tradition and disputed his accounts of sacred history. In the course of this struggle, new revelations denounced the Jews for having broken their covenant. These verses revealed that Abraham was the prophet par excellence (the first *hanif*), the builder of the Ka'ba, and the father of the Arabs. The Quran now stressed that Muhammad was sent to restore the pure monotheism of Abraham. In effect, Muhammad's mission and his community would no longer include Jews and Christians but would be a distinct religion alongside them.

Muhammad's disputes with three of the Jewish clans also involved long-simmering political and economic grievances. In the sixth century, the Banu Nadir and the Banu Qurayza had collected taxes on behalf of Persian overlords. The growing hostility may have been

related to land and the location of the Muslim community's newly established market. After a quarrel, the Banu Qaynuqa were expelled. The Banu Nadir were accused of trying to assassinate Muhammad and were expelled. The Banu Qurayza were accused of aiding the enemy; the males were executed. The elimination of these powerful Jewish clans enhanced the political and material power of the Muslims. Muhammad seized the lands of the Banu Nadir and the Banu Qurayza, confiscating their weapons and horses. Women and children were sold as slaves. After the Battle of the Ditch and the decimation of the Banu Qurayza, Muhammad's power was clearly established, and there seems to have been a more widespread acceptance of Islam.

At this point, however, Muhammad relaxed, rather than intensified, the pressure on Mecca. In 628, in a seeming turnaround, Muhammad proposed to make a peaceful pilgrimage to the Ka'ba. The Meccans, however, intercepted him at a place called al-Hudaybiya. There, he concluded a truce in which the Meccans agreed to admit the Muslims for the pilgrimage and Muhammad agreed to drop his demand that he be recognized as the Prophet of God. He agreed to an unequal arrangement whereby children who left Mecca to become Muslims would have to be returned if they did not have parental consent, whereas Muslim apostates would not be returned. The treaty may seem like an embarrassment to Muhammad, but he made important political gains. Meccan hostility was allayed, and the treaty confirmed what Meccan failures at the Battle of Uhud and the Battle of the Ditch had shown: that Meccans could not defeat him.

Throughout this struggle, Muhammad tried to gain control of the tribes. Missionaries and embassies were sent throughout Arabia, factions loyal to Muhammad were supported, and tribes were raided to compel them to pay allegiance and the alms tax (*zakat*). Many of the recalcitrant tribes accepted his leadership. Muhammad expanded his sphere of influence to the settled regions in the north. He subdued the oasis of Khaybar, made a foray into Syria in 629, and defeated a bedouin alliance in 630.

As Muhammad's position grew stronger, his attitude toward other Arab tribes became more defined. Early in the Medinan years,

Muhammad made alliances with peoples who were not Muslims. He did not require his allies to believe in God and accept him as the Prophet of God. Non-Muslims could choose between accepting Islam or paying an annual tribute. Without one or the other, they would be attacked and, if defeated, killed or enslaved. Typically, Christians and Jews agreed to pay the tribute (*jizya*). In 630/1, he granted the Christians of Najran protection in return for payment of taxes. This was a critical precedent for the later Muslim policies toward conquered peoples.

Muhammad's occupation of Mecca, however, showed that his policy toward non-Muslims would be adapted to circumstances. On his entry into Mecca, Muhammad proclaimed a general amnesty, and it seems that Meccans freely accepted Islam. In 632, the pilgrimage was modified and transformed into a Muslim ritual. (See Illustration 1.)

Illustration 1. The Pilgrimage to the Kaʿba. *Source:* Newspix.com.au.

By the end of his life, Muhammad had created a large-scale Arabian federation of oases and tribes, based in Mecca and Medina, appointing officials and collecting taxes and tributes from the member groups.

Perhaps the most contested aspect of Muhammad's career is warfare and the presumed legacy of jihad (holy struggle). In fact, Quranic statements about war are quite different from later Muslim interpretations and from contemporary Western concepts. Jihad in the Quran does not mean holy war. In the Quran, the words for war are "*qital*" – generally used for religiously authorized war – and "*harb*" – generally used for profane war. "Jihad" means striving to one's utmost, including striving to be pious, showing religious loyalty through the observance of rituals, and supporting one's fellow believers.

The Quran does not present a consistent doctrinal position on warfare. The earliest statements from the Meccan period counsel patient endurance (*sabr*), rather than fighting. In Medina, the Quran specifies that Muslims may fight enemies who attack them and may defend the oppressed. There are verses placing restrictions on fighting, presumably in the sacred month, except in cases of self-defense. Gradually, over time, the tone of Quranic statements changed. Some verses exhort apparently reluctant followers to fight. At Badr, Muhammad first promised paradise to his warriors. Later verses advocate war in the path of God and call on Muslims to subdue their enemies. Thus, in Medina, there was a progression from a time when the early Muslims could not imagine a war against their own kin, to booty raids even against kin, and to war against all opponents of Islam. The changing tone of the Quran may reflect divisions in the community among people less and more willing to fight. It may also reflect changing economic and political realities, and a transition from a more conciliatory to a more militant stance, as the power of the Muslims grew greater.

The Quran set diverse precedents, but later Muslim jurists linked jihad to offensive war. Mid-eighth-century jurists did not consider warfare obligatory, and Hanafi jurists held that war was legitimate only in self-defense, but under the 'Abbasid dynasty the term jihad

became increasingly linked to imperial policy. Al-Shafiʿi (d. 802) appears to be one of the first jurists to permit offensive war. By the mid-ninth century, collections of hadith generally advocated war on behalf of Islam, although hadith that counseled against war and martyrdom were not eliminated from the tradition. An important concept in the later doctrine of warfare – the concept of *dar al-Islam* (Islamic territory) and *dar al-harb* (non-Islamic territory) and of a constant cold war between the two – has no basis in the Quran. Whatever sanction jihad has in later Muslim thinking, the Quran supports a variety of positions.

Conclusion: the *umma* of Islam

By the time of his death in 632, Muhammad had provided his followers with the design for a political community based on religious affiliation. Acceptance of Islam was a gesture at once of political obeisance and of religious allegiance. The word "Islam" could mean submission to the Prophet in both a worldly and a spiritual sense Religiously, the new community was grounded in the vision of the oneness of God. In the revelations of the Quran, Muhammad synthesized Arabian religious concepts, Judaism, and Christianity into a new monotheism. Eschatological piety and fear of hellfire resemble Syriac monastic preaching. The role of a prophet, the significance of written revelations, obedience to God's commands, and stress on communal life as the context of religious fulfillment all parallel Jewish ideas. Although resembling Jewish and Christian beliefs, emphasis on God's utter transcendence, majesty, omnipotence, and untrammeled will; the submission of one's own will to God's; surrender to God's commands; and acceptance of God's judgment all gave Quranic teachings a special originality within the framework of the monotheistic religions.

The translation of monotheistic values into the principles of a reformed Arabian society and the formation of a new community with its own congregational life, rituals, and legal norms made Islam a new religion. This was the *umma*, the brotherhood that integrated individuals, clans, cities, and even ethnic groups into a larger community in which religious loyalties encompassed all other loyalties

without abolishing them and in which a new common law and political authority regulated the affairs of the populace as a whole. In a fragmented society, Muhammad had integrated otherwise anarchic small clans into a larger confederacy and built a churchlike religious community and an incipient imperial organization.

What made Muhammad so rare a figure in history, what made him a prophet, was his ability to convey his vision to people around him so that concepts long known to everyone took on the power to transform other people's lives as they had transformed his. This was accomplished by direct preaching about God, by changing family life and institutions, and by introducing new ritual practices, social mores, and political loyalties. Muhammad was a prophet who caused a religious vision to operate in the body of a whole society.

In the Quran and Muhammad's teachings and example, Muslims have ever after found a revelation of the spiritual reality of God's transcendence and man's humble place in the universe. They find a revelation of the laws by which people should live in a community of believers, dedicated to the care of the weak and the poor, to education, and to social reform. Equally, they are dedicated to a political community organized to administer justice, to defend itself, and to wage war in the name of the true faith. Islam proved particularly effective in unifying tribal societies and in motivating militant struggle in the interests of the community as a whole. To this day, to be a Muslim implies a combination of personal religious belief and membership in the community of fellow believers.

[1] A. S. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1955, II, p. 345. Hereafter all quotations from the Quran are taken from the Arberry translation.

The Arab-Muslim Imperium (632–945)

Chapter 5 Introduction to the Arab-Muslim empires

The death of Muhammad and the Arab-Muslim conquests opened a new era in Middle Eastern civilizations. The Arab-Muslim conquests initiated the long historical process that culminated in the amalgamation of Arabia, the Sasanian Empire, and the eastern regions of the Byzantine Empire within an Islamic empire; in the eventual conversion of the majority of Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian peoples to Islam; and in the formation of an Islamic society and culture.

On Muhammad's death, many of his followers decided on the appointment of a caliph or executor of the Prophet's legacy. The first four caliphs – Abu Bakr (632–34), ʿUmar (634–44), ʿUthman (644–56), and ʿAli (656–61) – ruled by virtue of their personal connections with Muhammad and Arabian ideas of authority. They were later called the Rashidun, the Rightly Guided Caliphs. These caliphs, in part following the precedents set by Muhammad, launched a great wave of military campaigns and a migration of Arabian peoples leading to the conquest of all the lands of the former Sasanian Empire and the Near Eastern and North African provinces of the Byzantine Empire. Iraq, Syria, and Egypt were conquered by 641; Iran by 654. North Africa was conquered between 643 and 711; Spain between 711 and 759. In the east, the region of Inner Asia between the Oxus and the Jaxartes rivers, Transoxania, was fully conquered by 751. Thus, the "Middle East," North Africa, Spain, and Transoxania were incorporated into a single empire. The Islamic religion and related cultures and an Islamic sociopolitical identity would be formed in this region.

The conquests made the caliphs the military and administrative chiefs of the newly conquered lands. The Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–61) represented the religio-political leadership of a coalition of

town-dwelling and nomadic tribes. The Umayyad dynasty (661–750) reconstructed the governing apparatuses of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires and began the work of molding them into an Arab-Muslim regime. After several periods of civil wars, the Umayyad were overthrown by the ʿAbbasid dynasty, which would reign from 750 to 1258. The ʿAbbasids brought the Arab-Muslim empire to the height of its political organization, the furthest boundaries of its conquests, and the peak of its political powers and cultural creativity. The ʿAbbasid Empire, however, disintegrated in the course of the ninth and tenth centuries. Although the ʿAbbasid caliphs continued as the nominal rulers from 945 to 1258, the territories of the former empire were ruled by new conquerors and new regimes. (See Table 2.)

Table 2. *Outline chronology of early Islamic history*

Muhammad	c. 570–632
Rashidun caliphs	632–61
First civil war	656–61
Umayyad caliphs	661–750
Reign of Muʿawiya	661–80
Second civil war	680–92
Reign of ʿAbd al-Malik	685–705
Marwanid caliphs	685–744
Third civil war	744–50
ʿAbbasid caliphs	750–1258

Consolidation of empire	750–c. 850
Reign of al-Ma'mun	813–33
Breakup of empire	c. 835–945
Independent succession states	945–c. 1220
Mongol invasions	c. 1220–c. 1260

The historical character of the Arab-Muslim empires was grounded in the economic and social changes generated by the Arab conquests. Economic development and urbanization generated the resources for the organization of a new and powerful empire. The unification of former Sasanian and Byzantine territories and the integration of the trans-Oxus region created a vast new trading zone. Basra and later Baghdad became two of the most important trading cities in the world. Samarqand, Bukhara, Nishapur, and many other Iranian cities prospered. New agricultural zones were developed in Iraq and Mesopotamia.

The conquests also had profound demographic, social, and cultural implications. With the defeat of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, a frontier between populations broke down. Families and whole tribes followed the conquering men. Arab-Muslim migrants created new cities and also settled in older towns, villages, citadels, and country estates, mingling with other ethnic and language groups, races, religions, sects, and cults. They interacted as rulers and ruled, patrons and clients, and in marketplaces as merchants and customers, as employers and employees, and as landlords and tenants. The settlements stimulated intermarriages, conversions, and exchanges of religious ideas and languages. A new society came into being integrating Arab-Muslim conquerors and conquered peoples on the basis of Islam and widespread Arabic and/or Persian linguistic identities.

In turn, the elites of cities and empire gave birth to new imperial and religious cultures. Imperial Islam was the Islam of the caliphate, the court, political elites, and the literati and artists patronized by the government. The court milieus contributed especially to Islamic art, architecture, philosophy, science, and Iranian and Hellenistic forms of literature in Arabic. Urban Islam embodied the religious beliefs and moral and social values of Muslim communities as expressed by the companions of the Prophet and their successors, the learned and holy men of Islam. The city milieus contributed to the literatures of Quranic exegesis, law, mysticism, and theology in conjunction with an Arabic belles lettres. Some subjects – such as poetry, theology, and history – were cultivated in both milieus. Both the imperial and the city versions of Islam were the cultural product of the new communities created by the economic and social upheavals of the Arab-Muslim conquests.

In the following chapters, we will explore first the conquests and the economic and social changes that formed the bases for the new empires. In successive chapters, we will discuss the history and politics of the caliphate and then the courtly imperial and the urban religious forms of early Islamic cultures.

Chapter 6 The Arab-Muslim conquests and the socioeconomic bases of empire

The conquests

With the death of the Prophet Muhammad, a new era began, an era of vast conquests and the formation of a Middle Eastern–wide Arab-Islamic empire. The Arab-Muslim conquests began the processes that culminated in the formation of a new empire, which included all of the former Sasanian Empire and much of the Byzantine Empire, and in the emergence in that geographic and political framework of Islamic cultures and societies.

When Muhammad died in 632, he left no instructions concerning succession, and, in the absence of an agreement with regard to a successor, the Muslim community – a conglomeration of diverse elements – was on the verge of disintegrating. To prevent this, some of the tribes and factions elected Abu Bakr – one of Muhammad's closest associates and his father-in-law – as caliph or successor. Abu Bakr was the first of those who were later identified as the Rashidun, the Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr (632–34), ʿUmar (634–44), ʿUthman (644–56), and ʿAli (656–61), who ruled by virtue of their personal connections with Muhammad and Arabian ideas of authority. The conquests made the caliphs the rulers of the newly conquered lands as well.

There are two principal interpretations of what motivated the Arab-Islamic conquests. One finds the origin of the conquest movement in the dynamics of tribal conflict. At Muhammad's death, many of the allied Arabians sought to regain their independence. Tribes in the Najd and Hijaz – but not tribes living in the region between Mecca and Medina – refused to pay the alms tax or tribute. Some considered their tribute payments personal to Muhammad; other tribes refused tributes and taxes, although they did not renounce

Islam. Some put forth prophets and religions of their own. In some tribes, pro-Muslim factions had taken control, and, at Muhammad's death, other factions tried to subvert their dominance.

Abu Bakr, however, refused any concessions to demands for relief from taxes, waged war on recalcitrant tribes, forced them into subjection, and even expanded the sphere of Muslim power beyond what it had been in Muhammad's time. At the Battle of al-Aqraba (633), Muslims defeated a rival tribal confederation and extended their power over eastern Arabia. These wars (known as *ridda*) were waged on a scale unprecedented in Arabia; in effect, Medina had become a state capable of marshaling large armies.

The immediate outcome of the Muslim victories was turmoil. Medina's victories led allied tribes to attack the nonaligned to compensate for their own losses. The pressure drove tribes to Hadramawt and Yemen in the far south, to Bahrain and Oman in the east, and then across the imperial frontiers into Iraq and Syria. The Bakr tribe, which had defeated a Persian detachment in 606, joined forces with the Muslims and led them on a raid in southern Iraq to Ubulla and al-Hira, the former Lakhmid capital. A similar spilling over of tribal raiding occurred on the Syrian frontiers.

Abu Bakr encouraged these movements. At first, small tribal groups were searching for booty, but, when Arab-Muslim raids forced the Byzantines to send a major expedition into southern Palestine, the raiding parties had to concentrate their forces east of Gaza. There, under the leadership of Khalid b. al-Walid (sent by Abu Bakr from Iraq to take the generalship of the Arab clans), they defeated a Byzantine army at the Battle of Ajnadayn (634). What began as intertribal skirmishing to consolidate a political confederation in Arabia ended in a full-scale war against the two empires.

A second view is that the Arab-Muslim conquests were not spontaneous raids but a planned military venture already under way in the lifetime of the Prophet. New but still controversial research in Persian sources argues that the Muslim campaigns in Iraq had already begun in 628 and that Muhammad's raiding parties had already entered Syria in 629.

In either case, in the wake of the Battle of Ajnadayn, the Arab-Muslims moved against the Byzantine province of Syria. They took Damascus in 636. Baalbek, Homs, and Hama soon surrendered. The rest of the province, however, continued to resist. Only in 638 was Jerusalem taken. Caesarea fell in 640. Finally, in 641, the Arabs took the northern Syrian and Mesopotamian towns of Harran, Edessa, and Nasibin. The conquest of Syria took so long because victories over Byzantine armies did not necessarily bring about the surrender of fortified towns, which had to be conquered individually.

The next Byzantine province to fall to the Arab-Muslims was Egypt. Egypt's attractions were its position as the granary of Constantinople, its proximity to the Hijaz, important naval yards, and a strategic location for further conquests in Africa. General ʿAmr b. al-ʿAs, on his own initiative, began the conquest of the province in 641. Within the year, he had taken Heliopolis, Babylon, and the whole of the country except Alexandria, which capitulated in 643. Because Egypt was politically centralized and scarcely urbanized, the conquest was virtually instantaneous. The next Arab-Muslim objective was North Africa. Tripoli was taken in 643, but the subjugation of the rest of North Africa took another seventy-five years. Instead of sudden, dramatic victories, painfully prolonged wars were waged to establish Arab-Muslim suzerainty.

Within a decade, Arab-Muslims had captured Syria and Egypt, but the Byzantine Empire retained its richest and most populous provinces (Anatolia and the Balkans) and would engage in almost continuous border warfare on land and on sea, always threatening to retake territories that had for hundreds of years been part of the Greco-Roman, Christian world. The survival of Byzantium left the Arabs with a contested and dangerous frontier and a permanent barrier to their expansion.

The Sasanian Empire, by contrast, was utterly destroyed. The Arab-Muslims defeated the Persians at the Battle of Qadisiyya (637), seized the capital of the empire (Ctesiphon), and forced the last emperor (Yazdagird) to flee to the protection of Turkish princes in Inner Asia. All of Iraq fell into Arab-Muslim hands. With the collapse

of the empire, the Arab-Muslims were faced in Iran with a number of small and weak but inaccessible principalities, protected by mountains and deserts. The problem in conquering Iran was not a strong resisting state but the large number of remote areas that had to be invaded and occupied. It took decades to subdue all the quasi-independent principalities that had comprised the Sasanian Empire.

From the garrison base of Kufa, the Arab-Muslims moved north, occupying Mosul in 641. Nihawand, Hamadhan, Rayy, Isfahan, and all the main cities of western Iran fell by 644. Azarbayjan, to the west of the Caspian Sea, was captured about the same time. Other forces operating from Basra captured Ahwaz (Khuzistan) in 640 but took until 649 to complete the conquest of Fars. Only then did the conquest of more outlying regions begin. Marw was occupied as a military base in 650–51 and Khurasan was conquered by 654.

This first wave of conquests was followed several decades later by new campaigns on a grand scale. To the west, North Africa was conquered between 643 and 711; Spain was absorbed by the Arabs between 711 and 759. In the east, the Transoxus region was fully conquered only after a century of effort. The capitals of Transoxania, Bukhara, and Samarqand fell in 712 and 713. Inner Asian Turkish peoples recognized Arab-Muslim suzerainty after more decades of warfare. In 751, the Battle of Talas secured Arab-Muslim-dominated Transoxania against Chinese expansion. In the north, Arab-Muslims attacked Anatolia and launched in 660, 668, and 717 three great but failed expeditions to capture Constantinople. They fought against the Khazars in the Caucasus and established small principalities in Sind, the lower Indus Valley.

For the first time in history, the region we now call the Middle East, as well as North Africa, Spain, and Transoxania were incorporated into a single empire. Thus the Arab-Muslims established the geographical arena for the eventual diffusion of a common culture and a common sociopolitical identity in the name of Islam. (See Map 2.)

Map 2. The Arab-Muslim empire to 750 CE.

The reasons for the relatively rapid success of the Arab-Muslim conquests are not hard to find. Arabians had long experience of military conflict with the bordering empires and, therefore, acquired military sophistication. The Byzantine and Sasanian empires were both militarily exhausted by decades of warfare prior to the Arab-Muslim invasions. The Christian populations – the Copts in Egypt, the Miaphysites in Syria, and the Nestorians in Iraq – all had long histories of troubled relations with their Byzantine and Sasanian rulers. Their disaffection was important in the cases where Christian-Arab border tribes and military auxiliaries joined the conquerors and where fortified cities capitulated. The conquests, then, were due to victories over militarily weakened powers and were consolidated because, by and large, local populations accepted the new regime.

The conquests were further secured by a large migration of Arabian peoples. With the defeat of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, a frontier between populations broke down. Families and whole tribes soon followed the conquering men, leading to a massive movement of peoples from Arabia into the lands of the Middle East. Arab-Muslim migrants created new cities and settled in a great variety of milieus – older towns, villages, citadels, and country

estates – mingling with a great variety of ethnic and language groups, races, religions, sects, and cults. They interacted in marketplaces as merchants and customers, as employers and employees, as patrons and clients, and as landlords and peasants. The settlements stimulated intermarriages, conversions, and exchanges of religious ideas and languages.

In effect, Arab-Muslim settlements promoted the partial integration of Arab and non-Arab populations into new cosmopolitan communities. In turn, urbanization, economic change, and the formation of new communities generated resources for the organization of a new and powerful empire; the elites of city and empire gave birth to new expressions of imperial and religious cultures. What we identify as Islamic civilization was the cultural expression of the integrated elites thrown up by the forces of economic and social change generated by the Arab-Muslim conquests.

The administration of the new empire

The conquerors represented an already complex and sophisticated society. The soldiers came from both nomadic and sedentary tribes, but the leaders were primarily Hijazi merchants. They brought with them exposure to the agricultural, urban, and monarchical culture of Yemen; to the Ghassanid and Lakhmid experiences of tribal confederation and intermediation with the empires; and to the court cultures of palaces, poetry, and hunting, as well as the merchant skills of Mecca. They would quickly add Byzantine and Persian landowning and administrative experience and adopt the imperial tax systems.

From the outset, the chiefs of the Muslim community in Medina sought to channel the bedouin migrations for both their individual and the common advantage. Meccans and Medinans decided on the two basic principles of the postconquest government: the bedouins would be prevented from damaging the agricultural society and the new elite would cooperate with the chiefs and notables of the conquered population. The necessary arrangements between

conqueror and conquered were implemented in the reign of the second caliph, 'Umar (634–44).

The first principle of 'Umar's settlement entailed the transformation of the Arab conquerors into a military caste that garrisoned the subdued areas and carried out further conquests. To prevent the bedouins from raiding indiscriminately, to forestall the destruction of the productive agricultural lands, and to segregate the Arabs from the conquered peoples, the Arab-Muslim armies were settled in garrison cities (*amsar* [plural], or *misr* [singular]). The three most important were new cities founded in Iraq and Egypt. Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was strategically located for easy communication with Medina and for expeditions into southern Iran. Kufa, on the Euphrates River to the north of the marshes near al-Hira, became the administrative capital of northern Iraq, Mesopotamia, and northern and eastern Iran. Fustat, the new capital of Egypt, was located just below the delta of the Nile and served as the base for Arab-Muslim expansion into North Africa until Qayrawan (Tunisia) was founded in 670.

In other provinces, the Arabs did not usually create new cities but settled in towns, and in suburbs and villages on the outskirts of existing towns. In Syria, the important Arab-Muslim bases were Damascus, Jerusalem, and a number of desert palaces. In Iran, they included Hamadhan, Isfahan, Rayy, and Marw.

The garrisons served not only to house the bedouin migrants and organize the armies but to distribute the spoils of victory. Soldiers were entitled to a stipend paid out of the taxes collected from peasants and the tributes paid by townspeople. In principle, soldiers and clans were not permitted to seize landed property as their own. Conquered property (*fay*) was considered the permanent possession of the community; the revenues, but not the land, could be given to the conquerors. These arrangements both protected the cultivated areas from pillaging and distributed the spoils of victory more equitably.

The second principle of 'Umar's settlement was that the conquered populations should be disturbed as little as possible. This

meant that the Arab-Muslims did not – contrary to reputation – attempt to convert conquered peoples to Islam. Muhammad had set the precedent of permitting Jews and Christians in Arabia to keep their religions if they paid a tribute tax; the caliphate extended the same privilege to Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians in the conquered lands, whom they considered protected peoples (*ahl al-dhimma*) or Peoples of the Book, the adherents of earlier written revelations. At the time of the conquests, Islam was primarily understood as a religion of the Arabs, a mark of unity and superiority. When conversions did occur, they could cause embarrassment, because they created status problems and led to claims for financial privileges.

Just as Arab-Muslims had no interest in changing the religious demographics of conquered lands, they had no desire to disturb the social and administrative order. Caliphs sent governors to oversee the collection of tributes and taxes, supervise the distribution of tax revenues as salary to the troops, and lead the soldiers in war and in prayer – but, otherwise, local situations were left in local hands. The old elites and the administrative machinery of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires were incorporated into the new regime. Iranian, Aramean, Coptic, and Greek scribes and accountants worked for their new masters as they had for the old. The old landowners, chiefs, and headmen kept their authority in the villages and assisted in collecting taxes. The former social and religious order was left intact.

In practice, the relationship established between the Arab-Muslims and local elites varied from region to region, depending on the circumstances of the conquests and on the available social and administrative machinery. Some provinces came under direct bureaucratic administration, but many others retained their autonomy. Places that had stubbornly resisted Arab-Muslim incursions forced the invaders to concede favorable terms in return for local compliance. Numerous formal treaties were made with town notables or the chiefs and princes of small provinces, promising to leave the old elites in power and respecting their property and their religion in return for the payment of a tribute, usually a fixed sum,

which the notables could collect from their subjects. In these cases, the conquerors simply collected taxes from sub-rulers who were their vassals. In the citied areas of upper Mesopotamia and Syria, in Khurasan and elsewhere, the Arab-Muslims were at first remote suzerains.

The arrangements made in the wake of the conquests, however, were not permanent. As the conquerors consolidated their power, they sought to increase their control over local affairs, to set the bureaucratic machinery of the old regimes to work for the new, and to adapt the preexisting tax system. Taxation was important not only for the incomes of the elites but also for the very viability of the tax-paying societies. Taxes on peasants often reached 50 percent of the value of their produce, and at such levels the incidence of taxation determined whether life for the mass of the people would be tolerable. Taxation affected the care given to soil nutrition, the level of investment in maintaining productivity, and the choice of crops. It determined whether or not the peasants would stay in the villages and work the land or flee, leaving their homes and lands to decay. Furthermore, taxation defined social structure. Taxes were duties levied on some classes of the population for the support of others. Peasants, workers, and merchants paid taxes. Landowners, administrators, clergymen, soldiers, and emperors collected them. To pay taxes was not only an economic burden; it was a sign of social inferiority.

The Arab-Muslim conquests thus followed a pattern familiar from past nomadic conquests of settled regions. The conquering peoples became the military elite, and the settled societies were exploited to support them. The governing arrangements were a compromise between the elites of the conquering peoples and the elites of the conquered or settled peoples: the interests of the former in military power and adequate revenues were assured in exchange for permitting the latter to retain their local political, religious, and financial autonomy. Both leaned on the tax-paying peasantry.

Chapter 7 Regional Developments: Economic and Social Change

Despite conservative intentions, the conquests, the settlement of large Arab-Muslim populations in numerous garrisons, and the consolidation of a new imperial regime set in motion vast changes in the patterns of international trade, local commerce, and agriculture. The unification of former Sasanian and Byzantine territories removed political and strategic barriers to trade and laid the foundations for a major economic revival. The Euphrates frontier between the Persian and the Roman worlds disappeared, and Transoxania, for the first time in history, was incorporated into a Middle Eastern empire. Commercial considerations inspired Arab-Muslim expansion in Inner Asia and India. Cities prospered in Iraq, Iran, and Transoxania. Basra and later Baghdad became two of the leading trading cities in the world. Samarqand, Bukhara, and Nishapur prospered. However, a new frontier was drawn between Syria and Anatolia, which had formerly been part of a single Byzantine state, and trade between these regions declined.

Each region of the new empire fared differently under Arab-Muslim rule. Some prospered, some declined. Agricultural production shifted from one area to another. Arab-Muslim landowners often replaced the previous elites. Soldiers settled on the land, and non-Arabs moved to Arab settlements. These changes created a high degree of mobility and interaction between different peoples and set the basis for the ultimate integration of populations into a shared culture.

Iraq

The Sasanians had developed Iraq to a level of productivity never to be reached again. Iraq was watered by two great rivers – the Tigris to the east and the Euphrates to the west. In central Iraq, parallel west-to-east canals carried water from the Euphrates to the Tigris.

The extensive irrigation system made possible the production of crops such as rice, sugarcane, and cotton. Other common crops were wheat, barley, dates, olives, wine grapes, and alfalfa. In late antiquity, the countryside was organized in village-scale estates, owned by absentee landlords called *dihqans* and worked by servile renters.

On the eve of the conquests, Iraq suffered from neglect of irrigation, exploitative taxation, and wars with the Roman Empire. In southern Iraq, the irrigation works had been allowed to degenerate; in 627–28, a major agricultural disaster took place. In a year of high water flow, the dikes in the Tigris River system of canals burst, and there was a major shift in the riverbed. The Tigris flowed westward through the canals into the Euphrates at a point to the north and west of its previous channel, creating a desert in the east but flooding the lower course of the Euphrates, which remains a marsh to the present day. Repeated floods and plagues devastated southern Iraq, destroying capital facilities and decimating the population. Agricultural production also declined in the Diyala region, which depended on state-maintained irrigation.

Arab-Muslim rule provided a stable government and encouraged recovery. The conquerors immediately took charge of fiscal and land policy in Iraq. The caliph ʿUmar confiscated the land that once had belonged to the Sasanian crown, along with the estates of notables who had fled with the defeated Sasanian emperor, and made them part of the caliphal domains. However, village-scale estates survived into the Islamic period, and their owners (*dihqans*) paid taxes to the conquerors. ʿUmar adopted the Sasanian system of collecting both a land tax (*kharaj*) and a poll tax (*jizya*). Land was measured, and a tax was fixed for every *jarib* (2,400 square meters); the actual rate of taxation per *jarib* varied with the quality of land, the crop, the expected productivity, and the estimated value of the produce. The rates also varied with distance from market, availability of water, type of irrigation, transportation, and so on. In addition, everyone was expected to pay a poll tax in gold coins. A per-capita tax was levied on the towns based on estimated population.

The caliphate also created a Muslim landowning class. ʿUthman awarded confiscated Sasanian crown estates around Kufa to Meccan and tribal aristocrats, and Muʿawiya (661–80) made similar grants from reclaimed lands around Basra. These lands were tithed rather than taxed at *kharaj* rates, the difference given as patronage for members of the ruling family and other loyalists. These richly productive lands were devoted to market-oriented production of high-value specialized crops such as cotton, sugar, and rice. The composition of the Muslim landlord elite then rotated as new caliphs and governors promoted their favorites.

More drastic changes in landownership followed. Al-Hajjaj, governor under the caliphs ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 685–705) and al-Walid (r. 705–15), broke the power of the old elites in lower Iraq by refusing investments in irrigation; he reduced the *dihqans* to the status of tenants. In 718–19, the Umayyads stopped the sale of *kharaj* taxable lands, extending the concept of *fayʾ* (Muslim communally owned property) to the whole of Iraq. In effect, this eliminated both the remaining *dihqans* and earlier Muslim landowners, giving control of the land to the caliphate. The ʿAbbasids in turn took over Umayyad properties, sometimes by confiscation.

Wherever the Arab-Muslims established garrison and administrative capitals – as at Basra, Kufa, and al-Wasit – efforts were made to stimulate agricultural output and develop fresh sources of food for the new cities. The swamps around Kufa were drained and brought under cultivation. Basra was planted with date-palm forests. To the east of Basra, the salt marshes were reclaimed by caliphs, governors, and rich tribal *shaykhs*, encouraged by the policy of land and tax concessions. Slaves were imported from East Africa to work the newly reclaimed lands. Thus, the Arab-Muslim regime created the only plantation-type economy in the region. This would lead to Zanj revolts in 690 and 760 and to sporadic Zutt rebellions in the early eighth century.

Imperial investments, however, were highly selective and favored new areas to the detriment of old areas of production, probably because the revenues of the latter were already assigned to

peasants, local landowners, and the garrison armies. By the end of the eighth century, however, soil exhaustion, salinization, the high cost of irrigation, absentee landlordism, and the use of imported, rebellious slave labor rendered further development uneconomical. Thus the net effect of the government's efforts was to restore regions in Iraq that had Arab settlements and to allow others to decay. All in all, the total output of Iraq was less than the best levels in Sasanian times.

Syria and Mesopotamia

In late antiquity, Syria was prosperous. The first half of the sixth century was a period of agricultural expansion and population growth. There were many prosperous, large villages in northern Syria, the Hawran, and the Negev (where they were supported by sophisticated water-conserving irrigation). Wine production centered in Gaza. Towns and villages invested heavily in walls, gates, paved and colonnaded streets, and lavishly decorated churches. Churches replaced theaters and bathhouses as the dominant civic institution.

Landownership differed from place to place. Small-scale farming was the dominant form of agriculture in northern Syria, the Hawran, and Palestine – although some monasteries and lords owned villages and extensive tracts of land worked by village-dwelling farmers. In Palestine, Christian landowners dominated a Samaritan peasantry. Arabian tribes had settled in Jordan and in Palestine from the Dead Sea to Gaza. Meccan merchants owned land in Jordan, where the Umayyads would later have their palace-estates.

Urban transformations probably began in the late sixth century. In many towns, the regular classical street plans were converted to the bazaar configuration even before the Arab-Muslim conquests. The Persian invasion of 611–19 caused enormous damage to urban life. The Christian population of Jerusalem and the monasteries of the wilderness of Judaea suffered particularly badly.

The Arab-Muslim conquests, which followed almost immediately after, seem to have allowed for consolidation and rehabilitation. The conquest battles were fought in open country and did little damage to

the towns. The invading Arab tribesmen were billeted in the towns and forbidden to engage in agriculture, thus protecting the countryside from some of the risks of nomadic incursions.

Towns, churches, and monasteries continued to flourish; many new churches were built even in the conquest years. Hama remained prosperous into the Islamic era. The dead cities region (a region of deserted stone towns and villages) of northern Syria, the Hawran, and parts of Palestine and Jordan continued to flourish in the seventh and into the eighth century. Production and commerce in olives and wine continued. For a time, the location of the caliphate at Damascus and the creation of "desert palaces" – sometimes the center of agricultural estates – promoted development in selected places. Coastal towns, the locus of Arab-Muslim defenses against Byzantine attack, were fortified and repopulated.

Papyri from the village of Nessana in the Negev give us an intimate glimpse into the social and political structure of the region. They show a village society independent of the larger towns. The village had an informal leadership of local headmen and landowners. There is no evidence of social hierarchy, or of collective leadership or councils, or of tenancy and dependency. Families were constituted by sibling groups.

In Syria and Mesopotamia, the conquerors made innumerable treaties with the local populations, but after a time the Arab-Muslims refused to renegotiate tributes and insisted on payment of taxes in direct proportion to population and resources. Arab-Muslim rule was more closely engaged in village communities than Byzantine rule had been. Muʿawiya made the first census and levied land taxes on the basis of the *iugum*, or the amount of land that could be worked by one man and a team of animals in a day. A special poll tax was levied on urban, nonfarming populations. In 691–92, the caliphate ordered a census and land survey to record individuals, households, land, crops, and animals and assigned a four-dinar poll tax and a rate for every land unit that varied with distance from the market. In the early eighth century, the Umayyad caliphs took over old crown lands and granted estates to favorites or allowed the Quraysh and tribal notables to buy them. Thus, the countryside was transformed

from peasant-owned to large-scale landed estates. The ʿAbbasids eventually took over the Umayyad holdings.

The Arab-Muslim regime also separated town and rural administration. Since classical antiquity, the Mediterranean region had been divided into self-governing city-states. Although the municipalities eventually became cogs in the machine of the Roman bureaucracy, the city-state with its surrounding rural area continued as a basic element in Roman administration. The new conquerors abolished the city-state as a political form and placed Syria and Mesopotamia under a territorial bureaucracy.

By the eighth century, the prosperity of Syria and Palestine was fading. Palestinian exports of wine and olives seem to have declined after 700. Syria ceased to import grain, oil, and pottery from the west. Gaza and Antioch withered. By the mid-eighth and early ninth centuries, many monasteries in Syria and Mesopotamia had been abandoned, and many monks went to Byzantium and some even to Rome. Although coastal trade declined, the interior continued to prosper into the ninth century, producing textiles and ceramics on a small scale. The Iraq trade, built around Aleppo and Aqaba, increased in the ninth century. Ultimately, the loss of Mediterranean markets, the decline of Christian pilgrimage, the rise of the ʿAbbasids, and the shift of imperial regime from Damascus to Baghdad rendered Syria a backwater.

In contrast with Syria, the caliphs did not intervene in the administration of Mesopotamia until the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705). Mosul was first ruled from Kufa by a conquest garrison that levied taxes through the local Christian landowning notables. The revenue surpluses probably went to Kufa. The later Umayyads created the first imperial-type administration in Mosul by appointing governors. ʿAbd al-Malik ordered a census and land survey for Mesopotamia to record individuals, households, land, crops, and animals; he assigned a four-dinar poll tax and a rate for every land unit.

In northern Mesopotamia, there were areas of economic growth and others of economic decline. Production in the Edessa region

was high in the sixth century but was then abandoned in the late sixth and seventh centuries. At al-Raqqa, Marwanid and ʿAbbasid investments in irrigation helped increase settlement density and production. At Mosul, the Marwanid caliphs distributed estates and developed urban facilities – including a mosque, a palace, canals, and mills. Lavish construction was both an economic measure and a symbol of legitimacy. In the countryside, Christian landed gentry kept their power well into the tenth century. Progressively, Mosuli families took on a provincial identity. For many of them, scholarship and administration were the keys to preservation of family status.

Apart from these zones of development, the migration of Arab bedouins seeking pasture, Khariji opposition to the caliphate, and banditry damaged the agricultural productivity of northern Syria and Mesopotamia.

Egypt

In Egypt, Byzantine administration had deteriorated before the conquests, but the Arab-Muslims immediately restored effective government. Arab officials were installed at the highest levels of tax administration and supervised the countryside. The division of taxes among villages and individuals and the collection of taxes were left to local Egyptian lay and church notables. There were both land and poll taxes. The poll tax was assessed on entire village populations and then divided up internally by the villagers. Greek and Coptic continued to be used in administration, but Arabic documents and bilingual Greek-Arabic documents were in use from the beginning.

The conquerors simplified the administrative system by breaking the power of large estates, subjecting them to taxation, and abolishing the fiscally independent estates (*autopragia*) and municipalities. Two essential concerns of the new Arab-Muslim government were to organize the transport of grain from Egypt to the Hijaz and to construct the fleets that would be used to attack Constantinople.

Under the Marwanids, administrative regulation was intensified. The tax registers were translated into Arabic, with a new formulary

and fiscal procedures. This began the process of replacing Coptic village headmen with Arab-Muslims and assessing taxes on individuals rather than communities. In 693–94, poll taxes were imposed on monks and a proportional tax was levied on crops. In 705, registers show records of landholdings by lists of individual taxpayers, minors, fugitives, and even deceased former taxpayers. Between 715 and 718, all travelers were required to have an internal passport identifying name, date, place of origin, and work permit. A comprehensive land survey was undertaken in 724–25. In the next year there was a great Coptic revolt. With the defeat of these rebellions, the influence of the church and of Coptic notables was further diminished.

By the middle of the eighth century, Muslims were living in the countryside. Some Arab-Muslims or converts may have been officials of the postal service, whereas others were landholders. In later Umayyad and early ʿAbbasid times, there was no longer a distinction in taxes paid by Muslims and non-Muslims; they were equally subjects of the state. By the time of the Caliph al-Mansur (754–75), Egyptian and Khurasanian documents were using the same formulas, suggesting a highly centralized empire-wide administration.

In general, the Egyptian economy flourished from Byzantine times to the Middle Ages. Wines, woolens, linen, papyrus, textiles, and grain continued to be exported – although they declined somewhat between 800 and 1000. Although the productivity of agriculture probably declined, grain surpluses continued to be exported to the Hijaz rather than to Constantinople.

Iran

In Iran, the Arab-Muslim conquest and migrations also favored urban and agricultural development. Security, trade, a new population, and new policies regarding settlement, city building, and irrigation stimulated economic growth. In Iran, the conquerors did not found new cities (except Shiraz) but settled in already-established ones. Important places such as Hamadhan, Isfahan, Qazvin, Rayy,

Nishapur, and Marw received Arab-Muslim garrisons. These were usually housed in newly constructed quarters and in villages surrounding the town centers.

Moreover, in Iran, construction and settlement continued beyond the initial conquest. Throughout the seventh and eighth centuries, each important governor imported his own clientele of guards, soldiers, and administrators and built new quarters, palaces, mosques, barracks, gardens, and canals. Surrounding agricultural lands were brought into cultivation. Later caliphs also constructed walls and redefined administrative jurisdictions, thus converting groups of quarters and villages into cities. By this process, Isfahan, Rayy, and Qazvin became large cities. Qum grew from a simple complex of agricultural villages into a major town. Whole regions – such as the districts around Samarqand and Bukhara, favored with new quarters and villages, irrigation works, and walls to defend them against Turkish nomads – prospered. Khwarizm, the delta of the Oxus River, which before the conquests had contained small hamlets and farmsteads interspersed with feudal castles, became highly urbanized and densely settled.

In Khurasan and other parts of Iran, however, only the loosest suzerainty and tributes were imposed, and virtually complete autonomy was conceded to local notables. By the ʿAbbasid period, however, Iranian lordly families (often continuing from Sasanian times) had been incorporated into the bureaucracy, and taxes were being collected by the central government.

Thus, the net effect of the Arab-Muslim conquests and empire formation was prosperity in Iran, a redistribution of the pattern of development in Iraq, and the partial economic decline of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt.

The integration of conquering and conquered peoples

Under pressures of war, migration, and intensive economic changes, the fundamental assumption of the conquest empire – that Arab and

non-Arab populations would be segregated, with the former serving as a military elite and the latter as producers and taxpayers – proved untenable. Instead, conquered and conquering peoples assimilated to each other on the basis of new communities and new Arab and Islamic identities.

Sedentarization itself created pressures for the assimilation of Arabs into the surrounding societies. Under the pressures of town life, Arabian kinship and lineage societies became socially stratified, occupationally differentiated, and communally organized. In the garrison cities, each major clan or tribal group originally had its own quarter, mosque, cemetery, and meeting place. Over time, however, the tent dwellings were replaced by reed huts; the huts were reinforced with earthen walls and then replaced with mud-brick houses. The bedouins, once accustomed to migration, found themselves immured in brick.

The military and administrative systems also generated profound changes by requiring that the preexisting units of Arabian society be rearranged into artificial groups. To make uniform regiments and to pay units of about a thousand men, large clans were subdivided and smaller ones combined. In 670, tens of thousands of families were moved from Basra and Kufa to garrison Marw in Khurasan, and all the remaining groups were reorganized. Also, newcomers who came in continuous streams to partake in the Arab-Muslim wars had to be integrated into the basic units. Even though the military units kept their clan and tribal names – perhaps also their kinship core – they no longer represented the pre-Islamic Arabian social structure.

Furthermore, class distinctions separated the chiefs and ordinary tribesmen. Military and administrative functions widened the gap between the chiefs and their followers. The existence of privately owned palaces and agricultural estates suggests that the chiefs were enjoying wealth, privileges, and a style of life far removed from that of the mass of their clansmen. The military elites began to form a new class stratum, fortified by marriage ties. Tribal society was being transformed into a society stratified into classes based on wealth and power.

Settlement also entailed the transformation of bedouins and soldiers into an economically differentiated working population. As Basra developed into an important administrative capital, a center of cloth manufacturing, and a trading city connected with Iran, India, China, and Arabia, Arab settlers became merchants, traders, artisans, and workers – supplementing their meager military allotments with new incomes. Similarly, the new religion of Islam offered opportunities for social mobility through careers in teaching, scholarship, and legal administration.

Simultaneously, settlements obfuscated the distinctions between Arabs and non-Arabs. As a capital and commercial center, Basra attracted non-Arab settlers. The soldiers and administrators of the old regime came to seek their fortunes. Iranian regiments were enlisted en masse as Arab governors brought back troops from the east. Sasanian soldiers were important as private retainers, bodyguards, and police in the service of Arab elites. The Asawira – Persian archers taken on as clients of the Tamim tribe in Basra – maintained their own language and resided in their own quarter. Bukharan archers were added in 673. Shakiriyya – the personal guards of Persian princes and landowners – became clients of Arab generals, setting a precedent for the Persian and Turkish military units that would later constitute the ʿAbbasid armies. Numerous other ethnic groups – Armenians, Azarbayjanis, Ethiopians, Sudanese, Berbers, Qiqaniyya from India, and Saqaliba (freed Slavs from the Antakya region) – were recruited in the course of the Arab-Muslim campaigns to provide loyal, reliable troops for the caliphs, governors, and Arab generals. Progressively, these new forces replaced Arabian forces. As the tribesmen of Basra and Kufa were demobilized and became civilian town dwellers, other ethnicities became the mainstay of the caliphal armies. These diverse ethnic groups were assimilated into Arab-Muslim society.

Furthermore, clerks, tax collectors, estate managers, village chiefs, and landowners flocked to the centers of government. Merchants in lucrative, long-distance trade and humble workers (including bath attendants, weavers, and spinners) migrated to the new towns. Slaves (captured and purchased), itinerant construction

workers, fugitive peasants, and migrant laborers – seeking employment and relief from the harshness of the countryside – also flooded the new cities. The most numerous elements of these diverse, non-Arab groups were Iranians and Arameans (the people of Iraq). Most of them were originally Nestorian Christians, but many were Jews. Indians, Malays, Gypsies, Africans, and Turks also came in small numbers from remote areas. As intermarriage and assimilation occurred, the meaning of "Arab" was less and less definable.

The assimilation of these non-Arabs had important repercussions for Arab society and identity. Arabs tried to absorb the newcomers into the old clan structure as clients (*mawali* [plural], or *mawla* [singular]). The concept of clientage was inherited from pre-Islamic Arabia, where a client was an inferior associate of an Arab clan. Very often, he was a former slave who was freed and then raised to the level of client, although many people were adopted or contracted directly into the status. The client was almost a member of the clan; his heirs were also clients. Clients could expect support and protection and would be helped in arranging marriages. The protection of the powerful was exchanged for the loyalty of the subordinates.

However, as they absorbed clients, Arab clans ceased to be kin units and became stratified political and economic groups built around a kinship core. The gap between aristocratic and plebeian clans widened. For example, in the Tamim tribe, the noble clans acquired former Persian cavalry units as their clients, whereas others had slave laborers and weavers as theirs.

Clientage also generated conflicts between clients and patrons. Even clients with skills in war, administration, commerce, medicine, and religious life were viewed as social inferiors. They were exploited economically and could not intermarry with Arabs or inherit equally. The active soldiers resented exclusion from the military payrolls (*diwans*), because enrollment was not only a financial benefit but a symbol of social privilege. Clients wanted to be recognized as part of the elite, but to the upper class (mostly, but not exclusively, Arabs) this was unthinkable. They clung to their status

and privileges and resented the importance of the clients in the army and administration, their religious precocity, their commercial skill, and the shadow they cast over Arab primacy.

In Iran, different circumstances led to similar outcomes. At Isfahan, Marw, Nishapur, and Balkh, the Arab-Muslim garrisons were settled in villages (rather than in cities) and conquerors rapidly became landowners or peasants. Of the 50,000 families initially settled in Marw in 670, only 15,000 were still in active military service by 730. Most of the Arab-Muslim army had by then left active service for civilian occupations. In Azarbayjan, parties of Arabs from Basra and Kufa seized lands and villages and established themselves as a local landowning aristocracy. In Kirman, Arab migrants reclaimed abandoned lands, founded new villages, and settled as a peasant population. In all these provinces, Arab landowning elites came into being. These Arabs refused to take up military duties and found themselves – although in principle an elite caste – in fact absorbed into the occupations of the subject population. Furthermore, in Iran, occupational assimilation was accompanied by social assimilation. Although some Persians became Muslim or Arabized, Arabs by and large assimilated to the Persian milieu. Arabs spoke Persian, dressed like Persians, celebrated Persian holidays, and married Persian women.

Thus, within fifty years, the founding of new cities and the transfer of economic opportunities and political power to new peoples and new places stimulated the interpenetration of Arab and non-Arab peoples. Non-Arabs permeated the Arab-Muslim military caste as converts and associates, and Arabs became landowners, merchants, and settlers. The pressures generated by sedentarization and urbanization and by contact with other Middle Eastern peoples dissolved the lineage structure of the old tribal society, fostered new group and communal structures, intensified the stratification of society and the division of labor, and led to the formation of new mixed Arab and non-Arab communities.

Conversions to Islam

Conversion was a very gradual process. Although earlier Muslim and Western writers assumed that the region was forcibly, quickly, and massively converted to Islam, nowhere in the sources is there mention of the conversion of large numbers of people, or of whole villages, towns, and regions. The only known exception may be on the Byzantine frontier. The available evidence points, rather, to a slow and uneven process of social and religious transformations. Moreover, the modern notion of conversion does not correspond to the historical process by which individuals came to identify themselves as Muslim for a variety of political, economic, and social reasons. Conversion did not necessarily imply a profound inner spiritual change.

There are a number of reasons for the slow pace of conversions. The Arab-Muslim elite assumed that they would form a dual society in which the conquerors would constitute an aristocracy and the conquered peoples a subject population: the former Muslim, the latter not. Arab elites were resistant to the conversion of masses of people partly to defend their exclusive privileges and partly to preserve the full revenue base of the regime.

The early Muslim regime was also religiously tolerant of the non-Muslim populations. In the highly fluid social world of the seventh century, peoples of all ethnicities and religions blended into public life. Muslims and non-Muslims were not segregated in public spaces such as markets, baths, and festivals. In Syria, they even shared churches before the conquerors were ready to build mosques for themselves. The Muslims recognized or accepted these churches as holy places and may not have fully distinguished Islam from Christianity.

Furthermore, in the seventh century, the Arab-Muslim regime helped reorganize the Christian churches. The Nestorian Church in Iraq resumed its roles in the educational, judicial, and even political administration of the Christian population. In Egypt, the Muslim authorities cooperated with Coptic lay and clerical notables. Christian scribes served in the administration of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. In Iraq, Azarbayjan, Khuzistan, and Sistan, relations with local notables were

generally cooperative and allowed for the survival of the fire temples. For the sake of political inclusiveness and effective administration, the empire collaborated with non-Muslim elites, permitted them partial access to power, and protected them against disruptive social and economic changes.

Nonetheless, in the postconquest mingling of peoples, conversions began to take place. The earliest converts to Islam were those Christian-bedouin tribes living on the margin of the Fertile Crescent who were swept up in the great migrations. Later, in the first century of Arab rule, other Mesopotamian Arab tribes also accepted Islam – although many remained Christian. The Taghlib living on the Byzantine frontier, for example, remained Christian well into the ʿAbbasid era but were considered loyal forces and were exempt from the poll tax levied on non-Muslim subjects.

Once the Arab conquests were secure, conversions began among the elites of the former Sasanian Empire. Soldiers, officials, and landowners made common cause with the conquerors and accepted Islam. Client soldiers and scribes serving the Arab elite converted. Conversions implied the ratification of old privileges and paved the way for entry into the dominant elite. Other strata of the population attracted to the Arab garrisons, including merchants, workers, and peasants fleeing the land, also converted. Prisoners were likely converts. In these cases, conversions involved mobile individuals and not classes or whole communities.

Islam was not imposed on the population but attracted people who wanted to escape from social and fiscal constraints and join the ruling elite. Converts might gain tax and political advantages, protection of landed property, employment, or perhaps manumission from slavery. The weakening of the older clerical and political elites facilitated the breakdown of communities and social mobility.

By the beginning of the eighth century, conversions became a policy issue for the caliphate and the Arab elite. Elite elements resisted the dilution of their status and revenues. Religious activists favored conversions. Widespread Arab assimilation into the general population and numerous conversions led many Arabs to accept the

equality of Arabs and non-Arabs and to value Muslim as well as Arab identities.

Transoxania reflects both attitudes. In Khurasan and Transoxania, converts began to demand exemptions from the poll tax (*jizya*). The political response was inconsistent. Some governors favored exemption in the interest of mobilizing local support for the struggle against Soghdian and Turkish peoples in the east; others resisted or revoked the changes in order to maintain the revenues and the support of Arab military cadres.

Caliphs also were divided. ʿUmar II (r. 717–21) favored the equality of all Muslims regardless of social origin. He sought to put the empire on a Muslim, rather than a strictly Arab, basis; he accepted the fundamental equality of all Muslims, Arab and non-Arab, and promulgated new laws giving fiscal equality to Muslims regardless of origin. Although later caliphs abandoned this policy, the sporadic attempts at encouraging conversion to Islam marked a turning point in the ongoing integration of Arabs and conquered peoples as Arab religious intellectuals undertook missionary activity in Khurasan and Transoxania.

Moreover, the religious and cultural barriers to conversion were low, because Islam was similar to Judaism and Christianity and because conversion may not have been understood in this period as a radical change. Converts may have signified their conversion by praying, by going to a mosque, by changing their names, or by dressing like an Arab; intellectual study or a change in moral or spiritual beliefs may not have been required. Some Muslim theological and legal schools – such as the Murjiʿa and Hanafis – held that a simple declaration of Muslim allegiance, rather than performance of works, made a true Muslim – a position favorable to new converts. Thus, in the first Muslim century, as myriad converts entered Islam – bringing the cultural, ritual, and legal practices of their old religions and societies – the religious beliefs and practices of new Muslims must have been exceedingly varied.

Reciprocally, Arab-Muslims were open to the incorporation of past religious beliefs, symbols, practices, and holy places into their own

culture. This openness would persist for centuries until Islam became fully consolidated in its own cultural identity.

The potential religious position of converts in the seventh and eighth centuries may parallel that of converts in Central and southern Asia during later Muslim conquests. People who worked for the new governments or who had business with them were the first to convert. These converts had many different stances toward Islam. Many were nominal converts who pronounced the testimonial (*shahada*) but who otherwise continued to live in their non-Muslim families and communities, taking part in the worship and festival life of the old religions. They were Muslims without Islamic orthodox teachings and practices. Still others would have been won over by the preaching, piety, and miracles of Muslim holy men. Others would have assimilated more deeply, perhaps taking positions that led to the acquisition of new languages and religious knowledge, perhaps becoming scholars of Islam ('*ulama*'). They may or may not have remained connected to nonconverted families and communities. In time, with education and incessant pressure from Muslim scholars, their practice would increasingly conform to the Islamic orthodoxy of that period.

Several scholarly efforts have been made to assess the amount and the historical rhythm of conversions. One method is to study family names in later biographical dictionaries and identify the earliest Muslim members. Based on this methodology, Bulliet concluded that conversions before 695 were minimal. The numbers of converts significantly rose between 695 and 762; by then, perhaps 10 percent of the town populations had converted. Conversions rapidly increased in the ʿAbbasid period until perhaps half of the town populations were Muslim by 850.

A second approach is to mine the chronicles for specific cases. By the late seventh century, Christian writers in Syria were concerned with apostasy. By the middle of the eighth century, there seems to have been a steady progress of conversions in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. Significant numbers of converts were located in and around the Muslim garrison centers.

In Iran, the chronicles indicate a very irregular pattern. As early as 666, Zoroastrians in Sistan were converting. In the 720s, masses of Samarqandis converted – probably in response to pledges of equality and tax relief. Between 723 and 738, there were 30,000 converts in Marw. By the end of the eighth century, sources report that Hanafi missionaries had converted 100,000 people in Farghana, Shash, and Balkh. The chronicles do not support Bulliet's hypothesis about the rate of conversion and instead indicate that conversions were episodic and driven by local circumstances. Despite this rising tide of converts to Islam, outside the garrison towns, the mass of Middle Eastern peoples remained non-Muslims.

Arabic and other Middle Eastern languages

Along with conversion to Islam, common languages emerged. In general, Arabic became the language of written communication in administration, literature, and religion. It also became the predominant spoken dialect in the western parts of the Middle East – North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iraq – where languages close to Arabic (such as Aramaic and Syriac) were already spoken. The adoption of Arabic as a language of literature, learning, politics, and everyday life was a critical milestone in the transformation of Middle Eastern cultures.

The spread of Arabic was faster than the diffusion of Islam, but this is not to say that the process was rapid or complete. In Syria, Greek was the language of the elites, intellectuals, and clergy, but Aramaic and Armenian were the ordinary spoken languages. Arabic became more prominent than Greek during the eighth century, but Greek continued to exist as both a literary and a spoken language. Arabic became the lingua franca of Melkites, but until the end of the eighth century, inscriptions in churches and ecclesiastical literature were written in Greek, and Greek continued to be used in monastic contexts until the Crusades. Theodore of Abu Qurra (d. c. 825) was the first important Christian theologian to write in Arabic. Coptic was still spoken in Fustat in the eighth century. In Syria and Iraq, there continued to be Aramaic-speaking populations.

In western Iran, however, Arabic did not predominate. Arab settlers were absorbed into the local populations and became bilingual. Not only did Arabs learn Persian, but the Arab-Muslim conquests became the vehicle for the introduction of Persian as the lingua franca of the peoples east of the Oxus. In Transoxania, Persian – the spoken language of Arabs in eastern Iran – replaced Soghdian as the common language for Arabs, Persians, and Soghdians.

Thus, within a century of the Arab-Muslim conquests, the basic principles on which the empire was organized were no longer valid. In the nomadic kingdom organized by Caliph 'Umar, Arabian peoples were to constitute a "nation in arms," settled in garrison centers, segregated from the subject peoples, restricted to military activities, and barred from commerce and agriculture. Membership in Islam was their prerogative. Non-Arab peoples were to keep their communal ties and religions and continue to work in the productive occupations that enabled them to support the ruling elite.

In the course of the first Muslim century, the Arabs changed from primarily (although not exclusively) a clan or tribal people into a primarily urban people; they assimilated with non-Arab peoples, abandoned military affairs, took on civilian occupations, and lost their monopoly on Islam. Correspondingly, non-Arab peoples entered the military and government services, converted to Islam, adopted the Arabic language, and claimed a place in the government of the empire in which they were initially subjects. Economic and social changes in the garrison centers, conversions, and shared languages paved the way for the society of the future: no longer divided between Arab conqueror and conquered peoples but united on the basis of their commitment to Islam, sharing an Arabic and/or Persian linguistic identity.

The mutual assimilation of peoples and the emergence of Islamic Middle Eastern communities took place, however, only in a restricted number of garrison centers. Most of the Middle Eastern population remained outside the influence of the new societies, still bound to their more ancient heritage. Nonetheless, the cosmopolitan communities would set the tone of Middle Eastern politics and

culture for centuries to come. The integration of Arab-Muslims and others in the garrison settlements was the social foundation for the integration of old and new religions and cultures.

Chapter 8 The Caliphate to 750

The caliphate was established as the succession to Muhammad and became a defining institution of Muslim societies. It was, however, an evolving institution with a different political and religious meaning in successive eras. The first phase, the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–61; known as Rashidun), was the religious chieftainship of a community and the political leadership of a coalition of nomadic conquerors. In the succeeding early Umayyad period (661–85), the caliphate was refashioned as a Syrian-Arab monarchy. In the later Umayyad (685–750), the caliphate was transformed into a new form of Middle Eastern empire defined and legitimized both in older imperial and in Islamic terms.

The Rightly Guided Caliphs

The bare outlines of the historical record suggest a very uncertain and contested beginning. At the death of the Prophet, there was no instruction from him and no agreement among his followers that there should be a succession at all. ʿUmar and other Muslims persuaded a partial gathering of the community to accept Abu Bakr as caliph. Abu Bakr (632–34), the first of the Rashidun caliphs, was named *amir al-muʾminin* (commander of the believers), a *shaykh* or chief who led the collectivity, arbitrated disputes, and followed the precedents set by Muhammad. His authority derived from tribal tradition, his personal connection to the Prophet, and the community's election of him. According to tradition, on assuming his office, Abu Bakr said simply that he would obey the precedent (sunna) of the Prophet and that people should obey him as long as he obeyed it.

Nonetheless, Abu Bakr made a number of decisions that defined the political direction of the new regime. He decided that all tribes formerly allied to Muhammad would have to continue to pay taxes (*zakat*), and he waged war on those who refused, a period known as

the apostasy (*ridda*) wars. He installed the governors who administered the conquered territories. He made legal decisions about the property of Muhammad, ruling that it belonged to the community and could not be inherited by Muhammad's family. The traditions say both that Abu Bakr named his colleague 'Umar to succeed him and that 'Umar was elected by the community.

'Umar's reign (634–44) continued the roles of the caliph as head of a religious community and ruler of a growing empire. 'Umar promulgated laws abolishing temporary marriage, increasing punishment for adultery, and regulating parentage by concubines. He established the *hijra* calendar and promoted religious identity by building mosques and appointing religious officials such as judges, preachers, and Quran reciters. From the beginning, however, there were deep divisions within the Muslim community. The succession of caliphs was disputed. 'Ali was regarded by his supporters as the intended heir of the Prophet because of his personal piety and the great importance placed in Arabian society on blood kinship. Madelung makes a strong case that 'Ali was the intended heir of the Prophet, but that there was in effect a coup in which a minority brought Abu Bakr to power. The bitterness was heightened by Abu Bakr's denial of Muhammad's property as inheritances for the family of 'Ali.

In addition, a political rivalry developed between the Quraysh (the Meccan tribal leaders) and the early Meccan and Medinan followers of the Prophet. The Caliph 'Umar adopted a Muslim-centric policy, favoring the Meccan companions of the Prophet (the *muhajirun*), his Medinan helpers (the *ansar*), and the clans who had supported Medina in the Arabian wars and had been early participants in the conquest of Iraq. 'Umar appointed them to governorships, generalships, and administrative posts; he gave them the highest stipends and allowed them to administer the abandoned Sasanian crown lands (*sawafi*). The Quraysh aristocracy resented 'Umar's policies. In the provinces, powerful Arabian clans and the chiefs of the earlier tribal opposition also claimed a share of power.

'Uthman (644–56) succeeded 'Umar by the vote of a council of notables appointed by 'Umar. He was a Meccan aristocrat of the

Umayyad clan, and he reversed ʿUmar's policies and favored Umayyads, other Meccans, and large clans at the expense of the emigrants and Medinans. To accomplish this redistribution of power, ʿUthman increased central control over provincial revenues. He also took initiatives in religious matters, including the promulgation of a standard edition of the Quran. This expressly laid claim to religious authority and was resented by other companions of the Prophet, who viewed themselves as custodians of the holy book. ʿUthman thus reasserted the pre-Islamic coalition of Meccan and Arabian tribal aristocrats against the new Islamized elements and claimed an enlarged authority for the caliph to effect social, economic, and religious changes.

In implementing these policies, ʿUthman provoked bitter opposition, conspiracies, and, eventually, civil war. In 656, he was murdered by a party of about 500 soldiers from Fustat. In the wake of this murder, ʿAli was elected caliph. As the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, as well as one of the earliest converts to Islam, ʿAli had claimed the caliphate on the basis of his devotion to Muhammad and Islam, but he was compromised because he had come to power with the support of ʿUthman's assassins and without the legitimacy conferred by a council (*shura*) of companions (*sahaba*). He opposed the centralization of caliphal control over provincial revenues and favored an equal distribution of taxes and booty among Arab-Muslims.

ʿAli's accession led to factional fighting. First, he was opposed by a faction led by the Meccan aristocrats Talha and Zubayr and ʿAʾisha (the Prophet's favorite wife), whom he defeated at the Battle of the Camel in 656. He was then challenged by Muʿawiya (ʿUthman's cousin and the governor of Syria), who refused ʿAli's demands for allegiance and demanded revenge for ʿUthman's assassination and punishment for his killers. The opponents and their armies met at the Battle of Siffin (657), where after months of desultory confrontation and negotiations, the moderates forced an agreement to arbitrate the question of whether ʿUthman's murder was justified. Some of ʿAli's supporters, called the secessionists (Kharijis), held that they were loyal to the ruler only so long as he upheld the Quran and the sunna; they saw ʿAli's willingness to submit to arbitration as a violation of

religious principles. They turned against him and were defeated in battle, but this new round of bloodshed further fragmented the Muslim community.

The results of the two arbitration meetings are not clearly known, but it seems that the arbitrators agreed that ʿUthman's murder was not justified (a boost for Umayyad claims) and did not agree on the continuation of ʿAli's caliphate. In the course of the next two years, ʿAli's support disintegrated. The protracted struggle had begun to threaten the security of the empire and the flow of revenues. As rebellions in eastern Iran cut off the payment of taxes to the tribesmen of Basra and Kufa, Arab opinion turned in favor of Muʿawiya. He was backed by disciplined forces; he seemed able to maintain order within the Arab-Muslim elite and to sustain control over the empire. After ʿAli's assassination by a Khariji, Muʿawiya declared himself caliph and was accepted as such by the political elites. He was the founder of the Umayyad dynasty (661–750).

This protracted civil war initiated a lasting division within Muslim society: henceforth, Muslims were divided over who had the legitimate right to occupy the caliphate. Muslims who accepted the succession of Muʿawiya and the historical sequence of caliphs after him are called the Sunnis. Those who held that ʿAli was the only rightful caliph and that only his descendants should succeed him are called the Shiʿis. For the Shiʿis, ʿAli gradually became not only a family claimant but the repository of high religious authority – the living embodiment of God's continuing guidance. Shiʿis tended to stress the religious functions of the caliphate and to deplore its political compromises; Sunnis were inclined to circumscribe its religious role and to be more tolerant of its political involvements. Kharijis held that the caliph should be elected by the community of Muslims at large and hold his position only so long as he was sinless in the conduct of his office. As these early differences were vested with ever-widening religious importance, Sunnis, Shiʿis, and Kharijis developed separate versions of Islam and formed distinct religious bodies within the community as a whole.

The precise nature and the boundaries of the caliph's authority have always been in dispute. The caliphs were cited in administrative

documents and inscriptions as successors to the Prophet, and they claimed to be heirs of the Prophet's mantle and staff. In Medina, the caliphs were dignified as the companions of the Prophet, tribal chiefs, jurists, arbitrators, exemplars, and holy men. In Muslim historiography, the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rashidun) – or some of them – are seen as the saintly perpetuators of the teachings of Muhammad. The conquests emphasized the military and political dimensions of the succession to Muhammad. Non-Muslim scholars have long perceived the caliphate as representing both Muhammad's political and religious leadership.

This authority, however, was by no means absolute. Apart from the caliphate, the companions of the Prophet – repositories of Prophetic memories and scholars of hadith and religious knowledge – exerted an important local, communal, and religious authority. From an early time, the collective authority of the companions was an implied alternative to the disputed authority of the caliphs.

The titles taken by the early caliphs also imply modest claims. The one official title attested from early times was "commander of the believers" (*amir al-mu'minin*). Crone and Hinds insisted that the title "deputy of God" (*khalifat allah*) was used by both Abu Bakr and ʿUmar as a sign of transcending authority, but Sunni sources – which they mistakenly dismiss as propaganda – indicate that Abu Bakr and ʿUmar used the more modest title "deputy of the prophet of God" (*khalifat rasul allah*) as well as "commander of the believers." Similarly, the term "imam" – adopted by the Shiʿis to mean divinely gifted spiritual leader and source of law – was, in later Umayyad times, applied to all persons and texts deemed authoritative. It was applied to the Quran, to the early caliphs, to companions, and to later jurists. It also referred to military leaders. Thus, the titles "*khalifat allah*" and "imam" were adopted in later literature and perhaps by later caliphs but did not originate with a defined meaning in the early period.

The Umayyad monarchy (661–685)

(See Figure 2.) The first civil war created permanent sectarian divisions within the Muslim community. Driven by changing historical circumstances and by political and religious conflicts among Arab-Muslim elites, the caliphate had to rebuild its institutions, validate its authority, and mobilize the political, economic, and ideological resources it needed to rule. Its response was to strengthen its institutional bases among Arab tribes and to give new voice to its Muslim credentials. On seizing power, Muʿawiya (661–80) expanded the military and administrative powers of the state. He appointed regional governors atop the network of tribal forces but did not yet establish a centralized government apparatus. His dynasty, the Sufyanid, ruled as a family regime through tributaries with a minimal bureaucracy; they were the directors of a tribal coalition. To satisfy the interests of the tribal chiefs, the conquests were resumed in North Africa and eastern Iran. On the Syrian front, Muʿawiya kept peace with the Byzantine Empire so that he could hold Syrian forces in reserve for purposes of internal policing. Further, he sought to build up revenues from private royal incomes, from confiscated Byzantine and Sasanian crown lands, and from investments in reclamation and irrigation.

Figure 2.   The Banu Umayya and the Umayyad caliphs.

Muʿawiya also devised new moral and political grounds for loyalty to the caliphate. He tried to cloak his growing police and financial

powers under religious gestures. He minted Sasanian-type coins "in the name of God" and called himself commander of the believers. Notably, there is no surviving mention of the Prophet.

The regime patronized Arabic poetry, genealogy, and history. Tribal lore, genealogies, and histories of Yemen were among the first matters to be set down in writing. Arabic poetry was adopted as sponsored court poetry. It derived from the *qasida* form of poetry, featuring praise of oneself and one's tribe and praise of the Lakhmid and Ghassanid kings. The presentation of praise poems was a ceremonial and ritual function in which lauding of the ruler was exchanged for gifts and honors to the poet; the recognition of royal power exchanged for royal beneficence. The *qasida* form attached the past to the present by making both patron and poet heirs of the Arabic cultural heritage. For the ruling elite in this period, however, Arab identity and Muslim identity were likely indistinguishable.

Mu'awiya's personal qualities were more important than any institutions. He embodied the traditional Arab virtues of conciliation, consultation, generosity, and respect for tribal tradition. He is legendary for his *hilm* – clemency, patience, and the power to do harm restrained by forbearance – his talent for dealing with his followers so that they cooperated without feeling that their dignity had been offended. If the caliphate of 'Umar fundamentally rested on his closeness to Muhammad and religious integrity, Mu'awiya's reign was based on state power, his networks of clientele ties, and his ability to exemplify the Arab tribal patriarch.

Despite these efforts, the decades of Mu'awiya's rule did not do away with the causes of the first civil war. Arab aristocrats continued to vie for control of the caliphate. Shi'is aspired to bring Husayn ('Ali's son) to power; Kharijis resisted any impious candidate. Arab factional conflict simmered beneath the surface. When Mu'awiya died, civil war broke out again; this time, it lasted from 680 to 692.

At Mu'awiya's death, his son and successor, Yazid (680–83), fought against Meccan rivals led by 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr. 'Ali's son Husayn attempted to move from Medina to Kufa to lead his followers, but his small party was intercepted at Karbala (Iraq) and destroyed.

At the time, the episode had few repercussions, but Husayn's death gradually assumed the significance of martyrdom. Today, Husayn's shrine at Karbala is one of the great pilgrimage sites of the Muslim world. Along with the defeat of his father, Husayn's death at the hands of the Umayyads deeply divided Muslims. 'Ali is the ancestor of Shi'ism; Husayn is its martyr.

Apart from these direct challenges to the Umayyad caliphate, the civil war period was marked by widespread factional fighting. Whereas the factions of the first civil war were based on Islamic versus tribal loyalties, the new factions were based on ad hoc alliances between clans that had come together in the insecure and changing societies of the garrison towns. Although defined in tribal terms, the warring coalitions were probably composed of older- and younger-generation migrants. The Syrian tribal coalitions – which had for decades been the mainstay of Mu'awiya's reign – divided into two warring coalitions called Yemen (or Kalb) and Qays; they were mainly located in Syria and northern Mesopotamia. The fighting spread to Iraq, where the factions were called Mudar and Tamim, and to Khurasan, where they were called Rabi'a and Qays.

The Kharijis who had repudiated 'Ali after the battle of Siffin formed small bands, usually of between thirty and a hundred men. Each group was at once an outlaw gang and a fanatical religious sect. They were held together by the conviction that they were the only true Muslims and that their rebellions had profound religious justification. A group of Kharijis (called Najda) controlled a good part of Arabia – including Bahrain, Oman, Hadhramaut, and Yemen – before they were finally crushed. These Khariji bands were most likely formed by uprooted individuals looking for communal affiliation through sectarian movements. The second civil war, then, was a crisis for the cohesion of the Arab-Muslim elite, for its political authority, and for its concepts of true belief and communal leadership.

The imperial caliphate: the Marwanids (685–750)

The Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705), backed by Syrian Yemeni armies, eventually crushed his numerous opponents. The new caliph and his successor, al-Walid (705–15), faced with endemic religious opposition – both Shiʿi and Khariji – and tribal factionalism, set in motion a new phase in the process of defining the beliefs, symbols, and institutions of Arab-Muslim society. The caliphate was transformed from a coalition of nomadic conquerors into a new form of Middle Eastern empire, defined and legitimized in both historic imperial and Islamic terms. The reigns of ʿAbd al-Malik, his son al-Walid, and their successors generated reinventions of the caliphate with profound implications for Islamic societies.

The new caliphate was built on the further centralization of state power. In domestic policy, ʿAbd al-Malik demilitarized the Arabs in the garrison cities of Iraq. A Syrian army policed Iraq from a new garrison town built at al-Wasit. Syrian forces replaced Iraqi soldiers in all the eastern campaigns. The Arabs of Kufa and Basra were now treated as pensioned subjects of the empire they had founded.

In foreign policy, the caliphate resumed conquests on a massive scale. The early conquests, which made use of tribal migrations and the annual campaigns of Arab forces based in the garrison cities, were superseded by planned attacks on remote places, carried out with the aid of non-Arab forces. These new wars were not fought for tribal expansion but were imperial wars waged for world domination. They brought North Africa, Spain, Transoxania, and Sind into the Muslim empire. Three failed attempts to conquer Constantinople indicate the ambition to inherit the Roman Empire.

The caliphal court was also reorganized. In Muʿawiya's time, the caliph was surrounded by Arab chiefs. Now a chamberlain kept visitors in order and regulated daily business. The officials of the chancery, the officer of the royal seal, guards, and scribes, as well as Arab favorites, surrounded the ruler. Important governorships were still assigned to Arab leaders, but the business of government was conducted by professional administrators (both Arab and non-Arab) rather than by councils of Arab chiefs. The caliphate had transformed itself from tribal-based rule into an imperial government.

In administration, ʿAbd al-Malik and al-Walid rebuilt roads, put in milestones, and reorganized the postal service. Large numbers of uniform tax seals were issued, suggesting a standardized procedure for producing them. Passports were issued with formulaic language invoking the name of God (the *basmala*) and stating that the document was "ordered by [name of caliph] commander of the believers" on a particular *hijra* date. Passports named the hierarchy of issuing authorities from caliph to scribe.

The Marwanids also arranged for the translation of the tax registers from Greek and Persian into Arabic. Résumés, copies, and reports appeared in Arabic. The changeover was made in 697 in Iraq, in 700 in Syria and Egypt, and shortly afterward in Khurasan. Umayyad administration also began to delineate a unique organizational identity. In the first decades of the Arab empire, administration had been carried out by Greek- and Persian-speaking officials inherited from the older empires. By 700, however, a new generation of Arabic-speaking clients came to power – an indication of a broad process of Arabization in the region. They and their descendants formed the secretarial backbone of the Arab-Muslim empire until the tenth century. With new personnel, the Marwanids carried out extensive censuses and land surveys and introduced empire-wide systematic record keeping and taxation. The caliphs then proceeded to reorganize the finances of various regions.

The crisis of the dynasty and the rise of the ʿAbbasids

The assertion of a new form of Arab-Muslim imperium, however, did not allay political and social unrest. Tribal-factional struggles within the military elite continued. In the Sufyanid period, the Arab-Muslim forces were still identified along tribal lines (Qays or Yemen), but by the Marwanid period, they had become military factions. As generals took over governorships and appointed their kin and clients to office, the factionalism intensified. Syria had previously been governed by the caliph's kin. By the time of the third civil war, it was ruled by the

generals. Syria was largely in the control of the Yemeni faction and the Jazira was largely controlled by the Qays.

Furthermore, the clients who served as soldiers in the armies and as administrators in the government bureaucracy demanded equality of status and privilege with the Arabs. Peasant converts claimed the right to exemption from the taxes levied on non-Muslims. In the face of these demands, caliphs did not implement a consistent policy. ʿAbd al-Malik did not discriminate against clients, but he was opposed to the conversion of peasants. ʿUmar II reversed this policy, accepted converts, and enrolled them in the army.

The struggle among these competing interests came to a head in the reign of ʿUmar II (717–20). ʿUmar believed that the domination of one ethnic caste over other peoples was un-Islamic. The peoples who filled the armies and staffed the administration, the merchants and artisans who took a leading part in the propagation of Islam, would all have to be accepted as participants in the empire. The antagonisms between Arabs and non-Arabs would have to be dissolved into a universal Muslim unity. He felt that the empire could no longer be an Arab empire but had to be the imperium of all Muslims. He thus promoted the conversion of all of the peoples of West Asia to Islam and their acceptance as equals to Arabs.

In his actual policies, ʿUmar demonstrated a pragmatic approach. He accepted the claim of the clients that all active Muslim soldiers (Arabs or not) were entitled to equal pay, and he also accepted the tax equality of all Muslims, but he implemented his decisions in ways that protected the interests of the state. Although converts claimed exemption from land and poll taxes as a form of equality with Arabs, ʿUmar ruled that land taxes applied to all landowners regardless of social status and that both Arab-Muslim landlords and converts would have to pay them. The poll tax was to be paid only by non-Muslims, but Arab-Muslim settlers and converts were expected to pay the alms tax, which partially compensated the state for the loss of poll tax revenues.

Later caliphs attempted to implement these principles, but with very limited success. Throughout the late Umayyad period, the interest in

reconciliation and justice conflicted with maintenance of the status quo; caliphal policy oscillated between tax concessions and cancellation of concessions.

These circumstances provoked opposition, and the stage was set for a third Muslim civil war. In Sunni religious circles, there was deep suspicion of and hostility toward the caliphate. Although supporting the caliphate in principle as the expression of the Muslim community, many Sunni religious leaders were alienated by the military and administrative policies of the regime and by its evident assumption of an imperial authority. Some Sunni thinkers wished to dissociate themselves from the regime, but not from the concept of the caliphate and its religious significance as the succession to the Prophet.

The Shiʿis claimed that the caliphate rightly belonged to the family of ʿAli, chosen by God to teach Islam and to rule the Islamic community. They raised the hopes of many disgruntled Arabs and converts that out of this family would come a savior (Mahdi). If Banu Hashim had borne Muhammad and ʿAli, might they not produce the messiah to come? Since the second civil war, however, the ʿAlids had scarcely been manifest in public, although various members were organizing underground conspiracies against the Umayyads. Between 736 and 740, Shiʿi agitation finally broke out in Kufa, and a number of Kufans were seized by the police and executed. In 740, Zayd b. ʿAli, a grandson of Husayn, rebelled and was defeated.

Meanwhile, another branch of the Banu Hashim (the ʿAbbasids) was biding its time. The ʿAbbasids, like the ʿAlids, were descended from an uncle of Muhammad, named ʿAbbas, but their immediate claim to the caliphate rested on the allegation that a great-grandson of ʿAli, Abu Hashim, had bequeathed them leadership of the family and of the opposition movement. While the ʿAlid branch of the family concentrated on Kufa with no success, the ʿAbbasid branch proselytized in Khurasan, sending a succession of missionaries to mobilize all the opponents of the Umayyads. ʿAbbasid agents agitated for revenge for ʿAli, for the overthrow of the Umayyads, and for a new era of peace and justice. From 744, the leading ʿAbbasid agent, Abu Muslim, built up an underground movement and

organized military support in Khurasan. The ʿAbbasids attempted to exploit factional fighting among Arabs, messianic movements, and provincial rebellions. The Hashimite propaganda was an effort to find a common denominator for all the political hopes of a return to a just caliphate.

With the death of the Caliph Hisham in 743, the Umayyad regime collapsed. The later Umayyad caliphs had increasingly used the military power of Syria to control other Arab-Muslims and to stiffen the armies fighting on the frontiers of the empire with professional, battle-hardened troops. Garrison duties exposed Syrian troops in these areas to the brunt of warfare precisely at a time when the empire was suffering temporary setbacks. The Turks had driven the Muslim army from Transoxania. The Khazars (a nomadic people living beyond the Caucasus) had broken through Muslim defenses, defeated them at Ardabil, invaded Armenia, and penetrated as far as Mosul in 730. In 740, the Byzantines won a decisive victory over Umayyad invaders at Acrazas in Anatolia and destroyed a major Syrian army. Arab and Berber invaders were defeated in central France in 732. Berber rebellions under the banner of Kharijism broke out in North Africa and destroyed a Syrian army of 27,000 men. What remained of this army made its way to Spain, where parts of it helped establish the Spanish Umayyad dynasty. It took yet another Syrian army to quell these rebellions in 742. These defeats brought an end to the imperial phase of Arab-Muslim empire building and left Syria militarily depleted. Having based a century of rule on the ever-increasing power of the state, the Umayyad dynasty now found itself without the military basis for effective central government. From 744 to 750, not only the ʿAbbasids but Shiʿis, Kharijis, tribal factions, and ambitious provincial governors struggled to seize the throne.

In 747, the ʿAbbasids were ready to move. In the villages of Khurasan – especially around Marw – Abu Muslim (the ʿAbbasid agent) found the support he needed. Khurasan was in a fever of political agitation and eschatological expectation. Popular apocryphal writings called *Jafr* and *al-Malahim* foretold fateful battles, the imminent end of the world, the coming of the messiah (Mahdi), and the beginning of a new era of universal justice. In this atmosphere,

Abu Muslim rallied peoples aggrieved by loss of status and by unjust taxes and, with only about 3,000 fighting men, defeated rival factions and seized the caliphate.

On the basis of support in Khurasan, the ʿAbbasids prevailed. Yet after centuries of scholarly research, it is still not entirely clear who these supporters were. There are two principal theories. One is that the ʿAbbasid organization was founded by Yamani Arabs and their clients in Kufa, whose agents in Khurasan mobilized the support of disaffected Persians. These Persians were Umayyad clients angry with the Umayyads because of the failure to reward them with a place on the military payrolls, and Persian converts to Islam who had been subjected to unjust taxation. Arabs were generally, but not exclusively, on the Umayyad side.

The alternative theory is that the ʿAbbasids were supported primarily by Arabs from the villages around Marw, belonging to the Yamani faction. They had been part of the armies sent to conquer the eastern region but had in the intervening years settled in villages, become peasants, acculturated to Iran, and were then subject to taxation by the Persian *dihqans*.

A hybrid theory is the most persuasive. The ʿAbbasid revolution was a revolt against the dominant alliance of the Arab military chieftains, mainly of the Qays faction, and high-ranking Iranian nobles. The ʿAbbasids were supported by a coalition of middling landowners (both Arab and Persian). The Persian landowners and tax collectors were alienated by Umayyad policies excusing converts from the poll taxes. The Arab settlers and their clients were opposed to the Umayyads because they were subject to the tax-raising authority of the Persian *dihqans*. They were backed by masses of oppressed Arab and Iranian peasants. The ʿAbbasid movement included Arabized Persians and Persianized Arabs who were ideologically united by their commitment to the family of the Prophet as the only legitimate caliphs and to the idea that Islamic identity should replace ethnicity and nobility as the basic principle of society.

Thus, the ʿAbbasid movement was based on interest groups in an integrated society in which Arabs and Persians were assimilating to

each other. On their victory, representing just one of a number of factions that had been competing for power, the ʿAbbasids would face the Umayyad problem of translating the title of caliph into institutions of effective and legitimate dynastic rule.

Chapter 9 The ʿAbbasid Empire

Baghdad

The first venture of the new regime was the creation of a new capital. From ancient times, Middle Eastern rulers had built new cities as headquarters for their armies and administrative staffs and as symbols of the advent of a new order. The rulers of the Assyrian Empire created the famous cities of Nineveh and Nimrud; the Sasanians founded Ctesiphon. In a strategic location on the main routes between Iraq, Iran, and Syria – in one of the most fertile parts of Iraq with ready access to the Tigris-Euphrates water system – the ʿAbbasids built Baghdad to be their palace and administrative base. (See Map 3.)

Map 3. Iraq and Baghdad in the early ʿAbbasid era.

Like its predecessors, Baghdad rapidly transcended the intentions of its founders and grew from a military and administrative center

into a major city. The very decision to build the administrative center – called the City of Peace (Madinat al-Salam) – generated two large settlements in the vicinity. One was the extensive camp of the ʿAbbasid army in the districts to the north of the palace complex (al-Harbiya), and the other, to the south (al-Karkh), was inhabited by thousands of construction workers brought from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. Here were markets to provision the workers and their families and workshops to produce their clothes, as well as utensils, tools, and factories to supply the building materials for the construction project. The original Baghdad, then, was a three-part complex – the troop settlement in al-Harbiya, the working populations in al-Karkh, and the administrative city itself, Madinat al-Salam. No sooner was the City of Peace completed than the decisions of the caliphs to build additional palace residences and administrative complexes in the immediate vicinity stimulated the growth of additional quarters. Across the Tigris, the new palace district of al-Rusafa also promoted urban development.

Baghdad was the largest city in the history of the region; it was not a single city but a metropolitan center, made up of a conglomeration of districts on both sides of the Tigris River. In the ninth century, it measured about 25 square miles and had a population of between 300,000 and 500,000. It was ten times the size of Sasanian Ctesiphon, and it was larger than all of the settled places – cities, towns, villages, and hamlets combined – in the Diyala region. It was larger than Constantinople (which is estimated to have had a population of 200,000) or any other Middle Eastern city until Istanbul in the sixteenth century. In its time, Baghdad was the largest city in the world outside China.

Its vast size is an index of its importance in the formation of the ʿAbbasid Empire, society, and culture. A capital city, Baghdad became a great commercial city for international trade and textile, leather, paper, and other industries. Its cosmopolitan population included people of different religions (Jews, Christians, Muslims, and secret pagans) and ethnicities (Persians, Iraqis, Arabians, Syrians, and Central Asians). Soldiers and officials, the workers who built the new city, the people who lived in the surrounding villages, and

merchants from Khurasan and the East who engaged in the India traffic through the Persian Gulf also settled in Baghdad. Basrans seeking intellectual contacts and business fortunes; notables and landowners from Ahwaz; cloth workers from Khuzistan; prisoners of war from Anatolia; scholars from Alexandria, Harran, and Jundishapur; and Nestorian Christians from villages all over Iraq made Baghdad their home. Baghdad, then, was the product of the upheavals, population movements, economic changes, and conversions of the preceding century; it was the home of a new Middle Eastern society, heterogeneous and cosmopolitan, embracing numerous Arab and non-Arab elements, integrated into a single society under the auspices of an Arab-Islamic empire and religion. It provided the wealth and manpower to govern a vast empire; it crystallized the culture that came to be identified as Islamic civilization.

ʿAbbasid administration: the central government

The creation of Baghdad was part of the ʿAbbasid strategy to cope with the problems that had destroyed the Umayyad dynasty. They had to build effective governing institutions and mobilize political support from Arab-Muslims, converts, and the non-Muslim communities that paid the empire's taxes. The new dynasty had to secure the loyalty and obedience of its subjects and to justify itself in imperial and Islamic terms. (See Figure 3.)

Hashim
|
'Abd al-Muttalib

al-'Abbas — 'Abdallah — Abu Talib
|
'Abdallah

Muhammad

'Ali

'Abdallah
|
'Ali

Muhammad — 'Abdallah — Da'ud — Sulayman

Figure 3. The ʿAbbasid caliphs to the disintegration of the empire.

To deal with these problems, the ʿAbbasids returned to the principles of ʿUmar II. The ʿAbbasids swept away Arab caste supremacy and accepted the universal equality of Muslims. Arab caste supremacy had lost its political meaning, and only a coalition regime – uniting Arab and non-Arab elements – could govern a Middle Eastern empire. The propagation of Arabic as a lingua franca, the spread of Islam, the conversion of at least some proportion of the

population, the tremendous expansion of commercial activities, and the economic and demographic upheavals that set people free from their old lives and launched them on new careers in new cities such as Baghdad made possible an empire-wide recruitment of personnel and of political support for the new regime. Under the ʿAbbasids, the empire no longer belonged entirely to the Arabs – although they had conquered its territories – but belonged to all those peoples who would share in Islam and in the emerging networks of political and cultural loyalties that defined a new cosmopolitan Middle Eastern society.

Arabs continued to play important roles in the new regime. Until the reign of Harun al-Rashid (785–809), the regime was supported by the extensive ʿAbbasid family, whose members were appointed to top military and governmental posts in Baghdad, Kufa, Basra, and Syria. The early elites were further drawn from Arab notables, tribal leaders, and Khurasanian-Arab officers. The ʿAbbasids continued to use Arab troops as the central army (known as the *ahl-khurasan* units, which probably included non-Arab officers and soldiers too) and employed Arab forces in Syria, Mesopotamia, Yemen, India, Armenia, and the Byzantine frontiers.

The end of the conquests, however, meant that Arabs in Iraq, Khurasan, Syria, and Egypt could be retired from military service. The ʿAbbasids no longer needed vast reserves of manpower. Rather, they required only limited frontier forces and a central army to make occasional expeditions against the Byzantines and to suppress internal opposition. The ʿAbbasids established new forces, which – although partly Arab – were recruited and organized so that they would be loyal to the dynasty alone and not to tribal or caste interests. In this regard, they followed the practice of the late Umayyads, who had also tried to concentrate military and political power in the hands of selected Syrian regiments and had begun to replace provincial Arab forces with Syrians, non-Arab converts to Islam, clients, and local non-Arab, non-Muslim forces.

The inclusiveness of the ʿAbbasid regime was particularly evident in administration. The ʿAbbasid dynasty was Arab in the paternal

line, because every ʿAbbasid caliph had a non-Arab mother; the judicial and legal life of Baghdad and other important cities was in Arab hands. The prominence of Arabs, however, was no longer a prescriptive right but was dependent on loyalty to the dynasty. Many of the scribes in the expanding ʿAbbasid bureaucracy were former Umayyad administrative personnel. Persians from Khurasan and Nestorian Christians (who made up a large proportion of the population of Iraq) were heavily represented. Jews were active in administrative and commercial activities. Shiʿi families were also prominent. Arab theologians, jurists, and literati were patronized and welcomed at court.

At the same time, the ʿAbbasids perpetuated Umayyad administrative and governmental precedents. Just as the Umayyads had inherited Roman and Sasanian bureaucratic practices and remnants of their old organizations, the ʿAbbasids inherited the traditions and the personnel of Umayyad administration. Clientele ties to the caliphs were the essence of government organization. At first, the ministries were just the clerical staffs of the leading officials, and the caliphs were consulted about everything. In time, however, the ad hoc, household character of the caliphate was substantially (although by no means entirely) superseded by a more rationalized form of administration. The business of the government became more routinized, and three types of services or bureaus (*diwans*) developed. The first was the chancery (*diwan al-rasaʾil*), the records and correspondence office. The second was the bureaus for tax collection (such as *diwan al-kharaj*). Third, there were bureaus to pay the expenses of the caliphs' armies, court, and pensioners; the army bureau (*diwan al-jaysh*) was the most important of these. Gradually, the conduct of government grew more elaborate and more specialized. Each function – revenue, chancery, disbursement – was subdivided into a host of offices, and each office was subdivided to carry on auxiliary activities.

Alongside the bureaucratic staffs, the caliphs also appointed judges (*qadis*). Caliphal appointment of judges began in 642. They were at first multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues. Judges in the Umayyad period had a variety

of administrative and political duties in addition to their judicial duties, including policing, tax collecting, making payments to soldiers, and preaching and leading the community in prayer. They adjudicated on the basis of Islamic law and local, customary law. Their status depended not only on government appointment but also on acceptance in legal circles and ties to local elites.

By the time of Caliph Harun al-Rashid, judges were usually selected from among the community leaders and scholars of Islamic law, and their duty was to apply this law to the civil affairs of the Muslim population, administer charitable endowments, perhaps collect the Muslim charity tax, and serve as a check on the activities of other officials. Other judicial officials dealt with state-related issues; customary law continued to be used in small communities. Harun was the first caliph to appoint a chief judge and adopt the Sasanian model of hierarchical judicial administration – a chief judge to oversee provincial judges, who in turn appointed delegates. The state also had a separate court (*mazalim*) – similar to courts of equity – to which subjects could appeal.

With this elaboration of functions and offices, the caliphs found themselves less and less able to directly supervise the business of the state. To keep the organization responsive to the will of the ruler, they instituted internal bureaucratic checks. Financial affairs were supervised by the controller's office (*diwan al-azimma*), which was originally attached to each bureau but later evolved into an independent bureau of the budget. Correspondence went through the drafting agency (the *diwan al-tawqi'*) for countersignature and then to the keeper of the seal (*khatam*). In a special administrative court (*mazalim*), the caliphs – advised by leading jurists – adjudicated fiscal and administrative problems. The official messenger and information service (*barid*) spied on the rest of the government.

Finally, the office of the chief minister (*wazir*) was developed to coordinate, supervise, and check on the operations of the bureaucracy. *Wazir* was the title originally applied to the secretaries or administrators who were close assistants of the caliphs and whose powers varied according to the wishes of their patrons. Under

the Caliphs al-Mahdi (775–85) and Harun al-Rashid (786–809), the Barmakid family rose to particular prominence. Originally a Buddhist priestly family from Balkh, they were appointed as generals, provincial governors, and the tutors of young princes. Still, however powerful, the Barmakids were not chiefs of the whole administration but depended on the changing impulses of the caliphs for their positions. In 803, Harun al-Rashid executed the leading members of the family. Not until the middle of the ninth century did the *wazir* become the chief of administration, with the combined duties of controlling the bureaucracy, nominating provincial officials, and sitting on the *mazalim* or administrative court.

This elaborate central government was the nerve center of the empire. From Baghdad, the caliphs maintained communications with the provinces. But despite the propensities of the central administration, the provinces were not all governed in a bureaucratic manner. The degree of control ran from highly centralized administration to loosely held suzerainty. The empire was tolerant and inclusive rather than monolithic.

Provincial government

The centrally governed provinces were Iraq, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, western Iran, and Khuzistan – the provinces physically closest to the capital. Khurasan was sometimes, but not always, included in this group. These provinces were organized to maximize the obedience of officials to the will of the central government and to assure the remittance of tax revenues from the provinces to the center. Governors' appointments were limited to a short term so that their careers would be entirely at the mercy of the caliphs. They were rotated to prevent them from developing local support. In addition, the powers of provincial governments were often divided among several officials. The governor was usually the military commander, and a different man was appointed by the central treasury to be in charge of taxation and financial affairs; yet another official headed the judiciary. These officials checked one another's powers, and all

officials were subject to the supervision of the information service (*barid*).

The ideal of frequent rotation of governors, separation of civil and military powers, and inspection by the information service was difficult to implement. Governorships were often awarded in payment of political debts to warlords, generals, and members of the royal family who had acquiesced to the accession of a caliph or to his succession plans. Caliphs had to give these appointees wide latitude. In such cases, frequent rotation and the separation of civil and military functions might be waived.

Iraq remained the crucial agricultural, commercial, and financial base of the empire; the land and tax policies begun by the Umayyads were perpetuated. However, over the course of the first hundred years of ʿAbbasid rule, the agricultural economy of Iraq was progressively undermined by underinvestment in irrigation and by the usurpation of tax revenues by high-ranking military officers, local notable families (sometimes dating back to pre-Islamic times), and tribal elites. Later efforts at reform failed to restore Iraqi revenues to earlier levels.

Syria was governed by ʿAbbasid governors. These were initially family members, but, later, ʿAbbasid clients and military officers were appointed. The ʿAbbasids retained Umayyad military and administrative personnel. Syrian and Arabian military forces were active in the Byzantine wars. Umayyad nobles were welcome in the ʿAbbasid court, and Umayyad clerks and some judges were employed. ʿAbbasid governors worked to win the support of the local notables (*ashraf*), often Umayyads, who felt entitled to rule. They also dealt with Qays and Yamani tribal competition for benefits and influence. Tribal factionalism and apocalyptic hopes led to occasional Umayyad-led rebellions, but generally the Syrian notables reached an accommodation with the new rulers.

In Egypt, the Umayyads had begun and the ʿAbbasids continued the process of centralizing administrative control. At the beginning of the eighth century, Syrian Arabs began to replace Coptic functionaries and to substitute taxation of individuals for communal

levies. The ʿAbbasids appointed Persian administrators and assigned assessment and collection of taxes at the local level to government officials. This made peasants directly responsible to the state and not to an intermediary notable. Although this arrangement had advantages in terms of central control, it also allowed local officials to embezzle revenues by falsely reporting that tax payments were in arrears or that there had been crop failures. Starting in the late eighth century, assessment and collection were separated. Government officials assessed but did not collect the taxes. Instead, the caliphate appointed a guarantor (*damin*), who was responsible for collection and payments to the state officers.

The guarantor could also collect rents. In effect, the state had created a new landlord elite that was responsible for taxes but was also given concessions for bringing land into cultivation. Ownership created incentives for the production of high-value crops and for using the peasants as laborers rather than as tenants.

Under the ʿAbbasids, Khurasan also became a centrally administered province. In the Umayyad period, taxes were collected by Iranian lords, but by the ʿAbbasid period, Iranian lordly families had been incorporated into the bureaucracy, and taxes were collected by the central government. As early as the reign of al-Mansur, Egyptian and Khurasanian documents were using the same formulas, suggesting a highly centralized, empire-wide administration.

Outside the directly administered provinces were affiliated regions that were scarcely, if at all, controlled by the central government. Geographically, these were the provinces of the Caspian highlands (Jilan, Tabaristan, Daylam, and Jurjan), the Inner Asian provinces (Transoxania, Farghana, Ushrusana, and Kabul), and most of North Africa. In some peripheral provinces, the caliphs appointed a supervising military governor and assigned a garrison to collect taxes and tribute payments. For example, until the middle of the ninth century, Armenia and Tabaristan had Arab governors who overawed the local rulers and collected tribute. These governors had no direct administrative contact with the subject people; the actual collection of taxes was in local hands.

In other cases, the caliphate merely confirmed local dynasties as "governors of the caliphs." Khurasan, which until 820 was directly ruled by caliphal appointees, came under the control of the Tahirid family (820–73). Officially, the Tahirids were selected by the caliphs, but the caliphs always confirmed the family heirs. The Tahirids paid very substantial tributes, but no one from the central government intervened to assure the payments or to inspect their administration. Transoxania under the Samanids was governed in the same way. The Samanids had been a local ruling family since Sasanian times, but in the wake of the incorporation of Transoxania into the Islamic empire, they converted to Islam. During the caliphate of al-Ma'mun (813–33), the ruling members of the family were named hereditary governors of Samarqand, Farghana, and Herat – without further supervision.

Local government

Local government similarly varied. Iraq was divided into a hierarchy of districts (called *kura, tassuj*, and *rustaq*). The *rustaq* was the bottom unit in the hierarchy and consisted of a market and administrative town surrounded by a number of villages. The same hierarchy and even the same names were used in parts of Khurasan and western Iran. In Egypt, the administrative structure was similar.

Local government was organized for taxation. Surveys were taken in the villages to determine the amount of land under cultivation, the crops grown, and their expected yield. The information was passed up to the central administration. The taxes for whole regions would be estimated, the sums divided up for each district, and demand notices sent out describing the responsibilities of each subdivision. Each subunit received its bill and divided it among the smaller units. At the next stage, taxes were collected, local expenses deducted, and the balance passed upward until the surplus eventually reached Baghdad.

This hierarchical administration did not encompass all cultivated lands. The crown lands – which included the estates of the former empires, church properties, reclaimed wastelands, and lands

purchased or confiscated by the caliphate – were not part of the usual provincial tax administration. Such lands were very extensive in Iraq and western Iran.

Other lands (*iqtaʿs*) were also cut off from regular provincial administration. Specifically, the *iqtaʿ tamlik* was frequently (although not always) ceded out of wastelands, for the sake of stimulating agricultural investment. The concessionaire was expected to reclaim the land and assure its cultivation in return for a three-year grace period and a long-term reduction of taxes. Ultimately, such lands became private property, because a concession holder could pass it on to his heirs.

A second type, *iqtaʿ istighlal*, resembled a tax farm. In this case, lands already in cultivation and part of the general revenue administration were assigned to individuals who agreed to pay the treasury a fixed sum of money in return for the right to tax the peasantry. The assignee's payment was assessed at a rate of ten percent (*ʿushr*), but he was permitted to exact from the peasants full taxes at the land tax (*kharaj*) rates, which usually amounted to a third or a half of the value of the crop. The benefit given the assignee was the difference between what the peasants paid him and what he paid the government.

There were several reasons for making these kinds of grants. They were a way of paying off political debts to the ʿAbbasid family, important courtiers, officials, and military officers who had claims on the state for rewards, pensions, or bribes for their support and cooperation. Such grants simplified administration by obviating the need for collecting revenues in the provinces, bringing the specie to Baghdad, and redistributing the income through yet other bureaus. Instead of keeping surveys and records for large areas, all that was necessary was the description of the assignment and the amount due. Nevertheless, before the middle of the ninth century, taxable lands were assigned with relative restraint, for they represented an important concession of state revenues and state powers. Never in this period were they assigned in lieu of payment of military salaries.

Regardless of the organizational forms of local government, local administration and tax collection posed delicate political problems. Despite the immense power of the bureaucratic organization, it was extremely difficult to make that power effective in the villages. The bureaucracy was admirably suited to the communication of orders and to clerical and financial tasks, but in the villages, the power of the state was limited by ignorance. How could the government tax the peasantry without knowing who owned the land, how much was produced, who had money, and who did not? How was the state to work its way through the millennia-old complications of landownership, water rights, and other legal matters? How was the state to know if crops were concealed? The state came to the villages with staffs of technical specialists, including surveyors to make land measurements, weighers and measurers to estimate the size of crops, and bankers and money changers to convert currencies or to give credits. It came with legal specialists – judges to adjudicate disputes, witnesses to transactions, registrars of deeds, and the like. Alongside the technicians came the specialists in violence – collectors, soldiers, police, extortionists, stool pigeons, and thugs. Fear was no small part of the business of tax collection.

Yet, even with all this, the potential for passive resistance and the problem of inadequate information could not be solved without the cooperation of local people. These included family patriarchs, village headmen (such as the *ra'is* in Iran or the *shaykh al-balad* in Egypt), and village landowners; they controlled a large part of the village land and were much richer than the average peasant, but not so wealthy as the great estate or *iqta'* holders. In Iraq and Iran, the *dihqans* included native elites and Arabs who had acquired land, village-dwelling and town-dwelling absentee landlords, grain merchants, and money changers who bought the peasants' crops or lent them money to pay their taxes.

These notables played an important intermediary role in the taxation process. As the most powerful people connected with the villages, they handled negotiations, made a deal on behalf of the peasants, and paid the taxes. The arrangement suited everyone. The bureaucratic agents were never absolutely sure how much

money they could raise and wished to avoid the nuisance of dealing with individuals. The peasants did not have to confront the exorbitant demands of the tax collectors directly. The notables underestimated the taxes to the state, overestimated them to the peasants, and pocketed the difference. ʿAbbasid officials understood perfectly well the importance of these people, whom they called their helpers (ʿawan). They understood that – for the ultimate tasks of assessment, division, and collection of taxes – the bureaucracy had to depend on people who were not subordinates, but whose cooperation had to be enlisted nonetheless.

Thus, the ʿAbbasid imperial organization was a complex bureaucracy – highly elaborate at the center and connected with provincial and local forces throughout the empire. Yet, the arrangements between the central government and the provincial and local levels were not simply hierarchical. At each level, the business of administration was carried on by independent people. In some cases, these were princes or independent governors who controlled whole provinces, whereas in others, they were the local village chiefs and landowners without whom the central and provincial governments were helpless. Because the ties of government were not strictly hierarchical, a complex system of constraints and opportunities, obligations and loyalties, bound the central, provincial, and local notables to the regime.

These ties depended first of all on the fact that the army, the police, and the inspectors of the information system could compel obedience. Also, self-interest dictated the collaboration of village chiefs and landowners, because participation in the tax-collecting apparatus consolidated their local position. It increased their political importance; conferred on them the prestige, authority, and respect of the state; and provided financial opportunities. Apart from force and interest, class and clientele loyalties drew together central administrators and local elites. The officials of the central government were drawn from the provincial notable families. Provincial landowning and notable families sent their sons to careers in the central government. Merchant families maintained branches in

Baghdad and facilitated financial contacts between the administrative center and the provinces.

Patronage and clienteles were crucial to this system. Central administrators appointed their provincial representatives, and patronage – fortified by ethnic, religious, regional, and family affiliations – helped to smooth the operations of the ʿAbbasid state. For example, a governor of Khurasan, Tahir (820–22), explained that only he could govern the province because all the notable families were allied to him by marriage and clientage. Clientele ties also crossed religious lines. Muslim converts at the center dealt with provincial cousins who remained Christians or Zoroastrians. Conversion to the new religion did not necessarily disrupt family, clientele, and regional ties. Thus, the ʿAbbasid policy of recruiting notables regardless of ethnic background not only soothed the conflicts that racked the Umayyad dynasty but was essential if a centralized government was to be built at all. Because effective administration was based on sympathetic communication between central officials and local notables, the wider the recruitment, the greater the possibility for effective rule. The ʿAbbasid Empire, then, was formed by a coalition of provincial and capital city elites. Sharing a common concept of the dynasty and the purposes of political power, they were organized through bureaucratic and other political institutions to impose their rule.

Resistance and rebellion

This regime imposed itself not in a single moment but only after decades of political struggle. The process of empire building was not smooth and uninterrupted but depended on the forcible subjection of many dissident and unwilling populations. Mountainous provinces remote from Baghdad resisted subordination. The Caspian region (the rulers of Tabaristan and Daylam) and parts of Inner Asia (the semi-independent provinces of Kabul, Ushrusana, and Farghana) refused tribute or allegiance, obliging the caliphs to send military expeditions to recover their suzerainty. By the reign of al-Maʾmun (813–33), however, most of these places were incorporated into the

empire and their rulers and officials converted to Islam. In North Africa, the tendency after 800 was toward independence, although local ruling houses recognized the suzerainty of the caliphate.

Arab opposition was also important. The old military caste – displaced by a single professional army and deprived of employment, salaries, and prestige – sporadically resisted the ʿAbbasid settlement. Syrian Arabs rebelled in 760 and were defeated. In Egypt, the ʿAbbasids established their own garrisons at al-Askar near Fustat, provoking Arab tribal fighting (785) and rebellions (793–94). Bedouins in Syria, Arabia, Sistan, Kirman, Fars, Khurasan, and particularly in upper Mesopotamia (where Arab and Kurdish outbreaks were virtually incessant) rebelled against the consolidation of any government that might restrict their autonomy. Until the beginning of the ninth century, bedouin rebels adopted Kharijism to articulate their opposition to the empire. From then on, Shiʿism became the main expression of tribal opposition to centralized government.

In Iran, local lords, *dihqans*, peasant villagers, and mountaineers maintained their own staccato opposition to the ʿAbbasid regime, sometimes led by former elites. Resistance to the caliphate took the form of syncretistic sects, blending Shiʿism and Mazdakism – perceived by the mainstream as heresies in both Islam and Zoroastrianism, respectively. The first of these Iranian rebellions was the rebellion of Bihafarid (a peasant leader near Nishapur), which spread widely in Khurasan in 747–50; he advocated a combination of Muslim ideas and the ancient worship of Ahura Mazda. The rebellion was put down by the ʿAbbasid governor Abu Muslim – significantly, at the request of the Zoroastrian priests (*mobads*), for it was a threat to the notables and to both Islamic and Zoroastrian beliefs.

This same Abu Muslim later became the symbol of religious and social opposition. His role in the ʿAbbasid revolution made him – in the popular imagination – a precursor of the messiah and inspired Shiʿi-Mazdakite syncretic heresies and rebellions in his name. The first of these broke out in the region of Nishapur under the leadership

of a man named Sunpadh. Supported by the mountain peoples of Khurasan, it spread as far west as Rayy and Qum. Sunpadh preached that Abu Muslim was not dead but lived on in the company of Mazdak and the savior until he would return again.

Similar outbreaks followed in Rayy, Herat, and Sistan. The most important of these was the movement led by a self-styled prophet called al-Muqannaʿ (the Veiled One). Al-Muqannaʿ preached that he was God incarnate and that the spirit of God had passed from Muhammad to ʿAli to Abu Muslim to him. He would, he said, die and return to rule the world. His emphasis on the passage of the spirit and his return as imam was parallel to extremist Shiʿi views, and he was accused of advocating Mazdakite social doctrines – communism of money and community of women. Most of his support came from peasant villages.

Insofar as the ʿAbbasid regime in Iran depended on the collaboration of local notables who were both Muslims and Zoroastrians, the empire presented itself as a dual orthodoxy based on a joint Muslim-Zoroastrian elite. Thus, resistance to the consolidation of the empire cast itself in the form of syncretic religious heterodoxy. The unusual degree of religious ferment may have resulted from the disorganization of both the older religions (Zoroastrianism and Christianity) and the newer religion (Islam) in the wake of the Arab-Muslim invasions and decades of warfare in Transoxania. The eighth century was a time of unique freedom for religious invention as part of social and political conflict.

Throughout the ʿAbbasid Empire, the most profound opposition to the caliphate took the form of Shiʿism. The Shiʿis had supported the ʿAbbasid movement before it came to power, expecting that one of the heirs of ʿAli would succeed the Umayyads, but the ʿAbbasids disappointed these expectations by seizing the caliphate for themselves. Once in power, the ʿAbbasids were resisted by Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya – a Shiʿi claimant to the caliphate who seems to have had support among the families of Muhammad's Medinan companions. There were a number of other minor Shiʿi rebellions in Basra, Kufa, Mecca, and Medina. A major Shiʿi

rebellion, backed by the bedouin tribes of upper Mesopotamia, took place between 813 and 816. In the early tenth century, the Ismaʿili movement (an offshoot of Shiʿism) would provoke a new wave of anti-ʿAbbasid provincial resistance.

The ʿAbbasid Empire, as a political system, has to be understood in terms of its organization, its social dynamics, its political concepts, and its opponents. As an empire, it was a regime governing a vast territory composed of small communities. Each community was headed by its notables: headmen, landowners, and other men of wealth and standing, who characteristically were allied to superiors and patrons with positions in the provincial or central governments. Government organization, communication, and tax collection was bureaucratic in form, but the social mechanisms that facilitated the organization work were the contacts between central officials and provincial elites. The bureaucracy mobilized the skills and social influence of prominent persons throughout the empire and put these assets at the disposal of Baghdad. This system of alliances was justified as an expression of God's will. By God's will – expressed both in Muslim and in pre-Islamic cultural terms – the exalted person of the caliph reigned in expectation of passive obedience from all his subjects.

However, not all peoples and provinces of the empire submitted to the imperial order. Mountain peoples, semisedentarized villagers, peasants, nomads, and segments of the town populations (including strata of the upper as well as the lower classes) refused to accept the system. They denied its legitimacy and rebelled against it, although they could not overthrow it. Nor could they be altogether repressed. The ʿAbbasid regime was locked into constant struggle with its opponents.

Chapter 10 Decline and Fall of the ʿAbbasid Empire

The decline of the central government

The very processes that led to the rise of the early Islamic empire, its elites, and its cultural forms resulted in its collapse and transformation. The decline of the ʿAbbasid Empire began even in the midst of consolidation. While the regime was strengthening its military and administrative institutions and encouraging a flourishing economy and culture, other forces were set in motion that would eventually unravel the ʿAbbasid Empire.

As early as Harun al-Rashid's reign (786–809), the problems of succession had become critical. Harun bequeathed the caliphate to his elder son, al-Amin, and the governorship of Khurasan and the right to succeed his brother to his younger son, al-Maʾmun. The independence of Khurasan under al-Maʾmun was probably set up by Harun to satisfy the demands of the eastern Iranian warlords. With the death of Harun, al-Amin attempted to displace his brother in favor of his own son. Civil war resulted. Al-Amin was backed by the Baghdadi population (the *abna*'). These forces may have included the descendants of the original ʿAbbasid forces from Khurasan but most likely were forces rallied for the civil war on the basis of royal patronage and not on any abiding ethnic or historical loyalty. Al-Maʾmun turned to Arab forces in Khurasan and to the independent Khurasanian warlords. In a bitter civil war, al-Maʾmun defeated his brother and in 813 assumed the caliphate. With Maʾmun's conquest of Baghdad, the empire was dominated by Khurasanians.

Once in office, al-Maʾmun attempted to deal with his unreconciled opponents by means of a double policy. One goal was to restore the legitimacy of the caliphate by manipulating Shiʿi loyalties and Muʿtazili theological doctrines to give the caliphate control over religious affairs. (See Chapter 13.) This policy failed and thereby deprived the caliphate of an important measure of popular support.

Al-Maʾmun also adopted a new military policy. To win control of the caliphate, he had depended on the support of a Khurasanian lord, Tahir, who in return was made governor of Khurasan (820–22) and general of ʿAbbasid forces throughout the empire, with the promise that the offices would be inherited by his heirs. Tahir's forces included Khurasanian warlords and their followers, as well as Turks, Bukharis, and Khwarizmis from the Transoxus region. From this point, the Arab component in the military disappeared. Furthermore, despite the momentary usefulness of the arrangement, the concession of a hereditary governorship defeated the caliphal objective of integrating provincial notables into the central government. Now the empire was to be governed by an alliance of the caliph with the most important provincial lord.

To offset the power of the Tahirids and regain direct control of the provinces, the caliphs were eager to create new military forces. Thus, al-Maʾmun and al-Muʿtasim (833–42) raised forces of two types. The first were intact units (*shakiriyya*) under the leadership of their local chiefs from Transoxania, Armenia, and North Africa. Although the soldiers were not directly beholden to the caliphs, they served as a counterweight to the Tahirids. The second type of forces was Turkish slaves (*ghilman* [plural]), who were purchased or captured individually in the frontier regions. They were then grouped into regiments. For the sake of efficiency, morale, and a balance of power between the regiments, each lived in its own neighborhood, had its own mosque and markets, and was trained, supplied, and paid by its commander. Thus, slave regiments also became self-contained units that gave their primary loyalty to their officers rather than to the caliphs.

The system of recruiting, training, and employing slave soldiers was a major innovation in Middle Eastern history and the beginning of an institution that would characterize many later Muslim regimes. The pressing military and political need for loyal troops directed the attention of the caliphs

to long-established precedents for the employment of military forces from peripheral regions and marginal populations. The Romans had recruited Illyrians and Germans. Since Umayyad times, the caliphs and governors of the Arab-Muslim empire had raised supplementary troops in eastern Iran and had depended on servile, client, and even slave troops for their personal bodyguards. The new system of slave regiments was a rationalization of earlier practices that became the centerpiece of ʿAbbasid military organization.

These new regiments strengthened the hand of the caliphs, but the Transoxanian and Turkish soldiers soon ran afoul of the Baghdadi populace and of the former Arab soldiers in the Baghdadi army. Bloody clashes ensued. Eventually, Caliph al-Muʿtasim built a new capital (Samarraʿ) about 70 miles north of Baghdad to isolate the troops from the masses. Although Baghdad remained the cultural and commercial capital of the region, from 836 to 870, Samarraʿ was the military and administrative headquarters of the caliphate.

The new city only created further difficulties. The caliphs, who had hoped to avoid clashes between the populace and the troops, instead became embroiled in rivalries among the various guard regiments. The officers took civilian bureaucrats into their patronage, won control of provincial governorships, and eventually attempted to control succession to the caliphate itself. Regimental rivalries led to anarchy. Between 861 and 870, all the leading officers were killed and the troops turned to banditry. The employment of slave armies further alienated the caliphate from the populace it ruled. Whereas the early ʿAbbasid Empire had depended on the military support of its own subjects, the late empire tried to dominate its peoples with foreign troops.

In the same period, changes in administrative organization also reduced the capacity of the central government to control the empire. These changes in administration were due partly to the interference of the army and partly to the rise of independent provincial powers, but they were also due to overwhelming internal stresses inherent in the normal operation of the bureaucracy. In ʿAbbasid government, all high-ranking officers employed their personal followers to do their staff work. To learn the art of being an accountant or scribe, a young man had to enter the service of a master, live in his household, and become a dedicated personal servant. He owed his master respect and obedience for life, and the patron was obliged not only to train him but to protect him and advance his career. In time, the bureaucracy came to be dominated by cliques and factions formed among the functionaries, whose main interest was to exploit bureaucratic office for private gain. The bureaucracy ceased to serve the interests of the ruler and the empire and began to act on behalf of the personal and factional interests of the scribes.

By the late ninth century, the numerous small cliques attached to many leading officials had become polarized into two great factions: the Banu Furat and the Banu Jarrah. Each of these factions was built around a *wazir* and his relatives and clients. The families also had a larger following based on social and ideological affiliations. The Banu Jarrah faction was composed mainly – although not exclusively – of Nestorian Christians or Christian converts, often educated in the monastery of Dayr Qunna in southern Iraq. By the middle of the ninth century, this faction had already grown powerful enough to influence state policy. In 852, Caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–61) was persuaded to assure Christians freedom of religion, freedom from military service, and the right to construct churches; he also gave the Nestorian catholicos full jurisdiction over all Christians. The caliph conceded the right of converts to inherit the property of parents who were still Christians, although Muslim law did not permit such transfers. These concessions, however, were soon revoked. The other major faction, the Banu Furat, was mainly composed of Baghdadi Shiʿis.

The chiefs of these factions eventually gained control of the entire government service. In the reign of al-Mutawakkil (847–61), the *wazirs* were put in charge of all the administrative bureaus. Although they could be appointed and removed by the caliph at will, in practice the caliphs rarely intervened in the routine operations of the bureaucracy. A *wazir* and his faction would come to power by intrigues and by bribing the caliph and other influential courtiers. Their main concern then would be to exploit their offices, earn back their bribes, and prepare for future hard times by various frauds, such as padded payrolls, false bookkeeping, illegal speculations, and taking bribes. The officials regarded their positions as property rights that they bought, sold, and exploited for private gain.

When a faction had been in power and was known to have become rich, the caliph and the opposing faction would be eager to seize the fortunes accumulated by the incumbents. The caliph would then appoint a new *wazir*; a rival group would come to power, which would then confiscate the assets of the defeated party. Some of the money would go to the caliph and back to the treasury, but some of it went into the pockets of the victorious faction. Special bureaus were set up to handle the reclaimed monies: the *diwan al-musadarat* for confiscated estates and the *diwan al-marafiq* for confiscated bribes. The caliphate could maintain only a modicum of influence by rotating the leading factions in office and using each change of government as an occasion to extort the resources stolen by the faction last in power.

The cost, however, was extremely high, for the central government was forced to look to new administrative devices to counterbalance the political and financial losses occasioned by a corrupt bureaucracy. One method was to distribute or sell tax-collecting rights (*iqtaʿs*) to soldiers, courtiers, and officials, who collected the taxes ordinarily due from the peasants and paid a portion to the central government. Although it brought in a short-term income, selling *iqtaʿs* reduced long-term revenues and subverted the normal operation of provincial and local administration. In addition, *iqtaʿs* acted as crystals to collect and aggregate small holdings. Peasants, under pressure from the tax bureaus, would appeal for protection to the powerful property holders and sign over their lands. The practice was called commendation (*taljiʾa*) or protection (*himaya*). The growth of large landed estates further diminished the areas under routine administration. Instead of taxing peasants in a relatively direct way, the government found itself dealing more and more often with powerful local landowning notables, who reduced the task of the administration to the collection of negotiated fees. In addition to the sale of *iqtaʿs*, the central government introduced tax farming in Iraq and western Iran. To obtain revenues in advance, the government sold the right to collect taxes to tax farmers. Tax farming, however, was not merely a financial arrangement; it was a substitute form of administration. The tax farmer not only paid a sum to collect taxes but also agreed to maintain local administration, meet all the government's local expenses, invest in irrigation, and support the local police. Although government inspectors tried to protect the peasants from abuse, the basic apparatus of local administration was being displaced by private governments. Through the distribution of *iqtaʿs* and the sale of tax farms, the government forfeited its control over the revenue-bearing countryside.

Provincial autonomy and the rise of independent States

With the decline of the military and financial capacities of the central government, the provinces became increasingly independent. The peripheral provinces – governed by tributary rulers – freed themselves altogether from their subordination to the empire, and many of the core provinces – once directly administered by Baghdad – became peripheral provinces under the control of semi-independent governors. (See Table 3.)

Table 3. *Middle Eastern provincial regimes: the ʿAbbasid Empire and the post-imperial era*

	Iraq	*Western Iran*	*Khurasan*	*Mesopotamia (Mosul)*	*Egypt*	*Syria*
700	ʿAbbasids, 750–945	ʿAbbasids, 750–934	ʿAbbasids, 750–821	ʿAbbasids, 750–905	ʿAbbasids, 750–868	ʿAbbasids, 750–945

	Iraq	Western Iran	Khurasan	Mesopotamia (Mosul)	Egypt	Syria
800			Tahirids, 821–73 Saffarids, 873–900		Tulunids, 868–905	
900		Buwayhids, 934–c. 1040	Samanids, 900–99	Hamdanids, 905–91	ʿAbbasids, 905–35 Ikhshidids, 935–69	
	Buwayhids, 945–1055				Fatimids, 969–1171	Partitioned between Hamdanids in Aleppo, 945–1004, and Fatimids in Damascus, 978–1076
				ʿUqaylids, 992–1096		
			Ghaznavids, 999–1040 (in Afghanistan, 961–1186)			
1000						Mirdasids, 1023–79, in Aleppo
	Saljuqs, 1055–1194	Saljuqs, 1055–1194	Saljuqs, 1038–1157			
						Saljuq conquest, 1078; Saljuqid states, 1078–1183; crusader states, 1099–1291
1100				Zangids, 1127–1222	Conquest by Saladin, 1169	

	Iraq	Western Iran	Khurasan	Mesopotamia (Mosul)	Egypt	Syria
1200	Mongols, 1258	Nomadic invasions culminating in Mongols, 1256–1353	Mongols, Il-Khans, 1256–1353		Ayyubids, 1169–1250	Ayyubids, 1183–1260
					Mamluks, 1250–1517	Mamluks, 1260–1517
					Ottomans, 1517–1805	Ottomans, 1517–1918

The devolution of provincial powers occurred in two main ways. In some cases, Turkish guard officers usurped provincial governorships and made themselves independent of the central government. Egypt, between 868 and 905, came under the control of the Tulunid dynasty. The founder of the dynasty, Ahmad b. Tulun (r. 868–84), originally a subgovernor of Egypt, built up a private slave army, seized control of Egypt's finances, and established his own dynasty – all while being protected by patrons at the caliphal court. In other areas, governors chipped away at the prerogatives of the central government; some ceased to remit tax revenues; others negotiated a fixed payment in return for their assignments.

Elsewhere, the decline of central authority triggered popular resistance to central control. Rebellions in Armenia, Azarbayjan, and Arran were led by local princes. In the middle of the ninth century, there was a mass uprising of frontier soldiers (*ghazis*) in Sijistan (southeastern Iran) under the leadership of the Saffarids. The Saffarids took control of Sijistan, Kirman, and northern India; seized Khurasan from the Tahirids; and then conquered western Iran and invaded Iraq. Although they were defeated in Iraq, the caliphate recognized Saffarid control of Khurasan and most of western Iran. The Saffarid victory displaced the older landowning and administrative elites with military leadership. Iraq was the scene of a prolonged revolt of the Zanj slave laborers led by dissident ʿAbbasid notables, by agricultural capitalists, and by an alliance of Bahrayni and Basran merchants involved in long-distance trade.

Despite the loss of control of Egypt and Iran, the caliphate was able to reassert itself. In 900, the Samanid rulers of Transoxania defeated the Saffarids. The Samanid victory was a great gain for the ʿAbbasids, because the Samanids represented the same landowning and administrative notables as those who governed the ʿAbbasid Empire and because they restored cooperation between a major independent provincial dynasty and the ʿAbbasid central government. In 905, the caliphs also managed to defeat the Tulunid dynasty in Egypt and Syria. The restoration of central authority, however, was short lived. With the bureaucracy in disarray, the caliphate could not use its temporary military victories to reorganize the empire. These victories were but a pause in a downward course that became headlong between 905 and 945.

In the early decades of the tenth century, Shiʿism again became the leading form of popular resistance to the ʿAbbasid Empire. Ismaʿilism was preached in southern Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Mesopotamia, Yemen, Daylam, eastern Iran, and North Africa. The Ismaʿilis seem to have had a central directorate, but the Ismaʿili missions tended to adapt to the prior religious convictions and understandings of the persons being proselytized. The movement addressed itself to all classes of the population, whether peasants in Iraq and Syria, bedouins in Arabia, villagers in Iran, Berbers in North Africa, or the upper classes of eastern Iran.

Ismaʿili religio-political agitation led to a series of rebellions called the Qarmatian movement. Around 900, there were peasant jacqueries in Iraq and bedouin revolts in Syria and northeastern Arabia; these led to the formation of a Qarmatian state in Bahrain. In the 920s, the Qarmatians attacked Basra and Kufa, threatened Baghdad, cut the pilgrimage routes, pillaged Mecca, and took the black stone of the Kaʿba. Shiʿism also inspired resistance to the ʿAbbasids in Mesopotamia, where Arab bedouins under the leadership of the Hamdanid family extended their influence southward from Mosul to Baghdad, westward into northern Syria, and northward into Armenia.

In North Africa, another offshoot of the Ismaʿili movement founded the Fatimid dynasty (909), which conquered all of North Africa and Egypt by 969. Fatimids claimed to be the rightful successors to the Prophet, not only for their own provinces but for the whole of the Muslim world. They adopted the title of caliph, thus breaking the symbolic unity of the Muslim community. They were followed by the Umayyad dynasty in Spain and by other North African states (see Part III) that thus debased the title, prestige, and legitimacy of the ʿAbbasid dynasty.

In the Caspian province of Daylam, Shiʿi refugees fleeing ʿAbbasid persecution converted the local people to Islam. In 864, the Daylam Shiʿis declared their independence from the caliphate, forced out the ʿAbbasid governor, and established an independent state. In the early tenth century, a local Daylamite ruler named Mardawij b. Ziyar conquered most of western Iran. When he was killed in 937, his empire was inherited by the Daylamite mercenaries in his service, led by the Buwayhid brothers, who established their dominion in the region.

Other governors and warlords also seized extensive territories. By 935, the caliphate had lost control of virtually all of its provinces except the region around Baghdad. Administratively and militarily helpless, the caliphs could only appeal for protection to one or another of the provincial forces or play them off against one another. In 936, to stave off the enemies pressing in on Baghdad, the caliphs created the post of general-in-chief (*amir al-umara'*) and divested themselves of all actual power – except the formal right to select the most powerful of their subjects as chief of state. After a complex, many-sided struggle, the Buwayhids took control of Baghdad in 945. The caliphs were allowed to continue in nominal authority – indeed, the ʿAbbasid dynasty lasted until 1258 – but they no longer ruled; the ʿAbbasid Empire had ceased to exist.

The disintegration of the ʿAbbasid Empire into a number of independent provincial regimes implied vast changes in the organization of society. The emergence of a slave military elite and the new property-based form of administration assured not only the breakup of the empire but also the transfer of power from old to new elites. Early ʿAbbasid government had been built on a coalition of the central government staffs with provincial landowning and other notable families. The empire attracted into central government service the scions of provincial families whose contacts and goodwill served to unify the empire and make the central government effective in the provinces. Over time, however, the staffs of the central administration tended increasingly to be composed of the descendants of former scribes, rather than being drawn from provincial families. As generations of scribes succeeded each other, the bureaucracy became a city-based organization, scarcely connected to the provinces. It ceased to represent the diverse populations of the empire. Moreover, the introduction of tax farming, which required large investments, favored the interests of merchants wealthy from involvement in slave, grain, and international trade. Bankers who could raise the necessary sums and channel them into state investments became politically ever more important. Thus, a merchant elite – the product of the empire's fiscal centralization, tax-collecting methods, and the opportunities it offered for worldwide trade – began to displace the scribal class, with its provincial contacts, as the political mainstay of the central government.

The decline of the central government brought in its wake the ultimate destruction of the provincial landowning notables who had originally supported the ʿAbbasid Empire. The rise of military warlords and of a new capital-city-based financial and administrative elite, as well as the development of new forms of land tenure (including *iqtaʿ* assignments and tax farms) brought to the countryside a new elite, backed by the waning but still significant powers of the central government, to compete with the old provincial notables. In many regions a new class of large land controllers and landowners foisted

on the countryside by central government policies displaced the small-scale landholding notables of the villages.

These extensive political and social changes were accompanied by widespread economic regression. In the course of the late ninth and early tenth centuries, the economy of Iraq was ruined. For more than a century, the caliphate had neglected investment in irrigation and reclamation projects. Irrigation in the Tigris region was severely damaged by almost incessant warfare, and large districts became depopulated. The distribution of *iqtaʿs* and the creation of tax farms removed the incentives for maintaining rural productivity. In southern Iraq, the slave rebellions also led to agricultural losses. Although the early Buwayhid rulers attempted to restore canals and to reclaim abandoned lands, political instability and fiscal exploitation ruined the countryside. Iraq, once the most prosperous area in the region, became one of the poorest and would not recover its agricultural prosperity until the twentieth century.

Iraq also suffered from declining international trade. The Qarmatian rebellions hurt the trade of the Persian Gulf and the trade between Arabia and Iraq. The disruption of the caliphate interfered with the international routes that brought goods from the Far East and South Asia to Baghdad for transshipment to the Mediterranean. In the late tenth century, the Fatimid regime helped to promote an alternative international route through the Red Sea and Cairo, which also damaged the commercial prosperity of Iraq.

Other provinces were similarly in decline. Mesopotamia – which had been settled in the seventh century by large numbers of bedouins – suffered economically from the encroachment of pastoralism on agriculture. In the late eighth century, peasants suffering from bedouin raids and excessive taxation began to abandon the land. In the course of the ninth century, there was a regression of sedentary life under nomadic pressure. The emergence of the Hamdanid dynasty ratified the dominance of pastoral over sedentary peoples.

Egypt, however, continued to prosper. The landowning elites formed in the ninth century continued in power through the Tulunid phase and into the Fatimid period. These elites invested in the growing of flax and the manufacture of linens. There was a government factory to produce embroidered fabrics for official use (*tiraz*), some private factories, and some cottage production. This opened up employment for weavers, dyers, tailors, and merchants. Egypt also produced wines, woolens, and papyrus and continued to export grain to the Hijaz. Iran also maintained its high levels of urban and agricultural development well into the eleventh century.

Thus, the breakup of the ʿAbbasid Empire was at once a political, a social, and an economic transformation. It led to the substitution of small states for a single, unified empire. The bureaucratic and small landowning elites who favored centralized government were replaced by large-scale landowners and military lords who opposed it. The overall decline of the economy further contributed to the weakening of the empire. Finally, the military, administrative, and cultural policies of the empire themselves led to its collapse and the eventual formation of a new type of state and society.

Cosmopolitan Islam: The Islam of the Imperial Elite

Chapter 11 Introduction: religion and identity

The delineation of Arabic-Islamic religion and culture and Muslim identities was a centuries-long process. Its social basis was the integration of Arab-Muslim, convert, and non-Muslim populations in the cities founded or settled by the Arab-Muslims. Mecca, Medina, Damascus, Kufa, Basra, Baghdad, and other cities were the homes of new Islamic societies that integrated the cultures of Arabia and the conquered peoples. The new civilization amalgamated Arabian language, poetry, and religion and late antique imperial symbols and literary and artistic cultures, as well as Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian religious values and family and communal institutions.

Islamic identities developed only slowly, and some scholars have questioned if there was a "Muslim" identity at all in the years after the death of Muhammad. If not, when did a Muslim identity come into being? One theory is that the conquerors first identified themselves not as Muslims but as a community of believers, a coalition of peoples of faith fighting the enemies of God. They were an assembly of monotheists, and the people of each faith had their own book and their own laws. Only after a century did they accept Muhammad as their prophet and the Quran as their holy book. The idea of a multireligious community was indeed implied in Muhammad's early teaching, but with the struggles for power in Medina and the exile or execution of the most powerful Jewish clans, it is not likely that this concept lasted even to the end of Muhammad's life. In Medina, the revelation of new ritual and family laws and of a sacred Arabian history for Muslims already implied the beginnings of a separate communal identity.

Moreover, there is no Middle Eastern precedent for a collectivity of religious groups. Each religious group regarded itself as the possessor of the true religion and the others as false – even though they held similar beliefs. As later polemics show, their clerics vigorously defended each religious group's monopoly on the truth.

Also, the later incorporation of Christian tribes (such as the Taghlib) and Persian regiments into the conquering Arab armies indicates not a multireligious army but Arab-Muslim tribal forces reinforced by the inclusion of captured or defeated soldiers as clients (*mawali*).

Another theory is that the initial movement was not Muslim but rather a movement of sectarian Jews. Only later did Islam become a distinct religion based on a new version of monotheistic concepts. From this perspective, the story of Arabia and Muhammad was invented later to demonstrate by historical narrative the mythical, doctrinal, and other beliefs of Muslims and their superiority to religious rivals.

This theory too does not stand up to the evidence. The Arab conquerors were from the beginning identified as Muslims, followers and heirs of the Arabian Prophet Muhammad with a distinctive religion of their own. Non-Muslim sources of the seventh century indicate a distinctive cult – one God, a sacred place in Arabia, a teacher named Muhammad, a holy book, the name *muhajirun*, and a calendar based on the Christian year 622 as the year one. Non-Muslims knew Muhammad as the teacher whose laws forbade the consumption of wine and carrion and who condemned fornication. They knew that the conquerors had their own places of worship and prayed in the direction of the Kaʿba in Mecca. They depicted the new rulers as monotheists, but deniers of the divinity of Christ and hostile to images.

Studies of papyri, inscriptions, coins, and archeological excavations indicate the early existence of an Islamic identity. A papyrus of 642 included the phrase, "In the name of Allah," and a document of 643 shows that the Arab-Muslims were dating by an era beginning in 622. Sasanian-type Arab coins from 651–52 were inscribed, "In the name of God," and later coins of 676–78 bore the inscription, "Allah is the lord of judgment." Early inscriptions in rock were permeated by expressions of Quranic piety, declarations of faith, and requests for forgiveness and compassion.

Furthermore, there is Arabic literary evidence for the existence of mosques in Muhammad's lifetime and soon after. The architectural

elements of the mosque date to the era of the Prophet and the Umayyads. Mosques are attested for Medina in the time of the Caliph ʿUmar (634–44), rebuilt in 665; Fustat (Cairo) in 641–42; Basra in 665; Jerusalem in the 660s; Kufa in 675; and Qayrawan in 670. An elevated platform for the preacher (*minbar*) goes back to Muhammad; a *minbar* in Damascus is attested for 657, and ʿAli had one in Kufa. Caliph Muʿawiya (661–80) in 665 put it on a six-step base. A royal enclosure (*maqsura*) is described for Damascus and Basra by 665 and was probably introduced by the Umayyad caliphs. The arrangements for mosques descended from Greco-Roman temples, churches, and synagogues. Like earlier places of worship, mosques had a distinctive orientation (*qibla*), a niche to mark a sacred place (*mihrab*), a seat of honor (*minbar*), and a place for ablutions in an exterior courtyard. Early Muslim religious buildings were distinctive because they were not decorated with images. However, archeological evidence only confirms the building of mosques from the construction of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem in 692 and thereafter.

Thus, in the seventh century Islamic identity was based on the Quran, the memory of the Prophet, and the collective experience of Arab-Muslim peoples as conquerors. The Islamic presence was asserted in documents, inscriptions, and the construction of places of worship, but there was little development of the political, ideological, religious, or cultural dimensions of this identity. Neither the caliphate nor the holy men and scholars had yet generated the public symbols and the literary content of Islam. Until the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik (685–705), the caliphate scarcely defined itself publicly in Muslim terms. Hadith, law, theology, and history were circulated orally but were not compiled in written form until late in the seventh century; they were organized into books in the middle decades of the eighth century.

Islamic civilization, then, dates to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the revelation of the Quran, and the first Muslim community in Medina and Mecca, and it was perpetuated throughout the first century after Muhammad's death and ever after. The Islam we recognize, however, is the elaboration of these teachings, carried

out in later centuries – not only in the original home of Islam in Arabia but throughout the whole of the vast region from Spain to Inner Asia conquered by the Arab-Muslims. Islamic religion came to encompass not only the Quran and the example of Muhammad but a vastly expanded range of religious study and practices – including law, theology, and mysticism – developed in numerous schools and subcommunities. Furthermore, religion was part of a larger civilization encompassing poetry and belles lettres, arts, philosophy, and sciences, which would be the cultural expressions of the new Islamic empire and societies.

There were two principal foci of Islamic religious and cultural development in the postconquest era. One was Islam as expressed by the caliphate, the court, political elites, and the literati and artists patronized by the government. The court milieus contributed especially to Islamic art, architecture, philosophy, science, and Iranian and Hellenistic forms of literature in Arabic. The other was Islam as the religious beliefs and moral and social values of the Muslim urban populations – as expressed by the companions of the Prophet and their successors, the learned and holy men of Islam. The city milieus contributed to the literatures of Quranic exegesis, law, mysticism, and theology in conjunction with an Arabic belles lettres. Some subjects – such as poetry, theology, and history – were cultivated in both milieus. In the chapters that follow, we will consider first the cultural production and Islamic identities of the caliphal elites and then the Islam of the literati, the scholars, and the holy men. Their different understandings and experiences of Islamic identity coexisted and sometimes overlapped.

Chapter 12　The ideology of imperial Islam

With the centralization of state power came a new rhetoric of legitimacy. The early caliphate had been a series of individual reigns deeply dependent on the religious qualities of the caliphs, and their personal connection to the Prophet. After the first four caliphs, the various contenders for the position adopted different claims. ʿAli and his descendants claimed the right to the caliphate as a matter of family relation to the Prophet, the Kharijis on the basis of religious purity, and others on the basis of their Meccan tribal heritage. The Caliph Muʿawiya asserted the legitimacy of his reign in terms of Arabian tribal culture, but after the second civil war ʿAbd al-Malik based his claim to rule on his services to Islam.

At the same time, the caliphs adopted the ancient symbols of divinely granted rule expressed in poetry and literature, philosophy and science, and art and architecture. To define the authority of the regime and the legitimacy of the ruling classes, they propagated a cosmopolitan culture implicitly wider in scope than Islam. A literary and philosophical culture presented a vision of the universe as a whole, of the role of the state and the ruler in the divine plan, of the functioning of human society, and of the nature of human beings and their destiny in this world and the next. In Umayyad and ʿAbbasid times, this vision was expressed partly in Islamic religious terms and partly in literary and artistic terms inherited from Greco-Roman, Persian, and Indian cultures.

In the Umayyad period, this imperial culture included Arabic poetry and oral traditions concerning Arab history, the life of the Prophet, the beginnings of Islam, and the deeds of the early caliphs. It also incorporated Byzantine and Sasanian artistic and literary materials. Thus, Umayyad mosques and palaces fused Christian and Byzantine decorative and iconographic motifs with Muslim uses and concepts to create new modes of Islamic architecture. The Umayyads also sponsored formal debates among Muslims and

Christians, which contributed to the absorption of Hellenistic concepts into Muslim theology. Byzantium was both a source to emulate and a foil against which to define the distinctiveness of the Muslim regime.

An early expression of imperial Islam was the issuance of uniquely Islamic gold and silver coinage in place of Byzantine and Sasanian money – coinage being the historic prerogative of emperors and the principle vehicle of their propaganda. The new coinage replaced Christian and Zoroastrian symbolism with Arabic script to signify the sovereignty of the caliphs, their commitment to Islam, and their triumph over the previous empires. A coin dated 694–95 reads on one side: "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God"; the reverse side lists the titles, "commander of the believers, caliph of God" (*amir al-mu'minin, khalifat allah*).

Umayyad architecture

The state also symbolized its sovereignty by undertaking monumental constructions. ʿAbd al-Malik elaborated the status of Jerusalem (the most sacred city of Judaism and Christianity) as a holy place for Islam. The Dome of the Rock, the first great Muslim shrine, was built between 692 and 702 on the site of the ancient Hebrew temple and near the place of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection. This was also the legendary site of Abraham's intended sacrifice of Ishmael (the favored son in Muslim tradition), thus establishing a direct connection to the common ancestor of monotheism. (See Illustration 2.)

Illustration 2.   The Dome of the Rock.

In Muslim tradition, this site is also the location of the Prophet's ascent to heaven. Muslims believe that Muhammad's miraculous night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem (*isra'*) and his ascension to heaven (*miʿraj*) took place from the rock and that Jerusalem will be the site of the last judgment and entry to paradise. Traditions defining the religious merit to be gained by visiting Jerusalem were already in circulation in the early eighth century; some urged a visit to Jerusalem in conjunction with the pilgrimage (*hajj*).

Apart from its religious prestige, there may have been practical reasons for the construction of a great Muslim shrine in Jerusalem. Jerusalem was an important town for the subject populations. Christians maintained a lively presence at least until the end of the seventh century. Jews – possibly from Arabia and Babylonia – were returning. By the 670s and 680s, there was a mosque, and laborers were moving into the city for construction work. The construction of the first great shrine of the Islamic era may also have been part of an attempt to make Jerusalem – in the heart of Umayyad domains – a rival to Mecca – then in the hands of the counter-caliph, Ibn al-

Zubayr. The Dome has the shape of a reliquary built over a sacred place or object, suggesting a pilgrimage destination at a time when the pilgrimage to Mecca appears not yet to have been established as a Muslim worldwide ritual.

The building – a dome resting on an octagon – resembles the Greco-Roman churches of Rome, Ravenna, and Jerusalem and other smaller churches in the surrounding region. The construction of a Muslim shrine on the site of the ancient Hebrew temple and the adoption of the design of local Syrian churches implied that Muslims were the heirs of the ancient religious traditions and rivals of the nearby churches that marked the ascension and resurrection of Christ.

Muslim triumph was further celebrated in the decoration of the building. Its ornamental motifs, expressing holiness and power, were adapted from Byzantine and Persian forms to illustrate the sovereignty of Islam. The Dome appears as a kind of royal pavilion covering God's throne on the Rock. Its mosaic decorations – crowns, jewels and hanging pearls, acanthus scrolls, grapes, and pomegranates – evoke pre-Islamic church decoration, trophies of rulers, and gifts to the temple. Eggs, pearls, lamps, stars, and gardens are symbols of the luminosity and radiance of paradise. Jewels and pearls also appear in Islamic texts as part of the decoration of paradise.

Inscriptions in the Dome of the Rock proclaimed the mission of Islam, the truth of the new faith, and the surpassing of the old faith. These passages name Muhammad as the envoy of God, but they bless Jesus and acknowledge him as a prophet and messiah. They acknowledge blessings for the day when Jesus is raised up again but deny that he is the son of God. Is the mention of Jesus meant to include him in the Muslim pantheon and thus appeal to Christians? Or is the intention to refute the Christian doctrines of Jesus's divinity and to convert them to Islam?

The Dome of the Rock was the first of a series of great mosques built in the late Umayyad period. In the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, 'Abd al-Malik's successor, al-Walid (705–15), combined

the aesthetics of a pagan sanctuary (with its classical, Roman, and Hellenistic motifs) and a Christian church to create a new and distinctly Muslim architecture. (See Illustration 3.) Before al-Walid, Christians and Muslims had both worshiped on the platform of the church (*temonos*). The church was then demolished and replaced by a triple-aisled hall placed against the south side of the *temonos* and decorated with colored marbles, glass mosaics, gilding, and lamps. The mosque is decorated with scenes of idyllic buildings and landscapes that may represent heaven or may imply the subjection of the world to the new caliphs and the new faith. (See Illustration 4.) In 706, the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus was inscribed, "Our lord is one God, our religion is Islam and our prophet is Muhammad." The old church was preserved by the incorporation of materials and by its location.

Illustration 3. The central portico of the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. Courtesy of Isabelle Chiosso.

Illustration 4. Mosaics of the Damascus mosque (detail). Courtesy of Isabelle Chiosso.

Moreover, the location of the clock gates, the caliph's box (*maqsura*), the nearby royal palace, and the colonnades that link palace and mosque correspond to the topography of the imperial complex in Constantinople. This suggests that Damascus was displacing both Jerusalem as a holy place and Constantinople as the center of imperial power. It was a message to both Muslims and non-Muslims about the replacement of the old imperium by the new.

Then, in 707–09, al-Walid rebuilt the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. The very structure of the mosque evoked the caliph's glory. It was built in the manner of Hellenistic royal architecture and contained a longitudinal hall, absidal niche, and pulpit (*minbar*) from which the official Friday sermon recognizing the sovereignty of the caliph and important political announcements were made. This was the first known mosque to have the decorated, semicircular niche that marks the direction of prayer (*mihrab*). The mosque also contained a box (*maqsura*) to seclude the caliph from his subjects, much as he was secluded at court. Umayyad caliphs sent necklaces, ruby-encrusted crescents, cups, and thrones to emphasize the submission of non-Muslim peoples to Islam and the triumphs and primacy of the caliph.

Al-Walid carried the decorative scheme of the Damascus mosque to other places in his empire, perhaps to create a uniform imperial-religious iconography in all Islamic lands. He rebuilt the Aqsa mosque adjacent to the Dome of the Rock and, in 710–12, he rebuilt the Mosque of ʿAmr and the governor's palace in Fustat. The Mosque of Sanʿa was remodeled by his governors. The Haram of Mecca and the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem were also completed. As a consequence of these constructions, a characteristic Arab-Islamic mosque emerged, defined by a longitudinal courtyard, a concave niche to mark the direction of prayer, a dome, a minaret, a wide axial nave, elevated transepts, and a decorative scheme of vines, marbles, mosaics, gilded epigraphy, and jewels.

In these works, the caliph as conqueror and endower treated religion as an intrinsic aspect of his own identity and the mosque as a symbol of the compact union of the political and religious aspects of his rule. Before entering the mosque, the Caliph al-Walid would change from perfumed and multicolored clothes to pure white garments. On returning to the palace, he would again put on the worldly and splendid garb of the court. Although the caliphate took Islam into its political majesty, Islam absorbed the caliph into the service of religion. The same motifs served both imperial and religious purposes. They testified to the glory and power of kings and sacred presences.

The desert palaces

Alongside the religious program of the caliph, there was a secular-imperial program manifested in court ceremony, art, and architecture. Like its predecessor courts, the court of the Umayyad caliphs became a theater enacting the drama of royalty. The caliph's residence was approached by ceremonial gates; its central feature was a longitudinal hall culminating in an absidal or domed room – a pattern found at Damascus, al-Wasit, Mushatta, and later Baghdad – adapted from Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, and Sasanian patterns for the emperor's court. The court, with its domed room, was the

center of the universe; its decorations signified the gathering of the living cosmos to glorify the caliph.

Court symbols conveyed the august majesty and unique rank of the caliph among men. He was entitled to dress and furnishings, to ceremonies and amusements, and to gestures of respect that no other humans enjoyed. Court poetry glorified the ruler and surrounded him with a divine aura. The Umayyad court poets addressed the caliph as the deputy of God (*khalifat allah*). Poetry of the late seventh and early eighth centuries also identified the caliph as the axis of the universe (*qutb*), as the light of guidance, and as the direction of Muslim prayer (*qibla*). The panegyrics sometimes imputed supernatural powers to him; his intercession brought rain. The oath of allegiance (*bay'a*) became a gesture of the humble servitude of the courtier and subject before his overlord.

In 742, al-Walid II was the first caliph to claim that the title "*khalifa*" meant "*khalifat allah*," that is, "deputy of God" instead of "deputy of the Prophet." A letter ascribed to al-Walid presented the caliph as God's agent on par with the Prophet and as a source of guidance (imam). The titles "*khalifat allah*" and "imam," however, were used only in poetry and rhetoric; they were not official titles and were not recognized by Muslim scholars. The recognized titles of caliphs were *khalifat rasul allah* (deputy of the prophet of God) and *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the believers).

The caliph held audience seated on a throne, dressed in a crown and royal robes, and veiled from his audience by a curtain. His courtiers stood or sat on each side of the long hall. His day included consultations, receptions, prayer, and private entertainments – hunting, music, dancing girls, wine drinking, and poetry reading. A chamberlain controlled access to the royal person; everyone addressed him in submissive tones and with panegyrical greetings. Obedience and fidelity to an adored majestic personage was a leading theme in later Umayyad court life.

Love of the steppe, its climate, its healthfulness, its seclusion, and its hunting brought Umayyad princes to their desert palaces. There, decorations depicted the caliph's majesty and power. In a fresco at

Qasr al-Khayr, the caliph appears in a formal, frontal pose; at Khirbat al-Mafjar, he assumes a martial figure. Paintings at Qusayr ʿAmr portray the Caliph al-Walid as Adam, in an hieratic manner adopted from Byzantine depictions of the Christ as Pantocrator. At Qusayr ʿAmr, his majesty appears in full triumph in a painting depicting the shah of Iran, the emperor of Byzantium, Roderic of Spain, the negus of Abyssinia, the emperor of China, and the emperor of the Turks greeting the caliph as their master. The caliph is shown at the head of the family of kings, preeminent among rulers who are shown as deriving their authority from their new suzerain, the Muslim caliph, whose power embraces not only Islam but the whole world. At Qusayr ʿAmr, a villa set in gardens or a small-scale agricultural estate, the paintings depict the luxury and extravagance of hunting, gardens, birds, animals, banquets, and dancing girls. All this defined the prerogatives of royalty. It was a statement of royal transcendence of religious identities.

In these ways, the Umayyads not only gave cultural legitimacy to the Arab-Muslim imperium but also welded the disparate elements of the governing class – the caliph, his family and boon companions, Arab tribal chiefs and generals, Inner Asian soldiers, Iranian administrators, Christian ecclesiastics, and Muslim religious scholars – into a cohesive imperial elite.

The Umayyads and the ancient empires

These policies and monuments were continuations of Byzantine and Sasanian practices. The sublimity of the emperor-caliph, the official support of the state for religion, and the construction of monumental churches – or, in this case, mosques – all had Byzantine precedents. In Syria and Egypt, the whole administrative apparatus – including the revenue administration and even the form of chancery documents – maintained Byzantine systems. Syrian military organization also followed Byzantine models. In Iraq, the Sasanian pattern of administrative organization – the fourfold division of finance, military, correspondence, and chancellery services – was adopted by Arab administrators.

In adopting the practices of the previous empires, the Umayyads transformed the traditional motifs. Although the Umayyads employed Byzantine designs and even builders, artists, and workers (from Damascus, Jerusalem, the Biqa Valley, Syria, Egypt, and Byzantium) to decorate their mosques and palaces, the artistic inspiration was not entirely Byzantine. Umayyad art was a fusion of Byzantine, ancient Roman, and Sasanian art, creating a uniquely Islamic aesthetic. The Umayyad Mosque of Damascus was built on the Roman *temonos*; the desert palaces resembled Roman villas in their fortification, isolation, and close connection to the land. In their palaces, the Umayyads integrated Sasanian motifs – images of hunting, drinking, music, dancing, and beautiful women. The portraits of princes were presented in Byzantine style, but with Sasanian overtones. Conversely, the six kings painting was a Sasanian motif presented frontally in Byzantine style. Thus, Greek, Roman, and Persian themes and techniques were used to create a decorative scheme that was distinctly Umayyad. In utilizing the art of their predecessors, the Umayyads chose, rejected, combined, and juxtaposed ancient themes in a new art.

The artistic symbolism communicated a double meaning. Early Islamic art suggested both that the new empire was an integral continuation of the existing civilizations and that it had superseded them. It called for the cooperation of non-Muslim notables and local power holders and for the acquiescence of its non-Muslim subjects, while also proclaiming a new Muslim empire replacing the Byzantine Empire and a new religion taking over from Christianity and Judaism.

Islam and iconoclasm

From an early period, Muslim religious and public art was characterized by vegetal and calligraphic decoration covering large surfaces and by the use of Arabic script as both a decorative motif and an emblem of identity. Muslim coins were embossed with script, but not portraits. However, royal and private Umayyad decorations did portray human and animal figures. Later Muslim practice was also mixed. Mosques, schools, and other places of religious

significance were never decorated with human or animal figures, but representational images were found in ʿAbbasid, Fatimid, Persian, Indian, and Ottoman art produced under royal patronage and for court consumption, although this was much less common in the Arab world.

What does this tell us about Muslim religious attitudes toward the representation of people and animals in art? There is nothing in the Quran or early Muslim religious literature to suggest an iconoclastic attitude. Grabar has argued that Muslim calligraphy and vegetal arts were most likely a pragmatic adaptation to the need for a new imperial-Islamic emblem distinct from the Byzantine and Sasanian portraits of emperors. The use of vegetal designs and writing was prior to any religious theory about them. Once adopted, they became the norm for Islamic public art. Theories about Islamic iconoclasm were developed later.

However, the absence of human images in Muslim public art may not be accidental. It may have been an implied choice of a fundamental religious orientation. The inscription in the Dome of the Rock demotes the status of Christ from son of God to a human prophet and instead extolls the Quran (the text of the revelation) as the only contact with God. It implicitly denies any human or material intermediary between man and God and thus rejects the veneration of icons and images. Early Islam favored the communal rather than the salvific forms of religion that look to human intermediaries as the medium of salvation. Because God alone is reality and cannot be represented, nothing material can substitute for him. Abstraction signifies transcendence.

Chapter 13 The ʿAbbasids: Caliphs and emperors

The caliphate and Islam

Like the Umayyads, the ʿAbbasids pursued two kinds of legitimation, Islamic and imperial. From the beginning, the caliphs were involved in religious matters, but their engagement was limited. The Rashidun caliphs – as companions of the Prophet – left authoritative precedents in many matters of law. ʿUthman promulgated an official edition of the Quran. Muʿawiya tried to exert influence over communal-religious leaders by appointing Quran readers and judges. Caliphs built mosques, protected the pilgrimage, proffered justice to the people, and waged war on behalf of the Islamic empire. In the reigns of ʿAbd al-Malik and his successors, the construction of great mosques defined the caliphs as patrons of Islam who glorified their religion and made it prevail over Byzantine Christianity. The Caliph ʿUmar II came to the throne from an earlier career in Medina engaged in legal and religious activity and brought to the caliphate a renewed concern for communal-religious issues. The later Umayyads assumed the right to intervene in theological matters; they executed Qadari theologians who proclaimed God's power absolute and, by implication, subordinated the authority of the caliphs. Their court poets bestowed on them the grandiose title of God's deputy (*khalifat Allah*).

The ʿAbbasids reaffirmed the Islamic basis of their legitimacy. In the course of their anti-Umayyad revolution, the early ʿAbbasids tried to promote their claim to rule as Hashimites; being the family of the Prophet, this revered lineage stood above all ethnic, tribal, regional, and local interests. They also maintained that the right to rule was assigned to the founder of their lineage, Ibn al-ʿAbbas, by the Prophet himself. As caliphs, they inherited the attributes of religious

authority: the Prophet's cloak, stave, and ring. The royal name was inscribed on coins and the borders of ceremonial garments (*tiraz*) and was invoked in the Friday sermon (*khutba*). They themselves claimed to be appointed by God to follow in the ways of the Prophet and to lead the Muslim community along the path of Islam. The idea of God's caliph was invoked in ʿAbbasid as well as in Umayyad poetry.

The ʿAbbasids had come to power on a current of messianic hopes, and their titles stressed their imagined role as saviors. ʿAbbasid caliphs – including al-Mansur (the Victorious), al-Mahdi (the Savior), al-Hadi (the Guide), and al-Rashid (the Rightly Guided) – claimed to bring enlightenment and to return Muslims to the true path. They patronized scholars and promoted the pilgrimage to Mecca by organizing way stations, by providing military security in the desert, and by making gifts to the holy places. They performed the pilgrimage. The ʿAbbasid caliphs also tried to draw Muslim religious leaders into public service as judges and administrators. They expanded the judicial hierarchy and tried to use the judges as intermediaries to organize scholars, teachers, and legists under the jurisdiction and patronage of the state.

Furthermore, the ʿAbbasids intervened directly in religious matters. In 777, the Caliph al-Mahdi began persecuting freethinkers and heretics (*zanadiqa*) in order to set the boundaries of acceptable doctrine and to unify his cadres on common religious grounds. The term "*zanadiqa*" was applied to people who held a variety of religious beliefs and social practices. In the narrow sense, it referred to Manichaeans or dualists who believed in the existence of two divine powers – one for good and one for evil – as opposed to the unitary conception of monotheism. However, the term was used more generally to refer to atheists who denied the existence of God, creation ex nihilo, prophecy, or the next world. It referred to people who denied that the Quran was a miraculous revelation from God. It referred to libertines or antinomians who did not believe in reward or punishment after death. The *zanadiqa* were those who believed in freedom from law and were therefore political subversives. Included in the denunciations were poets, theologians, scribes, and many

Shi'is. By the reign of Harun al-Rashid, however, the campaign had petered out.

The effort to bring Muslim religious life under state supervision was similar to both Byzantine and Sasanian imperial practices. Byzantine emperors did not have the right to define doctrine – only the church itself as represented by the collectivity of the bishops could do that – but they saw to it that the decisions taken suited imperial political interests as well as the convictions of the bishops. They presided over church councils and suggested formulas for the creed. The emperors also appointed the leading patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops.

The Sasanian system is less well known. However, the early 'Abbasid scribe and translator of Sasanian literature into Arabic, Ibn al-Muqaffa', may represent the Sasanian situation. He wrote that religious matters were of utmost importance to the state and that uniformity in doctrine and control over religious organization were indispensable bases of power. He argued that the caliphs could not afford doctrinal disputes in the administration and the army and could not permit religious scholars and judges to be outside state control. Ibn al-Muqaffa' urged the caliphs to promulgate doctrine, organize a hierarchical judiciary, and appoint the leading judges.

The early 'Abbasid caliphs did appoint judges and tried to define the boundaries of acceptable belief, but their influence in the formation of religious laws and doctrines was limited. The caliphate was constrained by widespread resistance to its religious claims (even among its Sunni supporters) and vigorously opposed by sectarian movements. The authority of the caliphs was not recognized as absolute or even comprehensive. Among Sunnis who supported both the Umayyad and 'Abbasid dynasties, the ever-growing importance of the religious intellectuals and the independent development of Quranic studies, hadith, law, and theology limited the authority of the ruler. Many Sunnis held that the Prophet's guidance had been passed on to the companions collectively, not solely to any one of them, and to their students, followers, and successors. The consensus, or collective agreement, of scholars defined law and belief. At best, the caliphs were considered equivalent to the

scholars and could decide questions not otherwise decided by the religious authorities. Primarily, the caliph was the guardian of Islam. By the time of Harun, the caliphate also seems to have accepted its role as the guardian but not the source of Islamic teaching. The caliphs distanced themselves from claims to be imams in the Shiʿi sense of divinely inspired teachers.

Shiʿis opposed the established caliphs in principle. They claimed that only the family of ʿAli, a holy lineage related to the Prophet, was entitled to hold the office. Then, with the anti-Umayyad rebellion of al-Mukhtar in 687, gnosticism – the belief that human beings embodied a divine spark trapped in this world and that they must return to their true divine realm – entered Shiʿi intellectual circles. The gnostics were eschatological dreamers who believed in incarnation, transmigration of souls, and continuous, living prophethood. They thought of the imam as the savior (Mahdi). By the eighth century the Shiʿis had evolved into a movement claiming not only the rights of the family of ʿAli but also that this family was divinely blessed with supernatural powers and moral perfection.

However, although they all agreed that leadership (imamate) was inherited in the family of ʿAli, they differed over which descendant was the true heir. Zaydis believed that the true heir had to prove himself in active struggle for the office. Imami Shiʿis defined the leader as the person who inherited the position or was designated by the previous imam, but he did not have to be a political activist. They introduced the idea of an imam who is not a political ruler, but a teacher and savior. Eventually the leadership of Imami Shiʿism passed to scholars. Quietism, accommodation, dissimulation, and martyrdom became the dominant sociopolitical motifs.

The inquisition

The Caliph al-Maʾmun (813–33), however, attempted to expand the religious functions of the caliphate. Al-Maʾmun came to power as the result of a civil war in which – supported by a new military force from Khurasan – he overthrew a legitimate caliph and brought a new governing entourage to Baghdad. To legitimate his regime, al-

Maʾmun assumed an austere lifestyle, emphasized his Hashimite descent, and adopted the slogan of "command good and forbid evil." This was intended to co-opt vigilante religious activity in Baghdad. He declared himself Imam al-Huda, the guide inspired by God, and the caliph of God (*khalifat Allah*). Al-Maʾmun then nominated ʿAli al-Rida – the Shiʿi eighth imam – as his successor. This has variously been interpreted as an effort to co-opt the Shiʿis or to implicitly adopt Shiʿi ideas of the authority of imams for himself.

These measures to bolster his religious prestige and authority were preliminary to the decisive measure of his regime: the declaration of a theological policy and an inquisition (*mihna*) to enforce his views. Al-Maʾmun declared the Quran "created." This was the position of the rationalist Muʿtazilite theologians (see Chapter 15) and implied that the Quran was a worldly object, not itself part of the divine being. This stood in contrast to the idea that the Quran was "uncreated" – like the Logos in Christian theology – an emanation of and part of the divine being. The practical import of the doctrine of the created Quran was that reason and/or caliphal authority could define religious belief and practice, whereas the contrary position placed revelation (including Quran and hadith) above all human authority.

The inquisition supported the rationalist theological schools that valued reason (Muʿtazilis, Zaydis, Murjiʿis) and the quasi-rationalist Shafiʿi and Hanafi law groups, which accepted the use of analogical reasoning – against the traditionalists or hadith scholars who stressed revelation as the source of religious knowledge. The inquisition required the religious scholars to accept both the doctrine and the caliph's right to promulgate it.

The inquisition was prosecuted by judges of the Hanafi school. It was aimed in particular at the followers of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the leading hadith scholar in Baghdad. Scholars who refused to accept the caliph's doctrine were beaten, denied court positions, disqualified as judges and legal witnesses, denied the legal right to pass on property to relatives, and forbidden from teaching or praying in the

mosques, from narrating hadith, or from giving binding legal opinions (*fatawa*).

The motives for the inquisition were probably as much political as theological. Although the Hanbalis accepted the authority of the caliphate, they were opposed to the arbitrary or abusive exercise of power. They were temperamentally hostile to the luxury and self-indulgence of the elites. In addition, they had strong support not only among religious scholars but also among shopkeepers, craftsmen, and skilled workers, who made up their following. The "street" was allied with the Hanbalis. Baghdadi Khurasanians, descended, as was Ibn Hanbal, from the original ʿAbbasid conquering army, were their principal supporters. Thus al-Maʾmun's intervention was also an effort to restore the authority of *al-khass* (intellectuals and theologians) over *al-ʿamma* (the common people).

The inquisition continued into the reigns of al-Maʾmun's successors until the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–61) abandoned the inquisition after years of tumult and popular opposition. His goal seems to have been to quiet the controversy, rather than to accept the uncreatedness of the Quran or to promote traditionalism. Judges who professed createdness were not removed; traditionalists were not appointed. Successive caliphs supported moderate rationalism but did not press the doctrine of created Quran. After this cultural and political ordeal, the caliphate limited its religious claims.

The defeat of the caliphal position marked a victory not only for the Hanbalis but for the independence of all the legal and theological schools. The outcome of the inquisition showed that the religious scholars had achieved both social authority and permanent political power vis-à-vis the caliphate. Specialists in Islamic law and theology were an autonomous pious and scholarly community operating as a private enterprise, distinct from the political sector. Once this was established, the caliphate was due obedience in all matters of state and politics. Scholars accepted the caliph as a symbolic religious leader and protector of religious law – having the authority to decide some questions of religious law not otherwise decided by the scholars. Only then did the caliphate become the symbol of the unity of Islam and empire, of a golden age in Islamic history.

The confrontation with religious scholars, however, by no means fully defined the concept of the caliphate and its authority. The caliphate was not only a Muslim regime; it was an imperial regime, the successor of ancient empires. Although they appealed to Muslim sentiment so that Muslims would recognize them as the legitimate successors to the Prophet and as the protectors and organizers of Islam, the caliphs simultaneously appealed to non-Muslims and converts as divinely selected rulers or exalted princes sent by God for the right ordering of worldly affairs. In ceremony, art, and architecture they expressed an imperial ideal. They sponsored a cosmopolitan literary and artistic Islamic culture and viewed themselves as heirs to the ancient cultures, which they incorporated into the amalgam of Islamic identities. The ʿAbbasid dynasty patronized Arabic poetry in both old bedouin and new courtly genres; they commissioned the translation into Arabic of Iranian literary classics, including works of history, polite literature, fables, political precepts, and manuals of protocol and behavior for scribes, as well as the mythic and scientific lore of Persia and India. Similarly, classical logical, scientific, and philosophical works were translated from Greek and Syriac into Arabic.

Architecture and court ceremony

The caliphal conception of the majesty of the ruler was expressed in Arabic, Persian, Hellenistic, and other Middle Eastern terms. The caliph was the vice-regent of God on earth. Court poets and court protocol elevated the caliphs above angels and prophets, calling them the chosen of God, God's shadow on earth, a refuge for all of his lesser creatures. By his magical powers, the caliph upheld the order of the cosmos, providing for the rain and the harvests, keeping all persons in their places, and seeing to it that they fulfilled their functions in society. He was the symbol of civilization: agriculture, cities, arts, and learning depended on his blessings. In the middle of the tenth century, a court chronicler reports that an unsophisticated provincial soldier, overcome by the splendor of the caliph's appearance, thought he was in the presence of God.

Palaces and palace-cities manifested the majesty of the caliphate. Baghdad incorporated materials taken from the ruins of Sasanian palaces. Its design had symbolic implications. The city of peace was a round city divided into quadrants by axial streets running from east to west and north to south, with the palace in the very center. The structure of the city reproduced the symmetry and hierarchy of society and the central position of the caliph within it. The central placement of the caliph symbolized his sovereignty over the four quarters of the world. It also symbolized the cosmic and heavenly world. Since ancient times, the founding of a city had signified the creation of order out of chaos in the geographic, social, and cosmic levels of the universe. With the construction of a new city, the caliph became the creator of order in the otherwise formless, boundless, and threatening experience of mankind.

The inner life of the court was marked by an elaborate protocol. The Umayyads had inscribed themselves in a universal history of power: processions, formal audiences, presentation of gifts, the screen shielding the ruler from view, and the privilege of wearing textiles embroidered with sacred words that were reserved for the ruler alone. These practices were continued by the ʿAbbasids. The caliph was presented as capricious, inscrutable, and terrifying. One of the prerogatives of the ruler was ceremonial and deferential behavior in his presence, marked by silence and kissing the ground. The court was governed by elaborate regulations for eating, drinking, and dressing. The protocol was also designed to signify the order of courtly ranks as determined by the caliph, who conferred on his servitors the symbols of rank and honor, such as weapons, banners, food, and royal robes. Court etiquette, manners, gaze, and speech were all fashioned to enunciate royalty. Carnal pleasures – wine, women, and song – were part of a Dionysian atmosphere featuring bacchic and homoerotic love poetry. Court protocol and the pleasures the caliphs promoted a vision of the ruler as transcending ordinary limits.

The Arabic humanities

Literature also served the imperial program. Arabic literature was cultivated in both court and urban circles, but the caliphate patronized poetry and history in particular as an expression of its legitimacy and of its affinity with the conquering armies, as well as an adornment of imperial rule. The caliphs were strongly influenced by the heritage of pre-Islamic bedouin Arabia and by Arab interest in glorifying the conquests.

The classical poetry of the desert became a part of courtly entertainment. The pre-Islamic ideas of sacred kingship became an Arabic-Islamic ideology of royal legitimacy. Panegyrics recited at the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid courts celebrated rulership in terms of victory and enshrined the idea of Arabs as masculine, dominant, aggressive, and active rather than feminine and submissive. Furthermore, panegyrics deified the patron. The poet praised him and prayed to him for blessings and gifts. The generosity of the ruler was compared to the divine overflowing of grace, except that the caliph's benefits were present and real, whereas God was distant and unresponsive. Court poetry implied that the benefits conferred by rulers elevated them above the powers of God.

Love poetry was particularly important. Pre-Islamic love poetry was nostalgic for lost loves but also unsentimental and intensely physical. In the caliphal era, there were two kinds of love poetry. One was a brazenly physical celebration of fulfillment in love. The other was ʿudhri poetry, yearning for an impossible and unrealizable love. ʿAbbasid court poetry made unfulfilled love fashionable. Yearning showed a refined sensibility and thus marked a man as part of the court elite. Esteemed poets, moreover, wrote about homoerotic desires and celebrated the blessings of wine.

Court poetry contradicted orthodox Muslim religious values. The scholars believed that Islam required mindfulness, concentration, clarity, attention to God, and resistance to the seductions of the body (including music, dance, secular songs, poetry, drinking, hashish, and gambling). They viewed Islam as regulating erotic relations and all attachments other than those to God. Yet, the puritanism of orthodox Islam did not erase the seduction of poetry about love and

war, intoxication, ecstasy, and freedom. When the power of the caliphate declined, later courts in Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and North Africa continued this literary tradition and made it a universal Muslim world expression of royalty.

Historical studies were also a product of both court and urban milieus. Historical literature embodied the desire to celebrate and validate the conquests as an Arab tribal and Muslim achievement. Muslim histories served to legitimate Muslim hegemony over non-Muslims and to assert the superiority of Islam to the older religions and of Arab kingship to the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. History was also written to advance the claims of contenders in Arab and intra-Muslim rivalries. In the seventh and eighth centuries, Arab scholars collected tribal lore, pre-Islamic Jewish lore (*isra'iliyyat*), information on Yemeni antiquity, genealogies, battle tales, tales of ancient kings and prophets, and the Prophet's biographical information. Papyri, coins, inscriptions, name lists, and lists of caliphs provided basic information.

Biographies of Muhammad, books about the conquests, and stories of the early civil wars were written down in the early decades of the eighth century. In these early works, Arab-Muslims defined their communities and the bases of their political community and imperial power. They told stories about the conquests and the battles they had fought, developing a narrative about the piety and religious virtues of the conquerors. Martial valor was equated with piety. The Arab-Muslim community was memorialized through the deeds of its heroes, defenders, and holy martyrs.

From the middle of the eighth century, these early accounts were reworked – in accordance with theological, political, and social needs – into narrative histories. Persian historiography provided the model of histories focused on the reigns of kings; historians (*akhbaris*) provided lists of caliphs, governors, judges, and officials. "Authored" texts replaced students' and scholars' notebooks circulated among colleagues. There was a boom in learning at the end of the eighth century as the production of paper made the reproduction and dissemination of knowledge easier.

One of the primary concerns in early historiography was to establish the distinctness of Islam from both paganism and other monotheistic religions. Pre-Muhammad prophetic history was narrated to elaborate Quranic stories and to give Muslims a history validating Muhammad as a true prophet. Muslim historians portrayed the emergence of a religious people out of a tribal wilderness; they pointed to the Islamic calendar, the direction of prayer, and a sacred language and script to validate the divine inspiration of the Arab-Muslim community. Some scholars condemned pagan, tribal, sectarian, and other monotheistic cultures as the enemies of the true community. Middle Eastern ideas of the cyclical history of prophecy and God's selection of Muslims for virtue and victory shaped the way early Muslim history was narrated. This was salvation history, the history of how God has ordered mankind and its destiny, told from the creation to the present, from former prophets to the final prophet, from the pagan era in Arabia (*jahiliyya*) to Islam.

Other cultural and social forces shaped the way in which history was conceived. History was often written by non-Arabs. Assimilated converts brought with them the literary concepts of their own traditions. Ancient Greek topoi – familiar to both Arabs and non-Arabs – appear in Arab-Muslim histories: the duel between two warriors, the small incident that triggers a momentous event, the eyewitness confirming the truth, love of lists and famous "firsts," and speeches to exhort to battle or belief in Islam.

The study of hadith was both a component of and an influence on Muslim historiography. Whereas cultivated courtiers were interested in the entertainment and instructional value of a story more than its literal truth, traditionalists believed that the wisdom of the ancestors was the highest knowledge and had to be conserved. Knowledge was not created – it was passed on. The past was a source of models for behavior, and so accuracy of transmission became critical. For some hadith scholars, historical tales and hadith both had to be valid; invention and any use of reasoning that made the teller anything other than the medium of transmission was frowned upon. In a multiethnic, multilingual society, these attitudes helped

maintain the ties of ʿAbbasid-era Arab-Islam to the Quran and to the Arabian past.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, historiography began to feature a variety of rhetorical styles. Two main subgenres emerged. First, history became important because of its connection to politics, because it was produced for rulers, courts, secretaries, and officials as a repository of prescriptions for, examples of, and knowledge about how to live. Scribes and secretaries replaced traditionalists as the sources for this kind of history. Second, local histories and biographical dictionaries were written to glorify the scholars – especially the collectivity of scholars of particular towns – and to ennoble the merchant and landowning strata from which they derived.

Thus, Arabic culture of this period was partly of the court and caliphal patronage, partly of Arab tribal milieus, and partly the product of the urban middle-class and scholarly communities. This culture had a crucial role to play in defining the political elite. Although Arabic culture was subtly merged with Islamic culture, the development of Arabic literature preserved an ethnic and linguistic distinctness from and within Islam. Arabism would later stand apart from Islam as the foundation of political and cultural identity.

Persian literature

Arabic poetry and history were not the only elements of cultural identity in this period. The incorporation of new peoples into the Arab-Muslim empire and the empire-wide recruitment of late Umayyad and ʿAbbasid political elites from all parts of the empire brought Persian officials and cultural influences into the caliphate. Persian court procedures were adopted and the first translations of Persian political documents were undertaken in the reign of the Umayyad Caliph Hisham (724–43). Under the ʿAbbasids, Persian and Nestorian officials, scribes, physicians, merchants, and soldiers oversaw the translation of Persian texts into Arabic. Persian courtiers translated manuals on how to conduct affairs of state, carry out the duties of various offices, behave in the presence of rulers, and fulfill

the duties required for different positions. This advice was embedded in tales and anecdotes about the great Persian rulers of the past. This was done partly as a partisan measure to enhance the prestige and authority of their own ethnic or factional groups, and partly to signify the supremacy of the caliphs and the political class to ordinary Muslims.

With political advice came technical and scientific knowledge. Iran was an important transmitter of Indian and Hellenistic medical, mathematical, astronomical, and astrological ideas. Works on horsemanship and the care and use of weapons and practical knowledge about government, agricultural management, and irrigation were all translated into Arabic. So too were literary masterworks such as the fables of Kalila and Dimna and some of the tales of the Arabian Nights. The literature of Persian courtly etiquette (*adab*) integrated Persian, Indian, and Hellenistic cultures. Valuing originality, wit, and style, this literature emphasized experiential knowledge, scientific understandings of nature and society, and historical knowledge discovered by research and reason.

The flourishing of Persian translations led to rivalry between Persian courtiers and their Arab counterparts. A literary movement, the Shu'ubiyya, asserted the cultural superiority of the Persians to the Arabs and influenced the official culture of the 'Abbasid caliphate. Persians emphasized the absolute and unlimited authority of the monarch, his divine selection, and his superiority in matters of religion as well as state. Persian literature also espoused a hierarchical view of society in which each person – ruler, noble, warrior, scribe, priest, merchant, worker, or peasant – had a fixed place. The duty of government was to preserve everyone in his place, giving each class its due.

These ideas differed profoundly from the prevailing sentiment in Arab-Muslim circles. Arab-Muslim sentiment was more egalitarian and less hierarchical. Urban Arab-Muslims tended to deny the ruler authority in religious matters and refused to accept that the ruler was a law unto himself. Arabs generally believed that the ruler was chosen by and was responsible to the community and its religion. Also embedded in Persian literature was a religious challenge to

Islam. Although Iranian administrators were Muslims, many were still sympathetic to Zoroastrianism; others may have been Manichaeans, gnostics, or even agnostics and atheists.

Arab scholars resisted Persian ideas and attempted to meet the temptations of Persian literary sophistication on its own grounds. In response to Persian literature, Arabic literary culture explored new directions for the sake of defending its old essence: the result, occurring primarily in the ninth century, was an Arab-Persian synthesis. Ibn Qutayba (828–89) compiled treatises on such themes as government, war, nobility, scholarship, asceticism, love, friendship, and women. His selections were organized in the manner of Arabic literature and included quotations from the Quran, hadith, and Arabic histories of the early caliphs and the Arab empire; he also incorporated Persian *adab* works, Indian tales, and Aristotle's philosophy to attract the Persian elites.

Another ninth-century writer, al-Jahiz (d. 869) – who is regarded as the finest prose stylist in the history of Arabic letters – also synthesized the literary interests of Arab- and Persian-minded elites. Out of the encyclopedic works of his predecessors, he selected, adapted, edited, and made attractive a body of literature that would serve as a common culture for both Arabs and Arabic-speaking Persians. Arabic writers thus offered some of the fruits of Persian thought to Muslims but obscured the elements that were in conflict with Islam and Arab values. The flood of translations from Persian was diverted and rechanneled into a stream of literature bearing a Persian imprint in manner, style, and subject but firmly wedded to Arabic and Islamic ideas.

Thus, elements of the Persian heritage became an integral part of Islamic imperial administrative and aesthetic culture. Still, the Persian language and Iranian political and religious ideas survived outside the Islamic synthesis. The Persian language would be the basis of a later Persian literary and artistic revival. Persian political ideas continued to influence the practice of Middle Eastern governments; Persian gnosticism would return to inspire later Islamic religious developments. In a later era, Persian would be the

foundation of a variant Perso-Islamic culture in the Middle East, and in Central and southern Asia.

Hellenistic literature and philosophy

Hellenistic thought also had a complex role in Islamic civilization. Greek culture as it became known in the Islamic era was not the thought of ancient Greece but rather Greek thought as preserved and interpreted in the late Roman Empire. Plato's ideas were represented by his political works and some of his dialogues. Aristotle's logical and scientific works, ethics, and metaphysics were also known. However, most of the materials attributed to Aristotle and Plato had actually been written in the centuries following the deaths of the two master philosophers, when they were reinterpreted in neo-Platonic terms as teachings of a path to spiritual salvation. The Greek heritage also included the science and medicine and the semimystical, semiscientific ideas of the alchemists, neo-Pythagoreans, and Hermetics.

The transmission of Hellenistic culture to Islamic societies depended on the survival of the ancient academies. The most important ancient academies were originally located in Athens and Alexandria, but with the Christianization of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries, pagan schools were dispersed. They found a haven in the Christian but non-Roman parts of the Middle East. The school of Athens was rescued by the Nestorian Church, which sponsored the translation of Greek works into Syriac. From the fifth to the eighth centuries, the school of Edessa translated the works of Aristotle and Porphyry, as well as many philosophical, historical, geographical, and astronomical works from Greek into Syriac. In the sixth century, the school of Nasibin, staffed mainly by Nestorian Christians, was transferred to Jundishapur, a Sasanian royal city in Fars. Here, Hellenistic philosophical and scientific studies flourished under the influence of Persian and Indian religious and occult conceptions. This school was eventually transferred to Baghdad.

Hellenistic schools were also active in Harran, Qinnesrin, Mosul, the Dayr Qunna monastery, al-Hira, and Marw. Secular topics –

including Greek rhetoric, dialectics, mathematics, music, geometry, astronomy, and philosophy – were taught privately in Damascus, but as private secular education waned in the seventh and eighth centuries, Syrian monasteries became the centers of Greek studies and translation into Syriac. A Syriac literature of hagiography, homilies, miracles, and disputations also blossomed. Syriac translations of Greek works continued to be made in the Umayyad period, but in the late Umayyad and ʿAbbasid era, Arabic replaced Syriac as the new common language. Arab princes commissioned the translation of works on alchemy from Greek and Coptic into Arabic.

Alexandrian Hellenistic thought also became a part of Islamic intellectual culture. Philosophical studies based on the canon of Porphyry (d. 305), including Aristotelian and neo-Platonic works, were taught in Alexandria, Beirut, and Gaza. The Alexandrian school was moved to Antioch (in Syria) under Jacobite auspices, then to Harran in Mesopotamia and Marw in Khurasan. Some of the scholars were Nestorian Christians, but others (at Harran) were pagans. From Mesopotamia, this school also moved to Baghdad at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth centuries. Iraqi-Persian Hellenism and Pahlavi culture, with its Indian connections, were other sources of late antique thought. In the Sasanian Empire, Greek works were translated into Pahlavi and were considered part of the Sasanian cultural heritage. Some works of logic and medicine came into Arabic from Persian translations.

Muslims interested in theological questions were drawn to the Hellenistic heritage. Debates between Muslims and Christians in the courts of the Umayyad caliphs conveyed Christian or Hellenistic vocabularies, forms of rational argument, and literary methods. In Baghdad, translations were undertaken by professional translators instead of clerics and often by scholars oriented to the culture of Iran rather than Syria. Translations in the reign of al-Mahdi (775–85) reinforced theological and cosmological arguments against heretics. In the eighth century, even before the great Arab grammarian Sibawayhi (d. 796), there was a Kufan grammatical school strongly influenced by Greek logic and philosophy. In the early ninth century,

there was increased interest in theological texts and practical works of alchemy and medicine.

In the reigns of al-Maʾmun (813–33) and al-Muʿtasim (833–42), under the guidance of Hunayn b. Ishaq (d. 873), works in medicine, optics, mechanics, geography, occult sciences, mathematics, and philosophy – including Aristotle's logic and the works of Galen and Hippocrates – were translated. The output of Hunayn's school was prodigious. This school of philologically competent editors created a body of translations and a spirit of critical inquiry that made philosophical studies in the Islamic era rigorous and exacting. Muslim and Christian scholars commented and glossed the translated works and prepared lectures, compendiums, and texts to disseminate their ideas. Al-Maʾmun and later caliphs also sent scholars to Byzantium to gather works on philosophy, geometry, music, arithmetic, and medicine for translation. The greater part of the translations was completed by the end of the tenth century. After that, philosophers and scientists worked with the corpus of earlier translations.

Translations were sponsored by caliphs, the royal family, ministers, officials, physicians, and scholars – whether Arabs, Persians, or Nestorians. In general, scholarly life was focused in patron households. Institutions – such as colleges or research centers – were few. Harun al-Rashid established a library and center for translations and scholarship (*khizanat al-hikma*). The Caliph al-Maʾmun is said to have established an academy and observatory (*bayt al-hikma*) to stimulate the translation of logical, scientific, and philosophical works into Arabic, but this may have been a center for Zoroastrian studies rather than philosophical translations.

Hellenistic philosophy played a profound intellectual role in the Islamic era. Philosophy – including logic, natural science, and metaphysics – was an intellectual movement with a great variety of positions united by a shared vocabulary and by a commitment to a rational program of investigations. Philosophers in the Islamic era also dealt with theological issues, such as the nature of God and his attributes, the theory of prophecy, ethics, and the relationship of philosophy to scriptural revelation.

Philosophy, however, was not a neutral form of analysis but was itself a kind of religious ideology. Its ultimate goal was not merely intellectual knowledge but the reabsorption of the human soul into the spiritual universe from which it had come. Philosophical teachings differed from Islamic teachings on such questions as the resurrection of the body, whether the universe was eternal or created, and whether God had knowledge of particulars as well as universals. Hellenistic philosophy – as a heritage of rational reflection – could be understood as posing a challenge to the Quranic revelation as a source of complete and infallible truth.

There were several responses to this challenge. One of the earliest Muslim philosophers, al-Kindi (d. ninth century), believed that philosophy and Muslim theology could be combined as an expression of wisdom (*hikma*) and could jointly refute heresy, gnosticism, and dualism. Still, al-Kindi believed in the primacy of the Quran and the superiority of faith over reason as the way to the discovery of religious truths. He believed that the teachings of the Quran required no philosophical justification. He advocated the superiority of the Prophet to the philosophers in providing knowledge of the divine world. He did not accept Platonic and Aristotelian opinions about the creation of the world, which he believed was created ex nihilo. He held that the role of reason was to clarify and to extend faith into areas left vague by Quranic pronouncements

Later Muslim philosophers (*falasifa*), however, gave primacy to philosophy as a means of finding truth and regarded Islam as no more than an acceptable approximation. Al-Farabi (d. 950) established the broad outlines of philosophy and defined its relation to Muslim scripture. He believed in a supreme and eternal being who was the first cause of all existing things. He also believed that the supreme being was connected to the world by a hierarchical series of emanations in the form of intelligences, which constituted the structure of the spiritual world and gave form to the material world. The successive levels of intellect mediated between God and the material world. Human beings, like all created beings, were formed by the intelligences of the spiritual world but at the same time were objects in the material world. Implanted in the human being was the

faculty of reason, which is a counterpart of the spiritual intelligences. Human beings, therefore, must cultivate rational intelligence to the utmost and use intellect and reason to control behavior and feeling so that the soul may be purified and returned to its ultimate destiny: knowledge of, vision of, and reintegration into spiritual reality.

Religion for al-Farabi was only an inferior and indirect way of symbolizing the truth, suitable for the masses. The imagination of the prophet, he believed, was inferior to the intelligence of the sage. To reconcile philosophy with Islam, al-Farabi held that Islam was indeed a true religion and that Muhammad was the perfect sage and philosopher, as well as a prophet who could express the truth in a fashion persuasive to ordinary people. Insofar as al-Farabi valued Muhammad, it was not as prophet but as philosopher. Still, philosophers saw themselves not as opposed to Islam but as Muslims vested in one of many dimensions of the ancient culture that they regarded as part of their heritage.

Other aspects of Greek heritage remained the pursuits of a cosmopolitan aristocracy remote from the mainstream of Islamic religious and cultural trends. Islamic-era scientists showed a great talent for direct observation and experiment, and their contributions to astronomy, mathematics, medicine, chemistry, zoology, mineralogy, and meteorology often surpassed the received heritage of Greek, Persian, and Indian ideas. Alchemy, occult physics, and occult neo-Pythagorean mathematics, however, were motivated by the quest for esoteric revelations rather than by scientific understanding. Neo-Pythagorean numbers, for example, were not mathematical entities but symbols of a higher and unseen reality that the occult scientist tried to conjure forth. In alchemy, the object was not only to transform materials but to discover the hidden relation of the material to the immaterial world. Hellenistic thought in this mode introduced not an experimental endeavor or practical technology but a nontheistic spiritual and religious program.

Culture, legitimacy, and the state

There were important cultural and political reasons for the translation of Persian and Hellenistic literatures. Translations were in part a continuation of a traditional form of culture, in part an appropriation of past culture by a new political elite, and in part a partisan project to enhance the prestige and authority of specific ethnic groups or factions. Translations were made to gain access to scientific, medical, mathematical, astronomical, and astrological skills and data. The caliphate, as sponsor and patron of philosophical literature, likely perceived it as an assertion of the superiority of rationality to revelation and of philosophers to prophets; by implication, an assertion of the superiority of caliphs as philosopher-kings over the scholars of religion. Philosophy was a literature appropriate to the transcendental claims of the ruler. Translations were also intended to symbolize the superiority of the Islamic empire to the Byzantine Empire, and the supremacy of the caliphs and the political elites to ordinary Muslims.

Furthermore, the ʿAbbasids created a universal, transethnic, and pan-religious empire by promoting both conversions to Islam and translations of all cultures into Arabic as the shared imperial language. The incorporation of old elites into the new empire and the need to legitimate the caliphate in all the cultural languages of the conquered societies were important motives for the translation movement. Translations acknowledged the growing importance of converts and clients, the founding of Baghdad as a multicultural society, and the need for the education of an ever more cosmopolitan elite.

Persian and Greek thought were also important in court circles, because they introduced the ideal of aristocratic self-cultivation. Courtiers, administrators, and the servants of caliphs were to be refined, learned, and worldly gentlemen. The aristocrat had to be knowledgeable in all the sciences, literature, history, philosophy, and religion. He was to be gentlemanly in manners, gracious, and sensitive to the nuances of rank and honor. He should also be competent in finance, in letter writing, in horsemanship, and in technical matters of administration. The aristocrat's cultivation included Islamic virtues, but its essential quality was a worldly

refinement that set him apart from the lowly and justified his claim to power. Indirectly, the cultivation of Persian and Greek letters implied a common culture for a heterogeneous elite based on the presumption of inherent aristocratic superiority.

Furthermore, all the court literatures served to propagate a pre-Islamic concept of the ruler and the empire. Interest in the secular aspects of Arabic literature, Persian *adab*, and Hellenistic philosophies and sciences signified the adaptation of a cultural heritage that could be used to legitimize caliphal rule. They provided, in the Arabic case, an ethnic concept of political leadership; in the Persian case, a continuation of the heritage of ancient Middle Eastern kings; and in the Hellenistic case, a concept of the structure of the universe itself, in philosophic and scientific form, as the ultimate justification for imperial rule. The patronage of these several literatures implied that the caliph, although a Muslim ruler, was legitimized by the non-Islamic heritage of the ancient Middle East.

In sum, the ʿAbbasids fostered ideological or religious loyalty to the caliphate using both Islamic and pre-Islamic motifs. They appealed to Muslim sentiment to recognize them as the legitimate successors to the Prophet and as the protectors and organizers of Islam. At the same time, they presented themselves to their subjects – Muslims and non-Muslims – as divinely selected rulers sent by God for the right ordering of worldly affairs. The caliphs expressed their claims in universalistic themes prevalent in ancient Near Eastern, Persian, Indian, Roman, and Hellenistic thought; they based their legitimacy not only on religious doctrine but on architectural symbols, literature, science, and philosophy, and on a style of court life marked by extraordinary possessions, pleasures, and powers. Their worldly power was construed as divine power, a power to be worshiped.

Urban Islam: The Islam of Scholars and Holy Men

Chapter 14 Introduction

Two principal forms of state and society stemmed from the Prophet Muhammad. One was the caliphate, his successors who were deemed competent to give both political and religious leadership. The other was a community (*umma*), a religious body headed by those learned in law and theology who provided schools and courts, teachers and judges. Whereas the caliphate sponsored a version of Islam as a culture of imperial power and courtly accomplishments, in the oases of Arabia and garrison cities of the Middle East, the learned and the holy men cultivated Islam as a religion of law and piety, theology and devotion.

The formal teaching of Islam as a religion embedded in a community began with the Prophet. Later hadith reported that the Prophet used to sit in the mosque surrounded by students, whom he instructed in passages of the Quran. Other hadith recount how he sent teachers of the Quran (*qurra'*) to the Arabian tribes.

After Muhammad's death, his companions became the bearers of his religious legacy and authority. They preserved the Quran and were the repositories of memories, stories, and the sayings of the Prophet. They were committed to the precedents he had set for ritual, family, social, and legal behavior and were venerated because of their contact with him. For a long period, the memory of the Prophet was oral and personal. Only gradually were the first written records, themselves embedded in later texts, set down.

The companions also formed study circles for Quran and hadith, as well as for theological, historical, and legal studies that were not yet considered distinct or specialized subjects. These study groups probably resembled ancient classical academies and Jewish schools of religious study. In the postconquest period, mosques, private homes, and shops were all used as schools.

Although concentrated in Medina and Mecca, the companions carried the story of the Prophet throughout the empire. Wherever Arab conquerors settled, men who had known the Prophet, or the disciples of these men, accompanied the migration. In the garrison cities, these students of religion, who were without office, institutional means of support, or priestly status – including the *qurra'*, the *'ulama'* (religious scholars), and the Sufis (the ascetics) – became the teachers of Islam and the leaders of their communities.

The relationship between the scholars and teachers and the caliphate varied. Some considered the caliphs to be the heirs of the Prophet's religious as well as political leadership, and they supported the regime. Many scholars accepted their authority and took official positions as teachers, judges, and preachers. Others were opponents of the imperial vision of Islam. They held that not only the caliphs but all the companions of the Prophet who had direct experience of Muhammad's teaching, and through them their followers, were the custodians of his legacy and heirs to his religious authority.

The politics of the caliphate intensified this opposition. The Umayyad dynasty provoked Shi'i, Khariji, and Yemeni Arab opposition in the name of religious principles. 'Abbasid efforts to build up a strong state apparatus and to give the ruler a ceremonial grandeur that bordered on divinity also provoked rebellions. Even Sunnis, who supported the caliphate in principle, often withdrew from public commitments and concentrated on small-scale community life and personal piety.

Under the leadership of the scholars and holy men, the Muslim community was extremely diverse. At Muhammad's death, the earliest Meccan recruits who migrated with him to Medina (the *muhajirun*) and the earliest Medinan converts (the *ansar*) were the most closely identified as Muslims – those who accepted the Quran as revelation, Muhammad as the messenger of God, and the *umma* as the community of the true believers. His following also included converts from some of the Medinan Jewish tribes. Also included in the *umma* were "converts," allies, and factional chiefs from the tribes

surrounding Mecca and Medina. The Quraysh of Mecca accepted Islam when, defeated by Muhammad, they recognized him as Prophet and leader in 630. These new Muslims, scarcely exposed to his teachings and influence, were less likely to be imbued with the moral sense of his teaching. Still, they were part of the Muslim community.

Postconquest settlements added further to this diversity as non-Arab clients and converts to Islam were assimilated into the tribal, religious, and literary traditions of the conquering elite. New Muslims – from pagan, Jewish, and Christian communities – brought with them a great variety of cultural understandings, ritual practices, and political sentiments. To some, Islam was a commitment to a way of life; to others it may have been little more than a political affiliation.

Under the pressure of this diversity, the community fragmented into a plethora of religio-political movements. The conflict between the Sunnis (the supporters of the established caliphate) and the Shi'is (those who campaigned for the succession of an imam descended in the family of 'Ali) led to a division within the Muslim *umma*. The political divisions, justified and sustained by religious concepts, led to separate versions of Islamic religion and identity. Kharijism had similar consequences, although on a smaller scale.

By the end of the first century, a new generation of scholars, disciples, and students (much augmented in number) succeeded the companions of the Prophet. The study circles became more specialized. Some circles focused on the legacy of the Prophet, the stories told about his person, his actions, and his sayings. Others focused on the text of the Quran itself, and the explications of its meanings (*tafsir*). Still others were engaged in legal analysis. Always present were the ascetics and holy men seeking a more direct experience of God rather than mere knowledge of his commands. These groups promoted alternative conceptions of political authority and religious merit and created diverse political and communal loyalties buttressed by theological speculation, historical narratives, mystical practices, and legal codes. Among Sunnis, the complex social and political situations of the first Muslim century led to a

variety of theological sects and social movements, such as the Muʿtazili, Murjiʿi, and Qadari.

Among the Shiʿis, the same tendencies toward diversity prevailed. The Shiʿis divided over the proper line of succession to ʿAli and over the question of whether the succession (the imamate) was a political or a purely religious office. The Shiʿi movement fragmented into numerous sects.

The diversity of beliefs and practices was further intensified by the close relationships of Muslims and non-Muslims. In the first century after Muhammad, there was no clear boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islam began in a complex religious milieu in which paganism and monotheism had already begun to converge. Muslims shared religious beliefs and practices, folk traditions, and popular spirituality with non-Muslims. Jews, Christians, and Muslims all believed in God, angels and prophets, the last judgment, and the purpose of human existence as being the fulfillment of God's commands and faith in his revealed truth. Eastern Syriac Christians who believed in the humanity of Christ had common ground with Muslims. Jews were committed monotheists. Christians and Muslims believed in the sanctity of holy men, equating the warrior and the ascetic as militant defenders of religion. All Middle Eastern peoples thought of communities as religious bodies and believed that religious communities had a founding prophet. Gnosticism, messianism, magic, apocalypticism, mysticism, science, and philosophy were found in all the Middle Eastern religions.

Moreover, in the highly fluid social world of the seventh century, peoples of all religions interacted on a regular basis in commerce, social life, and festivals. Many Muslims were married to non-Muslims. In some cases, Muslims and Christians worshiped in the same spaces and venerated the same holy men. There were also political pressures for common views. The early caliphs were the rulers of Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as well as the leaders of Muslims; they sought to win the cooperation of non-Muslim elites and the acceptance of the majority of their subjects.

In these circumstances, the new empire did not at first separate adherents of Islam from other religions, nor from past social, cultural, ethnic, and literary identities. Converts to Islam brought with them the cultural, ritual, and legal practices of their old religions and societies – Arabian tribal culture, Jewish ideas and practices, Christian eschatology, and late Roman and Sasanian political and legal institutions. Muslim family life and the relations of men and women followed earlier West Asian patterns. Jewish community organization – the authority of the rabbis or scholars of Jewish law, as well as the organization of schools, courts, and charities – was a model for Muslim institutions.

Furthermore, Muslims and non-Muslims participated in a dynamic, living culture. There was much integration and mutual influence among Muslims, Christians, and Jews. This is exemplified in the many shared religious narratives. Muslims, for example, absorbed stories from Jewish tradition (*isra'iliyyat*). The educational system – based on oral recitation followed by transmission of texts – was similar in Roman, Jewish, and Muslim study circles. Theological debates fostered a shared discourse. Arabic literary culture stemmed not only from Arabian traditions but also from the traditions of the cities of the Middle East. In addition, Hellenistic and Persian literatures flourished, partly sponsored by the caliphate, partly the expression of the urban elites. The past provided models for the new religious community and made Islam one of a family of religions.

In many ways, the first century was probably similar to the later diffusions of Islam in other parts of the world. People who served the new elite, court, and government were often the first to convert. Others were won over by the preaching, piety, and miracles of Muslim holy men. Many may have been nominal converts who pronounced the Muslim profession of faith – "There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God" (*shahada*) – but otherwise continued to live among their non-Muslim families and communities, taking part in the worship and festivals of the old religions. Others would be more deeply transformed, adopting new languages, beliefs, and customs.

In this fluid cultural situation, the multiplication of divergences in the teaching of the scholars, the intensification of sectarian competition, and the strong influences of other religions led to fears of losing the true legacy of Muhammad. Caliphs, scholars, and holy men strove to articulate their Islamic credentials, to define beliefs and behaviors that were properly Muslim, and to distinguish Muslims from other peoples.

The policies of the Umayyad caliphate lent further urgency to the question of who had the authority to define Muslim beliefs, practices, and symbols. With the minting of Muslim slogans on coinage and the construction of the Dome of the Rock and other mosques, the caliphs (beginning with ʿAbd al-Malik) dramatically declared their patronage of Islam and laid claim to a more exalted status for themselves as divinely selected rulers.

In response, Sunni scholars, literati, and holy men gradually shifted their intellectual activities from oral transmission to written literature in order to consolidate and to propagate their teachings. Some were concerned primarily with scripture, the study and explication of the Quran, the recollection of the sayings of the Prophet, and the elaboration of law. They considered laws, rituals, and norms of behavior the critical aspect of Islam. They wanted to know how to live their daily lives in the image of the Prophet – how to pray, how much to give in alms, how to dress, how to greet each other, what pious formulas to apply on everyday occasions, and what laws should regulate marriage, divorce, inheritance, contracts, and other social and familial issues.

Others were committed to theology and were primarily concerned with understanding the meaning of faith and true belief, the nature of God's being, and what will be rewarded and what will be punished in the afterlife. Still others identified with the presence of the sacred (in the person or memory of the Prophet and the holy men) or in mystic realization of God. The never-ending process of delineating a Muslim identity invoked not only law, theology, and asceticism, but also the writing of history.

At the same time, the Shiʻis maintained that the true leadership of Muslims was vested in the person of ʻAli and his descendants; they developed their own communities, conceptions, and practice of daily living under the authority of the imams. For most Muslims, however, Islam probably meant commitment to everyday life in everyday communities, with one's valor marked by restraint in thought and behavior, and a sense of humility before God.

Thus, between the seventh and the tenth centuries, the religion of Muslims was elaborated in Quranic exegesis, hadith, law, theology, mystical discourses, and the Shiʻi concept of the imamate – incorporating into Islam the heritage of Greece and Iran as well as of Arabia and Muhammad. The historical religions of the Middle East were recast into a new high cultural monotheistic vision. Urban Islamic religious culture was ultimately the amalgamation of all of these orientations, of the struggles among them, and of those between them and the courtly practices of Islam. In the following chapters, we will explore in greater depth the varieties of religious experience in early Islam.

Chapter 15 Sunni Islam

In the century following the founding of Basra, Kufa, and other Arab-Muslim cities, Arabic literary interests were pursued in conjunction with Quranic, legal, theological, and other religious subjects. An Arabic lingua franca emerged for the diverse tribes. Persian and Aramaic speakers contributed to rapid changes in Arabic's vocabulary, grammar, style, and syntax. As the Arabic language changed, religious scholars feared that they would lose touch with the Arabic of the Quran and thus lose the meaning of God's revelations. In eighth-century Basra, philosophical, lexicographical, and grammatical studies were undertaken to recapture the pure Arabic of Mecca and of the desert tribes and to clarify the usage of Arabic in the Quran and hadith. The roots of words had to be specified, vocabulary selected and explained, and proper speech given rules of grammar and syntax. These linguistic efforts persisted for more than a century and produced what we now know as classical Arabic. The grammar of Sibawayhi (d. 796) and the early dictionaries of Arabic were the products of this period.

The cultural ramifications of these studies went beyond linguistic analysis. The basis of linguistic studies was the collection of examples of old Arabic. Much in the manner of contemporary linguists or anthropologists, the scholars of Basra and Kufa sought out the bedouins and recorded their poems and sayings. Gradually, a large body of lore was accumulated and transcribed from oral into written form. This lore included bedouin poetry, as well as information about the life of the Prophet, Quranic revelations, the early conquests, and the behavior of the early leaders of the Muslim community. From the eighth to the tenth centuries, the totality of this literary and religious culture was gathered into several encyclopedic collections. Arabic literary culture was not purely the heritage of the desert but was shaped in the early Islamic era out of the religious and historical concerns of the Umayyad and early 'Abbasid periods.

History was an important part of this literature. Partly the product of caliphal patronage, it was also compiled and transmitted by the Muslim urban literati. In addition to the stories of the Arab conquests and empire, history was written to enshrine Muhammad as a prophet, to establish the credentials of the Muslims as a monotheistic people, and to explain their origins out of Arabian paganism. History portrayed the emergence of a religious people out of a tribal wilderness; it pointed to the Islamic calendar, the direction of prayer (*qibla*), and a sacred language and script to validate the origins of the Arab-Muslim community. Pre-Muhammadan prophetic history was elaborated to explain Quranic stories and to give Muslims their own prophetic history validating Muhammad as a true prophet.

The early caliphs promoted Muslim beliefs and practices by building mosques; they also appointed storytellers, teachers, and preachers who interpreted the Quran to ordinary people, related the sayings of Muhammad (hadith), and recounted stories of his life and of the ancient prophets. As moral preachers – much like the holy men of late antiquity – they admonished against sin and inculcated religious beliefs and norms of behavior. In the garrison cities, reciters of the Quran, preachers, and storytellers told of Muhammad and his exploits, his sayings, and his behavior. Historical materials embedded in later texts show that stories related to the Quran were compiled in the 650s and 660s. In the early decades of the eighth century, Medina was a center for the compilation and transmission of Prophetic reports (hadith), biography (*sira*), and campaigns (*maghazi*). The earliest extant biographies of the Prophet are attributed to authors who died in the second decade of the eighth century.

The veneration of the Prophet

A profound aspect of early Muslim religious feeling was the veneration of the Prophet. Next to the Quran, the veneration of the Prophet was – and arguably remains – the defining feature of Islam. In early biographical materials Muhammad is presented as having an

immaculate character and providing ideal leadership. Traditions about his perfect character, his appearance, his miracles, his triumphs over infidels, and his superiority to all past prophets abound.

There were two main themes in the accounts of Muhammad as prophet. One was that he was an ordinary man selected by God for this task. He was a lawgiver and chief of a community. Hadith dating to the end of the seventh and early eighth centuries made the practice of the Prophet a model for ritual and social behavior. Muslims wanted to know about the Prophet in intimate detail: how he cared for his body, his personality, his kindness, his love of children, and his moral example.

The second theme was that Muhammad was a miraculous being, to be venerated as were Moses and Jesus. In the Quran, Muhammad is presented as the beloved of God; angels invoke blessings on him; he is a model human being, a mercy to the world. Hadith and biographies cultivated an image of the Prophet as the bearer of divine qualities and earthly perfection. Some hadith incorporated materials about ancient Israel or those derived from Jewish sources, as well as folkloric themes passed on by Jewish converts (*isra'iliyyat*), placing Muhammad in the lineage of ancient prophets. Muhammad as prophet was put on par with earlier holy men, saints, and apostles – all of whom are wise, trusted exemplars; teachers and healers; and just and holy friends of God.

The earliest biographies are replete with stories of miraculous deeds and events. Stories from Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Buddhist legends were applied to Muhammad. At his birth, his mother saw a miraculous light; signs were seen by holy men. Extraordinary events occurred in his lifetime: he won easy victories in battle, fed many from little, and died by his own choice.

The greatest miracle was the Prophet's ascent to heaven. A Quranic verse states that God transported Muhammad from the Masjid al-Haram to the Masjid al-Aqsa. The location of al-Aqsa is not specified, but early hadith place it in Jerusalem. In the Umayyad period – possibly in the reign of al-Walid – al-Aqsa became

particularly sanctified because of its associations with Jesus and with the ascension, and/or to bolster the prestige of the caliphs in nearby Damascus. The story narrates that Gabriel awakened Muhammad and provided him with a winged beast (*buraq*) to carry him on a night journey (*isra'*) from Medina to Jerusalem. There, Muhammad ascended to heaven (*mi'raj*). He met Abraham, Moses, and Jesus and led them in prayer; he spoke with God, face to face, and learned about obligatory prayers. He visited paradise and hell. Muhammad acquired a heavenly book, echoing the lore of Jewish, Samaritan, and Judeo-Christian sects. In later centuries, the story was vastly elaborated and was told in resurrection (*qiyama*) literature, which describes the heavenly world. It was used as a symbol of mystical ascension to vision of God and was depicted in later Persian and Indian painting.

Superior to earlier prophets and on par with Jesus, Muhammad was also imagined as a kind of angel. Early narratives claim that Muhammad embodied the primordial light. He preceded all existence, and his birth was the manifestation of that light in human form. In Sufi theosophy, the light of Muhammad is the first expression of God's being – it is an emanation of the perfect man, the prototype of existence (i.e., the Logos). In the eighteenth century, Sufis defined their spiritual goal as the remaking of the person in the image of the Prophet.

Many Muslims believe that Muhammad can intercede for individuals with God and that his intercession may be won by prayer to implore God to bless him and his family, by repetition of the name of God (*dhikr*), and by the recitation of poetry. The appearance of the Prophet in a dream is considered a great blessing.

The adoration of the Prophet was expressed in poetry, prose, and festivals. The birth of the Prophet (*mawlid*) came to be celebrated almost everywhere with prayers, stories, sweets, festivals of lights, recitations, and ceremonies giving thanks to God, as well as expressing love of the Prophet and hope for salvation. The *mawlid* is marked by giving gifts that reciprocate the blessings of God and Muhammad. These may include money for charity, the sharing of food, and the reading of sacred texts or stories about the Prophet's

life. Reverence for the Prophet is expressed by standing or praying in ceremonies to express deference and awe (*qiyam*).

Mawlid celebrations probably originated within Shiʿi circles in the tenth century, but the narratives recited during them date to the first century of Islam. Al-Khayzuran (d. 789), the mother of Harun al-Rashid, transformed Muhammad's birthplace (as well as his tomb in Medina) into a place for prayers. The Fatimids (969–1171) celebrated the *mawlid* in Egypt with a ceremony that included a mosque recitation from the Quran, prayers, processions, and a sermon, mainly for the ruling elite. *Mawlid* practices then spread to Sunnis and became popular in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt in the twelfth century. In thirteenth-century Cairo, it was celebrated by Sufis and the common people. *Mawlids* came to include Sufi exercises (*dhikr*), as well as recitations of mystical verses, the canonical collections of hadith (*sahih*), and panegyrical poems and blessings of Muhammad. The *mawlid* is an auspicious time of year because in that season God's responsiveness and generosity is believed to be greater. A prayer at this time is vastly more efficacious than at other times.

The *mawlids* of the Prophet set a precedent for the celebration of the birthday (here meaning the death day and the beginning of the afterlife) of saints. Prayers, recitations of poems, processions, *dhikr*, and readings from the Quran were and are conducted at the shrines of saints throughout the Muslim world.

Some scholars were opposed to these celebrations. They saw the *mawlids* as religion made easy for poor, uneducated, and "undisciplined" people. But they were unable to suppress these beliefs and ceremonies. In modern times, Wahhabis vigorously oppose *mawlid* celebrations because, for them, obedience is more important than love, and observance of tradition (*sunna*) is more important than an emotional attachment or spiritual relationship. Under Wahhabi influence, the *mawlid* is being redefined as a historical commemoration whose didactic aspect matters more than the experienced presence of the Prophet.

This changing attitude reflects a still deeper transformation in Muslim religiosity. The traditional *mawlid* is premised on the idea that a person is constituted by ties to a community and by shared emotions that have to be publicly dramatized. The modern view emphasizes individuality, so that religious obligations are defined by adherence to precepts; emotions are purely private and personal. The modern idea rejects the transactional bargain through which Muslims sought blessings from God.

Early Muslim theology

Theology (*kalam*) – the investigation of the nature of God's being and his relation to human beings – was as much the product of Islamic urban milieus as of the caliphal court. Theological questions were prompted by political disputes. The Kharijis opposed 'Ali's agreement to arbitrate the murder of 'Uthman and opposed attempts to define the imamate in terms of lineage or ethnicity, arguing instead that individual piety and ability should be the criterion. They held that 'Ali's failure to decide by the Quran disqualified him as caliph. The supporters of Mu'awiya, however, did not want to scrutinize the personal religious qualifications of a caliph and held that all persons who professed Islam were ipso facto true Muslims. Later Kharijis extended the implications of their position to argue that anyone who failed to follow God's command was not a true Muslim and would be condemned to hell.

Kharijis also broached the problem of free will and predestination. Kharijis claimed that children of Muslims are not by definition Muslims, because individuals must elect to be Muslim; it was consistent with their view that only a blameless person was a true Muslim and, by implication, that every person had a choice and was responsible for his choices. They believed in freedom of will.

Other opponents of the Umayyads adopted a similar position. The Qadaris, a theological sect active between the end of the seventh and the beginning of the ninth centuries, held that a ruler is responsible for his actions. He has freedom of choice and should

abdicate or be deposed if unrighteous. (The name Qadaris, however, was used to define the advocates both of free will and of the opposite, predestination – human power of choice or God's power of determination.)

Emerging from the Qadaris in Basra, the Muʿtazilis took a politically neutral position. They agreed with the Qadaris that every individual is the author of his actions and is responsible for them, but they refused to draw the same political implication. The Muʿtazilis held that a sinful Muslim is an intermediate between a believer and a nonbeliever, neither true Muslim nor infidel, and continues to belong to the Muslim community. Muʿtazilism began as a political position but went on to become a proselytizing movement and a theological defense of Islam. Muʿtazilis were in political favor during the inquisition era until 849. After the loss of political support in the reign of al-Mutawakkil, Muʿtazilis were no longer accepted in Sunni law schools but were still engaged in Shiʿi Imami and Zaydi schools and continued to be an influential theological movement until the eleventh century.

Another politically neutral theological position was that of the Murjiʿa. Murjiʿa argued that anyone who professed to be a Muslim was a true Muslim, regardless of whether he practiced Muslim rituals. In the Murjiʿa view, faith and intention – not behavior – defined a true Muslim. Murjiʿa were active supporters of the equality of non-Arab converts with Arab-Muslims and defended the genuineness of their conversions whether or not they performed Muslim rituals.

The Murjiʿa and the Muʿtazilis prompted a host of theological issues. The debate about free will and predestination raised the question of God's powers and attributes. Do humans have free will, and, if so, does this compromise God's powers? If God determines human behavior, is he responsible for evil? What is to be understood by such Quranic phrases as "God's power" and "God's knowledge"? The question of attributes raised the further question of God's unity. Do his attributes imply that he is a composite being? Theologians thus debated the importance of faith versus works, of free will and

predestination, and of the nature of God's being and how his seemingly contradictory qualities should be understood.

In the course of these discussions, Muslims engaged the works of Greek philosophers and Christian theologians who had already devised a tradition of theological argumentation. Converts brought earlier traditions into Muslim circles. Debates between Muslims and Christians at the court of the Umayyad caliphs, other polemical confrontations with Christians, and the translation of Greek and Syriac literature into Arabic integrated Hellenistic vocabulary and Greco-Christian practices of rational argument into early Muslim theology. The translation of Aristotle into Syriac and then into Arabic provided common methods and materials for intra-Muslim and Muslim-Christian disputations.

In Muslim theological circles, the people most interested in Greek dialectics were Muʿtazilis. At the forefront of debates – competing with Christian Trinitarianism, Manichaean dualism, pagan materialism, and even anthropomorphic conceptions widespread among Muslims – the Muʿtazilis upheld God's unity and transcendence. They affirmed that there was but one God, who is pure, ultimate being. As pure being, God is not like any created matter, nor like a human person, nor divided in any way. They denied that the attributes of God mentioned in the Quran are physical and literal.

Other Muʿtazili doctrines were a corollary of their conception of God's transcendence and unity. For example, they held that the Quran was a created message inspired by God in Muhammad and not part of God's essence or divine itself – as opposed to the Christian view that Christ, the Logos, the word of God, proceeds from God as part of his essence and is co-eternal with him. Other Muslims held that the Quran was "uncreated." The issue became a cause célèbre in Muslim theology and the most important issue in the religious politics of the ʿAbbasid caliphate.

A further corollary of the Muʿtazili conception of God's transcendence and unity was the doctrine of God's justice and man's moral freedom and responsibility: men choose their own acts; they

are not created by nor determined by God. God rightly rewards and punishes men for their deeds. They also upheld God's goodness: men, not God, are the authors of evil. If men were not morally free, they argued, God would by implication be the cause of evil.

From this followed the Mu'tazili principle of the promise and the threat: a Muslim who obeyed God's revealed law would be rewarded in heaven; a Muslim who ignored the law would be punished in hell. For the Mu'tazilis (as opposed to the Murji'a), faith included works.

The main tenets of the Mu'tazilis were profoundly Islamic in inspiration. Although other Muslims might disagree, their stress on God's unity and man's responsibility seemed to be the essence of the Quranic message. Yet, the Mu'tazilis raised issues that were not found in the discourses of the people of hadith and the jurists. They developed a metaphysics of being, a theory of the origin of the universe, a physics of created things, and a psychology of man – building on the teachings of Aristotle, Democritus, Empedocles, and other Greek philosophers.

A crucial tenet in their philosophy was that God's being, the universe, and human nature are all rationally ordered and knowable to human reason. God is defined by his essence, which is reason. The created world functions according to rational laws and, once created, is independent of God and not changeable by him. Similarly, in moral matters, good and evil have an intrinsic value. They are not dependent on, or changed by, divine will. God's justice is constrained by the laws of good and evil. Revelation can complete, confirm, or complement reason, but there are no truths unknown, unknowable, or inconsistent with the dictates of reason. Revelation can do no more than amplify or make the teachings of reason more specific. A possible corollary of the Mu'tazili position is that revelation is only supplementary guidance and of secondary importance.

These positions are summed up as the five theses of the Mu'tazili school: (1) *Tawhid*, the unity of God's being (with the implication that the Quran is created). (2) *'Adl*, God is just and does not do or make humans do evil. (3) Reward and punishment are in the hereafter without intercession for grave sinners. Repentance may win God's

grace, but it is not assured. (4) A sinner is neither a true Muslim nor an apostate (the intermediate position). (5) Muslims are responsible for promoting good and suppressing evil.

Although the Muʿtazilis served Islam in their defense of the unity of God and in their clarification of man's free will and responsibility, their larger philosophy was at odds with the majority sentiment of the Arab-Muslim milieu about the nature of God and his creation. For other Muslims, the Quran and Muhammad – not reason – were the central experiences of Islam. They believed that the Quran contained God's will for men and the duties he had assigned them and that Muhammad was the messenger of God who delivered the last revelation. For most Muslims, man must submit to God, not presume to know better than God. The people of hadith – who severely criticized the legalists for the application of personal judgment to legal problems – were especially incensed that Muslim theologians were relying on reason for the discussion of religious matters. Some hadith scholars rejected Greek methods of discussion; they believed that reason had no place in religion at all because hadith were God's will and not to be questioned. They rejected the siren song of Greek ideas as incompatible with complete and unassuming devotion to God and his revelations.

Hadith scholars opposed the Muʿtazili conception of *tawhid* by insisting that the attributes of God – the independent existence of which was denied by the Muʿtazilis – must exist because they are mentioned in the Quran. To deny or explain them away would be to derogate from God's own revelation of his being. They rejected the Muʿtazili notion of the createdness of the Quran; they affirmed the contrary (uncreatedness) and made this a fundamental tenet of faith, as a way of asserting the superiority of the Quran to all human reasoning and knowledge. Finally, they held that man's acts are predetermined by God alone. For hadith scholars, God's omnipotent power and his untrammeled, inscrutable will – not his rationality or his justice – were the heartfelt attributes.

Thus, by the ninth century, two basic positions had emerged in Muslim theology. One was a rationalist-oriented position that emphasized the centrality of reason as an ordering principle in the

understanding of God's being, of the structure of the universe, and of the governance of human behavior. The rationalist position included, as its corollary, belief in free will and individual responsibility for moral choices. A contrary position stressed the absolute omnipotence and inscrutability of the divine being, who can be known only insofar as he has chosen to reveal himself through the Quran. This view denied the utility of reason in religious or moral choices. All human action is ultimately an expression of the power of the creator, rather than an autonomous exercise of free judgment and will. Embedded in the debate over God's determination and human freedom was a conflict of worldviews. The rationalists had confidence in the world as knowable and in the human mind as attuned to reality. The traditionalists believed in the limitations of human capacities and had a pessimistic view of human life as fated and controlled by the unfathomable power of God.

Ashʿarism

Dissatisfied with both the excesses of Muʿtazili rationalism and the constricting literalism of the hadith scholars, ninth- and tenth-century Muslim theologians tried to find a middle ground consistent with emphasis on the importance of hadith, while preserving some role for reason in the discussion of theological issues. The most important middle position in the history of Muslim theology was the work of al-Ashʿari (d. 935). On doctrinal matters, al-Ashʿari adopted the views of the hadith scholars but refined them to meet the standards of Muʿtazili reasoning. For example, he held that the words of the Quran subsist in the divine essence, but their expression in letters and sounds is created. Thus, the Quran is uncreated, but any particular copy of it is created. On the question of free will, al-Ashʿari held that God is the ultimate author of man's actions, but man is an instrument of and participant in these actions and has responsibility for them by acquisition (*kasb*).

On the role of reason, al-Ashʿari stressed the overwhelming importance of the divine revelation and the humble quality of man's own will and rational faculties. Al-Ashʿari claimed that revelation is the only source of knowledge of good and evil. He rejected rational

metaphysics as the key to the nature of God and the universe, but nonetheless he used Greek concepts to defend his position. Reason, he allowed, can spell out the meanings embodied in the Quran and hadith, defend the truth against its adversaries, and be used to persuade others of its validity. Theology does not of itself discover truths but reinforces belief in God and obedience to God's will by rational comprehension. Thus, Muslim theologians may use rational arguments to support theological tenets derived from tradition.

Maturidism, based on the work of al-Maturidi (d. c. 944), a Hanafi theologian and jurist, became the main rival to Ashʿarism. His views were integrated into Transoxanian Hanafism in the tenth and eleventh centuries and moved westward to Iraq, Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Contrary to the Ashʿaris, al-Maturidi agreed with the Muʿtazilis that man knows God through reason independently of revelation. He believed that there is a rational and universal basis for good and evil, that man has free choice, and that faith does not require works. Still, he believed that God has foreknowledge of who will be a believer and who a sinner. Unlike the Muʿtazili, he considered divine attributes – such as power and knowledge – to be real and eternal. Maturidis considered the word (*kalam*) of God to be uncreated but acknowledged that the ink, paper, and writing of Quranic texts are created.

In its modified Ashʿari and Maturidi forms, theology became an integral part of the intellectual life of the law schools. Great scholars of the eleventh century, such as al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali, held that reason cannot be the ultimate source of true knowledge but is rather a tool for prudential, useful, and worldly evaluations.

The turn to a more limited concept of the role of reason coincided with important sociopolitical changes in early Muslim societies. The emphasis on reason seems to have been correlated with Muslim minority hegemony in a mixed society and the need for Muslim elites to maintain ties with the non-Muslim population and broader cultural and religious traditions. The insistence on the priority of revelation belongs to a later period in which Muslims had become the dominant majority, although they were beset by intense intra-Muslim sectarian conflicts. The result was an Islam both dominant and threatened –

concerned primarily with consolidating Muslim identities and defining boundaries between Muslims and the minority non-Muslim populations and between truly Islamic beliefs and heresy. With these historical changes came a transformation of cultural mood from an open and optimistic to a guarded and pessimistic view of human nature; from revelation as parallel to reason to revelation as absolute and transcendent.

Scripturalism: Quran, Hadith, and law (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

However, for the great majority of Muslims (both Sunnis and Shiʿis), not theology but adherence to scripture is the first principle of Islam. Islam is defined as living in accordance with the law of God. The law is contained in the texts of the Quran and in the precedents of the Prophet (hadith). For early readers and commentators, the Quran was more than a text. Scholars were eager to mold their own lives by it and to infuse the lives of their contemporaries with the spirit and teachings of the holy book. They wanted the Quran to be the basis of a Muslim style of personal behavior and of ritual, family, and business matters, and also of political questions such as the selection of rulers, justice, and taxation. They aspired to cast the whole of life in the mold of the Quranic message. (See Illustration 5.)

Illustration 5. A page of an illuminated Quran. Reproduced by permission of the Trustees of the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin.

This interest in the application of the Quran led to works of interpretation, commentary, and explanation (i.e., exegesis, or *tafsir*). Two of the most important and extant early works were by al-Tabari (d. 923) and al-Thaʿlabi (d. 1035). Exegetical works are often encyclopedic, including earlier interpretations and embracing many aspects of the Sunni tradition – including poetry, hadith, *adab*, theology, law, and Sufi hermeneutics. Exegesis is not only philological but also doctrinal and devotional.

The centrality of the Quran also led to the study of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet, which were considered authoritative examples of how a proper Muslim life should be led. Hadith, which had been primarily transmitted in oral tradition, began to be collected in written

form from the beginning of the eighth century. In the ninth century, several canons were compiled that stand second only to the Quran as authoritative Muslim scripture. The impulse to fashion a divinely guided way of life further inspired the elaboration of Islamic law. Law (*fiqh*, which is misidentified as Shariʿa in contemporary usage) is not strictly speaking the revealed word of God, but it was widely understood to be a divinely inspired extension of the teachings of the Quran and hadith. The development of Islamic law was driven both by pragmatic considerations and by the impulse to actualize the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet.

Law in the seventh and eighth centuries

Islamic law, like all legal systems, first developed out of practical everyday concerns and the need to set out norms for behavior and to adjudicate disputes. Muslim legal thought and practice had deep roots in the ongoing functioning of Middle Eastern societies. Islamic law continued and modified pre-Islamic practices in familial, commercial, criminal, and administrative matters. Arabian customary law in commerce, marriage, and criminal matters was an important precedent. So too were deep traditions of provincial variations on Roman law, and Persian, canon, and Jewish law. In the early Islamic era, Jewish and Christian legal systems were also evolving, and there likely were interchanges between these legal systems. Customary social and business practices, the experiences of converts, discussions among experts, and the reading of texts brought ancient laws into early Muslim juridical reflection and practice.

Quranic teaching added to the ongoing practice of law. It set out religious rituals such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage; it regulated social behavior in such matters as almsgiving, feuds, marriage, and inheritance. After the death of Muhammad, law was amplified by the decisions and policies of the early caliphs and the Prophet's companions (who acted as judges and arbitrators). Caliph ʿUmar is said to have promulgated laws on temporary marriage, adultery, parentage by concubines, and other issues.

Furthermore, caliphs appointed governors who in turn appointed judges (*qadis*). Judges were initially multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues. Many, but not all, were religious scholars and teachers who in addition to their judicial duties led the community in prayer. Between 700 and 740 courts became more professional due to formal record keeping, the appointment of functionaries such as scribes, official witnesses, and the consultation of outside legal authorities (muftis). After 740 or 750, caliphs – rather than governors – appointed judges, whose nonjudicial functions ceased as a bureaucratic court apparatus emerged. By the reign of Harun al-Rashid, only religious scholars (*'ulama'*) were appointed as professional judges. Generally, the considered personal judgments (*ra'y*) of the judges, or of the judges and their legal advisors, set the precedents for what would be Islamic law.

Simultaneously, Islamic legal traditions were formed by discussions within communities. This was not the work of any single person or group but was carried out in geographically distinct centers of religious and legal scholarship. Mecca, Medina, Kufa, Basra, Baghdad, and Fustat were the most important. Independent scholars reflected on legal issues, cultivated students and disciples, and created study circles for discussion and instruction. Students participated in several study circles and studied with their master or masters, either at once or successively. These early study circles were not confined to law but included students of theology, history, and hadith who were being trained not only as lawyers but as religious intellectuals. Students in the same legal circles might hold different views about both legal and nonlegal religious subjects. Thus, Islamic legal systems were formed and implemented by both state-appointed officials and independent scholars, surrounded by their students, patrons, clients, and communities.

As legal, theological, and other study groups multiplied under the leadership of prominent local scholars in important cities, students disseminated their teachings, expanding local legal study groups into empire-wide networks of shared legal studies and practice. The Hanafis were the first of the legal study circles to become an empire-

wide legal network. They had their origins in Kufa and Basra. They traced their origins back to Abu Hanifa (d. 767) and his prolific students, Abu Yusuf (d. 798) and al-Shaybani (d. c. 805). By the second half of the eighth century, the earlier legal circles were absorbed or displaced by the Hanafis. In Iraq, Hanafi legal activity had a politically and socially pragmatic orientation. The Hanafis based their judgments on established (even pre-Islamic) precedents, individual judgment of the scholars (*ra'y*), and Islamic norms.

Hanafism spread, in part because it had the support of the 'Abbasid regime and was propagated by appointments to judgeships. Baghdad, being a newly created city, had no prior history of legal studies, and the legal cadres there were generated entirely by 'Abbasid appointments. Hanafi traditions soon reached beyond Iraq. They circulated in Isfahan and spread throughout Khurasan before the middle of the eighth century, to Transoxania in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, and to Egypt and Qayrawan in the early decades of the ninth century. In the first half of the ninth century, Hanafi opinions are attested in Mosul and Qazwin. In the late eighth and ninth centuries, a Hanafi-Murji'a orientation was strong in Isfahan, Rayy, and Khurasan, while in Baghdad some Hanafis were Mu'tazilis and others were Sunnis. However, the Hanafi network was not a monolith. Students of Hanafi scholars studied with a variety of masters and could hold different legal and theological opinions.

The legal tradition of Medina was the basis of a second legal network and of the later Maliki school of law. The *Muwatta'* of Malik (d. 767) is one of the earliest surviving and comprehensive legal works. It contains the results of a continuous tradition of legally defined social and ritual practices going back to the Prophet. In the *Muwatta'*, law is understood as deriving from the teaching of the Quran, the example of the Prophet (*sunna*), the judgment (*ijtihad*) of the companions, and the practice of the people of Medina. Thus, law was based on the practice of the Prophet, but as transmitted, agreed on, and modified by successive generations of Medinan scholars. Religious authority lay in Medinan custom, the recollected, vetted,

and practiced norms and rules of law, a continuous living tradition (*'amal*).

Malikis also developed widespread networks, although at first they were without political support. The disciples (*ashab*) of Malik appeared in Egypt at the end of the eighth century. Then in the late ninth century, Malikis were appointed as judges in Egypt, Wasit, Basra, and Baghdad. These appointees were not locals but officials of the central government. The Maliki school would become the most prominent school in Egypt, North Africa, and West Africa.

Little is known about the early Shafi'is. The Shafi'is spread from Egypt to Iraq and Iran around the middle of the ninth century and from Baghdad to western Iran and Khurasan in the tenth century. The expansion of the Shafi'is and the Malikis was probably favored because both had a balanced way of integrating hadith and legal practice in comparison with the Hanbalis, who emphasized hadith, and the Hanafis, who leaned toward practice. They attracted independents and new jurists to their ranks.

Some places – such as Syria and the Jazira, where pro-Umayyad sentiment was strong and 'Abbasid influence weak – remained outside of the predominant law networks. The judges of Mosul were local scholars from dominant Yemeni tribal families. Syrian scholars were often Awza'is (members of a school that did not survive) or Malikis related to the Umayyads or to local tribes.

A key factor in the development of legal networks was the ever-growing recourse to written texts. The production of texts and consolidation of study circles led to the coalescence of jurists around a limited number of authorities and traditions. The underlying stratum of legal texts was oral material. Oral transmissions were collected by students in the form of notes that – with successive interpolations – became books. Teachers would either check the materials in students' notebooks or produce their own texts. By about 750, important legal texts had been compiled. From then on, more formal, codified learning, driven by authoritative compilations, generated a school tradition defined by the transmission of and commentary on authoritative texts.

Most texts were independently produced by private scholars, but some texts were sponsored by the government. Abu Yusuf's *Kitab al-Kharaj*, for example, originated in order to gather documents to unify the tax system of Iraq and to validate the caliphal claim that Iraq was conquered by force and was therefore subject to taxation at the discretion of the caliphs. This was disputed by jurists who claimed exemptions for lands set aside for taxation at reduced rates.

Tradition and law: hadith

Before these legal networks and their traditions would be consolidated into the final schools of law, there was a crucial and defining struggle among the lawyers and the scholars of hadith. Although the Quran was an important source of law, it was not exclusive and not necessarily the primary source of law. The living practice of the Prophet (sunna), the practice of local communities (such as Medina) transmitted by personal example, and customary Arab law were also authoritative sources of ritual, social, and legal norms. The Quran was often interpreted in the light of living practices. Many Muslims believed that their practices were consistent with the Quran, or were justified by the visually perceived behavior of the Prophet, by the authority of the companions, or by the authority of the caliphs or claimants to the caliphate. The views of prominent *shaykhs* and teachers and the judgment of courts, scholars, and lawyers were also taken to be authoritative. In specific instances – such as stoning as punishment for adultery – actual practice could take precedence over Quranic texts. There was a lively debate among texts, practices, and political authorities. Only much later would legal discourse come to emphasize the Quran and hadith as the overriding legal sources, as part of a general process in which Islamic culture came to be dominated by traditionalism.

In the late Umayyad period, for example, Marwanid court circles debated whether purity laws and ablutions should be based on living practice, on the personal example of the Prophet, on visual memory, or on Quranic texts. In the reign of ʿUmar II (717–21), almost a century after the death of Muhammad, the Quranic text finally

prevailed. The Quranic ritual laws then came to be seen as God's gift, which marked the covenant with his people that was first given to Abraham and then to Moses and then to the Christians, but finally given to the Muslims. The application of Quranic and Prophetic norms to ritual matters thus separated Muslims from non-Muslims and defined a confessional community.

Similarly, rules about the charity tax (*zakat*) were elaborated in the first half of the eighth century. Quranic texts barring interest on loans (*riba*) were applied to challenge Umayyad coinage practices, in which the state took a commission or minted new coins lighter than the old ones, because these practices entailed a fee or tax on the exchange of coins. The prohibition of taking interest was then applied to various kinds of sharecropping transactions.

Alongside of the Quran, hadith – the sayings of the Prophet – became the most important source of law. According to the orthodox Muslim view, these sayings are Muhammad's own inspired utterances dealing with ritual, moral, and social matters, but they are not revelations (as is the Quran). Hadith probably originated as stories told by Muhammad's companions and their pupils in Mecca and Medina and then in the postconquest garrison cities of Kufa, Basra, and other cities. As veneration of the Prophet increasingly became central to Muslim identity, interest in emulating his every behavior intensified. Everything Muhammad said and did came to be of prime religious importance.

Initially, the transmission was primarily oral. Many hadith were recalled from the actual sayings of the Prophet; others carried the remembered sense of what he said, or intended, and not necessarily his exact words. Still others were thought to be consistent with the Prophet's intentions, but some were ascribed to the Prophet based on ideas that were considered good, right, and true in the time of their formulation. Others may have attributed words and ideas to Muhammad for ulterior motives. In late Umayyad and early 'Abbasid times, scholars who were devoted to a companion of Muhammad or perhaps interested in particular subjects gathered circles of students and began to make written compilations. Although hadith were supposed to be transmitted by personal contact, many were

probably transmitted through written collections. They could therefore be transmitted in parallel but varying versions. There was, however, resistance to written copies, because of the desire not to rival the Quran and because scholars wanted to maintain flexibility and a living tradition. Scholars in Basra, Kufa, and Medina continued to favor hadith transmission from memory, but this was abandoned in Baghdad and elsewhere outside of Iraq. Even scholars who permitted writing did not like copying from texts but preferred note taking from oral presentation. In the eighth century, chains of transmission (*isnads*) became necessary (because of the generational changes) to validate the genealogy of the reported sayings. At first, many transmission chains were incomplete or traced back to one of the companions rather than directly to the Prophet himself. Gradually, the use of transmission chains with continuous links back to the Prophet became the standard.

The progressive enlargement of the appeal to hadith can be traced in the history of Meccan law. Ibn al-ʿAbbas (d. 687–88) gave legal opinions explicitly supported by the Quran and by *ra'y* (individual judgment), but not by traditions from the Prophet. Ibn ʿAbbas's students expanded the authoritative role of hadith. In the work of Ibn Jurayj (d. 767), hadith from the Prophet were more numerous, but transmission chains – although more common – were not fully developed. By the late eighth century, there were systematically organized books of hadith and hadith transmitter criticism. In the early ninth century, hadith books organized by legal topics or as Quranic commentaries were produced.

Collectors of hadith determined authenticity based on the reliability of the men who transmitted the stories and the verifiability of the chains of transmitters. One had to demonstrate that Muhammad's sayings were reported by a person of known probity, who in turn had heard them from earlier holy men. Then, and later, hadith were accepted based on their probability and plausibility, on the authority of the *shaykhs* who transmitted them, and on collective agreement. Hadith compilers were strongly opposed to individual judgment and any use of reasoning that made the teller anything other than the medium of transmission. In the culture of early Islam, what mattered

were oral transmissions and the authority of the *shaykhs* who transmitted them. Regardless of theory, in practice it was the authority and reputation of the scholars and their acceptance by students and by the larger community that defined religious beliefs and practices.

In the ninth century, six Sunni canons of hadith – including the collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim – were compiled. The classical compilations were organized by topic to serve as reference works on ritual and legal issues. The Sahih of Bukhari uses such headings as faith, purification, prayer, alms, fasting, pilgrimage, commerce, inheritance, wills, vows and oaths, crimes, murders, judicial procedure, war, hunting, and wine. In each chapter, there are anecdotal descriptions of how the Prophet dealt with these matters. Muslims read hadith in close relationship with the Quran to clarify and supplement the Quran's specific guidance. However, the hadith are so varied that no matter what a Muslim believes and does there are infinite aspects that elude him. There is an endless tension among precepts fulfilled, precepts neglected, and precepts not understood.

Hadith literature also flourished in later centuries. In the tenth century, Baghdad, Iran, and Cordoba were the main centers of hadith scholarship. In the eleventh century, Spain, Iran, and Baghdad were centers for more specialized biographical and technical works bearing on hadith. By then, the process of hadith compilation and criticism was extensive, and later generations would edit, synthesize, and transmit them. Abridgements, commentaries, and reference works became the norm.

Almost a century of Western scholarship has called the validity of hadith into question. Many studies have alleged that some hadith were first put into circulation long after the death of the Prophet. Many others were provided at a later date with *isnads* that were expanded backwards to make contact with the Prophet as the original source. Because hadith are the basis of so much of Muslim religious and social practice, Muslim scholars have defended their authenticity. Scholars caught between root-and-branch criticism of hadith and Muslim acceptance of them as valid transmissions from

the Prophet often take the middle ground and argue that transmission chains are a late invention attached to material that genuinely goes back to a time when it might plausibly be remembered by the Prophet's companions.

Other scholars – both Muslim and non-Muslim – have recently argued that the issue of the fabrication of hadith is misconceived. Hadith, they argue, were always understood to represent Muslim acceptance of certain views as authoritative expressions of Islam, rather than a mechanical connection to the Prophet. Early hadith scholars made no claim to absolute certainty that a hadith derived expressly from the Prophet. They were interested in probability, plausibility, and soundness (*sahih*). The consensus of scholars on the acceptability of a hadith added validation. The addition of transmission chains, then, was not a conspiracy to mislead Muslim believers, but an expression of the consensus of scholars at a given time about the acceptable range of opinions and the authority of those opinions. The key objective was to capture the charisma of the Prophet.

Reasoned opinion versus traditionalism

Toward the end of the eighth century, the work of some legal scholars came under attack from scholars of hadith. The people of hadith – often minority members of the various law schools – differed with the majority on specific doctrines and about the proper sources of legal judgment. Whereas most legal scholars believed in the traditions of their school and in a certain amount of personal discretion, the hadith-minded (*ahl al-hadith*) opposed any source of law or morals other than the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet. They objected to the arbitrary personal opinions of their opponents (*ra'y*) and questioned the validity of the Madinan concept of normative practice (ʿ*amal*).

Although hadith scholars were found in all the law circles, in the early decades of the ninth century, hadith advocacy was organized into a separate movement under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855). Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers became the

leading spokesmen for hadith due to their resistance to the inquisition (*mihna*) of the Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813–33). Al-Ma'mun tried to define a religious orthodoxy in terms of the created Quran – a theological position that held that the Quran itself was an object in the material world. This doctrine defended the unity of God's being – nothing other was akin to God – but implicitly diminished the sanctity of the Quran and made it subject to interpretation by caliphs and scholars. The jurists held that human reasoning was essential to extend and to apply the law in areas not covered by revelation.

Ahmad ibn Hanbal defended instead the principle of the uncreated Quran, which implied that the revelation was on par with the divine being. Traditionalists believed that only the revealed word – including the authenticated words of Muhammad – could be the source of law. They opposed the use of reason in legal matters in any form – whether analogy (*qiyas*), consideration of the public interest (*istislah*), or casuistic manipulation of the letter of the law (*hiyal*). Whereas theological positions were integral to the worldview of the people of *ra'y*, traditionalists objected to reasoning itself.

These jurisprudential differences were reinforced by political differences. The people of *ra'y* tended to cooperate with the state and serve in the administration of justice; the traditionalists, inclined to asceticism and puritanism, tended to refuse state service and state patronage. The Hanbalis were also an activist public movement. They enforced Muslim values, "commanding the good, and forbidding evil," by preaching an ascetic and puritanical version of Islam, and they launched vigilante attacks, breaking wine bottles, musical instruments, and chessboards.

Nonetheless, the theological and juristic debates prompted the formulation of a middle position that combined hadith and rational legal judgment, reason and revelation. In the late ninth and tenth centuries, Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi'i jurists in principle accepted Quran and hadith as the fundamental bases of law, but in practice continued to base legal judgments on analogical reasoning and the consensus of the learned.

Although the people of hadith in principle relied on whatever was dependably reported as a Prophetic hadith – without appeal to external sources of appraisal or criticism – in practice Hanbalis and hadith scholars accepted the utility of rational arguments for defending their positions, for making consistent judgments, and for validating their views vis-à-vis other jurists. Also, jurists and traditionalists united to resist the more extreme position that only the Quran was a valid source of Muslim law – a position that would have undermined both the people of *ra'y* and the people of hadith – and to oppose the Shiʿis and Muʿtazilis.

These compromises are manifest in the literature of legal methodology (*usul al-fiqh*). One of the best-known early works on methodology is the Risala, which is attributed to al-Shafiʿi (767–820). The theory of the Risala was further developed by Ibn Surayj (d. 918) and his students and became a textbook in the tenth century. The methodology espoused in the Risala and similar jurisprudential texts accepted that the Quran and Prophetic traditions are the ultimate sources of law; indeed only hadith going back to the Prophet himself are considered valid. Still, legal rulings based on individual judgment, analogy (*qiyas*), and consensus are valid insofar as they keep within strict logical boundaries and are extensions of revealed texts. Although this methodology curbed the use of *ra'y*, it also controlled the use of hadith by holding that only the consensus of qualified scholars could determine the authenticity of hadith.

As in all legal systems, jurisprudential texts identified the sources of law and the procedures that allowed for extrapolation or application of the law to different circumstances. In the Islamic context, these methodologies replaced free reasoning based on experiential considerations with hermeneutic reasoning based on specific texts. They provided standards and methods to discover the will of God from the revealed texts and thus legitimated the positions of the law schools by showing them to be based on proper methods – even if the results varied by school.

The proliferation of legal methodology also had important implications for the relations of theology and law. In their early

history, the law study circles were at once schools of law, theology, and historiography. Hanafis gave primacy to revelation but held a variety of theological views that accepted some role for human reason, choice, and responsibility. The Hanafi school harbored a variety of theological sects, including the Maturidi, the Murjiʿa, the Najjari, and the Ashʿari. Shafiʿis were primarily Ashʿaris in theology, although up to the eleventh century many were Muʿtazilis. Hanbalism, however, rejected theological speculation and took a deterministic view of God's absolute omnipotence, calling for submission, obedience, humility, and strict respect for the literal words of the Quran and sunna.

Despite the importance of Aristotelian logic in theology and philosophy, Islamic jurisprudence does not appear to have explicitly incorporated Aristotelian logic until the works of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudama (d. 1223), the Shafiʿi jurist al-Amidi (d. 1233), and the Maliki jurist Ibn al-Hajib (d. 1248). The use of logic as known through the organon of Aristotle helped give legal thought a greater consistency and logical coherence and grounded legal theory in a still wider field of knowledge. However, in practice, it does not seem to have had much effect on legal argument.

Thus, the outcome of the long struggle between the people of hadith and the people of *ra'y* was to reconcile two vaguely defined religious orientations. Law came to be defined as a code of religious teaching based on revelation in Quran and hadith, as interpreted and amplified by the consensus of the legal scholars and by the use of analogical reasoning. The long debate refined the shape of law and hadith and persuaded most Muslims that both Quran and hadith were the scriptures of Islam.

Concealed within this consensus was a profound disagreement over the meaning of a truly religious life. The proponents of hadith thought of Islam as a completely revealed faith, a religion of submission to the revealed word of God and acceptance of the words of Muhammad. The proponents of community consensus and of individual judgment held that Islam was a religion based on scripture, but one that must be adapted and applied to changing circumstances based on individual judgment and the agreement of

the community. Thus, there was profound disagreement about the boundaries between revealed truth and human interpretation, the requirements of faith and the use of reason, the degree of man's submission to God, or his autonomy in living a Muslim life. The same outer life implied radically different forms of spirituality.

The schools of law

The struggle between *ashab al-hadith* and *ashab al-ra'y* also had important institutional effects on the study of law. It prompted the further development of legal study circles and networks of study groups into what we now identify as the classical legal schools (*madhhab* [singular], or *madhahib* [plural]). The social organization of Muslim legal activity evolved from broadly defined religious study circles, to more focused legal study circles, to networked legal study circles, and finally to the schools of law. As both hadith scholars and jurists defined their methodological and theological positions, the study circles and networks were provided with a more formal doctrinal identity. Their doctrines were then presented in authoritative compilations and a school tradition emerged from the transmission of and commentary on authoritative texts. The culmination of this process was the production of an authored summary of school teachings (known as *mukhtasar*).

School identity was fostered by naming the school after a past great figure and by compiling biographical dictionaries of past and present members. Teaching was organized under a single head (*ra'is*). The transition from study circles to schools of law with a defined identity, programs of study, and historical tradition established institutions that functioned as guilds insofar as they regulated entry, training, and certification in law. The schools also gave some consistency and predictability to Islamic law, although they continued to reflect geographical diversity and did not eliminate the individual judgment of prominent jurists (*ijtihad*). (See Table 4.)

Table 4. *Early schools of law*

Founding "father"	Region	School
al-Awzaʿi (d. 744)	Syria	Awzaʿi
Abu Hanifa (d. 767)	Iraq	Hanafi
Malik b. Anas (d. 795)	Medina	Maliki
al-Shafiʿi (d. 820)	Egypt	Shafiʿi
Ibn Hanbal (d. 855)	Iraq	Hanbali
Dawud b. Khalaf (d. 883)	Iraq	Zahiri

Note: Of the hundreds of legal schools that once existed, primarily four Sunni schools of law survive and they are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbali.

In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, Baghdad was the center of these transformations in legal education. A Shafiʿi jurist, Ibn Surayj (d. 918), started the practice of a regular course of study, a defined student body under a single teacher, a defined succession of teachers, and a written dissertation. He was a leader in the synthesis of hadith texts and rational jurisprudential procedures. Theology was often, but not necessarily, studied by the law students. Many Shafiʿis were Ashʿaris in theology and Sufis in devotional practices.

Al-Karkhi (d. 952) played a similar role for the Hanafis. As late as the first half of the tenth century, the Hanafis were defined as followers not of Abu Hanifa but of several of his disciples. The Hanafi school solidified in the tenth century with the writing of commentaries, the transmission of an authoritative doctrine, and the training of students – but there was still considerable variation and free choice of opinions. The Hanafi school perpetuated its identity not by teaching students to imitate but by introducing them to controversies within the school and by inculcating a sense of the

boundaries of controversies and of respect for competing authorities. For example, Hanafi texts from the thirteenth century took the form of commentaries on the Muhtasar of al-Qudari. These commentaries focused heavily on differences (*ikhtilafat*), which gave students a sense of the history of the school, the positions of earlier scholars, and the connections of later authorities to earlier authorities. This became the basis of legal reasoning according to Hanafi methodologies.

Abu Bakr al-Khallal (d. 923) was the effective founder of the Hanbali school. The basic text of this school, Ibn Hanbal's Musnad, was – strictly speaking – a work of hadith and not of law. It was arranged by transmitter and not by legal subject and gave no opinions from later jurisprudents. Hanbalism, however, became a law school, as Ibn Hanbal's followers collected his opinions and began to order and classify collections of hadith by subject matter. Al-Khallal (d. 923) gathered Ibn Hanbal's opinions, elaborated them, taught them to his disciples, and wrote a biographical dictionary of earlier Hanbalis. The institutional aspects of the Maliki school are less known.

By the end of the tenth century, most jurists were adherents of one or another of the schools. They disagreed over details, but they recognized one another's legitimacy, and they had fairly similar jurisprudential systems based on the integration of hadith and rationalism. Many differing opinions attributed to the companions and earlier jurists allowed for flexibility and diversity. Change came from commentaries, and from judicial opinions on specific matters raised by petitioners. Every scholar was entitled to independent reasoning (*ijtihad*), and only discussion and debate could resolve differences of opinion. Contrary to a common opinion, the gates of *ijtihad* were never closed.

Legal schools divided law into three substantive categories: ʿ*ibadat* (ritual regulations), *muʿamalat* (rules of social relations), and *imama* (theory of collective organization). Under these categories, the law dealt with prayer, almsgiving, and fasting; matters of marriage, divorce, slavery, partnerships, debts, wills, and other legal and social concerns; and a concept of the selection and authority of rulers.

Many aspects of law were derived from the world of everyday affairs. The system of taxation employed by the caliphate was a continuation of Sasanian practices – rather than the legal outcome of a specific Quranic verse or hadith. Similarly, many aspects of contracts, property law, criminal law, and family law found in the region's pre-Islamic legal systems persisted in Islamic legal practice through the acceptance of customary social norms. Islamic law was not a theoretical construct but was developed in discourse with the real world of Muslims.

The legal opinions and methods of each school were applied in daily practice. Jurist-consultants (muftis) adopted the schools' opinions. Judges applied the schools' teachings in courts. Courts rendered decisions in family and commercial matters and maintained communal records for marriages, divorces, and commercial and property transactions. There were also informal means of adjudication outside of the courts based on customary law and the mediation of community notables.

The tenth-century shift in the character of legal discourse and practice also indicates important changes in the social and political meaning of law. In the ninth century, jurists were still the informal elders of their communities – merchants, officials, and perhaps artisans, meeting in the marketplace or mosque. By the eleventh century, they were professionals. Authority had shifted from a diffuse community to a specialized elite. Within that elite, authority was vested in the legal scholars (*shaykhs* and *mujtahids*) who were the qualified interpreters of the law. Shiʿis are well known for having a hierarchy of jurists, but Sunnis in effect had an informal but similar respect for hierarchical authority. The authority of the legal scholar, however, was not spoken of as a present phenomenon but was held to inhere in past great teachers whose charisma was manifest in the present. Sunni jurists also accepted the overriding authority of the consensus of jurists (*ijmaʿ*), but this consensus was said to exist as long as there was no dissenting opinion on a particular issue.

Politically, the emergence of consolidated legal schools represented the triumph of the pious and scholarly community as a private socioreligious rather than a governmental enterprise; law was

the product of discussion within communities and competition among schools rather than state legislation. After the inquisition of the early ninth century (*mihna*), caliphs did not usually interfere in either legal education or adjudication. Law developed in an autonomous domain not shaped by the state.

The consolidation of the schools of law was an important moment in the history of Middle Eastern societies. In the early conquest era, Islamic law was the continuation of a living tradition of legal study and adjudication enhanced by Quranic and prophetic teachings, and the judgments of caliphs and companions. Progressively, however, legal practice and doctrine were overtaken by traditionalist demands that the Quran and hadith be the supreme – if not the only – sources of law. Although traditional methods of legal reasoning remained in play, in the course of three centuries, ancient law was traditionalized. Pre-Islamic legal traditions were assimilated and transformed into the distinctive system of Islamic law that functions, albeit with modifications, to the present.

Asceticism and Mysticism (Sufism)

An ascetic life, renouncement of the world, and a mystical vision of an integral connection to God are additional experiences of Islamic belief. Whereas legists concentrated on the laws of daily life and theologians focused on rationalizing their beliefs, mystics attempted to acquire an immediate and personal experience of God's reality. They sought to order their lives, channel their thoughts and feelings, and hone a language that would make possible a direct experience of the presence of a God who was otherwise acknowledged to be transcendent and inaccessible. In this quest, language was particularly important, because only right language could unify the soul of the individual, break down the barriers between human and divine discourse, and enable the mystic to symbolize the reality he experienced. In religious terms, this is a quest for unity with the divine being; in humanistic terms, it is an effort to overcome the divided self, to realize the truths by which life must be lived, and to attain wholeness of being.

Islamic asceticism and mysticism originated in the spiritual aspirations and religious practices of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and their successors. Arab-Muslim spiritual seekers questioned the value of a worldly life. Some withdrew from the world; militant ascetics devoted themselves to holy war. They chose a piety that emphasized memorization of the Quran, devotion to hadith and law, and the fulfillment of God's teachings in their daily lives. They sought a deeper spiritual meaning through contemplation of the Quran, imitation of the Prophet, poverty, renunciation, and bodily mortification. Ascetics stressed abstinence and opposed injustice, luxury, and hypocrisy.

They questioned the value of marriage versus celibacy, wealth versus poverty, and active engagement versus retreat. Some chose utmost poverty and isolation; constant watchfulness to avoid any sin, great or small; and yearning for the paradise promised for true believers. Their lives were marked by fear of heedlessness, of temptation or sin, and of the last judgment. They wept for their sins and the punishment to come; they wept for the misery of the world. They taught that the only proper life for a good Muslim was one of humility and poverty; that the only proper expression was tears, rather than laughter; and that silence was best of all. In silence, one could concentrate on the recollection of God and on waiting for the last judgment.

For others, however, the purgative way implied a more moderate asceticism and discipline of bodily desires. For still others, asceticism implied an attitude of emotional disinterest, of detachment, without requiring physical renunciation. Goodness in following the teachings of the Quran, avoidance of sin, and a humble, yearning attitude toward God were summed up in the word "*zuhd*" (renunciation).

Although the inspiration of early Muslim ascetics was Quranic, their beliefs and practices were profoundly shaped by their own pre-Islamic traditions and contact with other religions and cultures. Syrian and Iraqi Christian holy men, monks, and hermits provided examples of deep spirituality. The combined militancy and piety of

Christian monks became a model for the ascetic, self-denying Muslim warrior and, by extension, a model for ethical and pious renunciation in daily life. Muslim missionaries in India came into contact with Hindu thought. Contacts with teachers of philosophy, medicine, alchemy, mathematics, and astrology were important influences.

Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) is said to have wept for his unworthiness and feared death, the last judgment, and the hellfire to come. He also taught obedience to the commands of the Quran and the strict practice of the rules of religion reinforced by ascetic devotions, patient acceptance of the trials of this world, submission to God's will, and constant anticipation of the last judgment. For Hasan, the cultivation of proper acts and attitudes was an individual responsibility. While accepting God's determination and guidance in all matters, he sought to reconcile the power of God with the responsibility of individuals through the mystical concept of contentment (*rida*), an attitude that brought the soul into harmony with God's will and thus reconciled freedom of choice with God's power to determine all things.

The story of Hasan became a model for renunciation and self-restraint as the bases of responsibility and moral conduct in communal and political affairs. He lived an active life devoted to holy war (jihad), teaching, preaching, and administration. He fought in the frontier wars to expand Islam and held public office in Basra. He held it a responsibility of good Muslims to counsel ordinary believers on their obligations to God and to give moral advice to rulers. Even when rulers were unjust, the proper response was moral counsel and not violent rebellion. Paradoxically, renunciation of the world led back to the actual fulfillment of the divine law for both the individual and the community.

Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the factuality of some of the legends associated with Hasan, which now appear to be mythical inventions projected backward into an earlier time. Still, his life story gives a vivid image of a Muslim conception of holy life as it was narrated over the generations.

In the late eighth and ninth centuries, the mystical dimension embedded in early Islamic asceticism became more distinct. As ascetics cultivated psychological, emotional, and spiritual awareness, Islamic mysticism emerged in full flower. Recitation of the Quran, the remembrance of God and repetition of his name (*dhikr*), litanies, and meditation – along with the struggle to suppress inner vices – liberated the deepest capacities of the soul and prepared it for the vision of God. The overriding goal of closeness to and vision of God set the Muslim ascetic and mystic against the ordinary demands of familial and communal life.

The name "Sufi" came into use in the late eighth and early ninth centuries as applied to ascetics and recluses in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. The earliest person we can identify as a Sufi was a Kufan, Abu Hashim (d. 767–68). Many Sufis, especially in Basra and Kufa, wore a rough wool robe, from which their name may be derived. In Khursan and Transoxania, they were called *hukama* – wise men or gnostics. Abu Hafs al-Naysaburi (d. 883–84) may have been the first in Khurasan to use the term "Sufi."

Nishapur was also the home of the mystical-ethical movements of the Malamatiya and the Karramiya. The Malamatiya believed in a normal working daily life inspired by inward mystical devotions, and they organized young men's clubs devoted to good deeds. The Karramiya were world-renouncing ascetics who built hospices and carried out missionary work. Nishapur was also a center of Shiʿism, and this may be the basis of a shared Shiʿi-Sufi tradition in ethics, exegesis, and devotions. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Malamatiya and the Karramiya merged with Baghdadi Sufism.

Sufis maintained ties to other religious movements. Both Hanbalis and Muʿtazilis shared Sufi ascetic values and a commitment to "commanding the good." Some early Muʿtazilis were called Sufis. There were overlaps in the religious views of different groups that did not belong to the same party.

The Quran provided Sufis with inspiration, guidance, and a vocabulary for this quest. Muqatil b. Sulayman (d. 767) developed a form of commentary that allowed the interpreter of the Quran to

transcend its literal meaning and arrive at its spiritual meaning. Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765), the sixth imam of the Shi'is, taught that every passage of the Quran spoke on four levels of meaning, which could be appreciated by people having the requisite spiritual experience. These levels were the physical words of the Quran ('ibara); allusion to an outside object (ishara); the mysterious fruit within the Quran (latifa); and, finally, the truth or reality of the Quran (haqiqa).

Mystics did not rely entirely on the vocabulary of the Quran but developed their own language to express the stages of ascent toward God. Shaqiq al-Balkhi (d. 810) was one of the first known Sufi writers to discuss four stages. The first was renunciation of the appetites of the body (zuhd); the second was fear of God and constant humility; the third was yearning for paradise; and the fourth was love of God. Dhu'l Nun al-Misri (d. 860–61) developed the concepts of states of being (ahwal) and stages of ascent (maqamat) in his discussions of love of God – the transition from asceticism to real mysticism. Dhu'l-Nun is considered the first theosophical mystic. Later writers – such as Abu Sa'id Kharraz (d. 890 or 899) – described seven stages on the way to God in which the term "qurb" (nearness) was the central metaphor. Each stage was partly a product of the Sufi's own disciplined efforts (maqam) and partly a gift of God's grace (hal). Al-Kharraz (d. 890–91) is the first known mystic to use the terms "fana'" (annihilation of self) and "baqa'" (persistence in the self).

As the stages of ascent became more elaborate, Sufis emphasized patience in accepting God's will and in renunciation of the world (sabr); gratitude (shukr); trust in God (tawakkul), which implied utter reliance on God and acceptance of his will without recourse or hope in worldly things; and acceptance of the vicissitudes of life and the reality of the divine decree with equanimity and even with joy and love (rida). Love implied yearning for God, obedience to God's will, complete surrender, and dying to one's self in the hope of closeness to God. Rabi'a (d. 801), a female mystic, put into passionate poems her desire to be joined to God. Some Sufis saw love as yearning; others understood it as union. Still others thought of love of God in terms of God's mercy and forgiveness, on

which sinful man was always dependent. Love of God opened the way to a still higher stage, unity (*tawhid*), the loss of self, and absorption in the divine being.

By the ninth century, two broad tendencies had emerged within the Sufi movement. The Khurasanian tendency was characterized by emphasis on resignation to God's will (*tawakkul*) expressed through voluntary poverty. Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 873) epitomized the quest for an intoxicated, rapturous union with God. In al-Bistami's view, the mystic seeks annihilation of self and union with the divine names or attributes. The mystic's identification with God is expressed in theopathic utterances (*shath*), which are the voice of God speaking through his person. Al-Bistami represents a change from world-renouncing piety to true mystical self-annihilation and union with God. This mysticism ruptured the ordinary pattern of Muslim religious activities and ignored obedience to Quranic law in search of a transcending religious self-realization.

Al-Hallaj (d. 923), who lived as a preacher and missionary in Khurasan and Afghanistan, also sought loss of self and unity in God. As a manifestation of this union, al-Hallaj proclaimed, "I am the Truth," performed miracles, and claimed a religious authority greater than that of caliphs and scholars because it was the authority of the divine presence. His claims to miracles and the doctrine of divine love and union led to prosecution for heresy and his execution in 923.

Other mystics held back from the radical implications of ecstatic Sufism and the concept of annihilation of the self in God. The Baghdadi tendency placed heavy stress on asceticism and renunciation of worldly things, combined with the cultivation of practical virtues such as patience, trust, gratitude, and love of God. The daily life of Sufis was marked by kindness, charity, and good deeds. The Baghdadis, however, as opposed to the Khurasanians, believed in observance of the Quran and conformity with Muslim law. Practically and intellectually, the Baghdadi Sufis were more closely integrated with mainstream Muslim religious practice and belief.

Al-Harith al-Muhasabi (d. 857) was the leading ninth-century proponent of this position, but al-Junayd (d. 910) was the great master of the effort to integrate Sufism with other aspects of Islamic religious life. Al-Junayd laid stress on renunciation, purification, and mental struggle in order to return to the preexistent state, in which the human being is a concept in the mind of God. Al-Junayd professed a two-stage concept of Sufi union. Beyond annihilation of the self (*fana*ʾ) he found *baqa*ʾ or persistence in his own identity. He held that the mystic's goal was not the loss of self as the final end but, through a loss of self, a return to daily life transformed by the vision of God and ever after conducted in the presence of God. As opposed to the Khurasanians, al-Junayd taught that beyond the ecstasy of loss of self there was a sober persistence of the self in never-failing worldly devotion to God's will as expressed in the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet. For the Baghdadis, visionary insight into the reality of God's being was not an escape from but an intensification of the Sufi's commitment to the fulfillment of God's will in daily life. In opposition to Khurasanian intoxication, al-Junayd advocated Baghdadi sobriety. Thus, al-Junayd made mysticism acceptable in other pious circles. His emphasis on austerity, outward behavior in conformity with law, and inward trust in God integrated the ascetic and the mystical camps.

Although mystics differed on the stages of the ascent toward God, they had – by the end of the ninth century – collectively articulated a theory of spiritual progress that combined Quranic inspiration with the lived experience of generations of seekers. Later Sufis, such as Niffari (d. 985), further elaborated the language of Sufism. He employed symbols that came into being in the moment of mystic experience and cultivated a language that condensed human experience with its transcendent reference. Through symbols, the mystic became familiar with the God who reveals himself in the language of men without compromising his transcendence. Symbolic language became a symbol of the mystic's absorption into the divine reality.

In addition to their pragmatic program, Sufis also cultivated a metaphysical, theosophical, and philosophical concept of the divine

reality. By the early tenth century, several metaphysical theories of the creation of the material world and the relation of human beings to God had been put forth. All of them in one form or another posited a transcendent God, but one whose spiritual radiance or emanation was implanted in human beings. A human being must overcome the bodily and animal forces within him, restore purity of will and intellect, and thus realize his inherently divine nature. Through this realization he returns to his origins in God.

Sahl al-Tustari (d. 896) elaborated that God's essence is light, which is a single and transcendent illumination that radiates from him to create the spiritual prototypes of the material world. Enshrined in this light are the prototypes of the prophets and of ordinary people, who exist before their worldly birth as particles of the divine light. In this preexistent state, human beings recognize and testify to the oneness and the lordship of God, a primordial covenant. In the life of this world, man attempts to reactualize this preexistent covenant. In prayer, he contemplates God's existence; in *dhikr* or Sufi ceremony, he attempts to recollect God's primordial self-revelation. To do this, he must purify the heart and make it triumph over the forces of the bodily self, following Quran and hadith with sincerity and repentance, living according to God's commands and prohibitions. Penitence and inner struggle free him from his bodily self (*nafs*) and allow him to realize his spiritual self, heart (*qalb*), reason (*ʿaql*), or spirit (*ruh*). By the resurrection of this preexisting reality, the mystic prepares himself for the vision of God and life eternal in the presence of the divine being.

With the translation of the Syriac and Greek classics into Arabic, the intellectual mysticism that stemmed from the thought of Plotinus (d. 270) provided a similar theosophical concept of the mystic way. Neo-Platonism introduced the idea that the universe radiated from the divine being in successive stages of spiritual and then material manifestation. Man – who stood at the juncture of the spiritual and material worlds – was capable by inner knowledge or illumination of rising up in the hierarchy of being to the ultimate vision of God. By discovery of the inward truths of the heart, which correspond to the cosmological structure of the universe, the mystic ascends from his

material state toward ever-higher levels of spiritual being and the ultimate illuminative knowledge of God.

Thus, in several forms, early Sufi metaphysics combined a transcendentalist with an immanentist view of God's existence. God is utterly different from any created reality; yet he is also the source of spiritual illuminations that make it possible for human beings – in whom there dwells some aspect of the reality of God – to return from their material exile to their spiritual home.

Finally, there was a miraculous and magical aspect to Sufism. The individual who had achieved knowledge of God's being through his daily behavior and visionary insight was considered more than human. In his person, he was an epiphany, a manifestation, of the divine being, and the vehicle of communication between man and God. The mystic was considered a healer, a magician, a worker of miracles, and a pillar of the universe. For many Muslim believers, the Sufi was not only a person of great moral and spiritual quality but a living expression of God's power in the world. Al-Tirmidhi (d. 932) advanced the theory that the Sufi adept was a saint who by his spiritual achievements upheld the order of the universe. Standing in the hierarchy of God's emanation, he was capable of miraculous deeds. Al-Tirmidhi's doctrine of sainthood became the basis of an almost universal Muslim belief in saints as intercessors with God and of a veneration of saints and their descendants, disciples, and tombs as repositories of the divine presence. In metaphysical doctrine and in magical practice, the Sufis represented the possibility of salvation by entry into the presence of God.

Sufism, which began as the quest for individual spiritual redemption, became by the late eighth century a collective religious movement. By this period, Sufis had developed a concept of themselves – the people of the coarse white wool garment – as initiates in a form of Muslim religious life that was distinct from the piety enshrined in scholarship and legal practice. Sufis gathered to recite the Quran and to sit in the presence of great masters. In the houses of rich merchant patrons, in collective retreats such as the *khanaqa* at Abadan, and in castles and towns on the Byzantine frontier, Sufis were provided with a living and sometimes even with

stipends. The beginnings of a collective life helped give coherence to Sufism as a movement.

Combining ascetic renunciation with spiritual growth leading toward union with God, and grounded in philosophical and metaphysical conceptions of God's being and a doctrine of the venerable and miraculous nature of saints, Sufism began to manifest both a social organization and a public mission. All of these trends would be consolidated and further developed in the centuries following the collapse of the ʿAbbasid Empire.

Chapter 16   Shiʿi Islam

Alongside Sunni communities, the Shiʿis developed their own expressions of Islam. In one Shiʿi view, the source of true belief in each generation was ultimately not the text of tradition, nor the consensus of jurists, nor the piety of holy men, but loyalty to the Caliph ʿAli and his descendants. The true imamate or caliphate belonged in the family of the Prophet, the Hashimite clan. In the seventh and eighth centuries, this led to a number of political movements opposing the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid dynasties. Family loyalists tried again and again to seize the caliphate. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4.   The Shiʿi imams.

    Defeat channeled many Shiʿis from political activity into religious reflection. The defeat of the Kufan uprising led by al-Mukhtar in 687 prompted a turn to gnosticism – the belief that human beings embody a divine spark and that they must return from this world to their true divine realm. Gnosticism generated a large number of Shiʿi sects that denied the resurrection and believed in incarnation, transmigration of

souls, and continuous living prophethood. Collectively these were called extremist sects (*ghulat*).

By the mid-eighth century, there were two principle branches of Shiʿism – the Zaydis and the Imamis. They differed over which descendant of ʿAli was the true imam. Zaydis held that the true imam proved himself by active struggle for the office and by being both a political and a religious leader. A Zaydi-sponsored revolt occurred in Kufa in 740, and Zaydis were active in a number of later anti-ʿAbbasid rebellions. Eventually, they established local regimes in Yemen and the Caspian Sea region.

The Imamis held that the imamate descended directly in the family of ʿAli and Fatima, but they did not have a unified position on whether political activism was required for a claimant to the imamate. At least one faction in the Baghdadi community called for an immediate restoration of the true imamate as political ruler and in 762 backed the anti-ʿAbbasid revolt of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya. After the defeat of this revolt, the Baghdadi Shiʿis became a pacific religious congregation. Shiʿis were important in merchant and scribal circles and had access to the ʿAbbasid court. By the ninth century, the Baghdadi Shiʿis had renounced political aspirations in favor of local community affairs and pious personal lives and lived in an atmosphere of mourning for lost hopes and messianic dreams. Instead of trying to transform the world, they withdrew to a pious existence within it. Thus, the early political movement developed into a sectarian religious community.

The earliest Imami community was resident in Kufa and Baghdad, but in the ninth century, Qum replaced Kufa as the chief center of Imami Shiʿism. In the tenth century, Baghdad became the most important center. In the eleventh century, the community moved to Najaf and Hilla. From Qum, it was widely dispersed in Iran.

For the Baghdadi Shiʿis, the critical issue was the authority of the imam and the succession to the imamate. Jaʿfar al-Sadiq (d. 765), the sixth imam in the line of ʿAli, taught that the true caliph and ruler of the Muslim community descended in the family of ʿAli by virtue of *nass* – each incumbent imam's designation of his successor. Through

designation, the imam inherited a secret knowledge and exclusive authority to interpret the Quran and hadith and to elaborate the legal system of Islam. Many Shiʿis, however, yearned instead for a savior. Although the movement to ascribe supernatural powers to the imam began in the imamate of Jaʿfar, he both refused an active political role and denied that he was the expected redeemer (*qaʾim*). Until 874, the living imams gave guidance to their community and left a legacy of precedents that would shape later Imami Shiʿism.

A central issue for the Baghdadi Shiʿis was whether the imam possessed supernatural inspiration or was an ordinary – although learned and pious – human being. The historical succession after Jaʿfar reinforced the tendencies toward belief in the supernatural qualities of the imam. A succession of child imams who could not qualify for their office by virtue of learning led to the idea that imams became imams through divine grace or an indwelling divine light. In the extremist (*ghulat*) view, which would become integral to some later Shiʿi ideas, the imam was vested with an indwelling spirit of God and was the messiah (Mahdi) chosen by God to restore the true faith of Islam and to establish justice and the kingdom of God in the world. By the ninth century, Shiʿi concepts of the imam came to include the notion that he was *maʿsum*, a sinless and infallible guide to religious truth. The ordinary believer was obliged to obey and give unquestioning loyalty to the imam. These views provoked an intense intellectual struggle between the Baghdadi believers in the quasi-divinity of the imam and the Shiʿi scholars of Qum who held that the imam was merely a person with true knowledge of the Quran and the law.

In the tenth century, the concept of the imam was reformulated in neo-Platonic and gnostic terms that provided a new metaphysical context. The imam came to be understood as an emanation of the divine being and the universal intelligence (*ʿaql al-kull*) and thus a bearer of direct knowledge of the secret truths and states of spirituality that lead to the reunion of the soul of man with God. From this vantage point, Shiʿism moved toward Sufi ideas in that the divinely graced imam became the exemplar and teacher of a mystical reunion with God.

In a divided community, the succession to the imamate was often problematic. After Jaʿfar's death, the Shiʿi community split into two groups – the followers of his sons Musa and Ismaʿil. The followers of Musa and the ninth-century imams who were his descendants maintained the religious and social policies we know as Imami. But the followers of Ismaʿil created a new messianic and politically active movement.

In 874, after the death of the eleventh imam, Hasan al-Askari, who left no heirs, the line of succession from Jaʿfar came to an end. The Shiʿis then elaborated their concept of the hidden twelfth imam, who is not dead but is in retreat until he shall return as the messiah at the end of days. In the absence of a living imam, the Banu Nawbakht, an important Shiʿi family of Baghdad, took up the leadership of the community, and from 874 until 941 acted as agents of the hidden imam. This first period, in which the twelfth imam was hidden but still in direct contact with his agents, was called the lesser occultation. The period that followed, in which all direct contact was lost, is called the greater occultation. The *ithna ʿashari* (Twelver), or Imami, Shiʿi community has come to be defined by its eschatological conception of the imamate and doctrine of the historical succession of twelve imams culminating in the occultation of the twelfth imam, who will return as the messiah.

With the loss of direct divine guidance, Baghdadi Shiʿis began to codify their religious and cultural heritage to compensate for the missing imam. In the late decades of the tenth century, they began the public ritual cursing of Muʿawiya (ʿAli's political rival) and marked the holiday of mourning for the death of Husayn at Karbala (*ʿashura*') as well as the day of celebration for Muhammad's adoption of ʿAli as his successor (*ghadir khumm*). Pilgrimages to the tombs of ʿAli at Najaf, of Husayn at Karbala, and of ʿAli al-Rida at Mashhad became important rituals. The passionate mourning for Husayn, identification with the suffering of the martyr, and the messianic hopes implicit in the commemoration of Karbala gave emotional and religious depth to Twelver Shiʿism.

Politically, this meant that the Twelvers – although opposed to the ʿAbbasid regime in principle – were willing to postpone their expectations of a Shiʿi imam until the indefinite future. Some Imamis recognized that the occultation (*ghayba*) was permanent and that scholars would take over the leadership roles of the hidden imam. By the twelfth century, Imamis generally believed that a layperson must consult a learned scholar on all matters of belief and practice. Quietism, accommodation, dissimulation of true beliefs, and martyrdom became the dominant sociopolitical motifs.

In the same period, Twelver teaching in hadith, law, and theology also became more established. In the eighth and ninth centuries, hadith were central to the Imami Shiʿi practice of Islam. Because the Shiʿis denied the legitimacy of Sunni succession of caliphs, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar could not be accepted as authoritative sources of Muslim religious teaching; nor could the other companions or the Umayyads and ʿAbbasids. Therefore, an independent hadith and law in which ʿAli was the prime authority was elaborated.

An Imami legal and theological school came into being in the imamate of Muhammad b. ʿAli al-Baqir (d. 732). Legal traditions became common in the imamate of Jaʿfar al-Sadiq (d. 765). Because in Imami tradition all truth derives from the teaching of the imams, hadith was primary and law and theology were secondary pursuits. However, the Shiʿis were also in close touch with political sympathizers such as Muʿtazili theologians, and, by the end of the ninth century, they were also debating the questions of free will and God's attributes.

The first extant compilation of Shiʿi hadith on ritual and law was made by al-Kulayni (d. 940). His hadith collections were organized under legal subject headings. In time, the emphasis shifted from hadith to more general rules of law. Sunni legal development preceded Shiʿi law, and Shiʿis studied and taught in Sunni schools.

Shiʿis were divided, like Sunnis, between a traditionalist position and a modified rationalist position. Scholars debated the teachings of the imams as the sole source of beliefs and the permissibility of exercising individual legal judgment (*ijtihad*). Shiʿi traditionalists

(*akhbaris*) rejected rational methods and insisted on strict reliance on hadith. Traditionalists were dominant until the middle of the tenth century when rationalism was revived in law. Usulis (rationalists) favored a reasoned judgment in legal matters. Some Twelvers also adopted consensus (*ijmaʿ*) and claimed that the Twelvers constituted a fifth school of law (*madhhab*) on par with the Sunni schools. Shiʿis thus left a legacy of religious teachings basically similar to the Sunni types, but differing mainly in matters of detail and in chains of transmission.

By the mid-eleventh century, Imami Shiʿis had created a worldly life lived in perpetual expectation of the world to come. In permanent opposition to the established political regimes, Imamism had become a religion of salvation. This salvation might be attained by living in accordance with the hadith of the Prophet and the imams, by emotional absorption into their martyrdom, or by gnostic vision and mystical identification with the emanations of the divine being. With the consolidation of their doctrinal beliefs in written form, the development of a public ritual life, and political recognition by the reigning authorities, the Baghdadi Shiʿis emerged as a sectarian community within the body of Islam.

Ismaʿili Shiʿism

The second branch of Shiʿism is composed of followers of Jaʿfar's son, Ismaʿil. Early Ismaʿilis differed from the Imami Shiʿis in recognizing Ismaʿil rather than Musa as the true imam. Moreover, their strong messianic orientation led to doctrinal changes and to political activism. In Ismaʿili doctrine, the Quran revealed two truths – the external, literal (*zahir*) truth of the divine message and the inner, esoteric (*batin*) truth of the Quran – which could only be known by proper exegesis of the Quranic text and by comprehension of the external meanings as the symbols of an inner spiritual principle. For Ismaʿilis of the ninth century, the doctrine implied a conception of the imam as teacher and guide to the inner meanings of the Quranic revelation.

Isma'ilis generated a historical and eschatological concept of the imam. According to their doctrine, prophetic revelation was always complemented by the appearance of a *wasi*, who was the executor and interpreter of the inner meaning of the revelation. In history, there were to be seven prophets, each followed by a cycle of seven imams. Muhammad was the sixth prophet. His *wasi* was 'Ali, who was to be followed by a cycle of imams culminating in Muhammad the son of Isma'il (the Mahdi), who would return as the seventh and final prophet to reveal the truth in its fullness and establish everlasting justice. Isma'ilism combined a historical, cyclical concept of prophetology with eschatological messianism.

Furthermore, Isma'ilis held that the imams were figures in a universal hierarchy as well as participants in prophetic cycles. The prophet (*natiq*) was superior to the imams, who in turn were superior to the proofs (*hujjas*), who represented the imams in their absence and were in turn represented by missionaries (*da'is*). This structure of communal authority was at once a hierarchy of leadership and the mark of successive stages of spiritual initiation. Isma'ilism, Sufi messianism, and philosophical ideas about governance made the ruler a cosmological figure, a semieternal, semidivine emanation on whom a just political order depends. In this worldview, the ruler was also the redeemer and savior.

Isma'ilis of the ninth century were active missionaries and political organizers. Whereas the Shi'is of Baghdad maintained their position in 'Abbasid society and government, Isma'ilis set out to proselytize tribal and peasant peoples in Arabia, Syria, Iraq, North Africa, and the towns of Iran. They preached equality and justice, the need for reform, and the coming of the savior. Isma'ili missionaries converted new peoples to their version of Islam and led extensive rebellions against the 'Abbasid caliphate. Isma'ili dynasties were founded in North Africa, the Caspian region, Bahrain, Multan, and other places. Whereas Imami Shi'ism was politically quietist, Isma'ili Shi'ism carried the banner of Islamic revolution.

In either form, Shi'ism was characterized by a religious mood that stressed messianic hopes and chiliastic expectations. Shi'is believed

in the return of the imam as a messiah and that the historical world would come to an end with the fulfillment of successive cycles of prophets and imams in a cataclysmic era, out of which would come a reborn mankind and the establishment of a kingdom of God on earth. Although Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims did not vary much in the practice of their daily lives, they differed profoundly in the emotional mood through which they saw worldly reality.

Women, Families, and Communities

Chapter 17 Muslim Urban societies to the tenth century

Women and family (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

Of the topics that we have discussed thus far, the position of women in Muslim societies is the most controversial. It requires a digression to discuss the political, cultural, and methodological considerations that shape our views. Contemporary European and American public discourses are driven by religious rivalry, geopolitical issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ongoing wars in the Middle East. This situation promotes an atmosphere of suspicion, prejudice, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims. These same considerations also motivate widespread Muslim hostility against the West.

A key theme in this atmosphere of conflict is the position of women in Muslim families, communities, and countries. Westerners often allege that in Muslim societies women are oppressed and subordinated to men, without opportunities for independence, education and careers, or the cultivation of their talents and full potentials. Islamic law is perceived as discriminating against women, and Islamist demands for a return to Shariʿa are understood as being a campaign against the emancipation of women. The wearing of the veil or the burqa is viewed as the foremost sign of this subordination.

Conversely, conservative Muslims (and indeed some Christians and Jews) see women in Western societies as economically exploited for their labor, sexually abused, and commercially commodified by Western media's fixation on the female body. Most Muslims experience their faith as liberating or fair to women. Some find it offensive that Westerners do not fully understand the rich historical and contemporary realities of women's lives.

Some perspective on these issues may be helpful. Such strongly held convictions and prejudices make it difficult to fairly and realistically discuss the experiences of women in numerous Islamic societies. Western discourses about Muslim women ignore the problems and challenges Western women experience in their own societies. We tend to compare Western societies as we perceive them to be in the present moment without taking into account their recent histories or contemporary realities. A little more than a hundred years ago in America, women could not vote, nor, if married, manage their own property. Today, there is widespread resistance in the West to modern women's roles and widespread conservative convictions that the place of women is in the home and family. We fail to recognize that there are many different varieties of feminism and feminist movements throughout the world.

Rather, we have to come to terms with realities that are more varied, complex, and ambiguous than we generally imagine. There are myriad historical, geographical, socioeconomic, religious-doctrinal, and legal differences within the category of women and Islam. Much of the variation in the situations of women in the Muslim world is governed by class as well as religious, ethnic, and social considerations. Women of the same social class have similar life experiences across ethnic, national, or religious lines. Wealthy women and working-class women in different societies may have more in common with one another than with women of other classes in their own communities. In addition, women who are Muslims are affected by non-Muslim practices, beliefs, and cultures.

Finally, we do not usually think of women in the Muslim world in the context of global variations in the roles and identities of women. How are the contemporary or historical experiences of women in Muslim-majority societies different from those of women in non-Muslim-majority societies? Here and in the chapters that follow we will attempt to relate "Muslim women" to the historical, political, and socioeconomic realities of their times and places and in terms that are not unique to Islam.

In the period from the seventh to the tenth century, we have little evidence about the lives of women. Most of what we know comes from later legal and historical texts. The extant literature generally articulates the perspectives of upper-class men with religious and social influence. Our sources may not represent the daily reality of women's lives. In later chapters (Chapters 21 and 31) dealing with the period from the tenth to the eighteenth centuries, as the source material becomes more abundant, we can better describe the functions, status, and relationships of women.

In the early Islamic era, the overall status of women remained much the same as it was in pre-Islamic late antiquity. Middle Eastern societies continued to make a relatively sharp division between men's and women's roles. The family, the household, light agricultural labor, and domestic craftwork were the domain of women. The middle- and upper-class ideal was isolation from the marketplace, politics, and social life with men. In the early Islamic era, in extended families and lineages, women were subject to the authority of fathers, brothers, husbands, and husbands' male kin. This basic attitude was reinforced by the belief that the honor of a man and his family, lineage, or tribe depended on the honorable conduct of all its members, including women. Common attitudes about the roles of men and women, however, did not preclude wide variation in institutional and social arrangements.

Women and family in the lifetime of the Prophet

In late antique Arabia, the basic family unit was the patriarchal agnatic clan, a group of people descended directly in the male line from a common ancestor and under the authority of the eldest male or chief member of the family. This was an extended family of several generations – several groups of married couples and their offspring, with collaterals and clients – all considered part of one household. Status, duties, and rights stemmed entirely from the clan. The group was responsible for defending individual members and making restitution in case of any crime committed by a member.

Property was regulated by the customs of the group. Marriages were arranged by the heads of the families with a view to the interests of the families. A good marriage brought honor to the clan; if any of its members, especially the women, were violated or breached social norms, the clan was dishonored.

However, alongside the agnatic clan, various forms of polyandrous marriage of one woman to several men with varying degrees of permanence and responsibility for paternity, including temporary marriages, were also known in Arabia. Polygynous arrangements varied from multiple wives in one residence to several wives living with their own tribes, where they were visited by the husband on a rotating basis. It is unclear if women were secluded in pre-Islamic Arabia, and it seems improbable considering nomadic ways of life. However, it is conceivable that men's and women's economic activities and socializing patterns kept them apart. No single norm was universally accepted.

With the advent of Islam, the Prophet presented a value system and regulations that in many ways reflected and consolidated, but also significantly modified, the pre-Islamic Arabian context. Quranic verses seem to strengthen the agnatic clan. Quranic rules against incest were crucial for the viability of group life, for biological heredity, and for the creation of marriage bonds between families. Divorce, although still relatively easy, was discouraged. Because lineage was traced through its male heirs, the Quran provided rules to assure knowledge of paternity. (For example, in the event of divorce, a woman could only remarry after three menstrual cycles.) Polyandrous marriages were condemned because they undermined identification of lineage.

The agnatic family ideal was buttressed by a clear definition of its collective duties in the all-important matter of responsibility for crimes. As in pre-Islamic times, all the male kin were held responsible for the protection of family members, but Quranic teachings tried to reduce the devastating effects of the blood feuds that often resulted from this obligation. They urged the aggrieved party to accept compensation in money rather than blood and ruled that, if blood retaliation were insisted on, only the culprit himself

could be slain – instead of any male relative. This modification did not end the law of blood revenge or the strong common responsibilities of family members to one another, but it restricted feuds, to give security to families, who no longer had to fear that the indiscretion of one member would in the end destroy them all.

The moral and spiritual reform advocated in Quranic verses enhanced the status of women. The Quran addresses women directly and charges them to uphold morality in the community. It recommends respect for their modesty and privacy. Marriage was recognized as having important spiritual and religious values because it was a relationship sanctioned by the will of God. Furthermore, the Quran and Prophetic teachings recognized women's property rights. A woman was given the right to inherit up to a quarter of her husband's estate and, in case of divorce, to retain the agreed-upon bridal gift. In addition, the Quran tried to prevent hasty and willful divorces by urging delay, reconciliation, and mediation by families. A waiting period following a divorce also served to assure a woman of interim support and of support for a future child if she were pregnant. Finally, Prophetic practice indicates that women also had the right to initiate divorce.

Because the Prophet's practices set precedents for Muslim jurisprudence and social values, it is important to explore concrete examples of how the Prophet treated women. The Prophet's first wife was his employer, Khadija. This was a monogamous relationship with a widowed woman significantly older and wealthier than he. She is reported to have been forty and he twenty-five when she proposed marriage and he accepted. Historical sources describe her as the Prophet's confidante and note that he did not oppose her wishes. She appears to have provided him with both financial and emotional support. Khadija died after some twenty-five years of marriage to the Prophet, during which time she was his only wife.

The Prophet's monogamous marital life with Khadija in Mecca was followed by more than a decade of multiple marriages in Medina, mainly with widowed and divorced women, with the exception of his young bride, 'A'isha. His first marriage after Khadija's death was to Sawdah bint Zam'ah, a middle-aged widow; ostensibly, he needed

her to care for his daughters. His second wife was ʿAʾisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr (the first caliph). ʿAʾisha was the youngest of the Prophet's wives – probably just entering puberty – and the only one not to have been previously married. The Prophet chose to remain in her quarters during his last illness, and he died there. ʿAʾisha became an important transmitter of hadith, a jurist, and a political activist. Muhammad's other wives were widows and divorcees, and one was a captive. Many of these relationships appear to have had political motivations because they established alliances with various clans. Hadith report him as regularly conversing with his wives and generally treating them with respect, patience, and gentleness.

Little research systematically examines the Prophet's interactions with women who were not related to him as wives, daughters, or other relatives. From what we now know, he appears not to have imposed seclusion or avoided contact with women. When he first began preaching in Mecca, the sources report him teaching men and women together. They specifically depict the Prophet as making social visits to various female companions; many women other than his wives transmitted hadith from him. Women were present as political representatives at the ʿAqaba meeting between the Prophet and members of the Medinan community; later, women fought in raids and battles. Women are also reported to have provided food and nursed the wounded during battles.

There is no evidence for seclusion of women in the lifetime of the Prophet. In the Quran, women are enjoined, when in public, for the sake of modesty and chastity, to draw their scarves around them and not to display adornments. Later hadith interpreted this to mean a head covering and to be the basis of exclusion from public life, but the historical evidence of these practices in the Prophet's lifetime is scant. Narrative sources from the Medinan period depict female companions as marrying, divorcing, and remarrying with relative ease. Women in this period were instrumental in the transmission of knowledge – whether Prophetic traditions, folk remedies, or dream interpretations.

Women and family in the Caliphal era

We do not have sufficient biographical and historically detailed narratives to reconstruct women's lives immediately after the Prophet died. Unfortunately, this period was especially influential for later constructions of the status of women, because this was the era when Quranic exegesis and hadith – two sources of Islamic legal doctrines – began to flourish.

The Arab-Muslim conquests and the organization of the empire affected the position of women connected to the political and military elites. It seems likely that the taking of captives and slavery enforced a turn toward polygyny, harems, and the subordination of women. Slavery had profound effects on family and identities, because it created complex families with multiple relationships and loyalties and a fluid distribution of power. Slave women had minimal rights unless they bore acknowledged children. Yet slave women, as is known from ʿAbbasid court history, could become politically and economically powerful, and this may have been true for families at all levels of society. As is shown in early Arabic literature, slave women might also become love objects and thus an outlet for male imagination and individuality. Slave men could bring wealth into a family by virtue of their work and the accumulation of property and thus enhance the power of the extended family unit. In these circumstances, reinforced by laws that made divorce easy for men, the nuclear family would be a weak element.

The caliphal family was a special case. Under the early ʿAbbasids, royal women had their own households; but after the death of Harun, caliphs did not marry, and their mothers were the chief women at court. By the tenth century, women were housed in a special structure within the royal palace – much like the Byzantine equivalent, the *gynaikonitis*.

Family behavior and the role of women in society were shaped by the settlement of Arab-Muslim conquerors in the garrison cities. The new cities were first settled by tribal units, but after a century of sedentarization they were thoroughly urbanized. Tribal structures evolved into groups defined by family, geographical proximity in town

quarters and markets, and religious associations. In Basra, by the eighth century, nontribal names and identifications became dramatically more important. Mixed Arab and non-Arab Muslim populations included merchants, artisans, workers, teachers, and scholars. Independently of the caliphate, town populations developed sociocommunal and even political organizations of their own, under the leadership of both nonreligious and religious leaders. In these new conditions, from the seventh to the tenth centuries, Muslim jurists worked out a legal system to regulate family and property relations. With some variations, this system carried on the fundamentals of late antique legal practice.

Late antique marriage practices and sexual morality did not significantly change in early Muslim communities. Generally, an Islamic marriage is a contract between the bride (who makes a marriage offer) and a groom (who accepts the offer and pays the dower) in the presence of two witnesses – with or without particular contractual stipulations. Consanguinity, foster relationships, and marriage to mother and daughter or two sisters at the same time were forbidden. A marriage contract required the payment of a dower. Usually, two witnesses were required; some public celebration or notice was considered desirable, and most jurists disapproved of secret marriages. A marriage contract and consummation could be separated by a long interval. Marriage did not result in the creation of community property; men were solely responsible for family maintenance.

Most Muslim jurists required women to be represented by a male guardian, who accepted an offer for the woman from a suitor of appropriate class and status, but the bride had to give her consent for the marriage contract to be valid. Before puberty, a father's authority was virtually unlimited; minors, both girls and boys, could be forcibly married by a father. With a mature virgin, some gesture of assent was needed; a previously married woman had to give express verbal consent. Different rules applied if the guardian was not the father. Judges did intervene in cases in which there was no guardian or in which a guardian refused to let a woman marry an appropriate person.

Islamic legal traditions from the first several generations do not indicate any clear ruling on non-virgin brides – that is, women who were not previously married but were not virgins. However, later Muslim juristic practice corresponded to rabbinic practice in minimizing the significance of prior sexual activity. Likewise, polygyny and female concubinage were accepted practices. The Shiʿis permitted temporary marriages, whereas Sunnis prohibited it. There are reports of the Prophet punishing a Muslim man for adultery, and succeeding generations appear to have continued to do so.

Quranic verses and Prophetic practice indicate an interest in both preventing divorce and limiting its potential for harm. A man had the right to dissolve a marriage by declaring his wife divorced, but the Prophet's companions narrated hadith that encouraged arbitration and dissuaded couples from divorce. A husband could reconcile with his wife after two divorce declarations, but a third declaration of divorce was irrevocable. The divorced wife would have to be married to and divorced by another man before remarriage to her first husband. Unlike Sunni jurists, Shiʿi jurists require two witnesses for the divorce declaration to be valid. Although there are reports that the Prophet granted women's requests for divorce with little questioning, this was limited by later juristic practice. Women could petition for divorce in a variety of situations: if a husband was unable or unwilling to provide an appropriate standard of living, if a husband was unable or unwilling to engage in sexual intercourse, or if a husband was abusive.

Once a divorce declaration was made, a waiting period (ʿ*idda*) of three menstrual cycles would begin. This waiting period provided an opportunity for reconciliation and reflection, as well as, in cases of pregnancy, determination of paternity. Men were required to provide lodging and support during this waiting period and child support during the duration of an ex-wife's custody.

Property and inheritance

The Islamic juristic tradition guaranteed women certain property rights. In contrast to some late antique precedents, there were no legal restrictions on a Muslim woman's right to own or to manage property. Women appear as property owners in pre-Islamic Arabian practice, in historical sources from the early Islamic period, and in Egyptian papyri of the ninth and tenth centuries. Muslim women had the right to hold property in their own names and were not expected to contribute to the support of the household. Muslim women were given the right to inherit up to a quarter of a husband's estate, to receive gifts of property, and, in case of divorce, to retain the agreed-upon bridal gift. Also, in contrast to prevailing pre-Islamic late antique practices, Muslim women could inherit from a number of relatives. Women could use their wealth to negotiate favorable marriage contract stipulations or to arrange divorces on their own initiative. Although adult women were not legally required to have guardians, Muslim jurists generally restricted women from testifying in commercial transactions.

Inheritance is a particularly complicated area of Islamic law, with a complex history, differences among the legal schools, and a variety of special cases. The Quran favors direct descent of property from father to sons but allows for testamentary disposal of property and emphasizes the rights of women to own property. Similarly, very early Islamic law allowed a person to designate heirs and dispose of property as he wished. The testator could designate parents, or wife, or daughter-in-law. The testator could leave a will that favored particular heirs, such that certain relatives who would have inherited if the testator died without a will would get a smaller share. To meet their political and economic interests, some early caliphs manipulated Quranic exegesis to eliminate unrestricted designation of an heir. In the conquest period – probably for the sake of social cohesion at a time when great wealth was being accumulated – a system of fixed shares was made compulsory. Then, Islamic trusts (*waqf*) evolved to provide testators with the ability to evade the system of fixed shares.

Muslim jurists followed Quranic inheritance stipulations and upheld gender-based differences in apportionment that were common in late

antiquity. Generally, Sunni jurists ruled that women receive half the share of men who are related to the deceased in the same degree. A mother or a father inherits one-sixth of a child's estate; a grandmother receives one-sixth. A full sister receives half of her brother's estate (if he does not have children). A widow receives one-quarter of her husband's estate if there are children. However, there are significant differences between Sunni and Shi'i jurists in matters of inheritance; the latter generally provide larger shares for daughters without brothers.

In many respects, these legal norms favored men over women. Marriages were commonly arranged by families; a bride's male guardians were ultimately responsible for her welfare. A bride would ordinarily move to the house of her husband and reside with his kin. The Quran also gives a husband authority over his family because he is responsible for the family's economic well-being. Muslim jurists afforded men easier terms on which to initiate divorce, whereas women were given fewer opportunities. In the case of divorce, children beyond a certain age were under the guardianship of the husband and his family. In Islamic law, however, women had important economic rights and could come to court to enforce their economic and marital rights. In the ninth century, this was easy for a lower-class woman, but it was considered shameful for higher-class women to leave their homes and be seen in public. Eventually, arrangements were made for such women to send a representative. Although in law women could own property, in many instances non-Islamic social practices restricted their opportunities to accumulate or inherit property. Contrary to Islamic law, customary norms prevailed when families refused women their Islamic inheritance shares from the properties of husbands or other relatives.

Although legal and cultural norms advantaged men, this was tempered by economic and social realities. From later historical materials and theoretical considerations, we know that the relations between the sexes were more complicated than is implied in the simple concepts of male dominance and gender segregation. Although women had a lesser role in the "public" sphere, the public domain was much smaller in pre-modern than in modern societies;

families played a much larger role in economic life and politics. Women were commonly the custodians of the family's social status, and they had influence in arranging marriages and maintaining reciprocal relations with other families. Educated upper-class women taught the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet to the girls in their family networks. The nominal domain of women was thus more consequential than it would seem today.

Other factors could also give women considerable autonomy – and even dominance – in domestic affairs. In the direct relations between husband and wife, a wife's personal influence, manipulation of her husband, conspiracies and intrigues, threats to humiliate her husband by denouncing him for neglect or impotence, and setting sons against fathers all worked to subvert the domestic power of men. The dependence of men on domestic life and the opinion of their neighbors and kin also helped to equalize the relationship between husbands and wives. Furthermore, women had their own bases of social and personal autonomy in their networks of friendships and social gatherings.

Moreover, the relationships between men and women and women's standing in the public world were not fixed by culture or by law but varied by context. Wealthy upper-class women were more likely to be limited to the household, but they also had the resources and opportunities to take control of their lives and advance their interests. They became property owners through inheritance, dower, and gifts. Educated women were likely valued for their opinions on religious, family, and political matters.

Lower-class women had a measure of independence because of their work and relative mobility. Women played a significant economic role in animal husbandry, agriculture, home crafts, and cottage industries. Rural women produced tents, bedding, clothing, mats, rugs, sacks, pottery, and baskets – both for the household and the market. They acted as healers, midwives, cooks, prostitutes, musicians, savants, and traders. In towns, women did embroidery and washed, carded, and spun wool. Women's lending and marketing networks were a source of income. Although there were important variations by region and class, the economic contributions

of women's incomes and assets and their control over the distribution of family food and other resources gave them considerable familial and social power.

Nonetheless, women's options were more limited than those of men. Jurists granted men rights that women did not have – to polygyny, to marrying non-Muslims, and to advantages in divorce and in inheritance. Women – in both Islamic and other late antique societies – had to operate within a patriarchal framework of unequal power and unequal legal rights, finding or creating whatever amelioration they could.

Thus, the personal relations and attitudes of men and women toward each other have several dimensions, corresponding to the complexity of their social and economic roles. Women were perceived by some men as erotic objects, but to others they were partners in earning a living and in family relations. Although, from a contemporary point of view, men were dominant, women cannot be thought of as an oppressed class. They most likely did not see themselves as forming a collectivity with interests opposed to those of men, because women themselves had varying experiences depending on their social class and local community. Most women probably saw themselves as playing a valued, legitimate, and important role in family and social life, one that differed from but was complementary to that of men.

Urban communities

Beyond the family, Muslim populations belonged to larger-scale communities, but we have little information about the organization of communal and social life for the period from the seventh to the tenth centuries. Extended families and tribal connections seem to have mattered less in towns than in the countryside. Nor were ethnicity or national identifications the basis of community and political organization.

Scattered throughout the sources, and bearing mainly on Baghdad, there are indications that the settlers of the Arab-Muslim cities and garrison towns were organized by quarter, by market, and

by religious associations. From the chronicles, we learn that in the middle of the ninth century *shaykhs* of the quarters represented their people to the military. In 919, the chief of police designated legal scholars in the quarters to give judgments to guide the officers. We find references to the headmen of artisans, which suggests some kind of market organization, and the headmen of soldiers, functionaries, merchants, and scholars. These were most likely titles for prominent notables, but they may imply a spokesman for an informal group. There is no evidence for communes or guilds.

Yet the chronicles show that the populace was well enough organized to intervene in political crises. In 812, the common people joined in the fight against the Khurasanian forces of al-Maʾmun on behalf of the Caliph al-Amin. Gangs of young men (ʿ*ayyarun*) were organized in military fashion with a leader for each street and for each quarter. The groups were also active in battles with slave soldiers and in antitax or bread riots, which took place sporadically throughout the late ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries. While resisting the state, they also preyed on rich property owners and merchants.

Apart from the residential quarters and the markets, religious congregations or associations were a critical aspect of city communal organization. In the Muslim garrison cities, the imams of the Shiʿis, Khariji chieftains, charismatic preachers, Quran readers, jurists, theologians, ascetics, and mystics won over students, followers, and disciples. The learned and holy men became the leaders of sects, teaching circles, and prayer groups. Local legal scholars, teachers, storytellers, and preachers in the mosques assumed an independent authority as Islamic law, theology, and ritual developed largely without state interference.

Religious teachers were the social elites, notables in their communities, and assumed authority in all sorts of local matters. As in ancient times, scholarship and education were aligned with social and communal prestige and were connected to tribal chiefs, landowners, merchants, and government officials. Social prestige was attached to roles of mediating and adjudicating disputes and therefore to the study of law. Conversely, learning provided

opportunities for upward mobility. Judges were particularly important. Often selected from among the heads of prominent families or clans, judges had important social and administrative as well as religious roles. In the Umayyad and early ʿAbbasid periods, judges were often appointed in consultation with local scholars (ʿ*ulama*ʾ) and study circles. At first, many (but not all) judges were legal scholars, but after the reign of Harun they were drawn from the legal study circles. Law courts and their personnel became a focus of local consultation on legal issues, of mediation, and of adjudication of disputes.

Study groups and informal congregations were commonly attached to prominent families and tribes. They sometimes constituted a clientele or a faction, consisting of students, client workers, and/or residents of a neighborhood or market supporting prominent local leaders. Judges, in particular, had the support of a faction consisting of students, functionaries, official witnesses, notaries, and other clients. Some circles were engaged in social or political activism, in their words, "commanding the good and forbidding evil," by vigilante campaigns against vice, or defending the people against governmental injustice. Others had close political ties to the caliphate. Thus, in this early period, a legal study group was also likely to be a political faction, a school of theological dogma, and sometimes a religious movement. Political support, whether caliphal, tribal, or familial, was everywhere crucial to the influence of jurists.

Kharijis set early precedents for community formation on a religious basis among Muslims. Through their insistence on the equality of all Muslims regardless of tribe and through their conception of the true imam or caliph as a person without blemish or sin, they pioneered the notion of a Muslim community based on faith rather than politics or tribe. Kharijis appointed different leaders for war and for prayer, thus separating the functions of head of state from head of community. Shiʿi opposition to the Umayyads and the formation of dissident communities in Iran and Iraq early defined the Shiʿis as a sectarian community.

Theological positions also had important sociopolitical implications. Some of them became the basis of communal movements. Murjiʿa, Hanbalis, Muʿtazilis, Qadaris, and others had their own preachers,

who reached out for popular support. The Murji'a, who held that profession of Islam rather than performance of works made a true Muslim, were political and social activists. Their position on faith and works made them active missionaries in eastern Iran. Some of them fought on behalf of abused clients and converts in Transoxania. Other Murji'a made "command the good and forbid evil" the highest ideal and opposed Umayyad injustices. A moderate Murji'a position was adopted by Hanafi lawyers and spread in the eastern Iranian areas of Balkh and Turkharistan.

The Karramiyya were also connected to the Murji'a-Hanafi tradition. The Karramiyya were an ascetic missionary movement whose members preached poverty and set up residences (*khanaqa*) for their missionaries and adherents throughout Iran. Their theological opponents, the Hanbalis, also constituted a political-activist movement. They enforced Muslim values by vigilante action, breaking wine bottles, musical instruments, and chessboards, and preached an ascetic and puritanical version of Islam. In Baghdad, Hanbalis were typically drawn from the milieu of former Khurasanian fighters for the 'Abbasids. They were opposed to Shi'ism, to Mu'tazili theology, and to the Murji'a view that all professed Muslims were equal. They gave priority to the Prophet, his companions, and his Arab followers. Especially in the tenth century, under the leadership of al-Barbahari, they repeatedly engaged in demonstrations and street battles against the Shi'is and other religious factions.

Many of these religious "congregations" were small, even esoteric, cults, but some of them acquired a mass following. Muslim masses turned to them rather than to the caliphs for moral instruction and religious guidance. Learned and pious people who held no official position but who had acquired a reputation for knowledge of and devotion to the faith were accepted by ordinary Muslims as the true authorities on Islam.

Chapter 18 The non-Muslim minorities

The situation of religious minorities – Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and others – under Muslim rule or in Muslim-majority societies is highly controversial. Some contemporary scholars see them as an assimilated and integral part of the Middle Eastern (or Muslim) world. Others see them as ethnic enclaves. Still others see them as persecuted minorities.

In Muslim domains, non-Muslims had a legally and culturally legitimate standing. Non-Muslims were entitled to the practice of their religion, to autonomy in internal communal matters, to commercial activity, and to political safety or protection in return for the payment of a special tax and acceptance of Muslim rule and social supremacy. Although non-Muslims bore significant legal and social disabilities and often suffered the disdain of Muslims, in general, the security and prosperity of the religious minorities was assured in ʿAbbasid Iraq, Fatimid Egypt, Umayyad Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. In politically and economically troubled times, there were periods of exploitation, harassment, and persecution.

Although Jews, Christians, and others had a separate religio-communal identity, they were integrated into Middle Eastern societies in language, trade, and scholarship, and sometimes in government. Non-Muslims were participants in a shared nonreligious high culture of science and philosophy, theology and poetry, and many aspects of folk culture, such as norms of daily living in eating, dressing, social behavior, and commerce that were much the same regardless of religious affiliation. Even religious beliefs were similar. Whatever their religion, most peoples believed in the existence of God, the creation of the world ex nihilo, the last judgment, eternal life, prophecy, and the efficacy of the veneration of saints' tombs and other holy places. The cultural, religious, and social customs of non-Muslims were shaped by their interactions with the dominant

societies, but they also contributed to forming Muslim beliefs and lifestyles.

The early Islamic era

The practices pertaining to the place of non-Muslims in Muslim-dominated societies developed slowly over time. The Arab conquests established Muslim predominance. At the outset, some monasteries were sacked, and magian fire temples were confiscated in Syria and Iraq. A period of tolerance followed the depredations of war. For the Arab-Muslim conquerors, the perpetuation of the ruling class was necessary for the efficient administration of the new empire. The old military, administrative, and landowning elites continued in power and transferred their allegiances to the new regime. Christian landowners and monasteries survived in Upper Egypt, Syria, and northern Iraq for centuries, as did lower-level village headmen and landlords. Bishops, rabbis, mobads, and their academies and places of worship continued to function.

The historic relationship of state and religious communities was slowly restored, often at the initiative of the subjects. In the period of Roman and Sasanian domination, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians had been organized as self-governing, socio-legal corporations. Nestorians and Jews pressed for and were granted a restoration of Sasanian policies that gave religious bodies political and social roles. Arab-Muslim conquerors accepted that personal law was attached to religious status and acknowledged separate legal systems for different religions. The old religious communities were consolidated as the Arab rulers sought to pacify and to integrate their new subjects into the empire.

Indeed, in the wake of the Arab conquests, the old communities not only survived but experienced religious revivals. The Arab conquests inspired apocalyptic literatures among Muslims, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews. Populations were roiled by predictions of the coming of the anti-Christ and the end of the world. Zoroastrian literature envisioned a period of defeat and decline as a prelude to eventual resurrection and triumph.

The defeat of the Byzantine Empire allowed Christian heresies to flourish. The destruction of the Zoroastrian aristocracy allowed many sects and cults to flourish. In the eighth century, the population of Iraq included Melkites, Jacobites, Nestorians, Messaliens, Jewish Christians, Jews, Hermetics, Marcionites, Daysanites, Elkasaites, Mandaeans, Chaldeans, and others. The Khurasanian population included Christians, Manichaeans, Marcionites, and Buddhists. In the late Umayyad period, syncretistic religious movements, combining Muslim and Iranian beliefs and symbols, rose in opposition to Arab rule. Bihafrid, Sunbad, Ustadis, and Muqanna launched anti-Arab messianic movements. Mazdakite opposition – a conglomerate of movements based on cosmic dualism, gnostic syncretism, allegiance to Mazdak, and Muslim ideas – flourished in Khurasan under the name Khurramiyya and in Azarbayjan under the leadership of Babak. Under Muslim rule, Christianity expanded in the Caspian region and in Inner Asia. Some of these churches and heresies were intensely engaged in missionary activity. A non-Islamic religious revival was competing with nascent Islam.

Islamic legislation for non-Muslims

Muslim legal views on the status of non-Muslims had their beginnings in the precedents set by Muhammad. Although Muhammad had battles with the Jews of Medina and killed and expropriated many of them, he made agreements with the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran to pay taxes in exchange for protection and permission to function under their own laws and leadership. These precedents were applied in the early years of the conquest, when the Arab-Muslim invaders made treaties for the surrender of numerous cities and towns.

Islam treated Judaism and Christianity as precursor religions, ordained by God but superseded by the new revelations. Islam had its own direct linkage and descent from Abraham and Ishmael and a comparable authenticity and venerable antiquity. There were no important theological differences between Jews and Muslims. Each considered the other an imperfect but related monotheism. However,

there were significant theological differences between Jews and Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians, on the other, over the doctrines of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and the virgin birth.

Despite these beginnings, Muslim policy evolved toward more strict regulation of non-Muslims. Early caliphs began to tighten controls on non-Muslims to affirm the separateness and higher status of Muslims, precisely because Arabic-speaking peoples of different religions were not easy to distinguish from one another. Muslims and non-Muslims shared beliefs, cultures, and market and social connections, and devout Muslims became concerned with the identification of non-Muslims, perhaps for security reasons, and concerned about their own possible assimilation into the non-Muslim populations. ʿUmar II (r. 717–20) forbade Christians from holding powerful government positions and promulgated restrictive sumptuary codes. After his reign, Muslims increasingly treated Jews and Christians as subordinate minorities, forbidding non-Muslims to ride horses, bear weapons, ring church bells, stage processions, or display religious symbols in public. Christians and Jews were forbidden to change their dress and hairstyles to look like Muslims, and some sources report that Muslims were forbidden to dress like Christians. Business transactions with Muslims had to be conducted in terms of Islamic (or state) law. These rules also made it easier to identify the people subject to the poll tax (*jizya*).

Later caliphs sporadically harassed and persecuted non-Muslims. Yazid II (r. 721–24) promulgated an iconoclastic measure – perhaps in response to an internal Christian controversy – calling for destruction of human and animal figures in churches. In many Christian churches, human figures were dug out of marble mosaics. Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) – possibly in response to Muslim opposition to the important positions of non-Muslims in the government bureaucracy, banking, and trade – is reported to have issued restrictions on non-Muslims. Caliph al-Mutawakkil (in 850) promulgated regulations to require distinctive garments for non-Muslims. He ruled that houses of worship built after the Muslim conquests were to be destroyed, barred non-Muslims from government offices and positions of authority, and prohibited

displays of crosses or chanting in public. There is no evidence of physical persecution or any indication of whether these rules were enforced or for how long.

Muslim historians and jurists also promoted a Muslim identity. Their deliberations took place in the context of ongoing warfare with the Byzantine (Christian) Empire. The threat of espionage and collaboration on the part of non-Muslim subjects was likely a concern. In juristic treatises, restrictions on non-Muslims were first applied to predominantly Muslim cities and then extended to all cities. Jurists debated whether old prayer houses should be destroyed or only new ones prohibited. There was even discussion over whether non-Muslims should be allowed to live in Muslim cities.

Nevertheless, the jurists differed among themselves. The Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf (d. 798) favored a relatively tolerant approach to win non-Muslim acquiescence and support. He held that treaty-based rights of non-Muslims should be respected. As long as Christians paid the poll tax, their churches should not be destroyed – although no new ones could be built. In fact, archaeological evidence indicates that new churches were built. Public displays of religion should be restricted, though Abu Yusuf would have allowed the parade of the cross on Palm Sunday. Pigs were forbidden in public.

Al-Shafiʿi (d. 820) accepted former treaties but sought to ensure the submission of non-Muslims and to protect Muslims from insult, injury, or undue influence. He prohibited defaming Muhammad, apostatizing, and selling wine and pork to Muslims. Dress and saddles should distinguish Christians from Muslims. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) took a more subtle approach. To maintain Muslim identity in daily interactions, he recommended that Muslims remain conscious of and assert their identity – their differences, their separateness from other people.

Although early Islamic law on the whole protected non-Muslims (*dhimmi*), by the turn of the tenth century, regulations for non-Muslims came to include many restrictions not considered by earlier jurists. Later regulations required personal deference and respect to be shown by non-Muslims to Muslims – an emphatic demand for the

subordination of the ruled to the rulers. Non-Muslims suffered other practical disadvantages. A non-Muslim man could not marry a Muslim woman, although a Muslim man was allowed to marry non-Muslim women. The blood wit for non-Muslims was two-thirds or one-half that for Muslims. Non-Muslim merchants, in theory, had to pay twice as much in customs taxes at the frontiers, although this was not always enforced.

Nonetheless, legal and political regulation and the degree of enforcement varied in different political and socioeconomic conditions. Payment of the poll tax (*jizya*) seems to have been regular, but other obligations were inconsistently enforced and did not prevent many non-Muslims from being important political, business, and scholarly figures. In the late ninth and early tenth centuries, Jewish bankers and financiers were important at the ʿAbbasid court.

Christians and Christianity

Early Islamic era to the ninth century

At the time of the Arab conquests, large Christian populations were found in Syria and Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The Christian population maintained from Hellenistic and Roman times a rich religious, literary, and intellectual culture, but they were deeply divided by theological principles and church loyalties. In Syria and Palestine, most Christians were Jacobites or Miaphysites who spoke Aramaic. A small percentage were ethnically Greek, although Greek was widely spoken as a diplomatic and administrative language. The Melkite or Greek Orthodox Church was prominent in Jerusalem and Antioch. In Iraq, most Christians were Nestorians; in Egypt, they were Copts (Egyptian Miaphysites).

Although the Arab-Muslim conquests brought destruction, pillaging, and killing, the overall impact of the invasions was limited. The battles were fought in open country and probably did limited damage to the towns. Caliph ʿUmar visited Palestine in 638 and established political order. Christians were at first divided as to

whether to accommodate passively or to resist Muslim rule. Greek Orthodox Christians saw the Arab conquests as a disaster. Other Christians were ambivalent, because they were relieved of Byzantine persecution and found support in the new Arab-Muslim regime.

Later caliphs and the Umayyad dynasty brought administrative organization and partial agricultural and economic development. While Egypt and Iraq remained relatively prosperous, the economy of Syria and Palestine went into decline in the eighth and ninth centuries due to the transfer of the capital to Baghdad and the decline of Mediterranean trade and Christian pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

For the sake of political inclusiveness and effective administration, the ecclesiastical hierarchies remained intact. In the Umayyad period, numerous churches were repaired and new ones built. Monasteries continued to function. The Nestorian Church in Iraq resumed its roles in the educational, judicial, tax, and political administration of the Christian population. Christian scribes and landowners assisted in the administration of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iraq. In Egypt, the Muslim authorities cooperated with Coptic lay and clerical notables.

Muslims and non-Muslims circulated together in town markets and other public spaces, but Muslims came to insist ever more on their hegemony in public spaces. The inscriptions of the Dome of the Rock challenged the idea of the Trinity, and Muslims derided the veneration of icons. There was a wave of persecution during the reign of the Umayyad Caliph ʿUmar II (r. 717–20). According to Christian authors, Harun al-Rashid is said to have destroyed innumerable churches in Syria and Palestine; many priests, monks, and nuns were killed or fled to Constantinople. By the ʿAbbasid period, the numbers of churches in Syria and Palestine were also reduced by general economic decline and lack of resources for repairs. Under the ʿAbbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–61), non-Muslims were dismissed from government jobs and required to wear clothing that distinguished them from Muslims. Restrictions on church building, displays of the cross, and other manifestations of Christian religious life were imposed.

From the seventh to the end of the eleventh century, around half of the world's Christians lived under Muslim governments, but the Arab-Muslim rulers did not attempt to convert the populations to Islam. Under Muslim government, as a protected community, Christians were entitled to laws and courts of their own, but in many instances the Christians had no clear-cut legal tradition and adopted Islamic law for both administrative and communal affairs. Many individuals converted out of belief, desire to avoid the poll tax, fear of discrimination, and social, economic, and political ambitions. By the late seventh century, Christian writers in Syria were already concerned with apostasy. Christian communities prohibited intermarriage and forbade apostates to Islam from inheriting from their Christian families. Christian clerics, however, could not prevent appeals to Muslim courts and the mingling of people in ordinary commerce, social life, and festivals. By the middle of the eighth century, there seems to have been a steady progress of conversions in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. Perhaps half of the town populations were Muslims by 850, and by the tenth and eleventh centuries Muslims were probably a small majority in Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Iraq.

In the decades before and during the Arab invasions, the Christian churches were only beginning to form their distinct ecclesial identities and hierarchies, a process that continued in the Islamic era. The churches, however, fared differently under Muslim rule. After the Arab conquest, the Greek Orthodox Church lost the privileged status it had enjoyed under the Byzantines but also benefited from its independence from Constantinople. The caliphate delayed the appointment of Orthodox patriarchs and left their sees vacant in the cases of Jerusalem from 638 to 705 and Antioch from 702 to 742, but new patriarchs were elected to Jerusalem in 706, Alexandria in 727, and Antioch in 744. The Orthodox Church, however, remained an important landowner and was able to shelter Christian peasants especially around Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Mount Tabor, perhaps prolonging their attachment to Christianity.

In Syria and Palestine, the Syriac (or Jacobite, Miaphysite) Church had the largest following, especially among the peasant populations.

The Coptic Church in Egypt was also Miaphysite by doctrine. The senior ecclesiastical offices were open only to monks, and the bishops were selected from monasteries in Syria, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and Egypt. The Jacobite Church, however, developed its own civil law and court system, incorporating both Roman and Muslim civil regulations, so that it would have a legal system to compete with the Muslim courts.

In Iraq, Nestorians consolidated their own legal and ecclesiastical administrative systems and in general benefited from close associations with the Muslim authorities. Bishops sometimes designated judges; sometimes a layperson usurped power; sometimes the judges were appointed by the state. In general, the church was independent, but internal disputes often led to the engagement of the Arab-Muslim government in church affairs. Eventually, the Umayyad government required that any newly elected catholicos have governmental ratification. Other Christian churches included the Armenians and the Maronites.

Before the Islamic era, Christians spoke different dialects of Aramaic. Orthodox Christians around the patriarchate of Jerusalem spoke "Christian Palestinian Aramaic," but Greek was the language of the clergy and the liturgy. The Jacobite Christians of Syria and Mesopotamia used the Syriac dialect of Aramaic as their ecclesiastical and liturgical language. Arabic, however, became the vernacular of everyday life in late eighth-century Palestine, late eighth- and ninth-century Syria and Mesopotamia, tenth-century Egypt, and Iraq and North Africa. Arabic also displaced Aramaic and Syriac as the predominant written language of administration, literature, and religion. The linguistic changes helped reinforce a transition from the greater Christian orthodox world to more local Christian identities. Greek continued to exist, however, as both a literary and a spoken language in Syria. Inscriptions in churches and ecclesiastical literature were written in Greek, and Greek continued to be used in monasteries until the Crusades. Also, Christians did not pray in Arabic until the tenth century.

Christian literature in arabic

The new religio-political situation of the early Islamic era motivated Christian theologians to restate and defend the teachings of their churches against both Muslims and other churches. The Melkite author John of Damascus (d. 749/764) thus composed the first *summa theologiae* in Christian intellectual history, *The Fount of Knowledge*, refuting Islam and Christian heresies. Similar systematic statements, such as Theodore bar Koni's *Scholion* (c. 792), were written by Nestorian theologians. From the middle of the eighth century until late in the tenth century, the bishopric of Jerusalem and the surrounding monastic communities, cut off from Constantinople, also began to translate Greek texts in history, philosophy, prose, and poetry into Syriac. A Syriac literature of hagiography, homilies, miracles, and disputations flourished.

Translations into Syriac were followed by translations into Arabic. The Melkites were in the forefront of the transition from Greek into Arabic and the composition of polemical works in Arabic. The Melkite monasteries in the Judean desert, particularly Mar Sabas and Mar Chariton, produced the first sustained translations of the Gospels and the Christian patristic literature and also the first original theological compositions in Arabic. Theodore of Abu Qurra (d. c. 825) was the first important Christian theologian to write in Arabic. A primary reason for the adoption of Arabic for ecclesiastical texts was the need to reach Arabic-speaking and Arabic-reading Christians and defend the tenets of orthodoxy from their ever-growing familiarity with an Arabic-Muslim vocabulary and Muslim religious ideas. Christian beliefs and practices concerning the Trinity, incarnation, baptism, the Eucharist, and the veneration of the cross and of icons were vigorously defended against the Muslim insistence on the unity and oneness of God. The Christian concept of the divinity of Christ was defended against the Muslim view of Christ as a human prophet. Nestorian and Jacobite theologians and philosophers soon developed their own theologies, a Christian *kalam*, to defend their Christological positions in Arabic.

The leading theologians were Theodore Abu Qurra (d. 830), the Jacobite Habib ibn Khidmah Abu Raitah (d. c. 851), and the Nestorian Ammar al-Basri (fl. c. 850). In later generations, there

were the Jacobite philosopher and theologian Yahya ibn ʿAdi (d. 974), the Nestorian Elias of Nisibis (d. 1046), and the Melkite Paul of Antioch (d. c. 1180). Thus, only in the early Islamic period and in the Arabic language did the Melkites, the Jacobites, and the Nestorians come to a full statement of their theological identities. After the thirteenth century, Coptic Egypt became the primary center of Arab-Christian thought.

Hellenistic philosophy, science, and literature also flourished in Christian circles, and Christian scholars and theologians were the principle intermediaries in the translation of Greek and Hellenistic learning into Arabic. Theodore Abu Qurra translated a pseudo-Aristotelian work, *De virtutibus animae*, for one of the Caliph al-Maʾmun's generals. The Nestorian philosopher Hunayn ibn Ishaq (d. 873) coordinated a vast translation enterprise. By their appropriation (initially into Syriac) of the sixth-century Alexandrian school of Aristotelianism (a form of rationalism committed to the philosophical defense of religious truths), Christian thinkers provided the basis for the eventual development of Islamic theology (*kalam*) and philosophy. They stood for the ideal of a philosophical way of life in which universal truths transcended religious particularisms.

Crusades and reaction

Despite the conversions of many Syrian and Palestinian Christians in the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid periods, Christians remained a very large proportion of the total population, possibly even a majority in some areas until after the Crusades. Byzantine and crusader invasions of Syria, however, undermined the Syrian and Palestinian Christians, and the Mamluk era (1250–1517) brought economic and political pressures and persecution, leading to the conversion of the great majority of regional Christians.

In the tenth century, the Byzantine Empire reconquered the northern part of Syria and ruled for almost 120 years (969–1084), sheltering the Greek Orthodox from Muslim temptations and pressures. At the same time, there were large-scale conversions in southern Syria and Palestine. The Crusades and Latin dominance

deeply alienated native Christians. The Latins took control of the Christian holy places, including the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, and made many Syrian and Palestinian Christians look to Muslims for relief from coercion by the Latins. Indeed, in 1187 the churches were returned to native Christians by Saladin.

The rise of the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria and the Mongol invasions permanently changed the place of Christians. Many Christians in Syria sided with the Mongol invaders; the Mamluks, fighting both the Mongols and the crusader occupants of coastal Syria and Palestine, embraced Islam as an ideology of resistance to the invaders. Muslim jurists called for the strict enforcement of regulations for non-Muslims and the punishment of Christians who collaborated with the enemy. There were repeated efforts to drive Christians from government jobs and to rigorously enforce the collection of the poll tax. Moreover, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, nomadic Arab migrations into Palestine added to the forces of Arabization and Islamization. In the Mamluk period, the Christian population was reduced to the small proportions that endure to the present. One major exception was the Maronite population of Lebanon, protected by their mountainous country, who paid tribute and were free from direct Mamluk administrative interventions.

The Egyptian Copts

After the Arab conquest of Egypt, the patriarch was returned to his office; the Cathedral church of Alexandria, St. Marks, was rebuilt; and the patriarch played a diplomatic role in the Arab relations with Nubia and Ethiopia. The church also established a network of shrines commemorating the itinerary of the flight of the holy family into Egypt that would serve as a foundation for Coptic devotions and identity. A network of churches, monasteries, and shrines was the foundation of the Coptic community. At first, new churches were built, but in time the Muslim attitude hardened and required government authorization or at least tacit consent. By the tenth century, Muslim jurists had ruled that churches existing before the

conquest might be repaired, but new ones should not be constructed.

Arabic diffused rapidly among the Christian population; by the ninth century, it was in use by the clergy as well. Conversion to Islam progressed more slowly and painfully, associated over the centuries with social, fiscal, and political pressure from the dominant Muslims. Fiscal administration played a large part in the pressure or incentives for conversion. Under the Umayyads, administrative regulation was progressively intensified. The tax registers were translated into Arabic. Many Coptic village headmen were replaced with Arab-Muslims, and taxes were assessed on individuals rather than communities. Converts were promised exemption from the poll tax. There were repeated popular revolts. A comprehensive land survey was undertaken in 724–25, and in the next year there was a great Coptic revolt. There were thirteen more between 767 and 832. With the defeat of these rebellions, the influence of the church and of Coptic notables was further diminished, and the conversion of Egyptians to Islam increased. The limited evidence indicates a steady flow of converts in the ninth and tenth centuries.

In the early Fatimid era (909–1171), Christians and Jews were well treated. Christians – mostly Coptic Orthodox, although there were also Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox churches – are estimated to have composed at least a third of the population of Egypt. Christians and Jews were employed in the financial administration and frequently at the highest levels. Bureaucratic skills were passed on from generation to generation. Copts prospered as farmers, ceramicists, papyrus makers, textile producers, and in many other trades. The state generally tolerated non-Muslim places of worship and even provided financial support and gifts of land for the endowment of churches and Jewish courts and schools. Coptic festivals and ceremonies such as the feasts of Nairouz, Christmas, Epiphany, Maundy Thursday, and Martyr's Day were celebrated by both Copts and Muslims. Copts and Muslims venerated the same saints and holy men. The patriarchs promoted the interests of the state in their relations with the Nubian and Ethiopian churches and in diplomatic relations with the Byzantine

Empire. The one major exception was a period of persecution in the reign of the Caliph al-Hakim (996–1021). In his reign, Christian officials were pushed out of office, the sale of alcoholic drinks forbidden, sumptuary regulations enforced, and many churches closed or torn down.

In the twelfth century, the crusader invasions of Palestine increased religious tensions. Copts were again subjected to heavy taxation. Many converted to Islam. At the same time, Arabic was consolidated as the vernacular language of Copts. Books on canon law, theology, and church history were now written in Arabic. By the thirteenth century Arabic Christian texts from Syria and Iraq reinforced Coptic Arabic scholarship.

In the Mamluk era (1250–1517), the pressures for conversion and the numbers of conversions grew ever greater. In this period, the Coptic population of Egypt was reduced to the small percentages of today (variously estimated at 5 to 15 percent). The wars against the crusaders and the Mongols generated high tension among Muslims and Christians, a more assertive Muslim militancy, resentment of the favored position of Copts in the government financial bureaucracy, and demands by Muslim clerics for conformity to the more restrictive *dhimmi* laws. The Mamluks found it convenient to vent these pressures by repeated requirements that non-Muslim functionaries either convert to Islam or be removed from office, and by reenactment of the Covenant of ʿUmar sumptuary laws (1293, 1301, 1321, and 1354). In 1321, major anti-Christian rioting led to the destruction of some sixty churches. In 1354, there were riots and destruction of churches in Cairo and other parts of Egypt. Christian bureaucrats were dismissed or compelled to convert to Islam. The government confiscated church properties. The result was a sharp decline in church revenues and increased conversions to Islam. The restrictive regulations for non-Muslims were renewed in 1417, 1419, 1422, 1437–39, and 1463, which indicates both that they were not enforced and that the harassment of Copts was endemic.

The Coptic secretarial class, which had in effect displaced the clergy as the leaders of the community, was the key player in this ongoing drama. Its members provided patronage to the clergy and

the resources to rebuild the churches. Lay notables played significant roles in negotiating and managing the church's relations with the Muslim authorities. Coptic officials were also indispensable to the state. Even after centuries, the state continued to depend on Christians to staff the financial administration. In consequence, they were resented and hated by the Egyptian-Muslim population. Conversion did not necessarily resolve this tension, because many Copts were reluctant converts, perhaps with continuing family and church connections, and in any case Muslims were suspicious of their genuineness and loyalty.

The Coptic Church and communities nonetheless survive to the present. The church maintains its theological Miaphysite position. Its deep historical continuity, its shrines and sermons, and above all its identity as a church of martyrs sustain it to the present.

Christians in North Africa

The Muslim conquests of North Africa dealt a lasting blow to the Christian communities. The fall of Carthage in 698 led to a mass exodus of Christians. The church nonetheless survived, and in time Christians became socially and commercially engaged with Muslims as they were in the Levant and the Middle East. The Christian trading communities involved in the Mediterranean trade and connected to the Italian city-states and the Saharan trading community of Tahert maintained their prominence into the eleventh century. The eleventh century, however, was a turning point and the beginning of the effective extinction of ancient Christianity in North Africa. The Hilali invasions and succeeding Almoravid and Almohad conquests drove the remaining Christians into exile. The loss of the intelligentsia is marked by the absence of a Christian North African culture in Arabic. In the thirteenth century, under Spanish-Muslim auspices, there was a countermovement of Christian soldiers, mercenaries, and merchants returning to North Africa, but indigenous Berber Christianity continued to fade away. A church-based community survived in Tunis, but without an intellectual class, strong church leadership, or external support, Berber Christians were absorbed into the Muslim populace.

Jews and Judaism (co-author, David Moshfegh)

The place of Jews in Muslim societies is best seen against the background of their place in medieval European Christian societies. In Europe, there was an endemic conflict between Judaism and Christianity. Jews were held responsible for the murder of Christ. Early Christians, a persecuted sect, aspired to convert all Jews and gentiles and to replace Judaism rather than coexist with it.

The Christian treatment of Jews in Europe goes back to the Theodosian Code. In late Roman law, Jewish life, property, and religious observance was considered legitimate, but intermarriage with Christians, the construction of new synagogues, holding public office, and ownership of Christian slaves were forbidden. The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 added new restrictions. Jews were required to wear identifying clothing so as to inhibit mingling with Christians; excessive usury by which Jews oppressed Christians was prohibited. From 1239, the popes began to interfere in Jewish worship by banning and burning the Talmud.

At the same time, European princes, eager to promote commerce, assured Jews of privileges – including protection under municipal laws, judicial autonomy, and freedom of movement. Over centuries, however, Jews were excluded from participation in (Christian) artisan and merchant guilds and from representation in the "estates" and were confined to money lending and usury to earn a living. Excluded from all social groupings, they were vulnerable to taxes and extortion and eventually to expropriation and expulsion. Jews were expelled from England in 1290; from France in 1306, 1322, and 1394; from Spain in 1492; from Portugal in 1497; and from numerous German towns and princedoms.

The long-term situation of Jews in Muslim societies was very different. Before the Arab conquests, Jews were economically and culturally well integrated into pre-Islamic Arabian society. Under Sasanian rule, Jews were generally secure, although there were three episodes of persecution in the late fifth and sixth centuries.

However, oppressed Jews in Byzantine Syria and Palestine supported the Persian invasions in 614 and attacked Christians. The advent of Islam and the revelations of the Quran inspired messianic expectations. Jews in Arabia, Palestine, and Syria were swept by a wave of hopes for immediate redemption. Some accepted Muhammad. Others recognized him only as a prophet to pagan Arabs. Indeed, Jews had an endemic history of sectarianism. There were various Jewish sects – Samaritans, ʿIsawiyya, and gnostics – in Persia and Central Asia, where there was a long tradition of frontier refuge for deviant sects. Hybrid Jewish-Christian sects accepted Jesus as a human prophet but practiced Jewish traditions. Jewish messianists also joined the early Shiʿi movement. In the ninth century, Jews were primarily divided among Karaites and Rabbinites.

The largest Jewish communities were found in Iraq. They were Aramaic speaking and well integrated into Iraqi society; they called themselves Babylonians. The great majority of Jews, however, were agriculturalists and workers, often in menial and despised trades such as viniculture and tavern keeping, weaving, dying, tanning, and butchering. An elite cadre of merchants (the Radhanites) was engaged in very long distance international trade, bringing goods to and from Western Europe through the Middle East and on to India and China. By the late ninth century the Jewish population was increasingly urban, as is indicated by rabbinic responsa that increasingly deal with movable property. There were high-ranking Jewish courtiers, physicians, astrologers, bankers, merchants, and some functionaries in the ʿAbbasid financial administration. Some Jews belonged to the rich middle class – including landowners, physicians and pharmacists, merchants, and gold- and silversmiths. The majority was engaged in commerce and craft work.

Under Sasanian and later Muslim rule, Jewish communities were governed by the exilarchs, or leaders of the civil community who claimed descent from King David, collected taxes, and represented the Jews at court. Over time, however, the most important Jewish institutions became the rabbinic academies (yeshivas) in Iraq and Palestine. The heads of the academies were the most respected scholars and the highest authorities of Jewish law. The academies

served as appellate courts; trained the rabbis who were at once religious teachers, judges, and community administrators; and sometimes appointed them to their local posts. The heads of the Babylonian and Palestinian academies were seen as spiritual leaders whose views were passed on throughout the Jewish world to local teachers and judges. It is hard to determine how much of a formal hierarchy there was, how much client loyalty, and how much independence for local rabbis. There was probably a constant power struggle between the rival academies and between the central academies and local communities. Expert laymen could also take on judicial functions.

At the time of the Arab conquests, the gap in state control allowed the heads of the yeshivas, known as *gaonim*, to contest the authority of the exilarchs, and by the ʿAbbasid era to become the stronger power. Although the exilarch maintained some administrative functions, the rabbis chose the exilarch, though only from within the exilarch's family. In the ʿAbbasid era, the Babylonian academy moved from Sura and Pumbedita to Baghdad and gained primacy throughout the Jewish world.

In the early Muslim era, the foundations of Rabbinic Judaism evolved into the form we recognize today. Some rabbinic texts appear to have been recorded or redacted in their extant forms during the early Islamic era. The text of the Bible, the Babylonian Talmud, Jewish law and ritual, the synagogue and the prayer book, much of the Hebrew language, and Jewish philosophy and theology all date to this epoch. Jewish thought was influenced by both Christian and Muslim contemporaries, often through interconfessional discussions and debates. Jewish apologetics were influenced by Muslim and Christian writings. Comparative research into Quranic exegesis, Islamic law, and rabbinic texts suggests direct contact between Muslim and Jewish scholars. Not all Jews, however, accepted the authority of the rabbis. Karaite Jews rejected rabbinic law and believed the Bible was the sole and complete religious authority.

Although Jews in Iraq seem to have been generally safe and prosperous, as under the Sasanians, there were periods of

persecution. In all periods, the non-Muslim communities, including Jews, were vulnerable to changes of political mood. There were persecutions of Jews in ninth- and twelfth-century Baghdad. Jews were at least temporarily removed from government offices, and synagogues were attacked for violating the rules against new constructions. In eleventh- and twelfth-century Baghdad, the Saljuq era, rioting commoners and mobs repeatedly demanded the enforcement of the non-Muslim dress code, and the Saljuqs frequently expropriated Jewish merchants.

In an era of upheavals, conversions, and the mingling of people of different religions, the leaders of all confessional communities tried to maintain the allegiance of their followers. Clerical leaders in all communities strove to corral people within communal boundaries and insistently claimed judicial exclusiveness. In debates, religious leaders used much the same arsenal of scriptures, authenticated traditions, and dialectical arguments. Nonetheless, Muslims and non-Muslims mingled in public life. Muslim jurists permitted non-Muslims to appeal to Muslim (i.e., state) courts, and, by the ninth century, Jews and Christians were going to Muslim courts for commercial issues, wills, inheritances, and even marriages. They likely sought to reverse the decisions of ecclesiastical courts, or to find better terms, or to have access to more enforceable legal decisions.

Egyptian and North African Jews: the Geniza era

With the breakdown of the ʿAbbasid Empire in the tenth century, the Jewish communities of Iraq declined in international importance. Large numbers of Jews migrated from Iraq to Egypt and later from North Africa to Egypt. Egypt, North Africa, and Spain became the leading centers of Jewish community life, commerce, and Judeo-Arabic and rabbinic culture. From the tenth to the thirteenth century, Jews were heavily engaged in international trade, especially in the Muslim-dominated, Arabic-speaking parts of the Mediterranean. Political stability in Egypt and the weakness of medieval European

states allowed for an era of commercial freedom and opportunity for Jews.

In the first half of the eleventh century, Qayrawan was the ecumenical financial center of the Babylonian yeshivas. Qayrawan had an active scholarly academy that created its own synthesis of Palestinian and Babylonian Talmudic commentaries. Its scholars were responsible for gathering and relaying both religious queries and contributions of funds from the Maghreb, through Fustat, to the Babylonian and Palestinian yeshivas.

This was not accidental but was based on the deep history of Jewish communities in North Africa. The Jews of North Africa date back to the Phoenician period, although many of the Jews at the time of the Arab conquests were likely to have been Berber converts and their descendants. Jews lived in the commercial cities of Tripoli, Qayrawan, Tahert, Tlemcen, Sijilmassa, and Fez. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the merchants of Qayrawan were the hub of the Mediterranean trade with Sicily, Spain, Morocco, and Egypt.

The Jewish merchant elites, based in Fustat (Cairo), Qayrawan, Tunis, and Spain, were the leaders of their local communities. While engaged in commerce, this elite also cultivated learning and piety. They supported the yeshivas, synagogues, and Jewish education. They supported extensive charities, especially for the ransom of Jewish captives, whomever and wherever they might be; for Jewish foreigners in their communities; for education; and for the relief of the poor. A "proper" person was defined by a combination of business success, family, scholarship, etiquette, personal probity, and communal responsibility. Through commercial and scholarly networks, family alliances, and marriages, the Jewish elite linked together the Jewish communities of the Mediterranean. They supported both local identities and a coherent international community able to represent and defend the community before the political authorities and to enforce cohesion and discipline within it.

Most Jews were craftsmen and workers. Most business was conducted on the basis of informal partnerships, friendships, and mutual trust. Most craftspeople were independent partners rather

than employees. Jewish-Muslim partnerships were common. Formal contracts were important because they were enforceable in Muslim courts. The Jewish communities themselves generated a great number of positions for officials, functionaries, and servants connected to the synagogues, courts, and schools – notably, judges, teachers, cantors, ritual slaughterers, scribes, and court clerks. Jewish charities supported resident foreign Jews and other Jewish communities. Collections were regularly taken for bread for the poor, wheat, clothing, educational expenses, burials, traveling scholars, ransom of captives, and payment of officials.

The yeshivas and rabbinic Judaism

The breakdown of the ʿAbbasid Empire and the migration of Jews westward also promoted the rise of *gaonim* and the yeshivas as worldwide Jewish authorities. The Babylonian yeshivas at Pumbedita and Sura formed close bonds with new "Babylonian" congregations in Fustat (Cairo), Qayrawan, Fez, and Sijilmassa and eventually gained primacy throughout the Jewish world.

   The yeshivas functioned as the highest courts of the Jewish community and conceived of themselves as substituting for the Sanhedrin of the Second Temple. The Palestinian yeshiva in fact literally designated itself a Sanhedrin. The yeshivas fulfilled the functions both of the jurisconsults in giving responsa to legal questions and of the judges in adjudicating disputes. Each local Jewish congregation was under the religio-legal direction of one of the yeshivas and its *gaon*. The *gaonim* sent letters of instructions to be read to the congregations, and the congregations made regular financial contributions. Local congregations accepted legal and administrative oversight, and the chief judges and leaders in the important Jewish communities were generally members of the academies; as such, they were also scholars and students who were expected to continue their studies and maintain a scholarly relationship and correspondence with the yeshivas. The *gaonic* yeshiva was a much more hierarchal institution than the Talmudic one. The Talmud was created by discussion among scholars, but the *gaon* was a single, final authority. The members of the yeshiva were

organized in an elaborate hierarchy. In discussion, the senior members participated while the others listened. Ranking members expected to pass on their position to their heirs.

The *gaonim* of the Babylonian yeshivas depended on a local personage, usually a court physician, with prominent ties to the Muslim authorities who could serve as the secular head of the community, supervise its affairs, and guarantee the financial support of the yeshiva. The yeshivas also depended on the great mercantile families to act as trustees and treasurers who handled the international aspects of yeshiva finances. Although the *gaonim* had great authority, their power was also limited by the autonomy of Jewish congregations. Local congregations were in many respects independent communities. Although the *gaonim* appointed judges and communal leaders, they generally confirmed a congregation's own choices. In general, Jewish communities tried to minimize outside intervention by arbitrating disputes among themselves. Their critical goal was to maintain communal confidence, trust, and solidarity.

The authority of the yeshivas, the universality of *gaonic* authority, and the hierarchies of appointed functionaries resemble in many ways the organization of the Christian churches, but the religio-communal order of the Jews in Muslim lands lay somewhere between the defined hierarchy of the churches and the more informal networking arrangements of the Islamic legal schools. The attitude of the three yeshivas to one another can be compared to that of the Islamic schools of law toward one another. Notwithstanding many differences, each viewed the others as equally orthodox. There were some serious differences between the two Babylonian yeshivas; for example, Sura obligated levirate marriage, whereas Pumbedita forbade it and obliged the parties to grant each other a release. In Palestinian family law, half the dowry of a woman who died without children reverted to her own family, but not in Babylonian law. The most protracted struggle between the Babylonian yeshivas and the Palestinian yeshivas revolved around the Jewish calendar. The Babylonians celebrated the six yearly holidays for two days, the Palestinians for one.

Pumbedita was the dominant yeshiva in the last decades of the tenth century and the first half of the eleventh. Between the tenth and the thirteenth century, the authority of the yeshivas and the *gaonim* rose to their apogee and faded away. In the early twelfth century, the two Iraqi academies moved to Baghdad, where they may have coalesced into one. Around 1200, the ʿAbbasid caliphs made financial support of the Baghdad yeshiva a legal obligation of the Jewish population. Yet the *gaonim* disappeared by the end of the thirteenth century, and the remaining authority of the exilarch gradually disappeared after the fourteenth century.

The Palestinian yeshiva, having moved from Tiberius to Jerusalem, was at its peak in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The Fatimids, who held Jerusalem for around a century, recognized the claims of the Palestinian yeshiva to jurisdiction over all rabbinic Jewry. The Palestinian *gaon* was responsible not only for expounding the law but for administering it in all matters of personal status, such as marriage and divorce. He had the right of appointment over all communal officials (cantors, preachers, ritual slaughterers, etc.), especially judges. For decades, except for the crisis under Caliph al-Hakim, the Palestinian yeshiva received funding from the Fatimid state. However, after the Saljuq conquest of Jerusalem in 1071, it moved to Tyre, then to Damascus, and ultimately to Fustat in 1127. The school that formed around Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) replaced it.

The *nagid*

From the eleventh century, a countertendency emerged in the organization of the Jewish communities – a tendency toward a local leader who combined religio-legal and civil authority; in effect, this was a return to the exilarchate of a previous era, but in a local context. The *nagid* was the highest religio-legal Jewish authority, with a competence comparable to the *gaonim*, and also the secular head of the Jewish community, responsible for its affairs and for representing its interests before the Muslim authorities. The new authority reemerged in Egypt, where Fatimid and later Mamluk

governments favored the concentration of power in the hands of one supreme authority. From c. 1200 to c. 1370, the position was passed on in the Maimonides family. In Mamluk times (1250–1517), it was described as the office of the *raʾis al-yahud*, headman of the Jews.

The Jews of Egypt and Syria under the Fatimids were, despite their general security and prosperity, subject to waves of persecution. In the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim, there was a wave of anxiety about the free mingling and perhaps sexual connections of Muslim women and non-Muslim men. Laws to inhibit the social interaction of Jews and Muslims were promulgated. Non-Muslims were excluded from the baths on certain days; Jews and Christians were required to wear special colors or identifying clothing.

Under the Mamluk regime of Egypt and Syria (1250–1517), social tension turned into political persecution. Political instability, rivalries among Mamluk warlords, and the incessant demand for new revenues led to hardship and insecurity for all their subjects – especially for minorities. A slave, military elite, embroiled in war with the crusaders and dependent on Muslim support for its legitimacy, waged harsh campaigns against Christian minorities in the Lebanon and Syria and Jews in Cairo. Similarly, in Iran, the rise to power of the Safavids (a Shiʿi regime) led to the persecution of Sunni Muslims, Jews, and other non-Muslim religious minorities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Jewish culture in the Islamic context

Just as Jews participated socially and economically in Arabic-Islamic societies while maintaining a separate communal identity, Jews participated in the Middle Eastern Arab/Islamic culture while cultivating a parallel and separate Judaic culture. Generally, Jewish communities employed two languages: a vernacular (Aramaic in Babylonia and Palestine, Persian in Iran, Aramaic and Greek in Egypt, Berber and Latin in North Africa, and Romance in Spain) for general communication and a sacred language, Hebrew, for religious and ceremonial purposes. Aramaic, however, was also used for

Talmud and other sacred purposes. After the Muslim conquests, Arabic replaced Aramaic as the colloquial language, although scholars continued for some time to use Aramaic in writing.

In the tenth century, Saadya Gaon (d. 942) is the first known rabbinic leader to use Arabic, written in Hebrew script. Saadya translated the Hebrew Bible into Arabic and wrote short, focused treatises on specific topics in Talmudic law. The reception of Arabic extended to grammatical studies, theology, and poetry. The great works of Judeo-Arabic culture, from Saadya's *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* to Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed*, were written in Middle Arabic. Responsa literature was written in Arabic, Hebrew, or Aramaic, depending on the language used by the questioner. Aramaic was the language of the Talmud, but after Saadya, most of the scholarship on the Talmud was conducted in Judeo-Arabic.

At the same time that Saadya pioneered the dissemination of Judeo-Arabic, he originated a Hebrew-language revival. In reaction to multireligious discussion in ninth- and tenth-century Iraq and speculation about ethical rationalism and universal religious values, he championed the concept that universal truths were found within one's own religion. He became a leader in defending Rabbinic Judaism against Christian and Muslim polemics, Jewish gnostic skepticism, and Karaite sectarianism. He compiled the first Hebrew dictionary.

Jews shared not only the literary culture of the Arab world but also religious practices (such as pilgrimage to sacred shrines). The veneration of saints became a mass practice among both Jews and Muslims. In northern Palestine, Jews visited the alleged tombs of the great rabbis of the ancient world; in Egypt, Jewish pilgrims flocked to ancient synagogues that became associated with biblical figures and sometimes invited Muslim friends. In Iraq, both Muslims and Jews attended the presumed tombs of the prophet Ezekiel and Ezra the Scribe. Jews in Egypt later debated whether to wash before prayer or to pray in rows, as did Muslims. The relation of Jews to Muslims (and of Christians to Muslims) might be defined as separate but similar.

Chapter 19 Continuity and change in the historic cultures of the Middle East

In the first part of this book we reviewed the beginnings and early development of Islam and attempted to show how early Islam was a part and continuation of late antique Greco-Roman and Persian civilizations. Islam goes back to the Prophet Muhammad, the revelation of the Quran, and the first Muslim communities in Mecca and Medina, but the Islamic religion was the amplification of these teachings, carried out in later centuries, not only in the original home of Islam in Arabia but throughout the whole of the vast region from Spain to Inner Asia conquered by the Arab-Muslims. The Islamic religion came to encompass not only the Quran and the example of Muhammad but a vastly expanded range of religious literatures and practices, including law, theology, and mysticism, developed in numerous schools and subcommunities. Islam in this sense refers to the whole panoply of religious concepts and practices through which the original inspiration was later expressed. Similarly, Islamic-era philosophy, poetry and belles lettres, arts, and sciences were also continuations of both the Arabian and the broader regional cultures of late antiquity. In this larger body of literature, arts, and sciences, religious and nonreligious influences intermingled. Islamic political, economic, and social institutions were also built on the same template as those of past empires, economies, and societies.

The appropriation of the past was in part unconscious and in part deliberate. The vast reach of the Islamic empires, the broad recruitment of the imperial elite, and the cosmopolitan quality of Baghdad brought the whole of the ancient Middle Eastern heritage into the purview of Islam. The new elites were impelled to generate a unified culture to provide a coherent way of life in their melting-pot cities, to integrate the disparate elements of the new elite, and to articulate the triumph, the legitimacy, and the permanence of the

new order. These needs could only be fulfilled by the assimilation of the crucial elements of the ancient heritage.

In the new era, the past was a living presence. Prior cultures were transmitted through ongoing institutions; political, social, and business contacts among peoples with different backgrounds; texts; translations; and oral recitations. Family, village, neighborhood, tribal, and other forms of small-scale community organization were generally not affected by the Arab conquests and the Muslim empires. Despite geographical changes in the distribution of economic activity, the basic institutions of agricultural production and urban commerce remained unchanged. Byzantine and Sasanian imperial institutions, including the concept of the ruler and his responsibility for religion, were directly taken over by the Arab-Muslim caliphate. Monotheistic religious beliefs and congregational forms of religious organization became the template for the newly forming Muslim religious communities. Converts brought their previous education, cultural style, and political identifications into the new faith. Christian eschatology and theology and neo-Platonic and Hellenistic philosophy became part of Islamic theology and mysticism. Jewish scriptural, prophetic, ritual, and legal precedents were absorbed into Islamic law. Hellenistic science and Sasanian and Byzantine court ceremony, art and architecture, administrative precedents, and political concepts were assimilated by the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid empires.

Arab-Muslim participation in and transformations of antique heritage began in the seventh century and continued approximately to the eleventh century. The process of cultural creation occurred in several periods. The first was the beginning of Islam in a complex Arabian cultural environment. Bedouin elements made pre-Islamic Arabian culture different in many respects from the settled regions of the Middle East, but in politics, trade, material development, and religion, Arabia was already closely connected to the larger region. Pre-Islamic Arabian religious and literary cultures not only stemmed from bedouin origins but were modeled on the general system of culture found in the cities of the Middle East since the third century. Thus, Islam had its beginnings in a religious milieu in which

paganism and monotheism had already begun to converge, and Arabian Islam absorbed religious beliefs and practices, poetry, folk traditions, and popular spirituality from its environment.

The second period included the Arab conquests and the consequent political, social, economic, and demographic upheavals. In the seventh century, there was an Islamic identity, but there was little development of the political, ideological, religious, or cultural dimensions of this identity. The Quran was preserved. The memory of the Prophet was kept alive, and an Islamic presence was asserted in documents, inscriptions, and the construction of places of worship, but neither the caliphate nor the holy men and scholars had yet generated the public symbols or the literary content of what later became Islam.

The third period began in the late seventh century and continued approximately to the early eleventh century. This was the Arab-Islamic renaissance phase, a period of the assimilation, adaptation, and creative transformation of late antique Middle Eastern cultures. In this phase, Arab-Islam absorbed Roman and Sasanian arts and literatures, legal systems, political institutions, and economic practices. It absorbed Arabian tribal culture, Middle Eastern family practices, Jewish religious concepts and community institutions, and Christian theology and eschatology. Under the auspices of both the caliphate and the urban religious literati, Persian literature (*adab*), Hellenistic philosophy and science, and Greco-Roman law were translated, summarized, paraphrased, adapted, and integrated into new Arabic literatures. In each case, Islamic identities were a continuation of, a variation on, and at the same time, a discernibly innovative expression of the historic Middle Eastern cultural background. Each institutional and cultural type, however, had a different mode of reconfiguration and reconstruction in Arab-Islamic culture. These differences must be considered to grasp the variety and subtlety of the transmission and transformational process.

Islam infused inherited institutions with a new vocabulary, concepts, and value preferences, as well as a new definition of personal, social, and political identity. It redefined pre-Islamic institutions in Muslim cultural terms. The appropriation of Christian,

Byzantine, and Sasanian artistic motifs resulted in a configuration original and unmistakably Islamic. In literature, law, theology, mysticism, and philosophy, the materials of the past were reshaped. Islamic civilization had to find a balance between the tendency to incorporate the past and the need to assert a new identity, between the ancient religions of the book and the new dispensation, and between the continuity of Middle Eastern imperial regimes and the novelty of the Muslim caliphate.

In economy and society, the fundamental institutions of the ancient world were carried over into the new era. The modes of production in agriculture, trade, services, and taxation remained the same – indeed they were ratified in Islamic law for commerce and property. Muslim family life and the position of women in society continued the concepts and practices of late antique societies with some changes in details, now legitimated as part of Islamic law. The caliphate constructed an imperial regime as it was understood and proclaimed by the Roman-Byzantine and Sasanian emperors, similarly expressing its political identity and legitimating its rule partly on the basis of historic Middle Eastern imperial symbols expressed in art and architecture, poetry, philosophy, and science, and partly on the basis of Muslim concepts.

Architectural styles were assimilated not as a finished text but as a malleable vocabulary to allow for different results. Many aspects of art and architecture were developed on the basis of an earlier repertoire of images, motifs, and styles but yet were subtly rearranged and set into new contexts so as to create art forms that were based on ancient motifs but were recognizably original. The design and decoration of mosques, and even their placement in the urban environment, created a distinctive Arab-Muslim presence. At the same time, there emerged in Islamic art certain characteristic preferences, none of them by themselves wholly novel – the preference for complete decoration of surfaces; the ubiquity of geometric, vegetal, and calligraphic decoration; and the opposition to human or animal images in religious buildings – that, in combination, expressed a distinctive Arab-Muslim sensibility.

In the realm of literature, the Arabian *qasida*, the classical panegyrical ode, became the basis of later Arabic poetry and was adapted as a form of court poetry. Philosophy was translated from Greek and Syriac into Arabic, and ancient philosophy was carried into the Arab-Muslim era with little change apart from translation. Persian *adab*, however, although translated into Arabic, was very selectively incorporated into anthologies along with Arab, Indian, and other materials. *Adab* in this vetted form became the basis of the literary education of the cultivated gentleman. Philosophy, *adab*, and other Persian literatures and tales also maintained a position as distinct subcultures within early Islamic civilization.

In the third period, Muslim scholars and holy men launched a more determined effort to define Islamic orthodoxy. A new generation of scholars, disciples, and students, much augmented in number, succeeded the first generation of companions of the Prophet. Small groups of masters and disciplines took shape. Out of these study circles came a variety of specialized religious activities. Some circles focused on the legacy of the Prophet, the stories told about his person, his actions, and his sayings, all of which would constitute hadith and biography. Others focused on the text of the Quran itself and its exegesis. Still others were engaged in legal analysis and theology. Always, there were ascetics and holy men seeking a more direct experience of God. Allied to these interests were historical and linguistic studies that would be the basis of the Arabic humanities.

In the postconquest era, Islam became a parallel religion, different in the details of its expression but similar in its basic orientations to the previous monotheistic religions. Islam was a newly revealed religion, but it shared the mentality of its predecessors. Already in the Quran, Islam is avowedly a continuation and renewal of the older monotheistic traditions. Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Muslims all believed in God, the angels and the prophets, the last judgment, and the purpose of human existence being the fulfillment of God's commands and faith in his truth. Islamic teaching and practice overlapped with that of the other religions. Eastern Syriac Christians who believed in the human nature of Jesus had common ground with Muslims. Jews were committed monotheists. All Middle Eastern

peoples believed that religion implied community, and all believed that religious communities had a founding prophet.

Each religion provided for communal loyalties and made regulations for ritual and social behavior. As in Judaism and Christianity, Islam is expressed through participation in a community and adherence to its laws. It is expressed through acts of ritual and worship such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage. Sayings of the Prophet and stories about his deeds, faith in the miraculous events surrounding his life, veneration of his goodness, imitation of his example, and adherence to the laws he transmitted became the hallmarks of a Muslim life, just as stories of the ancient patriarchs and prophets in Judaism or the gospels of Jesus in Christianity defined the earlier monotheisms. Belief in the visions, healing powers, and miraculous deeds of holy men became a part of Muslim religious life, just as they had been a part of Christian and Jewish religious life. Muslim ascetics and mystics resembled Christian monks and Hindu holy men.

Greco-Roman provincial law, canon law, rabbinic law, and Sasanian law formed the customary legal background that was integrated with the teachings of the Quran and hadith to form what we now know as Islamic law. Family law was redefined in terms of Quran and hadith but differed mainly in detail from pre-Islamic law. Commercial, property, and contract law were essentially the same.

Muslim theology (*kalam*), reasoned argument on the basis of religious belief, was partly adapted from and partly developed in parallel with Christian theology. It shared the same dialectical form of discussion but drew distinctive conclusions for issues central to Muslim concerns, such as determination and free will and the createdness of the Quran. Sufism drew inspiration from the Quran and from neo-Platonism and Hindu mysticism. Early Islam shared folk traditions and popular spirituality with non-Muslims. Belief in revealed scripture, prophecy, mysticism, gnosticism, messianism, magical and apocalyptic thinking, science, philosophy, and law were interconfessional, that is, found in all the Middle Eastern religions.

By mutual influences, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity were all reshaped in the Islamic period. As Arabic became the common language of peoples of all religions, despite communal differences and loyalties to different authorities, texts, and traditions, the religious discourses became similar. Islamic religion, culture, and literature was neither derived from a bedouin past nor directly borrowed from other religions but developed in parallel with others as part of a shared Middle Eastern heritage.

The process of forming Islamic civilization, however, was not a passive assimilation but an active struggle among the proponents of different views. Within court circles, representatives of Arabic, Persian, and Hellenistic literatures struggled to shape the identity of the caliphate. The proponents of Arabic and Persian identities fought for a century, until Arabic triumphed as the primary language of the empire, and Persian and Hellenistic literatures were absorbed into Arabic literary forms.

Similarly, the Muslim urban communities embodied not one but a number of conflicting orientations. Some Muslims emphasized the authority of the scholarly tradition, others the teaching of the imams or the charismatic presence of the saints. The Sunnis tended to stress the revealed text itself, the chain of commentary and interpretation going back through the generations directly to the Prophet, and the collective authority of learned men as the basis of Islamic belief and practice, but they were divided among those who emphasized good works and correct practice and those who were concerned with doctrine and true belief. Still others urged the importance of direct experience of the being of God. The Shi'is emphasized personal loyalty to the imams and their teachings. Urban Islam embodied fundamentalist, conservative, puritanical, accommodationist, realist, and millenarian religious attitudes.

Each of these positions was formed by debate. We have seen how the scripturalists held different views about the authority of the Quran, hadith, and law and differed over the boundaries of revelation and human judgment. The theologians disputed the nature of God's being and his attributes, free will, and predestination. The relative

weight of revelation and reason, although defined in terms of a limited use of reason, was yet to be resolved. The mystics were divided by world-renouncing and world-accepting attitudes, and by ecstatic and sober practices. Just as there were intense debates within each orientation over the proper values of the religious life, there were intense conflicts among them. Scholars of law questioned the validity of mysticism. Theologians wrestled with the hadith-minded commitment to revelation rather than reason. The relations of scripture, theology, mysticism, and philosophy would have to be reconsidered in a later era.

The most fateful confrontations, however, were between the courtly cosmopolitan and the urban religious versions of Islamic civilization. Each represented a selection and synthesis of the heritage of Middle Eastern Jewish, Christian, Hellenistic, Byzantine, and Sasanian cultures. Islamic court culture was visual, literary, philosophic, and scientific. As opposed to the courtly concern for symbols to articulate a vision of the universe that justified the authority of the caliph and the supremacy of the dominant elite, the urban version of Islam emphasized individual piety. The pious set their concept of humbleness and devotion against aristocratic elegance and refinement. For the courtly milieu, Islam was but an aspect of a cosmopolitan identity and worldview. For the urban milieus, Islam defined the good life.

These differences led to conflict on several levels. The Shuʿubiyya controversy over the supremacy of Arabic or Persian literary values was partly a court-centered dispute, but it also spilled over into a confrontation between court and urban milieus. Whereas the proponents of Persian literature espoused political domination, social hierarchy, and aristocratic refinement, the urban ʿulama', the legal scholars, affirmed religious equality, political accountability, and personal values based on the Quranic revelation and the Arabic identity of the town populations.

An equally important struggle was waged over the legitimacy of Hellenistic thought. Hellenism represented both a reinforcement of and a challenge to the worldview of the urban ʿulama'. Court and urban theologians welcomed logical methods of argument to clarify

Muslim perspectives and to defend them against philosophic attack, but insofar as philosophy was conceived as an alternative source of divine truths, they rejected the primacy of reason in religious matters. Similarly, neo-Platonism was in one sense intrinsic to the philosophic vision and was therefore a court-sponsored alternative to urban Islam, but in another sense it reinforced an already-existing strand of Muslim mysticism and gave Sufi asceticism a rationale and a method for the mystical quest. Other aspects of Hellenistic teaching such as science, philosophy, and occult metaphysics, which were acceptable in court milieus, were rejected in urban '*ulama*' Islam. Like Persian *adab*, Hellenistic culture was screened, adapted, and utilized to reinforce the basic moral and religious positions of the urban '*ulama*'. Nonetheless, it continued to be sponsored in court circles as a part of cosmopolitan and aristocratic cultivation. In this guise Hellenistic philosophy and science would be preserved for future confrontations and interactions with Islamic religious thought and for eventual transmission to Christian Europe.

Religion and empire

The conflict of worldviews also led to a struggle between the caliphate and the urban '*ulama*' over the content of Islamic belief and the role of the caliphate in the governance of the Muslim community. As we have seen in the history of both Roman and Sasanian societies, empires and religious communities both laid claim to absolute truth and absolute authority. They were at times collaborators in maintaining control of society and at other times rivals for political, social, and cultural power. The critical issue was the boundaries between imperial and religious – church, congregational, or communal – authority. The Roman Empire supported one official religion, Christianity, in one orthodox form, but the Roman orthodox world was but one part of a more extensive grouping of politically independent and religiously diverse Christian societies. The Sasanian Empire made Zoroastrianism an official religion but accepted a plurality of religions.

The caliphate went through several phases of competing concepts of the office and its powers. In the Rightly Guided period, caliphs were both religious-community leaders and military and political rulers, continuing Muhammad's integral connection of political and religious-communal authority. The Rightly Guided Caliphs not only directed armies and governments but also gave authoritative legal judgments and set precedents for later Muslim practice. ʿUthman promulgated an authorized edition of the Quran. Muʿawiya appointed judges and tried to regulate preachers, Quran readers, and judges. ʿAbd al-Malik's issuance of coinage and construction of the Dome of the Rock defined the caliphate as the supreme patron and protector of Islam. ʿUmar II came to the throne from an earlier career in Medina engaged in legal and religious activity and brought a new concern for communal-religious matters to the caliphate. Later Umayyads expanded on the religious significance of the caliphate: they executed Qadari theologians as heretics and justified their reigns by claiming to be God's caliphs, *khalifat allah*, rather than *khalifat rasul allah* (successors to the Prophet of God).

Despite the lofty titles, ʿAbbasid caliphs also took limited positions in religious affairs. They persecuted and executed so-called heretics. Generally, they supervised the judicial administration and appointed judges from favored factions. They condemned certain religious positions. The ʿAbbasid Caliph al-Mahdi (r. 775–85) claimed to be the protector of Islam against heresy and arrogated the right to proscribe unacceptable beliefs. But caliphs did not define theological or legal positions nor legislate personal, familial, or commercial law.

Moreover, from the beginning of the Islamic era, there were alternative and competing conceptions of the caliphate. The caliphate was vigorously opposed by several sectarian movements and constrained by widespread resistance to its religious claims, even among its Sunni supporters. In the first civil war, a number of factions contested the succession. Kharijis called for the election by the community of a person without sin. In their view, the imam was simply the most righteous person in the community. Kharijis fused Islam with tribal equalitarianism and a communal idea of consensus, solidarity, and unity.

Shi'is also opposed the historic succession of the caliphs. They claimed that only the family of 'Ali, a holy lineage related to the Prophet, was entitled to the caliphate. Shi'is evolved into a movement claiming not only the rights of the family of 'Ali but also that this family was divinely blessed with supernatural powers and moral perfection. Whereas Zaydis believed that the true heir to the authority of 'Ali had to be both a political and a religious leader, Imami Shi'is did not require political activism. They introduced the idea of an imam who is not a caliph or political ruler but a teacher and savior.

Many Sunnis, who accepted the legitimacy of the historical succession and supported both the Umayyad and 'Abbasid dynasties, sought to limit the authority of the ruler. They held that the Prophet's guidance was not confined to a single leader but had been passed on to the companions collectively, and to their students and successors. By the late Umayyad period, many Sunnis held that the caliphs were simply *mujtahids*, scholars entitled to express an authoritative opinion on legal matters, on par with other jurists. Hadith and law, not the caliph, were the real rulers of the community; the collective agreement of the learned was the key to guidance.

By the time of 'Abbasid Caliph Harun, the caliphate too accepted its role as the guardian but not the source of Islamic teaching. Caliphs distanced themselves from claims to be imams in the Shi'i sense of divinely inspired teachers. Later, however, al-Ma'mun (r. 813–33) tried to remake the religious foundations of the caliphate in the wake of the disruptive civil war that brought him to power. He tried to win over his opponents by making a Shi'i imam, 'Ali al-Rida, the eighth descendant of 'Ali, heir to the caliphate. The rapprochement with Shi'ism implied that al-Ma'mun accepted the Shi'i view of the caliph as divinely chosen by God with the authority to define religious belief and law. 'Ali al-Rida, however, died within a year. Al-Ma'mun then tried to accomplish the same objective by adopting the Mu'tazili thesis that the Quran was created and not of the divine essence. This doctrine served to emphasize the religious importance of the caliph by implying that the Quran, as a created

thing, was, like all created things, subject to authoritative caliphal interpretation. These were not idle claims. Al-Ma'mun initiated an inquisition to force Muslim scholars to accept this doctrine and his right to proclaim it.

The inquisition was the most radical assertion of ʿAbbasid religious authority and has been interpreted in various ways. Some view it as an effort to claim supreme authority for the caliph in matters of religious belief; the doctrine of the created Quran implies that reason and/or caliphal authority can define law. Others view the inquisition as a political tactic; in the religious struggles of the time, al-Ma'mun's intervention supported the rationalists against the opposing hadith scholars.

Among religious leaders, only Ahmad b. Hanbal refused to accept the caliph's contentions. He denied that the Quran was created and affirmed the transcendent authority of the written word over its human interpreters. Islamic religious obligations, he argued, were derived not from caliphal pronouncements but from the fundamental texts known to the leading scholars. The caliph was merely the executor of the Islamic community, and not the source of its beliefs. A protracted struggle between the caliphate and the ʿ*ulama*ʾ eventually ended with the victory of the latter. In 848–49, Caliph al-Mutawakkil reversed the policy of his predecessors, abandoned the Muʿtazili thesis, and accepted the contention that the Quran was not the created word of God. The caliph in effect conceded both the point of doctrine and his claims to be the ultimate source of religious beliefs. Al-Ma'mun had tried to overcome an entrenched communal structure but did not succeed. The caliphate had to abandon its claims, because they provoked widespread popular opposition. After this cultural and political ordeal, the caliphate limited its religious claims. Only later would it become the symbol of the unity of Islam and empire, of a golden age in Islamic history.

The claims of the caliphate brought out a long-smoldering resentment. It had become suspect to the ʿ*ulama*ʾ and other pious Muslims, who saw it as falling away from true religious principles. Although the caliphate remained head of the Muslim community

(*umma*) and a symbol of Muslim unity, a gulf had opened between the state and some of the religious communities. Henceforth, the caliph would represent the administrative and executive interests of Islam, while the scholars and Sufis defined Islamic religious belief. Islam began to evolve independently under the aegis of the religious teachers. The struggle over the createdness of the Quran widened the differences of the two forms of early Islamic culture and community – the division of state and religious communities, of court and urban *'ulama'*, and of cosmopolitan and religious forms of Islamic civilization.

Because its religious authority was always contested, the caliphate attempted to provide itself with an imperial, indeed cosmic, authority apart from Islam. The caliphate constructed an imperial regime as it was understood and proclaimed by the Roman-Byzantine and Sasanian emperors. Early Umayyad caliphs reverted to Arabian conceptions of monarchy as the basis of their legitimacy. Later Umayyad caliphs defined themselves as successors to the Byzantine emperors as well as the guardians and promoters of Islam; they also claimed to be God-sent rulers. They expressed this royal, nonreligious authority in architecture and decoration, court protocol, poetry, and philosophy. In court life and in the decorations of the desert palaces, they assumed the prerogatives of all kings and royal families. In the 'Abbasid period, the assertion of a quasi-divine authority – integrating Persian cultures as well – grew more explicit and more elaborate. Court protocol, poetry, architectural design, and bacchic pleasures promoted a henotheistic ideal.

In theory, early Islamic institutions resembled the Roman model of unified imperial authority and religious identity. The early caliphate had a double identity and legitimation: one explicitly Muslim derived from the Prophet; the other universal or cosmic derived from the pre-Islamic, imperial cultures of the region. Like the Roman emperor, the caliph as head of state was also in a generalized sense head of religion. The administrative authority of both was widely accepted, but in both cases their religious authority was contested by congregations that drew their authority directly from scripture or charismatic succession to the founder of the religion (Jesus or

Muhammad). In the Islamic case, by contrast with Roman practice, matters of ritual, civil, and family laws were regulated by the scholars (rather than the state) and were the nonpolitical function of an independent religious elite. Yet the power of the caliphate always made some government intervention possible, especially in matters that concerned the state (such as taxation), and undoubtedly allowed for a great deal of variation in the administration of law and justice.

Islamic governance, however, differed from the Roman and resembled the Sasanian model in its acceptance of the legitimacy of other religions. The Roman Empire recognized only one orthodox form of Christianity, whereas the Sasanian Empire accepted Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism as approved religions organized to govern the internal affairs of their communities and to act as administrative conduits for the state.

Furthermore, Muslim communities under the caliphate were organized in a way closer to Jewish communities than to Christian churches. Unlike the Christian churches, there was no centralization or hierarchy of religious authority. Islamic society was a network of local communities under the leadership of scholars and judges who were linked by travels, by teaching, and eventually by schools and brotherhoods. Unlike the Jewish communities, most of the Muslim communities were linked under the authority of the caliphate. The regime accepted many or most, but not all, of the Muslim theological sects, law circles and schools, socioreligious movements, congregations, and communities. The state accepted a variety of Islamic positions, always maneuvering to draw support and legitimacy from them. The Islamic structure of state, society, and religion may be described, then, as a religious commonwealth of independent and religiously diverse groups, under the general leadership and partial authority of the caliphate. The collapse of the caliphal empire in the tenth century resulted in a religious commonwealth of both politically independent and religiously diverse Muslim regions.

Conclusion

Thus, there was an historical rhythm to the emergence of a distinctive Islamic civilization. In the first instances, the emerging Islamic civilization was closely modeled on its predecessors, but older cultural materials took on new qualities as they were not merely translated but freshly expressed in Arabic, and attuned to the religious sensibilities of Muslims. In architecture, in some forms of literature (such as courtly *adab*), and in law and theology, ancient materials were Islamized. Intense debates, cultural wars, and political struggles occurred over which elements of the overall culture should and would be considered legitimate and essential to Islam. Thus, ancient precedents outgrew their pasts and became distinctive expressions of an Islamic civilization.

By the late tenth and eleventh centuries, a new cultural world had come into being, superseding its ancient heritage – a period in which an Islamic "orthodoxy" had been consolidated, the alternative visions of Islam articulated, and boundaries with non-Islamic Middle Eastern cultures defined. Over centuries the process of assimilating, Arabizing, and Islamizing historic cultures led to the consolidation of a new civilization whose ancient sources were then forgotten and concealed and whose roots and history can now only be uncovered by scholarly investigation.

Nonetheless, in the new civilization, the past lived on. The deep historical past embodied meanings and concepts that defined what life is about and how it is lived, and it could not easily be reinvented. In perpetuating earlier civilizations, Islamic civilization is based on a newly revealed religion, but it shared the mentality of its predecessors and grew from the same Greco-Roman and Persian roots as did what we now call Western civilization.

Part II From Islamic Community to Islamic Society

Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, 945–c. 1500

Chapter 20 The post-ʿAbbasid Middle Eastern state system

The "medieval" era in the Middle East is the period after the breakup of the ʿAbbasid Empire and before the consolidation of the Ottoman and Safavid empires. Numerous and often ephemeral regional states replaced a unified empire. (See Map 4.) With the weakening of central governments and the rise of semiautonomous military, civic-religious, and land-controlling elites, it is no longer possible to recount Middle Eastern history from a central point of view. Its history is best understood by distinguishing the eastern parts of the Middle East – including Transoxania, Iran, and Iraq – from the western parts – consisting primarily of Syria and Egypt.

Map 4. The post-imperial succession regimes, late tenth century.

In the east, the first generation of regimes that succeeded to the domains of the ʿAbbasid Empire included the Buwayhids, mercenary

soldier-conquerors from the Caspian Sea region, in Iraq and western Iran (945–1055); the Samanids, a provincial noble family already in power in the late ʿAbbasid era, in eastern Iran and Transoxania (to 999); and the Ghaznavids, a dynasty founded by slave soldiers in Afghanistan and Khurasan (to 1040). These regimes gave way to a succession of nomadic empires as the collapse of the ʿAbbasid Empire broke down the frontiers between the settled parts of the Middle East and Inner Asia and allowed Turkish nomadic peoples to infiltrate the region. In the tenth century, the Qarakhanids took control of Transoxania. In the eleventh century, the Saljuqs seized Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia. Ghuzz and Nayman followed in the twelfth century; the Mongols conquered most of the region in the thirteenth.

In the west, the Fatimids (an offshoot of the Ismaʿili movement) conquered the former ʿAbbasid province of Egypt and parts of Syria. However, the collapse of political order in Syria permitted a succession of further foreign invasions. In the tenth century, the Byzantine Empire reoccupied northern Syria and even attempted to conquer Jerusalem. Byzantine armies were followed by Latin crusaders and finally by the Saljuqs. With the establishment of Saljuq-derived regimes, the western parts of the Middle East rejoined the stream of eastern developments.

Iraq, Iran, and the eastern provinces

After the disintegration of the ʿAbbasid Empire, Iraq and Iran became the crucial centers for the formation of new state, communal, and religious institutions. Middle Eastern states came to be built around similar elites and institutions. The old landowning and bureaucratic elites lost their power and were replaced by nomadic chieftains and slave soldiers. These several new states came to depend on slave armies and a semifeudal form of administration. Each state became the patron of a regional culture. In the Arab provinces, poetry, manuscript illumination, architecture, and minor arts developed. In Iran, new Islamic cultural expressions based on the Persian language and arts emerged. At the same time, scholars and mystics – who in the imperial age had been the informal spokesmen of Islam – became the heads of communal organizations. They encouraged the

conversion of Middle Eastern peoples, standardized Islamic religious teachings, articulated an Islamic social and political ethic, and organized schools of law, Sufi orders, and Shiʿi sects. Despite political fragmentation, a new form of Islamic state, community, and religious orthodoxy came into being.

The Buwayhids, who ruled western Iran, Iraq, and Mesopotamia, pioneered this new type of regime. They left the caliphs in position as titular heads of state, recognized them as the chiefs of all Sunni Muslims, conceded their right to make appointments to religious offices, and accepted the idea that their own right to govern was based on caliphal recognition. The sermon at Friday prayers, government coinage, and (in Iraq) even grants of land and appointments to offices referenced the names of the caliphs. Although it was deprived of actual administrative and military power, this allowed the caliphate to mobilize the support of the Sunni population of Baghdad and to retain an important role in Baghdadi politics.

In practice, the Buwayhid regime was based on a family coalition in which each of the conquering brothers was assigned a province of Iran or Iraq as his appanage. The armies, composed partly of Daylamite infantry and partly of slave Turkish cavalry, were, like the forces of the latter-day caliphate, organized into regiments loyal more to their own leaders and to their own ambitions for wealth and power than to the state itself. These regiments fought one another and encouraged conflicts among various Buwayhid princes, which further reduced the powers of the central government. The established bureaucratic families were replaced with Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. The Buwayhids sold landed estates to the soldiers, assigned them revenues from designated lands (*tasbib*), or allowed them to collect taxes in lieu of salaries. To these new military grants, the old name *iqtaʿ* was often applied. In Kirman, Fars, and Khuzistan, foreign Turkish and Daylamite soldiers neglected investments in agriculture and exploited the peasants for short-term gain. Arab and Kurdish tribes dominated northern Iraq, leading to a further regression of the agricultural economy of Iraq and western Iran.

In eastern Iran and Transoxania, the Samanid dynasty maintained the ʿAbbasid system for another half century. The regime was administered by a bureaucratic elite that depended on the local notables and landlord families, whereas the attached provinces of Sijistan, Khwarizm, and Afghanistan were governed by tributary lords or slave governors. Like the ʿAbbasids, the Samanids were the patrons of a fabulously creative Islamic culture. In the tenth century, Bukhara emerged as the center of new Persian-Islamic literatures and arts – as Arabic religious, legal, philosophic, and literary ideas were recast into Persian. For the first time, Islam became available in a language other than Arabic.

However, the Samanid regime disintegrated in the tenth century, and its domains in Khurasan and Afghanistan fell to Alptigin, a slave governor whose capital was Ghazna (Afghanistan). Alptigin founded a regime of slave soldiers who conquered and ruled Khurasan from 999 to 1040 and Afghanistan until 1186. They attacked Transoxania and western Iran, plundered Lahore in 1030, and occupied parts of northern India until 1187. Everywhere they destroyed established elites and replaced them with slave soldiers; the rulers were themselves former slaves. Like the Buwayhids, they gave land tax allotments to their soldiers, but they also maintained the vestiges of Samanid bureaucratic administration to keep central control over the distribution of landed estates and to collect tributes, booty, and the revenues of crown estates. The Ghaznavids also started the policy of cultivating the support of Muslim religious leaders by declaring allegiance to the caliphate and supporting Islamic education and a Persian literary revival. A slave army, decentralized administration, and patronage of Persian-Islamic culture were henceforth the defining features of Iranian and Inner Asian regimes.

By the middle of the eleventh century, Ghaznavid rule gave way to new forces that had their origin in Inner Asia (i.e., between the borders of the Iranian and the Chinese empires). (See Map 5.) This region was inhabited by pastoral peoples who raised horses and sheep for their livelihood. These people generally lived in small bands, but they could form confederations to contest control of pasture lands and to attack settled areas. In the course of the

seventh and eighth centuries, nomadic peoples on the eastern frontiers of China, prevented from entering China by the Tang dynasty, began to push westward in search of pasturage. This started a wave of migrations pushing Inner Asian peoples into the region of the Aral Sea, Transoxania, Khwarizm, and Afghanistan.

Map 5. The Middle East in the Ghaznavid era, early eleventh century.

These peoples were organized under the leadership of royal families and other chiefs. They entered regular commercial and cultural relations with the settled areas. From the settled peoples, the nomads purchased grain, spices, textiles, and weapons. In return, they sold livestock, hides, wool, and slaves. This lively exchange induced settled peoples to extend trading posts and towns out onto the steppes and involved Inner Asian nomads in the caravan traffic between Transoxania, the Volga and Siberian regions to the north, and China to the east.

Through contacts with Muslim merchants, scholars, and Sufis, nomadic peoples were introduced to Islam. Originally they were pagans (who believed that the world, animate and inanimate, was

peopled by living and vital spirits) and shamanists (who believed that some of their members had the capacity to separate body and soul and, in ecstatic moments, rise up to heaven or descend to the underworld). Knowledge of the realms and powers beyond made the shamans healers and interpreters of dreams. Inner Asian peoples, however, were familiar with Nestorian Christianity, which had been preached on the steppes. Many were Buddhists; some were Manichaeans. In the middle of the tenth century, the Qarluq peoples – who would later establish the Qarakhanid Empire – converted to Islam. Shortly before the end of the century, Oghuz peoples associated with the Saljuq family also converted to Islam. Thus, by the end of the tenth century, Turkish–Inner Asian peoples had developed the capacity for large-scale coalitions, possessed stratified elites and royal institutions, had gained experience in trade, and had adopted the religious identity of the settled peoples. They would enter the Middle East with the political and cultural capacities to become a new imperial elite.

This leveling of political and cultural capacities opened the way for the breakdown of the frontier between steppes and settled areas. With the conversion of Inner Asian peoples, the settled frontier warriors (*ghazis*), who had hitherto resisted Turkish incursions on the grounds that they were defending their Muslim civilization against barbarians, gave up the holy war. With the conversion of the Turks, the whole rationale of the frontier life was subverted, and these warriors abandoned the eastern frontiers. Many made their way with the Ghaznavids into India; others moved to the Byzantine frontier. With the frontier defenses in disarray, Qarluq peoples, led by the Qarakhanid dynasty, took Bukhara in 992 and Samarqand in 999.

The Qarakhanid elites were quickly assimilated to the traditions of eastern Iranian-Islamic states. In Inner Asian fashion, the new rulers divided their domains into a western khanate that ruled Transoxania until 1211 and an eastern khanate for Farghana and Kashgaria. The new rulers of Transoxania accepted the nominal authority of the ʿAbbasid caliphs and directly or indirectly promoted the spread of Islam among the populace of Transoxania, Kashgar, and the Tarim basin. The Qarakhanids also patronized the formation of a new Turkish literature, based on Arabic and Persian models, which made

it possible to re-create the religious and literary content of Islamic Middle Eastern civilization in Turkish dress. Just as the Samanids had presided over the formation of a Persian-Islamic culture, the Qarakhanids were the patrons of a new Turkish-Islamic civilization.

The Saljuq Empire, the Mongols, and the Timurids

The Saljuq Empire

While the Qarluq peoples occupied Transoxania, Oghuz peoples, under the leadership of the Saljuq family, crossed the Oxus River in 1025. In 1037, they took Nishapur; in 1040, they defeated the Ghaznavids and became the new rulers of Khurasan. This was the beginning of a Saljuq empire. (See Map 6.) The Saljuq chiefs, Tughril Beg and his brother Chagri Beg, led their followers into western Iran, defeated the Buwayhids, seized control of Baghdad and the caliphate in 1055, and were named sultans and rulers of a new Middle Eastern empire from Khurasan to Iraq. Nomadic bands pushed into Armenia, Azarbayjan, and Byzantine Anatolia, where, in 1071, at the Battle of Manzikert, they defeated the Byzantine army, captured the emperor, and opened the whole of Asia Minor to Turkish penetration. The advancing Turkish peoples also entered Iraq and Mesopotamia and extended Saljuq domination as far as the Mediterranean. (See Figure 5.)

**Map 6.** The Saljuq Empire in the late eleventh century.

Saljuq

Mikha'il

Chagri Beg   Tughril Beg
                    (d. 1063)

Alp Arslan
(1063–72)

Malik Shah   Tutush   Saljuqs of Kirman   Qutlumush
(1072–92)   (to 1187)

                  Saljuqs of Syria   Saljuqs of Rum
                  (Atabegs)   (to 1300)

Barkyaruq   Muhammad   Sanjar
            (1105–18)   (1097–1157)

            Saljuqs of Iraq and Iran
            (to 1194)

Atabeg dynasties

Damascus	Burids, 1103–54
Mosul–Aleppo	Zangids, 1127–1222
Irbil	Begtiginids, 1144–1232
Diyarbakr	Artuqids (1), 1098–1232
Mesopotamia, Mardin	Artuqids (2), 1104–1408
Armenia (Khilat)	Shah–Armans, 1100–1207
Azarbayjan	Iidegizids, 1137–1225
Fars	Salghurids, 1148–1270
Alamut	Ismailis, 1090–1256

Figure 5. Saljuq-period dynasties.

Thus the Saljuqs reunited most of the former 'Abbasid Empire and rekindled the dream of Muslim unity and universal empire. They sought to rebuild bureaucratic forms of administration, and they sponsored Muslim religious activity as the basis of their legitimacy. But although the Saljuqs aspired to a unified Middle Eastern empire, the organizational and institutional capacities needed to sustain a large empire were not available. The economy of Iraq could no longer support a centralized government; bureaucratic administration could

not be effectively restored in a society dominated by the military landowners who had replaced the smallholding notables of the late Sasanian and ʿAbbasid periods.

Moreover, the Saljuq nomadic heritage proved detrimental to their imperial ambitions. Although nominally unified under the authority of a single sultan, the Saljuqs had no fixed idea about legitimate succession and considered the right to rule to be vested in the leading family as a whole. Thus, members of the ruling house were entitled to share the family domains on behalf of the tribal subgroups whom they led. Furthermore, tribal tradition cherished the institution of the *atabeg*, who was a tutor or regent assigned to raise a minor prince and govern in his name. The *atabeg* was entitled to marry the mother of a ward who died and to become a governor in his own right. This was the start of many independent Saljuq-related principalities. Finally, tribal groups were entitled to regions for habitation and grazing. All these aspects of the nomadic heritage worked against imperial unity under the leadership of a single ruler.

To overcome these inherent liabilities, the Saljuq sultans adopted Buwayhid and Ghaznavid institutions. They tried to reduce their dependence on the Turkish peoples who had conquered the empire by creating slave armies of Turks, Greeks, Khurasanians, Kurds, Georgians, and others. They adopted the Buwayhid practice of granting lands as payment of the salaries of soldiers. Nonetheless, the unified empire lasted only from 1055 until the death of Malik Shah in 1092. His sons then divided the provinces among themselves, establishing independent dynasties in Iraq, Anatolia, Azarbayjan, Mesopotamia, Syria, Khuzistan, Fars, Kirman, and Khurasan. These proved to be ephemeral regimes, unable to consolidate power or defend their frontiers.

The result was renewed nomadic invasions. In the late twelfth century, the Qarakhitay, a Mongol people who had ruled northern China in the eleventh century, took control of Transoxania from the Qarakhanids. Ghuzz peoples, displaced by the Qarakhitay, invaded Khurasan and, in 1153, destroyed the last Saljuq resistance to further nomadic incursion from Inner Asia. They were followed by the Naymans and the Mongols.

These invasions had long-term demographic consequences. In the eleventh century, Armenia, Azarbayjan, and parts of Mesopotamia, which had been Iranian or Kurdish, became Turkish. The Greeks of Anatolia were in the process of converting. Iran experienced an almost complete breakdown of state authority, unremitting nomadic invasions, and unprecedented destruction. The ultimate symbol of this chaotic era was the execution of the last ʿAbbasid caliph in 1258.

The Mongols

The Mongol invasions dealt a devastating blow to Iranian-Muslim civilization. The Mongols originated with the formation of a confederation of Inner Asian peoples under the leadership of Chinggis Khan. Believing in a God-given destiny, the Mongols set out to conquer the whole of the known world and brought East Asia, the Middle East, and the Eastern European steppes under their rule. Within a few decades, they ruled all of Eurasia from central Europe to the Pacific. This vast empire was divided among the four sons of Chinggis, partly for administrative convenience and partly because the conquered territories were considered the joint possession of the ruling family. Because there was neither a defined succession nor any way to assure unity, the descendants of Chinggis fought among themselves. Out of these disputes came several independent and even hostile Mongol states. These included Mongol regimes in Mongolia and China, the Golden Horde on the northern steppes, the Chaghatay khanate in Transoxania and eastern Turkestan, and the Ilkhan regime in Iran and Anatolia. (See Map 7.)

Map 7. The Mongol empires in the thirteenth century.

The first impact of the Mongol invasions in Iran was disastrous and amounted to a holocaust. The populations of many cities and towns were systematically exterminated. Whole regions were depopulated by invading armies and by the influx of Mongol nomads who drove the peasants from the land. The conquerors plundered their subjects, made them serfs, and taxed them ruinously. The result was a catastrophic fall in population, income, and state revenue. For more than a century, fine pottery and metalwares ceased to be produced. A period of urban autonomy and cultural vitality was brought to an end.

Whereas the first century of Mongol rule wreaked havoc, beginning with the reign of Ghazan (1295–1304), the Ilkhans rebuilt cities, redeveloped irrigation works, and sponsored agriculture and trade in the familiar way of Middle Eastern empires. Despite their self-conscious superiority, however, the Ilkhans did not bring a new linguistic or religious identity to the Middle East. Unlike the Arabs, who changed both the language and the religion of the region, the Mongols were absorbed by Islam and Persian culture. In the reign of Ghazan, the Mongol and Turkish military elite converted to Islam and

began a new phase of creativity in Persian-Islamic culture. Later Mongol empires opened a new era of economic and cultural exchange across Asia. In an earlier era, the Arab conquests reached well into Inner Asia, making possible the export of Persian fruits, medicinal plants, and drugs to China and the importation of Chinese paper silks, porcelains, and other products. From about 1250 to 1350, exchanges between the Mongolian courts of China and Iran included not only regional products but also the travels of diplomats, scholars, merchants, and artisans, bringing important cultural and technological contacts.

The Ilkhans also resumed historical patterns of governance. The Mongol regime in Iran was made up of a single large army composed of a tribal aristocracy allied to the ruling dynasty. This aristocracy conceived of itself as a privileged people whose right to dominate and tax its subjects was enshrined in its supreme law, the *yasa*. The Mongols ruled Iran by distributing the land to military chiefs for pasturage or for tax revenues. The chiefs, in turn, divided it among their followers. Pasture and plow lands were combined in estates called *tuyul*, a concept that combined Mongolian ideas about the distribution of pasturage and Iranian administrative concepts about the distribution of the right to collect taxes. Mongol rule, moreover, depended – as did the preceding Saljuq regimes – on the support of local notable families. The Ilkhans allied themselves with Iranian urban bureaucrats, merchants, and scholars. Scholars continued or resumed their positions as local elites, filling the offices of judge, preacher, market inspector, and other posts. Urban elites – whose prestige was based on Islamic learning; whose social power was built on ownership of urban quarters, gardens, and village land and control of trusts (*awqaf*); and whose functions included financial and judicial administration – provided continuity in local government and buffered the impact of changing military regimes. They also provided the administrative personnel for the construction of successive Mongol and Timurid governments.

The Timurids

The Ilkhan regime lasted until 1336, when, like the Saljuq Empire, it dissolved into competing provincial states. The small successor states were in turn absorbed into a new empire established by Timur (d. 1405; famous in the West as Tamerlane) and his heirs, who introduced a new phase in the development of Iranian monarchical culture. Timur was a military adventurer who came to power by building up loyal bands of followers and defeating other chieftains. In 1370, he made Samarqand his capital and claimed to revive the house of Chinggis Khan and thus to be an heir to the Chaghatay branch of Mongol rulers in Transoxania. Timur and his successors considered themselves at once warrior conquerors, administrators in the Persian-Islamic tradition, and cultivated patrons of literature and the arts.

The Timurid military was composed of Turko-Mongolian, Chaghatay warriors in a standing (not tribal) army headed by clients of Timur. The amirs were also governors of provinces and advisors of the ruler. Timur appointed his sons and grandsons as provincial governors, but he was careful to restrict their power by frequently rotating the gubernatorial assignments, appointing generals and tax collectors who were directly responsible to him, and assigning his personal representatives to oversee their rule. At the same time, Timur continued the ongoing Persian-Islamic bureaucratic administration. Timur was supported by the local Muslim elites, including the chief jurisconsult of Samarqand and the Sufis who became his spiritual advisors. Muslim religious leaders served Timur as judges, diplomats, and tutors for young princes. They helped rally support from both nomadic and town populations to legitimize his new regime. The regime thus combined a Mongol patrimonial household guard and military elite with Persian bureaucratic administrative practices, thereby transforming a booty-seeking conquest into a routinized regime.

Once in power, Timur began his extraordinary conquests. From 1379 to 1402, zigzagging between east and west, he conquered Iran, northern India, Anatolia, and northern Syria. These conquests were made in the name of Islam. Timur's death in 1405 led to civil war among his heirs. Like the Saljuqs, the Timurids considered the ruling

family in its entirety as sovereign and all able warriors in the ruling family as eligible for succession. Indeed, the sons of Timur had already been allotted individual domains.

The successors of Timur carried on this rich tradition of patronage for Perso-Islamic culture. (See Table 5.) Under Ulugh-beg (r. 1404–49), Samarqand became a center of Muslim architectural, philosophic, and scientific achievement, generating a new variant of Mongol-Iranian-Islamic royal civilization. Muslim religious culture was represented in Samarqand by the Naqshbandi Sufis and their merchant and artisan followers. In Bukhara, Sufi leaders led revolts against political authorities, and Ulugh-beg sought to pacify them by endowing schools (*madrasas*) in both Bukhara and Samarqand. He also built a retreat (*khanaqa*) for Sufis and a great new mosque. The veneration of Muslim saints and Sufi *shaykhs* (masters or teachers) became one of the most important indications of the Timurid integration of Islamic principles. The accommodation of Timurid princes to the Sufi *shaykhs*, both Sunni and Shiʿi, provided the former with temporal legitimacy and religious prestige and the latter with state support and grants of landed income. The Kubrawi, Naqshbandi, Khalwati, Hurufi, and other Sufi movements prospered; the Khalwati appealed to the lower classes, and the Hurufis were considered heretical. After the death of Ulugh-beg, although Timurid princes remained nominally in power, effective local control was assumed by Khwaja Ahrar (d. 1490), a Naqshbandi holy man who denounced the lifestyle of the upper classes and had a strong influence on the army and the common people.

Table 5. *Iran: outline chronology*

Mongol conquests begin	1219
Ilkhan dynasty	1256–1336
Iran partitioned among several local regimes	1336–70
Conquest by Timur (Tamerlane)	1370–1405

Succession states	
Qara Qoyunlu, Azarbayjan	1380–1468
Aq Qoyunlu	1378–1508
Timurids of Samarqand	1370–1500
Timurids of Herat	1407–1506

Herat was the second principle center of Timurid Persian-Islamic culture. Shah Rukh (r. 1405–47) lived in an observant Muslim style, attending prayers, fasting during Ramadan, and listening to Quran recitations. Shah Rukh adopted the title of sultan, instead of adopting specifically Mongol honors, and publicly proclaimed his adherence to Islamic law, patronized Muslim learning, and enforced Muslim morals in the streets and markets. Shah Rukh built and embellished Muslim shrines – such as the shrine of Imam Riza at Mashhad, the tomb of ʿAbdullah Ansari at Gazargah near Herat, and the shrine at Mazar-i Sharif. His successor, Sultan Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–1506) also endowed numerous shrines of saints as expressions of piety, and as mechanisms for economic development. He purchased private properties to donate in trust (*waqf*) and turned over state lands to the shrine of the eleventh-century Sufi saint ʿAbdullah Ansari at Herat, the shrine of the eighth Shiʿi imam ʿAli Riza at Mashhad, and the shrine of ʿAli b. Abi Talib at Mazar-i Sharif near Balkh, all strategically located in rich agrarian oases. Through careful investment and agricultural and financial management, these shrines served as vehicles for economic development and for the enrichment of the military and bureaucratic elites and the Sufi brotherhoods.

Whereas Khurasan, Transoxania, Fars, Azarbayjan, and Central Asia were governed by a Chaghatay military elite, the central political fact of the Timurid era was that the regime did not have a monopoly of force. All strata of the population were politically organized and capable of military action. Local rulers maintained a measure of power and autonomy. Tribes were a military force. Princes who were

given land tax allotments and government positions to offset the power of the governors became independent lords. Artisans were organized under the leadership of town notables; regional armies were made up of peasants and artisans. Local as well as central military elites were contenders for power. The fate of would-be conquerors and reigning dynasties turned on whether tribes and townspeople would accept their authority. Thus, the cooperation of local elites was essential for the central government.

The state ruled through the mediation of local power holders. The administration was not so much a bureaucracy as an assemblage of notables drawn from financial and administrative officials, notable or scholarly families, and the landed and merchant elites. In their localities, notables exercised influence as a consequence of individual and family prominence rather than official or representative positions. The elites were expected but not required to contribute irrigation, mosques, bazaars, baths, and other public facilities. Timurid society functioned not through structured institutions but through a culture of personal loyalties and political entrepreneurship.

The western regions

Fatimid Egypt

Egypt and Syria were among the first Middle Eastern provinces to be absorbed into the Arab-Muslim caliphate. They were both conquered in 641, and their populations rapidly adopted the Arabic language, although they were slow to accept Islam. Under the Umayyad and early ʿAbbasid caliphates, Egypt was a subsidiary province, but from the middle of the ninth century, slave soldiers appointed by the ʿAbbasids established short-lived dynasties. The Tulunids ruled Egypt from 868 to 905 and the Ikhshidids from 935 to 969. In 969, the Fatimids conquered the country and established a new caliphate that lasted until 1171.

The Fatimid dynasty was not merely an independent governorship but a revolutionary regime that claimed universal authority. It had its origin in the Ismaʿili movement. The Qarmatians in the Fertile

Crescent and Arabia had roused peasant and bedouin opposition around 900. Similarly, the Fatimids incited Kitama Berbers to overthrow the Aghlabid regime of Tunisia in 909 and established a new government based on the claim of ʿUbaydallah to be the living imam. Under the leadership of the Fatimid imams, the Berbers conquered North Africa, Egypt, and parts of Syria. Based on Berber tribal forces and Turkish and Sudanese slave regiments, they controlled Egypt by means of an efficient administration inherited from the ʿAbbasids, staffed by Jewish and Christian officials. The agricultural riches of Egypt were augmented by the redirection of international trade. With the collapse of the ʿAbbasid Empire, the exchange of goods between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea was rerouted through the Red Sea and Egypt. The revived trade route favored the Egyptian economy and the Fatimid coffers. The Italian city-states brought metals, wood, and protein-rich cheese to Egypt. Silk came from Spain and Sicily. North Africa sent gold and silver and other metals, olive oil, hides, and leather. Egypt exported flax and sugarcane.

The Fatimid dynasty (969–1171), like the ʿAbbasids, claimed to be the true Islamic regime. This claim was advanced in the multiple vocabularies of Mediterranean civilization. The Fatimids presented an Ismaʿili, a philosophical, a Byzantine, and an ʿAbbasid symbolism of political authority. They proclaimed that they were the true imams, the descendants of ʿAli. (See Figure 6.) This declaration required a redefinition of the historical succession of imams and of the eschatological cycles of history. The Fatimids asserted that they were the continuation of the sixth cycle of imams and that the coming of the messiah and the closure of the historical cycles were postponed to the indefinite future. Under the auspices of the new theory, neo-Platonic and gnostic concepts were incorporated into Ismaʿili thinking. At the beginning of the tenth century, al-Nasafi, an Ismaʿili missionary in eastern Iran, taught that the universe was brought into being by divine emanations in the form of intellectual essences. The imams corresponded to these emanations. Through them, the believers would be initiated into spiritual truth; by gnostic illumination, they would become the Truth. The imam, then, was the center of faith – to

believe in him was to obey God. The palace was a spiritual as well as an administrative center.

'Ali (d. 661)

Hasan (d. 669)   Husayn (d. 680)

Zayn al-'Abidin (d. 714)

Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 731)

Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765)

Ismail (d. 760)

Muhammad al-Mahdi and
concealed imams

Fatimids

'Ubaydallah al-Mahdi (d. 934)

al-Qa'im (d. 946)

al-Mansur (d. 953)

al-Mu'tzz (d. 975)

al-'Aziz (d. 996)

al-Haidm (d. 1021)

al-Zahir (d. 1036)

al-Mustansir (d. 1094)

Nizar   Muhammad   al-Musta'I (d. 1101)

Number of
successors
uncertain

al-Hafiz (d. 1149)   al-Amir (d. 1130)

Ntzarts (Assassins)
Hasan-I Sabbah (da'I) (d. 1124)
Buzurg Ummid (d. 1138)

al-Zafir (d. 1154)   al-Tayyid (disappeared 1130)

Muhammad (d. 1162)

al-Fa'Iz (d. 1160)

Hasan II (d. 1166)

al-'Adid (d. 1171)

Muhammad II (d. 1210)

Tayyibis, hidden imams
to present

Hasan III (d. 1221)

Muhammad III (d. 1255)

Figure 6.   The Isma'ili imams.

Fatimid concepts of ruler and imperium were also expressed in court ceremony, art, and architecture. Emulating the rival 'Abbasid and Byzantine empires, the palace of the ruler was decorated with extraordinary splendor. Court decorations – some the gifts of foreign ambassadors, some of Byzantine manufacture, and some 'Abbasid relics – depicted his glory. A huge silk hanging with a map of all the lands of the world and their rulers expressed the Fatimid claim to belong to the family of kings. Fatimid paintings and illuminated manuscripts reflected the influence of the 'Abbasid court at Samarra. Fatimid ceramics were decorated with vegetal and animal themes (symbolizing good luck) and with hunters, musicians, dancers, and human figures (depicting court life). Their intent was to magically re-create the splendor of Fatimid rule.

Gold rafters supported the ceiling; rare birds and animals decorated the walls and the furniture; fountains of cascading water cooled the air. The ruler himself sat on a gold throne protected by a curtain in a fashion inspired by the 'Abbasids and resembling Byzantine enthronement. He was entitled to a special crown, sword, scepter, parasol, weapons, and other implements that were signs of his sovereignty. An elaborate protocol regulated eating, drinking, and dressing. One of the prerogatives of the ruler was deferential behavior in his presence – silence, dismounting, and kissing the ground. The protocol was also designed to signify the ranks of courtiers. The court was highly stratified, and the caliph could confer on his servitors symbols of rank and honor, such as weapons, banners, food, clothes, and robes of honor.

Court decorations and utensils were housed in royal treasuries, for they were not only useful ornamentations but rare and exotic objects reserved for the sole use of the sovereign and the court. In 1067, however, in the course of a civil war, the Fatimid treasury was looted and royal objects became accessible for imitation. Fatimid ceramics,

metalworks, and woodcraft inspired an Egyptian craft culture based on international imperial motifs.

Equally important were palace and public celebrations. Audiences with the caliph, formal processions, reviews of the soldiers, and receptions of ambassadors signified the sublime importance of the monarchy. The Fatimids gave an Isma'ili turn to Egyptian festivals that had no necessary connection to Shi'ism. Ramadan and New Year processions, the Shi'i festivals of 'ashura' and *ghadir khumm*, and the opening of the Nile canals brought the caliph and his entourage, arranged in order of rank, to the mosques of the city, where he delivered the sermon, celebrated the festivals, and displayed the magnificent and sacred objects of the Fatimid treasury. The holidays marking the end of Ramadan and of Hajj were celebrated with great banquets. Thus the caliph brought home to the populace the importance of the ruler both in the spheres of war and politics and in those of religion, nature, and magic.

The public architecture of the Fatimids was an extension of the ceremonial aspect of the royal court. The new Fatimid capital city, al-Qahira (Cairo), founded in 969, with its magnificent palaces and grand mosques, was an imperial city designed for imperial pageants. The principal mosques – al-Azhar and al-Hakim – were constructed with minarets and cupolas, which symbolized the preeminence of the imam and recalled the holy places of Mecca and Medina as a way of glorifying the ruler in the service of God and Islam.

The Fatimids further cultivated religious glory by sponsoring the cult of the family of 'Ali. The cult of saints had its roots in pre-Fatimid popular beliefs and practices, especially in the visitation of the cemeteries. The Fatimids initiated the celebration of the birth of Muhammad and constructed numerous mausoleums over the supposed graves of the family of 'Ali in order to encourage pilgrimage and to inculcate a popular enthusiasm for shrines and relics. Quranic inscriptions encouraged obedience to the imam and called on people to accept his authority as an expression of God's will. In 1153, the head of the martyr Husayn was moved from Ascalon, and a new mausoleum, Sayyidna al-Husayn, was constructed to house it. Pilgrims circumambulated the tomb, kissed his final resting place,

wept, and begged for the imam's favor. The graves of caliphs were considered holy, but they were buried in the palace precincts and could be venerated only by court personnel. From the eleventh century, wealthy officials and private persons also built mausoleums over their tombs. These constructions introduced artistic motifs, such as the stalactite decoration (*muqarnas*), facades with decorated gates and minarets, and the use of figural representation, which would become staple features of later royal Islamic art.

The new regime made Isma'ilism the state religion, and the Fatimids created an elaborate missionary and educational structure. The palace contained halls for the teaching of Isma'ili beliefs. Judges, missionaries, reciters of the Quran, and prayer leaders were regularly present for court ceremonies. Ministers patronized intellectuals and organized palace debates among Muslims, Jews, and Christians. The Fatimids sponsored palace and mosque lectures, research institutes, libraries, and an astronomical observatory. Their teachings, however, were directed at the regime elite, and they made no effort to change the allegiances of the Egyptian population. The Muslim population of Egypt remained predominantly Sunni, and Sunni schools of law flourished, especially in Alexandria.

The international missionary movement (*da'wa*) was in principle directed by the Fatimid imam in Egypt, but the provincial leaders had virtually complete autonomy. The Isma'ili missions reached North Africa, Sicily, the Lebanon, northern Iran, and India. The decline of the Fatimid caliphate, however, accentuated the contradiction between its revolutionary pretensions and the actualities of its Egyptian political base. The decline of caliphal authority led to schisms as the messianic and politically radical branches of the Isma'ili movement split off. In the Lebanon, the sectarians who believed that the Caliph al-Hakim (d. 1021) was the last imam and was indeed God himself established the Druze religion and community. Then, at the death of the Caliph al-Mustansir in 1094, his son al-Musta'li succeeded him, but the missionary movement in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iran cut itself off from the Fatimids in Egypt, broke with the parent regime, recognized al-Mustansir's son Nizar as the true imam, and founded a new branch of Isma'ilism. The Nizari

Isma'ilis, later known as the Assassins, would carry on the Isma'ili challenge to Sunni Islam.

With the shattering of the 'Abbasid Empire, Egypt emerged as a principal center of Arabic-Islamic civilization, but the rhythm of Fatimid history was similar to that of 'Abbasid history. The period from 969 to 1021 was one of political and religious consolidation. The second phase, from 1021 to 1073, saw a breakdown of political order, warfare between military factions, and the division of the country into land tax allotments controlled by the leading military officers. This decline was partially arrested by the administration of Badr al-Jamali and his son, al-Afdal, from 1073 to 1121, in which the military chiefs replaced the caliphs as the effective heads of government. In 1171, Saladin conquered Egypt, removed the Fatimid caliphs, and established a Sunni-oriented regime.

Syria and the Crusades

While the Fatimids ruled Egypt, Syria – a province characterized by numerous ecological and political zones (coastal, mountain, town, and desert) and exposed to multiple influences from Anatolia, the Mediterranean, Egypt, and Iraq – was divided into several small states. The Fatimids established their authority in southern Syria and took control of Damascus from 978 to 1076. Northern Syria, after a brief interlude of Hamdanid, Buwayhid, and Byzantine warfare, came under Byzantine control from 968 to 1086. The balance of power between the Byzantine and Fatimid empires allowed for a proliferation of bedouin principalities in Mesopotamia and northern Syria under the aegis of the 'Uqaylid (990–1096), Marwanid (983–1085), and Mirdasid (1023–79) dynasties. Southern Syria was in the hands of Kalb tribes. Towns such as Tripoli became independent city-states. Mountain populations in the Lebanon preserved their autonomy. In this fragmented condition, Syria was overrun by the Saljuqs. They conquered Damascus in 1079 and took Antioch and Aleppo in 1085. Syria was then divided between two Saljuq succession regimes, one based in Aleppo and one in Damascus.

Syria was subsequently exposed to yet another wave of invasions, this time by Latin crusaders. The Crusades had their origin, in part, in

already long-standing struggles between Western European Christians and their Byzantine and Muslim adversaries in the Mediterranean; Italian towns pushed back Muslim pirates. The Reconquista had begun in Spain and by 1085 Toledo was in Christian hands. In 1087, Pisa and Genoa destroyed Mahdiyya, the political and commercial capital of Muslim North Africa. The Normans conquered Sicily between 1061 and 1091 and moved on to attack the Byzantine Empire. The papacy encouraged the Crusades, because it was eager to reconcile the Greek and Western churches and to support the Byzantine Empire against the Saljuq Turks. It wanted to establish new states under its auspices in the eastern Mediterranean in order to spread the influence of the Latin church among Eastern Christians. Alongside these political currents ran a strong passion for pilgrimage to Jerusalem, the heavenly city, which symbolized salvation, penance, and the remission of sins. The Saljuq conquests raised European anxieties about access to Jerusalem and generated a passionate desire to secure the holy city in Christian hands.

These trends came together in 1096. Pope Urban II, speaking to an audience of restive warriors at Clermont in France, conscious of papal policy needs, and influenced by the pilgrimage sensibility, broached the idea of an armed pilgrimage to capture the holy places from the infidels. To those who would undertake this mission, Urban offered protection of property at home, new lands in the East, plenary indulgences, and the total remission of all temporal punishments that might be imposed by the church for the commission of past sins. His audience probably heard this as a promise of absolution from sin and of salvation.

By sea and by land, European warriors set out for the East. Between 1099 and 1109, they captured Edessa, Antioch, and Tripoli, and also established the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Baldwin was elected king, ruling as a feudal lord with the support of the Knights Templar and Hospitalers. Latin clergy took control of Christian administration in Palestine, but the Eastern Christian sects were not eliminated.

The Muslim response to the Crusades was slow to develop; when it did, it led eventually to the unification of Syria and Egypt into a single

Muslim state. The initial Muslim reaction was, by and large, indifference. Syria was so fragmented as to preclude any unified opposition to the intruders; several more little states among many did not much disturb existing interests. The fact that these new states were Christian was not exceptional – the Byzantines had also ruled northern Syria and, there was a substantial, if not a majority, local Christian population.

Gradually, however, a Muslim counterattack emerged in three phases. (See Map 8.) From 1099 to 1146 was the phase of Mesopotamian leadership. The Saljuq Atabegs of Mosul, who had nominal authority over Syria, attempted to create their own small empire in Mesopotamia and northern Syria. In 1128, a new governor of Mosul, Zengi (c. 1127–46), seized Aleppo; in 1144, he managed by chance to capture Edessa. When Zengi died in 1146, however, Mosul and Aleppo were severed from each other to make independent principalities for his surviving sons. Throughout this period, the Mosul campaigns were not primarily directed against the crusaders but were aimed at winning territory from either Muslim or Christian rulers whenever possible. There was little consciousness of Muslim-Christian antagonism per se. In fact, Christian and Muslim princelings often allied to resist Zengi's encroachments. A second phase began with the succession of Nur al-Din (c. 1146–74), the son of Zengi, who inherited Aleppo. Nur al-Din made the capture of Damascus his main goal. In 1147, he helped relieve the siege of Damascus by the Second Crusade. In 1154, a local rebellion expelled the ruling Saljuqid governors, and the populace of the city turned it over to Nur al-Din.

Map 8. Egypt and Syria, showing the crusader states in the twelfth century.

The Crusades revealed the underground growth of a new Muslim communal and religious spirit, which was frankly anti-Christian and opposed to the crusader presence. Jerusalem was the focus of a new Muslim self-awareness. The Dome of the Rock had been built in Jerusalem by the Umayyad caliphs to symbolize the Muslim continuation of the sacred past of Judaism and Christianity. In the course of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, Jewish and Christian ideas about Jerusalem were assimilated into Islamic teachings. Jerusalem was an axis of communication between this world and the next. It became venerable to Muslims as part of their own prophetic history, because Muhammad was believed to have ascended to heaven from Jerusalem. Refugees waged a literary and religious campaign about the merits of Jerusalem and the importance of jihad. By the middle of the twelfth century, this sentiment had become a popular force, and this helps to account for the surrender of Damascus to Nur al-Din, who was at the time seen as the Muslim prince who would redeem Jerusalem.

In fact, the reign of Nur al-Din in Damascus from 1154 to 1174 was concentrated not on the redemption of Jerusalem but on the consolidation of his little kingdom in Syria. He made treaties with the Byzantines and the Latins and concentrated on the conquest of Mosul, which he took in 1170, thus fulfilling a family ambition to reunite Syria and Mesopotamia. He also entered into the struggle for control of Egypt. With the Fatimid regime in total disarray and Amalric (the Latin King of Jerusalem) maneuvering to seize the country, in 1169 Nur al-Din sent his general Shirkuh and Shirkuh's nephew Salah al-Din (Saladin) with Muslim forces to take control of Egypt. In 1171, they removed the last of the Fatimid caliphs and established a Sunni regime. The histories of Egypt and Syria would be joined until the nineteenth century.

The advent of Saladin to the sultanate of Egypt opened a third phase of the Muslim response to the Crusades. From Egypt, Saladin brought Syria and Mesopotamia into a single Muslim state. In 1174, he took Damascus; in 1183, Aleppo; in 1186, Mosul. He then defeated the crusaders at the Battle of Hattin (1187) and brought an end to the Latin occupation of Jerusalem. At the siege of Acre (1192),

however, Saladin made a truce with Richard the Lion-Heart, which allowed the crusading principalities to maintain their foothold on the coasts of Palestine and Syria.

On Saladin's death in 1193, his family, the Ayyubids, succeeded to the rule of Egypt (to 1250) and Syria (to 1260). The family divided his empire into the smaller kingdoms of Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul in accordance with the Saljuq idea that the state was the patrimony of the royal family. Nonetheless, the Ayyubids did not revert to the fragmentation of earlier regimes. The sultan of Egypt usually managed to assert his suzerainty over the rest of the family and to make use of family loyalties to integrate the regime. The Ayyubids ruled Egypt and Syria through a military aristocracy composed of Kurdish and Turkish troops and some slave forces. In Syria they adopted the Saljuq land tax allotment (*iqtaʿ*) system, took over the feudal estates of the Latin crusaders, and converted Latin church properties into endowments for Muslim institutions. They administered Egypt by the age-old bureaucratic system that prevailed in that country and by the distribution of feudal lands (*iqtaʿs*) to leading military officers.

The Ayyubids were notably reluctant to continue the struggle against the remaining crusader principalities. Having achieved a tenuous unity and a prosperous Mediterranean trade between Syria and Egypt and the ports of Italy and Europe, the Ayyubids drew back from the struggle for Palestine and gave priority to the protection of Egypt. Realizing that Egypt was the key to the recovery of the holy land, the Christians attacked it in 1197, 1217, 1229, and 1249. In 1217, to divert the crusaders from Egypt, al-Kamil (1218–38) offered concessions in Palestine. In 1229, the Ayyubids negotiated a treaty with Frederick II, agreeing to return Jerusalem to Christian hands on the condition that the city would not be fortified and that the temple area would remain open to Muslim pilgrims. Thus, the Ayyubids gave preference to political and economic over religious and symbolic considerations. However deep Muslim anti-Christian sentiment might be, its effective expression still required that religious feeling correspond to the interests of the political elite.

The Mamluk empire

In 1250, the Ayyubid house was overthrown by a rebellion of one of its Mamluk or slave regiments, which killed the last Ayyubid ruler of Egypt and named one of its own officers, Aybeg, as the new sultan. The Mamluks defended Syria against the Mongols at the Battle of 'Ayn Jalut in 1260, crushed the last of the independent Syrian principalities, expelled the remaining crusader states by 1291, and expanded the boundaries of their empire into the upper Euphrates Valley and Armenia. Thus, they were able to unify Egypt and Syria until the Ottoman conquest in 1517. This was the longest-lived Muslim state in the Middle East between the 'Abbasid and the Ottoman empires.

The Mamluk era was noted for the perfection of the post-'Abbasid slave military system. Before the Mamluk period, slave regiments had been employed in all Middle Eastern armies, but the Mamluks, like the Ghaznavids, were based entirely on the slave military machine. The elite personnel of the regime, including the sultan, were slaves or former slaves. In principle, although there were important exceptions, no one could be a member of the military elite unless he was of foreign origin (usually Turkish or Circassian), purchased and raised as a slave, and trained to be a soldier and administrator. No native of Egypt or Syria could ever belong to this elite, nor, in principle, could the sons of slaves. The raison d'être of this arrangement was that every man who served the regime belonged entirely to the state and was without any family or local ties to compromise his total dedication to his master and to the service of the military caste.

Mamluks were purchased from abroad at the age of ten or twelve, converted to Islam, and raised in barracks, where they not only learned military technique but were imbued with loyalty to their masters and to their comrades-in-arms. On graduating from the barrack schools, the fully trained Mamluks served either in the sultan's Mamluk regiment or as soldiers in the service of other leading officers. The officers possessed their own personal slaves apart from the regiments of the sultan. A Mamluk army, then, may be imagined as a grouping of slave regiments, made up of the sultan's troops and of the regiments loyal to individual officers, who were in turn

personally loyal to the sultan. This army was not organized so much by hierarchy of rank as by personal allegiance.

In Mamluk Egypt, the bureaucratic tradition of Egypt and the land tax allotments of Syria were combined. The tax revenues of Egypt and Syria were assigned to pay the salaries of the sultan and the Mamluk officers, but the central bureaucracy kept close control over taxation. The bureaucracy made surveys to determine the available resources and to prevent the Mamluks from acquiring excessive revenues or other rights in the countryside. With the decline of the Mamluk state in the late fourteenth century, central controls became less effective, and the amirs usurped the revenues of the land tax allotments.

The need to legitimize the regime led to a program of imperial and court ceremony and of cultural patronage designed to glorify the rulers. The presence at court of the caliph and the chief judges, the guardianship of the annual pilgrimage caravan to the holy places of Mecca and Medina, the formal presence of the sultan in the Hall of Justice, and the celebration of Islamic religious feasts emphasized the religious importance of the regime. The magical as well as religious aspects of royal power were also celebrated. The ruler was revered as someone who had in his control the powers of the cosmos. A good ruler could bring rain and abundant harvests; a bad ruler could bring ruin. The tomb of al-Mansur Qalawun (r. 1279–90) copied features of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem to signify the Mamluk pretension to be heirs to the glory of the first Islamic dynasty. In a similar spirit, royal libraries were provided with copies of Persian illuminated manuscripts telling of the conquests of Alexander the Great and the histories of Persian kings. Late Mamluk-era culture was rich in Persian and Ottoman influences. The cosmopolitan heritage of Mamluk Egypt was also reinforced by the migration of Iranian, Turkish, Spanish, and Mesopotamian craftsmen and scholars, who brought with them metalwork, textile, ceramic, and building crafts, which were adopted by the Mamluks to adorn the life of the court and the military aristocracy. The religious and cosmopolitan aspects of Mamluk court culture were tempered by a parochial ethnic and military emphasis. The Mamluk court listened to Turkish and Circassian poetry; they reveled in military reviews,

tournaments, and displays of martial arts. In the course of this effort to legitimize themselves, the Mamluks left a distinctive Egyptian-Islamic artistic legacy.

The Ayyubids and the Mamluks also continued the Saljuq policy of strong state support for and control of Islam. The decisive force behind Ayyubid- and Mamluk-era Egyptian culture was the commitment of the state to Sunni rather than Shiʻi Islam. The early Mamluk period was dominated by intense Muslim religious feeling expressed in warfare against the crusaders, the Mongols, and the Ismaʻilis, and hostility to Christians and Jews, coupled with pressures for the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. In addition, both the Ayyubids and the Mamluks sponsored a revival of Sunni Islamic religious activity. In the Ayyubid period (1193–1260) there were no fewer than 255 religious structures built in Damascus. This was followed by an equally intense period of construction in the first century of Mamluk rule, at the instance of governors, generals, judges, and rich merchants. The Ayyubids and Mamluks also followed Fatimid precedents by constructing tombs for venerated Muslim ancestors and for deceased rulers. One of the first Ayyubid projects was the construction of a madrasa near the grave of al-Shafiʻi, the founder of the principal Egyptian school of law. Colleges and *khanaqas* came to be provided with mausoleums for the remains of their founders. A tomb advertised the sanctity of the ruler, and his devotion to Islam.

A characteristic architectural design emerged for the religious architecture of this period. Mosques, madrasas, and *khanaqas* were often built with an open central courtyard surrounded by four galleries or *liwans* on the principal sides of the courtyard, with the intervening spaces filled in with rooms for students. The mausoleum itself was often topped by a dome, and the whole structure provided with tall, slender minarets. Such buildings, clustered along main streets or in the cemeteries, created a vast visual display, shaped the physical fabric of the city, and symbolized the integral relation of the state, Islam, and the urban society. With strong state support, the schools of law became the foci for the spread of Islamic teaching among the common people. In Damascus, lawyers issued legal advice,

preachers exhorted the general populace, and religious manuals instructed the people.

In Syria and Egypt, the Saljuq succession states converted the routine patronage of the ʿ*ulama*ʾ (legal scholars and teachers) and Sufis into a system of state control. Nur al-Din selected the appointees to judicial and teaching offices and created a supervisory post for the administration of Sufi *khanaqas*. He pioneered a policy of making the ʿ*ulama*ʾ and Sufis directly dependent on state patronage and appointments. Saladin appointed a chief judge (*qadi*) and a chief *shaykh* for the Sufis. In 1263, Sultan Baybars (1260–77) appointed a chief *qadi* for each of the four major schools of law, a chief *shaykh* (master, teacher) for the Sufis, and a syndic for the corporation of descendants of the Prophet (*naqib al-ashraf*). Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi *shaykhs*, prayer leaders, and other Muslim officials. They paid the salaries of religious personnel, endowed their schools, and thus brought the religious establishment into a state bureaucracy. Never did the state attempt to define the content of religious teaching. Thus, the Mamluks extended the Saljuq-Iranian pattern of organized religious life to Syria and Egypt. Owing to this strong support for Islam, Mamluk royal culture emphasized its Islamic rather than its cosmopolitan bases. It was thus typical of the tendency in the Arab provinces to legitimize states in Muslim rather than universalist terms.

Military Slavery

New institutional arrangements characterized the post-imperial era. All post-ʿAbbasid regimes included an alien military elite. The Buwayhid, Ghaznavid, Qarakhanid, and Saljuq regimes were built by ethnic minorities, including mercenaries from the Caspian Sea and nomadic Turkish peoples from Inner Asia. These elites had no ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or historical connection with the peoples they ruled. Nomadic forces were supplemented by a praetorian guard of slave soldiers organized to offset the influence of the nomadic elites. These slaves were commonly purchased in Inner Asia while still young and then raised at the courts of their masters. Every regime followed a policy of pitting slave regiments against one another to maintain the

authority of the ruler. Occasionally, as in the Ghaznavid case, the slaves seized control of the state, and the leading generals became sultans. They were not hereditary, landed, or aristocratic and depended on the continuous recruitment of new cadres.

The slave elites were organized as households, held together by interests, surrogate kinship, and patronage. The patronage of an amir or a sultan who raised, trained, and empowered his men created a lifelong obligation and affection like the relation of parent and child. Such ties might last for generations. Loyalties were created by the giving and taking of benefits. Oaths of allegiance, such as the oath of allegiance to a caliph or to a prominent official, were even used to consolidate conspiracies to seize power.

Military slavery and slave states were peculiar institutions. However, the translation of the word "*ghulam*" or "*mamluk*" into English as "slave" carries inappropriate connotations. The concept of *ghulam* or *mamluk* designated a binding personal obedience but not necessarily a humble situation in society. In its Arab-Muslim sense, the slave soldier was the personal property of a master and could be bought and sold. He was a servile retainer, depending on the master for security and support. The social position of the slave, however, did not reflect his personal servitude but rather reflected the status of his master. The slave of the sultan could be a general or minister of state, and the slave of a general could be an officer in the army or administration. Furthermore, military slaves were eventually manumitted and became freedmen, clients of their former masters, which gave them limited legal rights to property, marriage, and personal security. In this institution, the exclusive personal loyalty of the slave or client soldier to his master was crucial.

The *iqta*ʿ System and Middle Eastern Feudalism

The system of state fiscal administration was closely related to military organization. ʿAbbasid government had been based on bureaucratic methods of taxation and disbursements to the court and the army. The central government staffs collected revenues from the

countryside and made payments in cash and kind to the officials and soldiers who served the state. With the decline of ʿAbbasid administration, the central bureaucracy progressively lost control of the countryside; with the advent of the Buwayhid dynasty in 945, soldiers were for the first time assigned *iqtaʿs* (land tax allotments) in payment for military service. The Ghaznavids adopted a similar system, and the Saljuqs extended this means of paying the army from Iraq and western Iran to Khurasan. They also introduced the system into Syria and eventually, under the Ayyubid dynasty, into Egypt.

The terms of assignments varied considerably. In the Ghaznavid and early Saljuq cases, a strong central government maintained control over the assigned lands. Assignees were held to their military responsibilities and rotated at the will of the ruler; hereditary succession was not permitted. Central government officials kept registers indicating the value of the tax assignment, the number of troops to be provided, and the terms of service.

Later in the Saljuq period, the central government was unable to maintain control. Land tax allotments became hereditary, and the assignees usurped the land and turned their tax-collecting rights into private property. The assignees became landlords over peasants. Hereditary control of rural districts in the hands of military assignees gave rise to virtually independent principalities in Mesopotamia and Syria. The Saljuq practice of giving appanages to the members of the ruling family, the encouragement to independence inherent in the institution of the *atabeg*, the decline of central checks on the authority of provincial governors, the widespread assignment of salary *iqtaʿs*, and the usurpation of *iqtaʿs* dispersed political power. Saljuq administrative practices led to a drastic fragmentation of political power and to the substitution of small principalities for large-scale states.

Many scholars have referred to these changes as a period of Middle Eastern feudalism. The decline of the ʿAbbasid Empire may be seen as parallel to the breakup of the Roman Empire and the widespread distribution of *iqtaʿs* in the Middle East as analogous to the widespread distribution of fiefs in Europe. European feudalism

also had its origin in the breakup of a centralized state (the Carolingian Empire) and the distribution of land to a multitude of small lords in France in the late tenth and eleventh centuries. In fact, however, the Middle Eastern development is different from the European. The essence of feudalism did not lie simply in the decentralization of power and in the multiplication of numerous and relatively small principalities; rather, it lay in certain characteristic institutions governing the relationships between the peasant populations and their lords and the relationships among the lords themselves.

In European feudalism, the relationship of peasant and lord was defined by the manor, an agricultural estate made up of the residence of the lord and his private properties surrounded by the small plots of the peasants. The manor, when assigned to a lord by his overlord as a benefice, was a grant of the services of peasants, who became tenants of the lord and owed him economic dues for the use of the land. Benefices, moreover, were also conceded with immunity from central inspection. Then the lord was made judge, and his tenants became his political subjects. Finally, and perhaps most important, they became his personal servitors as well. They could not leave the land, and their heirs were automatically serfs. They had to work his lands; they were conveyable by him; they had to ransom the right to marry and to pass on their property. The economic powers of the landlord and the fiscal and jurisdictional rights of the state were united with the power of the patriarch over his household. The combination of powers defined the manor as a fief.

In the twelfth century, some hierarchical order was brought into the distribution of fiefs, and they came to be considered as the concession of a higher lord to one of his vassals in return for military service. All lords of fiefs were in principle the vassals of higher-ranking lords. The king, highest lord of all, was the source of everyone's tenures and jurisdictions. In the feudal system, the relationships among lords were not governmental relations of superior to subordinate but were relations of personal dependence. A vassal was the sworn client of his lord, exchanging service and devotion for protection and support. The relation between vassal and lord, moreover, was a contractual one, in which violation of the

agreement on either side resulted in the termination of the contract, the dismissal or withdrawal of the vassal from service, and the return of the fief to the lord. One crucial aspect of this relationship was that disputes were judged in a court composed of other vassals. Every vassal, as part of his obligations and rights, had to attend his lord's court for the settlement of disputes between the vassals and the lord and the judgment of other matters.

Time and the weakness of lords in France favored the entrenchment of vassals in their fiefs. The fief ceased to be granted solely on condition of service but became a hereditary right. Eventually all connections with military service and clientage were dissociated from the possession of a fief, which became simply a hereditary governmental jurisdiction and personal property.

As inheritable property, the possession of a fief also defined the social status of the warrior class. A fief not only meant economic rights, personal servants, and governmental jurisdiction but also conferred the privileges of nobility. Feudalism thus became not only a system that confounded public and private powers but also a kind of society in which function or occupation, social status, political power, styles of life and culture, and economic wealth were all tied to the possession of land.

The Middle Eastern system was not feudal in this European sense. Indeed, the collapse of the ʿAbbasid Empire led to a decentralization of political authority, to the emergence of many petty rulers, and to the distribution of land in *iqtaʿs*, but the situation differed in several ways. In the Middle East, the idea of public authority and the distinctions between governmental powers and personal possessions and rights were never abandoned. However decentralized the powers of government became, a subordinate was never considered a vassal but was always a delegate of the ruler. The ruler assigned a post to an official, and he could unilaterally, at his pleasure, remove his agent from office. He made no contracts with his appointees and gave them no rights to be consulted. It was common in the Middle East for the governor to be a personal dependent of the sultan, just as the vassal in Europe was a personal dependent, but still the relations were different. The vassal was a free man who contracted his dependency,

whereas dependents in the Muslim world were slaves or freedmen. Also in the Middle East, the personal relationship did not entirely substitute for the political relationship. It was not the personal relationship as such but the designation of the ruler that conferred authority on a governor.

A second difference was the distinction between an *iqtaʿ* and a fief. In principle, an *iqtaʿ* was a grant of the right to collect taxes and to keep them in lieu of salary, a mechanism to decentralize the collection and disbursement of revenues due to the state. In principle, *iqtaʿs* were conceded only on condition of military service being rendered and were valid only for the lifetime of the incumbent. They could be increased or decreased, revoked, or reassigned by the ruler. An *iqtaʿ* was not a personal property; it could not be sold, leased, or willed. Nor was it a government jurisdiction; it brought no political, judicial, or personal powers over the peasants, who were considered subjects of the state, and not serfs or slaves of the *iqtaʿ* holder. Nor did the possession of an *iqtaʿ* confer status privileges or legal rights. The status of the holder had nothing to do with the land but was determined by his rank and duties as a soldier or administrator and his closeness to the ruler. Finally, *iqtaʿs* could not be reassigned to subordinates. Officers were responsible for bringing men to service in proportion to the size of their *iqtaʿs*, but in principle they did not pay their men by granting them land tax allotments in turn.

In practice, certain powers not originally envisaged in the grants of an *iqtaʿ* were usurped. Often an *iqtaʿ* gave the holder enough local wealth to accumulate other properties and, eventually, by merging his *iqtaʿ* with other lands, to make it hereditary private property as well. Furthermore, *iqtaʿ* holders might force the peasants to surrender their land and to become personal dependents. In some cases, *iqtaʿ* holders even acquired governmental powers by usurpation or immunities. When coupled with private power over land and peasants, this created a fief-like or "feudal" condition. Such aberrations, even though widespread in the Saljuq period, never became a recognized system of governmental relations. Muslim rulers always maintained substantial slave bodyguards and the scribal staffs and records essential to the enforcement of obligations

and the utilization of *iqtaʿs* as a component of state power. Although some *iqtaʿs* became fiefs, a feudal system did not materialize. In the Middle East, then, decentralization entailed no fundamental institutional changes and could, in changed circumstances, be reversed. Imperial governments could and would be reconstructed by the later Mamluk, Ottoman, and Safavid empires.

Thus, from 950 to 1200, the unity of the ʿAbbasid age was lost. Still, despite the numerous different regimes, certain uniformities in the political concepts and institutions of the period emerged. The supremacy of the caliphate and of the Islamic identity it represented was universally accepted, whereas effective political power was conceded to nomadic conquerors and slave warlords. Similar institutions of nomadic family practice, military slavery, and *iqtaʿ* administration were developed, with variations, throughout the region. Everywhere the political concepts and military and administrative institutions adumbrated in the ʿAbbasid age were integrated with the institutions and concepts of the nomadic conquerors and worked into a new system of government. In an era of unprecedented fragmentation of power and instability, these institutions were similar throughout the region. They constituted, via numerous small experiments, an enduring legacy in the experience of Middle Eastern Islamic government.

Royal courts and regional cultures: Islam in Persian garb

The new system of Middle Eastern states also opened a new era in the development of aristocratic and cosmopolitan Islamic culture. The post-imperial era reveals two dominant trends. One was the continuation of ʿAbbasid tendencies toward the bifurcation of Islamic cosmopolitan and Islamic religious culture, although, in many respects, an intimate relationship was maintained between the two. Art and architecture, poetry, science, and certain forms of prose literature were usually expressions of court, regime, and governing elites, but court patronage also extended to Islamic religious studies. Some genres, such as history, political studies, and some forms of

philosophy and theology, were cultivated in both court and private urban milieus.

The second trend was toward regional diversity. As Baghdad dwindled, Samarqand and Bukhara, Nishapur and Isfahan, Cairo, Fez, and Cordova became the new capitals of Islamic civilization. In place of the single cosmopolitan court culture, each capital generated its own blend of Islamic motifs and local heritage. Islamic architecture differed from region to region. Samanid brickwork, Ghaznavid minarets, Isfahan domes, and Fatimid shrines were emblematic of a new cultural diversity.

Within this diversity, there was a tendency to divide the former regions of the ʿAbbasid Empire into two linguistic and cultural zones. In the western regions – including Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, and the lands of the far Islamic west, including North Africa and Spain – Arabic became the predominant language of both high literary culture and spoken discourse. In the eastern lands – including Iran and Transoxania – Persian became the predominant literary language. During this period the poems and epics of the east would be composed in Persian, whereas the odes and quatrains of Baghdad and Cordova would be written in Arabic. The two cultural regions, however, continued to share a common system of religious values and institutions.

In the post-ʿAbbasid era, Baghdad maintained its position as a capital of Islamic religious and Arabic literary studies. Baghdadi poetry continued to follow ninth-century forms; the *qasida* or panegyric and the *ghazal* or lyric were still the most important forms of poetic expression. Al-Mutanabbi (d. 965) and Abu al-ʿAlaʾ al-Maʿrri (d. 1057) were the most important poets. Sufi poetry celebrated ecstatic experiences in the imagery of the intoxication of wine and love. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, under the influence of Ibn Qutayba's compilations, anthologies of poetry, history, and other subjects were composed. Arabic letter writing and secretarial correspondence became an art of elaborate rhymed prose displaying great technical skill. The *Maqamat* of al-Hariri (d. 1122), done in virtuoso prose and with philological subtlety, was perhaps the greatest achievement of this type. Historical writing also flourished.

Histories of the caliphate were superseded by new world histories, city histories, collections of biographies, and historical anecdotes written to entertain and enlighten. Arabic prose literature was profoundly influenced by a new literary criticism that insisted on formal qualities in writing and deemphasized novelty or significance in content.

In the eastern provinces of the ʿAbbasid Empire, a Persian literary and artistic revival generated a parallel Muslim civilization. Persian culture developed in a multitude of places over a period of many centuries but was nonetheless strikingly unified. Persian culture drew on deep and wide-ranging roots. Ancient Mesopotamian law, Zoroastrian mythology, Buddhist mysticism, Indian mathematics and literature, and Hellenistic philosophy all flourished in the early Islamic era. In the ninth century, Sijistan, Khurasan, and Transoxania; the courts of the Tahirids of Nishapur and Marw; the Samanids of Bukhara; and the Ghaznavids were the primary centers for the patronage of a new phase in Persian linguistic, literary, and artistic development pursued by Iranian courtiers, administrators, scholars, painters, and poets. In the late tenth and eleventh centuries, the new Persian language and literature written in Arabic script and created in eastern Iran became the literature of western Iran. In later generations, Saljuqs, Ghurids, Ilkhans, and Timurids produced their own contributions to the common culture. Persian culture not only became the characteristic style of Iran but also had an important influence on the development of Muslim culture in Inner Asia, India, and Indonesia. Persian literary and artistic styles superseded Arabic as the predominant cultural influence in the formation of the eastern Islamic world.

The development of new Persian was conditioned by two factors. One was the linguistic situation in eastern Iran just prior to the Arab conquests. In late Sasanian times, Parsi (Pahlavi) or Middle Persian was the official religious and literary language of the empire. Dari was the dialect version of this language spoken throughout much of Iran. Alongside formal Parsi and spoken Dari, poets and entertainers cultivated a popular oral literature for the amusement of the common people and the local lords, also expressed in a version of Dari. All

three levels of Persian would contribute to the formation of the new Persian language.

The second factor was the Arab-Muslim conquests. Under Arab rule, Arabic became the principal language for administration and religion. The substitution of Arabic for Middle Persian was facilitated by the translation of Persian classics into Arabic. Arabic became the main vehicle of Persian high culture and remained as such well into the eleventh century. Parsi declined and was kept alive mainly by the Zoroastrian priesthood in western Iran. The Arab conquests, however, helped make Dari rather than Arabic the common spoken language in Khurasan, Afghanistan, and the lands beyond the Oxus River. Paradoxically, Arab-Islamic domination created a Persian cultural region in areas never before unified by Persian speech.

The new Persian language evolved out of this complex linguistic situation. In the ninth century, the Tahirid governors of Khurasan (820–73) began to have the old Persian language written in Arabic script rather than in Pahlavi characters. At the same time, eastern Iranian lords in the small principalities began to patronize local court poetry in an elevated form of Dari. The new poetry was inspired by Arabic verse forms, so that Iranian patrons who did not understand Arabic could comprehend and enjoy the presentation of an elevated and dignified poetry in the manner of Baghdad. This new poetry flourished in regions where the influence of 'Abbasid Arabic culture was attenuated and where it had no competition from the surviving tradition of Middle Persian literary classics cultivated for religious purposes – as in western Iran.

The new poetry borrowed both from Arabic literary forms and oral Iranian literature. The *qasida* became its chief expression. Based on Arabic rhyming schemes, it was used mainly for panegyrics praising Iranian princes. Oral Persian poetry contributed a distinctive rhythmic pattern. The most important early poets in the new vein were the Samanid court poets Rudaki (d. 940–41), who was considered the father of the new Persian poetry, and Daqiqi (d. c. 980), who was especially successful in conveying daily life in his poems. Bilingual poets translated Arabic poems into Persian and began to compose poems of their own in both Arabic and Persian.

The Persian literary heritage of stories, romances, fables, and dynastic histories also formed the basis of a new type of epic poetry. The Samanids revived Iranian interest in the ancient history of kings and in the literary collections of the Sasanian period. From the pen of Firdawsi (d. 1020–21 or 1025–26) emerged an immense historical epic. His *Shah-name* or *Book of Kings* contains not only the court histories collected by the Sasanians but also a cycle concerning the life of the great hero Rustam. For patrons who were attempting to legitimize their rule by virtue of their historical descent from ancient Iranian rulers and their emulation of ancient Iranian virtues, Firdawsi composed a new epic preoccupied with sovereignty, feudalism, and the war of good and evil. Poems written in the new Persian language with a moderate influence of Arabic vocabulary became the literary standard of the new era.

Prose was equally important in the new Persian language. The historical works of al-Tabari were translated, and a small number of geographical, philosophic, and scientific works were written in Persian. Commentaries on the Quran, mystical treatises, and legal and other religious texts were translated from Arabic. Such works were generally written in a utilitarian style without the elaborate literary pretensions of lyric and epic poetry. Under the influence of these translations and new compositions, Dari became more and more highly Arabized, and Persian evolved into "new Persian," which was heavily influenced by Arabic vocabulary and syntax.

This new language and literature flourished at other regional courts. Mahmud of Ghazna (d. 1030) sought the help of poets to legitimize his regime. Mahmud patronized Unsuri (d. 1039/40), whose *qasida* celebrated court festivals, the changing of the seasons, royal entertainments, and the pleasures of music and wine. Mahmud was also the patron of Firdawsi, the scientist and geographer Biruni, and a host of historians who chronicled the events of the era. Poetry also flourished brilliantly in the Saljuq courts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The poets moved from court to court looking for patrons, giving continuity and unity to a literary activity carried on in numerous places throughout Iran.

Under Samanid and Ghaznavid patronage, the new Persian literature favored several poetic and prose genres. Poetry was commonly composed in one of four metric forms. The *ghazal* is a lyric poem of some seven to fifteen lines on the theme of love that expresses private sentiments but in standard images and symbols – such as the nightingale in love with the rose. The *ruba'i*, or quatrain, was a lyric that usually expressed mystical or profane love. The *masnavi*, or rhyming couplet, was a loose form used for narratives such as tales, romances, legends, and histories. Persian literature was rich in such materials, including the tales of Sindbad, the heroic accounts of the life of Alexander the Great, the fables of *Kalila wa-Dimna*, and the lives of saints. A characteristic product of court poets was panegyrical poems produced for money in *qasida* and sometimes in *masnavi* form. Characteristically, the poems contained images of the king as ruler over cities, generous in gifts, noble in ancestry. The most important representative of this type of poetry was Anvari (d. 1189), who lived at times in Marw, Nishapur, and Balkh. Persian poets did not aim at self-expression, originality, creativity, or personal insight. Poetry was a public recitation, an adornment for court life, and the main value was virtuosity in handling familiar forms and content. This was a poetry of masks that wandered from theme to theme, so as to be a vehicle of sensuous appreciations or philosophical thoughts.

In Azarbayjan, romantic poetry was favored. Courtly romances based not on personal experience but on literary convention told the stories of heroes consumed by physical passion and heroes who sublimated their love into an idealization of a perfect but inaccessible woman. Court poetry dwelt on the theme of the lover who suffers just for a glance, while his only comfort is wine. Perhaps the most important writer in this genre was Nizami (d. 1209), who wrote the stories of Alexander's quest for the water of life; the love story of Shirin and the emperor Khusraw Parviz; and the story of Majnun, who became mad with longing for Layla, whom he could never attain. Nizami's poetry brought a vernacular vocabulary into the high Persian poetic tradition.

In Sufi poetry, images of wine, drinking, and love were adopted to express yearning for and love of God. The most important writer of this genre was Farid al-Din ʿAttar (d. 1221), who was famous for his histories of the Sufis and his books of wisdom, the *Language of the Birds* and the *Book of God*, whose principal themes were renunciation of worldly desires and the soul's journey toward metaphysical vision. His works describe the forty stations of the visionary and cosmic passage by which the traveler progressively leaves behind this world in his quest for the world to come. Rumi (d. 1273) was perhaps the greatest of the Persian mystical poets seeking the identification of the human self with the divine being. His *Mathnavi* combined impassioned lyrics with gentle storytelling, merging profane and mystical themes. Persian poetry would continue to inspire brilliant composition throughout Iran, Inner Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. Saʿdi (c. 1213–91) and Hafiz (c. 1320/25–88/89) in Iran, Rumi (1207–73) in Anatolia, Amir Khusrau Dihlavi (1253–1325) in Delhi, and Jami (1414–92) in Herat are among the great names of succeeding centuries.

With the blossoming of Persian literature, Islamic culture was no longer wholly identified with Arabic. Then, under the auspices of the Qarakhanids, who succeeded the Samanids as the rulers of Transoxania, Islamic culture was re-created in Turkish. A new Turkish language, developed first by translation and then by scholarly and literary re-creation of Persian literature, became the bearer of Islamic civilization throughout Inner Asia. Islam was becoming a universal religion and civilization in several linguistic media.

The visual arts became as important as the literary. In the ninth century, under the influence of Chinese wares, Nishapur and Samarqand produced white pottery decorated with Kufic writing. Pottery decorated with animals, birds, and vegetal elements was made to please an urban middle-class taste; silver and gold objects were produced in imitation of Sasanian models. Kashan and Rayy produced new types of ceramics. One type was a blue-black or turquoise floral with calligraphic design under glaze; another was a polychrome painting over glaze in which court scenes or historic legends were depicted. The court scenes included hunting, polo,

music, and dancing. The objects were illustrated with astronomical signs. Ceramics were often decorated with texts on the theme of love. Another type of ceramic depicted one or two persons sitting together, sometimes playing a musical instrument, perhaps an illustration of love or meditation. Ceramic manufacture of this sort continued until the middle of the fourteenth century.

In architecture, the most important buildings were the tombs of holy men and rulers. These were covered by a dome and surrounded by a complex of buildings dedicated to worship and study. The most famous of these was the Samanid mausoleum at Bukhara built before 943 and the Gumbad-i Qabus dated 1006–07. Mosques with cupolas, round minarets, and monumental arcades derived from Iranian precedents were also built. By the middle of the eleventh century, the characteristic features of Iranian architecture included brick construction, arcades, stalactite projections, and stucco decorated with geometric and vegetal designs to cover the surfaces of large buildings.

By the twelfth century, in the Saljuq era, a new standard form of mosque architecture spread throughout Iran and replaced the earlier Arab-inspired mosque built around a colonnaded courtyard. The new design consisted of a large central courtyard surrounded by arcades, the largest being on the *qibla* (toward Mecca) side of the mosque and surmounted by a large dome.

The mosques were built mainly of brick and with pointed barreled vaults. They also had *muqarnas* (stalactite-like projections) at the junctions between the domes and the substructures. In addition to mosques, numerous tower tombs and mausoleums with cupolas were built in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, especially in Azarbayjan and Transoxania.

The patronage of the Mongols and their successors the Timurids brought Persian-Islamic literature and arts to new levels of brilliance. Under Mongol sponsorship, history writing flourished, reflecting the Mongol sense of universal destiny. Al-Juvayni's (d. 1283) *History of the World Conquerors* told the story of Chinggis Khan and the conquest of Iran. His near-contemporary Rashid al-Din (d. 1318), a physician and vizier, wrote the *Compendium of Histories*, integrating

Chinese, Indian, European, Muslim, and Mongol histories into a new cosmopolitan perspective on the fate of mankind. The Ilkhans, like previous (Turkish) conquerors, were devoted to the construction of monumental tombs and adapted older Iranian architectural forms for the monuments of Tabriz, Sultaniyya, and Varamin. The most important Ilkhan construction was the mausoleum of Oljeytu (1304–17) at Sultaniyya, whose large central dome was a major technical achievement. Stucco, terracotta, and colored bricks or tiles were used to decorate the exterior surfaces.

The Mongol contribution to the revival of the glory of Iranian monarchy was most brilliantly expressed in painting and manuscript illustration. Tabriz became the center of a flourishing school. The historical works of Rashid al-Din were frequently copied and illustrated. So were the epic poems of the *Shahname*, the *Life of Alexander*, and the fables of *Kalila wa-Dimna*. Chinese influences were introduced by the travels of Mongol administrators, soldiers, and merchants across Inner Asia and by the importation of Chinese silks and pottery. Chinese artistic techniques are evident in the treatment of landscapes, birds, flowers, and clouds; in the composition of scenes that appear to be drawn on receding planes; and in new ways of grouping human figures. One type of human figure was aristocratic, elongated, and motionless, with facial features precisely drawn, perhaps gesturing slightly with a movement of the head or finger; a second type was a caricature with highly exaggerated expressions of comedy or pain. Thus, the Ilkhan regime continued the cosmopolitan aspect of Iranian monarchy, reinforced by Mongol concepts of authority and political destiny.

The succeeding Timurid regimes both adopted and re-created Iranian Islamic culture. Tent pavilions and garden residences, palaces, mosques, and tombs defined the ruler's glory in terms of both nomadic and sedentary traditions. The labors of craftsmen from Syria, Iran, and India conveyed the boundless reach of Timur's rule. Persian, which had a much greater literary reach than Chaghatay, was patronized as the language of court poetry, epic, history, and science. Great monuments were built at Samarqand, including the square of the Registan, the tomb complex of the Shah-i Zinda, and the mausoleum of Timur, the Gur-i Mir, which is famous for its blue

and turquoise tile decorations and gorgeous dome. Timur's successor in Samarqand, Ulugh-beg, presided over a court of musicians, poets, and singers. He was himself an astronomer and had a large observatory built for his studies. In Herat, Sultan Husayn (r. 1469–1506) reaffirmed his ties to Timurid and Mongol traditions by sponsoring Turkish and Persian histories. The great figures of his time were the classical poets Jami (d. 1492) and Mir 'Ali Shir Nava'i (d. 1501). Born in Herat of a bureaucratic family, Nava'i was a leading poet and patron of the arts and sciences. As a courtier, he was an intermediary between state and town religious elites; he was initiated into the Naqshbandi order. He was most famous as a translator of Persian literature into Chaghatay and as the poet who made Chaghatay Turkish, alongside Persian, an important language of Islamic high culture.

Perhaps the most dramatic and lasting achievement of Timurid rule was the production of illustrated manuscripts. Royal workshops produced the books and other fine art and craft work, whose distinction legitimated the Timurid regimes. Herat and Bukhara became the principal centers of manuscript illustration. Under the patronage of the Timurid Shah Rukh's son, Baisunghur (d. 1434), the reign of Shah Rukh witnessed the creation of a standard repertoire of scenes, which repeated, modified, embellished, and established a visual record of the descent and continuity of the Timurid dynasty; this would shape later Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal painting and royal imagery. Later, the school of Bihzad (d. c. 1530s) at Herat, and then Tabriz, further developed the Persian style of painting. Persian manuscript illustrations are among the most celebrated of Persian art forms. These miniature paintings are rich with colorful figures and depict victorious armies and royal hunting, trysts and garden feasts, and figures in conference and worship. The paintings are decorated with architectural motifs, flowers, and shrubs. In the fifteenth century, the images became illustrations that accompany a story, but they were not illustrations of specific passages or depictions of the narrative. They were a surprising, exciting enhancement of the book that called on readers to immerse themselves in a parallel world, apart from the text but related through the sequences of images. The

most popular work was the classic Persian epic history the *Shahnama* of Firdawsi.

Yet these are not realistic paintings. Timurid period paintings were composed in a way that broke up the surface of the painting into several scenes, each of which seemed to be independent of the others. Each wall, floor, or garden had its own self-contained pattern. Yet all the beautifully decorated objects within a painting – houses, gardens, tiles, carpets, animals, and human figures – were expected to form part of a larger ensemble. Landscapes were transformed in fantastic ways with exotic vegetation, animals, and rocks depicted in surging rhythms, suggesting Chinese sources. The result was an idealized, abstracted ordering of space. In late Timurid paintings, everything was subordinated to design. Even human figures were presented in a way that stressed graceful lines rather than conveying the feeling of a human presence. Faces were expressionless. There were no shadows and no expressions of emotion – a mood of abstract detachment prevailed.

The Timurid painter, like the court poet, wanted to adorn, delight the spectator, and perhaps convey the glory of a patron, but not reveal emotional depths. This was not a tradition of naturalism or illusionist realism but one of detachment, formality, and the transcendence of everyday life. The stylized realm suggested the transcending domain of the ruler. Since ʿAbbasid times, the princely realm had been portrayed as private, separate, luxurious, and otherworldly. Based on the Persian royal artistic tradition carried to exquisite refinement, painting conveyed the ruler's claim to the obedience of the Persian elites. Luxury, refinement, and high culture were joined to political power.

Sufi influences also had a powerful effect on late fifteenth-century Persian painting. Classic Persian love stories, such as the story of Layla and Majnun, were depicted to suggest a spiritual ideal. The final meeting of the two lovers, which causes them to lose consciousness before they can consummate their love, was a symbol of the belief that the Sufi can only attain the object of his devotion after death. Physical features took on a spiritual meaning. For example, doorways and gates implied the movement from outer to

inner worlds, the passage from the physical to the spiritual plane. Themes such as love and union inspired the dynasty's literature as well as its art. Given the allegorical character of Persian poetry, a love poem might evoke either (or both) profane love or spiritual devotion, the intoxication of wine or imagination, or the beloved as lover, Sufi master, or royal patron, who all had the power to bestow or withhold their gifts.

Royal patronage for poetry, literature, architecture, and art indicates a profound integration of the political and religious meanings of artistic composition. Kingship was justified by the construction and decoration of mosques, schools, tombs, minarets, and other religious buildings. The blending of profane and spiritual themes in Persian love poetry also bespeaks the inseparability of art and literature from religion.

Whereas in the early ʿAbbasid era aristocratic culture maintained a certain distance from Islam, in the Saljuq era and later the education of an aristocrat combined literary or secular studies (such as poetry, belles lettres, history, mathematics, and philosophy) with religious studies. The secular aspects of the training were designed to develop the courtier as an elegant stylist, technician, and engineer who was competent in finance and public works, as well as a refined and graceful adornment to the court of his king; the religious aspects were a moral and spiritual initiation intended to provide the deeper qualities of soul essential for the successful pursuit of both a worldly career and otherworldly blessings. Whereas the arts served both religious and political purposes, the images and motifs employed in Islamic art avoided cosmological or mythical meanings. Sculpture was almost unknown; religious arts avoided the reproduction of human and animal figures. Islamic arts concentrated on purely visual or verbal demonstrations of richness, quality of craftsmanship, elaboration of invention, and compositional effects. The unifying element in Islamic art was the repetition of calligraphic motifs, arabesques, or geometric designs.

By avoiding cosmic myths and minimizing visual forms, Muslim artists created an art form that conformed to dominant Muslim theological and philosophical views of the universe as being without

an overall pattern or causal interconnectedness. This world, created ex nihilo and maintained by continuous creation and re-creation, is governed by God's will; its apparent regularity is not intrinsic in nature but is his bounty. This aspect accords with a human ideal. Moral and spiritual qualities do not correspond to the ontological order of the world but derive from the fulfillment of God's will as expressed in the teachings of the Quran and the tradition. A human life is a sequence of actions correctly performed according to the divine command. Islamic art and literature, then, cultivated for the glory of the court, the ruler, and the elite, were expressive of the universal aspects of Islamic religious culture. Whereas they intruded the claims of the ruler on Islamic religious sensibility, they were close enough to expressing that sensibility to be acceptable as an expression of the genius not only of regimes but of the whole civilization.

This flourishing Timurid society, carrying on earlier Turkic and Iranian institutions, would be the political, administrative, and cultural model for the later Ottoman, Safavid, Uzbek, and Mughal empires.

The post-ʿAbbasid concept of the state

Despite the numerous and short-lived provincial regimes, between 950 and 1500, a region-wide pattern of governmental institutions took shape. These institutions began with the late ʿAbbasid practice of the caliphate, the use of slave military forces and *iqtaʿ* forms of tax administration, and nomadic concepts of family and state authority. This new order first took shape in the eastern provinces of the former ʿAbbasid Empire under the aegis of the Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids, and the early Saljuqs.

With the demise of the ʿAbbasid Empire, a new concept of governmental authority was devised to accommodate changing political realities. Although the ʿAbbasid dynasty continued in office until 1258, the caliphs no longer possessed exclusive political authority. Other rulers in Egypt, North Africa, and Spain claimed the caliphate's once-privileged title, and the caliphs lost effective military and administrative power. They retained, however, a role in judicial and religious affairs in that the caliph was considered the head of the

religious establishment and could suspend the administration of justice and worship. The caliphs also retained an important moral authority and were able to intervene to temper the policies of the secular lords. Above all, they retained their symbolic standing as heads of the Muslim community; all provincial authorities were considered delegates of the caliphs.

At the same time, the conquerors and reigning warlords sought to establish an independent basis for their authority. The Buwayhids – whose power was based on the lifelong patronage of slaves in exchange for their loyal service and sworn oaths exchanged among warriors and officials – still sought to generate a public aura of legitimacy. They revived an ancient Iranian nomenclature including the title *Shah-en-shah* (King of Kings), adopted sonorous-sounding Muslim names, practiced ceremonies to display royal insignias such as the crown and the throne, and cultivated a mystique of kingship suggesting divine selection revealed in dreams, miracles, and prophecies. The Buwayhids fabricated genealogies that connected them to ancient Iranian kings and patronized public works, literature, and the arts as symbols of kingship. Similarly, the Ghaznavids sought recognition by the caliphs and implicitly assumed responsibility for the protection of Islam; they also glorified their reigns by the creation of splendid palace architecture and court ceremony and by the erection of magnificent mosques and minarets as a sign of their service to the faith, to society, and to civilization. Like their predecessors, the Saljuqs professed to be the appointees of the caliph, to serve Islam, and to support the institutions of religion. The first Saljuq ruler, Tughril Beg, adopted the title "sultan" to assert supreme and exclusive power, although the title eventually became the ordinary name for Middle Eastern rulers.

The division of authority and power between caliphs and sultans was uncertain. As long as Saljuq sultans were effective rulers, the caliphs had a limited political position. Whenever the reigning sultans were weak, however, the caliphs were tempted to assert their political authority in Baghdad and the surrounding regions. Sultans, although dependent on caliphs for recognition of their legitimate rule, sought religious prestige through the patronage of Islamic religious life and through claims, in the Iranian fashion, to hold their authority and

responsibility for the protection of their subjects directly from God. Thus, in the course of the post-ʿAbbasid era, the Islamic aspect of political authority increasingly came to the fore. Appointment by the caliph was considered essential to legitimacy. Responsibility for Islamic institutions became the main justification of political authority, although ancient Iranian and Turkish concepts of rulership did not disappear.

Chapter 21 Muslim communities and Middle Eastern societies: 1000–1500 CE

In this period we have more abundant source materials on the community life not only of Baghdad but of many Middle Eastern cities. In this era, the town populations included four main strata: the military elites and their administrative adjuncts, as well as the notability defined by religious learning connected through family ties to the landowning, bureaucratic, and merchant elites; the common people – tradesmen, peddlers, craftsmen in both luxury and ordinary trades; and the lumpen proletariat, an underworld of illicit entertainers such as prostitutes, dancers, wine sellers, and cock fighters; and finally menial workers (especially in despised trades such as tanning, scavenging, and waste removal) and beggars, vagabonds, drifters, migrants, and refugees. These, however, were not amorphous masses. They were organized into a variety of communities, including families, quarters, markets, and religious associations.

Women and family: ideology versus reality (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

In the early Islamic era (roughly from the seventh to the tenth centuries), our sources for women in society are meager. Chronicles and poetry primarily depict women in the caliphal court, but not in everyday life; legal sources communicate the expectations of jurists, rather than daily behavior. In the "medieval" era (roughly from the eleventh through the fifteenth centuries), although our sources are still limited, we can broadly reconstruct the lives of women as they function in the politics, economics, and social life of their communities. However, most of our sources come from Egypt and Syria and therefore do not represent the full geographic scope of medieval Islamic societies.

Our understanding, moreover, remains obstructed by two ideological positions: one is that of medieval, orthodox Muslim scholarly and moralist opinions; the other is that of contemporary Western stereotypes. These ideological views share the assumption that Muslim women are or should be secluded, passive persons (veiled or otherwise), restricted in their access to public life, and under the authority and control of men. Muslim scholars writing in the medieval period unwittingly reveal the counterreality; in their jeremiads about the decline of morality and their objections to the liveliness, assertiveness, and independence of women, they reveal women's normal activities and behaviors. The reality of women's lives in medieval Islamic societies was more varied and complex than the representations of either ideology.

The norms for and the behavior of women in the medieval period differ in time and place, according to religious affiliation, popular culture, and – above all – socioeconomic class. Contrary to popular assumptions, polygyny and seclusion of women were elite practices that do not reflect the daily lives of the vast majority of women in medieval Islamic societies. Whereas veiling was part of the public image of elite women in the medieval period, there is not much evidence of veiling by other socioeconomic classes. In all classes, financial independence – wealth acquired through inheritance, gifts, dowries, and investments, as well as salaries and wages for trading and working activities – allowed women to exercise political and social power, mobility, and independence. Many women divorced and remarried with relative ease and enjoyed a public social life interacting with men in mosques, markets, Sufi celebrations, cemeteries, and other public places.

Royal Women

Royal women were housed in special quarters (*haram*). The occupants of the women's quarters included the caliph's or sultan's mother, wives, concubines, children (both sons and daughters), unmarried sisters, aunts, cousins, and their female slaves and servants. The widows of former rulers, the queen mother, and the wives (or concubines) of rulers had the highest status. Concubines

served as musicians, singers, poetesses, and entertainers and often became romantic love objects. Based on their relationships to men and through palace conspiracies, royal women exercised political and economic power in matters of succession, appointments, and finances. Mothers, wives, and concubines sometimes received diplomatic and other official correspondence. In the Fatimid state, one particularly prominent woman, Sitt al-Mulk (d. 1023), had her own military guard, engaged in diplomatic negotiations with the Byzantine Empire, issued laws on tax matters, redistributed confiscated properties, and helped reform the state's finances. Strictly speaking, however, women needed the authorization of a male family member or high-ranking official for their political dealings.

Apart from the Fatimids in Egypt, there were many cases of royal women exercising political influence. Women attached to ʿAbbasid, Saljuq, and Mongol rule were similarly powerful. A woman reigned on behalf of the Fatimid caliphs in Yemen during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Shajar ad-Durr, the Turkish widow of the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt, reigned briefly in her own name in 1250.

Royal women commanded great wealth. Mothers, wives, daughters, and concubines of caliphs and sultans received incomes from agricultural and commercial taxes. They acquired property by inheritance, dowries, gifts, and allowances. They accumulated rents from land and urban real estate, incomes from investments in trade, and material possessions such as jewelry and textiles. Rarely leaving the palace, women conducted their political and business affairs through proxies, whether husbands, male or female servants, or eunuchs. Their deputies and agents managed properties outside the palace walls. In both the Fatimid and Mamluk eras, unmarried daughters of the ruling family were particularly favored as depositaries for family wealth, perhaps because of their greater life expectancy and safety from political violence or as an inducement to remain unmarried and celibate so as to forestall disputes over succession to the throne. Astute personal servants of royal women could also become wealthy.

Royal women spent their money to establish political loyalties, to finance their administrative staffs, and to fund charitable institutions,

usually through trusts (*awqaf*). They built and endowed palaces, mosques, schools/colleges, mausoleums, fountains, and baths. Women of scholarly and upper-middle-class families also endowed and managed charitable trusts. The same factors that favored their accumulation of wealth – youth and security – also favored their selection as the supervisors and administrators of endowed properties. In these positions, they were able to secure the futures of their children and the continuity of their families. They counteracted the inherent instability in military and political households. A woman who outlived the men of her generation became a dowager and de facto head of her family.

Women of urban notable families

Among urban notable families, polygyny and seclusion of women were expensive and rare. Notable women who appeared in public and at prayers most likely wore a covering over their heads and shoulders, but precisely what was covered or how is unclear. Nonroyal elite women were also able to accumulate and manage property, including revenues from lands, orchards, residential rents, and other investments. They acquired wealth in jewelry, textiles, gold and silver, and other movable property. They often endowed charitable institutions, some of whose administrators and beneficiaries could be family members. Trusts (*awqaf*) were an effective way to transfer incomes to children and unmarried daughters in particular. In urban notable families – especially the families of judges, scholars, and scribes – wives and daughters were commonly educated. Male relatives, informal women's study circles, and private lessons in the mosques all taught women to read and write and to memorize Quran, hadith, and important legal texts. Many women are included in the biographical dictionaries as transmitters of hadith, reciters of poetry, or calligraphers. Few were jurisconsults or theologians and virtually none were judges, teachers, or students in the formal colleges where they might exert authority over men. Still, women did teach and learn in informal settings.

Women also had an independent religious life in women's Sufi orders. Women conducted female-only Sufi sessions and participated

in Sufi festivals. The Muslim equivalent of convents (*ribats*) housed Sufi women and were found throughout Syria and Iraq in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is unclear if Sufi women were primarily from the notable or working classes. Women's participation in scholarly activities and Sufi orders appears to have decreased after the sixteenth century, as reflected in their absence from late medieval biographical dictionaries.

Working women and popular culture

Unlike royal and notable women, working-class women were generally not secluded, and it is not clear when or if they were veiled. Women patronized markets regularly as both consumers and suppliers. Working-class women often facilitated the seclusion of upper-class women, who relied on delivery women to transport goods between the women's quarters and the markets. Women traders visited women in their homes to sell various household goods, beauty products, and fabrics. Middle- and lower-class women worked in agriculture and food preparation and sales. Perhaps the most common profession of working women was spinning and weaving. Women served as doctors, midwives, and nurses. Undertakers, washers of female corpses, official mourners, bath attendants, and hairdressers were exclusively women. Women entertainers performed in both private and public spaces. Prostitutes operated in market areas. As a result of their economic activities and inheritance rights, women often functioned as moneylenders to husbands, other family members, and business associates.

Working women primarily educated one another – in apprenticeships (for nursing, embroidery, funeral rites, hairdressing, etc.) and religious learning (recitation of Quran and hadith). Working women also learned in the company of men in mosques or private homes, where they jointly listened to recitations of books or sermons.

Studies of marriage and divorce in Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem in the Mamluk era (1250–1517) indicate that women were often financially independent because they earned their own livelihoods and received dowries and other gifts of parental property. These gifts were effectively a premortem distribution of jewelry,

household furnishings, and clothing to daughters that remained a woman's personal property throughout marriage and after. Women's wages and property were the key to a high degree of independence and mobility. In Mamluk-era society, repeated divorces and remarriages were the norm, with an estimated 30 percent of marriages ending in divorce. Thus, instead of patriarchal families, we find a highly individualized society in which marital relations were independent of clan relations; a highly monetary society in which women could earn a living and own property; a mobile society in which divorce, migration, and remarriage were common; and even an equalitarian society in terms of marital bargaining.

The material and social situation of women points to a popular culture – although frequently denounced by juristic and moralistic writers – in which women were lively, expressive, emotional, and fun loving, and sometimes defiant of male attempts to curtail their independence. Women used a variety of economically based strategies to stake out their independence; if husbands attempted to restrain them, they could resort to threats of costly divorce or deny them sex.

Women had frequent occasions to socialize with other women (and men) when visiting, celebrating weddings and childbirths, mourning at funerals, and participating in Sufi festivals. Some quasi-public spaces were frequented or dominated by women. In bathhouses, women socialized and competed – in terms of beauty, clothing, and jewelry – with one another. In medieval Cairo, plump women were highly regarded, and some women even refrained from fasting to avoid becoming thin and thereby losing potential suitors; sometimes they showed off their figures in form-fitting clothing.

Women celebrated religious events and other occasions with merriment and music. Weddings were loud, boisterous celebrations that could include music, dancing, singing, and wine drinking in gatherings of men and women – at least some of whom were likely unveiled. At weddings, women trilled cries of joy, clapped, danced, and sang to the accompaniment of tambourines. The birth of a baby was celebrated with music, dancing, and sweets – distributed among family and neighbors. Women mourned the dead in public

expressions that had been normative in the region for centuries (as evidenced in Jewish texts): disheveling their hair, blackening their faces and bodies, and wailing. To commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn (on the day of 'ashura'), they purchased and burned incense. Sufi *mawlids* were the occasion of lively festivities in which men and women mingled in the streets and cemeteries. Women, unveiled, greeted the Sufi celebrants with ululations and gifts of food. Men and women danced to the Sufi chants and songs. Thus, women interacted with men in markets and shops, in mosques and shrines, in visits to the cemeteries, and in Sufi ceremonies.

Muslim and non-Muslim women interacted freely and regularly throughout the medieval period and shared similar norms for social behavior. Elite Christian and Jewish women were secluded in the manner of their elite Muslim counterparts. Geniza documents suggest that elite Jewish women went veiled and accepted the same ideas of modesty as elite Muslim women. (Jews adopted Islamic dress wherever possible and permitted.) But non-elite Jewish women, like Muslim women of their social class, worked as spinners and embroiderers, traders, midwives and nurses, and body washers. They frequented markets, bathhouses, synagogues, shrines, and courts.

This behavior of women was criticized by religious scholars as too "free." A surviving text from one particular scholar is replete with criticisms of women's activities. Ibn al-Hajj, a Maliki jurist who lived in Cairo in the fourteenth century, objected to the weekly routines of visiting shrines and going to markets without compelling reasons. He opposed women's visits to cemeteries and participation in Christian festivals, another occasion for purchasing jewelry and perfumes. He was appalled by women who wore tight and short chemises and trousers below the navel instead of form-concealing clothing. This scholar frowned on the emotional commemoration of marriage, of the birth of a child, or of the death of a family member, as well as funerals and festivals that brought women and men together. In his view, men were as much to blame as women, because they were responsible for controlling the behavior of women and appeared indifferent to intermingling. The real mores of both men and women did not correspond to orthodox or moralist expectations. (Yet, the very same

scholars who advocated for women's seclusion did not question or neglect to use hadith transmitted or reported by women; nor did they deny the validity of a woman's testimony in court.)

Restrictions on women's daily lives came not only from jurists but from rulers. In the early eleventh century, the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim promulgated a variety of restrictions on women's movement and behavior; these regulations may have been motivated by contemporaneous crises of plague, famine, and drought. Al-Hakim's decrees prohibited women from unveiling, going out in the evening, going to cemeteries, gathering at the Nile's shores, or boating with men. Caliph al-Hakim's regulations attempted to curtail women's visits to cemeteries, bathhouses, and markets. These restrictions most likely affected middle-class women, because upper-class women rarely went out, due to their status and the availability of servants and agents, and because lower-class, working women could obtain exemptions from the restrictions. When al-Hakim's half sister, Sitt al-Mulk, became regent, she overruled her half brother's legislation and permitted wine drinking, musical entertainment, and the unrestricted mobility of women.

Jurisprudence and Courts

Contrary to the stereotype that the law was resolutely biased in favor of men, Islamic legal systems provided a variety of norms that could be manipulated to the advantage of either men or women. For example, both Sunni and Shiʿi schools of law differed considerably in their norms for family relations. Although Malikis insisted on a guardian for a first marriage, Hanafis and Imami Shiʿis allowed women to marry independently. In contrast to the other Sunni legal schools, Hanafis gave women broad discretion in marriage contract stipulations (including preventing spouses from contracting multiple marriages). Although most schools provided little leeway for annulment, Malikis allowed it for desertion, nonmaintenance, bodily harm, or impotence. Medieval jurists affirmed a man's obligation to satisfy a wife's sexual desires. Fatimid-era legal practice, based on Ismaʿili jurisprudence, allowed daughters (without brothers) to fully inherit, including inheriting land; unlike Imami (Jaʿfari) law, Ismaʿili

jurists outlawed temporary marriages and invalidated a contractual clause giving the wife the right to demand a divorce. Most Hanafi jurists did not permit women to frequent mosques, but Hanbalis generally did, and Malikis and Shafiʿis fell in between. There were few legal restrictions to abortions in this period. (These few examples only offer a glimpse of a complex and diverse legal situation for women living in various medieval Islamic societies.)

In economic terms, medieval Muslim jurists gave great advantages to women, more so than other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern legal systems. The contractual nature of marriage defined a spousal relationship in monetary terms that were favorable to women. A husband was obliged to feed, clothe, and house his wife; pay for domestic expenses; and also make a marriage gift that could be paid in yearly installments. Furthermore, medieval Muslim jurists maintained earlier Islamic legal traditions in respecting a woman's right to own and manage her property without male guardianship. A married woman kept both title and control of her property; she could gift or bequeath it to whom she wished. It did not become the property of her husband or community property. Women also had the resources of family and women's networks to support them.

Furthermore, although jurists granted men greater rights to divorce, they were limited by legal ramifications. Divorce was generally expensive, because it entailed payment of any uncompensated expenses, delayed dower, three months of alimony for the wife, child support, nursing fees, and any debts owed to the wife (which were not uncommon). In many medieval Islamic areas, the unpaid balance of the dower was considered a debt due on demand. In the fifteenth century, for example, a husband might well owe his wife a daily cash allowance, an annual installment of the marriage gift, and even rent – if he were living in her house. As a result, men often chose not to exercise their right to unilateral divorce, and women (despite limited legal rights to demand a divorce) commonly had the financial assets to buy out their husbands or to compel them to agree to a divorce. (This is known as *khulʿ*.) Still, most divorces were consensual and were informally negotiated or mediated by in-laws, kin, or neighbors.

Women had just as much access to courts as men, because the law recognized women as full legal persons and because women had economic power that translated into legal autonomy. Women were both plaintiffs and defendants in an array of cases related to contractual disputes, marriage, divorce, and alimony. Women used courts to procure a variety of marital advantages: opportunities for divorces and annulments, control of dowers, custody of children, and restriction of a husband's right to take another wife. Women also frequented courts to challenge any attempted limitations on their inheritances or to manage their property or other economic interests. Courts often appointed a woman as trustee for an orphan's inheritance. Women owned substantial amounts of urban property and were important contributors to educational and charitable trusts. Trusts (*awqaf*) were in effect an alternative to the patrilineal inheritance rules outlined in Islamic legal texts and thereby promoted matrilineal inheritance. In some medieval cities, more endowments were established or managed by women than by men.

Thus, married couples possessed separate economic assets, and both men and women had access to divorce and to multiple marriages. In medieval Muslim societies, all individuals engaged their extended family networks to assist them in protecting their economic or legal interests, as well as to mediate domestic disputes. Customary practices or social norms, however, could act as limitations on women even in the absence of any Islamic legal basis. For example, social norms that dictated the seclusion of elite women limited their access to the courts. Also, women's inheritance or control of property could be curtailed if they were forced to relinquish their legal rights because of social pressure or non-Islamic customary practices.

Thus, the status of women and their real-life situations in the medieval era differed greatly from the expectations embedded in Islamic legal texts, from pious moral literature, and from common contemporary Western expectations about the place of women in Islamic societies. Women in royal households, women in wealthy and educated middle-class households, and working women lived by different norms. Whether they were Muslim, Christian, or Jewish,

women lived similar lives depending on their socioeconomic class. Muslim women enjoyed economic rights and powers that gave them a measure of independence and mobility and opportunities to engage in the social and economic world. Working-class women in particular lived by cultural norms and practices that gave them opportunities to socialize with men as well as other women. Scholarly Muslim cultural and religious attitudes about the relations of men and women were incongruent with the complex socioeconomic and political forces that generated alternative cultural values.

Urban societies: the quarters and the markets

Towns and cities were divided into neighborhoods typically defined by religious or ethnic minorities, actual or presumed common ancestry, or village origins. The clienteles of notable families (business or professional staff members, servants, and workers) and certain crafts (especially in peripheral quarters, where tanning or other noxious industries were concentrated) were also the bases of quarter communities.

Quarters not only had a recognizable social base but were also administrative, tax, and police units. A *shaykh* or headman, appointed by the town governor, was responsible for maintaining discipline, representing the quarters to the military regimes, and conveying their orders to the people. Quarters were often political units in that they could be engaged in feuds or hostilities with other groups. In Syria, for example, these rivalries went under the names of the seventh-century tribal moieties, Qays and Yemen. In Iran, they were typically organized in the name of the schools of law, Shafiʿis and Hanafis. Thus, a quarter was a small, fairly integrated community based on family, religious, or ethnic solidarity and economic and political functions. Quarters were village-scale communities, typically physically distinct but not necessarily walled, gated, or barred to the rest of the city.

Although the quarters had local markets, there were also extensive central markets, bazaars, or *suqs*; these were physically organized by trade or craft, but they were not socially or politically highly organized.

The markets were under the supervision of the governor's police (*shurta*) and the market and morals inspector (*muhtasib*). Market inspectors were appointed by military governors to keep discipline and enforce regulations in the markets. They supervised the coinage and the standardization of weights and measures. They were responsible for maintaining the streets, supplying water, and providing a night watch. Gradually, religious and moral duties were added to their portfolio; market inspectors became responsible for preventing illicit meetings of men and women and for investigating extremism, heresy, and political sedition. Their authority over the market populations was mediated by the leaders of the crafts and trades, but there is little evidence to suggest that there were guilds, unions, mutual benefit associations, or religious confraternities based on trade or craft.

Another important locus of community organization (besides the quarters and markets) was young men's fraternities and gangs, variously called *ahdath*, ʿ*ayyarun*, or *zuʿar*. The term "*ahdath*" was sometimes applied to the gangs allied with a quarter or faction, whereas the term "ʿ*ayyarun*" seems to have applied more generally to gangs under their own leadership. Some of these gangs were devoted to an ideology of chivalry, bravery, and honor (*futuwwa*). Some were gymnastic or sporting associations. Some were constituted by the young men of the quarters recruited from the working population. There were also organized gangs of beggars, vagabonds, and menial workers – sometimes in the guise of Sufi orders.

These clubs and gangs were largely autonomous and played a complicated and ambivalent role in city life. They would from time to time defend their quarters against abusive taxation, fight the gangs of other quarters, and resist military regime control. But they also served as strong-arm men for local notables, quarters, or religious sects and acted as "mafias," running protection rackets and other criminal activities. Sometimes they served as military auxiliaries for as well as against the government. The gangs were particularly powerful in interregnums between military regimes. In Baghdad just before the consolidations of the Buwayhid and later of the Saljuq regimes, lower-class elements took over policing and some taxation and collected

tolls and protection money from merchants. Standing between the regimes and the urban populations, they had an important political and military role.

The learned and scholarly elites ('*ulama*') were a particularly important stratum of the populations. They were important in worship and education – as prayer leaders, scholars, and mosque functionaries. They were managers of educational, religious, philanthropic, and legal institutions. They were judges, lawyers, legal witnesses, and registrars central to family, commerce, and property. They organized clienteles of students and lesser functionaries; judges were surrounded by a clientele of deputies, witnesses, orderlies, clerks, and agents. They represented the people of the quarters and the markets. Especially in times of trouble, the people turned to the judges, the scholars, and the merchants and landowners for leadership.

The notables, however, were unable to govern the cities by themselves. They did not have military power, they did not control rural resources, and they did not have the capital to sustain their own cadres and to provide for big urban infrastructure investments – such as walls, canals, mosques and colleges, caravanserais, and shops; for these, they depended on the military elites. Reciprocally, the military did not have the local knowledge, administrative cadres, and legitimacy to govern directly.

Although the local units of society remained the same in the centuries following the collapse of the 'Abbasid Empire, a new political elite of nomadic and slave warlords – and the ruin of local landowners and other notables – paved the way for far-reaching changes in the organization of town and village communities. The crucial change in this period was the widespread diffusion of Muslim identities, the assumption of social leadership by Muslim teachers and holy men, and the crystallization of Muslim sectarian communities, including Shiʿi sects, Sunni schools of law and theology, and Sufi orders.

The creation of an Islamic communal and religious identity (distinct from the caliphate) had already begun in the seventh century. In his ideal and early form, the caliph was the sole ruler of a single

community and custodian of both its religious principles and its political interests. From the outset, however, pious believers were disenchanted with the worldliness of the early caliphate. This disenchantment first expressed itself in the form of the Khariji, Shiʿi, and ʿAbbasid movements, which aimed to return the caliphate to its ideal incumbents.

With the victory of the ʿAbbasids, and the defeat of both Khariji and Shiʿi aspirations, the political opponents of the caliphate evolved into religious sects. Bitter rivalries among them and strong state support for both Shiʿi and Sunni movements hastened their diffusion. Popular religious organizations that had their origin in an earlier period became normative and universal throughout the region. In the same period, masses of Middle Eastern peoples converted to Islam and were absorbed into Muslim social bodies. Islam, originally the religion of a political and urban elite, became the religion and social identity of most Middle Eastern peoples.

Religious communities

Shiʿis

Shiʿis are the earliest example of a new form of sectarian community. Early Shiʿis were divided into different groups, depending on their theory of the true succession of imams. One of these was the Baghdadi Twelver community, which believed in the imamate of Jaʿfar's son Musa al-Kazim and his descendants; another was the believers in the imamate of Jaʿfar's son Ismaʿil and his descendants. From the time of Jaʿfar, the Baghdadi community denied in theory, but accepted in practice, the reign of the ʿAbbasid caliphs and concentrated more and more on religious teaching. In 873, however, the last of its living imams, the twelfth in line of succession, "disappeared," and in 941 direct communication with the imam was lost altogether.

In place of the presence of a divinely guided leader, Twelver teaching in hadith, law, and theology was consolidated. Al-Kulayni (d. 940) compiled the earliest surviving compilation of Shiʿi hadith, ritual,

and law. Later scholars debated whether their beliefs were based solely on the teachings of the imams or whether *ijtihad*, the exercise of individual judgment in matters of law, was permissible. The concept of the imam was reformulated in neo-Platonic and gnostic terms, and he came to be understood as an emanation of the divine being, the universal intelligence (*ʿaql al-kull*), and thus a bearer of direct knowledge of the secret truths and states of spirituality that lead to the reunion of the soul of man with God.

At the same time, Baghdadi Shiʿis organized a new communal life. In the late tenth century, they began a day of celebration for Muhammad's adoption of ʿAli as his successor (*ghadir khumm*), the public ritual cursing of Muʿawiya (the enemy of ʿAli), a public holiday of mourning for the death of Husayn at Karbala (*ʿashuraʾ*), and pilgrimages to the tombs of ʿAli at Najaf, Husayn at Karbala, and ʿAli al-Rida at Mashhad. The passionate mourning for Husayn, identification with the suffering of the martyr, and the messianic hopes implicit in the commemoration of Karbala gave emotional and religious depth to Twelver Shiʿism.

By the mid-eleventh century, Imami Shiʿis had created a worldly life lived in perpetual expectation of the world to come. In permanent opposition to the established political regimes, Imamism had become a religion of salvation. This salvation might be attained by living in accordance with the hadith of the Prophet and the imams, by emotional absorption into their martyrdom, or by gnostic vision and mystical identification with the emanations of the divine being. With the consolidation of their doctrinal beliefs in written form, the development of a public ritual life, and political recognition by the reigning authorities, the Baghdadi Shiʿis emerged as a sectarian community within the body of Islam.

Schools of law

The consolidation of the Baghdadi Shiʿi community and the success of the Ismaʿili missions stimulated Sunni scholars to further institutionalize their practice of Islam and to make their schools of law, theology, and Sufism the focus of community affairs. Legal circles

began to organize in the late seventh century as groups of scholars committed to a common legal doctrine and method of legal analysis. There were innumerable legal circles and networks in the early centuries of Islam, but by the eleventh century most of them had disappeared, and most jurists became identified with one of the four now-surviving legal schools: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki. The consolidation of the jurisprudential schools was favored both by the appeal of their teaching and doctrines and by the support of the caliphate and other governments that oversaw the appointment of judges and the distribution of patronage to favored schools. Eventually, the Mamluks of Egypt appointed a chief judge for each of the four main Sunni legal schools.

From their beginnings in Medina, Basra, Baghdad, and Fustat, the four surviving schools spread throughout the ʿAbbasid realm. The travels of scholars and students in search of hadith and the appointment of judges with law school affiliations introduced the schools into new provinces. The Hanafi school began in Iraq and was soon established in western Iran and Transoxania. The Hanbali school, Baghdadi in origin, spread to northern Iraq and Syria. Hanbali judges (*qadi*s) were appointed in Damascus and Homs; Hanbalism also had followers in the important cities of Iran. The Shafi'i school first developed in Egypt but, by the tenth century, was established in Syria, Baghdad, and in all of the important towns of western Iran, Khurasan, and Transoxania. The Maliki school was concentrated primarily in Egypt and North Africa. In twelfth-century Baghdad, Hanafis dominated as judges, Shafi'is as "professors" in the colleges, and Hanbalis as preachers and teachers in the larger mosques of the city. There were also jurists who identified with the Maliki and Zahiri legal schools in medieval Baghdad, but they were marginal.

The schools were united by the travels of students, who came to study with great masters and to obtain certificates certifying their achievements. Having acquired a wide range of learning from different teachers, a successful student would sometimes settle down with a single professor and, in time, perhaps succeed him. This international system of connections was informal but was sufficient to generate a jurisprudential identity for each of the major schools. Identification with a particular legal school, however, was not

necessarily exclusive. Law students studied with scholars outside their own legal school – particularly on the topic of hadith transmission – and freely switched legal school affiliation. Some jurists shifted their legal school affiliation in order to procure administrative or judicial appointments.

Muslim theological schools also acquired a coherent social identity. Although they did not have judicial and administrative functions, the Muʿtazilis and Ashʿaris became important religious movements. The Karrami movement, which combined theological tenets and Sufi practices, appealing mainly to the lower classes, was influential in Khurasan, Transoxania, and Afghanistan.

In the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries, professional law schools were increasingly established. Islamic law was initially taught in mosques and private homes, which were then converted into hostels for traveling scholars and students. In Khurasan, this was the prototype for the madrasa, or college of legal studies. In Baghdad, the college was organized by combining the mosque in which the teaching was carried out, the *khan* or boardinghouse for students, private libraries, and the practice of community financial support. A madrasa then was a building used for study and a residence for teachers and students, commonly provided with a library. As buildings, madrasas were used for teaching, prayer, public fountains, tombs, libraries, and dormitories for teachers and students.

Furthermore, the colleges were also endowed with permanent sources of income, such as land or rent-bearing urban property, set aside in perpetuity. These trusts (*awqaf*) paid the salaries of the faculty and stipends for students. Endowments usually paid for a staff of religious functionaries, a maintenance staff (gatekeepers, carpet sweepers, candle maintainers, etc.), and an administrative staff. By giving such gifts, donors could preserve their property intact against fragmentation due to inheritance laws. Trusts also protected the wealth of mamluks, officials, or merchants from confiscation, allowing them to appoint their heirs, associates, or clients to an income and garnering social prestige. A trust could even be used to circumvent Islamic inheritance laws by providing an income for daughters. It also provided a tomb for the grantor.

The curriculum of colleges was determined by the professor and was therefore variable. Most were academies of law, teaching the particular version of the professor's own legal school. Although law was the master science, the schools taught what the teacher wanted to teach. All subjects – law, medicine, philosophy, and hadith – were transmitted from a single teacher to a single student (or to many students simultaneously). Colleges also commonly taught the related subjects of Quran, hadith, and Arabic grammar; some professors taught theology or Sufism. A broad education garnered from many teachers rather than specialized learning was the ideal. The madrasa was not a college in the modern sense, because it lacked a graded curriculum or a uniform system for certification. Islamic education was basically informal, flexible, and built on the individual teacher and student, rather than institutional ties. A student "heard" his subjects from a variety of teachers on a variety of topics in a variety of places and study circles.

Thus, the transmission of religious learning went on both in endowed colleges, madrasas, and in informal study circles. In both cases, learning revolved around the reputation of a respected scholar, who in his individual capacity could give students who "graduated" a specific license to teach, to transmit hadith, to judge, or to participate in scholarly debates, depending on the course of study.

The relationship of teacher and student was intensely personal, for the master communicated not only specialized learning but religious insight and a stylized mode of behavior that signified the rank of scholar. In that relationship, the teacher's authority was absolute, like that of a parent over a child or a Sufi master over a disciple. Through this scholarly devotion, a student acquired knowledge (ʿ*ilm*), literary cultivation (*adab*), blessing (*baraka*), a set of ritual and performative practices, and a style and presence that signified honor, dignity, and blessing. The true object of education was not merely knowledge but the whole style of personal behavior and deportment. The personal relationship between master and disciple, which could be traced generation by generation back to the Prophet himself, was the primary vehicle for the communication of Islamic traditions.

Teaching was not separate from other religious activities, because study was considered an act of piety. What mattered was the creation of a spiritual environment for Islamic faith, teaching, and practice. Thus, we even find colleges whose endowments provided for prayer leaders, muezzins, Sufis, and Quran and hadith readers, but not for teachers and students. In all cases, there was an intense consciousness of the importance of training Sunni Muslim scholars to combat Shi'ism and Isma'ilism. Madrasas were not only colleges but centers for religious propaganda and political action.

Education extended far beyond colleges. Teaching went on in public mosques and in private homes, without endowments; students could come to a madrasa without being a resident or receiving a stipend. Women studied with relatives but also received certification from outside scholars, including women scholars. Women most commonly transmitted hadith. Teachers, hadith and Quran reciters, book readers, and storytellers reached out to the common people.

In sum, medieval colleges consolidated informal legal instruction into an institution with a physical center and permanently endowed funds, thereby facilitating professional full-time study of Islamic law and the expanded training of cadres of Islamic legal teachers and administrators. It became the standard Sunni Muslim organization of religious and legal instruction, spreading from Iran throughout Samanid and Ghaznavid domains and then westward with the Saljuq conquests. Nizam al-Mulk, the leading minister of the early Saljuq period (1063–92), endowed Hanafi and Shafi'i schools in all the major cities of the empire and made it the state's policy to support organized Muslim religious scholarship. The Hanbalis adopted the madrasa form of instruction early in the twelfth century. In earlier centuries, jurists typically had earned their living through trade or craft work, but with the institutionalization of education in the form of endowed colleges, religious scholars became professionals, officials, and salaried employees. Through state patronage, salaries, and the administration of endowments, scholars rose to the position of a rentier class.

Coinciding with the rise of official colleges and the consolidation of the schools of law was an increase in the importance of the

jurisconsult (mufti). The earliest surviving collections of a jurisconsult's opinions (*fatawa*) date to the tenth century. The general public consulted a jurisconsult in much the same manner that we now consult attorneys for legal advice; indeed, some even "shopped" for a legal decree (*fatwa*), asking several jurisconsults until they found a desired outcome. A legal decree consisted of both the question sent in writing to the jurisconsult and his answer. In addition, judges often consulted with jurisconsults for their expertise in complicated cases, as evidenced by the inclusion of a jurisconsult's legal decree within the court register. Although generally jurisconsults were not affiliated with or regulated by the state, the Mamluks did appoint some jurisconsults to courts of equity. In the eleventh century, jurists defined a jurisconsult as being a *mujtahid* (i.e., one who has the ability to independently reason; the highest rank of a jurist). By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, it appears that the prerequisites were lowered, and jurisconsults were expected – by most, but not all scholars – to be *muqallids* (i.e., able to articulate a legal opinion based on the precedents and methodology of a particular legal school; a lower rank than *mujtahid*). Under the Mamluks, jurisconsults were appointed to special courts of equity.

A judge (*qadi*) was responsible for the administration of the courts and therefore selected both his own court recorders and witness certifiers (responsible for evaluating the reliability of witnesses). Judges were also involved in managing charitable endowments and, sometimes, managing the assets of orphans. There was no equivalent to attorney representation, because plaintiffs and defendants interacted directly with the judge. Although court recorders wrote down case proceedings, these documents were not effectively preserved, and Islamic court records are largely lost for periods before the sixteenth century. One exception is a significant repository of fourteenth-century Mamluk court documents that were found in Jerusalem's Islamic museum.

In addition to the formal court system, there were other judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. As early as the ʿAbbasid Caliph al-Mahdi, if not earlier, caliphs and sultans heard complaints or petitions in courts of equity (*mazalim*). (See Illustration 6.) Market inspectors enforced commercial regulations and morally proper behavior in the

marketplace. A genre of legal literature (*hisba*) emerged that reflected juristic attempts to delineate the duties and limitations of a market inspector. It is likely that market inspectors gained more discretion to regulate public behavior as a result of the growing social influence of legal schools.

Illustration 6. An old woman petitions Sultan Sanjar. Source: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Alexander Smith Cochran, 1913. 13.228.7 fol.17.

Thus, the medieval period was a time of bureaucratization and centralization that shaped the legal profession. All aspects of legal activity became confined to fewer legal schools that gained in power and prominence. Professionalization of jurists and institutionalization of learning contributed to the growing dominance of a religious orthodoxy. The diversity of opinions on a variety of legal and theological matters gradually became narrower and, after the tenth century, came to form a religious canon. As legal education became

more systematized and salaries of judges increased, the legal profession most likely attracted students drawn to the pragmatic – rather than spiritual – aspects of the vocation of law.

As law schools (*madhahib*) consolidated, they also became popular religious movements. Initially, each legal school was built around a core of scholars, judges, students, court functionaries, wealthy patrons, and local followers. Progressively, the leadership of the law schools was extended to the masses, beginning with charitable, educational, and judicial services and carrying on to informal social and political leadership.

Hanbalis were the first to convert informal, popular influence and sympathy into a sectarian movement. They resisted the efforts of the ʿAbbasid caliphate to promulgate religious doctrine. They opposed al-Maʾmun's claims to authority and held that while obedience was due to the caliph in matters of state, authority in religion rested with the scholars of Quran and hadith. Preaching to their followers among former ʿAbbasid soldiers and residents of the Harbiyya quarter of Baghdad, the scholars mobilized popular support. Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries, Hanbali preachers raised popular demonstrations for or against caliphal policy; they led anti-Shiʿi riots and opposed the Muʿtazili and Ashʿari theological schools. They organized groups of vigilantes, who attacked their opponents and suppressed such immoral activities as wine drinking and prostitution.

Under the Buwayhids, Shiʿis – perhaps in response to Hanbali activism – introduced the festivals of *ghadir khumm* and ʿ*ashura*ʾ, and Sunnis responded by celebrating the nomination of Abu Bakr to the caliphate, the reigns of the Rashidun caliphs and Muʿawiya, and other symbols of Sunni identity. Preachers and religious storytellers provided incitements. Festivals, processions, and demonstrations led in the tenth and eleventh centuries to riots and street battles between Sunnis and Shiʿis. Baghdad was frequently in turmoil because of battles between religious factions.

In eastern Iran, the schools of law also turned into popular factions. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Hanafis, Shafiʿis, Karramis, and Ismaʿilis struggled for local political power. The schools had become

exclusive and mutually hostile small communities. In this guise, they resembled the neighborhood, lineage, or other parochial bodies into which Middle Eastern towns had always been divided. Religious creed now superseded tribal or quarter identifications.

The history of Nishapur in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is the best-known example of the law schools as factions. Here, the Hanafi school was built around leading merchant, official, and scholarly families who controlled the judiciary of the city, important *waqf* revenues, colleges, and mosques. Their main opponents were the Shafiʿis, who controlled most of the teaching positions in the colleges and the revenues of important endowments. The Shafiʿi following, however, was broader than the Hanafi, because the Shafiʿis were united with Ashʿaris and Sufis and seemed to enjoy mass support. The antagonism of the two schools of law spread from disputes over control of teaching and judicial positions, to competition for governmental support, and to pitched battles in which large segments of the town and the surrounding rural populace were mobilized to fight for their group. As a result, Nishapur was physically and socially destroyed by the middle of the twelfth century. These conflicts were not simply disputes about legal reasoning but rather conflicts over theological and political issues. After this crisis, intraurban conflicts seem to have abated.

In many of these cases, however, the label "schools of law" obscures the fact that the common people gave their allegiance not to the abstract school but to local pious, charismatic teachers and *shaykhs*. From studies of Palestine in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, we see how Hanbali *shaykhs* became leaders of small communities and watched over the well-being of their villages. They protected them from enemies, gave aid to the sick and the poor, and mediated between their villages, other communities, and the military authorities. They taught orthodox practice of Islam, including adherence to the five pillars and the norms of ritual and social behavior. They were avatars of altruism and generosity and embodied the practical spirituality of Sufi attitudes, if not of Sufi doctrine. The schools of law came to the people in the guise of pious teachers and leaders.

Sufis

The development of the Sufi movement paralleled the development of the schools of law. From the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, Sufis worked out their mystical practice and metaphysics, integrated their thought and practice with other forms of Islamic belief and worship, and became a social movement. (See Figure 7.)

Figure 7. The early Sufi orders and their founders.

Sufism was highly individual. Sufis met in private houses, initially, and then later in Sufi meetinghouses. On the model of *ribats* – which were originally residences for Muslim warriors scattered along the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire in North Africa and the frontiers of eastern Iran – meetinghouses were founded at Abadan, Damascus, and Ramla in the course of the eighth century. In imitation of Christian monks, there were grottoes in Khurasan.

The term "*khanaqa*" appeared in the late ninth century and came to be widely used for Sufi residences in Khurasan and Transoxania. The word was applied to residences for migrant individuals without a

shared affiliation to a particular master. The *khanaqa* was adapted to more sectarian purposes by the mystic and theologian Muhammad b. Karram (d. 869), a student of hadith and an ascetic preacher in southern and eastern Iran. He taught a God-fearing way of life based on mortification of the flesh and pious devotion to God's will and a theological doctrine emphasizing an anthropomorphic view of God – interpreting literally the Quranic usages that suggest that God has substance and a body. Ibn Karram won a large lower-class following in Transoxania, Afghanistan, and eastern Iran, where he built *khanaqas* as centers of missionary activity.

Other Sufi masters followed his example. Shaykh Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Kazaruni (d. 1033) cultivated a large following in his home district in western Iran and converted numerous Zoroastrians and Jews to Islam. His warriors also fought on the Byzantine frontier. They built some sixty-five *khanaqas* in southwestern Iran as centers for teaching and missionary activity and as places to distribute charity to the poor. His near contemporary Abu Sa'id b. Abi Khayr (d. 1049), who was born and died in the region of Nishapur, was the first Sufi master to set up rules for worship and a code of behavior to regulate the communal life of the *khanaqa*. By the end of the eleventh century, in addition to their devotional, instructional, and missionary functions, the *khanaqas* came to be used as tombs for venerated Sufi masters and sites of pilgrimage for ordinary believers.

From the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, important changes in Sufi concepts reinforced the trend toward organized groups. A developing concept of the relations between masters and disciples paved the way for a more formal type of organization. In the ninth and tenth centuries, a Sufi novice was understood to be a student who took lessons from his master. By the eleventh century, he was a disciple who owed total obedience to his master, just as any man owes obedience to God. By then, the master was considered not only a teacher but a healer of souls and a repository of God's blessing. These new and deeper bonds were the basis of a more lasting loyalty of disciple to master and of the perpetuation of the authority of miraculous teachers over the generations.

New forms of Sufi ceremony emerged to symbolize the new relationships. In the earlier era, a student received an *ijaza*, or license to teach the subject he had learned from his master. In the new era, the *khirqa*, or cloak of the master, was conferred on him, and ceremonies of initiation were instituted to induct disciples of the same master into shared vigils, litanies, devotions, and other forms of worship. With the elaboration of the master's authority, the spiritual genealogy of masters and disciples also became important. In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, chains of authority (*silsila*) reaching from the present masters across the generations to ʿAli and to the Prophet were formulated. The authority of Sufi teaching in any given generation was guaranteed by a chain of contacts that connected the present to the Prophet. Initiation into Sufism bore with it a spiritual power derived directly from the original revelation of Islam.

The beginnings of Sufi orders are shadowy, but we may surmise that they coalesced in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries among disciples of the great twelfth- and thirteenth-century masters. These Sufis attributed their practices and doctrine to famous earlier *shaykhs* or originating masters, who were recognized as the transmitters of Sufi teaching and the founders of later Sufi orders. They were thought to have appointed the delegates (*khalifas*) who established new chapters of the order (*tariqa*) and who would in turn appoint their lieutenants and successors.

The known historical facts about the founding of these orders are few. The Suhrawardi order attributed to Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi was actually founded by his nephew ʿUmar al-Suhrawardi (d. 1234). ʿUmar was appointed by the Caliph al-Nasir (d. 1225) to be the head of a group of *ribat*s founded in Baghdad. ʿUmar wrote a treatise on the behavior of Sufi novices and thus established a monastic rule. The Shadhili order, which was introduced into Egypt in the late thirteenth century, began in Morocco with the teachings of Abu Madyan (d. 1197). His student al-Shadhili (d. 1258) moved to Alexandria in 1244, gathered followers and disciples, and created the particular pattern of devotional activities, social life, and avoidance of close relations with government authorities that would later

characterize the order. The Qadiriyya was at first a local chapter centered around the tomb of ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani in Baghdad, but a hospice for Qadiris was founded in Damascus at the end of the fourteenth century. Later, the order spread throughout the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa. The order named after Najm al-Din Kubra was in fact organized in Iran by al-Simnani (d. 1336) and spread widely in Khurasan, Khwarizm, and Transoxania. Al-Simnani was the founder of a movement that emphasized the unity of the Islamic community. His following embraced both Sunnis and Shiʿis; venerated the family of the Prophet, including ʿAli, along with the great Sunni masters; and appealed to Buddhists and pagans to convert to Islam. Sufism, in the view of this order, was an all-embracing form of Islam that transcended sectarian divisions.

By the end of the fourteenth century, the Sufi orders were well established throughout the Middle East. In eastern Iran and Transoxania, the Kubrawiyya was most important. In Iraq, the Suhrawardiyya was dominant. In Syria, the Qadiriyya and the Rifaʿiyya were well established. In Egypt, the Rifaʿiyya, the Qadiriyya, the Shadhiliyya, and the Badawiyya were widespread. Sufi orders in Egypt enjoyed government patronage, the attendance of sultans at Sufi devotions, and a considerable popular following.

The influence of Sufism was considerable. In each community, Sufis represented, in competition with the schools of law and theological sects, an alternative form of social affiliation. The alliance of Sufism with the *ghazi* commitment to holy war and its tradition of missionary activity made the peripheral rather than the historical regions of Islam – such as North Africa, Inner Asia, and India – centers of Sufi expansion. Still, Sufis were received at the courts of rulers, called on to give their blessings and counsel, and allowed to intercede on behalf of their constituents. They also became integrated into the Shafiʿi and the Hanbali schools of law. Most important, they exerted a vast influence on the common people. The Sufi *khanaqa* was a center of public preaching, of religious instruction, and of shared worship for lay followers. Insofar as the *khanaqa* was also the tomb of a venerated saint, Muslims made pilgrimages to worship, to be cured, and to receive spiritual blessing

and material aid. Worship at the tombs of saints, increasingly widespread in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, would become the main vehicle of the Sufi expression of Islam.

Individual Sufis – with their followings of disciples and lay believers – remained the heart of the Sufi movement, despite the formation of small discipleships, the establishment of the *khanaqa* as a focus of collective life, and the institutionalization of the concept of *tariqa*. Although the orders served to bring some uniformity into the teachings of the myriad of local Sufi masters and saints, Sufism was fundamentally the shared culture of individual teachers. Sufi insight was ultimately the product not of institutions but of otherworldly inspiration.

Thus, the schools of law and the Sufi orders were the backbone of larger-scale but diffuse communities that gave people a common law, common authorities, and common facilities, such as mosques, schools, and charities. They gave large numbers of people a common identity that transcended parochial and local membership in quarters and gangs. Religious communities diffusely organized under the leadership of scholars and Sufis were the most inclusive groups and linked the quarters within cities as well as the cities to one another.

Within the context of these communities, religious affiliations, identities, and authority were fluid and diffuse. The law schools and Sufi orders were not rigidly institutional but decentralized and focused on individuals. Even though offices, endowments, and family connections gave power to religious leaders, they had to attract followers by their personal qualities and performances, competing for recognition and influence. Rivalries, jealousies, and competition for patronage and followers embroiled leaders in disputes.

Moreover, competition for religious authority came from diverse sources. Apart from the legal schools and the Sufi orders, spiritual authority was widely distributed. Given the prevailing beliefs in the intercession of saints, visitation of graves to ask for divine favors, magic, charms, amulets, and exorcism, as well as Quran, law, theology, and mysticism, many people had access to the spiritual realm. Thus, rulers, scholars, *sayyid*s (descendants of the Prophet),

Sufis, poets, madmen, and ordinary worshipers might hold an independent religious authority.

Islamic institutions and a mass Islamic society

The institutionalization of Shiʿi sects, Sunni schools of law, and Sufi orders was but one aspect of a larger process by which Middle Eastern communities transformed into an Islamic civilization. The translation of Islamic institutions into an Islamic society also depended on the mass conversion of Middle Eastern peoples to Islam. Curiously, mass conversion was not achieved in the age of the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid empires. The early empires that nurtured Islamic literary, religious, and court cultures never attempted or succeeded in making Islam the religion of the majority of Middle Eastern peoples. Despite numerous conversions, substantial Christian populations remained in Iraq, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt; substantial Zoroastrian populations survived in Iran. Although there were conversions among individuals who migrated to the Arab capitals and became Muslims, as late as two centuries after the conquests, Muslims remained an elite minority among non-Muslim peoples.

The first known mass conversion of a Middle Eastern population took place in Egypt in the middle of the ninth century. A massive Coptic peasant rebellion was crushed in 832. In the wake of the rebellion, bedouins attacked Christian villages; money was extorted from the church. Under pressure of communal defeat, bedouin attack, and the impotence of the church, Christian loyalties were subverted. In regions that had been partially settled by an Arab population, such as the eastern delta and parts of Upper Egypt, mass conversions to Islam took place. Other parts of Egypt, however, especially the western delta, remained Christian.

Only with the breakup of the ʿAbbasid Empire and the vast upheavals attendant on the destruction of the established elites did the masses of Middle Eastern people convert. Extensive warfare, rural insecurity, and the decline of the old elites and village

communities resulted in large numbers of Persians converting to Islam. Sufi missionaries seem to have played a crucial role. In western Iran, Shaykh al-Kazaruni and his followers converted numerous villages. Islamic missionary activity also had substantial success in eastern Iran, where Muʿtazili and Karrami missions made converts. The Caspian regions were converted by Shiʿis fleeing from Baghdad. In Daylam, Tabaristan, Gurgan, and Transoxania, most urbanites had converted by the year 1000. Between 1000 and 1200, missionary Sufis and preachers brought Islam to the villages; rural mosques proliferated. By 1250 or 1300, an estimated 80 percent of the population was Muslim. Sufis pushed out into Inner Asia, where they converted Turkish peoples. In northern Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Syria, however, the bulk of the population remained Christian until the late thirteenth century and probably later. By the thirteenth century, as far as we can tell from exceedingly fragmentary evidence, Islam was no longer the faith of a dominant minority but was the majority faith of Middle Eastern peoples.

Whereas in the imperial era Islam was the identity of the political aristocracy and the dominant Arab-Muslim urban society, in the new era it progressively adapted to express the communal identity of the masses of Middle Eastern peoples. In the course of the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, Islamic communal groups and religious leaders were able to take charge of Middle Eastern communities and infuse them with their interpretations of Islamic identifications. This was possible because old landowning and officeholding notables lost their power to new military regimes dominated by slave soldiers or migratory nomadic chiefs. As foreigners with no historical ties to the societies they had conquered, warlords could restore provincial government, but they could not take the place of the old official and landowning classes and offer, on a local level, the protection, advice, and assistance that the powerful traditionally offered the poor. Faced with military elites unfamiliar with local traditions, scholars emerged as a new communal notability. Religious scholars married into established merchant, administrative, and landowning families and merged with the older local elites to form a new upper class defined by religious qualifications. They took charge of local taxation, irrigation, and judicial and police affairs and often became scribes

and officials in the Saljuq states. The elites, both local and central, were not required but were expected to contribute irrigation, mosques, bazaars, baths, and other public facilities. The scholars thus developed from a purely academic and religious elite with judicial functions into a broad social and political elite. In many instances, given the instability of military regimes, they became the effective representatives and even governors of their towns and territories. Like tribal chiefs, local landowners, princes, and military governors, leading scholarly families sometimes ruled their towns in de facto independence from the military regimes. The families descended from Abu Burda governed Shiraz for centuries; the Mikalis family served as leaders of Nishapur, and the Burhan family of Bukhara provided local governors who collaborated with the nomadic regimes that successively conquered eastern Iran and Transoxania. The acceptance of this new responsibility was a reversal of the earlier scholarly resistance to involvement in politics and is explained by the dramatic breakdown of the caliphate.

Scholarly authority was derived from achieved learning and a reputation for sanctity, because there was no central or churchlike agency to ordain, license, or validate religious leadership. Authority was personal, grounded in the relationship of individual religious teachers to their disciples and followers. In the case of a Shiʿi imam, the head of a school of law, or a Sufi *shaykh*, the personal relationship of layman to scholar, of worshiper to preacher, of sectarian to religious guide, and of disciple to master was crucial. Religious authority was validated by the recognition of other scholars and ordinary people. The influence of the scholars with the general populace was further reinforced by the exercise of patronage, which bound ordinary people to the educated elite. The binding force in society was not a structure of offices and institutions but the networks of personal ties that enabled the scholars to uphold family and religious community as the essential expressions of an Islamic social order.

Shiʿi sects, Sunni schools of law, and Sufi orders also served as cadres for local political organization. The legal schools – made up of study groups, teachers and students, interested members of the community and patrons, and legal functionaries such as deputies,

witnesses, orderlies, and clerks grouped around the important judges – formed organized parties or factions. Scholars had close ties to merchant families, bureaucrats, and officials. Their popular following was often found in the quarters where their mosques and schools were organized, among the people who sought their advice and protection. By the thirteenth century, everyone was considered to be a member of one of the four schools of law or one of the Shiʿi sects, on the basis of birth or the traditional membership of his quarter, city, or region. The common people belonged in that they looked to one or another of the schools for authoritative opinions on what they saw as the divinely commanded rules of behavior. They went to the scholars of the law for judgments in uncertain cases and to the witnesses and judges for commercial and legal matters.

Although Muslim religious bodies became the usual organizing cadres for local communities, they were by no means the only ones. Primary groups – including families, villages, and town quarters defined by family, ethnic, or sectarian homogeneity, or by shared employment in some craft or trade – remained active forces. Young men's gangs (*fityan, ʿayyarun, zuʿar,* or *ghazis*) – made up of unmarried men of working-class backgrounds, separate from family, tribal, or craft organizations – played a complex role in the social life of towns and villages. An already venerable culture of masculine honor and social sanction for revenge helped reinforce the tendency to factionalism and feuds in Middle Eastern town and village communities. These factions made Middle Eastern towns quarrelsome places but also gave them a limited capacity for organized resistance to nomadic and slave regimes.

The Islamic schools of law and Sufi orders played a double role. They were often parochial and factional bodies struggling for control of judicial offices and teaching positions and often involved in pitched battles with rival schools over doctrine, prestige, and control of the streets. In other cases, the schools of law and the Sufi orders served to integrate disparate town populations and bring factional groups into a more embracing Muslim community. Transcending loyalties to any particular place, membership in a law school or a Sufi order created a feeling of participation in the worldwide Muslim community (*umma*) and was an important aspect of social consciousness. United by the

travels of scholars, Sufis, merchants, and students, the schools of law and Sufi orders were crucial both in the formation of local community life and in linking each small locality to the worldwide community of Islam.

Towns and villages were thus segmentary societies made up of numerous groups, defined by neighborhood or by religious sect, and sometimes by occupation, but never by economic class. This is not to deny that the notables formed an elite stratum or that lower-class groups could be independently organized. In Iranian towns, the patriarchates, consisting of officials, professionals, landowners, and merchants, tended to dominate lower-class groups but, by and large, social and political groups were organized in communal rather than in class terms.

This pattern of social affiliations and identifications excluded one alternative pattern of communal organization – the corporation of citizens resident in a particular locality. The town or village from which a person hailed, however important in his consciousness, did not constitute a corporate body, had no territorial administration, and conveyed no political citizenship. No institutions corresponded to the social or psychological facts of town or village life. In this type of society – with its combination of parochial and cosmopolitan identifications and its weak geographic solidarity – people depended on the informal authority and mediation of the scholarly notables to cope with shared concerns. Informal consultation of respected notables and their networks of patronage ties allowed for mediation of local disputes, for mobilization across parochial group lines, and for the expression of shared religious and political interests.

Town and village societies of this type were not ordinarily self-governing. Scholarly notables were neither a military nor a territorial elite. They did not have the skills for warfare; nor did they control land and revenues. Middle Eastern localities lacked the technical, organizational, and economic bases for political independence. They lacked the internal cohesion necessary for political autonomy, and they feared the breakdown of internal order more than the heavy hand of alien regimes.

Conquest by nomadic peoples and slave warlords who militarily and economically dominated both town and country precluded the possibility of communal independence. Only in interregnum periods, in the absence of strong military regimes, could mediation by scholars and parochial clienteles give local forces temporary independence. When the ruling empires were weak, urban resistance to exploitation, revolts against unpopular governors, and protests against taxation were common. Town resistance based on religious leadership and local armed forces could even settle the fate of empires. In 992, when the Samanids were faced with the advancing Qarakhanids, their last hope lay with the masses of Bukhara, whose religious spokesmen counseled neutrality. Similarly, the notables and the scholars of Nishapur determined the success of the Saljuq invasion. Deciding that the Ghaznavids could no longer defend Khurasan, they surrendered to the Saljuqs and offered the services of a socially and administratively skilled elite to the new regime. Otherwise, empires reigned.

Thus, in the period between 950 and 1200, local elites and communities in Iran and Iraq became Muslim and transformed Islamic identities. By 1400, the same was substantially true for Syria and Egypt. Through the schools of law, Sufi orders, and Shiʿi sects, Islamic religious leaders provided the cadres of communal organization not only for a small sectarian following but, in an age of conversions, for the masses of Middle Eastern peoples. Islam thus gave the post-imperial Middle East a new identity. While conquerors and regimes came and went, Islam became ever more firmly and widely entrenched as the basis of the social and political order.

Muslim religious movements and the state

The religious and social roles of the Sunni schools of law, theological sects, Shiʿi communities, and Sufi orders made them of the utmost importance to Middle Eastern military regimes. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Buwayhids, the Hamdanids, and the Qarmatians were officially Shiʿi. The Buwayhids authorized, patronized, and guided the organization of the Imami community in Baghdad. They introduced

the festivals of *ghadir khumm* and ʿashuraʾ. The Fatimids were the sponsors of Ismaʿili missions that reached from North Africa to Khurasan, Afghanistan, and Transoxania. The triumph of the Shiʿi dynasties also prompted a literary and cultural renaissance in which Hellenistic, philosophical, and secular views flourished.

Caliph al-Qadir (d. 1031) took the lead in the Sunni response to Shiʿism by trying to organize a Sunni religious mission to restore the true practice of the faith. He helped Sunnis set up their own festivals, commemorating the nomination of Abu Bakr and the death of Musʿab ibn al-Zubayr, to rival the Shiʿi celebrations; by proclamation, he made Hanbalism the state's official Islamic legal school. In 1019, the caliph condemned allegorical explanations of the Quran and the thesis of the created Quran and proclaimed the excellence of the first four caliphs in order of their access to office. His successor, al-Qaʾim (d. 1075), renewed the effort to define Islamic orthodoxy in Hanbali terms and to mobilize popular support for caliphal supremacy. In reaction to Shiʿism, the Sunni revival of the eleventh century aspired not only to define Islamic orthodoxy but also to restore the caliphs as the heads of the Islamic community.

The advent of the Saljuqs in 1055 profoundly changed the relations between religious communities and the state. From the very beginning of their conquests in Khurasan, the Saljuqs became embroiled in religious controversy and soon devised a policy of alliance with selected Islamic movements. They espoused an uncompromising anti-Shiʿi policy and helped suppress Shiʿi activities throughout their domains. Their hostility was motivated partly by rivalry with the Fatimids and partly by Sunni anxiety over subversion by Shiʿi movements. Saljuq opposition to Shiʿism was vigorously pursued in order to create Sunni solidarity and to promote the legitimacy of Saljuq states in the name of the "true" Islam.

The Saljuqs also took positions vis-à-vis the competing Sunni schools. First, they intervened in the Hanafi-Shafiʿi and Hanbali-Ashʿari struggles, favoring the Hanafi school of law and forcibly suppressing Shafiʿi and Ashʿari activity. In 1063, however, Nizam al-Mulk, newly appointed as minister (*wazir*), proposed to calm Sunni religious quarrels by patronizing both the Hanafis and the Shafiʿis.

The major instrument of this policy was the construction and endowment of religious schools (madrasas) in every major city of the Saljuq domains. Saljuq support created a broad base for the education of Sunni teachers, for Sunni missions to the general populace, and for opposition to the Fatimids and the Isma'ilis. Nizam al-Mulk probably aimed at state control over the Sunni movements and used the major legal and theological schools as a vehicle for political influence over the masses.

After the death of Nizam al-Mulk, Saljuq policy oscillated between patronizing the Hanafis and patronizing the Shafi'is. The late twelfth century, however, brought a shift from sponsorship of individual schools to equal recognition of the four major schools of law. Alongside the colleges, which taught the legal doctrine of each of the four main schools, a new type of college, called *dar al-hadith*, was created to teach the sayings and deeds of Muhammad. The *dar al-hadith*, however, was not assigned to a particular school of law but represented the common Muslim interest in the legacy of the Prophet. In 1234, as a further expression of a pan-Sunni policy, a new madrasa, al-Mustansiriyya, was founded in Baghdad to house all four of the law schools. In the course of a century and a half, government policy had moved from identifying itself with particular sectarian movements to delineating Islamic orthodoxy to include all the major schools of law and the most prominent theological groups.

The Saljuqs endowed *khanaqas* as well as colleges. They brought the institution to Baghdad, where these centers were known as *ribats*. *Ribats* housed scholars of hadith, legists, and theologians and were, in particular, residences for preachers engaged in religious and political propaganda on behalf of the Saljuq sultans.

Thus, by sponsorship of colleges, schools of law, theological groups, and *khanaqas*, Nizam al-Mulk initiated a state policy of seeking legitimacy and political stability by patronage and sponsorship of Sunni religious institutions. State support and sponsorship of religious schools helped overcome factional antagonisms. The madrasas and *khanaqas* served as an organizational base for legal teaching, as a vehicle for providing financial support for religious scholarship, as centers for the training

of religious and administrative cadres, and as bases for missionary activity with the goal of achieving the universal acceptance of Sunnism. In return for Sunni support and legitimization of state policy, the Saljuqs helped to realize the Sunni ambition for a universal Muslim society.

The conquest of Syria and then of Egypt by Turkish (and Kurdish) warriors and the establishment of Saljuqid regimes introduced the system of state and religious organization that was being worked out in the eastern provinces into the former western provinces of the ʿAbbasid Empire. The Ayyubids in Syria and the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt continued the Saljuq policy of strong state support for and control of Sunni Islam. Under the patronage of Nur al-Din, new colleges of law were founded in Damascus and were endowed with permanent funds. In the Ayyubid period (1193–1260), there were no fewer than 255 religious structures built in Damascus. Stimulated by Hanafi and Shafiʿi scholars from Iran and Spain, the Syrian provinces were thus integrated into what was becoming the prevalent system of education in the Middle East.

The conquest of Egypt by Saladin in 1171 opened the way for the installation of the Sunni schools in Egypt. The Shafiʿi school had survived under Fatimid rule, but Saladin introduced the Hanafi school, endowed colleges of law, and recruited prominent teachers and judges from abroad. In the early thirteenth century, the Ayyubid government in Egypt adopted a pan-Sunni policy of equal recognition and equal sponsorship of all schools of law. The al-Kamiliyya, a school of hadith, was founded in 1222 to teach the points of law that were held in common among the schools. The madrasa, al-Salihiyya, was founded in 1239 to house all four schools of law in the same building.

Similarly, Saljuq sponsorship of *khanaqas* and *ribats* spread these institutions from eastern Iran to Baghdad and to the western Arab provinces. The first Syrian *khanaqa* was built in Aleppo in 1115. Nur al-Din established one in Damascus after 1154. Saladin founded a *khanaqa* in Egypt in 1173 as a hostel for foreign Sufis and one in Jerusalem in 1189.

The Ayyubids also followed Fatimid precedents by constructing tombs for venerated Muslim ancestors and for deceased rulers. One of the first Ayyubid projects was the construction of a college near the grave of al-Shafiʻi, the founder of the principal Egyptian school of law. Colleges and Sufi retreats were provided with mausoleums for the remains of their founders. A tomb advertised the sanctity of the ruler and his devotion to Islam.

This Ayyubid sponsorship of Sunni institutions was followed by another equally intense period of construction and endowment under the Mamluks. The early Mamluk period was dominated by intense Muslim religious feeling expressed in warfare against the crusaders, the Mongols, and the Ismaʻilis and by hostility to Christians and Jews, coupled with pressures for the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. At the instance of governors, generals, judges, and rich merchants, Cairo and other towns were provided with ever-enhanced facilities for worship, education, and charity. Thus, the Mamluks extended the Saljuq-Iranian pattern of organized religious life to Syria and Egypt. Owing to this strong support for Sunnism, Mamluk royal culture emphasized its Islamic rather than its cosmopolitan bases. It was thus typical of the tendency in the Arab provinces to legitimize states in Muslim rather than universalistic terms.

By the thirteenth century, from Iran to Egypt, a new system of government based on the collaboration of military elites and local religious notables was consolidated. As culturally and linguistically alien conquerors, the military elites did not have the legitimacy or bureaucratic personnel to control and tax the city populations, suppress urban factions and gangs, and forestall the emergence of independent civic associations. For this, they depended on the support of local notables – scholars, teachers, judges, market inspectors, and local officials. To win this needed assistance, rulers and high-ranking officers (amirs) supported the notables with endowed incomes, gifts, and stipends and thereby built up factional political support.

The endowment of colleges and other religious and urban facilities also served the personal interests of the rulers and officers. They could be used to perpetuate their private and household fortunes.

The gift of a trust (*waqf*) allowed the donors to keep control of their properties until death and pass control to their heirs. They provided the donors with tombs. Trusts were often endowed by the women of warrior households, helping to safeguard their fortunes.

Although their power was sometimes based on local groups of young men (with chivalric ideals and gangster behavior), notables and scholars were limited, because they were divided by faction, school, and other interests. Thus, they depended on stipends, gifts, and endowments for their influence and for the continuity of family power. Moreover, they had no title to such stipends – rulers could change the beneficiaries at will – and had to compete for favors and depend on the success of the military factions to which they were allied. The notables competed by prestige in learning and reputation for *hurma* (honor and cultivated personality) and by the transmission to their heirs of the knowledge, deportment, and behaviors that defined high status.

In Timurid Iran, we find a variant version of the relationship between political-military and religious-notable elites. The ruler showed respect for learning, Sufism, and shrines. Herat was the premier city of religion, with important scholarly lineages, Sufi masters, descendants of the Prophet, and tombs. The ruler did not try to promote his own religious program but appointed a chief judge to oversee the religious personnel. He showed respect for the existing local authorities by distributing the highest posts to students of religious leaders promoted by Timur, but other posts went to local Khurasanian families. However, given the diversity of religious beliefs and authorities and the intense competition among them, influence and power were largely individual achievements.

In sum, government was based on a dynasty, the ruler, and his men, who were supposed to protect the religion and the community. The ruler was supposed to balance the varied interests in the society and to prevent any one of them from becoming disproportionately powerful and therefore oppressive. He achieved this by an elaborate and ever-changing network of patronage ties to the men of power, influence, and status in the larger society.

Chapter 22 The collective ideal

The new realities of state and religious institutions were reflected in an abundant literature of political theory. This theory had three principal branches: a Sunni theory of the caliphate that was the work of the scholars, a Persian-inspired genre of mirrors for princes, and a philosophical theory of the ideal state composed by commentators on Plato and Aristotle. Each of them responded in part to the changing social universe and in part to their own literary canons, but they also embodied a common perception of the ultimate significance of politics and community. The shared values and assumptions bring us to the core of the post-imperial conception of an Islamic society.

Sunni theory

The Sunni theory of the caliphate was set forth in theological and juridical treatises. Sunni writers tried to explain why there should be a caliphate at all, what purposes the office served, what qualifications were required of its incumbents, how they were to be selected, and what were the obligations of subjects. The underlying assumption of the Sunni literature was that rulers held office to implement Islamic law and maintain the existence of the Muslim community. Before the middle of the tenth century, Muslim political debates turned on the question of who was qualified to hold this office. Sunnis proposed certain personal qualifications combined with an electoral process to guarantee the legitimacy of a ruler. Whereas Sunni authors discussed the formalities of assuming the office, including the formal act of designation, consultation with the religious scholars, the oath of investiture, and the contract with the community, legal thinking in effect justified the actual pattern of succession and especially the designation by the incumbent of his heir.

By the tenth and eleventh centuries, it was clear that the caliphs could no longer fulfill their political and religious roles. The sultanates had stripped the caliphate of its actual powers; sectarian quarrels diminished its religious authority. Sunni theorists accommodated to these realities. Al-Mawardi (d. 1058), a Shafi'i jurist, wrote *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya* (Principles of Government) to show that the primary duties of the caliph are to maintain religion according to early precedents, enforce judicial decisions, and protect the people of Islam. For al-Mawardi, the caliphate was both a religious commitment and a political actuality. Thus, his theoretical views were supplemented with a discussion of the delegation of authority, the conditions of appointments and tenure for all classes of government officials, and the personal and moral qualities required of each officeholder. He described the organization of judicial administration, tax collection, government measures to stimulate agricultural production, and the application of legal penalties for criminal offenses. In effect, he set out a comprehensive blueprint for the exercise of an Islamic government. Embedded in this elaborate literary exercise is a poignant mixture of scholarly devotion, religious idealism, and political ambition.

Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) similarly combined allegiance to religious tradition with a pragmatic awareness of political realities. He too wanted to restore the caliphate to its "true" function as the protector of the tradition of the Prophet and of Islamic law, to recapture the unity of Muslim peoples, and to restore their military and worldly might. To do this, he realized, it was necessary to assimilate the Turkish military aristocracy, subordinate them to the caliphate, reform political administration, and above all use the combined powers of caliphs and reigning sultans to suppress dissidents, especially the Shi'is. Most important for al-Ghazali was the need to inculcate in every individual Muslim true belief, true piety, and true practice of Islamic law. Despite his continuing commitment to the caliphate, al-Ghazali was realistic enough to recognize that military commanders often appointed the caliphs, who in turn legitimized their power. His theory conceived of Islamic government as a condominium of the authority of the caliphs and the effective powers of the sultans.

More important was the ever-increasing emphasis on obedience. Obedience is counseled in the Quran and in hadiths. The Hanbali theologian Ibn Batta (d. 997) condemned armed revolt against an established government. He held that obedience was required of all subjects, but that this obedience was limited, in that the individual should refuse to disobey a command of God. Al-Ghazali held that rulers should be obeyed because resistance, even to tyranny, was a worse alternative. He believed that in the absence of a strong government, factional hostilities could lead to anarchy. These fears were not unrealistic. Under the pressure of political necessity, Muslim jurists were led to accept any established government as legitimate and to put aside their insistence on the supremacy of the caliphate.

With the demise of the caliphate in 1258, Sunni political thinkers could finally articulate a concept of Islamic government based on the collaboration of secular rulers and religious teachers. Just as the authority of caliphs was based on succession to the Prophet and on the presumption that they had the knowledge, understanding, and moral qualities essential to implement the revealed law, so the authority of the scholars and Sufis was based on a combination of personal achievements and of *silsila* (chain of initiations going back to the Prophet). Thus, the followers of the caliphate, the students of the scholars, and the devotees of the Sufis respected the same essential principle: the transmitted teachings of the Prophet. Political theorists then assigned the scholars an ever-larger role in the government of Muslim communities as advisors and counselors to reigning princes. As early as the ninth century, the Hanbalis had emphasized the Quranic injunction to "command the good and forbid the evil" as the basis of the responsibility of every scholar and of every Muslim to apply God's law in community affairs. With the rise to power of slave and nomadic chieftains, Hanbalis and other Muslim theologians also stressed the requirement of advising and admonishing (*nasiha*) the ruling elites to induce them to observe and implement Islam.

In both practice and theory, Ahmad b. Taymiyya (d. 1328) represented the epitome of the trend to focus Muslim religio-

communal interests on scholars. Ibn Taymiyya was an outstanding Hanbali scholar of Quran and hadith and a prolific writer on a great variety of religious questions. Born in Harran in Mesopotamia, he fled from the Mongol invasions to Damascus. He first achieved notoriety in 1293 when he led a campaign to execute a Christian who was accused of insulting the Prophet. In sermons and speeches, legal responsa, and published creeds, he violently denounced his religious enemies. He opposed the Ashʿaris and speculative theology in all its forms; he opposed all forms of metaphysical Sufism; he denounced esoteric and antinomian religious views and the veneration of saints' tombs; he involved himself in violent controversies on legal matters such as the law of divorce. He took part in demonstrations to destroy cultic forms of worship and expeditions against the Ismaʿilis in the mountains of the Lebanon and led Muslim resistance to the Mongol invasions of Damascus. He insistently demanded that Islamic law be a continuing and vital force in the everyday life of every Muslim.

In accordance with his own political role, Ibn Taymiyya held that scholars were responsible for upholding the law by giving religious advice to rulers, teaching true principles to the community of Muslims, and "commanding the good and forbidding the evil." He set aside the traditional question of the caliphate – arguing that true caliphs had not ruled since the early days of Islam – and defined Muslim governments in terms of the actual ruling authorities and their attention to the advice of the scholars. His political activism thus embodied a new concept of state and society in which the scholars rather than the caliphs became the principal actors. Sunni political theory had shifted slowly to deemphasize the caliphate and to accept the reality of sultan and scholar as the key figures in the Muslim political order.

Mirrors for princes

While Sunni theory developed in Islamic religious circles, mirror literature arose out of a Persian tradition of manuals of statecraft. The first works of this kind were translated into Arabic in the course

of the eighth and ninth centuries to counsel the ʿAbbasid caliphs. The upheavals of the tenth and eleventh centuries led to a new wave of mirrors for princes, written by government officials and religious scholars, to define the rules of good government for their new Turkish overlords. (See Illustration 7.)

Illustration 7.   A youth prostrating himself before a ruler. *Source*: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the Edward Binney, 3rd, Collection of Turkish Art. Photograph © 2002 Museum Associates LACMA.

   The most important treatise of this kind was *The Book of Government* by Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092). This text urges the sultan to do justice and gives him specific advice on the techniques of rule. The work is devoted to explicating the proper role of soldiers, police, spies, and finance officials; it tells anecdotes about the great ancient rulers to illustrate its lessons. Another important work, the "Qabus-nameh" of Kay Kaʾus (d. c. 1082), was a compendium of the wisdom

of an old king written for his favorite son, containing advice on the proper conduct of a household, agriculture, the professions, and government. The "Qabus-nameh" tries to teach a youth how to be a statesman, a gentleman, and a good Muslim. The *Book of Counsel for Kings* by al-Ghazali is an altogether different kind of mirror. Whereas Nizam al-Mulk concentrated on pragmatic political questions and Kay Ka'us was concerned with the education of an aristocrat, al-Ghazali's *Book of Counsel* sets out the beliefs of Islam, the moral qualities and attitudes expected of a ruler, and his duty to uphold the true religion. The example of ancient Persian kings and the sayings of sages are quoted to illustrate these teachings and to give a work with Muslim religious content a Persian literary flavor.

These works are strikingly diverse in tone and content, but they are all concerned with the ultimate ends of government and with the cultivation of rulers who have the vision, the character, and the technique to realize these ends. The purpose of government is to uphold justice and to preserve the Islamic tradition. In the work of Nizam al-Mulk, justice means that each class of the population – soldiers, administrators, merchants, and peasants – shall have its due; the weak shall be protected, and the productivity of the population assured. In concrete circumstances, justice is defined by custom and by Islamic law. For these obligations, a ruler is considered a shepherd responsible to God for his flock.

Al-Ghazali's *Book of Counsel for Kings* also stresses the importance of justice. The ruler should understand that God loves a just sultan and that God will judge him on the final day. The ruler should also see that his officers, servants, and slaves are disciplined. His most important responsibility is to shun heresy and evil actions, to keep to the tradition of the Prophet, and to reward virtuous people and condemn evil ones. For al-Ghazali as well as for the secular writers, the principal function of kingship is to uphold order in society and the teachings of the true faith.

According to the implicit theory of the mirrors for princes, the principal means for realizing justice is that the ruler himself be a just person. Although there are numerous pragmatic or political matters that must be managed, societies depend ultimately on the

intellectual and moral qualities of their rulers. The good ruler must be a man of intelligence, knowledge, and experience, deliberate and circumspect, patient and self-restrained. This nobility must be expressed in a grave, dignified, and stern manner, for the ruler must inspire awe, loyalty, and good behavior in his subordinates. He must therefore avoid lying, avarice, anger, envy, and cowardice. If the ruler is a liar, men will have no fear; if he is avaricious, they will have no hope; if he is angry, they will not confide in him. The most desirable trait is generosity: he must reward his servants and spend his treasure on those who help him. His good character not only wins the support of his subordinates but serves as an example and induces them to be good to the people. Thus the moral qualities of the ruler are at the heart of his capacity to make justice reign. For al-Ghazali, this essential goodness is based on religious humility. The virtues of princes come from fear of God, for we are temporary sojourners in this world and our ultimate destiny is in the world to come.

To achieve goodness, the ruler must consult with the sages and the scholars. They will teach him what God requires; they will divert him from heresy and innovation; they will help make his soul into the image of a just ruler. The scholars thus define the goodness incumbent on the ruler and help instill it in him. The literature of the mirror for princes, then, trusts to personal virtue as the basis of social justice.

The Philosopher-king

A third genre of literature stems from the Greek heritage: Muslim commentators on Plato and Aristotle – including al-Farabi (d. 950), Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037), Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), and others – who examine the ideal state and the ideal ruler. The highest goal in philosophic political theory is the perfection of the human speculative intelligence and the attainment of happiness through the rational contemplation of the divine reality. For the realization of this blessed state, the cooperation of human beings is essential.

Al-Farabi was the premier political theorist in the philosophic tradition. His *al-Madina al-Fadila* (The Virtuous State) begins with a résumé of the principles covering the divine being, the emanation of the celestial intelligences, and the relation of human intelligence and imagination to the spiritual universe. His objective is to understand the nature of being and intellect and to attain a spiritual vision of reality; his principal concern is the person of the philosopher, who must know the truth and be responsible for actualizing it in human society. The philosopher who has attained a theoretical vision of the truth is the only person qualified to rule, instruct his people, form their character in accordance with moral principles, teach them practical arts, and rouse them to do good acts so that they in turn reach their highest possible perfection.

In *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, al-Farabi explains that there are two levels of ideal state. One is the state ruled by the philosopher-prophet-prince, whose personal guiding presence is the inspiration for a virtuous society. The second type is the state ruled in accordance with the law set down by the original philosopher-prophet. In this state, the ruler must have knowledge of ancient laws, good judgment about how to apply them, initiative in coping with new situations, and practical wisdom to handle matters in which tradition does not suffice. The second type of ideal state corresponds to the Islamic society governed by the revealed law under the guidance of a ruler who implements the law – it is akin to the ideal caliphate of Sunni legal theory.

Later political philosophers held much the same position. Ibn Rushd offered a comprehensive vision of the spiritual universe and the place of human society within it. This is presented in his commentary on Plato's *Republic*. The perfection of speculative intelligence is the highest goal of human existence; human society exists for the sake of this perfection. The ideal society requires a philosopher-king and lawgiver who will create an order in which each person fulfills the tasks appropriate to his nature. When the virtues of the soul – intellect, temperament, and appetite – receive proper expression, there is justice in the society and in each person. The ruler establishes this perfect order by teaching philosophy to the

elect and theology and poetry to the others. He trains the people by providing laws that guide them toward proper actions. Ibn Rushd, like al-Farabi, posits two levels of ideal society. One is established by the philosopher-prophet, who combines wisdom, intelligence, and the imaginative capacity to communicate the truth directly to the masses. The other is based on law, which is a way of implementing the speculative truth known to philosophers and is conducive to the perfection of the soul. In either case, a good ruler is essential to the realization of a good society.

All three forms of Muslim political theory are ultimately grounded in the premise that the goal of the social order is the formation of individuals who live rightly in this world in accordance with the truth and so are prepared to achieve salvation in the world to come. Politics is but part of a larger quest for religious salvation. Nonetheless, in each theory, the definition of that truth is somewhat different. In the Sunni theory, the fulfillment of the law is the fulfillment of God's revealed will. In the mirror theory, the substance of religious fulfillment is not discussed, but it is assumed that justice corresponds to the realization of religious principles. In the philosophical theory, knowledge of the intelligences and purification of the soul free the human intellect to regain its visionary attachment to the spiritual world.

The three genres of Muslim political theory also agree that political society is essential to the realization of this perfection. In the philosophical theory, a properly ordered society is necessary for the cultivation of souls who may comprehend the ultimate reality. In both philosophical and Sunni theory, law is the essential device for instructing, educating, and forming the morals of human beings. In turn, the state is essential for the enforcement of laws and the protection of individuals from being harmed or doing harm. In all three theories, society is necessary to enforce justice and order, sustain basic human needs, teach and instruct individuals in their moral duties, and support their spiritual quests.

All three genres insist that the proper social order requires a good ruler, whether he is a philosopher, caliph, or sultan. In all three forms of Muslim political literature, the ruler symbolizes the integration or

the orderly relation of human beings to the cosmos and to God. In the philosophical literature, the ruler stands not only for personal religious fulfillment but for the harmony of the individual and society with the spiritual cosmos. The ruler who actualizes his rational potential brings his own soul into contact with the active intellect and the spiritual intelligences. He symbolizes in mythic terms the integration of man and God. In Sunni and mirror theory, the ruler does not have a mythic function: the caliph is not divine, or semidivine, or an incarnate savior, or a perfect man. He is, however, God's vice-regent, God's shadow, his vehicle for the maintenance of order in society and for fulfilling the conditions essential to the implementation of Islamic law. The caliph is seen as the upholder of order and justice in the image of God. He is mighty, capricious, inscrutable, and deserving of loyalty regardless of his actual deeds. An ordered society is unimaginable without a ruler, just as an ordered universe is unimaginable without God.

The ideal ruler is presented as ethical, just, and God-fearing, but the unspoken motive for the composition of these literatures is that actual rulers are capricious, willful, self-serving, and tyrannical. The unspoken contrast symbolizes the deep conflict that is experienced in the soul of every individual and in the body of society – the conflict between the forces of unbridled passion and unrestrained exercise of power and the discipline of moderation and self-control. It also symbolizes the ever-present conflict in society generated by family antagonisms, tribal wars, factional struggles, conquests, and the rise and fall of regimes, as opposed to the hope for peace. The ruler signifies not merely order but the quest for order in a society composed of self-seeking human beings and groups. These genres are indicative of a broader concern among intellectuals that Muslim leaders of the medieval period were significantly less qualified or worthy of leadership than their early Islamic predecessors. Similarly, Sunni-Shiʿi disputes over legitimate Muslim leadership provoked an intellectual interest in analyzing and delineating the characteristics and functions of a successful leader.

The person of the ruler is so important that all of these works, with the partial exception of those of Nizam al-Mulk, neglect actual

political institutions. In the Sunni theory, the emphasis is on the person of the caliph and not on the mechanisms that could bring religious principles into practice. The mirror literatures are similarly vague about the meaning of justice and hierarchy. The philosophical writers give no concrete description of the ideal government. Society is described as organized into classes, but the classes are only metaphors for the virtues of the well-ordered soul. In none of these literatures do economic issues have an important place.

There are several reasons for this emphasis on the person of the ruler. One is that these literatures reflect the realities of their time. Whereas modern political theory may focus on institutions because of the highly bureaucratic and legalistic structure of modern societies, Muslim writers of that era turned their attention to the ruler because authority was vested in patriarchal figures who depended on the personal loyalty of their soldiers and officials to maintain their regimes. In a society that depended on men rather than institutions, the only conceivable check on the powers of rulers was their character as human beings.

Furthermore, the emphasis on the ruler also reflects the weakness of organized institutions. Although ubiquitous in influence, scholars and Sufis had no central organization. Urban communities were divided into factions. Landowners and other economic elites were divided by region and faction and had no formal ways of generating solidarity. Apart from the small urban family or rural clans, lineages, and tribes, there was no organized political society. Even the state was often the household of the prince.

Finally, the person of the ruler was emphasized because the ruler symbolized not only the aspiration for political justice but the hope for individual religious perfection. In the philosophic literature, the ultimate concern of political theory is the education of the philosopher. Analogously, the ultimate concern of Sunni writers was not politics but religious and moral perfection to be attained by adherence to the law. The caliph was a symbol of that perfection. Similarly, the mirror literature describes the ruler as a person in control of his own evil impulses and those of others. He is not an administrator but a model for how men should live. While addressing

the question of the state, the underlying premise of Islamic "political literatures" is that a good state is the product of good human beings.

Chapter 23 The personal ethic

The consolidation of a post-imperial Islamic society was accompanied by the consolidation of Islamic religious literatures, beliefs, and values and by the canonization of an Islamic orthodoxy. Although the basic literatures of exegesis, hadith, law, theology, and mysticism had originated in an earlier era, during the tenth to the thirteenth centuries these literatures were merged into the forms that we now identify as "classical Islam." A Sunni-scripturalist-Sufi orientation became the most commonly accepted version of Islam. Shiʿism, philosophy, theosophy, and popular religion were the alternatives to the Sunni consensus. The post-imperial era constructed both the normative forms of Islamic religious belief and practice and the alternatives, thus defining the issues that would ever after constitute the *problématique* of Muslim religious discourse.

Normative Islam: Scripture, Sufism, and Theology

Sunni consensus became grounded in scripture during the medieval period. In the post-imperial era, the Quran was understood to require each person to do the good deeds commanded by God; to be moderate, humble, kind, and just; and to be steadfast and tranquil in the face of his own passions. The true Muslim is the slave of God. He accepts his humble place in the world and takes no pride or consolation in human prowess but recognizes the limited worth of all worldly things and the greater importance of pleasing God.

By the ninth century, hadith had achieved a central place in Muslim religious life. Once the basic canons had been codified, hadith studies tended to concentrate on the criticism of chains of transmission (*isnad*) and on the compilation of anthologies garnered from the earlier canons. Sunni works of law, theology, and mysticism continued to quote proof-texts from the Quran and hadith. Also, by

the middle of the tenth century, the schools of law had developed their basic jurisprudential procedures and had elaborated a considerable body of legal materials. By then, it was evident that there were four principle schools of Sunni jurisprudence with large followings, although there were also numerous independent scholars and small personal schools, in addition to the Shiʿi schools. In time, only the four major Sunni schools – the Hanafi, Shafiʿi, Maliki, and Hanbali – survived.

Despite the consolidation of schools of law, there was considerable legal development after 950. (See Table 6.) The formalization and professionalization of legal schools is reflected in changing genres of legal literature. Whereas previously legal texts tended to compile the opinions of a single jurist, in later periods, the legal opinions of groups of jurists who belonged to the same school were combined. In the tenth century, legal schools began codifying their doctrines in compendia (*mukhtasar*) based on each school's most authoritative or widely accepted legal opinions. The law took the form of a vast reservoir of case materials and precedents that could be used as the basis of judicial decisions. This genre became increasingly more prevalent in subsequent centuries. The *Hidaya* (Guide) by the Hanafi jurist al-Marghinani (d. 1196) is representative of compilation, repetition, and formalism in Islamic legal scholarship. By selectively choosing which legal opinions would be considered authoritative, these compendia created a resource for later jurists to perpetuate and disseminate the rulings and the methodology of their school. Another genre of legal literature that intensified in the medieval period is the etiquette of judging (*adab al-qadi*). These texts outlined the duties and proper behavior of a judge, further formalizing the legal profession.

Table 6.   *Central concepts in law*

fatwa	Advisory opinion on a matter of law given by a *mufti* (jurisconsult)
fiqh	Understanding, law

ijtihad	Independent judgment of qualified legal scholar (*mujtahid*)
'ilm	Knowledge, especially of law; the learning of the *'alim* (pl. *'ulama'*)
qada'	Court judgment made by a judge (*qadi*) on the basis of *fiqh*
Shari'a	The way, the total corpus of law
taqlid	Imitation, following the established teachings
usul al-fiqh	Jurisprudence; sources of law: Quran, hadith (sayings of the Prophet), *ijma'* (consensus of schools and community), *qiyas* (reasoning by analogy)

Whereas the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi'i schools agreed that the "gate of *ijtihad*" or independent reasoning was closed and that scholars of later generations were not free to give personal or independent interpretations of the law, the Hanbalis and a minority of Shafi'i writers never accepted the principle of *taqlid*, or obedience to the traditional canon, and upheld the authority of every qualified legal scholar to use rational judgment in legal questions. Even the more conservative schools allowed for flexible accommodation of legal principles to custom and tradition. Surviving court records suggest that jurists applied legal doctrines of schools other than their own. The application of the law to practical situations and the procedure of consulting scholars for legal opinions also resulted in legal changes. The possibilities for individual interpretation and selection out of the repertoire of numerous jurists gave Islamic law almost boundless flexibility in practice.

Legal rules were mixed with moral injunctions. Some actions were required, others were recommended; some were forbidden, others

discouraged. In some matters, the law was neutral. In many categories, it did not provide sanctions, and its application was left to conscience. The universal tension between ethical ideals and legal rules, between fulfillment in spirit and in letter, and between law as a symbol of truth and as a system of rules manifested itself in Islamic societies. Furthermore, custom or socioeconomic circumstances often decided whether or not aspects of the law were applied. As in all legal systems, legalistic devices (*hiyal*) allowed for exceptions to the principles of the law while keeping to its letter. Actual legal practice was infinitely varied, according to locality, legal school, and many other circumstantial factors.

Embedded in the problem of adherence to the law was the question of its sources. Was law based on divine authority, the rational judgment of experts, or allegiance to the tradition and consensus of the community? Revelation, reason, consensus, and tradition all played a role in the formulation of religious judgments. Acceptance of scripture, then, implied faith in revelation, commitment to a specific way of life, and a search for personal realization of the moral and spiritual as well as the behavioral qualities implied in the Muslim revelation. In Quran, hadith, and law, we find not only prescriptive rules but the vocabulary of an open religious quest.

Sufism in the post-ʿAbbasid era

Sufism was another way of pursuing this quest. It devalued worldly things in the search for an ecstatic experience of God's being. It also carried with it a theosophical view of the universe that explained the structure of the cosmos and the possibility of religious ascent toward union with God. Finally, it encompassed belief in the miraculous powers of saints as channels for God's action in the world. Sufism thus encompassed piety and ethical behavior, ascetic and ecstatic practices, theosophical metaphysics, and magical beliefs. It embraced at once a scripturalist, an agnostic, and a miraculous concept of Islam. Some forms of Sufism would be integrated with law, whereas others tended to gnosticism and the veneration of saints. Its ascetic and theosophical aspects were consistent with

devoted practice of Islamic law, but the veneration of the magical powers of Sufi saints led rather to religious practices that were expected to produce miracles or to induce ecstatic visions. Sufism was thus not one but several forms of religious inspiration united under the same name.

By the end of the tenth century, Sufis had defined their movement as a science, parallel to that of law, capable of leading to true knowledge of God by virtue of correct doctrine, religious practices, and methods of mystical contemplation. Leading Sufis developed wide and complex religious views including legal and theological interests. Sufi writers worked out a technical vocabulary to define, defend, and standardize Sufi practice; integrate it with law and theology; and thus legitimize it within the framework of Islam.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a postclassical period began. God was seen as the only reality; meditation techniques, music, and love poetry were introduced, and emphasis was placed on the moral and ethical aspect of Sufism consistent with legal Islam.

Sufi positions were expressed in a growing body of literature. Biographies linked Sufi initiates with a chain of teachers leading back through al-Junayd to Hasan al-Basri and the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. Other Sufi treatises set forth the main ideas derived from Sufi experience and tried to communicate the actual experiences of the masters through anecdotes and sayings. They illustrated the great piety and scrupulousness of Sufis, their trust in God, their detachment from the material world, and their qualities of heart and soul. Such works included the *Qut al-Qulub* (The Food of Hearts) of al-Makki (d. 998), which set out Sufi prayers and recitations. The *Kashf al-Mahjub* (Unveiling of the Hidden) of al-Hujwiri (d. 1071) and the *Risala* (Epistle) of al-Qushayri (d. 1074), head of the Shafiʻi-Ashʻari party in Nishapur, explained the meaning of key Sufi terms, discussed metaphysical and theological issues, and gave the biographies of famous masters.

The central motif of this literature is renunciation of individual will, of worldly concerns, and of everything except God. This renunciation, however, refers to an attitude of mind rather than a

literal state of emptiness or vacuum. The Sufi lives with material things but does not care about them. He owns things but does not derive his esteem from them.

Further, the Sufis taught that true Islam is the submission of man's will to God's will. Al-Hujwiri says, "Divine grace is this – that God through His will should restrain a man from his own will and should overpower him with will-lessness, so that if he were thirsty and plunged into a river, the river would become dry." And further: "What we choose for ourselves is noxious to us. I desire only that God should desire for me and therein preserve me from the evil thereof and save me from the wickedness of my soul.…I have no choice beyond His choice."[1] The Sufi does not wish his own wishes but makes his wish whatever God has commanded; he is satisfied with whatever God decrees for his life; indeed, he embraces God's choices, doing God's will joyfully.

This does not mean that the Sufi does not have a "will" in the ordinary sense; it means he has fused the chaotic wishes of every person into his authentic will, his willing acceptance of God's command. In this, Sufism is consistent with the Quran, which sees that the unbeliever is one who gives free reign to unchecked passions and who only serves his apparent needs for wealth, honor, fame, and power. Controlling this false willfulness, obeying God's command, restraint, and modesty are the "true Islam."

Sufism further teaches that the will is tamed by the love of God. The politicians would curb men by force; the moralists, by public opinion; the philosophers, by reason; the theologians, by faith. Sufis teach that the true love of God is to love his will as one's own. They yearn to do God's will as a lover yearns to fulfill the wishes of his beloved. "God's choice for His servant with His knowledge of His servant is better than His servant's choice for himself with his ignorance of his Lord, because love, as all agree, is the negation of the lover's choice by affirmation of the Beloved's choice."[2] Love of God makes his every command the Sufi's own heartfelt wish.

The love of God was wedded to a profound Sufi determination to fuse personal religious experience with the practice of Islam

according to law and tradition. Sufis of the tenth and eleventh centuries grappled with the tension between scripturalist Islam – an orthopraxy of external laws, rituals, and moral and social norms required of all Muslims – and Sufism – a mystical experience of the subjective being of man inculcating purity of heart, visionary knowledge, and love of God. Despite the efforts of generations of Sufis, including al-Junayd and al-Qushayri, and the growing rapprochement of law and Sufism in the tenth and eleventh centuries, these two understandings of Islam continued to be taken as alternative paths to religious fulfillment. Scripturalism or orthopraxy meant the conformity of outer behavior to legal requirements, whereas Sufism meant the purification of the heart for the sake of the vision of God. Finally, al-Ghazali was able to combine the authority of scripture and historical tradition with the personal experience of the Sufi master. Seizing on currents in philosophy, theology, law, and Sufi practice, he integrated Sufism and law in a way that has become authoritative in Islamic civilization. (See Table 7.)

Table 7. *The vocabulary of Sufism*

The anthropology of the soul	
'aql	Reasoning faculty, often equivalent of *qalb*
al-fitra	Pure state of being, before investment of soul in the body
nafs	The passions and appetites to be subdued and ordered by reason
qalb	Heart, soul, seat of knowledge and conscience

The spiritual path

baqa'	Remaining in God
dhawq	Tasting of divine reality
fana'	Annihilation of the self
hal	State of rapture by grace of God
'ibadat and mu'amalat	Ritual and social obligations
'ishq	Love, yearning for God
islam	Submission to God's will
kashf	Unveiling, revelation
maqam	Achieved status on the way to God
ma'rifa	Immediate experience of truth
rida	Contentment; acceptance of the divine will
sabr	Patience in accepting God's will
shukr	Gratitude
tawakkul	Trust in God
tawba	Repentance
tawhid	Unity of God and union in God
zuhd	Piety, asceticism, renunciation

Al-Ghazali: his life and vision

Al-Ghazali still stands as the master of this era. He came to his vocation in a crisis, described in his memoir, whose immediacy and poignancy is vivid to the present day. He studied law and theology in Tus and Nishapur. At the age of thirty-three he was appointed professor at the Nizamiyya school in Baghdad, one of the most prestigious positions of the time. He wrote treatises on law and theology, mastered philosophy and esoteric subjects, gave authoritative legal decisions, and lectured to hundreds of students. He was widely regarded as living an exemplary Muslim life. Yet he was beset by doubts: at the time of his greatest success, his doubts flowed into a deep sense of unworthiness.

> Next I considered the circumstances of my life, and realized that I was caught in a veritable thicket of attachments. I also considered my activities, of which the best was my teaching and lecturing, and realized that in them I was dealing with sciences that were unimportant and contributed nothing to the attainment of eternal life.
>
> After that I examined my motive in my work of teaching, and realized that it was not a pure desire for the things of God, but that the impulse moving me…was the desire for an influential position and public recognition.
>
> One day I would form the resolution to quit Baghdad and get rid of these adverse circumstances;…the next day I would abandon my resolution. I put one foot forward and drew the other back. If in the morning I had a genuine longing to seek eternal life, by the evening the attack of a whole host of desires had reduced it to impotence.…The voice of faith was calling, "To the road. To the road!"…Soon, however, Satan would return. "This is a passing mood,…do not yield to it, for it will quickly disappear.…"
>
> It did not.

For nearly six months beginning with Rajab 488 AH [July 1095 CE], I was continuously tossed about between the attractions of worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal life. In that month the matter ceased to be one of choice and became one of compulsion. God caused my tongue to dry up so that I was prevented from lecturing. One particular day I would make an effort to lecture in order to gratify the hearts of my following, but my tongue would not utter a single word nor could I accomplish anything at all.

This impediment in my speech produced grief in my heart, and at the same time my power to digest and assimilate food and drink was impaired; I could hardly swallow or digest a single mouthful of food.[3]

Al-Ghazali had come to an emotional crisis. His doctors said wisely but helplessly: "This trouble arises from the heart…and from there it has spread through the constitution; the only method of treatment is that the anxiety which has come over the heart should be allayed."[4]

His decision was made. He took up the life of a wandering Sufi. For ten years, he pursued the mysteries of Sufism. His retreat, however, was neither total nor permanent. After ten years, he took up his public career again, returned to a professorship at Nishapur, and wrote his major treatises. He had resolved the doubt in his heart; he had come to certain knowledge of the truth of God's existence and of the nature of his obligations to him. He saw his return as a return to his old work in a new way.

In myself I know that, even if I went back to the work of disseminating knowledge, yet I did not go back. To go back is to return to the previous state of things. Previously, however, I had been disseminating the knowledge by which worldly success is attained; by word and deed I had called men to it; and that had been my aim and intention. But now I am calling men to the knowledge whereby worldly success is given up and its low position in the scale of real worth is recognized.[5]

Al-Ghazali did not renounce the world; he abandoned false goals in worldly activity.

Sufism brought al-Ghazali to certain knowledge of God, and certain knowledge brought him back to Muslim beliefs, prayer, and teaching, to the given way of scripture and tradition. His master of theology, al-Juwayni, had already said:

> I had read thousands of books; then I left the people of Islam with their religion and their manifest sciences in these books, and I embarked on the open sea, plunging into the literature the people of Islam rejected. All this was in quest of the truth. At an early age, I fled from the acceptance of others' opinions [*taqlid*]. But now I have returned from everything to the word of truth. "Hold to the religion of the old women."[6]

In the *Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din* (Revivification of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazali gives his mature conception of the relationship between the outer and inner life, between law and spirituality. His position was rooted in a philosophic concept of the nature of the human being. In his view, the essence of the human being is the soul, which is a spiritual substance variously called *qalb*, *ruh*, *nafs*, or *'aql*. In its original state, *al-fitra*, before it is joined to the body, is a pure, angelic, eternal substance. In this state, the soul possesses reason – the capacity to know the essence of things and the capacity for the knowledge of God. The highest good is the actualization of this inherent potential.

For this to be achieved, the soul must be joined to the body, for the body is the vehicle that carries the soul on its journey to God. The body, however, necessarily corrupts the pure state of the soul. In the combined constitution of man, desire, anger, and the inclination to do evil (*shaytaniyya*) are joined to the purely spiritual elements. The human being thus comes to possess both an animal soul made up of the faculties of desire and anger (*nafs*) and a divine soul (*rabbaniyya*) possessing the faculties of reason and justice. To perfect the soul, every person must subordinate the animal faculties

to the higher faculties and perfect the virtues – temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice – appropriate to each faculty. *'Aql* (reason) has to prevail over *nafs*. The proper channeling of the animal parts and the achievement of some harmony of faculties is called justice in the soul. This does not mean, however, the destruction or abandonment of the lesser parts of the soul, but rather the dominance of reason over the other faculties. The goal is not to destroy but to make use of *nafs* in the interest of *'aql*.

The Sufi quest is aimed at such purification. Sufis seek to empty the mind of all distracting passions by retreat to the *khanaqa* (where the Sufi can concentrate on renunciation of worldly attachments), and by repetition and remembrance of the name of God (*dhikr*). As al-Ghazali explains, the Sufi path to knowledge is to shut the gate on sense perception, sexual passion, and worldly ties; to shut the gate on the material side of the mind. To do this, one does not need education or book learning – and here is the quarrel of Sufism with the scholars. The certain knowledge of God comes not from learning but from piety.

Sufi detachment, however, is but an extreme tactic in a more broadly conceived reform of the heart. This reform has both an outer and an inner aspect. It involves the triad of good actions, virtues, and knowledge. According to the *Ihya'*, actions come first. The first book of the *Ihya'*, after the introduction on knowledge, is entirely devoted to ritual actions (*'ibadat*). These include ablutions, prayer, alms, fasting, pilgrimage, reading the Quran, *dhikr*, and *wird* (the continual remembering of God). Book II of the *Ihya'* is devoted to social actions – to table manners, marriage, earning a living, friendship, and journeys. These actions, ritual and social, are important precisely because they are God's revealed ways to cleanse the soul of passions and invoke the remembrance that is inherent in the original soul (*al-fitra*). The prescribed acts are themselves purifying.

The second aspect of purification is a direct assault on inner vices. The vices include the sins of speech (cursing, false promises, lying, slander, and backbiting), anger, envy, greed, jealousy, gluttony, miserliness, ostentation, pride, love of wealth and power, and love of

this world. These vices sully the heart and stand in the way of ultimate happiness, not to speak of ordinary well-being.

The elimination of these vices is a lifelong process. Children must be raised properly with praise and blame, reward and punishment, to discipline their desires and habituate them to good acts. As children become adults, the discipline of society, the admonition of friends, the counsel of elders, and the imitation of good people is also helpful. In adulthood, however, the process of rooting out the vices becomes an individual responsibility. The individual must himself become aware that he is beset by vice, and self-awareness must be followed by inner struggle (*mujahada*), self-training (*riyada*), and habituation, by sturdy resistance to any external expression of bad impulses in speech or action. Indeed, not only must the individual control his impulses, he must oppose his vices by deliberately acting contrary to them. He has to create in the soul a struggle between vices and their opposites so that the faculties are driven from extremes toward the virtuous mean.

The elimination of vices paves the way for a new level of inward achievement, the acquisition of the mystical virtues. Book IV is devoted to these virtues – the states and stations on the way to God. They include repentance, fear, asceticism, and patience, which are preliminary to gratitude, trust, love, and intimacy. In one sense, these virtues develop spontaneously. They flourish like flowers in a garden, when the garden is weeded. In another sense, they can only be won through God's guidance and grace (*rahma*). A good Muslim strives for ethical self-control, but the mystical virtues flourish only by passive acceptance of God's will.

Passive fulfillment is at the heart of al-Ghazali's discussion of abandonment of self or trust in God (*tawakkul*). In the *Revivification of the Religious Sciences*, al-Ghazali explains that trust in God means to leave everything to God and to have no will, initiative, or activity of one's own. There are three levels of this extraordinary state. One is akin to the trust of a man in the attorney who represents his interests. The man turns over his affairs to the management of another, in whose honesty, energy, and ability he has confidence. This delegation, however, is limited to a particular

case, and the subject does not surrender his awareness of what is going on, his judgment, or his ultimate right to make choices. This modest degree of trust may continue indefinitely.

The second degree of trust is akin to the dependence and confidence of a very small child in his mother. The infant cannot take care of himself; he knows only his mother, seeks refuge with her, and depends on her support. He has no capacity for initiative of his own, but he can cry, call for his mother, run after her, and tug her dress. At any distress, his first thought is of his mother; he has complete confidence that she will meet his needs. This is like the man who trusts entirely to God and has complete confidence that he will be nourished by the Almighty, to whom he addresses his prayers and petitions. This state of passivity may last a day or two, like a fever, before it passes and the mystic is returned to an everyday condition.

The third state is to be in the hands of God as a corpse in the hands of the washer. The mystic sees himself as dead, moved by God, and certain that he does not move, or will, or know, save by God's decree. In this state, the mystic trusts completely that he will be sustained. He does not call out like a child or pray like an adult. This third state, al-Ghazali says, lasts no longer than the pallor produced by fear.

These images convey the state of being that al-Ghazali has in mind. The trust of the child in his mother is a man's trust in his basic security, his confidence that his being will be sustained. The trust of the corpse in the washer, that passivity that can only be communicated by images of death, whose interval is the moment of fear, lies beyond the infant's trust. To know it, one passes through the helplessness of infancy, through the fear of death, through the terror of nonexistence. This trust is known by the abandonment of one's own efforts and resources, by the testing of one's capacity to endure a total surrender of one's own life to the very ground of all life. To know this trust is to know that one's existence is assured without striving, effort, or will of one's own. It is assured as such.

Renunciation of the will, of the self, abandonment to God, and trust in God represent not detachment in a physical sense from the

ongoing life of the world, but rather moments that come to pass and return as part of the flow of man's psychic reality. These moments of passive grounding in trust become the basis of an active Muslim life and of the active virtues that pervade the scriptural and traditional imagery.

The third aspect of purification is knowledge. Knowledge has the most complex implications. It is at once a means and a goal to be attained. It is also a metaphor for the whole of the process by which religious vision is achieved. First, knowledge is basic. Knowledge of the principles of the faith; belief in God and his attributes, the angelic world, paradise, and the last judgment; knowledge of the character and actions of the Prophet; knowledge of which actions are commanded and which are prohibited; and knowledge of the heart and how to cure evil impulses – all of this is essential. The scholar's knowledge – indeed, the knowledge contained in the volumes of the *Ihya'* – is important information.

In another sense, knowledge for al-Ghazali is not what is learned but what is experienced. It is precisely the insights impressed on the heart by the actions and the inner traits of the person. Every action of the heart or the limbs, or inner movement of the soul, impresses itself as an image (*athar*) on the heart. Or, he sometimes says, the heart is like a mirror that reflects the form or the essence of the actions (*sura*). Sometimes al-Ghazali speaks of the heart as acquiring a *hal* (condition) or a *sifa* (attribute). In effect, every action implants a thought, an idea on the soul, for the essence of the soul is intellect. This knowledge of the heart is more than just information. It so impregnates the mind that all thinking runs by allusion from one passage of the Quran or sunna to another, totally controlling the will and the actions of the believer. Deeply rooted in the soul, this knowledge generates actions without the mediation of reflection or judgment. Such knowledge is not only what we know but what we feel. It is knowledge that is not only known but meant. The fusion of knowing, feeling, and doing integrates the outer and the inner man.

Finally, this maturation of the soul through good deeds and virtues leads to knowledge in yet another sense, to mystical vision and love of God. Purification brings *kashf*, the lifting of veils and a vision of

God as real beyond doubt. How is this to be interpreted? In one sense, it seems to mean that the soul once purified is set free from the trammels of the body and rises up to a transcending vision of God, but in fact al-Ghazali does not allow any direct contact, vision, or unity between man and God. The vision, *ma'rifa*, means knowledge of the truths of religion known with utmost clarity without any intervening screen. In this sense, the vision of God is not another reality but a way of understanding reality and a way of living life as a whole that results from the good deeds and virtues that impress themselves on the heart as truth. *Ma'rifa* is not an extra experience but insight into the meaning of reality that rises from intellect and conviction, from behavior in the world and conformity to the principles of one's culture.

Actions, virtues, and knowledge are provisions for the eternal happiness of the soul. The three factors, however, are not cultivated successively or independently. They are altogether interrelated. In al-Ghazali's view, doing good deeds establishes inner virtues. In turn, the virtues of the heart govern the actions of the limbs. As each act, each thought, each deed presses itself as an image on the heart or becomes an attribute of the heart, the acquired attributes become all the more continuous, deeply rooted, and seemingly natural. Moreover, because the heart is the seat of knowledge, this maturation of the soul through good deeds and virtues leads to mystical vision and love of God. Reciprocally, mystical vision is the source of virtue and channels all action according to God's will. What al-Ghazali tells us about the relations of inward and outward deeds, of acts and knowledge, and of the struggle for virtue and the vision of God is that they are aspects of a single progressive achievement in the course of which the believer becomes more wise, more just, and more obedient at each step, until he achieves a totality of being that entails at once mystical vision and ordinary piety. This kind of Sufism reinforces the everyday fulfillment of Islamic law by providing the believer with a still-deeper insight into the reality of God's existence. Thus, al-Ghazali gives expression to a cultural ideal, the integration of orthopraxy and Sufism, the outer and the inner ways – an ideal that is manifest in his return from Sufi retreat to his work as teacher, advisor, and reformer. In these terms, al-Ghazali unified orthopraxy

based on scripture and Sufism and made them the normative form of Sunni Islam.

Theology

Theology offered another option for the deepening of scriptural Islam. It arose out of the need to give rational expression to religious concerns. After the early debates over the proper understanding of the divine revelation, three basic positions had been accepted by the middle of the tenth century. The Muʿtazilis and the philosophers emphasized the centrality of reason as an ordering principle in God's being, in the human understanding of the universe, and in the governing of human behavior. The rationalist position had as its corollary belief in free will and individual responsibility for moral choice. A contrary position stressed the absolute omnipotence and inscrutability of the divine being, who could be known only insofar as he had chosen to reveal himself through the Quran. Religious insight could only be attained by accepting the teachings of the Quran and hadith. By extension, all human action was ultimately an expression of the power of the creator – rather than an autonomous exercise of free judgment – and will and reason was of no use for religious knowledge or moral choice. The Hanbalis, who held this position, rejected allegorical interpretation or rational speculation on the text of the Quran or hadith.

The Ashʿaris and the Maturidis steered a middle course between Muʿtazili rationalism and Hanbali literalism. Religious truths, according to the Ashʿari position, can only be known through revelation, although reason may play a subordinate role in defending the truth and persuading others. In moral matters, all human action is governed by God's power, but human beings acquire responsibility for or participate in their own actions. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the Ashʿaris continued to hold the intermediate position, but they evolved away from the thought of the master in the direction of a more philosophical form of theology. In the work of al-Ashʿari, theological argumentation (*kalam*) was not methodical, like philosophical proofs, but indicative, in the sense of persuading or

demonstrating the validity of a proposition. The main point of *kalam* was to attack and denounce all false religious views, but as the foremost opponent of philosophy, Ashʿarism absorbed the strategies of the opposition. Philosophic methods and reasoning became an integral part of a new type of philosophical *kalam*.

Al-Juwayni (d. 1085) and al-Ghazali were key figures in the development of a new form of Ashʿari theology. In the prevailing mode of dialectical argumentation, the theologians reasoned by analogy to draw conclusions about new subjects. Al-Juwayni supplemented this form of argumentation by using the Aristotelian syllogism to deduce conclusions from universal principles or logical premises. Al-Juwayni shifted the contours of *kalam* from rationalistic argumentation toward systematic philosophical discussion of the principles of religion. Al-Ghazali further advanced the use of Aristotelian logic, and Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 1209) completed the integration of theology and philosophy. In later manuals of theology, virtually two-thirds of the text was devoted to logic, natural philosophy, and ontology.

The absorption of a philosophic format did not imply a reconciliation of theology with the principal teachings of philosophy. On the contrary, Ashʿari *kalam*, revitalized by a more sophisticated method of argument, was all the more vigorous in its condemnation of philosophic teachings that were contrary to the scriptural revelation. Al-Ghazali's *Incoherence of the Philosophers* exposed the contradictions among philosophical writers and affirmed that a transcendent God could not be known by rational insight. From this vantage, al-Ghazali denied the philosophic concept of the eternity of the world in favor of the Quranic idea of its creation in time, defended the doctrine of the resurrection of the body against the philosophic belief in the eternity of the soul, and affirmed God's knowledge of particulars against the philosophic belief that limited God's knowledge to universals. Al-Ghazali employed Aristotelian logic and acknowledged the importance of philosophy in the study of nature and mathematics, but in religious matters he insisted on the primacy of God's revelation, the divine will, and God's command over human acts. For al-Ghazali, theology was useful for the defense of religious

truth against certain kinds of intellectual confusion, but it was not itself a way of confirming the reality of God's existence. Insight into religious truth could be found neither in philosophy nor in theology, but only in the direct religious experience of mysticism.

Through the synthesis of philosophy and theology, rational inquiry found an integral place in Islamic religious culture, but philosophy and theology continued to diverge, despite the close alliance between them. Whereas philosophy operated with the conviction that reason alone would reveal reality, most theologians held that reason alone without support of revelation could not address ultimate realities. What was believed could not be changed by rational speculation, nor could reason discover God's will in matters of good and evil, or control moral behavior. At best, the knowledge that comes from divine revelation could be enlarged by rational insight and transformed from faith based on tradition to reasoned faith.

For Muslim theologians, faith (*iman*) was the key to religious fulfillment, and they defined it as knowing the truth and believing in it. Faith begins in the intellect: knowing that God exists; knowing his attributes, his prophets, and his will; and accepting this knowledge as the truth (*tasdiq*).*Tasdiq* is a conviction about what has been preached and recorded, which becomes the basis of a commitment to live one's life in accordance with that reality. It is an emotion of the heart as well as a thought in the mind. It is a state of devotion; it entails trust in and submission to God, fear and love of God, and above all love of what God wants men to do and hatred for what he has forbidden. Faith issues in devoted worship; every deed of everyday life is carried out as an expression of God's will.

Ibn Khaldun, a North African scribe and historian (d. 1406), explained that there were several degrees of faith. First, faith is simply genuine belief in the teachings of Islam as traditionally defined: "The affirmation by the heart of what the tongue says."[7] Beyond simple faith, there is a higher degree of faith, perfect faith. Calling on Sufi thought, Ibn Khaldun defined perfect faith as knowledge of the oneness of God. This knowledge, however, is not merely a knowledge known, but knowledge that has become a built-in attribute (*sifa*), modifying the very nature of a man's being. The

difference, Ibn Khaldun explained, between "'state' and knowledge in questions of dogma is the same as that between talking [about attributes] and having them."[8] It is the difference between knowing that mercy for orphans is recommended and gladly giving alms. This quality of faith can only be acquired by repeated affirmation of belief and by acts of worship and good deeds. Faith, like any habit, arises from actions, is perfected by actions, and then governs all actions.

> The highest degree is the acquisition, from the belief of the heart and the resulting actions, of a quality that has complete control over the heart. It commands the actions of the limbs. Every activity takes place in submissiveness to it. Thus all actions, eventually, become subservient to this affirmation of faith, and this is the highest degree of faith. It is perfect faith. The believer who has it will commit neither a great nor a small sin.[9]

In the theological tradition, the capacity for faith rather than reason sums up the human potential for religious salvation. Yet faith includes intellect and implies acceptance of a rational dimension in human religiosity. Thus, theology transcended its purely apologetic functions and allowed an essential role for rational speculation in the elucidation of Islamic beliefs.

Alternative Islam: philosophy and gnostic and popular Sufism

The integration of scripturalism, theology, and Sufism constitutes the normative, orthodox forms of Islamic belief and practices. The supreme authority of scripture as revealed truth was integrated with rational judgment. Commitment to the fulfillment of God's command in everyday life was allied to the quest for spiritual insight. Within the purview of Islamic culture, however, there were alternative visions of human nature and religious salvation. They were embodied in intellectual form in philosophy and gnosticism; they were expressed in popular rituals and worship. These other forms of Islam

overlapped with theology and Sufism, but they were at the same time profound challenges to Sunni-scriptural-Sufi Islam.

Islamic philosophy and theosophy

Islamic philosophy was the work of a small group of scholars committed to rational inquiry and to the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. Al-Farabi defined philosophy as a comprehensive vision of the divine reality and the human condition. His successor, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the great physician and metaphysician, was the son of a Persian official serving the Samanid regime near Bukhara, who by the age of eighteen was a master of logic, natural science, and medicine. He became a Samanid minister but as a result of court intrigues was forced to flee from place to place. He lived for fourteen years in Isfahan and died at Hamadhan in 1037. A man of action, he produced numerous scholarly works. He contributed to all the natural sciences (including physics, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, and natural history) and composed the monumental *Qanun fi al-Tibb* (Canon of Medicine). The *Canon* includes an introduction to the general study of medicine and volumes on the pharmacology of herbs, pathology of organs, fevers, surgery, and other books. His most important philosophical work was the *Kitab al-Shifa'* (Book of Remedy). Like his philosophic predecessors, Ibn Sina wrote on neo-Platonic metaphysics, natural science, and mysticism.

The core of Ibn Sina's teaching was his ontology, or doctrine of being. God is conceived as transcendent and prior to the universe. He stands utterly beyond all being. However, Ibn Sina allowed for a continuity between the necessary being and the contingent universe. Although distinct from him in essence, the universe is brought forth from God. As he conceived it, God is the necessary being whose essence is by definition inseparable from existence. All other beings are contingent, for their existence does not follow from their essence. They come into being, following the neo-Platonic tradition, by the self-contemplation of the necessary being. The first being brings forth the first intellect, which, contemplating the essence of the necessary being and its own being, brings forth the second intellect. The process of contemplation proceeds until it brings forth the tenth

intellect, which completes the celestial and spiritual universe. Thus, there are successive levels of heavenly being, each of which is an intellect emanating from the divine being, comprising a substance generated by the next higher level of being; each level includes an angel, a soul, and a heavenly sphere. The tenth or active intellect apprehends itself and forms ideas that bring into existence the concrete beings of the terrestrial realm. The tenth intellect also illuminates the minds of human beings and enables them to contemplate the universals existing in the angelic sphere.

This theory of creation also defines the ultimate relation of human beings to God. In Ibn Sina's view, the human soul is composed of several faculties. The rational faculty includes the theoretical or speculative faculty. This may be perfected through several stages until it reaches the level of intellect, in which the human soul becomes an image of the spiritual world, receiving illumination from the active intellect. This religious vision is essentially an intellectual one, for there is no suggestion of direct union between the human being and the necessary being. In Ibn Sina's view, the highest level of interaction belongs to prophets, who come to know all things perfectly and directly from the active intellect and who communicate their knowledge in imaginative images to ordinary human beings. Prophets teach the existence of God and the practical and ritual aspects of religion. Religion, then, is an imaginative presentation of truths that are known in a pure form to the purely rational soul.

The *Recital of Hayy*, the *Recital of the Bird*, and the *Recital of Salmon and Absal*, three allegorized texts believed to have been written by Ibn Sina, develop the mystical aspects of his philosophical concepts. They recount how a beautiful stranger, an angel of initiation, leads the soul to the orient, to the source of light and the vision of God. This journey of the soul is at once an inward exploration of its own being and a progress through the cosmos. The consciousness that attains knowledge of itself attains knowledge of the successive levels of the divine emanation in the form of angels' souls and celestial spheres. This journey is motivated by love of the divine being and by the realization that the soul is a stranger in the world seeking to return to its origin. The method of this journey is

ta'wil, interpretation of all existing things in a symbolic way so as to arrive at a new insight into reality. The study of the visionary recitals is then a psychic event leading the soul back to the experience that these texts symbolize.

This journey requires that the soul be detached from every worldly and corrupting influence. Like a steel mirror, it must be polished to perfection to see the divine radiance reflected in itself. In this vision, the soul loses consciousness of itself as the medium of vision and retains consciousness only of the divine presence. This mode of union, however, is not a substantial union of the soul with God, but an intellectual vision of God as the necessary being who is the cause of the contingent world. By purifying imagination and by concentrating the intellect, the soul, driven by love of God, may lose itself in contemplation of the divine truth, but it has no prospect of merger with a transcendent God.

Ibn Sina's philosophy is thus a form of intellectual mysticism, which attempted to reconcile Greek philosophical and theosophical views with scriptural traditions. The doctrine of the necessary being attempts to be consistent with the scripturalist view of the transcendence of God and the separation of the created world from him. The concept of human salvation, although allowing for human intellectual and philosophic comprehension of divine reality, is presented in a way that maintains the ultimate distance between man and God.

Whereas Ibn Sina tried to reconcile the scriptural vision of the transcending oneness and otherness of God with the philosophical and mystical conviction that God and humanity share the same spiritual essence, his efforts were in tension with scriptural traditions. His images and vocabulary come from Greek philosophy, rather than the Quran. Some of his specific doctrines are perceived as heretical. His doctrine of the eternity of the world and its creation as a form of emanation from the divine being contradicts the dominant interpretation of revelation that the world was created ex nihilo. His emphasis on the inherent rationality of human beings contradicts the scripturalist conviction that all that exists is the product of God's inscrutable will. His view that the soul survives by union with the

spiritual world contradicts the orthodox view that man, constituted of both body and soul, will at the day of judgment be resurrected as an entity and rewarded or punished as such. His philosophy attempted to define positions in accordance with scripture, but its inspiration and religious vision remained profoundly distinct from orthodox, scripturalist concepts. Moreover, Ibn Sina's metaphysical universe corresponded to gnostic Sufi visions of the quest for salvation. Whereas the orthoprax forms of Sufism stressed the fulfillment of God's commands, gnostics did not think it was necessary to follow ritual laws. The former was an active fulfillment of God's commands; the latter a contemplative state of being.

Ibn Sina stands therefore not only as a central figure in philosophy but as a precursor to Suhrawardi, Ibn al-ʿArabi, and later philosophers and mystics of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Iranian school of *hikma* (wisdom). His concepts stand at the center of a long tradition of philosophic speculation and gnostic experimentation – a tradition that continues to appeal to intellectual and religious minorities in Muslim countries to the present day.

In the post-imperial era, two figures stood out as the spokesmen of a theosophical and gnostic form of Sufism oriented toward metaphysical comprehension and ecstatic contemplation. Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi was born in 1153 and was executed for heresy in 1191. He combined the philosophical and theosophical aspects of Sufism with Ibn Sina's philosophy of emanations and with ancient Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Hermetic symbols, thereby synthesizing them into a new form of Islamic mysticism. In Suhrawardi's view, he was reviving an ancient esoteric wisdom, revealed to Hermes Trismegistus and then communicated via Greece, Persia, and Egypt to Islam. He believed himself to be the spokesman of a universal wisdom known to the ancient sages of Iran, Greece, and India and revealed once again in the Quran. Thus, Sufi gnosticism was fed by strong currents in Islamic philosophy, neo-Platonism, Ismaʿili metaphysics, ancient Greek or Hermetic occult sciences, and other Middle Eastern religious ideas.

In his *Hikmat al-Ishraq* (Theosophy of the Orient of Lights) and other symbolic and mystical narratives, Suhrawardi taught that the

divine essence was pure light, the source of all existence, and that the reality of all other things was derived from the supreme light. Degrees of light were associated with degrees of knowledge and self-awareness. For Suhrawardi, as for Ibn Sina, the emanation of light from the primary being established a hierarchy of angelic substances standing between God and this world. The angels were limitless in number. In Suhrawardi's vision, there were two orders of angels: a vertical order in which each higher angel generated and dominated the lower ones and each lower angel loved the higher. The vertical order of angels gave rise to the celestial spheres, whereas the horizontal order of angels constituted the world of Platonic forms and archetypes and gave rise to the angels who governed human souls.

In this spiritual universe, the human soul stood in a privileged position. The soul was a heavenly body imprisoned in an earthly body. The imprisoned part sought to reunite with its angelic half and to escape its material and pitiful state. The souls who succeeded in freeing themselves would enjoy the proximity of the supreme light. In Suhrawardi's theosophy, the hierarchy of being was a ladder of illumination along which the purified soul could return from the material world to the world of archetypes. In its own symbols, this vision resembles neo-Platonic, Sufi, and Avicennan ideas.

Ibn al-ʿArabi

Another great theosophist, Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 1240), born in Murcia in Spain and educated in Seville, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he had a vision of the spiritual universe. He saw the divine throne upheld by pillars of light. In the vision, he was told that he was the seal of sainthood, the supreme figure in the hierarchy of saints who upheld the universe. As a result of these visions, he wrote the *Meccan Revelations*. From Mecca, he moved to Konya (in Turkey) and then Damascus. In Damascus, he wrote *The Bezels of Wisdom*, dictated to him by God through the angel Gabriel. This book was the masterpiece of esoteric sciences, for it synthesized Hermetic, neo-Platonic, Ismaʿili, and Sufi influences into a religious vision for which Ibn al-ʿArabi claimed an authority equivalent to that of the Prophet.

In Ibn al-ʿArabi's thought, all reality is one. This is the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud*, the unity of being. Everything that exists is God. The divine reality transcends all manifestations, but the manifested world is identical with him in essence. A hadith says: "I was a hidden treasure and I wanted to be known so I created the world."[10] The reality of the universe is manifested on several planes, the lower planes being symbols of the higher. The highest is the absolute essence of God; following in the hierarchy of being are the attributes and names of God, the actions and the presence of lordship, the world of spiritual existences, archetypes and forms, and, finally, the world of senses and sensible experience.

The hierarchy of being is understood in terms of theophanies (*tajalliyat*). Each level of reality is a theophany of the divine names, which is brought into being by the self-consciousness of a higher level, which, becoming conscious, generates another state of spiritual being. The process of creation is further imagined as the result of the divine breath, just as words are formed by human breath. The creation is renewed at every breath of the Lord. Existence gushes out from the absolute being, whose mercy and love of his own fulfillment bestow existence.

Ibn al-ʿArabi's vision of the unfolding of the divine being and the creation of the material world follows in broad outline philosophic and neo-Platonic theory. To these theories he adds a rich and original vocabulary and corollary symbols. For example, in his vision, the first intellect of the philosophers, the primary manifestation of the divine being, is variously symbolized as the attributes and names of God, the Logos, the prototypes of creation, the *insan al-kamil* (perfect man), and the *haqiqa muhammadiya* (Muhammadan reality). The divine names symbolize at once the creation of the world, the revelation and the appearance of prophets, and the spiritual capacities of human beings. The symbols of the perfect man and the Muhammadan reality compress the universe into a personified image. The prophets and the saints symbolize the fact that man himself is a manifestation of and ultimately an aspect of the absolute. The person who understands the nature of reality and the unity of existence is a perfect saint. Having discovered the truth, he in turn

becomes a guide for the rest of mankind. This condensation of symbols also links the gnostic concept of spiritual reality to the Muslim concept of the historical actuality of the revelation and of Muhammad as Prophet.

In the continuous hierarchy of existence extending from God to the spiritual world to the lowliest beings, man stands in a central position linked to both the world of spirit and the world of matter. By understanding the symbolism of this reality, human beings may pass from this world to the world beyond. Because the spiritual world is a hierarchy of intelligences, through the human capacity for knowledge we may participate in the divine reality. By contemplating the cosmos, we become one with the universe. Thus the intellectual and spiritual task of Muslim gnostics was to understand the nature of symbolic discourse and its relation to concrete reality and to integrate the two by making speech and thought correspond to the physical and social actuality of the world. In gnostic thought, the intangible reality of meaning carried in language and conveyed between persons is a realm of reality separate from the physical world; yet it is the model of the physical world, the image of it, and the guide of our actions in it. Thought and language in the theosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabi are ever the same and ever different from the actualities they define.

Ultimately, the return to God is motivated by love; it is driven by prayer and worship. In the vision of Ibn al-ʿArabi, God is the mirror in which man contemplates his own reality, and man is the mirror in which God knows his essence. Man needs God to exist, and God needs the world to know him.

The doctrine of Ibn al-ʿArabi was the culmination of centuries of Sufi gnostic and philosophical contemplation. His theoretical vision and his personal authority shaped for centuries to come the further development of Sufi theosophy and practice. However, his thought had profound, although unintended, implications for later Sufi practice and for the daily life of Muslim believers. By implication, theosophical metaphysics diminished the importance of observance of law and ritual. For Sufis, cosmic harmony became a justification for abandoning Islamic laws and for seeking states of intoxicated

ecstasy. It justified an antinomian morality. Such doctrines were also used to minimize the importance of communal loyalties, for truth is universal. Theosophical views increased the importance of dreams, visions, and ecstasy rather than ordinary Muslim devotions. In some cases, it was allied to the use of drugs and physical techniques to gain ecstatic vision. The doctrines of the perfect man and the invisible hierarchy of saints, the doctrine of the *qutb*, or pole of the universe around which the cosmos revolves, reinforced popular belief in miracles. Although consistent in principle with the orthoprax Sufi orientation, the theosophical doctrines of Ibn al-'Arabi allowed for religious practices and popular belief by which Muslims sought to short-circuit the trying discipline of the orthoprax way of life and to directly achieve spiritual redemption by contemplative, miraculous, and magical means. For the Sufi masters, Sufism was a devotional practice or gnostic illumination. For ordinary believers, it came to mean the veneration of saints and the tombs of saints. (See Illustration 8.)

Illustration 8.   A Sufi preaching. *Source*: The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.

Popular Sufism: the veneration of saints

The veneration of saints has its Islamic beginning in the Quran and the hadith, which mention the Prophet, the angels, the scholars, and holy men as potential intercessors between ordinary Muslim believers and God. The earliest form of Muslim veneration of human intermediaries was the cult of the Prophet. By the end of the eighth century, his burial place had become an important place for prayer. ʿAbbasid queen mother Khayzuran (d. 789) built a mosque over the Prophet's grave in Medina. The story of his ascension to heaven from Jerusalem (*miʿraj*) became a focus of popular piety and Sufi inspiration. Al-Bistami (d. 873) used the ascension as a model for his mystical journey, in which the stages of the Prophet's ascent became equivalent to the stations of the Sufis' progress toward God. Other Sufis wrote their own stories of heavenly visits, modeled on that of the Prophet. They organized the levels of heaven into stages corresponding to the emotional levels of the journey toward unity. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the site of the Prophet's ascension in Jerusalem became a popular place for Muslim worship. Already theologians were explaining that Muhammad was not of ordinary flesh and that he was immune from ordinary sins.

Shiʿis were probably the first to revere the family of the Prophet. In the early tenth century, Shiʿi holy places were provided with elaborate tombs and became centers of pilgrimage. Najaf, the burial place of ʿAli, became a hallowed cemetery; Mashhad, Karbala, and Qum became Shiʿi shrines. The Fatimid caliphs (969–1171) marked the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid*) with recitations from the Quran, prayers, sermons, and a procession of court dignitaries. The Fatimids also built a number of monumental shrines on the graves of descendants of the Prophet, which became the object of popular pilgrimage in the course of the twelfth century. In 1154 and 1155, the head of Husayn, the martyred son of ʿAli, was transferred to Cairo, where it became the focus of a popular Sunni cult lasting to the present day.

Sunni veneration of the Prophet, the family of the Prophet, and later Muslim martyrs and saints developed either in parallel with or in

reaction to Shiʿi pilgrimage and worship at the tombs of the family of ʿAli. By the end of the eleventh century, the *mawlid* (the celebration of the birth of the Prophet) had also become a popular custom among Sunnis in Mesopotamia and Syria; Saladin is credited with bringing it to Egypt as a popular festival. In thirteenth-century Cairo, it was celebrated by Sufis and the common people.

The birth of the Prophet is celebrated in popular narratives, ceremonies, and festivals that express love and closeness to the Prophet and bear the hope of salvation. *Mawlids* came to include Sufi exercises (*dhikr*) and recitations of mystical verses, hadith, and poems and blessings of Muhammad. Celebrants give thanks to God, express love of the Prophet, and give charity to the poor. These activities are considered an exchange of gifts with the Prophet, a transaction that wins blessings for the donor. The *mawlid* is an auspicious time of year because in that season God's responsiveness and generosity is believed to be greater. A prayer at this time is vastly more efficacious than at other times.

Some scholars were opposed to these celebrations. They saw the *mawlids* as religion made easy for poor, uneducated, and "undisciplined" people. But they were unable to suppress these beliefs and ceremonies. In modern times, Wahhabis vigorously oppose *mawlid* celebrations, because for them obedience is more important than love, and observance of tradition (sunna) is more important than an emotional attachment or spiritual relationship. Under contemporary Wahhabi influence, the *mawlid* is being redefined as a historical commemoration whose didactic aspect matters more than the experienced presence of the Prophet.

This changing attitude reflects a still deeper transformation in Muslim religiosity. The traditional *mawlid* is premised on the idea that a person is constituted by ties to a community and by shared emotions that have to be publicly dramatized. The modern view emphasizes individuality, so that religious obligations are defined by adherence to precepts; emotions are purely private and personal. The modern idea rejects the transactional bargain through which Muslims sought blessings from God.

In the medieval period, the *mawlids* of the Prophet set a precedent for the celebration of the birthday (here meaning the death day and the beginning of the afterlife) of saints. Prayers, recitations of poems, processions, *dhikr*, and readings from the Quran were and are conducted at the shrines of saints throughout the Muslim world. In the eleventh century, a mausoleum and school in the memory of Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi school of law, was reconstructed in Baghdad. In 1176, the Ayyubid dynasty rebuilt the college and tomb of al-Shafi'i in Cairo. It became customary for pilgrims to visit the tombs of companions of the Prophet and to pray at the graves of holy men who martyred themselves for Islam or through whom miracles had been performed. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, there were hundreds of sanctuaries all over the Muslim world. Guides and manuals were written to tell the miracles of the saints and to prescribe the rituals and prayers that would bring blessings on the pilgrim. Early thirteenth-century guidebooks show shrines dispersed throughout Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

Formal theology and mystical writing gave support to popular belief. As early as the tenth century, al-Tirmidhi (d. 932) developed a theory of sainthood as an explanation of the mysterious power of Sufis. Al-Baqillani (d. 1013) wrote that Sufi masters were friends of God who were capable of performing miracles and of interceding on behalf of ordinary Muslims. He elaborated a theological doctrine to distinguish saints from the Prophet and to define the nature of their miraculous powers. Al-Qushayri and al-Ghazali accepted this doctrine and made it part of formal Muslim belief. Ibn al-ʿArabi elaborated it into a cosmological doctrine of the hierarchy of saints who upheld the order of the universe.

These teachings gave support to popular faith in Sufi ceremonies, belief in the efficacy of prayers performed at the tombs of saints, and the quest for ecstatic experiences. Many Muslims believe that saints do miracles of telepathy and healing, feed the poor, and intervene with the government on their behalf. Funerals and visitations of graves continue the faith in miracles. Thus, the equation of holy men and martyrs with the spiritual universe became an integral aspect of Islamic religious culture. Whatever the legal, intellectual, or doctrinal

basis of Sufism, its power and appeal to the masses of everyday Muslim believers came from faith in the miraculous power of saints.

In Mamluk-era Egypt, popular festivals echoed the *mawlid* of the Prophet and the visitation of saints' tombs. 'Id al-Adha (the day of sacrifice for pilgrims on the *hajj* to Mecca) was commemorated by the sacrifice of an animal. On 'Id al-Fitr (the breaking of the fast of Ramadan) Muslims dressed up, gave presents, and went to the cemeteries, often sleeping out in tents. Nawruz, the first day of the Persian solar year (usually midsummer solstice, coinciding with harvest), came to be celebrated in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in Muslim times. In Egypt, it corresponded with the peak rise of the Nile and was a day to don new clothes, eat good food, and give gifts to friends, and also for carnival-like celebrations. The pilgrimage (*mahmal*) was an occasion for carnival.

Dialogues within Islam

By the ninth century, Sunnis accepted the Quran, hadith, and law as the core of Islamic practice; schools of law and colleges had become the central institutions. Each legal school had its own, although similar, jurisprudential methods. They varied in matters of detail, but there was widespread agreement on basic religious issues. With the consolidation of scripturalism as the central expression of Islamic identity, the great debates of the tenth to the thirteenth centuries turned on the relation of hadith and law to theology and Sufism. The debate over law and theology was especially complex, for it involved a debate over the role of rationalism that was carried out at several levels. At one level, there was a debate between philosophy and theology over reason and revelation. At another, there was a general debate between theology and scripturalism over the role theology itself would have in Islamic belief.

The result of these debates was the integration of theological rationalism into the legal mentality. Theology (*kalam*) became an acceptable adjunct of Islamic belief. Some scholars held that rational understanding of the truth was essential to being a good Muslim. For many others, however, theology was but a secondary concern

limited to the defense of revealed truth, a kind of medicine for doubters. It was necessary that at least some members of the community pursue it, but it was not essential for all believers.

The schools of theology became closely linked to the schools of law. The Hanafi school of law harbored the Maturidi school of theology. The Shafiʿi law school was the home of Ashʿarism. However, not all legists in each school were committed to a theological position; nor was a theological position necessarily part of the teaching of the law schools. Hanbalis, however, rejected rational speculation in any form. Thus, in general, jurists treated theology as an enrichment of their intellectual and religious life rather than as the center of their scriptural position. By a broad, but not quite complete, consensus, theology in various forms was accepted as an important adjunct to Islamic religious faith and activity.

Sufism was similarly integrated with scripturalism. Sufis began with a religious community and forms of worship separate from those of the schools of law. Progressively, however, there was a rapprochement between the legal and the Sufi approaches to Islam. Sufis accepted hadith and law as the basis of Muslim belief and practice. Legists recognized the importance of the inner life to the full realization of the law. In this period, the term "Shariʿa" was applied both to the legal and moral norms for behavior specified in the Quran, hadith, and law and also to a rich intellectual, spiritual, and mystical life. (See Table 8.)

Table 8. *Islamic religious movements and sects*

Kharijism

Azariqa (684– c. 700)	Southwestern Iran: sinners must be excluded from the Muslim community; call for election of caliph; declaration of war on all other Muslims
Ibadis	States founded in Oman, North Africa:

sinners may remain Muslims with limited rights; permit political compromise

Philosophers (falasifa)	
al-Farabi (d. 950)	Tradition of Alexandrian Hellenistic thought, superiority of reason to revelation
Hunayn b. Ishaq (d. 873)	Translator of Greek texts
Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198)	Aristotelian, reconciliation with Shariʿa
Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037)	Neo-Platonic philosophy and medicine
al-Kindi (d. c. 866)	Accepts Muʿtazili *kalam*
Shiʿism	
ʿAlid imams	Claim to be sole rightful leaders of Muslim community
Ismaʿilis	Militant, established Fatimid and Qarmatian movements
Ithnaʿashari	Twelvers, Imamis, pacifist, primarily in Iraq
Zaydis	Followers of Zayd; established dynasties in the Caspian region and Yemen
Sufism	

School of Baghdad	al-Junayd (d. 910), sober
School of Khurasan	al-Hallaj (d. 923), ecstatic
Sunni schools of law	
Hanafi	
Hanbali (*ahl al-hadith*)	
Maliki	
Shafiʿi	
Theological schools	
Ashʿaris	al-Ashʿari (d. 935); compromise between Muʿtazili and Hanbali theological positions
Murjiʿa	Define good Muslims by faith rather than works; refuse to judge between ʿUthman and ʿAli
Muʿtazilis	Neutral in the disputes over the proper succession to the caliphate; affirm human free will and createdness of the Quran
Qadaris	Hasan al-Basri (d. 728); discuss God's determination and human autonomy

Law, theology, and Sufism shaped Muslim consensus around belief in a transcendent God who had created the world and revealed his will to human beings through the agency of his prophets. Muslims believed in the authority of Muhammad and his prophethood and in the tradition of the community. They accepted the goodness of the companions, the genius of the leaders of the law schools, and the piety of Sufi masters as the sources of right guidance. They accepted the literatures of law, theology, and mysticism as setting forth the beliefs, practices, and ethical and moral attitudes required of a good Muslim. The integrated concept of Islam thus combined the scriptural revelation of required actions with philosophical, theosophical, and mystical views of the nature of the universe and the meaning of human action within it.

The Sunni consensus presented a Muslim ideal of an individual who lives in society according to the rules he has been brought up to respect; according to the norms and laws of the Quran, hadith, law, and social custom; yet in harmony with his own inner knowledge, dispositions, choices, and feelings. This cultural ideal combined legal practice and the cultivation of mystical knowledge. The scripturalist-Sufi form of Islam sought salvation in this-worldly conduct of the ritual and social prescriptions of Islam. For Sunni Muslims, a religious life was an active life, consisting of everyday occupations in politics and business, of marriage and family, intermixed with the practice of ritual and other religious obligations. For the Muslim merchant or artisan in the marketplace, the scholar at school, the scribe at court, or the mystic at worship, worldly action and fulfillment of religious commands were the soil in which intellectual and moral skills could grow. Religious knowledge and virtue could only be achieved by engaging in worldly affairs, although worldly activity has no ultimate value unless it is infused by religious purpose. The orthoprax-Sufi tradition rejected worldly values pursued for their own sake; the enjoyment of family, economic well-being, and power is of secondary importance. This tradition did not incorporate the *areté* of the warrior, the civic responsibility of the Greek citizen, the intellectualism of professionals, and the aestheticism of aristocrats. Still, it did not embrace otherworldly detachment, such as the

spirituality of the monk, the creativity of the romantic, or the abstract knowledge of the scientist. It was neither a surrender to the world nor an escape from it. It was a way of living in the world without being absorbed by it or fleeing from it. The goal of the scripturalist-orthoprax-Sufi view of life was devotion to God as the basis of an active worldly personality.

The complex of views contained in orthoprax-Sufi Islam never became a formal system. Islam has no master science as Christianity has in theology. Within the Sunni complex, there were numerous collections of hadith, several equally valid versions of the law, several acceptable theological positions, and different schools of mysticism. Within the Sunni consensus, the range of theological viewpoints could vary from sophisticated philosophical reasoning in theology and law to complete exclusion of the use of reasoning and literal reliance on scripture. Muslim mystics varied from strict adherence to the law to complete antinomian lack of interest in convention, ritual, and morality.

Whereas the orthoprax-Sufi consensus allowed considerable flexibility within itself, the Sunni community also permitted major religious positions to develop outside its framework. Although devotional, rational Sufi positions were partly merged into the general position, philosophy, gnosticism, and popular religion maintained an independent stance, challenging Islamic orthodoxy. The availability of religious alternatives and the debates concerning their validity made up a more comprehensive program of Islamic religious discussions.

The most important religious alternative came from within Sufism. The gnostic and theosophical tradition influenced by philosophy, although partly accepted into the Sunni consensus, represented an altogether different view of human religious goals. Whereas the scripturalist view insisted on the fulfillment of God's commands in worldly action, the gnostic goal, embodied in Sufism, Ismaʿilism, and philosophical literatures, was insight and contemplative union with the divine reality, to be achieved by purification of the soul and its detachment from bodily and material concerns.

The various forms of gnosticism, however, differed in their comprehension of the mechanism of this purification, vision, and union with God. The peripatetic philosophers stressed reason as the basis of knowledge of God and as the key to a total transformation of the soul that enabled the gnostic not only to comprehend but to enter into the divine presence. Some gnostics stressed reason as the essential aspect of the human soul and the metaphysical structure of the universe. Others stressed emotional forms of illumination; still others stressed the authority of imams and spiritual guides. In all its variations, gnosticism was a quest for a direct contemplative realization of the divine for which scripturalist symbols, rational dialectics, ritual practices, and ethical behavior were all secondary considerations. It was a religion of the visionary soul rather than the active person.

Another religious alternative within the Sunni tradition was popular Islam. Faith in direct divine intervention in human affairs put aside the whole of the Sunni effort to build a morally disciplined worldly life on the teachings of the scriptural tradition. Popular faith held that the saints could intercede on behalf of human beings and could transmit God's miraculous powers into the world through the person of his saints and the physical things with which they had come into contact. The tombs of saints were considered especially potent.

Outside the Sunni fold, there were also communal alternatives. For the Shi'is, the critical issue was loyalty to the family of 'Ali. They believed that the divine spirit passed from imam to imam in each successive generation. This divine grace both entitled the 'Alids to the caliphate and made them an infallible source of knowledge of the divine will. Whereas Muhammad had revealed the Quran, its interpretation was vested in the infallible imams. In their view, the true source of belief in each generation was ultimately not the text of tradition, the consensus of the jurists, or the piety of other Muslims, but an imam descended from 'Ali. From this vantage point, Shi'ism left a legacy of religious teachings similar to the Sunni types, but it also moved toward a merger with Sufism, in that the divinely graced imam became the example of a mystical reunion with God. Shi'ism is characterized by a religious mood that stresses hope in the return

of the imam as a messiah who will redeem Muslims from the burdens of the world. Shiʿism is also chiliastic in believing that history will come to an end. The cycles of prophets and imams will culminate in a cataclysm, out of which will emerge a reborn mankind and the kingdom of God on earth.

The partitions of Shiʿi Islam are different from those of Sunni Islam. Instead of schools of law, there are sects founded by the followers of the various imams. The Twelver branch followed one line of succession; the Ismaʿilis followed another. In time, there would be more disagreements, each leading to the development of a new sect with different religious principles. Shiʿi communities, often at war with their Sunni neighbors, were established throughout the Middle East. (See Table 9.)

Table 9. *Islamic worship*

Five pillars of Islam

hajj	Pilgrimage to Mecca
salah	Prayer performed five times daily: before dawn, midday, mid-afternoon, before sunset, mid-evening
sawm	Fasting in the month of Ramadan
shahada	Statement of faith: There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God
zakat	Almsgiving

Prayer rituals

Friday midday prayer	Performed in *jami'* (mosque for the whole community), sermon
imam	Leader of prayer
khutba	Preached by *khatib* from the *minbar*, in which the authority of the ruler is acknowledged
masjid	Mosque; place of prayer furnished with a *mihrab* (niche to mark direction of Mecca), *minbar* (pulpit), *maqsura* (box for caliph)
muezzin	Stands in the minaret to summon worshipers to prayer
qibla	Facing in the direction of Mecca, which is necessary for performing prayer
wudu'	Ablutions prior to prayer

Festivals

'id al-adha	Greater *'id*: celebration and animal sacrifices to mark end of the pilgrimage
'id al-fitr	Lesser *'id*: festival celebrating the end of Ramadan
laylat al qadr	27th of Ramadan: Night of Majesty commemorating first revelation of the Quran
Ramadan	Ninth lunar month, dedicated to daytime fasting

Optional festivals

'ashura'	10th of Muharram: Shi'i festival commemorating martyrdom of Husayn
laylat al-mi'raj	Night of Muhammad's ascent to heaven from Jerusalem
mawlid al-nabi	Birthday of the Prophet

With all these variations, what did it mean to be a Muslim? It meant that one believed in the truth of God's existence and in the revelation of the Quran, and that one adhered to at least some of the positions in a wide range of religious expression. Muslim believers clustered around one of several Sunni schools of law or one of several Shi'i sects. Islam, then, included a variety of religious positions sharing the same historical tradition. To be a Muslim meant to ponder these positions in the terms set down in the medieval era of Islamic civilization.

[1] Al-Hujwiri, *The Kashf al-Mahjub*, trans. R. A. Nicolson, London: Luzac, 1970, pp. 378–79.

[2] Ibid., p. 379.

[3] W. M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1953, pp. 56–57.

[4] Ibid., pp. 57–58.

[5] Ibid., p. 76.

[6] W. M. Watt, *A Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali*, Edinburgh: University Press, 1963, pp. 23–24.

[7] F. Rosenthal, *Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah*, New York: Pantheon, 1958, III, p. 41.

[8] Ibid., p. 39.

[9] Ibid., pp. 41–42.

[10] A. M. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1975, pp. 189, 268.

Chapter 24 Conclusion: Middle Eastern Islamic patterns

What we now classify as a Middle Eastern Islamic civilization is actually the by-product of a process that occupied six hundred years, from the beginning of the seventh to the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. However innovative, Islamic civilization was constructed on a framework of institutions and cultures inherited from the ancient Middle East. On the eve of the Islamic era, Middle Eastern societies were organized on several levels. At the base, there were numerous local, parochial communities built around factional, lineage, tribal, and village groups. These communities were integrated by market exchanges and by great religious associations – Jewish, Christian, or Zoroastrian. The larger-scale economic networks and religious associations were in turn under the rule of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. On the cultural level, the ancient heritage included the monotheistic religions, imperial arts and literatures, and philosophy and science. This complex institutional and cultural heritage was carried over into the Islamic era. Despite the rise and fall of empires and shifts in economic activity, the fundamental aspects of technology, modes of production, and the relation of human communities to the natural environment continued unaltered. Also, the basic modes of state organization and family and religious association remained the same. The characteristic changes of the Islamic era were the formation of new political and social identities, the organization of new religious communities, and the generation, out of the elements of the past, of a new cultural style.

New political and religious identities for Middle Eastern societies began in Arabia. While under the influence of Byzantine and Sasanian civilizations, Arabia was not fully integrated into the rest of the region. It was basically a lineage society in which the conflicts of lineage and commercial communities and the religious and cultural influences emanating from the rest of the Middle East made possible

the emergence of a new prophet, Muhammad, and the revelation of a new religion, Islam. To Muhammad, God revealed a new monotheism, which differed in its specific teachings, eschatological consciousness, and literary qualities from Judaism and Christianity. The Prophet also organized a new community parallel in form to Jewish and Christian religious associations.

The Muslim community in Mecca and Medina acted as an integrating force in a lineage society. The Prophet and his disciples mediated among lineage groups, regulated the economy, created a state, and inspired moral reform while maintaining basic lineage structures. In Arabia, the existence of the two levels of segmentary and religious organization resulted in a complex system of values. In principle, the Quran introduced a concept of transcendent reality, as opposed to the aggrandizement of tribal groups and the *areté* of the tyrannical, boastful, and hedonistic warrior, and a community based on religious brotherhood and personal humility, modesty, and self-restraint. In practice, however, the family and lineage structures of Arabian peoples became part of Islamic society. Pagan virtues were preserved by being vested with new meaning as Islamic ethics, and bedouin identities persisted alongside Islamic loyalties. In its first guise, the Islamic mission became a model for the way in which radical religious values and sectarian impulses would later function in lineage and tribal societies.

Imperial Islamic society

The next phase in the transformation of Middle Eastern Islamic societies was the Arab-Muslim conquests and migrations. They led to the creation of a new regime (the caliphate), the settlement of new cities and towns, the formation of new urban communities, the rise of trade, and the growth of agriculture. In the garrison cities of the Middle East, warrior-bedouin migrants were assimilated to non-Arab populations to form new mixed communities. Migrant Arabs were transformed into an urban-dwelling, occupationally differentiated population that included workers, artisans, merchants, and a new religious elite of Quran readers, scholars of law and Arabic letters,

and ascetic and charismatic preachers. The town populations were also stratified on the basis of political officeholding, landownership, and tribal chieftainship and organized into new religious sects and political movements.

The new urban societies generated both the resources and the conflicts that would shape the caliphate and the imperial regime. From the towns, the caliphate could draw skilled manpower and economic resources. The ʿAbbasids in particular based their regime on the diverse populations that flocked to Baghdad as well as other Arab cities. The pressures of urban social change also generated conflict over political interests and over the caliphate. The first Muslim century witnessed a series of civil wars. Initially, the problem was factional divisions in the Arab elite, the balance of central and local power, and the role of religious versus political factors in the concept and identity of the regime. The major struggle was between factions united by commitment to Islam and Arab tribal coalitions. The second civil war was motivated by sectarian Khariji and Shiʿi opposition and by continuing factionalism within the Arab elite. The third civil war, which brought the ʿAbbasids to power, was the product of the division between Arabs assimilated into the general society and those active in the military, a struggle marked by strong ideological conflict over "Arab" versus "Muslim" identity.

Each of the civil wars forced the caliphate to develop the institutional mechanisms to keep political power and to legitimize dynastic rule. To consolidate its position, the caliphate adopted Byzantine and Sasanian institutions and concepts of imperial rule while giving them a new Islamic definition. The Umayyads adopted the bureaucratic administration of the older empires and patronized architectural works that integrated Byzantine, Sasanian, and Christian symbols into Islamic designs. The ʿAbbasids continued the Umayyad trend toward consolidation of an imperial regime and its definition in transmuted Middle Eastern terms. Their regime was centered on a royal court; they governed the provinces through clients and servants of the rulers, using a combination of bureaucratic tax-collecting methods and quasi-feudal forms of administration in which local princes and chieftains were confirmed

in power and given status as servants of the caliph. ʿAbbasid administration depended on a coalition of elites throughout the Middle East. The regime brought together Arab soldiers; Iraqi, Egyptian, and Iranian landlords; Nestorian scribes; Jewish merchants; Inner Asian warlords; and others to serve the central regime. These elites were united by loyalty to the caliphate, by clientele and family ties linking the center and the provinces, and by common interests in the exploitation of the empire. These were the people made available by the extended period of economic change, social mobility, and urbanization that followed the Arab conquests. They transformed the Arab conquest kingdom into a universal Middle Eastern empire.

To legitimize their domination, the ʿAbbasids patronized cultural activities that made clear the historical roots of the regime and its cosmopolitan inclusiveness. The court culture signified the superiority of the Arab-Muslim imperium by adapting the artistic and ceremonial themes of its ancestors and incorporating them into a new ritual of state. It signified its universality by patronizing the various Middle Eastern cultures: the poetic and historical traditions of the Arabs, the *adab* literature of Iran, and the Hellenistic philosophy and sciences of the Mediterranean. Imperial culture justified the exercise of power as a divine necessity and stressed the hierarchy of society, the responsibility of masters, and the subordination of the masses. The new culture gave the new elite a shared language, literary expression, and personal values based on the validation of worldly power and wealth. In the ancient debate over whether it was legitimate to enjoy the goods of this world, the ʿAbbasid imperial culture was resoundingly positive. As in the past, out of the formation of an empire came a new civilization. Empire was a moral and cultural entity as well as a system of political exploitation.

However, the very social processes that had made it possible to construct an empire extending over all the Middle East – the new urban centers, economic growth, and the formation of cosmopolitan communities – also created an independent urban population, led by religious chiefs and organized into sectarian communities, who would oppose the imperial vision with one of their own. The family or

companions of the Prophet and their descendants, reciters of the Quran, scholars of Islamic law and history, and Sufi ascetics won over groups of disciples, students, and followers and thus generated numerous Shiʿi and Khariji associations, Sunni schools of law, and, later, Sufi discipleships. Most of these groups were small, even esoteric, cults. Some of them acquired a mass following. In opposition to the caliphs, all of these groups claimed to embody the tradition of the Prophet and the true teachings of Islam. Shiʿis and the Kharijis at first violently opposed the caliphate, but by the ninth century the Twelver Shiʿis and many Kharijis had renounced world-transforming political aspirations in favor of local community affairs and pious personal lives, living in an atmosphere of mourning for lost hopes and of messianic dreams. Instead of trying to transform the world, they withdrew to a pious existence within it. Even Sunnis, who supported the caliphate in principle, withdrew from public commitments and concentrated on small-scale community life and personal piety. In the urban milieu, the crucial question was the following: what is the proper way to live the life of this world in view of the eternity to come? Was a good Muslim a person of good deeds or of inner faith, one who fulfilled his obligations to the law or who cultivated a spiritual contact with God? Between the seventh and the tenth centuries, the Muslim urban response to these questions was elaborated in Quran commentary, hadith, law, theology, and mystical discourses that incorporated into Islam the heritage of Greece and Iran as well as of Arabia and Muhammad, and recast the historical religions of the Middle East into a new high cultural monotheistic vision.

Imperial and urban versions of Islamic culture were closely related. The court accepted the religious supremacy of the Quran, the validity of hadith, and the Islamic historical tradition. Law had important political, regulatory, and moral functions; many legists and jurists were employed by the state. Muʿtazili theology was as much a court as an urban science. Similarly, urban scholars and Sufis accepted many aspects of court culture. The symbols of palace and mosque, the legitimacy of the caliph's authority, the cultural primacy of the Arabic language, poetry and history, and aspects of philosophy, neo-

Platonism, and theology were all accepted in urban circles. Still, despite the interpenetration of cultural interests, the two milieus were in conflict over basic values. The Hanbalis, in particular, resisted the religious authority of the caliphs. As a result of ninth-century struggles between caliph and scholars, it became clear that two elites – caliphate and court versus scholars and Sufis – would elaborate two distinct concepts of Islam – one imperial and one urban, one political and one communal, one worldly and one pietistic. Ever after, Islamic societies have been characterized, in fact if not in culturally recognized principle, by separate state and religious institutions.

At the end of the ninth century, Muslim elites and their cultural vision still represented only a limited population, including the state elites and the populace of the Arab-Muslim towns and converted rural districts. The translation of these elite influences and cultural paradigms into a mass Islamic society accelerated with the disintegration of the ʿAbbasid Empire in the ninth and tenth centuries. The empire disintegrated not as the result of external shocks but as the outcome of the inherent evolution of its basic institutions. The caliphate, caught in the dilemma of representing both worldly power and religious values, compromised its political authority and was forced to depend more and more on military force. Both army and administration broke up into independent and self-serving factions; factional competition made it impossible for the caliphate to maintain control over the central government and the provinces. The result was the rise to power of independent warlords and the outbreak of popular rebellions. By 945, the empire was no more. The process of disintegration, moreover, destroyed the bureaucratic and landowning classes that had controlled the empire and opened the way to power for nomadic elites, slave soldiers, local warlords, and others who had no interest in collaboration with a central government.

States and communities in a Fragmented Middle East

With the breakdown of the ʿAbbasid Empire, the separation of state and religious elites and institutions became more marked. The Middle East was conquered by Turkish nomadic warriors and by slave warlords. In the post-imperial era, the ʿAbbasid caliphs kept only nominal authority, whereas Buwayhid, Ghaznavid, and Saljuq sultans organized the military-political regimes. Muslim religious associations took on the task of organizing the populace.

Under the Saljuqs, a standard pattern of institutions developed, in which the power of the ruler was based on a praetorian slave guard and the manipulation of nomadic tribal levies. Court bureaucrats and scholars helped maintain administrative services; in the provinces, the sultans were represented by governors, garrisons, and fiscal inspectors. *Iqtaʿs* (quasi-feudal grants of tax income to soldiers) were distributed widely, decentralizing control over rural revenues. These institutions did not suffice to provide a lasting political order. Disputes among competing members of aristocratic lineages, tribal lords, and slave generals prevented the centralization of power. The *iqtaʿ* system of administration, in which tax-collecting privileges were parceled out among the military elite, also contributed to the fragmentation of power. Nevertheless, the institution of the sultanate, slave military forces, and *iqtaʿ* administration formed a pattern of government that would become the norm.

The consolidation of these institutions was accompanied by the articulation of concepts to define, rationalize, and legitimize the exercise of power. Muslims viewed the caliphate as the institution mandated by the Prophet to uphold Islamic law, protect the security of Muslim peoples, and wage jihads. All legitimate power was delegated from the caliph to sultans and from sultans to their subordinates. Sultans were expected to uphold Islamic justice and education, patronize the scholars, and suppress heresy. If he upheld Islamic law, a ruler was considered legitimate regardless of how he had come to power. Government was also legitimized in personal terms. All regimes were built on the loyalties of slaves, clients, and retainers to their masters and patrons. A subordinate officer conceived of himself not as a functionary of the state but as an elevated servant of the ruler. Slavery was but the most forceful

expression of the personal bonds that complemented concepts of delegated authority. Furthermore, the state was identified with the person of the ruler. In all the political literatures of the time – Muslim, Persian, and Greek – the ruler was portrayed as the prototype of the perfected human being. He embodied wisdom and virtue, restrained the evil inclinations of his subordinates, and inspired goodness in his subjects. Government functioned as a consequence of personal ties and was considered legitimate because it was conducive to the fulfillment of religious ideals.

Finally, government was legitimized in terms of historical descent from ancient empires and of the fulfillment of cosmic and divine purposes. Architecture, art, and poetry, in Arabic or Persian regional variants, symbolized the attachment of the political regimes to the divinely given order of the universe, the inherent glory of the ruler, the rightness of the pursuit and exercise of power, and the legitimacy of aesthetic refinement and luxury. The sultanal regimes patronized historical writing to trace the genealogical descent and mythic connection of present rulers to ancient Persian and Turkish kings. As God's own servant, the ruler was entrusted with the care of the world and given authority over men whose fate was confided to him. The ruler ordered society, promoted the construction of civilization, and even had magical powers, which could affect the course of nature. Despite the arbitrary exercise of powers, states were an image of the cosmos. They were vital not only to daily life but to the mythic wholeness of the social order. However damaged the great empires, however many military lords became independent, however much control of the land was distributed in *iqtaʿs*, however much authority was conceded to local notables and local militias, the state continued to represent a commitment to a transcending order. Thus, whereas the sultanates had Islamic functions and identities, their Islamic aspect was paralleled by non-Islamic Persian and Turkish concepts of the nature of government. An "Islamic" state was also an expression of a non-Islamic territorial and cultural identity.

As states became militarized and disconnected from religious institutions, Muslim associations became the almost universal basis of Middle Eastern communal organization. Until the ninth century,

Islam was the religion of the Arab populations and assimilated urban groups, but from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries the mass of Middle Eastern peoples converted to Islam. This was due to the dissolution of the ʿAbbasid Empire, its replacement by foreign military elites, the ruin of the landowning and administrative classes, and their replacement by Muslim religious leaders – who converted the uprooted masses and provided them with leadership and religious organization through the Sunni schools of law, Sufi orders, Shiʿi sects, and other Muslim groups.

The schools of law were not colleges and institutions but were schools in the sense that the adherents shared a common legal tradition. They were associations of scholars, teachers, and students adhering to the law codes developed by discussion among legal scholars in the eighth and ninth centuries. Through the law schools, scholars organized higher education and trained teachers and judicial administrators; from the schools came consultants, notaries, and judges. The schools also gathered a popular following. The students considered themselves personal disciples of their masters; the communities in which the schools were located provided patrons and supporters, especially from the merchant and artisan classes. Sufi orders were based on the disciples of each master and on the groups of Sufis who lived in common residences called *khanaqa*s. Orders were formed when Sufi masters in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries began to reckon themselves the descendants of earlier teachers. Those who descended from the same teacher regarded themselves as perpetuating a common spiritual discipline and as units of a much larger religious movement accepting the same higher authority. Such formations grew beyond their local origins and became regional and even worldwide brotherhoods.

In an urban context, the legal communities and Sufi orders served as confessional collectivities that could recruit individuals across the lines of existing community structures and unify smaller-scale family, clan, or residential collectivities into larger units. But Muslim religious associations could also operate wholly within the framework of existing collective units. Sunni legal schools, Sufi orders, or Shiʿi sects were often identified with particular neighborhoods, or

occupational and ethnic minorities, and gave previously existing collectivities an Islamic identity.

Coping with the limits of worldly life

The ethos of these associations varied on a spectrum ranging from otherworldly ecstatic, contemplative forms of Sufism to very worldly family and business orientations. There was a broad middle ground – the orthoprax-Sufi position. This was represented by the Hanafi and Shafiʿi schools of law, the Ashʿari and Maturidi schools of theology, and the "sober" Sufi tradition of al-Junayd, al-Qushayri, and al-Ghazali. This middle ground attempted to integrate commitment to the principle of the caliphate as the basis of the ideal Muslim community, devotion to the fulfillment of Islamic law, belief in the limited use of reason for understanding religious truths, and the practice of Sufi ethical and meditational exercises. It was an attempt to combine the correct external forms of social and ritual behavior with inner emotional and spiritual awareness.

Sunnis with this orientation had a nuanced attitude toward worldly actualities. They accepted existing regimes as legitimate by virtue of the inherent need for order in society, and they worked out routine ways of collaborating with states. Political obedience was highly emphasized. Scholars reserved for themselves a consultative role and the right to admonish, to educate, and to give moral advice to rulers; they expected rulers to give them control over legal administration and to patronize Muslim educational and charitable activities. Within this framework, however, Sunnis were involved not so much in politics as in community affairs. Their concern was to uphold public morality, to apply Islamic law to family and commercial affairs, to educate, to heal, and to mediate local conflicts.

Sunni Muslims accepted the given clan, lineage, tribal, or clientele substructures of Middle Eastern societies and with them inequalities of wealth and property. They regarded social and economic justice as matters of individual behavior. Sunni values were thus neutral with regard to different economic systems; there was no Muslim teaching on the proper structure of the economy and no obvious

correlation between Islamic beliefs and any particular economic organization. Furthermore, if we compare the dominant Sunni attitude toward economic activity with later Protestant attitudes, we find that, although Muslims were highly motivated in economic matters, they did not see such activity as a vehicle for the transformation of the world or of the individual. Sunni Muslim leaders did not try to mobilize people for economic ends but called on them to lead a pious life in the context of economic and other worldly activities.

Acceptance of the world was modified, however, by an attitude of detachment and a rejection of commitment. Although many scholars and Sufis accepted the responsibilities of political power, held office, accumulated land and property, and served as spokesmen for the needs of their people, there was a deep strand of feeling opposed to such engagements. The companions of princes were regarded as morally corrupt. Scholars and Sufis characteristically refused official positions and turned down royal gifts. Disengagement was taken as a mark of piety and of the highest moral virtue. The refusal to give moral assent to the world as it is was accompanied by a nostalgia for the restoration of the true caliphate and a yearning for the coming of the savior. Nostalgia expressed withdrawal from the actual world, but it also served to ratify things as they were.

The Hanbalis cultivated a more active stance. They undertook vigilante action to enforce morality, suppress alcohol consumption and prostitution, and attack rival sects. They rallied Muslim volunteers for holy war and on occasion attempted to restore the political power of the caliphate. This activism, however, was channeled mainly into pressuring existing political regimes to uphold Muslim morality, rather than being aimed at changing the political order. Thus, the majority of Sunnis accepted the world as it was, yet withheld their full assent by refusing to be directly involved in politics, by actively campaigning to improve public morals, and by nostalgic reflection and eschatological yearning.

The reasons for this complex orientation can be understood when we consider that Muslim religious associations were partially but never fully differentiated from other sociopolitical institutions. The

Sunni positions reflected a transcendent religious vision embedded in sectarian associations, but these associations existed within the overall political framework of the sultanal regimes, and they were interlocked with parochial lineage, residential, and other solidarities. Therefore, the tension between religious and other commitments could not be absolute, and the complex relationships among them had to be expressed in subtle modes of acceptance, detachment, and rejection.

Islamic organizations and identities were also institutionalized in rural societies, although on different terms. Throughout the Middle East, clans, lineages, and village communities led by independent chieftains – legitimized in terms of tribal tradition and by the acceptance of an age-old pattern of culture – continued to be the backbone of the social order. The basic lineage and factional structures were reinforced by Arab and Turkish migrations. In these societies, Muslim religious leadership and Islamic symbols were used to unite factionalized peoples into more unified religious-political movements. The Arab-Muslim conquests were prototypical. In addition, Berbers in North Africa were united under Kharijism, Shi'ism, Sunni reformism, and later Sufism, into conquering religious movements such as the Fatimids, the Almoravids, and the Almohads. Kharijis in eastern Arabia, Qarmatis in the Fertile Crescent, and later the Safavids in western Iran are other examples of Muslim religious leaders and symbols becoming the basis of rural unification in the quest for the ever-elusive just Islamic society.

There is also evidence for the beginnings of widespread acceptance of Islamic identity by rural collectivities in the form of the veneration of Sufis and worship at shrines. By the thirteenth century, the doctrinal basis for the veneration of Sufis as intercessors between man and God had been established, and pre-Islamic magical practices and superstitions were accepted as part of popular Islam. Sufis were commonly believed to be saints and were venerated as intermediaries between the material and the spiritual worlds, as miracle workers and as dispensers of blessings. On this basis, they served to mediate disputes; facilitate the selection of chiefs; organize long-distance trade; teach the young; heal the sick;

provide amulets; officiate at circumcisions, marriages, and funerals; celebrate festivals; do white magic; and otherwise uphold the tenuous connection of human beings with the world of the spirits and the divine. This type of Sufism also led to veneration of the tomb, and the disciples and descendants, of the holy man, and to a religious life of sacrifices and festivals around the tombs. Belief in Islam did not necessarily lead to the formation of an organized association capable of collective action but served as a shared identity among diverse peoples who preserved their own kinship, territorial, linguistic, ethnic, and other bases of non-Islamic culture.

State and religion in the medieval Islamic paradigm

The crucial feature of this system of states and religious communities was the tacit collaboration of state military, local scholars, and Sufi elites. The foreign origin and the militarization of the ruling elites emphasized the distinction between the state and the religious elites and required their political cooperation. The nomadic and slave military elites needed the collaboration of the scholars in order to govern. The Saljuqs were leaders of tribal groups with no experience in ruling an agriculturally based empire. Scribes, finance officials, estate managers, and other technicians were vital. Furthermore, the nomadic and slave elites needed scholars, for both political and psychological reasons, to recognize the rightfulness of their regimes. Scholars were the guardians of tradition and to the Saljuqs – who were at first lacking in technical skills and literary and social knowledge – represented the epitome of a desired way of life. They looked to the scholars to be tutored, educated, and guided in acceptable courses of action. Thus, the conquerors were conquered by their subjects.

In return, the scholars accepted the need for a military regime because it alone could protect the trade routes and the agricultural villages from bedouins and bandits. The scholars favored a strong state to repress factional strife and gang warfare and to act as an arbiter of disputes that the communities themselves could not

regulate. Moreover, they were interested in an accommodation with military regimes because they could, by serving in the state administration, transform themselves from local elites into an imperial governing class. The state accorded them positions that could consolidate their local power. Finally, military elites could give valuable support to Sunni social and educational missions.

To work out this tacit bargain, the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs restored mosques, built colleges and Sufi retreats, endowed trusts, and appointed members of the law schools to official positions. The Saljuqs suppressed Shiʿism and gave vigorous support to Sunni Islam. In return, Sunni scholars preached the legitimacy of established regimes, supported favored princes against their rivals, supplied cadres for the state administration, facilitated taxation, and accepted the nomadic and slave conquest states as part of the legitimate and necessary order of Islamic societies. Although the religious notables could mediate between military regimes and city populations, they lacked the ideological and economic bases to be fully independent. Their inevitable collaboration with the state elites brought the rest of society under control.

In the post-imperial period, new forms of state organization, community life, and culture were integrated into a new order. The post-imperial system of government and society was profoundly different from that of the earlier era. The earlier ʿAbbasid era had been characterized by a universal empire built on the support of Middle Eastern landowning, bureaucratic, and merchant elites who forged a common religious and cultural identity. In the post-imperial period, the unity of the Middle East was no longer to be found in empire but was found in the almost universal diffusion of certain forms of social and political organization and of allegiance to common values and symbols. For the first time in Middle Eastern history, the peoples of western Asia belonged, if not to the same empire, to the same culture, religion, and type of political society. Islam had become a universal society without a universal empire.

The institutions and traditions of Middle Eastern Islamic societies held a crucial place in the development of later Islamic societies. They bequeathed a repertoire of cultural and religious ideas that

remain operative in Islamic lands to the present day. From this era came the forms of Islamic orthopraxis contained in hadith and law, Sufi forms of ethical and spiritual self-cultivation, Shi'i concepts of religious leadership, ideals of mystical and gnostic transcendence, popular saint worship and magical practices, and a socially active and reformist Islamic ideal.

This period also gave rise to the basic elements of Islamic social organization: states, schools of law, and Sufi orders. Finally, this era set the precedents for a distinction between state institutions and Muslim religious communities. All the while, the persistence of non-Islamic modes of social and economic organization and non-Islamic cultures generated an endlessly rich variety of social and communal possibilities and an abiding ambiguity as to what constitutes an Islamic society. Wherever Islam was established, these institutions and cultural concepts would be combined and recombined and merged with local traditions to form new types of Islamic societies. Each of them would bear profoundly the imprint of the Middle Eastern beginnings of Islamic societies.

Part III The Global Expansion of Islam from the Seventh to the Nineteenth Centuries

Chapter 25 Introduction: Islamic institutions

Between the seventh and the thirteenth centuries, the historical institutions of pre-Islamic Middle Eastern societies were recast in Islamic forms. New empires and states were organized under Islamic practices of authority and symbols of legitimacy. Muslim religious elites, including scholars (*'ulama'*) and Sufi holy men, generated Islamic forms of worship, education, and legal administration. The majority of Middle Eastern peoples became Muslim, although what that meant in practice varied by region; pastoral tribes, peasants, urban artisans, merchants, and state elites elaborated diverse Islamic identities. A new civilization, in part royal and artistic, in part urban and pietistic, came into being.

In subsequent eras, an Islamic system of institutions and its various cultures would continue to evolve in the already Islamized regions of the Middle East – including Iran, Transoxania, and the Arab provinces. These societies would also serve as a paradigm for the establishment of Islamic societies in other parts of the world. From the seventh to the nineteenth centuries, Islamic societies – based on the interaction of local institutions and cultures and Middle Eastern influences – were established in Anatolia and the Balkans, Inner Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. The development of a global system of Islamic societies, however, was blocked in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the growing political and economic power of Europe. The consolidation of European colonial rule in most of the Muslim world marks the end of the pre-modern era and the beginning of the modern transformation of Muslim societies. (See Map 9.)

Map 9. The expansion of Muslim states and populations, 900–1700.

Conversion to Islam

North Africa and the Middle East

From the seventh to the tenth centuries, Islam was carried by Arab-Muslim conquests to North Africa, Spain, Sicily, and the Mediterranean coasts of Europe. Muslim warriors, merchants, and scholars spread the religion to Saharan and Sudanic Africa. Other Islamic societies originated from the conversion of Inner Asian Turkish peoples to Islam and their migrations, conquests, and empire building. From the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, Turkish peoples took Islam westward into Anatolia, the Balkans, and southeastern Europe; eastward into Inner Asia and China; and southward into Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. They thus played a crucial historical role in the diffusion of Islam and in the founding of the Saljuq, Mongol, Timurid, Safavid, Ottoman, Uzbek, and Mughal empires. Finally, another cluster of Islamic societies originated from

the expansion of Muslim merchants in the Indian Ocean. From Arabia, Islam reached India and East Africa (tenth to twelfth centuries); from Arabia and India, it reached the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries); from the coastal zones, it spread to the interior of the islands and continents.

The expansion of Islam involved different factors in different regions. In North Africa, Anatolia, the Balkans, and India, it was carried by nomadic Arab or Turkish conquerors. In the Indian Ocean and West Africa, it spread by peaceful contacts among merchants or through the preaching of missionaries. In some cases, the diffusion of Islam depended on its adoption by local ruling families; in others, it appealed to urban classes of the population or tribal communities. Its appeal was couched in interwoven terms of political and economic benefits and of a sophisticated culture and religion.

The question of why people convert to Islam has always generated intense feeling. Earlier generations of Western scholars believed that conversions to Islam were made at the point of the sword and that conquered peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now apparent that conversion by force, although not unknown in Muslim countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished to dominate, rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary.

Even voluntary conversions are suspect to Western observers. Were they made out of true belief, or for opportunistic political or social reasons? Surely there are innumerable cases of conversion to Islam by the illumination of faith or by virtue of the perceived sanctity of Muslim scholars and holy men, as well as by calculation of political and economic advantage. In most cases, worldly and spiritual motives for conversion blended together. Moreover, conversion to Islam did not necessarily imply a complete turning from an old to a totally new life. Although it entailed the acceptance of new religious beliefs and membership in a new religious community, most converts retained a deep attachment to the cultures and communities in which they were raised and continued to live. In the sections that follow, I stress the historical circumstances that have induced large numbers of people to adhere to Islam, rather than analyzing the spiritual or

material motives of individuals for becoming Muslims. This is not to diminish the centrality of belief and commitment in the subjective experience of individual converts, but to account on a historical basis for the responses of great numbers of human beings.

Initial conversions to Islam occurred in the Middle East between the seventh and the thirteenth centuries. These took place in two phases: the first was the conversion of animists and polytheists belonging to the tribal societies of the Arabian desert and the periphery of the Fertile Crescent; the second was the conversion of the monotheistic populations of the Middle Eastern agrarian, urbanized, and imperial societies.

The conversion of Arabian populations was part of a process in which the civilization of the sedentarized imperial societies spread to the nomadic periphery. Arabian peoples, living on the borders of the wealthier agricultural and commercial zones of the Middle East, strongly influenced by Middle Eastern commerce and religious thought, found in Muhammad's teaching a way to formulate a kind of Middle Eastern monotheistic religion parallel to, but distinct from, the established Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian religions. Indeed there were prior efforts to define an Arabian monotheism. The conversion of pagan – as well as Jewish and Christian – Arabian peoples to Islam represented the response of a tribal, pastoral population (and of the sedentary oasis and town populations) to the need for a larger framework for political and economic integration, a more stable state, and a more imaginative and encompassing moral vision to cope with the problems of a tumultuous society. Conversion intensified the ongoing process of Arabians integrating into a new cultural and political order defined in monotheistic religious terms.

The conversion of non-Arabian peoples to Islam was a different process. In this case, Islam substituted for Byzantine or Sasanian political identity and for Jewish, Christian, or Zoroastrian religious affiliation. The transformation of identities among Middle Eastern peoples took place in two stages. In the first century of the Islamic imperium, Arab-Muslim conquerors attempted to maintain themselves as an exclusive Muslim elite. They did not demand the conversion as much as the subordination of non-Muslim peoples. At the outset, they

were hostile to conversions, because new Muslims diluted the economic and social status advantages of Arab-Muslims. Nonetheless, Muslim rule offered substantial incentives for conversion. It formed a protective umbrella over and conferred the prestige of the state on Muslim communities. Political patronage allowed for the establishment of mosques, the organization of the pilgrimage, and the creation of Muslim judicial institutions. The establishment of an Arab-Muslim empire made Islam attractive to elements of the former Byzantine and Sasanian aristocracies, including soldiers, officials, landlords, and others. Arab garrison cities attracted non-Arab migrants who found careers in the army and administration open to converts. Merchants, artisans, workers, and fugitive peasants seeking the patronage of the new elite were also tempted to accept Islam.

Despite these attractions, the mass of Middle Eastern peoples did not quickly or easily convert. Only with the breakdown of the social and religious structures of non-Muslim communities in the tenth to the twelfth centuries did the weakening of churches, the awakening of Muslim hostility to non-Muslims, sporadic and localized persecution, and the destruction of the landed gentry of Iraq and Iran weaken the communal organization of non-Muslim peoples. Muslim teachers were then able to take the lead in the reconstruction of local communities on the basis of Islamic beliefs and identities. Large parts of Egypt and Iran were probably converted in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In northern Syria, however, Christian majorities survived through the twelfth century, until – compromised by their sympathies with and assistance to the crusaders – they were put under severe pressure. Most converted in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but substantial Christian minorities remained. Similarly, most of the remaining Christian population of Egypt adopted Islam in the fourteenth century. To adherents of the monotheistic and communalist faiths, Islam offered the same variety of intellectual, legal, theological, and mystical appeals. Although Islam had a specific religious orientation toward the inscrutable and untrammeled will of God and the necessity for submission of spirit and actions to the will of God, its basic religious positions were fundamentally similar to those of the other monotheistic religions.

The conversion of North Africa also began with the Arab-Muslim conquests but unfolded in a different process because it primarily involved the adoption of Islam, notably in sectarian form, by the chiefs of Berber societies as the basis of tribal coalitions and state formation. Khariji states in Algeria and Morocco adopted Islam to help regulate tribal relations and long-distance trade. The process of Islamization of the masses of Christians and Jews is not known, but it may be related to the spread of *ribats* (forts manned by warriors for the faith), trade, and Sufis. In any case, it seems to have been rapid when compared to conversion in the Middle East.

Turkish conquests and conversions in Anatolia, the Balkans, the Middle East, Inner Asia, and India

The diffusion of Islam to regions beyond the Middle East involved analogous processes. The spread of Islam in Inner Asia, Anatolia, the Balkans, and India was closely tied to the conversion of pastoral Turkish (rather than Arab) peoples, which began in the tenth century. Inner Asian peoples came into contact with Muslims through caravan trade and commerce with merchants who operated on the steppes as brokers between nomadic and settled populations. Muslim missionaries and Sufis also moved out to proselytize among the Turks. Political ambition prompted the Qarakhanid and Saljuq elites to take up the new religion. Later Inner Asian regimes – including the Mongols of the Golden Horde and the Chaghatay Khanates – also adopted Islam and brought it to the northern steppes and eastern Turkestan. In Inner Asia, Islamization was important for the establishment of nomadic regimes over sedentary populations, for the organization of long-distance trade, and for the creation of politically cohesive ethnic identities among Tatars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and others.

The spread of Islam into Anatolia and the Balkans paralleled the historical process of the spread of Islam in the Middle East. (See Illustration 9.) The Saljuq and Ottoman conquests of the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries established Muslim regimes that patronized

Sunni law schools, Islamic judicial administration, the construction of schools and colleges, and other religious and communal facilities. They gave protection to scholars and Sufis who founded centers for teaching and social services in the conquered territories. The migration of a substantial Turkish population under the leadership of Muslim holy men uprooted Anatolian agricultural communities and replaced them with Turkish Muslim peoples. Nomadic conquests and the hostility of the Saljuq government to the Byzantine Empire and the Greek Orthodox Church also led in Anatolia to the progressive reduction of church lands, administrative capacities, and authority. The weakening of the church deprived the Christian population of leadership and organization. In Anatolia, as in Inner Asia, India, and Africa, Sufi warriors and activist missionaries helped to establish Islam among a newly conquered peasant population. The assimilation of Anatolian peoples was facilitated on the cultural as well as the social level by the familiarity to Christians of Islamic religious concepts. In Anatolia, as in the rest of the Middle East, the conjunction of Muslim state power, the decline of organized Christian societies, and the social and cultural relevance of Islam facilitated mass conversions to the new religion.

Illustration 9. The Battle of the Twelve Heroes. Source: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the Nasli M. Heeramaneck Collection, Gift of Joan Palevsky, by Exchange Photograph © 2002 Museum Associates / LACMA / Art Resource / Art Resource, NY.

In the Balkans, the factors favoring Islamization and conversion of local peoples were similar to those in Anatolia: the establishment of a regime that favored Islam and the migration and settlement of a substantial Turkish population. Islamization under these pressures was especially pronounced in the towns. In the Balkans, however, the spread of Islam was limited by the vitality of the Christian churches. It came at a later stage of Turkish conquests, at a time when Ottoman policy favored Christian nobles and churches as vehicles of Ottoman administration and so maintained – and, indeed, reinforced – the social structure of Balkan communities. Most Balkan peoples, buttressed by the continuity of organized Christian community life, maintained their confessional affiliation.

The history of Islam in India most closely resembles that of the Balkans. Islam was brought into India by a conquering Afghan and Turkish military elite that established the Delhi sultanate in the thirteenth century. Conversions occurred as a result of the political attraction of the dominant regime to both non-Muslim elites and dependent peasants and workers. Also, as in the Middle East, the construction of new cities favored the conversion of mobile peoples attracted to the centers of Muslim administration and trade. In most of India, however, as in the Balkans, the appeal of Islam was relatively restricted. Only in the Northwest Frontier, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal were the populations converted en masse. In these regions the transition from hunter-gatherer and pastoral activities to settled agriculture was the occasion for a total reconstruction of society under Muslim leadership and for the development of new Islamic identifications. Conversion to Islam on a mass scale was most likely among populations lacking prior organized institutions.

In general, however, the assimilative capacity of Islam in the subcontinent was limited by the relative thinness of the Muslim elite. Although Muslim rule in India attracted numerous warriors, administrators, and religious teachers, the Muslim conquest was not accompanied by massive migrations, as in the cases of the Arab conquest of the Middle East or the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. Furthermore, the social structure of conquered peoples remained intact. Hindu Rajputs, for example, maintained their authority under Muslim suzerainty; Brahmanic Hinduism and the caste system were not challenged by Muslim rule. Indeed, Hindu philosophy and popular religions were invigorated by Muslim competition. In the face of an ordered social and religious structure, conversions to Islam were inhibited.

When conversions did occur, Sufism played a considerable part. Following the scent of battle, Sufis streamed into India from Afghanistan, Iran, and Inner Asia. Many came as warriors to establish Muslim supremacy and convert the infidels. Some tied their fortunes to the state. Others fanned out in North India, establishing their influence by personal merit. Here too, the adaptability of Sufis to traditional religious cultures was important in the transition from Hindu

and Buddhist identities to Islam. In India, the boundary between Hindu and Muslim beliefs, ritual practices, and social loyalties was thin. As in the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire, Islam was established under the auspices both of a political elite and of independent religious teachers.

Conversions in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa

The conversion of Malaya, Indonesia, and sub-Saharan Africa to Islam followed a different pattern. In these regions, Islam was not established by conquest, by the imposition of a single centralized state, or by the settlement of a substantial foreign Muslim population; nor was it associated with massive social change. It was, rather, due to the diffusion of Muslim merchants and missionaries who founded small communities and sometimes induced (or forced) local elites interested in state formation, trade, and political legitimization to accept their religion. Islam spread as the result of commercial contacts and political and business rivalries, and by the progressive acceptance of new symbols of identity by ongoing societies.

Islam was first introduced into Indonesia at the end of the thirteenth century by merchants and Sufis from India, Arabia, and perhaps China. It appealed to the rulers of small coastal and riverine principalities who had close trading contacts with the Muslims and intense rivalries with other Indonesian and Chinese traders. Acceptance of Islam by local merchant princes won them social and administrative support and an entrée into extensive trading networks. Portuguese (sixteenth century) and later Dutch (seventeenth century) intervention in the Indies further stimulated the acceptance of Islam, because the struggle against the Portuguese and the Dutch made Islam a bond of solidarity in resistance to the efforts of Christian powers to establish trading monopolies. Local competition facilitated the further spread of Islam. The struggle of the coastal principalities with the interior states of Java eventually led to the establishment of Islam as the official religion of the whole of Java. As a result, Indonesian state and elite culture was shaped not by an aristocracy coming from the Middle East but by a local elite that preserved its

political and cultural continuity and adopted Islam as an additional expression – or reinforcement – of its earlier legitimacy. Throughout Indonesia and Malaya, Islam was also integrated into popular culture. Sufi missionaries and village teachers settled widely and made Islam part of folk culture and folk identity. In Southeast Asia, as opposed to India and the Balkans, where it reached only a minority, Islam became the religion of great majorities of the population.

In most of Africa, Islam was established by processes more closely resembling those of Southeast Asia than those of the Middle East and India. Muslim merchants and missionary colonies, rather than conquest and empire, were central to Islamization. Arab and Berber traders and settlers in the Saharan and Sudanic regions, Arab and Persian settlers on the East African coasts, and Dyula communities in West Africa were the nuclei of Muslim influences. In Sudanic Africa, colonies of Muslim traders allied with local political elites and induced the rulers of the states of Ghana, Mali, Kanem, Songhay, Hausaland, and Dogomba to accept Islam. It is possible that Muslims themselves seized kingships and created small states. Islam was adopted to consolidate political power, reinforce commercial contacts, recruit skilled personnel, and mobilize spiritual and magical powers in the interests of state elites. As in North Africa, acceptance of Islam provided an additional basis for legitimization of state regimes, coalition formation among disparate peoples, organization of trading networks, and the employment of skilled personnel. Under the auspices of Muslim states, a small scholarly elite of judges, scholars, and imams was established, but no evidence for conversion of the lower classes is available. Islam was primarily the religion of the political and economic elites.

In other parts of West Africa, the Islamic presence was established by Dyula traders, landowners, missionaries, and teachers scattered throughout the region, all of whom created an Islamic presence without necessarily generating Islamic states and without attendant Islamization of the population. These family communities seem to have fitted into a highly stratified and subdivided society, whose internal divisions made it acceptable to have unassimilated communities but were a barrier to the further diffusion of Islam.

Whereas in West Africa Arab merchants inspired warrior elites to convert to Islam, in East Africa Arab traders themselves took over the leadership of small states. In Somalia and Ethiopia, Arab merchants married into local lineages and assumed leadership of tribal coalitions, which then adopted an Arab and Islamic identity. In East African city-states, Arab settlers intermarried with local peoples and became the elites of the coastal Swahili society, based on a new language and cultural style that symbolized the merger of populations. Muslim communities were consolidated by the integration of peoples and the formation of new cultural idioms. As the religion of the state and trading classes, Islam in Africa appeared in highly syncretic forms. Because African elites were not conquered and replaced but converted and maintained power, they brought with them a strong component of traditional, non-Islamic African practices.

In some cases, the formation of African-Muslim states was followed by the conversion of the masses. In Somalia, Mauritania, and other Saharan regions, the large numbers of Arab migrants, the close identification of pastoral peoples with Arab nomads, and the utility of holy leadership for the regulation of relations among tribal communities explain why Islam was so widely accepted. In the Funj and Darfur sultanates, state elites adopted Islam as a result of trading contacts and opened the way for a large influx of Sufi missionaries. Muslim holy men, supported by state grants of land, introduced Islam to the common people. In the Sudan, the spread of Arabic and contacts with Egypt and the Middle East helped establish Islam among the common people.

By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, throughout West Africa, the spread of Muslim trading communities linked by lineage, trade, teaching, and Sufi affiliations had reached a critical mass that enabled Muslims to fight larger-scale political regimes. Motivated by a tradition of hostility to rulers among both trading and pastoral peoples, African-Muslim communities attempted to seize political power and to Islamize both state regimes and the masses of the African population. In Sudanic, savannah, and forest West Africa, Muslim jihads were equivalent to Islamic conquests in other parts of the world and led to the Islamization of northern Nigeria,

Senegambia, and parts of the upper Guinea coast. However, even when colonial conquest put an end to Muslim jihad, Islam – without state support – served to express anticolonialism and to unite uprooted peoples into new communal structures. In Africa, the process of conversion was tied to a double mechanism of peaceful expansion of traders, settlers, and teachers and to militant conquest. As in other parts of the world, the two could work either separately or in tandem.

Throughout the Old World, the diffusion of Islam led to the formation of new communities and states or to the redefinition of existing communities and empires in Islamic terms. In many parts of Africa and Inner Asia, the introduction of Islam was the basis for conversions from animistic to monotheistic religions and for the construction of states in hitherto stateless societies. In most places, however, the advent of Islam inspired the reconstruction of societies that already had monotheistic religions and state institutions. If there is an underlying common factor in the global diffusion of Islam, it seems to be its capacity to generate religious fellowship, larger-order communities, and states among peoples otherwise living in factionalized or fragmented societies. Islam became the religion of tribal peoples and merchant groups seeking economic integration and state elites seeking consolidated political power. In general, it seems to have been most effective when it gave a new social identity to peoples severed from traditional social structures.

In all these cases, the Middle Eastern experience anticipated the formation of later Islamic societies. Middle Eastern Islamic societies were built around three different types of collectivities: parochial groups, religious associations, and states. Parochial groups were based on family, clan, lineage, tribal, clientele, and neighborhood ties. At the level of religious associations, scholars and Sufi elites were organized around schools of law, Sufi fraternities, and shrines. States were characterized by such institutions as nomadic or ethnic elite armies, slave or mercenary military forces, a combination of bureaucratic and quasi-feudal forms of administration, and an Islamic legal terminology for taxation. These components of the Middle Eastern societies involved a combination of Islamic and non-Islamic institutions and concepts. Although religious associations and certain

aspects of states were specifically Islamic, state bureaucratic, administrative, and feudal-like systems of taxation were not. Furthermore, the prevailing concepts of legitimacy were formulated in patrimonial, ethnic, historical, or cosmopolitan cultural terms as well as in Islamic symbols. Similarly, the social systems and cultural expressions of parochial communities were not unique to Muslims. Thus what we classify as "Islamic societies" by definition includes non-Islamic institutions and cultures. It is impossible to disassociate Islam from its regional (i.e., Middle Eastern) context.

In the diffusion of Islamic institutions and identities, Middle Eastern precedents were transmitted sometimes as a whole system and sometimes in parts, depending on who were the bearers of Islam and what were the conditions of its diffusion and reception in different societies. For example, conquest by nomadic peoples as opposed to contact among small groups of merchants made a significant difference in the way in which Middle Eastern Islamic influences were transmitted and received. In all instances, however, the diffusion of Islam released tremendous artistic and cultural forces as each new Islamic state and society created its own synthesis of Middle Eastern Islamic institutions and local traditions. The history of Islamic societies illustrates the originality of Muslim regimes the world over and yet reveals them to be variations on an underlying pattern shaped by indigenous conditions in each part of the Muslim world.

Muslim elites and Islamic communities

In every Islamic society, scholars (*'ulama'*) and Sufis were the teachers, exemplars, and leaders of Muslim communities. The scholars were knowledgeable about Muslim history, law, and theology. Their primary function was instruction and judicial administration. In West Africa, we find scholars under the local names of *mallam* or *karamoko* teaching in villages and town quarters. In Indonesia, they were called *kiyayi*, the teachers in boarding schools (*pesantren*). In Iran, Inner Asia, and the Ottoman Empire, they were the mullahs, who taught in Quran and higher-level schools. Despite important differences of knowledge, lineage, and wealth among higher- and lower-ranking scholars, there were rarely formal

distinctions among them. Only in Bukhara and West Africa were scholars graded by rank.

Scholars were commonly organized into schools of law, which were associations of scholars, teachers, and students adhering to the codes of law developed by discussion and debate among legal scholars in the eighth and ninth centuries. By the late medieval period, the principal Sunni schools were the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools. Shi'i scholars were organized in two main schools. Through the law schools, scholars organized higher education and trained teachers and judicial administrators. The law schools trained legal consultants (muftis), notaries, and judges. (See Map 10.)

Map 10. Islamic schools of law and Sufi brotherhoods, c. 1500.

These activities generated a popular following for the scholars and their schools. The students usually considered themselves the personal disciples and loyal clients of their masters. In Africa and Indonesia, they worked in their masters' employ to pay their tuition.

They commonly married into their masters' families. As an organized following, they could have considerable local political importance. The students of Istanbul and Bukhara were ready to take to the streets to defend their collective interests. Patrons and supporters came from the merchant and artisan classes. In eastern Iran and Transoxania, under Mongol and Timurid suzerainty, and in West African Dyula settlements, scholars were political leaders as well.

The religious authority of scholars, their expertise in law, and their social leadership made it important for states to control them. The Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal empires, as well as the states of Tunisia and Bukhara, provide – in differing degrees – examples of the bureaucratic organization of scholars. In other North and Sudanic African states, scholars were not bureaucratically organized but were still courtiers and clients of the political elites. By contrast, Hanbalis in Egypt and Syria, Malikis in North and West Africa, and Naqshbandis in India not only maintained their autonomy but were active opponents of state elites in the name of Islamic principles.

Scholars performed different political roles depending on their status and the type of political system in which they were embedded. Higher-ranking scholars were commonly state functionaries, whereas lower-level teachers were often spiritual counselors for the common people. In the Ottoman Empire, scholar-bureaucrats belonged to the state elites and lower-ranking students and teachers to the opposition. In Iran, the Shi'i scholars evolved from a position of subordination to the state to autonomy and leadership of the common people.

The most striking socioreligious development of post-thirteenth-century Islamic societies was the emergence of Sufism in innumerable variations as the principal expression of Islamic beliefs and communal identities. Personified in scholar-mystics, ardent reformers, ecstatic preachers, and miracle-working holy men, Sufism became the almost universal sign of the Muslim presence. It is difficult to characterize Sufism briefly, because the word was used to apply to extremely varied religious and social practices. In general, Sufism is Islamic mysticism, or the spiritual quest that leads to direct experience of the reality of God's being. With variations, the term

covers two basic, sometimes overlapping, constellations of religious ideas. One kind of Sufism is a religious and ethical discipline built on adherence to the teachings of the Quran, the hadith, and the law, supplemented by spiritual practices designed to cultivate an outward conformity to Islamic norms and an inner insight into the ultimate spiritual realities. Muslim holy men of this type are commonly integrated with the scholars and cultivate religious knowledge, ethical discipline, and spiritual insight. The ordinary Sufi of this type is at once a scholar and a spiritual master.

A second kind of Sufism emphasizes faith in Sufi saints and relates to preexisting beliefs in the world of spirits and the magical powers of holy men. To many ordinary Muslims, a Sufi is a person who has attained a quality of inner consciousness that makes him close to God. The saint is directly connected to the cosmos because he participates in the essential forces of rational or spiritual power. The Sufi is considered by his followers to be a spiritual teacher, a miracle worker, a dispenser of blessings, and a mediator between men and God. This type of Sufism led to veneration of the person of the holy man and the heirs of his *baraka* (power of blessing) in the form of his tomb or shrine, or his disciples and descendants. It led to a religious life of offerings, sacrifices, and communal festivals around the shrines of saints. Shrine-Sufism, then, is a religion of magical acquisition of divine powers rather than of ethical or emotional self-cultivation. Although both types of Sufism are Islamic, they represent profoundly contrasting concepts of religious life.

In either case, the social organization of Sufism followed from the authority of Sufi masters. The ultimate social unit was the individual Sufi, surrounded by his disciples. The individual holy man (and his disciples) could also win lay followers among the people of his village, quarter, or camp. Such small communities might in turn be linked together in lineages or brotherhoods, sharing a common religious identity.

An individual Sufi's authority was built on a combination of knowledge of the Quran, mystical achievements, and inherited powers transmitted by spiritual and/or genealogical descent from an earlier saint or from the Prophet himself. Just as the chain of

transmission (*silsila*) went back to the companions of the Prophet, the genealogies of Sufis were commonly traced back to the caliphs and the Prophet. Such was the case for the *mirs, khwajas*, and *sayyids* of Transoxania and the *shurafaʾ* of Morocco. The fusion of spiritual and genealogical descent was easy to make, for the Sufi was indeed a child of the Prophet; one who imitated his ways, re-created his life, and concentrated within himself the noble qualities or the image of the Prophet (*sura*). Given the widespread Muslim veneration of the holiness of ancestors, it was natural to identify present holiness with descent from superior beings. In many respects, this is parallel to the descent of the Shiʿi imams.

In turn, the personal authority and spiritual power of the master was transmitted to his descendants, to his disciples, and to his tomb. The descendants of a famous saint constituted a holy community based on inheritance of his spiritual qualities and lineage ties. Descent from the Prophet became particularly important in many regions in the fourteenth century and later. Certain lineages in Egypt, the *khwajas* of Bukhara and Kashgar, the *shurafaʾ* of Morocco, Jakhanke lineages in West Africa, *evliadi* groups among Turkmens, and Berber *zawaya* lineages in Mauritania were identified as holy communities – every male member of which was a descendant of a saint and heir to his spiritual qualities.

More common was the organization of a Sufi order (*tariqa*). A Sufi order was formed when several Sufi masters considered themselves the disciples of an earlier teacher, perpetuating a common spiritual discipline. Although Sufi cells were independent of one another, they recognized the same higher authority and became units of a larger-order association. Some of these associations were regional in scale. In India, the introduction of the Sufi order was the basis of a region-wide Islamic society. In West Africa, the consolidation of such brotherhoods in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was in part the basis of the effort to create Muslim states. Some of these brotherhoods – such as the Naqshbandi, the Qadiri, and others – became worldwide.

Veneration of shrines also led to special forms of communal or political organization. As the tombs of saints became centers for

worship, administered by their descendants, tomb complexes became the focus of communities composed of people who believed that the saints could perform miracles. Shrines were endowed with agricultural estates to provide funds for their upkeep and for charitable activities. In such cases, a Sufi order included not only the descendants of the saint and the active disciples but all of the people who believed in the saint and worshiped at his tomb. This fellowship of believers, however, remained highly diffuse, segmented, and unorganized. Still, from the thirteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries, the veneration of shrines and holy places became the most widespread form of popular Islamic practice. Sufis and their shrines provided ritual and spiritual counsel, medical cures, and mediation among different groups and strata of the population. Sufis helped to integrate corporate bodies (such as guilds) and to form political organizations among diverse lineage groups.

Sufism embodied myriad religious and social practices. The individual Sufi may have subscribed to any of a wide variety of religious or theosophical beliefs, may have come from any walk of life, may have had multiple affiliations (including simultaneous membership in different schools of law and Sufi brotherhoods), and may have coupled his mystical insights and practices with any of a number of worldly vocations, combining the roles of Sufi and scholar, merchant, artisan, or political chieftain. Similarly, the disciples and followers, although united by their adherence to the master and to the religious practices of their order, represented every conceivable social milieu. Given all this variation, Sufism cannot generally be defined but may only be described case by case. The underlying common factor is the exercise of religious insight, discipline, or authority in worldly affairs and a reputation for sanctity.

By the nineteenth century, Islamic societies the world over had acquired similar types of Muslim elites, beliefs, religious practices, and social organizations. In each Muslim region, we find not one but several variant types of Islam. There were the scholars who represented formal scholastic learning, organized education, and judicial administration, affiliated through schools of law. There were also the scholars-cum-Sufis, who combined legal learning with mystical discipline and contemplation, in an effort to live their lives in

imitation of the Prophet. Such religious teachers perpetuated a tradition of learning that combined law, theology, and Sufi wisdom representing Sunni–Shariʿa (orthoprax)–Sufi Islam. There were ecstatic visionary Sufis in the tradition of Ibn al-ʿArabi and the gnostic forms of Islamic mysticism, as well as the popular forms of Sufi Islam expressed in veneration of saints, faith in their charismatic powers, and belief in the magic of their shrines. Throughout the Muslim world, Sufism in all its forms became the most widespread and popular form of Islam. (See Table 10.)

Table 10. *The social organization of Sufism*

The Sufi master

ʿarif	Gnostic
khalifa	Deputy, head of branch of Sufi order with authority to initiate new members
murshid, pir, ishan	Guide
shaykh	Teacher
wali	Friend of God, saint

Sufi lineages

ashraf, shurafaʾ, zawaya, insilimen, evliad	Descendants of the Prophet, of companions of the Prophet, and of saints

Sufi brotherhoods

dargah, khanaqa, tekke, zawiya	Residences and facilities of an order

khirqa	Patched cloak of the master transmitted to the disciple as a sign of initiation
murshid, khalifa, murid	Hierarchy of members
silsila	Chain of transmission of blessing from the Prophet to a present master
waqf	Endowed financial support
Tombs and shrines	
baraka	Blessing, God's power communicated through the saints
karamat	Miracles of saints
'urs	Celebration of the anniversary of the death of a saint, his marriage to God
ziyara	Visit to venerate a saint's tomb and seek his intercession before God

The reform movement

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rise of a reformist (*tajdid*) movement opposed to both the rigidities of the schools of law and the cultic aspects of shrine-Sufism. The reformist mentality theoretically traces back to the early Hanbali movement, which emphasized commitment to the hadith of the Prophet (rather than law or cultic worship) and to social activism to improve the quality of Muslim political and communal life. The imitation of the Prophet Muhammad became the ideal of a Muslim life. These

reformers, aided by the conviction that God was punishing Muslims for failure to heed his will, opposed the tolerant attitude of Muslim states toward non-Muslim peoples and cultures, sought to abolish the veneration of saints and the more florid cults and ceremonies, and worked to dispel superstitious or magical beliefs and practices. The reformers espoused, instead, a religion of personal discipline, moral responsibility, and commitment to a universal Muslim society. They were committed, if need be, to militant action to destroy corrupt versions of Islam and to create a just and truly Islamic community.

These various protoreformist tendencies came together in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Mecca, Medina, and Cairo, where scholars representing the new trends in Morocco, Iraq, India, and elsewhere met in informal *'ulama'* and Sufi study groups. They advocated a purified version of Islamic belief and practice based on the study of the Quran, hadith, and law combined with Sufi asceticism. They worked on the earliest possible texts of hadith, rather than the later standard collections, and sought to eliminate religious practices that were not found in the Quran and in the teachings of the Prophet. They celebrated al-Ghazali as the premier teacher of Sufism and set the foundation for religious orders that would propagate the new devotional seriousness.

From Arabia and Cairo, traveling scholars, students and Sufis, and merchants and craftsmen carried the reformist doctrine to India, Indonesia, and North and West Africa. In Cairo, al-Azhar emerged as an important center of the new tendency, marked by hadith scholarship, the teachings of al-Ghazali, and repudiating the traditions of Ibn al-'Arabi; visiting North African scholars taught their doctrine of imitation of and union with the spirit of the Prophet rather than pantheistic union with God. Muslim scholars in the Ottoman Empire again emphasized the primacy of hadith. The Naqshbandi and Khalwati orders combined hadith and law with Sufi asceticism and meditation in opposition to shrine worship and festivals. Naqshbandi teachers brought the order from Yemen to Egypt and from India to Syria. Social reformers were active in India, where they stressed a combination of hadith and Sufism because their religious goal was not union with God but identification with the spirit and active life of the Prophet.

Reformism also inspired political action. The reformist discourse appealed to two milieus. First, it appealed to fragmented lineage and village societies, to whom it offered Islamic authority and leadership for the unification of diverse groups in the struggle against local rivals and states. Reformism could be used as an ideology of mobilization for conquests, the formation of new states, and for anticolonial resistance.

The earliest example of a reformist movement in a pastoral and tribal society was the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. Born out of an alliance between a reform preacher and the Saʿudi family, the Wahhabis united diverse tribal groups into a movement that conquered most of Arabia. The religious goal of Wahhabi teaching was the purification of the heart from vices and sin and acknowledgment of the unity and transcendence of God. Wahhabis rejected Sufism, the veneration of any human being, and any authority except the Prophet himself.

Wahhabism set an example of militant moral and social reform. In India – which was in continuous interaction with Arabia through the travels of merchants, the movements of scholars, and the journeys of pilgrims – reform movements took root in Delhi, the Northwest Frontier, and Bengal. In the Indian Northwest Frontier, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi tried to organize the Pashtuns against the British and the Sikhs on the basis of reformist teaching. Reformism inspired the Padri movement in Minangkabau in Sumatra. Reformism also became the basis of the local struggle against colonialism in the Caucasus and Inner Asia, where the Naqshbandi order became the bearer of new religious inspiration and, ultimately, of political resistance to both Russian and Chinese expansion.

In West Africa, Islamic reform had both indigenous roots and international Muslim connections. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reformist movements in the Senegambian region represented a local tradition of Muslim resistance to non-Muslim political elites, but the Fulani conquests, led by ʿUthman don Fodio (1754–1817), who established the caliphate of Sokoto (1809–1903) in the region between the Niger and Lake Chad, had mixed local and Arabian inspiration. Reformism inspired the Sanusiyya, the Tijaniyya, the jihad

of al-Hajj 'Umar, and Sufi orders in the Sudan. International reformist influences, introduced by the Tijani order, spread in Algeria, Morocco, and West Africa and interacted with local forces to inspire the formation of the regime of al-Hajj 'Umar (1794?–1864) in the regions from the Niger to Senegal. In Libya, the Sanusiyya unified tribal peoples and created a loose confederation of tribes and oases that served to mediate disputes and to organize trade.

Second, reformism took root in agricultural and urban merchant milieus, in direct response to European political intervention and economic changes. In Bengal the reformist Fara'idi movement was associated with the introduction of British rule and the rise of Hindu and British landlords. In northern India, British rule and the collapse of the Mughal Empire led to reform movements in urban and small-town, middle-class milieus. Based at Deoband, reformist *'ulama'* created a network of colleges that trained cadres to proselytize, educate, and make true Muslims out of Indian believers. Deoband and subsequent reformist movements in India contributed heavily to the creation of a sense of Muslim identity throughout the subcontinent.

In Southeast Asia there were successive waves of reformism. The early nineteenth-century Padri movement in Sumatra was associated with the commercialization of coffee production. Coffee farmers were receptive to the influence of the reformist pilgrims and scholars returning to Sumatra from Mecca and Medina, who launched a movement to Islamize Muslim villages. At the end of the nineteenth century, reformism became the creed of the Indo-Malay merchant communities of Singapore and other Southeast Asian ports. Enlarged world trade; pilgrimage; the creation of a capitalist plantation economy in Sumatra and Malaya producing rubber, coffee, tobacco, pepper, sugar, pineapples, and palm oil for export; the formation of a plantation and mining proletariat; commercialization; urbanization; and other forces of socioeconomic change broke down traditional family and social structures, favored the growth of a Muslim merchant class in Singapore and other island ports and of commercial planters in Sumatra and Malaya, and led to the adoption of Muslim reformism as the doctrine of new communities. These and similar milieus were

the basis of the early twentieth-century Muhammadiya movement in Indonesia and the Kaum Muda (Young Group) in Malaya. In Inner Asia, merchants and intelligentsia adopted *usul-i jadid* (the New Method) in response to Russian domination and the need to revitalize a threatened Muslim community.

In sum, Islamic reformism was the political and moral response of *'ulama'*, tribal, and urban communities to the transformation of the traditional structures of Muslim societies and to the threat of European political, economic, and cultural domination. It had its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in response not to European pressures but to purely internal conditions, and it was later adapted to anticolonial resistance. Reformism appealed to tribal societies seeking political unification and to merchant and farmer milieus undergoing commercialization and urbanization, where reformist doctrine provided a cultural basis for larger-scale communities. Although often politically passive, reformism contributed to the psychological mobilization of colonized peoples and became the vehicle for the reconstruction of Muslim political identities among subnational populations in the Caucasus, Inner Asia, India, and Indonesia and the basis for national movements in Algeria and Morocco. The political breakdown of Muslim countries and the rise of European imperialism would give reformed Sufism a new role in the mobilization of Muslim peoples for defense against European colonial domination.

Social structures of Islamic societies

These various types of Muslim elites, beliefs, and associations gave Muslim societies complex structures. On one level, Islam may be considered an international religion in which all Muslims are linked by a shared tradition of learning and belief, by travel and pilgrimage to common centers of learning and worship, and by membership in international schools of law and religious brotherhoods. For example, Istanbul was the religious capital not only of the Ottoman Empire and of many of the Arab provinces but also of Inner Asia. Cairo drew students to al-Azhar from as far away as Indonesia and West Africa. Schools of law found their affiliates over broad regions. The Malikis

were predominant in North and West Africa; the Hanafis in the Ottoman Empire, Inner Asia, and India; and the Shafi‘is in India, Southeast Asia, and East Africa. Similarly, the Sufi brotherhoods generated regional and international loyalties. The Naqshbandis spread throughout India, Inner Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The Tijaniyya in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became a North and West Africa–wide brotherhood with important branches in the Arab Middle East. The reform movement was centered on Mecca and Medina but radiated its influence to India, West Africa, Inner Asia, and China. This international Muslim community enables us to speak of "the Muslim world." Still, on another level, Muslim identities remained intensely local, in that scholars and Sufis were embedded in particular communities and represented concepts and practices that were a fusion of the mainstream interpretations of Islam with local customs, beliefs, and lifestyles. Islam, then, has to be understood both as a universal religion and in its numerous particular contexts.

Islamic religious leadership and beliefs had a profound effect on the social organization of Muslim peoples. In urban societies, which were commonly divided into strong family, clan, clientele, and residential groups, Islam could be the basis for the organization of neighborhood communities around a mosque, Sufi retreat, or college. Within the urban fabric, there were schools of law, Sufi brotherhoods, or Shi‘i sects identified with particular neighborhoods, occupations, or ethnic minorities. For example, in eleventh- and twelfth-century Iranian cities, neighborhood communities were closely identified with schools of law. In India and East Africa, merchant groups sometimes had a sectarian Isma‘ili identity. Isma‘ilis formed *jamatbandis*, or collective associations, which provided political leadership and organized worship and instruction for a self-contained small community. Similarly, Dyula or Hausa merchant groups formed close-knit communities in West Africa. In these cases, the special trust and cohesion required for commercial activities came from religiously reinforced familial and ethnic loyalties.

Towns and cities, however, also provided a setting for social and political integration. This took place through markets, direct political

negotiations among town notables, and the activities of scholars and Sufis. Schools of law and Sufi orders drew diverse elements of the population into common religious bodies. Islamic collectivities formed a superordinate community. Their integrative function was expressed in terms of allegiance to Islamic law. Through urban communities, Islam also played an important role in creating regional and international trading networks, administrative organizations, and states.

In many village societies, Muslim identity was often superimposed on preexisting village identity. In Minangkabau Sumatra, peasant villages had a double social structure, in which family and property were treated on matriarchal lines, whereas trade and politics were symbolized in patriarchal terms. In other cases, the merger of Islamic and non-Islamic cultural identity was expressed through shrine worship, festivals, belief in spirits, and shamanistic or magical curing practices that blended faith in the miraculous powers of Islamic holy men with pre-Islamic beliefs. Religious conviction was expressed through worship at shrines and holy places in an annual cycle of religious festivals, magical activities, and other rituals that incorporated non- or pre-Islamic concepts and ceremonies. Islamic belief, then, did not necessarily lead to the formation of an organized body of believers but could serve as a shared identity among diverse peoples who preserved their own kinship, territorial, linguistic, ethnic, and other bases of non-Islamic culture in group organization and social relations.

After the thirteenth century, Sufism became central to lineage societies, wherein Muslim holy men appeared as individual charismatic teachers – sometimes the custodians of local shrines, sometimes affiliated with brotherhoods. Sufis also appeared as members of their own holy lineages. Sufi lineages in Algeria, Morocco, southern Somalia, Mauritania, and Turkmenistan are among the many examples of groups tracing their descent to the Prophet or the early caliphs, who were organized as separate communities within the framework of the surrounding tribal societies. Similarly, African Dyula communities were made up of lineages or specialized occupational castes operating as components of complex, usually non-Muslim segmented societies. The authority of

these lineages was based in part on descent and in part on Sufi qualities. Whether as individuals or lineages, Sufis served to facilitate the selection of chiefs, mediate disputes, and organize long-distance trade or other economic ventures.

Sufi leadership could also unite clans, lineages, and tribes into larger movements and tribal conquests and assist in the formation of states. In such cases, religious leadership and loyalties created a double structure of society in which religious elites represented the larger movement and secular tribal or group chieftains represented the smaller units. In these cases, the larger religious identity did not efface other aspects of ethnic, tribal, or clan loyalties but rather was superimposed on them. Movements created in this way were likely to fragment into their component parts.

The unification of pastoral or tribal peoples under Islamic religious leadership was a recurring phenomenon. The prime example is the initial integration of Arabian bedouins into a conquering movement by the preaching of Islam. Later, in Oman, Arab tribesmen were united and governed by the ʿIbadi (Khariji) imams. In North Africa from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries, Berber peoples were united under Kharijism, Shiʿism, Sunni reformism, and Sufism to form the Fatimid, Almoravid, Almohad, and other movements. After the twelfth century, Sufism played a particularly important role in tribal unification. Rural populations throughout North Africa came to be organized in Sufi-led communities. In Morocco, the Saʿdian and the ʿAlawi dynasties were based on Sufi-led coalitions of pastoral and mountain peasant peoples. The Safavids united individuals, clienteles, and clans to conquer and govern Iran. The Saljuq and Ottoman conquerors of Anatolia and the Balkans, although under overall dynastic direction, were at the local level led by Sufis. In Inner Asia, the *khwajas* created coalitions of pastoral peoples. The tribes that occupied Somalia were united by allegiance to Sufis. The West African Fulani jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were built on reform preaching. (See Table 11.)

Table 11. *Muslim religious leaders*

caliph	Head of Sunni Muslim *umma*

Mosques

imam	Leader of prayer
khatib	Preacher of official sermon
muezzin	Crier of calls to prayer

Schools

faqih or 'alim (*pl. 'ulama'*)	Scholar of law
mudarris	Professor of madrasa

Legal administrators

mufti	Jurisconsult
muhtasib	Market inspector and enforcer of morals
shaykh al-Islam	Chief mufti and head of judicial establishment
qadi	Judge

Sufi brotherhoods

khalifa	Deputy
muqqadam	Local headman in brotherhood
sajjada nishin	Successor, chief of shrine
shaykh (*murshid, etc.*)	Master and guide

shaykh al-shuyukh	Chief of Sufi *shaykhs* (Egypt)

Descendants of Prophet

sayyid, sharif (*pl. ashraf, shurafa'*), *naqib al-ashraf*	Syndic of the descendants of the Prophet

Ithna ʿashari Shiʿis

ayatollah	Sign of God: highest-ranking *mujtahid*
hujjatollah	Proof of God: higher-ranking *mujtahid*
marjaʿ-i taqlid	Religious teacher to whom obedience is due
mujtahid	Scholar of law qualified to give independent legal judgment

Ismaʿilis

daʿi	Missionary
hujja	Proof, the representative of imam
imams	Successors to the Prophet and leaders of the Muslims

Thus many of the great "tribal" movements that led to the formation of Islamic states were built on Muslim religious leadership or the integration of Muslim religious and secular chieftainship. In tribal societies, Muslim leadership inspired millenarian revolts and radical

opposition to established regimes. Before the modern era, these were the principal expressions of Islamic societies.

Islamic states

Most early modern Muslim societies were ruled by states often based on similar concepts, institutions, and vocabularies. Generally, a Muslim ruler was the symbol of a legitimate regime, the guarantor that Muslim laws would be enforced, and the representative of the historical continuity of Muslim communities. Islamic states and empires were expected to maintain worship, education, and law. In times of war, they were to defend against infidel enemies; in times of peace, they patronized scholars and saints.

Islamic states differed greatly in their religious legitimization. In many cases, this legitimization was attached to the person of the ruler. The Umayyads of Damascus, ʿAbbasids, Fatimids, Almoravids, Almohads, Umayyads in Spain, and the leaders of West African jihads in the nineteenth century all considered themselves hierocratic rulers. They were the heirs to the authority of the Prophet; they were at once teachers and rulers. Similarly, the *khwajas* of Kashgar, the Sufi masters of small Moroccan states, and the Safavids of Iran regarded themselves as the repositories of religious as well as temporal authority. In Morocco, the legitimacy of the ruler depended on his prophetic descent and Sufi qualities. The reform movements of the nineteenth century would bring a resurgence of the aspiration to unite religious and political leadership.

In other Muslim societies, legitimacy was attached directly to the state institutions. The Ottoman Empire was legitimized by its reputation as a warrior regime that expanded the frontiers of Islam and defended Muslim peoples against the infidels. Even in the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman state was in decline and overwhelmed by European powers, its importance to Muslim security remained unquestioned.

Legitimization, more generally, depended on a combination of Islamic and non-Islamic patrimonial, cosmopolitan, or cosmological symbols. The ʿAbbasid regime and its Mamluk, Ottoman, Safavid,

and Mughal successors appealed to genealogical descent from earlier Arab, Persian, or Turkish nobility to justify their rule. Each regime also patronized a cosmopolitan culture to define its political identity. A continuing tradition of Persian language and literature linked the Samanids, Saljuqs, Timurids, Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Architecture, painting, and music received royal patronage. Through their patronage of philosophy and science, Islamic regimes appealed to universal symbols as the basis of political order. Islamic statecraft was also conceived of as being regulated by rules derived from secular monarchical traditions. The state elites distanced themselves from Islamic commitments by cultivating artistic, literary, and scientific achievements that had little to do with Islam but were part of the historical political culture of the various Muslim regions. The multiple levels of legitimization responded to the need to win political support or acquiescence from the multiethnic, multireligious populations who were commonly subjected to Muslim rule.

Furthermore, each regime showed originality in the selection of cultural and artistic styles and in the fusion of Islamic, cosmopolitan, cosmological, and patrimonial symbols. Thus, Arab regimes tended to be strongly Arab-Islamic, without noteworthy cosmopolitan symbols; the Indian Mughal Empire was highly syncretic. Indonesian and Malayan regimes perpetuated a non-Islamic culture of imperium with little more than Islamic titles. By contrast, the nineteenth-century African jihads were dedicated to an Islamic utopia.

Islamic states tended to adopt similar political practices and to redefine local political precedents in Islamic terms. The militias of tribal-founded Islamic empires were commonly transformed into slave or client forces. This was especially important in the Middle East, where slave troops were recruited to supplement or to displace tribal levies, as in the cases of the ʿAbbasid, Ghaznavid, Saljuq, Mamluk, Ottoman, and Safavid empires. Slaves were also used in North and West Africa. Slaves were generally recruited in Inner Asia and the Caucasus but were also taken from non-Muslim populations in the Balkans, Georgia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Slaves commonly retained an ethnic and cultural identity based on their non-Muslim past.

In administration, Islamic states also shared practices based on regional precedents. The ʿAbbasids inherited Byzantine and Sasanian practices in granting tax revenues for military services, and the Saljuqs molded the *iqtaʿ* of late ʿAbbasid times into a system of financial administration that, under various names, was later adapted by the Mongol, Timurid, Ottoman, Safavid, Uzbek, and Mughal empires. The *iqtaʿ*, *timar*, *tuyul*, and *jagir* (all names for grants of tax revenues) represent a similar principle of decentralized financial support for the state military elite. Other examples of administrative uniformities among Muslim states are taxation on a land- (*kharaj*) and poll- (*jizya*) tax basis and the endowment of trusts (*awqaf*) for religious purposes. In many cases, as in Inner Asia and North Africa, these uniformities were due to the direct transfer of Middle Eastern institutions, but in many others, they were due to the inheritance of similar institutions from earlier non-Islamic regimes and to the adoption of a common Islamic terminology for separate precedents.

Alongside Islamic practices and symbols, Islamic states were defined by their relationship to the scholars and the Sufis. The Ottoman, Safavid, and Bukhara monarchies were strongly supported by an organized scholarly bureaucracy, which viewed the state as indispensable to Islam. These states suppressed antagonistic Sufi brotherhoods and appropriated the political functions of Sufis by endowing government officials with extensive powers to dispense justice, regulate economic matters, protect trade, and sponsor education. Sunni scholars commonly held the view that even a corrupt and evil state had to be accepted and obeyed, for any regime was better than none. In their view, the alternative to state control was anarchy and factional violence. In some African kingdoms, the scholars, although not highly organized by the state, were still the source of political legitimization – even from non-Muslim subjects, who accepted the superior magic of literate Muslim courtiers. In India, the Mughals drew limited support and much criticism from the scholars. In Indonesia, by contrast, Muslim elites had little or no role in the legitimization of regimes and were, if anything, the leaders of peasant resistance.

Whereas the relations between states and scholars tended toward interdependence, those between states and Sufis tended toward opposition. Some Sufi orders cooperated with central governments and transmitted governmental authority to the common people, as did the Suhrawardis of India and the Mevlevis of the Ottoman Empire, but Sufism was usually apolitical, as in the case of the Chistis in India. Many Sufi orders opposed governments, as in eighteenth-century Algeria and Morocco. In general, highly organized states regarded the scholars as politically compatible but considered the Sufis as political competitors to be suppressed or co-opted.

Even in cases in which Sufis were independent, there was an intimate connection between Sufis and state authorities. Rulers patronized Sufi masters in order to acquire some of the blessings attributed to the saints and to transfer Sufi legitimacy to the princes. In India, the same rituals and ceremonies were observed in both the courts of the Sufis and the court of the ruler. Both courts were called by the same name – *dargah*. Conversely, the authority of Sufi masters was built around worldly success, power, and efficacy in daily affairs.

These states fused Islamic and non-Islamic practices. The state's "Muslim" elites were often warriors for whom tribal identity was more salient than Muslim identity. Moreover, such tribal military forces were frequently supplemented or replaced by non-Muslim levies. The Mughal regime, for example, absorbed Hindu lords; North African regimes depended on Catalan or Aragonese forces. The subordinate vassal principalities of large Muslim empires included non-Muslim tribal chiefs, feudal lords, and other local notables. These subordinate regimes were ordinarily legitimized in patriarchal or patrimonial terms and not by recourse to Islamic symbols or ideology.

Thus, Muslim regimes and empires were usually composite formations that embodied Islamic institutions in the matrix of a broader political culture. On one level, they were Muslim; on another, they were cosmopolitan patrons of a style of monarchical culture that, despite variations, gave a similar gestalt to Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, and other Muslim state cultures. The production of illuminated manuscripts, the diffusion of Persian literary forms into

Turkish and Urdu, the construction of domed architectural monuments, and many other features identify an imperial expression of Islamic civilization. On another level, the culture of Muslim regimes was also regional and derived from the pre-Islamic and non-Islamic substrates of the societies they ruled. Local languages, poetic traditions, literary forms, architectural motifs, musical motifs, and cultic practices made each Muslim regime an expression of a particular locality. The several interacting levels of universal Islamic, cosmopolitan, imperial, and local cultural styles afforded each regime a distinctive identity.

The Western Islamic Societies

Chapter 26 Islamic North Africa to the thirteenth century

From the origins of the Islamic era to the nineteenth century, the history of North African society turned on two essential motifs: state formation and Islamization. Historically the basic units of society – families, hamlets, or groups of hamlets – were embedded in factional and tribal groups. The economy was based on small-scale grain, fruit, and olive production; stock raising by pastoral peoples; and limited urban-based textile and other small-scale manufacturing. Although trade was important, the merchant middle class was not highly developed. Unlike the Middle East, North Africa did not have a long experience of imperial organization, monotheistic religious communities, sedentarized agriculture, and urban commerce. It had a veneer of imperial and urban Christian civilization set down by the Phoenicians and Romans, and confined to relatively limited coastal territories.

Islamic civilization was brought to North Africa and Spain by the Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Arab conquests led to the formation of not one but several political centers, and an ever-changing political geography. North African forces conquered Spain in the eighth century. From the seventh to the eleventh centuries, North Africa and Spain were divided among governments formed by the Arab conquerors, by Berber tribes, or by Arab-Berber coalitions. The smaller Berber kingdoms defined themselves in varying forms of Khariji Islam, while the Umayyad dynasty in Spain and the Fatimids in North Africa claimed to be the caliphs of the whole Islamic world.

A period of political consolidation began in the eleventh century. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Almoravids and the Almohads brought large regions of Saharan, North African, and Spanish territory under their control. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Muslim states of North Africa took on an institutional configuration resembling that of the Saljuq Empire in Iraq and Iran and the Mamluk Empire of Egypt and Syria. By the end of the fifteenth century Muslim states in Spain had been defeated by Spanish Christians, and North Africa assumed the political configuration we know today – the region encompassing the separate states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. (For convenience, however, I will refer to the various subregions of North Africa in the early period by these names.) In the sixteenth century most of North Africa (with the exception of Morocco) came under Ottoman suzerainty. Finally, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these societies were undermined by European economic competition and brought under colonial rule.

Muslim states to the eleventh century

(See Map 11.) The Arab conquest of both Berber peoples and Byzantine towns began with scattered raids from Egypt. Around 670 Tunisia was occupied, and Arab garrisons were established in Qayrawan, Tripoli, Tunis, and Tobna, and in numerous Byzantine forts or frontier *ribats*. The people who manned these *ribats* were committed to Muslim holy war and cultivated an ideology of piety and longing for martyrdom. From North Africa, Arab and Berber forces reached Spain in 711.

Map 11. North Africa, Spain, and the Mediterranean in the ninth century.

Arab-Islamic civilization in North Africa was based on the integration of Arab conquerors, Berbers, and the populations of the Mediterranean cities. Berber speakers who made up the great majority of the indigenous population were known under the names of Masmuda, Sanhaja, and Zenata. Some lived in farms, villages, and towns in the coastal regions of what are now Tunisia and Algeria. The majority were camel-herding nomads in the Sahara, and pastoralists in the mountain regions. They shared a common culture, but they had rarely, if ever, formed states. With the Arab conquests, sedentarized Berbers remained Christians, but nomadic Berbers enlisted in the Arab armies and helped spread Islam westward into Algeria, Morocco, and Spain. They also became merchants engaged in the trans-Sahara trade. Arabic replaced Latin as the language of administration. Berbers became Muslims long before they became speakers of Arabic. (See Table 12.)

Table 12. *North Africa: outline chronology*

		Libya	*Tunisia (Ifriqiya)*	*Algeria*	*Morocco*	*Spain*
	Arab conquests begin, 643					
700						Arab conques begin, 7 the Umayya dynasty 756–10:
				Rustamids (Tahert), 761–909	Idrisids (Fez), 789–926	

		Libya	Tunisia (Ifriqiya)	Algeria	Morocco	Spain
800			Aghlabids (Tunisia and eastern Algeria) (Qayrawan), 800–909			
900			Fatimids, 909–72; Zirids, 972–1148	Fatimids	Fatimids, 921–72	First Ca 'Abd al-Rahmar III, 912–
1000				Hammadids, 1015–1152		Muluk a Tawa'if, 1030–c. 1090; th party kir in Malag Seville, Cordoba Toledo, Valencia Saragos etc.
		Hilali migrations and conquests begin, 1052			Almoravids (Marrakesh), 1056–1147	Christia conques of Toled 1085; Almorav conques 1086–1
1100			Almohads, 1160–1228	Almohads, 1147–1236	Almohads, 1130–1269	Almoha conques 1145
1200			Hafsids (Tunisia and eastern Algeria), 1228–1574	'Abd al-Wadids (Tlemsen), 1236–1550	Marinids, 1196–1549 (take Marrakesh in 1269)	Defeat the Almoha Las Nav de Tolos 1212; Christia conques of Cordoba 1236, ar Seville, 1248

		Libya	Tunisia (Ifriqiya)	Algeria	Morocco	Spain
1300						Nasrids Granada 1230–1
1400					Portuguese take Ceuta, 1415; Wattasid regency and sultanate, 1428–1549	
1500	Ottoman conquests	Ottomans, 1551–1711	Ottomans capture Tunis, 1574; deys of Tunisia, 1591–1705	Ottomans capture Algiers, 1529, Tlemsen, 1551	Saʿdians, 1511–1659	
1600				Deys, 1689–1830	ʿAlawis, 1631–present	
1700		Qaramanlis, 1711–1835	Beys, 1705–1957			
1800		Ottomans, 1835–1912; Sanusiya, 1837–1902 (Cyrenaica)	French protectorate, 1881	French occupation begins, 1830		
1900		Italian conquest, 1911			French protectorate, 1912–56	
		Independence, 1951	Independence, 1956	Independence, 1962	Independence, 1956	

The Arab conquests led not to a single state but to numerous small Arab and Berber states, often with sectarian identities. The earliest Muslim kingdoms in North Africa were founded not by Arabs but by Berbers, often in the name of Kharijism. Thus they expressed both acceptance of Islam and affiliation with the conquerors, but also their cultural and religious autonomy. In the middle of the eighth century Berber-Khariji principalities were established at Tlemsen, Tahert, and Sijilmassa. Another kingdom was founded by Kharijis of the Sufri sect around Tangier.

The Ibadi-Khariji kingdom of Tahert (761–909) founded by ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Rustam may be taken as typical. The Ibadi imamate of Tahart was a kind of theocracy. The imam was elected by the notables and lived an ascetic life interpreting laws, rendering justice, and leading his warriors in battle. Life at Tahert was conducted in a perpetual state of religious fervor. The theocratic community enforced a high standard of social behavior by physical punishment and imprisonment.

In Tunis, the Arab governors founded the Aghlabid dynasty, which ruled Tunisia, Tripolitania, and eastern Algeria from 800 to 909. The region of what is now Tunisia was a natural center for an Arab-Islamic regime and society. In North Africa, only Tunisia had the urban, agricultural, and commercial

infrastructures essential for a centralized state on the model of the eastern Islamic state. The Aghlabid military elites were drawn from the descendants of Arab invaders, Islamized and Arabized Berbers, and black slave soldiers. The administrative staffs comprised dependent client Arab and Persian immigrants, bilingual natives, and some Christians and Jews.

Tunisia flourished under Arab rule. Extensive irrigation works were installed to supply royal gardens and towns with water, and to promote olive production. In the Qayrawan region hundreds of basins were built to store water to support horse breeding. Important trade routes linked Tunisia with the Sahara, the Sudan, and the Mediterranean. A flourishing economy permitted a refined and luxurious court life and the construction of the new palace cities of al-ʿAbbasiyya (809) and Raqqada (877).

The region we now know as northern Morocco was the center of another cluster of Arab-Berber principalities, and eventually of a territorially defined Islamic state, this time in the name of Shiʿism. The Idrisid regime was founded in 786 at the former Roman capital of Volubilis by a descendant of ʿAli and Fatima, Idris I. His son Idris II was the founder of Fez, built in 808. Despite its small size, the Idrisid kingdom was the first Moroccan-Islamic state and a center of active proselytization among Berbers on behalf of Islam.

The rest of Morocco was divided among a number of localized states, including that of the Barghwata peoples on the coastal plains of north-central Morocco. Derived from Sufri Kharijism, their leader, Salih b. Tarif, declared himself a prophet, composed a "revealed book" in Berber, gave rules for fasting and prayer, and otherwise established a Berber version of Islam. These regimes were islands of kingly rule in a sea of independent Berber peoples living in pre-state communities.

For a time, these North African states maintained a flourishing economy. The countryside produced olives, grapes, and cereals; the towns had lively textile and ceramic industries. The towns produced carpets and textiles, ceramics, pottery, and glasswares. Trade with Europe, Egypt, and sub-Saharan Africa enriched the economy. North African commerce with Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa went from Tripoli to the Fezzan and from Qayrawan to Walata. Tahert and Tlemcen were linked to the Sudan through Sijilmassa. Sijilmassa was a critical nodule in the trade among the Moroccan Khariji states and the Sudan and an important base for the southward diffusion of Islam. On the Sudanic routes the principal products were slaves and gold, which allowed the North African regimes and the Umayyads in Spain to mint gold coins. From Qayrawan, cereals, oils, and slaves were sent to Alexandria. From Morocco, sugar, hides, horses, and sheep were sent to Spain.

The Fatimid and Zirid empires and the Banu Hilal

The era of small states was brought to an end by the Fatimid movement. At the end of the ninth century, an Ismaʿili missionary converted Kutama Berber villagers in the mountains of Kabylia in eastern Algeria to the Fatimid cause. The leader of the movement, Ubaydallah, proclaimed himself caliph in 910. The Fatimids conquered Sijilmassa, Tahert, Qayrawan, and much of the rest of North Africa. They destroyed the Khariji principalities. Warfare also destroyed the trade routes and led to the rise of nomadism. The Fatimids conquered Egypt in 969. Moving their capital to Cairo, they abandoned North Africa to local Zirid (972–1148) and Hammadid (1015–1152) vassals.

In the eleventh century, the invasions of nomadic peoples, the Banu Hilal Arabs from the east and the Almoravids from southern Morocco, transformed the political and religio-cultural geography of North Africa and Spain. The Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym, coming from Arabia and Egypt, defeated the Zirid and Hammadid states and sacked Qayrawan (1057). Qayrawan and other cities, created by the first wave of Arab conquests, were ruined by the second. The Banu Hilal collected tributes in kind: wheat, dates, and olives from the farmers and taxes and tributes from the cities. As the invaders took control of the plains, sedentary peoples were forced to take refuge in the mountains. In central and northern Tunisia, and later in Algeria and Morocco, farming gave way to pastoralism. Tunisian trade and agriculture declined as the result of the Arab invasions, the internal weakness of local regimes, and the shift of the Sahara trading economy to other routes.

A politically weakened North Africa was also subject to attacks from Europe. The Genoese and Pisans attacked Bone in 1034. The Normans conquered Sicily between 1061 and 1092, devastated

Mahdiyya in 1087, and between 1135 and 1153 conquered the coastal strip from Tripoli to Cape Bon.

The destruction, however, was not total. The coastal regions survived. Tripoli retained its palm, olive, fig, and other fruit plantations, and Tunis remained an important city for textiles, ceramics, glass, oil, soap, leather, and other urban manufactures. Moreover, some of the factors that led to decline of the Tunisian and Algerian regions of North Africa favored economic development in Egypt and Morocco. The transfer of the Fatimid regime to Egypt favored eastern Egyptian trade routes to sub-Saharan Africa. Spanish-patronized western routes to the Sahara favored Morocco and the exchange of salt and luxury products from the north for gold, slaves, hides, ivory, and wood from the south.

The most important cultural consequence of the Banu Hilal migrations was the blending of Arab and Berber cultures and the diffusion of an Arabic dialect as a common spoken as well as official language of North Africa. (See Map 12.)

Map 12.   North Africa, Spain, and the Mediterranean in the late eleventh century and the Almoravid conquests.

The Almoravids and the Almohads

In the eleventh century, a second nomadic invasion came from southern Morocco. This one, however, led to the political unification of Morocco and Spain under the Almoravid movement. Like the Fatimids, the Almoravids were a coalition of Berber peoples united by religious leadership and doctrine. The movement rose among Sanhaja Berbers in the western Sahara who were being pushed out of their trading livelihood by Zanata Berbers at the northern ends of the trans-Saharan trade routes, and by the Sudanic state of Ghana, which was taking over the southern outlets of the trans-Saharan trade. Islam played an important role in the Sanhaja adaptation to these pressures. An Islamic reformist movement provided the religious cement for a Sanhaja counterattack, under the leadership of the Lamtuna tribe, against pagan Sudanese kingdoms to the south and impious Zanata domination in the north.

Returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca, a Sanhaja chieftain brought back a Moroccan student, ʿAbdallah b. Yasin, who taught Quran, hadith, and law. Ibn Yasin called for repentance and warned that the last day was coming. He imposed a strict moral and religious discipline on his followers. He closed taverns, destroyed musical instruments, abolished illegal taxes, and implemented Muslim laws for the distribution of booty. The inner jihad – the purification of body and soul – had to precede the warriors' outer jihad. The name of the movement he founded, al-Murabitun, was derived from the Quranic root *r-b-t*, referring to the technique of fighting in closed ranks, with infantry in front and camels and horsemen in the rear, rather than in the long, loose lines common to Berber battles. "Almoravid," then, refers to those who wage holy war in the quranically prescribed fashion.

The Almoravids defeated the kingdom of Ghana and took control of the trading cities of Sigilmassa in 1055 and Awdaghost in 1056. This gave them control of the trans-Saharan trade routes. They went on to conquer Morocco. They founded Marrakesh as their capital around 1070 and conquered the central

Maghrib between 1070 and 1080. In 1082 a delegation of *'ulama'* urged the Almoravids to intervene on behalf of the Spanish-Muslims. Thus, in 1086 a Moroccan army crossed the straits and defeated Alfonso VI. From 1090 to 1145, the North Africans conquered the Spanish-Muslim cities and governed Spain as a province of Marrakesh. The Almoravids thus linked the Sahara, Morocco, and Spain into a single political regime and trading zone with Marrakesh and Seville as their two capitals. Morocco, benefiting from trade and empire, became in the course of the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries a commercial and urbanized society.

The Almoravid regime was built around the Lamtuna tribal aristocracy, but the Almoravids also employed Spanish scribes, Christian mercenaries, and black slaves to form a cavalry bodyguard for the ruler. This gave him predominance over camel-riding Berber troops. The legitimacy of the regime was based on claims to religious purity. Almoravid rulers were titled *amir al-muslimin*. Scholars of Maliki law sat in executive council with the ruler and gave legal advice. The legalists condemned Muslim theology and opposed Sufism. Despite their narrow religious position, the Almoravids promoted the final triumph of Sunni Islam and the Maliki school of law over Shi'i and Khariji rivals. With their victories in Spain, the North African rulers became patrons of Spanish scribes, philosophers, poets, and architects and engineers and brought many of them to North Africa. The great Mosque of Tlemcen, built in 1136, and the rebuilt Qarawiyin Mosque of Fez were designed in the Andalusian manner. As a result of the conquests, Spanish and Moroccan cultures were integrated.

By the middle of the twelfth century the Almoravid state began to unravel. In southern Morocco a new religious movement challenged its legitimacy. The Almohad movement (al-Muwahhidun) was founded by Muhammad b.'Abdallah b. Tumart, who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca and studied in Baghdad and Damascus. He regarded himself as the heir of the Prophet, his career as a duplication of the Prophet's career, and his teaching an effort to restore the Islamic community as it had existed in the Prophet's lifetime. On his return he preached the transcendence and oneness of God, the supremacy of Quran and hadith over the law schools, and the need for moral reform. Grounding himself in the theology of al-Ash'ari, he rejected anthropomorphism and a physical interpretation of the attributes of God mentioned in the Quran. Ibn Tumart also denounced pagan Berber customs taken into Islamic practice and proscribed wine drinking, music, and the enjoyment of luxurious clothing.

At Tinmal in southern Morocco he received the support of a local chieftain, Abu Hafs 'Umar. He then declared himself Mahdi (messiah), imam, and *ma'sum* (sinless) or infallible leader sent by God. His regime depended on a military aristocracy made up of the tribes that supported the movement. Under his authority a new government was organized under a council of ten disciples, who in turn were advised by an assembly of fifty tribal delegates. A religious hierarchy was thus superimposed on a tribal society.

After the death of Ibn Tumart, his successor, 'Abd al-Mu'min (1130–63), took the title "caliph of Ibn Tumart." 'Abd al-Mu'min governed his empire through his family but attached an Almohad *shaykh* as a teacher to each of its youthful members. The Almohad government was much more Berber than that of the Almoravids; Berbers played an important role as court counselors, secretaries, poets, physicians, and ministers of finance. The military was augmented by slaves, Arab tribes, and contingents of Turkish, Kurdish, and black soldiers, as well as urban auxiliaries. An elaborate religious administration including a keeper of morals (*mizwar*), muezzins, and instructors in the Quran was also established. Among the duties of the *mizwar* were the destruction of musical instruments and the prohibition of alcohol. A civil bureaucracy of the Andalusian type was mobilized to support the government. Thus the Almohad regime was based on a combination of a royal household, an hierarchical religious organization, a tribal military elite with Berber and Arab tribal allies, and a Spanish-type administration.

Despite the power of the regime, the Almohad doctrine was never successfully implemented. Alternative expressions of Islam, including that of the Maliki jurists, the popular cult of saints and Sufis, and the philosophy of Averroes, were always tolerated. Later rulers abandoned Almohad doctrine, and conflict within the ruling elite led in 1229 to the formal renunciation of the teachings of Ibn Tumart and a return to Maliki law.

Under al-Mu'min's leadership, the Almohad movement defeated the Almoravid dynasty and captured Tlemcen in 1144, Fez in 1145, and Marrakesh in 1146. In 1151–52 the Almohads conquered the central Maghrib and ended the Hammadid emirate. The coastal zones, however, remained in the control of the

Normans and the Genoese. The Almohads also accepted the Almoravid precedent of a Moroccan empire reaching from the Sahara to Spain. They took Seville and Cordoba in 1149, and the rest of Muslim Spain by 1172. The Almohads, however, were defeated in 1212 by the combined Christian forces of Leon, Castile, Navarre, and Aragon at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. Southern Morocco was invaded by Arab tribes of Banu Ma'qil, who ruined the villages and undermined the authority of the central government. In turn they would construct a new state. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, through a succession of invaders and state builders, Morocco had evolved from a region divided among Arab and Berber principalities into a society with a lasting territorial identity.

The collapse of the Almohad Empire marked the conclusion of the first phase of state formation and Islamization in North Africa. In this era a succession of regimes – Rustamid, Idrisid, Fatimid, Almoravid, and Almohad – had used Islamic religious beliefs to legitimize new political elites and to unify Berber tribal peoples. Islam had become the basis of political solidarity among factious populations, but the role of religion in the formation of these states varied. The Idrisid, Fatimid, Almoravid, and Almohad rulers all claimed an unmediated, divine authority based on their personal qualifications and their descent in the family of the Prophet. In some respects these regimes were the ideological equivalents of the caliphate. The Khariji states of southern Tunisia and Algeria, however, stressed ideology rather than the person of the rulers. They were built on an ascetic, egalitarian concept of the social order in which the imam was a representative of collective values rather than an embodiment of the divine mystery.

To build these states, religious authority was joined to revenues from commerce and the support of tribes. Yet the North African states were short lived and subject to changing patterns of trade, the rise of new tribal movements, and the breakdown of coalitions. Moreover, they did not fully control the territories under their nominal domain but were suzerainties over independent peoples. Sometimes the states were no more than islands in a sea of autonomous and unorganized Berber populations.

Scholars and Sufis: Islamic Religious Communities

Although Islamization was associated with state formation, as early as the eighth century, religious elites, separate from the state and committed to Islamic values above state interests, had also come into being. Under Aghlabid patronage Qayrawan became the leading North African center of the Maliki school of law. Despite criticism that the Maliki school was rigid and literal minded, it was not monolithic.

Theological issues were hotly debated. Such topics as the creation of the Quran, free will and predestination, and the meaning of the caliphate were debated as much in Qayrawan as in Baghdad. In the course of the tenth century Ash'arism was assimilated into the Maliki school and was later transmitted to the Almohads. Maliki scholars were also students of grammar, philology, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. Ibn al-Tabban (d. 981) was a student of law, philology, grammar, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and the interpretation of dreams. Al-Qabisi (d. 1012) was a theologian who stressed hadith and mysticism, and an intensely pious religious practice. These men exemplified divergent orientations within the Maliki school parallel to those in the eastern Shafi'i school.

The schools of law were the vehicles for the mobilization of public opinion in the struggles among political regimes. In Qayrawan, the Hanafis, representing an upper-class milieu, were favored by the Aghlabids. They later collaborated with the Fatimids. The Malikis, by contrast, eschewed appointments to office and won popular support. Under Fatimid rule, the Malikis denounced Shi'ism, provoked anti-Shi'i riots and massacres in Qayrawan, and in 1049 forced the Zirids to accept Sunni allegiance and to recognize the 'Abbasid caliphs. Although Qayrawan and Tunis were the main centers of Maliki teaching, the Maliki position was also strongly supported in the coastal *ribats* and spread to southern Morocco, across the Sahara, and into Sudanic West Africa.

Along with the Maliki school of law, Sufi asceticism – stressing sadness, silence, suffering, fear of God, attention to the coming of the last judgment, and the virtues of humility and charity – was cultivated in Qayrawan. The *ribats* combined holy war with pious devotions. The common people believed in saints who had the power to heal, bring rain, perform miracles, communicate with spiritual forces, interpret dreams, and otherwise act as intermediaries between men and God. Sufism in North Africa, as in the Middle East, was not so much an organized religious movement as a religious sensibility.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a new form of Sufism, based on both Spanish and Eastern teachings, was introduced to North Africa and spread in reaction to the Almoravid and Almohad conquests. Abu Madyan al-Andalusi (d. 1197) brought the Spanish form of Sufism that integrated ascetic mysticism with the study of law. His tomb became a venerated place of pilgrimage, and his successors continued the tradition of combining the study of hadith and law with mystical practices. Sufi scholars were established in Tunisia at Tunis, Bone, and Qayrawan and were represented in Morocco at Aghmat, Marrakesh, and other places. Abu al Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258) introduced a new brotherhood to the Islamic West. The Maliki school, the early *ribats*, Khariji teachers, and Sufis helped to diffuse Islam from its Tunisian base into southern Morocco. Traders and scholars also brought it to the Saharan region.

Alongside the formal and legal Islam of the Sunni *'ulama'* and the scholarly mysticism of the Sufi leaders, a popular form of Sufism, here called Maraboutism, developed among the common people. As in the case of parallel developments in the eastern Islamic world, popular Sufism derived from the tradition of the popular storyteller-teacher-missionary and from the warrior traditions of the *ribat* or frontier fortress dedicated to the expansion of Islam. The holy warrior or popular saint was believed to possess magical powers of divination and healing and ultimately the power to convey God's grace (*baraka*) into worldly affairs and to intercede with him at the last judgment. The holy man gathered his disciples into a community and ultimately a brotherhood with many branches that carried on his teaching and conveyed his blessing. His tomb came to possess the magical powers he embodied in his lifetime. The Almohads helped to popularize this form of Sufism.

Our knowledge of this early period is too scattered to give an assured account of the rhythm of the development and diffusion of the several varieties of Islam. Libya appears to have been relatively quickly converted in the wake of the early conquests. Large numbers of Berbers accepted Khariji Islam, but Qayrawan, Tunis, Tripoli, Sfax, Mahdiyya, Bougie, Bone, and other cities still had Christian communities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Nonetheless, the 200 bishoprics known in the seventh century had been reduced to 5 by 1053 and to 3 by 1076. The Almohads effectively put an end to Christianity in North Africa; Christians survived only in isolated villages. Jews were reduced in number.

Thus, by the middle of the thirteenth century, the Arab invasions and the introduction of Islam had inspired a centuries-long wave of state construction culminating in the integration of Tunisia and Morocco into territorial states. At the same time, Islam had been established as the dominant religion. Informal schools of legal instruction, theology, and mysticism emerged, and Islamic religious teachers acquired a large popular following. Religious leadership and communal ties were differentiated from state institutions. Only in the thirteenth century, after numerous experiments – Kharijism, Zaydism, Shi'ism, Malikism, Almohadism – was the full panoply of Sunni scriptural, mystical, and popular Islam established. As a result of state formation, the defeat of the great tribal and religious movements that sought to unify North Africa, and the formation of an autonomous Islamic religious elite, the way was prepared for a new historic phase of the relationships between state and Islam in North African societies.

Chapter 27 Spanish-Islamic civilization

Muslim Spain from the Arab conquest to the liquidation of the last Muslim possessions in Granada in 1492 represents yet another expression of the caliphal type of early Islamic civilization. This civilization assimilated the Spanish, Jewish, and Berber populations to Arab-Islamic culture, fostering extraordinary economic prosperity. Muslim Spain bears an aura of glory. The great Mosque of Cordoba; the gardens, fountains, and courtyards of the Alhambra; the *muwashshah* and *zajal* poetry, with their Arabic verses and Romance language refrains; the irrigated gardens of Seville and Valencia; the wisdom of philosophy and science – these are the monuments of Spanish Islam. Spain was the focal point for the transmission of Greek philosophy from the Arab world to Europe. No less important was the drama of the defeat of this brilliant Muslim civilization by its European enemies, the expulsion of the Jews and Muslims, and the reabsorption of Spain into Christian Europe.

For all its brilliance, Muslim Spain was a province of the Arab caliphate. Already overrun by successive waves of Alaric and Vandal invasions from the north, Spain was conquered by Arab and Berber forces from North Africa led by Tariq, who defeated the Visigothic King Roderic at the River Barbate in 711. The Arab advance into France was checked by Charles Martel at the Battle of Poitiers in 732. Whereas in the East Arab conquerors were generally forced to settle in garrison towns and villages – leaving the land in the direct control of its preconquest landlord elite and a tax-collecting bureaucracy – in Spain large territories were parceled out among Arab and Berber clans. This was both the basis of the complex integration of ethnic groups, religions, and cultures and the tumultuous political competition that would characterize Hispano-Arabic civilization.

Arabs and Berbers alike were organized as patrilineal clans and tribes that facilitated factional quarrels. The Arabs in Spain (like

those in the East) were divided into quarreling tribal factions called Qays and Yemen, representing the first-generation settlers and later immigrants. In the very first decades of Muslim rule, Berbers, allocated poor mountain lands in Galicia and Cantabria, rebelled against Arab governors. The rebellions were put down by Syrian Arabs and the new forces were in turn given fiefs. As in the Middle East, by the eleventh century long-term processes (such as sedentarization, urbanization, and the centralization of political power in the caliphate) had greatly reduced the importance of tribal segmentation.

Cultural development was abetted by extraordinary economic prosperity in the ninth and tenth centuries. The introduction of irrigation agriculture based on Eastern models led to the cultivation of valuable new crops, including cherries, apples, pears, almonds, pomegranates, figs, dates, sugarcane, bananas, cotton, flax, and silk. A Damascus type of irrigation assigned water to each cultivator in proportion to the size of his land. In the irrigated, oasis-like gardens (*huertas*) of Valencia, a Yemeni type of irrigation distributed water by a fixed time flow. Irrigation was administered either by a town authority under the control of the *sahib al-saqiyya*, who policed the distribution of water and assured equity, or by local communities who selected their own irrigation managers. Luxury manufactures abounded, including perfumes and incenses, silk textiles and clothing, ceramics, ivories, jewelry, and metal objects. At the same time, Spain prospered due to the breakdown of Byzantine naval control over the western Mediterranean. Cities such as Seville and Cordoba prospered from both agricultural production and international trade.

Economic development led to political consolidation. After a succession of weak governors appointed from North Africa, three great rulers built up the Spanish-Muslim state. ʿAbd al-Rahman I (r. 756–88), a grandson of the Umayyad Caliph Hisham, supported by Berbers from North Africa and by Syrian clients of the Umayyads, founded the Umayyad dynasty in Spain. The new regime followed the ʿAbbasid pattern. It suppressed local revolts and built up a client army of soldiers coming from north of the Pyrenees. ʿAbd al-Rahman

II (r. 822–52) further centralized administration, brought into being a new secretarial class made up of merchants and clients, and created state monopolies and controls over urban markets. ʿAbd al-Rahman III (r. 912–61) built his army with captives from northern Spain, Germany, and the Slavic countries. These troops, known as *saqaliba*, were later reinforced with detribalized professional Berber soldiers and local levies. A *hajib*, equal in rank to a vizier, was in charge of administration and taxation. Provincial tax collectors were appointed to raise revenues and to send the surplus to Cordoba. While twenty-one provinces were governed by appointees of the central government, frontier districts were managed by local officials (*qaʾid*) and hereditary petty lords. A chief judge supervised the judicial administration and managed the properties endowed for religious and charitable purposes.

ʿAbd al-Rahman III also sought a new basis for the legitimization of his regime by adopting Baghdadi ʿAbbasid cultural forms. Although Islamic culture in Spain assimilated some aspects of local culture, it was primarily an outpost of Middle Eastern Arab-Islamic civilization. As in the East, court culture tried to integrate Muslim and cosmopolitan symbols. ʿAbd al-Rahman adopted the title caliph, or *amir al-muʾminin*, in reaction to the claims of the Fatimids in North Africa. Thus, the precious title signifying the unity of the Muslim community was claimed by no fewer than three rulers in the tenth century. ʿAbd al-Rahman expanded the Cordoba mosque, installed irrigation works, and waged war to check Christian attacks in northern Spain.

Hispano-Arabic society (co-author, David Moshfegh)

Dispersed settlement contributed enormously to the Arabization and Islamization of Spain. In the period of the caliphate and the succeeding factional (*taifa*) states, Muslims constituted the political elite, but "Muslim" identities were complex. Some considered themselves Arabs by lineage; others Berber by family heritage. For others the Arabic language defined their status. Then rulers took on

clients, captured slaves, hired mercenaries, and married into local families. By the ninth century, Arabic was widely used by the indigenous population, and there were many converts (*muwalladun*). As converts multiplied, the distinction between the original Arab elite and assimilated Arabs blurred, and a more homogeneous Hispano-Arab society came into being.

The Spanish caliphate defined itself by its heritage of high culture in poetry, courtly literatures, entertainments, architecture, philosophy, and science. It was also Islamic and adopted much of the religious culture of the eastern Arab world. As in the cases of the Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires, the Spanish caliphate considered its non-Muslim subjects to be protected minorities (*dhimmi*), permitted to exercise their own religion. Native Christians and Jews were given communal autonomy and continued to administer themselves in terms of their Visigothic Christian rite or Jewish law. As in the East, the way was often open for a blending or merger of populations in language and everyday culture and indeed in some religious matters as well.

In Spain, the complex identities of the Muslim populations were matched by an equally complex situation among the Christian and Jewish populations. Jews considered themselves notables, if not nobles. They may have assisted in the Arab-Berber-Muslim conquest and served in administration and financial affairs. Sephardic Jews identified with the ruling elite and acted as intermediaries between the Muslim rulers and the Christian powers. Leading Jewish administrators carried on an international correspondence and assumed an implied spokesmanship for Jewish communities in Europe.

The language of the non-Muslim population of Cordoba during the ninth and tenth centuries was principally a Romance dialect, but there were many variations of religious, linguistic, and ethnic identities. Many Muslims came to speak Romance. Some Christians retained both their Romance language and Visigothic Christian culture. Other Christians converted to Islam but spoke only Romance and knew no Arabic. Still others took on Arabic language and cultural traits without becoming Muslims. Mozarab was the name applied to

Christians acculturated to Arabic but not converted to Islam. These Christians may have included Visigothic nobles who were allied with the Muslim conquerors, or others who served in the Umayyad and *taifa* periods as government officials and soldiers. People in all three categories married each other, creating new layers of hybrid family, religion, and culture. Their progeny were raised as Muslims but born into a non-Arab-Muslim family and were called *muwalladun*, which means "those born of two races." In sum, there were Romance-speaking Christians and Romance-speaking Muslims, as well as Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians. Both a Romance vernacular and spoken Arabic were used across confessional lines. With the Arabization of the Christian population and the reciprocal transmission of the Romance and Roman-Visigothic heritage to the Muslim elite, a new cultural blend came into being.

This cultural blending was strongly resisted by elements of the Christian church hierarchy who feared not only the ever-growing numbers of Christian conversions but also cultural assimilation, Arabization, as a religio-communal defeat. Indeed, Christian Visigothic texts were being translated into Arabic. Between 850 and 859, some forty-eight monks, nuns, priests, and other fervent Christians committed to the Latin Christian Visigothic heritage, promoted by a priest named Eulogius, martyred themselves to protest Arab-Muslim rule. This was an effort to draw a clear boundary between Muslims and Christians. Some of these activists deliberately courted execution by denouncing Muhammad. Some were the children, especially daughters, of mixed families who were Muslim according to Islamic law but who considered themselves Christians and renounced their putative religion. In reaction to these protests, the Umayyad regime dismissed Christians from court service, levied new taxes, and had some churches destroyed. Christian extremism was also repudiated by many Christians who maintained good relations with Muslims.

This complex society in many ways resembled the eastern Islamic societies. In the eastern case, too, Muslims held the highest political status, but in everyday life there was a great deal of interaction between Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others,

depending on the locale. Non-Muslims converted and adopted Arabic (or Persian) as a common language; others adopted the common culture without converting. Muslims often adopted the cultural and material styles of the older Middle Eastern populations. Especially in marketing and business affairs, the caliphal-era societies were fairly well integrated. Jews and Christians were prominent in Baghdad and in Cairo, as well as in many other places, in trade, banking, and government administration. Among the educated elites, there were shared religious, philosophical, scientific and legal, and literary interests and a shared pursuit of these interests. Despite these shared lives, there were still episodes of religious-political tension, competition, and persecution.

Thus, the societies of Spain under the caliphate and the *taifa* principalities were based on the eastern Arab-Muslim imperial models. This was the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern–wide mode of Muslim rule and the prevailing mode of acculturation and quasi-integration of populations.

Hispano-Arabic culture

Poetry became the primary expression of Spanish cosmopolitan culture. Spanish poetry was originally based on Arabic models, which carried with them the warrior sentiments and factional interests of the Arab conquerors. The urbane Baghdadi style was introduced when the poet, musician, and singer Ziryab (d. 857) came to Cordoba. In early Hispano-Arabic poetry, the *qasida*, which praised the virtues of the ruler and served official purposes, was the dominant form. A new poetic form, the *muwashshah*, combined Arabic strophes with a responding refrain (*kharja*) in the Romance dialect. The Arabic part, usually a love poem, was courtly in theme, masculine in tone; the *kharja* was usually the voice of the lower classes, or of a Christian slave girl, and feminine in inspiration. The metrical system, the syllabic prosody, and the rhyme scheme of the Arabic verses indicate Romance traditions.

Other literary activities flourished under caliphal patronage. Eastern scholars emigrated to Spain, and the royal libraries were

enlarged. Grammar and philology came from Iraq. *Adab*, or belles lettres in Eastern style, was first composed in Spain by Ibn ʿAbd al-Rabbih (d. 940). Caliphal patronage broadened scientific learning. Aristotle's philosophy was introduced by the reception of the *Organon*; the *Republic*, the *Laws*, and the *Timaeus* of Plato were known. Galen became the standard medical author. A new translation of a classic work – Dioscorides' *Materia Medica* – was made in Spain. The earliest translations of astronomical and geometric works from Arabic into Latin were made in the tenth century.

The architecture of the caliphate, including mosques, palaces, and baths, was also Eastern in inspiration. The Mosque of Cordoba was expanded and rebuilt by successive rulers. It was a vast hall divided by columns surmounted by horseshoe arches, a hallmark of Hispano-Roman architecture of the Visigothic period. A niche with a fluted shell-like vault and a horseshoe arch indicated the direction of prayer. Red and white banded arches evoked the grand Umayyad monuments of Damascus and Jerusalem. Visigothic and Roman elements were built into the Muslim design, including horseshoe arches and classical orders. The mosque was redecorated between 961 and 966 by mosaic workers, who gave it a vivid and brilliant interior. The Mosque of Cordoba, like the Mosque of Damascus, was a symbol of the incorporation of ancient values and their supersession by Islamic civilization. In the tenth century, the caliphs also built the royal city of Madinat al-Zahra, a city of splendid palaces, fountains, and gardens that echoed the palace complexes of Baghdad.

Under the auspices of the Spanish Umayyad regime, Islamic legal and religious studies were promoted. The Syrian school of law, founded by al-Awzaʿi, favored by Syrian-Arab military lords, was imported into Spain, but the town populations favored the Maliki school from North Africa. From the East came Shafiʿi concepts. Hadith studies were introduced in the ninth century, and Muslim scholars were divided between those who emphasized law and those who favored hadith and theology. This distinction may have represented a division between Arab elites and later converts. Shafiʿi

scholars, however, had to accept Maliki law, and Malikism remained the primary legal school of Muslim Spain. Muʿtazilism was also introduced from Baghdad in the ninth century. Muhammad b. Masarra (d. 931), whose father had studied in Basra, amalgamated neo-Platonic, Shiʿi, and Sufi thought. The legal scholars, however, restricted the public expression of mystical tendencies.

Arab-Islamic culture in Spain was thus associated with different social milieus and sociopolitical movements. Monumental architecture, formal poetry, and philosophic interests characterized the royal style of culture in Spain as in Baghdad. The scribal class was identified with Arabic belles lettres. As in the East, the secretarial class, composed of Spanish converts, generated an Arabic literature that was intended to prove their equality with the Arab warrior elites. The *Risala* of Abu ʿAmir b. Garcia provoked an avalanche of contemptuous Arabic poetry in response.

Important lower-class social movements were also connected with religious trends. In circumstances that still remain obscure, the scholars (*ʿulamaʾ*) of the Rabad quarter of Cordoba led local rebellions in 805 and 818. They denounced the regime for corruption, fiscal exploitation, use of foreign military forces, and chronic insecurity. As in North Africa, Baghdad, and other parts of the Muslim world, the scholars assumed political responsibilities and a voice in the direction of society. Sufis also led a lower-class movement opposed to the exploitative accumulation of wealth by the upper classes and espoused an ascetic, mystical, and communalist doctrine. The revolts, however, were put down, and ʿAbd al-Rahman II created a religious council to demonstrate that he ruled in accordance with Islam. Thus, the Umayyad princes sought to legitimize their rule by co-opting the scholars of law.

Like its ʿAbbasid model, the Spanish-Muslim state was subverted by internal conflicts. The hostilities between provincial and urban mercantile elites, between townsmen and Berber troops, and between converts and Arabs made it impossible to stabilize the regime. In the early eleventh century, the caliphs lost control of the central government, provincial governors became independent, and Arab clans revolted. The caliphate was abolished, and Spain was

divided into petty warring principalities, the *taifa* states. Arab, Slav, and Berber soldiers and local elites took power, and each province became an independent state with an army, court, and administration of its own. The Amirids – descendants of former caliphal administrators – ruled the eastern coast of Andalus. Regimes based on local Arab families were founded at Cordoba, Seville, and Saragossa. Berber-dominated states were founded at Toledo, Badajoz, and Granada. The Christian states of the north joined in the free-for-all. Small states made opportunistic alliances with one another and employed mercenary soldiers regardless of religion. In Granada, the Berber ruling elite governed with the help of the Jewish Banu Naghrila family. This provoked intense Muslim hostility and a pogrom against Jews in 1066.

Although the emergence of provincial regimes was a defeat for centralized government, Spanish society was not as fragmented as the political divisions of power would imply. Islamic law and a Muslim-Arab identity were widely accepted; scholars continued to represent the urban populations. Spanish-Muslim society was also integrated by a flourishing regional and international commerce. Andalusia traded with Morocco, importing wood, alum, antimony, and cloth, and exporting cloth and copper. It traded with Tunisia and through Tunisia with Egypt, importing the wool, flax, and dyes that came to Egypt from Iran, Arabia, India, and China. Spanish-Muslims also traded with the Christian north, where growing wealth and the rising power of new states created ever-larger markets.

The disintegration of the caliphate did not disrupt Spanish-Muslim cultural life. With the decline of the caliphate, the patronage of art and culture shifted to the courts of the provincial rulers and merchants. In place of grand mosques, private palaces became the characteristic symbols of Hispano-Arabic civilization. In the late tenth century, the *muwashshahat* poetry flourished, as city dwellers rediscovered the beauties of nature. Poems in *qasida* form devoted to descriptions of nature and gardens, wine and war, and love and passion were composed. Ibn Quzman (d. 1160) cultivated the *zajal*, a form of poetry in colloquial Arabic, whose themes were the life of towns and markets, the common people, and the underworld. This

was a deliberately irreligious form of art. After a long period in which the Baghdadi style had dominated Arabic-Spanish literature, poetic interests were transferred from the political to the personal. Love and art for art's sake became the dominant themes.

Love was the central theme in the philosophy of Ibn Hazm (d. 1093). He taught that the attraction of two people was based on an eternal affinity, a timeless connection of souls. Ibn al-ʿArabi later explained that a man loves a woman because she is the mirror that reveals his innermost true being – the spiritual being that transcends his animal reality. The love of a woman is the love of the original nature of the soul and therefore a reminder of God. Love stems from the creation of man in the image of God, and sexual love is a symbol of the extinction of the separate natures in the divine reality.

With the breakdown of the caliphate, Sufism also became important. From Almeria came Abu al-ʿAbbas b. al-ʾArif (d. 1141), whose writings described the stages of mystical ascent to the realization that only God exists. Ibn al-ʿArabi, also from Spain, was probably the greatest Muslim mystical metaphysician. Theological and philosophic debates took place under Almohad rule (1149–1212). Al-Ghazali had taught that direct apprehension was the basis for the knowledge of the divine being, and that the Quran was a direct expression of God's being. Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) held that reason was the basis of human knowledge of the divine being, and that the Quran was an allegory requiring rational interpretation.

The Reconquista

Despite its great prosperity and cultivated urban life, the extreme degree of political fragmentation eventually undermined Islamic Spain. The initial Muslim advance had left a small belt of northern territories along the Pyrenees in Christian hands. In the course of the eighth and ninth centuries, skirmishes among the small kingdoms in this region led to the beginnings of an ideological movement to reconquer and recolonize the Muslim areas of Spain. Christian sentiment was also expressed in the founding of Benedictine monasteries and the pilgrimage of Santiago de Compostela. Pope

Gregory VII made the reconquest a religious duty of Christians as well as a territorial ambition of Spanish kings.

The disintegration of the Muslim states in the eleventh century allowed for the rapid expansion of various Christian kingdoms. In 1085 Alfonso VI, on the strength of the unified kingdoms of Castile, Leon, and Galicia, conquered Toledo. This was a signal event in the struggle between Muslims and Christians, for a brilliant center of Muslim civilization, once the capital of Visigothic Spain, again fell into Christian hands. Christian migrants flocked to Toledo, but the Muslim, Jewish, and Mozarab populations were allowed to remain. In the meantime, the kingdom of Aragon captured Huesca (1096), Saragossa (1118), Tortosa (1148), and Lerida (1149). In the second half of the twelfth century, the reconquest became institutionalized in the founding of monastic-military fraternities, such as the orders of Calatrava and Santiago, financed by landed estates, and conquered and colonized Muslim territories.

The Christian advance was countered by the Muslims. The Muslim sense of retreat and decline prompted, in 1082, a delegation of scholars to urge the Almoravids to intervene on behalf of the Spanish-Muslims. Thus, in 1086, a Moroccan army crossed the straits and defeated Alfonso VI. From 1090 to 1145, the North Africans conquered the Spanish-Muslim cities and governed Spain as a province of Marrakesh. The Almoravids polarized religio-communal relationships. Although they grudgingly accepted the *dhimmi* status of Christians and Jews, Christians began to emigrate from Almoravid domains. There were Sufi-led revolts in Silves and Niebla and scholar-led revolts in Cordoba and Valencia that eventually overthrew Almoravid rule. The Almohads, who took Marrakesh in 1147, accepted the concept of a Moroccan empire reaching from the Sahara to Spain. They took Seville and Cordoba in 1149 and the rest of Muslim Spain by 1172. A new Moroccan suzerainty was imposed on Spain, but the Almohads did not honor the *dhimmi* pact, and much of the Andalusian Jewish and Christian population moved to other regions.

Nonetheless, the Muslim position continued to weaken under the combination of Christian pressures and regional anarchy. The

Almohads were defeated in 1212 by the combined Christian forces of Leon, Castile, Navarre, and Aragon at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. With the defeat of the Almohads, the Spanish-Muslim states again found themselves independent but helpless before the resumption of the Christian reconquest. The union of Castile and Leon in 1230 opened the way for the conquest of Cordoba in 1236 and Seville in 1248. The Aragonese advanced along the coast to take Valencia in 1238 and Murcia in 1243. By 1249–50 the Portuguese had taken all of the lands west of the Guadiana River.

By the middle of the thirteenth century, only Granada remained in Muslim hands. It was protected by a large populace, a mountainous territory, and a productive economy that paid a heavy tribute to the princes of Castile. Castilian attacks on Granadan farmers weakened the Muslim state, as did internal factional disputes, but divisions in Castile long protected it from defeat. The union of Castile and Aragon opened the way for the final conquest of the last Muslim possession in Spain in 1492. (See Map 13.)

Map 13. North Africa and Spain in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Muslims under Christian rule

The attitudes of the Spanish Christians toward their Muslim subjects were deeply ambivalent. In all the conquered places, the monarchies and especially the local Christian nobility wanted to retain the productive working and agricultural populations. Yet they feared Muslims and Jews, and especially converts to Christianity, as a subversive and dangerous presence.

There was substantial continuity in the social and political organization of the Muslim population. Treaties guaranteed Muslims religious, judicial, and communal autonomy. Some Muslims were pushed out of urban neighborhoods, but Muslims generally kept their residences; merchants and artisans continued to flourish. Small farmers, property owners, and tenants kept their tenures. The kings of Aragon at first maintained the authority of the Muslim elites by treating them as vassals of the crown. They required oaths of loyalty and military service. The old rural social structure, consisting of small village or castle-scale communities governed by a *qa'id*, was maintained. In the cities, Muslims and Jews were allowed to govern themselves in local affairs. They became – as the Christians had been – a protected population. Muslims retained control of civil courts and of internal matters. The judge (*qadi*) was the chief Muslim official, the *amin* was the main administrator and tax collector, and the *sahib al-madina* was in charge of the police. The organized Muslim communities could thus both cooperate with and ward off state interference. Apart from the small crusading principalities in Palestine, Lebanon, and Sicily, this was the first experience of Muslims under non-Muslim rule.

In Spain, the living together of Muslims, Christians, and Jews is called *convivencia*. The Muslim conquest, Muslim governments, and its substantial Muslim and Jewish populations made Spain, perhaps apart from Sicily, a unique part of Western Europe. In Europe Spain has a distinctive history because of the synthesis of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish cultures. *Convivencia* signifies the acceptance of Jews and Muslims in royal courts and administration, in economic life and daily social relations, and in intellectual collaboration among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Recently, it has come to be celebrated as an epoch when Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived in

harmony and in economic and cultural collaboration. Now it is often presented as a model for pluralistic societies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The historical story, however, is more complex. Historians who celebrate the *convivencia* overlook the parallel history of the breakdown of the security and prosperity of the Muslim and Jewish communities, economic exploitation, violent assaults, religious persecution, and indeed their eventual expulsion from Spain. In fact, the history of Jews and Muslims under Christian rule falls into two phases. The first phase was a period of autonomy and relative security for the governed populations and cultural collaboration among the elites; the second phase was a period of increasing harassment, persecution, and eventually expulsion from Spain.

The conditions of Muslim and Jewish community life under Christian rule differed from kingdom to kingdom and from province to province. In Castile, Alfonso adopted the previous Muslim policy of respecting the religious, communal, and economic interests of the subordinate populations. The Castilian treatment of its Mozarab population – meaning Christians of Visigothic rite who spoke Arabic – is emblematic of the treatment accorded the Muslims and Jews. In the early postconquest era, the Mozarabs were treated as a favored minority. Alfonso granted a special dispensation to six parish churches to use the Visigothic or Hispano-Gothic rite rather than the Catholic liturgy. They were granted their own communal legal jurisdiction and many fiscal advantages. This allowed Arabized Christians and Muslim converts to Christianity to occupy a favored position in the expanding Christian states. In 1371, Enrique II confirmed the privileges of the Mozarabs of Toledo, but by the end of the fifteenth century the Mozarabic tradition had virtually disappeared.

Muslims and Jews were at first given similar treatment. Within two years, however, the central Mosque of Toledo was confiscated and converted into a cathedral. In Andalusia, the Muslims of the Guadalquivir Valley were forced to leave their town quarters and to settle in outlying suburbs or hamlets. In general, however, Muslims could keep their properties and govern their internal affairs and were

assured freedom of worship. In Aragon, Muslims, perhaps 20 percent of the population, were bilingual in Romance and Arabic and were highly integrated into Christian society. They served Christian lords and in the market had Christian employers and customers. Navarrese Muslims often held high office under the crown and served in the army.

Of the reconquered territories, Valencia had the largest Muslim population. At first, the Muslims of Valencia province, called Mudejars, some of whom lived in towns but most of whom lived in country villages, constituted about 80 percent of the population. They were Arabic speaking. The Mudejars made up most of the workforce. They were free farmers, small landowners, and artisans. They dominated the ceramics and paper industries. They were important as merchants, shopkeepers, entertainers, household servants, and slaves.

They were ruled by Christian lords assisted by Christian and Jewish administrators. The conqueror, James I of Aragon, attempted to consolidate Christian hegemony by bringing in Christian and Jewish settlers from Catalonia and Aragon, by establishing religious orders, by giving lands to Christian landlords, and by organizing a tax-collecting administration. However, Christian power was not consolidated until the fourteenth century when, as a result of Christian and Jewish immigration and Muslim emigration, Mudejars constituted only one-half of the population. By the fifteenth century, they were probably less than one-third of the total. Relations between Muslims and Christians were not always peaceful. The Mudejars did not passively accept Christian rule. From the 1240s through the 1270s, they repeatedly rose in revolt, often aided by Moroccan and Granadan allies. There were anti-Muslim riots in 1275–76.

Muslims continued to live in self-governing communities. By royal decree, Muslims were permitted to live under their own laws, to offer public prayers, and to educate their children. The chief Muslim official under the crown of Aragon was the *qadi* general, or royal *qadi*. In each Muslim community (*al-jamaʿa*) there was a local judge and an *amin* or fiscal officer responsible for the collection of taxes.

The local jurists advised the Muslim and Christian judges and officials called in to arbitrate disputes among Muslims. In this role, the jurists sought to preserve Islamic ethics, mediate the needs of a subjugated population, and maintain Muslim communal identity.

Communal identity was reinforced by commercial, family, clan, and linguistic ties. The religious scholars, preachers, and teachers traveled widely, maintaining extensive networks that linked the communities together. Valencian Mudejars spoke a dialect of Arabic and created their own vernacular written version (Aljamiado). At the same time, standard literary Arabic was used in Quranic, legal, and other religious studies and for drawing contracts for marriages, commercial obligations, and tax records. Because Valencian Muslims were not versed in Romance dialects, their linguistic knowledge created both an inner solidarity and a barrier to the Christian world.

The Reconquista did not extinguish the cultural vitality of Muslim Spain. On the contrary, in Castile and Aragon, a new Islamic devotional literature written in Arabic script and in Arabized Spanish, Aljamiado, emerged as the literary language of the Mudejars. Granada, the surviving Muslim enclave, maintained a sophisticated style of life. The city was adorned with patios, fountains, and pavements; Granada copied Eastern styles in bronzes, ivories, ceramics, and furniture. In order to meet its huge burden of tribute, Granada developed an export trade in ceramics, porcelains, silks, and weapons. (See Illustration 10.)

Illustration 10. Patio de los Leones, Alhambra (Granada, Spain). *Source*: Ray Lifchez Collection, Architecture Visual Resources Library, University of California at Berkeley.

The Alhambra was one of the great achievements of Islamic urban art. It was first constructed as a fortress and royal residence in the eleventh century. By the thirteenth century, it had been enlarged into a princely city. Like Baghdad and Cairo, it was a symbol of the power and aloofness of royalty. The Nasrid dynasty of Granada (1230–1492) built the famous Court of the Myrtles, the Court of the Lions, and innumerable gardens and pavilions. The palace complex was decorated with Islamic symbols and water motifs. It was embellished with Quranic inscriptions and provided with a large mosque, an open prayer field, and the "Gate of the Law." Pools and fountains symbolized refuge, repose, and paradise. Inscriptions bore allusions to the legend of the glass floor built by King Solomon to resemble a

pool of water – the Solomonic story linked Granada with the royal art of the ancient Near East and its later Islamic versions. It was a last echo of the courtly cosmopolitan civilization of the Arab East in the western Mediterranean.

In the Christian kingdoms as well, Hispano-Islamic culture was a powerful influence. Nobles and churchmen built their houses in the Moorish manner and borrowed Hispanic-Islamic motifs for their heraldry. They dressed in Arab fabrics. Even before the conquest of Toledo, buildings in northern Spain were built or remodeled with some of the characteristic features of the Umayyad and *taifa* period. Mozarab churches blended Visigothic plans and elevation with Cordoban arches and decoration. In Toledo after 1085, the construction of the apses of churches combined semicircular Roman arches characteristic of Castilian construction with horseshoe and scalloped niches for the portraits of saints characteristic of Mudejar art. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Castilian monuments – such as the Alcazar of Seville, the palace of Tordesillas, and other buildings – shared Mudejar architectural features with the buildings of Granada. Indeed, Granadan and North African craftsmen may have worked on these Castilian projects. As in eastern Umayyad and ʿAbbasid art or Spanish Umayyad art, the appropriation of the artistic styles of past regimes was used to express victory, dominance, and authority. It signified the appropriation of the wealth, refinement, sophistication, and mythic power of Islamic culture. Islamic motifs also distinguished Castilian architecture from European art represented by Romanesque and Gothic styles.

The Jews in Spain (co-author, David Moshfegh)

The Jews of Spain probably date back to the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE), when Jews were dispersed throughout the Roman Empire. After the conversion of Visigothic kings from Arianism to Catholicism, in 613 Jews were given the choice of conversion or exile. Later, Jews cooperated with the Arab/Berber invasions of 711. They made up a substantial part of the population

of cities such as Lucena and Granada and soon came to speak Arabic and dress in the Muslim fashion.

The golden age of Jewish culture in Spain opened under the reign of the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al-Rahman III (912–61). The leaders of the Jewish community, such as Hasdai ben Shaprut (c. 915–70) and Samuel ibn Naghrela (993–1055), were at once courtiers, physicians, diplomats, and scholars of Hebrew, Arabic, Latin, and Romance. Hasdai ben Shaprut was the impresario behind the invitation of scholars of Bible and Talmud, philosophers, scientists, poets, and linguists to the court. Aware of the importance of poetry in Arab social and political life, Hasdai encouraged the development of Hebrew "court poetry" on Arabic models. From North Africa came Issac al-Fasi, a Jew from Algiers and later Fez, who established at Lucena the first Spanish school of Talmudic studies. Another Fasi scholar, Judah b. David Hayyuj (c. 945–c. 1000), the founder of comparative grammatical studies of Hebrew and Arabic, identified the common word structure built on three-letter roots.

The renaissance of Hebrew poetry (and philosophy) defined the golden age of Spanish-Jewish culture. Following Arab examples, a worldly Hebrew poetry celebrated the pleasures of earthly life. Jewish secular poetry included poetry about the ecstasies of sensual pleasure and homoerotic love, but with the language and narrative background of the Bible. The poetic genres included the *qasida*, and later the *maqama*, with its mix of narrative and rhetorical text, as well as the Spanish-Arabic *muwashshah* (ending in a colloquial Arabic or Romance couplet resetting the scene of the poem). Samuel bin Naghrela (c. 993–1056), the vizier of Granada, was the first true master of secular Hebrew poetry. Solomon bin Gabirol (1021 to 1058 or 1070), a Jewish neo-Platonist and the foremost Hebrew poet of his time, turned poetry into a means of cultivating an intimate and personal religious sensibility. Judah Halevi (1085–1141) was a distinguished philosopher as well as poet. The eleventh century marked the high point of both Arabic- and Romance-inspired Jewish poetry.

With the breakdown of the caliphate, the succession of the numerous Muslim *taifa* kingdoms, and the Almoravid and the

Almohad invasions, the security of the Jewish communities in Spain eventually broke down. The *taifa* kingdoms protected a small Jewish elite who served at *taifa* courts and who perpetuated Hebrew culture. However, under the Almoravids and Almohads, the nonMuslim populations suffered. The Christians of North Africa had already disappeared, and the Jews of Granada were massacred. Many Jews converted to Islam, but they remained suspect to the Almohad ruler al-Mansur (1184–99), who imposed the *dhimmi* regulations, which included distinctive clothing meant to distinguish Jews from Muslims. Many Jews migrated to the Christian states of Portugal, Castile, Navarre, and Aragon, where they were valued for their financial, administrative, and diplomatic skills. Toleration and assimilation led many to voluntarily convert to Christianity. From the late twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, Jewish culture and Jewish communities flourished in the Christian kingdoms. Highly educated Jews, fluent in classical Arabic as well as Hebrew and Romance, served as royal secretaries and translators and participated in the interconfessional cultural life of the reconquest kingdoms.

In this period, biblical and Talmudic commentary resumed. Writing in Hebrew became the hallmark of Jewish scholarship. In the mid-twelfth century Abraham ibn Ezra wrote his Bible commentaries in Hebrew, and from then on a good part of the vast corpus of Judeo-Arabic literature was translated into Hebrew for Jews in Europe and Spain. Maimonides's (1135–1204) epochal work, *Mishneh Torah*, written in Hebrew, was completed in 1180. His "codification" of the Talmud replaced its wide-ranging discussions with a logically ordered treatise and short historical accounts of legal problems. By the mid-thirteenth century, Hebrew had become the exclusive language of Jewish scholarship in Spain; in the Arab East, Arabic held out as the normative language of scholarship until the sixteenth century.

Philosophical reasoning on religious issues also became an integral part of Hebrew culture. Much of medieval Jewish philosophy and theology followed Philo's attempt to reconcile divine revelation and Hellenistic thought. Saadya Gaon brought medieval Jewish theology, the Jewish *kalam*, into being. He adopted the positions of

Muslim Muʿtazili theology to demonstrate the oneness and unity of God, his justice, and the Hebrew Bible as the true revelation of God.

Neo-Platonism became characteristic of Jewish thinking in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, especially in Spain in the work of thinkers like Solomon bin Gabirol and Bahya bin Paquda. Neo-Platonism was a metaphysical system that held that the world emanated out of the singular divine origin toward increasing multiplicity, ending in the material world. The philosopher sought reunion with the divine by ecstatic or meditative consciousness of the source of all being. Jewish neo-Platonists often sought to retain some vestige of the personal God of Judaism, and to reconcile the idea of the creation of the world out of nothingness with the schema of creation by spiritual emanations.

Jewish neo-Platonists also relied on the example of Sufism. Jewish mysticism was shaped by Ismaʿili ideas. Avicenna's philosophical mysticism (Illuminationism or Ishraq) and its successors, such as the mysticism of Suhrawardi, were taught to Jews, Jewish converts, and Muslims identifying with Judaism. Hermetic mysticism influenced such Jewish thinkers as Moses ibn Ezra, Judah Halevi, and Abraham ibn Ezra. Ibn al-ʿArabi was also an important influence. Mysticism may have appealed to Jewish scholars because it represented a universal religious truth, transcending confessional loyalties and traditions. The study of esoteric mysticisms implied a transcendence of ordinary religious cultures. In any case, the aim of Jewish mystics was a spiritualization of the Jewish heritage and a new emphasis on inward devotion to God. The focus on the Hebrew language and the spiritualization of the Jewish tradition effected by Jewish neo-Platonism led to a new genre of meditative poetry (*piyyut*). This form of Hebrew poetry imported ideas from Arabic poetry, while drawing on the new spiritual philosophy, to bring a new profundity to the Hebrew liturgical canon.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Aristotelianism became the dominant philosophical outlook. Maimonides established a middle position between the Jewish tradition and Aristotelianism. He demonstrated the existence of God by arguing that his being was

necessary for the always-contingent world to subsist, but he drew a strict line between the necessity of the divine and the contingent, although regular and rational, effects of his will on the world. In this way, he was able philosophically to demarcate the personal God of Judaism from the rationally ordered but contingent cosmos that was his creation.

Jewish and Muslim scholars shared in the philosophical enterprise. Alongside of biblical and Talmudic commentary, the entire corpus of Arabic Aristotelian philosophy was translated into Hebrew. Aristotelianism opened the way, as it had done in Arabic and would do in Latin, for the interpretation of the Bible or Talmud and for theological speculation. It also opened scientific studies to Jewish scholars. The integration of Muslim and Jewish philosophical scholarship set the foundations for Muslim, Jewish, and Christian interactions at the court of Alfonso X and for the translation of the Aristotelian and Greek philosophical and scientific corpus into Latin.

In poetry and architecture, as well as in philosophy, science, and mysticism, Jewish and Muslim cultures were blended. Arabized Jews continued the tradition of Hebrew poetry based on Arabic models, including the *muwashshah* poetry that combined Hebrew verses with a Romance refrain. The congregational synagogue in Toledo (today the Church of Santa Maria la Blanca), the Synagogue of Samuel Halevi in Toledo (El Tránsito), the Synagogue of Isaac Mehab in Cordoba, and a Mudejar-style synagogue in Segovia, now destroyed, show the close integration of Almohad, Spanish Mudejar, and Jewish impulses in design.

The synthesis of Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin cultures

In philosophy and science as well as in art, Islamic, Jewish, and Christian cultures were brought together in one of the great achievements of European culture: the translation of classical Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew science and philosophy into Latin. Churchmen eager to persuade Muslims of the truth of their beliefs and to convert them to Christianity first sponsored the translation of the Quran. The

first translation of the Quran into Latin, indeed into any non-Muslim language, was completed around 1141 under the guidance of Peter the Venerable. Later translations were made into Castilian and Catalan.

Toledo was the center of these translations because of church patronage and great libraries. By the 1140s, the translation of Arabic philosophy was being promoted by Toledo's French archbishop, Francis Raymond (r. 1125–52), who established the Toledo school of translators. The presence of scholars of Romance languages, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin in the same milieu was critical. Teams of translators – including Mozarab Christians, Muslim and Jewish scholars, and Cluniac monks – who were often bilingual or multilingual, worked together to translate books from Arabic into Castilian or Latin, and from Castilian to Latin. A Mozarab, a Christian native speaker of Arabic, might first render an Arabic text word for word into the vernacular; then a Latin expert would redo the vernacular into formal Latin.

Key texts of the Aristotelian tradition were translated in Toledo shortly after being written in Cordoba or Seville. Aristotle and Muslim philosophers – such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Avicenna – were translated into Latin. Between 1160 and 1187, Gerard of Cremona translated some eighty-seven works, including the Quran, Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and *Physics*, and many works on mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy. He translated the *Qanun* of Avicenna. Between 1220 and 1250, Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle and the works of Maimonides were also rendered into Latin and were later quoted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus Greek philosophic thought came through the Arab world to Europe.

The translation project was of immense historical cultural importance. It brought together the scholarly worlds of the three Mediterranean religions. It brought the teachings of Aristotle into the European worldview and introduced a new metaphysical mentality and empirical orientation to Western European Christianity. By the end of the twelfth century, Latin Europe had been reconnected with the classical Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew philosophy and science that would shape its religious and intellectual outlook to the present day.

In the thirteenth century, the movement of translation was given royal patronage. Jewish and Muslim literatures were translated into Castilian and Latin. Alfonso X (d. 1284) arranged for the translation of the Bible, the Talmud, and the Quran into Castilian. He commissioned lavishly illustrated books of chess; monumental histories of civilization from biblical times to the Castilian era; illustrated treatises on astronomy, astrology, geology, and codes of law; and handbooks of philosophy. The use of the astrolabe was learned from treatises written in Arabic and Hebrew and then in Latin. In frank emulation of the ʿAbbasid caliphs of Baghdad, Alfonso had translated *Kitab al-Jawarih*, a Baghdadi treatise on falconry and other hunting practices, and *Kalila wa-Dimna*, the centerpiece of the Baghdadi adoption of ancient Iranian imperial culture. Scholars from northern Europe worked with Spanish scholars to translate medical, religious, scientific, philosophical, and literary texts into Castilian and Latin.

From ancient Iran to ʿAbbasid Baghdad to Castilian Toledo and from Zoroastrian to Islamic to Christian monarchies, a single trail of literary legitimization for monarchical authority was blazed. In the interests of empire, in the ambition to rival and replace both the Umayyad Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, Alfonso sought to create a Castilian imperial literature that would supersede both Latin and Arabic. These appropriations gave Islamic culture an afterlife in Christian Spain. Some of these translations were carried into old French and Latin. The works of Ptolemy were translated. The story of the ascent of the Prophet into heaven (*miʿraj*) was translated into Castilian and then into old French and Latin, where it may have become available to Dante.

Integration of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian experts also took place in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century medical studies. By the fourteenth century, Spanish Jews were studying Latin scholastic medicine and philosophy with Christian scholars. The medieval system of separate examinations for each ethno-religious group was replaced by an examination system under Christian authority. All medical students were examined by Christian overseers.

The breakdown of *convivencia* (co-author, David Moshfegh)

Convivencia under Christian rule reached its apogee in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Although there were incidents of harassment – such as the confiscation of the Mosque of Toledo and its conversion into a church – and there were frequent riots and pogroms against the Muslims of Valencia between 1276 and 1291, Muslim and Jewish communities remained relatively secure, and cooperation among scholars and intellectuals continued to be productive. The first major Muslim experience of Christian rule showed how in the multiethnic and multireligious societies of the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Muslim concepts of autonomous religious community could serve for a time to accommodate Muslims in a Christian society, just as they had accommodated Christians in a Muslim society.

In the long run, however, several factors worked against this outcome. The rulers of Castile and Aragon had no abiding or principled commitment to the autonomy of their Muslim and Jewish populations. They saw them as economically important, but also as a political threat. Jews were both assets and a danger, because of their economic importance and administrative positions at court. Jews were the recalcitrant stiff-necked people who had refused Christ, but also potential converts. Muslims were important as workers and taxpayers, especially in Valencia, but were a political danger because of their large numbers. As the economic importance of Muslims and Jews diminished, their vulnerability to Christian religious hostility and Christian demands for religious purity, conformity, and homogeneity increased. This led in the end to forced conversion, forced assimilation, and finally the expulsion of the Jewish and Muslim populations.

By the middle of the fourteenth century, the position of the Muslims of Valencia, the largest Mudejar population, had sharply deteriorated. The Mudejars were burdened with growing financial obligations. Free Muslim peasants were pushed into servitude. They were pushed out of the irrigated *huertas* of Valencia into nonirrigated, less productive

dry farming areas. Christian political control also led to a progressive restriction of Muslim religious liberties. By the middle of the fourteenth century, some 80 percent of judicial cases were heard in Christian rather than Muslim courts and were tried under Christian rather than Muslim law. Muslim communities were losing their internal autonomy.

In the critical reign of Fernando II (1479–1516), the situation of Valencian Muslims was stabilized. Economic interests for a time prevailed. Fernando tried to increase the population of royal *morerías* (Muslim communities) by attracting the vassals of Christian lords and by bringing in new settlers from the Granada region. Many Mudejars thus obtained better working and living conditions; purchased, leased, or reclaimed additional land; launched new commercial ventures; and shared in the relative prosperity of late fifteenth-century Valencia. Popular antagonism was curtailed by Muslim-Christian cooperation in workplaces and marketplaces. For a time, neither kings nor subjects showed marked hostility toward the Mudejars.

The Dominicans wanted to convert the Muslims and sponsored schools of Arabic to prepare cadres for rationalistic debate with elite Muslims. By contrast, the Franciscans adopted a confrontational approach, preaching the evil of Islam and the triumph of the cross in mosques and to Muslim crowds. Sporadic riots and pogroms underlined the rise of Christian anger and hatred. Still, the monarchy kept these forces in control. In this uncertain situation, Valencian Muslims maintained their identity. They continued to speak Arabic and to identify with Granada and North Africa. Language differences were a powerful factor in the alienation of Muslims and Christians.

The expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal (co-author, David Moshfegh)

Despite their cultural brilliance, the economic and political position of the Jewish communities began to deteriorate in the fourteenth century. The Jews of Valencia are the best known of these communities. In Valencia, Jews lived in their own self-governing

community, with their own court of law, schools, charities, synagogues, ritual baths, and slaughterhouses, as had been the pattern under Muslim rule. They were the tax farmers of Castile and served the kings of Aragon as government officials, translators, physicians, and diplomats, but most of all as tax collectors, helping to govern a majority Muslim population. They were moneylenders to Christians and Muslims who collected debts with interests to pay off their obligations to the king. In the kingdom of Aragon they were allowed to buy and own land.

The powerful position of Jews was a double affront to Christians, and especially to Christian nobles, who felt themselves subordinate both to Jews and through Jewish intermediaries to the power of the sovereign. As early as the twelfth century the municipality of Toledo attempted to limit Jewish prerogatives. The Cortes, the assembly of the estates of the Spanish realms, expressed its hostility to Jews. In the thirteenth century even the crown of Aragon, although in practice depending on Jewish tax collectors and moneylenders, declared itself opposed to usury and to Jewish officeholding and by the end of the century did indeed remove Jews from positions at court, obliged them to sell their landholdings, and imposed heavy taxes on the Jewish communities. A critical factor in Aragon was the rise of a Christian merchant and professional class that could take over the moneylending, tax collecting, and administrative positions of the Jews. Jews were relegated to small-scale lending to Muslims and to an increasing diversity of occupations. Less and less important as tax collectors for the monarchy, Jews were left ever more vulnerable to a rising Christian socioeconomic and religio-ideological antagonism. In Castile, however, in a semifeudal military society, Jews remained important for their bureaucratic and economic roles until the end of the fourteenth century.

The increasing political and economic pressure opened a class and cultural divide within the Jewish communities. Because the royal demands were laid collectively on the communities, elite families competed for control of the Aljamas and disputed the division of taxes with the common people. These socioeconomic splits may have been related to a cultural divide as well. The elites favored

rationalism, an expression of religion transcending specific community laws. The common people favored pietism and mysticism.

More important for the survival of the Jews was the hostility of the church. To many Christians, the failure of the Jews to recognize the mission and the divinity of Christ – the very existence of Jews – was a repudiation and an outrage. Furthermore, Christians were unnerved by the conversion of Jews and Muslims, because converts often maintained good relations with their natal families and communities. Christians were doubtful about the loyalty, commitment, and religious practices of these converts. They saw a grave danger in the mixing of peoples and feared the subversion of Christian purity and solidarity. Some of the most rabid anti-Jewish agitators were apostates from Judaism.

These fears have a deep history. As a result of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Jews and Muslims were required to dress differently than Christians, because it was difficult to separate Christian, Jewish, and Muslim men by physical appearance, and this could lead to sexual intercourse between Christians and non-Christians. A cape and badge of colored cloth for Jews and a special haircut and dress for Muslims were prescribed to define a sexual boundary.

Increasing pressure on both Muslims and Jews came from the church. Franciscans and Dominicans, and notably apostates from Judaism, denounced the Jews in public sermons. An ever-increasing Eucharistic devotion and brooding over the torment of Christ led to harassment, persecution, and mob violence. The period from 1391 to 1416 brought massacres and massive forced conversions in the kingdoms of both Castile and Aragon. Jews were attacked in Seville, Cordoba, Jaén, Ubeda, Baeza, Carmona, and many other cities. The Jewish population of Valencia was destroyed in 1391 and was relocated in Morvedre. The largest surviving Jewish community in Valencia province was unmolested until the expulsion in 1492. There the Jews were protected in part by their lack of political importance. Also, the king of Aragon protected the Jewish populations in Catalonia and Palma de Mallorca.

Throughout Spain, however, masses of Jews were forced to convert to Christianity, enlarging the class of conversos, converted Jews who retained their family contacts and many Jewish religious practices. This ambiguous situation made converts suspect and seemingly ever more subversive and threatening to the Christian population. Thus in 1478 Isabel I of Castile and Fernando II of Aragon established the Spanish Inquisition in both Castile and Aragon to suppress the Judaizing conversos. In 1483 the inquisitors persuaded the monarchy that the only way to eliminate the continued Judaic practices of the conversos was to expel the Jews – not necessarily the converts themselves – from Spain. In 1483, the Jews were expelled from Andalusia, and, in 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella ordered the Jews to either convert or be banished from the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Perhaps one half of the Jewish population converted; many of the others went to Navarre and Portugal.

The Catholic monarchs then imposed this policy on Portugal. In 1497, in negotiations for the marriage of Infanta Isabella of Aragon and the Portuguese monarch, Manuel, the Spanish insisted on the conversion or expulsion of Portuguese Jews as a condition of the marriage. In 1497 the Portuguese also required Jews to convert or go onto exile. Jews were banished from the Iberian Peninsula. The Jewish population, once a flourishing commercial and cultural community, estimated at its height to have numbered hundreds of thousands, was expelled to other parts of Europe, North Africa, and the Ottoman Empire.

The converted Jews who remained were cut off from Hebrew literature, synagogues, and the other facilities of Jewish ritual life, but secret observance of Jewish rituals and beliefs continued. In the absence of formal institutions, women played an ever-greater role in maintaining Jewish family life. Converts also maintained a kind of ethnic solidarity in the Christian framework by living in the same parish, selecting convents for their daughters, and burying their dead in the same chapels.

Jews in North Africa

With the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, many Spanish and Portuguese Jews took refuge in North Africa and in the Ottoman Empire. As early as the thirteenth century the defeat of the Almohads allowed for the revival of Jewish communities in North Africa under the succeeding Hafsid, Ziyanid, and Marinid regimes. Jews began to repopulate North African cities and to act as diplomatic and commercial links between European and North African polities.

The Marinids and the Hafsids employed Jews to conduct diplomatic missions with Europeans. The Marinids of Morocco employed Christian captives, merchants, Iberian Jews, and conversos. At the same time, Morocco experienced an influx of new and diverse populations – Atlas villagers; Christian artisans from Europe; merchants from Holland and Britain, including Franciscans; and Iberian Catholics. To reconcile the Muslim identity of the sultanate with the actualities of its social base, the Moroccan sultans created a special quarter for the Jews and other foreign servants of the regime adjacent to the Kasba or fortress quarter where the government was housed. The first walled and gated Jewish quarter (mellah) was organized in Fez (1438). The mellah of Marrakesh was founded around 1557, followed by the mellah in Meknes (1679). The mellahs did not isolate Jews but facilitated their interactions with the sultan and the reception of Europeans, both Jewish and non-Jewish, and helped mediate between Europe and Morocco.

The mellah, long misconceived as a Jewish ghetto, was also the quarter for foreigners and for the dealings of Muslims with foreigners, thus sheltering Muslims from foreign influences. Despite the intentions of their royal founders, however, Muslims had a large presence in the mellahs. Muslims owned about 10 percent of the property in the mellahs, and landlords came to collect rents. Muslim shoppers came to the mellah, especially on Friday mornings. Muslim pilgrims came to saints' tombs. Mostly, the mellah was the illicit entertainment quarter, where Muslims could find alcohol, gambling, contacts with Europeans, and Jewish prostitutes. Reciprocally, Jews were not allowed to own property in Medina, the Muslim city, but they rented storage and selling space. When they went to Medina,

however, they risked insults and relegation to the inferior status of *dhimmi*. Sumptuary rules required Jews in Medina to remove their shoes.

The expulsion of the Muslims (co-author, David Moshfegh)

In the kingdom of Castile and Aragon, the conquest of Granada in 1492 marked the beginning of the end of the Muslim population in Spain. Although the treaty of surrender guaranteed Muslim religious liberty and property, in practice these rights were ignored. On the arrival of Christian immigrants in 1498, the city was divided into two halves, with the Muslims confined to the Albaicin district. All the mosques of Granada were converted to churches. The Muslims of Albaicin and other areas revolted and, in 1502, were given an ultimatum requiring the conversion or emigration of all the Mudejars of Castile. Some Granadan notables who collaborated with the crown were permitted to practice their religion in the confines of their own estates. Many Granadans became crypto-Muslims who practiced Islam in secret while outwardly professing Christianity. Many fled to North Africa.

In 1511, measures were taken to suppress even the everyday culture of Muslims. Tailors were forbidden to make Muslim-style garments. Then, in 1526, the Arabic language, local dress, jewelry, and baths were outlawed. Only Christian midwives could assist in deliveries, and the Inquisition, rather than the parish clergy, was charged with supervision. Not only religion but Mudejar culture was banned.

Forcible conversions were extended to other parts of Spain. In 1515–16 Navarre was incorporated into Castile, and its anti-Mudejar laws were extended to Navarre and later to Valencia. The Inquisition was empowered to enforce conversions. In 1525, King Carlos received a papal brief allowing him to retract earlier promises to the Muslims. By early 1526, Mudejars living in the crown of Aragon had to convert to Christianity or face expulsion from the peninsula.

Mosques were shut down; Arabic books and documents were banned.

The converted Mudejars defined themselves as Muslims, but the names "moriscos" and "moros" were given to them by outsiders. They were by definition crypto-Muslims living their religion secretly because the law considered them Christians. Their nominal conversion implied important changes in lifestyle. Important legal changes ensued. Endogamous marriages, accepted in Islamic law and Arab and Berber social practice, were now forbidden. Property would no longer be distributed to heirs by the terms of Islamic law.

Still Muslim jurists helped keep alive an underground Muslim culture. Books in Arabic and Aljamiado, including the Quran, continued to circulate. Notaries drew up contracts in Arabic, and marriages, circumcisions, and burials were still performed in traditional Islamic ways. Teachers continued to instruct the young about Islam.

In 1556, Arab and Muslim dress was again forbidden, and in 1566 Philip II decreed that the Arabic language could no longer be used. In 1570, there were Muslim rebellions in Granada that led to the crown deciding that the only solution to the morisco problem was the removal of the formerly Muslim population of Granada. Thousands of moriscos were sent to Seville, Cordoba, Toledo, and other towns. Finally, in 1609, Philip III decreed the expulsion of the Muslims from all of Spain. They took refuge in North Africa, where Andalusian communities once again contributed to a flourishing Islamic civilization. The religion of Islam introduced in Spain in 711 was driven out in 1614, 903 years later.

Chapter 28 Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries

While the Muslim presence in Spain was being liquidated, Islamic societies in North Africa were entering a new stage of development. With the collapse of the Almohads, North Africa began to take on a new configuration of state and society. Although older claims to a "caliphal" type of religious authority were carried into the new era, with the exception of Libya, North African states increasingly moved toward the Saljuq (and Egyptian Ayyubid-Mamluk) type of Middle Eastern Islamic institutional structure. The new states would be based on client, slave, or mercenary armies and a small household bureaucracy but would depend on a governing coalition of tribal forces. The larger society would be organized into Sufi-led communities. Inspired by developments in the eastern Muslim world and Spain, Sufism took root throughout North Africa in the twelfth and later centuries. The states of the post-Almohad era would have to develop a new relationship with the religious notables. Some of them would surrender their claims to direct religious authority; all would accept the *'ulama'* and Sufis as the bearers of Islamic legitimacy and as intermediaries in the government of their societies. In different forms, they implemented the Eastern patronage concept of a Muslim state.

Tunisia

Tunisia by contrast had a deep history of centralized states. The Tunisian state from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries was essentially a reconstruction of a past form of centralized state based on an urbanized economy and relatively close political control over rural and pastoral populations. Although the regime of the eighth and ninth centuries had lapsed under the pressure of the Hilali invasions

and economic decline, it was rebuilt with significant innovations by the Hafsid dynasty (1228–1574). Despite repeated phases of consolidation and disintegration, the Hafsids defined the institutional framework of Tunisian society until the modern era.

The Hafsid regime grew directly out of the Almohad Empire. The dynasty descended from an aristocratic Almohad family and was supported by the former Almohad elites. The Hafsid armies included Almohad tribes, Arab nomads, Berbers from the Constantine and Bougie regions, Turks and Kurds, black slaves, and a Christian militia sent from Aragon. In the fifteenth century, the descendants of earlier generations of mercenaries, by then Arabized, continued to form a bodyguard for the rulers. The Hafsids also maintained a weak navy supplemented by privateers.

The civil administration was dominated by Andalusian scribes who provided the ministers for the army, finance, and chancery services. They were the principal officers for court affairs, governors of the royal palace, secretaries, chamberlains, and treasurers. The elites were supported by the distribution of *iqtaʿs* to government officials, Almohad *shaykhs*, and tribal chiefs. The Hafsids tried to control nomadic tribes by influencing the choice of the chiefs, by putting them under military pressure, by winning favor through fiscal or territorial concessions, or by integrating tribal factions into the royal armies. Still, southern tribes were likely to be independent.

The strength of the state was related to the revenues of international trade. A series of thirteenth-century treaties with Sicily, Venice, Marseille, Genoa, and Florence helped revive Tunisian prosperity. At the end of the fourteenth century Tunis was exporting cereals, dried fruits, dates, olive oil, fish, salt, spices, sugar, wool, leather, cotton goods, coral, weapons, and slaves, and it was importing cereals, spices, wine, cloth goods, dyes, wood, metal, weapons, and jewelry. At the end of the fifteenth century the Portuguese discovery of a route to India and the aggressive expansion of Portugal and Spain along the coasts of North Africa undermined Tunisian trade.

Out of the broad possibilities afforded by the historic repertoire of Muslim, cosmopolitan, and patrimonial concepts of rule, the Hafsids chose to portray themselves as Muslim rulers. They took the titles of caliph and *amir al-mu'minin*; the head of state was later called *malik al-sultan* in imitation of Mamluk Egyptian rulers. Succession was legitimized by the oath of allegiance and the recognition of the ruler in the Friday prayer. Solemn public processions accompanied by flags and drums were also prerogatives of the sovereign.

The rulers conducted state business in a formal court attended by tribal chiefs, soldiers, men of religion, intellectuals, and other courtiers. Mornings were reserved for military business, afternoons for civil administration, and evenings for entertainment. The households of the rulers were centers not only of political administration but also of mosques and academies of learning. Scholars from all over North Africa and Spain gathered to instruct the rulers, minister to religious needs, and symbolize the religious credentials of the sultans. The Hafsid court produced studies of the Quran, hadith, law, and Arabic grammar; biographies of the Prophet and of saints; dictionaries of famous scholars; histories; and works of theology. The architectural style of the Hafsid period was derived from Morocco and Egypt. Science and medicine, however, languished.

Like the Mamluks in Egypt, the Hafsids sponsored Muslim law and a Maliki restoration. They maintained an Islamic religious administration under the authority of the *qadi al-jama'a*, a title that goes back to Umayyad Spain. Tunis had a second *qadi* who specialized in marriage law. A weekly council of *qadis* and muftis met to review important cases in the presence of the rulers. In 1257 the Hafsids endowed the al-Mustansiriyya madrasa. The feast of the end of Ramadan and the feast of the conclusion of the pilgrimage were celebrated by massive public prayers led by the sovereign. The birthday of the Prophet, marked first in Egypt in the thirteenth century and declared an official festival in Morocco in 1292, was accepted as an official feast in Tunisia at the end of the fourteenth century. The sultans also sponsored the daily reading of hadith and of the biography of the Prophet in the great Mosque of Tunis.

Gradually, however, Sufism began to displace law as the most important expression of Tunisian Islam. Between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries, Sufism spread from the towns into rural areas. Al-Shadhili, who was born in Morocco, educated in Egypt, and died in Tunis in 1258, left numerous disciples who combined formal scholarship with mystical exercises. As friends of God, they were believed to perform miracles, know what would happen at a distance, see or dream the future, transport themselves magically over time and space, cure the sick, and intercede before God on behalf of ordinary believers. They gathered groups of disciples, sworn to absolute obedience, to whom they taught the special techniques that had given them their mystical powers, and whom they initiated by transmitting the *khirqa*, or cloak of the Sufi. The more puritanical Sufis deplored the common practices of visits to tombs and the use of music to achieve ecstasy.

From the late thirteenth century, Sufi *zawiyas* (hospices) began to assume social and political functions. Sufis organized tribal coalitions to safeguard the trade routes, suppress brigandage, promote religious piety, and oppose illegal taxation. In the course of the fourteenth century Sufism was sufficiently consolidated for the political authorities to seek the favor of the Sufis. Territorial or fiscal concessions were given to the *zawiyas*. In Tunis a combination *zawiya*-madrasa, founded in 1399, marked the integration of urban Sufism and Maliki Islam. The breakup of the Hafsid state in the fourteenth century, its subsequent reconstruction in the fifteenth century, and its final decline in the sixteenth century allowed organized Sufi Islam to become the most powerful force in Tunisian society. The breakdown of the regime shifted the balance of power in North Africa to Sufi-led tribal communities that united rural peoples to meet the needs of political order, defense, economic organization, mediation of disputes, and other essential functions.

With the decline of the Hafsid dynasty, the Tunisian state was rebuilt by the Ottomans. The Ottomans made Tunisia a province of their empire in 1574 and garrisoned Tunis with 4,000 janissaries recruited in Anatolia, reinforced by renegade Christians from Italy, Spain, and Provence. In 1591, however, the local janissary officers

replaced the sultan's governor with one of their own men, called the deys. The deys ruled over Tunis, but a Corsican-born Tunisian tax collector (bey) named Murad (d. 1640), and his descendants, dominated the rest of the country. The struggle for power made allies of the deys, the janissaries, and bedouin tribes against the beys, the towns, and the fertile regions of the countryside. The beys eventually triumphed and ruled until 1705, when Husayn b. ʿAli came to power and established a dynasty that would reign until 1957. In theory Tunisia continued to be a vassal of the Ottoman Empire – the Friday prayer was pronounced in the name of the Ottoman sultan, money was coined in his honor, and an annual ambassador brought gifts to Istanbul – but the Ottomans never again exacted obedience.

Under Ottoman suzerainty Tunisia resumed the system of political control over the religious elites developed under the Hafsids. Under the Husaynids both Hanafi and Maliki *qadis* were appointed to high offices. The leading *qadis* and muftis participated in the bey's council. The bey could appoint and dismiss the judges, jurisconsults, teachers in madrasas, and Sufi *shaykhs* of *zawiyas*. The central government also controlled the rural tribes. It broke the power of the great tribal chiefs and left only lesser chieftainships and smaller units intact. Tunisia was ruled by some sixty *qa'ids* (district governors) and some two thousand local *shaykhs*. Much of the rural population, however, was partly independent on the basis of organized lineages, Sufi brotherhoods, and political alliances.

The migration of Spanish-Muslims to North Africa reinforced the sedentary and commercial sectors of Tunisian society. After the fall of Granada in 1492, increasing Christian pressure on the Muslim population in Spain led to a steady emigration to North Africa, which reached its peak with the expulsion of the moriscos at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Andalusian poets, scribes, scholars, and soldiers took refuge with the Hafsids. Many newcomers settled in the Zuqaq al-Andalus and other suburbs of Tunis. Numerous Andalusian villages were founded. As cultivators, the Andalusians introduced new irrigation systems, mills, gardens, and vineyards in the Spanish fashion. The migrants were accorded autonomy in tax collections; an official spokesman, the *shaykh al-Andalus*, represented them to the

government. A cultured community, they continued to speak their own languages and founded mosques and colleges.

Until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Tunisian economy functioned in the traditional way. It was divided into a sector of self-sufficient nomads and cultivators, and a sector attached to international trade. Tunisia exported meat, wool, olive oil, hides, beeswax, dates, and sponges and imported European cloth and paper. The beys entered the trade, gathering taxes of wheat and wool in kind, which they sold to European merchants. In the eighteenth century ʿAli (1759–82) and Hammuda Pasha (1782–1813) seized the opportunities provided by European wars to enlarge Tunisian trade, improve ports, and encourage cloth production.

The felt cap industry, introduced by Andalusians, was one of the most important. The *shashiya* was the standard cap worn throughout the Mediterranean by Christians, Jews, Armenians, and Muslims and was widely sold throughout the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and Iran. Hundreds of workshops were organized by merchant investors, and Tunisian production often reached 100,000 dozen hats per year. There were between 15,000 and 50,000 people engaged in the trade. The production of these caps also depended on international trade. Wool came from Spain, vermilion from Portugal, and alum from Rome. The imports, however, were generally in the control of French merchants from Marseille and Jewish merchants from Livorno. Although Tunisians suffered from regulations imposed by the bey of Tunis, European control of raw materials, a rigid corporate organization, and high costs of production, they had the advantage of understanding the market and producing an appropriate commodity.

In the late eighteenth century, however, the Tunisian economy went into decline. From 1784 to 1820 there were repeated crop failures and outbreaks of plague. Olive oil replaced wheat as the major export, and the *shashiyya* was forced off the market by French competition. The industrial revolution and the tremendous increase of European production undermined the industry. By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the most profitable and highly

capitalized Tunisian industry was in decline. At the same time the price of olive oil declined drastically, and Tunisia was left importing manufactured and luxury products with an unfavorable balance of payments.

In spite of economic decline, the government attempted to build up the army and the state apparatus. Rapid increases in taxes provoked a great peasant uprising in 1864. Even though the regime put down the revolt, it still did not have adequate revenues to maintain the army. Borrowing from European banks led to bankruptcy in 1867. In 1869 Tunisia had to submit to a French, British, and Italian commission to collect tax revenues and repay the bondholders. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the European powers encouraged France to establish a protectorate over Tunisia to divert it from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and to compensate it for Russian gains in the Balkans and the British occupation of Cyprus. The protectorate was declared in 1881.

Algeria

Whereas Tunisia had a long history of centralized states in addition to Khariji principalities and tribal dynasties, Algeria had no history of central states and no territorial identity. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries it was generally under Hafsid suzerainty, but in the course of the fifteenth century Sufi teachers gathered followers, acquired large territories as gifts from local rulers or from their devotees, and became landowners, patrons, and spiritual counselors for multitudes of small cultivators. Henceforth the political structure of Algeria would be based on lineage or tribal groups and Sufi-led communities.

An Algerian state first came into being as a result of the Ottoman conquest. With the help of Ottoman guns and janissaries, Khayr al-Din Barbarossa captured Algiers in 1529. From 1529 to 1587 Algiers was ruled by a beylerbey (provincial governor), supported by janissaries. In the period of its ascendancy, the Turkish regime managed to define the territorial identity of Algeria and to create a centralized state in the region between Tunisia and Morocco. The

state apparatus was highly institutionalized in the Ottoman manner, but its control over the country was limited by independent rural communities. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a small professional army could deal with dispersed tribal coalitions.

Eventually, the agha of Algiers, the chief officer of the janissaries, made himself independent with the title of dey. Although tribute was sent to Istanbul in exchange for the sultan's political and ideological support and the right to recruit janissaries in Anatolia, from 1659 to 1830 Algeria was ruled by the deys and the local Turkish janissaries. The sons of Turkish soldiers and local women, called *kulughlis*, were in principle excluded from the janissary corps but served as subordinate militias. The dey was elected by the officers to administer the city of Algiers and its agricultural environs. The rest of the country was divided into three regions – Constantine, Mascara, and Titteri – governed by representatives of the dey, who were called beys. To subdistricts within their jurisdiction the beys named *qaʾids*, who controlled the local tribal leaders, levied taxes, settled judicial disputes, and presided over the markets. Apart from the judicial administration, there is little evidence for a large *ʿulamaʾ* establishment or for state sponsorship of a Muslim education system. There was no institution in Algeria comparable to the Qarawiyin college of Fez or the Zaytuna Mosque of Tunis.

Apart from zones of direct administration, the people were organized under the authority of religious and tribal chieftains. Many of the local chiefs were Sufis. Because the state could not control the tribal populations, it allowed *zawiya shaykhs* to assume political functions, such as arbitration in tribal disputes and collection of taxes, and to maintain their own soldiers. To win their support, the Algerian regime endowed mosques and tombs, appointed them to judicial positions, and gave them land and tax revenues. The Sufi-organized tribal communities were particularly important on the Moroccan frontier. The Turkish-Algerian regime also required all persons wishing to trade or work in the marketplace to have a permit issued by the agha of the janissaries. The Kabyle region, in particular, was dependent on these permits because it was overpopulated and relied on the export of olive oil, figs, craft

products, and surplus labor for survival. In southern Algeria the government controlled the movements of pastoralists by manipulating the price of grain and levying a tax on each camel load. To collect taxes the government also had recourse to military expeditions to coerce the local population. Some districts, such as the Kabyle, Aurès, and the Sahara, remained fully autonomous.

In the course of the sixteenth century privateering was a flourishing enterprise. Algerian corsairs, often manned by Turkish and Greek seamen, seized European ships at sea, confiscated their goods, and sold their crews into slavery. Portions of the booty went to support the government and repay merchants who helped finance the ventures, but there was also a great increase in the number of mosques and pious foundations endowed by the earnings of the corsairs.

By the eighteenth century, the dominance of the state was greatly diminished. Algerian naval power and sea revenues declined, fewer recruits came from Anatolia, and modern weapons were more widely dispersed. As the state depended increasingly on Jewish, French, and English merchants, its legitimacy was compromised. In the decades between 1800 and 1830 there were Sufi-led rebellions by the Darqawa, the Qadiriyya, and the Tijaniyya brotherhoods. The Tijaniyya represented a kind of Islam with deep roots in North African popular culture. Founded by Ahmad al-Tijani (1737–1815) and carried by numerous deputies, the central Tijani teaching was the concept of the *hadrat*, the stages of the metaphysical cosmos and of the ascent to the divine essence, which is suffused by the light of Muhammad, the divine light that can only be approached through the mediation of the Prophet. The devotees must believe that the *shaykhs* of the brotherhood, their litanies, or their tombs open the way to heaven. Such beliefs and the organized brotherhoods that espoused them were a powerful political force. In the early nineteenth century the balance of power between a limited central government and the Sufi brotherhoods was turned against the Turkish state. This was the moment for the French invasion of 1830.

Morocco: The Marinid and Saʿdian states

The Almoravids and Almohads created the basis for a Moroccan territorial state. Morocco would go through successive cycles of political consolidation and decline as the Marinid, Saʿdian, and ʿAlawi dynasties in turn captured the state and lost control to other forces.

The Marinids were the dominant group in a coalition of Zenata Berbers who overthrew the Almohads and conquered Morocco between 1244 and 1274. The Marinids built Fez Jadid in 1275 as a military and administrative residence for the ruler and his family, officials, and troops. Here were quartered Castilian or Catalonian militias. The dynasty was supported by a coalition of Moroccan tribes that included the Banu Marin; the Banu Maʾqil, who controlled the territory south of the Atlas; and various Zenata Berber chieftains in the Atlas region. Government control was effective on the plains of central and northern Morocco, but not in the mountain regions. To legitimize the regime, the Friday prayers were first said in the name of the Hafsid caliphs; the Marinid princes claimed the title of *amir al-muslimin*. Gradually, however, they abandoned Almohad doctrine and simply claimed to be the protectors of Sunni Islam. They favored *ʿulamaʾ* and madrasa forms of religious instruction. In 1437 they attempted to co-opt the legitimacy attached to descendants of the Prophet by their discovery of the tomb of Idris II and the creation of a Marinid-sponsored cult around his tomb.

The Marinid regime, however, was undermined by a variety of economic problems. In the course of the fourteenth century there were profound changes in the pattern of international trade that were detrimental to Moroccan prosperity. The kingdom of Mali entered into competition for the southern sectors of the Sahara-Sudan routes and helped revitalize competing trade routes via Tlemcen, Bougie, Tunis, and Egypt, which substantially cut into Morocco's share of the profitable traffic. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ships from Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Marseille, Catalonia, and Aragon regularly traded in Moroccan ports. Morocco imported metals, hardware, textiles, woolens, spices, and wine and exported leather,

hides, carpets, wool, coral, grain, slaves, and sugar, but from the beginning of the fifteenth century it was damaged by Portuguese efforts to establish their political and commercial supremacy in the western Mediterranean. In 1415 the Portuguese seized Ceuta and in 1471 Tangiers. Between 1486 and 1550 they established themselves on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. The Portuguese did not use their forts for further inland conquests. Rather, they moved along the African coast, opening the way for direct trade with Sudanic Africa.

Even in the short term, the Portuguese threat brought about both a crisis of economy and one of political legitimacy. Within Morocco the precarious balance between the state and tribal forces shifted in favor of the latter. Already Hilali Arabs had pushed their way into the Sus and Saharan regions of Morocco and had done severe damage to agriculture. The Banu Ma'qil took control of Sijilmassa and created their own small empire south of the Atlas. Marrakesh fell into the control of tribal chiefs. The Wattasids, originally tribal allies of the Marinids, became regents for the dynasty in 1428 and then assumed the sultanate from 1472 to 1549. Under the Wattasids the weakness of the central state allowed nomadic peoples to make further gains at the expense of peasant cultivation and permitted the Portuguese to seize and fortify numerous coastal ports.

The economic and political regression of Morocco in the Marinid and Wattasid periods led to the rise of Sufism. Moroccan Sufis were generally religious scholars living in village communities. A typical Moroccan Sufi of the fourteenth century combined knowledge of mysticism and law, literate scholarship, and esoteric practices. In the Moroccan ideal of the time the perfected Sufi was a symbol of the religious qualities of the Prophet, who was in turn a symbol of the reality of God. The Sufi was venerated not in his person but as a symbol of the *surat al-muhammadiyya* – the laudable qualities that belong to the spiritual universe and are concentrated in the person of the Prophet. Sufis were affiliated with *zawiyas* as centers of worship and teaching, but in this period they did not have political functions.

In the fifteenth century, however, Sufism became crucial for organizing local self-defense and mobilizing popular resistance to the Portuguese. Sufis became the leaders of local tribal coalitions,

and the scale of Sufi organization was greatly enlarged by the introduction of the Sufi orders. Under the inspiration of Abu ʿAbdallah Muhammad al-Jazuli (d. 1465), master *zawiyas* created satellite communities, or combined into single brotherhoods based on shared spiritual lineages. Loyalty to the *shaykhs*, shared *dhikrs* (chanting of the name of God), and ceremonies of initiation bound together the members of the brotherhoods.

Sufi authority was also buttressed by the acceptance of a new concept of religious authority. In addition to authority based on the imitation of the Prophet, descent was taken to assure religious sanctity. The descendants of the Prophet (*shurafaʾ*) were already a privileged caste in local society, supported by religious endowments and organized under the leadership of a *naqib*, who acted as judge, maintained records, and represented the interests of the group. With the decline of the Marinid state, the *shurafaʾ* claimed the right to oversee political affairs. Ever after, Moroccan Sufis and princes would claim *sharifian* descent.

The authority of the Sufis and the *shurafaʾ* challenged both tribal and state concepts of the political order and allowed for the creation of local coalitions on the basis of tribal allegiances to the Sufi orders. Henceforth, no Moroccan regime could come to power or maintain itself without integrating this new concept of authority and the organizational form in which it was embedded into its own political practice.

By the fifteenth century, then, Morocco, like Tunisia and Algeria, was a society with a central state and a Sufi-led rural population. In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the central regime temporarily broke down, and Sufi-led communities became the dominant force, but in the late sixteenth century the Moroccan state was seized by the Saʿdians and restored to a precarious sovereignty. The Saʿdians had their origins in a local jihad led by Muhammad al-Mahdi against the Portuguese fortress of Agadir. The holy war gathered the support of Sufi and tribal chiefs, and Muhammad was elected amir of the Sus. From the Sus the Saʿdians conquered and ruled all of Morocco from 1554 to 1659.

Whereas Algeria and Tunisia were shaped by Ottoman institutions, the Saʿdians provided Morocco with another type of Islamic regime. Like that of the Ottomans, the authority of the new regime rested on its service to Islam in the holy war, but the Saʿdians claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad and thus identified themselves with a concept that had, in the course of the fifteenth century, become central to Moroccan notions of political authority. This descent was conceived partly in genealogical terms, partly in terms of devotion to the teachings of the Prophet, and partly in terms of the symbolic embodiment of divine virtues.

The Saʿdians linked themselves to the Sufis by the discovery of the tomb of Mawlay Idris II in Fez in 1437 and by encouragement of a popular cult. They also moved the body of al-Jazuli, who had popularized the teaching of Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili, to Marrakesh to symbolize the formation of a coalition of Sufi brotherhoods around the venerated tomb. The Saʿdians appealed to the Sufi brotherhoods, because they too claimed physical and spiritual closeness to Muhammad and gave the common people a worshipful closeness to the principal figure in their religion. The celebration of the Prophet's birthday gave added import to the political claims of the dynasty.

Sultan al-Mansur (1578–1603) also tried to embellish the ritual paraphernalia of his office by introducing a more elaborate court ceremonial. In the absence of Ottoman institutions, the sultans ruled not only by administrative means but also by the *baraka* (power of blessing) derived from *sharifian* descent, by dynastic inheritance, and by elective authority conferred by tribe, city, and the army. Thus the Saʿdian sultanate embodied Islamic religious unity and authority in a territory dominated by tribal and Sufi concepts of society. In this regard Moroccan authority resembled that of the Safavids rather than the Ottomans.

Al-Mansur emerged as the great organizer of the regime. He conquered Timbuktu and thus gained direct access to the gold of the western Sudan. He expanded the army from its Berber tribal base to include mercenaries from Spain, Turkey, and Africa who were

competent in the use of firearms. In 1603 there were 4,000 European renegades, 4,000 Andalusians, and 1,500 Turks in an army of some 40,000. Modern artillery units were incorporated. Fortifications capable of mounting artillery were built at Taza, Fez, and Marrakesh. England and the Netherlands, in their shared enmity to Habsburg Spain, provided Morocco with ships, cannons, and powder. Al-Mansur also built up a civil administration, called the Makhzan. Loyal tribes enabled the regime to control the plains of northern Morocco and the Atlantic coastal regions.

Despite the favorable economic conditions, the Moroccan state broke down on the death of al-Mansur. Saʿdian princes established separate regimes at Fez and Marrakesh; Sufi chiefs created independent principalities. In the ensuing struggles for power, the brothers Maulay Muhammad and Maulay Rashid, leaders of a *sharifian* faction in Tafilalt, triumphed over other factions and established the dynasty that governs Morocco to the present day.

The ʿAlawi dynasty to the French protectorate

Like the Saʿdians, the ʿAlawis came to power on the basis of the religious legitimacy provided by descent from the Prophet and war against the infidels. Maulay Ismaʿil (1672–1727) was the first great ruler of the dynasty. He reconstructed the centralized state by building up a professional army of some 30,000 to 50,000 slaves. These slaves were probably recruited from the existing Moroccan slave population and from the subordinate, client tribes called *haratin*. The slave army was supplemented by the tribes who furnished troops in return for tax exemptions and rights to land. High government functionaries were recruited from the dominant tribes and from the town bourgeoisies, including the leading families of Fez and families of Andalusian descent. *ʿUlama'* filled the offices of judge, market inspector, administrator of intestate properties, and other posts. In the provinces the government was represented by *qa'ids*, who varied in power from subordinate functionaries to independent local lords.

Despite the ostensible strength of the central government, it had limited power in the provinces. Although rural peoples did not question the sultan's authority, in practice defiance of his power was the norm. In principle the Sufi leaders were also subordinate to the authority of the central government, but in fact they remained independent. Sufi chiefs played an important role in trade, and their headquarters were commonly located along trade routes or along the boundaries between tribal groups, where they could facilitate traffic and negotiate disputes. The *zawiyas* were also centers of agriculture and provided educational and judicial services. A *zawiya* was at once a hotel, a hospital, a school, a market, a mosque, a court of law, and a refuge. Nonetheless, the ʿAlawis tried to overcome Sufi influence by using the authority of the sultan over religious activities. They took over the right to ratify succession to the chieftainships of the *zawiyas* and the control of their properties, and they conferred on the Sufis both spiritual titles and land and revenues. The relation of the Sufi orders to governments was a complicated combination of antagonism and cooperation. In some cases the Sufi orders helped the state consolidate its authority; in others they resisted.

Sufi influence continued to expand as new brotherhoods were founded throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. These included the Nasiriyya, which claimed to represent the purest Islamic orthodoxy. Its rituals consisted of supplementary prayers and the recitation of the profession of faith, "There is no God but God," a thousand times a day. Its chiefs refused to use the name of the ʿAlawi sultan in the Friday prayers on the grounds that it was blasphemous to mention a human being in the course of divine supplication. The Darqawa, founded in the late eighteenth century, denounced the pointless repetition of prayers and sought to restore direct communication with the divine being through a prayer and dance designed to induce religious ecstasy.

The ʿAlawis were able to consolidate their power with the help of economic resources gained from trade with Europe and the Sudan. They first captured the Portuguese forts along the Atlantic coast and then, in 1591, seized Timbuktu and took control of the trans-Saharan

region. Moroccan sugar was an important source of royal revenues. The industry was owned by the sultans, managed by Jews and European Christians, and operated by slave labor. As early as the late thirteenth century, Moroccan sugar was being exported to Flanders, Venice, and later to Spain, but in the seventeenth century new plantations in Madeira, the Canary Islands, and the Americas squeezed Morocco out of the international market.

In the eighteenth century Morocco was exporting large numbers of slaves in return for cloth, leather, silk, jewelry, iron, lead, and weapons, and European-derived tea, coffee, sugar, paper, tin, copper utensils, and Indian spices. Britain and France were Morocco's principal trading partners, but dyes came from Spain, and woolen goods, other textiles, spices, and metals came from Holland. Italy supplied alum and artisanal products. From the eastern Mediterranean came silk, cotton, and opium. Salé was the most frequented port, but Agadir and then Mogador were important for the contacts between Europe, the Sus, and the Sudan. Trade, however, did not necessarily benefit the central government, because it could be organized by tribal confederations under religious protection. Local *shurafa'* played an important part in providing the liaisons and guarantees of security for caravans. For example, descendants of Maulay Isma'il, residing in the fortresses of Tafilalt, had a monopoly on guiding caravan traffic to Touat.

In the nineteenth century European trade led to the economic penetration of the country. In 1856 Morocco was forced by British pressure to conclude a treaty, which opened the country to free trade on the basis of a 10 percent customs duty. After the middle of the century the Europeans were no longer content to maintain a strictly commercial relationship and tried to directly control the means of production. They began to purchase land, extend loans at high rates of interest, and take Moroccans under extraterritorial protection. Also, Moroccan exports declined after the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the introduction of steamships and railroads that made it possible for American, Russian, and Australian producers to provide wheat and wool to European markets in competition with Moroccan products. The Moroccan Saharan trade also dwindled, owing to

French expansion in West Africa that drew Sudanic and Saharan goods to Atlantic ports.

As a result, elements of the Moroccan population prospered while others suffered. A new Moroccan bourgeoisie, including the merchant intermediaries between the European and the local markets and a host of petty traders and retailers, prospered. Customs officials and other functionaries also profited from trade. The merchants of Fez maintained their dominant position, and Fassi families established colonies in Manchester, Marseille, Genoa, and French West Africa. The Fez textile industry survived European competition by cultivating new Middle Eastern, African, and domestic markets. The production of straw mats, rugs, carpets, and wool blankets, as well as the building trades, also continued to prosper. Other Moroccan crafts suffered from European competition. Imported products destroyed cotton farming and manufacturing and the Moroccan shoe industry. The Moroccan state was among the economic losers.

Faced with declining revenues, power, and territory, Sultan Hasan (1873–95) attempted to reform the army by means of military instructors and weapons obtained from Europe, and to reform the state bureaucracy by a reorganization of provincial administration. He also proposed to improve the economic infrastructure of the country by building bridges and railroads and by establishing cotton and sugar plantations. These reforms had only a limited success. Most of the religious and political elite opposed them as infringements of tradition and law; the European powers were hostile to changes that might reduce their economic privileges.

Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century, Berbers pushed government forces out of the Middle and Central Atlas. The High Atlas fell into the hands of the quasi-independent great *qa'ids*. By the end of the century the central government controlled scarcely a third of the land and about half of the population, concentrated in the plains of eastern Morocco, the Rif, Fez, and the Atlantic zones from Tangiers to the Atlas. Even in these regions local chieftains were often paramount. To maintain his influence, the ruler commonly had to move a small army into noncomplying or rebellious territory,

camp, live off the resources of the country, and compel payment of taxes in arrears. The local people were thus put under pressure to save their crops; the sultan, however, was also under pressure to conclude an agreement so that he could move on to another rebellious district. Religious chieftains would mediate between the tribes and the ruler until some kind of deal was made.

This kind of polity was scarcely able to resist European colonization. Between 1899 and 1912 the French occupied Morocco, abetted by diplomatic agreements with Italy, Spain, Britain, and eventually Germany. To consolidate their gains, the French manipulated the various players in the Moroccan political system. Thus in the region of Touat, faced with French intervention, local chiefs demanded that the sultan wage jihad, but at the same time they resisted his efforts to collect taxes. The shortage of revenues made the sultan dependent on French financial support, and in turn he lost legitimacy in the eyes of local people, who then felt justified in yielding to French military superiority. The autonomy of local officials, religious leaders, and chiefs made it impossible for Morocco to put up a unified resistance to French aggression.

The sultan's efforts to increase the power of the state only played into the hands of the French. From 1901 to 1903 Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz tried to strengthen the central government by implementing a new tax on agriculture and livestock, and by the appointment of new officials to assure the collection of taxes. He proposed to tax tribes, religious leaders, government officials, and others hitherto exempt. The opposition of the rural notables and the *'ulama'*, however, was resolute, and 'Abd al-'Aziz was forced instead to mortgage the customs revenues and borrow heavily from the French. For this he was greeted with widespread revolt and a revolution that deposed him in favor of his brother 'Abd al-Hafiz.

The intervention of the *'ulama'* was a novelty in Moroccan history. Traditionally the Moroccan *'ulama'* were a group of officials but not an organized corporate body. The chief *qadi* of Fez named the professors of the major mosques and colleges and controlled their endowed properties. For more than half a century, however, the government had been increasing its control over the appointment of

judges and professors and of madrasa graduates who entered the state bureaucracy. Nonetheless, after 1900 many *'ulama'* joined the opposition because they could not accept the collaboration of the sultan with the French, his failure to protect Moroccan territory, and his tax reforms, loans, and European advisors. The result of *'ulama'* and rural tribal opposition was the loss of independence and the declaration of French and Spanish protectorates in 1912.

Chapter 29 States and Islam: North African variations

From the origins of the Islamic era to the nineteenth century, the history of North African society turned on two essential motifs: state formation and Islamization. The Arab conquests gave new impetus to state formation and to the organization of North African society into Muslim communities. Tunisia in the eighth century, Morocco in the eleventh, and Algeria in the sixteenth acquired territorial identity and state regimes. The conquests also led to the institutionalization of Islam for the masses of the population. From the eighth century, the Maliki school of law became rooted throughout North Africa and remained the mainstay of legal administration, education, and state legitimization until the nineteenth century. From about the twelfth century, Sufis became the chieftains of rural communities in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco and the leaders of tribal coalitions, in parallel with and in opposition to states. Much of the history of North Africa from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries may be defined in terms of the relations between state and Sufi forces. Finally, the Arab conquests also gave North Africa an Arab identity due to successive waves of Arab migration, and Arab dominance of states. Large parts of southern Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, however, were primarily Berber. Only in the twentieth century would Arabic become the universal language of societies that had been Muslim since the Almohad era.

   Each society, however, exhibited its own variations on state, religious, and tribal institutions. At the time of the Arab conquests, Tunisia was already the center of a developed civilization and remained throughout its history a society marked by a highly developed agricultural and commercial economy governed by an aristocracy of landowners, merchants, and urban intellectuals. Tunisia in the early Muslim era, like the Middle East, maintained its inherited institutional base but accepted an Islamic version of ancient

civilization. Under the early Arab and Aghlabid governors a caliphal type of administration and the Maliki school of law flourished. The Hafsid regime adopted the sultanal type of administration and *'ulama'* and Sufi forms of Islam. With the Ottoman conquest at the end of the sixteenth century, Ottoman janissary and administrative institutions and the Ottoman type of *'ulama'* bureaucracy modified the structure of the Tunisian state. Throughout this era Tunisia maintained its state institutions, despite a large pastoral and tribal population in the southern parts of the country, and despite constant fluctuations in the balance of power between the state and the tribal parts of the society. Until the nineteenth century Tunisia was in all respects a provincial variant of the Middle Eastern Islamic world.

Algeria has a different history. As a whole it remained without state organization well into the Islamic era, although it supported a number of local dynasties, such as the Hammadids, on the basis of a share of Saharan and European trade. These regimes, however, never controlled the whole of the territory and gave way readily to tribal opposition. A stable state was finally introduced by the Ottomans, who provided a ready-made military elite, administrative cadres who were supervised from Istanbul, and the rudiments of a religious bureaucracy. The concepts of jihad against Christians and of sultanal authority served to legitimize this regime.

At first the Algerian regime was confined to the city-state of Algiers and was based on privateering and on direct support from Istanbul, but progressively Algiers established its own administrative, tax-collecting, and judicial authority over a large territory. Ottoman-Turkish authority came to be recognized throughout Algeria, although it was not uniformly effective. Provincial, tribal, and Sufi resistance, however, grew in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus Algeria resembled Ottoman Syria and Iraq, where a centralized state governed a segmented society. The Ottoman-Algerian regime succeeded in creating an Algerian territorial and administrative identity, while the spread of Sufism among rural populations gave it Islamic identity.

The history of Morocco shows a third variation on the theme of Islam and state formation in a highly fragmented society. Although

Volubilis was the capital of a Roman province, Morocco on the eve of the Arab conquests had neither territorial identity nor a history of centralized regimes. A number of local principalities emerged in the wake of the Arab conquests, based on the personal religious authority of the rulers, but from the eighth to the eleventh centuries the process of state formation was inhibited by internal fragmentation and external Fatimid and Umayyad interventions. The Almoravid conquests began the process of creating the territorial base for a Moroccan state. The Almoravids, the first of a series of conquest regimes set up by coalitions of tribal peoples from the south united on the basis of religious principles, were succeeded by the Almohads, the Marinids, the Sa'dians, and the 'Alawis, each of whom was legitimized by an appeal to the charismatic authority of the ruler, although this authority was articulated in different ways. In the Almoravid and Almohad cases, the leaders were heads of reform movements. Later Sa'dian and 'Alawi rulers possessed the *baraka* of descent from the Prophet and were believed to have the charismatic powers of Sufi saints. They were also regarded as caliphs, successors to the Prophet in the defense and administration of an Islamic society. The sultan was at once caliph, imam, *sharif*, *wali*, and *mujtahid*. He had important ritual roles at the Muslim holidays and shared in the national veneration for religious leaders.

Moroccan sultans, however, did not have a monopoly of religious legitimacy but shared *sharifian* descent and Sufi *baraka* with other religious leaders. This sharing of authority was both supportive and competitive. It was supportive in that the Sufis provided the sultans with a cultural basis for their claims to worldly authority. It was competitive in that the sources of moral judgment and political authority were independent of the state and dispersed among many individuals in the society. This dispersion meant that Morocco could not easily create a unified national regime.

The highly personal nature of the Moroccan monarchy assured its legitimacy and historical continuity but was also a source of weakness. Power was effected by means of personal contacts between the ruler and his clients. The highly personal nature of the state implied weak institutions. The central regime was supported by

household administration and by mercenary and slave soldiers, but the *makhzan*, or coalition of independent, tribal, or Sufi power holders supplying military forces to the regime, was crucial to its effectiveness. With the help of the *makhzan* the government could control the towns and the central plains, but not the mountains and the deserts. Morocco thus preserved a distinctive territorial and monarchical identity, based on the personal religious authority of the sultans. This differed from Tunisia, which combined a Muslim statist concept of political legitimacy with centralized political administration, and from Algeria, which had a highly developed central government but a weak sense of political identity.

There are several reasons for the failure to consolidate a central Moroccan state. Although Morocco was a relatively wealthy region, its agricultural and commercial sectors were small in comparison to its pastoral populations. Successive bedouin invasions destroyed peasant village life. Furthermore, the weakness of the state made it difficult to collect regular taxes. To supplement poor tax revenues the sultans attempted to exploit long-distance trade, but rival Moroccan chiefs, and Sudanese, Algerian, and European competitors, appropriated important shares. Although Moroccan dynasties often came to power on the basis of control of trade, it proved impossible to monopolize trade revenues for extended periods.

A related factor was the weakness of the urban bureaucratic, commercial, and intellectual elites. Andalusian minorities provided the cadres of administration. Without links to either the rural or urban masses, however, they could serve only as secretaries. The *‘ulama’*, also, were merely a slim stratum of the population, dependent on the sultans, restricted to the urban areas, and without politically potent ties to the common people. They also had to compete for religious prestige with the sultans, the saintly lineages, and the Sufi brotherhoods.

The corollary of the weakness of the sedentary society was the strength of autonomous tribal and Sufi groups. Their independence was enhanced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by their access to European weapons. The effort to control the tribes and Sufi coalitions was continually subverted by intra-elite struggles for

power and by the need to make fiscal, territorial, and other concessions to pacify communities that could not be defeated. In any case, Moroccan tribes were themselves unstable constellations. They used the patrilineal idiom, but they did not have a firm hierarchy or permanent constituencies. Tribal chieftainships were temporary positions subject to a constant competition for power. Sufi lineages and coalitions were similarly unstable, for the power of Sufis was personal rather than organizational and depended on the voluntary adherence of the tribes to the saints.

The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a period of protracted crisis for North African–Muslim societies. Their Ottoman suzerain could no longer protect them. Their states were no longer capable of exerting close political control or of generating large revenues and strong armies. Their economies were increasingly in bondage to Europe. The decline of economic power made them prey to French conquest and French protectorates.

Islam in Asia

Chapter 30 Introduction: Empires and societies

Within the global framework of Muslim regimes and societies, the great Muslim empires of the Middle East and South Asia – the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal – were linked by shared historical, ethnic, and cultural traditions. Western scholarship has been preoccupied by their similarities and differences from the states of Western Europe. Karl Wittfogal's *Oriental Despotism* characterized Asian empires as centralized, authoritarian, monolithic, and despotic regimes that governed subordinate and supine societies; as opposed to Western societies, which were seen as ruled by law (rather than tyrants). The West was the domain of autonomous classes (nobility, clergy, and bourgeoisies), of autonomous collective institutions (communes, councils, parliaments, courts, guilds, and other corporations), and of free men.

This extreme dichotomy is challenged by revisionist scholars. In recent work, East and West are no longer seen as having separate histories. They develop in the same global context. As early as the eleventh or thirteenth century, depending on different authors, there was already a global system of political and economic interactions. War and trade brought empires and states into close interaction and awareness of technological, military and administrative, intellectual, scientific, and artistic developments. In both Asian and European societies, there was a trend toward the consolidation of centralized states that dominated local nobles, warlords, tribes, and other potentially autonomous forces. This was partly due to new military tactics (the use of gunpowder weapons), international trade, and new financial and administrative methods. Competition among these states and empires led to intensified warfare and new military technologies, mobilization of resources from the population (or simple exploitation), and sometimes the promotion of economic development. International trade was also a powerful factor in the

interrelated growth of early modern empires. From the fourteenth century onward, throughout Eurasia, political regimes were becoming larger, more powerful, and more centralized.

Furthermore, although centralized to different degrees, both Asian and European states were engaged in fluid political interactions with other forces in their societies – military officers, administrators, landowners, merchants, and religious spokesmen – who were at least partially independent and on whose cooperation imperial regimes depended. More recent studies understand state formation as a negotiated process involving subordinate or subaltern elites. Empires are understood, as they are in this book, as built on networks of political relationships with regional and local forces. Islamic-Asian and Islamic-African states, as much as European states, governed by means of ever-shifting negotiated relationships with their political constituencies. All Eurasian empires depended on the collaboration of independent or quasi-independent elites, and on legitimacy, consensus, and the support of their populations. In some revisionist studies, however, royal authority and military and administrative powers are dissolved into an infinitely flexible system of negotiations, which may underestimate the power of the central states and the long-term historical importance of the institutional distinctions between South and West Asian empires and Europe. In some European states the legal rights of nobles, the autonomy of the churches, bourgeois corporations, and popular communes were the basis for the emergence of parliamentary governments and for exceptional economic development.

In the succeeding chapters, we will first examine the institutions and operations of the early-modern-era Islamic empires of South and West Asia: the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the Balkans (1281–1924), the Safavid Empire in Iran (1501–1732), and the Mughal Empire in India (1526–1858). All three were built on the legacy of the Timurid Empire (1370–1526), and on both Iranian and Inner Asian governmental practices. The Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal empires had similar institutions for succession, military recruitment, patrimonial or bureaucratic administration, and relations of central

government and local elites. In conclusion, we will compare the similarities and differences among them.

Chapter 31 The Turkish migrations and the Ottoman Empire

Turkish-Islamic states in Anatolia (1071–1243)

The Turkish migrations that gave rise to the Saljuq, Mongol, and Timurid empires in Iran also gave birth to a succession of Western Muslim empires. Oghuz peoples pushed their way into Georgia, Armenia, and Byzantine Anatolia, bringing Islam into territories not hitherto reached by the Arab conquests or Muslim expansion. At the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, the Turks captured the Byzantine emperor, Romanos I. In the next century, they spread across Asia Minor.

The migrating peoples were organized into small bands of warriors (*ghazi*s) under the leadership of chieftains (beys) or Sufi holy men (*babas*). Veneration of the chiefs and the desire to find rich pasturage, gather booty, and win victories against the infidels in the name of Islam held them together. The migrants did extensive damage to the countryside and cut off cities from their hinterlands and trading connections, but Turkish expansion was soon counterbalanced by the formation of states that attempted to stabilize and reconstruct the region.

Anatolia came under the Saljuq sultanate of Rum (c. 1077–c. 1308), whose rulers were remote relatives of the Saljuqs of Baghdad, with its capital at Konya. The Saljuqs of Rum, like earlier Middle Eastern Muslim states, employed Turkish nomadic forces but built up a large standing army of Turkish and Christian slaves and mercenaries. The administration was composed of Iranian scribes. In the early thirteenth century, a fiscal survey was taken, and tax revenue grants (*iqta'*) were distributed in return for military service. The Saljuqs appointed provincial governors. Energetic efforts were

made to sedentarize and extract taxes from the pastoral population. The Saljuqs built caravansaries and encouraged maritime commerce on the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean. Still, there were many regions in tribal hands and a number of minor principalities outside of Saljuq control.

The Saljuqs built up the infrastructure of Sunni Islam by inviting scholars from Iran to settle in Anatolia. Judges were appointed, colleges were endowed, and funds were provided for the education of converts. The money came primarily from levies on Christian villages and expropriated ecclesiastical properties. The Saljuqs also attempted to bring independent Sufi fraternities under government influence by providing them with schools, hospices, and endowments. Sufis were particularly important in Anatolia. Members of the Qalandariyya, Rifaʿiyya, and other Sufi brotherhoods came into Anatolia from Inner Asia and eastern Iran; some were driven westward by the Mongol invasions. The Sufi *babas* helped bring new territories into cultivation. They built hospices, schools, and mills; planted orchards; provided for the safety of travelers; and mediated disputes among tribes. Thus, they brought order into a fragmented warrior society.

Rural Sufis also adopted a tolerant attitude toward Christians and facilitated the conversion of Greeks and Armenians to Islam. Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1297), who was widely revered in Anatolia, synthesized Sunni and Shiʿi beliefs and Muslim and Christian religious practices. Urban religious fraternities – groups of unmarried young men devoted to the youth (*futuwwa*) ethic of bravery and hospitality (known as *akhis*) – recruited from the artisan and merchant strata of the population, organized commerce among towns and between towns and rural areas, protected people from abuse, and gave charity to strangers and the poor. These fraternities were closely allied to the Mevlevi order, whose Friday prayers and common meals were a focus of town life.

In 1242–43, the Mongol invasions destroyed the existing urbanization and sedentarization. The Mongols defeated the Saljuqs, made them vassals, and tipped the balance of power in Anatolia from the central state back to the pastoral warrior populations. Large

numbers of new migrants entered Anatolia in the 1230s and settled on the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire. Small groups of warriors, nomads, refugees, adventurers, and bandits, eager for booty and glory in the holy war, resumed the struggle against the Byzantine Empire and founded new principalities. The most important of these new states were the Karaman beylik in Cilicia, which in 1335 made Konya its capital and claimed to inherit Saljuq authority; the dynasty of Dulgadir in the northern reaches of the Euphrates River; and Menteshe and Germiyan in the region of Kutahya.

The absorption of the former Byzantine territories by Turkish-Muslim conquerors led to the Islamization of Anatolia. Before the Turkish migrations, the vast majority of the Greek, Armenian, Georgian, and Syrian populations of Anatolia were Christians. By the end of the fifteenth century, the great majority was Muslim. Some of this change was due to the immigration of a large Muslim population and the ravages of war, but in great part it was due to the conversion of Christians to Islam. These conversions reflected the weakening of the Byzantine state and the Greek Orthodox Church. In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Turks excluded bishops and metropolitans from their sees. Church revenues and properties were confiscated. Hospitals, schools, orphanages, and monasteries were destroyed or abandoned, and the Anatolian Christian population was left without leadership and social services. Muslim holy men appealed to a demoralized Christian population by presenting Islam as a syncretism of Muslim and Christian religious beliefs. Jesus and Christian holy places were venerated by Muslims. Byzantine princes, lords, and administrators were tempted to convert to Islam in order to join the Turkish elite. At the same time, the Saljuq state and the Turkish emirates built palaces, mosques, colleges, caravansaries, and hospitals, supported by endowments and staffed with Persian and Arab scholars.

The rise of the Ottomans (C. 1280–1453): from *ghazi* state to empire

The Ottoman state arose as one of the Turkish principalities on the Byzantine frontier. Its ruling dynasty would hold power from 1300 to 1924. In its early period, the Ottomans were bands of frontier raiders (*ghazi*) under the leadership of the Ottoman family. The frontier warriors, however, were not ideological, and the Ottomans developed a network of alliances with local tribes, farmers, and townspeople; Muslim dervishes; and Christian lords. This was superseded in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by a centralized patrimonial state based on slave elites and *timar* (quasi-feudal grants of tax revenue equivalent to *iqtaʿs*) holding soldiers, and on an imperial ideology. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the centralized empire evolved into a network regime in which provincial notables played an ever-growing role in the empire's military, landholding, mercantile, and tax-collecting arrangements. The nineteenth century was marked by a renewed concentration of power at the center. Through all these changes in the political apparatus, the dynasty survived and maintained its authority. (See Table 13.)

Table 13. *The Ottoman dynasty*

Accession date	Sultan
1281	Osman
1324	Orhan
1360	Murad I
1389	Bayazid I
1402	Interregnum
1413	Mehmed I

Accession date	Sultan
1421	Murad II (first reign)
1444	Mehmed II the Conqueror (first reign)
1446	Murad II (second reign)
1451	Mehmed II the Conqueror (second reign)
1481	Bayazid II
1512	Selim I
1520	Suleyman I ("the Law-Giver" or "the Magnificent")
1566	Selim II
1574	Murad III
1594	Mehmed III
1603	Ahmed I
1617	Mustafa I (first reign)
1618	Osman II
1622	Mustafa I (second reign)
1623	Murad IV
1640	Ibrahim

Accession date	Sultan
1648	Mehmed IV
1678	Suleyman II
1691	Ahmad II
1695	Mustafa II
1703	Ahmed III
1730	Mahmud I
1754	Osman III
1757	Mustafa III
1774	'Abdul-Hamid I
1789	Selim III
1807	Mustafa IV
1808	Mahmud II
1839	'Abdul-Majid I
1861	'Abdul-Aziz
1876	Murad V
1876	'Abdul-Hamid II

Accession date	Sultan
1909	Mehmed V Rashid
1918	Mehmed VI Wahid al-Din
1922–24	ʿAbdul-Majid II (as caliph only)

The Ottoman dynasty was initiated by frontier warriors under the leadership of Ertugrul (d. c. 1280) and his son Osman, who gave his name to the dynasty. Struggling for control of pasturage, they expanded their domains from hills to plains, and in 1326 Orhan, son of Osman, seized the important towns of Bursa and Iznik. In 1345 he crossed the straits from Anatolia to the Balkans. Having established a foothold in Europe, the Ottomans occupied northern Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Ottoman control of the western Balkans was decisively established by their victory at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The papacy and a coalition of European powers tried in 1396 and again in 1444 to push back the Ottomans but were defeated both times.

Then, on the basis of their European empire, the Ottomans began to annex rival Turkish principalities in western Anatolia. Ottoman expansion was temporarily set back in 1402 by the invasion of Timur, who defeated Bayazid I (r. 1389–1402) and reduced the Ottoman state to vassalage. The Ottomans, however, survived this defeat and continued to enlarge their domains in both Anatolia and Serbia. By 1449, the Ottomans had reached the Danube and in the next half century would absorb Greece, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Albania. In 1453, they conquered Constantinople, a triumph that fulfilled an age-old Muslim ambition to inherit the domains of the Roman Empire. (See Map 14.)

Map 14. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire, c. 1280–1683.

Ottoman institutions were based on the Saljuq state in Anatolia and the Byzantine Empire. The regime was built on Turkish chiefs, religious leaders (such as Turkish *babas* and dervishes), Greek warlords and castle chieftains, and former Byzantine civil servants and Christian nobles who were integrated into the Ottoman armies and administration. Ottoman elites intermarried with Christian nobles. The courts of the Ottoman sultans brought together Muslim scholars, Sufi teachers, and Christian and Jewish theologians. The Ottomans inherited Middle Eastern practices such as the slave military corps and *iqta'* form of administration. Reflecting its conquests, some administrative practices, some architectural styles, patronage of Christian churches, the guild system, and controls over the provincial economy were integrated from Byzantine precedents.

The Ottoman conquests in the Balkans also established Muslim hegemony over large Christian populations but did not lead, as in Anatolia, to substantial conversion of the populations to Islam. In the Balkans, the Turkish-Muslim presence was first established by Turkish migrants who entered Thrace, the Maritsa Valley, northern Bulgaria, and Albania in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Hundreds of new villages were founded, often around Sufi hospices (*tekkes*). The major towns were settled by Muslims. Still, in the Balkans the pressure to convert to Islam was much less than in Anatolia. There was no large-scale Turkish immigration comparable to that in Anatolia. After the conquest of Constantinople, the Orthodox Church in the Balkans was reorganized, confirmed in its jurisdictions and properties, and allowed to protect Christian communities. Although there were some cases of forced conversion in Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria, there was no systematic persecution.

In the Balkans, as in Anatolia, some conversions were facilitated by the preaching of the Sufi orders, such as the Bektashis and the Mevlevis. Converts to Islam often maintained their Christian beliefs and practices. Baptism, worship of saints, the celebration of Easter, and belief in the healing efficacy of churches were continued from Christian into Muslim practices. In the Balkans, Islam was also influenced by pagan practices, which had remained a strong aspect of Balkan folk Christianity.

A census of 1520–30 indicates that about 19 percent of the Balkan population was Muslim, and 81 percent was Christian, with a small Jewish minority. The Bosnian Muslim population, one of the most numerous, made up 45 percent of the total population. In general, Muslims were concentrated in towns. Much later, in the seventeenth century, Islam came to the Rhodope, northern Albania, and Montenegro. Greeks in southwestern Macedonia and Crete converted in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Ottoman world empire

The conquest of Constantinople and the Balkans was a turning point in Ottoman history. Rather than satisfying Turkish, Ottoman, and Muslim ambitions, it made them boundless. Mehmed II the Conqueror (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) combined Turkish interest in victories over the infidels with the imperial ambitions of the Muslim caliphate and the Roman Empire. This empire would sweep eastward to the borders of Iran, subsume the Arab provinces of the Middle East and North Africa and the holy places of Arabia, and defend Muslim interests in the Indian Ocean region. Westward it would expand into the Russian steppes, Eastern Europe, and across the Mediterranean Sea.

Ottoman expansion, exacerbated by Sunni-Shiʿi religious antagonism, brought the Ottomans into rivalry with the Safavids for control of eastern Anatolia and western Iran. The decisive Battle of Chaldiran (1514) enabled the Ottomans to annex eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia and to take control of the important trade routes leading from Tabriz to Aleppo and Bursa. The Ottoman struggle with Iran continued sporadically for more than a century until the treaty of Qasr Shirin (1639) gave Baghdad and Iraq to the Ottomans and the Caucasus to Iran. This treaty delineated the modern boundaries between Iraq and Iran.

In 1516 and 1517, the Ottomans took over the Mamluk Empire of Syria and Egypt and the Islamic holy places of Arabia. (See Illustration 11.) From this vantage, the Ottomans maintained their participation in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean international trade. With the conquest of the former lands of the ʿAbbasid caliphate, the Ottomans inherited Muslim world leadership. The absorption of Damascus, Cairo, Mecca, and Medina brought a great influx of Muslim scholars to Istanbul. In addition to the title of "Warrior for the Faith," Ottoman rulers took the titles of "Servitor of the Two Holy Sanctuaries" and "Defender of the Shariʿa." Muslims the world over appealed to them for military and political support. Muslims in Spain appealed for Ottoman help against the Christian Reconquista. Sunnis in Inner Asia called to their Ottoman brothers to protect them against the Safavids and the Russians.

Illustration 11.   Sultan Selim the First. *Source:* Sonia Halliday Photographs.

   The Muslims of Gujarat and Aceh invoked their aid in the Indian Ocean struggle against the Portuguese efforts to divert the international spice trade from the Mediterranean to Atlantic routes. By 1507, the Portuguese had established a series of bases in the Indian Ocean, cutting off commerce to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, but after 1517, the Ottomans established their own bases in Arabia and East Africa, including Sawakin, Aden, and Yemen. From these bases, the Red Sea fleets under the leadership of Piri Re'is (d. 1554) reopened the routes to Alexandria and Aleppo. In the Persian Gulf region, the Ottomans occupied Baghdad in 1534, Basra in 1538, and Bahrain in 1554. In this epic struggle, the Portuguese relied on maritime commerce and the control of trade.

The Ottomans depended on the revenues of their vast territorial empire.

From their dominant position in the Muslim East, the Ottomans also swept northward and westward over Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The conquest of the Balkans opened the way for a two-centuries-long struggle against the powers of Europe. In these wars, the Ottomans were primarily allied to France against their principal enemies: the Habsburg Empire in Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, and Tsarist Russia.

A world war unfolded in three principal theaters. In central Europe, the Ottomans pushed beyond the Danube and absorbed the Romanian principalities by 1504. They confirmed local princes in power but maintained forts and garrisons and received a tribute of cereals, honey, hides, and cloth. The Hungarian monarchy, crippled by aristocratic factional quarrels and by unrest among the peasants, lost Belgrade in 1521 and was forced to accept Ottoman suzerainty in 1526. In 1529, the Ottomans besieged Vienna, and although the siege failed, it assured the Ottomans control of Hungary. Still expanding, the Ottomans made Transylvania a vassal in 1559. Finally, the long war of 1593–1606 brought an end to Ottoman expansion. By the treaty of Zsitva Torok (1606), Ottoman rule over Romania, Hungary, and Transylvania was confirmed, but the Ottoman sultans had to recognize the Habsburg emperors as their equals. The struggle to break the stalemate went on and culminated in the last, and fruitless, Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683.

These wars in central Europe were accompanied by an equally vast Ottoman-Habsburg struggle for control of the Mediterranean. In the early days of Ottoman expansion, the dominant naval powers were Venice and Genoa, each of which had established a series of fortified trading posts along the Mediterranean and Aegean coasts in order to sustain their commerce. After the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II built a new navy based on Italian designs and Greek seamanship. Ottoman naval policy was directed to the control of trade routes and the acquisition of productive resources. In wars that lasted from 1463 to 1479 and from 1499 to 1503, Venetian possessions in Greece and the Aegean were conquered. Muslim

privateers led by Hayreddin Barbarossa carried Ottoman power into the western Mediterranean. Barbarossa took Algiers in 1529 and was made grand admiral of the Ottoman fleets in 1533.

The Spanish Habsburgs counterattacked by building a series of fortified posts along the coast of North Africa, reaching as far as Tripoli in 1510 and La Goletta in 1535, but eventually the Ottomans seized Tripoli (1551), Bougie (1555), Jerba (1560), Malta (1565), and Cyprus (1570 or 1571). This provoked the formation of a coalition among the papacy, Venice, and the Habsburgs, who defeated the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Lepanto was celebrated as a triumph of Christian Europe over the Muslim Turks. The Europeans regained their confidence, but the Ottomans restored their fleets and, in a resounding victory, seized Tunis in 1574. By 1580, both protagonists recognized that they could no longer change Mediterranean boundaries. An Ottoman-Habsburg truce of 1580 confirmed the porous frontier between Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa that lasts to the present day.

The regions north of the Black Sea and between the Black and the Caspian seas were disputed by the Ottomans and the Russians. After 1484, the Ottomans excluded foreigners from the Black Sea, with the exception of ships bringing wine from Crete or Chios. The Black Sea trade, in general, passed from the Genoese to Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Turks, and Romanians in the course of the fifteenth century. In the late fifteenth century, the Ottomans established their suzerainty over Romania and the Crimea, but the Russians seized Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) and thus won control of the lower Volga. In response, the Ottomans determined on the bold strategy of building a channel between the Don and the Volga rivers, which would enable them to transfer ships from the Black to the Caspian seas, block Russian expansion into the Caucasus, and keep open the trade and pilgrimage routes from Inner Asia. An Ottoman expedition of 1569–70, however, was defeated. Russian expansion led eventually to a three-way Polish, Russian, and Ottoman struggle for control of the Ukraine that culminated (in 1676) with Ottoman control of the Black Sea and part of the Ukraine. Here,

the Ottomans reached the apogee of their expansion in northern Europe.

Thus, the sixteenth century was the period of the most aggressive expansion, and the seventeenth century was a period of maintenance. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottomans had created a world-scale empire, reaching from the western Mediterranean to Iran and from the Ukraine to Yemen. The dynamism of the worldwide expansion of Ottoman rule came from the inner motivations of Turkish and Ottoman society. The spearhead of the early Ottoman conquests was *ghazi* warrior adventurers under the leadership of popular military chieftains or venerated holy men united under Ottoman authority. The later conquests were backed by an imperial state of exceptional organizational capacities, employing an advanced military technology (based on cannons and massed infantry musket fire), tolerating and assimilating non-Muslim populations and reconciling them to Ottoman rule. By the seventeenth century, however, the logistical problems of further expansion and increasingly organized resistance in central Europe brought an end to Ottoman advances.

The patrimonial regime: fifteenth and sixteenth centuries

From the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, the early Ottoman state was slowly transformed into a centralized empire in parallel with similar processes throughout the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Europe. Kings and emperors were consolidating their authority over feudal, tribal, and local elites. In the Ottoman case, the critical transformations were the institutionalization of succession to the sultanate, the creation of a standing army exclusively loyal to the sultan, the regularization of the *timar* system and provincial administration, and the construction of a central bureaucratic administration to replace reliance on Turkish and Christian vassals. Yet the degree of centralization should not be overestimated. The Ottoman Empire operated within the limits of pre-modern communications and transportation; extensive territories

remained in the control of nomadic tribes and local rulers. The quasi-feudal *timar* system used in the directly governed regions was by definition a decentralized system. Crucial to the empire in this early period, as in later ones, were the arrangements for shared power with provincial elites and the clientele networks that bound together center and periphery.

The Ottoman Empire was not only governed but "owned" by the sultan. All the revenues of the empire were his property – although he assigned a portion to his military and administrative servants and a portion to charitable endowments. All the officers of the state were his "slaves" and servants. By the seventeenth century, the imperial household, including the armies and the administration, numbered about 100,000 people.

At the center of the centralizing Ottoman state was an elaborate court, palace, and household government. The Istanbul palace, the Topkapi Saray, which was built in 1470, itself a symbol of patrimonial power, was divided into an inner and an outer section. The inner section was the very heart of the empire. It included the residence of the sultan and his harem, secluded from public view; the privy chambers and treasury of the ruler; the royal kitchens; and the schools for the training of pages and slaves for the inner service. The outer section housed the state offices for military, civil, and religious administration; kitchen staffs; artisans; and gardeners, who maintained the palace grounds and performed military service. Whereas the inner courtiers enjoyed a direct relationship with the sultan, the outer household was in effect the government of the empire.

At the very heart of the palace was the royal family. The rules and customs governing the royal family were designed to serve the political interests of the regime, yet dynastic marriage policy and succession policy led to profound political uncertainties. The authority of the sultan was absolute, but there was an ambiguity about the transmission of authority. According to Turkish practice, the authority of the sultan was passed on to his sons (females and descendants in the female line had no right to the throne), but the line of succession was not specified. The sultan's sons were given

provincial commands, and the death of a reigning sultan led to a struggle for power among them. The sultanate was inherited by whichever son defeated and killed his brothers. This practice favored politically and militarily competent sons but undermined the stability of the realm.

Multiple children compounded the problems of succession. Because a child's legal status was defined by his father, and because it made no difference in law if the mother was a legal wife or a concubine, to reduce the number of potential claimants to the sultanate, Ottoman rulers began to make celibate marriages for political purposes and to restrict sexual relations and childbearing to concubines. Furthermore, they limited each concubine to one child. This was the system of reproduction until the reign of Suleyman (1520–66). Suleyman, however, fell in love with his slave, Hurrem; married her; and allowed her to have several children, thereby assuming the role of queen mother on his death. After Suleyman, seniority rather than civil war became the normal route to succession. Still, until the end of the sixteenth century, the successor sultan executed brothers and half brothers. When this practice was abolished, the brothers were instead imprisoned in the royal harem.

The janissaries and civil and religious administration

The driving force in the centralization of the Ottoman state was the conflict between the Turkish warrior or *ghazi* party, which was powerful in the provincial armies and the religious administration, and the slave or *devshirme* party, which was powerful in the imperial service and in the janissary corps. The warriors were concerned about the excessive power of the sultan and wanted a decentralized government with a Muslim and Turkish – as opposed to a cosmopolitan and imperial – cultural style. Successive sultans favored the policies of one party or another, or manipulated them against each other. Bayazid I (r. 1389–1402) consolidated the slave party by introducing the slave soldiers into administrative positions and by bringing the provinces under central control, but Mehmed I (r. 1413–21), in the wake of defeat by Timur, gave full support to the

Turkish and *ghazi* elements. He removed Byzantine advisors from the court and made Turkish and Persian, rather than Greek, the official languages of administration.

Mehmed II (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) returned power to the slave soldiers. He removed the Turkish nobility and all competing members of the Ottoman family from power and reserved the most important positions in the central government for his own slaves. To maintain some balance of power, a functional division was made between the offices of the grand vizier, the religious notables, the treasury administration, and the chancery services. Some Turkish families were restored to favor and allowed to keep their properties. Mehmed II also sought the support of the Greek Orthodox clergy by recognizing their civil as well as religious authority over the laity. He centralized government controls by taking tax surveys and absorbing independent vassal territories into the *timar* system, and he promulgated the first systematic legal codes dealing with the organization of the state and the obligations of subjects. Bayazid II (r. 1481–1512) reversed his policies by sponsoring an Islamo-Turkic policy, but by the reign of Suleyman I (r. 1520–66), the dominance of the janissaries was uncontested. The centralizing program triumphed by defeating rival Ottoman claimants to the sultanate, subduing the independent Turkish states in Anatolia, co-opting noble Turkish families, and building an administrative apparatus based on slaves.

The slave military forces were critical to the Ottoman system. Murad I (r. 1360–89) was the first sultan to use slave military units (*kapikullari*) organized either as infantry (the famous janissaries) or as cavalry. The new troops were at first taken from prisoners and volunteers, but in 1395 the *devshirme* was instituted as a kind of tax in manpower taken on the Christian population of the Balkans. Whereas the slave soldiers of previous Middle Eastern regimes had been recruited from outside the territories of the empires they served, the Ottoman janissaries were taken from the subject population. This afforded a regular supply of soldiers and perhaps a cheaper source of slaves, but it permitted the complication that the system had originally been designed to avoid: slaves recruited in the Balkans could resume family and social contacts in their home

region. Murad II (r. 1421–44) expanded the janissary corps and also built a navy to combat the Venetians in the Aegean and Black seas. In his reign, the Ottomans first armed their infantry with muskets and cannons. Gunpowder weapons were a critical factor in decreasing the power of noblemen fighting from horseback.

The most promising of the slave recruits were educated in the palace schools to be pages in the royal household or officers in the army or administration. They were given a Turkish, Arabic, and Islamic education and were cultivated as gentlemen in the Ottoman style. Other recruits were apprenticed to Turkish officers in Anatolia and were trained to operate as infantry in organized formations using firearms. These "slaves" – as in the Mamluk case – were not an oppressed class but were the highest-ranking officers of Ottoman society and were "slaves" only in the sense that they were the servants of the sultan.

The janissary corps was complemented by provincial cavalry, most of whom continued to be recruited from the free Turkish population and supported by assignments of tax revenues in return for military service. In 1527, there were about 28,000 slave infantrymen and some 70,000–80,000 cavalrymen, of whom 37,500 were *timar* holders. In addition, there were auxiliary garrison and frontier raiders who were financed by tax exemptions.

Civilian institutional changes followed from military developments. A bureaucracy was essential to the financing of the slave armies. Orhan (r. 1324–60) appointed a minister for the central administration and military and civil governors for the conquered provinces. From the reign of Mehmed II to the accession of Suleyman, ministers were drawn from among the Christian noblemen of the Balkans and thereafter from among the *devshirme* recruits. Chancery officials came from the Muslim colleges.

Muslim religious administration was another pillar of the empire. Ottoman political policy promoted Muslim identities. The postconquest reconstruction of Istanbul society reaffirmed and strengthened the state's connections to the religious elites and to Muslim communities. Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, a Muslim hero of the

Umayyad assault on Constantinople, was made "patron saint" of the city. Some churches were converted into mosques and colleges. Ottoman wars with the Shiʿi Safavids for control of eastern Anatolia, conquest of the Mamluk Empire of Egypt and Syria, and the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the holy places of Arabia reinforced Ottoman Sunni identity.

The Ottomans were keen to bring scholars (*ʿulama*ʾ) and Sufis under state control. From the earliest days of the regime, the Ottomans patronized both groups by endowing schools (madrasas) and Sufi retreats. The first Ottoman college was established in Iznik in 1331, when scholars were invited from Iran and Egypt to augment Muslim instruction in the new territories. Later sultans founded colleges in Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul. In the late fifteenth century, these were arranged in a hierarchy that defined the career path for the promotion of leading scholars. The college built by Suleyman between 1550 and 1559 as part of his great mosque complex was made the highest ranking. Beneath it were ranked the colleges founded by previous sultans and beneath these the colleges founded by state officials and religious scholars. The colleges were not only organized by rank but also distinguished by their educational functions. The lowest-level colleges taught Arabic grammar and syntax, logic, theology, astronomy, geometry, and rhetoric. The second-level kind stressed literature and rhetoric. The higher-level colleges taught law and theology. The Ottoman state appointed all important judges, jurisconsults, and professors of law.

Suleyman consolidated the bureaucratic system of control over the scholars. The head of Ottoman legal administration was the *şeyhü'lislām* (*shaykh al-Islam*), the leader of an organization of jurisconsults (muftis) that paralleled the organization of judges. The *shaykh al-Islam*, the chief jurisconsult of Istanbul, had direct access to the sultan. He issued legal decrees (*fatawa*) and intervened in political matters by issuing legal opinions related to the state's foreign policies. Ebu's-suʿud (d. 1574), a sixteenth-century Ottoman *shaykh al-Islam*, is one of the best-known Ottoman jurists to hold the position. Ebu's-suʿud gave the Ottoman sultan the title of caliph, justified interest-bearing loans, and modified tax practices.

A similar elaboration took place in judicial administration. The judicial appointments of Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne were originally the most important, but the hierarchy came to include judgeships in Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo, Baghdad, Medina, Izmir, and Konya. The educational and judicial hierarchies were interlocked. Appointments to judgeships required the attainment of appropriate levels in the educational system. The judicial service was headed by two military judges (*qadi-askers*), one for the Balkans and one for Anatolia. Ordinary judges were graded into several ranks. Ottoman court records show that judges followed well-known procedural and substantive rules. Indeed, they were bureaucrats, and their methods of adjudication were systematized, as was administration in general.

Judges had important administrative as well as judicial responsibilities. The judges and their deputies served as notaries public, registrars of deeds, and administrators of the properties of orphans and minors. Judges supervised the administration of colleges and had an important role in certification of taxes, overseeing harvests, inspection of military forces, and supervision of the urban economy, including government regulations for artisan guilds and markets. The state courts also took control of religious endowments and charities. Trusts represented approximately 16 percent of the economy in the seventeenth century and 27 percent in the eighteenth century. Trusts funded educational institutions, charities, transportation, and inns and meals for students and teachers, pilgrims or travelers, and indigents.

Ottoman law (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

In earlier Islamic societies, legal training, the formulation of law, and judicial decisions had been the preserve of jurists with minimal state intervention. The Ottoman state, however, became intimately involved in every aspect of judicial activity – from training jurists and court personnel, to selecting judges, and to applying legal codes. Ottoman courts became the primary venue for litigation throughout the empire.

The Ottomans made Hanafi *fiqh* (laws derived from the jurisprudential methodology of jurists) the official legal school. The Ottoman courts applied Islamic legal precedents, which, however, did not cover all aspects of Ottoman political and social life. On a broad range of issues, the sultans issued *firmans*, decrees that were later gathered in codes called *kanun*. These administrative laws were considered to be a valid extension of religious law. Medieval Muslim jurists' law, state (*kanun*) law, and customary law were all integrated in the Ottoman codes. Suleyman compiled the judgments of predecessor sultans in his legal code, the *kanuni Osmani*, which became the law of the Ottoman Empire for several centuries. The law codes dealt with administrative and criminal justice, property and tax, the discipline of officials, military affairs, the relations of *timar* holders and peasants, and the organization of the religious hierarchy. This systematic codification of law was an extension of the centralizing and bureaucratizing tendencies of the Ottoman Empire.

In matters of government administration, Ottoman law was applied to all subjects, but in matters of family and business law, it applied only to Muslims. Non-Muslims had their own communal law and courts. In practice, however, Jews and Christians commonly had recourse to Ottoman courts in order to assure enforcement, or to have state guarantees for commercial and property transactions, or to win an advantage in marital and inheritance disputes. Rabbinic courts were aware of the Jewish community's venue shopping and would sometimes decide cases according to Ottoman law, rather than rabbinic precedents. For example, Jews often established trusts according to Ottoman law rather than Jewish law in order to avoid Jewish laws of inheritance. In general, Jewish and Ottoman courts appear to have regularly communicated – even collaborated – in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Ottoman law was contested. Some Ottoman subjects objected to Ottoman laws that they perceived as not being based on Islamic law. This was often an expression of opposition to the authority of the state and to the usurpation of the prerogatives of Muslim jurists. The Ottoman criminal code differed from Muslim law in that it changed a variety of penalties into fixed fines and permitted some circumstantial

evidence in determining adultery. Ottoman law accepted payment of interest on loans, although this was proscribed by the earlier Islamic schools of law.

There was also local resistance to Ottoman legal hegemony. Local customs competed with jurisprudential texts, and Ottoman judges sometimes deferred to customary law. Ottoman courts honored guild law and customs in adjudicating disputes between guild members. Islamic law had always been an amalgam of *fiqh* and *kanun*. What makes the Ottoman period distinctive in Islamic legal history is the leading role of the state in law making and adjudication.

Provincial government

In matters of provincial government, the empire was never truly centralized. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was still common for newly conquered regions to remain vassal provinces under the control of their former lords, often Christians, in return for tribute and military manpower. Former Byzantine, Serbian, and Greek cavalry were incorporated into Ottoman armies as *timar* holders. As the empire expanded, provinces that had initially been tributaries were annexed and brought under routine administration. In the Balkans, direct controls were implemented as early as 1400, but many Anatolian regimes held out for another century. By 1500, the four central provinces of the empire – Rumelia, Anatolia, Rum, and Karaman – were under direct rule, and by 1550 most provinces were administered by salaried officials who collected taxes and sent the surplus to Istanbul. The largest provincial units, called *beylerbeyliks*, were subdivided into *sanjak beyliks* and further divided into *timarliks*, which were the districts assigned to military officers in lieu of salary.

A *timar* typically consisted of the right to collect taxes from a village or group of villages and their lands in return for military services. For tax purposes, cadastral surveys (*tahrirs*) listed the villages, the households, the adult males who were responsible for the payment of taxes, and their crops and other resources. In addition, a *timar* holder was the chief law enforcement officer on his lands. Although the assignment of *timars* indicated a greater degree

of central control than the earlier contracts with vassal lords, this was a quasi-feudal dispersal of authority. Furthermore, *timar* holders themselves used intermediaries to oversee their domains. Local landowners, merchants, and village notables or headmen were important in tax collection and the administration of local affairs.

Although all provinces were in principle subordinate to the central authority and subject to taxation, in each region there was tension between Ottoman control and local autonomy. Anatolia was the home of a bellicose pastoral population whose chieftains were important local political figures and Sufi-led resistance was almost endemic. In the Balkans, Ottoman rule perpetuated the historic social structure and thus a considerable measure of local autonomy. Tribal groups, the Serbian *zadruga* or joint family, and independent churches such as the Serbian patriarchate at Pech (between 1557 and 1766) were all partially independent. The Orthodox Church helped to preserve the ethnic and linguistic character of Greek and other Balkan peoples.

In peripheral areas, the state had to make further compromises with local princes, chieftains, and tribes. The Crimean khanate, Albania and Montenegro, and principalities north of the Danube including Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia remained under the rule of native tribute-paying dynasties. The Greek aristocracy of Istanbul (Phanariot) controlled church properties, tax farms, and the commerce of much of the Balkans. In the eighteenth century, leading Phanariot merchants were appointed as rulers of Romania. Control over the Arab provinces – Egypt, Yemen, Abyssinia, Basra, Baghdad, Libya, Tunis, and Algeria – was never fully established. The Arab provinces were virtually subsidiary regions organized around their own capitals, such as Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, and Baghdad. The Ottoman regime was in continual negotiation with Arab tribes, *shaykhs*, and notables.

Despite these zones of autonomy, the Ottoman regime was striking among pre-modern empires for the degree of state control over the subject societies. The state inhibited organized elite resistance by manipulating factions and individuals and by rotating officials rapidly. The Ottomans extracted from each village and

locality the surplus wealth that supported the central government and sustained the wars of expansion. Among Muslims, the state resisted the formation of independent loci of authority such as scholarly schools, Sufi brotherhoods, *akhi* fraternities, or independent merchant and artisan associations. The empire assured its dominance not only through force but also through its hold on the minds of men. It stood for Islam and the arts of civilization. It won the cooperation of local chiefs, landlords, village headmen, and religious leaders, all of whom had to respect the power of the central regime and all of whom benefited from being its accomplices.

Nonetheless, the power of the central government was always limited, because the people who served the state had ambivalent purposes. The men who made up the armies, the *timar* holders, and the central administration always looked for ways to advance their private, familial, and factional interests. The local notables who supported the regime also resisted an excessive encroachment on their prerogatives. Nevertheless, the Ottoman regime was vastly more powerful than the Safavid, and, until the end of the sixteenth century, autonomous chiefs played a much smaller role in its history.

Royal authority, cultural legitimization, and Ottoman identity

Like the rulers of the ʿAbbasid and Saljuq empires, the authority of the Ottoman sultans combined patrimonial, Islamic, and imperial dimensions. The Ottoman regime, in both concept and practice, integrated caliphal, Saljuq, Timurid, and Mamluk Middle Eastern precedents. Christian European influences were relatively limited. The patrimonial authority of the Ottoman sultan was foremost. The state was his household; the subjects his personal retainers. The soldiers were his slaves. The territory of the empire was his personal property.

The sultan was glorified as a warrior prince, as a Muslim caliph, and as a conquering emperor. At the core of this absolute authority was the Ottoman descent from the original khan of the Oghuz peoples, with echoes of pre-Islamic Iranian, Roman imperial,

Byzantine, and Timurid authority. After the defeat of the Ottomans by Timur in 1402, they adopted the concept of *ghazi*-warrior to reinforce their damaged authority. Murad II and later Ottoman rulers presented themselves as the embodiment of the *ghazi*-warrior-king. Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, declared himself Caesar and traced his lineage to both the Byzantine and Saljuk royal houses. Bayazid claimed to be successor to the caliphate. In 1547, after Suleyman received tribute for Habsburg lands in Hungary, he added "Caesar of Caesars" to Ottoman nomenclature. Suleyman also styled himself "sultan of the Arabs, Persians, and Romans," as well as caliph and imam of the Muslims. The titles of holy warrior, successor to the Saljuks, and caliph would survive into the twentieth century. The Muslim character of the sultanate, expressed in its control of the religious establishment, was at the core of Ottoman legitimacy.

Timurid precedents enhanced the Ottoman self-conception. The garden kiosks in the Topkapi Palace, court poetry, histories, manuscript illustration, and astronomical observation all followed Timurid patterns. From their wars with the Safavids, the Ottomans brought back important Persian art and craft collections to signify their inheritance of Timurid authority.

Poetry was the principal expression of royal style. Court poetry was based on the *aruz* (a prosodic meter derived from Arabic meters) and was heavily infused with Arabic and Persian words. The basic poetic forms were those already pioneered in Persian court poetry – the *qasida*, the *ghazal*, the *masnavi*, and the *ruba'i*. The greatest Ottoman poet of the classical period was Baki (d. 1600). Nef'i (d. 1636), a panegyrist and satirist, composed poetry celebrating power and struggle. Yahya Efendi (d. 1644) developed an original subject matter based on direct observation of life and nature and the expression of personal emotion.

Ottoman prose literature was strongly influenced by imperial ambitions. Early Ottoman historical writing was composed in both Turkish and Arabic to legitimize the origin of the dynasty, its rise to power, and its everyday court and military events. In the course of the sixteenth century, Ottoman world ambitions were given

expression in the composition of universal histories. Mustafa ʿAli's (d. 1599) *Kunh al-Akhbar* (which was strongly influenced by Persian histories) contained a history of the world from Adam to Jesus, of early Islam, of Turkish peoples up to the rise of the Ottomans, and of the Ottoman Empire. In the seventeenth century, historians were employed to compile daily court chronicles. Geographical writing was stimulated by the expansion of Ottoman naval power. Piri Re'is, the Ottoman commander in the Indian Ocean, was the author of an important atlas. Evliya Chelebi's (d. 1682) *Seyahat-name* (Book of Travels) contains a comprehensive description of journeys throughout the Ottoman Empire and his observations of Ottoman society and economy.

Manuscript illustration also expressed the Ottoman sense of an imperial destiny. From the time of Mehmed II, the Ottoman regime maintained a court studio (*nakkashhane*) that employed calligraphers, painters, illuminators, and bookbinders to produce manuscripts and to design Ottoman ceramics, woodwork, metalwork, textiles, and carpets. Between 1451 and 1520, Persian precedents formed the basis of Ottoman manuscript art. Artists from Shiraz, Tabriz, and Herat were brought to Istanbul. The earliest works were illustrated copies of Persian classics such as ʿAttar's *Language of the Birds*, the *Love Story of Khosraw and Shirin*, the *Khamsa* of Amir Khosraw, and the fables of *Kalila wa-Dimna*. The history of Alexander's conquests and illustrated contemporary histories became staple products of the Ottoman workshop.

Sixteenth-century manuscripts turned from the illustration of classic literature to contemporary events, such as the ceremonial reception of ambassadors, the collection of taxes, and the conquests of famous fortresses in the Balkans. Victories, festivals, accessions, royal processions, battles, sieges, banquets, and celebrations were the subject of manuscript illustrations. The *Shahinshah-name* of 1581 depicts the circumcision festivals held in Istanbul, athletic performances, guild parades, and other court events. Viziers, janissaries, cavalrymen, scholars, guildsmen, merchants, and sultans appear in profusion. The *Shah-Name-i Al-i Osman* (Book of Kings of the House of Osman) by Arifi (d. 1561/2) is one of the most

famous productions of this period. By the end of the sixteenth century, illustrated history, celebrating the splendor of the Ottoman state and its conquests, had become a special Turkish contribution to the tradition of Middle Eastern and Islamic manuscript illumination. Ottoman manuscript art celebrated the self-consciousness of the Ottoman elite as a world historical force. Ottoman miniature painting gave up the warmth, the whimsy, the theatricality, and the multiple meanings of Iranian art in favor of realism, which was also expressed in Ottoman maps, fortress plans, and geographies. Ottoman painting – unlike Safavid and Mughal art in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – was not much influenced by European painting, despite Ottoman proximity and exposure to the West.

The Ottoman imperial sensibility was similarly reflected in architecture. Koja Sinan (d. 1578) was the master of the Ottoman style of architecture. Sinan designed buildings for mosques, schools, hospitals, libraries, kitchens, and mausoleums that were donated by the rich and powerful. Ottoman design features, such as single large domes, tall minarets, and colonnaded courtyards, showed the strong influence of Aya Sophia, the greatest of Byzantine churches. The dome, independently supported apart from the rest of the building, and the echoing half domes, expressed (as did the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem) the triumph of Muslims over Christian rivals. (See Illustrations 12 and 13.) By 1600, Ottoman architecture, miniature painting, poetry, historical writing, and numerous crafts had created a new style, a new aesthetic, and a distinctive Ottoman identity.

Illustration 12. The Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque, Istanbul.
Source: Photodisc/Getty Images.

Illustration 13. The Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque, Istanbul (interior). *Source*: Photodisc/Getty Images.

The Ottoman economy

In many respects, the Ottoman economy was fostered and directed by the Ottoman state. Ottoman expansion was directed toward securing a powerful position in the international luxury trade in spices, drugs, dyes, and silk. In the fifteenth century, the Ottomans took control of Mediterranean and Black Sea trade away from Venice and Genoa. The naval war against the Portuguese in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and Ottoman conquests in Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Arabia gave the Ottomans access to the Indian Ocean trade. Baghdad and Basra traded with Iran and India. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was the principal intermediary between Europe and southern and eastern Asia. It maintained a trade surplus with Europe, receiving payment in silver,

and in turn used the silver to cover its purchases of Iranian silk and Indian spices and cotton cloth. Precious Eastern goods came on various routes: overland from Jidda to Mecca, Damascus, and Aleppo and from the Persian Gulf to Basra and Aleppo. At the end of the sixteenth century, Aleppo was the most important silk market in the Ottoman Empire. From Aleppo and Tabriz, silk came to Bursa, the terminus for the Asian silk trade and an important producing center, where it was exchanged for Florentine and other European woolens and metalwares.

Added to the luxury trades was a growing trade in bulk goods for mass consumption, such as grain, cotton, wool, hides, fish, wine, olive oil, and ordinary textiles. Bursa was also a principal market for the Black Sea trade. From Bursa, silks, spices, cotton, and other products were shipped across the Black Sea to the Crimea, whence they were carried into the Ukraine, Poland, and Russia in exchange for Eastern European cattle, fish, wheat, and hides. Bursa's rich merchant elites included Muslims, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians who invested in specie, real estate, slaves, and cloth.

The Ottoman conquests brought prosperity to other parts of Anatolia and the Balkans. Silk industries flourished in Amasya, Bursa, Istanbul, Mardin, and Diyarbekir. The European market stimulated Ottoman exports from the Balkans. Salonika woolens were exported north of the Danube. Edirne had a "capitalist" population, including money changers, jewelers, long-distance traders, local landowners growing wheat or raising cattle, and moneylenders who invested in textiles or milling. Soldiers and government officials were prominent among the wealthy.

Interregional trade was lively. Egypt traded with Anatolia, Syria, and the Sudan and with North and West Africa. Syrian pistachios, dates, spices, and slaves were sent to Anatolia. The pilgrimage routes brought people from all over the empire to Mecca and Medina. Mecca was an emporium for spices, pearls, pepper, and coffee, and almost every pilgrim financed his journey by bringing goods to sell in Mecca and returning with goods to sell at home. The provisioning of the pilgrimage caravans in Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad was an important business.

Internally, the Ottomans stimulated land traffic by building bridges and caravansaries, digging wells, and garrisoning major road junctions. They also endowed towns and villages with religious and social facilities, including *imarets* and Sufi hospices (*tekke*). An *imaret* was a complex of buildings, including a mosque, a college, a hospital, and a hospice for travelers and students. Endowment funds for mosques, colleges, hospitals, bridges, convents, soup kitchens, libraries, and other institutions were invested in baths, bazaars, shops, tenements, workshops, mills, presses, slaughterhouses, tanneries, and tile factories; they were an important source of capital for commerce and agriculture. Sufi *tekkes* became centers of cultivation, trade, and local administration, as well as of educational and charitable activities. Numerous villages founded by Sufis in Anatolia and the Balkans were backed by the state.

The single greatest state project was the reconstruction of Istanbul for the glory of the sultan and the needs of administration and trade. At the time of the conquest, Constantinople probably had a population of between 50,000 and 60,000 people. To repopulate it, the Ottoman government obliged Muslim merchants from Bursa, Konya, and other Anatolian and Balkan places to move to Istanbul. The government gave land, houses, and tax concessions to the new migrants. Numerous villages in the vicinity were settled with slaves, prisoners, and deportees from the Balkans. According to the census of 1478, there were about 9,000 Muslim, 3,100 Greek Christian, 1,650 Jewish, and about 1,000 Armenian and gypsy dwellings in Istanbul. Thus the population was about 60 percent Muslim, 20 percent Christian, and 10 percent Jewish, and it totaled less than 100,000. Within a century, it would rise to more than 700,000, more than twice the population of the largest European cities of the time.

The city was rebuilt by constructing public institutions such as mosques, schools, hospitals, baths, and caravansaries with attached bazaars, bakeries, mills, or factories in several districts. Each neighborhood was centered around an important religious and public institution and its attendant facilities. Between 1453 and 1481 alone, 209 mosques, 24 schools or seminaries, 32 public baths, and 12 inns or bazaars were built in Istanbul. Many thousands of houses

and shops were constructed by trust administrators in order to generate revenue.

A critical Ottoman concern was the provisioning of Istanbul. This was accomplished not by reliance on market forces but by close government regulation of production and trade. The produce of Bulgaria, Thessaly, the Ukraine, western Anatolia, and Egypt was mobilized to feed the capital. Ottoman regulations applied to ports and caravans and specified roads and customs houses to assure the collection, transit, and delivery of supplies. The state required traders to guarantee delivery of wheat, rice, salt, meat, oil, fish, honey, and wax directly to the palace and the capital city at fixed prices. Merchants were thus made agents of the state to meet the fiscal and provisioning needs of the capital.

Guilds were the basic units for the organization of the urban economy. Merchants, craftsmen, transport workers, and even entertainers and prostitutes were organized into corporate bodies to enforce economic discipline. The administrative apparatus that supervised the activity of professional corporations was elaborate. The grand vizier, the chief (*agha*) of the janissaries, judges, and market inspectors enforced guild regulations. Guild officials were appointed by the government in consultation with guild members in order to implement state rules and collect taxes. The chiefs of guilds acted through an informal body of guild elders, who were collectively responsible to the state. Guild regulation, however, was flexible. Outside of Istanbul, guilds had more leeway in the selection of officials, and disputes were typically settled by negotiations among state officials, guild spokesmen, and local notables.

In conjunction with the guilds, the authorities regulated entry into trades, opening of new shops, and the types and quality of merchandise produced. Maximum prices designed to protect consumer interests were set by the state. Weights and measures were regulated by government inspection. Guilds were expected to supply workers to accompany military campaigns, to provide labor services, and to take part in royal processions.

Ottoman guilds served not only the state but also the economic, social, and religious interests of the members. They operated under an internally generated guild law and took on certain social and religious functions. Guilds arbitrated disputes among their members and collected funds for mutual aid, religious ceremonies, and charities. They staged picnics and celebrations. The guilds were also religious confraternities with a patron saint and initiation ceremonies modeled on Sufi lines, which sponsored prayers and pilgrimages, and heard lectures on the value of sobriety and honesty. Guilds were usually confined to people of the same religious community. Only a minority had a mixed Muslim and Christian, or Muslim and Jewish, membership.

Some sectors of the Ottoman economy escaped direct administrative control. Merchants engaged in money changing and international trade were usually able to operate without close governmental supervision. Some merchants organized a putting-out system of manufacture in rural areas to compete with the monopolies of town guilds. Also, as janissaries penetrated into commerce and craft production in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it became increasingly difficult for the government to regulate the artisan population.

Rulers and subjects: Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottomans reigned over an extraordinarily diverse population in terms of language, ethnicity, culture, religion, occupation, and social class. They classified this society in two dimensions. One was the distinction between *askeri* and *reʿaya*, which corresponds to the distinction between rulers and ruled, elites and subjects, warriors and producers, and tax collectors and taxpayers. The chief attributes of the ruling elite (the military, civil, and religious administrators) were the right to exploit the wealth of the subjects, exemption from taxes, and trial only by military court. In addition, to be a member of the ruling class, one had to be cultivated in the distinctive language and manners known as "the Ottoman way." One could become an

Ottoman either by birth or by education in the imperial, military, or Islamic schools. By contrast, commoners paid taxes and were subject to the laws of their religious communities.

The distinction between rulers and ruled was not the same as that between Muslims and non-Muslims. Although non-Muslim populations were considered subordinate to Muslims, elite non-Muslims held positions of power and influence in the government, the royal court, tax administration, banking, and commerce. They shared the same style of consumption as the Ottoman elites. Some prominent Jews were excused payment of the poll tax paid by non-Muslims. Alongside Turkish soldiers and Arab and Persian scribes and scholars, the ruling elite also included Balkan Christian lords and scribes. The patrician Greek families of the Phanar district of Istanbul (who were prominent merchants, bankers, and government functionaries) and the higher clergy of the Orthodox Church (who collected the poll tax and administered communal affairs) were part of the Ottoman elite. Armenian bankers (*sarraf*) directed the flow of capital to the purchase of shares in tax farms, linked provincial merchants to the ruling class, and provided the elites with credit. Greeks and Jews were active in tax farming and international trade. Galata had large populations of Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and European as well as Muslim merchants.

Jewish refugees from Spain also became important in Ottoman trade and banking in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Joseph Nasi (d. 1579), for example, was a refugee descended from a Portuguese Jewish family that had moved to Antwerp and then to Italy after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. In 1554, he arrived in Istanbul, where he had European business and diplomatic connections; he became a close advisor to Sultan Suleyman, played an influential role in French-Ottoman diplomatic relations, and in 1566 was made Duke of Naxos, entitling him to a monopoly of customs revenues and the export of wine. Nasi was also a patron of Jewish community life and of Jewish settlement in Palestine. Thus, the Ottoman system was in a sense a condominium of elites, some Muslim, some non-Muslim, who had partitioned the various

dimensions of the political economy among ethnically or religiously defined subelites.

In practice, the subjects (*reʿaya*) included both Muslims and non-Muslims organized into small communities, which were primarily religious but also territorial and economic. Non-Muslims were known by the generic term "*dhimmi*" (protected peoples). In return for the payment of taxes and their acceptance of Muslim supremacy, they could retain their religious practices, communal associations, and identities. The religious communities administered the educational, judicial, and charitable affairs of the subject population, provided worship services and burials, and collected taxes. Like previous Muslim regimes, the Ottomans considered their non-Muslim subjects autonomous but subordinate peoples whose internal social, religious, and communal life was regulated by their own religious organizations, but whose leaders were appointed by and were responsible to a Muslim state.

Religious communities, however, were not the only form of non-Muslim social organization. Many communities were organized as ethnic, language, or family groups, including, for example, the Serbian joint family organization (*zadruga*) and self-governing community (*knezina*), the Balkan pastoral community (*katun*), and the Greek free communities (*eleuthe-rochoria*). These communities maintained a separate identity, because many Greek, Serbian, Albanian, or other Slavic communities were not fully integrated into religious bodies.

At the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II reaffirmed the Ottoman history of collaboration with Christians and permitted the religious, legal, and commercial autonomy of both indigenous and foreign non-Muslim merchants. Ottoman non-Muslims belonged to three recognized communities: Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish. The non-Muslim communal administration (the millet system) was not a uniform or centralized system, but a great number of ad hoc local arrangements with great variations over time and place. Internal authority could be held by either clerics or laymen, but the leadership and the communal regulations had to be registered

with the Muslim authorities, who could be called on to enforce communal rules and/or to resolve internal disputes.

In public life, such as in the markets, Jews, Christians, and Muslims mingled freely. Although there were some exclusively Christian or Jewish crafts, Muslims and non-Muslims together belonged to many of the same craft and trade associations. Muslims and non-Muslims bought and sold, contracted, and employed each other. Some specialization was evident in commerce. Muslims dominated the caravan commerce linking Aleppo, Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo and the cities to their hinterlands. Non-Muslims were prominent on the Anatolian and Balkan trade routes and in trade with Western Europe. Relatively homogeneous residential neighborhoods clustered around places of worship, but exclusively Muslim, Jewish, or Christian neighborhoods were rare. Music, cuisine, and material culture were generally indistinguishable.

Jews, Christians, and Muslims also shared religious beliefs and festivals. Sufi and popular practices integrated Jewish and Christian beliefs and practices. Regardless of religion, people exchanged food on religious holidays, often celebrated the same saints' days, and venerated the same shrines, such as the tomb of Abel in Damascus and the tombs of the patriarchs in Hebron. In Homs, a popular Sufi festival coincided with the Christian Holy Week. In Egypt, the Monday after Easter spring holiday was celebrated by both Muslims and Copts.

Non-Muslims, however, were not fully accepted as equals. Just as noncitizens have limited rights in contemporary states, so too did non-Muslims have specific legal disabilities as compared to Muslims. Although a Muslim man might marry a non-Muslim woman, non-Muslim men could not marry Muslim women. The testimony of non-Muslims against Muslims was not accepted in court. Non-Muslims were required to keep their place. Public manifestations of certain non-Islamic religious practices, such as processions or ringing of church bells, were forbidden. Riding horses was proscribed. Muslim officials often insisted on a clear separation of the communities. Non-Muslims were supposed to wear distinctive clothing in public or at least not wear the Muslim color green or white turbans. In the

bathhouses of Syria and Egypt, non-Muslim men had to wear an identifying amulet or towel. Judges sometimes ruled that Muslim and non-Muslim women must visit the baths on different days. Such regulations, however, were enforced only intermittently and usually in times of high sociopolitical tension.

Persecution was rare, but despite the general harmony, there were episodes of intense pressure on non-Muslims to convert. Sultan Beyazid II (r. 1481–1512) pressured Jews to convert and Selim I (r. 1512–20) pressured Bulgarians. The most serious episode of this sort was a wave of religious zealotry under Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87). The Kadizadeli "fundamentalist" preachers insisted on clear boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims (especially the separation of Muslim women from non-Muslim men). Due to their influence, Jews were made the scapegoats for a great Istanbul fire in 1660, were banned from living in the city, and were required to sell their properties to Muslims. In the following year, the sumptuary codes regulating dress were reapplied, Jewish and Christian property was confiscated, and some churches and synagogues were destroyed. Assaults on Jews and Christians included the destruction of taverns and the prohibition of the wine and spirits trade. These actions were supported by imperial decrees and encouraged by contemporary Muslim jurists. Between 1666 and 1670, the population of the Rhodope and Pirin mountains of Bulgaria converted under pressure. Between 1663 and 1687, Jewish palace physicians and others converted, or were made to convert, to Islam. The sultans stopped appointing Jewish physicians, translators, and diplomats to court positions and replaced them with Greek Orthodox personnel.

Jews

The Jews in the Ottoman Empire stemmed from diverse populations. Romaniot (Greek) and Karaite Jews were part of the Anatolian and Balkan populations at the time of the Ottoman conquests. They spoke either Turkish or Greek. Mehmed the Conqueror resettled many Anatolian and Balkan Jews in Istanbul. Emigrants from northern Europe and then refugees from the Inquisition and from the

expulsion of Jews from Spain followed. Sephardic or Spanish Jews also settled in Istanbul, Salonica, Edirne, Bursa and other towns. In general, Istanbuli Jews spoke Turkish, and Jews everywhere tended to amalgamate their dialect with the ambient language – Turkish, Slavic, Greek, or Arabic.

Jewish communities were found throughout the empire. At the time of the Ottoman conquests of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, there were numerous Jews in the Arab cities of Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, and Baghdad. In the Levant, some Jews were peasant farmers in predominantly Muslim villages. Jews were found as craftsmen, especially goldsmiths and jewelers, in the major Kurdish towns of northern Iraq. Jews in the Arab provinces generally spoke Arabic, but Jewish communities in Palestine had diverse ethnic origins and spoke many languages. Sephardic immigrants settled in Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, and Safed. In Aleppo and Jerusalem, the Sephardim kept their dialects, but elsewhere they assimilated the local languages. Sephardic Jews established the first Ottoman printing presses.

The wealthiest Jewish communities were those of Istanbul, Salonica, Izmir, Damascus, and Cairo, due to the importance of Mediterranean international commerce, in which Jews acted as middlemen between Europe and the Ottoman domains. The Jewish communities of Izmir and Aleppo flourished in the second half of the seventeenth century. The commercial cities also attracted small numbers of European Jews – Portuguese Marranos and Italian and French Jews – all of whom were known as Francos.

Toward the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, Jewish prosperity diminished. Jewish immigration to the Ottoman Empire ceased. The textile industry was in decline due to competition from the quality products of England, France, Italy, and Holland. Salonica, the largest Jewish textile-producing town, never recovered. In Bursa and other towns, the Jewish upper class was pushed out of tax farming by Ottoman officials and soldiers and reduced to secondary positions as agents or managers of tax farms. Worsening economic conditions also reduced the number of Jewish physicians and advisors at the

Ottoman court. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the middle classes remained strong, but more and more Jews turned to craft work. In Iraq, however, Jewish merchants enjoyed renewed prosperity in the nineteenth century under British patronage; they dominated the trade of Baghdad and Basra with India.

A major factor in the decline of Jewish economic activities was competition from Greeks, Armenians, and Syrian Christians of both Eastern and Roman Catholic denominations. In the eighteenth century, these communities entered the international trade as the preferred middlemen of the Europeans and sent their children to be educated in Western Europe. They took over prominent positions as merchants, financiers, translators, and court physicians. In Cairo, Jews had served since the Ottoman conquest as moneylenders, customs officers, and masters of Cairo's mint; but in 1768 a new ruler, Bulut Kapan ʿAli Pasha, removed Jews from their positions in the customs office, confiscated their wealth, and executed several leading figures. Syrian Catholics replaced Jews in the customs house and as translators for the European merchants. Armenians took the post of customs inspector in Aleppo in 1831, and by the mid-nineteenth century, Christian Arabs replaced Jews in the customs house of Damascus.

Within the empire, Jews were organized into local congregations (*kahal* or *jamaʿat*) under the authority of both lay and religious leaders who managed communal educational, legal, and tax concerns. Small congregations were sometimes united in citywide communities. In the seventeenth century, the independent rabbinic courts of Istanbul were consolidated into three district courts united under a single supreme court. Similarly, in Salonica, the Jewish communities built a central school, hospital, and charitable complex. Jews, unlike Christians, had no formal representative to the Ottoman government but were represented by court favorites and special envoys. In the eighteenth century, the title of chief rabbi emerged, but it was often held by more than one person. In 1835, the Ottomans finally designated a *haham basi*, a chief rabbi.

In accord with Ottoman recognition of the civil law of non-Muslims, Jewish courts were permitted to function in all matters except

criminal cases that involved a death penalty. From the Ottoman point of view, cases involving Jews brought to Jewish courts were matters of arbitration. Jews turned to Jewish courts for not only religious but also family and commercial issues. Jewish courts were effective as long as Jewish litigants themselves did not refuse their judgments, for they always had the option of appealing to Ottoman courts. Jews went to Muslim courts for marriage, divorce, inheritance, and commercial cases.

The persecutions of the late seventeenth century led to a profound upheaval in Jewish identity. Great numbers of Jews became followers of the self-declared messiah Shabbatai Zvi and converted to Islam when he did so in 1665. The converts, known as Donme, formed a separate community that observed Muslim customs (such as praying in mosques and fasting during Ramadan), but held private beliefs in Shabbatai Zvi as the messiah, performed rituals from the kabala, and prayed in Hebrew and Ladino (the Judeo-Spanish dialect). They married only within their community and buried the dead in their own cemeteries. Nonetheless, in the nineteenth century, while Christian communities in the Balkans and the Arab provinces turned to nationalism, Jews remained attached to their religio-communal and Ottoman identities.

Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians

The Christian populations of the empire were extremely diverse. In Istanbul, Christians spoke the languages of their ancestral roots. Orthodox Christians spoke Greek or Slavic languages, and Armenians spoke Armenian. In the Balkans, Orthodox and Armenian Christians spoke Turkish, and in the Arab provinces the Christians generally spoke Arabic. Most Christians were considered part of the Eastern Orthodox Church, which included Greek, Romanian, Slavic, and Arab believers. In Ottoman parlance, the Orthodox speakers of Slavic, Romance, Semitic, and other languages – whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa – were all described as "Rum" (literally Roman), designating them as Greek Orthodox.

Mehmed, the conqueror of Constantinople, appointed Gennadius as patriarch and, in principle, subordinated the Slavic churches to

the patriarchate of Constantinople. In addition to collecting taxes for the Ottomans, the Orthodox Church had authority over and managed church lands, education, and the legal institutions of the Orthodox community. Church courts dealt with births, deaths, marriages, and other civil issues. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Greek merchant elite of Istanbul, the Phanariots, chose patriarchs and administered the church's internal affairs. The authority of the patriarch of Constantinople outside of the capital, however, was never clearly defined but rather evolved gradually over time. In the eighteenth century, the church attempted to convert the local authority of the patriarch of Constantinople into an empire-wide authority. The independent patriarchates of Ohrid (Bulgaria) and Pech (Serbia) were abolished in 1766 and 1767.

The Armenian Church in the Ottoman Empire was a separate administrative body founded in 1461. In 1441, the catholicos of the Armenian Church moved to Persia, and, in response, the Ottomans established two new centers in Istanbul and Jerusalem, appointing a patriarch for each. With the growth of the Istanbul Armenian population, the patriarch of Istanbul was able to dominate the entire church. The Armenian patriarch was responsible for tax collection and civil administration and, in principle, was the administrative authority for the non-Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire – Miaphysites in Syria and Egypt, Assyrians, the Bogomils of Bosnia, and Copts.

Although in Anatolia most Armenians were peasants, in Istanbul, Izmir, Aleppo, and Basra they prospered in international trade. By the nineteenth century, they had become supervisors of customs houses, bankers to local pashas, purveyors of luxury goods, and minters of coins, as well as long-distance merchants. An Armenian lay elite (*amiras*) came to dominate the church and influence the Ottoman selection of patriarchs.

Coptic Christians

Egyptian non-Muslims included Melkites, Armenians, Jews, and later a growing community of Syrian Catholics, but the majority were Copts. Over the centuries since the Arab conquests and especially in

the Mamluk period, the Coptic population had been drastically reduced by conversion and waves of persecution to a small minority of the total population. According to one visitor, in the years 1530–40, there were only seven Orthodox churches in Egypt – four in Cairo and one each in Alexandria, Damietta, and Raithou. In the Ottoman period, conversions to Islam seem to have been rare.

The majority of Copts were farmers and village craftsmen. In the towns, Copts worked as goldsmiths and jewelers, shoemakers, masons, engravers, carpenters, weavers, tailors, furriers, construction workers, laborers, candlemakers, and purveyors of wines and distilled alcoholic drinks (especially ʿaraq). Copts were employed as bureaucrats, financial and tax administrators, secretaries, and stewards to the political elite. In the eighteenth century, they staffed the households of the leading military officers and tax farmers.

The Coptic Church was hierarchical. The patriarch appointed the metropolitans of Ethiopia, Damietta, and Jerusalem, and the bishops below them. Bishops commonly purchased their positions. They ordained the priests, consecrated churches and altars, administered the finances of their dioceses, and helped care for the poor. A Coptic priest could be married so long as his marriage took place before ordination. Coptic monks were laymen and, apart from those who were appointed bishops and patriarchs, were not considered clergy.

As in the Orthodox and Armenian churches, the lay elite (archons) came to rival the clergy and often to dominate church affairs. They made large contributions to charity and religious affairs, and they had political connections to the Mamluk military elite.

Despite these internal conflicts, the Coptic Church preserved the identity of Coptic Egyptian Christians. The Coptic Church perceived two main challenges: Muslim influences and the competition of Catholic missionaries. Copts began to adopt Muslim practices. They circumcised their sons around the age of ten and would eat only properly slaughtered meat. They participated in religious festivals with Muslims and Jews. In the sixteenth century, Copts turned to Sufis for blessings and miracles. At the same time, Catholic

missionaries – backed by the riches and prestige of European states and merchants – sought to proselytize the Coptic population and converted the wealthy and the intelligentsia. In the eighteenth century, Syrian Catholics came as traders to Damietta and Rosetta, and by the end of the century they controlled the coastal trade between Syria and Egypt and along the Red Sea coast. By the mid-nineteenth century, they were eclipsed by Greek merchants.

In response to these pressures, the Coptic clergy promoted the beliefs and ceremonies that kept Coptic commitments alive. The church promoted a cult of martyrs, the veneration of saints, and pilgrimage to and religious festivals at Coptic shrines and sanctuaries. The clergy preached homilies and sermons to discourage conversion to Islam or Catholicism and to promote uniformity in Coptic beliefs and practices. The archons patronized Coptic scholarship and sponsored a renaissance of architectural, literary, and artistic projects. Manuscripts were copied and restored; icons were produced for churches and homes.

Christians in the Ottoman Near East

The Christian population of geographical Syria at the time of the Ottoman conquest is variously estimated at between 20 percent and 35 percent of the total population. Christians centered around Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, and Tyre with concentrations on Mount Lebanon and the villages surrounding Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth. The populations of the major cities grew substantially in the seventeenth century. Palestinian Christian villagers moved to Jerusalem, and, by the nineteenth century, villages that had been Christian in the sixteenth century were Muslim. Most of these Christians were Arabic-speaking Greek Orthodox, known as Melkites. The Ottoman conquests made the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem administratively subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople. The Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem supervised the holy places in constant struggle with other Christian churches. The Jacobites – Aramaic speaking and much depleted in number by earlier conversions – were concentrated in the Jazira of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey, with large numbers in

Aleppo, Damascus, and Urfa. Aramaic-speaking Nestorians inhabited Kurdistan and Mosul.

The most important religious development among Christians was the spread of Catholicism. The Maronites of the Lebanon were the first Christian communities to accept the authority of Rome, although they retained their rites and dogma. In 1584, a Maronite college was established in Rome under Jesuit auspices.

The spread of Catholicism was fostered by treaties between the Ottomans and the European countries. The French-Ottoman treaty of 1604 gave Catholic pilgrims and priests the right to visit the holy places in Palestine and permission for French clerics to reside in Jerusalem. A treaty of 1673 accorded diplomatic status to priests serving the French consuls in Galata, Izmir, Sidon, and Alexandria, and other cities. In 1690, with the help of the French ambassador in Istanbul, Catholic missionaries were permitted to preach in Ottoman territories. These and later treaties allowed the Europeans to designate local translators and agents who would enjoy the same favorable customs rates as the Europeans themselves. France was named guardian of the holy places, and other European powers then claimed to be the protectors of Ottoman non-Muslims. The Russians claimed the Orthodox; the French adopted the Catholics. Britain and Prussia competed for the small Protestant communities and the Jews.

In the seventeenth century, Catholics began to proselytize openly in the Ottoman Empire. Colleges were founded in Rome to educate Eastern students. Schools and hospitals were founded in Ottoman domains. The missionary effort included the adoption of the vernacular languages of the Christian populations (Greek, Arabic, Coptic, Syriac, and Armenian) for teaching and preaching, and the composition or translation of Catholic religious works into these languages. To spread the new dogma, in 1706 the Metropolitan Athanasios Dabbas established in Aleppo the first Arabic printing press in the Ottoman Empire. New monastic orders were founded in the Lebanon. Catholic missionaries were much appreciated for the practical education they provided and for involving women in parish activities. Many women converted to Catholicism apart from their

husbands or other male relatives. Economically upwardly mobile Christians, disillusioned with the traditional churches, found encouragement in the Catholic Church.

Catholicism appealed particularly to the Orthodox merchants of Aleppo. To prosper in the Mediterranean trade, they needed strong European patrons. French consuls – working in parallel with missionaries – helped promote conversions by protecting Syrian Christian merchants and issuing berats that gave them legal and diplomatic status and reduced tariffs. Catholic Arabs would hold the post of dragoman in Aleppo throughout the eighteenth century. In Aleppo, missionaries succeeded in converting the majority of native Orthodox and Jacobite Christians.

The unsettled political conditions of the eighteenth century gave rise to both intense competition among religious-commercial communities and political alliances across the sectarian divides. In Egypt, Syrian Catholics replaced Jews working for the European merchants and displaced Muslims in the Cairo and coastal trade. The improved position of the Catholic merchants in the Arab Levant also came at the expense of Jewish bankers and merchants. Rivalry between Catholic and Jewish merchants flared in Palestine in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Aleppo Armenians regained control of the custom revenues from Jews.

There was financial and political collaboration between Muslims and Christians. Muslims realized that non-Muslims could provide financial assistance; non-Muslims understood that politically powerful Muslims could assure their safety, access to opportunity, and continued economic prosperity. By the end of the eighteenth century, the leading Muslim families in Aleppo were allied with equally prominent Catholic families. The Catholics supplied the bankers, business partners, and even political agents in Istanbul for their Muslim associates. The Muslims brought Catholics into the tax farming business. In Mosul, Christian businessmen sought the patronage of Muslim warlords.

The rise of Syrian Catholicism led to profound changes in the organization and relations of the several Christian churches. Pope

Benedict XIII (r. 1724–30) was the first pope to recognize the communion of the Melkite Catholics with Rome. Henceforth, the Melkite Church was divided between the Orthodox patriarchs appointed by the patriarch of Istanbul and the Catholic pope. Only the Catholics continued to use the title Melkite. In current usage, the term refers to Arabic-speaking Catholics. In the course of the eighteenth century, similar splits occurred among the Armenians and other churches that accepted the authority of Rome. The Uniate churches included the Melkite Catholic Church of Antioch, the Maronite Church, the Chaldean Catholic Church (which grew out of the Nestorians), and the Armenian Catholic Church and Catholics in Hungary, Croatia, and Albania. The Uniate churches kept their liturgies, calendars, and holidays. Their clergy retained the right to marry. However, in the Uniate churches, Arabic began to replace Greek, Syriac, and Armenian.

The rupture in the churches was ratified by the Ottoman authorities, who recognized the Catholics as constituting a separate millet in Aleppo, although not in the empire at large. The Armenian Catholic Church was recognized as an autonomous millet in 1831. Throughout the Ottoman provinces, the strong authority of the Roman pontiff subverted the influence of the patriarch of Constantinople and greatly reduced the autonomy of the Eastern patriarchs.

A still more profound and lasting impact on the Christian communities was the transformation from millet to secular and national identities. The identification with Western Europe, Catholicism, and "modernity" led to new political identities. For example, the long struggle of Syrian Christians with the Greek authorities in their millet led them to think of themselves first as Syrians and then as Arabs. The millets functioned as both administrative entities and social communities, joining people who shared both religion and language and making it possible to imagine a national identity.

The millets also empowered new classes of the population – rural notables, commercial entrepreneurs, and secular intellectuals and professionals – for whom a national identity could be a route to

political and economic power. Lay elites defined in ethnic and secular terms displaced clerical elites and increasingly defined a secular political identity for their co-religionists. At first, in alignment with the program of the Ottoman Tanzimat, this was an Ottoman citizen identity, but progressively Ottomanism was displaced by an Arab nationalism. The emergence of new elites made it possible to redefine the cultural union of religion and language as the basis of ethnic and national identity. These changes corresponded to broader, global changes as nationalism replaced religion and localism as the most important expression of social and political identity.

Muslim communities

The Muslim masses, as a subject (*re'aya*) population, were organized in a parallel way. They were grouped in families, residential units (such as villages or town quarters), merchant and craft associations, and religious communities. Each group was represented by its elders and headman, who were responsible for order and for the payment of taxes. The schools of law and the Sufi brotherhoods were the framework for popular religious associations. Ordinary people looked to – and sometimes loyally followed – the scholars, teachers, and judges for leadership in ritual, law, and communal matters. Even more potent were their allegiances to Sufi *shaykhs*.

From the earliest Ottoman times, the Bektashis, the Central Asian–Indian Naqshbandis, and the Anatolian Halvetis had widespread popular support. Sufi *babas* mobilized bands of Turkish warriors and led them to holy war, protected travelers, and mediated in disputes. Wandering dervishes, called Malamatiyya or Qalandariyya, who openly disregarded Islamic law and opposed contact with government authorities, were nonetheless venerated by rural people as bearers of God's blessings and of magical powers. Sufis attracted landless and dispossessed peasants in the countryside and artisans, traders, and merchants in the towns.

The Bektashis were among the most influential of these Sufis. Hajji Bektash, the founder of the order, probably lived toward the end of the thirteenth century. According to legend, he and some forty followers set up hospices (*tekkes*) throughout eastern Anatolia and among Turkomans in Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Rhodope. Bektashis spread throughout Anatolia and the Balkans in the course of the fifteenth century. Around 1500, Balim Sultan organized the rituals of the order and perfected its system of hospices. The Bektashis were strongly influenced by both Shiʿism and Christianity. They took the sixth imam, Jaʿfar, as their patron saint; venerated the trinity of God, Muhammad, and ʿAli; offered bread and wine in initiation ceremonies; and required celibacy of their teachers. They taught that there were four levels of religious belief: *shariʿa*, adherence to the law; *tariqa*, initiation in special ceremonies to the Sufi order; *maʿrifa*, understanding of the truth; and *haqiqa*, the direct experience of the divine reality. Initiates were introduced progressively to the secret knowledge and ceremonies of the group.

The Bektashis, although unorthodox, were taken under the wing of the Ottomans as chaplains to the janissaries. They lived and marched with the soldiers, providing them with magical protection in battle. This resulted in the order's spread throughout eastern Anatolia and among Turkish migrants in Macedonia and Albania.

Many rural Sufis were politically important because they could inspire resistance to the state. Eastern Anatolia, like northwestern Iran, was a breeding ground for Sufi messianic beliefs and Sufi-led revolts against state domination. For example, in central Anatolia and the Balkans, Bedreddin (d. 1416) denied the literal truth of heaven and hell, the day of judgment, the resurrection of the body, the creation of the world, and other basic tenets of Muslim belief. The Hurufiyya (whose doctrine spread among both Muslims and Christians in Anatolia and Bulgaria at the end of the fourteenth century) preached that the only rightful income was that earned by manual work. Sufi-led rebellions also occurred in the late fifteenth century. In 1519, a preacher named Jelal took the name of Shah Ismaʿil, claimed to be the messiah (Mahdi), and attracted Turkish cultivator and pastoralist opposition to the imposition of taxes. An

early sixteenth-century wave of revolts was closely related to Safavid agitation and the opposition of eastern Anatolian peoples to the Ottoman-Sunni regime. The Ottoman-Safavid conflict exaggerated the differences between Sunnis and Shi'is, and the persecution of the Shi'is in the Ottoman Empire became routine in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Anatolian resistance was fostered by Turkish folk culture. Itinerant minstrel poets (*saz shairi*) toured villages, singing of the struggles of the Turks against the Georgians, Circassians, and Byzantines and celebrating the virtues of Turkish peoples. Epic poetry was translated into shadow-play theater (*karagoz*). Sufi poets, such as the influential Yunus Emre (d. 1329), gave expression to popular literary and religious culture. Poets traveled with soldiers, sang in camps, entertained people at fairs, and conducted contests that were the basis of an Anatolian folk consciousness. The heritage of nomadic populations, independent states, and Sufi brotherhoods separated the Anatolian provinces from the capital city elites.

Alongside the rural Sufis, urban religious orders also flourished in Anatolia and the Balkans. The Mevlevis were spiritually descended from Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273) and have become universally known for their ceremonial dancing as the whirling dervishes. Apart from their ceremonial function, Mevlevi *tekkes* were also important for the study of Persian literature and Sufi thought, and for the education of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite. They attracted many intellectuals, poets, scholars, bureaucrats, and rich merchants in Istanbul. The Mevlevis were similarly tied to the Ottoman state; they acquired the right to gird a sultan with a holy sword on his accession. Naqshbandis and Khalwatis were also influential and active Sufi orders.

In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottomans succeeded in domesticating the major Sufi brotherhoods without entirely eliminating the independent influence of Sufi teachers. The state co-opted Sufi *tekkes* by providing them with permanent endowments and gifts for charitable purposes, but many Sufis remained skeptical and even hostile to the bureaucratization of the religious elites.

Women and family in the Ottoman era (1400–1800) (co-author, Lena Salaymeh)

Ottoman-era literatures reveal a continuity with the mores of earlier Middle Eastern societies (ʿAbbasid, Fatimid, and Mamluk) but provide more abundant source materials and reveal new dimensions of family, male-female relations, and sexuality. In previous sections, we discussed the divergences between the cultural and legal systems espoused by religious elites and the actualities of women's lives. In the Ottoman era too, women were expected to obey and defer to men, to be veiled and unobtrusive in public, and to attend to the needs of husbands and households. Yet we find the same gap between religious and social norms and the real world of family, sexuality, and property. Although the dominant social norms did not favor women, women nonetheless had considerable leeway to maneuver in society; their situations varied greatly by historical context and social class. Upper-class women were more likely to be secluded, but they also had greater access to financial, educational, and political resources. Lower-class women had comparatively more mobility, but more difficult daily lives.

The royal family and harem were defined by very special circumstances. The Ottoman harem was a part of the Topkapi Palace, kept exclusively as a residence for the sultan's wives, concubines, female relatives, and servants. The harem was based on a widespread and long-standing Middle Eastern and Mediterranean practice of keeping aristocratic and elite women within the household, a practice then extended to all female relatives. The harem was open only to the sultan and his eunuchs and was invisible to the outside world. However, seclusion did not imply that the royal women were cut off from the world of power, money, or culture. It was considered not a confinement but a protection from the profane world and a sign of prestige and honor.

The royal household was further marked by an intricate nexus of freedom and slavery. The wives of sultans were legally married free women, but many of the sultans' consorts were concubines. Until the late fifteenth century, Ottoman sultans typically married both Muslim

and non-Muslim royal and noble women from the dominant Anatolian and Balkan dynasties and in turn gave the men from these dynasties royal daughters in marriage. These marriages fostered close political ties, but they also generated rivalry among the sons of different mothers and warfare among the sons fighting to succeed to the sultanate. To increase family and political stability, the Ottomans determined first that only the eldest son was entitled to succession and then that Ottoman sultans would restrict sexual relations to concubines – wives were henceforth celibate – and limit each concubine to a single male child. This gave great political power to concubines, who accompanied their sons when they were appointed as provincial governors. This practice was changed by Suleyman, whose concubine, Hurrem, had more than one son with Suleyman and remained in Istanbul with the sultan when her sons were appointed as provincial governors. She assumed the role of queen mother on Suleyman's death, initiating a practice that became prevalent in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Women in the royal household enjoyed great political power and economic privileges. They maintained family and political connections with Ottoman allies and Ottoman nobles and officials and sometimes played an active role in diplomatic and political negotiations. This may have been a specifically Ottoman phenomenon, because there is no parallel in the Safavid and Mughal empires. Moreover, royal women were richly provided with properties and, as did royal women in an earlier era, generously funded endowments for educational and charitable purposes – endowments that gave them a network of social and political contacts in the wider society. Still, there were limits to these powers, because women did not have access to official positions from which they could rival high-ranking men in the accumulation of property and power.

The lives of middle-class and working women continued some of the patterns of earlier times. Women in these classes commonly possessed property and earned their own living. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the expansion and commercialization of the Ottoman economy and the engagement of the Ottoman Empire in the world trading economy resulted in increased jobs in coastal

cities and factories, which in turn gave many women increased mobility, earning power, and independence. Ordinary women inherited and received dowers and other gifts of property and land. They acted as landlords and moneylenders, had businesses and jobs, and earned and lent money. There was also a female economy in things valued by women.

Family inheritance and property practices differed in different parts of the empire. In Anatolian towns, women generally inherited cash, cloth, or jewelry. Family real estate was typically sold for the proceeds to be divided among the heirs. In Cairo and Aleppo, however, women created and administered educational, charitable, and familial trusts (*awqaf*). In eighteenth-century Cairo, women endowed 25 percent of trusts; in eighteenth-century Aleppo, women endowed between 30 and 40 percent of trusts. Women were sometimes the executors (*mutawali*) of trusts, if they stood in the line of appointed successors to a dead husband, son, or brother.

Furthermore, wealth and earnings gave women social and familial advantages. Divorces at the initiative of women (known as *khul'*) were more prevalent, as women sought to end unhappy marriages by relinquishing some of their financial rights. Women could exchange property for protection and support. Still, wherever property was considered a collective resource and household and kinship ties were strong, women were vulnerable to family pressures and could be deprived of property by male relatives.

The Ottoman legal system and the family

The Ottoman legal system continued the Islamic legal tradition, which allowed for great variability in practice. Courts responded to the realities of peoples' lives rather than strictly applying legal or cultural norms. Court records indicate that judges were flexible in their adjudication of family issues, implementing a variety of custody practices and often providing financial support for women in cases of divorce. Some examples from specific places and times reflect a great variety of practices that favored women and were prevalent throughout the Ottoman Empire. In seventeenth-century Cairo, a

woman could stipulate in her marriage contract that her husband could not take a second wife. In eighteenth-century Aleppo, mothers and matrilineal female relatives were awarded custody of children in more than 50 percent of the known cases – despite the availability of patrilineal guardians. Support for pregnant or divorced women was greater in practice than legal texts suggest. The prescribed waiting period (*'idda*) helped assure paternal responsibility. Widows were often granted guardianship of children's inheritances or the right to use a child's inheritance, rather than the mother's own money, for support of the child. The courts commonly helped women keep their inheritances and gave them and maternal relatives guardianship of children. Children born of widows long periods after the deaths of husbands were assigned the paternity of the deceased spouse. Courts recognized a woman's claims to debts owed to her by a deceased husband. Parents of children conceived or born out of wedlock were allowed to marry without punishment. Court records also suggest that judges did not require or enforce seclusion of women. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal opinions from Syria and Palestine indicate that even though judges believed in the gender superiority of men, they helped women by enforcing their rights and widening the grounds for divorce or annulment at the woman's initiative.

Local judges sometimes ignored Ottoman state law and looked to the several legal school traditions to find interpretations that seemed best suited to the cases they were adjudicating. The law schools differed considerably in their norms for family relations and could be manipulated to gain advantages in given situations. For example, although Malikis insisted on a guardian for a first marriage, Hanafis allowed women to marry by themselves. Whereas Hanafis gave little leeway for annulment, Malikis allowed it for desertion, nonmaintenance, or bodily harm.

The courts served a broad spectrum of the population. Upper-class women were less likely to go to court, but if they or their representative did so, they had advantages due to family and social networks, economic assets, and education. Eighteenth-century Ottoman court records include female petitioners from the

countryside, which suggests a degree of state centralization that allowed appeals to the center against provincial officials and a favorable attitude toward women's needs.

Non-Muslim women frequented Ottoman courts for marital, divorce, and property issues when the Ottoman courts were more likely to favor their interests than Christian or Jewish courts. Ottoman court decisions were also more likely to be enforced. Jewish women benefited from the advantages of Islamic law in matters of inheritance. Also, a non-Muslim woman who wanted a divorce not granted by a husband or wanted to remarry, escape from a husband's decision to marry a second wife, or avoid punishment for adultery had the option of converting to Islam. By converting, a woman would automatically be divorced from a non-Muslim husband.

Freedom and slavery

As in earlier eras, women's mobility varied according to class, age, and other circumstances. In addition to employment, events such as religious festivals and other celebrations provided opportunities for women to leave domestic spaces. In eighteenth-century Cairo and Mosul, for example, women visited tombs and took part in Sufi ceremonies. Eighteenth-century miniatures depict women in public situations, including ceremonies, processions, visits to tombs, and pilgrimage. Female poets participated in the general culture. Although many women wore veils in public spaces, veiling provided a certain anonymity that could be liberating.

Slavery was a significant aspect of both the Ottoman economy and Ottoman society. Slave women differed in social status and mobility depending on their specific socio-legal category, whether concubines, mothers of free children, or manumitted slaves. Generally, slaves who had children with their owners were equivalent in status to wives. If the father acknowledged paternity, his children were legally recognized and given full inheritance rights. Jews and Christians also owned slaves, sometimes including Muslim slaves – although by law a non-Muslim would have to sell a slave who converted to Islam to a Muslim.

Family and sexuality

Economic developments and the decentralization and redistribution of political power in the eighteenth century had important ramifications for family life, sociosexual mores, and even sexual identities. In traditional patriarchal and patrilineal households, elder males were the dominant authority, and older women – especially mothers – exerted strong influence over their sons. A young bride was commonly subject to the authority of, and perhaps abuse by, her mother-in-law but could become a dominant mother-in-law in turn. Ottoman and Egyptian women who married into extended families often stipulated protective conditions in their marriage contracts, such as assurances against domestic violence or the husband taking a second wife without their consent.

Moreover, contrary to common assumptions about Ottoman or Islamic patriarchy, there is much evidence that matrilineal relationships were as important as patrilineal ones, suggesting a relatively bilateral kinship system. Bilateral kinship appears to have been informally recognized in previous eras, as demonstrated in biographical literature, but became more prominent in the eighteenth century. Women were often married to maternal kin and maintained close emotional, financial, and property ties to their natal families. Natal families continued to support their daughters and sisters – brothers and sisters were typically closely bonded – after their marriages and, if need be, after divorces. Divorced women tended to remarry quickly. Family instability and frequent divorces and remarriages were compensated by bilateral family ties that remained important throughout the life cycle. In addition, scholars of eighteenth-century families have found that men were increasingly identified with their wives' families, especially if the wife came from a family of high status. Tombstones show a new fluidity in the way people identified their ancestors. Wives' names appear; men sometimes link themselves to women's patriline. Ottomans were creating their own lineages.

Eighteenth-century Ottoman households varied considerably according to region and class. We find both extended families and

natal units, sometimes living in a house of their own within a compound and sometimes living in nuclear units. Divorced or widowed women often remarried, and women raised children from previous marriages in their new households. In the early modern period, there was a growing tendency toward the formation of nuclear families marked by affection and concern for the security of women. Earning opportunities and mobility favored the small family unit. The early modern trend toward couple autonomy and single-family homes would become more pronounced in the nineteenth century.

There were a variety of discourses shaping the Ottoman-era practices of sexuality. Although we do not have sufficient historical evidence to compare the Ottoman with the pre-Ottoman period, it seems likely that Ottoman sexual norms continued earlier practices and beliefs. Although religious scholars defined adultery and fornication by unmarried men and women as serious crimes and condemned homoerotic sexual relations, in practice Ottoman norms attached no shame to sex, viewed men and women as having the same sexual nature, and accepted both hetero- and homoerotic relations as normal. Ottoman state law (*kanun*) tended to equalize the treatment of men and women and of hetero- and homosexuals. Medical discourse, based on Galen and the humoral theory of the body, held that men and women have the same nature, blurring the distinction between hetero- and homosexual behaviors. Dream interpretation literature accepted both homo- and heterosexuality as natural. In the puppet theater, both men and women are portrayed as avidly sexual, and women as independent and assertive. The principle character (*karagoz*) is married and has children, but he chases women, has both active and passive homosexual sex, and cross-dresses. Furthermore, Sufi mystics sought spiritual inspiration by gazing on youthful male beauty. Homoerotic relations between an older man and a beardless youth – especially between a Sufi master and his disciples – were widely considered desirable, although the growing eighteenth-century Islamic reform movement rejected Sufi practices.

An important change would occur in the nineteenth century, as European ideas about sexual differences of men and women and a more judgmental tone – distinguishing natural and unnatural, normal and abnormal, and Christian and heathen forms of sexuality – led to attacks on the Ottomans for the seclusion and the promiscuity of women, sodomy, homoerotic relations, and lurid theater. This discourse connected the weakness and corruption of Ottoman government to Ottoman sexual corruption. By the 1850s, European ideas were driving Ottoman discourses into self-censorship. There was a Victorian-like regression in the autonomy of women. An embarrassed silence descended on Ottoman sexual discourses. Homoerotic love became shameful. Dream books virtually disappeared. The puppet theater was toned down. The hetero-normalization of sexuality was reinforced by massive sociopolitical changes, such as the centralization of state power, the breakdown of small communities, and the emergence of the nuclear family.

Chapter 32 The postclassical Ottoman Empire: decentralization, commercialization, and incorporation

In the late sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, foreign wars interacted with domestic political and economic problems to bring about profound changes in the Ottoman system. The pressures of war, internal social and demographic crises, and the commercialization and monetization of the economy led to new political institutions.

After centuries of conquests, the Ottomans reached a stalemate with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Habsburgs in the Mediterranean. The Austrian war of 1593–1606 showed that further Ottoman expansion was blocked. As the Ottomans reached farther into central and northern Europe, logistical difficulties hampered their campaigns. A new premium was being placed on infantry armed with gunpowder weapons, muskets, and cannons, fighting from entrenched positions. As firearms and organized infantry became ever more important, the Ottoman cavalry (*sipahis*) could no longer resist German riflemen. Western economies could better afford the costs of war. Moreover, from the 1680s to the 1730s, the Ottomans became dependent on Albanian, Bosnian, Kurdish, Cossack, Tatar, Georgian, and Circassian auxiliaries who were not as well disciplined, trained, and armed as the traditional Ottoman forces.

In the late seventeenth century, both the Habsburg and the Russian empires expanded at Ottoman expense. For the first time, the European powers pushed back the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. An Ottoman siege of Vienna failed in 1683, and the Habsburgs seized most of Hungary north of the Danube, Serbia, Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Venetians took Dalmatia and the Morea. Poland invaded Podolia and the Ukraine. Russia, under Peter the Great, with its armies newly modernized, took Azov

in the Crimea in 1696. The Ottomans, however, were able to restore their territorial positions with gains in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea.

In the late eighteenth century, however, Russian expansion resumed. Between 1768 and 1774, the Russians occupied Romania and the Crimea and by the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarca (1774) achieved access to the Black Sea. A new series of wars, culminating in the Peace of Jassy (1792), allowed the Russians to advance to the Dniester River, to establish a protectorate over Georgia, and to consolidate its position in the Crimea. In 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt.

The losses in foreign wars were partly due to domestic problems. In the late sixteenth century the Ottoman military system was breaking down. As early as the 1530s, there was evidence that *timars* (the grants of tax revenues from land to support soldiers) were becoming hereditary – contrary to the original intention of reserving control in the hands of the sultan. By the end of the century, further corruption in the system of grants of land income was evident in evasion of duties, assignments of *timars* to the protégés of high-ranking officials, and banditry by displaced *sipahis*. The discipline and loyalty of the janissaries were also compromised, in part due to falling incomes. As it ceased to expand, the empire ceased to acquire booty. After 1580, inflation, possibly due to the influx of American silver and certainly due to the debasement of Ottoman coinage, also reduced the value of Ottoman incomes. Inadequately paid soldiers and officials seized provincial lands and diverted the revenues for their private benefit.

Moreover, in response to political unrest, janissaries were stationed in towns and fortresses to suppress rebellion and criminality. They soon became enmeshed in local communities, took control of artisan associations, engaged in trade and crafts to supplement their incomes, married and established families, and then promoted their own children into the military corps. They became resistant to military service and used their political and military clout to extract gifts and privileges from the sultans. Janissaries soon formed an exploitative class living off illegal tax

revenues. Close ties among janissaries, artisans, and scholars made it politically impossible to control the soldiers. Discipline in the army was reduced to such an extent that there were pay riots in 1622 and 1631, accompanied by the looting of Istanbul. In the following century and a half, janissary rebellions supported by artisans and scholars became almost an ordinary political event. Rebellious janissaries brought down ministers and sultans. The abandonment of the *devshirme*, the draft of Christian youths for military and court service, in 1637 made it impossible to redress these trends.

The political and military crises coincided with long-term social and economic crises. Late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century inflation raised prices and reduced the real incomes of peasants, *timar* holders, salaried soldiers, and the state. The sixteenth century also saw the beginnings of a long period of population growth, landlessness, and rural unrest. The end of Ottoman conquests in Hungary and Iran forced displaced cavalrymen and demobilized irregular infantry to return to their villages and towns. They were joined by peasants fleeing excessive taxation, footloose students, unemployed drifters, and bandits, who provided the manpower for a series of revolts between 1595 and 1610, known as the Jelali rebellions. The Jelali rebellions were led by lower-ranking military and administrative officers and were supported by commoners, fighting to gain a share of the privileges allotted to the slave forces. Jelali rebels aimed at being bought off, and the Ottoman authorities managed them by alternately paying and suppressing them. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had begun to adapt to the weakening of its janissary and cavalry forces by recruiting bandit gangs, peasant militias, ethnic auxiliaries, and the retainers of provincial notables for its armies.

These developments weakened the state but increased the power of the common people. Peasants moved into villages clustered around fortified manor houses and were often permitted to arm themselves for defense against bandits. This strengthened local community ties and encouraged the emergence of a stronger peasant leadership. In many parts of the Balkans, the weakening of Ottoman central authority led to a three-way struggle for power

among provincial officeholding and landowning notables, janissaries and artisans, and peasant bandits.

Commercialization

At the same time, there were important changes in the trading and commercial economy. After centuries of increasing Ottoman power and economic advantages in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, Western European powers were gaining the upper hand. Whereas in the sixteenth century the Ottomans had fended off the Portuguese intrusion into the Indian Ocean, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Dutch and the British took control of the spice trade in Asia and diverted most of it to Atlantic routes. The silk trade further declined as the demand for cotton textiles rose. The Atlantic countries also profited from the production and sale of woolen cloths and metals, the enormous expansion of trade with the Americas, and the substitution of Western for Eastern sources of colonial sugar, tobacco, and cotton. The Ottomans, however, remained active in the trade of Indian cotton goods and dyes and in control of the growing coffee trade from Yemen through Egypt to Istanbul and from Istanbul to Europe.

Control of the Asian trade helped Europeans build up a strong position in the Mediterranean as well. The Ottoman-French alliance against the Habsburg Empire disposed the Ottomans to give France a monopoly on Ottoman trade. For a time, all European ships had to sail under the French flag. In 1583, however, the British ambassador Harbourne succeeded in negotiating a trade treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The English formed the Levant Company to export cloth and tin, which was essential to make brass for cannon founding, in return for silk, mohair, cotton, wool, carpets, drugs, spices, and indigo. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, competition in the Mediterranean among the French, English, and Dutch was fierce. In the late eighteenth century, France again became the dominant trading partner, but the overall volume of Mediterranean trade was probably declining due to the competition of direct shipments of spices, Indian cloth, and Persian silk to Europe over Atlantic routes.

The British East India Company, buying Far Eastern goods at their source and bringing them into the Mediterranean via London, actually became a competitor of the British Levant Company, which depended on the Persian Gulf and Red Sea routes.

Moreover, European merchants penetrated Ottoman markets, especially as the decline of the Eastern trade shifted European interest from Turkey and the Arab provinces to the Balkans. European traders, with the participation of Jewish and Greek intermediaries, brought their imported products to the interior and gathered goods for export. From Salonika, European trade reached Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The English imported luxury cloth; the French, middle-quality cloth. Venice sold silk, satin, and taffeta. The Germans brought paper, tin, iron, copper, sugar, and indigo. European merchants exported wood, cotton, silk, leather, tobacco, beeswax, and hides by sea; cattle went overland from Romania and Hungary into central Europe. Ordinarily the Ottomans prohibited the export of iron, lead, copper, and grain, but there was an active trade in contraband. In the eighteenth century, the French became dominant over other Europeans in the Istanbul market and set up their own corporate structure to strengthen their collective position. They used their influence with the Ottoman state to break the grip of Ottoman merchants and guilds over the local economy.

Changes in trade caused profound changes in the internal Ottoman economy. Some regions suffered while others prospered. Coastal areas expanded production of cotton and rice and introduced maize and tobacco. Parts of western Anatolia and the Adana region went over to cash-crop farming of grain, cotton, silk, and other raw materials for export. In general, silk, printed cottons, and carpet production expanded, but the production of Bursa silk cloth and Ankara mohair woolens fell when Europeans began to replace Turkish textiles with their own manufactures. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman consumption was reinforced by the importation of Indian textiles, Far Eastern porcelains, coffee, tobacco, and European luxury cloth goods. The Ottoman Empire was entering into a cosmopolitan consumer culture.

As Baghdad, Cairo, and Aleppo declined, Izmir emerged in the seventeenth century as the principal market for the exchange of Iranian silk for Dutch and English woolens and Italian silks and as a rendezvous for Europeans and local Armenian, Jewish, and Greek merchants. Portuguese Jews dominated tax farming; Ottoman Muslims controlled regional exchange; Greeks handled interregional trade; and Armenians predominated in the silk trade. In the eighteenth century, with European patronage, the Greeks emerged as the most important merchant community.

The Balkan economy flourished. Macedonia became a major exporter of grain and other commodities – such as cotton, livestock, tobacco, and maize. Cotton production increased enormously. Thessaly and Macedonia exported roughly half of their grain, cotton, and tobacco crops. Bulgaria produced cheap woolen cloth for the internal market. As cities grew and craft industries developed, textile production from Greek and Turkish (Muslim and Jewish) manufacturers in Izmir, Salonica, Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul prospered.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, Ottoman manufactures seemed to have prospered in international trade, but by the last decades of the century Ottoman trade relied on the export of raw materials such as wool, cotton, furs, hides, tobacco, and olive oil. The balance of trade was shifting. As became clearer in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly importing manufactured goods and exporting raw materials.

European commercial penetration also subverted Ottoman control of trade and its revenues, helping to transfer political and economic power from the Ottoman state to foreign commercial powers, provincial elites, and non-Muslim merchants. Ethnic factors became crucial to market positions. Away from the coastal areas, Ottoman Muslim merchants controlled local markets, but English, Dutch, and French merchants allied with Greek Orthodox and Armenian merchants and bankers to push aside Jewish and Muslim merchants. The French attacked local monopolies by allying with Jews against Greeks and by mediating their relations with Muslims

through the Armenian money changers. Greeks, Albanians, and Serbs gained in commercial prominence. The Phanar Greek financial aristocracy held administrative and economic power in Romania. Non-Muslim traders in Istanbul, Salonica, Izmir, Aleppo, and other important cities strengthened their commercial and cultural ties with counterparts in Livorno, Ancona, Trieste, Leipzig, Vienna, and Lwow.

Thus, economic change contributed to the development of a pluralistic, multicentered economy with substantial foreign involvement. In an earlier era, the empire was able to closely control and tax international trade and to channel the surplus produce of Anatolia to the benefit of the political elite and the populace of Istanbul. Increasing European demand for Ottoman products gave local notables, merchants, and estate owners an incentive to convert tax farms into private estates (*chiftliks*), and to bypass state regulations so as to export surplus produce to Europe. Newly independent tax farmers and local officials redirected the agricultural surpluses from the capital to provincial towns and markets. Furthermore, in the Balkans, a new landlord class made up of Muslim officials, army officers, and rich non-Muslim merchants and other notables raised new crops such as maize, rice, and animals for export, despite the fact that this was illegal under Ottoman regulations. Commercialization also stimulated the growth of towns. Absentee landlords, tax farmers, rich notables, and import-export merchants formed a new urban aristocracy. A provincial economic elite rose to power.

New Political institutions

In the decades from the late sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the end of the Ottoman conquests, the breakdown of the old military system, the rise of popular forces, and an increasingly commercialized economy led to profound changes in the Ottoman political system.

The key to political change was the financial system. The stabilization of frontiers meant that the incomes from booty, tributes,

and taxes from new regions were lost. New and enlarged infantry forces, however, required increased cash revenue. Whereas European governments typically borrowed from moneylenders or banking houses or sold bonds to meet their revenue needs, the Ottomans attempted to maximize taxation. In the early seventeenth century, they replaced assignment of tax revenues to *timar* holders with direct collection. *Timars* were sold to wealthy investors as tax farms. The empire also levied new taxes on the growing commercial sector (*avariz*) and on the non-Muslim population (*jizya*). With the transformation of the *timar* grants into money tax revenues and the increasing trade with Europe, economic development led to the need for a more monetized economy and eventually for a single Ottoman currency. In tandem with the monetary unification of the economy came the need for a single and centralized system of law. Islamic law became ever more essential for the regulation of property and commercial transactions. The empire was evolving from a feudal to a capitalist type of economy.

Consequently, in the seventeenth century, financiers and merchants rose in political importance, joining the high-ranking military as the elites of the empire. The viziers and the pashas of the finance and scribal bureaucracies fortified their positions by building powerful households on large cadres of subordinate personnel and extensive kinship and clientele networks that rivaled the sultan, the palace hierarchy, and the religious bureaucracy. This development was abetted by the sultan's practice of marrying his daughters and sisters to leading officials. Mehmed Koprulu, a *devshirme* recruit of an Albanian Christian father, who was grand vizier from 1656 to 1661, further consolidated the power of the bureaucrats over the slave elites, undermined the influence of the religious elites by confiscating the properties of the chief judges, and suppressed the Sufi orders. As a result, the households of the leading officers of the state came to be more powerful than the imperial household. The sultans became ever more ceremonial figures. Of the nine sultans who reigned between 1617 and 1730, seven were dethroned. In effect, the Ottoman state had become distinct from the Ottoman dynasty.

The key to the enhanced power of the financial elites was the expansion of tax farming. Tax farming was an arrangement in which anticipated tax revenues were sold to private persons in return for payment in advance. This assured the government of a fixed return but deprived it of incomes exceeding the price of the farms. In 1597, the state converted the *timars* into tax farms. In 1695, tax farms were sold as life tenures (*malikane*). By 1703, lifetime tax farms were in wide use in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Arab provinces. The state also sold tax farms for the collection of commercial and poll taxes. Eventually, shares in tax farms were sold to the public.

Due to tax farming, the tax bureaucracy dominated the central government. At first, the high-ranking central officials occupied provincial positions as well, but increasingly they appointed deputies (*mutesellim*), many of whom were local notables (*a'yan*) and employed local officials, religious leaders, notables, merchants, and landlords as subcontractors. In Egypt and the Arab provinces, these local elites were Mamluks. In Romania, they were Greek Orthodox merchants from Istanbul. Everywhere, local tax farmers increased their wealth as regional production and trade grew in response to international commerce. They invested in land, urban real estate, and money lending, thus retaining an increasing part of the provincial surplus for local use. As power and wealth shifted to the provinces, the central government depended ever more heavily on them.

In turn, the provincial elites developed their own extended political households, military forces, administrative staffs, and local patronage networks. With bands of peasants, demobilized soldiers, and idle students roaming the country, provincial officials and notables created bodyguards and even small armies. In the Arab provinces, janissary regiments took power. The tax farmers also took over local government by assisting judges and organizing troops for the Ottoman armies. From one point of view, the central government was losing power to its own officials, but at the same time it was extending and deepening its reach in the provinces. Although increasingly powerful, local officials depended on the grants of tax farms and authority from Istanbul; they collected taxes and sent military forces when required.

The balance of power between central and provincial elites was always changing. Over a period of two centuries, waves of provincial autonomy alternated with periods of state centralization. The first half of the eighteenth century was a period of consolidation. The ministerial and chancery services maintained discipline within the scribal corporation. In many provinces, the Ottomans reorganized administration and appointed effective governors. Still, the forces of decentralization and the privatization of official positions and incomes continued apace. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, a period of wars and disruption, provincial notables further built up households of servants and retainers, soldiers, and scribes, in imitation of the sultan and the great lords of the regime. The position of notable became a formal, locally elected office, and councils of notables won control over the appointment of deputy governors and judges, enforced guild regulations, prevented food shortages, and maintained public buildings. In 1809, the notables extracted formal recognition of their rights and prerogatives from the sultan.

Local dynasties entrenched themselves in power. The Karaosmanoglu dominated central and western Anatolia; the Chapanoglu, the north-central plateau; and the Caniklizadeler, the northeast. In the Balkans, 'Ali Pasha of Janina (r. 1788–1822) founded a small regional state in northern Albania and Greece. Osman Pasvanoglu (r. 1799–1807) ruled western Bulgaria and parts of Serbia and Romania. Other Balkan lords occupied eastern Bulgaria and Thrace. In the Arab provinces, the governors of Damascus, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra were substantially independent. Egypt was governed by the Mamluks, and North Africa was autonomous. By the end of the eighteenth century, almost all of the Ottoman Empire was in the control of independent officials. This was the high point of notables' influence and political decentralization and would be followed in the nineteenth century by strong efforts to reestablish central control.

Networking

Decentralization, commercialization, and the consolidation of strong provincial elites was accompanied by the formation of new social and political networks among individuals and interest groups interacting directly with one another, rather than under the aegis of the state. In 1703, Istanbul guilds led by janissaries and supported by lower-ranking officials, merchants, and craftsmen rebelled against the burdens of war and taxes. The rebellion deposed the sultan, but a provincial lord marched on the capital and convened an assembly of powerful notables from the Balkans and Anatolia to restore him. This gave the first historically visible indication that viziers and pashas, based in Istanbul, Anatolia, and the Balkans, had created extensive patronage networks among family members, lesser notables, administrators, soldiers, merchants, religious functionaries, students, and others and had used these networks to manipulate political power. The great *aʿyan* were creating what were, in effect, political parties.

A further development of the networking tendency was manifest in the Patrona Halil revolt of 1730. Led by an Albanian janissary, this revolt was joined by masses of commoners – shopkeepers, craftsmen, religious students, and ordinary soldiers – who rebelled in protest of economic hardship, taxes, and wars. As janissaries merged into the working population and merchants and craftsmen were incorporated into the military and paramilitary forces, the common people were drawn into political action.

In May 1807, a coup d'état led to another coalescence of Ottoman notables who joined to shape the policies of the central government. Sultan Selim III proposed a radical program of reforms to strengthen the army and the state and was deposed by rebellious janissaries and scholars. In response, a coalition of the notables of Anatolia and Rumelia, an ad hoc parliament, was formed to support the reform program. A "deed of agreement" between the sultan and the provincial lords exchanged the loyalty and military support of the provincial notables for the acceptance of their local authority. The Ottoman Empire was moving from state control to a multicentered participation of different interests in the governance of society. As a result of decentralization, commercialization, and the privatization of

property, the Ottoman state was moving toward a post-imperial "modern" form of society.

Power, ideology, and identity

These political, social, and economic changes had complex implications for the ideologies and identities of Ottoman elites and their subjects. Within the Ottoman elite, the seventeenth-century military setbacks caused consternation. Ottoman historians and court officials gave thoughtful attention to the problems of the regime and wrote volumes of advice to rulers. They recommended a restoration of traditional Ottoman institutions. The *Risale* of Mustafa Kochu Bey, written in 1631, advised the sultan to return to the direct management of the government, restore the authority of the grand vizier, reconstruct the *timars*, and suppress factions. He warned against the oppression of the peasantry. Katip Chelebi (d. 1657) analyzed the weakening of the empire in terms of the abuse of peasants, the loss of production and revenues, and the flight to the cities and called for the restoration of just taxation and lawful order. He attributed a Venetian military victory in 1656 to their superior geographical and scientific knowledge. Mustafa Naima (d. 1716), an official historian of the Ottoman court, understood the problem in terms of government financial policies and advised that the army be purged of incompetent soldiers.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, there was a reorientation of Ottoman perceptions. The treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the first time that the Ottomans lost territory to a European power, showed that European innovations in military technology, economic organization, and cultural style were a direct threat to the empire. The Ottomans cautiously began to import European advisors to implement military reforms. Between 1734 and 1738, de Bonneval taught mathematics and artillery techniques to Ottoman soldiers. In 1773, Baron de Tott provided up-to-date instruction in artillery and naval warfare. An Ottoman press was established to print European technical works dealing with military subjects, engineering, geography, and history.

This new political consciousness of the balance of power was expressed in the emulation of European fashions. Ottomans became enamored of European architectural decoration and furniture. Ottoman mosques were decorated in baroque fashion. Summer palaces and water fountains, built on traditional Ottoman architectural lines, were decorated in a French-inspired rococo manner. Ottoman writers reported on French theater and opera, dress and decorations, garden design, and the freer style of social relations.

The craze for tulips in the reign of Ahmed III (r. 1703–30) became an emblem for this new sensibility. Among the Istanbul elites, the taste for European textiles, glass, clocks, flowers, architectural adornments, and home furnishings was accompanied by a mania for prize tulips. The sultans sought to enhance their standing by taking a leading role in setting standards and taste in consumption. They promulgated sumptuary laws to define the required dress and identifying marks for persons of different religions, occupations, and ranks and presented themselves as the guardians of order and morality and the arbitrators of social status. No longer in direct command of the armies or the administration, they were the leaders of high society.

Turkish poetry turned to themes of everyday life and adopted a more vernacular language. Turkish proverbs, puns, and jokes became part of the poetry of such writers as Ahmed Nedim (d. 1730). Mehmed Emin Belig (d. 1758) described bazaars, baths, and the lives of artisans. Ottoman art lost its hieratic quality; the taste for naturalistic and floral design replaced the formality of traditional geometric and Arabesque decoration. These changes indicate a shift from a self-conscious imperial style to a more personal sensibility, much in parallel with the evolution of Safavid taste in an era of imperial weakness.

Despite the administrative decentralization of the empire, however, the identity of local Turkish and Arab elites remained bound up with the empire and with Islam. The sultans continued to be recognized as legitimate suzerains, and local officials continued to be Ottomans.

Indeed, the extension of elite networks and the increased reliance of the regime on the support of provincial notables and even of peasant riflemen implied the need for greater ideological and cultural ties between the ruler and the populace.

The traditional ideological expression of this bond was "the circle of justice" – the commitment of the regime to the protection and well-being of the people that was the basis of prosperity, order, and power. This was overtaken in the eighteenth century by a new statist ideology that reflected the growing power of the vizier households and the wealthy financiers of the empire – the tax-farming and merchant strata. Their identity was expressed in the historical writings of official chroniclers and in compilations of biographical dictionaries. Earlier histories were organized by the reigns of sultans; new histories were more impersonal chronicles of the Ottoman state. Earlier biographies focused on the judicial and religious notables; new biographies discussed the viziers and administrators.

A competing cultural response was framed in terms of Islam. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a strong populist movement promoted more restrictive and puritanical expressions of Islam in opposition to Sufism and the diversity of Muslim beliefs and practices. As early as the 1540s, theology and mathematics were losing popularity. In 1580, an observatory attached to the Sulaymaniyya College in Istanbul was destroyed. Puritanical legalists, supported by students and tradesmen, won strong support for a more narrow definition of Islam. Nonetheless, neither the rational sciences (such as mathematics and philosophy) nor Sufism were eliminated. The college curriculum of the eighteenth century continued to include these subjects. Sufism, reoriented toward reform and social activism, also flourished.

From 1630 to 1680, the supporters of Qadizade Mehmed Efendi (d. 1635) formed a party, the Kadizadeli, to persuade the authorities to enforce a legally oriented form of Islamic practice. Many of the leaders were preachers (rather than scholars) who must have felt themselves to be in direct competition with Sufi masters for popular support. The Kadizadeli movement seems to have been a reaction against the formation of a *classe dangereuse* in Istanbul, including

migrants from the countryside, gangsters, and street peddlers living in bachelor inns. The Kadizadeli opposed coffee houses and the consumption of opium, coffee, and tobacco; puppet theater shows (*karagoz*); and the relaxed behavior of women in public. Reform-minded religious scholars denounced Sufi practices, including the popular ceremonies for the dead, pilgrimages to saints' tombs, and Sufi dancing and singing. Under their influence, Sufi hospices (*tekkes*) were closed and ceremonies banned. Some Sufis were imprisoned; others executed.

The rise of a "fundamentalist" orientation was also connected with a profound change in Ottoman policy toward non-Muslims. The Kadizadeli insisted on clarifying boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims and especially on the separation of Muslim women from non-Muslim men. In the late seventeenth century, there was intense state and public pressure on at least some of the empire's non-Muslim populations to convert to Islam. Eventually, the Ottoman authorities suppressed the Kadizadeli movement, probably out of concern at once for the authority of the state, the threat to public order, and sympathies with Sufi piety and Sufi influence with the common people.

Still, the effects of the movement were felt long after. Late eighteenth-century sultans set out their own claims to be "caliphs" and leaders of Muslims worldwide. The Ottoman scholarly families became entrenched as a religious aristocracy. Important posts were filled by a limited number of families. The scholars were a powerful interest group. Through the trust system of charitable grants, they were the only segment of the Ottoman elite that could securely pass on their property after death and appoint their heirs as administrators. The influence of scholarly families enabled them to promote their children into the higher grades of the educational and judicial hierarchies without having reached the proper preliminary levels, whereas theological students who could not find patronage were excluded. Their integration into the Ottoman regime made them the spokesmen of Ottoman legitimacy. They were less and less perceived as representing a transcendent Islamic ideal opposed to worldly corruption.

Whereas Ottoman-Muslim identities remained focused on the sultan and the empire, in the Balkans local autonomy was a harbinger of revolutionary change. In the late eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth century, Balkan peoples, predominantly Christians, never completely Ottomanized, began to conceive of national independence. Although the Orthodox Church continued to ally itself with the Ottoman regime as a bulwark against European, Latin, and Catholic influences, the centralization of power in the hands of the Greek clergy provoked ethnic resistance. Bulgarians, especially in the merchant class, cultivated a national history and a literary Bulgarian language. Local clergy fostered an interest in history and vernacular language among Romanians. Orthodox Slavs were dissatisfied with Greek leadership. Rural lords, peasant bandits, and urban merchants began to look westward not only for economic exchange but for intellectual stimulation. Elements of the Christian urban middle classes in Greece sponsored secular schools to replace church schools and patronized secular and nationalist literary, intellectual, and political movements. Religious identity was being replaced by national identity. Progressively, segments of the Balkan mercantile and landowning elites, prospering as exporters and middlemen in the trade with Europe, developed a new political consciousness. Increasing contacts with Europe and the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire opened the way for national independence.

Center and periphery

The Ottoman Empire originated in the conquests of Turkish warrior bands under the leadership of the family of Osman. As they expanded throughout western Anatolia and the Balkans, the Ottomans devised institutions to concentrate power in the hands of the sultan and his entourage. From the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries, these institutions – the palace household, the janissary corps, the *timar*-supported cavalry, provincial governorships, and the patronage of Muslim religious elites (both scholars and Sufis) – constituted the classical Ottoman imperial

configuration. These were the institutions that sustained Ottoman conquests, administered their domains, and legitimized their rule.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, changes in the military and financial systems and in the economic and social conditions of the provinces undermined the earlier institutional configuration. The succession of poorly trained sultans, the corruption of the janissaries, the breakdown of the *timar* system, and the need to recruit infantry from lower-class bandit gangs, displaced soldiers, students, and peasants all weakened the sultanate. The sultans became dependent on provincial magnates, warlords, officials, and chieftains for military manpower. Taxes were diverted from the sultans to provincial lords.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two factors further transformed the relations of the state to its elites. One was the increasing power of local notables culminating in the privatization of politically acquired assets – the conversion of tax farms into private estates. The second was the growth of both local and international commerce that enhanced the wealth and influence of merchants, officials engaged in commerce, local notables, and non-Muslims. These officials and merchants benefited from rising rural productivity, local manufactures, and a more vibrant market economy. While the Ottoman state became increasingly decentralized, the enrichment of provincial elites and commoners was leading to a more variegated society.

These changes have been described as the "decline" of the Ottoman Empire. In terms of military power and wars with Europe, the Ottomans were stalemated and in retreat from the beginning of the seventeenth century. But from an internal perspective, these changes represented a realignment of power among the Ottoman elites. High government officials were transforming the regime in their own interests. Military leaders, tax collectors, administrators, scholars, and other wealthy and powerful persons became the beneficiaries of a more decentralized system. The Ottoman center was losing power because it was losing control over taxes and markets and no longer had the resources to be a redistributive state. From the point of view of the sultanate, the devolution of power was

a corruption of Ottoman institutions. From the point of view of provincial chieftains, officials, and merchants, it was a reduction of the exploitative capacities of the center and a gain in local autonomy.

Yet, as central power was becoming less concentrated, its influence was becoming more widespread. The center was reaching out to the real holders of local power and allying them with the sultanate. Starting in the seventeenth century, in place of slave military forces and *timar* holders, it could mobilize provincial officials, landowners, merchants, financiers, and even peasant recruits for the army. With these connections, the Ottoman state succeeded in recruiting new infantry and reining in otherwise unemployed soldiers. It raised revenues and reorganized financial administration. Through tax farming, it could tap the wealth of the military and provincial elites. Thus, the era of "decline" vis-à-vis Europe also appears as a broadening of the base of regime recruitment and a co-optation of military and financial elites on the basis of negotiated relationships.

Despite decentralization, the concept of a legitimate state, its importance as the representative of Islam, and its authority as the overlord of local notables in Anatolia and the Arab provinces were unimpaired. The state maintained its dominance over the scholars and the religious establishment. In the Balkans, however, European influence enhanced the autonomy of the Christian populations and gave them new advantages in international trade that paved the way for their ultimate independence.

The change from a centralized state to a network state was probably not as radical as it has appeared to historians. Royal power was always mediated through provincial lords – warrior chieftains (*ghazis*), *timar* holders, and local satraps elevated to the rank of imperial functionaries. The Ottoman state always functioned by consultation and mediation. Not only were regional warlords and local landholding and administrative notables consulted, but the heads of religious communities (scholars and Sufi leaders, patriarchs, and rabbis), merchant leaders, and village headmen were all intermediaries – not in a chain of command, but in a web of negotiated understandings. Accommodation and incorporation were

the means by which the Ottoman state maintained its authority and longevity.

At the end of the pre-modern era, Ottoman-Islamic society was still built on a strong state, which was legitimate in military, patrimonial, and cosmopolitan as well as Islamic terms; a well-organized and subordinate Islamic religious establishment; extensive patronage networks linking provincial notables to the center; and an abiding acceptance of the concept of the authority of the empire over parochial communities. These institutions would powerfully affect the modern development of Islamic societies in Turkey and other parts of the Middle East.

Chapter 33 The Arab provinces under Ottoman rule

Egypt

The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 perpetuated, with some modifications, the ongoing system of society. The Ottomans garrisoned Egypt with several corps of janissaries and appointed military governors, inspectors, and finance officers to assure the collection of taxes and the remittance of surpluses to Istanbul. The main functions of Ottoman administration were to pacify the country; control the bedouins; protect agriculture, irrigation, and trade; and thus assure the flow of tax revenues. In the course of the first century and a half of Ottoman rule, the irrigation system of Egypt was rebuilt, cultivation increased, and trade restored by reopening the routes between India and Egypt. Egypt was also important to Ottoman control of the Red Sea, Yemen, Nubia, and Abyssinia, and the holy places in Arabia.

In many respects, Egypt remained a separate political society. Beneath the top level of Ottoman administration, the old institutional structure remained intact. The local Mamluk households continued to be militarily important and were assigned taxable estates. Although the Ottomans appointed a chief judge and a chief syndic for the corporation of descendants of the Prophet from Istanbul, the rest of the scholarly establishment was of local origin. The muftis of the law schools, the chiefs of the holy lineages, and the rector of al-Azhar were the principal leaders of the religious establishment. They were responsible for disciplining their followers and managing the trust revenues and, in the eighteenth century, the tax farms assigned for their personal upkeep, as well as being responsible for the maintenance of the religious function of their schools and fraternities.

From the fifteenth century, there were important changes in the character of Egyptian religious life. Whereas in the early Mamluk period the schools of law and the colleges had been the most important expression of Sunni Islam, Sufism became increasingly important. The Khalwatiyya, Shadhiliyya, Ahmadiyya, and other brotherhoods were organized under centralized leadership and endowed with substantial properties. They were held in reverence by the military elites and the common people alike. The birthdays of the Prophet and of famous Sufi saints were occasions for immense celebrations in which many thousands of people participated. Visits to the tombs or shrines of saints became a routine part of Egyptian religious life.

In Egypt, as in many other parts of the Muslim world, Sufism and shrine worship precipitated a religious reaction. Reformers in Mecca, Medina, Istanbul, and Syria – including Naqshbandis and others – opposed the shrine forms of Sufism. In Egypt, reform influences made themselves felt at al-Azhar, where hadith studies were revived. The Naqshbandis and the Khalwatis reinforced the trend. Reformism was especially appealing to, or indeed the expression of, the more scholarly, ethical, and puritanical spirit of merchant-scholar milieus, with their wider range of commercial and intellectual contacts and their need for a more universal form of Islam (as opposed to the parochial and localized forms of saint worship). In the late eighteenth century, Egypt seems to have maintained a variety of religious styles, including orthoprax, Sufi-orthoprax, shrine-Sufi, and reformist types of Islam.

Throughout this period, scholars and Sufi leaders played important political and social roles. They were the intermediaries between the Mamluk elites and the common people. On the one hand, higher-ranking scholars were often the clients of Mamluk regiments, from whom they received trusts, gifts, salaries, and fees for teaching and religious services. In the eighteenth century, these ties enabled the leading scholars to become extremely prosperous from the management of trusts, control of tax farms (*iltizams*), and other incomes. They served the Mamluks as negotiators and mediators in disputes among the factions, acted as bankers and tax collectors,

and communicated the demands of the regime to the common people. On the other hand, they were also closely connected to the commoners. They married into merchant families; frequently invested in trade and real estate; managed schools, hospitals, and charities; and served as patrons for their neighborhoods. A leading scholar or Sufi would arbitrate in local disputes, feed the poor, and protect his people from abuse by soldiers and tax collectors. He could either organize or calm local resistance. Thus, in Egypt, the scholars and Sufis played a critical role as intermediaries in the functioning of their society.

The late eighteenth century in Egypt was a period of violent warfare, exploitative taxation, a decline in irrigation, and rising bedouin power. As in many other parts of the empire, Ottoman governors lost authority as the Mamluks seized control of trusts and divided into factions. The Qasimiyya and the Faqariyya fought for political power until the Ottomans defeated the Mamluk factions in 1786–87 and restored central government control.

This was also a period of economic hardship due to inflation and a decline in commerce. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Egypt lost some of its trade to Portuguese and then Dutch competition but gained partial compensation from the coffee trade with Yemen. The eighteenth century, however, brought more severe European competition. European textiles, ceramics, and glass beat down Egyptian industries. Even coffee was imported into the Ottoman Empire from the Antilles.

The Fertile Crescent

In the Fertile Crescent, the Ottomans also perpetuated the regional political society. Unlike Egypt, which was a single province, the Ottomans ruled this region through the major towns (Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, and Baghdad) that formed the territorial base for several Ottoman governorships. Ottoman administration had very limited means for centralizing political power. The Ottomans aimed at the minimum of governmental power needed to prevent officials from becoming independent and still allow them to maintain order, collect

taxes, and remit the surplus to Istanbul. The primary concern in Istanbul was to make it difficult for its own appointees to defy central authority. Political authority was divided among military governors and independent civil and judicial officials. The army was divided into numerous units, including regiments of janissaries and cavalry sent from Istanbul, the governor's private retainers, and local janissaries. Bedouin tribes served as auxiliary military units. The weakness of the state apparatus made it necessary to depend on local notables. Their power was based on control of taxation and of trusts and on the support they could rally from town quarters, artisan guilds, and local soldiers. In any case, control of the towns did not necessarily mean control of the countryside. Bedouins, especially in southern Iraq and along the Syrian margins of the north Arabian desert, and mountain peoples in Kurdistan, northern Syria, and the Lebanon, maintained freedom from central control.

Notables differed in composition from city to city. In Damascus, the scholars were particularly important. Throughout the period of Ottoman rule, a relatively small group of notable families controlled the posts of judge, preacher, mufti, and teacher in the colleges and constituted a religious patriarchate. Although Sufism was well established in Syria, it does not seem to have played as large a role as in Egypt. The scholarly-Sufi synthesis was less manifest, and Syrian scholars tended to be hostile to less "orthoprax" forms of Sufism. Sufi brotherhoods, Sufi hospices (*khanaqas*), shrines, and celebrations of the death day of the Sufi saints (*mawlids*) seem to have had a smaller place in Syrian religious life. The major exception to this was the veneration of the shrine of Ibn al-ʿArabi in Damascus.

Aleppo is an example of both a provincial capital and a cosmopolitan caravan city. In the seventeenth century, the Persian silk trade was Aleppo's primary industry. Armenians, Christian Arabs, Sephardic Jews, and merchants from Iran, India, and Europe were the principal actors in this trade. In the eighteenth century, the French surpassed the English as the predominant European merchant community, and many local Christians converted to Catholicism. Nonetheless, foreigners and minorities did not control or define the lifestyle of Aleppo as much as they did that of Izmir.

Aleppo's hinterlands were as important in the political economy as trade.

Throughout the sixteenth century, the Ottomans maintained a dominant position, but by the end of the century their position had deteriorated. Janissary units, aggrieved by the declining value of their salaries, rebelled against the central government, seized tax farms, and turned them into life-tenure farms or private estates. Ottoman governors were reduced to manipulating the competing military factions. In the eighteenth century, the weakening of the central state allowed local notable families to control the rural hinterlands. Then, in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans regained control of Damascus and Syria. In 1708, the newly appointed governor of Damascus was given direct authority over other administrative subdistricts of Syria and was charged with responsibility for the pilgrimage. His job was to maintain the goodwill of the urban notables and to curb the bedouins by offering them bribes and offices. After 1758, however, the central government was defeated by local forces. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans could no longer control the notables or protect the pilgrimage.

With Ottoman decline, governors established local dynasties. The ʿAzm family ruled Damascus from 1724 to 1780; the heirs of Hasan Pasha governed Baghdad and Basra from 1704 until the early 1830s; the Jalili family governed Mosul from 1726 to 1834. In Palestine and Lebanon, there were several small-scale regimes. Zahir al-ʿUmar took control of Acre in 1750 and established a local despotism based on efficient economic management. He encouraged the production of cash crops, established monopolies over production and foreign trade, and wooed European advisors. This short-lived regime ended in 1775, when the territory reverted to the governorship of Damascus. After 1780, Ahmad al-Jazzar succeeded to the control of Acre and Sidon, building up a personal domain based on a strong army, economic monopolies, and lively European trade. This new type of despotism foreshadowed the nineteenth-century reform movement in Turkey and Egypt, which led

to a recentralization of power and to efficient government controls over the local economy.

The Lebanon posed special problems for Ottoman authority. In the north and in the Kisrawan region lived the Maronites. They had been Monothelite Christians until the period of the Crusades, when they accepted Catholic doctrine and papal supremacy. Turkish Muslims also inhabited the north, but in the Gharb and the Shuf the population was largely Druze. Although the Lebanese peasants were affiliated with the religious communities, the local political order was based not on religion but on allegiance to village and valley chiefs, who were subordinate to feudal suzerains, who were in turn subordinate to the governor of Damascus and the sultan in Istanbul. This hierarchy of authority was at best unstable. Between 1544 and 1697, the Ma'n family was the most powerful. The great ruler of this era, Fakhr al-Din (r. 1603–35), governed by means of a Maronite and Druze peasant coalition. In 1697, the Ma'n were succeeded by the Shihabi, who ruled from 1697 to 1840.

In other parts of the Fertile Crescent, Ottoman power was subverted by bedouin opposition. Parts of Syria east of Hama and Homs were occupied by Arab bedouins, who threatened agricultural settlement and the security of the pilgrimage route. Turkmen and Kurdish tribes occupied the regions north of Damascus. The northern Euphrates region was taken over by the 'Anaza confederation, and the southern reaches of the river were occupied by the Shamar.

In sum, the Arab Middle East was governed by an Ottoman elite with the cooperation of local intermediaries. In Egypt, these were Mamluk households and scholars. In the Fertile Crescent, they were local janissaries, scholars, and mountain and bedouin chieftains. In the late eighteenth century, the balance of power between the central state and the provinces and even between provincial capitals and their hinterlands shifted in favor of the latter. Almost every local political power – Mamluk or janissary households, scholars, officeholders, tax farmers, guildsmen, town quarters, bedouin tribes, and mountain communities – managed to increase its autonomy. Still, the basic institutional structures of these societies and the

historical system of ever-changing balances of power among state, military, religious, and parochial elites continued to function.

On the horizon, however, the clouds of new forms of highly centralized states and of European commercial and political penetration were already visible. Ottoman supremacy in the Arab provinces was being threatened by European trade and by the rising influence of Greek, Armenian, Maronite, and other Christian merchants who prospered under the protection of foreign powers while Muslim communities were in disarray. The decentralization of the late eighteenth century made it impossible to crystallize a regional political identity or to protect Ottoman Muslims against the competition of local and foreign Christians. This political disarray would also make it extremely difficult to form stable nation-states in the twentieth century.

Chapter 34 The Safavid Empire

The origins of the Safavids

Iran had a profound historical tradition of imperial regimes and cultures. The Saljuq governments of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were built on prior ʿAbbasid and Sasanian and more ancient institutions. The Mongol and Timurid invasions continued many of the political and cultural achievements of the past but brought lasting demographic, economic, and political changes to Iranian societies. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, large numbers of Turkish and Mongol peoples settled in northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia, and, by the fourteenth century, a large Turkish population was also established in eastern Iran and in the Oxus region. Ever since, Turkish peoples have constituted about one-fourth of the total population of Iran.

The Turkish presence radically changed the economy of Iran. Substantial territories were turned from agriculture into pasturage. Villagers were induced to take up a migratory existence, farming in valley bottoms and pasturing sheep in adjacent mountain highlands. Only in the reign of Ghazan (d. 1304) did the Ilkhans attempt to develop a more balanced relationship between agricultural and pastoral activities and a system of property organization that maintained the position of both agricultural and pastoral peoples. The Ilkhans began to stabilize the division of Iran into two economic and cultural worlds – one, the world of the sedentary village; the other, that of the pastoral camp.

From Inner Asia also came new political institutions. To the Iranian legacy of monarchical and hierarchical institutions and Islamic communities were added Turkish and Mongolian political traditions. Rulership in Turkish society was achieved by victory in battle and was maintained by active struggle against rivals. The crucial expression of chieftainship in the Turko-Mongolian societies was the

household state (*uymaq*). An *uymaq* was an elite military formation organized as a great household under the leadership of its chief. The chief was supported by his family and by other lesser chiefs and their followers, whose support was won by delicate negotiations and/or by success in war. The *uymaq* chief used his military support to collect taxes from townsmen and peasants and to establish, in effect, a local territorial government commonly based in a citadel or fortress. The powers of an *uymaq* chieftain could be reinforced by royal appointment to a position that gave him the right to tax and to supervise the local bureaucracy. The *uymaq*, however, was generally unstable, owing to the fact that it was based on the personal prowess of chiefs and on semi-independent warriors, clans, and vassal groups who constantly calculated their relative advantage, bitterly competed for leadership, and regularly rebelled against the dominance of the great chiefs. The authority of an *uymaq* lord was always challenged by lesser chieftains. Competition among all these groups made the *uymaq* extremely volatile and led to rapid rises and falls of fortune.

Thus, all post-Saljuq Iranian states acquired the dual heritage of an Iranian monarchical tradition and of Turkish *uymaq* polities. The Mongols, the Timurids, and the Safavids in succession had to struggle with the problems of maintaining a centralized monarchy and of coping with the tribal and military chiefs. Indeed, the later dynamic of Iranian history would turn on the relationship between state and *uymaqs*.

The shattering impact of the Mongol invasions, the succession of unstable and ruinous regimes, and the intrusion of Turkish pastoralists also provoked new forms of socioreligious organization among the common people of Iran. Islamic leadership in western Anatolia, northeastern Iran, and northern Mesopotamia passed into the hands of Sufi preachers, shamans, and sorcerers. These preachers performed miraculous cures, manipulated occult forces, and claimed a religious authority based on esoteric knowledge vouchsafed through direct revelation or the interpretation of magical texts. They taught their followers that a savior would come to redeem

ordinary people and that the pillar (*qutb*) of the saintly world would provide a haven for oppressed peoples.

Responding to the need for political protection and spiritual reassurance, Sufis organized a number of local movements to unite rural populations and resist political oppression. In the thirteenth century, the Kubrawi order in western Iran, named after Najm al-Din Kubra (d. 1221) but actually founded by al-Simnani (d. 1336), stood closest to high-culture Islam. Al-Simnani preached a doctrine that attempted to transcend sectarian divisions. The order appealed to both Sunnis and Shi'is by venerating the family of the Prophet, including 'Ali, along with great Sunni masters. Kubrawi mysticism was also intended to win Buddhists and pagan converts to Islam.

The Hurufiyya, founded by Fadlallah Astarabadi (d. 1394), represented a more populist version of Islam. Astarabadi claimed to be a hidden imam, the beneficiary of a direct revelation of God's will. He taught that it was possible to gain knowledge of secret and spiritual matters through the interpretation of the alphabet and the understanding of its implicit numerical values, for the letters of the alphabet are the microcosm of the divine reality. This secret knowledge would bring his followers salvation. Nurbaksh (d. 1465), like many other militant Sufi preachers, held that the true messiah must carry out jihad in the name of Islam. He led a rebellion in Kurdistan against the local Timurid rulers. Other millenarian movements looked forward to the ultimate confrontation between good and evil, the coming of a messiah, and the redemption of mankind.

Another such movement, the Safavid, would conquer Iran and establish a dynasty that would reign from 1501 to 1722. The Safavid movement – founded by Shaykh Safi al-Din (d. 1334), a Sunni/Sufi religious teacher descended from a Kurdish family in northwestern Iran – also represented a resurgence of popular Islam in opposition to chaotic and exploitative military domination. The founder began by preaching a purified and restored Islam. His son, Sadr al-Din (r. 1334–91), transformed the movement into a hierarchical, politically sensitive, and propertied organization. He was the first head of the order to claim descent from the Prophet. He expanded the family

compound in Ardabil, providing it with schools and residences, and broadened the movement's missionary activities. He organized the hierarchy of the *murshid*, who was the head of the order, and the *khalifas*, who were his direct agents, and supervised the missionaries, assistants, students, and novices.

In the fifteenth century, the Safavid movement became a powerful political force in northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia. The Safavids took advantage of the breakup of the Timurid regime and of the bitter Turkish tribal conflicts to turn from preaching to militant action. Shaykh Junayd (d. 1460) was the first leader to fight Christian populations in Georgia and Trebizond. His wars against the Christians were soon turned against established Muslim states, which he denounced as infidel regimes.

The more militant Safavid policy depended on active recruitment of individuals and of *uymaq* and tribal groups. Anatolian followers were individual soldiers and adventurers given political organization by the Safavid order. Iranian supporters were Turkish-, Kurdish-, and Luri-speaking pastoralists, peasants, artisans, and middle-level lineage chiefs who joined the Safavids to oppose the more powerful tribal lords. In addition, Shaykh Junayd married into the families of local princes to form military alliances and to recruit whole tribes to his cause. His recruits were called Qizilbash, after their distinctive red headgear, which showed that they were the disciples and warriors of the Safavid house. As exploited peasants flocked to the Sufi brotherhoods to find leadership in their struggle for existence and to give expression to their hope for redemption, the Safavids combined the forces of religious devotees and *uymaq* clients to establish a dynasty and an empire representing a new constellation of imperial, religious, and tribal forces.

The reorientation toward militant political action was accompanied by doctrinal elaboration. The Safavids declared their Shiʿi allegiances, and Shah Ismaʿil (d. 1524) proclaimed himself the hidden imam, the reincarnation of ʿAli, and an epiphany of the divine being. Ismaʿil claimed to be descended from the seventh imam, and to be the seventh descendant in the Safavid line; each successive imam was the bearer of the divine fire passed down from generation

to generation to its embodiment in Isma'il. Leaning on the religious syncretism of almost two centuries of Sufi movements in northwestern Iran and Anatolia and combining diverse religious influences (including Shi'ism, Sunni messianism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism), Isma'il also proclaimed himself the incarnation of Khidr, the bearer of ancient wisdom, and the spirit of Jesus. He titled himself the Shadow of God on Earth in the manner of Persian emperors. This absolute authority was communicated to his followers through his role as perfect master (*murshid-i kamil*), reinforced by the cult of the Safavid ancestors at Ardabil. His claims to power were thus based on pre-Islamic Iranian and early Islamic cosmologies, Sufi mysticism, and 'Alid loyalties. He was therefore messiah and shah, possessor of both mystical rulership and temporal power.

On the basis of these religious claims, Safavid leaders called for absolute and unquestioning obedience from their Sufi and Qizilbash followers. To question the authority of the perfect master was tantamount to apostasy. The followers of Isma'il were supposed to adhere strictly to a code of conduct called *sufigare*; disobedience was punished by expulsion from the order and possibly by execution.

Iran under the early safavids

By means of fierce and violent campaigns driven by millenarian and apocalyptic expectations, Isma'il occupied Tabriz in 1501 and proclaimed himself shah. Within a decade he had conquered the rest of Iran. While the rival Ottoman Empire to the west seized eastern Anatolia and the Shaybanid Empire to the east took control of Transoxania as far as the Oxus River, Isma'il established the borders that have defined Iran until the present day. These borders would eventually divide the region into separate realms of Turkish Ottoman, Iranian, and Inner Asian Muslim cultures.

The problems of rebuilding the Iranian state and society were formidable. Centuries of political upheaval had worn away the infrastructure of centralized imperial government. Agricultural and urban production had been undermined by nomadic invasions.

Economic regression and a declining peasant population reduced the resources essential for a centralized state. Moreover, political power was widely dispersed. Qizilbash and other *uymaq* chieftains ruled over subject clans, tribal affiliates, and towns and villages. For example, the Mausillus controlled vast territories in western Iran. The chiefs held official positions in the Safavid government and received subsidies, allotments of infantry, soldiers, tax revenues, and economic rights that made them all the more powerful.

The fluid *uymaq* and tribal groups were not the only contenders for political power. The *uymaqs* were opposed by urban bourgeoisie and by peasants organized in secret religious societies. Tribal-led, merchant-led, and Sufi-led peasant groups waged a multisided struggle for political and social power. In 1537 and 1538, there was a rebellion in Astarabad of local Persians against the Turkish elites, led by Muhammad Salih Bitikchi, who preached an egalitarian doctrine and promised the deliverance of oppressed peoples from the hands of evil masters. There were similar peasant rebellions in Mazandaran, Jilan, Azarbayjan, Fars, and Afghanistan.

To fight this dispersion of power, the Safavids struggled to consolidate the religious authority of the shah and the military and administrative power of the central government. Shah Ismaʿil (r. 1501–24) and his successor, Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–76), tried to control the army by appointing as generals men of lesser *uymaq* standing in order to limit the power of the great Qizilbash lords. Shah Tahmasp began to incorporate non-Qizilbash Persian tribal volunteers and captured Georgian, Circassian, and Armenian slaves into his forces. The military officers (amirs) were given land grants from which each had to pay a sum of money to the central government and support a contingent of troops.

They also built up a civil administration inherited from the governing apparatus of previous regimes. The Persian officials, and many scholars, poets, and literati, who had served the Timurid courts and local dynasties in Iran, Central Asia, and eastern Anatolia were recruited by the Safavids. Local and regional lords on the borders of the Safavid domains were brought into the regime by negotiation. Local administration was left in the hands of Persian tax collectors

and landlords. Persian administration embodied Persian culture. The scholar-bureaucrats not only kept the records of the regime and carried on its correspondence; they also transmitted the literary, scientific, philosophic, and religious heritage of Persian Islam. They embodied the heritage of literary learning, rhetorical excellence, elegant manners, ethical behavior, and philosophical wisdom (collectively known as *adab*). Persian painting and crafts – including textile and carpet weaving, ceramics, and metalwork – flourished under the Safavids.

Equally important to the new regime was the consolidation of its religious authority. Parallel to the program of state formation, the Safavids created a religious establishment that would lend its authority and administrative services to the regime. Safavid religious appeals had first been addressed to their Qizilbash and tribal supporters, to whom they promised messianic fulfillment. The devotion of the Qizilbash, however, was a double-edged sword, for the millenarian impulses that had brought the Safavids to power could also be turned against them. In fact, the Ottoman victory at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 shattered the Qizilbash belief in the invincibility of their leader.

To cope with the complications of Qizilbash enthusiasm and the tepid response of the Iranian population, Ismaʿil set aside his messianic claims in favor of Twelver Shiʿism, which was proclaimed the official religion of Iran. His son Shah Tahmasp also abandoned claims to quasi-divinity and claimed only to communicate with God indirectly through dreams. Although there were Shiʿis in northern Iran, the shahs imported Twelver Shiʿi scholars from Syria, Bahrain, northeastern Arabia, and Iraq. These scholars promoted a legalistic form of Shiʿism based on Jaʿfari law and rational derivation of legal principles (*ijtihad*). ʿAli al-Karaki (d. 1534) founded the first Shiʿi school in Iran, where Shiʿi texts were abridged and translated from Arabic into Persian. Arab Shiʿis defined a new orthopraxis based on Shiʿi law and spearheaded a policy of imposing a new doctrinal uniformity throughout the towns and villages of Iran.

In the early period of Iranian Shiʿism, the administrative and moral authority of the shahs over the religious establishment was virtually complete. The Safavids organized the scholars into a state-controlled bureaucracy. A chief religious bureaucrat (*sadr*) supervised judicial and teaching appointments and charitable endowments. He was initially responsible for the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs. The office of *divan bagi* was created as a high court of appeal. Grants of land called *soyurghal* were made to eminent religious families and were allowed to pass from generation to generation immune from taxation. With the influx of Arab scholars, there emerged a network of intermarried families co-opted by the Safavids through appointments to offices, grants of estates, tax immunities, and charities and endowments. The religious elite became part of the Iranian landowning aristocracy. In time, the Arab Shiʿi elite gave way to new cadres of Persian scholars (*ʿulama*ʾ) and to a much enlarged religious community of lower-ranking scholars, merchants, and artisans. These developments disposed the Shiʿi scholars to accept state authority and to stress those elements of the Shiʿi tradition that affirmed the state as an historical necessity.

To sustain the official religion, the Safavids embarked on a bold program to eliminate all rival forms of Islam in what had been a highly pluralistic society. Twelver Shiʿism was imposed by a wave of persecutions that had little or no parallel in other Muslim regions. The Safavids suppressed their messianic and extremist followers, who seemed likely to turn their religious passion against them. The millenarian Nuqtavis and Hurufis were eliminated. Popular Sufi movements and the *futuwwa* artisan cults, especially the cult of Abu Muslim, were suppressed. Shah Tahmasp forbade wine drinking, dancing, singing, and other Sufi behaviors at court. The dominance of Twelver Shiʿism was further assured by the violent suppression of Sunnism. The Safavids ritually insulted the memory of the first three caliphs and violated the tombs of Sunni scholars. Sufi shrines were destroyed. Ismaʿil desecrated Naqshbandi tombs and suppressed the Khalwatiyya and other Sunni-Sufi orders.

Despite repeated repression, however, merchants, craftsmen, and the working population of the towns maintained a religious and communal subculture built around Sufi leadership, *futuwwa* ideals, guilds, and youth associations. In these milieus, Sufi teaching and the veneration of Abu Muslim were kept alive by storytellers and poets in coffeehouses. In the same population, women had a separate religious subculture centered on the visitation of shrines, especially to pray for fertility and good health. Female religiosity linked women of all communities – Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Armenian – in shared beliefs and practices. Although the Safavids repeatedly attempted to suppress these tendencies, their policy was not to completely eliminate them but to play them against one another and to maintain the supremacy of the shahs as the balancing, arbitrating, and manipulating leaders of society.

The Reign of Shah ʿAbbas

The move to centralize political power was set back by several ineffectual reigns in the late sixteenth century, but the state-building program was resumed by Shah ʿAbbas I (d. 1629). ʿAbbas reorganized the army. He rallied loyal Qizilbash supporters, known as lovers of the shah (*shah-seven*). In the tradition of earlier Islamic regimes, he supplemented these troops with Kurdish, Georgian, Circassian, and Armenian slave forces to offset the power of Turkish warlords. The financial basis of the slave armies was secured by seizing Qizilbash lands and turning them into crown lands. The ministers were made responsible for putting these lands into cultivation. They were expected to invest in irrigation works, protect the peasants from oppression, and assure the collection of rents and taxes. Bureaucratic administration, however, was not completely centralized. In order to pay the salaries of the soldiers, ʿAbbas reverted to the basic Islamic and Iranian practice of assigning *iqtaʿs* or *tuyul*, grants of land tax revenue, which often became the property of the assignees.

The new slave military elites played an important political role. On behalf of the shah, they collected revenues from the crown lands and

constructed roads, bridges, and urban projects. Still, their power was limited. By the death of Shah ʿAbbas, the slave officers held eight of fourteen provincial governorships and made up about a quarter of the generals. The Qizilbash and other *uymaq* confederations held the balance of important military and provincial positions. Generally royal influence was used to tip the local balance of power against the great magnates in favor of lesser chieftains who would ally with the shah. ʿAbbas succeeded in reducing the power of the great magnates without changing the basic structure of the Turkish *uymaq* political system. On his death, the Iranian state continued to function by virtue of the shifting balance of power between the Safavid regime and the *uymaq* elites.

The military reorganization, however, had important foreign policy consequences. New musket and artillery units gave the shah's armies modern firepower and made them the equivalent of the Ottoman janissaries. Territories earlier lost to the Ottomans and the Uzbeks, including eastern Khurasan and parts of Kurdistan and Diyr Bakr, were retaken by the Safavids.

The centerpiece of Shah ʿAbbas's administrative and economic program was the creation of a great new capital city, Isfahan. (See Illustration 14.) It was essential both to a centralized state and to the legitimization of the Safavid dynasty. The Safavids built the new city around the Maydan-i Shah, a huge square that measures about 160 by 500 meters. The square served as market, carnival place, and polo ground. It was surrounded by two-storied rows of shops and by principal buildings or arches on each of the cardinal sides. To the east, the Masjid-i Shaykh Lutfallah, begun in 1603 and completed in 1618, was an oratory designed for the shah's private worship. To the south stood the royal mosque, begun in 1611 and completed in 1629. On the west stood the ʿAli Qapu Palace or Sublime Porte, which was the headquarters of the government. On the north side of the Maydan was the monumental arch that marked the entrance to the royal bazaar and its innumerable shops, baths, caravansaries, mosques, and colleges. From the Maydan, the Chahar Bagh Avenue ran two and a half miles to the summer palace in which the ruler gave audiences to ambassadors and held state ceremonies. On

either side of the avenue were elaborate gardens, the shah's harem, and residences for courtiers and foreign ambassadors. The whole ensemble was a masterpiece of Middle Eastern city planning.

Illustration 14. The Maydan of Isfahan. *Source*: © Roger Wood/CORBIS.

Isfahan's bazaars were essential to the state economy, for they concentrated production and marketing and brought them under the taxing authority of the state. The new capital was a reservoir for recruits to the imperial armies and administration. It was equally important to the vitality of Iranian Islam. In 1666, Isfahan, according to a European visitor, had 162 mosques, 48 colleges, 182 caravansaries, and 273 public baths – almost all of them erected by ʿAbbas I and ʿAbbas II (r. 1642–66). Isfahan's vast plazas and bazaars symbolized the legitimacy of the dynasty through its ordering of the world by royal decree; its religious monuments signified royal sustenance for the faith; its gorgeous decoration was the universal sign of royal splendor. Safavid claims to legitimacy were broadened from their initial religious basis to include the traditional motifs of Iranian monarchical grandeur.

The patronage of manuscript illuminations was one such motif. In 1510, the Timurid School of Painting was transferred from Herat to Tabriz. Bihzad, the greatest painter of the time, was appointed director of the royal library and supervisor of a workshop that produced illuminated manuscripts. Shah Tahmasp was also a great patron of the production of robes, silk hangings, and works in metal and ceramics. He kept these treasures as private and courtly adornments and devoted little attention to mosques, shrines, colleges, or other public expressions of imperial authority. The Timurid School produced an illuminated edition of the *Shah-name* (Book of Kings) that contains more than 250 paintings and is one of the great masterpieces of Iranian-Islamic illuminated manuscript art. ʿAbbas I patronized paintings of battles, hunting scenes, and royal ceremonies. After his death, artistic effort turned to emotional expression and themes of private daily life; the great themes of the royal tradition were put aside in favor of more realistic and secular scenes, such as couples embracing, which may have appealed to an aristocracy of bureaucrats, landlords, and soldiers. Single-page drawings and paintings were made for inclusion in albums. The later seventeenth-century style combined sensuality and realism.

Shah ʿAbbas's military and administrative reforms were partly financed by an elaborate mercantilist venture. The silk trade was critical to the Iranian economy. Since the fourteenth century, Iranian silk from beyond the Oxus and the Caspian littoral was shipped from Tabriz to Bursa in the Ottoman Empire, where it was used by Ottoman elites and sold to European merchants. To control this trade and its essential revenues, Shah ʿAbbas turned northern Iranian silk-producing lands into crown estates. He also forced Armenian merchants to reside in Isfahan and to serve as intermediaries between the shah and foreign customers. Thus, the royal court gained a strong position in the trade between Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Europe and indeed in the international trade from East, Southeast, and South Asia to Europe. In 1619, Shah ʿAbbas declared silk production and sale a royal monopoly, managed exclusively by royal merchants, and forbade the export of specie.

Iran's entry into international commerce was facilitated by the British. Ever since the Portuguese seized control of the Indian Ocean trade in the early sixteenth century, the British had been looking for opportunities to bypass Lisbon and find direct access to eastern spices and luxury goods. The first Englishmen to make their way to Iran were Anthony and Robert Sherley, merchant adventurers who arrived in 1598. In 1616, the English East India Company acquired the right to trade freely in Iran. In return, the English helped 'Abbas expel the Portuguese from the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz in 1622 and create Bandar 'Abbas as a new port for the Persian–Indian Ocean trade. The British and Iranian victory encouraged the Dutch to enter the Iranian trade market, and the Dutch East India Company signed a treaty with Iran in 1627. Armenian merchants, in alliance with the British, the French, and the Dutch – and supported by the shah – competed with the Ottomans and Portuguese in the silk, wool carpet, shawl, and porcelain trades. By 1645, the English had been overrun by Dutch competition. The French East India Company entered the scene in 1664, although the first treaty between France and Iran was signed only in 1708, granting trading privileges and protection to Christian religious orders in Iran. By the late seventeenth century, however, European merchants were substantially in control of Iranian trade, and the economic benefits of international trade were probably lost to Iran. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the English reestablished their supremacy in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

'Abbas also established royal factories to produce luxury products for royal use and for international sale. Carpet making, which began as a cottage industry, was centralized in great factories in Isfahan. Silk making also became a royal industry, producing velvets, damasks, satins, and taffetas to be sold in Europe. Apart from the royal factories, there was a vibrant market economy. Metalwork, ceramics, painting, and carpet making flourished with middle-class as well as royal patronage. Safavid ceramicists, with the help of imported Chinese workmen, produced their own china based on Chinese porcelains. Throughout Iran, trade was stimulated by the construction of roads and caravansaries.

The general economy was highly organized and highly regulated. Iranian merchants were organized by craft or trade, religion, and ethnicity under the supervision of headmen appointed by the shah. The heads of the royal workshops supervised the corresponding guilds. Déclassé workers – such as jugglers, acrobats, dancers, singers, and puppet show artists – were supervised by a government official. Brothels, gambling dens, cannabis and wine shops, and coffeehouses were similarly regulated.

Under ʿAbbas I, the Safavid monarchy reached the height of its political power. His reign was a glorified household state, with the ruler surrounded by his personal servitors, soldiers, and administrators. He closely controlled the bureaucracy and tax collection, monopolized the manufacture and sale of important cloth goods and other products, built great cities, and maintained shrines and roads as an expression of his fatherly concern for the welfare of his people. Although his reign marked the apogee of the Iranian state, he never succeeded in establishing a fully centralized regime. The military and administrative policies that reduced the power of Turkish lords did not succeed in replacing them. His commercial policies had only short-lived success; his religious and artistic efforts were eventually appropriated by others. Ultimately, the tribal forces proved too strong, and urban merchant and rural landlord support too weak, to sustain a centralized state.

The Conversion of Iran to Shiʿism

Shah ʿAbbas I and his successors continued to promote Twelver Shiʿism as the official and only tolerated religion of Iran. By the reign of ʿAbbas I, the translation and abridgement of Shiʿi texts carried Shiʿi legalism to an extensive community of Persian scholars, lawyers, theologians, merchants, and artisans. Shiʿi law and worship spread through all classes of the population. Although the position of the legal scholars was generally dominant, Shah ʿAbbas and his successors sponsored gnostic and philosophic ideas to counterbalance the influence of Shiʿi legalism. A new school of philosophy, under the leadership of Mir Damad (d. 1631) and his

disciple, Mulla Sadra (d. 1640), combined Shiʿi scripture, theology, and mystical reflection to create a Shiʿi version of Sufism and give a philosophic basis to individual religious consciousness and to Shiʿi loyalty to the imams. The new philosophy was in the main an extension of the neo-Platonic (rather than Aristotelian) tradition of Greek and Muslim philosophy. It combined the Illuminationism of Suhrawardi and the gnosticism of Ibn al-ʿArabi (see Chapter 23) with the sayings of ʿAli and the imams.

The central problem for Mir Damad was the creation of the universe and the place of the human being within it. He approached the classic issue of scholastic theology – whether the world is eternal or is created in time – by introducing an intermediary state. He divided temporal reality into three categories – *dahr*, *sarmad*, and *zaman*. *Dahr* means eternity and defines the divine essence, which is unitary and has no internal distinctions but is the source of the names and attributes that are integral to it and yet separate from it. The relationship between essence and attributes is characterized as *sarmad*. In turn, the names and attributes are the archetypes that generate the material and changeable world. The latter is characterized as *zaman*, or temporality. Although existing in time, the created world is not purely temporal in its origin, for it is brought into being by archetypes that exist before the creation of the world and are themselves eternal. Like the neo-Platonists, Mir Damad tried to close the gulf between God and the creation and to reconcile the transcendence of God with his immanence in the created world.

For Mir Damad, as for the neo-Platonist and Illuminationist philosophers, the human being stands in an intermediate position, a bridge between the world of eternity and the world of time. Man possesses qualities of perception, imagination, and intellect that link the visible and the invisible worlds. The soul both receives sensible perceptions from the material world and is illuminated by intelligible concepts from the spiritual world. The realm of archetypes (ʿ*alam al-mithal*), intermediate between material sense perception and intellectual abstraction, is the ontological basis for symbolic imagination, dream experience, and religious commitment. The emphasis on this intermediary reality gave Shiʿism a rationalistic

explanation of revealed truth and defined the metaphysical meaning of the individual's quest for spiritual salvation. Politically, it denied the claim of the Shi'i legal scholars to absolute authority in the absence of the true imam.

Although the shahs promoted gnosticism and theosophy, the spiritual and intellectual core of Sufism, they nonetheless suppressed Sufi movements. 'Abbas I massacred his Sufi disciples, who were accused of collaborating with the Ottomans and of failing to place the will of the master before all other concerns. Other chiliastic movements in northwestern Iran were also suppressed. At the same time, the shahs promoted popular veneration for the imams similar to the veneration of Sufi holy men and shrines. The great shrines of Mashhad and Qum were rebuilt in the reign of 'Abbas I and were endowed with extensive properties. Shah 'Abbas personally visited the shrines. Shrines built in memory of people born or related to imams (*imamzadas*) and shrines devoted to Hasan and Husayn (*imambaras*) replaced popular village shrines. The pilgrimage to Karbala became an alternative for pilgrimage to Mecca. The festivals of the month of Muharram became the ceremonial center of the Shi'i religious calendar. Recitations of the heart-rending story of Husayn and processions that included public flagellation, passion plays, sermons, and recitations of elegies marked a period of mourning and atonement for his death. Neighborhood groups, youth gangs, and religious factions competed in their veneration of Husayn and often ended up in bloody struggles. Thus, Shi'ism seized hold of popular emotions in order to attach the Iranian populace to the religious establishment. By the late Safavid period, Shi'ism had duplicated the whole complex of religious sensibility already found within Sunnism. It thus became a comprehensive alternative version of Islam.

In pursuit of a Shi'i polity, the shahs were also hostile to non-Muslim communities. After the capture of Hormuz, 'Abbas required the local Christians to convert to Islam. Decrees of 'Abbas I made it possible for a convert to Islam from Judaism or Christianity to claim the property of his relatives. In 1656, Shah 'Abbas II granted extensive powers to his ministers to force Jews to become Muslims.

Shah Husayn (d. 1726) decreed the forcible conversion of Zoroastrians. Shiʿi scholars, however, were less harsh in their treatment of Armenians, who maintained good relations with the Iranian regime because of their shared hostility to the Greek Orthodox Church. Also, Armenians and Georgians provided important recruits for the shah's military and commercial establishments.

State and religion in late Safavid Iran

The Safavid pattern of state, tribal, and religious institutions created by Shah ʿAbbas I was profoundly altered in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In this period, the Safavid regime was weakened and eventually destroyed by tribal forces, and Shiʿi Islam was liberated from state control. (See Map 15.)

Map 15. Iran under the Safavids, seventeenth century.

The decine of the central government was manifest after the death of ʿAbbas I. In order to prevent violent struggle among potential

successors to the throne, succeeding generations of Safavid princes were confined to the harem and palace precincts and were raised with a narrow education lacking any experience of public life. No ruler after ʿAbbas I duplicated his vision or authority. After the peace of 1639 with the Ottoman Empire, the army was neglected and declined into a number of small and ill-disciplined regiments. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Safavid army was no longer a competent military machine. With the decline of the military, the grand viziers and other high-ranking officials took control of rural estates and converted them into centrally administered crown lands, but the central administration ceased to function in the interests of the shah and the state.

The weakening of the Iranian state in the seventeenth century and its eventual destruction in the eighteenth century also had profound implications for the relations between state and religious elites. Land grants and tax immunities, the administration of endowments, and large clienteles of family, students, and administrative staffs transformed religious teachers into a clerical nobility. The centralized religious administration gave high-ranking clerical officials the power to appoint religious functionaries such as the chief judge (*shaykh al-Islam*), judges, and college professors, and to fill lower-ranking posts, such as teachers, prayer leaders, shrine attendants, and notaries. Religiously trained officials crossed over to the financial and chancery administration.

The declining power of the shahs allowed the latent claims to autonomy of Shiʿi scholars to come to the fore. The first steps were taken with the reaffirmation of the Shiʿi millenarian concept that the hidden imam would establish his personal rule only at the end of time, rather than in the era of Safavid authority. Many scholars withdrew from engagement in public affairs, and, by the seventeenth century, the religious motivation for involvement in worldly action was being replaced by a pious disdain for worldly affairs.

A parallel tendency was the growing claim to clerical supremacy. By the late seventeenth century, Shiʿi scholars cast doubt on the inherited authority of the shah as the primary bearer of Shiʿi Islam. This authority depended on descent from the seventh imam, but in

Shiʿi theory biological inheritance was not sufficient. Testamentary designation (*nass*) was necessary to determine which of the descendants of a given imam had inherited his authority. The Safavid position was weak because they could not demonstrate designation by testament.

Moreover, according to Twelver Shiʿi belief, since the greater occultation of 941, religious scholars rather than rulers represented the hidden imam. Scholars capable of independent religious judgments (*mujtahids*) bore the highest religious authority. Their authority was based on knowledge of the Quran, the tradition of ʿAli, the use of reasoned judgment in legal matters, and the consensus of the community. The people who espoused this position and gave *mujtahids* broad latitude were called the *usulis*. Their opponents, called *akhbaris*, restricted the authority of individual scholars by stressing the importance of literal adherence to the letter of the tradition passed down by the Prophet and the imams. The *usuli* rationalists harbored a claim to be the true rulers in the absence of the imams. The *akhbari* traditionalists implicitly accepted the authority of the shahs. A modus vivendi between the opposing schools was reached under the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi (d. 1699), the head of the Shiʿi scholars, who advocated a middle way between rationalism and traditionalism. He considered traditions the crucial source of religious guidance but accepted reason and consensus as authoritative sources of judgment.

At the same time, both the shahs and the clerical elite faced a challenge from popular forms of Muslim communal organization, worship, and social customs. Sufis and gnostics found support among the common people. Despite persecution, individual Qalandaris – committed to a wandering life and rejecting all worldly connections – remained an important spiritual influence. Deviant religious practices were linked to brigandage and political revolts. To cope with these pressures, the shahs sometimes, but not consistently, adopted policies of tolerance and support for the gnostic or philosophic, Sufi, and popular versions of Shiʿi Islam. Shah Sulayman (r. 1666–94), for example, patronized the popular *imamzadas*, Sufis, and philosophers as well as the legal scholars. By

contrast, Shah Sultan Husayn (r. 1694–1722) and his clerics tried to suppress popular religious and social practices – ranging from music and dancing to gambling, wine drinking, cannabis consumption, and prostitution – in the name of religion and of social order. (See Illustration 15.)

Illustration 15.   Persian court dress in the Safavid period: (a) Male court dress in the Safavid period; (b) Female court dress. Source: Cornelius de Bruyn, *Travels in Muscovy, Persia and Part of the East Indies*, 1737.

The dissolution of the Safavid Empire

From the Mongol invasions to the collapse of the Safavid Empire, the history of Iran was marked by both continuity and transformation of the basic patterns of state, religion, and society inherited from the Saljuq era. From the Saljuq era, the Mongols, Timurids, and Safavids inherited a tradition of centralized monarchy and sought to strengthen the power of the central state by subordinating the tribal or *uymaq* conquerors to slave military forces and a quasi-centralized administration. Nonetheless, the Turkish and Mongol invasions had permanently consolidated the parochial *uymaq* or tribal forces in Iranian society, and all Iranian monarchs were obliged to rely on the political cooperation of *uymaq* and tribal chiefs and on *iqtaʿ* (or *tuyul*)

forms of tax administration. Iranian states remained at best household or court regimes with limited powers in the countryside. Even when the state overcame the power of the *uymaq* lords and tribal chiefs, as in the reign of Shah ʿAbbas I, it could not change the underlying distribution of political power. The weakening of the central state permitted the revival of *uymaq* chieftainships and provincial revolts against Safavid authority. In the eighteenth century, Iran fell into anarchy. The most important of the new competitors for political power were the Afghans, Afshars, Zands, and Qajars. Ghalzai Afghans took control of Isfahan, the Safavid capital, in 1722. Iran was then attacked by both its Ottoman and its Russian neighbors, who in 1724 agreed on a partition of Transcaucasia in which the Ottomans gained Armenia and parts of Azarbayjan and the Russians obtained the Caspian Sea provinces of Jilan, Mazandaran, and Astarabad.

With the Afghans in control of the south and the Russians and the Ottomans in control of the north, Nadir, an Afshar chieftain of Chaghatay descent, seized power. Nadir deposed the last of the Safavids and in 1736 named himself shah of Iran. His actions were not merely a Bonapartist-like adventure but harked back to an eastern Iranian frontier tradition of Turkish resistance to an Iranian central government and to ethnic Persian rule. For centuries, a frontier population, closely resembling the Cossacks of the Russian steppes, had maneuvered between the larger powers and kept alive its aspirations to establish a new khanate on the basis of a Chaghatay and Sunni identity.

In his short reign, Nadir restored the territory of the Iranian state, attempted to promote a reconciliation of Sunni and Shiʿi Islam, and integrated Afghan and eastern Iranian tribal peoples into the regime. He proposed to make Shiʿism a fifth school of law, called the Jaʿfari school, equal in status to the four Sunni legal schools. He also weakened Shiʿi scholars by confiscating properties, abolishing clerical positions in the government, and canceling the jurisdiction of religious courts. Nadir was succeeded by Karim Khan, the leader of a coalition of Zand tribal groups in western Iran, whose effective regime lasted from 1750 to 1779. In its turn, it gave way to the

Qajars, who were originally Turkish lords in Safavid service and local governors in Mazandaran and Astarabad. In 1779, the Qajars defeated the Zand and established a dynasty that was to last until 1924.

Iran also went through extraordinary changes in the relationship between state and religion. In the Mongol and Timurid periods, rural Sufi movements organized popular opposition to brutal foreign regimes. The Safavids originated in a movement to unite disparate peoples, but on coming to power suppressed millenarian forms of Sufi Islam in favor of a state-constructed scholarly establishment. The Safavids made Twelver Shiʿism the official religion of Iran and eliminated their own Sufi followers as well as Sunni scholars. Safavid-period Shiʿism absorbed philosophic and gnostic ideas and popular saint worship. Iran was virtually unique among Muslim societies in the degree to which the state controlled the religious establishment and in the extent to which it absorbed all religious tendencies found within the Muslim spectrum. But with the termination of the Safavid dynasty, the all-absorbing religious establishment created by the shahs was no longer tied to the state. In the nineteenth century, it would become the leading opponent of the new regimes.

The eighteenth-century crisis brought to an end the pre-modern history of Iran. Whereas in most Muslim regions the pre-modern period ended with European intervention, conquest, and the establishment of colonial regimes, in this case the consolidation of European economic and political influence was preceded by the breakup of the Safavid Empire and the liberation of the scholars. Thus, the Safavid regime left as its legacy to modern Iran a Persian tradition of glorified monarchy, a regime based on powerful *uymaq* or tribal principalities, and a cohesive, monolithic, and partially autonomous Shiʿi religious establishment.

Chapter 35 The Indian subcontinent: The Delhi Sultanates and the Mughal Empire

In the Indian subcontinent, Islam was introduced into an already developed civilization defined by agriculture, urbanization, higher religions, and complex political regimes. India was defined by the caste system, by Brahmanic Hinduism and Buddhist religions, and by Rajput and other Hindu political elites. In the past, there had been great empires, but on the eve of the Muslim invasions India was divided into numerous small states. The Muslim conquests brought a new elite and a new level of political integration, beginning the process of generating a new culture blending universal Muslim concepts and symbols of statecraft, cosmopolitan artistic pursuits such as architecture and painting, and regional motifs. In India, Muslim religio-communal orientations encompassed all of the principal varieties of scholasticism, Sufi orthopraxy, shrine worship, and reformism. In India, as opposed to Iran or the Ottoman Empire, a pluralistic religious society escaped bureaucratization and state control. The special cultural qualities of Indian-Islamic civilization and the autonomy and plurality of religious tendencies made it a distinctive variant of Islamic societies.

The Muslim conquests and the Delhi sultanates

The conquests of India began in earnest with the Ghaznavids. Their regime in Afghanistan was based on Turkish military slaves. They captured Lahore in 1030 and plundered North India. In the late twelfth century, free Afghan mountain warlords, under the leadership of the Ghurid dynasty, began the systematic conquest of India. Between 1175 and 1192, the Ghurids occupied Uch, Multan, Peshawar, Lahore, and Delhi. In 1206, one of the Ghurid generals, Qutb al-Din Aybeg, the conqueror of Delhi (r. 1206–10) and his

successor, Iltutmish (r. 1211–36), founded the first of a series of dynasties collectively known as the Delhi sultanates (1206–1526). (See Map 16.) Each dynasty represented a different segment of the Afghan-Turkish Inner Asian military lords and their clients, the victors of the moment in the constant jockeying for power. The successive dynasties made repeated efforts to centralize state power, but each was merely senior in a political society composed of numerous local Muslim and Hindu lords. Each dealt with the problem of establishing an Islamic state in a region of profound Hindu and Buddhist culture. In succession, they made Delhi a refuge for Persian bureaucrats, Muslim scholars, and Sufis fleeing the Mongol invasions of the Turkic, Persian, and Afghan regions to the north. Out of their collective achievement emerged a distinct kind of Indian-Muslim civilization. (See Table 14.)

Table 14.   *Muslim India: outline chronology*

Ghaznavids (began the Muslim conquest of India)	
Afghanistan	977–1186
Khurasan	999–1040
Ghurids	
Afghanistan and India	1173–1206
Delhi sultanates	
Dynasty of Aybeg	1206–90
Khaljis	1290–1320

Tughluqs	1320–1413
Sayyids	1414–51
Lodis	1451–1526
Suris	1540–55
Mughal Empire	1526–1858
Akbar I	1556–1605
Aurangzeb	1658–1707
British victory at Plassey	1757
Britain becomes paramount power	1818
Independent Muslim regimes	
Kashmir	1346–1589
Deccan (Bahmanids)	1347–1527
Bengal	1356–1576
Deccan (Faruqis)	1370–1601
Jawnpur	1394–

	1479
Malwa	1401–1531
Gujarat	1407–1572
British Raj	1858–1947

Map 16.   The Delhi sultanates.

The short-lived Khalji dynasty (1290–1320) succeeded the first Delhi sultanate (the dynasty of Aybeg) and extended the rule of Delhi to Gujarat, Rajasthan, the Deccan, and some parts of South India. They systematized agrarian administration. Before the Muslim conquest, agrarian taxation was based on the principle that peasants cultivated the land and paid the ruler a share of the produce. The ruler generally dealt with the villages as a unit and collected taxes with the assistance of local headmen, who would assess the individual peasants. The ruler commonly assigned his tax rights to

pay the salaries of his soldiers or administrative employees. In 1300, however, 'Ala' al-Din Khalji set a new standard of revenue demand at one-half the produce, abolished the perquisites of local chiefs, and confiscated all existing land grants in an effort to deprive local lords of their military and financial power. He also controlled the grain market in Delhi, where grain was distributed at regulated prices to the soldiers and the urban population.

For the Delhi sultanate – an offshoot of Muslim expansion sustained by a small and factious military aristocracy that ruled over the vast Indian subcontinent – cultural and ideological cohesion was essential. To soothe the factional quarrels, maintain solidarity among the Muslims, and integrate the Hindu lords into the governing elite, the Delhi sultanate elaborated its own cultural and political identity. This was at once Muslim and cosmopolitan, built on both Persian and Indic languages, literature, and arts, brought together into a new Indian-Islamic civilization.

This cultural policy, however, took time to develop. The first gesture of the Muslim conquest was to destroy major Hindu temples. They were destroyed in order to loot their riches or to signify the defeat of both Hindu rulers and their gods. Sometimes former temples were replaced with mosques that announced the victories of Muslim warlords to both Hindu and rival Muslim warriors. The Mosque of Quwwat al-Islam in Delhi, which incorporated stones and iron pillars from Hindu monuments, and the Qutb Minar, a towering brick structure, signaled the presence of a Muslim community. The Delhi regimes stressed allegiance to the caliphate and supported the judicial establishment of the scholars (*'ulama'*). Some rulers, such as 'Ala' al-Din, sought Sufi (rather than scholarly) support. Just as the Sufi saints stood at the apex of the universal spiritual order, the sultans stood at the head of secular society.

The Khalji regime was succeeded by the Tughluq dynasty (1320–1413). Muhammad b. Tughluq (r. 1325–51) was supported by newly immigrant Turkish warriors. He was the first sultan to appoint non-Muslims to military and government offices, participate in local festivals, and permit the construction of Hindu temples. To maintain the Muslim credentials, Muhammad b. Tughluq stressed his identity

as a Muslim warrior by defending India against the Mongols. He gave formal adherence to Islamic law, accepted the ʿAbbasid caliph in Cairo as head of the Muslim community (*umma*), appointed a chief judge, and imposed the tax on non-Muslims. He was generally favorable to the scholars. His was the first Muslim regime to integrate Turkish warlords, Hindu feudatories, and Muslim scholars into the political elite. The Tughluq Empire, however, disintegrated rapidly under the pressure of revolts by governors, local resistance in the Deccan, and the formation of independent Hindu kingdoms.

The Indian-Islamic practice of kingship was derived from the Iranian-Muslim tradition as expressed in a treatise on kingship by Barani, a Tughluq administrator (d. c. 1360). The ruler must follow the teachings of the Prophet, enforce Islamic law, suppress rebellions, punish heretics, subordinate unbelievers, and protect the weak against the strong. The ruler and his servants must set an example of good behavior for all subjects and create the conditions that make it possible for them to fulfill their religious duties. Barani's moral principles were followed by practical advice on the management of the army, the treasury, and subordinate officials. His political theory aimed at the creation of a social order that brought men into accord with God's command by cultivating moral virtues in the governing authorities.

The Delhi regime also inherited pre-Islamic Persian traditions of kingship that promoted the exaltation of rulers and prompted them to demonstrate their authority in lavish public works. Sher Shah (r. 1540–45), for example, constructed forts, mosques, and caravansaries that provided food and fodder for travelers, troops, and merchants. He also built splendid monumental tombs for his grandfather, his father, and himself, placed in strategic locations as an assertion of legitimacy and near the tombs of saints to give himself religious respectability.

Despite its Muslim emphasis, the Delhi regime also had substantial appeal to Hindu lords. The Muslim emphasis on loyalty to the ruler, patron-client relations, and the virtues of service and honor were consistent with Hindu political ideals. Indian-Muslim recognition of the hierarchy of ranks validated the organization of Hindu society.

Both subcultures accepted the dominance of kings, although the meaning of kingship was different. For Hindus, the ruler upholds the order of the world by virtue of who he is – the axis mundi; for Muslims, he fulfills his role by virtue of what he does – implementing Islamic law. In the fourteenth century, the Tughluq dynasty began to absorb Hindu motifs into Islamic architecture – both as a symbol of Muslim appropriation and as a fusion of Muslim and Hindu political authority. Tughluqid architecture borrowed such design features as the Hindu kiosk (*chatri*), heavy stone balustrades, eaves, block pillars, and capitals.

The historic task of forming a shared cosmopolitan culture was furthered by the various provincial Muslim regimes. In Bengal, Sufi writers and Muslim rulers adopted the local languages. The Hindu classic *Mahabharata* and Arabic and Persian classics, including stories from the *Arabian Nights*, were translated into Bengali at the order of Muslim rulers. Muslim poets also wrote in Bengali about Hindu deities and myths, using Arabic and Persian loan words. This synthesis of languages and literatures was the basis for the emergence of a new literary Bengali language. Similarly, the independent sultans of Gujarat (1407–1572) patronized regional languages, instead of Sanskrit or Persian.

The Deccan, Bijapur, and Golconda were important centers for the synthesis of Islam and local cultures. The Bahmanid regime in Bijapur (1347–1527) ruled a land that lay between Marathi-speaking peoples to the north and Kannada speakers to the south. In each of these regions there were local devotional movements and strong attachments to local saints. In neither was the Hindu Sanskritic tradition strong. Here, a Muslim regime encouraged the integration of elements of Marathi and Kannada culture and the formation of a new regional language, Dakhni, strongly influenced by Persian. The local Muslim elites developed a shared culture for the diverse linguistic and religious elements of the Bijapur state, defined in opposition to the northern regimes.

In Golconda, the synthesis of Muslim and Hindu aristocracies and cultures developed under the Qutb Shah dynasty (1491–1688). This regime helped to integrate the Muslim and Telugu-speaking elites by

patronizing the local warrior aristocracy, providing tax-free lands for Saivite Hindu temples, and sponsoring a regional culture based on the bilingual use of Telugu and Persian. Thus, while the Delhi sultanate leaned to Muslim supremacy, the provincial Muslim regimes fostered the integration of Muslim and Hindu cultures and the formation of an Indian version of Islamic civilization.

Conversion and Muslim communities

Under the cover of the conquests, Sufi warriors seeking religious merit in the holy war, Muslim scholars, scribes, poets, and intellectuals flocked to India, seeking the patronage of the new regimes, organizing colleges and Sufi retreats, and opening the way for the conversion of Indian peoples to Islam. Conversion was relatively limited; it seems doubtful that more than 20 or 25 percent of the populace of the subcontinent ever became Muslim. Muslims were concentrated in the Indus Valley, northwest India, and Bengal. In the fourteenth century, Islam spread across the Brahmaputra River into Assam and in the Deccan.

Whereas the aristocracy was composed of Muslims who came from Afghanistan, Iran, and Inner Asia, Indian converts were mostly from the lower classes. Conversions commonly occurred when Muslim lords endowed a mosque or Sufi retreat (*khanaqa*) and invited scholars or Sufis to take up residence. Around the lord and his sponsored religious teachers gathered peasants and service people who adopted the religion of their masters. However, the Turkish and Afghan warrior elite was probably hostile to conversions of nobles lest they compete for political power. Their position was similar to that of the early Arab regimes in the Middle East, for whom Islam signified the suzerainty and solidarity of an otherwise factious ruling caste.

Furthermore, the growth of cities broke down caste and geographical barriers to social interaction. People who had given up their social and political status and who were ambitious to make careers under a new regime – such as itinerant merchants, workers and peddlers, fugitive peasants, and vagabonds – found in Islam a

unifying ideology. Sufi retreats were often established on the outskirts of towns and villages, where they might appeal to lower-caste elements. In North India, they were the centers for the birth of Urdu as the common language among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In some cases, conversions to Islam were correlated with important socioeconomic changes. In the northwest provinces, where the Jats (a hunter-gatherer and pastoral population) were coming into contact with a state-based agricultural society and a literate population, Islam became the religion of people who were becoming peasants. In Bengal, conversion also represented the change of hunter-gatherer and pastoral peoples to a sedentary way of life. Before the advent of Islam, Hinduism was well established in West Bengal, where rice culture supported a Brahmin religious aristocracy and Hindu temples. In East Bengal, Brahmin and caste influences were weaker, and Buddhism was the dominant religion. Muslim rule put East and West Bengal under a single regime permeated by Islamic symbols. Under the leadership of Muslim landlords, warriors, and Sufis, agricultural expansion into East Bengal made converts out of newly sedentarized peoples.

The influence of Sufis was crucial in the spread of Islam. The story of Farid al-Din Ganj-i Shakr (d. 1245), one of the early heads of the Chisti order, is illuminating. Baba Farid settled in a place now called Pak-pattan, a village in the North Indian plain. A small dusty place of mud houses and a few shops, peopled by men reputed to be illiterate, superstitious, and quarrelsome, it had a reputation for robbing travelers. Baba Farid came to this village seeking escape from the distractions and temptations of the court in Delhi. He had for years practiced a rigorous asceticism, denying himself worldly satisfactions and concentrating his attention on devotion to God. At Pak-pattan he stopped at the edge of the village under a clump of trees, unfolded his prayer rug, and lived for days, weeks, and perhaps months in solitude, subsisting on small gifts of food that he did not acknowledge. He spent all his time in prayer.

After a time people recognized him as a holy man. The poor came for cures, amulets, and advice on family matters. They asked him to

intercede with landlords and tax collectors. Officials, landowners, scholars, and the rich, weary of the emptiness of the world, went to consult him. Tribal chiefs visited to ask his help in negotiating feuds. Merchants sought his protection to pass through the town unmolested. Other holy men, both Muslim and non-Muslim, sat in his presence. As his reputation grew, Baba Farid acquired enough gifts to build a hospice. Disciples came to live with him. Stories circulated about his wisdom; he came to be venerated. People converted to Islam in his name. Thus an otherworldly man acquired worldly power. Renunciation was the basis of his worldly success. Because he no longer cared for the ordinary things of life, he was able to see matters in context and measure their relative importance. Because he did not care for himself, he was a good judge of other people's motives and interests; he was, therefore, successful as a teacher, healer, and mediator.

His followers did not see this as ordinary wisdom. They saw his powers as a sign of God's blessings being channeled into this world. They believed that he possessed *baraka*, the capacity to know things unknown and to dispense blessings that are ultimately gifts from God. When he died, his grave became the repository of his *baraka*. People visited his tomb, touched and kissed the holy place, made gifts and sacrifices, and celebrated seasonal festivals and his birth and death days.

Behind the mystical and magical powers of individual saints such as Baba Farid lay deep cultural sympathies that made the person of the Sufi and his teachings attractive to non-Muslims. The Sufi who renounced worldly gain, devoted himself to prayer, and expressed himself through poetry corresponded in the popular imagination to the Bhakti devotional preacher who had given up his past life and had access to higher wisdom. Sufism stood for detachment within the world rather than renunciation of the world. Sufis married and raised children, cared for the community, and sought to bring justice and ethical values into human affairs. Similarly, Indic philosophies valued a detached style of life that permitted the believer to outwardly fulfill the complex requirements of the social and moral code and yet inwardly be free for spiritual progress. The masses saw

in the Sufis the kind of spiritual achievement they had come to expect from yogis.

Sufi teachings and practices also corresponded to the Hindu metaphysical concept of the universe. The monotheism of the Sufis was not a surprise to Hindus, because the Saivite and Vaisnavite traditions had monotheistic trends. At the same time, the claims of the Sufi masters to be the concrete manifestation of the powers of God were compatible with Hindu polytheism. Moreover, the Sufis did not wholly exclude the worship of local gods within and alongside Islam. Indeed, the veneration of Sufi graves and their annual festivals corresponded in some cases with the Hindu calendar. In Bengal and the Punjab, Muslims celebrated Hindu festivals, worshiped at Hindu shrines, offered gifts to Hindu gods and goddesses, and celebrated marriages in Hindu fashion. Hindus who converted to Islam retained many of their past beliefs and practices; many Hindus venerated Muslim saints without a change of religious identity.

Thus, in popular culture, the boundaries between Islam and Hinduism were more flexible than in formal doctrine. Islam entered into the Indian environment sometimes by assimilating converts into a new communal identity and religious beliefs and sometimes by being assimilated into the indigenous culture. Conversion to Islam was a subtle matter in which Islamic elements might be added to an existing complex of Hindu religious beliefs, without change of worldview or social identity. Alternatively, the convert could make a revolutionary change in both beliefs and allegiances.

Yet, despite considerable success in the conversion of Hindus to Islam, the great majority of the subcontinent's peoples remained Hindus. Whereas the Middle East and Indonesia were almost totally converted, India, like the Balkans, remained substantially non-Muslim. There are several reasons for this. First was the thin veneer of the Muslim conquest in India. The Muslims were small bands of warriors who were not, as in the case of the Arab or Turkish conquests of the Middle East, backed by large numbers of settlers. The Muslims established a political elite, but they could not colonize the country. Second, the pre-Islamic political structure of India

remained intact. The previous regime was highly decentralized, composed of local lords and a Brahmin religious elite who retained local political power under Muslim suzerainty. The caste social structure under Brahmin leadership was also resistant to change. As in the Balkans, the thinness of the governing elite, the confirmation of local lords, and the protection of non-Muslim populations served to maintain the continuity of non-Muslim identities.

The varieties of Indian Islam

The combination of migrations from the Middle East and Inner Asia and local conversions created many varieties of Islam in the subcontinent. Scholars often became part of the state establishment. Iltutmish patronized both Hanafi and Shafiʿi scholars, who were respected as learned men, esteemed for their moral conduct, and admired for their demeanor. The sultans appointed a chief administrator (*sadr*), a chief judge, and a chief mufti; the post of *sadr-i jahan* was created in 1248 to supervise most religious activities, including justice, prayer, markets, and endowed funds. The chief justice administered the court system, and judges were appointed at provincial and district levels. Subordinate officials (*sadrs*) dealt with local land and registration matters, and judges dealt with civil and criminal cases. Preachers and prayer leaders were also state-appointed and state-paid officials. The Delhi regimes also established colleges (*madrasas*) whose teachers were salaried by the government. The curriculums of the Muʿizziyya and Nasiriyya colleges included Arabic, hadith, law, logic, theology, literature, and mysticism.

However, despite the formal Muslim establishment, the influence of the scholars on the general society was limited. Rather, Sufi brotherhoods played the critical role in the creation of a Muslim community in India. The brotherhoods were built around the total devotion and obedience of the disciples to the master. The disciple was initiated into the discipline and spiritual technique taught by the master. Once the novice had been initiated, there was a ceremonial passing on of the cloak (*khirqa*) of the master to his disciple. The

Sufis believed in the miraculous powers of their saints and that the very order of the universe was upheld by a hierarchy of masters, the leading one of whom was called the *qutb*. Rural mystics spread the Sufi notion of the universal hierarchy of saints and the practices of tomb veneration.

The Kazaruniyya order helped establish Islam in Kashmir; the Suhrawardiyya created an extensive network of Sufi retreats throughout North India. Multan was their main base, but the order was also important in Uch and Gujarat. The Shattari order was introduced into India by Shaykh ʿAbdallah Shattar (d. 1485), who toured the Ganges Valley dressed like a king, with followers in military uniforms, carrying banners and beating drums, in order to propagate his beliefs. His followers regarded him as being in direct contact with the saints, the Prophet, and God himself, a man possessed of both earthly and spiritual power and absolved by his detachment from the world from all ordinary legal and social norms. The Shattari order appealed to the rich and was closely identified with the state elites. It withered away when it lost the favor of the Mughal emperor Akbar.

The Chisti order was introduced into India by Muʿin al-Din Hasan Chist (d. 1236). His order spread throughout Rajasthan, Bengal, and the Deccan and was especially important in the northern Gangetic plain and the Punjab. The Chisti order accepted the doctrine of Ibn al-ʿArabi concerning the unity of being and preached a nonpolitical and nonviolent philosophy. The Chistis were committed to poverty and avoidance of the temptations of the world.

Shaykh Nizam al-Din Auliya (d. 1325), one of the founding fathers of the Chisti order, was perceived by his followers to be the head of a spiritual hierarchy who ruled a kingdom parallel to that of temporal rulers. The great Sufi leaders presided over courts that rivaled those of temporal sultans; the patched cloak, the prayer carpet, the wooden sandals, and the rosary were the mystics' insignias of chieftainship. The head of the order dispatched his lieutenants to various provinces, and they, in turn, appointed subordinates to bring the mission to towns and cities. The chief of the whole network of

Sufis was often called the shah or sultan to symbolize the combination of a territorial and a spiritual sphere of influence.

The focus of Chisti devotion was the tombs of saints. The shrine festivals were held on the death day of the saint according to the Muslim lunar calendar. In these commemorations, the believers, often belonging to the same locality, clan, or professional group, brought a gift to the shrine to pray for God's assistance through the mediation of the saint and the help of the *pirs* (caretakers of the shrine, often the descendants of the saint). The caretakers provided exorcisms, incantations, amulets, and spiritual medicine to cure the ills of their followers. The donations made the *pirs* important landowners and the centers of networks of religious and political alliances.

The Sufi retreat (*khanaqa*) was the collective home of the Sufi community. A Chisti *khanaqa* consisted of a big hall called a *jama'at khana* in which the followers lived communally. The hall was usually a large room supported by pillars, which marked the places where the Sufis prayed, studied, and slept. Some retreats had rooms attached for the private use of the *shaykh* and senior members. Often there was a garden, a veranda, and a kitchen. Life inside a retreat was organized like that of a royal court. The Sufi master took a central place; his disciples hung about, waiting to be invited to sit near him. Similarly, the shah received the general public, listened to petitioners, gave amulets to heal the sick, mediated disputes, and dispensed spiritual counsel.

People attached to the *khanaqa* were divided between permanent residents and visitors. The permanent residents were organized in a hierarchy depending on their spiritual standing and the duties assigned them. The disciples did personal services for the master and his family and organized the housekeeping tasks of the *khanaqa*. The visitors were numerous; they included scholars, government officials, and businessmen looking for escape from worldly burdens. Poor people came for money, advice, recommendations, or intercessions with their superiors. They came for cures, sympathy, and blessings. The mystics taught them Islamic worship. Still other Sufis – Malamatis and Qalandaris, individual

wandering dervishes – exemplified rejection of the worldly way of life.

Apart from the Quran and hadith, the most important religious influence on Indian Islam was the teaching of Ibn al-ʿArabi and the doctrine of the unity of being (*wahdat al-wujud*). These views were spread by both the Chistis and the Shattaris, who believed that spiritual attitude was more important than specific religious laws or practices. The philosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabi encouraged the acceptance of alternative paths to spiritual vision and led to the mutual assimilation of Sufi and Hindu beliefs about the control of emotional life as a prerequisite to the control of external behavior. The Sufis adopted Hindu ceremonies, devotional songs, and yoga techniques, as well as many details of shrine worship and etiquette. Popular religious culture became a mixture of Muslim and Hindu practices. Thus, the Sufis were divided among monist, pantheist, and syncretistic religious tendencies; between commitment to individual spirituality and to collective law; and between universal Muslim practices and specific Indian forms of worship.

Sufism was closely connected to the vernacular languages; Sufis pioneered the absorption of Indian languages, music, and poetic forms into Islamic practice. Hindi became their spoken language and inspired the birth of Urdu (a literary version of Hindi) as a Muslim language. The earliest work in Urdu was a treatise on Sufism written in 1308. Dakhni was first used by Chistis in Golconda in the early fifteenth century and was developed further by Sufis in Bijapur and Gujarat. Mystical poetry in Sindhi and Punjabi dates back to the fifteenth century; Pashto mystical poetry dates to the late sixteenth century. Poetry in vernacular languages took up classical Persian themes of the yearning for and love of God. The love of the Prophet was told and retold in poems, folk songs, riddles, and bridal songs. Hindu poets also wrote mystical poems using Islamic images and themes, including the honor of the Prophet and the mourning for Husayn.

Other Muslim movements veered away from the spiritualist and syncretic forms of Sufism. The Mahdawi movement was founded at the end of the fifteenth century by Sayyid Muhammad of Jawnpur (d.

1505). Sayyid Muhammad claimed to be the messiah (Mahdi) and traced his descent to Musa al-Kazim, the seventh in the Twelver line of imams. He preached poverty, renunciation, and prayer and sought to restore the purity of religious belief and practice by building a community based on allegiance to Islamic law. His followers established communities (*daira*) in which they lived an ascetic life, shared their earnings, and attempted to minimize their worldly involvement so as not to be distracted from their dependence on God. The members met weekly to confess their sins. The Mahdawi movement was important in Gujarat in the sixteenth century and was widely accepted during the reign of Sultan Akbar by the administrative, military, landowning, and merchant elites. With acceptance came a loss of missionary zeal, and with the passing of the millennium, the thousandth year of the Muslim era, the followers of Sayyid Muhammad lost their conviction in the imminent coming of the messiah. The movement, however, still has followers in contemporary India.

Yet another alternative was a "reformist" type of Islamic belief that stressed hadith as the basis of Muslim learning and pious practice. Opposed to the excesses both of legal studies and of Sufi spirituality, the hadith scholars found their master in Shaykh ʿAbd al-Haqq Dihlawi (d. 1642). The Suhrawardis were committed to Islamic law, taught the doctrine of unity of witness (*wahdat al-shuhud*) in contrast to the Sufi concept of unity of being, and insisted on the superiority of prophecy to sainthood. These movements would inspire Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) and the reformers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Muslim holy men and political authority

The relations among scholars, Sufis, and the state were varied. In principle, the scholars were servants of the state. They benefited from state protection of Islamic religious life, enforcement of Islamic laws, and state employment as bureaucratic officials, judges, prayer leaders, and teachers. The scholars and the state had a symbiotic

relationship because of the division of political and religious authority.

The Sufi relationship to state authority was more ambiguous. Sufi orders, such as the Suhrawardi and the Chisti, were themselves quasi-political societies within the Delhi sultanate. The Suhrawardis maintained a close and collaborative relationship with the Delhi regimes, facilitated by their geographical distribution. Concentrated in the border regions of Multan, Uch, and Gujarat, remote from the center of power, the Suhrawardis were able to enjoy state patronage, gifts of land, and other favors, while still maintaining their autonomy as provincial notables. Their role was to mediate between the Delhi sultanate and provincial princes and tribes. Sufism thus played an important role in integrating tribal and frontier peoples into the Delhi regime. The ability of the Suhrawardis to fulfill these political functions was the basis of their spiritual authority. Wealthy state-supported Sufi retreats were the worldly symbol of the Suhrawardi claim to mediate in the world to come.

The Chistis lived by a different political philosophy. Their *shaykhs* rejected government service, refused endowments, and expected to earn their living by cultivating wastelands or receiving unsolicited gifts from the common people. The *shaykhs* even refused interviews with sultans. For ordinary disciples, however, earning a living in some simple, productive way was considered meritorious. As part of their responsibility for improving the worldly condition of Muslims, they were permitted to take employment. For the order as a whole, charity and responsibility for the poor were primary values. The Chistis maintained their spiritual authority by detachment from rather than by mediation among worldly powers. Although rejecting worldly concerns, the Chistis were, after all, in the midst of the world. They implicitly accepted the political structures of the sultanate and indirectly endorsed the authority of the sultans by advocating a concept of universal hierarchy that sultans could use to validate their claims to be the heads of a temporal world order. Only wandering Qalandaris and Malamatis denounced and wholly withdrew from the world.

The relations of scholars and Sufis to the state and to each other changed over time. In the course of the thirteenth century, scholarly influence was ascendant, but under the Khalji dynasty (1290–1320) Sufis were promoted as a counterweight. ʿAlaʾ al-Din Khalji used the latitude given him by Chisti ties to reduce the power of Turkish nobles and scholars and to bring Indian Muslims into the governing elite. Muhammad b. Tughluq, however, called on the scholars and the Suhrawardis to condemn Chisti religious practices, such as musically accompanied religious ceremonies (*samaʿ*). Nizam al-Din Auliya, the head of the Chisti order, had to appear in person to defend himself. The Chistis were also forced to serve in military campaigns in South India and to take up missionary activities under government sponsorship. The Tughluqs succeeded in forcing them to abandon their headquarters in Delhi and to disperse all over India. Under political pressure, the Chistis split. Some collaborated with the government, and others refused. The division within the order broke the power of its all-India organization.

The political power of the Suhrawardis was also eventually broken by the authorities. Muhammad b. Tughluq gave them lands and villages and then forbade anyone to visit their retreats without permission from the governors. Disputes over succession to the leadership of the order had to be brought to the sultans for resolution. As the Suhrawardis became more dependent on the state, their mediating powers declined. Only in Gujarat, which had an independent dynasty, did the Suhrawardis continue to be regarded as patron saints. They received gifts of landed estates and maintained their influence over public opinion. With the absorption of Gujarat into the Mughal Empire in 1572, the Suhrawardis lost their political importance. Their decline allowed for the spread of the Naqshbandi and Qadiri orders and the eventual resurgence of scholars and Islamic reformist movements that demanded that state policy be based on allegiance to Islamic law, rather than on Sufi principles.

The Delhi period thus set the basis for an Islamic society, with its characteristic ambiguities of Islamic and non-Islamic aspects of state ideology and popular culture. Islam in India was marked by a

pluralism of religious communities that continued during the Mughal Empire.

The Mughal Empire and Indian Culture

In the early sixteenth century, the struggles over the Delhi sultanate led to the intervention of Babur (a descendant of Timur), a warrior adventurer and local lord in Farghana, who was for a short time ruler of Samarqand and then of Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar. In 1526, Babur defeated the Lodis at the Battle of Panipat and established himself as the ruler of Delhi.

Babur considered himself the heir of the Mongol destiny to rule the world. His regime was based on Timurid and Chaghatay-Mongol warriors and administrators, whom he assigned positions at court and rural estates and whom he appointed as governors of provinces and fortresses in his newly conquered empire. The Timurid military elite was backed by Persian administrators from Transoxania and eastern Iran. Babur cultivated the cultural style of his Timurid ancestors by the creation of garden palaces and the patronage of Persian poets, artists, historians, astronomers, mathematicians, and musicians from the Timurid homeland of Herat and Samarqand. At the same time, like his Timurid ancestors, he supported the Hanafi school of law and maintained a close alliance with the Naqshbandi Sufis, to the extent of marrying Mughal princesses to Ahrari Naqshbandi *shaykhs*. In his memoir and later reign, however, Babur backed away from the Timurid identity that evoked bitter historical memories of earlier invasions and stressed his role as a warrior (*ghazi*) expanding the domains of Islam.

The key to the Mughal regime was the integration of the frontier lands that supplied the conquering warriors and the settled societies. An absolute ruler governed through the imperial household, surrounded by his officers, his ministers, scholars of religion, and the servants who waited on him and the court. Household officials who dealt with domestic or palace matters were at the same time administrative officers. The imperial household had departments to manage the mint, the arsenal, the royal seals, the imperial camp,

and the treasury. The ruler took a personal role in government, and the great warrior lords reported directly to him. He regulated their marriages, their leisure, and their children's education. The system of land taxation was taken over from the Delhi sultanates.

The dynamism of the regime was generated by the absence of a defined method of succession. Mughal princes were equally entitled to succeed their father and fought one another to inherit the realm. This competition was destabilizing, but it had the advantage of forcing the competing princes to rally their clients. This led to the expansion of Mughal contacts and influences in new populations and regions. Although the monarchy was not always stable, the Mughal system was constantly expanding.

Babur's grandson Akbar (r. 1556–1605) was a distinguished builder of the Mughal Empire. Akbar expanded the empire from its original territories in Hindustan and the Punjab, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Bihar, and Bengal. In the north he took Kabul, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. In the south, the Deccan was absorbed in 1600. Not until the end of the seventeenth century did the empire expand farther south and absorb Bijapur, Golconda, and other hitherto independent South Indian provinces. Nonetheless, large parts of South India – especially Tamil-, Telegu-, and Kannada-speaking peoples – remained outside the Mughal realm. Rajasthan remained in the hands of local Hindu lords, and east-central India was governed by tributary tribes.

Akbar centralized and systematized Mughal rule. In addition to the Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish warlords, Akbar made native Indian Muslim and Hindi Rajputs part of the governing elite. Although the ruling elite was officially Muslim, Hindus formed about 20 percent of the Mughal aristocracy. Hindus were important as subordinate military lords, administrative officials, financiers, merchants, and landowners. Hindu officials commonly shared the Persianate cultural style of their Muslim counterparts. (See Illustration 16.)

Illustration 16. The marriage of Akbar. *Source*: © Victoria and Albert Museum, London.

From the Mughal point of view, the ruling elite was held together by the loyalty and service of subordinate lineages to the dominant Mughal lineage. Indian society was a condominium of noble lineages bound to the emperor by territorial or political concessions, family ties, and ceremonial and cultural style. The aristocratic lineages were called *biradari, jati*, or *qawm*. They in turn made their clients the supporters of the Mughal state. The ruling elite was further organized according to the *mansabdar* system, a military hierarchy that defined the place of the officers in the chain of command and specified the number of troops they were expected to bring to battle. The *mansab* officers were paid either in cash or by the grant of an estate called a *jagir*, which was the equivalent of a Middle Eastern *iqtaʿ*. The *jagirs* were awarded to the sultan's officers, local princes, Rajputs, and tribal leaders. Most *jagirs* were rotated and reassigned to prevent the

officers from usurping control of the land, except for the historic estates of Rajputs, which were often exempt from supervision and reassignment.

About seven-eighths of the taxable land of the Mughal Empire was distributed to military assignees, and about one-eighth was reserved as the personal estate of the ruler. A major administrative problem was to set the assignment of territories and revenues in proportion to the military obligation of the assignees. Changes in local conditions required constant redistribution of land in order to maintain a realistic correspondence between rated values, actual income, and military obligation.

Like the emperor, each noble maintained a military contingent, a financial and administrative staff, a household staff, a harem, and servants. The household of a noble imitated the household of the ruler. Mughal nobles also assumed responsibility for building mosques, bridges, and caravansaries and for patronizing scientific and literary activity.

Beneath the level of the *mansabdars*, there were numerous local chieftains. These included *zamindars* (local notables), who had a claim to a portion of the land revenues by virtue of local conquests or caste dominance, but did not have, in principle, proprietary rights over the land. Every notable was backed by armed retainers who helped him coerce the peasants and who protected his interests against central government intervention. The notables, however, were subject to the authority of the emperor and could be expelled from office. Mughal rulers often tried to displace Rajput and other Hindu lords in favor of Muslim notables.

Beneath the level of the notables there were several classes. Moneylenders and grain merchants, rich peasants, small peasant landowners, landless laborers and agricultural workers of various castes, and untouchables made up a structured society ranked by ritual purity. Each peasant village was headed by a local official (known as *muqaddam* or *patel*), whose position was likely to be hereditary and who was responsible to the authorities for payment of revenues and for the prevention of crimes. Peasants were

guaranteed permanent and hereditary occupancy of the land, but they were also bound to it. In an age when land was abundant, people scarce, and peasants prone to flee to uninhabited regions, physical force had to be used to keep them in place. (This is just the reverse of modern conditions, in which landlords dominate an excessive number of human beings by threatening to evict them.)

The system for the collection of taxes that applied to the central provinces of the empire, including Multan, Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Oudh, and Allahabad, went back to Sher Shah, was continued by Akbar, and lasted until the end of the seventeenth century. Taxation was administered according to the *zabt* system: a fixed fee was assessed for each unit of land and paid in cash. The rate of assessment was based on the value of the crop raised and the average yield of the previous ten years. The amount actually collected was ordinarily half of the total crop. Everything that could be taxed without depriving the peasants of their subsistence and their capacity to produce another crop was taken. The actual collection of taxes was entrusted to the holders of military assignments (*jagirdar*), who were supposed to be supervised by other government officials.

In town administration, the judge not only adjudicated or arbitrated disputes but also registered contracts, regulated prices, mediated the payment of taxes, maintained mosques, and supervised charities. He played a central role in the social life of his community, officiating at births, marriages, and deaths. Another local official, the *kotwal*, policed the towns, prosecuted criminal activities, and censored immoral behaviors by suppressing brothels and taverns.

In matters of property and commerce, there were complex relationships among individuals, their communities, and the state that linked together different elements of town societies. Property was often regulated by the community. Some transactions – such as the sale and purchase of property – had to be agreed not only between seller and buyer but by the relevant corporate group, kin, or neighborhood, and by the judge representing the state. In important trading towns, a corporate body of merchants negotiated with

government officials, regulated commerce, collected taxes, and sometimes advanced loans to the state.

Apart from the formal system, governance depended on personal and informal arrangements among the central and local officials and notables, and the collaboration of both local officials and local nonofficial power holders. Not only nobles, warrior chieftains, and large landowners but also small landowners, merchants, tribesmen, religious leaders, and even petty clerks had some elements of authority and influence. The sultans could not make their will prevail without the aid of local notables, and no local notable could impose his authority without appearing to be loyal to the sultan. Sovereignty was shared between the central government and local authorities.

Authority and legitimacy

Akbar also set the cultural style of the Mughal era on the basis of the combined legacy of Chaghatay Inner Asia (communicated through Babur) and the Delhi sultanate. The Chaghatay heritage stressed the role of the ruler as a warrior lord. Both the Timurid and the Delhi sultanates contributed concepts of royal authority derived from the Persian monarchical tradition that made the scholars advisors, tutors, diplomats, and administrative servants of the ruler. While appealing to Muslim scholars by the endowment of colleges and libraries, Akbar also supported the Chisti order.

This policy was radically revised in 1582 after Akbar defeated his brother Mirza in a struggle for the throne. With Mirza's defeat, Akbar went beyond the indirect appeals of the Delhi sultanate to the non-Muslim elites and proclaimed a cultural policy intended to create a hybrid cosmopolitan Indian-Islamic culture. Akbar founded a new cult, Din-i Ilahi (divine religion), to bind the members to the emperor himself. The emperor claimed to be virtually a prophet, possessed of the right both to interpret the Quran and Islamic law and to be the Sufi master of a new religious order. He adopted the Shi'i title of "*imam-i 'adil*" (just imam), suspended imperial sponsorship of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and planned to replace the Islamic calendar. The *Akbar-name* of Abu'l-Fazl 'Allami (d. 1602) captures the

underlying concept. It describes a court society in which the ruler is considered a philosopher-king, a protector of all his subjects regardless of their religion, a spiritual guide who brings reconciliation and love, and a fosterer of well-being in the whole of his domain.

Cultural policy also sought to focus loyalty on the ruler as the protector of a shared Hindu-Muslim elite culture in manners, dress, art, painting, architecture, poetry, and belles lettres. Persian was the literary language of high culture and became the language of Mughal administration for Hindu as well as Muslim officials. Poets from all over the Persianate world flocked to India. Hindu works on religion, law, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, romances, and fables were translated into Persian. In the eighteenth century and later, Persian was gradually superseded by Urdu, a dialect of Hindi enriched by Persian. This was a new common language for regional elites, service officers, gentry, and wealthy merchants.

The architectural style patronized by Akbar and exhibited in the major palace and forts of Ajmer, Agra, Allahabad, Lahore, and Fathepur Sikri was based on motifs drawn from both Muslim and Hindu architecture. The combination of these elements reflects earlier Indian structures. Post and lintel construction, serpentine brackets to support eaves, zoomorphic forms, bell-and-chain motifs, and other devices were all used in earlier mosques and palaces. Reciprocally, Hindu palaces and temples used abstract geometric decorations and domed roofs stemming from the Muslim tradition. By the Delhi sultanate period, Indian architecture had already assimilated diverse forms in ways that no longer retained sectarian implications and transcended religious and regional origins. Adopting this architectural style for the tomb of his father, Humayun, Akbar fostered a hybrid culture for a diverse elite.

Similarly, Indian painting integrated Persian techniques of figure drawing, illumination, and calligraphy but took on specifically Mughal qualities that emphasized line and form rather than color. Akbar and later Mughal emperors favored portrait groups that illustrated their descent from Timur and a mythical Mongol ancestress, Alanqua, impregnated by a shaft of light. Although Mughal painting depicted court and hunting scenes, battles, animals, flowers, portraits, and

other motifs of Persian art, it also drew inspiration from Hindu subjects and landscapes. Paintings were used to illustrate both Persian and Hindu literary works, including the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, and were produced by artists of both religious backgrounds. Indian painting, like Indian architecture, transcended sectarian implications.

Political theory embodied a similar nonsectarian ideal. The Nasirean ethics, along with Sufi tradition and Persian poetry, cultivated the ideal of a ruler who ensures the well-being of all his subjects. Through the pursuit of justice and the application of law, harmony and cooperation could be achieved in society. Mughal cultural policy implied a vision of a society that was both Indian and Muslim.

The decline of the Mughal Empire

The successive reigns of Jahangir (r. 1605–28) and Shah Jahan (r. 1628–57) were high points in Mughal cultural creativity. Jahangir was linked to the Timurid tradition through miniature paintings, seals and inscriptions, and the creation of gardens such as the Shalimar Bagh in Kashmir. Shah Jahan reconstructed the royal city in Delhi and built the Taj Mahal, considered one of the most beautiful Islamic buildings ever built. (See Illustration 17.)

Illustration 17. The Taj Mahal. Courtesy of Thomas Metcalf.

Shah Jahan extended the Indic-Islamic cultural policy into politics. He proclaimed himself the "second Timur" and tried to prevent a struggle over succession by nominating one son, Dara Shikuh, on the basis of his spiritual qualities and his alleged leadership of the Qadari Sufi order – rather than his military or administrative achievements. Dara Shikuh was promoted as the bearer of divine favor who accepted elements of Hindu religious thought as an

expression of monotheism and universally valid religious truths. He was, however, defeated by Aurangzeb in a struggle to inherit the throne. (See Map 17.)

Map 17. The Mughal Empire, 1605–1707.

The reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707)

Aurangzeb was the first Mughal ruler to reverse the policy of conciliation of Hindus in favor of Islamic supremacy. In 1659, he forbade drinking, gambling, prostitution, the use of narcotics, and other vices. In 1664 he forbade *sati*, the Hindu sacrifice of widows, and abolished taxes that were not legal under Islamic law. In 1668, he banned music and astrology at court, imposed the poll tax on non-Muslims, and ordered the destruction of some Hindu temples.

There is some question as to whether these edicts were enforced or whether they were just political theater. Aurangzeb sponsored the codification of Islamic laws called the *Fatawa-i ʿAlamgiri*, intended to be the legal bases for decisions by judges and muftis. He also founded colleges to promote the study of Islamic law. Aurangzeb's reforms antagonized Hindus but still fell short of Muslim reformist demands.

The reign of Aurangzeb also saw profound changes in the structure of the Mughal nobility. He was the first ruler since Akbar to expand the frontiers of the empire. He absorbed East Bengal, pacified the Northwest Frontier, took direct control of Rajasthan, and expanded the Mughal Empire in the Deccan. The invasion of the Deccan involved the incorporation of a large number of Bijapuris, Hyderabadis, Marathas, and other Hindu lords into the imperial elite. As a result, the proportion of Hindus in the *mansabdar* system rose from approximately 20 to 30 percent; Marathas came to outnumber Rajput lords. Whereas the new lords could easily be assigned a place in the rank system, there was no way to provide estates for the enlarged military elite. The result was increased competition for scarce *jagirs*, factionalism, and the exploitation of the peasants. In the late seventeenth century, taxes began to be collected before the harvest. The poll tax on non-Muslims also increased the fiscal burden of peasants.

Moreover, by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, power was shifting from the Mughal capital and court to regional and local power holders. This was encouraged by succession struggles after the death of Aurangzeb and a series of feeble rulers that weakened the central state. Yet the redistribution of power was inherent in the political system of the empire. From the beginnings of the Mughal conquest, the power of the state depended on the acquiescence and collaboration of local notables. Higher officials took into service petty officers recruited in their jurisdictions. Networks of personal relations held together center and provinces, and capital and peripheral communities.

By the eighteenth century, however, as in the Ottoman Empire, the balance of power favored local forces. They benefited from the

resources accumulated in earlier clientele relations. The arrival of new trading partners in the Indian Ocean – the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, and the French – gave further incentives for regional, local, and commercial elites to shake off a waning imperial power. Land grantees, village headmen, and tax farmers became landlords. *Mansabdars* converted their land-tax tenures (*jagirs*) into permanent tenures, reversing the long-standing Mughal policy of rotating land revenues among the nobles to forestall the formation of independent local elites. *Zamindars* (local notables) became increasingly independent and refused payment of revenues. Village headmen became the key figures in the collection of revenues and in local negotiations with the government authorities. Rich farmers, small-town and rural shopkeepers, coin changers, moneylenders, and landlords profited from the redistribution of fiscal power.

Furthermore, the urban merchant class was growing. In the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century, the Indian economy was generally prosperous. Although Delhi and parts of the Punjab were in decline, Bengal, Awadh, Rajasthan, and the Deccan were growing. India prospered from strong agricultural production, long-distance trade in cheap bulk commodities, linkages among the financial centers, exports of silk and cotton cloth, and a common monetary system supplied with European silver. The towns were lively market centers and gave employment to soldiers, servants, laborers, and artisans who worked on luxury goods. Small towns and markets throughout North India grew in commercial importance on the basis of wider market networks and rural enter-prises.

Decentralization of power also favored the growth of Muslim families composed of local judges, government functionaries, landowners, urban rentiers, and religious leaders who controlled the revenues of mosques, tombs, and shrines. Muslim landlords and moneylenders acquired a corporate consciousness. In the *qasbahs* (small- and medium-sized towns) the leading Muslim families – sharing *ashraf* (noble Arab, Mughal, or Pashtun) status, united by intermarriage, and linked to the town academies and to Sufi tombs and shrines – emerged as a local elite.

In other parts of Indian society, sustained by aristocratic consumer demand in such growing cities as Lucknow and Benares, Hindu merchants, their clients, and their dependents grew wealthy. Their commercial networks overlapped with religious sects as a rising elite sought communal solidarity and corporate protection. Peasants also organized to resist exploitation. Castes, religious sects, and the clienteles of *zamindar* chiefs provided the social basis for peasant action. As in the Ottoman Empire, the widespread availability of gunpowder weapons made it all the more necessary for the empire to depend on merchant capital for resources and to negotiate with its subjects. Popular resistance and appeals to Muslim values and Islamic law constrained the exercise of authority at all levels.

With this redistribution of power in favor of local elites, the Mughal Empire came apart, and its provinces became independent. In several regions local *mansabdars* became provincial governors (*nawwabs*). The Nizam of Hyderabad became independent in 1723.

In Bengal, the change of regimes destroyed the *jagir* form of assignments, and the old Mughal aristocracy lost its position. *Zamindars* and bankers seized control of the tax system. In other parts of India, regimes based on Hindu lordships and popular uprisings came to power. Hindu-governed principalities regained control of Rajasthan. In the Punjab, religious and ethnic groups such as the Sikhs and the Jats established local regimes. The Maratha movement, based on peasant resistance to taxation, Hindu revivalism, and vernacular languages, led by Shah Shahji and his son Shivaji, defied Mughal authority. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Marathas controlled most of South India and had replaced the Mughals as the dominant power in Gujarat.

By the middle of the century, Marathas, Sikhs, and Afghan tribesmen from the north were fighting to control the remaining territories of the moribund empire. The Marathas consolidated their grip on central and western India and formed five independent and expanding states. In 1739, Nadir Shah, the conqueror of Iran, occupied Kabul, sacked Delhi, and took control of the Mughal lands north of the Indus River. The Marathas occupied much of India south

and west of Agra. The helpless Mughal regime had to call on Maratha support to resist the Afghans, but at the Battle of Panipat (1761) the Marathas were defeated by Ahmad Shah Durrani. No Indian power proved capable of resisting the foreign invaders. As a result, the Sikhs were able to expand in the Punjab between 1750 and 1799 and establish a new state with its capital at Lahore. With the empire broken into smaller political units, the way was also opened for the emergence of the British as the paramount power in India.

Islam under the Mughals

Although imperial culture tried to integrate Muslim and Hindu elites, not all Muslims were part of the ruling elite. Muslims did not constitute a single community but belonged to different ethnic groups, lineages, classes of population, and even castes. Muslims, like Hindus, were often identified with kinship and specialized occupational groups, ordered in a hierarchy that gave the highest status to warriors from Afghanistan or Inner Asia and to religious families descended from the Prophet or from Iranian and Arab scholars. Merchants, craftsmen, and service people were of lower status.

   Above, all, Indian Muslims formed numerous religious bodies divided by allegiance to schools of law, Sufi orders, and the teaching of individual *shaykhs*, scholars, and saints. Some were Sunnis and some Shi'is, although this was not an absolute distinction, owing to the strong sympathies for the family of 'Ali among Sunnis. Sunnis were themselves divided between those committed to scripturalist Islam (to the beliefs and laws set out in the Quran, the hadith of the Prophet, and the Islamic legal tradition) and those devoted to popular Sufism (in which veneration of saints, living and dead, with associated ceremonies of remembrance, mourning, and ritual marriages and funerals was the principal form of religious expression). One current in Indian Islam ran toward the disciplined, rational, and controlled practice of Islamic law; the other, toward emotional faith and identification with the miraculous powers of

saints. Into the first camp fell such diverse groups as the scholars, the organized schools of law, and orthopraxy-minded Sufi orders. In the second camp, there were the Sufi saints and their descendants, who managed their tombs, shrines, and the brotherhoods founded in their names. The two orientations led to different views about the boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims. Popular saint worship blurred the religious distinctions among Muslims and Hindus; certain Sufi theories and cosmologies blended Hindu and Muslim concepts.

In the Mughal era, the scholars were in the service of the state. The Mughals continued the Delhi sultanate system of bureaucratic religious administration. Full control over the judiciary was given to a chief judge. The provincial *sadr* was in charge of local judges, market inspectors, preachers, prayer leaders, muezzins, and trust-fund administrators. He was responsible also for the appointment of muftis and for liaisons between the government and the scholars. His office provided stipends for scholars and sometimes included the power of making grants of landed property; trusts were created to provide income for shrines, tombs, and schools. He issued the daily allowances for religious persons and made payments out of the funds of charitable endowments. The *sadr* was also responsible for charities and for feeding the poor. In the course of the seventeenth century, his power was checked by administrative arrangements that gave other officials control over land and by the creation of a more decentralized religious administration in the provinces. His judicial powers were also limited by rulers who involved themselves directly in religious affairs.

In the Mughal period, the influence of the Naqshbandis and the Qadiris replaced that of the Suhrawardis and Chistis. The Naqshbandis cultivated a spiritual discipline leading to the vision of God, but they also insisted on the necessity for active engagement in worldly affairs. The histories of two Naqshbandi *shaykhs* of the eighteenth century illustrate the religious and social principles espoused by the order. Mirza Mazhar (d. 1781), the founder of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the order, came from a family of soldiers and administrators and took up the Sufi life to avoid political conflicts and

to control the violent impulses in himself. He turned to Sufism as a way of finding tranquility and security in an uncertain world. His teachings stressed the harmony of the various Sufi traditions. He minimized the differences between the theosophical and legalistic forms of Sufism. His whole life was lived in cautious efforts to protect himself from contamination by food, gifts, and other worldly things, which were all scrutinized for their legality and appropriateness. He also recommended celibacy. Mirza Mazhar never claimed the power to perform miracles, but his followers believed it of him anyway.

His successor was Shah Ghulam ʿAli (d. 1824), who stressed the social and political roles of the Naqshbandi *shaykh*, organized the *khanaqa*, sent disciples to proselytize in Iran and Afghanistan, and distributed charity and spiritual and moral advice to supplicants. He used his moral influence with political figures whenever possible.

By contrast, other Sufi orders stressed veneration of saints. The Chisti order was originally built on the personal religious insights of the founding teacher, but as time passed, the charisma of the saints was taken to reside in their tombs. Their descendants then served as the managers of their shrines and the organizers of the orders that flourished around them. The *pirzadas*, the hereditary descendants and managers of the saints' tombs, supervised the festivities commemorating the birth and death anniversaries of the saints, maintained public kitchens, led community prayers, and offered amulets along with spiritual and social advice. The growth of the shrines as centers of worship led to the accumulation of properties granted and protected by the state. The Mughals awarded landed properties to the Sufis, a practice that legitimized both donor and recipient, enabling the Mughals to intervene in succession disputes and to control the managers of the shrines. They converted the *pirzadas* into a petty gentry sensitive to the wishes of the political authorities.

In the sixteenth century, Shiʿi influence was also very strong. Golconda and Kashmir were ruled by Shiʿi princes. The Mughals had Shiʿi wives, and many Shiʿis held high offices. The Indian Shiʿi communities included the Twelvers, whose teachings we have examined in the chapter on Iran. The headquarters of these Indian

Shi'is was moved to Lucknow in 1775, and the Nawabs of Awadh later promoted a distinct set of rituals and practices.

The Nizaris had their origin in a schism among the Fatimids. They were the Assassins of twelfth-century Iran. With the collapse of the Nizari state of Alamut in 1256, the mission entered a new passive phase, concentrating on the symbolic and religious rather than political expressions of its goals. The Nizaris held that God was utterly transcendent and unknowable and that he brought into existence the world of intelligences; religious salvation was achieved by ascending the ladder of intelligences and returning to the first intelligence through which man achieved unification with God. The Nizaris believed that the cosmic order was represented in history by cycles of prophets and imams. There were seven cycles of prophets, each cycle consisting of seven imams; the final cycle ends with the resurrection. Their mission in India began in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century in Sind and Gujarat. At first, the Nizari communities in India acknowledged the supremacy of the imams in Iran, but in the sixteenth century the movement split, and only some of the Nizaris maintained this connection. Eventually, the imamate was transferred from Iran to India by Aga Khan I, Hasan 'Ali Shah, who moved to Bombay in 1845.

The Bohras had their origin in the same schism that gave rise to the Nizaris. With the disappearance of their imam, al-Tayyib, in 1133, leadership of the community was turned over to the *da'i al-mutlaq*. The *da'i* stands in a hierarchy that includes other missionaries, including the higher-ranking *hujja* and *natiq* and the imams. When the imams and the higher authorities are concealed, the *da'i* becomes the highest functionary in the social world. He is empowered to teach the community, resolve internal disputes, and name his successor in accordance with divine inspiration. He operates through agents called *amils* and *shaykhs* who are the equivalent of scholars.

The Bohra branch of Isma'ili Shi'ism was first established in Yemen, and the Bohras probably came to Gujarat in the early thirteenth century. A deputy (*wali*) ruled until 1539, when the first

Indian *daʿi* was appointed. In the long history of the Bohra community, there were several major schisms. In 1846, with the death of the last *daʿi* of the Rajput line, the authority of the missionaries was compromised. The nineteenth-century Bohras tended to regard them as administrative figures rather than spiritual teachers, and their leadership was challenged by the scholars.

The diversity of Muslim religious and social groups in India inspired conflicting concepts about the social meaning of Islamic religious belief. The legally minded conceived of Muslim society as cutting across lineage and class lines. They defined Muslims not by inherited lineage, position in the state, or occupation, but by individual belief in Islam, which transcended all other social ties and made men equals and brothers in religion. Although they recognized the importance of the Mughal Empire, Islam in their view was still a universal community. Orthopraxy-minded Muslims stood for state enforcement of Islamic law and state-mandated subordination of Hindus to Muslim rule by discriminatory taxes and restrictions. By contrast, popular Sufism viewed Islam as an integral aspect of lineage, occupational, and neighborhood ties.

These differences of religious orientation were an important political issue in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whereas the state pursued a policy of conciliation among different Muslim groups and among Muslims and Hindus, scholarly critics of Akbar opposed his religious toleration, his openness to non-orthoprax religious ideas, and his assumption of the prerogatives of a Sufi. The most important opponent of imperial policies was Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). Sirhindi claimed to be the *mujaddid*, the renewer of Islam in his century, a man standing on the spiritual level of the early caliphs. Initiated into the Naqshbandi order, he became the principal Indian spokesman for Islamic law and the reformist point of view. He taught that obedience to Islamic legal norms was the key to its inner meaning and modified Ibn al-ʿArabi's doctrine of the unity of being, the metaphysical basis of religious syncretism, in favor of the doctrine of unity of witness. He opposed the insinuation into Islam of Sufi and Hindu practices, such as worship of saints, sacrifice of animals, and religious festivals. As a reformer, he waged

an unrelenting crusade to persuade the Mughal authorities to adopt policies befitting an Islamic state. He regarded Hinduism and Islam as mutually exclusive. He believed it was the obligation of Muslims to subdue non-Muslims, and thus he urged rulers and nobles to impose the poll tax on non-Muslims, to permit the slaughter of cows, to remove non-Muslims from political office, and to enforce Islamic law in every way.

Sirhindi's great follower was Shah Waliallah (d. 1763), who pursued the tradition of reform in different circumstances. In the declining age of the Mughal Empire, Shah Waliallah was concerned with securing the Muslim presence in the subcontinent. After visiting Mecca, the center of reformist teaching, he stressed the importance of returning to the Prophet's teachings and the need to purge Islam of saint worship, which was subsequent to and inconsistent with the true meaning of the Prophet's life. He translated the Quran into Persian and argued for the use of independent scholarly judgment in the adaptation of the law to local conditions. While supporting the supremacy of Quran and sunna, he attempted to synthesize the different schools of law and reduce legal divergences among Muslims.

Shah Waliallah believed that reform required a Muslim state, modeled on the early caliphate, to enforce Islamic law. He defined the caliph as the religious leader who is closest to the example of the Prophet, a perfect man who strives for justice and tries to use administrative and judicial techniques to lead his people to religious virtue. In Shah Waliallah's view, the will of God radiates through the caliph into the feelings and minds of his subjects. Even in the absence of this spiritual function, a caliph provides for the political defense of Muslim peoples and the organization of Muslim law. His duty is to enforce Islamic religious practice, collect the alms tax, promote the pilgrimage, foster study and teaching, administer justice, and wage jihad. This was a program of religious consolidation in the struggle against popular Sufi Islam and in opposition to a lax Mughal regime.

As a consequence of this pluralism, there was no sense in India of a universal or unified Muslim identity. Although the state patronized

the small scholarly establishment, both scholars and Sufis were generally independent. Reformist-minded scholars were critical of the Mughal state for its cosmopolitan and imperial culture, its Hindu elite, and its patrimonial loyalties. Many pious Sufis withdrew altogether from political contacts, but Sufi leaders tended to be accommodationist and to accept state support and the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, the legacy of pre-modern Indian-Islamic organization was not state control of doctrine, teaching, or judicial administration nor a history of well-established schools of law and scholars, but one of numerous autonomous and competitive Muslim religious movements.

Over centuries, a distinctive expression of Islamic civilization emerged in the Indian subcontinent. Like their Iranian and Middle Eastern predecessors, the Delhi sultanates and the Mughal Empire were committed to a concept of state culture that blended Islamic symbols with a royal heritage. In the Iranian case, these were the symbols of ancient Iran as transmitted through the ʿAbbasid caliphate. In India, royalty meant the heritage of Iran combined with Mongol, Timurid, and Chaghatay concepts and with Indian and Hindu motifs, which introduced new elements into Islamic imperial culture. The Mughal era bequeathed to modern India a distinctive variant of Muslim institutions and cultures.

Muslim religious life in the Indian subcontinent both resembled and departed from Middle Eastern norms. Islam in India replicated the basic forms of scholarly and Sufi Islam. Whereas in Iran Shiʿism absorbed all levels of Islam into a monolithic establishment, in India the various forms of scholarship, Sufi contemplation, worship of saints, and reformist tendencies remained in open competition with one another. In India, Islamic belief and practice on the popular level was manifestly mixed with local Hindu and Buddhist forms of belief and worship. The formation of a popular Muslim subculture in India was not, however, a departure from Muslim norms but an example of a process that was universal. In the Middle East as well, Islam had been formed as a syncretism of popular Christian and Jewish religious practices with Muslim teachings, although the passage of time has concealed the syncretic nature of Middle Eastern Islam.

The international economy and the British Indian Empire

India had long held a central position in international trade. Geographically it stood at the hub of the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. It was a bridge in the trade between the Far East and Europe and an important producer and exporter of textiles and spices. Indian trade with Europe had historically been routed through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, until in 1498 Portuguese mariners rounded Africa and discovered a direct sea route to South and East Asia. They established a series of bases in the Indian Ocean region (including Cochin and Goa) and sought to monopolize the spice trade. The Portuguese attacked the pepper fleets from Calicut, Kollam, and Cannanore and forced Indian Ocean traders to call at the port of Diu to pay customs duties. After 1600, the Portuguese monopoly was broken by the English and the Dutch. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch, British, and French established factories, warehouses, and residents for their merchants.

The British East India Company began trading in India in 1600. British factories were founded at Surat in 1612, Madras in 1640, Bombay in 1674, and Calcutta in 1690. They exported Indian cotton and silk cloth, cotton yarn, raw silk, saltpeter, indigo, and spices and imported silver bullion and other metals. At the outset, the East India Company depended on Indian traders and manufacturers, but it gradually set up its own networks with local producers and suppliers and undermined the older trading and manufacturing cities by concentrating commercial activity in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In effect the British set up the kinds of networks that the Mughals had used to govern India, progressively extending their economic influence from one region to another and converting that power into political control. The company thus made itself into a local government and, in its struggles with competing local forces, into a colonial regime.

The critical events in the British rise to dominance were a long series of eighteenth-century wars in which the British defeated French and Indian rivals. Through the battles of Plassey (1757) and

Baksar (1764), the British established themselves as the de facto rulers of Bengal. In 1772, Warren Hastings, the British governor of Bengal, took charge of the British factories of Madras and Bombay and created a unified regime.

In Bengal, the British established a new system of taxation and judicial administration. They took control of the courts and established a British-officered police and army. By means of the so-called Permanent Settlement (1793), rural taxes were set at fixed rates – a measure that ruined the old Muslim elite and opened the way for the purchase of *zamindari* tenures by wealthy Hindu merchants and investors from Calcutta. British goods came to dominate the local economy and undermined the Indian textile industry.

British power in Bengal was soon extended to other parts of India as "protection" was offered or imposed on local rulers and elites. By 1818, the remaining Rajput and Maratha rulers acknowledged the British as the paramount power. The Punjab and the Northwest Frontier were absorbed at a later date, but by the 1820s and 1830s British paramountcy was secure. In 1858, in the wake of the Indian mutiny, the British removed the last of the Mughal emperors and brought India under their direct control.

Chapter 36 Islamic empires compared

Each of the Islamic empires of West and South Asia – the Safavid, the Ottoman, and the Mughal – had a unique history, but the three had many features in common. They were all built on the combined heritage of past Middle Eastern imperial Islamic societies and the heritage of Inner Asian, Mongolian, and Turkic political institutions. In the Iranian tradition government was entrusted to hereditary rulers. The Turkish conception of society was based on military competition. Rulership in Turkish society was achieved by victory in battle and was maintained by active struggle against rivals. In the three empires, Iranian traditions of kingship, social hierarchy, and justice were combined with Turkish concepts of mythical heroes and glorious ancestors.

Whereas Mongol and Timurid precedents called for partitioning an empire among the sons of the ruler and allowed them to fight one another for power, the Safavids, Ottomans, and Mughals established, with some exceptions, a routinized dynastic succession. Each empire was built around a patrimonial or household government, elements of a centralized bureaucracy, a quasi-feudal assignment of tax revenues to support the military and to carry on local administration, and finally the extensive farming out of tax collection and other governmental functions to create patronage networks that bound soldiers, provincial officials, and local notables to the central government. All three empires had the support of royal armies (sometimes slave military forces and sometimes lower-class recruits), bureaucratic personnel, provincial feudal and tribal notables, landowners, merchants, and religious elites. There were important differences in the weight and balancing of the several bases of imperial power. The Ottomans probably had the most centralized regime; the Mughals were notably more patrimonial and less bureaucratic; the Safavid regime, the most patrimonial, was dependent on religious prestige and on the support of administrative

and tribal notables. From the fourteenth century, the Ottomans relied on slave military forces; the Safavids introduced such forces in the sixteenth century, but the Mughals by and large depended on freeborn Muslims and Hindus.

The empires ruled diverse populations. The Ottoman Empire ruled over many religious (Muslim, Jewish, and Christian) and ethnic (Greek, Romanian, Hungarian, Tatar, Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic) groups. Armenians, Georgians, Turks, and Afghans, as well as Persians and other ethnic and tribal peoples, made up the Safavid population. The Mughal Empire embraced Hindus and many ethnic and language groups.

The three great Asian-Muslim empires shared a common history and indeed many elements of a common culture. They were the heirs of Central Asian, Turkish, Mongol, and, in particular, Timurid traditions of conquest and rule. Osman, Isma'il, and Babur, the founders of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires respectively, traced at least part of their lineage to earlier Turkic commanders or rulers, spoke a Turkic dialect as their native language (Osman, Oghuz Turkish; Isma'il, Azerbaijani or Azeri Turkish; and Babur, Turki or Chaghatay Turkish), and led Turkic troops in conquests.

They all derived their historical legitimization from a mixture of pre-Islamic Iranian, Roman, and Turko-Mongol imperial traditions. The rulers depicted themselves as conquerors (*ghazis*) in the name of Islam for their victories over Christians, Hindus, or heretical Muslims. They adopted the ancient Iranian titles of shah, *padishah* or *shahanshah*. The Ottoman claim to power was enhanced by their conquest of Constantinople and later of Egypt and the holy cities of Arabia, which made them caliphs as well as Caesars. The Safavids leaned more heavily on the religious claim to be Sufi masters, representatives of the imam, and infallible guides to salvation.

All three empires perpetuated Persian as the high literary common language and cultivated Perso-Islamic architecture, painting, and poetry. In urban design, they all subscribed to the by then canonical assemblage of royal palace, Friday mosque, bazaar, and royal tombs. They all drew on the Timurid love of gardens and garden

kiosks. The Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, the ʿAli Qapu and the Chihil Sutun palaces in Isfahan, and the Agra fort and Shahjahanabad complex in Delhi were at once residences for the imperial families, administrative centers, and pleasure resorts. They constructed or endowed mosques, Sufi retreats, and schools; commercial structures such as bazaars and caravanserais; and charitable institutions (such as hospitals, kitchens, and fountains). The almost-universal design motif was a square building with circular and/or semicircular domes.

The great Asian empires shared a common literary culture. Beginning in the ʿAbbasid era and continuing through the Mongol and Timurid periods, Iranian scholars, poets, and administrators developed a Persian-Islamic culture. Persian language and literature became the dominant culture in the vast region from Anatolia to Central Asia and India, linking the great Asian empires through the travels of administrators, scholars, poets, and Sufis. Persian was the administrative language of the Safavid and Mughal empires and deeply influenced Ottoman court language as well. Inspired partly by ancient Iranian and Hindu literature and partly by Arabic literature, the empires created a rich corpus of religious literature, poetry and stories, history, mathematics, medicine and science, political commentary, and wisdom (*adab*) for educated gentlemen. The great figures in this tradition were Firdawsi (d. 1020), Nizami Ganjavi (d. 1209), Saʿdi (d. 1291), and Hafiz (d. 1388/89) in Iran; Rumi (d. 1273) in Anatolia; Amir Khusrau Dihlavi (d. 1325) in Delhi; and Jami (d. 1492) in Herat. Only in the sixteenth and later centuries did Ottoman Turkish (literary Turkish strongly influenced by Persian) begin to displace Persian; in the eighteenth century Urdu (Persianized Hindi written in the Arabic script) displaced Persian as the dominant literary language in India.

In all three empires, poets were summoned to court to entertain and praise the ruler and to compose poetry for military victories, birthdays, and royal celebrations. Through their poetry, they expressed political, religious, and erotic concepts. From Europe to southern India, poets used similar literary conventions, meters, rhymes, images, and forms adapted to the particular linguistic,

cultural, and political circumstances of each empire. The *ghazal* was the universal form to express courtly love, especially the exquisite suffering of unrequited love. Firdawsi's *Shah-nama*, a history of Iranian kings, and Nizami's *Khamsa*, five romantic epics, were universally admired.

Painting, mainly illustrations for literary works, was supported by emperors. Manuscript illustration, dating back to the Persian renaissance of the ʿAbbasid era, was developed by the Mongols and Timurids and enshrined in royal workshops by the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. All the regimes patronized variations on a common artistic heritage.

Asian empires as Islamic states

Each of the empires validated itself by the combined patronage and suppression of Muslim religious activities and movements. All three empires sponsored schools, mosques, Sufi retreats (*khanaqas*), and shrines. They appointed judges to apply Islamic law. The Ottomans and the Safavids organized and controlled scholars (*ʿulama'*) through state-organized hierarchies, but the Mughals patronized Islamic scholarship without attempting to bureaucratize the scholars.

Despite the Sunni-Shiʿi divide, these regimes endorsed a similar educational curriculum. Both Sunni and Shiʿi scholars agreed that knowledge was divided into religious sciences and rational sciences. The former incorporated Quranic exegesis, traditions, Arabic grammar and syntax, law, and jurisprudence. The latter included logic, philosophy, mathematics, and medicine. Theology could be placed in either category. For both the Safavids and the Ottomans, law and jurisprudence were the central subjects of study and were critical to administration. Mystical knowledge was also cultivated in all three empires. Ibn al-ʿArabi's doctrine of the unity of being (*wahdat al-wujud*) – the concept that God is the only reality and that the created world is an emanation of the divine essence into material existence – had followers in all the empires and beyond. The Persian poetry of Jami and later poetry in many regional languages (such as Sindhi, Punjabi, and Bengali) diffused his theosophy.

By the 1600s and 1700s, Ottoman scholars were emphasizing the transmitted religious subjects rather than the rational sciences. The emphasis in the Mughal and Safavid empires was changing from the rational sciences and mysticism to the transmitted religious subjects (such as hadith). In all regions, Sufism was suppressed or reoriented to stress fulfillment of worldly social obligations. In the Mughal Empire, however, the theosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabi and the pursuit of the rational sciences was not attacked and displaced until well into the nineteenth century.

International scholarly networks linked the several empires to one another and to the wider Islamic world. The Safavids brought Arab Shiʿi scholars from Syria, the Lebanon, and Bahrain to Iran; Shiʿi families and networks spread from Iraq and Iran to India, reaching from the coasts of the Mediterranean to central India. Sunni scholars and Sufis were also linked in international networks. Pilgrimage and study in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina created ties among scholars from the several regions of the Ottoman Empire, including Arabia, Cairo, Damascus, and Iraq. The reform (*tajdid*) movement was at the core of the Islamic revival and resistance to Sufism and to the theosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabi in the seventeenth and later centuries. Naqshbandi Sufis maintained connections among Inner Asian, Indian, and Arabian Muslim reformers and activists. Sufi brotherhoods were established in all the empires, and some had branches in several regions, especially the Khalwatiyya in the Ottoman Empire and the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiyya in the Ottoman and Mughal empires.

In the decline of all three empires, tribal forces, provincial officials, and local notables arrogated an increasing share of political power and economic resources. Everywhere central governments were thwarted and starved by their provincial clients, but they would come to very different fates. The Safavid Empire would collapse in the early eighteenth century. In 1722, the Safavid dynasty was extinguished, and Afghan warriors took control of Iran. By the late eighteenth century, the Mughal Empire was effectively reduced to a small North Indian state. The Mughal dynasty would eventually be eliminated by the British in 1858. The Ottoman dynasty was the

longest lived. By the late eighteenth century, it was no longer a military threat to other European powers, but the dynasty survived until 1924, when it was replaced by the Turkish republic.

The common factor in the demise of the empires has long been thought to be economic competition and conquest by European powers. Yet the impact of commerce was mixed. Although the Ottoman and Mughal regions were exposed to competition from European manufactures, trade with Europe also stimulated demand for and exports of many local products. Nor was European military conquest the cause of their decline. The Safavids were crushed by Afghans rather than Europeans. The Mughal Empire was dismembered by both regional powers and the British. The Ottomans were most exposed to European encroachment, but the empire maintained its territorial core until World War I. In the decline and fall of these empires, internal factors played the critical role.

Chapter 37 Inner Asia from the Mongol conquests to the nineteenth century

For millennia, the central theme in the history of the vast and varied regions that lie between the settled parts of the Middle East and of China was the relationship between nomadic-pastoral and sedentary peoples. Whereas the great civilizations of the Middle East and China were primarily imperial and agricultural, the region between them was a zone of steppe lands and scattered oases. The population was predominantly pastoral and lived by raising horses and sheep. It was also organized into clans and tribes, which were sometimes assembled into great confederations. The settled peoples lived primarily in the oasis districts of Transoxania, Khwarizm, Farghana, and Kashgar, and in scattered towns along the trade routes that linked China, the Middle East, and Europe. Settled and pastoral peoples had close relationships with one another, exchanging products and participating in caravan trade. Pastoral peoples also infiltrated the settled areas and became farmers or townsmen. Sometimes they conquered the agricultural oases and became rulers and landlords. Inner Asia was also the reservoir holding a sea of peoples who, organized into great confederations, from time to time conquered the Middle East and China. From the second millennium BCE to the eighteenth century, the history of the region may be told in terms of ever-repeated nomadic conquests, the formation of empires over oasis and settled populations, and the constant tension between pastoral and agricultural peoples.

The development of an Islamic civilization in Inner Asia was closely related to that of Iran. Islam first spread in this region as a result of the Arab conquests of Iran and Transoxania and the movement of Muslim traders and Sufis from the towns to the steppes. The two regions were also linked by the Turkish migrations of the tenth to the fourteenth centuries that brought Inner Asian peoples into Iran, and Iranian monarchical culture and Islamic civilization into Inner Asia. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Qarluq and Oghuz peoples converted and founded the Qarakhanid and Saljuq empires. Under the Qarakhanids, the Hanafi school of law and Maturidi school of theology were established in Transoxania, and a new Turkish literature inspired by Persian Islamic literature came into being. The Qarakhanids also favored the diffusion of Islam from Transoxania into the Tarim basin and the northern steppes. Sufi preachers, especially Shaykh Ahmad al-Yasavi (d. 1166), helped to spread Islam among nomadic peoples.

The connections between Iran and Inner Asia were reinforced by the Mongol invasions. In the thirteenth century, non-Muslim Mongolian peoples established their suzerainty over the whole of Inner Asia, much of the Middle East, and China. The Mongol conquests brought the steppe regions north of the Black, Caspian, and Aral seas into contact with Muslim peoples in Transoxania and Iran and linked Muslim Transoxania with eastern Inner Asia and China.

The advent of Islam in this region led to the formation of three types of Islamic societies. Among the Kazakhs, Islam became part of popular identity and belief, but not the basis of social organization. In large-scale urbanized societies such as Transoxania, state-organized Islamic societies of the Middle Eastern type were developed. Among other tribal peoples and in some oasis communities such as Kashgar, Sufi masters or Sufi lineages mediated, organized, and sometimes governed.

Eventually all of Inner Asia was brought under Russian and Chinese rule. As early as the sixteenth century, Russia absorbed the Tatar states of the Volga region. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russia took control of Crimea, the northern steppes, Turkestan, and the territories beyond the Caspian Sea. The Chinese occupied eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century and divided Inner Asia into spheres of Russian and Chinese rule. The rule of settled (and non-Muslim) empires brought to an end the ancient patterns of nomadic migration and empire formation.

The Western and northern steppes

The semiarid steppe region north of a line drawn across the top of the Black, Caspian, and Aral seas and Lake Balkhash was inhabited predominantly by pastoral peoples whose livelihood depended on raising cattle, horses, goats, sheep, camels, and yaks. The populace spoke Turkic-Altaic languages and was organized into families, clans, and confederations (hordes), with the clan being the basic unit of tax collection, military organization, adjudication of disputes, and other political activities. Although small communities were based on lineage, a political or territorial concept was woven into the higher levels of organization.

The Mongol conquests gave this region a semblance of political unity. In 1236, under the leadership of Batu, Mongol and Turkish nomads conquered the regions north of the Aral and Caspian seas and established their capital on the Volga River. In one of the most extraordinary campaigns in world history, the Golden Horde also conquered Russia, the Ukraine, southern Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, creating an empire that extended north to the forests of Russia, south to the Black Sea and the Caucasus, west to the Carpathians, and east to Khwarizm. Local princes were left in power as vassals of the Golden Horde and were used to extract tribute from the population. Moscow was the principal vassal of the Golden Horde; other Russian principalities were responsible to Moscow for the payment of tribute.

Amalgamating with the conquered peoples, the conquerors evolved over time into the Turkic-speaking Tatar population and eventually converted to Islam. Khan Berke (r. 1257–67) was the first Muslim ruler, but only from the time of Uzbek Khan (r. 1313–40) were the rulers routinely Muslims. The Islamic loyalties of the royal family were probably reinforced by contacts with the settled Muslim populations of Khwarizm and Transoxania and perhaps by the absorption of the Bulgars, who had been Muslims since the tenth century. Culturally, the Golden Horde was dependent on Egypt and Syria, which provided artists and artisans to produce wall paintings, mosaics, lamps, tombstones, and other artistic objects. In the steppes of northern Asia, the Golden Horde integrated aspects of Mediterranean-Islamic culture.

The empire of the Golden Horde maintained its suzerainty from the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth centuries but gradually disintegrated under the pressure of Ottoman expansion (which cut off the Golden Horde from the Mediterranean) and the rise of Moscow, Moldavia, and Lithuania. Also, in the course of the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the Golden Horde broke up into smaller principalities and became differentiated into separate Crimean Tatar, Volga Tatar, Uzbek, and Kazakh ethnic and political groups. The khans of Crimea, who claimed to be descendants of Chinggis Khan, declared themselves independent rulers in 1441. The khans of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia also established their autonomy. Each of these khans had the right to conduct war and diplomacy and dispense justice, but their powers were checked by clan and tribal leaders, who had a voice in their succession. In the eastern steppes, from the Caspian-Ural region to the Tien-shan and Altai mountains, the Uzbeks probably originated as a coalition of warrior clans united under the leadership of the Shayban family. The stability and political success of the Shaybanid confederation led gradually to the development of an Uzbek language and ethnic identity.

The Kazakhs formed a second confederation in the regions north of the Caspian and Aral seas. The term "Kazakh" probably means "free" (possibly of Uzbek authority) and initially referred to a warrior stratum, then to a political confederation, and finally to an ethnic population. Kazakhs were organized into extended families called *aul* whose size was governed by the availability of pasture and ranged between three and fifteen tents. Each *aul* had its own pasturage and migrated as a unit to exploit its grazing lands. The *auls* could also be grouped into larger units (*uymaqs*), which were mixed groups of different clans. In the seventeenth century, the Kazakhs formed the Great, Middle, and Little Hordes. A fourth horde, called the Bukey (Inner Horde), was formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The hordes took shape only when a khan united them against a common enemy or when larger states (such as Russia) used the khans to control the nomads.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Naqshbandi and Yasavi missionaries began converting the Kazakhs. Islam, however, probably made little headway until the eighteenth century, when Tatar merchants, missionaries, secretaries, and teachers helped construct mosques and schools. Kazakh nomads accepted Muslim circumcision, marriage, burial practices, and belief in jinn as the equivalent of their spirit gods. They used Quranic amulets for protection and treated Muslim holy men as a kind of

supplementary shamans. They worshiped at saints' tombs and observed Muslim holidays. Alongside Muslim festivals, however, the Kazakhs also maintained a folk culture in which wandering poets sang epic songs. Their practice of Islam, like that of nomadic and rural peoples the world over, merged ancient folk beliefs and traditions with new religious practices. Thus, the new Uzbek and Kazakh polities came into being when warrior or political elites built their power on a confederation of families and clans, who in time assumed a genealogical relatedness and ethnic identity reinforced by Muslim beliefs and by a common language.

The decline of the Golden Horde opened the way for a multisided struggle for control of the western and northern steppes. (See Table 15.) In the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and the Muslim states of Crimea, Kazan, and Astrakhan fought for control of the Ural-Volga region. The ultimate outcome of these wars was that Russia freed itself from Tatar and Muslim domination and itself became master of the northern steppes and the Muslim populations. By 1535, Moscow claimed the right of investiture of Kazan rulers, and Muscovy chroniclers claimed that Kazan was "Russian land" that had to be recovered to reunite Russia. Church writers stressed the perfidy of the Tatars and the bitterness of the Christian-Muslim conflict. Amid a growing sense of religious superiority and national mission, Moscow conquered Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556. This gave it control of the Volga River and the north shore of the Caspian Sea, paving the way for the submission of the Siberian khanate in 1598.

Table 15. *Inner Asia: outline chronology*

		Northern and western steppes			*Turkestan*		
	Mongol conquests	*Volga*	*Northern Steppes*	*Crimea*	*Khwarizm*	*Transoxania*	*Easter Turke*
1200		Chinggis Khan (1206–27)					
1300		Blue Horde, Batu'ids (1227–1341), unites with White Horde to form Golden Horde (1378–1502)				Chaghatays, 1227–1370; Timurid Empire, 1370–1500	
1400		Partitioned into several khanates (fifteenth century)	Formation of Uzbek and Kazakh "nations" (fifteenth century)	Giray khans, 1426–1792			

	Northern and western steppes				Turkestan		
	Mongol conquests	Volga	Northern Steppes	Crimea	Khwarizm	Transoxania	Easter Turke:
1500	Kazan khanate annexed by Moscow, 1552 Astrakhan khanate, annexed 1556; Siberian khanate, annexed 1598				Khans of Khiva, 1515–1920	Shaybanids, 1500–98	Chagh continu nomin suzera until 16
1600						Astrakhanids, 1599–1785	
1700							Kashg ruled b *khwaja* 1678– Khoka ruled b khanat 1700– Russia annex: 1876 Chines conqu Xinjiar 1759
				Annexed by Russia, 1783		Mangits, 1785–1920	
1800			Russian annexation of Kazakhstan completed by 1868		Russian protectorate, 1873	Russian protectorate, 1868	China annex Xinjiar 1884
1900							

Russian conquest of Crimea, however, was delayed for almost two centuries. In the seventeenth century, Moscow developed adequate frontier defenses against Ottoman and Crimean attacks and began to colonize the southern steppes, which resulted ultimately in the Russian occupation of Azov in 1699. Peter the Great had to cede Azov to the Ottoman Empire in 1711, but in 1774 the Russians defeated the Ottomans and took full control of Crimea in 1783. The Ottomans recognized the new sovereign in 1792. (See Map 18.)

Map 18.   Russian expansion in Islamic Inner Asia to 1920.

From their dominant position in the Volga region, the Russians set out to conquer the Kazakh steppes. Under Peter the Great, the Russians established a string of forts across the northern steppes from the Ural to the Irtysh rivers, including Orenburg, Omsk, Barnaul, and Semipalatinsk. In 1723 the Kazakh Great Horde and in 1730 the Kazakh Little Horde were forced to accept Russian suzerainty. A century of slow consolidation was followed in 1822–24 by the abolition of the Kazakh khanates and the submission of the Kazakhs to Russian control. In 1864, the Russians took the Syr-Darya region and completed the occupation of Kazakh territories. This victory was not easily won. Between 1783 and 1797, Batyr Srym led a series of counterattacks, followed by some sixty years of Kazakh resistance. The Bukey Horde revolted between 1836 and 1838; Khan Kenesary Kasimov led Kazakh resistance between 1837 and 1847. The last revolt, in the name of Islam, was crushed in 1868. Thus, Russia became the heir of the Golden Horde in the Ural-Volga region and on the northern and eastern steppes.

The Russian conquests were a disaster for Muslim peoples. On the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the Russians expelled the Tatars from the important cities, redistributed the land to Russian nobles and monasteries, and colonized the region with Russian artisans and peasants. Mosques were destroyed, Quran schools closed, and trusts seized by the Russian treasury. The Russians aimed at no less than the complete conversion of the Tatars to Christianity. There was some success with Muslim nobles and their clients who were interested in collaboration with the Russians, but in general, Muslim resistance was fierce. From 1552 until 1610, there were repeated revolts by the Tatar nobility. Their defeat was followed by peasant uprisings from 1608 to 1615 and Tatar participation in Kazakh rebellions. In the seventeenth century, the Russians suspended their efforts at assimilation and worked mainly to prevent the apostasy of converts, but in 1710 Peter the Great began a new campaign that lasted until 1764. Converts were transferred to purely Russian villages. Muslim children were sent to Christian schools, and adults were forced to accept baptism. Churches were constructed in Muslim villages. Yet, after half a century, there were only a small number of Tatar converts. Paradoxically, Russian conquest helped to spread Islam. Driven out of the major towns and deprived of land, Tatar nobles became merchants, colonized rural areas, built mosques and schools, and propagated Islam among the nomads.

To calm her eastern provinces, Catherine the Great adopted a new policy in 1773. Aware of the importance of Tatar trading communities and eager to avoid further rebellions, Catherine ended religious

persecution, gave Tatar nobles equal rights with Russian nobles, and encouraged Tatar merchants to trade between Russia and Transoxania. Decrees of 1782 and 1784 authorized the construction of mosques; in 1788, an Islamic spiritual administration was organized at Ufa under the leadership of a mufti. Under Catherine's peace, Tatar merchants flourished and invested in tanneries and in paper and woolen mills. Peasants developed cottage industries. Commercial success opened the way to European education and eventually stimulated an intellectual enlightenment.

In Crimea, Catherine guaranteed the nobility possession of their lands and the Muslim scholars freedom of religion. A Muslim spiritual directorate for Crimea was established in 1794; the mufti was nominated by the tsar. In time, however, the Russians began to seize Tatar estates and trusts for the benefit of the Russian aristocracy and European colonists who flocked to the country. Between 1783 and 1896, most of the Crimean Tatars were forced to migrate to the Ottoman Empire; the remnant formed a minority in their own country.

Turkestan (Transoxania, Khwarizm, and Farghana)

Whereas the northern steppes were the domain of the Golden Horde and later of settled Tatar and pastoral Kazakh peoples, Turkestan – the domain of the Chaghatays – was primarily agricultural and the site of numerous important oasis cities, such as Bukhara and Samarqand. The commerce of these cities reached from China to the Black Sea, linking Iran, Afghanistan, India, China, and Russia. They were also important centers of Muslim religious learning. Although nomadic peoples from the surrounding steppes time and again conquered the region, they accepted its city tradition and became patrons of its culture. (See Illustration 18.)

Illustration 18.　The Registan of Samarqand. Courtesy of Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom.

Throughout the period of the caliphate and the Turkish and Mongol invasions, Turkestan was tied to eastern Iran. It was ruled in succession by the Qarakhanids, the Mongols, the Chaghatays, and the Timurids. The collapse of the Timurid Empire, however, led to a permanent break between the two regions. Iran was conquered by the Safavids and Transoxania (the principal part of Turkestan) by the Uzbeks. The trade routes that linked Transoxania to Iran were disrupted by Shaybanid-Safavid hostilities. Iran converted to Shiʿism; Transoxania under Shaybanid rule remained Sunni. While Persians held sway in Iran, Turkish peoples and Chaghatay literary culture grew stronger in the east. Although it preserved a rich component of its Middle Eastern Islamic heritage, Transoxania under Uzbek rule was integrated once again into Inner Asia and became the urban and agricultural center of Inner Asian–Islamic civilization.

Uzbek domination of Transoxania began with the Shaybanid dynasty (1500–98) and endured through successive dynasties until the establishment of a Russian protectorate in 1868. The Shaybanids were in many ways typical of Turkish conquest regimes. The conquering elite was divided between the ruling dynasty and its administrative, religious, and merchant supporters, and tribal chiefs (*uymaq*) and their clients and retainers. The two segments of the elite struggled for their share of the spoils of power. The khan himself kept a portion of the territory as state lands and a portion as private revenue estates

(*khasa*) that he controlled absolutely. A considerable portion of these lands was assigned as trusts to Muslim religious leaders, and the rest was assigned to the nobility. It was divided into provinces (*wilayat*), and each province was further subdivided into *iqta's* distributed to the supporters of the regional governors. The estates controlled by the members of the ruling family and the tribal chiefs (*beg*) were rated by *tumen*, probably a measure of the number of troops to be provided in return for the grant of revenues. Such grants of land tended to become hereditary, depriving the rulers of control. Strong rulers would seek to reestablish their power by seizing the *iqta's*, reducing the size of land grants, confiscating the excess properties of religious leaders, and paying their retainers in cash. In this respect, the Shaybanid khanate resembled the Safavid regime of Iran; the central rulers struggled against the *uymaq* and tribal forces that dominated the localities.

The Shaybanid khanate, like earlier Muslim regimes, legitimated itself by a combination of references to Sunni Islam and Persian literary culture. The khans took the titles of *khalifat al-rahman* (Lieutenant of the Merciful God) and *imam al-zaman* (Ruler of the Times), quoted hadith to justify their rule, and became disciples of Naqshbandi Sufi masters. Court poets wrote panegyrics, portraits were commissioned, and literary activity was patronized to depict the Shaybanids as Turkish-Persian princes. The *Shah-name* was translated into Turkish, and many Iranian scholars came to Transoxania, where they found generous Uzbek patronage. Thus, the Shaybanids maintained their own version of the Timurid heritage and created an Uzbek-dominated Irano-Islamic state.

The religious elites legitimized the regime. These elites included the judges and the scholars who taught in the colleges, but ever since the Timurid period, the leading position was held by the Naqshbandis. The Naqshbandis had their origin in the *Tariqa-yi Khavajagan* (way of the masters) founded by Yusuf Hamadhani (d. 1143). His disciple, Ahmad al-Yasavi, helped to spread Islam among Turkish peoples. Ahmad's tomb at Yasi was built by Timur as a gesture of obeisance to the Turkish Sufi tradition. His successor, ʿAbd al-Khaliq Ghujdavani (d. 1220), a principal teacher of the Bukharan populace, introduced the crucial spiritual and social principle that later defined the Naqshbandi position: solitude in society – inner devotion expressed in outward social and political activity. The order received its name from Baha' al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389). ʿUbaydallah (*khavaja*) Ahrar (d. 1490), a wealthy farmer and merchant who acquired a reputation for mysticism and magical powers, was the dominant figure in the late fifteenth century. He was an advisor of princes, a teacher of famous poets, and a revered master to the common people. He and other Sufis played a large political role in protecting Muslim populations from oppression, winning over the souls of kings, and defending the Muslim way of life. Sufis who had contacts in all reaches of society united the Inner Asian communities.

While Shaybanid rule constructed a variant form of Irano-Islamic state and society, larger historical forces were profoundly altering Inner Asia. For centuries, the riches of Transoxania had been built on trade and manufactures. Merchants, rich religious leaders, and government officials had participated in the trade with China and Russia. Bukhara, Samarqand, Tashkent, Yasi, and other towns were also centers of lively silk, cotton, leather, rug, jewelry, wood carving, metal, and paper industries. Craft workers were organized into associations under the leadership of officials appointed by the rulers but maintained a social and religious solidarity of their own based on the identification of guilds with patron saints, Sufi masters, and shared religious rituals.

In the course of the sixteenth century, however, the rise of the Safavids and the closure of Iranian routes to the Indian Ocean, the Russian conquest of the Volga region, and internal disorder and insecurity undermined the Inner Asian trade. The decline of Inner Asian routes was also hastened by the discovery of new sea routes between Europe and the Indies, and later by Russian expansion across Siberia to the Pacific that opened new routes to China. Inner Asia was cut off both from economic riches and from external cultural influences, because the roads that had once brought Buddhist, Christian, and other religious and cultural influences into the region fell into disuse. Once the links to the outside Muslim world were cut, provincialism, economic stagnation, and political fragmentation set in. The decline of Inner Asian trade compromised Shaybanid efforts to maintain a centralized state. It deprived the khans of tax revenues, the merchants of profits, and the religious elites of investment opportunities. Power drifted into the hands of tribal and *uymaq* chieftains. From the end of the Shaybanid dynasty (1598) to the nineteenth century, centralized political administration was the rare and precarious achievement of exceptionally able rulers.

The nineteenth century, however, brought a revival. Bukhara (Transoxania), Khiva (Khwarizm), and Khokand (Farghana) each became the center of a newly flourishing Muslim society. In Bukhara, the Shaybanid dynasty had been succeeded by the Astrakhanid dynasty (1599–1785), which maintained only the barest continuity with Shaybanid traditions. It was in turn succeeded by the Mangit dynasty (1785–1920). Murad, the first ruler of the Mangit dynasty, ruled as amir rather than sultan but also claimed an authority based on his conquests, his services as defender and executive of the Muslim community, and his personal charisma derived from being a descendant of the Prophet.

Under the Mangit dynasty, Bukhara continued to follow the basic Shaybanid pattern. The state was ruled by the amir, who was served by a chief minister (*qush begi*) and by Persian administrative officials. The territory was subdivided into provinces and tax-collecting districts consisting of groups of villages or hamlets, each under the authority of an *aqsakal*, or elder. The territories and tax revenues were divided among the amir and the leading notables. In the nineteenth century, about 12 percent of the taxable land belonged to the ruler, 56 percent to the state, 24 percent to trusts, and 8 percent to the rest of the population. State lands could be taxed in both cash and kind, the rates being adjusted to the surface unit, water amount, and type of crop, in order to approximate the value of the produce. State lands were commonly granted to tribal notables in return for a promise to supply troops to the regime. They could also be given away as permanent rather than conditional gifts.

In the nineteenth century, the Mangit dynasty struggled successfully to reduce the power of the tribal and *uymaq* chiefs. Amir Nasrallah (r. 1826–60) removed hostile Uzbek chieftains from office and replaced them with Persian, Turkmen, and Arab functionaries. He also confiscated land, redistributed it to his supporters on a nonhereditary basis, and regulated the relations of landholders and peasants. This consolidation was aided by the sedentarization of Uzbek pastoralists, which brought both men and land under the authority of the amir. Still, the local chiefs kept their castles, their retainers, and at least part of their revenues.

As in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, Bukhara had a state-controlled religious administration under the authority of a *shaykh al-Islam* (chief jurisconsult) and a *qadi kalan*, who was in control of judicial administration, colleges, elementary schools, and mosques. The judges and subjudges were appointed to provincial districts. The muftis recorded evidence, interpreted the law, and sat in council to pass judgment on the conformity of state regulations to Islamic law. The scholars staffed more than 110 colleges and taught in the elementary schools. They were organized in a hierarchy of three ranks under the titles *awraq, sadur*, and *sadr*, which were honorific distinctions given to scholars who had a madrasa education and who served as functionaries. People who held these ranks were entitled to collect taxes and to gifts of land. A functionary (the *ra'is*) served as the equivalent of the medieval *muhtasib*, enforcing honest market practices and good public morals. The *ra'is* could require delinquent Muslims to attend mosque or school in order to improve their religious practice and knowledge. Neighborhood religious life was under the direction of imams who presided over the recitation of prayers. The term "mullah" was applied to everyone who taught in schools, presided over prayers, and officiated at marriages, funerals, and other ceremonies. The whole of this elaborate religious organization was directly controlled by the amir, who appointed the chief judges and muftis, the professors in the colleges, and other functionaries.

The social power of the scholars of Bukhara was enhanced by their corporate organization. The religious establishment included privileged groups such as the descendants of the Prophet (*sayyids*), the descendants of the first three caliphs (*mirs*), and the descendants of the early Arab conquerors (*khwajas*). These groups formed endogamous lineages that were accorded popular veneration and religious prestige. Although not formally organized, the teaching scholars also derived considerable political and social support from the mass of their students. Alongside the lineages, there were Sufi brotherhoods, including the Naqshbandiyya, the Qadiriyya, and the Kubrawiyya. Sufi masters had a considerable following of their immediate disciples and the lay brothers attached to the orders. Sufis lived in retreats and worshiped at the shrines of venerated teachers. Sufi beggars, called Qalandaris, had their own community. Sufism was also important among the rural and nomadic populations, where it was strongly oriented to saint worship, healing, and use of amulets. Together, the holy lineages, the Sufi brotherhoods, and the student clienteles made a considerable force in Bukharan society.

Religious influence was also pervasive in the mentality of the Bukharan population. This was most commonly expressed in the veneration of tombs of saints. The relics of Timur in Samarqand were the object of pilgrimage, as were the tombs of the famous Naqshbandi teachers. When a shrine began to acquire a widespread reputation, it was commonly taken over by a Sufi order, which received the gifts of the pilgrims. The cult of ʿAli was prevalent, even among Sunnis, for ʿAli was the patron saint of the canal diggers and soldiers. Bibi Seshambeh (Lady Tuesday) and "Lady Solver of Problems" were the patron saints of women. Craft guilds were organized under patron saints and had collective rituals. Guild saints included Noah, the saint of carpenters, and David, the saint of metalworkers. The Muslim populace also celebrated the *bayram* festivals (the *ʿids* of the sacrifice and of the end of Ramadan) and the birthday of the Prophet. Muslim spirituality included a lively folk culture of secular entertainments by musicians, dancers, acrobats, jugglers, and gypsies. The populace also enjoyed tobacco, tea, and wine.

Despite the longevity of this state and society, important changes were taking place in the nineteenth century. First, the number of landless peasants was increasing, and the state had difficulty collecting taxes. As formerly nomadic Uzbeks were sedentarized, irrigation lagged behind the pace of settlement, partly because of the lack of skill among first-generation farmers and partly because of political struggles over the control of water. Whereas there were adequate lands for pasturage, lands suitable for cultivation were overpopulated.

The nineteenth-century consolidation of the Bukharan state also brought into being a new intermediary class between the ruling elites and the peasants and pastoralists. This class included lower-ranking functionaries, scribes, secretaries, couriers, and policemen. Promoted by an active Bukharan commerce with Afghanistan, Iran, India, and Russia, the commercial bourgeoisie also became more important. Bukhara controlled the Central Asian trade in raw silk and silk fabrics. Its merchants organized cotton industries and financed modest banking firms. Along with the growing merchant elite, private property and private landownership became more important between 1840 and 1870.

Similarly, the territories of Farghana and Khwarizm were reorganized. Before the eighteenth century, Farghana had been divided into a number of small states governed by religious chiefs, but in the early eighteenth century migrant Uzbeks assumed power and forced surrounding Kazakh and Kirgiz tribes to submit to a new state with its capital at Khokand. The consolidation of the khanate of Khokand was based on a flourishing economy in which irrigation agriculture, cotton and silk production, and trade with Kashgar, Bukhara, Khiva, and Russia were important sources of income. Khokand was the breakpoint where Russian and Chinese goods were sold and reshipped. The consolidation of state power, however, was inhibited by the struggle for control of land between the sedentary Persianized population and Qipchaq tribal peoples. Khwarizm went through a parallel phase of state consolidation and commercial development in the nineteenth century. However, the efforts of Muhammad Rahim I (r. 1806–25) to centralize the Khwarizmian state were undermined by the constant struggle with the Turkmen nomadic population supported by Sufi holy men.

Destabilized by conflicts among the ruling dynasties, *uymaq* and tribal chiefs, and pastoral and sedentary populations, Inner Asian societies became prey to Russian expansion. The governing factors in Russian expansion were the ambitions of its generals and the willingness of the tsars to tolerate their initiative and benefit from their successes. Motivated by the desire to secure its borders, control trade, and exploit rich agricultural lands, Russia had already absorbed the Tatar and Kazakh steppes. Further expansion would give Russia political and trading advantages in relations with Iran, India, and China and enable it to forestall potential British rivalry.

From their bases on the Kazakh steppes, the Russians occupied Tashkent in 1865 and Samarqand in 1868 and forced Bukhara to pay indemnities and open up to Russian trade. Khokand was absorbed in 1876 and the Transcaspian province in 1881, and the Pamirs were taken in 1895. Great Britain also took an interest in Inner Asia as a remote extension of its Indian sphere of influence. At the Congress of Berlin (1878) and by the treaty of 1907, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and India were divided into Russian and British spheres of influence. Thus, by the late nineteenth century, the Russians had rounded out their Inner Asian empire and had become the masters of Tatar, Kazakh, Uzbek, and other Inner Asian peoples.

Eastern Turkestan and China

Eastern Turkestan, the steppe and desert regions to the east of Farghana and now part of China, was also a region of nomadic peoples and important agricultural and oasis cities. From the time of the Mongol conquests, eastern Turkestan, parts of the northern steppes, and parts of Transoxania were the nominal domain of the Chaghatay khans, successors of Chinggis Khan. In the middle of the fourteenth century, the Chaghatays were restricted to eastern Turkestan. Chaghatay suzerainty was rarely more than nominal. Nomadic chieftains and the rulers of the oasis towns generally maintained their autonomy. Nonetheless, eastern Turkestan came into the domain of Turkish-Islamic culture. This was the result of a long, slow, and little-documented process in which Mongol peoples converted to Islam and began using Turkish languages. Muslim rulers tried to use Islam as legitimization for warfare against non-Muslim peoples. By the time that Komul (Hami) came under Muslim rule in 1513, Sunni Islam was widely accepted in the Tarim basin, and Chaghatay was spreading as a literary language. Mosques appeared along the trade routes between Inner Asia and China. Muslim expansion, however, was checked by Oirats (Mongols) who accepted Buddhism at the end of the sixteenth century. By then, however, much of the populace of Inner Asia outside Mongolia and Tibet was Muslim or under Muslim suzerainty.

The most striking manifestation of the influence of Islam was the role of *khwajas*, or Sufis who traced their biological as well as their spiritual lineage to the Prophet Muhammad or to the early caliphs. The earliest of these figures were probably itinerant holy men, faith healers, and miracle workers who in the fourteenth century acquired local prestige, gained a livelihood from gifts of tithes and landed estates, and married into prominent families. In many ways, they resembled the *shurafa'* of Morocco by combining Sufi qualities with descent from the Prophet. The *khwajas* gradually attained a spiritual ascendancy over secular rulers, all of whom became their disciples. The descendants of Makhdum-i 'Azam (d. 1540), the spiritual master of Bukhara, became the principal advisors to local rulers – and eventually became the rulers themselves – in Kashgar and Yarkand. From 1678 to 1756, Kashgar was ruled by a dynasty of *khwajas* who claimed descent from Muhammad, headship of a Sufi order, and a blood relationship to Chinggis Khan. Thus, the *khwajas* united spiritual and political authority. Nonetheless, the elites of these oasis cities were divided into bitterly hostile factions. Factional wars eventually led the *khwajas* to appeal to nomadic peoples for political support – a measure that eventually cost the oases their independence.

While Chaghatay khans, *khwaja*s, and tribal chiefs ruled eastern Turkestan, a new Oirat-Mongol empire called the Dzungarian Confederation, the last of the great Inner Asian nomadic empires, was being formed. The Dzungarian Confederation had its origins between 1400 and 1550, when Mongolian peoples were cut off from the markets of China and were forced to move westward and northward into eastern Turkestan, the northern steppes, and Transoxania. By the early seventeenth century, an Oirat khanate had come into existence – its power based on trade and dominance of peasants – and its leaders adopted Tibetan Lamaism as the religion of the confederation. Buddhism helped, as did Islam, to foster political unity among pastoral peoples and to unite them with sedentary populations. Expanding westward, the Oirats attacked the Kirgiz and the Uzbeks – their competitors for pasture and access to cattle markets in Transoxania – and conquered the Tarim basin. Allied with the religious factions of Kashgar and Yarkand, the Oirats took control of the oasis cities and appointed the *khwajas* as their vassals.

Oirat expansion, however, provoked Chinese intervention. China had long regarded Inner Asia as part of its inherent domain and was concerned for the protection of its frontiers against barbarian incursions. The Chinese considered Inner Asian rulers as their vassals. In the guise of tributes and exchanges of gifts, China imported horses, furs, metals, and jade in exchange for paper, textiles, drugs, tea, and porcelain. The Chinese pursued their commercial and diplomatic policy under the assumption that they possessed cultural and political supremacy and considered all exchanges as a form of tribute. By 1759, the Chinese defeated the Dzungarians, took control of the oasis cities, drove out the *khwajas*, and absorbed eastern Turkestan. In addition, the Chinese made the eastern Kazakhs and Khokand their tributaries. With these new vassals, the Chinese exchanged silk, tea, and porcelain for horses, cattle, and Russian products.

The conquest of eastern Turkestan brought a new Muslim population under Chinese control. The earliest Muslims in China were Arab troops coming from Inner Asia and Muslim merchants who settled in Canton in the eighth century. Although permanent residents, these Muslims were considered foreigners, subjects of far-off Muslim rulers, and enjoyed an extraterritorial jurisdiction under their own officials. The Mongol conquests and the formation of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) reinforced the Muslim population. The Mongols employed Muslim administrators and tax collectors, encouraged trade between China and Inner Asia, and sponsored the migration and settlement of Muslims not only in northwestern but also in southwestern China and Yunnan. In many cities, Muslims, living under the leadership of their own *shaykh al-Islam* and judges, occupied separate quarters provided with mosques and bazaars. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Muslims served the emperor as astronomers, diviners, translators, postal officials, and caravaners.

In the Ming period, the name Hui was applied to Chinese of Muslim faith, both to assimilated foreign Muslims and to Chinese converts to Islam. Muslims adopted the speech, names, manners, clothing, and other outward features of being Chinese. Muslim writers in this period attempted to show how Islam and Confucianism could be reconciled and how Chinese mythology and Islamic history were congruent. Still, Muslims retained an inner Muslim identity defined by their prayer rituals and communal affiliations. Under the authority of an imam, Muslims had their own mosques, schools, charities, and endowments. Chinese Muslims, however, were not an organized group. There was no unity among the numerous different congregations, and the Hui were widely dispersed. The Manchu dynasty dealt with the Hui by assurances of protection, threats of punishment, and a pragmatic policy of suppressing resistance and tolerating religious differences. As long as Muslim identity did not interfere with their outward conformity, it was acceptable to the Chinese. This coexistence lasted until the great Muslim revolts of the nineteenth century.

The newly conquered Muslim population of eastern Turkestan was very different from the assimilated Hui. Turkestani Muslims were mainly Uighurs and Kazakhs and were not assimilated to the Chinese way of life. Under Chinese suzerainty, the Islamic identity of both the urban and the nomadic populations was fully maintained. Kashgar was the site of the much-venerated tomb of Hazrat Afaq and his family. Beggars and dervishes lived in the cemeteries; religious colonies surrounded the tomb. Pre-Islamic survivals such as fluttering flags, yak tails, and heaps of horns marked the reverence in which this place was held. Although the Muslims of China proper had become a Chinese religious minority, the Muslims of Inner Asia remained a politically subordinate non-Chinese population.

The Chinese administration of eastern Turkestan was based on a superstructure of Chinese garrisons and administrative officers in the oasis towns of Komul, Urum-chi, Kashgar, Khotan, and other places, who governed through local Muslim chieftains (*begs*). The chieftains collected taxes, controlled water supplies, administered justice, and maintained order. They were granted land and serfs to pay the costs of their offices and then tried to increase these holdings and to convert them into private properties. Chinese rule introduced a period of security and commercial prosperity. By the 1820s, the cultivated lands in the oasis district of Kashgar had doubled, and Chinese peasants were being brought in to reclaim wastelands.

Inner Asian Muslims, however, never fully accepted Chinese rule. A Muslim religious movement, the so-called New Teachings (Hsin-chiao), a variant of the Naqshbandi order, was introduced by Ma Ming-hsin, who came to China in 1761. He had studied in Yarkand and Kashgar and propagated a form of Sufism expressed in loud chanting of the Quran, prayers with dancelike head shaking and foot stamping, belief in miracles and visions, and worship of saints. New sect members believed that faith was more important than family. They were reformers who were hostile to the old practices and to the political elites. Ma attracted a following in Kansu province and, in 1781, rebelled against Chinese rule. The movement was soon repressed, but this provoked later revolts by Kirgiz warriors. The political unrest in eastern Turkestan tempted the *khwajas*, the former rulers of Kashgar who had taken refuge in Khokand, to try to regain their former possession. Between the 1820s and 1862, they led a series of attacks on Chinese territory, supported by Kirgiz and local Uighurs. The rulers of Khokand also aspired to a larger sphere of influence in eastern Turkestan. Chafing at Chinese political and trading restrictions, Khokand demanded the right to control the caravan trade and to appoint tax collectors in Kashgar. Chinese concessions only led to an expansion of Khokand's trade and influence in eastern Turkestan and to conversion of Khokandi support for the aspirations of the *khwajas*.

The weakness of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911) in eastern Turkestan was only a symptom of the general breakdown of the Chinese empire. Beset by the Taiping and numerous provincial rebellions, the Ch'ing were forced to allow their subjects to organize local military forces and yet had to press them for increased taxes. Chinese hostility to Muslims and demands for their assimilation also increased with the breakdown of the Ch'ing. Ch'ing misrule provoked Muslim rebellions in Yunnan, Shensi, Kansu, and eastern Turkestan. Hanafi law, which legitimizes rebellion if non-Islamic law is enforced or if non-Muslim territory separates Muslims from one another, provided a legal basis for secret societies and revolts. Muslim religious and political consciousness was stimulated by an outpouring of Islamic literature stressing the importance of emulating the teachings of the Prophet, ritual purity, and fulfilling God's commands. This nineteenth-century literature stressed the superiority of Islam and attacked Chinese civilization rather than attempting to be reconciled to it. Chinese Muslim scholars no longer insisted on the similarities of Islam and Confucianism and urged Muslims to abide by Islamic law and to avoid Chinese customs. The nineteenth-century Muslim rebellions were also abetted by reformist Muslim influences coming from India or other parts of Inner Asia.

A series of Muslim rebellions in Yunnan culminated in the formation of an independent Muslim state from 1856 to 1873 under the leadership of Tu Wen-hsiu, who called himself commander of the faithful and sultan. The principal Muslim rebellion in Shensi province was led by Ma Hua-lung, who represented the new teaching movement. Here Muslim secession took on a peculiarly Chinese quality. Ma Hua-lung adopted the name Tsung-ta A-hung or General Grand A-hung, which is a Muslim name, but when written in Chinese characters it means "the horse became a dragon" and thus evoked Chinese as well as Muslim symbols. The new sect adopted Chinese popular symbols as the basis of a Muslim revivalism with separatist political implications. Under A-hung's leadership, Kucha and Hi rebelled, cutting off Chinese communications with Kashgar.

Taking advantage of Chinese weakness, the khan of Khokand sent the surviving *khwajas* of Kashgar with a military subordinate named Ya'qub Beg to take control of Kirgiz and Uighur peoples. Ya'qub quickly conquered most of eastern Turkestan and the oasis states. He enforced Islamic law and gave large gifts to mosques. However, he was dependent on Khokandis, Afghans, and others for his army. In a direct affront to Chinese authority, he recognized Ottoman suzerainty; the Ottomans acknowledged him as amir in 1873.

Ya'qub's fate and that of the Muslim rebellions was linked to Russian and British maneuvers. In the nineteenth century, eastern Turkestan was the object of Russian and British rivalry; both of them were interested in trading advantages and the protection of their respective territories in Russia and India. Generally, the British planned to cooperate with friendly local rulers to check Russian advances, but in the late 1860s, they backed China's efforts to suppress local rebellions, for fear that the dismemberment of China would hamper British access to Inner Asia. Russian occupation of the Hi province in 1871 led the British to see Ya'qub Beg as a potential buffer against the possibility of further Russian penetration of Inner Asia. In 1874, they supplied him with a small number of rifles. A revival of Chinese power under the leadership of Governor Tso Tsung-t'ang (d. 1885) put an end both to Ya'qub and to British concerns. Tso reorganized Chinese forces, reconquered Shensi and Kansu, took Aksu and Kashgar by 1878, and suppressed the new teachings. In 1881, China and Russia negotiated a treaty that restored the Hi province to China and paved the way for the reorganization of eastern Turkestan as a province under civilian Chinese administration. Named Xinjiang, it became part of China in 1884. By then, all of Inner Asia had come under either Russian or Chinese rule. It remained only to define the borders between Russia and China in 1892 and between Russia and Afghanistan in 1895. The expansion of the two great imperial powers brought an end to 3,000 years of nomadic migration and empires.

Thus, Inner Asian societies, until their conquest by Russia and China, exemplified several types of Muslim society. On the northern steppes and in eastern Turkestan, Tatar, Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uighur, and other peoples were organized in family units and loose confederations. The *uymaq* (tribe), an alliance of family and clan units, was the effective political unit. Larger-order khanates and hordes were fragile coalitions. Nevertheless, pastoral peoples conquered the sedentary areas. In the sedentarized districts of Transoxania, Farghana, Kashgaria, and other oases, they founded centralized states, legitimized partly in Islamic and partly in cosmopolitan cultural terms. In urban areas, Islam was crucial to the viability of states. The Mangit dynasty was virtually the expression of the scholars of Bukhara, who controlled judicial administration and education and whose organized bodies of *sayyids*, *khwajas*,

Sufis, students, and guilds made up the body politic. In Kashgar, dynasties of *khwajas* ruled directly. Muslim society in sedentary Inner Asia was built around the tripartite division of power and authority among tribal, state, and religious elites, but Russian and Chinese rule would – as colonial rule did everywhere in the Muslim world – profoundly change this historical configuration.

Chapter 38 Islamic Societies in Southeast Asia

Just as Islam spread from the Middle East to Inner Asia and from Afghanistan to India, in the late thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries it spread from various parts of India and Arabia to the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago. Whereas the history of Islamic societies in other parts of Asia can be told in terms of empires and contiguous geographical areas, maritime Southeast Asia is a region of scattered peninsulas and islands. The sea was the connection among them. The region held a central position on the trade routes that connected China to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The population of the region included not only local peoples but Chinese, Indians from Gujarat, and Arabs from Hadramawt. Hadramawtis were especially active as teachers, traders, judges, and officials and married and sired children with local women.

Whereas in other regions Islam was established by Arab or Turkish conquests, it was introduced into Southeast Asia by traveling merchants and Sufis, often coming from Arabia and western India. Whereas in the Middle East and India, Muslim regimes were founded by new political elites, in Southeast Asia existing regimes were consolidated by conversion to Islam. The continuity of elites gave strong expression to the pre-Islamic components of Southeast Asian–Islamic civilization. The royal culture of Java seems more local and less Muslim than the corresponding royal culture of the Mughal Empire was Indian. At the same time there were Muslim merchant communities typical of international Islam and also syncretisms of Islam and village cultures. Whereas Muslims remained a minority in India, in Indonesia and Malaya they became the overwhelming majority.

Pre-Islamic Southeast Asia

Indigenous pre-Islamic maritime Southeast Asian cultures formed the basis of later Islamic civilization. By the beginning of the Christian era, the diverse populations of Southeast Asia had developed a civilization based on irrigated rice cultivation, animal husbandry, and metallurgy. The native cultures had their own religious beliefs and artistic accomplishments, such as the wayang puppet theater and the gamelan orchestra recitals of Java and Bali. The interior of Java was a region of rice agriculture and was the locus of small kingdoms. In the coastal regions of Sumatra and Java, the smaller islands, and the Malay Peninsula, the populace earned its living by trade and was strongly influenced by contacts with Hindu cultures. From earliest times, there was tension between the agrarian hierarchical society of Java and the cultures of the coastal towns.

Many of the early Southeast Asian societies were state ruled, but there was no single polity. The earliest historical known kingdoms on Java date from the fifth century CE. From the fifth to the fifteenth centuries, there were several kingdoms, each a suzerainty over petty lordships maintained by control of rice and legitimized by myth, magic, and mysticism. Each was a center for the diffusion of high culture to the surrounding countryside. Local princes borrowed Indian and Hindu political concepts to legitimize their rule. The Shailendra dynasty (c. 760–860) blended indigenous Indonesian culture with Sanskrit literature and Brahmin and Saivite versions of Hinduism. The Hindu concepts of a god king and of the terrestrial order as an analogue of the cosmic order sanctified temporal power as an expression of the spiritual universe. Great imperial palaces and Hindu and Buddhist monumental tombs were constructed by these early rulers. In the tenth century, the center of culture and power in Java shifted to Mataram, which held sway from 929 to 1222. Mataram was succeeded by a number of other regional kingdoms, notably by Majapahit (1293–1389).

The most important maritime kingdom was Srivijaya, first centered at Palembang and then at Jambi in Sumatra. This kingdom controlled both sides of the Malacca Straits, which gave it commercial hegemony over the trade between Arabia, East Africa, Iran, and India

to the west and China to the east. Locally the straits area produced food, tin, gold, and pepper. Its cosmopolitan trading connections helped establish a Hinduized culture, just as it would later favor the introduction of Islam.

The Coming of Islam

The advent of Islam depended on the close trading relationships between the Indian Ocean region and Southeast Asia. (See Map 19.) The period from 1400 to 1700 saw increased commerce, the growth of cities, the monetization of the economies, and – with these fundamental socioeconomic changes – the introduction and diffusion of universalistic religions based on sacred scriptures; this included not only Islam in the island arc of what is now Indonesia and Malaysia, but Confucianism in Vietnam, Theravada Buddhism on the rest of the Southeast Asian mainland, and Christianity in the Philippines.

Map 19.   Muslim states of Southeast Asia to 1800.

Seaborne commerce was crucial to the diffusion of Islam. By the thirteenth century, Southeast Asia was in contact with the Muslims of China, Bengal, Gujarat, Iran, Yemen, and South Arabia. Merchants, travelers, scholars, *shurafa'* (descendants of the prophet), and mystics connected by commerce, lineage, and faith flowed eastward from Yemen, Hadramawt, and Oman to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The fact that Malayan and Indonesian Muslims primarily adhere to Shafi'i law points to South India as a major source of Islamic influences.

The facts indicating the diffusion of Islam in the region are few. In 1282, the Hindu Malay ruler of Samudra on the island of Sumatra had Muslim advisors. A Muslim community in Pasai in North Sumatra was reported by Marco Polo in 1292. The tomb of Sultan Malik al-Salih in Perlak dated 1297 indicates the conversion of a local ruler. In 1345–46, Ibn Battuta, on his world tour of Muslim communities, found Shafi'i scholars in Samudra. In the fourteenth century, Muslims were also established in northeast Malaya, some parts of Java, Brunei, and the southern Philippines.

Malacca was one of the principal Muslim societies. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, Iskandar, the former ruler of the trading kingdom of Srivijaya, was defeated by Javanese rivals and forced to flee Palembang. He founded Malacca and converted to Islam. Iskandar based his political claims on genealogical descent from past rulers, Buddhist consecration, and Islam. By such syncretism Islam was added to the panoply of Southeast Asian cultures. Malacca built up a trading empire with extensive contacts in India, Java, and China. Ships from Malacca sailed to Gujarat, Bengal, and the smaller islands of the East Indies archipelago. Malacca also attempted to build up a Malay-Sumatran territorial empire with possessions on both sides of the straits. Malacca became a base for the spread of Islamic influence throughout the region. By 1474, the Malay rulers of Pahang, Kedah, and Patani were converted to Islam, and most of the rulers of the northeast coasts of Sumatra, from Aceh to Palembang, were Muslims.

Java's Islamization began in the fourteenth century. The first evidence suggesting that Javanese were converting to Islam is found

in the gravestones of the Hindu-Buddhist court elites of Majapahit. The earliest is dated to 1368–69 CE. At Tralaya, gravestones dated from 1376–1611 CE bear Quranic quotations and pious formulas. As early as 1414, Javanese students were coming to Malacca and Pasai to study with Muslim teachers. By the middle of the fifteenth century, the coastal principalities of Java – Demak, Tuban, Madura, and Surabaya – had become Muslim. Muslim holy men established independent kingdoms centered around important sanctuaries or tombs, as at Giri, Cheribon, Kadilangu, and Semarang. Muslim scholars and preachers established mosques and schools and proselytized among Javanese. In general, however, by the fifteenth century, the coastal areas were more likely to be Islamized. Some of the coastal lords were native Javanese, but others were Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Malays who had established trading states. Around 1500, there was constant warfare between them and the Hindu principalities of the interior.

Manuscripts of the sixteenth century show that early Javanese Islam blended Sufi teachings with Javanese cultural practices. These manuscripts use Javanese rather than Arabic terms for important mystical concepts. Muslim texts were being translated into Javanese vernacular. By the end of the century it was possible to be both Muslim and Javanese. However, as opposed to Malay texts that articulate Islamization as a conversion – the acceptance of a new identity through such rituals as the acceptance of an Arabic name and circumcision – Javanese texts envision Islamization as integrated with existing identities.

From its bases in Sumatra and Java, Islam spread farther eastward. Ternate was converted in 1495. The Moluccas became Muslim in 1498 as a result of contacts with Java, and the coastal towns of Borneo were converted by Javanese contacts before the arrival of the Portuguese in 1511. Islamic influences from Sumatra, Ternate, and Borneo reached the Philippines. Conversions were made in Luzon, Sulu, and Mindanao.

Islamic influences and conversions intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Stimulated by commercial wealth and the availability of firearms, the established Islamic states, notably Aceh,

Johor, Patani, Banten, Demak-Pajang-Mataram, and Ternate extended their control to their rural hinterlands. The concept of jihad (holy war) began to assume a major role in their legitimization. From 1580 to 1650, much of eastern Indonesia converted to Islam. Islam was adopted by the rulers of parts of Sulawesi (1603–12) and eastern Borneo. On the Southeast Asian mainland, the Cham kingdom became Muslim sometime between 1607 and 1676.

There were several interrelated factors in the diffusion and acceptance of Islam. Often, the first converts were local rulers who sought to attract Muslim commercial traffic or win allies in the struggle against Hindu traders from Java. Coastal chiefs used conversion to legitimize their resistance to the authority of Majapahit and to throw off the suzerainty of the central Javan empires. Rulers typically adopted Muslim names and dress, sponsored the construction of mosques, and made ritual gestures such as renouncing the consumption of pork. They adopted Islamic laws for commercial and family matters such as contracts, marriages, divorce, and inheritance, although the application of the law was limited. Rulers exempted themselves from the detail of the law and called on ancient gods for their spiritual authority. Rulers also created administrative hierarchies for the administration of law and prayer, including the posts of judge (*qadi*), prayer leader (imam), and preacher (*khatib*). They sponsored scholars, study circles, and debates at court and in the mosques. They set an example for and sometimes commanded their subjects to adopt Islam. At the same time, the rulers blended aspects of Islamic teaching with their historic supernatural attributes and their devotion to local spirits and gods. Court-sponsored rituals of homage to ancestral spirits and spirits of the sea, exorcisms, and artistic performances remained an important part of the regional religious cultures.

Furthermore, Islam served as the basis of shared norms and trust among Muslim traders and local rulers. Muslim merchants married into ruling families and provided important diplomatic skills, wealth, and international experience for the commercial enterprises of coastal rulers. Muslim traders were attracted to ports, where they were assured a mosque for worship and the protection of a Muslim ruler. In an era of expanding trade, conversion to Islam may have helped to

create new communities to replace the village-scale communities disrupted by commerce and political change.

Missionaries from Gujarat, Bengal, and Arabia played a critical role. The Sufis came not only as teachers but also as traders and politicians who penetrated the courts of rulers, the quarters of merchants, and the villages of the countryside. They could communicate their religious vision in a form compatible with beliefs already held in Indonesia. Sufism blended indigenous spiritual and mystical beliefs and ideas of the supernatural. Pantheistic doctrines were understood because of Hindu teachings. Saint worship and faith in the saint as a healer were common to both Muslims and Indonesians. Ultimately, the success of Islam was due to its tolerance of local traditions. Rather than converting to Islam, Southeast Asians accepted Islam, adding a new body of beliefs to established local ideas.

Although there was no single process or single source for the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia, the travels of individual merchants and Sufis, the winning of apprentices and disciples, and the founding of schools seem crucial. Instruction and education in Islam developed alongside the adoption of Islamic law and Muslim identities. At the elementary level, Quran instruction and study of written Arabic was conducted in mosques, prayer houses, and the homes of learned Muslims. At a more advanced level, instruction in hadith, Quran exegesis, law, and mysticism was provided in the courts of rulers and then was taken over (in the mid-eighteenth century and later) by schools called *pondoks* in Malaya and *pesantren* in Java.

Thus, from the thirteenth to the early nineteenth century, Islam became the common religion of peoples who held different ethnic, linguistic, regional, and cultural identities. The foundations were being laid for the ultimate emergence of the modern Indonesian and Malay nations.

Portuguese, Dutch, and Muslim States

The diffusion of Islam was paralleled by a wave of state formation lasting from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. (See Map 20.)

Trade led to capital accumulation and trading resources and thus to the concentration of political power. The expansion of cash crops – such as pepper in western Java, Sumatra, and Borneo and the mining of tin in the Malay Peninsula – strengthened the coastal principalities. New revenues allowed them to buy firearms and to reinforce the patronage networks that linked rulers to lesser officials and notables. Chinese, Indian, and later Hadramawti Arab traders worked in partnership or as agents and tax farmers for local rulers.

Map 20. The Portuguese, Dutch, and British empires in Southeast Asia, 1500–1914.

The development of these Islamizing states and societies was profoundly affected by outside powers engaged in the pepper and spice trades. Chinese maritime activity burgeoned at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and the Portuguese established themselves as an Indian Ocean power in the early sixteenth century. In 1509, the Portuguese defeated a combined Egyptian and Indian fleet and took Goa in 1511. They conquered Malacca in 1515; they went on to take Hurmuz on the Persian Gulf and, in 1522, Ternate, in an attempt to

control the trade between China, Japan, Siam, the Moluccas, the Indian Ocean, and Europe. They were expelled from Ternate in 1575, but they held on to other islands in the Moluccas. By the mid-sixteenth century, however, Portuguese interests were primarily focused on Japan and China, Brazil, and Africa.

Like the Portuguese, the Dutch came to the East Indies in quest of pepper. In 1594, Holland won its war of independence from the Habsburg monarchy and was excluded from access to pepper and spices in the Lisbon market. Instead, in 1595 Dutch fleets sailed directly to the East Indies; in 1602, the United East India Company (VOC) was chartered by the merger of competing smaller companies to control Dutch trading and to compete with the English East India Company. Holland joined the Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, Portuguese, and Indians, competing to buy pepper, cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, sandalwood, lacquer, silk, and deer hides in return for Indian cloth and silver.

The Dutch pushed their way into the East Indies trade by naval warfare. They sought to control trade, create monopolies, and extract tributes. The spice trade required naval bases; bases needed surrounding territory. Trade required empire. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Dutch had acquired substantial control over the trade in pepper and spices by establishing forts and bases throughout the East Indies archipelago and by forcing local rulers to grant them trading monopolies, sometimes by violence and sometimes in return for political help. They defeated the Portuguese and took Amboyna in 1605. In 1619, they founded Batavia, on the island of Java, rich in rice and timber, as the new capital of their trading empire. They seized Banda in 1621, Ceylon in 1640, and Malacca in 1641. The VOC established a monopoly of nutmeg in 1621 and of cloves in the 1650s.

With these commercial advantages and fortress bases, the Dutch eliminated the Portuguese and established their supremacy over the Muslim states. Aceh came under Dutch commercial control between 1629 and 1663. Treaties of 1639, 1650, and 1659 gave the Dutch two-thirds of Aceh's tin supplies. From Aceh, Dutch economic power extended to the rest of Sumatra. They took Palembang in 1658 and in

1663 obtained a monopoly on the pepper trade of Minangkabau. The Dutch defeated resistance in the Moluccas by 1658 and established a monopoly of cloves and nutmeg. In 1669, they forced Macassar to give them a monopoly on its trade and subsequently established forts on Ternate, Macassar, and Borneo. By the 1670s, the VOC position in East Indonesia had been consolidated. With the establishment of territorial political power, Dutch interests turned from trade to a new system of economic exploitation requiring local rulers to deliver tributes. Spices declined in importance in favor of pepper, sugar, coffee, tea, and tobacco, plantation crops largely managed by Europeans and Chinese. The Dutch exchanged these products for opium rather than Indian cloth.

The British entered the regional competition in 1786, when they made an agreement with the sultan of Kedah to use Penang, an island off the coast of Malaya, to repair and equip fleets for the Indian Ocean and as a base from which they could sell British goods to raise revenues for the purchase of silk and tea in China. In 1791, they occupied Penang. The Napoleonic wars in Europe worked to the further advantage of the British. With the conquest of Holland by France in 1795, William V of Holland turned Malacca and other Dutch colonies over to the British for use in the war against France. In 1800, a strip of mainland called Province Wellesley was ceded to them. In 1810, Britain took control of Java. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, Britain agreed to return Dutch possessions in order to restore Holland as a buffer between Britain and France and to prevent the development of a French-Dutch alliance in the postwar period. However, the British retained control of the Malacca Straits and established a new base at Singapore in 1819. In a treaty of 1824, the Dutch recognized India and Malaya as being in the British sphere of influence, and the British recognized Dutch predominance in Sumatra, Java, and the rest of the Indies.

As in the steppes of Inner Asia, European economic and political intervention did not prevent but actually stimulated the spread of Islam. While the Dutch established their commercial supremacy, Islamic loyalties, Muslim regimes, and Islamic institutions were being consolidated as the indigenous expression of cultural identity, political resistance, and economic competition. In each maritime Southeast

Asian region – such as Java, Aceh, Malaya, and Minangkabau – a form of Islamic society developed that was at once characteristic of the particular region, reminiscent of Indonesian-Islamic societies in other areas, and recognizably Islamic in international terms.

Java: the state, the '*ulama*', and the peasants

On Java, the Dutch conquered already well-established Muslim states. Between 1513 and 1528, a coalition of Muslim kingdoms defeated Majapahit, and two new states emerged – Banten in central and western Java (founded in 1568) and Mataram in east-central Java. Under Sultan Agung (r. 1613–45) and Sultan Mangkurax (r. 1646–77), Mataram reduced the independent princes of the island to vassals and ministers of the Mataram state. A bitter struggle also took place between the state and the Islamic religious centers, in which Mataram progressively destroyed the political power of the Muslim lords – although not their local religious influence. Mataram became the ruling power and the focus of Islam on Java, but the Muslim holy men retained a charisma that could be used to rally opposition to the state.

On Java the Dutch progressively established themselves as territorial overlords. They consolidated their control by founding a new capital at Batavia in 1619 and by defeating the ruler of Mataram, Sultan Agung, in 1629. In 1646, they forced Mataram to recognize their monopolies in the Spice Islands. Peace prevailed until 1675, when the rivalries of Mataram and Banten required Mataram to ask for Dutch help, for which the island was obliged to give the Dutch a monopoly over the cloth and opium trades. Dutch help was purchased again and again by tributes and concessions of land. Agrarian Java replaced the Spice Islands as the most lucrative Dutch possession. In 1723, the Dutch required an annual quota of coffee, and native princes were expected to comply with Dutch demands for timber, cotton, and indigo. At first, the local princes were autonomous intermediaries, but gradually Dutch overseers were appointed to see to the production of coffee, cloves, cinnamon, and pepper. The tributes in kind were supplemented by forced deliveries of spices at fixed prices. These goods the Dutch exported for resale in Europe.

Finally, in 1755, with the partition of Mataram into two kingdoms, Surakarta and Jogyakarta, the Dutch became suzerains of both. The rulers of the divided kingdom could no longer fight each other for supremacy and increasingly became administrative and spiritual rather than military powers. Dutch intervention brought peace to Java from 1774 to 1825.

In the early seventeenth century, the Mataram court was only partially Islamized. Despite the new Islamic titles, the Hindu cosmological conception of the state continued to be valued. Mataram maintained Hindu-Buddhist literary traditions and rituals and combined Islamic and Hindu concepts of rule. Its rulers believed that they derived their authority directly from God (the ruler was God's representative on earth, *kalipatullah*) and indirectly from the tomb of Sunan Kalijaga (the saint and holy man who represented the spiritual presence of Islam).

In the Mataram conception, the ruler was a sacred, indeed divine, figure; he was the repository of divine radiance (*wahyu*), a luminous light that suffused his person and emanated from him. *Wahyu* was seen as a concrete, tangible, creative energy that flows through the universe – a force that can be accumulated, concentrated, and preserved in individuals as a result of yogic practices and extreme self-denial. Power is concentrated by public rituals, including mass demonstrations, powerful slogans, and the presence of thousands of submissive persons. It is concentrated by the ownership of heirlooms (*pusaka*, including spears, musical instruments, and carriages) and by control over extraordinary or deformed human beings. Power is manifest in wealth and sexual energy. Fertility, political unity, prosperity, stability, and glory of the kingdom are all considered expressions of power. However, possession of power is prior to legitimacy. Power is neither good nor evil; it is just real. Thus, in the Javanese conception of kingship, the ruler was glorified by his descent from gods as well as human beings, by his possession of holy relics, and by court ceremonies in which weapons and decorations symbolized his special powers. The ruler had the deepest knowledge of reality, sense of justice, and a flawless

personality acquired by ritual and by observance of taboos. The king's actions were taken to be God's will.

Royal administration was conceived in terms of maintaining order and justice in the whole of the kingdom. The ruler's subordinates were fully responsible for their districts and personally accountable to him. They formed a social class called the *priyayi*, bound to their lord by *kawula-gusti*, the bond of lord and servant. The ruler must care for his officials as a father, and the servants must give total love, submission, and gratitude to their lord. Officials were paid by benefices allotted to them by their patron. The central political problem for a ruler was to control the land granted to his supporters and not to allow it to become hereditary. When provincial notables built up an independent base of power, the ruler tried to use his household clients to offset their influence and to absorb or co-opt them. The king and the nobility lived on the labor of the peasantry. The king was entitled to part of the produce of the land. The salaries for court workers and guards were paid for by taxes from designated districts. Peasants also labored to build waterworks and bridges and provided transportation and personal services to the king and his officials.

The ideal of the Mataram aristocracy was based on individual self-cultivation. To be loyal to their lord and to fulfill their role in the cosmic order, the *priyayi* had to cultivate an inner life of refined feeling and an outer life of polite formality. For each individual, the ideal of life was to cultivate an inner tranquility that made the soul correspond to the order of society and the universe. In the pre-Islamic Javan conception, the universe was taken to be a single and unified phenomenon; the cosmos harmoniously ordered; the world of human beings grounded in cosmic principles.

The ruling elite was distinguished from the rest of the population by a quality called *halus*, which meant smoothness of spirit, beauty, elegance, politeness, and sensitivity. The opposite of *halus* was *kasar*, lack of control, coarseness, and the degradation that comes from indulging in purely selfish and personal desires. Control of emotion, equanimity, patience, acceptance of fate without protest,

and detachment from the external world were the most highly regarded virtues.

This inner restraint was the basis of realistic behavior. In the outer world, the *priyayi* would express themselves by conformity to etiquette and ethics and by speaking in correct linguistic form. Language, dance, music, and art were all channeled outer expressions of a restrained inner being. The *priyayi* ethic of control over the outer world protected them against inner disturbance; a balanced inner world expressed itself in outward order. The cultivation of true feeling and of true expression, both called *rasa*, was a realization of the individual's true self and a recognition of the reality of God's existence; it was also a means to worldly power through concentration and mastery of one's spiritual capacities.

In cultural style, the *priyayi* looked to the rich Javanese tradition of wayang shadow theater and its spiritual imagination. They cultivated and patronized Javanese dancing, with its Hindu connotations, and the production and consumption of fine crafts such as manuscript illustration, batik dyed fabrics, symbolic ornamental daggers (*kris*), and the gamelan orchestra.

Thus, Mataram society was in name Islamic, but the actual organization of state, including its concepts of rulership and the personal ideal of the *priyayi* elite, was based on Hindu and Javanese mythical and cosmological conceptions. The strong Javanese and Hindu basis of Mataram culture was due to the continuity of political elites. Whereas Muslim regimes in India, the Ottoman Empire, and many other parts of the world were established by conquerors who brought their Muslim identity from without, the Mataram regime was converted from within. Although Islam had been introduced by the wars between the coastal principalities and the rulers of the interior, Mataram eventually destroyed the coastal powers, suppressed the sea trade, and made the aristocracy of the interior, rather than the commercial lords of the coast, the dominant elite on Java. Islamic identity then served to reinforce the legitimacy of the old order and allowed Javanese society to define its opposition to Dutch rule without disturbing the inherited structures of political order and personal values. The state continued its traditional, political, and

symbolic functions in Islamic guise. As compared with Safavid Iran and even Mughal India, which also combined universal Islamic norms with local regional cultures, Mataram leaned strongly in the direction of the non-Islamic aspects of state culture.

Alongside the state, the local communal form of Islam was built around a *pesantren*, which was part school and part religious brotherhood. The pupils lived in dormitories, worked in the fields or at some craft that helped support the school, studied chanting of the Quran, and learned magical and mystical formulas. The influence of the scholars (*kiyayis*) extended from the schools to the villages, where they won a following of strict Muslim believers who looked to the teachers as their spiritual masters and who joined religious orders (particularly the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya). The Shattariyya entered Java from Aceh in the late seventeenth century. The teachers, students, and village followers who adhered to this Muslim way of life were called *santris*.

The mass of villagers, however, were Muslim in a different sense. (Little is known about Javanese village life in the pre-modern era. The observations made here for the sake of completeness are based on mid-twentieth-century research.) For most Javanese villagers, Islam was not a question of political legitimacy or doctrine but was simply part of their mentality – part of their attitude toward the world seen and unseen. Islam was not a religion or a sect in the sense of being an ideology and a defined social allegiance so much as a vocabulary by which people defined the sacred forces in everyday life.

Villagers called themselves Muslims and practiced Muslim rituals. The influence of the scholars (*'ulama'* or *kiyayis*) was considerable. However, village culture was in fact compounded of animist, Hindu, and Islamic elements. The *slametan* feast was the primary village ritual; it was given to mark such important life events as birth, marriage, illness, death, personal and business occasions, village ceremonies of purification and solidarity, and Muslim holidays. The feast was meant to establish security and equanimity for the host, his family, and his guests; to dispel hostility and aggression; and to defend against evil spirits. Its symbolic purpose was to organize society, regulate behavior and feeling, and ward off the forces that

threatened to bring disorder and chaos into everyday life. The ceremonial itself was marked by a short speech given by the host and a prayer or Quranic passage chanted in Arabic, followed by a meal. The Arabic recitation, the participation of the village religious teacher, and the choice of Muslim occasions, such as the birthday of the Prophet or the ending of the fast of Ramadan, made this multipurpose village ceremony an Islamic occasion. The curing of disease and the warding off of evil spirits was also the function of the village sorcerer (*dukun*), who worked his magic by spells, amulets, and herbs, sometimes giving them a Muslim orientation by chanting Quranic verses.

Islam was thus assimilated to a village religious mentality that focused on belief in a world of spirits, demons, and powers of nature. Islam in the village context was not so much a metaphysical, ethical, or legal system, or a form of social and political organization, but another metaphor for an ongoing community life based on traditional religious and social conceptions.

The crisis of imperialism and Islam on Java: 1795–1830

The Napoleonic wars in Europe brought a profound upheaval to Java. The Netherlands came under French domination in 1795 and in 1808 the Napoleonic regime sent Marshal Daendels to be governor-general of Java (r. 1808–11). For access to labor and economic resources, to meet its military requirements in an era of global conflict, the Dutch upset the traditional political arrangements between themselves and the Javanese princes. Daendels treated the Javanese rulers as if they were vassals, and in 1811 imposed treaties on Surakarta and Yogyakarta that involved extensive annexations to Dutch government territory. Daendels demanded a monopoly on the supply of timber, rice, and other key commodities as well as the opening of shipyards and logging enterprises to European investment. During the Napoleonic wars, however, the British took over Java in 1811–12. Thomas Stamford Raffles was appointed lieutenant-governor of Java (r. 1811–16).

In 1816, Java was returned to Dutch authority as part of the post-Napoleonic European settlement. Under renewed Dutch rule, the aristocracy continued to be alienated. The Europeans interfered in court affairs. Ever-larger tracts of sugar, coffee, indigo, and pepper plantations in Central Java were leased to Europeans and Chinese. Cultivators were ever more obliged to pay taxes in cash and thus were forced to borrow money from Chinese lenders. Chinese-run tollgates exacted a tribute from local trade. Heavy labor services were exacted by the Dutch planters on the coffee estates.

Moreover, the per-capita standard of living of the peasants was falling. The population in the rice-growing regions of Java had grown steadily from 1755 to 1825. At the same time, too much land had been converted from rice to sugar production. A cholera epidemic struck in 1821. When sugar prices collapsed in 1821–22, the price of rice remained high. In the years leading up to the crisis of 1825, harvest failures were frequent. Finally, the use of opium, promoted by the European governments and Chinese retailers, made agrarian conditions in south-central Java intolerable.

Java began to seethe with messianic expectations of a golden age of justice and plenty. In 1822, the people attacked land-tax offices, tollgates, the resident Chinese community, and the houses of European tax inspectors and estate overseers. Then, in 1825, local resentment burst into a civil war led by Prince Dipanegara (d. 1855), a member of the ruling family who had been passed over for succession and had devoted himself to religious studies. The corruption of the court and its subservience to the Dutch made him a spokesman for Muslim religious virtues. The prince came to see himself as both temporal lord and spiritual overseer of Java; his mission was to suppress and purify Islam on the basis of a new moral order grounded in Islamic law. He also insisted on Javanese cultural norms in language, dress, and etiquette. Prince Dipanegara's supporters included the scholars, functionaries of the religious hierarchy or other courtiers, local communal religious officials, students of the religious schools, and masses of peasants. Their revolt lasted for five years and ended in 1830 with Dipanegara's capture and exile to Sulawesi. Although he was eventually defeated,

Dipanegara became a symbol of national resistance to foreign rule. The 1825–30 revolt was the prelude to a new economy, polity, and religious culture on Java.

Aceh

Portuguese and later Dutch intervention contributed to the further spread of Islam. With the fall of Malacca, Muslim teachers and missionaries migrated to northern Sumatra, Java, the Moluccas, and Borneo. Aceh became the heartland of Indonesian-Islamic societies. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were marked by Aceh's struggle against the Portuguese and then the Dutch. Sultan ʿAli Mughayat Shah rallied the opponents of the Portuguese, defeated them at Pidie in 1521, and at Pasai, in 1524, conquered the north coast of Sumatra. Between 1529 and 1587, Aceh made continual efforts to recapture Malacca, and, finally, between 1618 and 1620, it took Pahang, Kedah, and Perak. The apogee of Acehnese power was reached under Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–36), who organized an efficient regime and established his dominance over the local lords (*uleebalang*) and village associations. Sultan Iskandar's ambition to control the whole Malay Peninsula, however, was defeated by other Malay sultans in 1629.

As an embattled Islamic land, Aceh attracted political support from the Ottoman Empire and an influx of Ottoman and Mughal scholars and Sufis. Correspondence; books; the travels of teachers, students, and pilgrims; and diplomatic missions tied Aceh directly to the international world of Islamic learning. Sufi masters formed the backbone of Acehnese Islam. The indigenous Sufi tradition goes back to Hamza Fansuri, who died around 1600. He founded the Qadari order in Indonesia, wrote mystical commentaries in Malay, and propagated the teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabi and the doctrine of the unity of being, with its emphasis on mystical unity, ecstatic experiences, and receptiveness to folk-culture versions of Islam. Hamza Fansuri was followed by a literary renaissance in both Malay and Javanese, including non-mystical texts of Quranic exegesis and law.

The integration of mysticism, Islamic ritual, and spirit worship was opposed by reformist Muslims. The reform (*tajdid*) movement was centered in Mecca and Medina, with connections in Cairo and Yemen. As early as the seventeenth century, with expanding international trade, Arab scholars, especially those from Hadramawt, came to the Indies. Southeast Asian pilgrims had more ready access to Mecca and Medina. By contrast with the Javenese and Acehnese syntheses, the reformers repudiated the theosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabi and advocated Muslim beliefs and practices derived from the Quran itself and from the most reliable hadith. They repudiated the schools of law as a deviation from the true Islam. Based on the teachings of al-Junayd, al-Qushayri, and al-Ghazali, they also opposed the excesses of Sufi devotion and spiritual practices that were not integral to orthodox Muslim views.

In Aceh, Shams al-Din Pasai (d. 1630) represented the school of Junayd, with its stress on worldly activity and the fulfillment of the religious law. The early masters were followed by ʿAbd al-Raʾuf al-Singkeli (c. 1617–90). He returned after 1661 to Aceh from Arabia, bringing with him the legal and mystical teachings of scholars in Medina and the Shattari order. Al-Singkeli taught that reason was of limited value in the understanding of God, and that union with God is achievable through the performance of ordinary religious duties and Sufi remembrance and evocation of God (*dhikr*). At the end of the eighteenth century, ʿAbd al-Samad of Palembang translated al-Ghazali's work into Malay. Acehnese Islam, then, came to encompass both the ecstatic and the reformist tendencies characteristic of Islam in the Indian subcontinent and other regions. Muslim teachings became an integral part of Acehnese identity.

Although we know little of Acehnese society before the middle of the nineteenth century, from late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observations, we can reconstruct the role of Islam in Aceh. Acehnese village society was built around lineages (*qawm*). The lineage units, however, were not organized by territory; people of different lineages lived in the same villages. In each village there were two types of authority. One was the village headman, who ruled in the name of customary law and represented the state. The other

was the *tuanku*, a combination of Muslim scholar and Sufi adept. Ordinarily, the village *tuanku* organized prayers, taught religious law, and performed feats of spirit healing. The two authorities represented two parallel cultural and social structures in village life: one based on kinship, custom, and political allegiance; the other based on Islamic belief and worship.

Outside the villages, the scholars and Sufis maintained schools that were self-supporting agricultural communities; in these, the students not only studied but worked on the land belonging to the teachers. The schools taught ritual recitation of the Quran, Sufi beliefs, and magical formulas to students who would in turn become village teachers. These schools represented a very different world from that of the village – the world of purely Islamic social and religious obligations beyond the ties of kinship and territoriality. Islam, then, was integral to the village communities and yet offered a radical alternative. In place of kinship, it offered brotherhood based on faith. In the political realm, Islam was the principle that legitimized and defined the organization of the state. The state in Aceh was represented by the sultan, originally the ruler of a small capital town and the surrounding territory. He used Islamic symbols, ideas, and rituals to legitimize his regime; waged war against the Portuguese and the Dutch; and patronized the teaching of Islam in his domains.

Malaya

Islam in the riverine states of Malaya was also closely integrated with both village life and the state. (See Illustration 19.) As in Acehnese villages, there were two parallel authorities. The village headman, or *penghulu*, was appointed by the higher authorities to keep the local peace, arbitrate disputes, collect taxes, organize labor, and act as a healer and spirit doctor. At the same time, the imam of the mosque, supported by a muezzin and a preacher, organized local worship and taught in the local school. The holy man was often venerated for having made the pilgrimage to Mecca and for his magical powers. Islam made an important contribution to the rituals and festivals marking the solidarity of the village community and to the

commemoration of important events in the life cycle of individuals (such as birth, marriage, and death).

Illustration 19. The Ubadiah Mosque, Kuala Kangson, Malaysia.
Source: The Photo Source.

Acehnese and Malay villagers followed both Muslim and non-Muslim religious practices and believed in holy spirits, holy places, and saints who were venerated in both Muslim and non-Muslim guise. In the villages, both Muslim and non-Muslim holy men were available to offer counsel and cures. There were both Muslim and non-Muslim festivals to mark the natural cycle of life and the agricultural year. Malay and Acehnese villagers considered themselves Muslims, but Islam did not thereby distinguish them as a group, as a community, or as a cult separate from the total fabric of the society.

Islam was also important for the Malay states. The sultans were the heads of aristocratic lineages, made up the political elite, and were the village overlords. The Malay sultans traced their descent to the sultan of Malacca. A ruler was called at once raja (sultan) and *yang di-pardon* (he who was made lord). His titles were Muslim and Hindu, and he was believed to be descended from ancient and divine Hindu lords as well as Muslim ancestors. His regalia symbolized his sacred and mystical personality. Special drums, weapons, clothing, food, and

adornments were reserved for him. Whereas the ruler was believed to have supernatural powers, there was scarcely any public expression of his Islamic role. Apart from prayers at royal inaugurations and funerals, there were no Muslim public rituals. Although Islamic law was known, there is little evidence of a Muslim judicial administration. Religion, then, symbolized the legitimacy of the states but did not define political practices. Compared with other Muslim states, Islam had a minimal impact in Malaya. In a highly compartmentalized political system, it symbolized the unity of the society based on the allegiance of states and village communities to the same religious symbols.

Minangkabau

Minangkabau, a region on the southern side of Sumatra, and its colony, Negri Sembilan in Malaya, is another example of how Islam operated on several levels in Malay-Indonesian societies. Minangkabau was a region of rice agriculture and of trade in pepper and gold. Islam was introduced into Minangkabau in the sixteenth century by Sufi missionaries and Muslim traders. By the seventeenth century, Islamic schools were established and the Naqshbandiyya, the Qadariyya, and Shattariyya were organized. In the eighteenth century, the Shattariyya became the leading Sufi order.

Minangkabau society was built on two parallel principles – one matrilineal, the other patrilineal. On the village level, clan organization, laws of marriage, land ownership, and property were defined in matrilineal terms. The village community, called *nagari*, was a grouping of a number of clans administered by chieftains called *penghulus*. The *nagaris* were integrated into still-larger federations called *alaras*, under the authority of a prince or raja. Islam represented the masculine principle. In the villages it was institutionalized in the *surau*, young men's houses, which became schools and centers of Sufi brotherhoods.

In practice, however, there was a considerable overlap between matrilineal and patrilineal forms of organization. Marriage practices and inheritance laws were blends of Islamic and traditional

Minangkabau norms. The two forms of law and social structure generated deep conflicts. Islamic inheritance, child custody, and residence laws were patrilineal and patrilocal, yet the Minangkabau were affiliated with large clan houses that were passed down from one generation of women to the next, defined by a common female ancestor.

Moreover, in the eighteenth century, both economy and society in Minangkabau were changing radically. American and European demand for coffee, pepper, and cassia created a boom in the highland economy that disrupted traditional trading systems. Marginal villages with poor soil became wealthy by planting the new cash crops, threatening the influence of the wet rice farmers. The gold and pepper trades collapsed, while coffee production expanded. In this economic upheaval, the interests of coastal trading towns locked into the Dutch trading system and upland producing communities came into conflict. Some communities disintegrated, while new entrepreneurs and peasants prospered. Rice and coffee producers came into conflict over land. Uprooted people sought their living in towns and markets. Traditional morality gave way to a new individualism.

In those troubled times, Islamic reform movements came to the fore. Through the early 1700s, scholars had been primarily concerned with states and with kingship. The reformist Islamic movements were more involved with the everyday lives of ordinary people; legal opinions addressed issues of family life, sex, and appropriate conduct. By the late eighteenth century, Islamic reformism reached the Minangkabau highlands. From West Africa through South Asia and into the Malay world, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries experienced a wave of Muslim reformist and revivalist movements.

In Minangkabau, the old order was challenged by a religious revival under the leadership of Tuanku Nan Tua. He insisted that local religious and social practice be reformed to meet the demands of Islam: a more strict application of Islamic law, better attendance at Friday prayers, an end to gambling and drinking, and a cessation of the brigandage and slaving that came with increased trade. Tuanku

Nan Tua (also known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol) taught that it was necessary to strictly observe Islamic law in inheritance and family matters, improve mosques and dwellings, celebrate the birthday of the Prophet, and in general make the teachings of the Prophet (rather than custom) supreme. He also taught that Islamic law and mystical vision (Shariʿa and *haqiqa*) should be integrated in religious life. His reform was directed not at the village communities but at the newly mobile merchant and peasant population to whom Islamic law was offered as guidance for the regulation of economic conflict and moral problems. In Minangkabau, as in India, the reformist version of Islam challenged local usages. Minangkabau matrilineal inheritance and matrilocal residence were plainly in contradiction to majoritarian interpretations of Islamic law.

The reform movement led to bitter civil war. In 1803, the reformers were reinforced by pilgrims returning from Mecca who had imbibed the Wahhabi principles current in the holy cities of Arabia. The returned pilgrims, preaching in the coffee-producing villages, also called for the purification of Islamic life, adherence to Islamic law, and an end to gambling, cock fighting, opium consumption, drinking, smoking, robbery, and violence. They called for a Muslim way of life in strict accordance with the teachings of the Prophet and opposed the magical practices that were part of the village concept of Islam. The reformist movement soon divided. Whereas Tuanku Nan Tua advocated pacific preaching, one of his disciples, Tuanku Nan Rincheh, organized military action. This was the so-called Padri movement. His followers pledged to dress in white, wear beards, and abstain from bodily satisfactions. They were also prepared to wage war against the *nagaris*, kill the *penghulus*, confiscate their property, and establish a new regime, headed by an imam and a judge and dedicated to the enforcement of Islamic law.

Some *penghulus* accepted Islamic law peacefully and assisted in the reform movement. This was especially true in merchant communities that had extensive trading connections with other parts of Malaya and Sumatra. Most of the customary chiefs, however, refused to accept the reformist movement. To defend themselves, they invited the Dutch to intercede, and a bitter and protracted war followed (1819–39), until the Dutch finally defeated the reformers and

conquered the province. By then, the internal momentum of the reform movement was spent; the collapse of the Padri in 1833 was followed by a unification of the reformist Muslims and matrilineal traditionalists in a revitalized resistance to foreign occupation. Six more years of violent warfare ensued. By 1838, the Minangkabau were defeated by the Dutch. Despite the final compromise between traditional leaders and reformist Muslims, the reform movement had a profound effect on Minangkabau society. Whereas Aceh and Malaya maintained the traditional balance among village, school, and state forms of Islam, in Minangkabau the conflict between traditional village and reformist versions of Islam strengthened orthopraxis Islamic orientations and succeeded in Islamizing the village communities.

Thus, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, both Java and Minangkabau went through profound political and religious crises. With Dutch dominance of the Indies and the attendant social and religious upheavals, the way was prepared for the radical changes of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Islam in Africa

Chapter 39 The African context: Islam, slavery, and colonialism

The history of Islam in the African continent falls into three geographical and historical zones. The Mediterranean littoral was conquered by Arab-Muslims and later by the Ottoman Empire and was a region of Arab-Islamic culture. West Africa, including the Sahara desert, and the savannah, forest, and coastal country south of the Sahara constituted a second region. Coastal East Africa and its hinterlands, including inland savannah country, was the third. The history of Islam in North Africa appears in conjunction with the history of the early Arab-Islamic conquests and the Ottoman Empire. However, the history of Islam in Africa cannot be separated from the interactions between Africa and the outside Muslim world, nor from its varied connections to Europe.

Islam

Three themes define pan-African history. The first is Islam. The Islamic period in Africa began in the seventh century with contacts among the newly founded Arab-Islamic empire and sub-Saharan and coastal East Africa. Whereas Islamic societies in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent were established by conquest and ordered by states, Islam in Africa, as in Indonesia, was diffused primarily by the migration of Muslim merchants, teachers, and settlers.

Islam came into East Africa through two channels. Arab bedouins and Egyptian armies carried Islam into Nubia and the upper Nile basin. Arab- and Persian-Muslim traders settled in the towns and islands along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts of East Africa. By the end of the eighth century, trade routes from the Somali coast, built around the exchange of lowland salt for highland produce, brought Islam to the Ethiopian highlands. By the thirteenth century, a

chain of petty sultanates ran from Zayla to the Shoan plateau, and many of the stateless nomadic peoples, including the Afar and the Somali, had become Muslims. In the early sixteenth century, the Galla peoples also adopted Islam. The spread of Islam in Ethiopia again gained momentum in the nineteenth century, owing to the revival of the highland trade to the Red Sea, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the increased demand for slaves in Arabia and elsewhere. Further south, in East and Central Africa, a thriving slave and trading economy also brought Islam to the East African interior. Nyamwezi traders came down to the coast and Arab and Swahili traders to the interior. The trade was stimulated by the commercial interests of Sultan Saʿid of Zanzibar.

In West Africa, the Arab conquests opened the way to contacts among Muslim Arabs, Berbers, and Saharan and Sudanic African peoples. North African Berbers had been converted to Khariji Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries. Mauritanian Berbers were converted to Islam in the ninth century. By the tenth century, Muslim traders from North Africa were established in Awdaghust and Tadmekka in the southern Sahara, and from there traded with the kingdom of Ghana. In addition, Sudanic Africans also accepted Islam. By the late tenth and eleventh centuries most of the Sudanese trading towns had a Muslim quarter, and Muslims were important as advisors and functionaries at the courts of local rulers. A succession of Muslim states – Takrur, Ghana, Mali, Songhay, and Bornu – governed the western and central Sudan. From the twelfth through the fourteenth century, Walata and Timbuktu were centers of Muslim trade and scholarship.

From the Sahara and the Sudan, African-Muslim merchants and scholars, known as Wangara, or Dyula (Juula), moved into the Volta River basin and the Guinean forests, trading in gold, kola nuts, and salt. Merchant communities grew up along the trade routes at the crossings of rivers, toll posts, and stopping places for caravans, where they settled down to trade with the local populace. The trading communities often developed agricultural interests, and in some cases Muslims became the custodians of specialized crafts such as

weaving and dyeing. In later centuries, farming – performed mostly by slaves, clients, and students – became more important.

Scholars and holy men offered their services to local chiefs and carried on the tradition of Islamic learning, provided instruction in Islamic law and rituals, and served as prayer leaders, teachers, and healers. Many claimed that they were *shurafa'*, descendants of the clan of Quraysh, the clan of the Prophet Muhammad, whose holiness made their charms, medicines, and prayers efficacious, and their fortune-telling and divination perspicacious. Scholars were often members of merchant families or lineages, and some individuals carried on both business and clerical activities. Linked by trading networks, family connections, teacher-student relationships, and Sufi fellowships, the Muslims were typically independent enclaves within small-scale non-Muslim regional states and in stateless societies.

Certain families provided scholars generation after generation. In the Sahara, the *zawaya* or *insilimen* clans, the religious lineages, lived by livestock rearing, agriculture, and commerce and held a high status because of their wealth, their Islamic learning and spirituality, and their claimed Arab or *sharifian* descent. By the early 1800s the most important of the *zawaya* lineages was the Kunta clan, which had widespread influence throughout Mauritania, Senegambia, and other parts of the western Sudan. The Saghanughu was a Dyula lineage living in the northern and western Ivory Coast and in parts of upper Volta. The Jakhanke were prominent in Senegambia.

The Muslim communities fit readily into an African society that was in general highly segmented, built around political lineages, age-group associations, religious cults, occupational groups, and different classes of free men and slaves. Political units were based not on ideology or a history of shared culture, ethnicity, and language, but rather on sudden conquests by small minorities. Muslims were considered yet another clan or lineage with their own culture, Islam, in a society of innumerable such communities. They were treated as clients, given business patronage, and afforded safe passage and protection from bandits. In return Muslims typically became secretaries and administrators in African kingdoms and

providers of religious, ritual, and magical services such as divination and the production of talismans and amulets.

Over time, however, Muslim settlements became enmeshed in the host societies. Sometimes the Muslims converted local rulers and established a joint elite of warrior rulers and Muslim merchants. Non-Muslim African rulers converted to Islam and built mosques, instituted public prayer, patronized Muslim scholars, and celebrated Muslim holidays. Nonetheless, they continued to sponsor ceremonial dances, poetry recitations, and other non-Muslim rituals. They maintained a double cultural orientation to express both the Islamic and the indigenous bases of their authority. African kings were not retrograde Muslims; they simply followed the universal tendency of Muslim regimes to blend Muslim and non-Muslim cultures. In other cases, the chiefs remained pagans but employed Muslims as officials, traders, and advisors. Sometimes they gave their daughters in marriage to Muslim clerics.

Ruling elites and merchant communities could also come into conflict. Kings might crush the Muslim merchant communities and carry on a royal household trade, often in slaves, as happened in Asante, Dahomey, and Dar Fur. Merchants could seize power and govern themselves as independent towns, as happened in Timbuktu. Even after centuries, Islam remained a class and communal religion of certain mercantile and religious groups and a royal cult and had only a limited impact on the masses of the host societies.

The cultural relations of Muslim enclaves and their hosts were ambivalent. Muslim communities wanted to maintain their special identities and wanted a superior status due to their wealth, education, religious charisma, and cosmopolitan connections. In East Africa, Arab-, Persian-, Shirazi-, Swahili-, and Asian-Muslim groups developed a racial and cultural chauvinism toward the indigenous people. Islam came to be identified with "civilization," whereas the indigenous peoples were considered "barbarians." Even converts were considered inferior Muslims. At the same time, Muslims wanted to occupy important positions in the host societies and to proselytize on behalf of Islam. Muslims and Africans both had strong cultural motives for close relationships. Muslims could

express their religious worldview in local idioms. Muslim religiosity included not only a culture of scripture, law, theology, and mysticism but also a popular culture of belief in spirits, the protective and healing power of magic and divination, and the efficacy of dream interpretation, prayers, and amulets comparable to those of non-Muslim African diviners, magicians, and spiritual leaders. Quranic ideas about jinn, incorporeal beings inhabiting the physical world, were similar to African concepts of spiritual presences. Non-Muslim Africans and Muslims both constructed elaborate genealogies and venerated their ancestors.

Non-Muslim Africans could adopt Muslim beliefs and practices on a number of levels. They could be considered as isolated cultural artifacts. Elements of Islamic material culture – including ornaments and dress, religious arts, rituals, calligraphy, talismans, and amulets – were not necessarily understood as part of an integrated religious culture that had to be accepted in its entirely but could be appropriated piecemeal and without embracing the whole Islamic religious system or a Muslim identity. Africans could combine their traditional cultural and religious customs with Arab-Islamic ones. Furthermore, cultural synthesis or exchanges did not necessarily imply a profound spiritual transformation or even a break with prior African cultures but could be simply a matter of social customs expressed in dietary habits, clothing, ritual, taboos, and ethnic identity.

At yet another level, many non-Muslim Africans formally converted to Islam and recognized scholars as the representatives of God's will. The power of communal cults waned, and the worship of Allah became supreme. Converted African Muslims recognized the supremacy of Islamic law, worshiped according to the five pillars of Islam, and followed Islamic ritual practices for circumcision, marriage, and death. There may also have been legal and social changes from matrilineal to patrilineal forms of family, and from communal to private ownership of property.

Alongside peaceful Muslim colonization there was a parallel tradition of militant determination to turn small colonies into Muslim states by defeating non-Muslims and corrupt Muslim rulers who

blended Islam with customary African religious and social practices, conquering the pagan populations, converting them to Islam, and ruling them according to Muslim law. With the North African Almoravid movement of the eleventh century as a shadowy precedent, the jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rose from the *jama'at*, or rural Muslim communities, and from Fulbe pastoralists, led by Muslim scholars, teachers, and itinerant preachers. They began in Mauritania and spread to Senegambia. These were followed in the nineteenth century by the jihad of 'Uthman don Fodio, who established the Sokoto caliphate among the Hausa peoples of northern Nigeria. The jihads of al-Hajj 'Umar and Samori Ture extended the rule of Muslim states in the Voltaic regions and the Sudanic zone of West and Central Africa. Religious movements, although not jihads, were also important in North and East Africa. In Cyrenaica, part of present-day Libya, the Sanusi movement helped spread Islam. In the northern parts of present-day Sudan, an anti-British Muslim movement was led by the Mahdi.

Although great numbers of people were converted to Islam, the process of conversion was slow and the change in institutions and beliefs variable. The result was the formation not of a uniform Islamic culture but of a plethora of local variations on Islamic practice. Although we may speak about conversion and the syncretism of Islam and African practices, there was no single cultural expression of Islamic civilization in sub-Saharan Africa.

Slavery

A second defining theme of African history was the almost universal commerce in slaves. In West Africa slaves were carried from the central and western Sudan to Cairo, Tripoli, and Qayrawan and then to the wider Islamic world. As plantations for sugar, tobacco, cotton, and other products were developed in the Americas, Africa was exploited for slave labor to be transported across the Atlantic. In Senegambia, the Atlantic slave trade and the wars between the traditional warrior elites (*tyeddo*) and Muslim jihadists promoted slavery. The Atlantic slave trade reached its apogee in the 1780s. In

the nineteenth century, slowly at first but fairly dramatically after 1850, the Atlantic slave trade was suppressed.

In West Africa, the jihads led to the enslavement of countless thousands of people who were employed in armies, administration, and trade and as concubines and domestic servants. The textile industry in cities such as Kano, Bornu, and Bundu also employed numerous slaves. The introduction of new plantation crops vastly increased the internal demand for slave labor on sugar, cotton, palm oil, groundnuts, beeswax, cloves, and – later – rubber and cotton plantations. The jihad conquests of ʿUthman don Fodio, the jihad of al-Hajj ʿUmar, the reign of Samori, and the adoption of the plantation system of agriculture led to the enslavement of a substantial part of the population in the western and central Sudan.

In East Africa a vast commerce in slaves both for internal use and for export to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Arabia had been carried on for centuries. The slave trade flourished in Egyptian, Omani, and other Red Sea and Indian Ocean states. In the middle of the nineteenth century the island of Zanzibar, ruled by Oman, became the principal center of slave-based production of cloves. Along the East African coast, grain, coconut, and copra plantations developed between 1830 and 1884 used large numbers of slaves. Sugar plantations were established on Mauritius. In the Nilotic Sudan, slaves were widely used in Wadai, Dar Fur, and the Funj sultanate.

Zanzibar was also the principal center of the international slave trade. Under Omani auspices the slave trade in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean peaked between 1830 and 1880. The Egyptian slave trade peaked at about the middle of the century. Perhaps half of the slaves for export came from the Upper Nile and the Ethiopian mountains. Slaves were sold to Arab buyers from Yemen, the Hijaz, Hadramawt, and Oman, who often resold the slaves to buyers from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrayn, Iran, India, Malaya, and the Indonesian archipelago. In Arabia, slaves were employed as maids, sailors, soldiers, administrators, and shop assistants and in menial work. In India and the Malay archipelago, slaves worked in a plantation economy similar to that found in the Americas. In Sumatra they also

did craft work as mechanics, masons, and carpenters and served as soldiers.

Colonialism

The third common theme in African history was the exploitation of Africa by colonial regimes. European intervention goes back to the end of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese discovery of a new route to the East Indies led to the establishment of Portuguese bases on the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea coasts of Africa. This was the opening phase of the incorporation of Africa into the international capitalist economy. By the seventeenth century Europeans had established bases all along the coasts of Africa from Algiers to Cape Town and had begun to move into the interior. Europeans sought palm oil, peanuts, ivory, sisal, and slaves in exchange for cotton fabric, textiles, and firearms, which in turn promoted internal warfare, enslavement, and the export of slaves to the Americas. The increase in the slave trade was especially pronounced on Atlantic routes as well as on trans-Saharan routes to North Africa.

Foreign commercial engagement in Africa was followed by the colonization and the partition of Africa. Before 1850 European "possessions" were limited. The Portuguese had claims in Angola and Mozambique. After 1815 the French revived Saint-Louis and Gorée, their trading posts in Senegambia, and conquered much of Senegal. Britain had established Freetown and agricultural villages on the neighboring peninsula. British commercial and missionary influence began to penetrate into the interior around 1850, and the British entered what is now Ghana in competition with the Danes, the Dutch, and the native Asante. Muslim colonial regimes have a more sporadic history. The Almoravids conquered Ghana in the eleventh century. The pashas of Timbuktu were vassals of Morocco in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, the Mazruis of Mombasa and other East African coastal dynasties were subordinate to the Busaidi imams of Oman. Egypt conquered Sudan. The jihad states of West Africa were indigenous conquering regimes.

In the late nineteenth century, the jihad states were challenged by the French and the British. At the Congress of Berlin (1884–85) the European powers agreed on the partition of Africa among themselves. The French took possession of Senegal and of the state founded by ʿUmar in 1893, and they defeated Samori in 1898. The British defeated the Mahdi in the Sudan in 1885 and the Sokoto caliphate in 1903. Belgium, Italy, and Germany seized pieces of the continent. Only after World War II would African countries regain their independence.

Chapter 40 Islam in Sudanic, savannah, and forest West Africa

From the seventh to the eleventh centuries, Arab and Berber Muslim traders made their way into and across the Sahara, established colonies in the Sudan, and inspired the adoption of Islam by a succession of local rulers. Then, from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, African-Muslim traders, scholars, and communities settled in Mauritania, Senegambia, and the Guinean regions. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, some of these Muslim communities launched jihads and created new Muslim states. At the same time they were faced with European competition, colonization, and empire formation.

The kingdoms of the western Sudan

The Arab conquests opened the way to contacts among Muslim Arabs and Berbers and Saharan and Sudanic peoples. (See Map 21.) North African Berbers had been converted to Khariji Islam in the seventh century; in the eighth century Tahert, Sijilmassa, and other Moroccan towns were centers of Ibadi Kharijism. Mauritanian Berbers were converted to Islam in the ninth century. By the tenth century, Muslim traders from North Africa were established in Awdaghust and Tadmekka. By the late tenth and eleventh centuries most of the Sudanese trading towns had a Muslim quarter, and Muslims were important as advisors and functionaries at the courts of local rulers.

Map 21. Sub-Saharan Africa, eleventh to fourteenth centuries.

In the Sahara and the bordering Sudanic region, the economy was supported by pastoralism, agriculture, craft production, and above all trade. Before the coming of the Muslims the Sudanic region was already an agricultural and state-centered society. Herding was carried on in the Sahil, the grassy steppelands that border the Sahara. The Sudan, the broad savannah belt to the south, produced millet, maize, yams, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, indigo, and other crops. The Sudan traded with other parts of Africa and the Mediterranean, often through Berber intermediaries. It exported gold, slaves, hides, and ivory and imported copper, silver beads, dried fruit, and cloth.

After the Arab conquests, North African cities such as Marrakesh, Fez, Tahert, Qayrawan, Sijilmassa, Tlemcen, Tunis, and Tripoli were the northern ends of the trans-Saharan trade routes that led to southern terminus cities such as Takrur, Kumbi Saleh, Kanem, Goa, Timbuktu, and Jenne. Intermediate towns such as Wargala, Ghadames, Fezzan, Tadmekka, and Awdaghust flourished on the

several main routes. Sigilmassa was a key town in the nexus of trans-Saharan trade routes that linked the Sudan, sub-Sudanic Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. The Sudan was the principal source of gold for North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Sudanese gold sustained the Aghlabid, Fatimid, and Spanish-Umayyad regimes and later formed the economic basis of the Almoravid Empire in Morocco and Spain.

Sudanic societies were built on small agricultural villages or herding communities, sometimes but not always integrated into larger tribal and linguistic groups. The oldest of the Sudanic kingdoms was Ghana, probably founded between the second and the fourth centuries CE. In the ninth and tenth centuries Ghana was both a partner and a rival of Berbers for the control of the trans-Saharan trade. To the west of Ghana was Takrur on the Senegal River. To the east, the kingdom of Kawkaw had its capital at Gao on the middle Niger River. To the south of Ghana there were no large kingdoms, but a number of small chieftainships and large areas that were not under state control.

Sudanic states had their origin in groups led by patriarchs, councils of elders, or village chiefs. The state came into existence when a local elder, an immigrant warrior, or perhaps a priestly ruler established his control over other communities. A Sudanic empire commonly had a core territory integrated by ethnic, linguistic, or similar ties and a larger sphere of power defined by the rule of a particular person or lineage over numerous subordinate families, castes, lineages, and village communities. The key political factor was not the control of territory but the relations that enabled the ruler to garner religious prestige, draw military support, and extract taxes or tributes. The kings were considered sacred persons and were believed to have divine powers. They did not appear in public and were not to be seen carrying out ordinary bodily functions such as eating. Around the kings were numerous officeholders who helped govern the realm and provincial and district chiefs often recruited from the junior members of the noble families.

For the sake of administrative support, legitimization, and commercial contacts, the rulers of Kawkaw, Takrur, Ghana, and

Bornu adopted Islam in the late tenth and eleventh centuries. Islam became an imperial cult and the religion of state and trading elites, while the agricultural populations maintained their traditional beliefs.

From the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, several kingdoms, in different geographical locations, succeeded one another as the principal centers of political power, trade, and Islamization. In Senegambia, south of the present-day Mauritania, the kingdom of Takrur, between the Senegal and the Gambia rivers, adopted Islam before 1040–41. The kings of Takrur introduced Islamic law and waged jihad against infidel neighbors. With the disintegration of the kingdom of Takrur, Ghana became the leading center of Islam in the western Sudan. There Muslim traders lived under the patronage of a non-Muslim ruler. The capital city of Ghana, Kumbi-Saleh, was a dual town, with one district for Muslims involved in the gold trade, and one for non-Muslims. The Muslim town was equipped with mosques and religious functionaries, including imams, muezzins, Quran reciters, and scholars. The Muslims provided the ruler with interpreters and officials. The prayers, rituals, amulets, and magical books of the Muslim traders were as important as their financial and administrative assistance.

Local Muslim influences were reinforced by Almoravid economic, diplomatic, and cultural penetration, and by the proselytizing activities of the North African Almoravid leader Abu Bakr (d. 1087) and his colleague Imam al-Hadrami (d. 1096). The Almoravid confederation had been formed in the ninth century in order to control trans-Saharan commerce from Sijilmassa to Ghana. The Almoravids conquered Morocco in the eleventh century and then took control of Ghana as well. The Almoravid invasions resulted in the adoption of Islam over wide areas and made Maliki law the dominant school in West Africa. With the decline of the Almoravids in the twelfth century, Ghana became the richest kingdom in the Sudan, but in the thirteenth century its former tributaries freed themselves from central control, and the kingdom disintegrated. The decline of Ghana gave rise to a number of small states among Soninke-speaking peoples.

Mali

From the early thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth centuries, Mali became the dominant regime in the western Sudan and the principal center of Islam. Mali had its origin among Malinke (Mande) peoples living between the Senegal and the Niger rivers. Mande-speaking peoples lived in family and village units, the head of the family being both priest and chieftain. A group of villages in turn formed a *kafs*, or *kafu*, a community of 1,000 to 15,000 people living around a mud-walled town and ruled by a hereditary chieftain called a *fama*. As in other African empires, the supreme ruler was a king of kings. He bore the military title of *mansa*, conqueror. The descendants of the *mansa* supplied the principal functionaries. Client clans, castes of dependent craftsmen, and people allied by marriage or by past service supported the ruler. Slaves and serfs worked in agricultural settlements to provide produce for the court, the army, and the administration. The *mansas* adopted the Ghanaian and Sudanic concepts of kingship to institutionalize their power. The rulers surrounded themselves with a bodyguard, servants, and elaborate ceremonies. A quasi-divine figure, the king was accepted as a symbol of the power of life and death.

The kingdom of Mali was founded by a local chieftain, Sunjata (1230–55), of the Keita dynasty. The Keita dynasty ruled, with some interruptions, from 1230 to 1390. After Islam became the royal cult, rulers built mosques and adopted Islamic law, and the king and the entire court took part in public prayers held on the great Islamic festivals. The most famous of these rulers, Mansa Musa (r. 1307–32), made a sensational pilgrimage to Cairo and Mecca in 1324 that made his kingdom legendary for its wealth in gold. Mansa Musa returned to Mali with Arab and Berber adventurers to serve in his administration. He built new mosques and palaces, appointed an imam for Friday prayers, and introduced Arabic-style poetry to his court. He encouraged Muslim scholarship in Timbuktu and sent Malian students to Fez. The rulers of Mali brought Muslim scholars from Cairo and Fez to help establish a West African tradition of Islamic learning. Arabic became important both for the diffusion of religion and for communications and trade. It was used for official correspondence in the Ghana Empire before the end of the twelfth century and in Mali in the mid-fourteenth century. The earliest known Arabic texts, though,

come from Bornu at the end of the fourteenth century; fifteenth-century immigrants brought Arabic to Hausaland.

Islam as the religion of the commercial classes and portions of the political elite helped unify the kingdom and gave cultural support to the dynasty. Still, Malian rulers enforced customary law when it suited them and preserved ancient ceremonials. Muslim festivals were also occasions for the performance of pagan ceremonies and dances. This was especially important in segmented African societies in which only portions of the ruling elite and the trading classes were Muslim and the mass of the agricultural population was still pagan.

The economy of Mali was based on the gold of Bambuk and Bure on the upper Niger and on the important trading cities of Walata, Timbuktu, Gao, and Tadmakkat, where Saharan salt was traded for the cereal produce, the slave captives, and the ivory and gold of the western Sudan. In the thirteenth century, trade with North Africa increased enormously.

By the end of the fourteenth century the Malian Empire was in decline. Jenne, probably settled by Muslim traders in the thirteenth century, became the crucial link to the Akan forest region (modern Ghana and the Ivory Coast) and a source of new supplies of gold. Timbuktu, an important trade and religious center settled in the thirteenth century, replaced Walata as a terminus of the Saharan caravan traffic. As the trade routes changed, local chieftains became independent, and this reduced Mali once again to a petty chieftaincy. The people of Mali remained identifiable as having a common dialect and customs, but the empire was no more.

Songhay

With the breakup of the Malian Empire, a period of chaos ensued. Tributary states became independent. Nomadic horsemen, Mossi, Fulbe, and Tuareg raided the towns. Finally, a local warrior, Sunni 'Ali (1464/65–92), founded a new empire, Songhay, in the region of the middle Niger and the western Sudan. He seized Timbuktu in 1468 and Jenne in 1473 and took control of the gold, kola, and trans-Saharan trade. Sunni 'Ali built his regime on the revenues of trade

and the cooperation of Muslim merchants. He behaved as a Muslim in giving alms and fasting during Ramadan, but he also worshiped idols and practiced non-Muslim rites. In 1469 he made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

His successor, Askiya Muhammad Ture (r. 1493–1528), attempted to reconstruct the empire of Mali. Supported by Mande clans, he created a standing army and a central bureaucracy. Songhay acquired slave laborers by annual cavalry raids on the stateless, and therefore unprotected, peoples south of the Niger. The empire won substantial control over the salt mines of Taghaza and the copper mines of Takedda.

Askiya Muhammad made Islam the official religion, built mosques, and brought Muslim scholars, including al-Maghili (d. 1504), the founder of an important tradition of Sudanic Muslim scholarship, to Gao. Gao, the capital of his empire, was a trading city and had large communities of foreign Arabs, Berbers, and Sudanese converts to Islam, each with its own mosque. Timbuktu flourished as a center of Arabic and Islamic sciences. Askiya Muhammad appointed the first *qadi* of Jenne and extended Islamic judicial administration to other towns by establishing courts and appointing judges. War against unbelievers was considered a responsibility of the state. The legitimization of his regime also depended on his investiture by the *sharif* of Mecca as caliph of the land of Takrur. Still, Islam remained the religion of the governing elite, whereas the masses of Songhay society continued to be pagans.

The empire of Songhay was destroyed in 1591 by a Moroccan invasion that established a new ruling elite. Timbuktu became a pashalik of the Moroccan Sharifian empire. The *arma* (musketeers), the descendants of the invading army, became the ruling elite in the Niger region. The conquerors built fortresses and established permanent garrisons at the main river ports between Gao and Jenne, which enabled them to control the exchange of Saharan salt for Sudanic grain. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Moroccan regime was disintegrating. Timbuktu effectively became the capital of an independent state. By the mid-eighteenth century, the power of the

arma was limited to the Niger River. Beyond the riverain territory, bands of freebooters lived by raiding the caravans. (See Map 22.)

Map 22.   Sub-Saharan Africa, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

   A profound transformation of the position of Sudanic West Africa in the international economy took place in the seventeenth century. Although Morocco continued to be its largest market, the development of plantation agriculture in Brazil and the West Indies during the 1630s and the growth of the trans-Atlantic slave trade attracted the interest of the European commercial and naval powers. By 1642 the Dutch had expelled the Portuguese from their coastal bases in West Africa, and during the 1650s and 1660s, French, British, Danish, Swedish, and German companies were formed to develop tropical plantations and promote trade in African slaves. Internal warfare and the shift of trade routes from the Sahara to the Atlantic brought an end to the history of the rise and fall of Sudanic empires. The once-great Muslim kingdoms of the western Sudan disintegrated into a plethora of small states.

The central Sudan: Kanem and Bornu

The central, like the western, Sudan was also the home of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups and was a center of state formation. The earliest state in this region was founded by Saharan nomads at some time in the ninth century, with its capital in the region of Kanem, northeast of Lake Chad. Trade routes from Tripoli through the Fezzan brought Ibadi Khariji merchants into the region. The first *mai* or king of Kanem of the Sefuwa dynasty accepted Islam in 1086 as the religion of the ruling elite. Later kings promoted Islamic scholarship, courts, and local administration. In the thirteenth century the rulers of Kanem made the pilgrimage, and in 1240 a madrasa was established in Cairo for Kanuri students, marking the integration of the central Sudan into the international network of Muslim scholarship. By about 1350 the reigning dynasty was Sunni and Maliki. By this time the state had progressively united the various peoples subject to them into the Kanuri nation.

In the fourteenth century, however, the dynasty, defeated by pagan peoples living east of Lake Chad, was forced to abandon Kanem and move to Bornu, west of Lake Chad. ʿAli b. Dunama (1476–1503) founded the new capital of Ngazargamo in Bornu. Idris b. ʿAli (1570–1602) completed the process of state formation. He developed a standing army, including a cavalry corps made up of members of the ruler's household and other chiefs, and an auxiliary infantry. The elite troops were provided with firearms.

From about the sixteenth century Bornu scholars made Ngazargamo the leading center of Quranic studies in central Sudan. Ngazargamo had four Friday mosques; the *ʿulama'* engaged in learned disputations at court. Islam, however, did not have a substantial following outside court and *ʿulama'* circles and was not the religion of the majority.

Bornu reached new heights of power between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century. Bornu's dominant interest was the trade in gold, salt, slaves, and weapons between the central Sudan, Tripoli, and Cairo. Its major rivals were the Hausa city-states; its major ally, the Ottoman regime in Libya. Ambassadors

brought rich presents of Ottoman weapons and luxury goods in exchange for slaves and gold. Bornu also maintained close trading connections with Cairo. However, by the middle of the eighteenth century Bornu's hegemony broke down, and it was transformed from a regional empire into a smaller, relatively homogeneous Kanuri state.

Hausaland

Hausaland, now northern Nigeria, lay between the eastern kingdoms of Kanem-Bornu and the western empires of Ghana and Mali. As a cultural and political region Hausaland took shape in the first millennium CE as a result of the westward expansion of Hausa peoples. Their expansion was marked by the conversion of woodlands into open savannah and the introduction of grain cultivation, which allowed for a denser peasant population. In large areas, there was a common language and common laws and customs.

The earliest Hausa societies were confederacies of kinship groups led by a priest-chief. The groups in the confederacy specialized in fishing, hunting, agriculture, and crafts such as blacksmithing and salt digging. The Hausa population lived in defended towns from which they went out daily to work their farms in the surrounding countryside. Hausa peoples were dominated by horse-riding military elites organized under rulers called *sarkin*. Sometimes, kings emerged through the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of one priest-chief. Such kings often turned to a universalistic religion, such as Islam, to acquire legitimization and to undermine the authority of their competitors.

The city regimes were characterized by a centralized chieftainship with a fortified capital, an elaborate court, and a substantial officialdom. By the fourteenth century, Kano had acquired a powerful military machine. The *madawaki*, or chief cavalry officer, was the commander of a professional officers' corps. The Kano armies were equipped with iron helmets and coats of mail. By conquest, Kano acquired great numbers of slaves, who were used as soldiers,

officials, agricultural laborers, and porters on the trade routes. Colonies were created to produce agricultural revenues. The power of the state was also based on extensive trading networks. Kano became a base for the trans-Saharan trade in salt, cloth, leather, and grain, and for trade with the Ashanti and the Yorubas.

Islam was first introduced in Kano at the time of King Yaji (1349–85), when African Wangara or Dyula traders and clerics came from Mali, from the Volta region, and later from Songhay. He appointed a *qadi* and an imam as part of the state administration. Muhammad Rumfa (1463–99) is credited with the advancement of Islam by building mosques and schools. He commissioned al-Maghili to write a treatise on Muslim government. Other scholars from Egypt, Tunis, and Morocco turned Kano into a center of Muslim scholarship. Islamization generally facilitated the expansion of trade. It was the basis of an enlarged marketing network, for which the *'ulama'* provided legal support, guarantees, safe conducts, introductions, and other services.

Islam was introduced into Katsina by Mande immigrants. Toward the end of the fifteenth century, the Wangara (Dyula) community of Muslim clerics and traders in Katsina took control of the city, and Muhammad al-Korau (d. 1541–42), a cleric, became the king of Katsina. His successors invited Muslim scholars from North Africa and Egypt to reside in Katsina. An *'ulama'* class emerged under royal patronage. The Hausa rulers fasted at Ramadan, built mosques, kept up the obligatory prayers, and gave alms to the poor. The reformer of Islam in Katsina, Ibrahim Maje (1549–66), ordered the implementation of Islamic marriage law. Generally, however, Islamization amounted to a nominal acceptance of Islam by the nobility, and the staffing of the courts with literate expatriate Muslims. Hausaland remained divided between a Muslim cosmopolitan urban royal society and the local kinship-based animistic rural communities. Islamic learning in Hausaland, however, was reinforced with the coming of the so-called settled Fulani, torodbe, or Tornkawa, Muslim clerics who lived in rural enclaves called *jama'at* and did not serve at the courts of the rulers.

From the time of their institutional consolidation in the fifteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, the Hausa states were at war with one another and with neighboring peoples. In the late eighteenth century the Hausa states, like those of Bornu and the western Sudan, were economically and politically exhausted.

Thus, between the tenth and the eighteenth centuries, a succession of Sudanic kingdoms was organized under the banner of Islam. These kingdoms owed their existence to Muslim trading communities or to nomadic chieftainships that found economic support and legitimization in Islam. In some cases the traders provided the economic resources, weapons, and horses that enabled local adventurers to establish states. In other cases they were themselves the conquerors. Still, further south the savannah region remained very little influenced by Islam, and the local rulers were, in ceremonial and ritual matters, old-style divine kings.

Non-state Muslim communities in West Africa: merchants and religious lineages

Muslim traders, scholars, and communities grew up alongside of, and indeed prior to, the adoption of Islam by Sudanic states. (See Map 23.) Lamtuna and Sanhaja Berbers became known for piety and scholarship. From the twelfth through the fourteenth century Awdaghust, Kumbi Saleh, Walata, and Timbuktu were noteworthy for both their trading and scholarly activities. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries Timbuktu replaced Walata as the principle trading city for the trans-Saharan traffic with the Sudan.

Map 23. Trade, settlements, and the diffusion of Islam in West Africa, 1500–1900.

Timbuktu is a fabled city in West African history. Timbuktu was probably the most important center of Arabic and Muslim studies. In the period of Malian rule, the imams of the Friday mosque were Sudanese, but after the Tuareg conquest of Timbuktu in 1433, they were replaced by Arab and Berber scholars from the oases of the northern Sahara. For centuries the *'ulama'* of Timbuktu maintained a rich tradition of Quranic, hadith, and legal studies, supplemented by studies in theology, linguistics, history, mathematics, and astronomy. An important biographical dictionary, written by Ahmad Baba (d. 1627), indicates a high level of Arabic and Muslim learning and close contact with Mecca and Egypt.

Timbuktu's scholarly elite was drawn from a number of interrelated families representing the tribal and ethnic subgroups that made up the city populace. The *qadi* was the principal figure, speaking for the people before military regimes, and the mediator of internal commercial and religious disputes. Scholars also acted as

intermediaries among the merchants and families who made up the *jama'at*, or communities of the four main (and several lesser) mosques, and the state officials.

The scholarly families were sustained by trade; by investments in cloth, camels, cattle, and urban property; by slave labor on their farms; and by the donations of their disciples, who worked as traders and tailors. The contributions of rulers and officials often took the form of slaves to work on farms. Although trade and scholarship could be specialized activities, many individuals were active in both pursuits. The commercial and the learned families were stratified by wealth. Leading scholars often came from the great merchant families; lesser scholars from the stratum of small merchants and craftsmen.

With the Moroccan conquest in 1591, Timbuktu lost its autonomy and became the seat of a military government. The authority of the *qadi* and the *'ulama'* declined as the merchants made direct contacts with the *arma* military elite. Also, the ethnic composition of the scholarly class changed as Sudanese, Soninke, Mandinge, and Dyula Muslim traders became the leading scholars. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, Timbuktu was no longer able to support a large scholarly community, and rival centers, especially at Jenne, developed in its place. Its merchant class moved into artisan work, mainly in cloth production.

Zawaya lineages: the Kunta

Instead, the leading proponents of Islam came to be not urban-based merchant families but rural clans. After the breakup of the Songhay Empire at the end of the sixteenth century, the population of the Saharan regions from Mauritania to Lake Chad was divided into dominant warrior (Hassani) clans and subordinated religious lineages called *zawaya* (or *insilimen*). The religious lineages lived by livestock rearing, agriculture, and commerce and held a high status for their wealth, their Islamic learning and spirituality, and their claimed Arab or *sharifian* descent. Each of the major caravan trading posts, such as Walata, Timbuktu, and Agades, became the center of a *zawaya* lineage and of its economic and religious networks.

By the early 1800s the most important of the *zawaya* lineages was the Kunta clan, a commercial lineage rooted in the salt trade and a scholarly lineage with widespread influence throughout Mauritania, Senegambia, and other parts of the western Sudan. The family's history goes back to Shaykh Sidi Ahmad al-Bakka'i (d. 1504), who established a Qadiri *zawiya* (Sufi residence) in Walata. In the sixteenth century the family spread across the Sahara to Timbuktu, Agades, Bornu, Hausaland, and other places, and in the eighteenth century many of the Kunta moved to the middle Niger. Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1728–1811) united the Kunta factions and established an extensive confederation, herding livestock and trading in salt, wool, hides, dates, tobacco, and textiles between the Sahara and the Sudanic regions, linking the desert and the savannah. Students (*talamidh*), subordinate families, clients, and slaves tended the animals, especially camels, and cultivated dates and cereals. Under the leadership of Sidi al-Mukhtar, the Qadiriyya Sufi order, already established in the Sudan, was reborn in the late eighteenth century. (See Figure 8.)

Figure 8. The Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya in West Africa.

A student of Sidi al-Mukhtar, Shaykh Sidiya al-Kabir (1775–1868), extended the family network to Mauritania. Sidiya began his religious education by memorizing the Quran and then went on to studies of poetry, theology, grammar, and law. In 1809–10 he apprenticed himself to Sidi al-Mukhtar. As student, secretary, and advisor to a family that had a powerful part in the revival of the Qadiri order, extensive trading operations, and political authority in the southern

Sahara, Sidiya was introduced into one of the most sophisticated of Saharan and West African communities. He studied law and mysticism, including the works of al-Ghazali and Ibn al-ʿArabi. After some thirty-five years, Sidiya returned to his home community, established his residence at Boutilimit, and, as a successful mediator, became wealthy from gifts of livestock, the revenues of gum and salt caravans, and the work of clients who cultivated his fields. The *shaykh* became the head of an association of believers who looked to him for guidance in political, economic, legal, and moral matters. As a successful social and economic organizer, Sidiya acquired a reputation as a miracle worker. After his death, his eldest son, Sidiya Baba (1862/63–1926), succeeded him. Even after France occupied Mauritania, Sidiya's family was able to maintain its political influence.

The Kunta *shaykhs* played critical religious, social, and economic roles. They served as judges and mediators. Their residences and sanctuaries (*zawiya* and *diya*) served as the equivalent of mosques and schools. Under their influence, Maliki law was reinvigorated, thus integrating Sudanic West Africa with the religious practices of North Africa. Under their auspices, the Qadiri Sufi order knit together the Muslim communities of Mauritania, Senegambia, the middle Niger, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. In economic matters, their earnings and the taxes they collected served as a system for the redistribution of products and incomes in place of a market economy.

Islamic law and Sufism were both essential for this worldly success. In the West African context, as in many other parts of the Muslim world, Sufism and saintly qualities did not imply retreat from but rather engagement in everyday life. Sufis were valued for their learning and for their charms, amulets, talismans, and practice of divination. Their religious knowledge encompassed not only Islamic scriptures but the secret worlds of the human mind. The Sufi mission was to purify the soul as the foundation of social reform and the defense of Islam. Although both Sufism and African cultures were agreed on the veneration of ancestors and holy men, in West Africa saint veneration did not lead to cults focused on tombs. Rather, Sufi virtue was expressed in study and teaching, healing, law, and politics and war.

Merchants and missionaries in the forest and coastal regions

From the Sahara and the savannah, African-Muslim merchants expanded into the forest and coastal regions to the south. The opportunity for trade in gold, kola nuts, and salt attracted Muslim merchants into the Volta River basin and the Guinean forests. The empire of Mali encouraged its merchants to establish colonies close to the Akan goldfields in what is now Ghana. Muslim merchants also opened up the trade in gold from the Lobi fields in Burkina Faso. Other traders came from Kanem, Bornu, and the Hausa city-states and moved into Gonja, Dagomba, and other parts of the Volta region. Towns like Kankan in modern Guinea, Bobo-Dyulasso in modern Ivory Coast, and Begho in modern Ghana originated in this way.

Some of these merchants were Soninke-speaking peoples linked by family ties and trading networks who became known as Wangara or Dyula (Juula). Their trading communities often developed agricultural interests and in some cases engaged in weaving and dyeing. With the Muslim merchant colonies came religious scholars and holy men, who organized festivals, offered prayers and divination at local courts, distributed talismans, and participated in anti-witchcraft rituals.

Muslims married local women and raised families, which were tied to the Muslim community through the fathers and to the local pagan communities through the mothers. The offspring of such marriages often inherited chieftainships and brought about the conversion of local peoples. As a result, Muslims in the middle Volta region were not a distinct language group but regarded themselves as part of the Dagomba, Gonja, or Mossi kingdoms.

The degree of Muslim integration into the larger African societies varied. Muslim religious influence was strongest in the kingdoms of Gonja and Dagomba. The Gonja state had been established toward the end of the sixteenth century by Mande warriors with the help of Muslim advisors and courtiers. Although the chiefs came under Muslim influence, they did not formally convert to Islam. Court ceremony and culture remained a mixture of Islamic and pagan

practices. The children of chiefs were circumcised and took Muslim names, but this was done in accordance with pagan ceremonies.

Islamic influence among the political elite spread from Gonja to Dagomba. The relatively centralized political system of Dagomba favored the spread of Islam. Because the state was divided into territorial and village chieftainships – each of which, in imitation of the royal court, sought the religious and magical support of Muslim clerics – a Muslim presence was established throughout the region. Sons of Dagomba chiefs who had no prospect of obtaining ruling positions commonly converted to Islam. The chiefs also gave their daughters in marriage to Muslims in order to draw the two estates closer together. By the end of the nineteenth century, many Dagomba families had Muslim members, and Muslims were considered part of the Dagomba people.

Dagomba chiefs adopted circumcision, Muslim names, the Muslim calendar, and Muslim festivals and burial practices. Maliki law influenced customary law, and pre-Islamic pagan festivals were merged into Muslim ones. In Dagomba Muslims performed important functions, such as circumcision, washing the dead, officiating over festivals, and slaughtering animals for meat. By the early nineteenth century imams were widely appointed in Dagomba villages. The imam of Yendi, the capital city, was the leader of Friday prayers and the enforcer of Muslim law. Muslim healers gained influence by providing amulets. Non-Muslims consulted them for herbal medicines and for nightlong prayer vigils to aid the supplicants.

In other places, such as Kong in the contemporary northeastern Ivory Coast, the Dyula were the forerunners of Islamized governments. Kong was a textile-producing town; a trading junction for kola nuts, gold, salt, and slaves; and a daily market where local villagers could sell their produce and buy salt and kola nuts from far away or locally produced textiles, iron tools, and pottery. It was also a center for Islamic studies. Attracted by the prosperity of the Dyula, non-Muslim warrior groups settled the region in the early seventeenth century. In the early eighteenth century, Shehu Watara (d. 1745) seized power with the help of the Dyula, who provided him amulets to assure his victory and horses and guns. In return they received

slaves. As a result of this alliance, the rulers brought Islamic cultural traits and Dyula teachers and traders into the villages.

In many West African areas, however, Muslims had little effect on the rest of the society. West of the Black Volta, Muslim trading communities remained isolated enclaves with their own neighborhoods, mosques, and schools and kept their own languages and a separate ethnic identity. Here Muslims were important as traders, courtiers, and religious magicians, but they had little missionary spirit and did not try to convert local peoples to Islam.

The Muslims of the Ashanti capital, Kumasi, were an example of Muslims living separate from and with little influence on other African communities. In the early nineteenth century, Kumasi had a Muslim community of about a thousand, drawn mostly from neighboring Gonja and Dagomba but also including Dyula from Senegal and Arabs from North Africa. The Muslims were headed by Muhammad al-Ghamba, who was imam and *qadi* and principal of a Quran school. The Kumasi Muslims acted as agents for the Ashanti princes in the gold, kola nut, slave, and salt trades and served Ashanti rulers as diplomats, bureaucrats, courtiers, soldiers, and religious functionaries. They provided amulets and performed rituals. In the late nineteenth century, strong reformist influences stimulated poetical and historical writing and raised Muslim exclusivist consciousness and a sense of commitment to Islam. Classical Middle Eastern and North African Arabic works and West African books produced outside the Ghana region were widely circulated. Despite the importance of Muslims, Ashanti culture was not notably influenced by Islam.

In general, the Dyula communities maintained a high standard of Muslim education. Students read Quran and commentary, hadith, and the life of the Prophet with a single teacher over a period varying from five to thirty years and earned their living as part-time farmers working on the lands of their teacher. Students and slaves provided low-cost labor for their teachers. The mature students were called *karamokos*, the equivalent of ʿulamaʾ. The *karamokos* often started their own schools in other villages and might eventually become imams or *qadis*.

Certain families provided scholars generation after generation. The Saghanughu was a Dyula lineage living in the northern and western Ivory Coast and in parts of upper Volta. The lineage may be traced back to Timbuktu, but its principal figure was Muhammad al-Mustafa Saghanughu, the imam of Bobo-Dyulasso, who died around 1776–77. He produced a system of education based on three canonical texts of Quran commentary and hadith. His sons continued his teachings, founding Muslim schools and acting as imams and *qadis* throughout the towns of Ghana and the Ivory Coast. In the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries, they sponsored a new wave of construction of mosques large enough for the whole of the Muslim population in several of the Guinean towns.

The Saghanughu continued the Suwarian tradition of accepting the existing political authorities and renouncing jihad, not even proselytizing peacefully to win converts to Islam. Muslims, they held, may accept the authority of non-Muslim rulers so long as they are allowed to pursue their own way of life in accordance with the sunna of the Prophet.

Senegambia

To the west and north of Ghana and the Ivory Coast, throughout Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Senegambia, Muslims also had a complex role to play. In Senegambia the legacy of the Takrur and Mali empires was faintly kept alive in a number of small-scale states. Kings stood at the apex of a political hierarchy, accumulating the loyalty of subordinate households and subgroups of herders, fishermen, or farmers. Vassals and slaves were the key to political and economic power.

Muslims were also organized by households and communities. By the eighteenth century there were important Muslim settlements in Kankan, the hinterlands of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro. These communities were typically constituted by holy lineages or were under the authority of marabouts or Sufi holy men who served as village chiefs, judges, and teachers. As early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there were numerous Mandinka

marabouts spread throughout the Wolof regions. The torodbe, the Muslim scholars of Futa Toro, were the leading element of peasant society.

In Senegambia, the Jakhanke were a prominent Muslim lineage living in scattered towns and villages. The various Jakhanke villages were independent of one another and of the local chiefs. They were committed to peaceful coexistence and refused to become engaged in politics or war. Often their villages enjoyed the privileges of sanctuary, judicial independence, and freedom from military service. The Jakhanke were agriculturists supported by slave labor, but they also engaged in trade, perhaps carried on in the course of journeys as traveling teachers.

The Jakhanke had a reputation for exceptional learning. They traced their spiritual ancestry to al-Hajj Salim Suwari, who probably lived in the late fifteenth century. They adhered to Maliki law, although they were tolerant of customary practice. They stressed the importance of obedience to the *murshid*, or Sufi master. They celebrated the birthday of the Prophet and the feasts of the end of Ramadan and other Muslim holidays. They interpreted dreams and gave amulets for protection. Although saint worship was not common in West Africa, they believed that the spirits of dead saints kept guard over their followers and interceded for them before God. The graves of al-Hajj Salim and other great teachers were centers for pilgrimage. In all but name the Jakhanke extended family was a Sufi lineage.

In these Muslim communities, the signature institution was the Quran school. The Quran school was not only a center of learning; it was a center for the exercise and transmission of *baraka* or blessing. Knowledge of the Quran was taught as memorization and correct pronunciation, which were themselves considered miraculous forces that improved intelligence and combated evil spirits. The teacher who had the most intimate knowledge of the divine text had the most powerful *baraka*. The Quran school for little children was a mild discipline; for older students it might demand harsh conditions of work and submission. Wolof teachers used both student and slave labor on their farms, as was widely done throughout Muslim Africa.

Muslims fit into the Wolof system in a variety of ways. Ordinary marabouts living in their own communities could, like other households, be represented at the royal court. Muslim clerics could not be part of the hierarchy of vassals and officeholders, but they were employed by kings and nobles as personal chaplains, scribes, legal advisors, and tutors. Sometimes the royal family promoted political marriages to consolidate their ties with the Muslim clergy. Sometimes the clerics were rewarded with land, which they might distribute to followers and disciples in their home communities. Only after the jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the whole of Wolof society converted to Islam.

In sum, by the end of the eighteenth century, Islam in West Africa was the religion of scattered groups of Tukulors and Songhays, Dyula trading colonies, and some Hausa towns, and of the dominant classes of the central Sudanic states. Islam also had a foothold among the Wolof, the Yoruba, and the Mossi. The Kunta, the Saghanughu, the Jakhanke, and others were closely linked by trading networks, affiliation with the Qadiriyya brotherhood, and shared religious and intellectual traditions.

The Muslim settlements were centers for the diffusion of Islamic and Arabic culture. Towns such as Timbuktu made the Quran, the sayings of the Prophet, and Islamic law familiar to local peoples. The translation of religious texts into vernacular Swahili, Wolof, Hausa, Somali, and Zenaga followed. Arabic had a strong influence on Fulbe, Wolof, and other African languages, which borrowed Arab and Muslim vocabulary and came to be written in Arabic script. Arabic was used to record family histories, dowries, debts, merchants' accounts, and information about trading itineraries. It became increasingly important as an ordinary means of communication for government and merchant elites.

The Muslim communities, to a limited degree, promoted the diffusion of Islam. The political elites sometimes forged alliances with Muslim clerics and traders. Agricultural communities might become Muslims when traditional groups broke down. Therefore, war, slave trading, and state formation favored Islam. Reciprocally, communities without extensive trading connections or political centralization found

it easier to preserve a non-Muslim identity. The durability of family and village institutions, the depth of African religious culture, and the strength of traditional authorities helped to maintain a non-Islamic African majority.

Chapter 41 The West African Jihads

Alongside peaceful Muslim colonization there was a parallel tradition of military campaigns to establish Muslim states and convert pagan populations to Islam. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth century, with the Almoravid movement as a shadowy precedent, jihads burst out from Mauritania to Chad. The jihads were led by Muslim scholars and teachers, the religious leaders of trading and agricultural communities, itinerant preachers, and their student followers. They were supported by the Fulbe, the Hausa, the Mande, the Wolof, and the Tuareg peoples: nomadic pastoralists, *'ulama'*, Sufi disciples, and slaves. As Muslim teachers articulated the hardships of ordinary people, they both radicalized Islamic teaching and mobilized popular support.

The jihads took their immediate inspiration from the militant reformers of the fifteenth century such as al-Maghili (d. c. 1503–06). In the fifteenth century, al-Maghili had denounced the corrupt and un-Islamic practices of West African Muslim states. He condemned illegal taxation and the seizure of private property and denounced pagan ceremonial practices and "venal" *mallams* (religious scholars) who served rulers without adequate knowledge of Arabic or Islam. Al-Maghili called for the implementation of Muslim law by a strong and committed Muslim ruler and introduced into West Africa the concept of the *mujaddid*, the renewer of Islam. The pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina also brought West African scholars into contact with reformist Sufi circles, and perhaps with the radical views of the Wahhabi movement in Arabia.

The first West African jihad took place in Mauritania and represented the resistance of Berbers to the dominance of the Arab Banu Ma'qil. Imam Nasir al-Din (d. 1674) denounced the rulers for failing to perform the prayers, consorting with musicians and jugglers, and pillaging the people. He claimed to have been sent by God to stop the oppression. He called himself *almami* (imam) and *amir al-*

mu'minin, the traditional title of Muslim caliphs; proclaimed the end of time and the coming of the messiah (Mahdi); and demanded that his followers conform to the teachings of the Quran. His followers swept through southern Mauritania in 1673, but Nasir al-Din was killed in 1674, and the movement was defeated by 1677. The outcome of the war was the lasting military dominance of the Arab tribes over the Berbers. Forced to pay tribute to the Arab Hassanis, the Berbers (*zawaya*) concentrated on economic activities, engaging in the mining and marketing of salt and gum arabic, maintaining wells, organizing caravans, and raising livestock. They also took up the roles of judges and religious teachers. The *zawaya* would continue the struggle for Islamic principles and later give rise to both peaceful missionary movements and new jihads in Senegal.

The Senegambian Jihads

From Mauritania the jihads spilled out into Senegambia. The jihads in Senegambia were promoted by the emissaries of Nasir al-Din, preaching among Fulbe pastoralists and the villages of Futa Toro against the tyranny of the rulers. In the Wolof- and Pulaar-speaking regions of Senegal, the ruling dynasties of Cayor, Walo, Jolof, and Futa Toro were overthrown. By 1680, however, the political elites, with support from French trading interests based in Saint-Louis, regained power. Then a jihad led by the torodbe (the clerical wing of the Fulbe) in Bundu founded a Muslim regime in the 1680s or 1690s. Although they spoke Fulbe as a common language, the torodbe had no ethnic or tribal identity. Some torodbe were supported by the work of students or slaves and the contributions of artisans, but many were wandering beggars. In the early part of the eighteenth century, new jihads, led by the torodbe, were waged against the Wolof, Jalonke, and Deniake dynasties.

In Futa Jallon the jihads were due to torodbe-led Fulbe peasants and herders in conflict with the dominant landlords. Uprooted peoples, outlaws, vagrants, and runaway slaves were attracted to their ranks. In 1726 Ibrahim Musa, known as Karamoko Alfa (d. 1751), proclaimed a holy war and took the title of *almami*. He

gathered the support of young men's gangs, renegades, and slaves and began a long struggle against the political elites.

The Muslims finally prevailed in 1776, when Ibrahim Sori (r. 1776–93) was named *almami*. The *almami* was selected alternately from among the descendants of Ibrahim Musa and Ibrahim Sori; the former tended to represent the more pacific tradition of Muslim learning; the latter, the more aggressive tradition of jihad. Under the authority of the *almamis* the provinces were ruled by appointed governors, and the family hamlets were ruled by local chiefs and councils of elders. The most important state activity was jihad, which was the source of slaves for export and for use on agricultural plantations. The central power, however, was gravely weakened by the emergence of a landowning aristocracy descended from the original jihad warriors and by succession disputes between the two families that provided the *almamis*. Futa Jallon eventually became a French protectorate in 1881 and recognized French suzerainty in 1896/97.

In the second part of the eighteenth century, militant Islam gave rise to a new pious literature written in Fulfulde. Poems were composed to mobilize the common people.

The jihads in Futa Jallon were followed by a new wave of jihads in Futa Toro, in the valley of the Senegal River, under the leadership of Sulayman Bal (d. 1776) and his successor ʿAbd al-Qadir (1776–1806), a highly educated teacher, judge, and mediator, closely related to the Senegambian and Guinean network of Muslim teachers. The new jihadist state encouraged the construction of mosques and furthered settlement of the river frontiers with Mauritania. It invoked jihad to attack the Moors in 1786 and by 1790 had invaded Walo, Jolof, and Cayor. After a critical defeat in 1790, the *almamate* disintegrated. The death of Almamy Abdul in 1807 marked the end of strong central government in Futa Toro. The torodbe intermarried with the former rulers, seized land, and became an elite of local chieftains. Although *almamis* continued to be appointed throughout the nineteenth century, they no longer had any political power. However, memory of the early successes would again inspire jihads in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The wars in Futa Toro were the inspiration for another century of jihads all across the western and central Sudan. The first of these was the jihad of 'Uthman don Fodio, which led to the formation of the Sokoto caliphate in northern Nigeria. This was followed by the caliphate of Hamdullahi on the middle Niger, which was replaced in the 1860s by the empire of Shaykh 'Umar Taal, extending from the upper Niger to the upper Senegal. From the 1870s to the 1890s, Samori Ture built a small empire in what is now upper Guinea-Conakry and Ghana. In the late nineteenth century similar religious revolutions broke out in the smaller states along the Gambia and in present-day Senegal. From Cape Verde to Lake Chad, the western and central Sahara was remade in the name of Islam.

In the central Sudan as in Senegambia, the jihads were led by Muslim clerics. Such teachers as Jibril b. 'Umar had traveled to Mecca and Medina, where they were influenced by reformist Sufi views. They returned to preach the principles of obedience to the Quran, the tradition of the Prophet, and the rule of Shari'a. Some of the leaders claimed that they had been entrusted with this mission by the Prophet himself, and/or that they were the heirs of Sufi *shaykhs* descended from him. They also taught the doctrine of the double jihad: the inner jihad, the struggle against the corruption of the body, must precede the outer jihad, the war against corrupt Muslim governments and pagan rulers. Hijra, migration to a true Muslim community, and jihad, a war in the name of the faith, were overriding obligations. For them Islam was an exclusive religion incompatible with African cults. They introduced a universalistic and theocratic concept of Islam as the supreme arbiter of social life and as the transforming force in the lives of individuals. This message was preached with messianic fervor. Throughout West and Central Africa, the thirteenth Muslim century (corresponding to the nineteenth century) was expected to mark the victory of Islam over the infidel world. This was to be the age of the *mujaddid*, or renewer of Islam, who comes once every century, and of the caliph of Takrur, the twelfth caliph, whose rule would be followed by the coming of the messiah.

'Uthman don Fodio and the Sokoto Caliphate

'Uthman don Fodio (1754–1817) was the greatest of these new leaders. 'Uthman was a descendant of a torodbe family that was well established in Hausaland, and a student of Jibril b. 'Umar, who was an uncompromising opponent of corrupt practices and a proponent of jihad. He began his African preaching in 1774–75, wandering from place to place as an itinerant *mallam*. For a time he accepted the patronage of the Hausa state of Gobir. But, publicly expressing his frustration with the failure of the rulers to put Islam into practice, 'Uthman criticized the Hausa rulers for unjust and illegal taxes, confiscations of property, compulsory military service, bribery, gift taking, and the enslavement of Muslims. He also criticized them for condoning polytheism, worshiping fetishes, and believing in the power of talismans, divination, and conjuring. Another strand in his preaching derived from the tradition of Maliki law, communicated through Timbuktu and Bornu and reinforced by reformist religious currents emanating from Mecca and Medina. He insisted on the observance of Islamic commercial, criminal, and personal law. 'Uthman denounced pagan customs, the free socializing of men and women, dancing at bridal feasts, and inheritance practices that were contrary to Muslim law. 'Uthman broke with the royal court. Disillusioned, he returned to Degel to preach to his followers. As in other Islamic societies, the autonomy of Muslim communities under *'ulama'* leadership made it possible to resist the state and the state version of Islam in the name of the Shari'a and the ideal caliphate.

'Uthman was also motivated by mystical visions. In 1789 a vision led him to believe he had the power to work miracles, and to teach his own mystical *wird*, or litany. He later had visions of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the founder of the Qadiri brotherhood, and an experience of ascension to heaven, where he was initiated into the Qadiriyya and the spiritual lineage of the Prophet. His theological writings dealt with the concepts of the renewer (*mujaddid*) and the role of *'ulama'* in teaching the true faith. Out of these concerns, 'Uthman produced numerous tracts on political theory, biographies, histories, and other works in Arabic and Fulbe. Many people regarded him as the Mahdi (messiah) come in fulfillment of popular prophecies.

'Uthman's appeal to justice and morality rallied the outcasts of Hausa society. He found his followers among the Fulbe or Fulani. Primarily cattle pastoralists, they were dependent on peasants for access to riverbeds and grazing lands and were taxed accordingly. The leadership, however, came from the clerics living in rural communities who were Fulfulde speakers and closely connected to the pastoralists. The Fulani would later hold the most important offices of the new states. Hausa peasants, runaway slaves, itinerant preachers, and others also responded to 'Uthman's preaching. His jihad served to integrate a number of peoples into a single religio-political movement.

In 1804, the conflict between 'Uthman and the rulers of Gobir came into the open. The rulers forbade Muslims to wear turbans and veils, prohibited conversions, and ordered converts to return to their old religion. 'Uthman declared the hijra and moved from Degel to Gudu, where he was elected imam, *amir al-mu'minin*, and *sarkin muslim* – head of the Muslim community. There he declared the jihad. By 1808 'Uthman had defeated the rulers of Gobir, Kano, Katsina, and other Hausa states. He expanded into the territory south of Lake Chad and into Nupe and Yorubaland as far as the forest zone. By 1830 the jihad had engulfed most of what are now northern Nigeria and the northern Cameroons.

The regime founded by 'Uthman is known as the caliphate of Sokoto. 'Uthman was caliph; his brother 'Abdallah, based in Gwandu, and his son Muhammad Bello, based in Sokoto, were his viceroys. 'Uthman retired to teaching and writing, and in 1817 Muhammad Bello succeeded him. Sokoto was a combination of an Islamic state and a modified Hausa monarchy. Bello introduced an Islamic administration. Muslim judges, market inspectors, and prayer leaders were appointed, and an Islamic tax and land system was instituted with revenues on the land considered *kharaj* and the fees levied on individual subjects called *jizya*, as in classical Islamic times. The Fulani cattle-herding nomads were sedentarized and converted to sheep and goat raising as part of an effort to bring them under the rule of Muslim law.

Although the Hausa people continued to retain much of their pre-Islamic culture, including traditional medicine, folklore, music, and dancing, Islamic mores were well established by the end of the nineteenth century. Mosques and schools were built to teach the populace Islam. The state patronized large numbers of religious scholars (*mallams*). The jihad movement helped to fortify the practice of Islamic law in Hausaland. Kano became famous for law, Zaria for Arabic grammar, and Sokoto for mysticism. Sufism became widespread. The Muslim revival also generated a theological, legal, astrological, and vernacular poetic literature in the Hausa language. Most important books were written in Arabic or Hausa, although texts designed for recitation were also composed in Fulfulde. The poetry of Nana Asmaʿu, ʿUthman's daughter, in Fulfulde, Hausa, and Arabic, and her teacher training programs helped diffuse knowledge of Islam.

Under the authority of the caliphate, the territories were divided into emirates appointed by and responsible to the caliphs. (See Illustration 20.) The power of the amirs was based on military force, but they governed with the aid of the Fulani lineages and the advice of the *mallams*. Each emirate had a judicial officer with the title of *alkali* or *qadi*, and there were minor judges in the countryside appointed by local chiefs. Although the caliphs issued orders to the amirs, there were no Sokoto officials resident in the provincial capitals to enforce them. Many emirates corresponded to the former Hausa states and accepted Hausa methods of administration and palace organization. Officials maintained large polygynous households staffed with concubines and servants. The wives of the major officeholders were kept in purdah.

Illustration 20. Hausa horsemen during tenth-anniversary-of-independence celebration, Niamey, Niger. *Source*: Photograph by Eliot Elisofon, 1970. EEPA EENG 02671, Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution.

For rural administration the emirates were divided into fiefs, some of which were controlled by the rulers and some by local Fulani chiefs. Village chiefs administered their subjects through appointed ward heads and through the chiefs of organized craftsmen. The crafts were also the fiefs of officials who were responsible for the collection of taxes, observance of Muslim law, and maintenance of public property, such as mosques, roads, and walls. The fact that the greater part of the territory nominally ruled by Sokoto remained in the hands of local fief holders and chieftains meant that Islamic ideas were only occasionally applied in the provinces. Government by

secular-minded Fulani chieftains led quickly away from Muslim norms, and many of the practices that had been criticized by the Muslims flourished again.

The economy of the Sokoto caliphate was based on slave villages or plantations. First developed in the Sokoto region after 1760 (and again after the jihad of 1804–08), the plantations produced cotton, indigo, grain, rice, tobacco, kola nuts, and other crops. The plantation economy flourished until the late nineteenth century, when colonial rule and the suppression of slavery allowed for a revitalization of the peasant economy. Slave labor was also used for construction of defenses, houses, and mosques. The state also promoted indigo and textile industries. Trade within West Africa and between West Africa and North Africa flourished. Hausa traders expanded their range of operations to the frontiers of the empire and exported cloth to other areas of the Sudan and ivory and oils to Europe.

The jihad inspired by 'Uthman also helped spread Islam into southern Nigeria and inspired other jihads in the western Sudan and Senegambia. With the help of the Sokoto caliphate, Muslims won control of Ilorin, and Muslim quarters were formed in Abeokuta, Lagos, and other towns. Their communities were organized under the leadership of imams, who led the prayers and festivals and mediated disputes.

The influence of the Sokoto caliphate also reached Bornu. Bornu was already a center of Muslim learning, but it had a substantial Fulani population aggrieved by landlord domination. Inspired by 'Uthman, the Fulani rose up to attack their rulers. Bornu, however, successfully resisted the jihad by revitalizing its own Muslim credentials. Al-Kanemi, a *mallam* living in Ngala, helped the rulers to defeat the Fulani and became the most powerful chieftain in Bornu. In 1814 he built his own town, Kukawa, appointed his own officials, and essentially displaced the former rulers. The new regime was built on an aristocracy consisting of the royal family, courtiers, and nobles called *kogonas*, but it also appointed *qadis* and imams. It had a double structure of administration. One system was applied to the control of territories and all the resident populations; the other was directed to clans and ethnic and craft associations. The existence of

both territorial and group administrations indicates a society in transition from clan-lineage to territorial forms of organization.

Still other jihads led to the formation of Muslim states south of Lake Chad in Air, north of Sokoto among the Tuaregs, and in Masina. The Masina state, south of Timbuktu (in what is now Mali), was led by Ahmad Lobbo, had its capital at Hamdallahi, and lasted from 1816 to 1861. It was based on a highly organized army supported by a system of granaries created to provision the soldiers and spare the local population from abuse. A council of state was made up of religious teachers; the local administrative apparatus was filled with relatives and clients of the leading counselors. New morals legislation introduced controls over women and suppressed fortune-telling, tobacco smoking, and prostitution.

The jihad of al-Hajj ʿUmar

The jihads of the central Sudan indirectly inspired a revival of jihad in the Senegambian region. Al-Hajj ʿUmar (1794?–1864) was born in Futa Toro, became one of the torodbe, and in 1826 made the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he was initiated into the Tijaniyya. He returned as the order's *khalifa* (successor of the Prophet) for the Sudan. He stayed in Sokoto from 1831 to 1837 and married a daughter of Muhammad Bello. In 1840 he settled in Jagunku on the frontiers of Futa Jallon, where he could preach to local peoples. Growing tension with the leaders of Futa Jallon forced him to move in 1851 to Dingiray, where he began the militant phase of his mission. There he organized his followers into a professional army equipped with French weapons. In 1852 he proclaimed a jihad against pagan peoples, lapsed Muslims, European intruders, and the backsliding rulers of Futa Toro and Futa Jallon.

ʿUmar claimed a transcendental personal authority. He denied the importance of adherence to a school of law and favored *ijtihad* or personal religious judgment. He taught that a believer should follow the guidance of a Sufi *shaykh* who has immediate personal knowledge of the divine truth. ʿUmar claimed the titles of *amir al-muʾminin*, *khalifa*, *qutb* (pole of the universe), and vizier of the Mahdi.

Although 'Umar never took the title of either *mujaddid* or Mahdi, he assumed the title of *Khalifat Khatim al-Awlyya'* (successor of the Seal of Saints), a Tijani-Sufi title. He claimed to possess divine guidance in times of difficulty. His followers regarded him as their *almami* and reviver of the eighteenth-century revolutions.

'Umar appealed to the populace of Futa Toro on the basis of local grievances against the military elites. His community also appealed to rootless individuals of mixed ethnic background who found new social identity and opportunities for conquest under the aegis of Islam. He came to embody the torodbe ideal of religious revival and conquest of pagans.

His jihad began with the conquest of Futa Toro. By 1862 his empire included Timbuktu, Masina, Hamdallahi, and Segu. In Futa Toro, however, he came into conflict with the French, who were attempting to establish their commercial supremacy along the Senegal River. In 1857 they defeated 'Umar in a battle at Medina, and in 1860 'Umar made a treaty with the French that recognized their sphere of influence in Futa Toro and assigned him the Bambara states of Kaarta and Segu. In quest of new territory, 'Umar and masses of followers invaded Masina. His enemies, led by Ahmad al-Kunta al-Bakka'i (of the Qadiri order), denounced this as an illegitimate war of Muslims on Muslims and promoted a coalition of local states, including Masina and Timbuktu, to resist. 'Umar's enemies defeated and killed him in 1864, but his followers captured Hamdallahi and established a state that lasted until 1893. With the state in disarray, local chieftains took to raiding to support their troops. Muslim jihad shaded over into a purely military exploitation of the surrounding peoples. Finally, the jihad state was absorbed into the growing French West African empire.

'Umar was strongly influenced not only by West African concepts but also by the teachings of the Tijaniyya and of other reformist movements, which stressed the importance of strict obedience to Muslim practice. 'Umar's state forbade dancing and the use of tobacco, alcohol, and charms and prohibited pagan ceremonies and the worship of idols. Many un-Islamic practices were banned. The prohibition on drinking of alcohol was strictly enforced; he abolished

uncanonical taxes and replaced them with the *zakat* (tithe), *kharaj* (land tax), and *jizya*. Polygamists were restricted to four wives. However, 'Umar seems to have had little interest in the practical aspects of inculcating Islam, such as building courts, schools, and mosques. The primary function of the state was predatory warfare, slaving, the accumulation of booty, and the reform of morals. (See Map 24.)

Map 24. The jihad states of the nineteenth century.

The late nineteenth-century jihads

After 'Umar's death, jihad flared again in other parts of Senegambia. In the nineteenth century Muslim influence increased further, owing to the suppression of the slave trade and the growth of the peanut, oil, and soap industries, which favored the economic and political power of the peasantry. Islam provided the idiom for peasant resistance to the military elites and for the integration of peasants and traders into a larger economy.

The great Senegambian jihad of this period was led by Ma Ba (c. 1809–67), a Quran teacher and the founder of an independent settlement. Rebelling against *tyeddo* (military) domination, his followers swept through Senegambia, burning villages, killing pagans, and enslaving their enemies. Ma Ba himself never actively participated in battle and retired whenever possible from political affairs, but the cumulative effect of the Senegambian jihads was the substantial conversion of the Wolof to Islam.

Jihad also spread into the stateless regions of the upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea. The torodbe revolutionary tradition was kept alive by Mahmadu Lamin of Senegambia (1885–88). The most important campaigns in this region were launched in Guinea by Mori-Ule Sise, who gathered bandits, vagrants, and other rootless people; built the city of Medina; and launched a jihad in 1835 in the region of Toron and Konyan. Defeated and killed in 1845, he was succeeded by a local adventurer named Samori Ture (1879–98).

Samori was born in about 1830 of a Dyula family. He served the Medina state; engaged in various local struggles, sometimes on the pagan side; and worked relentlessly to enlarge his personal army. In 1871, he gained control over the Milo River valley, seized Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power holder on the upper Niger. By 1883 he had brought under his control the local chieftains in the territory southwest of ʿUmar's state and founded the kingdom of Wasulu.

This new state was governed by Samori and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancery and the treasury and administered justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. The army was the essential institution. Samori imported horses and weapons and modernized his army along European lines. Samori attempted to convert his regime into an Islamic state. In 1884 he took the title of *almami*, opened Muslim schools, forbade the use of alcohol, and required his followers to pray. He destroyed pagan sacred groves and cult symbols and forbade pagan worship. Muslim teachers and holy men were posted as officials in non-Muslim areas to enforce the Shariʿa, and defeated peoples were forced to convert to Islam. Dyula traders supported Samori because of his

encouragement of commerce, although they did not play a central part in the creation of the state. His Muslim policy, however, eventually led in 1888 to revolts that forced him to tolerate pagan religious associations and cults.

Samori's would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who pushed him eastward to the upper Volta and the Ivory Coast, where he conquered new territories and set up a new state between 1892 and 1896. In this eastern zone, Samori came into conflict with both the French and the British. The French took Sikasso in 1898 and sent Samori into exile, where he died in 1900.

Jihad and conversion

With the defeat of Samori, the era of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jihads came to an end. Beginning in the western territories of Mauritania and Senegambia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had spread throughout Sudanic and Guinean Africa in the nineteenth century. These movements represented an uprising of Muslim religious teachers and their followers against the military elites. The uprisings, however, took various forms. Most common were the revolts of Fulani pastoral peoples against landowning elites in Bundu, Futa Jallon, Hausaland, Bornu, Fombina, and other places. In some cases Muslim Fulanis formed coalitions with non-Muslim Fulani clans or with Muslim communities formed of uprooted peoples, former slaves, and oppressed peasants. In other cases the jihads represented peasant rebellions. Throughout Senegambia, Muslims who opposed the *tyeddo* slave military elite overthrew their masters. In some of the Wolof-inhabited parts of Senegal, the Muslim assault overthrew the old social structure and paved the way for massive conversions. In the Volta region, Ivory Coast, and Guinea, Dyula peoples established independent states.

The Muslim mission involved not only local social struggles but also wars of expansion and conquest. In certain cases, such as that of Samori in Guinea, revolts in the name of Islam were the work of military adventurers manipulating Muslim symbols. Throughout West

Africa, Islam had become the almost-universal language of political ambition and moral reform.

In many cases Islam provided for the unification of heterogeneous peoples and the creation of new state-centered societies. As a result of the jihads, Muslim populations were consolidated in much of what are now northern Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Gambia, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. New states were also founded in Masina, parts of Guinea, and Senegambia. The formation of these states led to the conversion of local peoples to Islam. Parts of Senegambia and Masina became Muslim. Converts were made among the Fulani, Soninke, and Wolof peoples. Conquest was accompanied by educational and missionary activities promoting literacy and scholarship. During the spread of Islam, not only conquest but the enslavement of substantial populations led to conversions, as slaves took up the religion of their masters or sought emancipation through conversion.

The widespread conversion of Sudanic farmers marks the breakdown of the traditional order of society and the emergence of Islam as a principal organizing force in the creation of new societies. Whereas Islam had frequently been adopted as an imperial cult without being spread among the subjects, the nineteenth-century jihads created Islamic states that sought to include the whole population rather than a limited aristocracy, and to create a political people out of smaller groups of diverse racial, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds.

Yet the successes of Islamization did not break down the profoundly rooted African culture. Traditional religions and social loyalties maintained their hold on a great part of the population. Furthermore, at the very moment when masses of Sudanese peoples were being converted to Islam, Muslim expansion was being checked by European intervention. By the late nineteenth century the French had taken possession of Senegal and of the state founded by ʿUmar, and they subsequently defeated Samori in 1898. The British defeated the Sokoto caliphate in 1903. The great century of jihads came to an end with the defeat of all the Muslim states and their absorption into European colonial empires.

Chapter 42 Islam in East Africa and the European colonial empires

East Africa, including the eastern Sudan, the East African coasts, and the hinterlands of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, formed another major zone of Muslim population. Here the sources of Islamic influences were primarily Egypt, Arabia, and the Indian Ocean region, rather than North Africa. (See Map 25.)

Map 25.   East Africa.

Sudan

The history of the eastern Sudan (the modern state of Sudan) was separate from that of the central and western Sudan, due to the fact that Islam reached the eastern Sudan from Egypt rather than from North Africa. Over centuries Arab-Muslims moved deeper and

deeper into Sudan. The Arab-Muslim conquerors occupied Egypt as far as Aswan in 641. In the ninth century, Egyptians swarmed to the newly discovered Allaqi goldfields between the Nile and the Red Sea. An early pact, renewed in 975, between Egypt and the king of Maqurra, the northern provinces of the Sudan, provided for a tribute of slaves in exchange for wheat and wine for the Christian Eucharist and for free passage of merchants. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Arab bedouins migrated south and married into local families, who adopted Arabic and were drawn into the Islamic cultural orbit. Through matrilineal succession, their children inherited local chieftainships. Arab penetration was followed by the Mamluk conquest of Nubia in 1276, the first of a number of campaigns lasting through the fourteenth century. In 1317 the church of Dongola was rededicated as a mosque. Most of the country, however, was in the hands of local Arab tribal chiefs who continued to push south across northern Kordofan and Darfur and into the Chad basin. In 1517 the Ottoman sultan, Selim I, occupied Nubia as far as the third cataract of the Nile. Nubia remained under Ottoman rule for some 300 years.

While Arabs were pushing south, herding peoples from the region of the Blue Nile, called Funj, were pushing north. The first historically known Funj ruler, Amara Dunqas, defeated the Christian kingdom of Aiwa in 1504 and founded Sinnar as the capital of a Funj kingdom that reached north to the third cataract, south to the foothills of Ethiopia, and east to the desert of Kordofan. Its rulers were Muslims and used Arabic as the lingua franca of trade, although the court at Sinnar continued to speak Funj. Only in the eighteenth century did state documents appear in Arabic.

The Funj monarchy was a patrimonial regime built on a Sudanese concept of semidivine kingship. The public appearance of the sultans was accompanied by pomp and ceremony, but Funj rulers spent most of their reigns secluded from public view. The ruler was in principle absolute but was in practice very much under the sway of his ministers, courtiers, and family. Provincial nobles lived in castles supported by their own slave retainers. Provincial nobles, however, had to appear before the sultan each year to perform obeisance, account for their behavior, and deliver tribute. Each lesser lord was

also required to take a wife from the royal family so that every vassal was related to the ruler. The ruling community formed a caste-like group that avoided intermarriage with the local population. The Funj sultanate reached its maximum power in the reign of Badi II (1644–80). In the mid-eighteenth century, the state disintegrated into regional warlord-ships, supported by rich merchants and landowners.

Islam spread in the Funj sultanate not only as the result of its acceptance by the governing elite and the trading communities but also as the result of the migration of Muslim scholars and holy men into the region. In the sixteenth century Funj patronage attracted scholars from Egypt, North Africa, and Arabia. These holy men, known locally as *faqis*, were scholars of the Quran and Muslim law and Sufi mystics and magicians. The *faqis* gained considerable influence, because they could intercede with and even rebuke the rulers, and because they were venerated by the common people for their magical powers. Many *faqis* were merchants who founded lineages, settled in villages, established schools, and won the populace over to Islam. Their *zawiyas* were residences and places of prayer in which the holy men lived surrounded by their families, servants, and disciples. Their schools (*khalwas*) taught young boys the Quran, law, and Muslim theology. In time the *zawiyas* grew into colonies and villages in which the descendants of the original holy men maintained a spiritual or temporal authority. They administered Maliki law, arbitrated local disputes, and instructed the people in Islam. They were believed to possess *baraka*, the power given by God to perform miracles. The eastern Sudanic *faqis* were also members of the Sufi brotherhoods. The Shadhiliyya was brought into the Sudan in the fifteenth century, the Qadiriyya in the middle of the sixteenth, and the Majdhubiyya in the eighteenth.

The Funj kingdom depended for its economic viability on the gold trade. All gold mined within the kingdom belonged to the sultan, who also organized long-distance commerce. Important revenues came from customs dues levied on the caravan routes leading to Egypt and the Red Sea ports and on the pilgrimage traffic from the Western Sudan. In the late seventeenth century the Funj opened trading

relations with the Ottoman Empire. By 1700, with the introduction of coinage, an unregulated market system took hold, and the sultans lost control of trade to a new merchant middle class. At the same time, civil wars forced the peasants to look to the holy men for protection; the sultans lost the peasant population to the *faqis*.

The autonomy of provincial vassals, merchant communities, and *faqis* and their peasant clients subverted the power of the Funj sultanate. After a long and fitful history, the Funj kingdom disintegrated in the eighteenth century. The system of marriage alliances and princely hostages on which the power of the state depended broke down; local dynasties became autonomous. The Funj kingdom was finally brought to an end by the Egyptian conquest of 1820–21. Muhammad ʿAli, the ruler of Egypt, established a government of Egyptian and Turkish officers based in the new city of Khartoum to exact tribute in slaves for the Egyptian army. The Egyptians created a counter-religious elite to the *faqis* by setting up a hierarchy of judges (*qadis*) and muftis and a new court system, and by educating young Sudanese scholars at al-Azhar in Cairo.

Darfur

The Arabization and Islamization of Funj was followed by the spread of Islam and the formation of kingdoms further south and west. In Darfur, the Keira lineage of the Fur peoples established a new dynasty in the late sixteenth century and inherited Sudanic concepts of divine kingship. Between 1660 and 1680 Sulayman made Islam the royal cult, built mosques, and added Shariʿa principles to his claims to legitimacy. Arabic became the language of the chancery; Fur remained the spoken language of the court.

At the end of the eighteenth century ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Rashid (r. 1786/87–1800/01) consolidated the Darfur sultanate around a palace complex called al-Fashir. Al-Fashir was the hub of administration, a training ground for officers and courtiers, a center for the redistribution of goods, a final court of justice, and a stage for festivals, ceremonies, and parades. An important part of the economy was the trade in slaves and ivory. The Keira dynasty ruled

their Fur subjects through a centralized administrative hierarchy, but their non-Fur subjects, the majority of the population, were divided into five provinces ruled by local chieftains. In the late eighteenth century the central government attempted to replace the traditional territorial leaders with the sultan's slaves and clients, including merchants and Muslim holy men. The new elite progressively took control of outlying areas. The rulers also rewarded their retainers with landed estates and slaves. The land grantees, however, made their holdings hereditary, married into the local elites, and emerged as a quasi-independent aristocracy. Islam came to be identified, as in Funj, with a middle class of merchants, jurists, and officials.

The political consolidation of Darfur was accompanied by further Islamization. Through the protection and patronage of the sultans, and under the stimulus of trade with Egypt, traders and Sufis from the northern Sudan, Egypt, Arabia, and West Africa settled in Darfur. In eastern Darfur Muslim holy men married local women and opened *khalwas* and mosques. Young boys left home to study with the *faqis* and cultivate their fields, and they then returned home to further spread the teachings of the faith. These holy men sustained the regime by creating nontribal communities, and by providing it with legitimizing genealogies and proper Arabic documents. The Muslim holy men were particularly successful in consolidating their local power. Endowed with land, subjects, and immunities, they became in effect independent local rulers. Nineteenth-century sultans attempted to bring the holy men under bureaucratic control, and after 1898 the *faqis* were organized district by district under supervisors responsible for their discipline.

The coastal cities and Swahili Islam

On the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean another form of Islamic civilization came into being as a result of the contacts of Muslim merchants and teachers with indigenous African societies. As early as the seventh century, Arab and Persian seafaring merchants from the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean had established trading posts along the shores and islands of the East African coast.

Muslim burials on Shanga date from 780 to 850 CE. Muslims settled Pemba and Zanzibar soon after. By the tenth century, there were Arab merchants from Aden, Yemen, Hadramawt, and Oman in Mogadishu, Brava, and Merka. Muslims reached the Comoro Islands and Madagascar by the eleventh century, but on Madagascar Arab immigrants were gradually assimilated, and Islam did not displace the local Malagasy cultures. It left only the Arabic script, vague echoes of the Quran, and some magical practices.

There were no Muslim communities on the southern coast before 1100. After 1100 the Muslim presence began to expand, stimulated by intensified trade. In the twelfth century, when the first mosques were built, Zanzibar became the most important Muslim settlement. By 1200 Persian merchants and Afro-Shirazis ruled the islands of Mafia and Pemba and the coastal town of Kilwa. The earliest mosque at Kilwa dates to the thirteenth century. By the thirteenth century, there were some three dozen towns between Mogadishu and Kilwa, the most important of which were Malindi, Mombasa, Zanzibar, and Sofala. Muslim migrants had come from the towns on the Somali coast, Oman, and Iran, but the early settlers were superseded in influence in the thirteenth century by migrants from Yemen and Hadramawt. By the fifteenth century, there were about forty Arab settlements or petty sultanates on the East African coast and islands.

The period of greatest prosperity for the East African coastal towns was roughly 1250 to 1500 CE. By 1300, Mogadishu, Malindi, Mombasa, Pemba, Mozambique, and Sofala were linked into the Indian Ocean trade. These towns traded with Arabia and the Persian Gulf and via Indonesian intermediaries with China. Kilwa exported copper; Malindi and Mombasa, iron; and Mogadishu, cloth. Tortoise shells, rhinoceros horns, amber, leopard skins, slaves, ivory, and gold were traded. There were also extensive coconut-palm, orange, sugarcane, rice, and sesame cultivations along the coast. As Kilwa prospered, stone palaces, city walls, and a Friday mosque were constructed; copper coins were minted. By the end of the century a stone mosque was built, with domes in the Indian style.

The small towns running along the 2,000 miles of the East African coast from Moghadishu in the north to Sofala in the south were essentially autonomous entities but shared many elements of common culture. Little is known about the political system of these towns, but it may be surmised that they were composed of lineages. Each town may have had a council of clan chiefs, although such councils were probably superseded by a dominant lineage or by an outside Arab or Persian chief who became ruler and mediator among the local clans. The rulers were legitimized in terms both of hereditary succession and of African symbols.

By 1400 Islam had become the religion of most of the coastal peoples. Ibn Battuta, who visited around 1332, saw the towns at the height of their prosperity and culture. He described Mogadishu as a Muslim community with a madrasa, scholars of Shafiʿi law, and a community of descendants of the Prophet. It was ruled by a sultan and officials called *wazirs*, amirs, *qadis*, and *muhtasibs*, using the traditional vocabulary for administrators, military officers, judges, and market inspectors. It showed South Arabian influences in court ceremony.

Swahili was the common language of speech, and Arabic was used primarily for religious texts and correspondence. An earlier generation of scholars regarded Swahili East African coastal Islamic society as a colonial society based on the settlement of Arab or Persian migrants amid a primitive African population. The Swahili language and culture was thought to be the product of the assimilation of Africans into an Arab-Muslim or Persian-Muslim society. More recent scholarship stresses the indigenous African basis of Swahili civilization. The archeological evidence reveals a pre-Islamic urban society inhabiting mud-and-thatched-hut settlements with some stone buildings. Most of these settlements were agricultural, growing fruit, rice, millet, and cotton, and keeping livestock. A few, on the islands, were oriented to commerce. Some southern towns, such as Kilwa, ruled by African chiefs, traded in the Indian Ocean. In these already-developed societies, Arab and Persian migrants took local women as concubines, married into local families, and spawned a Muslim-African culture in language,

architecture, and dress. They produced the local variations of Arab-Islamic, Persian-Islamic (Shirazi), mixed-Arab, Somali and Ethiopian (Zeilwali), and Swahili (a mixture of Arab and Bantu) cultures. The rise of an East African Islamic civilization, then, was due in part to migration, settlement, and the founding of new towns and in part to the further development of a previously established society.

This prosperous East African society was destroyed by the Portuguese. Vasco da Gama discovered the region in 1498, and he was followed by a Portuguese campaign to control the Indian Ocean and the Eastern spice trade. Admiral d'Almeida took Kilwa in 1505 and sacked Mombasa. By 1530 the Portuguese controlled the entire coast, basing themselves on the offshore islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and other places. The Portuguese fought off the Ottomans and in 1542 helped defend Christian Ethiopia against Muslim expansion. Portuguese domination lasted until Oman expelled them from the Persian Gulf region in 1650, attacked Pemba and Zanzibar in 1652, and finally took Mombasa in 1698. The Portuguese were finally expelled from all their coastal positions by 1728.

This conquest opened the way for a new wave of migrants from Oman and Hadramawt. Between 1550 and 1800, Hadrami migrants made the Lamu archipelago the religious and cultural heartland of the coast. The Hadramis brought a scholarly tradition and a written literature, at first in Arabic, then in KiSwahili. The earliest written poetry dates from the middle of the seventeenth century. A handicraft industry produced copies of religious texts. In the nineteenth century, the Hadrami presence and the establishment of an Omani sultanate consolidated the Arabization of Swahili culture.

In the nineteenth century Omani influence in East Africa was revived by Imam Sayyid Saʿid b. Sultan (1804–56) of the Busaidi dynasty, who in 1840 replaced Muscat with Zanzibar as the capital of the Omani Empire. His authority was at first accepted in Zanzibar and Kilwa, but progressively he forced Lamu, Pate, and Mombasa to recognize his regime. The new ruler appointed his own officials but allowed for local autonomy through the appointment of officers nominated by the local lineages. The sultan also promoted Islam by appointed *qadis*. The pilgrimage became more popular. *ʿUlamaʾ*

sought training at the feet of scholars in Arabia, and Sufi orders played a greater part in local religious practices. After the death of Imam Sayyid Saʿid, his sons divided Oman and Zanzibar into separate kingdoms.

The Busaidis promoted a thriving Zanzibar economy. They developed clove and coconut plantations worked by slave labor and dominated the international market for cloves. The ruler of Zanzibar monopolized the ivory and gum copal trade. Zanzibar became a center for the East African slave trade and a market for ivory, rice, tobacco, and gum copal, which were exchanged for European and American cottons, beads, ironwares, and weapons. The United States became its most important trading partner.

Ethiopia and Somalia

The influence of Arabs and Muslims established on the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean reached inland to the Somali and Ethiopian hinterlands. A number of small Muslim kingdoms developed in the lowlands of today's Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia and the eastern parts of Ethiopia. They were supported by the proximity and the trade of the Hijaz and Yemen. Arab merchants propagated Islam among their servants, trading partners, and in market villages. They also married into Somali pastoral lineages and created an Arab-Muslim-Somali identity.

By the end of the eighth century, trade routes from the island of Dahlak and the town of Zayla, built around the exchange of lowland salt for highland produce, brought Islam to the Ethiopian highlands. Merchants settled along the northern edges of the Sidama country, took wives from the local ruling families, and brought Muslim clerics to teach their children. By 896–97, an Arab state was founded on the Shoan plateau under the Mahzumite family that lasted until it was annexed by the Muslim kingdom of Ifat in 1285. By the thirteenth century, a chain of petty sultanates ran from Zayla on the Red Sea coast to the eastern corner of the Shoan plateau, encircling the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia. By the thirteenth century, many of the

stateless nomadic peoples of the region, including the ʿAfar and the Somali, had also become Muslims.

The Muslim principalities bordered on an ancient and powerful Christian Ethiopian civilization. The dominant population of Ethiopia spoke Amharic, a Semitic language related to South Arabian, Arabic, and Hebrew. The ancient kingdom of Axum had been converted to Christianity in the fourth century; from 451 Axum adhered to the Miaphysite doctrine. The head of the Ethiopian church was appointed by the patriarch of Alexandria (until 1948). The Ethiopians were ruled by a Christian monarch bearing the title of *nejashi*, who reigned over tributary local rulers. The church identified the Ethiopian Christian nation with the Israel of the Old Testament, as a beleaguered state surrounded by hostile pagan and Muslim neighbors. By the mid-thirteenth century, a revived Ethiopian monarchy challenged Muslim merchants for control of the caravan routes to the coast. Thus began a long, bitter, and still unresolved conflict among rival kingdoms, trading peoples, and religions for control of Ethiopia. To this day, the history of this region has been shaped by the struggle between Muslims and Christians.

Victory in the first phase of this struggle went to the Christians, who by 1415 had subdued the Muslim kingdom of Ifat and the lesser principalities. Whereas some Muslims accepted Christian rule, descendants of the former rulers of Ifat founded a new Muslim kingdom called Adal along the coast of Somalia. Supported by nomadic peoples from ʿAfar and Somalia, Adal resumed the war with Christian Ethiopia. Muslim forces under the leadership of Imam Ahmad b. Ibrahim (r. 1529–43), supported by Ottoman troops and firearms, conquered much of southern Ethiopia, but in a decisive battle between Muslims and Christians near Lake Tana in 1542, the Portuguese intervened to help Christian Ethiopia prevail over the Muslims.

The Christian victory shattered the Muslim regimes. Only the plains of ʿAfar, Somalia, and parts of southwestern Ethiopia remained Muslim. Muslim sultanates and chieftainships disintegrated into Beja, ʿAfar, and Somali tribal and village communities, although Harar and the coastal towns survived as centers of Islamic trade and

religious activity. In the mid-seventeenth century ʿAli b. Daud founded a new sultanate of Harar. Prosperity in the Red Sea and on the Horn of Africa and trade with Zayla and the Funj sultanate helped maintain the Harar sultanate until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Without a strong centralized state to oppose it, Muslim expansion resumed. The Galla (Oromo) peoples, pastoralists with a common language, culture, and sociopolitical organization, had begun to move into Ethiopia in the early sixteenth century. They settled in the vicinity of Harar, slowly expanded in the Shoa and ʿAfar regions, adopted Islam, and accepted the ruler of Harar as their nominal master. In practice they maintained their tribal system and an independent political hierarchy. By the early nineteenth century, the Galla tribes effectively dominated the region. Harar remained a Muslim town with numerous shrines of saints, and its peoples made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In the early nineteenth century Muslim influence began to spread again, owing to the revival of the highland trade to the Red Sea, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the increased demand for slaves in Arabia and elsewhere. Gondar was revived by Sudanese and Ethiopian merchants, who brought European products and Maria Theresa gold thalers in exchange for coffee, wax, musk, and slaves. Merchant caravans also penetrated the Galla country of south and southwestern Ethiopia, importing copper, brass, knives, swords, spices, and cloth in exchange for coffee, skins, wax, and slaves. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, thousands of Ethiopian slaves, mostly pagans of Galla and Sidama origin, were being exported from Ethiopian ports. The trade benefited Muslims, and the penetration of Muslim caravans furthered the Islamization of Gallas.

In northern Ethiopia the Gallas expanded into the Sidama highlands and the Amhara provinces. Their growing influence gave Muslim merchants and scholars a foothold in these regions. In the southwest, the Innarya kingdom was founded by an adventurer named Bofo Abba Gomol, who adopted Islam soon after coming to power and employed Muslim merchants and advisors. As in Sudanic Africa, a local ruler relied on Muslim officials, scribes, and financiers

to consolidate his power. The capital of Innarya, Sakka, had a population of some 10,000 to 12,000, with several hundred *'ulama'*. Sakka traded in ivory, skins, and incense from Lake Rudolph; musk, gold, ivory, and spices from Kaffa; and thousands of slaves. Gold was a royal monopoly.

Muslim holy men married into the families of local chiefs and reared children who succeeded to chieftainships and brought whole peoples over to Islam. These new Muslims venerated the shrines of local saints. At these shrines cultic practices mixed influences from the Meccan pilgrimage, Muslim saint worship, and pre-Islamic Galla and other local ceremonies. Numerous Ethiopians converted to Islam in the troubled nineteenth century. By the 1860s, Oromo commoners began to use Islamic rather than customary law in marriage and inheritance, paid the *zakat* levied by the kings, circumcised their sons, adopted the Islamic calendar, and went on pilgrimage to Mecca.

While Gallas occupied the Harar plateau, Somalis moving southward and westward from 'Afar took over the Ogaden. By the eighteenth century, they had pushed as far as the Juba River and controlled the coastal towns of Mogadishu, Zayla, and Berbera. In the nineteenth century they moved as far south as northern Kenya. In the course of this centuries-long migration, Somalis pushed out or assimilated the original Galla inhabitants of the region. The movement of Galla and Somali lineages thus established a Muslim bloc of peoples in southern Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa.

Islamic reformist Sufism became more influential in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth centuries. Agricultural production and exports prospered, and this stimulated trade with Egypt, pilgrimage to Arabia, and the settlement of Arab traders and clerics near the coast. The Qadiriyya Sufi order, which had been established in Harar by Abu Bakr ibn 'Abdullah al-'Aydarus (d. 1503), spread into Somalia and Eritrea in the nineteenth century. The Qadiri *shaykhs* were known for their humble lifestyle, their miracles, and their commitment to teaching. New brotherhoods founded by students of Ahmad ibn Idris (1785–1837) followed the reformist teaching by avoiding sensual stimulation from coffee, qat,

dancing, or drumming, and rejected the belief in the intercession of saints. Other brotherhoods such as the Salihiyya, founded by Muhammad Salih of Arabia (1854–1919), appealed to Somalis, who already had a long history of religious leadership in dealing with interclan problems. The Salihiyya were established in Ogaden after 1850. Their agricultural settlements attracted runaway slaves and detribalized individuals. The Ahmadiyya were established among Somalis by ʿAli Maye Durogba and founded agricultural settlements. In Eritrea, the revitalization of Islamic belief and practice was led by the Mirghaniyya, who were Arabian in origin but intermarried with African women to generate an indigenous class of Muslim *ulama*.

Muslim reform turned to militancy in the turn-of-the-century era of European, Egyptian, and Ethiopian Christian conflicts. European and Omani capitalists expanded their trade and political influence in the Red Sea region. Egypt invaded Ethiopia, taking Zayla in 1870 and occupying Harar from 1875–85. Defeated by the Mahdi of the Sudan, however, Egypt retreated to the north. The Christian Ethiopian empire recovered in the reign of the Emperor Menelik II (1889). Militant Sufi movements were then directed against non-Muslims, lax Muslims, local and foreign Christian states, and rival Muslim powers.

Central Africa

For centuries the Muslim presence had been confined to coastal ports, whereas the hinterland remained pagan, composed of self-sufficient farming communities. Although the Swahili-Arab sultans raided for booty and slaves, they made little effort to colonize the hinterlands. From the eighteenth century, the growth of population and the formation of small states in the interior made it possible to organize caravans that brought Nyamwezi traders to the coast and Arab and Swahili traders to the interior. The trade was stimulated by the commercial interests of Sultan Saʿid of Zanzibar. By the 1820s and 1830s, a handful of Arab and Swahili merchants and adventurers, responding to the increased demand for ivory and slaves, had become active in the interior. Swahili and Omani

merchants from Zanzibar were often active missionaries, and their influence permeated Mozambique, reaching the Yao of northwestern Mozambique and southern Malawi. The conversion of the Yao after a long history of contacts with the coast was probably due to closer association with Muslim trading partners, the role of Islam as a political ideology in the consolidation of chiefly authority, the importance of Swahili scribes and traders as healers, and a growing awareness and resistance to encroaching colonial rule.

Islam was carried inland along two major trade routes. A southern route connected the coastal towns of Kilwa and Malindi with the Lake Malawi region, south and southeast of Lake Victoria. On this route ʿAbdallah b. Salim settled in Nkhota Kota, dominated its trade, and became a local chieftain. His successors instituted Arabic and religious instruction. Yao peoples living on the eastern side of Lake Malawi adopted the new religion. The first local chieftain converted in 1870; the arrival of Muslim missionaries in 1885 helped persuade other Yao of the cultural as well as the economic value of ties to the coast. Islam brought literacy, international commerce, social contacts, and administrative expertise into central Africa.

A second route was the trade network connecting Zanzibar and the coastal town of Dar-al-Salaam with the Manyema region and Buganda. On this route Tabora was the key town; from Tabora Arab traders reached Lake Tanganyika, where they established Ujiji, which became the center of an Arab and Muslim community, although there is little indication of the diffusion of Islamic influences in Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. In this region Arab and Swahili traders supplied local chieftains with firearms in exchange for slaves and ivory. Local adventurers, often supported by uprooted young men who had become warriors, took advantage of the situation to conquer small kingdoms. Tippu Tip, a Swahili trader and warrior, set up a small Muslim state. In Buganda, however, where there was a centralized state, King Mutesa I (1856–84) Islamized his regime by observing Ramadan, building mosques, and introducing the Muslim calendar.

By the late nineteenth century Islam had only a scattered representation in East Africa. It spread as the result of individual

conversions rather than by the conversion of tribes or lineages. Chiefs who cooperated with Arabs in trade adopted Islam. So too did the entourages of Arab and Swahili merchants, including wives, porters, slaves, and others rooted out of their home communities to settle in Muslim towns. Still, there were cases in which non-Muslim Africans adopted Islam and continued to reside in their rural villages. Because Islam was accepted as a religion rather than a political or communal identification, Muslims, Christians, and pagans could live in the same villages and even in the same families. In this way the Swahili language, some Quranic prayers, healing rituals, and cotton clothing spread to the interior.

In South Africa the Muslim communities had very different origins. In the eighteenth century most Muslims came from South and Southeast Asia. Many were converted slaves. By the 1790s, free Muslims formed a small mercantile community in Cape Town. Exiled convict imams provided religious and social leadership.

Colonialism and the defeat of Muslim expansion

The spread of Islamic polities in both West and East Africa was checked at the beginning of the twentieth century by the imposition of European colonial rule. (See Map 26.) Although European domination was secured in a sudden burst of conquests, European involvement in Africa goes back to the fifteenth century. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to explore the African coast, establish trading stations, and open commerce between West Africa and Europe. They were eager to find gold, break the monopoly of the Muslims over the traffic of the Sudan, and convert local peoples to Christianity. In an extraordinary century of exploration, the Portuguese discovered Madeira, the Azores, the mouth of the Senegal River, and Cape Verde; visited the Gold Coast; and finally in 1482 built the fortress of Elmina as the headquarters of a garrison that enforced the Portuguese monopoly on the Gold Coast trade.

Map 26. Colonial expansion in Africa to c. 1900.

With the discovery of the Americas and the potential for growing sugar and other crops, slaves became more important than gold, and human beings became the principal African export. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had seized all of the major Portuguese bases on the Gold Coast, but in the eighteenth century the English won control of the Gold Coast and became the leading European commercial and slave-trading nation. In the meantime, in 1637 the French established themselves on the Senegal River at Saint-Louis and Gorée and developed a trade in gum, wax, ivory, hides, and slaves. Europeans were almost entirely involved in exporting slaves and had little impact on the technological or cultural development of African societies. The growth of the slave trade, however, stimulated local warfare, increased the power of African rulers over their subjects, and brought new states into being. Kings and officials became the principal slavers, exchanging slaves for weapons and other goods. Thus, most of southwestern Nigeria came under the control of the Oyo Empire and much of Ghana was ruled by the Ashanti.

In the nineteenth century, the British took the lead in suppressing the Atlantic slave trade. In 1807, an act of the British parliament made it illegal for Britons to engage in the slave trade, and in 1833 Parliament abolished slavery in the British Empire. The British used their navy to enforce the anti-slave-trade laws and forced other countries to join in the prohibition. Behind the British resolve to abolish the trade was a combination of humanitarian concerns and the interest of manufacturers in a growing African market. From Bathurst, Freetown, and fortresses on the Gold Coast and the coast of Nigeria, British traders promoted traffic in palm oil, timber, ivory, and beeswax.

European explorers, missionaries, and colonists also sought to convert Africans to Christianity and to create a new class of Europeanized Africans. European trade stimulated the rise of Western-educated Africans, a proto-bourgeoisie who would later become the pioneers of African nationalism. For much of the nineteenth century, Europeans still held the notion that Africans could be equals once they had acquired a European education and had become Christians. French and British colonies were supplied with legislative and executive councils to introduce Africans to European modes of government; Africans were prepared to hold the highest offices of state. By the end of the century, however, with their rising determination to conquer Africa, Europeans came to consider them inherently inferior.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, the British began to expand from the coasts into the interior, looking for new markets and new sources of supply. Lagos, the main port for Yorubaland, was annexed in 1861. Britain's policy was to use sufficient military and political force to protect trading interests but not to seek commercial or political monopolies. As long as interior African states were well enough organized to hold up their end of the trade and as long as other European powers did not intervene, Britain was at first content with minimal political engagement. The British debated whether they should keep their settlements as small and inexpensive as possible or whether they should develop strong political controls to suppress the slave trade and to promote commerce and missionary work.

British policies oscillated between the two alternatives, but after 1865, the British generally moved toward direct intervention and control. Traders, explorers, and missionaries, who cried out for increased political protection, won their cause. In 1874 the British made the Gold Coast a crown colony.

The French developed their colonial empire in Senegambia. After the defeat of Napoleon, Saint-Louis and Gorée were returned to France and became the main bases of French expansion. Suppression of the slave trade and the growth of the gum arabic and peanut trades prompted the French to establish inland fortified trading posts on territories rented from local rulers. In 1849 they obtained rights to open factories at Joal and Kaolack. After 1851 the French adopted a more aggressive expansionist policy. Under Louis Faidherbe, military governor from 1854 to 1865, they annexed Dakar (1857) and pushed French trading posts into the African interior. They blocked the western expansion of al-Hajj ʿUmar and took control of the lower Senegal River. In 1859 Faidherbe forced Sine and Saloum to guarantee freedom of French commerce and to give the French a monopoly on trade and the right to buy land. A second phase of French expansion completed the absorption of the Senegambian region. After 1863 the French laid plans to establish a series of garrisons and a railroad to link the Senegal and the Niger rivers. They occupied Bamako in 1883, Cayor in 1886, and Nioro in 1887. The telegraph, the railroad, and the cannon assured French domination. Henceforth, the French would not only protect trade but try to assure their permanent authority by constructing roads, establishing formal administration, and introducing legal and educational policies.

Thus the European powers turned from trading interests to political annexation. As late as 1880, Britain's Lord Salisbury denied any British or European interest in African colonies, but by 1884 the expansion of the several powers, their mutual rivalries, and their competition for prestige stimulated a wave of chauvinistic nationalism in all the European countries. The winds of nationalism fanned the flames of trading interests and political rivalry into a scramble for African colonies. At the Congress of Berlin (1884–85)

the European powers agreed on the partition of Africa among themselves. Already the French had created protectorates in Senegal; the British had seized Egypt in 1882; and the Germans had created protectorates over Togo and the Cameroons in 1884. In 1886 the Niger Company was given a royal charter to administer law and customs in its territories, and in 1897 the company took control of Nupe, Ilorin, and Bida. The British built a railroad from Lagos to Ibadan. Progressively, in 1885, 1891, and 1900 the British government took control of the Niger Company's territories and reorganized them under the colonial office as the Protectorate of Southern and Northern Nigeria. Between 1900 and 1906 Sir Frederick Lugard subordinated the northern Muslim emirates and brought the Sokoto caliphate under his control. Elsewhere, in 1891 the British assumed a protectorate over the hinterlands of Sierra Leone. Having defeated the Ashanti in 1874, they took control of Kumasi and declared a protectorate over Ghana in 1896.

While the British took Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, the French went on to complete their West African empire. By a treaty of 1889 they delineated the boundaries between French and British possessions in Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. By 1893 they took Masina and eliminated the state established by al-Hajj ʻUmar. They pushed back Samori and established French colonies in Guinea and the Ivory Coast. From their bases in Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the French moved on to establish a protectorate over Futa Jallon in 1897, defeated Samori in 1898, and took control of the upper Volta. By 1900 they had swept across the whole of the Sudan and conquered the Sahara as far as Lake Chad. Although fighting continued in the Ivory Coast until 1908 and in the Niger region until 1921, the French and British African empires were essentially established by 1900.

As in West Africa, European rivalries provoked a scramble for East Africa. British interests were inspired by the desire for trade, by opposition to slavery, and by Christian missionary zeal. Britain also had established interests in India, South Africa, Aden, and other Indian Ocean ports. In 1841, the British appointed a consul to Zanzibar and by 1873 had sufficiently consolidated their influence to

force the sultan of Zanzibar to prohibit the slave trade. Britain began to look on Zanzibar as its proxy for the penetration of explorers, missionaries, and traders. In 1890 Zanzibar became a British protectorate.

British expansion provoked Germany to seek compensation. Between 1884 and 1888 the Germans took control of Tanganyika, including the territories that are now Rwanda and Burundi. By agreement between the Germans and the British in 1886 and 1891, East Africa was partitioned. In 1888 the British East Africa Company acquired Kenya, which was ruled from Zanzibar until 1904, when the Kenya protectorate received its first commissioner. Britain also created a protectorate in Uganda in 1893 by treaty with Mwanga II, the kabaka of Buganda, by the terms of which the slave trade was prohibited. By 1914 the British had extended their control over most of the local chiefs of the region.

The British also led the way to the partition of the Somali and Red Sea coasts, primarily because of their concern for the security of traffic to Aden and the Indian Ocean. First, they encouraged Egyptian and Italian interests as a barrier to French expansion. Then in 1887 they established a protectorate on the Harar-Somali coast and by agreement with the French defined the boundaries between their respective territories as lying between the ports of Zayla and Djibouti. In 1891 the British and Italians agreed on boundaries between British and Italian protectorates in Somaliland. Further treaties in 1897 among Ethiopia, Britain, France, and Italy regulated the Somali protectorates. Italy achieved only a nominal and disputed protectorate over Ethiopia. In the meantime, on another front, the British, who had occupied Egypt in 1882, conquered most of the Sudan in 1898 and Darfur in 1916. Thus all of Muslim Africa – indeed, all of Africa except Liberia and Ethiopia – came under European rule by World War I.

Conclusion

Chapter 43 The varieties of Islamic societies

By the eighteenth century a global system of Islamic societies had come into being throughout Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Each was built on the interaction of Middle Eastern Islamic state, religious, and communal institutions with local social institutions and cultures, and in each case the interactions generated a different type of Islamic society. Although each society was unique, they resembled one another in form and were interconnected by political and religious contacts and shared values. Thus they made up a world system of Islamic societies.

Islamic societies from the tenth to the nineteenth centuries had a complex structure. In some cases Muslim communities were isolated pastoral, village, or urban minorities living within non-Islamic societies. Examples of this type are lineage groups united by shrine veneration in the northern steppes of Inner Asia and parts of the Sahara and merchant communities in China or West Africa. In African societies the Muslim presence was centered around small communities such as lineage groups, teachers and disciples, Sufi brotherhoods, or networks of merchants. Merchant communities were established as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the western Sudan. By the eighteenth century, there were Muslim merchant enclaves in the central Sudan, Berber holy lineages in the Sahara region (*zawaya* or *insilimen*), cultivator and merchant communities and scholarly lineages such as the Saghanughu (called Wangara or Dyula) in the Volta River basin and Guinean forests, and Jakhanke lineages of cultivators and scholars in the Senegambia region. In East Africa, Muslim communities were settled in the coastal towns. In Ethiopia and Somalia they were present among Galla and Somali peoples. In general these Muslim communities were scattered, had no territorial identity, and did not constitute governments.

The Muslim communities were connected to state formation in two ways. First, they often had great influence with military nobles. Muslim advisors gave an Islamic identity to the rulers of the ancient empires of Kawkaw, Takrur, Ghana, Bornu, Mali, and Songhay. Learned Muslim merchants served to legitimize the authority of the rulers and provide administrative services and economic resources, cultural identity, and guidance for festivals, rituals, and magic. Several of these regimes, such as the Mali and Songhay empires, became centers of Muslim worship, scholarship, and legal administration. These regimes were built on a condominium of military and Muslim merchant elites. In these societies, however, the mass of the population remained committed to their traditional religions and were not converted to Islam.

Second, Muslim communities repeatedly attempted to build states of their own. Torodbe or Muslim clerics and teachers were the leaders of these movements. They were a kind of free-floating intelligentsia hostile to the powers, sometimes outraged at their moral shortcomings and failure to implement Islamic policies, sometimes aggrieved over economic exploitation. They were backed by marginalized pastoralists and peasants, rootless wanderers, and gangs of youths. From the seventeenth century, jihads were launched in Mauritania, Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro. The most famous of these was the jihad of 'Uthman don Fodio, who created the Sokoto caliphate in 1804, and the nineteenth-century jihad of al-Hajj 'Umar in Futa Toro. These jihads overthrew military elites and created states in hitherto stateless regions. They were an expression of both moral reformism and political expansionism. Their greatest consequence was to bring masses of common people into the faith of Islam. The jihad states, however, were crushed by British and French colonial intervention at the end of the nineteenth century. Apart from Hausaland and Senegal, they left little or no political legacy in the structuring of twentieth-century African states.

More commonly we find the various types of Muslim collectivities bound together in a larger system governed by a state. Islamic states were generally made up of numerous religious collectivities, village and tribal segmentary societies, urban *jama'at*, Sufi

brotherhoods, schools of law, and feudal principalities. In theory, state and religion are supposed to be unified and Islam is a total way of life, which defines political as well as social and familial matters. This is the Muslim view embodied in the ideal of the Prophet and the early caliphs, who were rulers and teachers, repositories of both temporal and religious authority, and whose mission was to lead the community in war and morality. This ideal inspired the efforts of reformist, revivalist, and caliphal movements to create an integrated Muslim state and society. Such movements were common in lineage communities, in which adherence to Islam led to tribal unification, conquest, and the formation of new empires, as in the case of the Fatimid, Almoravid, and Almohad movements in North Africa, the Safavid movement in Iran, and others. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reformist movements with similar intentions led to conquests and state formation in such cases as the Sokoto caliphate in what is now Nigeria and the Mahdist state in the Sudan. In different terms, the ideal is invoked by contemporary neo-Islamic movements.

Most Muslim societies did not and do not conform to this ideal and were and are built around separate state and religious institutions. By the eighth and ninth centuries, the early caliphate was already evolving into an imperial and secular political regime, while Muslim populations were being formed into a multitude of religiously defined communal groups. These included schools of law, reformist movements, Sufi lineages, brotherhoods, shrine communities, Shiʿi sects, and ethnic associations. Such groups were or became independent of states; most withdrew from participation in government and were primarily concerned with solidarity, worship, education, law, personal morality, and upholding the public symbols of Islam. The separation on an institutional level of state institutions and religious associations became the norm for the late ʿAbbasid caliphate; the Saljuq and Mamluk sultanates; the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires; and other Muslim regimes.

This separation, however, was neither clear-cut nor complete. Although the separation was well defined on an institutional level and in terms of organizations, personnel, and ethos, in cultural concept

there was a deep ambiguity about both states and religio-communal associations. On the one hand, Muslim states were considered instruments of worldly secular power and were legitimized in terms of patrimonial claims to superior ancestry, state-patronized artistic and literary cultures, and appeals to universal cosmological or philosophical concepts. Their culture derived from the pre-Islamic and non-Islamic substrates of the societies they ruled. On the other hand, these states also had a Muslim religious value derived from historical continuity with the early caliphate, or based on their role as defenders, patrons, and supporters of Muslim worship, education, law, and jihad. They also had an inherent sacred value, for in many Muslim societies the state was conceived as the direct expression of God's will for the ordering of human affairs. Their religious worth was derived both from service to Islam and directly from divine decree.

Similarly, Muslim religious associations, although basically committed to small communal and individual religious pursuits, were involved in politics. Although Muslim religious leaders were in fact committed to an apolitical form of religiosity, in concept they could not imagine their associations as entirely independent of an all-embracing Islamic political order. In concept a Muslim state was necessary for a complete Muslim way of life.

Conceptual ambiguities were translated into a variety of institutional patterns in the relationship between states and religious associations. In the Ottoman and Safavid empires, the states themselves controlled Muslim judicial, educational, and social functions. The Ottoman and Safavid monarchies were strongly supported by an '*ulama*' bureaucracy. In these empires Muslim religious associations became virtual departments of state, although in Iran the religious elites were eventually able to assert their autonomy. In Mughal India, or Mataram Java, Muslim religious leaders, associations, and activities were largely autonomous and often critical of state policies and state-patronized culture.

Thus in the pre-modern era there were two alternative concepts of Islamic society. One was the caliphate, which integrated the state and the community, the realms of politics and religion, into an inseparable whole. The second was the sultanate, or secular state,

which ruled over the quasi-independent religious associations that were the true bearers of Muslim religious life. In one image the state was the all-encompassing expression of an Islamic society; in the other, an Islamic society was divided into separate state and religious institutions. The relationship between Muslim communities and states was variable and ambiguous. The former were sometimes subordinate and committed, sometimes independent and hostile. Sometimes they accepted the inherent legitimacy of ruling regimes; sometimes they rejected them as antithetical to a truly Muslim society. Most often they regarded states with detachment. While accepting the necessity of political order, they disdained political involvement and withdrew into communal and personal religious affairs. While accepting political realities, they were nostalgic for the better days of the true caliphate and yearned for the era of justice. The legacy of pre-modern societies to the modern era, then, was not a defined structure of state and society but a spectrum of variation and an inherent ambiguity about the relations between the two.

In practice, the most common state type of Islamic society was modeled on the Saljuq-period form of Middle Eastern Islamic society. The early Islamic model, although modified, persisted in Iran, and Turkish migrations and conquests brought it directly to Inner Asia, India, and the Arab Middle East, and via Anatolia to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and North Africa. Although based on the same model, in each case there were differences in state organization, religious institutions, concepts of legitimacy, and religious beliefs. In the Ottoman, Mughal, Egyptian Mamluk, and Hafsid states, the government was strongly centralized. In Iran, Algeria, Morocco, and parts of the Arab world, states were weak because they were opposed by strong tribal societies, sometimes under Sufi leadership. State control of religious elites was marked in the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Iran, and the state of Bukhara, but *'ulama'* and Sufis in India, Algeria, and Morocco were relatively independent. Similarly, the bases of legitimacy varied considerably. The Ottoman and Safavid empires emphasized a combination of Islamic and cosmopolitan qualities. In the Arab provinces of the Middle East and North Africa, Islamic elements predominated. Other variations

occurred in the prevailing religious orientation of Muslim societies. *'Ulama'* Islam was particularly strong in the Ottoman Empire, Inner Asia, and Iran. Shrine-Sufism was pronounced in India and North Africa. Everywhere Islamic culture was marked by strong local syncretisms. To fully understand the variations, however, each of the regional societies has to be considered not only with regard to specific features but also as a whole system in which state, religious, and parochial collectivities and cultures interacted.

The Iranian type of Islamic society may be understood in terms of the relations among state, religious, and tribal (*uymaq*) populations. The forces that gave shape to Iran go back to the Safavid conquest in 1500. The Safavids were the religious leaders of *uymaq* and tribal peoples, but their empire was gradually rebuilt on the basis of slave forces and a bureaucratic administration. The Safavid regime became a suzerainty superimposed on a society parceled out into *uymaq* kingdoms, each region actually ruled by a tribal lord and his warriors, descended often from Mongol Inner Asian families, who organized a local government and economy and taxed the local population. In Iran political power was from the outset divided between an imperial state and tribal societies.

The central government attempted to legitimize its reign in Muslim terms. Safavid authority was based on the claim that the rulers were descendants of the seventh imam and therefore were quasi-divine persons. As chiefs of the dominant Sufi movement, they claimed the absolute obedience of all their disciples. To bolster the prestige of the state, the Safavid dynasty sponsored an Iranian-Islamic style of culture concentrating on court poetry, painting, and monumental architecture that symbolized not only the Islamic credentials of the state but also the glory of the ancient Persian tradition. The symbolism of the regime was essentially Muslim, but included strong overtones of an independent Iranian cultural heritage.

In the course of Safavid rule, Iran was converted from Sunni to Shi'i Islam. After the Safavids conquered Iran, they made Shi'ism the official religion of the country, built up cadres of Shi'i *'ulama'* (mainly imported from Iraq), and ruthlessly suppressed rival religious movements. Sunni *'ulama'* and Sufi movements, even including the

Safavids' own supporters, were crushed or driven from the country. By the seventeenth century the Safavids had built up a virtually monolithic religious establishment and had eliminated rival forms of Islamic belief and organization.

Still, the relationship between the state and the Shiʿi *ulama* was ambiguous. The *ulama* of Iran depended on state support, deferred to state authority, and benefited from state appointments to political and religious offices and from state endowment of religious shrines. They played the role of intermediaries and mediators between the regime and the general populace. Altogether subordinate to the Safavid state, the *ulama* served to legitimize and support the central regime against its tribal and religious rivals and took the lead in the persecution of Sunnis and Sufis. There were some doctrinal and social indications, however, of an *ulama* claim to autonomy and freedom from state control and of religious doubts about the legitimacy of the Safavid regime. With the decline and eventual destruction of the Safavids, some *ulama* argued that the true leaders of the Islamic community were not the rulers but the scholars themselves – the *mujtahids*. They had the wisdom to give guidance on spiritual matters in the absence of the true imam, and the people were bound, according to their teaching, to follow their advice.

The Iranian Shiʿi *ulama* differed from Sunni *ulama* in several respects. One was that the *ulama* of Iran formed a relatively cohesive body, related through the spiritual and intellectual genealogies of teachers and students, geographically defined by the boundaries of the country, and in communication with one another. Moreover, they held a large degree of authority over the common people and did not, as did the *ulama* of the Ottoman Empire, India, or Indonesia, have important Sufi or reformist movements as competitors. Thus, Iranian society before the eighteenth century was characterized by a legitimate but not powerfully centralized monarchy, a distribution of power among tribal principalities, and a monolithic religious establishment patronized by the regime.

The Ottoman Empire represented a different constellation of state, religious, and small community relations. The Ottoman regime was

highly centralized. A slave military elite, bureaucratic financial administration, and Muslim religious administration gave the central government control over the subject population. As early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman state had effectively subordinated the Turkish and Kurdish tribal populations of eastern Anatolia.

Within the Ottoman Empire, however, there was considerable variation in the degree of centralization of power and in the distribution of power from province to province. Whereas the central regime was powerful in the Balkans, most of Anatolia, the Nile Valley, Tunisia, and Algiers, much of Iraq, Upper Egypt, parts of Algeria, southern Tunisia, and Syria were dominated by segmentary populations. In these regions the authority of the central state was tenuous, and the local populations were organized in tribal or Sufi-led coalitions. In Tunisia, itself a subordinate state within the Ottoman Empire, the centralized state was based on a highly sedentarized and urbanized population, and tribal domains were limited to the south of the country. In Algeria, another vassal state based on a small janissary militia, the state governed some of the coastal regions, but most of the country was ruled by tribal and Sufi chiefs. The weakening of the Ottoman state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries allowed, in general, for a strengthening of local elites and communities.

Ottoman success in centralizing state power depended on a number of factors. The first factor was the power of the central regime and the relative weakness of the tribal populations. As opposed to Iran, which came under the control of the *uymaqs*, the Oghuz peoples who entered Anatolia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries did not bring Mongol and Chaghatay concepts of political authority and were not organized under chiefs who controlled a large central household and smaller segmentary groups. They were dispersed peoples operating in small bands, united by successful warrior lords or by charismatic Sufi leaders. The small size of these bands made it easy for the Ottoman state to suppress them, absorb the chiefs into Ottoman administration, and deprive the Sufis of their military and political authority.

Equally important was the concept of Ottoman legitimacy. Unlike the Safavids, the legitimacy of the Ottoman regime was never questioned from a Muslim point of view. Ottoman authority was based on a Turkish tradition of patrimonial leadership, the legacy of previous Muslim states in Anatolia and the Middle East, and the conquest of the Byzantine Empire. The Ottomans thus inherited the responsibilities of the historical caliphates and the imperial aura of the ancient empires. Above all, their legitimacy was based on their success as a warrior state, which fulfilled the Muslim duty of jihad, protected the holy cities of Arabia, and organized the pilgrimage. The kind of doubts about royal authority raised in the Safavid Empire by the Shi'i *ulama*, and those raised in the Mughal Empire by the accommodation of non-Muslim cultures, were minimal.

The organized religious life of Ottoman Muslims was also different from that of Iranian Muslims. The Ottoman Empire, like the Safavid, organized a bureaucracy of scholars, but unlike the Safavids the Ottomans kept the loyalty of the religious establishment. Government patronage and the creation of an elaborate bureaucracy absorbed the *ulama* into the state machine. A graded judicial and professorial hierarchy, state salaries, and state endowments effectively committed the *ulama* to the Ottoman regime. Even the Sufi brotherhoods, despite their large followings, were attached to the state machine and were neutralized or suppressed. The Sunni *ulama* were totally committed to the authority of the sultan and stressed the legacy of religious attitudes that legitimized the state. In Iran, by contrast, the *ulama* came to be independent of and hostile to the state.

Thus, by the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had an institutional pattern that emphasized the centralized state, legitimized in Muslim terms, and a centralized and unified Sunni religious establishment that served virtually as a department of state. Only in bedouin-populated regions of the Arab world and North Africa was some degree of autonomy possible.

The Mughal state, like the Ottoman and Safavid empires, was a patrimonial regime. The emperor ruled through a royal household

supported by a quasi-feudal elite. The armies were composed of Muslim officers, mainly of Afghan and Inner Asian descent, who were assigned tax revenues from the land in return for supplying contingents for military service. Native Hindu vassals such as the Rajputs formed an important part of the military establishment. Muslims were the original conquering elite, but the Hindus were important as subordinate lords, administrative officials, financiers, merchants, and landowners. The regime was also supported by a bureaucratic administration that served to tax the subject populace and to register landed incomes. The bureaucracy was staffed by both Muslim and Hindu officials.

The Mughal regime wove together Muslim and Indian social and cultural considerations. The identity of the Muslim elites was based not only on Islam but on noble lineage. All members of the elite were members of extended families linked by ceremonies, gifts, and concessions of property and office. Muslim peasants and pastoralists were as much subjects of the empire as were Hindus.

The Mughal Empire was officially Muslim. It defended Islam, patronized Muslim religious life, and appointed Muslim judicial and other religious officials, but the Mughals also claimed the loyalty of Hindu lords and subjects and elaborated a court culture in which painting, music, literature, philosophy, and architecture embodied aspects of the Hindu as well as the Muslim heritage and blended them into a single stylistic form. In contrast to the Ottoman and Safavid regimes, the Mughal Empire had a strong non-Islamic expression of its cultural and political identity.

In religious organization proper, Mughal India – as opposed to Safavid Iran – recognized no single dominant concept of Islam and no single Muslim community or religious establishment. Indian Muslims formed numerous religious bodies, divided by allegiance to points of doctrine, schools of law, Sufi brotherhoods, and the teaching of individual *shaykhs*, scholars, and saints. Indian Muslims qua Muslims appeared as a congeries of religious groups rather than as a single communal body. Despite state patronage of a small *'ulama'* establishment, both *'ulama'* and Sufis were generally independent – and often critical – of the cosmopolitan and imperial

culture, the Hindu elites, and the patrimonial loyalties of the Mughal regime. Thus, Indian Islamic society was organized not in terms of an Ottoman type of state control or an Iranian type of uniformity, but in terms of numerous independent and competitive Muslim religious movements.

Southeast Asia had a similar heritage of an agrarian and commercial economic base and a history of state regimes legitimized in terms of high religious culture, but there political fragmentation rather than imperial unity was the rule. Southeast Asia was never conquered by Muslim tribal peoples; nor were indigenous regimes able to achieve political unity. The coastal and regional states of Malaya and Sumatra and the principalities of Java took on an Islamic identity, but they were derived historically from pre-Islamic states. Characteristically, Indo-Malay Muslim states depended heavily on symbolic and cultural attachments to implement their rule. Although Islam was woven into the symbolism of state authority, legitimization still depended on the heritage of Hindu and Buddhist concepts. Even as compared with Mughal India, the non-Islamic cultural aspect of the political system was strongly pronounced.

The Muslim religious communities of Southeast Asia also tended to be decentralized. Religious life was built around individual teachers and holy men; the Sufi brotherhoods and the *'ulama'* schools were institutionally weak, and there were no significant tribal communities. Scholars functioned independently, teaching in schools and seminaries (*pesantren*). The village holy men were also important influences. In Indonesia, the mass of villagers considered themselves Muslims but were not strongly influenced by Islamic rituals, concepts, laws, ethics, or institutions. They followed a customary religious and social life that had existed prior to the establishment of Islam and assimilated Islam into this preexisting culture. Islam in Indonesia was manifest as identity rather than as social organization. Some regions were exceptions to this Indo-Malay pattern. In Minangkabau the Sufi orders were strongly organized and generated intense conflict as reformers struggled to bring Minangkabau into accord with Muslim norms.

Southeast Asian Islamic societies differed from Middle Eastern societies in that there was little state participation in the organization of Muslim religious life. The village *'ulama'*, Sufis, and other popular teachers were wholly independent. Indeed, deep in the history of the *'ulama'* of Java and the outer islands there was a tradition of resistance to state authority. The common people believed that a savior or just ruler would eventually overthrow the state to create a truly Islamic society. In India and Southeast Asia the initiative passed to independent Sufi and *'ulama'* reformers and other charismatic leaders who would struggle among themselves, and with foreign and non-Islamic forces, to try to shape the Islamic destiny of the area in the modern era.

Chapter 44 The global context

The inner spaces of the Muslim World

Although much of this book is about the history of Muslim states and empires, regions that lay outside of the boundaries and authority of individual states or empires are essential to understanding the political and cultural geography of the Islamic world. These regions are the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the great inner deserts of Central Asia and the African Sahara. The oceans, steppes, and deserts both isolated regions from one another and allowed them to be linked together by travelers, traders, missionaries, and conquerors. Each of these regions cultivated cultural and religious practices and social networks that crossed political borders. The cross-regional connections help explain the diffusion of Islam from the seventh to the eighteenth century. They were arenas of religio-cultural transmission. From the sixteenth century, however, they also became arenas for the growing power of European states and their subsequent commercial and colonial domination of both the inner spaces and the regional territories of the Muslim world.

The Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean

The Mediterranean – from Spain in the northwest and Morocco in the southwest to Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt in the east – was first integrated under the rule of the Roman Empire and Hellenistic culture. With the creation of a second capital at Constantinople and the fall of Rome to "barbarian" invaders, the region began to fragment. The late Roman or Byzantine Empire continued to rule over the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt, but independent states were formed by Gothic and Celtic peoples in the former Western European provinces of the Roman Empire and in parts of North Africa. The region was further divided by religious differences among Christians.

In the seventh century, the Arab conquests partitioned the Mediterranean among Muslim- and Christian-dominated regions. The Arab-Muslim conquests made Egypt and Syria part of the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid empires. North Africa, Spain, and Sicily were governed by numerous independent Arab-Muslim rulers. In the tenth century, the Fatimids brought most of North Africa, Egypt, and Syria under their rule, but the historic political unity of the region would never be reconstituted.

From the tenth century, Muslim and Christian states were constantly at war. On many fronts Christian states pushed back the Muslims. The Byzantine Empire regained northern Syria. Italian city-states fought off Muslim pirates and attacked North Africa. In Spain, the small Christian kingdoms of the north captured Muslim Toledo in 1085. The Normans conquered Sicily by 1091. European warriors and pilgrims established the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and other principalities in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine that would last from 1096 to 1291. A Muslim counterattack followed. The Moroccan Almoravids invaded Spain in 1086; the Almohads, who succeeded them in Morocco, conquered Spain in 1172 and extended their domains further east to what are now Algeria and Tunisia. The two dynasties brought the Sahara, Morocco, and Spain into a single polity and a new trading zone. Morocco, benefiting from trade and empire, became a commercial and urbanized society. Christian forces, however, defeated the Almohads at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Within half a century, all of Spain except the kingdom of Granada was under Christian rule. Granada fell to Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492. In the east, however, the Ayyubids, led by Saladin, and the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria pushed out the Latin states by 1291, bringing a long period of Muslim-Christian struggle over control of the Levant coasts of the Mediterranean to a temporary end.

Despite wars, the Mediterranean was crisscrossed by commercial routes that linked its many regions and states and allowed for the transmission of cultural artifacts and ideas. Although trade between East and West diminished in the early Middle Ages due to the breakup of the Roman Empire and the Arab-Muslim conquests, it never was entirely extinguished. Jewish merchants (Radhanites)

conducted trade from the western Mediterranean to China and India, bringing spices and rare woods to the West and carrying slaves, weapons, and hides to the East. In the eleventh and later centuries, a lively trade flourished among the Italian city-states, Egypt, Spain, Sicily, and North Africa. From the tenth to the thirteenth century, Venice and Genoa created extensive networks of fortified trading posts and colonies in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea where they could purchase spices, drugs, dyes, silk, and other exotic products. The Italian city-states maintained an active trade with Mamluk Egypt and Syria. Thirteenth-century treaties among Sicily, Venice, Marseille, Genoa, and Florence promoted Tunisian prosperity. Jews were heavily engaged in international trade – particularly in the Muslim, Arabic-speaking parts of the Mediterranean.

The Ottoman era renewed the historic Mediterranean combination of political rivalry, warfare, trade, and cultural exchange. The Ottomans originated in Anatolia, crossed the straits of Gallipoli in 1345, and by 1389 had conquered Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. In 1453, they captured Constantinople and made it their capital, Istanbul. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, they extended their domains in the Balkans as far as the Danube in the north and the Adriatic in the west. In Hungary, they established a new frontier with the Hapsburg Empire of Austria, Spain, and Holland. Ottoman expansion forced the Genoese and then the Venetians out of their extensive trading empires in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In 1516 and 1517, the Ottomans took over the Mamluk Empire of Syria and Egypt, Iraq, and the Islamic holy places of Arabia, giving them control of the routes from southern and eastern Asia to Europe. At the same time, they launched a nearly century-long naval struggle against the Hapsburgs for control of the Mediterranean. In time the Ottomans established their suzerainty over North Africa, except for Morocco.

Ottoman expansion gave the empire a powerful position in the international trade of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was at the heart of the world trading system between Europe and southern and eastern Asia. From Jeddah to

Mecca, Damascus, and Aleppo; from the Persian Gulf to Basra and Aleppo; and from Aleppo to Bursa came Iranian silk, Indian spices, and cotton cloth, where it was sold in return for European woolens and metalwares. Bursa was also a principal market for the Black Sea trade to the Crimea and from there to the Ukraine, Poland, and Russia. Eastern luxuries were exchanged for European bulk goods for mass consumption, such as grain, cotton, wool, hides, fish, and ordinary textiles.

The Ottomans, however, reached their limits in the late sixteenth century. The Portuguese discoveries of new sea routes around Africa to the Indian Ocean in the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century undermined the Ottoman trading position. Allied European powers checked Ottoman expansion in southeastern Europe and challenged Ottoman supremacy in the Mediterranean. Finally, an Ottoman-Hapsburg truce of 1580 confirmed each in its possessions and defined the frontier between Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa and the Levant that endures to the present.

Like the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean both divided and united the surrounding territories. However, it has a very different history. With the partial exception of the Indian subcontinent and Iran, the history of the territories surrounding the Indian Ocean, including East Africa, Arabia, and maritime and mainland Southeast Asia, cannot be told in terms of empires and contiguous geographical areas but rather must be told in terms of scattered coastal towns, peninsulas, and islands. The population of the region included Chinese, Indians from Gujarat, Bantus and Swahili-speaking peoples of East Africa, Omanis, Hadramawtis and other Arabians, Malays, Javanese, Siamese, Thais, and the innumerable peoples of the islands. The sea was the connection among them. The Indian Ocean held a central position on the trade routes that connected China to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, linking Arabia to East Africa, India, and island Southeast Asia, now Indonesia. Then the Turkish-Muslim conquests of India brought northern and western India into the zone of Muslim regimes and cultural influences.

By the thirteenth century, the nearly simultaneous rise of the Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid empires gave an increasingly Muslim

coloration to the region. The Ottomans conquered Egypt, Iraq, Arabia, and Yemen in the early decades of the sixteenth century; the Safavids and the Mughals took control of the coasts of Iran and western India. Egypt, Yemen, Hadramawt, East Africa, West India, the Malabar coast, and Malaysia/Indonesia were connected by commerce. As the coastal and island populations converted to Islam, the Indian Ocean was becoming a Muslim sea, a trans-ocean new world of Islam.

The Muslim commercial presence was reinforced by traveling scholars, *shurafaʾ* (descendants of the prophet), and mystics who flowed out of Yemen, Hadramawt, and Oman to East Africa from about 1250, and to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines after 1300. Hadrami networks reached Surat in India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Mecca a little later, and then Malaya from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Hadramis and other Arabian scholars were particularly active as teachers, judges, officials, religious counselors, and holy men. They married and sired children with local women – connections favored by the matrilineal and uxorilocal marriage traditions of Swahili East Africa, the South Arabian coast, the Malabar coast of India, and West Sumatra – and created dispersed families with half siblings, offspring of the same father, often living in separate countries and speaking different languages. The dispersion of families created familial, social, and economic networks spanning the whole of the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, there was a reverse tide of migration – Muslims visiting the holy places of Arabia on pilgrimage and settling in Arabia, Yemen, and Cairo for prolonged periods of study.

The desert as ocean: Inner Asia and the Sahara

Not only seas but also deserts defined arenas for political, commercial, and cultural interaction. Historically, the great steppelands of Central Asia from the Oxus River, the border of Iran, to the frontiers of agricultural China were inhabited by pastoral peoples who spoke Turkic-Altaic languages and were organized into families, clans, and confederations (hordes). The settled peoples

lived primarily in the oasis districts of Transoxania, Khwarizm, Farghana, and Kashgar and in scattered towns along the trade routes that linked China, the Middle East, and Europe. The steppes allowed the nomads to invade the peripheral settled societies of Europe, the Middle East, and China. From the second millennium BCE to the eighteenth century, the history of the region may be told in terms of ever-repeated nomadic conquests and of the formation of empires over oases and settled populations.

Islam first spread in this region as a result of the Arab conquests of Iran and Transoxania and the movement of Muslim traders and Sufis from the towns to the steppes. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, Qarluq and Oghuz peoples converted and founded the Qarakhanid and Saljuq empires. The Qarakhanids divided their domains into a western khanate that ruled Transoxania until 1211 and an eastern khanate for Farghana and Kashgaria. They promoted the spread of Islam among the populace of Transoxania, Kashgar, and the Tarim basin, patronizing a new Turkish literature based on Arabic and Persian models – the basis of Turkish-Islamic civilization. The Saljuqs moved westward to conquer Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia. Out of the Turkish peoples in Anatolia came the later Ottoman Empire.

In the thirteenth century, the Mongols followed the Qarakhanids and the Saljuqs. The Mongols originated with the formation of a confederation of Inner Asian peoples under the leadership of Chinggis Khan. They established their suzerainty over the whole of Inner Asia; much of the Middle East; parts of Eastern Europe, including Russia, the Ukraine, southern Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria; and China. The Mongols accomplished what could never be achieved in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, or the Sahara – a vast transregional empire. This vast empire was divided among the four sons of Chinggis. Out of their disputes came several independent and even hostile Mongol states. These included Mongol regimes in Mongolia and China, the Golden Horde on the northern steppes, the Chaghatay khanate in Transoxania and eastern Turkestan, and the Ilkhan regime in Iran and Anatolia. These states were the basis of several distinct Islamic societies in Inner Asia.

On the western and northern steppes, the breakup of the Golden Horde allowed for the emergence of separate Crimean Tatar, Volga Tatar, Uzbek, and Kazakh ethnic and political groups. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Naqshbandi and Yasavi missionaries began converting the Kazakhs. Islam, however, probably made little headway until the eighteenth century, when Tatar merchants, missionaries, secretaries, and teachers helped construct mosques and schools.

In western Turkestan – including Transoxania, Farghana, and Kashgaria – the Timurids and the Chaghatays were succeeded by Uzbek domination under the Shaybanid dynasty (1500–98). The Shaybanid Empire was succeeded by a number of city-states, including Khokand, Kashgar, and Bukhara. Islam became the political basis of several of these states as well as the religion of the people. Sufi masters or Sufi lineages mediated and sometimes governed. Bukhara was ruled by the Mangit dynasty and by the scholars who controlled judicial administration and education and whose organized bodies of *sayyids*, *khwajas*, *mirs*, Sufis, students, and guilds made up the body politic. Eastern Turkestan, now part of China, the domain of the Chaghatay khans, was also integrated into the domains of Turkish-Islamic culture. At the end of the sixteenth century, much of the populace of Inner Asia outside of Mongolia and Tibet was Muslim or under Muslim suzerainty.

The great Sahara desert, like the Taklamakan in Inner Asia, led both to the separation of populations and to trade and the communication of culture. On both sides of the desert the economies were based on a similar mixture of pastoralism, agriculture, craft production, and trade. From the seventh to the eleventh centuries, in west and central Saharan Africa, Arab and Berber Muslim traders made their way into and across the Sahara, settled in the trading towns, and became courtiers and secretaries for the local rulers and for a succession of regional empires – Takrur, Ghana, Mali, Songhay, and Bornu. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Almoravids and the Almohads brought large regions of the Sahara, North Africa, and Spain into north-south empires, including Sudanic Africa, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula.

From the Sudanic regions, African-Muslim merchants and scholars, known as Wangara, or Dyula (Juula), settled in Mauritania, Senegambia, the Volta River basin, and the Guinean forests, establishing their own communities and in some cases converting the local peoples to Islam. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth century, some of these communities launched jihads and created new Muslim states. In East Africa, Arab Bedouins and Egyptian armies brought Islam into Nubia. Arab- and Persian-Muslim traders settled the towns and islands along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts. From there, over centuries, the traders reached into the interior, bringing Islam to Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania.

The Rise of Europe and the World Economy

By the eighteenth century, Islamic societies had begun to decline in political power. The Safavid state had been defeated by Afghan invaders and, deserted by its tribal vassals, disintegrated completely. The Ottoman Empire went through a period of decentralization that impaired the concept of an imperial state. The Mughal Empire disintegrated into numerous competing provincial and feudal regimes. In Southeast Asia, a centralized regime had never been established over the Indonesian archipelago or the Malay Peninsula. The largest Indonesian state, the Mataram Empire of Java, came under direct Dutch economic and indirect Dutch political control. In North Africa, Muslim states were being subverted by their declining commercial position in the Mediterranean, while provincial, tribal, and Sufi resistance was increasing. The Sudanic states had long passed the peak of their commercial prosperity, although Muslim communities were growing in influence in other parts of Africa. By this period, much of the northern steppes of Inner Asia had come under Russian control, and eastern Turkestan had come under Chinese rule.

An important but hardly the only factor in the political decline of many Muslim regimes was the rising power of Europe. On the far western fringe of the Eurasian landmass, Europeans were making a revolution in world history. From the late Middle Ages to modern times, European societies were generating technological inventions,

economic wealth, and military power. These developments would profoundly change the conditions of life not only for Muslims but for all the world's peoples.

European world power emerged from a set of intertwined socioeconomic and cultural conditions that led to the formation of highly pluralistic societies. Unlike Middle Eastern societies, European societies were not organized on the threefold template of kinship, religious community, and empire. Medieval European family structure, with some exceptions among the feudal nobility, was based not on closed lineage groups but rather on interlocking social networks built on bilateral ties of both husbands and wives. Moreover, with the fall of Rome and the failure of the Carolingian and Holy Roman empires, European states no longer had the all-embracing political and mythic importance still held by states in the Middle East. In place of empires, feudal governments based on personal and contractual loyalties, governments by oath association, and communes or assemblies based on Roman or Germanic notions of popular sovereignty were accepted as legitimate.

Most important was the tendency toward secularization. The potentiality for secularization was implicit in the Christian church, because it was a highly organized, corporate institution governed under laws and norms appropriate to itself but not to lay society, making it possible to define a profane realm – "the world" – outside the church, a world governed by nonchurch or noncanonical laws. Greek and Roman political and legal ideas and German communal and feudal concepts defined a realm of legal authority and secular values that, although not Christian, were viewed as legitimate.

Historical changes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries enhanced the pluralism implicit in European family, state, and religious organization. The growth of commerce, a money economy, and towns broke up village communities, favored the mobility of individuals, and promoted occupational specialization. New urban classes of landowning and capital-investing patricians, merchants and bankers, artisans, journeymen, workers, and entrepreneurs in manufacturing, shipbuilding, and commerce grew in size. With the expansion of secular learning in literature, philosophy, law, and medicine, a

nonclerical intelligentsia of poets, writers, physicians, lawyers, professors, administrators, and judges increased. Thus, European society was divided into numerous social strata and classes: nobles, knights, clergy, and a bourgeoisie, subdivided again among merchants, artisans, intellectuals, lawyers, and other groups.

The differentiation of late medieval European society stimulated the formation of corporate groups to advance the interests of their members. Some groups served the need for political security. Feudal fiefdoms, aristocratic factions, church governments, peace associations, and communes all became active centers of political power. Within the church, monastic orders and confraternities were formed to express new religious orientations. Merchant and artisan guilds and commercial companies organized economic activities. Universities were founded to carry on secular learning. Corporate structures were critical to the formation of a civil society that was a counterweight to centralized political power.

This pluralism was expressed in values as well as social organization. European societies recognized the legitimacy of several culture systems, including feudal chivalry and romance, Roman law, philosophy, and bourgeois business ethics – each of which constituted a world of independent values. Each type of government, each stratum, and each group operated in accordance with its own laws and regulations, its own moral concepts, and its own implicit idea of the nature of the human being and of human fulfillment. Muslim societies were also built on a similar multiplicity of culture and value systems, but they maintained at least a rhetorical commitment to Islamic law and community.

In this pluralistic society, the relationship between the individual and society was different from that of the Middle East. Whereas in the Middle East individual obligations were defined primarily in terms of participation in a community and secondarily in terms of specialized roles, in Europe the prioritization was reversed. The cultural heterogeneity of Europeans led to identification of individuals in terms of the specialized roles they played in occupational, corporate, and officeholding situations, and also in terms of an individual spiritual identity. Society itself came to be conceived in terms of individuals

fulfilling a function, a calling, and a role in a corporate, pluralistic, and secular world.

European trade, naval power, and empire

These social conditions were amplified by economic and technological development. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the towns of Italy, Flanders, and the Baltic were already committed to commerce and industry, rather than agriculture, as sources of wealth. Out of these towns came novel techniques for investment, banking, and insurance, and other methods of economic organization and exchange. The pursuit of wealth and sophisticated means to generate it led to a tremendous outward expansion of European city-states in search of exotic luxury products and of new sources of food, fuel, and raw materials for their growing and ambitious populations.

The trading impulse led by stages to a revolution in world commerce and politics. Venice and Genoa had already created extensive networks of colonies and trading posts in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, where they could purchase spices, drugs, dyes, silk, and other products of the East. When the rise of the Ottoman Empire cut off the Italian city-states from their Eastern sources, Genoa was forced to turn to the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic for its supplies of wool, sugar, alum, silk, cereals, dyes, and spices. The Portuguese undertook the search for a new route to the Indies that would bypass Middle Eastern routes and enable them to bring Eastern products directly to Lisbon. By 1507 they had established bases in the Indian Ocean, reducing commerce in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Spanish and Italian explorers discovered new continents. Portugal and Spain conquered empires in the southern seas and the New World and brought home untold wealth.

In the sixteenth century, the great empires vied to dominate the global economy. The Ottomans fought the Habsburgs in Italy, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. By the late sixteenth century, the Ottomans had consolidated

their position in the Balkans and North Africa, but the entry of northern trading and warships into the Mediterranean heralded a major change in the international capitalist economy and a shift of commercial and military power to northern Europe. Holland, England, and France emerged as the dominant forces in world trade. Each of them would create a global commercial empire based on sophisticated trading, advanced gunnery and sailing techniques, and utter ruthlessness.

Although the discovery of new routes to the Orient did not close the traditional Middle Eastern international routes, it created a revolution in the distribution of wealth. As a result, Europe would prosper on the captured gold and silver, spices, and other products of both the New World and the Old. The Baltic and the Atlantic replaced the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean as the most important centers of world trade. The growth of Atlantic trade meant not only a change of routes but also a change in the nature of the goods being exchanged. Whereas the traditional trade was largely a trade in luxury goods, the new commerce was a trade in agricultural and industrial products (timber, grain, fish, salt, etc.) on a mass scale and represented a new level of commodity production and division of labor in the world economy. The formation of the new commercial empires made possible a system of economic exploitation in which Europe became the principal beneficiary of a division of labor between colonies producing raw materials and metropoles producing high-value industrial goods and commercial services. European commercial dominance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led ultimately to the emergence of capitalist industrial economies.

In the seventeenth century the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean were displaced by the Dutch. The Dutch conquered key commercial centers such as Makassar (1669) and Banten (1682), gaining control of the vital ports and products of the Indies. By the middle of the eighteenth century, they had conquered the rest of the Indies and converted their commercial empire into a territorial empire. They made themselves suzerains of Java and conquered the rest of the Indies in the course of the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, new products – plantation crops largely managed by Europeans and Chinese, including sugar, coffee, and tobacco – were

added to Dutch exports. Instead of cloth and silver, these exports were paid for in opium.

Malaya and India also became part of European trading and then territorial empires. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch, the British, and the French established factories, warehouses, and residences for their merchants in India. The British East India Company began trading in India in 1600, exporting cotton, silk cloth, and spices and importing silver bullion and other metals. The British progressively extended their economic influence from one region to another, converting their economic power into political control. After bitter rivalries with the French, the British took control of Bengal in the late eighteenth century and went on to dominate the rest of the Indian subcontinent in the early decades of the nineteenth. At the same time, they took control of the Indian Ocean, with bases in Malaya, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and East Africa. By the late nineteenth century, the Indian Ocean region was Muslim in religion and culture and largely under colonial rule.

On the basis of their dominance of international and East Asian routes, the British, the French, and the Dutch also gained commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean and went on to take territorial control of Egypt, North Africa, and the Fertile Crescent. The French occupied Algeria from 1830 and declared a protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 and over Morocco in 1912. Egypt came under British control in 1882. Libya was invaded by Italy in 1911. In the aftermath of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned, with Lebanon and Syria coming under French control and Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq placed under British suzerainty. Only parts of the Ottoman Empire remained independent and were reborn as the Turkish Republic in 1924. Even in the colonial era and the contemporary period of independent national states, the Mediterranean remains, at least in concept, despite centuries of political division, a region with an intrinsic geographical, commercial, and cultural unity.

Africa was the last region with a large Muslim population to be subjected to colonial domination. Plantation agriculture in Brazil and the West Indies created a huge demand for African slaves. During the 1650s and 1660s, French, British, Danish, Swedish, and German

companies were formed to develop tropical plantations and promote the slave trade. In the seventeenth and later centuries, the Europeans began to move into the interior. Europeans sought palm oil, peanuts, ivory, sisal, and slaves in exchange for cotton fabric, textiles, and firearms, which in turn promoted internal warfare, enslavement, and the export of slaves to the Americas as well as an increase in the slave trade on trans-Saharan routes to North Africa. French expansion in the nineteenth century further drew Sudanic and Saharan goods to Atlantic ports. Colonialism, the capitalist economy, and the technologies of industrialism vastly reduced the historic roles of the Sahara in trade and the transmission of culture.

In the late nineteenth century the European powers turned from trading interests to political annexation. At the Congress of Berlin (1884–85) the European powers agreed on the partition of Africa among themselves. Already the French had created protectorates in Senegal; the British had seized Egypt in 1882; and the Germans had created protectorates over Togo and the Cameroons in 1884 and added new territories in Tanganyika, Rwanda, and Burundi. While the British took Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, the French went on to complete their West African empire in Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast and conquered the Sahara as far as Lake Chad. In 1890 Zanzibar became a British protectorate, followed by Kenya and Uganda. Treaties in 1897 among Ethiopia, Britain, France, and Italy regulated the Somali protectorates. The British conquered most of the Sudan in 1898 and Darfur in 1916. Thus all of Muslim Africa – indeed, all of Africa except Liberia and Ethiopia – came under European rule by World War I.

On the northern reaches of the Muslim world, Russia began its expansion across Inner Asia and Siberia to the Pacific, conquering and absorbing Muslim populations. In the sixteenth century, Russia absorbed the Tatar states in the Volga basin; by the nineteenth century, most of the Kazakh population of the northern steppes was under Russian control. The Russian conquests culminated in the colonization of Transoxania and the Transcaspian regions in the late nineteenth century. At the same time, China established its suzerainty in eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century and made it a province

of China in the late nineteenth. Russia and China took control of most of the Muslim populations of Inner Asia.

Only the Ottoman Empire and Iran maintained their political identity without experiencing direct colonial rule. (See Map 27.)

Map 27. European domination over Islamic and other lands, 1815.

European imperialism and the beginning of the modern era

By the eighteenth century, the reorganization of the global economy and the consolidation of European commercial and political dominance subverted Muslim societies, weakened Muslim states that depended on commercial revenues, and promoted factional strife and the exploitation of the peasantries. European imperial ascendancy took a cultural as well as a political and economic form. By the nineteenth century, Europe was beginning to seize the imagination of Muslim peoples. The Ottomans, for example, were impressed with European military and technological efficiency and artistic styles.

European political – and especially nationalist – concepts and moral values began to influence Muslim populations. These influences opened a new era in the history of Muslim peoples.

As Muslim societies entered the modern era, they would be drastically changed by internal reorganization and by the impact of European imperialism and the world commercial economy. By the late eighteenth century, the Russians, the Dutch, and the British had established territorial suzerainty in parts of the northern steppes of Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, and European commercial and diplomatic intervention was well advanced in other regions. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European states, driven by the need of industrial economies for raw materials and markets, and by economic and political competition with one another, established worldwide territorial empires. The Dutch completed the conquest of Indonesia; the Russians (and the Chinese) absorbed Inner Asia; the British consolidated their empires in India and Malaya and took control of parts of the Middle East, East Africa, Nigeria, and other parts of West Africa. France seized North Africa and much of West Africa, parts of the Middle East, and other territories. Small German and Italian colonies were also founded in Africa. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the European powers (and China) had completed their conquest of almost all of the Muslim world. Only Iran and the Ottoman Empire remained nominally sovereign states. (See Map 28.)

Map 28. European domination and the Muslim world, c. 1920.

These conquests were driven by rapid changes within European societies. The Industrial Revolution in Britain in the eighteenth century – and in France, Germany, and other countries in the nineteenth – the development of bureaucratic forms of economic organization, new technologies for the production of steam and electricity, and the expansion of scientific knowledge further enhanced the economic dominance of European countries.

The American and French revolutions brought equally profound changes in the realm of politics and statecraft. They brought into being the modern nation-state built on the relative equality and participation of its citizens, close identification of populations with the state, and a merging of national, political, and cultural identities. They also pioneered the creation of parliamentary institutions that allowed for widespread political representation and state structures that diffused or moderated the exercise of power in the interests of the autonomy of the civil society and the political freedom of individual citizens.

Furthermore, the European and American Enlightenments completed the historical process of secularization. Political and economic institutions were generally differentiated from religious norms. The cultivation of scientific and of humanistic mentalities relegated religion to a narrowed sphere of worship and communal activities. The scientific mentality "disenchanted" and demystified the world of nature and of human relations. Nature, society, and even the human personality became accessible to rational understanding and to the conviction that they could be modified by conscious human intervention.

These developments would have a profound impact on Islamic societies. Throughout the Muslim world, European dominance led to the construction of centralized bureaucratic territorial states. European economic and capitalist penetration usually led to increased and often exploitative trade, stimulated the production of raw materials, and undermined local industries, creating new patterns of economic production and exchange and new technologies. The European powers forced or induced others to create modern schools, and to promote the values of European civilization, blended as best they could be with indigenous cultures. In turn the new state and economic structures were the bases for the rise of new elites. Political managers, soldiers, technocrats, comprador merchants, intelligentsia, intellectuals, commercial farmers, and industrial workers became important forces in Muslim societies. European influence also stimulated the acceptance of new value systems – an appreciation for national identity and political participation, economic engagement, moral activism, and a new scientific worldview. All of these changes involved the adoption or re-creation of the basic features of European civilization in the matrix of older Islamic societies.

In each case, however, the European impact was different – and these differences, combined with the institutional and cultural variations among the Muslim societies, would generate the various contemporary Islamic societies. Just as each Islamic society was the product of the interaction of a regional society with Middle Eastern influences, modern Islamic countries are the products of the interaction of the historical Islamic societies with Europe. Because

there was no single European model of modern society, and because the impact of Europe was different in every part of the world, the result was a multiplicity of societies. Like the great empires, religions, and civilizations of the past, Europe challenged existing elites, institutions, and cultures and forced them to define their own version of modernity. Modernity engendered plurality because it resulted from the efforts of third world indigenous elites to reconstruct their own societies. Such transformations, of course, were not peculiar to the Islamic world. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European influence reached all civilizations, provoked profound changes, and helped shape their contemporary development.

Part IV The Modern Transformation: Muslim Peoples from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries

Chapter 45 Introduction: imperialism, modernity, and the transformation of Islamic societies

By the eighteenth century a global system of Islamic societies had come into being. In Part I of this book we have seen how Islam originated in Arabia in the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. The Arab-Muslim conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries established Islam as the politically dominant culture of the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Inner Asia. In the first three centuries of the Islamic era a new religion and a new civilization came into being. Islam as a religion was expressed in ritual, law, theology, and mysticism, and Islam as a civilization was proclaimed in art and architecture, literature, philosophy, and science. In Part II we studied how from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries Islam in the Middle East and North Africa was embedded in social-communal and political organizations. This was the era of nomadic and slave elite regimes, schools of law and theology, Sufi brotherhoods and Shiʿi communities. In Part III we learned how, in successive waves, Islam and Islamic cultures were carried by conquering nomads, traveling merchants and itinerant holy men to vast reaches of Eastern Europe, Central, South and Southeast Asia, and Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa. In each of these regions, the Islamic institutions originally defined in the Middle East interacted with local institutions and cultures to generate a variety of Islamic societies. Each was distinctive, but they resembled each other, and were linked by political, cultural, and religious ties. They constituted a world system of Islamic societies. At the conclusion of Part III we saw how European economic and political imperialism impacted Islamic societies and initiated a new phase in their historical development.

The impact of Europe was profound, but there was no single model of a modern European society, nor any single type of Islamic society. The modern era is marked by the emergence of a great variety of

Islamic societies. In each Islamic society indigenous elites were crucial in determining the patterns of modern development. The impact of Europe on Islamic societies was mediated by the collaboration or resistance of their elites. The changes that took place in Islamic societies were forged in terms of the interests, perceptions, and responses of internal elites to the pressures and incentives generated by European power and by their desire to exploit European influences in the struggles for power within their own societies.

These indigenous elites differed from those of Europe. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European societies were to a considerable extent organized in terms of economically derived social classes. In many European countries, the bourgeoisie was the principal force behind economic development and state organization. The industrial working class was the backbone of production. In Muslim societies, despite the importance of merchant elites, economically defined social classes were relatively less significant. Instead, the economy was embedded in and regulated by local, tribal, communal, associational, and state political structures. State elites – as well as tribal and religious notables – used political power to control land and trading resources and to extract the surplus product of peasants and other producers. The elites in Muslim countries tended to define the problem of European intervention in political or sociocultural rather than economic terms. Indigenous elites, institutions, and cultural codes were as important to the shape of modernity as were European imperial and economic systems.

Illustration 21. The Muharram procession, Calcutta (© Earl and NazimaKowall/CORBIS).

In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, Muslim elites generated two principal responses to European pressures: Islamic reformism and Islamic modernism. The first came from tribal leaders, merchants, artisans, and commercial farmers, led by *'ulama'* and Sufis who advocated a reorganization of Muslim communities and the reform of individual behavior in terms of fundamental religious principles. These movements of religious renewal, called *tajdid*, we will call reformism. Beginning in the eighteenth century, this reaction to the breakup of the Islamic state system and to the imposition of European commercial and territorial domination was the first wave of Islamic revivalism in the modern era, and continues in new guises to the present.

The second response, Islamic modernism, came from the political classes and the newly formed intelligentsias. Colonial rule transferred

political power to new military, bureaucratic, or landowning elites – and in some countries, in a later generation, to upwardly mobile, modern-educated intellectuals, technicians, and soldiers. In some cases, European economic penetration promoted new strata of merchants, commercial farmers, and industrial workers. All of these new groups and classes were at first very small in size, but they were the vanguard of the modernization of their societies. Trained in Western techniques and enamored of Western cultural values and accomplishments, they favored first Islamic modernist, and later secularist and nationalist, concepts of the future of Muslim societies. The modernist response, beginning in the late nineteenth century, led, after World War I and World War II, to the worldwide formation of nation-states that persist to the present.

In the 1970s, the consolidation of independent nation-states in turn provoked a new wave of Islamic revival movements, and new conflicts between authoritarian regimes and popular demands for Islamic and/or democratic governments.

Islamic reformism

Modern Islamic reformism began as the religious and moral response of *'ulama'*, tribal, and urban communities to the decline of Islamic states, the transformation of traditional structures of Muslim societies, and the threat of European political, economic, and cultural domination. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, informal scholarly and Sufi study-groups in Arabia and Egypt advocated a purified version of Islamic belief and practice based on the study of the Quran, hadith, and law combined with Sufi asceticism. Their basic principle was the return to the Quran and the earliest texts of hadith as the defining guidelines for Islamic belief and practice. The reformers were opposed to later accretions to the foundational texts, and to the blending of Muslim and non-Muslim cultures. They denounced popular Sufi practices such as the veneration of saints, and other local forms of superstition and magic. Some reformers even rejected the Muslim legal schools. Instead, reformers advocated a religion of personal discipline, moral responsibility, and commitment to a universal Muslim society.

Reformism came in a broad spectrum of colors, from light corrections of Sufi practice to deep hues of fundamentalism. Some were dedicated to preaching, counseling, and education – to the schooling of Muslim communities in proper Islamic beliefs, rituals, and social practices; they aspired to transform their societies by the cumulative effect of educational and missionary activities. Others emphasized political action and control of the state as the way to the formation of truly Islamic communities. From the late eighteenth century to the present, reformism generated anticolonial movements, political parties, and revolutionary efforts to create Islamic states. I call these reformist–political movements. Contemporary movements of this type are also called "Islamist." Some of these movements are broad-spectrum organizations whose activities range from prayer to politics and whose emphases may vary with circumstances.

Itinerant *'ulama'*, students, Sufis, merchants, and craftsmen carried the reformist doctrine to India, Indonesia, and North and West Africa. Reformism in all these societies was stimulated by pilgrims and students returning from Mecca and Medina. It appealed to peoples throughout the Muslim world subject to European economic interventions and colonialism, and in particular to fragmented lineage, tribal, and village communities because it provided an ideology of unification and mobilization for local political struggles, anticolonial resistance, conquests, and the formation of new states.

The earliest example of a reformist movement in a pastoral and tribal society was the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. Born out of an alliance between a reform preacher and the Saʿud family, the Wahhabis united diverse tribal groups into a movement that conquered most of Arabia. In West Africa, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reformist movements in the Senegambian region organized Muslim resistance to non-Muslim political elites. The Fulani conquests, led by ʿUthman don Fodio (1754–1817), established the caliphate of Sokoto (1809–1903) in Nigeria. The Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhood inspired the regime of al-Hajj ʿUmar (1794?–1864) in Senegal and the Niger regions. In Libya, the Sanusiyya unified tribal peoples and created a loose confederation of tribes and oases that mediated disputes and organized trade. In the Indian Northwest

Frontier, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi brought reformism to Pashtuns fighting the British and the Sikhs. Reformism promoted by the Naqshbandiyya order helped mobilize resistance to Russian and Chinese colonialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. (See Map 29.)

Map 29. Islamic reform and resistance movements: eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Reformism also took root in agricultural and urban merchant milieus that were under the pressures of commercialization and European imperialism. In Bengal, the reformist Fara'idi movement opposed British rule and the rise of Hindu and British landlords. In northern India, British rule and the collapse of the Mughal Empire led to reform movements in urban and small-town middle-class milieus. The reformist college in Deoband trained students to proselytize, educate, and make "true Muslims" out of nominal Indian believers. Deoband created a network of colleges that contributed heavily to the awareness of a common Muslim identity throughout the subcontinent.

In early nineteenth-century Southeast Asia, the breakdown of traditional family and social structures opened the way to Muslim reformism as the doctrine of new communities. Reform-minded pilgrims and students returning to Sumatra from Mecca and Medina launched the Padri movement to Islamize Muslim villages. Their preaching appealed to coffee farmers engaged in international trade. Reformism was adopted by the Indo-Malay merchant communities of Singapore and other Southeast Asian ports. The Muhammadiyya movement in Indonesia and the Kaum Muda (Young group) in Malaya were based on reformist teaching, and recruited mobile young businessmen and intellectuals. Elsewhere, in Inner Asia, merchants and intelligentsia adopted usul-i jadid (the New Method) in response to Russian domination. Reformism thus contributed to the mobilization of colonized peoples and became the vehicle for the reconstruction of Muslim political identities among subnational populations in Africa, the Caucasus, Inner Asia, India, and Indonesia and the basis for national movements in Algeria and Morocco.

In many Islamic countries, however, religiously led opposition came not from reformers, but from traditional religious scholars and teachers, the *'ulama'*, who opposed both colonial influences and the state intelligentsias. In Iran Shi'i *'ulama'* protested Russian military expansion, foreign economic penetration, and the military, administrative, and educational reform programs of the monarchy. In Java, where the political elites became subordinate collaborators in Dutch rule, anticolonial resistance was led by rural *'ulama'* united by the Sufi brotherhoods. By contrast with the Ottoman Empire, where traditional *'ulama'* were generally subordinate to state elites and did not play an important role in resistance or adaptation to colonial rule, in the Indies *'ulama'* led popular resistance movements.

Islamic modernism

By contrast, Islamic modernism was the nineteenth-century doctrine of Muslim political elites and intelligentsias rather than of religious leaders. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the political elites and intelligentsias adopted Islamic modernist, secular

nationalist, and (after World War II) socialist conceptions of national transformation. In almost all Muslim countries, politicians, displaced politicians, would-be politicians, professionals, technicians, and intellectuals, all of whom were trained in Western techniques, sought to define new political ideologies for the development of their societies. The essential principle of Islamic modernism was that the defeat of Muslims at the hands of European powers had revealed their vulnerability, and that adopting European military techniques, centralizing state power, modernizing their economies, and providing a modern education was essential for the restoration of their political power. It meant that the medieval forms of Islamic civilization had to be repudiated – but not that Islam itself would be denied. Rather, it was to be reconstructed on its own inherent, but neglected, principles of rationality, ethical activism, and patriotism.

Table 16. Islamic reform (*tajdid*) movements, eighteenth to twentieth centuries

Arabia	Reform teaching in Mecca and Medina Wahhabiyya – founded by Muhammad b. ʿAbd. al-Wahhab (1703–92); allied with Ibn Saʿud to create the Saudi state Idrisiyya – founded in Mecca by Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837)
Caucasus	Naqshbandiyya – 1785–present, anti-Russian resistance
Inner Asia	Naqshbandiyya – reform-oriented Sufi *tariqa* leads Muslim resistance to Russia and China New teaching, 1761–1877 – offshoot of Naqshbandiyya, late eighteenth- and late nineteenth-century resistance to Chinese rule Khwajas and Yaʿqub Beg – holy Muslim lineage, formerly rulers of Kashgar, attempt to establish an Islamic state, defeated by China in 1878

Yunnan, 1856–73 – rebellion against Chinese rule and effort to establish an Islamic state

usul-i jadid – Kazan, Crimean, and Bukharan intellectuals, notably Isma'il Gasprinskii (1851–1914), sponsor new schools, combined Muslim and Russian education; modernization of Muslim peoples

India   Shah Waliallah (1703–62)   Meccan
Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (1746–1824)   influences
Muhammad Isma'il (1781–1831)
Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1785–1831)
unites Pashtuns to resist British and Sikhs

| | | |

Pantna-Maulana   Titu Mir   Fara'idi
Walayat 'Ali   (Bengal)   (Bengal);
                                     1818–45, anti-Hindu and anti-British

Maulana   Ahl-i
Karamat 'Ali   Hadith

|

Delhi School

|

Deoband – founded 1876.
Muslim college combined

hadith studies and Sufism;
spawned satellite schools

Tablighi Islam – founded 1927
by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas

Southeast Asia	Padri movement – Sumatra 1803–37 Dipanegara leads revolt on Java, 1825–30 Banten, West Java revolts, nineteenth century Kaum Muda – Sumatra and Malaya movement for reform and modernization Aceh – 1873–1908 *'Ulama'*-led resistance to Dutch occupation Muhammadiyya – 1912–present; educational and social reform
Egypt and North Africa	'Abd al-Qadir – Qadiriyya chieftain attempts to establish Algerian state, defeated by the French Rahmaniyya – religious brotherhood uses networks of *zawiyas* in Algeria and Tunisia to resist French occupation Tijaniyya – reform Sufi order inspires West and North African jihads and resistance movements Khalwatiyya – reformist Sufi brotherhood Sanusiyya – reformist brotherhood founded by Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi (d. 1859); resists Italian occupation; creates "state" in Libya Salafiyya – founded by Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), influenced *islah* and national movements in North Africa; Tunisia, Young Tunisians; Algeria, Ben Badis; Morocco, 'Allal al-Fasi
East Africa	Idrisiyya spawned Rashidiyya in Algeria; Amirghaniyya in Sudan and Nubia; Sanusiyya in Libya

| | Sudan – Sammaniyya gives rise to Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Mahdi (d. 1898) Somalia – Muhammad ʿAbdallah Hassan leads resistance to British, 1899–1920 |
| West Africa | Jihad of ʿUthman don Fodio (1754–1817) – Northern Nigerian reformist opposition to Hausa states, leads to Sokoto caliphate (1809–1903) and related jihads in Adamawa and Masina al-Hajj ʿUmar (1794–1864) – jihad state in region of Mali and Senegal Reform Muslim states in the Senegambian region were formed in Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro Ma Ba – nineteenth-century jihad in Senegal Samori Ture (1879–98) – Muslim adventurer founds West African state |

In the regions under Ottoman suzerainty – Turkey, Egypt, the Arab Fertile Crescent, and Tunisia – the dominant indigenous response was that of the established political elites and the political, technical, and literary intelligentsia who rose out of the political classes. The Young Ottomans of the 1860s and 1870s were the most prominent of these modernist elites. While committed to the principles of Islam, the intelligentsias called upon the endangered Ottoman regimes to transform themselves into constitutional governments and to promote a new social morality. This was a cultural and political response to European diplomatic, commercial, and educational influences. European diplomats and wars had played a critical role in both the dismemberment and the lingering survival of the Ottoman Empire. European merchants promoted trade and investment in manufacturing, railroads, mining, and agriculture, stimulated the production of cash crops, and lent large sums to the Ottoman state. Eventually European bankers took over the fiscal management of the

empire. Economic change favored Christian and Jewish merchants, and weakened the Muslim bourgeoisie.

The response of the political elites and intelligentsias went through a cycle of several generations. In late eighteenth-century Palestine, early nineteenth-century Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, and mid–nineteenth-century Tunisia, the political elites sought to reorganize their military forces, centralize and rationalize bureaucratic administration, and promote economic activities that would increase state revenues. Political elites also recognized the need to create new schools to educate modern professional and administrative personnel. Physicians, engineers, army and navy officers, and administrators were the product of these schools and of studies in Europe. They were partially absorbed into state service, but many of them found careers in law, journalism, and literary activities. In the next generation, Ottoman, Egyptian, and Tunisian reformers introduced social, legal, and educational programs that undermined the traditional roles of the religious elites and created the prototypes of modern judicial and educational systems.

In the Arab Fertile Crescent, European political influence and commercial penetration did not lead to structural and political changes until after World War I, but educational and literary influences in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century promoted an Arab cultural renaissance and the birth of Arab literary nationalism among elite official, merchant, and religious families. By the 1930s and 1940s, further education and development fostered a younger generation of soldiers, technocrats, and journalists from middle- and lower–middle-class backgrounds who would rival the first generation of national leaders. Tunisia went through a similar developmental sequence. From approximately 1890 to 1920, modernist leadership was provided by government officials, reformist *'ulama'*, and French-educated notables. In the 1930s and after, a new generation of French-educated, upwardly mobile Arab intellectuals, largely from provincial small-town, middle-, and lower-class milieus, took the lead in the movement for Tunisian independence.

In some cases, the modernist tendency was merged with Islamic reformism. The most influential spokesmen for an Islamic-oriented modernism were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) and his Egyptian disciple Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905). Al-Afghani was an Iranian who later claimed to be an Afghan in order to ensure a favorable reception among Sunni Muslims. Educated as a Shiʿi, he was deeply versed in Muslim philosophy. He sought to awaken Muslims to the threat of European domination and to oppose Muslim rulers who abetted Christian interventions. His political career took him to India, Afghanistan, Egypt, France, England, Iran, and finally to Istanbul, where he died. A dramatic and passionate political intriguer, an inspiring lecturer, and a man of novel and imaginative ideas, he devoted his life to persuading rulers to modernize Islam. He lectured widely on theology, natural science, philosophy, and mysticism. Everywhere he was mistrusted, used, and then discarded by heads of state. He inspired suspicion and fear as much as confidence and hope.

Al-Afghani dreamed of restoring the glory of Islam triumphant. He worked to encourage an international union of Muslim peoples committed to the modernization of Islam, the cultivation of Muslims as scientifically and technically competent modern peoples, and political unity in the face of colonial oppression. The reform of Islam was essential because religion was the moral basis of both technical and scientific achievement and of political solidarity and power. Islam, in his view, was quintessentially suited to serve as the foundation of a modern society. It was a religion of reason and the free use of the mind. The Quran, he argued, should be interpreted by reason and was open to reinterpretation by individuals in every era of history. He also argued that Islam, properly understood, was a dynamic faith, for it encouraged an active, responsible approach to worldly affairs. The passivity and resignation that he saw in medieval Muslims were a corruption of its true teachings. Further, Islam was the basis of patriotism and loyalty to one's people. As a religion of rationality, science, activism, and patriotism, Islam embodied precisely those virtues that had made the European countries world powers. Al-Afghani saw Islam as a religion that could be the wellspring of a rationally guided, active, responsible life, compatible with modern

science, dedicated to the restoration of the autonomy of Muslim nations and to the revival of the political and cultural glory of Muslim peoples. He believed that it was essential to modernize Islam, but also that faith in Islam was essential to modernity.

In Egypt, al-Afghani's disciple Muhammad ʿAbduh defined the intricacies of the merger between reformist and modernist ideas. He combined the reformist principles – return to the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet; the right of independent judgment in religious matters; abandonment of a stifling conformity to outmoded tradition; and opposition to cultic Sufism, magical practices, and the veneration of saints and shrines – with a modernist responsiveness to the political and cultural pressures of Europe. A reformist thinker, he was also an educational and legal reformer.

In the late nineteenth century, under the influence of al-Afghani and ʿAbduh, this blend of modernist and reformist thought became the ideological program of the Egyptian intelligentsia, inspiring the Salafi movement in Egypt, the Arab Middle East, and North Africa. In the 1920s, the Salafi movement became the principal ideological expression of the merchant bourgeoisie of Fez and other Moroccan towns. It appealed to the urban petite bourgeoisie and uprooted rural migrants of Algeria. In both Morocco and Algeria, reformist modernism transcended specific class milieus and became for a time the ideology of national identity and resistance to French rule.

Modernist movements also emerged in other parts of the Muslim world. In India, British control deprived Muslim elites of political power, generated economic changes that weakened the grip of Muslim landlords on rural revenues, and threatened to undermine Muslim culture. In response, the displaced Muslim political elite transformed itself into a modern intelligentsia. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) argued that the survival of Indian Muslims under British rule required the education of a new generation of Muslim leaders loyal to the principles of Islam but adapted to the political and scientific culture of the modern world. Under his leadership the modernists founded a college at Aligarh to provide a modern Islamic education to a new generation of officials, lawyers, and journalists. After the turn of

the century, Aligarh graduates became the leaders of Muslim resistance to British rule and, ultimately, the proponents of Pakistan.

In Indonesia, Dutch rule similarly transformed the historical ruling classes, the *priyayi*, into subordinate functionaries of Dutch administration. The Dutch themselves provided the former elites with a Western professional education in order to generate the Indonesian cadres needed to maintain Dutch administration. From Dutch-sponsored colleges and technical, legal, and medical schools came the officials and intellectuals who became the advocates of Indonesian national independence. In all these places, Islamic modernism was the ideology of elites who were concerned with the restoration of state power based on indigenous social and cultural norms.

Nationalism

The commitment of the intelligentsias to Islamic modernism was followed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by a move to secular nationalism. In general, Young Turks, Arab nationalists, pan-Turkish intellectuals, Indonesian *priyayi*, Malay aristocrats, and others minimized the Islamic dimensions of their political and cultural heritage to advocate the formation of "secular" national forms of modern societies. In the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks succeeded the Young Ottomans. In reaction to the pan-Islamic policies of Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1908), they turned from an Islamic modernist to a secular constitutionalist position. Under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk (r. 1923–38), they established the Turkish Republic in 1923. In Tunisia, the first generation of nationalist elites blended Islamic modernist and secular orientations; they were followed in the 1930s by a revived independence movement that was articulated, despite symbolic appeals to Islam, mainly in secular nationalist terms. In Egypt, the first generation of modernist intelligentsia was superseded by secular liberal political parties. At the end of World War I, the Damascus notables changed their emphasis from an Islamic to an Arab orientation, and nationalist political movements were formed throughout the Fertile Crescent.

In some cases, however, nationalism was combined with other ideologies. For example, in India, the Aligarh graduates were secular and modernist in lifestyle and personal religious orientation, but for reasons peculiar to the subcontinent developed a commitment to the formation of a "Muslim" national state, which would be Pakistan. In Algeria, whose migrant workers in France and rural migrants to Algerian towns formed the popular base of Algerian national movements, and in Indonesia, where the workers' movement and the Communist Party were particularly strong, nationalism was blended with socialist conceptions of state control of the economy.

Nationalism came to be the preferred doctrine of the political elites and modern-educated intelligentsias for several reasons. Foremost was the influence of a Western education. Though opposed to colonial rule, the first- and second-generation intelligentsias were raised in the intense glow of self-confident European supremacy, and absorbed the nationalist paradigms created by their colonial rulers and instructors. National and secular symbols were also particularly meaningful to a segment of society that had been uprooted from local affiliations and cast into a world of cosmopolitan education and state-centered political movements. An independent nation-state was the only potential homeland for people who no longer belonged to traditional communities and for whom colonial political societies could only offer subordinate positions.

There were also tactical reasons for the adoption of secular nationalism as the ideology of political intelligentsias. Nationalism helped differentiate the new segments of the intelligentsia from the established elites. Nationalism could serve as a mobilizing symbol in the competition for the support of other uprooted strata of society and as a claim to leadership of the masses. In the Ottoman Empire, Young Turks used the new ideology against the pan-Islamic claims of the sultan and in opposition to more conservative and entrenched Ottoman officials. In Lebanon and Syria, nationalism was the preferred position of Christians in predominantly Muslim societies. French-educated Tunisian intellectuals used nationalism against the established Muslim reformist elites of Tunis. In Indonesia, *priyayi* aristocrats and administrators developed their nationalist views

partially in opposition to Muslim merchant reformist movements. Nationalism also served better than Islamic modernism to symbolize the ambiguous relationship between Muslim intelligentsias and colonial political domination. On the one hand, secularism and nationalism signified that the intelligentsias were the advanced elements of their societies and justified their demand to participate in colonial regimes. On the other hand, nationalism legitimized resistance to foreign rule in the eyes of Europeans as well as Muslims.

In the development of nationalism and national movements, *'ulama'* and merchants played only a secondary role. *'Ulama'* were auxiliaries or participants in the early phases of national movements in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, but were soon superseded by the Western-educated intelligentsias. Not until the 1930s did structural changes in the economy or sufficiently far-reaching changes in class structure generate a politically significant merchant or working class. In no case did these new milieus disturb the dominance of the Western-educated political intelligentsias.

Patterns of response and resistance

In sum, the two principal responses to the fragmentation of Islamic societies and to European penetration came from the *'ulama'* and the political intelligentsias. These responses embodied, despite modifications, a striking continuity in the structures of Islamic societies. As we shall see in the succeeding chapters, in societies with a strong heritage of state domination over the *'ulama'*, such as the Ottoman Empire, the political intelligentsia led the way, unopposed, to national independence. In the more pluralistic Islamic societies, colonial rule precipitated a multisided struggle for power waged against the colonial rulers and among the various Islamic modernist, secularist, nationalist, socialist, traditional, and reformist elites. In Iran, a society with a more open political structure, foreign pressures promoted a limited modernization of the state and collusion between government elites and foreign business interests, but it damaged Iranian merchant and artisan interests and the cultural security of the *'ulama'*. Thus it provoked a coalition of *'ulama'*,

merchant, and intellectual opposition to foreign encroachment. The result was direct conflict between state and religious elites over Iranian national identity, policies of economic development, and foreign relations.

Similarly, in India the loss of political power, economic dominance, and cultural supremacy to English and Christian rulers provoked multiple Muslim responses. From the displaced political elites, transformed by modern education into an intelligentsia, came a movement for the formation of a national Muslim state in the subcontinent. From reformist *'ulama'* came repeated efforts to define the identity of Indian Muslims in terms of personal religious values.

Indonesia was also the center of a complex struggle among forces that had different experiences of colonial rule, different class and status interests, different historical variants of Indonesian Islamic culture, and different responses to the problems of colonialism and economic change. The *priyayi* were transformed by Dutch education into a secularized intelligentsia who took the lead in the Indonesian nationalist movement, while reformism became the preferred ideology of merchants and commercial farmers. In the more traditional parts of Java, *'ulama'* (*kiyayi*) maintained their leadership in the countryside and led peasant resistance against Dutch rule. Before and after independence, Indonesian politics has been characterized by a struggle for political and ideological power among Indonesian nationalist, reformist Islamic, and conservative Islamic movements.

Algerian society similarly evinced a plural response to French occupation and colonization. French-educated Algerians favored cultural and political assimilation into France. Reformist *'ulama'* attempted to define an Algerian national identity in Arab and Muslim terms; and populist leaders organized Algerian workers, both at home and in France, into a radical political movement. Independent Algeria came to be defined by elements of both Islamic reformism and populist socialism.

Thus, in most Islamic societies the struggle among political intelligentsias, *'ulama'*, and other elites gave political and cultural definition to modern Muslim national states. The continuity of historical elites, institutions, and cultures in the "modernization" of

these societies meant that in each Muslim country the universal features of economy and technology were expressed, organized, and interrelated in ways that yielded different versions of modernity.

The contemporary Islamic revival

Although they were defined in national and ethnic terms, the national states that came into being in the twentieth century were built on a Muslim substrate. Ethnic and national loyalties were based on Muslim identities. Since the 1970s, the limitations and failures of secular national states have allowed these latent Muslim identities to reassert themselves in a worldwide "Islamic revival." This began as a reaction against authoritarian and military regimes, failures in economic development, and a perceived lack of cultural authenticity. It is also a counterattack against European and American values such as individualism, materialistic consumerism, the commodification of women, sexual liberty, religious and moral relativism, and pop culture. The revival movements are motivated by the fear that domestic regimes and Western influences will subvert Islamic beliefs, cultures, and identities.

The term "Islamic revival" embraces a great diversity of newly self-conscious and activist movements. The term "revival" also encompasses three principal religious–cultural versions of Islam. Islamic liberalism stresses the integration of Muslim belief and contemporary social and political values that are also seen to be rooted in Muslim tradition. Neo-Sufism cultivates a Muslim spirituality and individual self-realization. Islamic neofundamentalism, represented by "reformist," Salafi, and Wahhabi movements, emphasizes correct behavior through obedience to the law and observance of Islamic rituals. They seek to return to the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet. All three have a strong emphasis on individual choice and responsibility.

Many of the movements in the Islamic revival have a social activist, community-building orientation. Clubs, congregations, and ethnic associations have multiplied to meet the need for collective worship, education, charity, and for simple sociability and discussion. In many

cases, local cells are linked up with larger movements. Some are Sufi brotherhoods such as the Tijaniyya in West Africa. Some are reformist or Salafi movements, such as Muhammadiyya in Indonesia, intended to inculcate the correct practice of Islam, provide for community welfare, and foster solidarity among Muslims. Some of these movements were missionary (*da'wa*) movements, such as Tablighi Islam, which work to convert non-Muslims to Islam, and nominal Muslims to the correct practice of Islam. These movements sponsor educational and social-welfare activities, including schools, clinics, cooperatives, scout groups, and women's auxiliaries. These reformist movements expect that they will ultimately transform their societies by the cumulative effect of educational and missionary activities.

Other reformist movements are political movements that believe the control of the state is essential to the formation of a truly Islamic society. Reformist–political, also called "Islamist" movements, may function as political parties in countries where there are democratic elections, or as opposition movements in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes. They may be national or international. Many of these movements call for the implementation of "shari'a." This is a political ideological slogan intended to rally support for the creation of a utopian, divinely governed Islamic state and society, often with the implication that a truly Islamic state would legislate regressive punishments and family regulations. What it means in practice is obscure because historically, Islamic law (*fiqh*) was and is variable and changeable.

On the extreme are movements that use assassination, bombing, and other assaults as part of an effort to seize political power by coups d'état. The term "jihadist" applies to those for whom violence is the principal tactic.

Some of the "Islamic revival," however, is simply the expression of Muslim identity by means of dress, taste in music, consumption of specifically "Islamic" products, participation in social activities, or support for Muslim political causes.

Thus, the term "Islamic revival" is an umbrella designation for a wide variety of movements, some intolerant and exclusivist, some

pluralistic; some favorable to science, some antiscientific; some primarily devotional and some primarily political; some democratic, some authoritarian; some pacific, some violent. In the following chapters, we will explore these categories and examples of the various movements in greater depth.

Nationalism and Islam in the Middle East

Chapter 46 The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the modernization of Turkey

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was one of the more complex cases in the transition from eighteenth-century Islamic imperial societies to modern national states. The Ottoman regime was suzerain over a vast territory, including the Balkans, Turkey, the Arab Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and North Africa. Its influence reached Inner Asia, the Red Sea, and the Sahara. While the empire had gone through a period of decentralization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had begun to give ground to its European political and commercial competitors, it retained its political legitimacy and its basic institutional structure. In the nineteenth century, the Ottomans restored the power of the central state, consolidated control over the provinces, and generated the economic, social, and cultural reforms that they hoped would make them effective competitors in the modern world.

While the Ottomans struggled to reform state and society, they depended increasingly upon the European balance of power for survival. Until 1878, the British and the Russians offset each other and generally protected the Ottoman regime from direct encroachment. Between 1878 and 1914, however, most of the Balkans became independent and Russia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary all acquired control of Ottoman territories. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire culminated at the end of World War I in the creation of Turkey and a plethora of new states in the Balkans and the Arab Middle East. The effects of European intervention mingled with the Ottoman institutional and cultural heritage to generate what we recognize as modern Middle Eastern society. The modern Turkish state emerged out of the reforms promulgated in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman Empire, and reforms in the period of national independence under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk. These reforms were challenged in

the late twentieth century by a revived assertion of Islam. Turkey today is ruled by a democratically elected Islamic party and has the world's sixteenth-largest national economy.

The Partition of the Ottoman Empire

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire could no longer defend itself against the growing military power of Europe, or ward off European commercial penetration. Russia had absorbed the Crimea and established itself on the Black Sea, while Britain, after helping defeat Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, became the paramount military and commercial power in the Mediterranean. Russia wanted to absorb Ottoman territories in the Balkans and win access to the Mediterranean; Britain wanted to shore up the empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion and protect its commercial and imperial interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and India. The stage was set for the century-long struggle over the "sick man" of Europe. (See Map 30.)

Map 30. Territorial losses and the partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1683–1923.

In a series of political crises, the Ottoman Empire was progressively dismantled. The first test of the balance of power came with the invasion of Syria in 1831 by Muhammad ʿAli (r. 1805–48), the independent Ottoman governor of Egypt. In response, Russia and the Ottomans concluded the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 1833), in which they agreed to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign warships, thus protecting Russian territories on the Black Sea. Britain, alarmed, tried to forestall a possible Russian intervention in the Mediterranean, declaring for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the restoration of Syria to Ottoman control. In 1840, Russia, Britain, and Austria agreed that Muhammad ʿAli would have to retreat from Syria and that no warships were to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in time of peace. Both Russia and Britain would be protected in their spheres of influence. By a supplementary agreement in 1841, the powers allowed

Muhammad ʿAli to establish a hereditary regime in Egypt. Thus, the internal crisis of the empire led to a concert of European powers regulating Ottoman affairs. The Ottoman Empire had become a protectorate of Europe and a pawn of the great powers.

The balance of power and the durability of the Ottoman Empire were again tested in the Crimean War, 1853–56. Provoked by Russian demands for influence in Jerusalem and a protectorate over all Ottoman Christian subjects, British, French, and Ottoman forces entered the Black Sea and took Sebastopol in 1855. By the treaty of Paris (1856) the Russians were forced to dismantle their naval forces on the Black Sea, but they were compensated by an agreement to make Romania an autonomous province under Ottoman suzerainty.

The next crisis was the revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1876 against Ottoman rule. Nationalist resistance to Ottoman rule in the Balkans had begun with the Serbian revolt of 1804–13. Between 1821 and 1829, Greece gained its independence. With Russian support, Serbians, Romanians, and Bulgarians also demanded autonomy. By the treaty of San Stefano (1878), the Ottomans were forced to concede the independence of Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro, new states that would be under Russian protection. These huge Russian gains provoked other European powers to convene the Congress of Berlin in 1878 where a new settlement was imposed. In compensation for Russian gains, Austria "temporarily" occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina and Britain obtained the use of Cyprus as a base of operations. Then, in 1882, to protect her interests in the Suez Canal and the Egyptian debt to British and other European bondholders, Britain occupied Egypt. Britain had changed from a policy of defense of the territorial integrity of the empire to a policy of partition. Henceforth, the "Eastern Question" would be handled by the further dismemberment of the Ottoman state.

Between 1878 and 1908, the further partition of the empire was postponed only by the rivalries of the European powers. Germany established its influence by investing in Ottoman railroads and by supplying advisors and technicians to the Ottoman army. Big-power rivalry centered on the Balkans. In 1908, taking advantage of an internal Ottoman political crisis, Austria annexed Bosnia and

Herzegovina. In 1912, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro negotiated treaties with secret agreements to attack the Ottoman Empire. In October 1912, the combined Balkan armies defeated the Ottomans and took all of the remaining Ottoman territories in Europe except for Istanbul and a small strip of surrounding territory. The rivalries of Austria and Serbia soon precipitated a general European war.

World War I completed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In December 1914, the Ottomans entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria. German military and economic assistance, the traditional Ottoman fear of Russia, and perhaps an ambition to restore Ottoman control over lost provinces prompted the Ottomans to join the central powers. In response, the British, the French, the Russians, and the Italians agreed to divide the Ottoman Empire among themselves. By the Sykes–Picot agreement (1916) Britain and France delineated their shares of the Arab provinces. To promote her ambition to be the paramount power in the Near East, Britain also entered other, often contradictory, agreements. In return for Arab support against their Ottoman overlords, the British promised Sharif Husayn of Mecca that Britain would recognize an independent Arab state. In 1917, the Balfour Declaration promised that Britain would also support the formation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

By 1918, the European allies had defeated Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire; Britain conquered Palestine, Syria, and Iraq; and the allies took control of Istanbul and the straits. Britain and France divided the Arab Middle East into a number of new states, including Lebanon and Syria in the French sphere of influence, and Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq in the British sphere. Italy was conceded southwestern Anatolia. Greece was allowed to occupy Thrace, Izmir, and the Aegean islands. Armenia was to be an independent state and Kurdistan an autonomous province. Istanbul and the straits were put under joint allied occupation. Egypt became, under a British protectorate, fully independent of Ottoman suzerainty. In the remaining territory of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey would become an independent state in 1923. The political process, begun more than

two centuries before, of reducing and dismembering the Ottoman Empire, reached its climax in the formation of a new system of national states.

Ottoman reform

Although the European powers divided the Ottoman Empire into a number of national states, the institutions and ideological identity of these states was also shaped by the Ottoman historical legacy. As early as the seventeenth century, Ottomans had debated the problem of how to restore the political integrity and military effectiveness of the regime. Two main positions emerged. The restorationists called for a return to the laws (*kanuns*) of Sulayman the Magnificent, and opposed any change that threatened to give Europeans and Christians, or European and Christian concepts and techniques, supremacy over Muslims. The modernists called for the adoption of European methods for military training, organization, and administration, and for the civil, economic, and educational changes that would be needed to support a modern state. Throughout the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries, these two points of view were in vigorous competition, but the dominant view came to be the one that favored modernization along European lines. In the eighteenth century, European military advisors were employed to provide technical training for army officers and a printing press was set up to publish translations of European technical, military, and geographical works. Selim III (r. 1789–1807) introduced the first comprehensive reform program, called the Nizam-i Jedid, or New Organization, encompassing a modern army corps, increased taxation, and technical schools to train cadres for the new regime. Selim's program, however, was defeated by the opposition of the *'ulama'* and the janissaries; he was deposed in 1807.

In the decades that followed, Russian advances in the Caucasus, the rise to power of Muhammad ʿAli in Egypt, and the Greek war for independence again made the need for reform urgent. Under Mahmud II (r. 1807–39) the Ottomans attempted to centralize state power under the absolute authority of the sultan, supported by technically proficient elites. Mahmud sought to improve military

capabilities, raise revenues, rationalize administration, subordinate the provinces, and establish schools. Conservative resistance was utterly crushed. In 1826, the entire janissary corps was destroyed and feudal tenures were partially abolished. The *'ulama'* were weakened by the absorption of many endowments, courts, and schools into new state-controlled ministries. The Bektashi religious order, associated with the janissaries, was dissolved. There would henceforth be little opposition to reform – and even considerable support from the higher-ranking *'ulama'*.

The Ottomans also realized that a productive economy was essential for state finances. They built factories to manufacture cloth, paper, and guns. Coal, iron, lead, and copper mining were encouraged. To stimulate agriculture, the government undertook reclamation and resettlement. Government monopolies were ended in 1838, and international commerce was favored by low tariffs. Technical modernization included the introduction of a postal system (1834), telegraph (1855), steamships, and the beginning of railroad construction in 1866. Trade and banking reforms, however, enabled European traders and investors to achieve a dominant position in the Ottoman economy.

The first phase of reform was followed by the Tanzimat (reorganization) period, which lasted from 1839 to 1876. This reorganization program was extended from military and administrative to social and religious affairs. The nationalist revolts in the Balkans made it imperative to further integrate the Christian populations and win their loyalty for the Ottoman regime. The Hatt-i Sherif (Noble Rescript) of Gulhane (1839), a declaration of principles of government, recognized the rights of life, property, and honor, and the equality of all religious groups before the law. In 1856, the Hatt-i Humayun (Imperial Rescript) promised equality for non-Muslims and guaranteed their right to serve in the army. In 1867, Christians began to be appointed to state councils. To further integrate Muslims and non-Muslims into an Ottoman nation, the non-Muslim communities were reorganized to shift power from clergy to laymen. In 1850, the newly formed Protestant millet was governed by an assembly of lay members rather than by clergy. In 1863, the Gregorian Armenians

formed a national assembly with a lay majority. The Ottoman government also forced the Greek clergy to form a lay assembly, and separated the Bulgarian from the Greek Orthodox Church as part of its program of promoting lay influence in the Christian churches.

Furthermore, important changes were made in the legal system. In 1847, to deal with legal issues involving Europeans and their local affiliates, Ottoman courts were established with both European and Ottoman judges, applying a combination of European and Ottoman laws and procedures. Foreign legal jurisdictions in the Ottoman Empire continued in force until the 1923 treaty of Lausanne. New commercial and penal codes were promulgated to supplement Islamic law. The new Ottoman codes were based on French law and were implemented by state courts; they included the Commercial Code (1850), the Penal Code (1858), the Code of Commercial Procedure (1861), and the Code of Maritime Commerce (1863). Unlike commercial and criminal codes, land-law codes were instead based on medieval Islamic and Ottoman practices. The Ottoman Land Code (1858) identified five types of property: (1) privately owned land (*mulk*); (2) state-owned land under private administration (*miri*); (3) charitably endowed trusts (*waqf*); (4) public land under conservation (*matruka*); and (5) waste land outside of inhabited areas (*mawat*). In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, land ownership became increasingly privatized as part of the integration of the empire in the global capitalist economy.

In 1869 the Ottoman government issued a new civil code, the Mecelle, which in substance followed Islamic codes of law, but departed from tradition because it contained changes made on the personal authority of the sultan, was adjudicated in state courts, and required court registration of marriages and divorces. These modifications created a demand for jurists trained in the new codes and European-influenced legal procedures, thereby undermining traditional Muslim jurists. Finally, the Family Law of 1917, by adopting a European system of personal law, replaced Islamic law.

Ottoman educational reforms began with the establishment of professional schools followed by elementary and secondary schools. In 1847 the Ministry of Education undertook to organize middle

schools (*rushdiye*); the army created a parallel system of secondary schools. After the Crimean War, the Ministry of Education and the army began experiments in elementary education, introducing arithmetic, geography, and Ottoman history. In 1870 the first efforts were made to create a university that would integrate professional, humanistic, and religious studies. Much of the program, however, remained a paper system.

Transcending the statism of the first reforms, the Tanzimat amounted to a change in the very concept of Ottoman society. It repudiated the autonomous functioning of Islamic educational and judicial institutions and challenged the very concept of Muslim supremacy. In the interest of a strong state and the integration of its various religious and ethnic populations, the Ottoman authorities were tampering with the fundamental structures of a historic Muslim society and replacing traditional educational, legal, and religious systems with secular organizations.

The Young Ottomans

The reforms proved to be revolutionary because they brought into being a new elite committed to still further change. While the Tanzimat did not affect most people, it did create a "new class." With the destruction of the janissaries, the weakening of the *'ulama'* and the adoption of the reform programs, political power in Ottoman society shifted to the *memurs*, or bureaucrats. Within that elite the leading roles were held by the Westernized and Westernizing elements – the servants of the translation bureaus and the war office who had been educated in secular schools and had traveled in Europe. This group of bureaucrats was led by Mustafa Reshid Pasha (d. 1858), the son of a *waqf* administrator. He began his career in religious schools but entered the newly reorganized administrative service of Mahmud II and became a grand vizier. His protégés included Mehmed ʿAli Pasha (d. 1871), the son of an Istanbul shopkeeper, and Mehmed Fuad Pasha (d. 1869), a former medical student.

By the 1860s, moreover, the Tanzimat had also generated its own opposition. While the "new class" occupied government offices,

graduates of the middle and professional schools, middle-level bureaucrats, and sons of poor families who found their careers blocked by an entrenched older generation turned their energies to literature, becoming poets, writers, journalists, and editors of opposition newspapers. Resentful of the established bureaucrats, they sought allies among lower-ranking military officers, liberal *'ulama'*, and theological students.

In the 1860s, the literary intelligentsia formed the Young Ottoman Society. In the name of a synthesis of Ottoman tradition and Ottoman reform, Young Ottomans such as Namik Kemal (d. 1888), Ibrahim Shinasi (d. 1871), and Ziya Pasha (d. 1880) favored a constitutional regime. They believed that the ultimate value of the empire was measured by its contribution to the rights of its citizens, to the security of life and property, to justice, and to the reconciliation of Christians and Muslims. In their view, the empire could not survive unless it became rooted in the masses. Moreover, a constitutional regime was the natural expression of the political and moral values that they held to be inherent both in Islam and in European culture. They stressed the aspects of the Islamic heritage that encouraged scientific and technical learning, the value of reason above blind faith, and the importance of actively striving for individual and social improvement. Along with their commitment to Islam, the Young Ottomans also advocated the use of a simplified version of the Turkish language to bridge the gap between the Ottoman elite and the mass of their subjects. The Young Ottoman thinkers were, without the designation, modernist Muslims.

In 1876, taking advantage of the Ottoman defeat by Russia, the constitutionalists staged a coup d'état and brought Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1908) to power. He was forced to accept a parliament and a constitution mandating equality for all religious groups. ʿAbd al-Hamid, however, was unwilling to surrender 500 years of Ottoman authority. Turning the tables on his constitutionalist supporters, he suspended parliament and established an authoritarian and religiously conservative regime based on the absolute power of the sultan, the bureaucracy, and the police. The regime, however, continued technical Tanzimat reforms. New

schools, legal codes, railroads, and military techniques were introduced. Continued economic and educational development swelled the ranks of white-collar, technical, railroad, and telegraph workers. The press disseminated European ideas about science and politics. Popularized Western ideas spread from the capital to the provinces as students brought home a new vision of the universe.

The Young Turks

In 1889 exiled journalists, writers, publishers, and agitators in Paris formed the Ottoman Society for Union and Progress. The Young Turks, as they were now called, agitated for the restoration of a parliamentary and constitutional regime. The Young Turks were divided into a group led by Ahmed Riza, who favored a strong sultan, centralization of power, and the predominance of the Turkish-Muslim elements of the Ottoman population; and a group led by Prince Sabaheddin, who emphasized decentralized forms of Ottoman rule. The latter gave less emphasis to the Turkish and Muslim peoples of the empire and advocated for a federated society with autonomy for Christians and other minorities.

Within the empire, army officers, bureaucrats, and physicians were outraged by the inefficiency of the government, by defeats suffered at the hands of European and Balkan states, and by their exclusion from participation in power; they formed revolutionary cells in Damascus, Salonika, and elsewhere. The Fatherland Society was founded in 1905 by Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman army officer later to be president of Turkey; a Young Turk congress created the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1907. In 1908, the CUP cell in Monastir mutinied and forced the sultan to restore the constitution of 1876. The military coup established a facade of parliamentary government, but the new government was actually run by the CUP and by the army, and proved to be authoritarian and highly centralized.

In bitter reaction to the Islamic veneer of the reign of ʿAbd al-Hamid, the CUP was resolutely secular. Between 1913 and 1918, it adopted a program of aggressive secularization of schools, courts, and law codes, and passed the first measures for the emancipation

of women. In 1916 the CUP government reduced the powers of the *shaykh al-Islam*, transferred jurisdiction over Muslim courts to the Ministry of Justice, and control of Muslim colleges to the Ministry of Education. In 1917 a new family code based on European principles was promulgated. While the regime of ʿAbd al-Hamid had been bolstered by appeals to Islam, the opposition intelligentsia moved from the Young Ottoman position, which synthesized Islam and constitutionalism, to a more radically secular position.

The CUP program was also increasingly Turkish. For Christians, it was easy to form a national identity in opposition to Muslim and Ottoman domination, and in frank emulation of the Christian nations in the West. For more than a century, Christians had demanded that peoples who shared an ethnic, linguistic, and religious heritage have a territorial state of their own. By the late nineteenth century there were already several Christian nations – Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro – in what had once been the domains of the Ottoman Empire. By 1908 the majority of the Christian population was independent. Albania revolted in 1910 and its autonomy was conceded in 1912. Armenians were claiming territorial autonomy. For Muslims, however, it was difficult to disentangle nationalism from Islam and from the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, historically the peoples we now call Turks had no concept of themselves as an ethnic group. They thought of themselves either as Muslims or as subjects of the sultan. The word "Turk" only meant peasant, nomad, or rural bumpkin – someone without education.

Still, the idea of a Turkish nation began to take shape in the late Ottoman era. Loyalty to Islam and to the Ottoman Empire came to be considered a kind of patriotism, described by the word *watan*, or fatherland. Pan-Islamic identifications inspired a sense of political unity. In the 1890s, under the stimulus of European students of Turkish language and culture, and of Crimean and Inner Asian intellectuals who were refugees or students in Istanbul, the Ottomans were introduced to the idea of the "Turkish people." The press glorified Anatolia as the homeland of Turks, and peasants as the backbone of a Turkish nation. The Turkish idea was propagated by literary clubs such as the Turkish Homeland Society and the Turkish

Hearth. These organizations waged a "national" campaign to simplify the Turkish language, make it more accessible to the masses, and persuade the populace of its own Turkish nationality. Ziya Gokalp (d. 1924) emerged as the spokesman of Turkish nationalism. He celebrated the folk culture of the Turkish people, and called for the reform of Islam to make it expressive of the Turkish ethos. 'Abdallah Jevdet (d. 1932) presented a secular basis for Turkish nationalism. The Turkish concept made it possible to define a new civilization that embodied the historical identity of the Turkish people but was not Muslim, and that was modern but not Western.

The turn toward nationalism may also be understood in terms of the historical weakness of alternative elites. The turn toward a concept of a secular nation-state was abetted by the inability of Ottoman religious leaders to articulate an effective Muslim opposition. The destruction of the janissaries and the weakening of the *'ulama'* in 1826 proved decisive. Most of the *'ulama'* remained loyal to the Ottoman regime because they were the servants of the state and were committed to an ideology of obedience. Leading *'ulama'* were also personal friends of the sultan, enjoyed his financial favors, and were connected by family ties to the military and bureaucratic elites. Many leading *'ulama'* were sympathetic to the need to make Islam effective in the modern world.

Through the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the only religious opposition to the state came from lower-ranking functionaries, theological students, and rural Sufis. At the end of the century, when the initiative passed to the radical secularists, the tradition of subservience to state initiative and the ambivalent recognition of the need for modernizing reforms made it impossible for Muslim religious leaders to resist.

Furthermore, the Young Turk leadership and the Ottoman state were still able to persuade Muslim public opinion that, despite its apparent assault on Islamic educational and legal institutions and its willingness to grant political and economic equality to non-Muslims, the empire was still an Islamic regime. The sultans demonstrated their Islamic credentials by the construction of mosques and tombs. They attended mosque prayers and Sufi ceremonies, and appointed

religious teachers for the soldiers. ʿAbd al-Hamid revived the identification of sultan and caliph, basing his authority on the claim that he was the padishah of the Ottomans and the caliph of all Muslims.

Nor did the Young Turks have to contend with a Muslim bourgeoisie or commercial middle class. In part this was due to the legacy of state domination of the society and in part to European economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire. The Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1838, which led to the removal of Ottoman monopolies and high tariffs, stimulated the production of cash crops such as grain, wool, raisins, tobacco, and opium. Manufacturing also prospered. Turkish cloth weaving and carpet making flourished, partly due to Austrian and British investments. Other industries, however, were very little developed except for state-owned factories that produced guns, clothing, and footwear for the soldiers, and sold the surplus to the general public. Ottoman efforts to create their own industries for cotton, textiles, iron, and weapons had limited prospects in the face of the high cost of imported raw materials and technicians. In all, Ottoman engagement in the world economy led to intensified production for export, but to the failure of domestic industries and crafts in competition with Europe.

Ottoman engagement in the global economy also led to state indebtedness and financial dependency. The first Ottoman loans were contracted in 1854, and Ottoman economic development came to depend upon European loans for the construction of railroads, mining, and public utilities. Foreign capital also financed military expenditures and the formation of Ottoman banks. By 1882, the Ottoman state could no longer pay the interest on its debts and was forced to accept a foreign debt administration. Henceforth, foreign bankers controlled the Ottoman economy. However, from 1880 to 1914 there was increased prosperity owing to the centralization of state power, security in the provinces, and the foreign stimulus to internal investment and trade.

The sociopolitical consequences of this pattern of development were critical. It weakened Muslim commercial elites while it favored Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and other minorities involved in

international trade. These groups, however, could not challenge the state elites. Control of taxation, major investments, and ideological and military power remained the prerogative of the Ottoman establishment. On the eve of the formation of the Turkish Republic, neither the religious nor the commercial classes could challenge the military and administrative elites. They alone would determine the destiny of the coming Turkish state.

World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire

Between 1912 and 1924, the Balkan wars of 1912–14, World War I, and the Greco-Turkish War put an end to the possibility of a multinational, multireligious Ottoman Empire and made the Turkish idea a political reality. At the same time, World War I also destroyed the multiethnic, multireligious Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. The concept of nationalism took hold throughout Eastern Europe. The underlying assumption was that it was no longer possible to live in multiethnic, multireligious societies. Each ethnic group had to have a state of its own, and to survive, states had to be built on homogeneous populations.

In the Ottoman Empire, the implementation of this principle led to a vast and virtually unimaginable rearrangement of the peoples of the Balkans and Anatolia – by transfers and exchanges of populations, deportations and resettlements, massacres and genocide. The Balkan wars of 1912–14 stripped the Ottoman Empire of virtually all of its European possessions. In the name of military security, the Greeks of Thrace and the Aegean coast were "cleansed," attacked, killed, or deported to Greece. During World War I, Nestorians from the Iranian border of Iraq, also considered a security risk, were settled in central Anatolia. Some Syrian Arab families and some Jews in Palestine were also resettled for security reasons.

Furthermore, during World War I, the CUP, the Turkish leadership, particularly feared a revolt by or the collaboration of the empire's Armenian Christian population with a possible Russian invasion, and that its Anatolian territories, the homeland of the Turkish peoples,

would be dismembered or lost in such an invasion, or to a possible Armenian state. They came to regard the Armenian population of Anatolia as aliens to the nation and probable traitors to the state. The CUP elites concluded that they could hold onto the Anatolian territories only if the population was homogeneously Muslim and Turkish. Christians were to be eliminated and replaced with Kurds, Balkan Muslims, and possibly Arabs, dispersed among the Turkish population.

During World War I, the Armenian population of Anatolia was destroyed in order to create a Turkish space in eastern Anatolia. Armenians in western Anatolia were limited to 5 percent of the total population, and the eastern Anatolian Armenian population was to be reduced by deportation and physical annihilation to between 5 and 10 percent. In the course of deportation vast numbers of people were removed from their villages and towns eastward and southward to Syria, left to die in the desert, attacked by local Kurds and other marauders, and/or simply massacred. An estimated 1.3 million people were killed.

The physical destruction of the Armenians was accompanied by measures to assimilate some by forced conversion to Islam, sending children to Muslim schools, and forcing girls and women into marriages, concubinage, and prostitution. Armenian properties were seized for the benefit of the army and of Turkish businessmen and Muslim immigrants.

The Greeks of Anatolia were also subject to "ethnic cleansing." After the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–22 most of the remaining Greek population was deported in exchange for the "repatriation" of the Turkish-speaking population of Greece.

The population of Anatolia was replaced with Muslims expelled from the Balkans. Albanians and Bosnians were resettled to a maximum of 10 percent of the population. CUP policy was to assimilate the Kurdish population by ending nomadism, separating leaders and communities, and resettling Kurds from eastern to central and western Anatolia with a goal of reducing the number of Kurds in every district to 5 percent of the total population. The Kurds of eastern Anatolia, however, as Muslims, were considered Turks

who had forgotten their language. The small remaining Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish populations were excluded from power.

By the end of World War I, all that was left of the Ottoman Empire was Anatolia, Istanbul, and a small territory on the European side of the Bosphorus, now with a majority Turkish population, a Kurdish minority, and very small Greek and Armenian communities. The war had cut the Gordian knot of Ottoman loyalties by stripping away most of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations. The realities of Ottoman political life now corresponded to the nationalist concept of a Turkish people.

After the war, Mustafa Kemal, a leading Turkish general, organized the movement for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, established a Grand National Assembly at Ankara (1920), promulgated a new constitution (1921), and established a republican government in most of Anatolia. The new regime defeated the Armenian republic in the Caucasus, the French in Cilicia, and the Greeks in central Anatolia. In 1923, the European powers agreed, by the treaty of Lausanne, to recognize the independence of Turkey in its present boundaries. Turkey emerged from World War I as a fully independent country. It came into being with a coherent state structure, a national intelligentsia of army officers, experienced administrators, politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals, a unified national movement, and a strong cultural and political identity.

Republican Turkey

The Ottoman tradition of a strong centralized state, military leadership, and state control of the religious elites was transmitted to the Turkish Republic. Under the domination of the republican elites, the history of modern Turkey can be divided into three phases. The period from 1921 to 1950 was the era of authoritarian nationalism, presidential dictatorship, religious reform, and the first stages of industrialization. From 1950 to approximately 2000 was the era of a dual military rule and multiparty political system, increasing social differentiation, rapid economic change, ideological conflict, and the

reassertion of Muslim identities. In the twenty-first century a new Muslim–Turkish regime has taken form.

The Turkish Republic under Ataturk

The Kemalist period began in 1921 with the Law of Fundamental Organization that declared the sovereignty of the Turkish people. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was named president of the Republic for life. He was head of government, and leader of the Republican People's Party. Despite brief experiments with an organized political opposition – the Progressive Party of 1924, and the Liberal Party in 1929 and 1930 – the regime proved intolerant of opposition. The party was its main instrument in the countryside and its offices disseminated information about agricultural improvements, organized educational programs, and taught the secular and national ideology to the country people. A highly educated, urban, bureaucratic, and military elite dominated the rest of the country. '*Ulama*' and local notables were excluded from political power, but landlords were allowed to retain and consolidate their economic position. It was a regime in the name of, but not by, the Turkish people.

The primary goals of Kemalist Turkey were economic development and cultural modernization. In the course of the nineteenth century, European competition had forced Muslims into reliance on the state as the main vehicle of economic activity. Between 1908 and 1918, however, foreign capital was withdrawn, Greek and Armenian merchants were pushed out, and the way was opened for the growth of a new Turkish commercial class. In the 1920s, the Kemalist regime promoted agricultural production by reducing taxes and by investing in roads and railways. Exports of cotton, tobacco, and dried fruit rose. With the help of Soviet loans and expertise, the Turkish Republic also took the lead in building textile factories. Traditional crafts, however, floundered. With the collapse of the export market in the great depression of 1929, Turkey turned to more energetic state control of the economy and planned economic development. In the 1930s the state nationalized the railroads, utilities, ports, and mines. The first five-year plan (1929–33) promoted consumer substitution industries. The Sumer Bank was founded to finance textile, paper, glass, and

sugar enterprises. Great Britain helped finance the construction of iron- and steelworks. In the 1920s and 1930s, the foundations were set for a modern industrial economy.

At the same time, Mustafa Kemal sought to absorb the masses of the people into the ideological and cultural framework of the republican regime, break the attachment of ordinary people to Islam, and win them to a Western and secular style of life. The Ottoman sultanate was abolished in 1923 and the caliphate in 1924. Charitable trusts and *'ulama'* were put under the control of a new office of religious affairs. In 1925, the Sufi orders were declared illegal and were disbanded. In 1927, the wearing of a fez was forbidden. In 1928, a new Latin script was introduced to replace the Arabic script and an effort was begun to purify the Turkish language of its Arabic and Persian content. In 1935, all Turks were required to take surnames in the Western fashion. A new family law based upon Swiss legal codes replaced Islamic law. "People's Houses" were set up to teach literacy, disseminate the new ideology, and inculcate a Turkish national identity. Thus, Islam was "disestablished" and deprived of a role in public life, and the ordinary symbols of Turkish attachment to the traditional culture were replaced by new legal, linguistic, and other signs of modern identity.

Part of these changes was the transformation in the status of women. The nineteenth-century Tanzimat program had already provided elementary education for women, but at the turn of the century secular nationalists made the women's question a crucial concern. Ziya Gokalp (d. 1924) theorized that equality of women was essential for the development of a modern Turkish society. He advocated equality in education, employment, and family life, allowing women equal rights in divorce and inheritance. In the first decade of the century urban women began to dress in European fashion. The first *lycée* for women was established in 1911, and schools for teachers, nurses, midwives, and secretaries expanded rapidly. The war years, which drained the Turkish male population, brought women into new professions and factory labor. Family legislation in 1916 and 1917 broke with Islamic law, restricted polygamy, and allowed women to obtain divorces in specified

conditions. Still, women remained segregated in public places. Transportation, theatrical entertainments, education, and many other activities were still carried on separately for men and women or in partitioned rooms.

The reforms of the 1920s and 1930s brought still more radical changes. Family laws of 1924 abolished polygamy, required that divorce be subject to court rulings on specified conditions rather than a male prerogative, and made the sexes substantially equal in rights to divorce. The constitution guaranteed the right of women to equality in education and employment, and in 1934 women were accorded the right to vote in national elections. In 1935, women deputies were elected to the Turkish parliament. The changes in attitude and legal principle have been the basis of an ever-expanding participation of women in Turkish public life.

Radical as were the economic and cultural policies, the Kemalist regime was not revolutionary. The position of women was improved for the sake of the state and national development rather than as a commitment to women's rights. The dominant elites and organizations retained their authority. No effort was made to mobilize the peasantry. The cultural revolution, imposed from the top, had relatively slight penetration. It served to divide the country into an urban, modernized elite and rural peasant masses still oriented toward Islam. The combination of a radical cultural policy with conservative statist political and social policies made Turkey one of the first of a new type of modern Asian nation – an authoritarian regime attempting to carry out radical economic and cultural reforms. (See Illustration 22.)

Illustration 22.   Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the shah of Iran (Australian Picture Library/CORBIS).

The post–World War II Turkish Republic

When Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, the government continued under his loyal colleague, Ismet Inonu (r. 1938–50). The period between Kemal's death and the end of the Inonu regime prepared the way for a new political system. Economic development generated new groups of businessmen, factory managers, rural landowners, prosperous peasants, and a new generation of intellectuals who wanted political recognition. Turkish legislation after World War II relaxed government controls over commerce and the universities and increased the expectation of political participation. The Inonu government permitted the formation of the Democrat Party and free parliamentary elections in 1950. After World War II, the United States, as the main protector of Turkish political security and

economic development, reinforced these trends, favoring a less paternalistic and more democratic multiparty system. American intervention was prompted by the expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Soviet backing for the Communist Party in the Greek civil war, and direct threats to Turkey and Iran. In 1947 President Truman declared the US determination to defend Turkey, Iran, and Greece, and in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded to counterbalance Soviet power.

A new regime came into being: a representative state alongside the military–bureaucratic guardian state established by Ataturk. Still, until the first decade of the twenty-first century, the military and courts considered themselves the embodiment of the state and society, the guardians of the secular national identity and the national family, and its territorial integrity. Governments were considered the secondary and ephemeral expression of local interests and parties. The army aligned with bureaucrats and students represented the Westernized elite defending Kemalist secularist policies. The military state controlled the industrial economy, trade associations, and labor unions. It persevered in its commitment to secularism. Parliament represented the free-market sector of the economy and the interests of independent peasants, businessmen, and professionals. They favored a mixed development policy combining state direction and market expansion, and a flexible cultural policy in which the aspects of Islam that appealed to peasants and small-town populations would be tolerated. The political parties were expected to give allegiance to Kemalism. In recognition of the increased political representation of the population, the state extended its patronage to the middle classes and the populace through subsidies and welfare payments. The Turkish government became an ever more elaborate system of patronage and top-down controls. The existence of a parliament, however, also promoted numerous political parties and factions and led to ideological polarization. There would be confrontations between left and right, secular and Islamist forces, Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups, and contradictory economic policies.

The history of the Turkish Republic ran in phases of parliamentary government, each ending in a crisis in which the military seized

power. Each time, the army gave new direction to the economy, suppressed political conflict, revamped the constitution, and then partially relinquished power to a civilian government. Such crises took place in 1960, 1970, and 1979–83. In 1997, the military intervened to ban an Islamic party from participation in the parliamentary system.

The first parliamentary phase ran from 1950 to 1960. In the 1950s the Democrat Party, led by Jelal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, took power from the People's Republican Party, founded by Ataturk. The Democrat Party mobilized a new coalition of small businessmen, landowners and their peasant dependents and clients, and middling and rich peasants. It favored economic modernization, and promised to curtail state intervention in the economy, transfer state enterprises to private control, and to increase marketing opportunities for peasants. In the course of the 1950s, agriculture was modernized; production of sugar, cotton, and tobacco was increased. Turkish–American military collaboration led to the construction of roads, railroads, airfields, ports, and communications. Rural villages were transformed by the introduction of roads, electricity, tractors, bus transportation, and schools.

Hectic and chaotic growth, however, was marked by inflation, trade deficits, and an enlarged public debt. In 1958, the International Monetary Fund forced Turkey to cut wages and social services, and to devalue the currency. With Turkey in economic collapse, on May 27, 1960 a military coup overthrew the Menderes government. The army, representing the Westernized elite defending Kemalist secularist policies, aligned with bureaucrats and students against rural, small-town businesses and Islamic interest groups and took control of the government; however, it stayed in power for only one year. This was long enough to abolish the Democrat Party and to promulgate a new constitution and a new economic policy.

The 1960s and 1970s marked the second phase in Turkey's postwar development. In these years, Turkey's economic growth was based on state-sponsored and protected consumer industries, shielded from international competition. A welfare or clientism policy used industry to provide employment for government officials,

managers, and workers, and funds for welfare and other services. Industrial production and the industrial working force grew considerably. Agricultural exports and the remittances of Turkish workers in Europe contributed heavily, but these earnings failed to pay for the capital, raw materials, and other imports needed for Turkey's industries. By the 1970s, the Turkish economy was dependent upon foreign loans. Rising oil prices led to inflation, exchange problems, and eventually to an International Monetary Fund program of wage freezes and imposed deflation in 1979–80.

Also, in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey returned to multiparty conflict. A new technical elite composed of engineers and industrial workers, a large worker movement, and militant ideological groups on both the right and the left entered the political arena. The Republican People's Party, the party founded by Mustafa Kemal, now under Bulent Ecevit (d. 2006), represented the bureaucratic, intellectual, and technical elite of the country, including industrial workers and other urban groups. The Justice Party, led by Suleyman Demirel (who later served as prime minister and president of Turkey), was heir to the legacy of the Democrat Party. It was oriented to large-scale private enterprise and rural development. Alongside the two major parties, new parties formed on both right and left, including the Agrarian Capitalists Democratic Party, the elitist and fascist National Movement Party, the Turkish Workers' Party, and other left-wing worker, Maoist, and Soviet-oriented groups.

The parliamentary system failed to mediate among these conflicting interests. The high level of conflict led to violence in the streets between rightist and leftist groups. In 1971, and again in 1980, the army temporarily took control of the state.

Islam in Turkish politics: 1950–1983

In the meantime, the economic and political stresses of the postwar era, and economic and social change, had made Turkey a highly pluralistic society, but a society without coherent economic and ideological direction. This allowed for the rise of new movements and parties committed to the re-Islamization of state and society. Even though the ideology of the Republic was secular, the influence of the

'ulama' was substantially destroyed, and the urban educated upper classes considered Islam a symbol of backwardness, the rural Sufi tradition survived and the Islamic loyalties of ordinary people were never seriously disturbed. The Turkish populace continued to identify itself as Muslim and continued to carry on worship in mosques and at the tombs of saints.

The republican political parties indirectly lent legitimacy to Islam, and compromised the Kemalist dogma that only through secularization could Turkey become a modern country. Military regimes and conservative political parties saw enlightened Islam as a bulwark against communism. The military also sought to use state-sponsored Islam to fight radical Islam, extremist nationalism, Marxist socialism, and Kurdish separatism. Thus the post-Kemalist Turkish state did not simply repress Islam, but used it as a state-sanctioned tool to enhance its own legitimacy and combat competing ideologies. The policy of the state was not so much to abolish Islam as to control it.

In the 1950s the Democrat Party set up seminaries (known as Imam-Hatip) for the training of prayer leaders and teachers. Imam-Hatip schools are state sponsored and supervised by the Ministry of Education, which determines policies and approves textbooks. The curriculum at seminary schools included Islamic subjects, Arabic, and English. They appealed to people from rural areas and to rural migrants to the cities, and to families who viewed this as the only acceptable education for girls. The state also permitted voluntary religious courses in schools, and radio broadcasts and calls to prayer in Arabic. Mosques again received state support. The Republic institutionalized Islam as a department of state by taking over courts, charitable endowments, and the education of imams. The Diyanet, or Ministry of Religion, administers worship, the appointment of imams to mosques, religious education, pilgrimages, and relations with Turkish communities abroad. It is a vehicle for the promotion of Islam within a secular state.

Neo-Islamic movements flourished outside the purview of the government. The Said Nursi (d. 1960) movement was founded by a religious preacher and writer, the author of the *Risale-i Nur* (Epistle of

light), which achieved a wide underground distribution in Turkey despite government opposition and the prosecution of Said Nursi for religious agitation. The *Risale-i Nur* integrated science, tradition, theosophy, and mysticism, appealing especially to technically educated people and others familiar with Western scientific ideas. Said Nursi advocated the addition of mathematics, physics, and logic to the traditional madrasa curriculum.

The Gulen movement further promoted Said Nursi's synthesis of religion and science, and of Islam and Turkish nationalism. The movement is secretive and mysterious. In contrast to Kemalist secular nationalism, it advocates a religious–ethnic nationalist modernism. It sponsors an extensive network of schools reaching into Central Asia and promotes a pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic ideal in which Turkey plays a leading role. It acts as a fraternal association to coordinate the activities of its members in global business, charitable activities, and perhaps in politics.

The Milli Gorus (National vision) movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 advocates a return to Islamic spirituality and values, in this case as the basis of an economically and politically productive Islamic society. It is a nationalist Turkish–Islamist party promoting a Muslim religio-ethnic identity. Milli Gorus has a strong following among Turks in Germany and in many other parts of the world.

These movements appealed to students, especially in technical and medical subjects, as an expression of alienation from an authoritarian state, of concern over economic prospects, and of moral doubt stemming from social and educational mobility. They appealed especially to students and youth searching for networks to help them gain education and connections, identity, and a sense of belonging in a Muslim and Turkish national community. Islamic networks could compete with the appeal of socialist and communist movements to youth idealism, offering opportunities to gain education, skills, and connections that could help their advancement in society.

The Islamic parties also appealed to provincial small-town bazaar merchants and artisans, especially in central and eastern Anatolia, and to rural or small-town populations who migrated to the larger

cities but preserved a small-community orientation and old values in the new environment. For migrants to the big cities, often living in shanty towns (*gececondu*) a renewed Islamic identity was the basis of social cooperation and political representation, as they struggled to organize new lives in a new setting.

The Islamic movement also led to the formation of political parties. The National Salvation Party, formed in the 1960s, advocated the reestablishment of an Islamic state in Turkey. It called upon the state to work for a moral and just society. The party rallied old Sufi networks. Hostile to capitalism and big business, it represented the economic interests of Anatolia's petite bourgeoisie, but accepted the liberal, parliamentary, and human rights aspects of secular political culture. In the 1970s, the National Salvation Party won a small percentage of the vote in Turkish elections.

Islam and the state: 1983–2000

In response to both Turkey's economic problems and the ever more intense climate of the return to Islam, the military regime that seized power in 1980 held power until 1983, and then returned the government to civilian hands. A new constitution outlawed parties based on class, religion, and ethnicity, and restricted freedom of the press and rights of labor organizations. The military retained a veto over government policies. Turgut Ozal was prime minister and later president (1983–93).

The Ozal regime, introducing a third phase in Turkish economic management, turned to neoliberal economic development policies. The former policy of developing industries to produce goods at home that had previously been imported from abroad was rejected as too costly to sustain. The Ozal government reduced state intervention and deregulated the financial system. It encouraged private enterprise and welcomed foreign investment. Minority interests in the Turkish airline and in hotels and telecommunications were sold to investors.

Ozal's economic policies – neo-liberalism, privatization, and deregulation – encouraged new business elites. Entrepreneurial

activity among Anatolian small and middling businessmen flourished, and led to the emergence of a prosperous new business elite in competition with Istanbul businessmen and the executives of large industries. The Anatolian business class is conservative and religious in identity but not traditional in belief and practice. Its members were already educated in and socialized to the secular Turkish Republic and sought to express their identity as Muslims in the context of the secular Turkish state. Politically, the rise of this new bourgeoisie elite proved to be a crucial factor in the further development of the Turkish state and the role of Islam in Turkish society.

The lifestyle of neo-Muslim Turks differs greatly from the adherents of Islamist revivalism. While the Islamist lifestyle is marked by simplicity and emphasizes ideological commitments to Islamic law and to an Islamic state, Turkish neo-Islam is not an ideology but an identity demonstrated through the choice of consumer goods and activities. Men have avoided the beard and robes of the Islamists in favor of the clean-shaven look and the dress of global businessmen. Women take their fashion cues from "Islamic" magazines. They favor the hijab or head covering, and clothing based on Ottoman styles. Conversation is laced with pious references. Homes are decorated with Ottoman objects of art and Arabic script. With the new elites came a media renaissance of magazines, newspapers, and radio and television channels with Islamic themes. For example, a television soap opera about the life of Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent is very popular.

Well-to-do pious businessmen and their families often live in gated communities. They favor gender-segregated mosques and recreation. The new elite promotes an Islamic identity and values through contributions to favored political parties, charitable organizations, schools, and scholarships. In public life, Islamic references and values play an ever-larger role in politics, schools, banking and businesses, media, and fashion. Political Islamism gives way to cultural Muslimhood and conservative forms of the bourgeois lifestyle. The Ozal government and the Motherland Party encouraged this new Turkish–Islamic synthesis. It expanded the networks of Imam-Hatip. In 1983 religious education was made compulsory for all

elementary and secondary public schools. Graduates of Imam-Hatip schools were admitted to all faculties of the universities. In the 1990s the number of seminary schools grew dramatically.

The Ozal government, however, foundered because of its inability to manage the economy. It was unable to tax the wealthy, curb its own expenditures, or control inflation. Even so, the state continued to subsidize housing and to provide benefits for the military, bureaucrats, and other favored groups. The results were destructive. Inflation was rampant, the poor suffered, and there were economic crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001.

In the 1990s, the Refah (Welfare) Party, the direct successor of the National Salvation Party, became the leading Islamic party. Refah protested against the unfair distribution of wealth and opportunity favoring Istanbul and Ankara rather than the provinces, and against governmental and administrative corruption and the authoritarian controls of the state. Refah, with some 20 percent of the electorate, became the country's most popular party. Conservative Muslim business elites supported the party. It also won some secularist backing by its support for pensions, housing, health care, and environmental protection for ordinary voters. Taking over from the leftist parties destroyed in the 1980 coup, Refah became the champion of economic and social justice. The party won numerous mayoralty positions in the elections of 1994. In 1996 and 1997 it formed a governing coalition. The head of the party, Necmettin Erbakan (d. 2011), became prime minister of Turkey (r. 1996–97).

Refah, however, provoked grave anxiety in secularist military, government, and intellectual circles. Erbakan intensified these fears by denouncing laicism and Westernization and criticizing Turkey's military cooperation with Israel. He promised to leave NATO and the European Customs Union. In the high tensions of the 1990s, the army reverted to a rigidly authoritarian and secularist policy. The military opposed political and legal liberalization, and attempted to control the media and the schools to maintain the secular, authoritarian Kemalist heritage. In 1997, the military forced the Erbakan government out of power on the grounds that it had a reactionary Islamist agenda, opposed to the secular principles of the

constitution. The courts declared Refah illegal, and some of its leaders were prosecuted or banned from politics. The military also opposed Kurdish demands for autonomy as a threat to the survival of the Turkish state, and so justified tight police control over the country and widespread human rights abuses. Thus, for a time, Islamic and Kurdish interests were largely excluded from the political process.

The AKP: a new synthesis and a new governing party

Nonetheless, the cadres of the former Islamic party organized a new party, this time called the Justice and Virtue Party, or AKP, led by Tayyip Erdogan (prime minister from 2003). The new party defined itself as "conservative democratic," the party of a secular state, a democratic polity, a capitalist economy, and a Muslim nation. AKP was successful as a governing party and fostered political stability and economic growth. The AKP candidate, Abdullah Gul, was elected president in August 2007, and the AKP was victorious in national elections held in 2011.

AKP favored neo-liberalism and integration into world markets, and entry into the EU. It defines its orientation as a new "Ottomanism." In conjunction with the new Ottomanism, Turkey has ever-widening trading networks with the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It exports everything from consumer durables to television serials. In domestic policy the new Ottomanism is tempered by protection of the general welfare, social justice, education, and employment. AKP provides cash payments to the poorest segment of the population on condition that they send children to school and use the health services. In the twenty-first century, Turkey's economy has flourished.

AKP catered to the religious sensibilities as well as the economic interests of the "modern religious." It advocated a form of secularism in which religious identity is acceptable, a Muslim–Turkish rather than a Turkish–Muslim identity. The wives of government leaders wear the hijab in public. Efforts have been made to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol. More important is the expansion and influence of the Imam-Hatip schools. These schools give a high

school–level education to nearly a quarter of a million students, who spend about 40 percent of their class time on religious subjects. The schools also promote Islamic manners and lifestyle, socialize students to participation in national Imam-Hatip school networks, and to a sense of responsibility for the molding of the national cultural environment. Most of the graduates enter business, law practice, and government service. Erdogan has appointed many graduates to high positions in the Ministries of Education, Justice, and Interior.

The new rhetoric broadened the party's base of appeal and protected it against charges of harboring a radical Islamist agenda. It drew political support from business leaders, farmers, and peasants, especially in Anatolia. It appealed to young professionals, students, and intellectuals searching for a way to enter the technology and service sectors of the global economy and at the same time retain an Islamic identity and a Muslim lifestyle.

Furthermore, the new Ottomanism implies an opening of the society to the participation of women and of ethnic and religious minorities. Turkey has a long history of promoting women's education and professional employment. New laws were passed to expand women's rights, but in some respects the AKP government also acts counter to this tradition. The neo-Islamic revival propagates patriarchal and religious values that prefer women in family roles, and many leading AKP politicians and bureaucrats are said to be uncomfortable working with female colleagues. Government policies and government rhetoric are often inconsistent and contradictory.

Kurds, who number some 20–25 million, are distributed among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Kurdish ambitions for a national state of their own were blocked by the post–World War I partition of the region into the various states now in existence. Since then Kurds have struggled to win independence or autonomy within each national state or a unified Kurdish state. However, the Kurds fight as much with each other for leadership and for local economic and political advantages as they do against the existing states. In turn, each of the states manipulates the Kurdish factions against each other and uses them in their rivalries with other states.

Kurds account for nearly a quarter of Turkey's population, and the Kurdish-speaking population is largely concentrated in the economically weak provinces of eastern Turkey. Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state goes back to 1925, when Kurdish Naqshbandi chieftains fought against the Republic. Kurdish separatism became intense in the 1980s. The Gulf War (1991) gave Kurdish nationalists a new opportunity. The Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) intensified its ongoing violent struggle for regional autonomy and a federalized state structure for Turkey; the Turkish government responded with repressive policies. Kurdish terrorist attacks and Turkish incitement of tribal and factional strife, relocation of Kurdish populations into so-called "strategic villages," and military attacks on Kurdish bases in Iraq escalated into an all-out war. The capture of the PKK leader, 'Abdallah Ocalan, in 1999 broke militant Kurdish resistance, forcing the more radical elements of the movement to retreat from the goal of independence in favor of cultural autonomy and regional development.

The Erdogan government has moved toward increased acceptance of the Kurdish ethnic minority, especially as Kurds moderate their own demands. In 2004, Kurdish rights to public use of the Kurdish language were affirmed. In 2009, Turkey relaxed restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in schools, television, sermons, and public notices. A Kurdish-language TV station was inaugurated in 2009. Turkey still restricts Kurdish broadcasts, but now permits political campaigns in languages other than Turkish. In 2011, however, there was a resumption of intense fighting between Turkish military forces and the PKK.

AKP's "new Ottomanism" extends to its foreign policy, including participation in the global economy, expanding political influence and economic engagements in the Middle East and in Central Asia, and possible entry into the EU. Under the AKP Turkey is involved in education and development programs in Central Asia, the Palestine–Israel conflict, and the Syrian civil war. It has contributed to UN forces in Lebanon and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Throughout the Cold War era, Turkey was an integral supporter of NATO's policy of containment of the Soviet Union. With the

breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1989, the outbreak of neo-nationalist wars in the Balkans, and the emergence of independent states in Central Asia, Turkey found new diplomatic and political opportunities. In the Balkans, Turkey gave strong diplomatic support to the Bosnian Muslims, but avoided direct engagement because of the danger of polarization into a Muslim (Bosnian–Albanian–Turkish) coalition versus an eastern Christian (Serbian–Greek–Russian) entente.

In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey attempted to assert leadership for a new group of independent and underdeveloped nations. It promoted a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council, made extensive investments in the infrastructure of the new Central Asian republics, sponsored schools, promoted student exchanges, and took part in the creation of a new Western alphabet for Central Asian Turkic languages. However, Turkish initiatives were checked by Russia, which considers itself the patron power of the former Soviet states. Russia also sponsored conferences of exiled Kurds as a warning against Turkish intervention in Chechnya and the former Soviet republics.

Russia and Turkey are also rivals for the development of alternative pipeline routes for the export of Central Asian oil and gas. Turkey has focused on the Caspian region, promoting ties with Turkmenistan, Azarbayjan, and Kazakhstan, rather than the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, which are more firmly in the Russian sphere of influence. Turkish–Russian relations, however, are favored by the fact that Russia supplies almost two-thirds of Turkey's natural gas imports and 25 percent of its crude-oil imports. The Erdogan government has also attempted to normalize relations with Armenia. In 2009, diplomatic relations and other bilateral ties were established, though this has strained Turkish–Azarbayjani relations due to the conflicting claims of Armenia and Azarbayjan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a Turkish enclave within Armenia.

The Kurdish question is particularly important in Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern countries. From 1980 to 1988, Turkey repeatedly invaded northern Iraq in an effort to suppress the PKK, and has

continued sporadic military operations against the Kurds in Iraq to the present. Turkey's relations with Iran have been roiled by the Kurdish problem. Turkey objected to PKK attacks across the Iranian–Turkish border and Iranian cooperation with Iraqi Kurds. In 2004, Turkey and Iran decided to share intelligence and conduct common military operations against the PKK and the PJAK (the Iranian branch of PKK). President Ahmadinejad of Iran visited Turkey in 2008 and signed an agreement to cooperate against terrorism.

Relations with Syria are equally complicated. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, many Turkish Kurds took refuge in Syria, which supported the PKK until the late 1990s. To forestall Syrian support for the Kurds, Turkey has threatened to divert the Euphrates water supply and has developed ties with Israel. Israel and Turkey signed an agreement for military education and cooperation in 1996, and they have conducted joint military exercises. Turkish–Israeli relations were warm until the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008–09, and Israel's subsequent blockade of a flotilla of supply ships headed for Gaza in which nine Turkish nationals were killed. Diplomatic relations were suspended when Israel refused to meet Erdogan's demand for a full apology, but were restored in 2012 in a deal brokered by the United States. The Arab revolutions that began in 2011 have brought both new diplomatic and economic opportunities for Turkish leadership in the Arab and Mediterranean world, and new conundrums in dealing with volatile and dangerous Syrian conflicts.

The Kurdish problem plays a very large part in Turkey's aspirations to join the European Union. Although Turkey is a member of the European Customs Union, and although 52 percent of Turkish exports go to and 44 percent of its imports come from the European Union, Turkey is held on probation for membership in the EU. Turkish policies in regard to Kurdish political representation and human rights and its denial of Turkish responsibility for the massacre of Armenians in World War I have been repeatedly cited in EU reports as a hindrance to its candidacy. The EU requires Turkey to improve its human rights record as a condition for admission. These include an end to torture, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, rights to political expression, and respect for the rights of women and the

Kurdish minority. The EU has funded economic and social reforms, oversight of the police, and the training of lawyers and human rights activists. Apart from the Kurdish issue, Greece resists Turkish participation because of a conflict over Cyprus. Germany fears Turkish labor migration. There is a widespread, if barely spoken, reluctance to accept a Muslim country as part of Europe.

The current state of Turkish politics

AKP policies were opposed by the military bureaucratic elites as a threat to Turkish secularism and national identity. Behind the army's resistance to Muslim or Kurdish political and cultural demands lies a concept of the Turkish nation as a unitary, homogeneous entity. Turkish nationalists do not allow for minority rights or for plural ethnic and cultural identities. The constitutional court threatened to remove the government for its antisecularism and its Kurdish policies.

Between 2002 and 2007, however, the influence of the military in the National Security Council and in supervisory bodies for higher education and media was diminished. In 2010, Turkish voters approved amendments to the constitution that made it more difficult for the constitutional court to dissolve political parties, and weakened the military by permitting civilian courts to prosecute military officers. Armed with these new powers, the Erdogan government arrested hundreds of officers accused of plotting a coup, forced the resignation of the leading generals, and appointed a new commander in chief. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, civilian control seems to have been imposed on the military.

Prime Minister Erdogan's opponents, however, point to disturbing signs of authoritarian attitudes and repression of opponents. Human rights activists point to the curbing of a free press and the incarceration of journalists, publishers, and distributors. Critics of Turkey's historical treatment of the Armenians and the Kurds and critics of its present policy toward the Kurds are also suppressed. The Nobel Prize–winning novelist Orhan Pamuk was fined for a statement denouncing the treatment of Armenians and Kurds. In 2013, Erdogan attempted to force through the redevelopment of a popular Istanbul park and used the police to suppress protest

demonstrations. While in principle AKP supports universal human rights, in practice it curtails freedom of speech and assembly.

In many respects, Turkish and Muslim nationalists share an authoritarian and patriarchal attitude toward the nation. They agree on the Muslim character of the nation though not on how it may be expressed. They believe in the management of law, education, and public mores to create a uniform national culture. They both believe that democracy gives a license for the imposition of the values and policies of the winning party to the exclusion of the defeated. However, since the twentieth century, Turkish economic and social change has led to a more pluralistic, secularized national society in which there are alternative and competing concepts of the role of Islam, and profound uncertainties about the inclusion of ethnic and social minorities. The conflicts created by Turkish pluralism have become a test of the nation's modern identity.

Chapter 47 Iran: state and religion in the Modern era

From the Safavid period (1501–1722), Iran inherited the pattern of state, religious, and tribal (*uymaq*) institutions that shape its history to the present day. The Qajar dynasty, which ruled Iran from 1779 to 1925, resembled its Safavid predecessors in that it was a weakly centralized regime faced with strong provincial tribal forces and an increasingly independent religious establishment. In the nineteenth century, European conquests, cultural influence, and above all economic penetration polarized state and society and led to the constitutional revolution of 1905, in which a coalition of intellectuals, *'ulama'* (in the Iranian case, often called mullahs), merchants, and artisans attempted to create a parliamentary regime. After an anarchic period, a military officer, Reza Shah Pahlavi, seized control of the state. The Pahlavi period, from 1925 to 1979, virtually repeated the earlier history. The Pahlavis sought to centralize state power and modernize the Iranian economy and society, and again provoked scholar-led nationwide resistance in the name of Islam. For 200 years, the struggle between the state and the *'ulama'* was a principal feature of Iranian history.

Qajar Iran: the Long Nineteenth Century

The modern cycle began with the Qajars, who came to power after a period of anarchy and tribal struggles. Their regime was never consolidated. Their armies were composed of a small Turkoman bodyguard and Georgian slaves; the central administration was a court government too underdeveloped to tax the country effectively. The provinces they ruled were fragmented into innumerable tribal, ethnic, and local factions headed by their own chieftains. A combination of formal governmental appointments, control of land, rights to collect taxes, and the power to administer justice and

mediate disputes made tribal chiefs virtually independent of the state. Khans and ilkhans governed their own tribes. Even the authority of khans was by no means absolute since it depended upon the ability to rally support from lesser chiefs who had to be coerced, cajoled, bought off, or otherwise made allies of the paramount khans. Town quarters and guilds also had a degree of political autonomy. The Qajars, moreover, never captured the aura of legitimacy that had surrounded the Safavids. They maintained their suzerainty by exploiting the rivalries of lesser chiefs.

While the Qajars maintained a tenuous suzerainty, the power of the religious establishment was enhanced. In the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Iranian mullahs achieved an unprecedented degree of independence and organizational coherence. The religious authority of the *'ulama'* (also known as *mujtahid*s, or interpreters of the religious law) was vastly enhanced by the claim that they had the right to exercise independent judgment and to make new interpretations in religious matters based on their spiritual and intellectual attainments and, further, that the most pious and spiritual leaders were, in the absence of the Imam, the true leaders of the Muslim community. It was a religious obligation of ordinary people to take them as their absolute spiritual guides (*marja'-i taqlid*). The Shi'i shrines, ceremonies of *ta'ziya* (the mourning of Husayn), and the passion plays that commemorated his martyrdom helped to capture the allegiance of the Iranian populace. Furthermore, these claims to an enhanced religious authority, wrested from a weak political regime, were backed by the formation of a loose system of communications that bound together Iranian *'ulama'* and the spiritual centers of Shi'ism in Iraq. The Iraqi shrines gave Iranian Shi'ism a base outside the physical control of the Qajar monarchy.

The *'ulama'* also consolidated their ties with the common people through the administration of justice, trust funds, and charities, and by presiding over the prayers and ceremonies marking birth, marriage, and death. Their ties with the bazaar population of artisans, workers, and merchants were especially important. A secure financial foundation was built on the contributions of their

followers and the endowment of state lands. This religious body was not quite a church, because it lacked a formal hierarchy and a regular internal organization, but it was nonetheless partially autonomous, nationwide, and capable of cohesive religious and political action.

The relationship of the *'ulama'* to the Qajar regime was complex. The government had both positive and punitive policies toward the religious elites. Fath 'Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834), whose power was precariously based on tribal forces, reconstructed the shrines, appointed *'ulama'* to official positions, and respected them as mediators between the government and the populace. He tolerated the independence of leading scholarly notables, such as Sayyid Muhammad Baqir of Isfahan, whose power was based on substantial landed wealth, the control of religious endowments, and the support of numerous strongmen. Fath 'Ali aided in the suppression of Sufism and heretical doctrines. His reign had the double effect of binding the *'ulama'* to the regime and preparing the way for their later resistance. By contrast, under Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848–96) the government tried to limit the jurisdiction of the *'ulama'* by establishing new courts. It restricted the right of sanctuary in mosques and shrines, introduced measures to control endowments, reduced allowances, and sponsored the formation of secular schools in competition with religious schools. The state also tried to abolish the mourning ceremonies for Husayn.

Similarly, the religious elites had reasons both to collaborate with and to oppose the state. On the one hand, the *'ulama'* depended upon the state for appointments to office, salaries, grants of land, and endowments for shrines and schools. Many *'ulama'* accepted pensions, gifts, and positions at court or in government service, owned land, and identified with the ruling elites. On the other hand, many adopted a quietist position, turned their backs on the corrupt affairs of the world, and tried to preserve a measure of religious purity while waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam. Their ethos called for concentration on theological and religious matters and deference to the state in all other respects. They withdrew from political affairs to concentrate on teaching and worship, judicial

administration, and charities. However, foreign influences, economic concessions, centralization of power, and state policies that restricted the judicial and educational prerogatives of the *'ulama'* provoked their opposition. This opposition was generally directed against specific policies: the *'ulama'* were not in principle antimonarchical, but were simply concerned that state policies should be consistent with Islamic religious norms.

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the *'ulama'* were also beset by the rise of new religious movements. The yearning for religious certainty, inherent in Shi'ism, broke out again in the preaching of Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad, who proclaimed that the believers were not in fact cut off from the Hidden Imam, but that there was always a human representative interpreting his will. In 1844, he declared himself to be that man, the Bab (gateway), and later proclaimed himself the True Imam. This claim swept away the authority of the *'ulama'*, whom he denounced as venal and corrupt servants of the state. Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad further announced a new scripture, the Bayan, which superseded the Quran. His teachings included a powerful social message calling for justice, protection of property against taxes and confiscation, and freedom of trade and profit. He inspired rebellions in several Iranian provinces, but his movement was defeated and Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad himself was killed in 1850. His followers divided into two groups. One group, called the Azalis, maintained their intense hostility to the Qajars and were active in the 1905 revolution. The second group followed Baha'oilah, who in 1863 declared himself a prophet and founded the Baha'i religion. From Baha'ism came a pacifist liberal outlook that would later appeal to elements of the Westernized business classes. For the *'ulama'*, a compensating development was the emergence of Shaykh Murtada Ansari as the sole *marja'-i taqlid*, or spiritual leader who requires the obedience of all Shi'is. For the first time, the religious leadership was concentrated in a single person.

European encroachment heightened the implicit tensions between the state and the *'ulama'*. Russian and British territorial and economic penetration of Iran prompted the Qajar monarchy to attempt to modernize the state apparatus, and this in turn provoked

vigorous scholarly opposition to state policies. The conflict came to a head in the constitutional crisis of the early twentieth century.

The territorial and economic problems began with Russian advances in northwestern Iran and British advances in the south. The treaty of Gulistan (1813) confirmed the loss to Russia of Georgia, Darband, Baku, Shirvan, and other parts of Armenia. In 1826, the Russians seized Tabriz. By the treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), Russia obtained Armenia, control of the Caspian Sea, and a favored position in Iranian trade. Between 1864 and 1885, a new wave of Russian expansion culminated in the seizure of Iran's Central Asian provinces. The British took control of Afghanistan to protect their Indian empire. Iran, which itself aspired to annex Afghanistan, was defeated in 1856 at Herat, and was forced to recognize the independence of Afghanistan and to make other political and commercial concessions. The net result was to create a Russian sphere of domination in Inner Asia and the Caucasus and a British sphere in Afghanistan.

After 1857, the primary form of British and Russian penetration was economic. In 1872, the Iranian government gave extensive concessions to Baron de Reuter. De Reuter was given control of customs revenues for twenty-four years, a monopoly of rail and tramway construction, exclusive rights to mine numerous minerals and metals and to construct canals and irrigation works, and rights of first refusal for a national bank, roads, telegraphs, and mills in return for royalties and a share of profits for the shahs. In 1889, the Imperial Bank of Persia was founded under British auspices, and in 1890 a British firm was conceded a monopoly of the Iranian tobacco industry, including both domestic sales and exports. Russia made compensating economic gains. Caspian fisheries were turned over to Russia (1888) and a discount Bank of Persia was formed under Russian sponsorship (1891). In the course of the 1890s, Russia became the primary investor in loans to the shahs. Finally, in 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement divided the country into two spheres of influence – a northern Russian and a southeastern British zone – with a neutral buffer between. In order to calm their own disputes in anticipation of a general European war, the powers allowed Iran to

remain nominally independent with its monarchy intact, but effectively assumed control of the country.

As in the Ottoman Empire, European political and economic intervention stimulated the Qajars to modernize and strengthen the state apparatus. Western influence created a vogue in upper-class government circles for the reform of Iran's military and governmental institutions along Western lines. Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848–96) tried to break the dependence of the regime on local governors, tribal chiefs, and landlords and to formalize a government administration along Russian lines. He organized a military system that required each town or village to supply a quota of soldiers or to pay the equivalent of their salaries. In 1851, the Dar al-Funun, or technical college, was created to train army and civil officers. Between 1878 and 1880, Austrian and Russian advisors helped the Iranians reorganize the cavalry and form the Cossack Brigade.

The reforms also brought into being a new stratum of Islamic modernist thinkers and Westernized intellectuals, who favored the modernization of Iran as the only effective way to resist foreign control and to improve the conditions of life for the mass of its people. This stratum included people educated in Europe, high-ranking government officials in contact with foreign powers, and various religious minorities influenced by radical movements in Russian-occupied Transcaucasia. European commercial activities also generated a small Iranian bourgeoisie that prospered from the roles of middlemen in the exchanges between Europe and Iran.

Neither the governmental nor the intellectual reformers, however, had much impact on the country as a whole. The reform program faltered because the rulers were themselves afraid that they might compromise their authority. Tribal groups opposed the centralization of military power. The *'ulama'* opposed secularization. The Russians hindered railway construction. In the face of such pressures, Qajar reforms were insufficient to resist foreign encroachment, and reached only a small milieu of court officials and Western-educated Iranian journalists.

Instead, important segments of the population turned against the regime. The *'ulama'*, anxious over foreign influences, were pushed into outright opposition. In 1826, the *'ulama'* resisted the effort to establish a Western-type army regiment along Ottoman lines. In 1828, Russian occupation of the Caucasus led to a nationwide agitation in favor of war. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the tensions between the state and the *'ulama'* came to a head over economic issues. The *'ulama'* bitterly opposed the de Reuter concessions as a sellout of Iranian interests to foreigners. They were canceled in 1873. Then in 1890, a tobacco monopoly was conceded to a British company. A judicial opinion (*fatwa*) issued by Mirza Husayn Shirazi, who had succeeded Shaykh Murtada, led to a nationwide boycott of tobacco products in 1891 and 1892, and the eventual dissolution of the monopoly. *'Ulama'* led demonstrations in Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad. Merchants and artisans joined the demonstrations to protest European competition and state-sponsored monopolies. The livelihoods of Iranian artisans, cotton cloth makers, and weavers suffered drastically from foreign imports. The opposition of *'ulama'*, merchants, and artisans was also reinforced by the small stratum of Westernized intellectuals and Islamic modernist thinkers. Westernized intellectuals objected to corruption and to their exclusion from power. Secret societies composed of intelligentsia, *'ulama'*, and merchants carried on an underground agitation. Publications and an extensive letter-writing campaign helped coordinate resistance to the tobacco monopoly. This coalition merged the century-old hostility of the religious establishment with the opposition of middle-class merchants, artisans, officials, and intellectuals to create the first "national" resistance to the Qajar monarchy. The monopoly was eventually canceled.

Peasant resistance, however, was minimal. In Iran, the middle-sized landowning peasantry that in many societies has been the basis of resistance to government oppression was scarcely to be found. Most peasants were tenants and sharecroppers dependent upon their landlords. The isolation of the villages also prevented the development of class consciousness. The peasants of Iran were

both too poor and too divided to participate in the insurrectionary movement.

The constitutional crisis

The years between 1892 and 1905 saw further struggle between the state and the *'ulama'* that culminated in the constitutional crisis of 1905–11. In this crisis the traditional religious and economic objections to government policies were merged with constitutional ideas. The existence of European parliamentary states, the Russian revolution of 1905, the formation of the Great Diet of Vilnius, and, above all, the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt inspired Iranians to rethink the political structure of their country. Popular sovereignty, rule of law, and patriotism were advanced as the principles for a modernized Persian society. The nationalists were also committed to an ethnic rather than a religious or tribal concept of the nation.

The new climate of opinion was promoted by liberal *'ulama'* within Iran and by liberal and revolutionary newspapers from Russian-held Transcaucasia. Malkum Khan (d. 1908), an Armenian convert to Islam, educated in Paris, who served most of his diplomatic and political career as an ambassador in Europe, published the newspaper *Qanun* in London to advocate a strong monarchy, an advisory assembly, and a new system of education. He argued that Westernizing-type reforms were compatible with Islam. The reformers were joined by pan-Islamic agitators such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, who believed that Islam could help revive national pride and mobilize Muslims to resist Western imperialism.

A treatise called *Admonition and Refinement of the People*, written by Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini, embodied the position of the liberal *'ulama'*. Limitations on the authority of the ruler, he argued, are essential to prevent despotism; the best mechanism for controlling rulers was a national consultative assembly. However, many liberal *'ulama'* adopted constitutionalism partly out of misunderstanding and partly for tactical reasons. Some *'ulama'*

thought of constitutional government as a way of enhancing their own authority and enforcing Islamic law rather than as representative government. The possible conflicts between Islamic and secular law, equality of citizens and the supremacy of Muslims over non-Muslims, and freedom of speech and religious truth were not explored. This allowed the *'ulama'* to form a coalition with liberals and merchants opposed to the monarchy.

The constitutional campaign came to a head in 1905 and 1906. The increasing indebtedness of the shah to the Russians and Russian support for the Baha'is led to protests in the bazaars, and in 1906 to the convening of a constituent national assembly. The assembly, representing a coalition of *'ulama'*, merchants, and Westernized intelligentsia created the constitution that remained officially in force until 1979. The new constitution subordinated the shah to a parliamentary government, but declared Islam to be the official religion of Iran. It committed the state to the enforcement of Islamic law, and created a committee of *'ulama'* to evaluate the conformity of new legislation with Islamic law.

Bitter battles were fought over the new constitution. It was backed by many *'ulama'*, merchants, artisans, and Bakhtiyari tribesmen, and had strong popular support in Tabriz and Isfahan. It was opposed by the shah, conservative *'ulama'*, and wealthy landowners and their clients. In 1907 and 1908, the shah used his guards regiment, the Cossack Brigade, to close parliament; the constitutionalists resumed power from 1909 to 1911. In the second constitutional period, the coalition between liberal reformers and *'ulama'* began to break up. When the reformers wanted to disestablish Islam, adopt far-reaching programs for redistribution of land, and introduce a new system of secular education, the *'ulama'* became disillusioned. In any case, the Russians intervened in 1911 to destroy the new regime and restore the government of the shah. The weakness of the state and the high degree of organization among *'ulama'*, tribes, guilds, and local communities made revolutionary resistance possible, but in the end military force was decisive.

Twentieth-century Iran: the Pahlavi Era

The twentieth century brought a new phase of historical change, but one that repeated and sharpened the basic conflict between the state and the religious establishment. While the power of the state was consolidated on the basis of authoritarian rule, "modernizing" reforms, and even closer dependence upon European and American support, the *'ulama'* continued to be the leading opponents of the government, foreign influences, and policies contrary to Iranian Islamic values. In the twentieth century, the long-term conflict between the state and the *'ulama'* was renewed in changing ideological, economic, and political conditions.

The modern Iranian state arose out of a period of near-anarchy from 1911 to 1925, during which foreign intervention reached its peak. In World War I, Russian troops were garrisoned in the northern provinces and British troops occupied the south. With the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917, all of Iran fell into British hands; the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 made Iran a virtual protectorate of Britain. Under the terms of this treaty, Britain would train an Iranian army, finance the economic development of the country, and provide technical and managerial advisors. At the same time, the Soviet Union supported separatist movements in Jilan and Azarbayjan and Communist parties in Tabriz and Tehran. In 1921, however, Iran and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship on terms very favorable to Iran. The Soviets agreed to withdraw from Jilan, cancel Iranian debts and concessions, and surrender the special legal privileges afforded foreigners. The Soviets reserved the Caspian Sea fisheries and the right to intervene if Iran was threatened by another foreign power. Strengthened by the new treaty, Iran denounced the humiliating 1919 treaty with Britain.

Internally Iran was governed by a succession of ineffectual cabinets until Reza Khan (prime minister, 1923–25), an officer in the Cossack Brigade, came to power as head of the army and minister of defense. He consolidated his control over the army and the police, defeated tribal and provincial forces, brought most of the country under military control, and in 1925 made himself the shah of Iran. He

was the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, which lasted from 1925 to 1979. Under the rule of the Pahlavis a strong centralized government was created for the first time in Iranian history. The state was committed under authoritarian rule to an ambitious program of economic modernization and cultural Westernization, and was defined in nationalist ideological terms.

Reza Shah's first accomplishment was to build a modern army. Reza Shah set about training a new officer corps in France and introduced compulsory conscription. Some 33 percent of the annual government budget was allocated for military purposes. Bolstered by its army and an expanded administration, the new regime broke the power of the tribal communities and their chiefs. It outlawed the Communist Party and the trade unions, reduced the parliament to a rubber stamp, and censored the press. For political support it looked to the landowning classes. New laws in 1928 and 1929 recognized the de facto possession of land as proof of ownership, and required registration, which was favorable to wealthy landowners but not to poor tenants.

Through the creation of a secular education system, government supervision of religious schools, and other measures, the Pahlavis also sought to bring the *'ulama'* under state control. In 1934, the Teacher Training Act provided for new colleges, and the Ministry of Education introduced its own curriculum for theological schools. Furthermore, as an alternative to religious education, technical schools were founded by the Ministries of Education, Industry, Health, Agriculture, War, and Finance. The University of Tehran was founded in 1935 and operated with a European-educated faculty under the close supervision of the government. Many students were educated abroad and returned to spread technical knowledge and Western ideas of social relations.

A second and equally damaging blow to the *'ulama'* was the reorganization of judicial administration. During the 1930s, a new court system was organized, following French models, to administer a mixture of Western and Islamic legal norms. In 1928, Reza Shah introduced new law codes that replaced Islamic law. In 1932, the parliament enacted a new law that turned the registration of legal

documents over to secular courts and removed the most lucrative functions of the religious courts. A law of 1936 required every judge to hold a degree from the Tehran faculty of law or a foreign university, making it impossible for the *'ulama'* to sit in courts of law. Regardless of the adequacy of the legal system, in political terms it established the supremacy of the state. Other measures were taken to ban the presentation of passion plays, pilgrimages, and sermons and to legislate modern dress codes.

The secularization of legal administration and education was part of a still larger program of state-controlled economic modernization. The infrastructure of a modern economy was developed in the 1920s and 1930s. A new customs office was established, staffed by Belgian officials. American financial missions helped organize tax collection; an Iranian national bank was founded in 1927 under the management of German financial experts. An Iranian railroad was constructed between 1926 and 1938, running from Bandar Shahpur on the Persian Gulf to Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. Designed in response to strategic needs, however, the railroad neglected international connections, major cities, and links between the major economic areas of the country. Similarly, postal and telegraph communications and air transportation were introduced to facilitate economic development and help extend the authority of the central government to the provinces.

After 1930, owing to lack of sufficient capital in the private economy and lack of motivation among landowners to make long-term investments in industry, the state sponsored numerous industrial projects. Priority was given to consumer substitution industries (i.e., those replacing imports with domestic products), including cotton, wool, and silk factories, sugar refining, and food-processing plants such as bakeries, canneries, and breweries. By 1941, soap, glass, paper, matches, and cigarettes were all produced in state-owned factories. The state also controlled trade and foreign exchange. In 1925, the government established a monopoly on imports of tea and sugar.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Russia was an important trading partner; Britain controlled the production of oil. To offset the influence of

these two powers, Iran made use of German capital and technical assistance, and Germany maintained a strong presence by establishing research and cultural institutes, as well as espionage and political networks. In the 1930s, the Russian share of Iranian exports fell from 34 percent to 1 percent and the German share rose from 20 percent to 42 percent. The state controlled approximately 33–40 percent of Iranian imports and exports.

Oil was first found at Masjid-i Sulayman in 1908, and in 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded to exploit the discovery. The British government acquired a controlling interest in 1914. The refineries at Abadan were constructed in 1915. Oil production was profitable for Iran, but was a source of bitter resentment against foreign companies for their manipulation of royalties and the absence of Iranians in managerial and administrative positions. In 1933, Iran demanded a reduction in the territories conceded for foreign exploration and a fixed income; in return, it extended the existing concessions to 1993 and exempted the oil company from taxation. These arrangements cushioned Iran in the depression years but proved contrary to Iranian interests when prosperity was restored during and after World War II.

This phase of development created a small modern sector in an otherwise weak economy and society. Manufacturing was concentrated in cities and benefited only a small portion of the population. Agriculture remained unproductive. State centralization, economic modernization, and a new education system helped to create an elite of army officers, bureaucrats, merchants, contractors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, and writers, who adopted Western values and lifestyles. This new elite, allied to an older generation of *'ulama'* and tribal khans, dominated an unproductive and impoverished peasant population. The modernized Iranian state defined its legitimacy in nationalist and secularist terms. A revival of interest in Persian history and themes of ancient kingship were used to legitimize the modernization of the army, the government, and the economy.

World War II put an end to this phase of the Iranian experiment in centralization of state power and economic development. Britain and

Russia – concerned to keep open the supply routes across Iran to Russia and to assure the control of Iranian oil – seized control of Iran, forced Reza Shah to resign, and made his minor son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the nominal suzerain. Between 1941 and 1953, Iran passed through a period of open political struggle among its various would-be foreign protectors and internal political parties. In the late 1940s, the United States, on the edge of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, eager to create a Middle Eastern barrier against possible Soviet expansion, emerged as the principal patron of the postwar Iranian regime. The United States advised the Iranian government on economic management, organized Iran's police and military forces, and supplied it with military aid. With American backing, Iran successfully resisted Soviet occupation of the northern provinces, Soviet demands for oil concessions, and Soviet sponsorship of separatist movements in Azarbayjan and Kurdistan.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Iran also struggled to win control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1951, Muhammad Mosaddeq, the leader of the National Front, supported by a coalition of landowners, tribal leaders, leftist intelligentsia, merchants, and *'ulama'*, pushed a bill through parliament to nationalize the oil company. A bitter three-year struggle followed in which the United States refused to support Iran. The Western powers boycotted Iranian oil. The Iranian economy collapsed and the Mosaddeq coalition broke up. In the ensuing struggle for power, the CIA helped the army and the shah to seize power, dismiss Mosaddeq, and reestablish an authoritarian regime. The dispute with the oil companies was settled in 1954 by the formation of the National Iranian Oil Company and a consortium of foreign oil companies including the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (renamed British Petroleum) and several American firms. The consortium would produce and market oil and divide the profits with the National Iranian Oil Company. Thus the foreign companies avoided nationalization and maintained control of oil pricing and marketing.

The 1953 coup also put an end to the period of open struggle for political power. The restored regime of Muhammad Reza Shah was technically a constitutional monarchy, but the shah ruled with virtually

absolute powers. He controlled the army and SAVAK, the secret police and intelligence agency, appointed the ministers, selected half of the senate, and manipulated parliamentary elections. A small elite of officers, administrators, landowners, and some wealthy merchants and religious leaders dominated Iranian political life. The shah's regime was closely allied to the United States and was dependent upon American military and financial support. Having been brought to power with American assistance, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (1959). Iran maintained close relations with Israel. In the 1970s it assisted the sultan of Oman in suppressing opposition and in 1975 forced Iraq to settle disputed boundaries in the lower reaches of the Euphrates River. Close ties with the United States, however, did not prevent Iran from maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union to balance American influence and political pressure.

The Pahlavi program called not only for the construction of a centralized secular and nationalist regime, but also for the further modernization of society along Western lines. Between 1960 and 1977, the government undertook to reform the structure of landowning, modernize the industrial economy, build up military forces that would assure its regional supremacy, and reform the social structure of the country. In conjunction with agricultural reforms the shah proposed the formation of a literacy corps and a health corps intended to bring the direct influence of the state into the countryside. Other reforms included the extension of voting rights to women and their employment in government offices.

A crucial aspect of the "white revolution" was land reform. In Iran the ownership of land was concentrated in the hands of a small number of families, mainly absentee landlords. The peasants were rarely owners. Most were sharecroppers and laborers. In 1962–64 and 1968, landowners were required by law to sell excess land to smallholders and tenants, but because of widespread evasion not as much was distributed as had officially been proposed. The new owners, moreover, lacked the capital, the technology, the cooperative organizations, and the government extension services necessary to maintain and increase productivity. In fact, the main

objective of the shah's agricultural programs was the creation of large-scale, state-sponsored farm corporations and private agribusinesses, often with heavy foreign investment. These state-controlled entities favored capital-intensive mechanized farming, and forced peasants from the land at a time when there was already surplus labor in the country. Similarly, nomads were forced to sedentarize, and pastoral livestock herding was replaced with mechanized meat and dairy farms. These farms commonly failed, and the result was falling per capita production and a large-scale movement of rural people to the big cities, especially Tehran.

As per capita agricultural production declined in the 1960s and 1970s, Iran became more dependent upon industrial development. For the first time since the 1930s, the country experienced an industrial boom. State investments provided the infrastructure and roughly half of the capital invested in industry. The state also supported industrial growth by high tariffs, tax credits, licenses, and other devices, and promoted a boom in steel, rubber, chemicals, building materials, and automobile assembly. The huge growth of oil revenues after 1973 also enhanced the gross national product. Iranian industry, however, was too inefficient to compete in international markets and suffered from a lack of skilled management and labor. The combination of falling per capita agricultural output, inefficient industry, and heavy purchases of foreign manufactured goods and weapons with a booming oil economy led to severe inflation and probably to a lower standard of living for all Iranians not directly involved in the modern sector of the economy.

The shah's regime also attempted modest reforms in women's issues. As early as the 1920s a few leading intellectuals, both men and women, were working for improvements in women's education, social position, and legal rights. In small numbers, women began to enter into teaching, nursing, and factory work. In 1936, wearing of the veil was forbidden, and women of the urban upper and middle classes began to adopt modern dress. In the crucial areas of family law and political rights, however, little was changed. Men still had greater legal rights to divorce. Guardianship of children remained the

legal right of males. Polygamy was still permitted. The family protection laws of 1967 and 1975 partially circumscribed male prerogatives by requiring divorces to be reviewed in court and wives' consent for polygamous marriages.

The program of modernization was also the basis for the emergence of opposition to the regime. It expanded the cadres of Western and modern-educated intelligentsia, officials, soldiers, business managers, and skilled workers. It also provoked first the anxieties and then the active hostility of the *'ulama'*, the merchants and artisans of the bazaar, and leftist intellectuals who opposed the consolidation of the shah's power, his dependence upon foreign support, and the policies that brought economic hardship to the peasantry and to the lower middle classes. Above all, the opposition was alienated by the highly authoritarian nature of the regime. Opposition in the 1960s and 1970s was widespread but scattered and easily defeated. The Tudeh (Communist) and National Parties were crushed by the secret police (SAVAK). Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi minorities were defeated in their bids for regional autonomy. Guerrilla groups, such as the Marxist Feda'iyan-i Khalq and the Islamic leftist Mojahedin-i Khalq, opposed despotism, imperialism, and capitalism, but their resistance only provoked further repression and did not shake the grip of the shah's regime. The leftist opposition would again be important in the Iranian revolution of 1979, but the religious establishment would be more successful in mobilizing mass support.

The *'ulama'* and the Revolution

The position of the *'ulama'* remained ambiguous throughout Pahlavi rule. The politically open 1940s encouraged clerical activism in political affairs. From 1948 to 1953 Ayatollah Kashani, supported by street preachers and lower-ranking religious leaders, carried on an anti-British and anti-imperialist campaign in favor of the nationalization of the oil industry and the termination of foreign influence in Iran. For a time, he supported the Mosaddeq

government, but later turned against it and assisted in the restoration of the shah.

The defeat of Mosaddeq introduced a period of religious quietism and tacit collaboration with the state. The government supported the interests of the *'ulama'* through appointments at court, opportunities for enrichment through landowning, and marriage into prominent families. It increased the amount of religious instruction in public schools and periodically closed down movie houses, liquor stores, and public musical entertainments. In return, the *'ulama'* accepted the Baghdad Pact and tolerated the government's policy of cooperation with foreign companies. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Burujirdi, the clergy, while politically quiet, also consolidated their internal strength. In the 1950s and early 1960s, a national network of communications developed, with Qum as the center of Shiʻi religious instruction and organization.

In the 1960s, however, the government's economic and social policies generated intense clerical opposition. The *'ulama'* opposed the new land laws. Scanty evidence indicates that many *'ulama'* were wealthy landowners or controlled extensive charitable endowments. They opposed the extension of suffrage to women; Iran's close ties with the United States and Israel; and the creation of a literacy corps because it would give the state its own cadres to rival clerical influence in rural areas. The quarrel between the government and the clergy came to blows when, in 1963, the shah decided to call a national referendum on land reform. The proposed referendum and the police crackdown on religious activities in Qum provoked demonstrations, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled to Iraq in 1964.

As important as renewed clerical resistance to the state was the development of a religious reform movement. The reformist view was crystallized in a speech by Mehdi Bazargan in 1962, in which he referred to the Quran and to Shiʻi religious traditions to justify an active political role for the *'ulama'*. He said that political organization and collective struggle for a better society was the responsibility of the custodians of Islam; no longer should the *'ulama'* wait passively

for a return of the Imam, but actively prepare the way. The reformers further proposed the formation of a council of ʿulamaʾ to give authoritative religious advice and the creation of a centralized financial organization to assure their autonomy from both government influence and popular pressure. Between 1967 and 1973, the reform movement took a new direction under the leadership of Dr. ʿAli Shariʿati, who formed the Husayniyah Irshad. This was an informal "university" which was intended to revitalize Shiʿism by reconciling Islamic teachings with European social sciences and thereby generate the commitment to overthrow a repressive government. For Shariʿati, Shiʿism was a religion of protest.

Ayatollah Khomeini, from his sanctuary in Iraq, became the main spokesman of opposition to the monarchy. In 1961, he advocated a parliamentary form of government, but in 1971, in his book *Islamic Government*, he declared the monarchy an un-Islamic institution and called for a total reform of political society. The authority of the ʿulamaʾ would not be limited to religious and legal issues; Shiʿism as a political ideology would define the actions of the government and mold the character of the people. While based on a long tradition of scholarly opposition to the abuse of monarchical powers, this was, in fact, a profound innovation. Khomeini's position was the most radical statement of ʿulamaʾ responsibilities. Thus, the traditional religious elites joined the radical intelligentsia in opposition to the state. At the same time a new image of Husayn, the martyr of Karbala, took shape. He was to be not only the object of mourning and pity, but the exemplar of courage and resistance. His image was redefined from one of passive suffering to one of protest against tyranny.

The influence of the ʿulamaʾ spread throughout Iranian society. *Hayʾat*, or informal groups of some thirty to fifty people based in a neighborhood, a factory, or a bazaar, and tied to particular religious leaders, met to discuss the issues of the day. *Bazaaris*, the workers in the old-fashioned markets, and *maktabis*, the technical, managerial, clerical, upwardly mobile lower-middle-class cadres, only partially integrated into the modern sectors of the economy,

were the leading recruits for revolutionary action. These groups became the basis of a mass movement in opposition to the shah.

In the course of the 1970s, the Pahlavi regime became all the more oppressive. The army and the secret police were widely feared and hated for their numerous investigations, intimidation, imprisonment, torture, and assassination of potential enemies of the regime. The regime was widely perceived as being based upon American political and military support and as benefiting only a very narrow elite consisting of the shah and his family, the army, and a cadre of prominent supporters. The government was not only hated for being a dictatorship but was resented for mismanaging the economy. Great fortunes were being earned from oil income and were being spent on weapons and for the benefit of a small elite, while inflation was undermining the standard of living of bazaar merchants, artisans, and industrial workers. The bazaar population suffered particularly from confiscations, fines, and imprisonments, as the shah sought to contain inflation by intimidation. At the same time, the 1970s were also disastrous for masses of Iranian peasants. Millions fled the land for the cities, where they formed a huge mass of unemployed and underemployed people. By the late 1970s, Iran was importing most of its food from abroad.

In these deeply disturbed political and economic conditions, the spark for revolution was a demonstration by religious students in Qum against an alleged assassination by SAVAK. The police shot a number of demonstrators and provoked a new demonstration to mourn the martyrs of the last. Every forty days, the Shiʻi time of mourning for the dead, the protests were repeated, and grew in scale until the month of Muharram (the fall of 1978), when millions of people demonstrated against the regime. The Fedaʼiyan-i Khalq and Mojahedin-i Khalq were revived. The oil workers refused to produce, the bazaar merchants closed their shops, and the army either would not or could not suppress the revolt. The shah fled the country and a new regime came to power. Masses of Iranians had been mobilized by a coalition of religious and liberal leaders under the guidance of the highest Iranian religious authority, Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Iranian Islamic revolution arose out of the particular configuration of Iranian state and religious institutions, but is nonetheless a signal event in the history of all Islamic societies. It marks the culmination of an almost 200-year struggle between the Iranian state and the organized *'ulama'*. In the nineteenth century, the weaknesses of the state, and the strength of non-state tribal and ethnic communities, allowed for the consolidation of a religious establishment capable of opposing the regime and of mobilizing large-scale popular support. State efforts at modernization and European penetration of the Iranian economy led to the tobacco monopoly protests of 1891–92 and to the constitutional revolution of 1905. Again, in the late twentieth century, the effort to centralize and modernize state power led to a crisis in which *'ulama'*, intellectuals, students, and large segments of the artisan and working population mobilized to oppose the government. The defeat of tribalism as a third force in Iranian society had led to a polarization between the state and the *'ulama'* and to an Islamic revolution.

Nonetheless, the history of *'ulama'*–state relations in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Iran was ambiguous. Resistance to the state was in fact sporadic and at different times the *'ulama'* espoused both revolutionary activism and religious quietism. Within Shi'ism there is justification for both. The activist position is justified by the doctrine of commanding the good and forbidding the evil and by the claims of the jurists to be spiritual advisors to all Iranians and the only legitimate authorities in the absence of the Hidden Imam. The example of Husayn stands as a paradigm of the obligation to confront and resist tyranny in the name of justice and Islam. Equally important, however, are the cultural traditions tending toward political pacifism. The Shi'i expectation of worldly injustice and the hope for messianic redemption worked against involvement in public life.

The Iranian revolution, therefore, cannot be said to be due to an inherent religious opposition to state authority, but has to be treated as a response to specific conditions. The Russian invasion of 1826, the de Reuter concessions, the tobacco monopoly of 1891, the land reform acts of 1960 to 1963, and the economic tensions of the late

1970s impelled the *'ulama'* to adopt the active rather than the passive side of their complex tradition. The constitutional revolution of 1905 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 were not expressions of a constant hostility between state and religion, but the expression of a recurring possibility of confrontation between them. In Iran the weakness of the state, the organizational strength of the religious establishment, and the latent cultural permission for *'ulama'* resistance have all allowed for, though they have not mandated, revolutionary struggle in the name of Islam.

The revolution also had worldwide importance. Revolution came, not primarily from the left, but from the religious establishment; not in the name of socialism, but in the name of Islam. For the first time in the modern era, religious leaders had defeated a modernized regime. For the first time the Islamist revolutionary implications, hitherto manifest in lineage or tribal societies, have been realized in a modernizing industrializing society. The event shook the relations between states and religious movements, and opened doubts as to the future, not only of Iran, but of all Islamic societies.

The Islamic Republic

The revolutionary movement abolished the monarchy and established an Islamic government. The new regime was built upon the charismatic authority of Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989), the official head of the government and the authority of last resort. His authority was legitimated by a modern Shi'i theory (*wilayat al-faqih*), which obligated government to be under the rule of jurisprudential *'ulama'*. The ayatollah was called Imam by some of his followers, referring to his role as head of the community but implying the divinely inspired, messianic function of the 'Alid Imams. In 1979, Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which was deployed against opponents of the revolution. A Supreme Council of *Maslahah* (public welfare) was created to oversee the activities of both the Council of Guardians and the parliament. By 1989, the religious elite controlled all of the leading positions in government and the political authority of the *'ulama'* was consolidated. (See Illustration 23.)

Illustration 23. A girls' school, Tehran (© David and Peter Turnley/CORBIS).

In the 1980s, however, the clerical elite split into three main factions. The strongest was the religiously conservative and revolutionary (or jihadi) faction that emphasized patriarchal authoritarian rule, cultural purity, and social conformity. The reformist and internationalist (or *ijtihadi*) faction, led by Mehdi Karroubi and Muhammad Khatami, was committed to a democratic Islamic political system and an independent civil society. A pragmatic or centrist group was led by Ayatollah Rafsanjani.

The new regime consolidated its power by eliminating its coalition allies, especially the liberal nationalists, Marxist intellectuals, and the Mojahedin. Thousands of officers of the shah's government were purged and executed by revolutionary courts. Jews, Armenians, Zoroastrians, and other minorities suffered harassment, arrest, and destruction of property. Baha'is were relentlessly persecuted. The Westernized middle class was forced into exile. A fierce puritanism took hold. Revolutionary vigilante groups (*komiteh*) took to the streets to police morals and to assault women who were improperly dressed or who entered men's spaces. Women were forced out of many professions, and were required to be completely veiled in

public. Places of entertainment, including cinemas and theaters, were shut down.

Iran was immediately embroiled in disputes with other countries. The revolutionary government seized the United States embassy and held its personnel hostage for over a year. A Bureau of Islamic Propaganda was created to stimulate like-minded revolutionary action in other Muslim countries. Iran supported Hizballah as its proxy in the Lebanese civil war and the struggle against Israel.

Then in 1980 Iraq attacked the oil-rich southwestern provinces of Iran. Iraq claimed to be defending the Arab countries against revolutionary threats and its own Shi'i population from revolutionary contamination, but its principal motive was expansionist opportunism. Eight years of bitter warfare followed. Iran, lacking modern equipment and tactics, hurled countless young men against the Iraqis in a war reminiscent of World War I trench warfare, while Iraq fought with all means at its disposal, including chemical weapons and poison gas. The United States played a duplicitous role in the war, supplying arms and intelligence to both sides, but from 1986 weighed in on the Iraqi side to forestall an Iranian victory.

In the Islamic Republican period, economic development was stymied by the war with Iraq, the collapse of international oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the 2000s by American-imposed sanctions intended to deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Economic development was also hampered by an ongoing struggle between clerics favoring a privatized market economy and those favoring government regulation in the interest of popular welfare. The economy, 80 percent controlled by the state, was mismanaged by bureaucratic bungling and by outright corruption. So-called charitable foundations (*bonyad*) controlled vast resources and used them for political and clerical favorites. Government policies favored the bazaar merchants, the mainstay of the revolution, but small-scale industries suffered from the lack of necessary foreign imports, weak exports, and black-market competition. Agriculture stagnated, requiring the importation of food. In general, the Islamic state had little impact upon the distribution of wealth, welfare, housing, and other domestic issues.

While state policy did not decisively shape the Iranian economy, Islamist policies were forceful in shaping the media, education, and the treatment of women. The legal changes favorable to women's rights introduced by the shah were reversed and the family protection laws of 1967 and 1975 were repealed. Men regained the right to unilateral divorce and to custody of children. Polygyny was again permitted. Women were required to be veiled in public, and an unsuccessful effort was made to restrict women's employment mainly to health care. Women were banned from judgeships.

Women writers, artists, and intellectuals, however, created new journals to subtly push back the demands of conservative *'ulama'* and increase the scope for women's self-expression. Some women writers contested traditional interpretations of Islam. The journal of the Women's Society of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, *Payam-i Hajar* (Hagar's message), denounced the extremes of intoxication with the West, of abandonment of cultural traditions, and of blind submission to whatever religious leaders interpreted as Islamic. The journal interpreted Islam in ways that supported women's rights and argued that each individual has the right to interpret the Quran. It called for the creation of a ministry of women's welfare, protested the exclusion of women from judgeships, criticized polygyny and temporary marriages, and favored marriage contract stipulations that forbade a second wife and guaranteed alimony in case of divorce. This "feminist" campaign met with some early successes. Under President Rafsanjani (1989–97), new laws allowed for marriage contract stipulations, the divorce law was revised to give women greater rights in divorce and child custody, and the minimum age of marriage was raised from nine to puberty. Women were reinstated as judges in family courts. The facilities for women's education were greatly improved, though women's participation in the workforce was still hindered by policy and social mores.

With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei succeeded him as the ruling Islamic jurist. The constitution was revised to strengthen the office of the president and the state apparatus; the regime built cadres of younger *'ulama'*, student activists, and town and village militias to constitute a new

elite. Still, the government was divided. The more radical *'ulama'* wished to consolidate the authority of the supreme Islamic jurist and to further Islamize the country. The moderates led by President Rafsanjani wanted an efficient government adapted to the realities of the global economy. Ayatollah Khamenei and President Rafsanjani formed an uneasy alliance.

In the 1990s, moreover, the Islamic left revived. In the first decade of the revolution, the Islamic left had relied on the support of Khomeini and the left-dominated parliament under Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Moussavi. After Khomeini's death, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent discrediting of socialism, the left reinvented itself under the banner of reformism and support for democratic institutions. Under the leadership of Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the new left called for a republic of law rather than the personal authority of the Supreme Leader. Students demanded freedom in daily life. Liberal intellectuals such as Abdol Karim Soroush advocated a tolerant Islamic society.

The elections of 1997 brought a more liberal government to power. The new president was Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005), who advocated social reform, a reduced governmental role for the jurists, and a greater role for women in public life. In his first term, President Khatami promoted freedom of the press and restrained the morals police. Civil society and women's organizations flourished. In the parliamentary elections of 2000, reformist candidates won two-thirds of the seats. Khatami went on to win reelection in 2001.

His election brought into the open the struggle between conservative *'ulama'* defending an authoritarian Islamic society (ruled by *wilayat al-faqih*) and more liberal reforming elements defending Islamic pluralism, democracy, and the rule of law. The clerical establishment, headed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, fought back. The Supreme Leader controlled the judiciary, the broadcast media, and large sectors of the economy. The Guardian Council and the courts used their veto powers to block parliamentary action. A vast paramilitary apparatus of soldiers, police, intelligence officers, morals enforcers, and organized "vigilantes" were employed to crush drug use, gambling,

homosexuality, prostitution, rape, murder, spying, counterrevolutionary activities, and "sowing corruption on earth," and to punish women for being improperly dressed in public. Reformist newspapers were shut down. Vigilante violence was directed against writers, journalists, and students to break up pro-reform student demonstrations.

The most powerful forces on the Islamist clerical and right wing were the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the paramilitary Basij. The IRGC originated in 1979 as a militia to protect the ideals and institutions of the revolution. It includes ground, air, and naval forces, and served in the Iran–Iraq War as a force to monitor the army. Under Rafsanjani's administration, it entered business activities, such as civil construction and engineering, and has assembled a multi-billion-dollar economic empire. Though ostensibly devoted to Islamic fundamentalism, the IRGC has strong anticlerical, authoritarian, nationalistic, and pragmatic tendencies, including a claim to national leadership as a consequence of its military and political services. The IRGC became a rival to President Muhammad Khatami and to reformist-controlled security and intelligence forces.

The Basij, an auxiliary law enforcement, morals police, and social service organization, plays an important role in repressing dissidents and anti-regime demonstrations. The Basij are estimated to have about 90,000 uniformed members, some 300,000 reservists, and as many as a million men available for mobilization when necessary. Basij volunteers and their families became the IRGC's popular base in society.

In 2005, the reformists were defeated by the election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad as president. Ahmadinejad was the candidate of the IRGC and the Basij. His power was based on client networks supported by oil revenues and incomes from the foundations. Ahmadinejad and his supporters saw a divine hand in the "second revolution," ushered in by his election. The new administration quickly took on a religious tone. Ahmadinejad paid visits to the mosque in Qum where the Twelfth Imam is believed to be in occultation, but he staffed the cabinet with IRGC and other security

personnel. In his first administration, the cabinet had only one cleric. Despite occasional tensions, Ahmadinejad worked with Khamenei to strengthen their fellow conservatives in all spheres of government.

Once back in power, the conservatives pursued harsh social, economic, and foreign policies. They promulgated a more conservative dress code and imposed stricter controls over the relations between men and women in public. A quota was placed on the admission of women to universities. The government harassed and imprisoned secular activists and closed down women's NGOs and numerous newspapers and journals. In response, women revived or formed their own women-only organizations such as the Zeinab Society to advocate for gradual change and argue that equality between men and women was an Islamic teaching. Websites, blogs, virtual networks, and citizen journalism became the principal means of opposition and of political and cultural self-expression.

The Ahmadinejad government was unable to stabilize the economy, and government policy was erratic. In 2006, Ahmadinejad radically raised the minimum wage, but was forced to reverse his position after mass lay-offs in factories. In 2007, he suddenly decreed a change in interest rates, causing a panic at the central bank. Under his administration, Iran suffered from double-digit inflation, and a sharp decline in the standard of living. Youth unemployment reached 30 percent. Over 30 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line. The reasons for this dire situation include corruption, failure to attract foreign investment, and large budget deficits. Iran's natural resources have been mismanaged. In 2008, less oil was produced than in 1978 even though 50–70 percent of government revenue came from oil exports, which are financially vital to the state. Iran has 41 percent of the world's natural gas reserves, but has to import gas from Turkmenistan. In late 2011, the value of the Iranian currency (the *rial*) declined precipitously, this time undermined by American efforts to reduce Iran's oil exports and block transactions with Iran's central bank.

At the same time, the IRGC benefits from the development of infrastructure and technology, a cheap labor force, and privatization

programs that transfer state assets to the IRGC or favored individuals. It controls border crossings and runs a large smuggling operation and a black-market empire.

In foreign policy, Iran's principal goal is the pursuit of nuclear energy, a nationalist project to make it a great power. Iran denies that it intends to make atomic weapons, but the outside world generally believes that it does. It may consider atomic weapons protection against potential American and Israeli (atomic) attacks; it may see such weapons as an assertion of power over the Arab Middle East and as a deterrent to American intervention in the region, or as conferring political status and leadership in the Middle East and the Muslim world. Conversely, an Iran armed with atomic weapons is of great concern to Israel, which sees a threat to its very existence. Ahmadinejad supports both HAMAS and Hizballah, Israel's immediate enemies, denounces Israel's policies, and is a vocal denier of the Holocaust. The United States and the Arabian states see Iran's nuclear program as threatening potential Iranian dominance in the Middle East.

The 2009 presidential elections precipitated a crisis in Iranian politics. The government lost the support of many leading Islamists. Reformists and pragmatists supported the challenger, Mir-Hossein Moussavi, in an effort to defeat Ahmadinejad and return Iran to a more balanced relationship between the religious and administrative spheres of government. The government declared an Ahmadinejad victory, but many Iranians contested the legitimacy of the results in mass demonstrations that were violently suppressed by the IRGC and the Basij. The IRGC tightened its grip on the state apparatus. Mass arrests and tortures destroyed the populist image of the regime. Iran today is in effect ruled by martial law.

In the new regime, there was a covert struggle for power between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, between the clerical hierarchy and the military–economic–security elites. Ahmadinejad hoped to increase the power of the presidency and secure his continued influence in government after the end of his second term in office, while the Supreme Leader and conservative clerics sought to marginalize the presidency and retain ultimate control over politically important

government agencies. Ayatollah Khamenei floated a suggestion to transform the government from a presidential to a parliamentary form that would eliminate the direct election of the president. With the election of a new president, Hassan Rouhani, in 2013, the Ahmadinejad faction seems to have been eclipsed.

Islam and the state

Modern Iranian history is marked by an ambiguous relationship between the institutions of the state and those of religion. Historically, the religious institutions have both depended upon and opposed the powers and authority of the state. The clerics have looked to the state for defense and the economic management of Iranian society, but have resisted state encroachment upon their prerogatives and opposed policies contrary to their interests. Conversely, the monarchies have looked to the religious elites for political, cultural, administrative, and psychological support, while at the same time seeking to subordinate the *'ulama'* to state control.

The seizure of state power in the name of Islam has not changed that ambiguous relationship. In many ways, the revolutionary government carries on the work of state building begun by the shahs. The Islamic Republic strengthened the state bureaucracy and brought the army under its control by creating the IRGC. Iranian foreign policy remains driven by national rather than "religious" interests. Under Ahmadinejad, the government was transformed into a highly militarized institution, staffed with veterans of the Iran–Iraq War, the IRGC, and the Basij.

Despite the authority of the Supreme Leader and "Islamic" policies in social matters, the state is not fully under the control of the clerics. Even though a cleric is accepted as the highest authority, he shares power with an elected president who embodies the public and governmental aspects of the society. There is an ambiguity as to whether authority derives from Islam or from the people. While committed in theory to an Islamic state, Islamic considerations commonly yielded to *raisons d'état*. Islamic law is not the official law of Iran and the state remains the ultimate promulgator of law. Non-

Muslims continue to be citizens. Most members of the Council of Guardians are laymen. Khomeini himself stressed the importance of the revolution over that of adhering to Islamic law. In many respects, the Iranian national state has absorbed its Islamic component, but the historical tensions between Islamic and national identities, between the religious and secular institutions of the government, and between the clerical and the governmental elites are still unresolved. The Islamic Republic seems less an expression of Islam than of authoritarian nationalism.

Chapter 48 Egypt: secularism and Islamic modernity

The history of Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resembles that of Turkey. Egypt also developed from an Ottoman and Islamic to a national and secular form of society. Its evolution also began with a period of state-managed reform, but its development was diverted by British occupation from 1882 to 1952. British rule cut off the consolidation of an Egyptian military and administrative elite, making a secondary elite of landowners, officials, merchants, and intelligentsia the spokespeople for national independence. These elites, still hampered by British occupation, came to power in 1922 and ruled until 1952. Unable to surmount the dilemmas of governing under foreign rule, divided by nationalist and Islamist political orientations, the liberal elites were removed from power and replaced in 1952 by Arab nationalist military officers who instituted the regime that governed Egypt until the popular revolution in the Spring of 2011.

The nineteenth-century reforming state

Though part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt retained a separate political and cultural identity. Under Ottoman suzerainty, Egypt was ruled by local Mamluk military factions. Like the rest of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had a strong religious scholarly (*'ulama'*) establishment and Sufi brotherhoods. In the course of the eighteenth century, as Ottoman control weakened, fighting among the Mamluk factions led to the decline of irrigation, excessive taxation, and increasing tribal autonomy and pastoralism. Ottoman weakness exposed Egypt to invasion by Napoleon in 1798, to British counter-intervention, and finally to the appointment of Muhammad ʿAli as governor (1805–48).

Muhammad ʿAli was determined to make himself an independent potentate, and founded a dynasty that ruled Egypt until 1952. He defeated the Wahhabis and established Egyptian control over western Arabia and the holy places of Mecca and Medina. He expanded Egyptian power in the Sudan and helped the Ottomans in the Greek war of independence. In 1831, Muhammad ʿAli invaded Syria and threatened the viability of the Ottoman Empire.

His aggressive military regime was sustained by a far-reaching reorganization of the Egyptian state and society. He tried to create a centralized dictatorship based on an army of Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and other foreigners who were part of his personal retinue. With the help of Italian and French military advisors, he built a new army, for the first time recruiting Egyptian peasant soldiers. He devised a new tax system, employing salaried officials to replace the old tax-farming arrangements. Coptic scribes were employed in subordinate administrative positions. The old Mamluk households were destroyed, and all other political forces were broken.

For the sake of an effective military machine, the administration and economy of the country were totally reorganized. Muhammad ʿAli promoted sugar and cotton production because they were cash crops with an international market. Major irrigation projects were undertaken to make it possible to cultivate the land all the year round. State control of agriculture and trade allowed Muhammad ʿAli to buy cotton from peasants at low prices and resell it to exporters at a profit. Machinery and technicians were imported to build factories to produce cotton, wool, and linen textiles, sugar, paper, glass, leather, and weapons. A new school system was founded to train technicians and army officers.

Muhammad ʿAli's descendant Ismaʿil Pasha (r. 1863–79) carried the development of the country still further. He continued the program of economic and technical growth, extended the railroads and telegraph, and constructed the Suez Canal and a new harbor for Alexandria. He also gave Egypt European-type law courts, secular schools and colleges, libraries, theaters, an opera house, and a

Western-type press. Egypt, like the Ottoman Empire, acquired the infrastructure of cultural modernity.

The effect of this reorganization was to destroy the old order of society in an upheaval even more profound than that which took place in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The whole balance of social power in Egyptian society was altered. Egyptians and Turko-Egyptian families became powerful in the army and administration. Muhammad ʿAli's economic and administrative policies promoted the development of a new landed elite. Members of the ruling family were awarded estates called *jifliks*, and tax-free lands were granted to village leaders who took control of taxes and corvées. The abolition of collective village responsibility made individuals responsible for paying taxes.

These measures led to the concentration of land in the hands of merchants, money lenders, village headmen, and government officials. Changes in land law abolished restrictions on private ownership and made it possible to buy, sell, or mortgage land, and opened land to purchase by foreigners. By 1901, foreigners or Egyptians with foreign passports owned 23 percent of all estates of more than 50 acres (*faddans*). From the new class of large-scale landowners came bureaucrats and army officers. While its base was in landowning, the new elite had a commercial wing, including Egyptian-Jewish and Syrian merchants, who prospered as middlemen in the growing trade with Europe. The power of the merchant elites was also enhanced by the elimination of craft guilds. Out of this class came the lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals who would give voice to the aspirations of the new elite.

A new economy promoted state control and individualism in place of the corporate structures of pre–nineteenth-century Egyptian society. Government controls and private ownership replaced village collectivities and destroyed the village economies. The disruption led to peasant indebtedness, fugitivism, and to a series of peasant rebellions that swept Egypt in 1798 and 1812, throughout the 1820s, from 1846 to 1854, and from 1863 to 1865. Popular preachers who called themselves saints (*wilaya*) or guides (mahdis) appealed to Sufi conceptions and eschatological hopes.

The position of the religious elites was equally transformed. In the eighteenth century, the *'ulama'* of Egypt, like the *'ulama'* of Istanbul, were an integral element of the ruling elite and represented the interests of the regime, acting as intermediaries between the government and the common people. After Muhammad 'Ali consolidated power, however, he subordinated the *'ulama'* to the regime, banished their leading spokesmen, confiscated their tax farms and charitable endowments, and made them dependent upon the ruler for their incomes. In the course of the nineteenth century, the *'ulama'* withdrew from public affairs to protect a narrow sphere of educational and judicial interests. The lack of an autonomous power base and a tradition of compliance operated in Egypt, as in the Ottoman Empire, to confine the *'ulama'* to the defense of a narrow range of traditional prerogatives.

Later in the nineteenth century, Islamic legal institutions were taken under government control. Egypt adopted new criminal and civil law codes. A civil code based on French models was introduced in 1873; a double court system was established in 1875 to restrict the competence of Islamic law courts and to establish an alternative system of law. Yet another civil law code was introduced in 1949. In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, government interventions made al-Azhar the principal Islamic educational institution. The confiscation of charitable trusts destroyed rival colleges and made others administratively subordinate to the head (shaykh) of al-Azhar. Laws of 1908 and 1911 mandated curriculum and administrative reforms that increased the authority of Shaykh al-Azhar over both *'ulama'* and students. In a limited sphere he became principal spokesman of the *'ulama'* and the conduit of government influence among the religious elite.

The powers of Sufis were similarly circumscribed. Whereas the Sufi orders, families, shrines, and meeting places of the eighteenth century were independent, Muhammad 'Ali brought them under state control. In 1812, he appointed the shaykh of the Bakri lineage as chief shaykh, and made the chiefs of Sufi lineages, shrines, and brotherhoods beholden to the new chief shaykh for the payment of

their stipends and endowment revenues. After 1855, the state imposed a system of licensing that gave the chief shaykh and the government the authority to define the territories in which each order could stage ceremonies and *mawlid*s (commemorations of their revered masters), as well as proselytize for new members. State regulations also suppressed the most dramatic of Sufi ceremonies. In 1881, music and dance performances, flagellation, and the swallowing of hot coals were prohibited. In 1903 and 1905, the regulation of Sufis became the function of a government ministry. Both *'ulama'* and Sufis had been made subordinate to the state.

British colonial rule

The subordination of the *'ulama'* and the emergence of a new landed, commercial, and intellectual elite opened the way for further radical change in Egyptian society. Before these new elites could make their influence felt, however, Egypt fell under direct British rule. British interest in Egypt derived ultimately from the consolidation of the British Empire in India. Napoleon's invasion of 1798, Muhammad 'Ali's attack on Syria in 1831–39, and the construction of the Suez Canal between 1859 and 1869 underlined the fact that Egypt lay on the route to India and was essential to the defense of the empire. Furthermore, Britain had acquired a major interest in the Egyptian economy. The reforms of Muhammad 'Ali had made Egypt an exporter of cotton and dependent on the world market. Reciprocally, Egypt had become an importer of British cloth. Heavy Egyptian borrowing to purchase consumer luxuries, military equipment, manufacturing machinery, and capital equipment for railroads and the Suez Canal put Egypt into debt to European banks and governments. Egypt's economic dependence led eventually to bankruptcy and to the imposition of a foreign-managed debt administration under Anglo-French control (1875).

The debt administration was the beginning of colonial rule. It led to conflict between foreign interests and the new Egyptian elites. *'Ulama'*, landowners, journalists, and native Egyptian army officers provoked demonstrations in 1879; in 1881, led by an army officer

named ʿUrabi, they seized control of the War Ministry and formed a parliamentary government. Britain refused to compromise with the nationalists, bombarded Alexandria, landed troops, defeated ʿUrabi, and in 1882 took complete control of the country in the name of the bondholders. In 1898, the British took the Sudan under joint Anglo-Egyptian rule.

From 1882 until World War I the British managed the Egyptian economy efficiently, but in the imperial interest. The British improved agricultural productivity by investments in railroads and irrigation. They built a delta barrage and the first Aswan dam (1906); the cropped area grew from 5.7 million *faddans* in 1882 to 7.7 million in 1911. The British improved tax collection, consolidated private property ownership, and raised adequate revenues to pay for the Egyptian budget and the foreign debt. Economic development encouraged the concentration of surplus wealth in the hands of large landlords. Egypt became ever more dependent upon cotton for export. However, the peasantry did not benefit. The population of the country grew from 6.8 million in 1882 to 11.3 million in 1917. Industrialization was inhibited by the lack of British interest in encouraging competition, the unwillingness of landowners to invest, and the lack of natural resources.

Although British administration was in some respects favorable to Egyptian interests, there was deep resentment over the imposition of British rule, the displacement of Egyptian officials by British ones, neglect of education, and the exploitation of Egypt to expand the British Empire in the Sudan. The Egyptian landowning elite and intelligentsias resisted British rule through two overlapping ideological positions: Islamic modernism and Egyptian nationalism. Like the Ottoman intelligentsia, the Egyptians defined first a modernist Islamic and later a secular concept of an independent Egyptian society.

Egyptian resistance: from Islamic modernism to nationalism

The most influential spokesmen for nineteenth-century Egyptian Islamic modernism were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) (see Chapter 45) and his Egyptian disciple Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905). ʿAbduh came from an educated village family and was schooled at al-Azhar. He participated in the ʿUrabi revolt of 1881, was exiled in 1882, and returned to Egypt in 1888, where he was appointed judge and later mufti, or chief of Islamic law, from 1889 to 1905. ʿAbduh's endeavors as mufti were directed toward modernizing Islamic law, and revising the curriculum of al-Azhar to include modern history and geography.

ʿAbduh combined reformist principles – return to the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, the right of independent judgment in religious matters, abandonment of a stifling conformity to outmoded tradition, and opposition to cultic Sufi practices – with a modernist responsiveness to the political and cultural pressures of Europe. He advocated educational reform both as a correction to shrine and saint worship and magical religious practices, and as the means for adjustment to modern economic and technological conditions. Whether the emphasis was political modernism or educational reformism, the goal was the same: autonomy from European powers and the restoration of the vitality of Islamic states and societies. Under the influence of al-Afghani and ʿAbduh, Islamic modernism and Islamic religious reform became the ideological programs of the Egyptian intelligentsia in the decades between the ʿUrabi revolt and the turn of the century.

In Egypt, however, as in Turkey, the Islamic modernism and reformism taught by al-Afghani and ʿAbduh gave way to a more secular nationalist concept of Egyptian identity. The nationalist intelligentsia also stemmed from the classes of landowners, officials, and Western-educated journalists and lawyers generated by earlier reforms. The leaders included Mustafa Kamil (d. 1908), who held a French law degree; Lutfi al-Sayyid (d. 1963), who came from an Egyptian village notable family and was educated in Quran schools and later in law; and Saʿd Zaghlul (d. 1928), the son of a village headman, who began his career with a religious education and then

turned to secular nationalism. Other nationalists were Jewish or Christian journalists and writers who became proponents of a secular society in which minority groups could be full citizens.

In the late nineteenth century, Egyptian patriotic sentiment was blended with the idea of modernizing reform. Nationalist writers such as Mustafa Kamil propounded the idea of a unified nation, patriotic in spirit, passionate in its hatred of foreign rule, but also dedicated to a constitutional form of government and Western-type education. Lutfi al-Sayyid became the philosopher of a secular and constitutional society. Freedom, he argued, was the basis of society. Freedom from foreign rule, freedom from state control, and recognition of the inherent civil and political rights of citizens were its essential principles. For Lutfi al-Sayyid nationalism meant independence and a new social and political system for Egypt.

National feeling seems to have come easily in Egypt. Even before nationalism became a self-conscious doctrine, Egyptian writers spontaneously identified Egypt as the *watan*, the homeland. The homogeneity and isolation of the country, its long history of central government, and its distinctive cultural past encouraged a consciousness of Egyptian identity. In Egypt, more than in any other Middle Eastern country, the modern national state is based on the historical existence of an Egyptian people and an Egyptian state.

The national movement began with speeches and journals, but it took political form with the formation of the National Party (Hizb al-Watani), led by Mustafa Kamil in the 1890s. This party and others took on a formal identity in 1907. The Denshawai episode in 1906 conveyed the nationalist idea from its original middle-class milieu to students and even to the masses. A group of British officers on a pigeon hunt fought with local people. One of the officers was killed, and in retaliation the British publicly executed four peasants and flogged numerous others. The outrage awakened widespread Egyptian hostility to British rule.

World War I crystallized the determination to be independent. The declaration of a British protectorate, martial law, requisitions of Egyptian labor and manufacturing capacity, heavy migration to Cairo,

and widespread hardship stiffened Egyptian opposition to British rule. At the end of the war, a delegation (*wafd*) led by Saʿd Zaghlul, inspired with hope by Woodrow Wilson's proclamations, demanded complete independence. Zaghlul was able to mobilize mass support and, in the course of a three-year struggle from 1919 to 1922, forced the British to dissolve the protectorate.

The liberal republic

In 1922, Egypt emerged as a semi-independent state under British tutelage with all the makings of a national state, including a unified population, a history of centralized government, and a Westernized intelligentsia committed to liberal constitutionalism. A parliament and a king – of the dynasty established by Muhammad ʿAli – governed Egyptian affairs. But foreign policy, the army, the attached region of the Sudan, and jurisdiction over all foreigners in the country remained under British rather than Egyptian control.

Thus, Egypt, like Turkey, came out of World War I with a secular national regime, but unlike Turkey it remained partially dependent. The difference was due partly to the fact of foreign occupation and partly to the class composition of the Egyptian elite. The Turkish elite, composed essentially of army officers, deeply rooted in a statist tradition, was capable of mobilizing the political and military potential of the Turkish nation. The Egyptian elite, composed of landowners, journalists, and politicians, was able to organize a political, but not an effective military, resistance in the struggle for independence. Once in power, the liberal regime failed to win full independence, or achieve adequate and equitable economic development, or provide an abiding cultural identity.

The effort to achieve independence was complicated by a tripartite division of power among the king, the political parties, and the British. The British controlled the military and used their power at critical junctures to play the king and the parties off against each other; similarly, the king and the party leaders did not try to unite against the British, but were only too glad to use British help to best their rivals. Egyptian politics between 1922 and 1952 thus fell into a

pattern. The Wafd Party, which had emerged from the struggle for independence as the most popular, would win national elections. The British and the king would conspire against the Wafd government and force it to resign. The king would, if necessary, suspend and dissolve parliament and govern through his personal cabinet, until new elections eventually returned the Wafd to power. The game would then begin again. The king and the British were generally united against the majority party until in 1942, when the king drew too close to German and Italian interests, and the British – backed by tanks in the streets of Cairo – conspired with the Wafd to outmaneuver the monarchy. These machinations made it impossible for the liberal regime to achieve independence. The king was not eager to remove the British forces that maintained his power. The Wafd was unwilling to have any agreement negotiated by another party.

Despite these complications, in 1936 a treaty was worked out that gave Egypt "independence" subject to certain reservations. The treaty provided for a twenty-year military alliance and British evacuation, except for the Canal Zone. It committed Britain to the defense of Egypt, committed Egypt and Britain to the joint defense of the Sudan, ended the special legal privileges of foreigners (such as mixed courts), and proposed that Egypt enter the League of Nations as an independent state. After the treaty, Egypt gained a greater degree of internal sovereignty, but Britain kept her predominant military position. World War II made Britain still more reluctant to withdraw. Postwar negotiations foundered over control of the Sudan, until finally, in 1950, Egypt abrogated the treaty of 1936 and the 1899 Sudan Convention. Guerrilla war against British occupation of the Canal Zone led to riots in January 1952, followed by a military coup in July. This ended the era of the Egyptian monarchy and the parliamentary system. Britain finally agreed to the evacuation of the Canal Zone.

Between 1922 and 1952, the liberal regime also failed to cope with the problems of economic development. Important gains were made in Egyptian consumer industries that produced processed foods, textiles, cement, paper, sugar, and other products. The Egyptian

Bank was founded, with ownership deliberately restricted to Egyptians, in order to compete with foreign companies. However, the benefits of economic progress accrued only to a very small part of the population. Businessmen, skilled workers, and white-collar bureaucrats prospered to a degree, but the general standard of living fell owing to rapid population growth, extortionate rents taken from agricultural tenants, and the decline of global demand for cotton. Per capita food production from the late 1920s through World War II actually fell below the level of 1886. While the parliamentary regime had come to power in 1922 on the strength of peasant uprisings, once in power the nationalist parties proved to represent landowner, bourgeois, industrial, and professional class interests, rather than the general need for economic growth.

Similarly, the liberal regime failed to define Egypt's cultural and political identity. In the 1920s, Egyptian political and intellectual leaders were outspokenly secular, or liberal, or modernist, or some combination thereof. Some writers tried to reinterpret Egyptian history in Pharaonic, but not in Islamic, terms. Taha Husayn (d. 1973) even called Quranic and biblical history into question, espousing a thoroughgoing rationalism. Other writers attacked custom, rejected ethical ideas based on revelation and otherworldly sanctions, and advocated Western humanistic values.

Despite these modernist views, Egyptian leaders, by contrast with Turkish elites, could not implement a program of cultural modernization. They lacked the political power and unity essential for such a program. They were also overtaken by a growing disillusionment with Europe. World War I, the political strife of the interwar years, the Great Depression, and finally World War II exposed Egyptians to the failings of the constitutional and liberal governments of Europe, the ruthlessness of the powers, their indifference to principle in ruling over non-European peoples, and their contempt for their subjects. These events undermined the confidence of many Egyptians that the future belonged to the West. Furthermore, the failure of the liberal regime to win full independence and to deal equitably with the country's political and economic

problems also undermined faith in parliamentary regimes and in the value of individualism.

Most important in the retreat from secularism and Westernism was the revival of popular commitment to Islam. The Islamic revival in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s owed little to the traditional *'ulama'* or Sufi brotherhoods, whose political and ideological position had left them unable to resist the state authorities. Rather, a new generation of Muslim preachers and teachers, representing youth associations, worked to teach Islamic morals and ethics, strengthen the ties of brotherhood, and restore religious law and the supremacy of Islam in public life. They appealed to people with traditional Islamic educations such as clerks, lower civil servants, shopkeepers, students, and others who had been hurt by foreign occupation and by the change from Islamic to Western education. Islam also appealed to a new generation of students and industrial workers who were dissatisfied with the dominance of a landowning elite committed to foreign ideologies.

The most important Islamic reform movement of this era was the Society of Muslim Brothers, founded by Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) in 1928. Hasan al-Banna preached the restoration of Islamic principles, and a return to the Quran and Islamic piety. He built up an extensive following divided into cells or chapters, which organized mosques, schools, clinics, and even cooperative work opportunities for their members. The movement became politically active in the 1930s, adding athletic and paramilitary groups to the other cells. Muslim Brotherhood volunteers supported the Arab uprising in Palestine in 1936–39.

In Egypt the Muslim Brothers allied with other Muslim youth movements to oppose British rule, Christian missionary activities, foreign values and foreign schools, and the corruption of the Egyptian regime. They supplied guerrilla fighters for the struggle against the British occupation of Suez, and sponsored violent demonstrations and strikes. By 1948–49, the movement had become the standard-bearer of Egyptian mass grievances against British rule and the failure of the liberal political system. It called for the establishment of an Islamic government based on consultation with

the *'ulama'* and devoted to the application of Islamic law, proposed the regulation of the economy in accordance with a combination of Islamic and socialist principles, including the nationalization of banks, and promised a more equitable distribution of income. Committed to the fundamental scriptures of Islam, to the assertion of an Islamic social and political identity, and to the adaptation of Islamic principles to the needs of a modern society, the Muslim Brothers were devoted to the reform of morals, education, economic projects, and the creation of an Islamic state. Islam in their minds was the blueprint for a totally modern society and an ideological and political alternative to liberalism or to communism.

In the face of this tide of public opinion, Egyptian secularists had to give way. In the cultural atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s, the secular intelligentsia lost the initiative, accepted an Islamic framework, and attempted to compromise between Islam and modernity. Secularist leaders such as Muhammad Haykal (d. 1956) did not so much change their views as seek ways to make rationalism and scientific and secular attitudes meaningful to a mass Egyptian audience. Haykal's biography of the Prophet and his attacks on materialism in Western culture became the public framework of an effort to insinuate modern rational and ethical values within Islam. The net effect was not so much to rescue secularism as to legitimize the Islamic revival. In Egypt, as opposed to Turkey, the political elite was unable to control the national cultural agenda.

World War II and its aftermath brought the Egyptian regime to a crisis. The war further discredited British rule and intensified economic distress. Cotton prices fell, living standards declined, strikes were suppressed. Migrants from rural areas to Cairo could not find work. After the war, the corruption of the Egyptian state was exposed by its failure to stop the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Egypt's army intervened in 1948 but was disgraced in battle. Government mismanagement and profiteering in the supply of military hardware was exposed. Soldiers returned embittered, and denounced the regime for their defeat.

For a time, it seemed as if the Muslim Brothers would seize power, but they were forestalled by the Free Officers. A new force had come into being in the persons of students and army officers with professional and technical educations, the sons of small-scale landowners, traders, or clerks, not implicated in the old regime. Shocked by its failure to defeat the British and by the corruption that undermined the Egyptian army in Palestine, they conspired to seize power. In 1952, the Free Officers, led by Muhammad Naguib (d. 1984), Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasser (d. 1970), and Anwar Sadat (d. 1981), overthrew the king and brought the parliamentary regime to an end. In the three-way struggle among the liberal, secularized older generation, the Muslim and lower-class reformers, and the new generation of technically educated military intelligentsia, the army conspirators were victorious.

The Nasser era

The regime established by the Free Officers in 1952 set Egypt on a course that, with modifications, has lasted to the present. It was from the outset a military, authoritarian regime, but one that would successfully cultivate mass support. The monarchy, parliament, and the political parties were abolished. The old elites were replaced by a presidential regime and one-party system, which rested on an elite of army officers and bureaucrats of middle-class origin and not on the landowning and professional classes that had governed Egypt until the middle of the century. Ideologically, the Free Officers' government turned from liberalism to socialism, from collaboration to anti-imperialism, and from nationalism to pan-Arabism to define the objectives of Egyptian national development. The Nasser government also strove to control Islamic affairs. The Society of Muslim Brothers was dissolved in 1956 and driven underground; the new regime brought al-Azhar University, private mosques, charities, and charitable endowments under state control. (See Illustration 24.)

Illustration 24. President Nasser is mobbed by townspeople (Popperphoto).

In domestic affairs President Nasser was the dominant figure, basing his power on the army, the bureaucracy, and his talents for political manipulation and mobilizing public support. A major innovation was the one-party system. The Liberation Rally was formed in 1952 and was succeeded in 1955 by the National Union. The single political party helped keep the upper echelons of the government in touch with the needs of the society and the masses responsive to decisions at the top. It also served as a channel for mobility. In 1962, a national congress created the Arab Socialist Union, which established a local party organization to influence municipal administration, to train youth cadres for eventual leadership in the party and the government, and to inculcate a socialist ideology among peasants and workers. In 1965, ʿAli Sabri (d. 1991) reorganized the party to stress youth militancy, training camps, and a more aggressive party role in local affairs. The one-party system, however, was not as important as Nasser's personal authority, charisma, and ability to balance the powers of the officers and officials who controlled the army, the ministries, and the major industries against each other.

The international crisis of the 1950s was crucial in defining the new regime. World War II generated a great upheaval throughout the Middle East. France was destroyed as a colonial power and Britain greatly weakened. Middle Eastern states – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and finally, in 1952, Egypt – became independent of their colonial rulers. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as global superpowers and immediate rivals for regional influence, contesting control of the Balkans, Turkey, and Iran. NATO was established to contain the threat of Soviet expansion. In 1955, Iraq and Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact promoted by the American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and Egypt came under intense pressure to join the new alliance. Nasser feared the loss of Egypt's newly won independence, the possible hegemony of Iraq within the Middle East, and the possibility of being connected, via an American alliance, to Israel. In response to these pressures, he attended the Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations, and emerged as a leading spokesman for the independence of Third World nations and for neutrality in the Cold War. In 1955, Egypt refused to accept the Baghdad Pact, and negotiated Russian security guarantees and an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. In response, in March 1956, Dulles withdrew from promises to fund the construction of an Aswan dam; Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal. In October, Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt to regain control of the canal, but were forced to withdraw because of united Russian and American opposition.

The Suez crisis, Nasser's neutralism, his defiance of the United States and Britain, his arms deal with Czechoslovakia, and his survival of the British–French–Israeli assault made him the leader of the Arab world in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Nasserite parties were founded in several Arab countries. In 1958, a union was formed between Egypt and Syria that, it was hoped, would be the basis for a single Arab state. The union broke up in 1961, mainly because of Syrian resentment of Egyptian domination. Egypt, committed to redressing the injustice in Palestine and achieving Arab unity, continued the struggle against Israel. Defeat in the 1967 war with Israel set back the movement for Arab unity and

damaged Nasser's and Egypt's anti-Israel, pan-Arab, and pro-Soviet foreign policy.

From the late 1950s, the Free Officers regime also began to organize a socialist economy. This was done both out of ideological commitment and pragmatic efforts to find a solution to Egypt's economic problems. The basic economic problem was to check the decline in the Egyptian standard of living. Between 1882 and 1960, the population of the country had risen from 6.8 million to 26 million, almost four-fold, but in the same period, the cultivated area had barely doubled, from 5.7 million to 10.2 million *faddan*s.

Economic development required a new strategy, based on industrialization financed by increased agricultural productivity and the appropriation of the agricultural surplus. The regime began a program of reclamation of desert land in Tahrir (Liberation) province. Large estates were eliminated and small ones favored, though there was not sufficient land to provide for all landless laborers. Limits on land ownership to 200 *faddan*s in 1953, 100 in 1961, and 50 in 1969 undermined the economic base of the old landowning elite. Productivity was to be increased by the creation of state-controlled cooperatives and government provision of credits, fertilizers, and seeds. Peasants were to be politically mobilized by opportunities to participate in local government. The state also provided vastly increased rural services in the form of roads, schools, health centers, and cottage industries. At the same time, it requisitioned produce for export.

To promote industrialization, the Free Officers at first encouraged private entrepreneurs, but its laissez-faire economic policy, discouraged by the hostility of the regime to large-scale private ownership in agriculture and handicapped by lack of capital and expertise, failed to improve the economy. Between 1957 and 1960, the state took control of the major banks, sequestered British, French, and Jewish property, and developed plans for agricultural reform and for the construction of the Aswan dam. In 1960 and 1961, banks and major industries were nationalized and direct government control of banking, insurance, foreign trade, transportation, construction, textile, and other manufactures was instituted. Only

retail trade and housing were left to the private sector. Both foreign and Egyptian bourgeoisies were dispossessed and the economy was nationalized and Egyptianized. The army, backed by a second echelon of officials, engineers, teachers, journalists, and lawyers, took charge of government administration and industrial management.

The socialized economy was expected to meet the needs of Egyptian economic development by freeing Egypt from foreign economic control, and by generating employment, higher-value products, and exports. By 1965 the public sector was providing 45 percent of the output, 45 percent of the savings, and 90 percent of the capital formation for the Egyptian economy as a whole. With the nationalization of industry came a welfare policy that promised mass education and subsidies for rents and basic commodities. The result, however, was not development but stagnation. Economic resources were channeled toward the maintenance of a large army, an ambitious foreign policy, a bloated bureaucracy, and a welfare state. Excessively ambitious planning, bottlenecks, inefficiency, and corruption took their toll. Though Nasser lived until 1970, the 1967 war with Israel brought an end to the Nasserite style of Egyptian development and ruined the socialist experiment. Nasser's personal charisma was tarnished and it was left to his successor, Anwar Sadat (r. 1970–81) to rethink both Egypt's foreign and domestic economic policies.

Sadat and Mubarak

Sadat began with fundamental political decisions: Egypt would disengage from the Soviet Union, ally itself with the United States and with the conservative Arab regimes, and resolve the conflict with Israel. The first part of this strategy was accomplished with the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972; but, paradoxically, ending the struggle with Israel required one last war to give legitimacy to Sadat's regime. In 1973, Egypt surprised Israeli forces by attacking across the Suez Canal and by winning the initial battles. Israel counter-attacked, penetrating Egyptian territory, but the United

States intervened to stop Israel's advances and to arrange a truce. Sadat was able to break the aura of Israeli invincibility, claim a moral victory in the war, and go on, in a dramatic speech to the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem, to offer Israel peace with Egypt. By the Camp David accords brokered by President Carter in 1979, Egypt agreed to recognize the existence of Israel in return for the Sinai territories conquered in the 1967 war. These gestures made Sadat an international celebrity and won American aid and Saudi and Gulf state investments. The years that followed brought formal peace but a tense and unsatisfactory relationship for both Israel and Egypt.

The reorientation in foreign policy brought with it new domestic policies and political identities. Egypt turned from socialism toward a mixed economy. This was the policy of open door to foreign investment (*infitah*), which encouraged foreign banks and joint-venture companies. Egyptian prosperity, however, continued to depend upon tourism, Suez Canal tolls, and the remittances of Egyptian workers abroad. In fact, the Egyptian foreign debt grew enormously. In agriculture, Sadat's policy was to compromise with the numerous interests involved. Some land was given to the syndicate of agricultural engineers; some was distributed to peasants who were enrolled in agricultural cooperatives; other lands were sold at auction to the highest bidder, which enabled wealthy industrialists to consolidate agribusiness holdings. In general, Egypt maintained a state-dominated economy sensitive to pragmatic political considerations.

The political coalition that governed Egypt was widened to include elements of the business and professional middle classes. The Nasser generation of army officers, bureaucrats, and technocrats remained in power, but *infitah* generated a new elite of import–exporters, contractors, and speculators in housing. Islamic investment companies with ties to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and local, Muslim-oriented, small-scale shoe and furniture manufacturers and labor contractors flourished in the new economy. In the countryside, political power was transferred from large landowning families to middle-size village notables, and even to the peasant leaders of agricultural cooperatives. Middle-size landowners

(10–50 *faddan*s), although only 3 percent of the population, owned 40 percent of the land. This class, however, did not share in national political power and was a subordinate clientele of the central state elites. An overcentralized and unresponsive municipal and agricultural cooperative administration weighed heavily on Egyptian rural society. With the change in economic orientation Egypt also retreated from the welfare and social service goals of the 1960s and accepted a less equitable distribution of income.

Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by Muslim radicals in apparent protest against his peace with Israel and his secularist policies, but the military government established by Nasser remained secure. Sadat was succeeded by Husni Mubarak, his vice-president and an air force officer, who in the main continued the Sadat policies: alliance with the United States with its attendant military and economic aid. In the 1991 Gulf War, Mubarak played a major role in mobilizing Arab support for the United Nations coalition that expelled Iraq from its occupation of Kuwait. Mubarak also maintained economically supportive ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and a cold peace with Israel, attempting repeatedly to negotiate further agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. While Egyptians understood that Egypt had to maintain ties with Israel as a state, intellectuals and public opinion were strongly critical of Israel and sympathetic to the Palestinians. Egypt was in effect a client of the United States and oil-state interests.

In domestic policy, Egypt under Mubarak was a highly centralized authoritarian state with a narrow base of political support drawn from the military and governmental apparatus and elements of the middle classes. The police, intelligence services, and a subordinate press assured the predominance of the government elites. Political parties, labor unions, and professional syndicates were manipulated and subordinated by the government. Agricultural cooperatives and village councils brought government regulation to the countryside, and made local notables and strongmen part of the governing system. The direct influence of the army in bureaucracy and business administration receded as compared with the Nasser years, but the army consolidated its place as an economic power

enclave within Egyptian society. It ran its own factories, pension funds, and other businesses. Another large stake in the economy was taken by cronies of the government elites. Officials, former bureaucrats, and Egyptian businessmen formed private monopolies and oligopolies. They were favored by the privatization of state-run businesses and high tariffs. Business groups, such as the Osman and Sawiri families, established close ties with the military and worked to exclude potential competitors.

Egypt, however, seemingly had some attributes of democratic politics. Mubarak opened parliament to wider middle-class participation. Opposition parties such as the Wafd, representing secular views, and the Muslim Brothers, representing the Muslim-oriented middle classes, were allowed to hold a minority place. By participating in the system, however, opposition parties were recruited as clients with access to and dependence upon state resources. At the same time, the Mubarak government attempted to co-opt and divide the opposition, closing down or undermining the finances of opposition parties and newspapers. The state also attempted to deter citizen activism in such causes as democracy, human rights, or solidarity with the Palestinians, and to block prominent individuals from challenging the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). A law passed in 2002 subordinated civil and human rights organizations to a ministry of social affairs.

Electoral fraud was common in maintaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority for the NDP. As a result, the opposition, consisting of Wafd, Muslim Brotherhood, Labor, Liberal, and independent MPs never held more than 22 percent of the seats. Mubarak was reelected in 2005 with 88 percent of the votes. Ayman Nour of the secular al-Ghad Party came second with 7.3 percent, and was later imprisoned. Opponents of the government were subjected to beatings, arrests, trial in military courts, incarceration, torture, and murder. While the system included opposition parties, civil society organizations, and elections, these were never strong enough to upset one-party, military, or personal dictatorship.

From the 1990s to the present, the Egyptian economy has been in a precarious state. There was an increase in the incidence of poverty

in both urban and rural areas. Revenues from oil, tourism, and remittances of Egyptian workers abroad, the principal sources of Egyptian foreign earnings apart from Suez Canal tolls, declined drastically. The Egyptian pound lost half its value in the decade 1990–2001. Inflation soared again in 2008 and 2009; repatriated earnings from Egyptians working in the Gulf countries further declined during the global recession of 2008–09. By 2009, over one-fifth, or 18 million of Egypt's population of 83 million, lived in poverty, and about 25 percent of young men and 60 percent of young women were without work.

However, there were some gains in this period. Rural productivity per hectare greatly improved when the government removed production and marketing controls on wheat in 1990. Life expectancy increased from fifty-seven to almost sixty-five years, more rapidly than the international norm, due to higher child survival rates, which in turn were due to better medical care, better quality water, and the availability of rehydration packets for children stricken with dysentery. Literacy increased from 44 to 51.4 percent of the populace, less of a gain than other countries, inhibited by a government policy that concentrated resources on higher education and did not invest enough in primary and secondary schooling.

The Islamic Revival

This was the context for the reemergence of an Islamic-led opposition. Since the nineteenth century, the Egyptian state had been trying to bring Islamic institutions under government control. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser's regime outlawed the Muslim Brothers and curtailed the autonomy of other religious institutions. In 1955, the Egyptian government consolidated Islamic courts and civil courts dealing with matters of personal status. In 1961, al-Azhar was made a state university with a reformed curriculum. Endowed lands were taken under government control in 1960 and 1973, and private mosques were brought under government ministries. The government used state-sponsored mosques and their religious functionaries to control religious life, to support government policy, and to identify Islam with national and socialist programs. Sadat also

cultivated regime-supporting *'ulama'* by giving the scholarly establishment access to the media and by making religion a compulsory subject in the schools.

This effort to fuse Islam and the state was only partially successful. While the *'ulama'* and the official Islamic establishment remained under government control, independent preachers, missionaries, and teachers actively promoted a renewed commitment to Islam. The political and social atmosphere of the late 1960s and 1970s gave a new cachet to religious loyalties. The defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem, the burden of authoritarian government, economic failure, unfair distribution of income and power, the migration of large numbers of people from rural areas to cities, and the collapse of old and meaningful cultures into empty nationalistic and ideological slogans led to condemnation of Egypt's secular and socialist policies. As Egyptians returned to their faith for consolation, Sadat also took up the rhetoric of Islam, and gave it official sanction. Deeply felt Islamic loyalties held in abeyance among Western-educated professional and governmental elites, not fully supplanted by national, secular, or socialist loyalties, came into the open. As secular nationalism failed to take hold, economic failures and social breakdown strengthened the potential for a new surge of Islamic identifications.

The Islamic revival expressed itself in a great variety of ways and through a plethora of small groups. It was not a single, organized movement. Listening to sermons or television preachers, religious worship, welfare and charitable activities, and participation in commercial associations and banks were all aspects of the larger revival. Some revivalist groups preached that the Quran and sunna must be the basis of individual morality and that Islamic law be applied in all relevant matters. In social policy they held that the primary role of women should be the care of the family. They avoided ideological positions in economic matters, but stressed the importance of minimizing the differences in wealth between rich and poor. For them, social justice was more important than technological, economic, or administrative issues. In general, these groups believed that their society had been corrupted by secular values and

that only a return to Islamic principles would restore morality, economic well-being, and political power. There was also a concurrent revival of Sufi Islam, which represented a quest for moral and spiritual fulfillment.

In the 1970s, Islamic revivalism appealed especially to students and professional people – engineers, schoolteachers, and white-collar workers – often from rural backgrounds and from upwardly and geographically mobile, but socially conservative, families. Student enrollment in the universities grew from less than 200,000 in 1970 to more than half a million in 1977. The students had almost no direct instruction, and lived in extremely poor and crowded conditions. Intellectually they had become slaves of mimeographed course manuals; socially they felt oppressed and frustrated. Many young professional people also came from rural backgrounds and acquired a technical or professional skill without going through a deep process of social or cultural adjustment. In Cairo they found themselves, despite their high professional qualifications, without a place in society, living in marginal districts, alienated by inadequate salaries, and distressed by the moral corruption of a big city. Since poverty greatly hindered the possibility of marriage, they were beset by sexual tensions and were concerned about finding proper spouses. Many young adults were drawn to the anti-imperialist message of the Islamists.

Young female professional students began to wear Islamic dress, which does not reveal the figure or expose hair or limbs. This new commitment to Islamic modesty came precisely at a time when women were increasingly entering professional schools and public life and would soon make up the majority of post–secondary-school students. For women who were entering the public world dominated by men, the veil and the profession of Islamic modesty were ways of recreating the traditional separation among young people who were otherwise – through education, public transport, public entertainment, and political activities – thrown together. The adoption of Islamic dress served as a way of protecting family values and marriage possibilities. Thus, while the Islamic revival in Egypt had important political aspects, it was also a mechanism for the

adjustment of Muslim students to the complexities of an urban environment.

The Islamic revival also appealed to segments of the population that had lost out in the drive to modernization – to people who did not have a good or Western education, or a place in the modern sectors of the economy. It appealed to the old literate elite of schoolteachers and religious functionaries, to artisans and shopkeepers in the bazaar economy, and to small workshop and factory owners. It appealed to large numbers of uprooted migrants from rural areas lost amidst the rapid urbanization of Cairo.

The Muslim Brotherhood was the premier Muslim religio-political organization. The Muslim Brothers favor the formation of an Islamic state whose defining characteristic is not necessarily democracy, but rather the primacy of the Shariʿa, the term for Islamic law that implies divine law. An Islamic state would in their vision reduce but not eliminate the private sector, respect private property, and provide welfare and social security. It sponsored social service projects in poor neighborhoods, and since 1992 has had control of the doctors', lawyers', engineers', and pharmacists' professional associations, university faculties, and student associations.

The party, however, was divided by generational and class differences. It contained both a radical revolutionary wing and a moderate reformist wing that was ready to participate in multiparty politics. Some segments were tacit collaborators with the Mubarak regime, holding places in parliament as the leading (if nominal) opposition to the government. Many youth members, however, took a more populist and democratic position. Older-generation leaders tended to be authoritarian and exclusive; younger leaders often expressed themselves as more open to compromise with other political or religious tendencies.

Furthermore, the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt is the home base for numerous affiliated international chapters. Branches of the society are found in Jordan, Gaza, and other Arab countries, and in West Africa and Europe wherever there are growing Muslim communities. These branches uphold a revivalist version of Islam,

but they are only loosely coordinated and play different roles in different countries depending upon local educational, social, and political conditions.

Apart from the Muslim Brothers, more radical student associations dedicated to Islamization, especially *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic group) emerged after the defeat of 1967. Significantly, most of the members of the radical groups came from small towns in southern Egypt. Their objective was to re-create an Islamic society on the basis of a restored caliphate. These student associations began by forming poetry, lecture, Quran-reading, and other clubs. They were covertly aided by the government to counter the power of the communists and other leftists in the universities. Apart from politics, they served student interests by making copies of course syllabuses and distributing them at low cost, organizing bus services for women in Islamic dress, and providing subsidies for pilgrimage. Through independent mosques, they began to preach to common people in Cairo and the villages. They adopted the veil for women, the unshaven beard and long white robe (jalabiyya) for men, and favored public prayer demonstrations. Muslim propaganda was circulated to denounce alleged Christian aggressions, proselytizing among Muslims, and cooperation between the state and the Coptic community. The security of Copts was undermined by Muslim assaults and Muslim–Christian riots.

More radical segments of al-Jama'a adopted a doctrine of direct action against the state. While the student communal groups focused on moral and social issues, the radicals held that only the overthrow of the government and the establishment of an Islamic state could lead to a truly Islamic society. They were inspired by the teaching of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) whose *Signs of the Road* has become an influential manifesto. This book teaches that sovereignty belongs to God and that all human authority derives from God's sovereignty. In human societies there is no middle ground between Islam and *jahiliyya*, between an Islamic and an ignorant and unbelieving society. Egypt in this view had become an ignorant society and the primary tasks of good Muslims must be retreat (*hijra*), as the Prophet had retreated to Medina; excommunication

(*takfir*) of false Muslims; the waging of war (jihad); and the re-conversion of Egypt to Islam.

In the 1970s, Shukri Mustafa, the head of al-Jamaʿat al-Muslimin (called by others *al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra*) took up this doctrine. He denounced reformist and collaborationist points of view, and excommunicated the society led by Sadat. He gathered a small group of followers who retreated from the mosques under the control of the authorities, refused all collaboration with Egyptian institutions, including the courts and schools, and even introduced a special form of marriage for the members of his community. This group and similar ones did not attempt to preach to the Egyptian masses, but rather expected to seize power by first destroying the corrupt leadership. Such groups attempted assassinations of Egyptian political leaders in 1973 and 1977. In 1981, one of them succeeded in killing Sadat. The government then dissolved the radical groups while the army put down their uprisings in Asyut and other places.

In the 1980s, the Mubarak regime reached a temporary modus vivendi with the Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya in which it tolerated their missionary and social work in the south of the country and in the poor parts of Cairo with the expectation that they would conduct themselves peacefully. By the 1990s, however, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya resumed terrorist assaults on government officials, military and police officers, Copts, intellectuals (including the Egyptian Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz), and against cultural symbols such as cinemas and bars. A sporadic but deadly campaign was waged against foreign tourists to signify opposition to foreign influences, to diminish government revenues, and to demonstrate the failure of the state to control the country.

This campaign turned public opinion in Egypt against the Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya. Other Arab Islamist movements condemned them. By 1997, the government had crushed the militants by a relentless military campaign and tightened its controls over political parties, media, schools, and charitable associations. The Islamists lacked the political unity and charismatic leadership necessary to get an ideological hold over the masses of Egyptians. By contrast, the Egyptian state was highly centralized and for the most part legitimate

in the eyes of its population. The radicals were defeated and some activists, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, moved abroad to take part in an international jihad. The radicals had overestimated the appeal of Islam to Egyptians imbued with nationalism and underestimated the power of the state to keep control of the population.

Following this defeat, al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya dramatically altered its ideological position, accepted the authority of the state, and declared it to be authentically Muslim, evidently in return for a license to pursue its educational and proselytizing activities. Since 2002, the organization has presented itself as Salafi Muslim, accepting the existing state and society and seeking only to promote Islam. It thus accepted an authoritarian and repressive Egyptian state.

The relationship between Islamic revivalism and politics is both varied and ambiguous. While Islamic revivalism is implicitly political, the revivalist groups served many cultural and social purposes apart from politics, and were ambivalent about the relationship of their social and cultural objectives to political power. While some wings of the movement believe that control of the state is essential to the success of an Islamic social and moral program – the official position of al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya – others found actual and symbolic satisfactions by turning away from politics toward moral, communal, and familial concerns. Most served the needs for moral guidance, for reassurance and self-esteem in an unsettled world, and for collective organization to serve the welfare and community needs of their members.

In some ways, the Islamic revival even served as a diversion from politics. One of the deep problems in Egyptian society was the powerlessness of masses of people. Since Nasser, Egypt has been ruled by dictatorships. Large numbers of people had no political power and few political rights. Egyptian men found it hard to earn a living within Egypt, and many went abroad. In addition, the traditional realm of men's power in society, the family, has been subverted. The state provided education, health care, and social services, which had previously been the domain of religious communities and of the family. Thus, one tenet of some Islamic revival groups is the restoration of symbolic and actual male supremacy over society

(including women and children) and the curtailment of the social and educational rights that have been gained by women in the last couple of generations.

While Egypt has been committed to modernization and secular development since the early nineteenth century, and the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak were committed to authoritarian rule and to an economy with strong state participation, the place of Islam in Egyptian national development remains an issue for political struggle. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood stressed the anti-imperialist aspects of Islam because it saw the British as the main enemy. In the 1950s and 1960s, it stressed solidarity and justice in opposition to the corruption of the military regime. In the 1970s, the Islamic reform movements emphasized personal morality and family values in response to the stresses of a changing social order. In the Egypt of the 1980s and 1990s, Islam was the principal vehicle of resistance to the state and its policies. In the 2000s, however, the Muslim Brotherhood and the al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya were in league with the government, even though officially they constituted the opposition.

Secular Opposition movements

Egyptian secularists never had the organizational strength of the Islamic movements, and any successful opposition to the government would have to depend on a coalition of Islamist, liberal, and leftist parties. In the 1980s, joint committees were formed among the parties to support the Lebanese and Palestinians and to resist accommodations with Israel.

A broader, combined liberal, leftist, and Islamist opposition began to coalesce in the 1990s. Shared concern over foreign policy and shared jail time provided an opportunity for ideological opponents to collaborate. In 1993 and 1994, leftists, liberals, and Islamists overcame the fears of secularization on one side and of politicized religion on the other that had kept the opposition divided. Toward the end of the decade, Islamist and leftist lawyers began to work together on cases of state torture. They also found common ground

in opposition to the Camp David accords and to the normalization of relations with Israel.

The most successful of these overtures was the emergence of the Kifaya movement in 2004. Kifaya is officially called the Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC). It brought together Islamists, communists, liberals, and secular leftists. The Muslim Brothers nominally joined the coalition but held back their full support. There were two different approaches within Kifaya: the militant wing stressed its antagonism to the regime, while the moderates saw Kifaya as a grassroots movement to rebuild democratic institutions in trade unions and local assemblies. They were united by rejection of the Mubarak regime; opposition to the succession of his son Gamal Mubarak; demands for political freedoms and democratic institutions; and the condemnation of routine state violence against Egypt's people. Kifaya and other extra-parliamentary protest groups cultivated an awareness of democratic citizenship and political protest.

The emergence of Kifaya was coupled with a radical change in the media. From 2003 to 2011, dozens of independent newspapers and magazines appeared. Kifaya was the first political movement in Egypt to use the internet, blogs, Facebook, and Twitter to mobilize demonstrations and strikes. The blogosphere helped cultivate a more embracing political rhetoric free of the problematic of secularism versus fundamentalism. Kifaya helped organize a series of demonstrations between 2004 and 2007 that called for President Mubarak to resign. On April 6, 2008, workers and students joined in a strike organized on Facebook in support of workers at the Mahalla textile factory who were seeking better salaries and working conditions. The strike grew into a national day of protest against the regime. However, Kifaya began to decline in importance due to repression, internal divisions, and its lack of appeal beyond the educated, urban middle classes. Nonetheless, what appeared to some to be a sudden upsurge of popular protests in 2011 in fact followed years of growing political unity among all those opposed to Mubarak's authoritarian rule.

Labor opposition, in a series of occupations, strikes, demonstrations, or other collective actions, played a critical part in developing resistance. Labor actions were generally local and based on informal networks prompted by worker anger with legal restrictions on the right to strike, laws favoring employer interests, and the privatization of government-owned industries in favor of businessmen close to the president's son and heir apparent, Gamal Mubarak. The politically most important strikes took place at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company (Ghazl al-Mahalla) in the city of Mahalla al-Kubra. The first five months of 2009 witnessed over 200 collective actions. Workers in the textile industries have been the most important, but workers in virtually every industrial sector, public services, and professions (such as pharmacists, doctors, and university professors) have also been involved.

Revolution and reaction

These developments were the prelude to the great outburst of January 25, 2011. The rebellion was prompted by the self-immolation of a Tunisian street merchant, Muhammad Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010. Broadcast by Al-Jazeera, Bouazizi's death became a symbol of the frustration of young people all over the Arab world due to lack of work and to the indignities and punishments heaped on them by authoritarian and abusive governments. It provoked uprisings in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the Arab world. (See Chapter 49.)

The demonstrations revealed a powerful current of young but unemployed or underemployed, technically savvy young men and women. In Egypt, thousands of blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and other media helped mobilize hundreds of thousands of people for protracted demonstrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square and other parts of the country. The Mubarak government tried to suppress and disperse the demonstrators by force, but they persevered despite hundreds of deaths and casualties until they compelled the resignation of Mubarak on February 11, 2011.

A three-way struggle for political power emerged. To the disappointment of many of the protestors, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed power. The military, often supported by the Mubarak-appointed judiciary, entrenched in privilege, refused to surrender real power, continued to try civilians in military courts, and proposed maintaining a position outside the control of a civilian government. The military has a direct interest in protecting its huge holdings and privileged economic position in Egyptian society. In November 2011, there were massive demonstrations protesting military rule.

At the same time, a series of constitutional drafting committees, referendums, and elections brought the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists to political power. The Muslim Brothers won 40 percent of a national vote and the Salafis won about 25 percent. The Muslim Brothers and the Salafis dominated the first elected parliament, and in June 2012 Muhammad Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president. Morsi was the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history. Secular and leftist voters were distinctly a national minority.

The new government, however, drastically overplayed its hand. Instead of creating a coalition of Islamic and secular parties, it treated its victory solely as the victory of the Islamist movement. Morsi attempted to staff key government offices entirely with Muslim Brothers. He did not even include the Muslim Brother reformers who stood for democracy, pluralism, and human rights, and ignored their demands for the fair representation of women and for the security of the Coptic minority. He then attempted to bypass the judicial system and to push through a new constitution on his own authority.

The entrenched bureaucracy, especially the police and the army, and the leftist secular opposition, who mobilized masses of defiant demonstrators, refused to accept the authority of the elected government. Then, by a coup d'état, the army, led by General Abdal-Fattah al-Sisi, set up a new military regime. It arrested President Morsi and many important leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its troops opened fire on Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators, killing

hundreds of people and wounding countless more, appointed military governors to the provinces, and in effect reversed the defeat of the Mubarak government to reestablish the military regime under new leadership. The new regime has considerable popular support from secularists.

Two factors are critical to the "logic" of Egyptian politics. One is the power of the military as an armed force, as an economic elite, and as the perceived representative of the Egyptian nation. Behind restored military rule is an already long tradition, going back to Nasser, of mobilizing bureaucratic, business, and landowning elites to support the regime, and a long experience in co-opting and manipulating opposition and potential opposition forces.

Second, the antimilitary and antigovernment forces have an equally long history of being unable to consistently work together. Despite repeated efforts, the religious and secular parties are unable to form a stable, broad-based coalition that can challenge a military regime. The Islamic movement is divided among traditional *'ulama'*, moderate Muslim Brothers, radical Muslim Brothers, and revolutionary Salafis. Each of the Islamic factions treats itself as possessing the "Truth" and considers the others un-Islamic. The Morsi government has demonstrated that it could not compromise and cooperate with the secularists and leftists either. The secularists are no more able to cooperate with the Islamists. Since the Islamists have a much greater mobilizing potential due to their networks of mosques, charities, businesses, and sociopolitical groups, they are generally stronger than the secularists. In the crises of regime transition, the secularists opt for military authoritarian rule rather than risk an Islamic government. Each of them fears the consequences of the rise to power of the other more than it fears authoritarian or military rule. The relatively rare moments of a coalescence of Islamist and secular forces were easily disrupted by the manipulations of the regime.

Thus, Egypt faces a military regime, severe economic problems, and the challenges of integrating Muslim and secular identities with democratic aspirations.

Chapter 49 The Arab East: Arabism, military states, and Islam

The Arab Middle East can be divided into two zones: the Fertile Crescent countries including Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine; and the Arabian Peninsula countries of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the smaller Gulf states. The Arabian Peninsula and Arab North Africa will be considered in the following chapters.

The Arab Fertile Crescent countries, like Turkey, had their origins in the Ottoman Empire, but they developed in a different way. In the case of Turkey, with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the state elites absorbed European influences and assumed control of the construction of a Turkish national state and society. In the Arab Fertile Crescent, there were no organized states, no continuing governing elite, and only the beginnings of national political movements. There was no widely accepted concept of an Arab nation. In this chapter, we will discuss Arab elites and Arab nationalism in the late Ottoman era, the formation of colonial states after World War I, the emergence of independent states after World War II, and their history to the present. With independence, authoritarian military and family regimes came to dominate most countries, and the new states were replete with unresolved conflicts among national, ethnic, and religious sectarian identities. The new states attempted to control Islamist activities, but since the 1970s, Islamic opposition movements have generated profound political and cultural changes.

Notables and the rise of Arab nationalism

Arab nationalism originated in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In this region, there were no territorial governments corresponding to the Ottoman substates in Egypt or Tunisia. The principal cities, such as Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, and Baghdad, were often the only areas under Ottoman control. Internally, they

were divided into family, tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious, guild, and residential communities. Rural areas were often controlled by tribal chiefs and other local notables. Reinforcing this diversity, European influences had different impacts in different parts of the region. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European trade stimulated the economic changes that led to the formation of new commercial and intellectual elites. European cultural and educational influences helped give rise to several "national" identities.

In Lebanon, the Maronite church was the earliest focus of European influences. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the church had been in the control of lay Maronite landlords who appointed the Patriarch and the bishops. Eighteenth-century reformers, led by churchmen educated in Rome, attempted to free the church from lay control. The reformers established church schools and propagandized the populace in favor of a church-led Maronite government. The political consequences of the Maronite revival were formidable. In 1820, there was a peasant revolt against the feudal landlords. The Maronite movement led also to increasing tension with the Druze, another sectarian peasant population in the mountains of Lebanon. Bashir II (d. 1840), a Maronite overlord of Lebanon, tried to centralize power and to eliminate his rivals. He defeated the Druze in 1825, but there were Maronite–Druze wars in 1838, 1841–42, and 1845. The Ottomans then established a new government in 1843, but it lasted only until 1858, when the Maronite populace again rebelled against its feudal lords. Druze–Maronite wars resumed in 1859 and 1860. The country was ungovernable, and this opened the way for French military intervention. In 1861, the European powers forced the Ottomans to recognize Christian predominance in Lebanon. Under new regulations, the head of government, or *mutasarrif*, was to be a Christian, while a governing council represented the other religious communities. The European powers guaranteed security.

European political influence opened the way to educational and economic influences. French Jesuits established a school at Aintura in 1728 and Maronite colleges were established at Zigharta (1735) and Ayn Warqa (1789). The Syrian Protestant College, which eventually became the American University of Beirut, was founded in

1866. Zahleh, Damascus, and Aleppo acquired new schools between 1839 and 1873. The French-sponsored University of St. Joseph was established in 1875. In Lebanon and Syria the new intelligentsia (including Ottoman- and Western-educated soldiers and officials, landowners, religious notables, and sometimes tribal chiefs and merchants) was the product of European and modern late Ottoman education.

European trade with Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria became ever more important. After 1860, Beirut flourished as an exporting center linking the Near East to the world economy. Growing trade stimulated the production of cash crops such as silk, cotton, soap, leather, and cereals wherever they could easily be transported to the coast. In Lebanon, rising population and greater economic specialization allowed silk weavers to enhance their position. In Palestine, new markets also prompted local political changes. In Jabal Nablus, for example, the middle peasantry increased its holdings, and eventually moved to the towns. Soap production from olive oil became the premier industry and gave the town dominance over the surrounding countryside. Merchant and money-lending elites and rich peasants broke the political power of rural chiefs. The bedouin were brought under control and new lands were brought into cultivation. However, many craftsmen succumbed to European competition. Christian merchants active in the import–export trade became the protégés of Europeans and gained an advantage over Muslims.

The development of European commerce and the imposition of European legal, economic and political controls, and eventually, after World War I, of direct colonial administration, favored the development of a new Middle Eastern middle class. This included officials, doctors, lawyers, and military officers drawn primarily from an earlier generation of late Ottoman merchants, landowners, and clerics. In disproportionate numbers, it was recruited from religious minority communities, and, in line with the Ottoman "millet system" of separately organized religious communities, it was divided into sectarian segments. Muslims tended to be stronger in landowning; Christians and Jews in commerce and banking. Based on the expanding commercial and educational opportunities provided by

contacts with Europe, this new middle class took on many of the mores, attitudes, and political ideas of their Western models.

These foreign educational and commercial influences led in particular to the formation of a new literary intelligentsia, and to several Arab literary and political movements. The first was the emergence of an Arab identity among Christian literati and well-to-do merchants in Lebanon and Syria. What the Tanzimat had done in Turkey and what economic change did in Egypt, Western education accomplished in the Levant. Educated Arabs became aware, not only of the West, but of their own literary heritage.

The early figures in the literary revival, such as Nasif Yaziji (d. 1871) and Butrus Bustani (d. 1883) were Christian Arabs. Bustani was a Maronite, educated at the seminary of Ayn Warqa, who compiled a dictionary of the Arabic language. These early publicists disseminated their views through cultural associations, such as the Society of Arts and Sciences, founded in 1847, and the Syrian Scientific Society, founded in 1857, to foster the study of Arabic literature and the recollection of the glory of the Arab past. The early Arab literary thinkers also stressed modernization and reform. Their newspapers and journals presented Western European scientific and political ideas. Government, they preached, should be conducted in the interest of the governed, and provide for just and regular taxation, education, and legal reform.

Alongside the literati, the ever more wealthy and powerful Christian merchant elites were turning from the traditional millet, or religious communal identity, to more secular and national identities. This was prompted by the rising influence of lay leaders instead of clerics within the Syrian churches. Catholics took a secular identification as Arabs to be an indication of modernity and kinship with Europe. Syrian Orthodox found support in Syrian identity and the Arabic language to oppose the Greek authorities in the Orthodox church. Christian Arab writers put forward the idea of secession from the Ottoman Empire. Naguib Azoury called for the formation of a secular Arab state in which Christians and Muslims would be equal citizens under a constitutional regime.

Arab identity also emerged among Arab Muslim literati. By the turn of the century, this wing of the intellectual revival had turned into political unrest, based upon strong anti-Turkish feeling and a sense of the superiority of Arab to Turkish peoples. Al-Kawakibi (d. 1903) was one of the first Arab writers to say that Arabs must take the leadership of the Muslim world from the corrupted Turks. The new attitude may have been promoted by a conspiracy for the restoration of the caliphate in the person of the Sharif of Mecca, the custodian of the holy places. Behind this revival of Arab sensibility also lay Islamic religious feelings channeled into Arab sentiments. Arabs, after all, were the first people of Islam. The Quran was revealed in Arabic and the early Islamic empires were Arab glories.

Arab nationalism also took root among the Muslim notables of Damascus. Here, the primary factors were struggles for power within the Ottoman system and a Muslim reaction against growing European and local Christian commercial successes. Before 1860, the Damascus notables were primarily *'ulama'* descended from prominent eighteenth-century families who filled the religious posts of mufti, khatib (preacher), and Syndic of the Descendants of the Prophet. They also managed the charitable endowments and had strong support from merchants, artisans, janissaries, and the town quarters. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these families were joined by military chieftains (aghawat), whose power was based on janissary clienteles, and on control of suburban quarters and the grain trade that went through them. By the late nineteenth century, *'ulama'* and elite military families had merged into a combined religious and landowning elite. Rich merchants and Ottoman officeholders were also part of this elite. Many families were sending their sons to Ottoman professional schools and were competing for places in the Ottoman government service. The notables, however, were not a unified body, but were divided into competing families and factions.

The position of the notables was challenged but not overturned by programs for the centralization (*tanzimat*) of state power. The precedent for centralization was set by the Egyptian occupation of Syria (1831–39). The Egyptians attempted to disarm the local

population and introduced forced labor and a new head tax. They established monopolies for the production of silk, cotton, and tobacco, and began mining for coal. When Syria was returned to Ottoman suzerainty in 1841, the Ottomans tried again to centralize power, eliminate the intermediary notables, and mobilize mass support for the state. They planned to secularize the judicial system and introduce formal equality among Muslims and non-Muslims. To offset the power of governors, they created local councils (*majalis*) and allowed the local notables important fiscal and administrative powers. Already threatened by European commercial competition, the growing role of Christians and Jews as intermediaries in trade with Europe, and the beginning of Christian and Jewish money lending in rural areas, the Damascus notables were hostile to Ottoman reforms.

The rise of the Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908 pushed some of the Damascus notables into adopting the Arab intellectual and political currents of the day. The CUP tried to centralize power in the hands of Turks. In Damascus, it imposed Turkish as the language of schools and courts. It took control of charitable endowments, dismissed local officials, and blocked the careers and cultural self-expression of educated Arabs. These measures prompted the adoption of Arabism as the expression of opposition to secularization and Turkish rule. Just before and during World War I, Arabism became the ideology of Damascus notables, military officers, lawyers, and those *ʿulama*ʾ who were out of government favor. Arabism before 1918, however, did not mean political independence. Arab leaders generally favored an Arab–Turkish ruling condominium on the model of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and other schemes for decentralization and Arab equality.

Another current in the formation of Arabism came from Arabia. Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, hoped to overthrow the Ottomans and become king of an Arab state. His ambition was based upon his religious prestige as a descendant of the Prophet (*sharif*), as custodian of the holy places, and upon some earlier conspiracies to make him the new caliph of the Islamic world. Husayn tried to rally Arab national and literary sentiment to his side by cultivating al-Fatat, a secret society in Damascus. In 1915, Husayn entered secret

negotiations with the British to promote an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule in Syria and Arabia. Britain saw that Husayn could be militarily and politically useful. Thus, in a famous letter of October 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt, implied that the British would recognize an independent Arab state, except for Lebanon and unspecified French interests. In June 1916, Husayn was declared king and attempted to seize the Hijaz. He waged guerrilla warfare against the Turks with the help of British agents and military advisors, including T. E. Lawrence. His forces took 'Aqaba in July 1917. Together the British and the Arabs took Damascus. By the end of the war, the British were in control of most of the Near East, while Faysal, the son of Husayn, established himself as governor of Damascus under British auspices. Faysal, supported by Syrian notables, demanded that the British recognize him as the monarch of an independent Arab state.

However, the Arab attempt to establish an independent state was aborted by the European powers. The British were not really committed to Husayn. By the Sykes–Picot agreement with France (1916), they had promised to partition the Arab Near East into two zones of direct colonial rule and two spheres of influence; in 1917, by the Balfour Declaration, they promised to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. In response to Husayn's protests, Great Britain assured him that both the political and civil and religious rights of Arabs would be protected, and in other declarations promised to assist in the formation of independent states based on the consent of the governed. At the conference of San Remo in April 1920, Britain and France nonetheless divided the Arab world in accord with the Sykes–Picot agreement. The European allies created four dependent states: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. France took control of Lebanon and Syria and ousted Faysal from Damascus. Britain took control of Iraq and Palestine. In 1922, Palestine was divided to create a fifth state, Transjordan. The new colonies were legitimized as mandates of the League of Nations. The turmoil surrounding the creation of these states – petitions, demonstrations, party activities, and the formation of committees of national defense – mobilized merchants, *'ulama'*, and street gangs. Their involvement in politics was the basis of later nationalism.

Thus, the British and the French, rather than local elites, created modern Arab states and gave them territorial boundaries and central governments. The Arab national movement was too weak and divided to affect the fortunes of the region. Its literary wing was barely coming to political consciousness; the Arab revolt led by Sharif Husayn did not represent the modernist aspirations of the intellectuals in Lebanon and Syria. The Damascus notables were divided by faction, party, and competition for power. Although there was a shared Arab ethnic and linguistic pride, there were competing tendencies toward decentralization, toward a single Arab state, and toward regional states. In a society that had no history of independent states and no history of institutional or economic reforms, the nationalist literary–political movement was too weak to counter imperialist forces. The dilemmas of an ethnic and cultural region partitioned into numerous small states were left to the future.

Arabism and Arab states in the colonial period

From the 1920s to the 1950s, each of these states (apart from Palestine, which had special problems, to be considered shortly) was caught up in a double political struggle. Each attempted to win independence from its French or British colonial overlord, and within each there was a growing struggle for power between a dominant older-generation conservative elite and rising younger elites. Out of these struggles came political independence in the late 1940s and a conjoined domestic and international crisis over political leadership and ideological identity in the 1950s.

In the mandate period, each country was in the control of a foreign power allied to a conservative domestic political elite. In Iraq, a monarch, Ottoman and Sharifian officers in the service of Faysal, landowners, and tribal chiefs composed the political elite. In Syria, it included landowners, merchants, and religious leaders. In Transjordan, the palace household of the Amir and the local bedouin chiefs governed the country. Lebanon was governed by the traditional

landowning and sectarian bosses. The Arab population of Palestine had its clan and religious spokesmen.

In each country, the political elites accepted the mandate system. Their proximate goal was the consolidation of central governments, despite the fragmentation of the population into numerous tribal, ethnic, and sectarian communities; their long-term goal was independence from Britain and France. To institutionalize the newly created states, they tried to channel Arab national feeling into state-centered – Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese – nationalism, ideologies that would define and legitimize existing states. State rather than ethnic nationalism would also help integrate non-Muslim minorities into the political systems, express the state structures in terms of a modern form of political identity, and justify their claims to independence from the colonial powers.

While the state elites appropriated the term "Arab nationalism," Arab intellectuals and educators kept alive the idea of a unified Arab nation. They defined this nation in terms of a shared language, history, and culture that could overcome the division of Arab peoples into tribes, regions, religions, and states. Sati al-Husri (d. 1968), an Iraqi Arab nationalist and educator, preached the need for unity and willingness to sacrifice parochial interests to the cause of the nation as a whole. Michel Aflaq (d. 1989), a founder of the Ba'th Party, gave the most romantic expression to this idea. He defined nationalism by the Arabic word *qawmiyya*, which means "belonging to a group," and implies a total absorption of the individual in the nation. Only through the nation can the individual achieve true freedom and a higher mode of existence. Through solidarity and love of the nation, Arab peoples would not only realize their political objectives but attain the highest spiritual fulfillment:

> The nationalism for which we call is love before everything else. It is the very same feeling that binds the individual to his family, because the fatherland is only a large household, and the nation a large family. Nationalism, like every kind of love, fills the heart with joy and spreads hope in the soul; he who feels it would wish to share with all the people this joy which raises him above

narrow egotism, draws him nearer to goodness and perfection.…
It is, then, the best way to a true humanity.[1]

This appeal to romantic unity was akin to a religious mood, and pan-Arab rhetoric was suffused with words such as *umma* (the brotherhood of Muslims) and *milla* (religious community, used to mean nation). Even the mystical concept of *fana'*, loss of self and union with the divine being, was applied to express the bond of the individual to the nation. Pan-Arabism was a call to overcome pluralism and worldly interests. It was a secular version of Islam because, in the minds of many people, Arab nationalism and Islam could not be differentiated.

This kind of Arab nationalism appealed most profoundly to the younger intelligentsia of military officers, administrators, technocrats, and intellectuals. To administer the new countries, the dominant landlord, merchant, tribal, and religious elites needed people to staff the army, the administration, the schools, and the governments' technical services, thus opening up a channel for the youth of middle and lower-middle class, often of minority backgrounds, to receive an education and a prominent place in the new nations. In Syria, ʿAlawis, Druze, Ismaʿilis, and Christians went to high schools and military colleges. In Baghdad, Sunni Arabs followed this route. As in the case of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in the nineteenth century, the centralization of state authority, the provision of modern education, and a small degree of economic and social change led to mobility from villages to cities and from rural to urban occupations. As in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, military officers gained a dominant position due to their control of the apparatus of violence, educational achievement, technical sophistication, political awareness, social grievances against the ruling elites, and strong ambitions for personal and national glory. This new generation also adopted the national ideology because nationalism gave identity to people uprooted from local communities and legitimized the struggle against foreign rule in terms recognized as valid by the colonial powers themselves. The new elites were determined to seize control

of the states in the name of domestic reform, anticolonialism, and Arab nationalism. (See Map 31.)

Map 31. The Middle East between the world wars.

Syria

Syria is a principal example of the generational and ideological conflicts within Arab societies. In Syria the French secured public order, built road and communication networks, and established the administrative infrastructure of a modern state. They accelerated the sedentarization of the bedouin, which had begun in the late nineteenth century under the Ottomans, expanded cultivated territories at the expense of pastoralism, and converted bedouin into peasants and chiefs into landlords. After World War I, the bedouin were further hemmed in by states, settlers, and roads and by the heavy investments of city merchants and tribal leaders in land reclamation and cultivation.

The French also reinforced ethnic and religious divisions to inhibit the formation of a cohesive national society. They divided Syria into ethnic and religious districts. Lebanon was made into a separate state. Latakia, populated by poverty-stricken ʿAlawi peasants

dominated by Sunni landlords, was made into a separate administrative district. The Druze areas of southern Syria and the Jazira (the plains of northern Syria and the Euphrates region) were given regional autonomy. Alexandretta received special status because of its substantial Turkish minority, and was annexed by Turkey in 1939.

Starting in the 1930s and continuing into the period of independence, the conservative elites were opposed by young army officers of middle-class backgrounds (educated in the military academy of Homs) and by Western-educated intellectuals and politicians. The most important expression of the younger generation was the Ba'th Party, which was founded in the 1940s by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, two Syrian schoolteachers educated in Paris. They developed a doctrine of Arab unity, social justice, democracy, and freedom. They were anticolonialists and socialists. They advocated not only a political doctrine but a mystical feeling for the rejuvenation of the unified Arab nation. In 1949, they were joined by Akram al-Hourani (d. 1996), a socialist agitator and organizer of revolts in Homs and a conspirator with contacts in the army.

The weakening of France in World War II opened the way to Syrian independence in 1947. The new regime was immediately beset by a series of military coups that progressively transferred power from the old generation to the new. The process of forming a new political regime, however, was not to be completed without a protracted domestic and international crisis in the mid-1950s and early 1960s (see the section on the struggle for Arab unity).

Lebanon

The modern state of Lebanon, like Syria, was a French creation. Though France had a long history of close relations with the Maronite population, the French did not create a purely Christian state. To the old province of Lebanon, new districts, including Tripoli, Sidon, the Biqa', and South Lebanon, were added to increase the total size of the country and the proportion of Muslims. Lebanon was initially governed by a French high commissioner, but in 1926 a constitution divided political power among the major religious communities. It

provided for a president, a ministerial government, and a bicameral legislature, in which seats were distributed in a ratio of 6:5 for Christians and Muslims. By agreement, the president would always be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the head of parliament a Shiʿi. Foreign affairs would be in the hands of a Christian minister; the army would be headed by a Maronite, with Muslim or Druze subalterns. The division of power was based upon dubious census data. Furthermore, the state institutions were designed to reinforce sectarian divisions rather than integrate Lebanese society. Government agencies did not build national services, but rather subsidized sectarian schools, courts, and charities. In reality, Lebanon was governed by the *zuʿamaʾ*, or bosses, usually local landowners and religious leaders, whose powers were based on the control of the peasants and on patron–client networks. Political parties in Lebanon were expressions of these local leaders, and popular loyalties were channeled to the leaders of clienteles rather than to the state.

From 1920 to 1945, the Lebanese government was based on a compromise among sectarian and communal bosses. The bosses were linked up in two main political parties: the National Bloc was substantially Maronite Christian and favored independence, but resisted ties with other Arab countries; the Constitutional Bloc favored close relations with Syria. In 1943, the Lebanese factions agreed on a National Pact in which the Christians and Muslims deemphasized outside political ties, whether French or Arab, for the sake of greater internal cooperation. Thus, the way was prepared for the formation of an independent regime in 1945. The postwar regime continued to be based upon the allocation of government powers and resources among the bosses and confessional groups. The state existed to maintain the balance of power among them, and from 1947 to 1958, the country was ruled by a succession of coalition governments.

Iraq to 1958

When the British conquered Iraq in 1917, they first ruled it as a colony, but in 1920 a revolt of Ottoman officials and landlords, Sunni and Shiʿi religious leaders, and tribal groups forced them to include

the Iraqi elites. They then set up a constitutional monarchy under Sharif Husayn's son, now King Faysal II, with whom they had been allied in World War I. An Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1922 gave the British control of military, financial, judicial, and foreign affairs. In 1930, a new treaty made Iraq legally independent but allowed Britain continued control over foreign and military affairs. Under British rule, Iraq was run by a coalition of rural landowners, tribal chiefs, *'ulama'*, Shi'i religious leaders, and army officers – including Ottoman officers educated in Istanbul, Sharifian officers in the service of King Faysal II before his arrival in Iraq, and Iraqis educated at the Baghdad Military Academy. This elite, however, was deeply divided. Between 1936 and 1941, there were a number of military coups. World War II brought bitter struggles between pro-British and pro-German factions. In 1941, Rashid 'Ali al-Kiylani (d. 1965) took control of the government in the interests of a pro-German policy, but British troops seized the country. From then until 1958, King Faysal II governed with the collaboration of his principal minister, Nuri al-Sa'id (d. 1958) and a small minority of landowners – 2 percent of whom owned 66 percent of the land. In the name of Arab nationalism, this elite, predominantly of Sunni background, governed a populace that was then about 60 percent Shi'i and 25 percent Kurdish.

Oil was discovered in Iraq before World War I and was first exploited by the Turkish Petroleum Company, founded in 1912 with German, Dutch, and British participation. In 1929, the company was reorganized as the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). In the course of the 1930s, new concessions were granted to extend oil exploration, and in 1938, the various companies exploring for oil were merged into the IPC. In 1952 Iraq obtained an agreement from the international oil companies for a 50–50 share of oil profits. In 1961, Iraq revoked the oil concessions, and in 1972 nationalized the IPC. Oil production was maintained with Soviet and French help, but Iraq suffered considerable losses as a result of curtailed production.

Here too, the dominance of the old elite was challenged by a new generation of lower-ranking officials, junior army officers, textile workers, and displaced peasants – the products of a changing economy. The appropriation of land by the shaykhs and the breakup

of tribal communities drove large numbers of people to the cities. A new urban generation hostile to the entrenched regime took form. The army became the effective center of the opposition. Until 1958, the regime contained this growing opposition by proposals for extensive development programs, but it did not survive to carry them out. An army coup brought an end to the monarchy in 1958.

Transjordan and Jordan

Transjordan was, even more than Iraq, a British creation. It was the most "unnatural" of the new states, corresponding to no historical province or local community. Originally it was thought to be implied in the Balfour Declaration's promise of Palestine as a Jewish homeland, but in 1921–22 the British helped Amir 'Abdallah, a brother of Faysal, to establish a government and build up the Arab Legion. A 1928 treaty established a constitutional monarchy, a legislature, and political parties, but reserved for Britain control over foreign policy and the army. In 1946, Transjordan became independent, though a treaty of 1948 reserved for Britain the right to maintain bases. Between 1948 and 1950, as a result of the Arab–Israeli war, Transjordan absorbed parts of Palestine and was reorganized as the Kingdom of Jordan. By 1950, the state of Jordan comprised two totally different populations: the bedouin and farmers on the eastern bank of the Jordan and the Palestinians on the western side. The constitution of 1952 gave representation to both elements in a new parliament. A National Guard was formed, including Palestinian villagers, and was later integrated into the Arab Legion.

Throughout this period, Jordan was governed by a king, an elite of British army officers, tribal-based military officers and their cohorts, Palestinian Arab officials, Circassian palace servants, and Muslim religious leaders. The opposition was built on the educated middle classes and the Palestinians. In the crisis of the 1950s – when military–socialist regimes came to power in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – in Jordan the opposition was defeated in 1958 with the help of British paratroopers. The regime was consolidated by the defeat of Palestinian resistance in September 1970. King Husayn, who ruled from 1952 until his death in 1999, was succeeded by his son

'Abdallah. The regime is still based on military and bureaucratic elites, wealthy merchants, and East Bank tribal leaders, and is supported by American economic aid. The opposition is fragmented. Its most important component is the Muslim Brothers, who are loyal to the king, but consider the liberation of Palestine a religious duty and reject all peace initiatives. There are smaller, more radical Islamist groups. There is also a secular, leftist, and liberal opposition. Most important are the Jordanians of Palestinian descent who oppose Jordan's recognition of Israel and cooperation with the United States. The opposition is represented in parliament, but the king contains their influence by favoring tribal and rural areas, and is adept at manipulating their differences.

The struggle for Arab unity and the contemporary Fertile Crescent states

After World War II, the Arab Fertile Crescent states all became independent nations. In each country, domestic elites were engaged in a struggle for power, but in the late 1940s and 1950s these struggles would be vastly complicated by Arab and global conflicts. The Arab–Israeli war of 1947–48, the establishment of the state of Israel, the struggle for supremacy among Egypt and other Arab states, the drive for Arab unity, the advent of the Cold War, and the maneuvering of the great powers all interacted with domestic issues to define the identity of the contemporary Arab states.

Apart from the struggles of older- and younger-generation elites, the most important factor in the postwar period was the drive toward Arab unity. The movement for Arab unity had its origins in the pre–World War I Arab nationalist movement and in the brief and abortive effort of Faysal to establish an Arab kingdom in Damascus. With the formation of the Arab state system after World War I, the concept of a single Arab nation and state survived among intellectuals and ideologues. It was revived in the late 1930s by the outbreak of the Arab revolt in Palestine. Between 1936 and 1939, Palestinian peasants carried out a double struggle against Jewish colonization and British rule that mobilized widespread support in Egypt and the

Fertile Crescent countries. Also, on the eve of World War II, Britain renewed its efforts to win Arab support by declaring itself in favor of a union of Arab countries. Egypt took up pan-Arabism as a vehicle for the assertion of Egyptian leadership in the Arab-speaking Middle East. In 1945, the League of Arab States was founded under Egyptian patronage, with an Egyptian secretary-general and headquarters in Cairo. However, the Hashimite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan had their own schemes for Arab unification and resisted Egyptian hegemony. For all practical purposes, the League foundered over its failure to prevent the formation of the state of Israel in 1948.

The cause of Arab unity, however, was revived in the 1950s. By then it had been taken up by Nasser in Egypt, by the Baʿth Party in Syria, and by other elements of the new postwar Arab intelligentsia, as the rallying cry of opposition to Israel, to colonial and postcolonial domination by foreign powers, and to conservative domestic elites who stood in the way of social reform and economic development. Inspired by Nasser's charismatic leadership, the struggle for power in each of the Fertile Crescent countries was now waged in the name of Arab unity. In Syria, the Baʿth Party took power in the late 1950s and 1960s. In Iraq, a coup d'état overthrew the monarchy and brought a military regime to power in 1958. In Lebanon and Jordan, however, American and British intervention helped defeat the opposition and kept the established regimes intact.

These domestic struggles were entangled in big-power rivalries. At the end of World War II, Britain and France were no longer able to maintain their Middle Eastern positions and had to concede the independence of the Fertile Crescent states. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the principal competitors for regional influence. In the 1950s, the United States attempted to align Britain, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab countries in an American-sponsored treaty organization. The United States was supported by Nuri al-Saʿid, the prime minister of Iraq, and Adnan Menderes, the prime minister of Turkey (1950–60), who proclaimed the Baghdad Pact in January 1955. Egypt and Syria, however, opposed the Iraqi initiative and refused American aid. After an Israeli attack on the Sinai in February 1955, Nasser emerged as the leader of the Arab struggle

against imperialism and Zionism. All the Arab countries were swept by a wave of sentiment in favor of Arab unity.

The crisis of the 1950s gave the new regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq their political and ideological identity. In each country, the dominant force was a military elite legitimized by its formal commitments to Arab national independence and state-guided modernization of the economy. The political consciousness of these elites, formed in the 1950s and 1960s, was anti-imperialist, anti-Israel, and neutralist in international politics. They adopted socialist economic policies that were in accord with the rejection of Western imperialism, with the support given to underdeveloped countries by the Soviet Union and its allies, and with the need to reject the previous generation that had failed to make national economic and social progress. Nevertheless, the crisis did not lead to Arab unity. Despite their common interests, the rivalries among Egypt, Syria, and Iraq prevented Arab unification.

From the 1960s, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan were subject to authoritarian military regimes. In many respects, the regimes in Syria and Iraq resembled that of Egypt. They were military regimes with organized bureaucratic and one-party political support. They also depended upon patronage relationships between the leaders and a favored clientele. They subscribed to populist Arab nationalist ideologies. At the outset both adopted socialist or state-centered policies of economic development. Development not controlled, sponsored, or manipulated by the state was inhibited. In these states, there were no independent political parties, labor unions, or student groups allowed. In these states, religiously based opposition was crushed.

The Syrian and Iraqi states were different from Egypt in that neither was based upon a preexisting national society. While the Egyptian government had a broad popular base, the governments of Syria and Iraq were drawn from minority groups, and even from a limited number of families and clients within these minorities. Syria was about two-thirds Sunni Muslim, but there were strong ʿAlawi, Druze, Ismaʿili, and Christian minorities. The ʿAlawis are a sectarian minority considered Muslims by some but heretics by others. They were

predominantly poor peasants, living in northern Syria and indentured to wealthy Sunni, Christian, or ʿAlawi landowners who lived in the towns and collected rents in the villages. The Syrian regime was supported by ʿAlawis, minority Christians, and Ismaʿilis. Iraq was divided among a Shiʿi majority (some 60 percent) and two large minorities, one Kurdish (about 20 percent) and one Sunni Arab (about 20 percent), and was ruled by a minority from within the Sunni population. In Jordan, the Palestinian population was subordinate to the military drawn from trans-Jordanian bedouin. In highly sectarian Lebanon, a strong central state has never been consolidated.

This phase of Arab nationalism ended with the defeat of the Arab states in the June 1967 war with Israel. Nasser's leadership was discredited. The Arab states were condemned as ineffectual and the political appeal of Arab unity was weakened. Egypt's authoritarian government abandoned the Palestinian cause, eventually made peace with Israel (1979), and allied itself with the United States and with the conservative Arabian states. The Baʿth Party in Syria and Iraq gave up the goal of Arab unity in favor of power in each separate country. A period of ideological disillusionment with nationalism, national states, socialism, and secularism set in. In the 1970s, Arabism came to be associated with oil and the economic wealth of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.

Syria

Since the upheavals of the 1950s, the fortunes of Syria have been shaped by the Baʿth Party and military regime. In the mid-1950s, the Baʿth promoted union with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (1958–61), a disastrous move that destroyed the civilian leadership of the party and allowed the army to take power in 1963. Since then, despite changes of personnel, Syria has been governed by a regime of army officers, by Hafiz al-Asad (1966–2000) and by his son, Bashar al-Asad (from 2000 to the present).

To create the new regime, the Baʿth Party pursued a socialist program. Agrarian reform began in 1958 with the dismantling of large estates and the limitation of ownership to a maximum of 50 hectares of irrigated and 300 hectares of unirrigated land. In 1961, lands were

expropriated and redistributed to peasants. In 1966, the socialization of agriculture began in earnest, with the formation of agricultural collectives, a state monopoly of cotton production, and the beginning of the Tebke dam project, which was expected to bring 640,000 hectares of reclaimed land in the Euphrates basin into cultivation. To break the patron–client ties of peasants to landlords and urban-based money lenders, cooperatives and a peasants' union were established, which gave the state direct control of the population. The revolution, however, was not complete. A substantial portion of the land remained in the control of rich peasants, landlords, and urban investors. These measures were followed by the nationalization of industry and commerce in 1965. Electricity, oil distribution, cotton ginning, and most foreign trade were taken under government control. Finally, in its program to defeat competing elites, the Ba'th state took control of charitable endowments and appointments to religious offices.

The regime also attempted to overcome the inherent familial, ethnic, and religious factionalism of the country by creating a mass Leninist-type political machine based on middle- and lower-middle-class youths, often from rural areas, recruited among minority Isma'ilis, Christians, and 'Alawis. The party cadres monopolized officer positions in the army, government jobs, agricultural and village cooperatives, and youth organizations. Thus, the regime incorporated the minorities, broke the power of the old elites by creating new patronage networks, and extended party domination to all of Syrian society.

The creation of a mass society, however, was constrained by intra-elite struggles for power. Between 1963 and 1970, the army officers eliminated the civilian Ba'th Party ideologues. From 1970 until his death in 2000, the sole ruler, Hafiz al-Asad, diminished the importance of the party, and opened new channels to political power through the army, the praetorian guard units, and the police and intelligence services. The state relied more and more on factional and clientele loyalties, especially from the 'Alawis, and, within the 'Alawi community, from specific families and "tribes." Many 'Alawis had been involved in revolutionary movements in the interwar years and others

entered the Syrian army when the French promoted the minorities as a mechanism for controlling the majority Muslim population. They came to power in the 1960s and 1970s under the aegis of Hafiz al-Asad.

Economic development was in the main subordinated to political objectives. The Syrian economy was managed to reinforce the regime by favoring party members, government workers, and many peasants regardless of confessional affiliation, and by co-opting 'Alawi, Aleppin, and Damascene merchants. Under Ba'th rule, however, the regime's middle-class base has been vastly broadened by free education, white-collar jobs, bolstered by protection for local businesses against foreign competition, and even by food subsidies. Christian and other minorities continue to be protected. In return, the middle classes and the minorities have in the main taken a politically quietist line, and have given up independent civil society and political participation.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the public sector failed to generate the resources needed to finance the state. Domestic investment was limited, and self-sustaining economic growth has not been achieved. Deficit spending financed by foreign loans and a liberalization of the economy resulted in a trade boom in the 1970s, but by the late 1980s expansion had led to a payments deficit, serious inflation, and a partial economic collapse.

While the state was dominated by an 'Alawi minority and its powerful military and intelligence apparatus, the majority of the population is Sunni Muslim. However, the position of the Muslim religious elites (the *'ulama'*) in Syria was very different from that of their counterparts in Turkey, Egypt, and other Muslim countries. In all these countries, including Syria, the secularization of educational, charitable, and legal institutions – state schools, state courts, and state control of endowments – limited the scope of *'ulama'* influence. They had to face the competition of alternative, secular, scientific, and intellectual elites, and the diffusion of ideas through the media that made every individual a would-be authority on religious matters. In Syria, however, they did not face the same measures of bureaucratic control as did those in Turkey and Egypt. The Ba'th did not

incorporate the *'ulama'* into the state apparatus, but instead tried to maintain control by security and surveillance measures.

The Syrian *'ulama'* adapted to these circumstances by creating informal worship and study groups, based on a claim to religious authority embodied in their own participation in a continuous living tradition and modeled on the traditional Sufi associations. They offered informal instruction to students and young professionals such as doctors, pharmacists, engineers, and teachers. Many sought a larger audience through newspaper articles, essays, radio, television, and eventually the internet.

Politically, the *'ulama'* were grounded in the patronage of well-to-do merchants who underwrote their schools, mosques, and charities. Their connection to the private sectors of the economy rather than the state proved particularly advantageous in periods of liberalization and relaxation of state controls. Moreover, through their connections to businessmen, they were indirectly linked to the political–military elites.

Thus, Muslim opposition to the state did not come from the neo-traditional *'ulama'*, but from the more radical Society of Muslim Brothers and the Salafis. The Society of Muslim Brothers was founded in Aleppo and Damascus in the 1930s. As in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers appealed to the "old bazaar" shopkeepers, artisans, craftsmen, and their modern-educated student and intelligentsia offspring. Operating as a political party in the Syrian elections of 1961, the Muslim Brothers won 5.8 percent of the national vote and 17.6 percent of the Damascus vote.

In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Muslim Brothers turned from electoral politics to civil disobedience and armed resistance. The Islamist movement in Syria was essentially an urban reaction against a rural-based regime, an expression of Sunni hostility to 'Alawis, and a rebellion of the governed against the governing elite. From mid-1979 to late 1981, in response to the Syrian government's intervention against the Palestinians in Lebanon, rising inflation, and the general decline of Sunni political influence, they launched guerrilla attacks and then large-scale uprisings in Aleppo and Hama. In Hama the trigger for the resistance was the establishment of new

industries in competition with local merchants and the settlement of 'Alawi peasants in a Sunni region. These revolts were ruthlessly crushed with the loss of tens of thousands of lives and the destruction of the historical parts of Hama.

The destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood movement opened the way to the rising influence of the neo-traditional *'ulama'*. The Ba'thist regime was happy to support a more quietist religious orientation, and the *'ulama'* were willing to accept an authoritarian regime in return for the ratification of their position in society.

Since the advent of Hafiz al-Asad, Syria's foreign policy has been shaped by complicated considerations. From 1955 until 1989, the mainstay of Syrian policy was its alliance with the Soviet Union and its consistent hostility to Israel. Syria advocated that the Arab states mobilize to defeat and dismantle the state of Israel and expel the European population. The only way to do this, Asad asserted, was for the Arab states to come abreast of Israel in economic, military, and organizational capacities. Syria's support for cross-border attacks upon Israel were among the critical precipitating factors in the 1967 war in which Syria lost the Golan Heights. After 1967, Syrian policy was carefully calculated to avoid premature hostilities. Syria never permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to attack Israel from its territory. Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war (1975–91), partly to forestall the emergence of a PLO-dominated Lebanon that might drag Syria into a premature war with Israel, and partly to forestall the possibility of a Lebanese–Iraqi alliance against Syria.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 led to a reorientation of Syrian foreign policy. The withdrawal of Russian military and financial support made it impossible to sustain an energetic anti-Israel policy. The formation of a US-led coalition of Arab and European states to defeat Iraq in the Gulf War (1991) also made plain the shift to American, Egyptian, and Arabian political hegemony in the region. Hafiz al-Asad adapted himself to these new circumstances by joining the anti-Iraq coalition, pacifying Lebanon, and entering into talks with Israel over the Golan Heights. Syria, however, did not come to an agreement with Israel.

With the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, his son Bashar al-Asad succeeded him. Lebanon was his first concern. Syria controlled Lebanon through three agencies: the Syrian military intelligence network based in the Biqa' Valley; Lebanon's General Security Directorate, under Lebanese president Emile Lahoud; and Syrian liaisons with Hizballah, the Lebanese Shi'i political and paramilitary organization. Control of Lebanon gave Syria access to financial and smuggling networks and terrorist groups. After the murder of the Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, an opponent of the Syrian occupation, the US and French governments insisted on a full Syrian withdrawal. In April 2005, for the first time since 1976, Syrian troops left Lebanon. The Syrian regime, however, maintained its influence through Lebanese intelligence and security forces and Syrian and Lebanese business mafias. Bashar's relationship with the United States also reached a nadir due to his ties to Hizballah, HAMAS, and Iran, and his support for Arab fighters in Iraq.

In 2007, Bashar was reelected, in an unopposed referendum, to another seven-year term. In 2011, inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt, peaceful protests against abuse by the security forces and a stagnant economy broke out in Dara'a and Homs, later spreading to other parts of the country. Civilian protesters were ruthlessly attacked by the military and security forces. The bloody suppression of peaceful demonstrators prompted defections from the army and violent assaults on government forces and facilities. With the intensification of violence, resistance has become civil war. The government forces have so far mostly remained loyal to the regime. The 'Alawi population seems in general supportive. Sunnis, with support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Iraqi extremists, oppose the government. The Syrian revolution also has a class dimension. Much of the resistance is concentrated in small towns and the peripheral lower-class suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo while the well-to-do areas are either neutral or support the government. The majority of the *'ulama'* seem to be loyal to the regime or silent; only a minority have joined the opposition.

As of early 2012, there were two major opposition coalitions. The Syrian National Coordination Committee (NCC) is a coalition of leftist

political parties and youth activists. It calls for an end to the fighting, withdrawal of military forces, release of political prisoners, and international economic sanctions and observers, but allows for dialogue with the regime. The Syrian National Council (SNC), which includes networks of local councils with active participation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Damascus reformist intellectuals, Islamists, technocrats, youth activists, and Kurdish and Assyrian political parties, refuses negotiations with the government; some of its members call for a NATO intervention as in Libya. Armed defectors from the army make up the Free Syrian Army (FSA). As the fighting becomes ever more destructive and costly in loss of life and the forced exile of masses of people to Turkey and Jordan, no political solution is in sight.

Furthermore, the conflict has become international. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp, the al-Quds Force, and Hizballah forces back up 'Alawi elite Syrian army units. Turkey calls for the resignation of the Asad government and gives asylum to opposition forces. The Arab League has condemned the Syrian regime. The United States has held back from intervention for fear that an attempt to defeat the Asad regime would only empower al-Qaeda-related extremists who want to establish an Islamic state, and for fear that it would widen the war by provoking further Iranian and Russian support for Bashar al-Asad. In the United Nations, the United States and its allies have criticized the Asad government, but China and Russia (the principal military supplier to Syria) vetoed proposed Security Council resolutions condemning it. The Syria situation has become a proxy for a regional struggle for power between the United States, Turkey, and the Arabian states on one side, and Iran, Russia, and China on the other.

Iraq

In many respects, the development of Iraq was parallel to that of Syria. In Iraq, the old regime was also overthrown in the name of pan-Arab nationalism and domestic reform and was replaced by an authoritarian military regime. In July 1958, a group of young army officers led by 'Abd al-Karim Qassim, representing the generation of

soldiers, administrators, intellectuals, and ideologues schooled in the nationalist ideals of the 1930s and 1940s, seized power. Their hatred of Iraq's dependence on Great Britain, the Baghdad Pact, and the 1958 effort to form a conservative alliance between Iraq and Jordan precipitated a coup d'état, the execution of the king, and the formation of a Revolutionary Council.

The new regime at first favored conservative reforms in land ownership, free enterprise in industry, and strong state policies to promote health care and education. Under Qassim's leadership, however, it quickly turned into a military dictatorship based on strong Communist Party support. The Ba'th Party, the Muslim Brothers, and other opposition groups were suppressed. The Qassim regime was in turn overthrown by a Ba'th coup in 1963, also launched in the name of Arab unity. The Ba'th nationalized the major banks and industries. In 1968, another military coup brought Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn to power. A new constitution declared Iraq part of the Arab nation, an Islamic state, and a socialist society. The regime established in 1968 under Saddam Husayn ruled until it was overthrown by the US invasion in 2003.

The Saddam regime was based upon the Sunni minority, within that minority on people from the town of Takrit, within Takrit upon particular related lineages, and from within these lineages certain families who provided the officers of the government, the Ba'th Party, and the Republican Guard. The new elite came from middle- and lower-middle-class, and often conservative Islamic, backgrounds, but it was basically a state elite dependent upon the centralization of military, economic, and educational activities. The men closest to Saddam were his handpicked relatives and allies, and they ruled the country through the party, the security and military apparatus, and by a reign of surveillance, threat, and violence. A small cadre of army officers dominated the government and the ambassadorial corps and managed the major industries. The Ba'th regime controlled all sectors of society, including labor unions, businesses, the civil service, universities, and student and women's groups. Independent lawyers, landowners, and businessmen no longer had a significant part to play

in public policy. This group did not represent the majority Shiʻi and substantial Kurdish populations of the country.

Saddam's regime closely controlled the economy. A program of land reform on the Egyptian model was implemented. Laws were passed to limit ownership of land to 1,000 *dunum*s (250 hectares) of irrigated or 2,000 *dunum*s of unirrigated land and to organize the peasantry into agricultural cooperatives to assure efficient utilization of redistributed lands. This program was successful in expropriating the old landed elite, but only after 1970 were substantial acreages redistributed and peasant cooperatives – later collectives – organized. In the 1970s, however, emphasis was shifted to capital-intensive irrigation and the development of mechanized farms financed by the state. The government thus adopted an agricultural policy to bypass the peasant sector. To consolidate its control of agriculture, the state resisted tribal ownership of land, peasant unions, and other political forms of rural organization.

Supported by the army and by revenues from oil production fully in its control, Saddam had little incentive for negotiation or compromise. State power was consolidated by a regime of terror. Informers, armed party members, and secret police were pervasive. Political protesters – and also party, bureaucracy, and army members – could be summarily executed for the smallest deviance, hesitation, or suspicion of disloyalty. Political opposition was virtually eliminated. The regime was especially hostile to the Kurds, to whom it denied regional autonomy, a share in economic development, and permission to teach the Kurdish language in Kurdish schools. At the same time, the Baʻthist state managed to create a wide base of public acceptance. In the 1970s and 1980s, it provided extensive subsidies for urban middle-class education and health policies. It used war with Iran in the 1980s and the Gulf War of 1991 with the United States to win public acquiescence.

The state also tried to generate an Iraqi national identity. Like Egypt and Syria, the new regime went through a phase of pan-Arabism. The Baʻth Party, stressing the solidarity of Arab peoples, competed with Egypt for leadership in the Arab world. By 1970, the Iraqi regime began to move toward a state-centered national identity. A new

emphasis was placed upon the ancient Mesopotamian heritage of Iraq, now considered a pre-Islamic but proto-Arab civilization. Archeology, folklore, poetry, the arts, and local festivals were promoted to enhance a sense of Iraqi separateness. Islam, while retaining the strong allegiance of the population, played little part in public life until the 1990s when the regime shifted to an Islamic rhetoric for its justifications. Islam was also the rallying call of the opposition. In the 1960s, Shiʿi *'ulama'* formed the Daʿwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic mission) to work for an Islamic state and social justice. The more militant Mujahidin (Muslim warriors) was founded in 1979. Wherever militant opposition emerged, the regime reduced it to sporadic and ineffective terrorism.

In foreign policy, Iraq's goal was to restore Arab unity under Iraqi leadership. The two prongs of this policy were competition with Egypt and Syria for Arab world leadership, and the assertion of Iraqi hegemony in the Persian Gulf. The eastern flank of Iraqi policy led to almost two decades of warfare between Iraq and Iran, and between Iraq and Kuwait and Kuwait's Arab, American, and European allies.

The Iraqi–Kuwaiti problem began with the ambiguities of late Ottoman rule. In 1920, Britain received a League of Nations mandate for both Kuwait and Iraq, and the border between the two was a line defined by an Ottoman–British treaty of 1913 that was never ratified. When Kuwait became independent in 1961, Iraq claimed that it was a part of Iraq. In 1963, Iraq invaded Kuwait, but British and Saudi troops intervened and forced Iraq to desist. Iraq maintained its claims to small islands in the upper Persian Gulf that were essential to access sea lanes for oil export. Another border crisis followed in 1975.

Tension with Iran over border problems was equally high. Iraq and Iran had long disputed control of the Shatt al-Arab, the single waterway that merges the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers on the last leg of their journey to the Gulf. In 1975, in return for promises that the shah would not support Iraqi Kurdish resistance, Iraq conceded that the whole of the waterway was Iranian territory. Then in 1980, taking advantage of the revolutionary chaos in Iran, Iraq attacked western Iran to capture control of the oilfields of Khuzistan, an Arabic-

speaking province in western Iran. The Iraqis also hoped to forestall the spread of Iranian revolutionary influences to the Shiʿis of Iraq, and perhaps to topple the Iranian regime. Iraq may have seen the war as a way of asserting Iraqi supremacy in the Gulf region and in the Arab world generally. The war, however, cost almost eight bitter and bloody years of fighting, in which vast numbers of lives were lost on both sides before a stalemate and a truce was reached in 1989.

With the end of the war against Iran, Iraq returned to its claims to Kuwait, protested Kuwait's refusal to forgive its war loans to Iraq, objected to Kuwaiti drilling under a disputed and demilitarized border zone, and to excessive Kuwaiti oil production which lowered the price of oil in international markets to the detriment of Iraq's revenues. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1991 to loot Kuwaiti resources and to gain a controlling influence in Gulf policy. Iraq's extraordinary military preparations, however, including a worldwide network to acquire materials for biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare, implied a threat to Saudi Arabia as well. Saddam Husayn justified his invasion as an attack on a backward feudal and tribal elite. He soon linked his invasion to the Palestinian cause, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza in return for withdrawal from Kuwait. Later he attacked Israel with ballistic missiles. Saddam's audacity and the sheer display of power had widespread appeal among many Palestinians and other Arabs. He was opposed by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, and by a United Nations coalition led by the United States.

US intervention was governed by two considerations. The United States was opposed to any regional concentration of power that might affect long-term access to oil on favorable terms for the United States and other industrialized countries. In 1953, it had helped bring down Premier Mosaddeq of Iran; it had opposed Nasser of Egypt in the 1960s and the revolutionary government of Iran in the 1980s, and now it would oppose Saddam Husayn. The United States was also concerned about the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, thus far possessed only by Israel, though Israel has neither confirmed nor denied the possession of nuclear weapons.

On January 16, 1991, the United Nations coalition launched a rapid and decisive attack on Iraqi forces. Yet the military victory was not pursued to the point of overthrowing Saddam Husayn. At the last moment, the coalition forces held back from an attack upon the Republican Guard. Shi'i rebellions in the south and Kurdish rebellions in the north were abandoned by the United States and its allies, and were crushed by Saddam. The United States and its Arab allies were probably reluctant to destroy the Iraqi regime lest the country be fragmented. They feared Iranian hegemony over the Shi'i population of southern Iraq and the potential subversion of Shi'i populations in eastern Arabia and Kuwait. Turkey feared the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

In addition to imposing an economic embargo, the cease-fire of April 1991 required Iraq to cooperate with a United Nations arms-inspection regime and to destroy all stockpiles of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. United Nations inspectors destroyed nuclear and chemical weapons facilities.

Despite defeat, Saddam Husayn maintained unchallenged control of the country. The United States and its allies sought by every means to undermine his regime and to forestall Iraq's resurgence as a regional power. They launched a bombing campaign against Iraqi installations and established aerial exclusion zones to give cover to the Kurds and to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The United States supported the creation of an Iraqi National Congress, under the leadership of Ahmad Chalabi, as an opposition movement in exile. Finally, the United Nations imposed an embargo on both exports and imports. In 1996, Saddam agreed to the UN "oil for food" program in which half the proceeds of oil sales went to the Kurds, to reparations payments for Kuwait and UN expenses, and the rest for food and medicines for Iraq.

By 2000, the embargo had caused the death of countless Iraqis and was failing. Smuggling through Turkey, Syria, and Iran undermined the embargo and provided revenues to the Iraqi government. By 2001, Russia, France, and the United States were buying Iraqi oil. Arab states sent ambassadors to Iraq. Though the salaried urban middle class was ruined, and Iraqis suffered from a

badly deteriorated standard of living, from shortages of food and medical supplies, and a high rate of infant mortality, the regime maintained its power based on the military, the intelligence services, the Ba'th Party, and on revived tribal loyalties and a tribalist ideology.

In 2001, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were the pretexts for the Bush administration to invade Afghanistan and Iraq – both were alleged to be bases for al-Qaeda. Iraq was accused of attempting to develop nuclear weapons, but this was later proven to be false. Various theories have been advanced to explain the American determination to invade Iraq: the desire for bases in the Middle East, the control of oil, protection of Israel, and to assert American hegemony in the region. In any case, on March 20, 2003, US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. Baghdad was occupied twenty days later, and was allowed to fall into mass looting and other crimes. The Baghdad library was burned down and the National Museum looted of its treasures. The American "viceroy," L. Paul Bremer, made critical counterproductive decisions that led to an Iraqi insurgency. He postponed the formation of an interim Iraqi government. He set up an Iraqi advisory Governing Council based on representation by sect and ethnicity (a reversal of Iraq's movement toward a national identity), and he adopted a program of "de-Baathification" that dissolved the Iraqi army and entailed the dismissal of 50,000 soldiers, teachers, doctors, and other professionals.

The American-sponsored political arrangements promoted sectarian conflict. The Governing Council was dominated by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI). A rival Shiʿi movement was organized by Muqtada al-Sadr, a member of a very prominent Shiʿi family He created the Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of the redeemer, JAM). The Sadrists declared their own state in September 2003 with Najaf as their capital. Liberated from Saddam's oppressive rule and bolstered by thousands of Iranian pilgrims, the Shiʿi religious seminary (*howza*) in Najaf rose rapidly to power. Ayatollah ʿAli al-Sistani was, in 2004, the "most powerful man in Iraq." He issued a

famous *fatwa* approving of democracy and encouraging all Shi'is to vote in upcoming elections.

As Shi'is became politically more assertive, Sunni guerrillas led by former army officers, Ba'th Party members, tribal chieftains, and security and intelligence agents, reinforced by the influx of foreign fighters, rebelled against the American occupation. One strand of the Sunni opposition wanted to restore Sunni Arab power in Iraq and the other to establish a Salafi Islamic state. A Jordanian Salafi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden in October 2004. His organization, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, became known as al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM). Zarqawi's money came from Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The United States attempted to crush the insurgency militarily. The invasion and destruction of Fallujah in November 2004 was a signal moment in this phase of the occupation. This ambiguous victory was followed by the revelation of photographs of US troops torturing and humiliating Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison.

In 2005, the first multiparty elections in fifty years were held to elect a parliament that would write a constitution. The Shi'is won the elections and Nuri al-Maliki became prime minister, but the Shi'is were splintered into mutually hostile parties. An alliance of the SCIRI (or ISCI) and the Da'wa parties, supported by the United States, opposed the organization of the Sadr party and its military wing, JAM. JAM dominated parts of Baghdad and was a power in the south, but abused its power by launching death squads against Sunnis. It lost Shi'i support, and Sadrist leaders took refuge in Iran.

The elections did not pacify the intense civil war already under way. Baghdad was broken into sectarian enclaves. Mixed neighborhoods were "ethnically cleansed," thousands were killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes. The middle class was forced into mass exile in Jordan or Syria. The country was divided into fiefdoms. The Kurds controlled the north and northeast. Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups controlled parts of western and northern Iraq.

This human and political crisis became unbearable. The Sunnis began to rethink their positions. By the end of 2006, they realized they could not militarily defeat US forces nor overthrow the Shiʿi-led government, and that they were losing the battle for Baghdad. They came to regard Iran as the greatest danger. The Sunni tribal forces, called the Sahwa (Awakening), accepted US money and turned against the al-Qaeda extremists. The Iraqi government was supposed to incorporate the Sunni militias into its security forces.

By the end of 2008, there were four main positions in Iraqi politics. Iyad al-Allawi led a party calling for the integration of Sunnis and Shiʿis in a secular Iraqi movement. Muqtada al-Sadr and other Shiʿi leaders wanted to rule a united Iraq. Some wings of SCIRI wanted to form a separate state in the south allied to Iran. Kurdish leaders wanted an independent Kurdistan. The national elections of 2010 generated a fractured parliament.

In November 2008, parliament approved a security pact with the United States that called for complete US withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011. The United States did fully withdraw. After nearly eight years of war, the effect of American intervention had been to remove an anti-Iranian regime and bring the Shiʿis to power. Iraq is overcome by waves of political violence. Iranian influence is at a maximum due to political support for the Maliki regime, investments, and pilgrimage. Shiʿi communities in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon anticipate liberation and/or increasing political and economic influence.

Lebanon

The new state of Lebanon led a precarious existence before it disintegrated into civil war. The mandate-period constitution of 1926 divided power among the various religious communities – Maronite, Sunni, and Shiʿi – but the Lebanese government was never able to centralize power, and the country was run by local bosses (*zuʿamaʾ*) through their networks of political parties, religious charities, schools, and courts. In 1943, Christian and Muslim bosses agreed to cooperate in the formation of an independent state and formed a coalition that lasted until 1958. The regime of the bosses, however,

did not allow for the rise of new strata in Lebanese society, including technocrats and bureaucrats, upwardly mobile lower-middle-class persons (often coming from rural areas to Beirut), and Arab nationalists and lower-class urban gangs. Moreover, as Muslims became the demographic majority, they demanded a larger share of political power and economic opportunities. In 1958, pro-Nasser Arab nationalists tried to seize power, but American intervention helped restore the status quo.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the critical issue was the role of the Palestinian refugee population. Lebanon was divided between those who would allow the Palestinians to use Lebanon as a base for the struggle against Israel and those who wanted to restrict Palestinian activities and avoid a confrontation with Israel. The country was polarized between conservative and leftist coalitions. The conservatives included the Phalange and other Maronite groups, as well as some Shiʿis. The Maronite coalition was headed by Pierre Gemayel, the head of the Phalange, and by Camille Chamoun, a former president of Lebanon. Its goal was either to dominate Lebanon or to partition the country and create a Maronite state. This group favored a free-enterprise economy and noninvolvement in the struggle against Israel. Their opponents were an ideologically defined leftist coalition including Muslims, Druze, Palestinians, and some Christian minorities. Prominent in this group was the Progressive Socialist Party, dominated primarily by Druze and led by the Jumblatt family, which supported the Palestinians, a program of socialist development within Lebanon, and neutralism in world affairs. This faction also included the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which was largely Greek Orthodox and conservative, but opposed to the separatism of the Maronites.

In August 1975, the tensions among these forces ignited into civil war. The Lebanese army disintegrated, and the fighting was exacerbated by conflicts among the local bosses and lower-class street gangs (*qabayan*). Syria intervened in the summer of 1976 on the side of the Christians when it feared that a Palestinian victory might set the stage for a Lebanese–Iraqi alliance against Syria, or for Syrian involvement in an unwanted war with Israel. With Syrian intervention, Lebanon disintegrated into sectarian enclaves. In June

1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in the hope of driving the PLO from southern Lebanon, where it had been mounting attacks against Israel, and from its headquarters in Beirut, and of shoring up a cooperative Maronite regime. The Israeli invasion succeeded in driving out the PLO, but not in creating the Maronite government it wanted. The Syrians became ever more entrenched as the arbiters of Lebanese politics.

Lebanon remained mired in a destructive civil war until 1989, when the Arab League convened a conference of national reconciliation in Saudi Arabia and created a government of national unity. In one last spasm of ferocious warfare, General Michel Aoun tried to defeat the other factions and create a Maronite state, but in 1991 the Syrians crushed Maronite resistance, quelled the fighting, and allowed for the emergence of the first central Lebanese government in fifteen years. With the end of the civil war, Syria remained the hegemonic power in Lebanon. In 2005, however, Lebanese Sunnis and Druze under the leadership of Rafiq al-Hariri and Walid Jumblatt rallied the opposition to demand the full withdrawal of Syrian forces and intelligence agents from Lebanon. On February 14, 2005, Hariri and nineteen others were killed in a massive explosion on a road near the Beirut seafront. The United States, France, and the United Nations forced the Syrians to withdraw. The Syrian regime nonetheless preserved its influence in Lebanon through Syrian intelligence forces, Lebanese security forces, regime-connected Syrian and Lebanese business mafias, and above all through its connections to Hizballah.

Hizballah had come into being in response to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, as one of a number of rising political parties formed by the the disadvantaged Shiʿis of southern Lebanon and Shiʿi migrants to Beirut. Tinged with messianic hopes, the rise of the Shiʿi underclass was part of the larger Middle East–wide Shiʿi upheaval stimulated by the revolution in Iran. Led by Musa al-Sadr, a leading religious scholar, the new sectarian identity transcended the *zuʿamaʾ* clienteles. Musa al-Sadr created an infrastructure of schools and charities, rallied the newly educated and the newly rich alongside laborers, farmers, and teachers, and organized a paramilitary movement called Amal. When Musa al-Sadr "disappeared" during a

visit to Libya in August 1978, Nabih Berri gave Amal a more secular political orientation to promote the interests of Shi'is within the framework of a Lebanese state.

In response, a rival Shi'i movement, called Hizballah (Party of God), was created by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (d. 2010). Backed by Iran, it took the lead in the struggle against Israel. Hizballah fought against the Israeli invasion of 1982; from 1990 to 2000, it fought against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. In 2006, in response to border provocations and the seizure of two Israeli soldiers, Israel again invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush and disarm Hizballah, and inflicted terrible damage and heavy losses of life. Its military attempts to disarm and disperse Hizballah, which had failed in 1993, 1996, and in its eighteen-year occupation of southern Lebanon, failed again. Hizballah emerged from the war better armed than ever and with missiles that could reach Israeli cities. It remains a client of the Syrian regime, and underwrote Syrian domination of Lebanon. It is also a client of Iran, receiving Iranian military and political support and acting in Iranian interests.

In the 1990s, Hizballah also became a major political party. It provides schooling and social and charitable services to its communities, inculcating Shi'i values and loyalties. Hizballah imposed Islamic law in Baalbek and areas of the south. However, some Lebanese view the perpetual war against Israel and Hizballah's dependency on Iranian religious authority and military and financial assistance as barriers to the integration of Shi'is into the Lebanese state. Rival political parties fear its militias and its ambitions to dominate Lebanon. Many Shi'is who had suffered greatly in the war also questioned the wisdom of Hizballah's provocations against Israel. It was caught between its international roles and integration into Lebanon.

The tension between Hizballah and its opponents has led to repeated political crises. In 2008, the Hariri government attempted to shut down Hizballah's private military telecommunications network. In response, Hizballah supporters seized control of western Beirut, set up encampments, took over the port and media outlets, and engaged in street battles with rival militias. The Lebanese Army under General

Michel Suleiman, as a neutral force, proposed a compromise in which the army would "investigate" Hizbollah's private telephone network without actually removing it. On May 21, 2008, the rival groups reached a political agreement and elected General Suleiman as president. Hizballah and its allies emerged with a third of the cabinet seats, which effectively gave it veto power over cabinet decisions. Hizballah moved from being a minority paramilitary movement to having a central political role in Lebanese politics.

The Palestinian movement and the struggle for Palestine

Zionists and Palestinians to 1948

Palestine is the only part of the Fertile Crescent not to have become an Arab state. This was precluded by British support for the Zionist movement and by the formation of the state of Israel. The Zionist movement was sparked by the publication in 1896 of Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State*, written in response both to rising Russian and European anti-Semitism and to assimilation and the loss of Jewish identity. Inspired by the ideal of a Jewish national culture and an egalitarian and socialist society in a democratic polity, Zionism advocated for the transformation of a religious community into a nation requiring a territorial home. Jewish nationalism thus paralleled the emergence of other nationalist movements in the Balkans and the Middle East at the end of the nineteenth century. The Zionist case was complicated, however, in that the Jews wished to establish the national home in a territory where Jews were but a tiny minority amidst an Arab Palestinian population. Nevertheless, in 1917 the British issued the Balfour Declaration and promised to favor a Jewish national home in Palestine. The British imagined that a Jewish national home would serve as a pretext for British claims to administer the country. They also thought that they could rally the support of Russian and American Jews for the war effort and forestall similar German initiatives. In doing this, they ignored their conflicting commitments to the Arabs.

The Zionist communities in Palestine grew rapidly. By 1939, there were almost half a million Jews in some 250 settlements, some of them non-Zionist Jews previously settled in Palestine. The colonists were supported by the British, who initially allowed Jewish immigration and the purchase of land, defended the Jewish communities from riots, and permitted the organization of Zionist political institutions and the formation of a Jewish army. The Zionists were relatively highly organized through the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, the Vad Leumi, the representative body of the Jewish community in Palestine, Jewish political parties, and a Jewish labor movement.

The Palestinian movement developed in opposition to the occupation of Palestine by the British and the Zionists. In 1920, most Palestinian Arabs were peasants. A middle class of doctors, lawyers, journalists, and government officials was very small. The Palestinians, consisting of numerous clans and groups of affiliated clans, were deeply divided by strong class distinction between landlords, tenants, and sharecroppers, and by religious divisions among Muslims and Christians. However, in the course of the struggle against the British and the Zionists, Palestinians developed a sense of territorial identity on the basis of mass resistance to Zionism. In 1918, the Palestinian nationalists formed the first Muslim–Christian associations to protest against the Jewish national home. They were at first allied to the Syrian national movement and envisioned a single greater Syrian Arab state, but by 1920 Palestinian political activity had separated itself from the general movement. Led by the Nashashibi family, an alliance of mayors, landowners, and merchants formed the National Party (1923).The third Palestine Arab Congress set up the Arab Executive, which until the 1930s would be the principal representative for Palestinian Arab interests.

A Muslim movement developed in parallel with the nationalist movement. In 1922, the British established a Supreme Muslim Council to administer endowed funds and the appointment of Muslim functionaries. They appointed al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni to be the head of the council and Mufti of Jerusalem. Al-Husayni, who was also Syndic of the Descendants of the Prophet and patron of the

popular Nabi Musa festival, came to control both the Arab Executive and the Muslim Council. From these platforms, he attempted to arouse mass support by protesting the threat of Zionism to the holy places in Jerusalem. Al-Husayni sponsored a number of demonstrations: the Nabi Musa riots of 1920, a boycott of the legislative council campaigns, the anti–land-sale campaign, and the 1929 Wailing Wall riots. Al-Husayni perceived Palestine as a pan-Islamic cause.

The factional divisions, however, undermined the possibility of coordinated action. The Palestinian movement was also beset by Muslim–Christian tensions. Christians had a large stake in resisting Jewish colonization. They promoted the development of Arab nationalism and the formation of the Muslim–Christian associations. Christians were important for their potential ability to obtain support from the West, but Muslims found it threatening to see them taking an independent role, and Christians were suspicious of the emphasis placed on Muslim symbols. Christians did not participate in the 1929 anti-British and anti-Zionist riots.

Despite these handicaps, considerable progress was made in the 1920s. An ideology was formulated that defined the Arab nature of and the Arab right to Palestine. Islamic symbols of resistance to Zionism were mobilized. The Jerusalem notables emerged as leaders of the rural population and, despite religious tensions, Greek Orthodox Christians came to see themselves as part of the Palestinian Arab people.

The 1930s witnessed the beginnings of a mass movement. The basic tactic of the Palestinians was to refuse to cooperate with the British administration and to press the Arab cause by demonstrations, riots, and, eventually, guerrilla warfare. While the factional struggle between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis smoldered, the concept of direct mass action was fostered by militant youth groups such as the Young Men's Muslim Association under the leadership of Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam preached against British imperialism and Zionist settlement. He organized armed resistance cells to whom he preached a reformed Islam opposed to drinking, gambling, and prostitution. He also opposed popular religious

practices such as mourning and grave visitation, and the mingling of the sexes. His was a reformist, puritanical, populist, activist notion of Islam concentrating on the appeal to save the holy land. The concepts of *mujahid* (warrior for the faith) and *shahid* (martyr) were used to motivate popular participation. In the 1930s, when factional and kinship ties were all-powerful, and before the symbols of national ethnic identity had widespread appeal, only Muslim symbols could mobilize the Palestinian masses.

Al-Qassam and his followers played a large part in the Arab revolts of 1936–38. In 1935 and 1936, a national strike begun by the Higher Arab Committee spread to the countryside. Teachers, health officers, and other government officials propagandized the villagers. Throughout Palestine, Arab villagers, bandits, and volunteers from Syria and Egypt, operating without central direction, attacked government installations and Jewish settlements, attempting to overthrow British rule and stop Zionist colonization. These sporadic revolts were suppressed by the British in 1938. The Husaynis were removed from the Supreme Muslim Council; the Higher Arab Committee was declared illegal, and a British military administration was imposed.

From the late 1930s, however, in order to win Arab support for the impending war against Germany, Britain began to change its policy in Palestine. In a White Paper of 1939, the British decided to restrict Zionist immigration and land purchases. At the conclusion of World War II, Britain refused all but a very limited immigration of Jewish refugees, despite American and Zionist pressures. The Jewish reaction to this change of British policy was bitter. The rise of Nazism and the destruction of European Jews in World War II made Zionists determined to establish a Jewish state as a refuge for the survivors. In addition to the Haganah, the army of the Jewish colonists, Zionists created Irgun, a terrorist organization, to fight the British and the Arabs. The Palestinians also regrouped. At the end of World War II, al-Husayni returned from wartime exile in Europe to resume leadership of the Palestinian movement, and the League of Arab States, founded in 1945, took the initiative in defending the Palestinian cause.

Finally, in 1947, Britain resigned the mandate and the United Nations partitioned Palestine into two states – one Jewish and one Arab. The Arab League forcibly resisted the formation of a Zionist state, but in the war that followed the Zionists defeated both the Palestinians and the Arab states. Hundreds of Palestinian villages were destroyed, and under intense Israeli pressure a substantial portion of the Arab population of Palestine, over 700,000 people, was forced into exile. The Palestinians were scattered on the West Bank of the Jordan and in Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab states. Palestinians call this traumatic experience the *nakba*, the catastrophe. In 1948, the Zionists established the state of Israel. Transjordan absorbed the portions of Palestine west of the Jordan River and Egypt took control of Gaza. Though the Zionists had won the war and established the state of Israel, they could not win the peace. The Palestinians and the Arab states refused to acknowledge defeat. The masses of Palestinians in exile remained in refugee camps while Israel was unwilling to consider repatriation. (See Map 32a and 32b.)

Map 32. Arab–Israeli conflict: (a) UN Partition Plan, 1947; (b) Israel and the occupied territories, 1967.

The Palestinian movement and Israel from 1948 to the 1990s

Since 1948, the Palestinian struggle has gone through several phases. Until 1967, the Arab states took the lead in the campaign against Israel. They imposed a trade boycott, blocked passage through the Suez Canal for goods going to or from Israel, and launched guerrilla attacks. In 1956, Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, but were forced to desist by objections from both the United States and the Soviet Union. A decade of border clashes culminated in the war of June 1967, in which Israel won a rapid and complete victory over the Arab states, taking possession of Gaza and the Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Israel also won control of Jerusalem. Despite the Israeli victory, the struggle was not yet over. An artillery war with Egypt over the Suez Canal followed in 1969–70 and in October 1973

Egypt surprised Israel by an attack in the Sinai and fought another war to a stalemate. By this time, however, Egypt was maneuvering to back out of the conflict. In October 1977, Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem to offer peace. In 1979, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt and Israel and Egypt agreed to normalize relations. No agreements were reached concerning the Palestinians. This marked the end of the period of Arab state leadership in the name of the Palestinians.

From 1967, the Palestinians began to take leadership in their own cause and to convert the Arab–Israeli struggle into a Palestinian–Israeli struggle. They organized a Palestinian National Council and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO was a coalition. The largest group, al-Fatah, led by Yassir Arafat, an engineer trained in Kuwait, represented the Muslim- and nationalist-oriented segment of the Palestinian population, with aspirations to reconquer Palestine. Smaller, more radical Marxist–Leninist groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habash, and the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by Nayyif Hawatmah, advocated not only the restoration of Palestinians to their homeland, but the need for a revolutionary transformation of all Arab countries as a prelude to a showdown with Israel. Another important segment, Sa'iqa, was patronized and controlled by Syria. Furthermore, the competition among old Palestinian notable families, local bosses (*zu'ama'*), and clients of other Arab states also promoted factionalism. It was also difficult for the Palestinians to define their common identity because of divisions between Christians and Muslims, secularists and Islamists, and West Bank middle-class town populations living under Israeli occupation and lower-class Palestinians living in refugee camps.

Palestinians also suffered from difficult relations with their nominal supporters, the Arab states. Despite strong Arab sentiment in support of the Palestinian movement, the activities of the PLO were a threat to the legitimacy of established states. In 1970 al-Fatah in Jordan was defeated by the Jordanian army and forced to evacuate to Lebanon. When the PLO threatened to become dominant in Lebanon, it was suppressed by Syria. The Camp David accords of 1979 were another setback in Palestinian relations with Arab patron

states. They indicated the breakdown of Arab solidarity in the defense of Palestinian interests and the development of a counter-trend, as Arab states pursued their own interests regardless of the Palestinians.

Nonetheless, in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Palestinians made great gains for their cause. They carried on a sporadic guerrilla war against Israel. They won worldwide sympathy for their plight and fostered a shared national consciousness. Although Palestinian identity was primarily defined in nationalist and secular terms, Islam permeated Palestinian discourse through the use of such terms as *jihad*, *shahid* (martyr), *mujahid* (warrior for the faith), and holy land. These concepts have a specifically religious meaning, but merged into the secular nationalist vocabulary. Concepts such as *thawrah* (revolution) and *fidaʿi* (self-sacrificing resistor) defined national rights and dignity in words that implied redemption and resurrection. Islamic concepts helped articulate and mobilize the Palestinians for political struggle. As in the case of Arab nationalism generally, the Palestinians have acquired a secular identity while at the same time preserving Islamic loyalties as the basis of political solidarity.

By the 1980s and 1990s, Palestinian society was profoundly changed. A majority of Palestinians had left the camps, dispersed throughout the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas, acquired educations, and become a middle-class population of merchants, civil servants, and professionals. The Palestinian diaspora population was one of the most highly educated communities in the Arab world.

In the West Bank and Gaza, a younger generation of Palestinian notables came to power. The confiscation of lands by the Israelis, the entry of Palestinian peasants into the wage-labor market, and the growth of schools and universities all helped generate a larger educated, middle-class, and professional elite. These elites organized schools, social welfare agencies, agricultural relief societies, and the communal apparatus of a more organized, integrated, and nationalistic Palestinian community. The awakening in the West Bank and Gaza led in 1987 to the *intifada*, a campaign of strikes, demonstrations, riots, and stone throwing in protest against Israeli occupation, the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank,

taxation, and administrative harassment. Local businessmen protested against taxes and Israeli economic controls; street youths took the lead in calling for the formation of a Palestinian state. The new leaders, however, were divided between those with a secular nationalistic orientation and those with an Islamic religious orientation. The latter founded HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Palestinian opinion in the West Bank and Gaza generally split between those who favored compromise with Israel as a way of ending the occupation and those, usually the Islamists, who favored a continuing struggle for the liberation of all of Palestine.

The period between the June War of 1967 and the Gulf War of 1991 also saw major changes in the Israeli position. Under the government of the Likud coalition and Menachem Begin (1977–83), Israel expected to prevail by military superiority rather than political compromise. The Israeli victory in the 1967 war, the control of Jerusalem, and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza led to a rebirth of Jewish messianic hopes and a renewed desire to take over the remainder of Palestine. Strong movements emerged within Israel calling for the colonization and annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. By the 1990s, there were over 140 Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel expropriated land and water resources, employed Palestinians as workers, and provided most of the West Bank's imports.

In the 1980s, however, Israeli opinion divided over how to deal with the Palestinians. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush the PLO, but the continuing occupation of southern Lebanon and the rise of Hizballah made it costly for Israel in terms of soldiers' lives and political credibility. In the occupied West Bank, the Palestinian resistance, the *intifada*, though not militarily or diplomatically decisive, enormously increased the costs of the occupation, and raised tensions between the Israeli settlers on the West Bank and their supporters and the rest of the Israeli population. Finally, Israeli leaders became aware that the Palestinians did not constitute as grave a threat as the rising military power of Syria, Iraq, and Iran – which might threaten Israel with missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while Begin and his successor Yitzhak Shamir (1986–92) were committed to the expansion of Israeli settlements

and to the eventual absorption of the occupied territories, the Labor Party increasingly favored territorial compromise and a negotiated peace.

Toward a two-state solution?

The 1991 Gulf War provided a critical opportunity. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam Husayn allowed the United States to become the hegemonic power in the region, and the first Bush administration sought to resolve the festering Israeli–Palestinian problem. For the sake of unity, the Palestinians accepted Arafat and PLO authority, and Arafat declared his readiness to recognize Israel's right to exist within its pre-1967 borders. A formal peace conference was convened in Madrid in October 1991, and the PLO and Israel entered into secret negotiations. These led to the Oslo accords in September 1993. The Oslo accords provided for several stages of Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian empowerment. In the first stage, Israel would turn over control of Gaza and Jericho to Palestinian administration. This was to be followed by the election of a Palestinian authority. Israel was to further withdraw its military forces from the populated area of the West Bank, and the Palestinian authority was to take control of local matters such as education, culture, welfare, tourism, and police – though Israel retained ultimate military control. The two sides were then to negotiate a permanent settlement involving the return of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements, and Israeli military occupation.

Both sides were deeply divided about the wisdom of this agreement. Arafat and the PLO favored the agreement because it gave them control of Palestinian affairs and because, given the political and diplomatic realities, this was the only way to an eventual Palestinian state. The agreements allowed Arafat and the PLO to set up an authoritarian regime, built in part on the PLO militias and police, foreign aid support, favored business leaders, and the distribution of patronage to foster a political following. This regime was under strong pressure from the United States and Israel to suppress terrorism, i.e., attacks on Israel, as a condition for the implementation of the Oslo accords.

The Palestinian opposition denounced the agreement because it failed to give any assurances about the eventual status of Jerusalem and the return of the refugees. Palestinian intellectuals – and many younger-generation West Bank leaders displaced from power by the return of the PLO – also opposed the peace accords, which they saw as leading not to a Palestinian state but to a fragmented collection of Palestinian habitats under Israeli control.

The most important opposition movement was HAMAS. Allied to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, HAMAS was an Islamic reformist–political movement that provided political leadership, schools, and charities for its followers. It called for the formation of an Islamic state, in opposition to Arafat's secular Palestine, and for continued struggle against Israel, rather than recognition and acceptance. (See Illustration 25.)

Illustration 25. HAMAS posters for student council elections, al-Azhar University, Gaza. Courtesy of Jeroen Gunning.

In the 1990s, however, HAMAS and Arafat seemed to have reached an accommodation. HAMAS modified its opposition to the regime enough to participate in Palestinian Authority institutions and build up its social and educational services. The Palestinian Authority elections in 2006 showed HAMAS to be the largest party. Abu Mazen, the head of the PLO, remained president of the Palestinian Authority, but Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of HAMAS, became prime minister. Then, in June 2007, HAMAS seized complete control of Gaza after a brief battle with the PLO. Now the Palestinian territories were governed by different regimes. Despite repeated efforts to broker a common front, HAMAS and Fatah have been unable to overcome their rivalries and mutual suspicions. Furthermore, HAMAS would not recognize Israel and Israel would not deal with HAMAS. Israel attempted to strengthen the West Bank regime of Fatah by supporting its security forces and blockading Gaza to weaken HAMAS. In response to the provocation of rocket attacks from Gaza, Israel invaded the Gaza strip in December 2008–January 2009 with devastating force, killing nearly 1,500 Palestinians, displacing more than 50,000, and obliterating Gaza's infrastructure. The violence of the attack led to worldwide protests and eventually to a rupture in Israeli–Turkish relations.

Israel was similarly divided. While Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres and the Labor governments believed that agreement with the Palestinians would ultimately enhance Israel's security, Likud and the orthodox and nationalist right wing did not believe that the Palestinians genuinely intended to make peace. They pointed to continuing sporadic terrorist attacks and to the potential for a Palestinian state to be used as a frontline base for renewed Arab wars against Israel. They noted continued Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian hostility to Israel, and were convinced that Israeli security could only be assured by superior military power. In Israeli politics, these divisions produced a virtual stalemate. In November 1994, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish orthodox extremist.

Nonetheless, for a time it appeared that the peace process had taken hold. In 1994, Jordan made its own peace agreement with Israel, the culmination of a decades-long relationship marked by

shared interests in the division of water, the settlement of refugees, and the maintenance of a quiet border. Negotiations with Syria over the return of the Golan Heights and the ratification of peace were suspended in 1996, but President Asad was not provocative in his relations with Israel. Economic deals between Israel and the Gulf states went forward. In Israel, the religious parties, the settlers, and the Likud narrowly came to power in 1996 under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–99) and resisted further progress in negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel used the interim to expand settlements around Jerusalem by further confiscations of Palestinian land.

In May 1999, Israel elected a new Labor prime minister, Ehud Barak, who pledged himself to peace, security, an open and tolerant Israeli society, and a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian problem. In late 2000, however, negotiations between US president Clinton, Arafat, and Barak at Camp David collapsed. Israel offered to recognize a Palestinian state in about 90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza, sovereignty over some but not all of the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem, and administrative jurisdiction but not sovereignty over the Muslim holy places. These offers did not meet the Palestinian demands for a return to the June 4, 1967 borders, for a sovereign capital in Jerusalem and the holy places, or for a contiguous bloc of territory not partitioned by Israeli settlements, roads, and military zones. The Palestinians also demanded Israeli recognition of the right for refugees to return to all of Palestine, though with practical limitations. This was unacceptable to Israel. Instead of peace, a new wave of Palestinian resistance – the al-Aqsa *intifada* – broke out, and met with severe Israeli repression. The struggle escalated to Palestinian suicide bombings of Israelis and Israeli military occupation of West Bank cities. In the bitterness of renewed large-scale violence, the Oslo accords failed.

The twenty-first century virtually repeats the same story – military pressures and counterpressures, a succession of failed negotiations, and no resolution. The new century began with a series of failed diplomatic and political initiatives. In 2001, US president Bush and Israeli prime minister Sharon, for the first time, declared their support for an independent Palestinian state. In 2002, the Arab League, with

Saudi leadership, proposed an "Arab Initiative" that set out compromise terms for a peace agreement including a promise that all the Arab states would normalize relations with Israel. In 2003, the "Quartet," a committee representing the United States, Europe, and Russia, proposed a three-phase step-by-step route to a peace agreement. This was followed by the Geneva Initiative, a peace plan devised by former Israeli and Palestinian officials. These proposals all turned on variations of arrangements in which Jerusalem would be shared or divided among Israelis and Palestinians, adjustments of borders allowing large West Bank Israeli settlements to be included in Israel in exchange for lands in the Negev, and schemes for the limited repatriation and/or compensation of Palestinians. None of these proposals proved satisfactory to both sides.

From 2004 to 2007, Israel continued to change the situation "on the ground" by building more Zionist settlements and demolishing more Palestinian homes. Yassir Arafat died in 2004. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally withdrew Israeli settlements from Gaza in order to reduce the number of Palestinians under Israeli occupation and to reduce international pressures for the return of the West Bank. Israel began the construction of a lengthy security barrier to forestall terrorist attacks, but the barrier also incorporated more Palestinian West Bank land on the Israeli side. In 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to defeat Hizballah and to secure its northern frontier. Despite the devastation of Lebanon and the restraining effect, Hizballah remained a political power in Lebanon and a military threat to Israel.

A new phase of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian West Bank authority began in November 2007 and continued through 2008. In retrospect the two sides disagree as to what exactly was agreed upon, but it seems that Israel and the Palestinian Authority agreed to accept the 1967 borders with adjustments compensated by equal land swaps. Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would be under Palestinian sovereignty and the holy places under an international administration. The terms for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees are disputed but it seems that the president of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Mazen, and the Israeli prime minister,

Ehud Olmert, had agreed to a token return of some 30,000 Palestinians to their former homes in what is now Israel.

Israeli opinion was divided. Prime Minister Olmert believed that Israel's long-term security and identity as a democratic and predominantly Jewish state was threatened by the occupation of a large Palestinian population, and lay in withdrawal from the West Bank and the formation of two states. A new Israeli government elected in January 2009 repudiated the still unofficial agreement. His successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, rather than promote the resolution of the Palestinian–Israeli struggle, preferred to depend upon Israeli military power and the further spread of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. His terms for a peace settlement insisted on Israeli occupation of all of Jerusalem, no return of Palestinian refugees, and Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Given the large number of Palestinian citizens of Israel, this is an impossible condition for Palestinians to accept.

Israeli nationalists and orthodox nationalists are committed to the occupation of all of historical Palestine west of the Jordan River and are persuaded, pointing to HAMAS, that the Palestinians do not want peace in any case. Reciprocally, the Palestinians are also divided. Abu Mazen, the head of the Palestinian Authority, attempts to reach an agreement with Israel and to create a Palestinian state. HAMAS also wishes to reoccupy all of Palestine, and many – perhaps most – Palestinians, judging from Israeli settlements and territorial expansion, believe that Israel does not want peace. Both sides are divided between forces that favor and those that oppose an agreement.

Under the auspices of US secretary of state John Kerry negotiations resumed in 2013.

[1] Quoted in S. Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. 242.

Chapter 50 The Arabian Peninsula

For almost a millennium after the Arab conquests of the seventh century, the Arabian Peninsula was not integrated into the Middle East. Although the Arab conquests began a new era in Middle Eastern history, they left Arabia drained of much of its population and relegated to a politically marginal role in early Islamic history. Later, in the Ottoman period, Egypt and the Arab Fertile Crescent became provinces of the empire, but, with the exception of peripheral areas, Arabia did not. Unlike Egypt and the Fertile Crescent states, the peninsula was governed by family and tribal elites. Islam was a crucial factor in the unification of disparate clan and tribal groups into regional confederations and kingdoms. In the imamate of Yemen and the sultanates of Oman and Saudi Arabia, religion and state were closely identified. While the shaykhs of the Persian Gulf region did not formally claim charismatic religious authority, the rulers were considered the heads of the religion, responsible for the implementation of Islamic values. Throughout the peninsula, the *'ulama'*, whether Zaydi, Shafi'i, Ibadi, or Wahhabi, also played an important role as political advisors to rulers, administrators of judicial and educational institutions, and a source of moral advice and political legitimacy. Only since World War II has the peninsula become subject to the forces that have shaped the rest of the Middle East.

Yemen

Yemen has an exceptional position in the history of the Arabian Peninsula. Throughout their history, North and South Yemen had different regimes and different religious orientations. Since ancient times the south has been the center of an agricultural and state-organized society. The north has a tribal and pastoral population. Yemen was converted to Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet and was later absorbed into the early Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires.

In the late ninth century, like other regions far removed from Baghdad, northern Yemen became a center of Shi'ism. A Zaydi Shi'i dynasty ruled the region, with interruptions, from 893 to 1962.

Southern Yemen came under the influence of Egypt. First the Fatimids and then the Ayyubids established satellite states. The Rasulid dynasty (1229–1454) organized a strong central government and won the south over to Sunni Islam. The Ottomans occupied southern Yemen from 1539 to 1636, but the Qasimid branch of the Zaydi dynasty eventually expelled them and restored Zaydi rule. In 1839 Aden in south Yemen came under British rule, and in 1872 the Ottomans occupied the north. Yemen was divided between an Ottoman sphere of influence in the north and a British protectorate in the south. A treaty of 1911 confirmed Ottoman suzerainty, but divided administrative control between the Zaydi Imam in the highlands and the Ottomans on the coast. This corresponded to the division into Zaydi and Sunni spheres of influence.

With the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, Imam Yahya (r. 1904–48) won control over much of North Yemen. He governed in conjunction with the Zaydi *'ulama'*, officials, judges, teachers, merchants, and military officers. The Zaydi elite was divided into two groups: the sada' (*sayyids*), a landed aristocracy of descendants of the Prophet, and the quda', the descendants of early judges. In the Sunni parts of the country, the Shafi'i *'ulama'* held a similar position. Yemen in this period was isolated from the outside world; there were few contacts with the rest of the region and few secular schools. Every effort was made to preserve the traditional society.

Despite the efforts of Imam Yahya, in the 1940s social and ideological influences from other Arab states began to penetrate Yemen. Diplomatic, military, and economic contacts with other Arab states multiplied. In 1948, Egyptians were teaching in San'a', and after 1954 Yemeni army officers received training in Egypt. Yemeni merchants, workers, and students also went abroad. New ideas about constitutional authority and economic enterprise began to penetrate and Yemen went through the same process of political and ideological modernization as that experienced by Ottoman elites in the nineteenth century and other Arab elites in the early twentieth.

These changes led to the formation of rival cliques within governing circles who used ideological distinctions to justify their competition for power. There was a rapid succession of governments, coups, and civil wars. After several aborted coups, a federal union was formed between the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Yemen (1958–61). In 1962, an Egyptian-backed coalition of Zaydi army officers, Shafi'i merchants, and

tribal chiefs took power. The new regime was supported by an army from Egypt and was opposed by tribal groups backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Egyptians and the Saudis both withdrew from the conflict in 1967. After a succession of coups and governments ʿAbdallah Salih became president in 1978 and ruled until 2012.

Under Salih a new constitution defined a regime based on the army, tribal forces in the north, and Sunni elites in administration and business. The constitution made Islam the official religion of the country. The new state made Islamic law the law of the land and accepted Saudi help in creating a new school system. The authority of the Zaydi *ʿulamaʾ* was greatly reduced. The *sadaʾ* were delegitimized by the repudiation of hereditary elites and the *qudaʾ* dissociated themselves from Zaydism, professing Sunni loyalties or an undefined affiliation. Thus, Yemen combined an authoritarian military rule and administration, tribal autonomy and disorder, and a strong Sunni Muslim orientation.

South Yemen had a separate history. Aden came under British rule in 1839; in 1937 it was made a crown colony. The British protectorate included some twenty-three sultanates, emirates, and tribal regimes. Under British control, the traditional Arabian clan and religious communities remained intact. The sultans dominated the towns; the *sayyids* owned the land and served as mediators among the clans. Plebeian clans were organized into specialized agricultural, craft, and servant groups.

In Aden, nationalism began as a reaction against British rule. In the name of Arab nationalism and socialism, a resistance movement was founded by George Habash. From 1962 to 1967, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla warfare forced the British to withdraw. The National Liberation Front, supported by the South Arabian Federation Army, came to power and proclaimed the People's Republic of South Yemen. In 1969, the left wing of the National Liberation Front led by ʿAbd al-Fattah Ismaʿil took control of the government and changed its name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The new government replaced the traditional elite of tribal chiefs and Muslim religious teachers with a new generation of army officers and political activists. The new elite advocated a Marxist–Leninist ideology and organized a single party, the National Front, to control all other organizations in the country. Industry was nationalized, land ownership reformed, and feudalism and tribalism were condemned. Islam remained the state religion.

Union of the two Yemens

In 1990, the Popular General Congress of the north and the Yemen Socialist Party of the south agreed to unify the country. The union was motivated by the discovery of oil in the boundary region between the two Yemens, the declining position of the south due to economic hardship, the breakdown of its patron, the Soviet Union, and the threat to both of rising Islamic parties.

Unified Yemen is very poor. Its present population is about 24 million and grows at the extremely rapid rate of 3.5 percent per year. Oil was discovered in 1984; oil and gas constitute about 90 percent of Yemen's exports and more than 50 percent of state revenues. Other exports include cotton, coffee, and fish. Yemen imports machinery, cars, and consumer durables. Worker remittances made up one-third of exports until the 1990–91 expulsion of workers from Saudi Arabia. The underground economy in alcohol, guns, smuggled cars, and qat, a locally grown stimulant, is of huge importance. In the last decade, Yemen has become even poorer. Rapid population growth, declining oil revenue, and the distribution of incomes in favor of the rich have increased poverty among the masses of Yemenis. Water is in extremely short supply and much of it is diverted to growing qat at the expense of other agricultural products.

'Abdallah Salih became president of the unified Republic of Yemen. Salih's family dominated the important military and security positions. The first national elections in the unified Yemen were held in 1993. The principal contenders were Salih's party, the General People's Congress (GPC), the Islamic Islah Party, and the southern Yemeni Socialist Party. The GPC served as an umbrella organization to coordinate Salih's clients and officials and to manage the patronage system linking the major interest groups and prominent leaders through which he controlled the country. GPC membership extended to tribal elites, military officers, officials, religious leaders, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, merchants, and technocrats. The Islah Party was founded in 1990 as a coalition of the Muslim Brothers, Salafis, Islamist modernists, tribal chiefs, businessmen, technocrats, and the co-opted "men of the president." Islah advocated the enactment of Islamic law as the law of Yemen, and opposed socialism and popular Sufi Islam. Some of its more radical members may have been associated with Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network. The

Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), a secular leftist party, represented southern Yemeni interests.

The 1993 elections gave the GPC 123 seats, Islah 62, and the YSP 56. The GPC announced the formation of a tripartite government coalition. The tensions, however, between north and south, Islamist and socialists, led in 1994 to a nine-week civil war. The war resulted in the defeat of the south and gave the northern tribal elites control of the whole country. The YSP was decimated and many of its leaders were killed or exiled. In 1999, Salih was reelected. The opposition parties were not allowed to compete. In 2006, President Salih received more than 75 percent of the vote.

Gradually, however, the patronage regime unraveled as patronage was increasingly concentrated within the president's family, leaving out many important figures. The Islah Party has been excluded since 1994. Southern Yemeni leaders were not integrated into the system. Private-sector economic development also created a new stratum of young shaykhs outside the GPC. Moreover, ordinary Yemenis never benefited from Salih's patronage and instead suffered from the economic decline of the country. The GPC found it increasingly difficult to appease and mediate political, economic, social, and religious conflicts. In 2006, Hamid al-Ahmar, an important tribal and military leader, openly opposed the president by supporting an opposition candidate.

The weakening of governmental controls became evident in 2007. Sporadic civil warfare resumed in the north. The Shiʿi cleric and tribal chief Hussein al-Hawthi, who had criticized the government's pro-American policies, was attacked by Salih forces. In the south, secessionists denounced the 1990 agreements that unified the country as a form of northern imperialism and called for independence. In 2007 and 2008, militant jihadists attacked the government. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was formed in January 2009 by a merger between groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This group claimed responsibility for the 2009 attempted bombing of a US-bound airliner on Christmas Day. Government attempts to repress the militants only resulted in a dramatic increase in deadly attacks against Yemeni security forces and foreign diplomats. State repression and the radicalization of the militants generated a vicious circle of violence.

As in other parts of the Arab world, the outbreak of rebellions in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere prompted protests against the Salih

regime. These protests led to factional fighting among the Salih government, tribal forces, Islamists, and civil society youth. Salih had to step down after having been wounded in the fighting and forced to spend a long time in convalescence out of the country. On February 21, 2012 a new election, endorsed by both the followers of ʿAbdallah Salih and his opponents, elevated the only candidate, Vice President Abed Rabu Mansour Hadi, to the presidency. Salih will remain powerful due to his family and tribe and his support in the military. Whether a stable state can now emerge remains to be seen.

Islam and the state

Islamic movements play an integral role in Yemeni politics. Education, nationalism, and the rise of varied Islamic movements have attenuated the Zaydi–Shafiʿi distinction and have reduced the influence of the Sufi shaykhs. Still, religious movements continue to be important in national politics. The government has often included the Islah Party. Islamic movements, often financed by Saudi Arabia, have created a parallel education system, Islamic banks, and a propaganda network based on the distribution of audio and video cassettes. Jihadi movements such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have integrated themselves into Yemeni society through their involvement in local communities and their connections with tribes.

The state also has close ties with the Salafis, especially those associated with the Dar al-Hadith institute. This group supports the state by loyalty to the ruler and by advising political leaders, but attempts to transcend politics and avoid conflict among Muslims by not participating in elections or demonstrations. Other Islamic parties include the reformed Zaydi party, called the Hizb al-Haqq, which repudiates the imamate, and calls for a democracy and an elected ruler who is considered an *afir*, a hired servant. This party revives festivals such as Ghadir Khumm and the birthday of Zayd b. ʿAli. Religious groups in Yemen both support the state and limit the exercise of state power.

Saudi Arabia

In the eighteenth century, central Arabia became the domain of the Saudi kingdom and the Wahhabi movement. In 1745, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. Saʿud, the chief of a small tribal principality in north central Arabia, took up the

cause of a Hanbali preacher, Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhab (d. 1787). Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab had studied in Mecca, Medina, Damascus, and Basra, and returned to preach the reform principle: the Quran and the Prophet are the only valid Muslim authorities. Wahhabi reformism totally rejected belief in and veneration of saints or of any human being as a form of *shirk*, or polytheism. It rejected the common pantheistic types of Sufi theology and magical rituals. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's preaching was the first political expression of a religious tendency that would soon spread throughout Islamic India, Indonesia, and North Africa.

With the conversion of Ibn Saʿud, Wahhabism became the ideology of tribal unification. He and his successors waged war against the surrounding tribes, and became the spiritual and temporal chiefs of central Arabia. In 1773, they took Riyadh and made it their capital; in 1803, they captured Mecca. However, they were then defeated by Muhammad ʿAli of Egypt, who took control of Mecca and Medina in 1812 and destroyed the Saudi state in 1818. During much of the nineteenth century, the Saudis survived as a small tribal principality in the interior of Arabia, but in 1902 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. Saʿud II captured Riyadh, proclaimed himself Imam of the Wahhabis, and restored the Saudi kingdom. The principal instrument of his power was the Ikhwan – a non-tribal military corps, settled in agricultural villages, which fought and proselytized for the Wahhabi movement. Ibn Saʿud II succeeded in unifying the tribes of central and eastern Arabia, declared himself sultan of the Najd (1921), and proceeded to round out the boundaries of modern Saudi Arabia by treaties with Iraq (1922), Jordan (1925), and Yemen (1934). In 1925, he took control of the Hijaz and the holy places.

Table 17.   *Regimes of the Arabian Peninsula*

Persian Gulf				
Bahrain	**Kuwait**	**Oman**	**Central Arabia**	**Yemen**

Persian Gulf				
Bahrain	**Kuwait**	**Oman**	**Central Arabia**	**Yemen**
		Ibadi Imams, 796 to end of ninth century		
Qaramita (Qarmatians) 894 to end of eleventh century				
				Zaydi Imams (Sanʿaʾ); Rassid line ninth century to c. 1281; Sulayhids 1047–1158
		Ibadi Imams, eleventh century		

Persian Gulf				
Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Central Arabia	Yemen
				Rasuilds 1229–1454; Ottomans (South Yemen) 1539–1655; Zaydi Imams (Qasimid line) c. 1592–1962
		Bu Saʿidis, 1741 to present		
	al-Sabah, 1752 to present			
		Saʿid b. Taymur (1933–70); Qabus b. Saʿid (1970–)	Saudis 1746 Muhammad b. Saʿud 1765 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz b. Saʿud 1803 Saʿud b. Abd al-ʿaziz	Yemen Arab Republic 1962–90 and People's Republic of South Yemen 1967–69;

Persian Gulf				People's Democratic
Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	*Central Arabia*	Republic of Yemen 1969–90; Republic of Yemen 1990–
			1814 'Abdallah I b. Sa'ud 1818–22 Ottoman occupation 1823 Turki 1834 Faysal I (first reign) 1837 khalid b. Sa'ud 1841 'Abdallah II (as vassal of Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt) 1843 Faysal I (second reign) 1865 'Abdallah III b. Faysal (first reign) 1871 Sa'ud b. Faysal 1874 'Abdallah III (second reign) 1887 conquest by Rashidis of Hail, 'Abdallah remains as	

	Persian Gulf			
Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Central Arabia	Yemen
			governor of Riyadh until 1889	
			1889 ʿAbd al-Rahman b. Faysal,vassal governor	
			1891 Mahummad b. Faysal,vassal governor	
			1902 ʿAbd al-Aziz II	
			1953 Saʿud	
			1964 Faysal II	
			1975 Khalid	
			1982 Fahd	
			2005 ʿAbdallah	

The Saudi regime was based on a subtle combination of political and religious powers. The Saudi kings were tribal chiefs who ruled by maintaining alliances and marriage ties with the families of other chiefs. The army was made up of loyal tribes. At the same time they were religious rulers, committed to upholding the laws of Islam and protecting the pilgrimage and the holy places. The *ulama* of the country, largely the descendants of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, married into the royal family, were financially supported by the state, and had considerable influence in government circles.

The contemporary transformation of Saudi Arabia began with the issuance of exploration concessions to the Standard Oil Company in 1933 and 1939, and the discovery of oil. Oil production in Saudi Arabia began in earnest after World War II, but only after 1973 did the price revolution in oil bring in vast riches. An oil embargo was imposed in 1973 as an assertion of Saudi leadership in the Arab world and of resistance to Israel and to American influence in the Middle East. Since the 1970s, the Saudis have taken a long-term and moderate view of the political utility of oil. They see their own best interests as lying in cooperation with the oil-consuming powers of Europe, the United States, and Japan, and have favored moderate prices in the interests of global economic stability and prosperity.

Despite its oil wealth, water and food security is a critical issue. The country is the world's largest investor in desalination plants, but after twenty-five years of subsidizing wheat growing, Saudi Arabia recognized that it cannot provide its own food without quickly depleting its non-renewable water supply. It resumed importing wheat in 2009. To assure a stable food supply, Saudi Arabia is trying to decide whether to make long-term contracts with developed countries such as Canada and Australia or whether to buy land and farms in poor Third World countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Mozambique, and Ukraine. This has stirred a backlash in countries that fear a colonial-style land grab that would lead to the export of food crops even though they are not able to adequately feed their own populations.

The Saudi development budget reached 40 billion dollars in 1977 and 70 billion dollars in 1980, and led to important economic and social changes. Its programs led to the growth of cities, the construction of an industrial infrastructure, and a tremendous influx of foreign workers due to the lack of adequately educated and trained Saudi personnel. Palestinians were the chief immigrant group for professional work. Foreign workers also came from Yemen, Oman, Egypt, and Pakistan. In 2010, the population of Saudi Arabia was about 27.5 million, of whom 31 percent were non-nationals. About 85 percent of Saudis are Sunni, primarily Wahhabis; most of the rest are Shiʿis.

Another consequence of newfound wealth was the revolution in education. By 1980, there were approximately a million children in schools; by 1989, there were more than 2,500,000 students, of whom 1,160,000 were girls. There were about 100,000 students in local

universities, but many Saudis studied at universities outside the country. Numerous members of the royal family were educated at Western universities. Increasing numbers of Saudis were trained for technical work in the petroleum industry, commerce, agriculture, finance, communications, and the military, but critics say that Saudi education is not adequate to meet the demands of foreign competition. Saudi Arabia is characterized by restrictive labor regulations and a poor work ethic among the national labor force. In recent years, Saudi women have made up the majority of the national student body, but universities are segregated into male and female campuses. Facilities for women are sometimes inferior to those for men.

In the midst of these extensive economic changes, the Saudi state maintained its traditional political and religious authority and a conservative social and cultural environment. The Saudi regime is essentially an oligarchy run by a family council (*majlis*), which operates by consensus, but the regime is sensitive to the attitudes of leading bureaucrats, merchants, *'ulama'*, and Muslim activists. The Saudis maintain close family relations with important regional and tribal chieftains, and they appoint family members and loyal tribal chiefs to ministerial and administrative offices. State salaries and subsidies reach all sectors of the society. The regime has used its wealth to make clients of its own population. The tribal groups have been restructured by urbanization and by subsidized agriculture and state salaries. Even in periods of declining oil revenue, as in the 1980s and 1990s, the government has been reluctant to reduce these benefits lest it lead to political unrest.

Equally important is the continuing commitment to Wahhabism. Saudi society has been little affected by nationalism and secularism, and the Saudis cultivate their legitimacy by close attention to Islamic affairs and the enforcement of Islamic morals. The defining Saudi myth is that the ruling family is the protector of Wahhabi Islam and tribal values. The organization for "commanding the good and forbidding the evil" (the *mutawwi'in*) enforces Wahhabi concepts of morality. The successful organization of the pilgrimage is another important sign of Saudi legitimacy.

The *'ulama'* have a large voice in such matters as law and education. They control the Ministries of Higher Education, Information, Justice, Interior, and Waqf (charitable trusts), and Departments of Legal

Research, Propaganda, and Guidance and Public Morality, but their influence may not be as substantial as it sometimes appears. Even though many hold high positions within the government, issue *fatwas* (religious opinions) legitimating government policies, and influence legal and religious affairs, the *'ulama'* are generally not involved in national politics. Their power derives from their appointment by the king. They are part of the state bureaucracy and largely under the supervisory control of the government. They have little say in oil, economic, and foreign policy issues. The state does not tolerate an independent religious domain. Also, they face competition from the exposure of the society to new media.

Even in the critical realm of law, the state is encroaching on the preserve of the *'ulama'*. In a more complex global economy Islamic courts no longer seem sufficient to meet the country's legal needs. In 2007, King ʿAbdallah promulgated a codification of Islamic law and unified the Saudi court system. Islamic courts now exist alongside of and within a growing body of secular legislative enactments and administrative tribunals. The *'ulama'* have tried to resist the new legislation on the grounds that the ruler's legislative domain is limited to administration, foreign policy, and public order. For them, Islamic law has never been state law and is seen as a check on political power. Islamic law judges resist the incorporation of codified government law into their case-by-case jurisprudence.

The position of women is critical in how the West views Saudi Arabia. The control of women had become an antidote to the breakdown of the functions of the traditional family, to Westernization via the media, to the creation of a technically and administratively competent middle class, and to the disappearance of traditional village and market spaces in vast new urban constructions. The emphasis upon Wahhabi values, asceticism, and puritanism in public, and ever more concessions to scholarly demands for a stricter Wahhabi lifestyle, are shaping the Saudi nation. Sex segregation outside the home is more complete in Saudi Arabia than in any other Muslim country, and is sustained by state policy. Women can only be educated or work in sex-segregated places, which excludes them from many professions. In 1990, a *fatwa* that prohibited women from driving was made into a law by the Saudi Ministry of the Interior. In political crises such as those after the 1979 assault on the mosque in

Mecca or the Gulf War, these regulations were ever more intensively enforced.

However, there have been modest changes in women's rights in the past decade. Some studies and professions have opened up to women. Women can now apply for ID cards without male consent. There has been an increase in the number of Saudi women novelists and bloggers, through whom Saudi women's lives and opinions can reach the general public. A few leadership positions are open to women in the faculties of women's universities or women's campuses of mixed universities, as well as in the "women's department" of some newspapers. However, women were not permitted to vote or stand for office in the municipal elections of 2005; nor were they allowed to vote or stand for election in 2011.

Political and religious opposition

Potential political opposition exists in the new middle class of administrators, businessmen, skilled technicians, and workers who are crucial to the emerging modern economy, but who stand outside the status and political structure of the country. Saudi professionals have lobbied for political and civil rights, gender equality, government accountability, an independent judiciary, and the regulation of the Wahhabi religious establishment. In November 2003, King Fahd granted the *majlis al-shura* (the Consultative Council) the right to propose legislation without his permission. The first nationwide municipal elections took place in 2005; but the king declared that the Consultative Council would not be elected in the foreseeable future. Religious opposition comes from groups that have been disrupted by the breakdown of tribal society and by the growth of individualism attendant upon urbanization and economic and industrial change. Protests come from the northern Najd, tribes in Asir, members of the armed forces, and, most recently, from Islamic-educated but underemployed students and graduates.

Alongside the traditional Wahhabism, which is subservient to the state, there is a new Wahhabism that is critical of the state. A major trend in the 1990s was the increasing influence of non-establishment *'ulama'*, professors of Islamic studies, and graduates of Saudi universities. Al-Madina University became a center of Saudi neo-fundamentalism. The radical Islamic opposition denied the Islamic credentials of the regime and denounced it as a usurping and corrupt government using Islam for its own purposes. It questioned the morality of the rulers, and called for a

strict Islamic-law state. In the 1990s, the opposition was particularly critical of Saudi Arabia's close alliance with the United States, Western influences, and Western- and secular-educated technocrats. The Saudi opposition was particularly critical of the presence of US troops on Saudi soil after the First Gulf War. This was one of the motivations for the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the United States.

Violent jihadism was stimulated by the return of veterans from Afghanistan, the tensions of the Chechen war, the Kosovo crises, and the second Palestinian *intifada*. In 1979, the Masjid al-Haram, home of the Ka'ba, was attacked by militants. It was besieged for two weeks, hundreds of pilgrims were taken hostage, and hundreds killed. It was a turning point in Saudi policy, as the government decided to enforce a stricter religious code in order to retain its legitimacy in the face of an Islamic challenge. By mid-2008, the security forces had the upper hand and most of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's core members had been arrested or killed. Opposition also comes from Shi'i workers in Aramco factories and Shi'is in the eastern province. The biggest confrontation between the Saudi Shi'is and the state took place in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution, when Shi'is took to the streets to mourn the death of their martyrs, Hasan and Husayn – a practice forbidden by the Saudi state since 1913. The demonstrations were violently suppressed by the National Guard. Shi'i resistance then changed from violent confrontation to cultural resistance. Shi'is in London carried on a propaganda campaign against the Saudi state until 1993, when they made a deal to stop publication in return for the release of political prisoners. Abandoning Islamic revolutionary rhetoric, the Shi'i opposition now calls for democracy and pluralism, respect for human rights and religious and cultural diversity. During the Arab uprisings of 2011, the Saudi government repressed all expressions of Shi'i hostility, and continued in 2012 to clamp down on popular protests.

Despite this resistance, the Saudis seem to have absorbed massive economic, social, and educational changes within the political and cultural framework of tribal and Islamic legitimacy. In the 1950s and 1960s, modernization of the administration and expansion of education, harsh internal security laws, control over information, repression of organized opponents, and the beginnings of a mass welfare program helped diffuse and overcome some of this resistance. Middle-class nationalists were won away from pan-Arabism, Nasserism, and Ba'thism.

From the mid-1960s, there was a massive expansion of education and government bureaucratic employment. The new middle classes preferred personal wealth and achievement, and have not, despite repeated promises for the granting of an elected *majlis al-shura*, gained rights of political participation. The *'ulama'* have been assured that the Wahhabi character of the kingdom would be preserved, and the regime has steadily become religiously more conservative. The combination of religious identities and oil money has thus far, despite chronic latent tensions, served to maintain the regime.

Foreign policy

Internationally, the Saudis have cultivated an Islamic as well as an Arab national identity. Saudi foreign policy has been governed throughout by the concerns of a wealthy but small and vulnerable state for protection from regional dangers. The Saudis fear terrorist attacks and, at various times, possible Egyptian, Iranian, and Iraqi interventions. They fought a proxy war in Yemen against Egyptian forces from 1962 to 1967, warded off the threat of Iranian influence among the Shi'i populations of northeastern Arabia after the Iranian revolution, and turned to the United States for protection from Iraq during the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

In the 1960s and 1970s, King Faysal created new institutions to counter the influences of Arab nationalism and communism. The Muslim World League, founded in 1962, is aimed at preparing and educating preachers and imams in line with Wahhabi–Salafi teachings. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (1972), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (1972), and the International Islamic Relief Organization (1975) followed. The Saudi government also extended its influence in the Arab world through financial support to other Arab countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, and Syria. In cooperation with the United States, Saudi petrodollars also went to anticommunist causes in Angola, Zaire, Nicaragua, the Horn of Africa, and other places.

To strengthen the regime's Islamic credibility, Saudi Arabia sponsors conservative and militant Wahhabism. The Saudis support innumerable schools and colleges, publications and conferences, mosques and Islamic centers, and have helped foster a worldwide Wahhabi version of Islamic identity. The Saudis help finance the Salafi movement and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In Kuwait, the al-Islah Society, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, has strong Wahhabi inclinations. In Bahrain, the

three main Sunni societies – al-Islah, al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya, and al-Jamʿiyya al-Islamiyya – lean toward Salafi–Wahhabi teachings. Wahhabism was promoted in Yemen in the 1990s, which the Zaydis took as an attack on their religious and political identity. Saudi assistance also goes to universities in Malaysia, Niger, Uganda, Sudan, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Indonesia, and other places.

In Pakistan, Saudi Arabia financed Ahl-e Hadith groups who attacked Shiʿis. In Peshawar, there has been a vast expansion of schools from which Taliban and militants graduate to fight both in Afghanistan and against the Pakistani government. In India, the Saudis have funded the construction of Islamic university libraries and research centers. Wahhabism was first brought to Bosnia by volunteer fighters and missionaries who came to help the Bosnian Muslims in the Balkan civil wars. In consequence, Islamic sectarian and extremist political and religious views are being promoted worldwide. Saudi sponsorship is one of the sources of jihadism, paradoxically including the assaults on Saudi Arabia itself.

Apart from its sponsorship of Wahhabi and Salafi Islamic schools and movements, Saudi Arabia plays an important political and diplomatic role in the Middle East. It opposes the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and defends the Palestinian cause, but has also attempted to act as an intermediary and moderator. The Saudis prefer a comprehensive approach to Israeli–Palestinian negotiations that would involve all Arab states, rather than bilateral agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. In 2002, Prince ʿAbdallah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, advanced a peace plan that called for Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including areas of southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights. The Palestinian refugee problem would be resolved according to UN Resolution 194, which stipulates the return of refugees to their original homes or the payment of compensation to those who do not return. In return, all the Arab states would normalize relations with Israel. The plan was endorsed at an Arab League summit held in Beirut in March 2002, but Israel would not accept the condition on refugees. The Saudis have also supported insurgent movements in Kosovo, Kashmir, and Chechnya, and most extensively in Afghanistan.

The central Saudi political–diplomatic concern is the rising power of Iran. The Saudis see Iran as a challenge to their ambitions for regional supremacy and to the security and dominance of Arab Sunnis. They are

therefore opposed to Iranian-supported Hizballah in Lebanon, the regime of Asad in Syria, and Shiʿi factions and the government of Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq. They share American and Israeli concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

Saudi Arabia and the United States are locked in an intimate but mutually wary relationship. The Saudis depend upon American military and political support. They cooperated with the United States in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. They assisted in the deployment of American troops in defense of Kuwait in 1991. They have allowed American military bases in Saudi Arabia, and have pursued an oil policy that is reasonable to America and other industrialized societies. This ties the Saudis to a power that is widely hated in the Arab and Muslim world for its invasions of Muslim countries and support for Israel.

Conversely, the United States depends upon Saudi Arabia for its oil supplies, opposition to Iranian influence in the region, and a moderate approach to Israel. Yet Saudi and Gulf state charities and banks are also involved in supporting Islamic extremism. The United States is supporting a country that promotes an extreme form of Islam, hostility to Christians, Jews, Shiʿis, and others, and that sponsors schools from which the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan are recruited. Indirectly the Saudis promote a religious and political atmosphere that underlies jihadism and the al-Qaeda networks. This "Faustian pact" between the United States and Saudi Arabia is based on America's need for oil and Saudi Arabia's need for security. (See Map 33.)

Map 33. Arabia and the Persian Gulf, c. 1974.

The Gulf states

The history of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf region, like that of Yemen and central Arabia, depends on the union of political and religious authority as the basis of tribal unification. In the Gulf region, the earliest known history is that of Oman. In pre-Islamic times Oman was part of a Sasanian commercial network that reached India. Commercial profits were invested in an Iranian type of qanat irrigation, and Oman became a highly agricultural society. The Arab conquests, however, introduced a large pastoral population. In 796, Oman came under the rule of Ibadi Imams who managed to contain tribal rivalries, defend agriculture, and integrate the nomadic and settled populations. Under Ibadi leadership, Omanis founded commercial colonies in Basra, Siraf, Aden, and India, and traded on the east coast of Africa. At the end of the ninth century the Ibadi state and Omani commerce collapsed, and Egyptian-sponsored Red Sea routes took over the bulk of the Indian Ocean traffic. Oman, however, revived in the middle of the eleventh century when a second imamate was founded, and a social system was created that lasts to the present day. Cultivators accepted a tribal concept of social organization, and thus

were integrated with pastoralists into a single society. Ibadism became a full-fledged Muslim school of law, regulating personal and family behavior and political institutions. In the Ibadi system, the Imam is nominated by the elders of the community, and holds power insofar as he upholds the divine law and maintains the confidence of his electors. The imamate was thus a tribal state integrated by religious authority.

Oman's prosperity was revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when Omanis drove the Portuguese out of East Africa and the sultans of the Bu Saʿid dynasty established their own trading network. Oman regained control of Zanzibar and other East African towns. Zanzibar became a separate state in 1856. The Bu Saʿid dynasty continues to rule Oman (and Muscat) to the present day.

In other parts of the Gulf, a new political system took shape at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1752, Sabah b. Jabr of the Banu ʿUtub became the first ruler of Kuwait and established the dynasty that rules Kuwait today. The al-Sabah family also assisted in the establishment of another branch of the ʿUtub, the al-Khalifa, in Bahrain. Kuwait was and is a tribal state, a commercial entrepôt at the head of the Gulf and an important rival of Basra and other Gulf ports. By the end of the eighteenth century, Britain had become the dominant power in the Gulf region and paramount over the small tribal regimes. In 1798, the British made the first of a series of treaties to protect British shipping in the Gulf and to install British political agents. British treaties with Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the smaller "Trucial" states helped to strengthen the tribal rulers. British influence remained predominant until 1961, when Kuwait became fully independent. In 1970 and 1971, when Britain left the Gulf region, the Trucial states were severally reconstituted as members of the United Arab Emirates.

The modern transformation of the Gulf region began with the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932, though production did not get under way in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar until after World War II. Oil was found in Abu Dhabi in 1958 and in Sharja in 1973. The vast increase in oil revenues after 1973 had the same effects in the Gulf as it has had in Saudi Arabia. Oil changed the distribution of power in Gulf societies. It allowed for the formation of large bureaucratic states and made the rulers independent of the merchant elites with whom they had long collaborated. Rulers bought off merchant claims to political power; they assured them their money, but cultivated their own families as allies and distributed patronage benefits

to the populace to wean them from client ties to the merchants. Shaykhs became chiefs of departments and sons of merchants the next rank in the new bureaus.

The Gulf has become a highly urbanized area; the majority of the population lives in cities, including a large number of Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Pakistanis, who account for as much as half, and in some places even three-quarters, of the population. The Gulf states remain small tribal principalities in which the superstructure of modern industry is carried by foreign laborers and administrators.

Throughout the Gulf region modernization is in the hands of traditional monarchs and tribal chieftains. A patrimonial political structure is joined with a liberal, pro-business economy. Nationalism has had relatively little impact in this area, and there are only sporadic pressures for inclusion of larger elements of the population in the political process. Councils with advisory powers have been created; there is a slow, top-down effort to increase the rights of women. Arabism as well as Islamic identities are stressed as the basis of social cohesion and political legitimacy.

Oman

In 1955, Saʿid b. Taymur (1932–70), with British help, brought the whole country under his control. His narrow and tyrannical rule prompted several opposition movements. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman was formed in 1965 by embittered students; the Dhofar Liberation Front organized resistance in the personal estates of the sultan, but was defeated with Iranian help. Until 1970, Saʿid b. Taymur was able to maintain control of the country owing to his British-officered army and the complete isolation of Oman from the outside world.

In 1970, his son, Qabus b. Saʿid, seized power in a palace coup. However, he did not change the government. The army is made up of Baluchi regiments and northern tribes, and leading tribal shaykhs and merchants have been incorporated into the regime. The commercial elite controls oil, finance, and commerce, and the country has a more laissez-faire economy than other Gulf states. Tribal elites administer social programs. A *majlis al-shura* (consultative assembly) was appointed in 1990. In 2002, the sultan extended voting rights to all citizens over twenty-one except the military and security forces. The *majlis* is primarily

an advisory body, and the sultan remains an absolute ruler with final authority over the promulgation of laws and decrees.

Kuwait

Kuwait is a tribal state ruled by the al-Sabah family. Kinship and religious culture remain the bases of legitimacy. The secular and national aspects of Arabism are strongly present, but Islam remains the basis of law. A parliamentary and constitutional regime was introduced between 1962 and 1967, but was only fitfully implemented. Parliament was dissolved in 1976–81 and in 1986–92. In 1992, parliament was reconvened, but the electorate was restricted to families resident from 1920 to 1959, qualifying only 80,000 voters out of a potential 600,000 Kuwaiti men. When in session the National Assembly, which includes bedouin chiefs, Islamists, progressives, and Shiʿis, is used by the al-Sabahs to counterbalance the power of merchant elements. The al-Sabahs alternate periods of open discussion and assembly with police crackdowns. While journalists and academics are largely free, broadcasting, newspapers, and NGOs require government licenses. Union activity and organizing of any sort is closely controlled.

In November 2000, the assembly rejected a government proposal to grant women full political rights. Sunnis and tribal leaders opposed the government initiative, while Shiʿis, government officials, and liberals favored it. In 2005, parliament finally amended the constitution to grant women full political rights, and the first woman cabinet minister was appointed in June. Women did not win any parliamentary seats in the 2006 Kuwaiti elections.

Petroleum and petrochemicals provide 90 percent of Kuwait's government revenues and exports and 50 percent of its GDP. Foreign workers are essential in the labor force. In the 1990s, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Filipinos and others replaced the Palestinians who had been deported by the Kuwait government for supporting Iraq in the Gulf War. In 2000, 57.9 percent of the population were migrants; about 30–45 percent of the Muslim citizens were Shiʿis.

Per capita income has dropped steadily since the 1970s due to oil-price declines and population growth, but the great wealth of the country – in 1998 the per capita income was equivalent to over $22,000 per year – has been used to establish an extensive welfare system. The state

subsidizes utilities, health care, housing, telecommunications, and education, and guarantees government employment. Islamic banking – characterized by leasing, installment sales, deferred payment sales, and equity investments – is strong in Kuwait and Bahrain. Kuwait suffered extensive damage to its oilfields in the Gulf War of 1991, but it has recuperated rapidly.

Since 2000, there have been sporadic movements within Kuwait aimed at reforming or overthrowing the government. Kuwaitis have staged protests in parliament and agitated for more representative governance.

Bahrain

Bahrain is also a traditional chieftainship, ruled since 1782 by the al-Khalifa family. Here the ruling family represented commercial and pearl-fishing interests, but not the pastoral population. The political elite of Bahrain included not only the ruling family, but also merchants and religious leaders. Bahrain had numerous political clubs and professional societies and a fairly strong union movement. Thus when it became independent in 1971 it had a historical basis for a fairly sophisticated political system. A constitutional assembly was convened in 1973, granted by the al-Khalifa family to its subjects in accord with the Islamic principle of consultation. The assembly, however, was suspended in 1975 when it threatened the dominance of the ruling amir. In 2002, the Bahraini constitution was amended to make the emirate a hereditary constitutional monarchy. Bahrain was renamed the Kingdom of Bahrain, and Shaykh Hamad became King Hamad. A bicameral legislature has one elected chamber and one appointed by the king. Under the new constitution, women have the right to vote and run for public office; in 2004, a woman was made minister of health.

The critical feature of Bahrain's political life is the division between the Sunni governing elites and the majority Shiʿi working population. The Shiʿis are discriminated against in employment; much of the workforce comes from Iran, India, Pakistan, Korea, and other countries. The al-Khalifa regime has also deliberately built up Sunni Pakistani, Syrian, Yemeni, and Jordanian security forces to the extent of reducing the proportion of Shiʿis in the population from approximately 70 percent to 55 percent. A Shiʿi uprising from 1994 to 1996 was crushed by the military. Bahraini Shiʿis opposed the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. In 2005, they demonstrated on behalf of a fully elected parliament and in protest of

high unemployment. During the Arab revolts of 2011, Shiʿi protests were suppressed with the help of Saudi military intervention. The sectarian divisions have become so deep that Bahrain may be unable to reconcile its conflicting populations.

Qatar

Qatar has a political history similar to that of Kuwait. Qatar exports oil and is the world's largest producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas. In pre-oil days, the ruling shaykh depended on revenues from the merchants, but the discovery of oil enabled him to dispense with their support. Qatari workers came from nomadic, slave, and pearl-diving backgrounds, and were factious and prone to strikes. A Qatari national consciousness has emerged, partly fostered by government patronage for historical studies and archeology. The amir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, however, has not been able to control the bureaucracy; family members in office have created their own partially independent fiefdoms within the government apparatus.

In 2003, voters approved a constitution establishing an advisory council (*majlis al-shura*), with the power to pass laws, subject to the amir's approval. In 2004, Amir Hamad granted workers the right to unionize, banned work by children under sixteen, and established an eight-hour work day and equal employment rights for women. Women have the right to vote and hold office. Nonetheless, the Qatari state remains basically autocratic.

As a small and rich state, Qatar tries to play the role of go-between and mediator. Qatar's post–Gulf War security is based on US protection, but Qatar supports Iran in the UN and advocates a peaceful resolution to the issue of Iran's nuclear development. In 1996, Shaykh Hamad financed Al-Jazeera, the Middle East's first independent broadcasting station, which has become the principal news agency for the Middle East region. Qatar mediates between Palestinian factions. It was the only Gulf state to have official relations with Israel, but after the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2009, Qatar favored HAMAS, pledged reconstruction aid to Gaza, and broke off formal relations with Israel. It plays an increasing role in supporting the Syrian opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Asad.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was formed from the small Trucial states after the British withdrawal in 1971. Abu Dhabi is the principal state in the federation, along with Dubai, Sharja, Ajnan, Umm al-Qaywayn, Fujayra, and Ras al-Khayma. The population of the UAE is estimated to be more than eight million, of which less than 20 percent are UAE citizens. The native population is predominantly Sunni.

State authority rests on the military, and control of oil revenues and patronage. The UAE has built up an administrative apparatus for finance, justice, police, and public services. As an oil-rich union it has only recently moved away from a rentier mentality, comfortable with its oil revenues, to a development model promoting investments. Dubai, with its skyscraper skyline, luxury real estate, financial institutions, office facilities, airports, malls, and tourism, has become the exemplar of the new economic orientation. The 2008 financial crisis, however, has been a costly setback to Dubai real-estate construction.

Considerable technical and economic change, a high degree of urbanization, and large numbers of foreign workers have thus far been absorbed without affecting the basic political and cultural character of the Gulf regimes. Just as the Saudi regime has maintained its traditional position in the face of extensive changes, the Gulf states also show a surprising continuity of political leadership and Islamic loyalty. In these Arab countries, whose institutional heritage is tribal rather than Ottoman, secular national elites and ideologies have been suppressed.

Arab states, nationalism, and Islam

Relationships among state organizations, Arabism, and Islam are elusive. In the Arab Fertile Crescent, the quest for national identity and the struggle for political power has for over a century been conducted in terms of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism was born before World War I in the literary revival of the Arabic language, the revival of Arab identification with the glories of the Islamic past, and the anti-Turkish political ambitions of Arab intellectuals. Arabism rather than Islam became the dominant discourse, displacing the traditional vocabularies of political affiliation and political action.

In the colonial period, Arab nationalism became the shared ideology of both the political elites and the opposition intelligentsias. The

coalescence of ideologies was based on the shared desire for independence, the need to integrate non-Muslim minorities into the political system, and the awareness of the need for a modern national form of political identity corresponding to actual state structures. After World War II, Arab identity became the basis of political goals such as anti-imperialism, struggle against Israel, and the formation of governments. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the two crucial themes in Arab nationalist thinking were the struggle for unity and socioeconomic development. At this stage socialism generally became a part of Arab nationalist ideologies.

In the colonial era, Islamic reformism and modernism were subsidiary currents. In Syria, the Salafi movement was interpreted in a conservative sense by Rashid Rida (d. 1935), the foremost of Muhammad ʿAbduh's disciples. Rida, like ʿAbduh, held that the Quran and the teachings of Muhammad were the sole bases of Islam, but rather than stress the implications of this view for modernizing reforms, he emphasized opposition to Shiʿism and to Sufi shrines. In Rida's view the crucial goal of an Islamic restoration was a polity headed by a caliph and advised by the *ulama*, which would revise the law of Islam in accordance with contemporary needs. Rida stressed the importance of jihad – moral striving for purity and self-perfection – as the basis of loyalty and sacrifice for the common good. Other disciples of ʿAbduh stressed the modernist implications of his teachings. They emphasized the importance of science and the legitimacy of social change. For the modernist writers, Islam was accepted as a true religion, but not as a touchstone for the development of a scientific civilization.

The trend toward secularism and nationalism goes back to the weaknesses of the *ulama* in the nineteenth century. In the Arab world, as in Egypt and Turkey, resistance to secular trends generally came from lower-ranking religious functionaries such as prayer leaders, preachers in the smaller mosques, court clerks, notaries, Quran-school teachers, and above all students in the religious colleges. In rural areas, leadership sometimes came from Sufi shaykhs or independent preachers. This opposition proved ineffective. With the establishment of independent states after World War II, secular legal and judicial institutions displaced Islamic law. New penal and civil codes were introduced and a dual system of state and Islamic courts was established in Syria and Iraq. Even when Islamic legal principles continued to be accepted, they were

profoundly modified by new legal procedures. Eclectic combinations of Islamic law codes and Western legal criteria for evidence, cross-examination, and appellate jurisdiction changed the actual administration of Islamic law in modern nation-states. The effect of legal reform was to accept the Islamic modernist view that the law is not eternally fixed and that it is subject to reformulation in terms of contemporary circumstances and state interests. The dilution of traditional Islamic legal principles and the substitution of new law codes and court systems was perhaps the single most important index of the disestablishment of Islamic law in the public life of Arab states.

Despite the disestablishment of religion and the dominance of Arab nationalist sentiment, Islam continued to play a substantial role. Arab national consciousness was still bound up with Islam. Arab nationalist thinkers of the 1920s and 1930s stressed the close identification of Arabism and Islam. The vocabulary of Arab nationalism was infused with words such as *umma* (community of Muslims) and *milla* (religious community), which have strong religious overtones but were used to express national solidarity. Even Christian writers considered Arabism and Islam to be two expressions of the same ideal. They stressed the glory of Muhammad as a heroic leader and praised his contribution to Arab nationality, but they maintained that national ties should transcend religious ties and advocated the formation of secular states. The common people followed the nationalist thinkers in identifying the Arab nation with Islam. For them, to be an Arab was still primarily to be a Muslim. The rhetoric may have been nationalistic, but the emotional identifications were Islamic.

Islam continued to be important in ostensibly secular Arab movements. It was crucial in the mobilization of Palestinians in the 1920s and 1930s to resist British rule and Zionism; the Muslim attachment to Jerusalem remains a source of worldwide support for the Palestinian movement. Saudi support for the Palestinian cause does not distinguish Arab and Muslim interests. In the postwar era, Arab constitutions often declared Islam the official religion of the state or required the head of state to be a Muslim.

At the end of World War II, pan-Arabism became the dominant political and cultural trend. The driving ambition in the region was to achieve the long-awaited unity of Arab peoples, dedicated to eliminating Israel and avenging the defeat of 1948. In the 1950s, pan-Arabism became a

symbol of opposition to the elites of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. Nasser of Egypt, the Baʿth parties in Syria and Iraq, and Palestinian factions all proclaimed themselves custodians of the Arab dream, and fought against each other as much as they cooperated.

The 1967 war with Israel shattered this conflicted dream and opened a new cultural and political phase. Egypt gave up the struggle on behalf of the Palestinians. Egyptian leadership in the Arab world faded, and the initiative passed to Iraq, Iran, and the oil-producing Arabian states. The Palestinians organized to defend their own cause. Syria, though maintaining its verbal profile as a leader of the anti-Israel movement, maneuvered carefully to avoid direct conflict with Israel. Lebanon collapsed into civil war over the question of whether the Palestinians could use Lebanon as a base for their operations. Pan-Arabism receded and a new mood of national state assertion took hold. The more conservative Arabian Peninsula and Gulf states became ever more important in Arab affairs as investors and patrons of the less wealthy Arab states. Arabism came to be identified with oil wealth. The Gulf War of 1991 completed the disintegration of the pan-Arab dream. While Saddam Husayn hoped to make himself the hegemon of the Fertile Crescent and a dominant voice in Arab affairs, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states allied with the United States and the United Nations to defeat him and force his evacuation from Kuwait.

As pan-Arabism weakened, it became evident that despite their nationalist, socialist, and populist rhetoric, most of the Fertile Crescent and Arabian states were authoritarian family or military regimes. Countries such as Iraq and Syria were ruled through military, security, and party structures that were anchored in some small minority – families, clans, tribes, or sects. Others such as Egypt and the Palestinian Authority depended on military and security forces and a dominant political party, and were not based on political coalitions within their societies. Rather, they ruled by appeasing rural and traditional elites, supporting crony capitalists, and creating extensive patronage networks. In the cases of Egypt and Jordan, military rule was offset by plebiscitary popular support and quasi-parliamentary institutions, which were closely controlled by the governments.

The economies of these states reinforced their political institutions. In these countries, the public sector dominated. Most of these states lived on rents, oil, or strategic remittances, and therefore neither taxed their

citizens nor represented them. Rentier states commonly used their resources to create alliances of business and administrative and even tribal elites, and to provide welfare subsidies for the mass of their populations in order to win their acquiescence to undemocratic regimes. In most of these states, potential capitalists were tied to the public sector or to political networks. Bank lending was the predominant source of capital, and banks were often government owned or regulated. Property was not secure, thus discouraging both foreign and domestic investments. Military regimes resisted the free flow of information and repressed the middle classes, politicians, and intellectuals who might have created an independent civil society. On the United Nations Human Development Index, which includes education, literacy, life expectancy, and per capita income, the Fertile Crescent Arab countries fall below Latin America and Asia.

In the Arabian Peninsula, the dominant elements are extended families: the Saudis; al-Sabahs in Kuwait; and al-Khalifas in Bahrain and Qatar. These families have been in power, with some interruptions, since the middle of the eighteenth century, and are among the oldest governments in the world. They rule with the support of tribal coalitions and merchant elites. Culturally conservative, they have avoided the challenges of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism; the Saudis in particular sponsor Islamic movements worldwide. By their financial contributions to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians, they manipulate Arab political currents to maintain their security.

A critical problem everywhere is the fit between national identities and national states. There is a deep ambiguity in the meaning of ethnic and national identity. National or ethnic identity is blended with religious identity. Turks, Iranians, Kurds, Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and others believe themselves to belong to the same nation because they have Islam in common. While Islam is universal and the shared religion of peoples of many different ethnicities, it is most intensely expressed in its local and national versions. Conversely, Arab identity is transnational and not localized in any particular state, and thus overlaps with some two dozen state identities.

Moreover, Arab states have profound internal divisions. Iraq has a large Kurdish minority and the Arab population is divided among Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims – a distinction at least as important as Iraqi national or pan-Arab identity. Syria is largely Arab, but this belies the sectarian and

religious distinctions among Sunnis, Isma'ilis, 'Alawis, Christians, and Druze. Lebanon may be Arabic speaking, but its fifteen-year civil war makes clear the depth of sectarian divisions among its Muslim and Christian subcommunities. The Gulf states are defined as Arab, but the noncitizen populations are often the majority. For example, some 80 percent of the population of the United Arab Emirates, 66 percent in Qatar, 60 percent in Kuwait, and 20 percent in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are guest workers, including military, medical, engineering and administrative specialists, teachers, bureaucrats, and skilled workers, and masses of manual laborers.

The implied Muslim identity of Arab-world states also makes for grave complications in the position of the minorities: Jews and Christians in post-independence Iraq; Copts in Egypt; and Christians and animists in the Sudan have all suffered religious and political persecution.

The failure of these regimes to create a coherent national identity and to win legitimacy helps account for the most important trend of the post-1967 era: the movement away from secular nationalism, liberalism, and socialism toward Islam. The 1967 war with Israel and the oil embargo of the 1970s were important turning points. The defeat of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent Arab states exposed not only their military limitations, but highlighted the corruption of the regimes, their dependence on the United States, their failure to allow political participation or to achieve economic development, and their lack of cultural authenticity. The dramatic impact of the 1973 oil embargo turned attention to Saudi Arabia and the conservative Arab states.

These events discredited the secular, liberal, and socialist claims of the dominant elites, and started a revival of interest in Islam. In all sectors of society, but especially among students and the lower middle classes, a new interest in the teachings and practice of Islam became evident. Young women began to wear the headscarf (hijab). Books on Islam, preaching, discussion groups, and prayer became more a part of everyday culture.

Most striking was the emergence of an active political opposition based on Islamic claims. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Jordan, the Jama'at in Egypt, HAMAS among the Palestinians, and other militants opposed the rule of the entrenched elites. These were communalist movements that espoused traditional moral and social values and that organized worship, instruction in schools, cooperatives, clinics and

workshops, and neighborhood and social welfare services. They called for economic fairness, the reinforcement of the family, and ultimately the formation of Islamic states. Their goal was to inculcate Muslim virtues in individuals and justice in society. These movements were not antimodern so much as a populist alternative to state capitalist societies.

In general, the supporters of these movements were people excluded from social and political power: *Bazaaris* – merchants, shopkeepers, peddlers, artisans working in the old-fashioned economy of the bazaars, without government connections or access to international trade; *maktabis* – clerks, teachers, and minor bureaucrats without the educational opportunities to be integrated into the modernized sector of the economy; students; deracinated migrants from villages to shanty towns in the big cities. Their protest was not only political, but also stemmed from moral confusion in face of the sexual liberty and consumerism offered by contemporary societies, and thus appealed to myriads of people fearful of the empowerment of women and children and the breakdown of families.

These movements pursued their goals on various levels attuned to the context, opportunities, and problems of each different national society. In Jordan, they created a parliamentary party; in Egypt, a plethora of small groups pursued objectives ranging from moral education to terrorism. In Syria and Iraq, political defiance led to crushing defeat. In Palestine, HAMAS functions as a competing social movement, a political opposition to the PLO regime and a guerrilla operation against Israel. In Lebanon, active Shiʿi movements, Amal and Hizballah, are competitors for political power.

So far the radical Islamist movements have made only limited gains in the Fertile Crescent and Arabian countries. Only in 2011 and 2012, due to massive uprisings in many Arab countries, have some old regimes been undermined. Islamist parties participating in elections have won majorities in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. These parties no longer bear revolutionary goals but participate in democratic elections within the national state framework. Their opponents, however, fear that they intend to impose a radical Islamist agenda. The struggle for power among still-powerful old elites, military forces, Islamists, and new secular–leftist movements continues.

Chapter 51 North Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

The modern history of Arab North Africa parallels the history of the Arab Middle East. By the nineteenth century, North Africa was substantially Muslim. Sufism played a large part in the organization of rural communities, and states were legitimized in Islamic, rather than patrimonial, cosmopolitan, or ethnic terms. The urban populations were Arabic in speech and culture, although in the southern, Saharan, and mountain regions, Berber was the common language and the basis of social identity.

In the pre-modern era, there were considerable variations in the social and political structure of each region and state, but in each one, lineage communities were the basis of society and pastoralists were an important social and political force. Under Ottoman suzerainty, some consolidation took place, but Libya had no central government and the Tunisian and Algerian states did not extend to the whole territory of each country. Morocco maintained a central state by emphasizing the Islamic credentials of its sultans. Islam played a crucial political role both in the integration of tribal communities and the legitimization of regimes.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the North African states were becoming more centralized and more rigorous in exacting taxes, but increased taxation provoked widespread tribal and Sufi-led resistance. European economic competition further weakened the already tenuous hold of the North African states over their rural populations, and they all succumbed to European domination. The French invaded Algeria in 1830, and established protectorates in Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912. Libya was invaded by Italy in 1911. The imposition of foreign rule led, as in the Middle East, to profound changes in the structure of these societies, and eventually to the emergence of independent nation-states.

Algeria

The French occupation

Algeria on the eve of the French conquest was governed by a regime that in many ways resembled those of Iraq and Syria. From the sixteenth century, a small force of janissaries organized the state and gave Algeria its territorial identity, but most of the country was ruled with the collaboration of tribal chiefs and Sufis who gathered their supporters on the basis of kinship or religious loyalty. By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Algerian regime was in decline and the major Sufi brotherhoods, in reaction to fiscal burdens imposed by the central government, were in sporadic revolt.

In 1830, the government of Charles X, prompted by the need for a military victory to restore its political prestige after setbacks in the Greek war for independence, and supported by Marseilles' commercial interests, invaded Algeria. The French occupied Algiers and other coastal towns. However, the defeat of the Turkish administration allowed a new Muslim state to emerge in western Algeria. In 1832, ʿAbd al-Qadir, whose father was head of the Qadiriyya order, declared himself Commander of the Faithful and Sultan of the Arabs, applied Islamic law, and fought the French. He maintained the image of an ascetic Sufi; abstaining from alcohol, modest in dress and manner, he emulated the Prophet. On the basis of his religious prestige and the propaganda of the Qadiriyya order, most of the regional tribes accepted his authority.

ʿAbd al-Qadir developed a hierarchical administration. He appointed deputies (*khalifa*) with combined military, financial, and judicial authority. Beneath the deputies were lieutenants (*agha*), whose duty was to collect taxes. Below them were the *qa'ids*, who were chiefs of the tribes. ʿAbd al-Qadir chose his officials from important religious families and avoided using the people who had cooperated with the Turks. Alongside the state administration he organized a standing army.

From 1832 to 1841, ʿAbd al-Qadir alternately waged war and made peace with the French as part of a complex struggle for the loyalty of the Algerian tribes. In 1841, however, a new French general, Bugeaud, decided to crush the resistance, and open Algeria to French colonization. The Moroccans intervened to protect ʿAbd al-Qadir, but they were defeated in 1844 at the Battle of Isly. In 1847, ʿAbd al-Qadir was deported to France, and then to Damascus. The way was open for complete French control of Algeria. Between 1851 and 1857, the French occupied the Kabyle and moved into the Sahara. In 1853, Wargala and the Mzab came under French suzerainty; the Mzab was annexed in 1882. In 1890, a treaty with Great Britain gave European political recognition to an expanded French Algerian empire.

The French began their reign in Algeria by adopting the Turkish and native Berber administrative system (*makhzan*). They combined a regional government modeled on that of the Turks with the mobilization of support from privileged tribes. After 1843, however, the French felt sufficiently in control to supervise the population directly through the Bureaux Arabes, some fifty units that combined military and civil administration. Also by the early 1840s, the French embarked upon the destruction of Algerian society to make way for French colonization. General Bugeaud cut down orchards, burned crops, and destroyed villages. Great numbers of people were killed by war and famine. Algerian tribes were confined to specific districts or resettled in the south to make way for French colons. Between 1843 and 1870, the French undermined the tribal and religious chieftains in favor of a new generation of officials who lacked authority and were more amenable to French control. From 1874, the Muslim population was subject to the *code de l'indigénat,* which made Muslims punishable for a long list of treasonable or illegal acts. These laws permitted confinement and confiscation of property.

The defeat of Algerian society left it vulnerable to economic exploitation. Vast areas of land were confiscated. A few Muslim landowners were able to move from subsistence to a market economy, but the bulk of the population was forced into ownership of uneconomical small plots, sharecropping, labor, and destitution.

While the French argued that the poverty of the Muslims was inherent in their social and cultural limitations, or that not enough incentives had been provided to overcome a pre-market mentality, or that capitalism did not go far enough in Algeria to absorb the Muslim population, the major cause was the devastation wrought by the French invasion and the seizure of Algerian lands.

In the face of the destruction of their society, Algerian resistance was bitter but local in scale. Muslim beliefs and loyalties played an important part in this resistance. In northern Algeria there was a series of millenarian uprisings. In 1849, Bu Zian of Zaatsha, a local shaykh who had supported ʿAbd al-Qadir, was impelled by a dream in which the Prophet Muhammad named him the representative of the redeemer (the Mahdi), to resist taxation and to rebel against French control. In 1858, Sidi Sadok b. al-Haji, a leader of a Rahmaniyya order who had been an ally of Bu Zian in 1849, also waged holy war, but he and eighty-eight followers were arrested. In 1860, Bu Khentash, a member of a pious and highly regarded warrior lineage, promised his followers miraculous protection against French bullets. He was killed in the same year. In 1879, Muhammad Amzian, who had fought a generation earlier on the side of Sidi Sadok, declared himself the Mahdi and attacked the local officials. In southern Algeria there were also rebellions between 1851 and 1855 and 1871 and 1872 by camel-herding peoples who were attempting to protect the passages from the northern oases and to resist French officials. Sheep-herding nomads also rebelled to protect their access to markets and avoid complete economic dependence.

These insurrections were sometimes prepared by secret societies called *shartiyya,* which formed within each tribe to keep watch on officials, prepare horses and weapons, and mobilize the people to fight. Preachers and Sufis, who claimed to be forerunners of the Mahdi, created an atmosphere of ecstatic fervor. Sufi brotherhoods were also important. From his base in Tunisia, Shaykh Mustafa b. ʿAzzuz (d. 1866) used his contacts in the Rahmaniyya order, religious prestige, kinship ties, and his central position in the munitions trade to support anti-French propaganda and resistance in the Constantine region. For a time, however, the shaykh also made

peace with the French. His policy was not to carry on an ideological or religious war, but to make the best of the political realities.

In 1870–71, scattered local resistance crystallized into a massive Algerian uprising. It was driven by years of hardship and famine, by hopes that the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian war would make independence possible, and by fears that the rise of a republican government in France would remove all restraints upon French colonization and lead to the seizure of Algerian lands. These rebellions were led by an Algerian tribal chief named al-Muqrani, supported by the Rahmaniyya brotherhood. Al-Muqrani's family had been allies of the French since the 1830s, but in 1870 their position was threatened by French efforts to replace them with more malleable local officials and to open the way for the settlement of French colons in the Mejana and the Kabyle. Al-Muqrani was defeated. The French extracted an enormous indemnity, amounting to ten times the usual tribute, and confiscated or held for ransom hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. In historical retrospect the resistance movements were signs of Algerian determination not to accept French rule, but they were also the last phase in the defeat of Algerian society.

Islamic culture also suffered. Before the French conquest, there were numerous schools and extensive properties endowed to support religious instruction. Constantine and Tlemcen, for example, had numerous primary schools, religious schools, and Sufi orders with hundreds of advanced students. The colleges provided a higher education stressing grammar, law, interpretation of the Quran, arithmetic, and astronomy. French occupation, however, led to the seizure of the revenues and the destruction of many schools. In principle, they were supposed to be replaced by French schools to assimilate Algerian children into European civilization, but the new school system, introduced between 1883 and 1898, reached only a small minority, and essentially trained native Algerian functionaries to cooperate with the French. While many Algerian middle-class families from the Kabyle, the Aurès, and the Mzab enrolled in the new schools, the absolute numbers were small. In 1890, students enrolled in French schools amounted to 2 percent of the school-age

population; in 1930, only 9 percent of Algerian children received some education; in 1945, approximately 15 percent. In 1954, only 0.75 percent of Muslims of secondary-school age were being educated. The system, minimal as it was, was resisted by the colons and by many Muslims.

Massive colonization began almost immediately after the French conquest as companies were formed in France to speculate in Algerian land and would-be settlers seized abandoned properties. The French government soon decided to expropriate Algerian lands on a large scale. A decree of 1843 ended the inalienability of religious endowments and allowed them to be bought and sold under European law. The French also forced tribal groups to move out of their traditional domains or to occupy smaller spaces so that the "surplus" land could be converted into colonial farms. Further regulations culminating in a law of 1873 broke down Algerian communal properties by allowing individual Muslims to sell their portions of collective tribal lands as well as family property. Vast tracts were made available to French settlers. By 1900, Europeans held 1,700,000 hectares, and by 1940, 2,700,000 hectares – about 35 to 40 percent of the arable land of Algeria. European settlers were nonetheless extremely dependent upon government help. Before 1870, efforts to grow grain, sugarcane, cotton, tobacco, linen, tea, and mulberries all failed. Only after a series of grape-crop failures in France did wine become the dominant European industry in Algeria.

The large European and French colony in Algeria demanded that it be made an integral part of France. This was opposed by the French army, which itself wanted to govern Algeria through the Bureaux Arabes, and tried to restrain the appropriation of Muslim lands and the establishment of a civilian government for the colonial population. In 1860, Napoleon III visited Algeria, and was convinced that his first obligation was to protect his 3,000,000 Arab subjects. Military administration was again strengthened, but between 1864 and 1870 famines, epidemics, and tribal insurrections discredited the military administration, and the defeat of the great Muslim revolt of 1870–71 finally allowed for the establishment of a regime committed

to ruling Algeria entirely in the interests of the colons. Algeria was administratively incorporated into France and reorganized as three French departments, though under a single governor-general. The colonists were given the right to municipal government, and could elect deputies to the French Assembly. In 1896, the system of direct control by French ministries in Paris was ended, and in 1898 an elected assembly, with European preponderance, was created. French settlers controlled local councils and the Algerian Assembly and manipulated the French parliament so that the system operated to vest control of Algeria in the hands of the colons.

The rebirth of Algerian resistance: to the end of World War II

Paradoxically, colonial rule generated the conditions for the emergence of a renewed Algerian resistance and demands for independence. The vast but disorganized and impoverished Algerian population, confined to marginal lands, its tribal leadership demolished, its religious elites co-opted, its military resistance defeated, was nonetheless revitalized. The very economic changes introduced by the French led to the formation of new classes and a changing Algerian consciousness. As the French colonized the countryside they upset the village economies, forced rural peoples to migrate to the cities, and brought new elites into being as a result of their efforts to destroy the old. A new generation of Western- or Muslim–reform-educated men arose. They were often state employees such as teachers, postmen, pharmacists, and railway workers; sometimes they were returned war veterans. The new elites became the backbone of new cultural associations, trade unions, and political parties.

On a psychological level, French penetration came up against a hidden core of national feeling that was mobilized in symbolic ways until it eventually took political form. Popular poems and epics celebrated the past glory of Islam, destined to once again overcome the unbelievers. Disillusionment and anger were manifested in demonstrations, strikes, and sporadic violence. These were

expressions of a refusal, however limited, to accept the permanence of French power.

After World War I, French policy indirectly encouraged Algerian resistance. In the flush of victory and gratitude for Algerian support in the war, France offered Muslims French citizenship if they would give up Islamic civil law. Other legislation enlarged the representation of native peoples in local assemblies and gave suffrage to property owners, officials, and veterans. French settler pressure forced the French government to renege on many of these concessions, but not before French concepts of justice, equality, and citizenship had taken hold among Muslim intellectuals. The intellectual elites had three main components: the French-educated Algerians who favored cultural and political assimilation into France and the acceptance of Muslims as citizens of France; populist leaders who organized Algerian workers, both at home and in France, into a radical political movement; and reformers who appealed to the petite bourgeoisie of the towns and to certain rural populations, and attempted to define an Algerian national identity in Arab and Muslim terms.

The graduates of French–Arab schools expected to be fully integrated into French society, while retaining their social and legal identity as Muslims. After the turn of the century, a small group of French-educated Muslim intellectuals organized the "Young Algerians" to press their demands. In 1927, the Fédération des elus indigènes d'Algérie was founded by liberal lawyers and teachers who had been elected to municipal councils. This organization became the mouthpiece for those Algerians who demanded equality in the army, in education, and in appointment to public office, and the abolition of all measures that discriminated against the Muslim population. The French-educated elite, however, did not demand Algerian independence. Farhat 'Abbas made the famous statement "I have questioned history; I have questioned the living and the dead; I have visited the cemeteries. The empires of the Arabs and Islam are in the past; our future is decisively linked to that of France."

A second Algerian elite of the 1920s and 1930s, which was more radical and nationalist in orientation, grew up among Algerian émigrés in Paris. In 1926, L'Étoile Nord Africaine (ENA) was

established by the French Communist Party; after 1933 it was led by Messali Hajj. The ENA stressed Algerian independence, but it played down the concept of class struggle within Algeria in the interest of generating Algerian solidarity against foreign rule. In 1936, Messali Hajj was converted to pan-Arab ideals and called for an independent Algeria rooted in Islamic values and allied to fellow Arabs. In 1937, the ENA was transformed into the Parti du peuple algérien (PPA).

The PPA called for the creation of an Algerian parliament, universal suffrage, the admission of Algerians to all public functions on an equal basis, and obligatory instruction in Arabic. It called for the total political independence of Algeria, the removal of all occupying troops, and the control by the new Algerian state over banks, mines, railways, ports, and public facilities. The organization also called on Algerians to conform to the principles of Islam. The PPA was a populist movement whose social base widened from its original migrant-worker supporters to artisans, small merchants, workers, students, and graduates.

The third section of the new Algerian elite was the leaders of the Islamic reformist movement, who adapted Islamic scripturalism to Algerian nationalist needs. Muslims felt the need for a Muslim press and religious associations to compete with Catholic organizations and French schools. ʿAbd al-Hamid b. Badis (Ben Badis), educated at the Zaytuna in Tunis, became the principal leader of the reform (*islah*) movement and of the postwar revival of Arab cultural identity in Algeria. He took his inspiration from Muhammad ʿAbduh, Rashid Rida, and the Salafi movement, and emphasized the importance of returning to the Quran and hadith as the basic sources of Muslim belief and practice. From the Quran Ben Badis extracted the general principles of the reform: belief in the unity of God, filial piety, respect for the rights of others, proper use of worldly fortunes, honesty in commercial transactions, and purity of moral intentions. A good Muslim should emulate the virtues of the Prophet. He emphasized the revealed sources of Muslim knowledge, but without diminishing the importance of reason.

The emphasis on divine unity was used to launch a bitter critique of Sufi beliefs and practices. The reformers denounced the

veneration of saints and beliefs in miracles, and attempted to use rational arguments to demystify rural Sufism. Maraboutism, they argued, was a reprehensible novelty introduced into Islam that was neither prescribed in the Quran, nor recommended by the Prophet, nor practiced by the early caliphs. Thus, they tried to change the way in which the birthday of the Prophet (*mawlid*) was celebrated. In schools, clubs, and theaters, as well as mosques and Sufi orders, the reformers, less ecstatic, less ritualistic, and more austere, emphasized Muhammad's historical role and gave sermons on topics of current interest.

Islamic reformism took hold after World War I, when the position of rural Sufis was undermined. The migration of workers to the cities reduced their clientele in the countryside and collaboration with the French reduced their prestige. The growth of an urban petite bourgeoisie and working class subverted the appeal of the magical, thaumaturgic, and mystical authority of the marabouts. The rise of the reformers in turn pushed the marabouts into cooperation with the French, and thus further subverted their position.

The reformers were particularly concerned with social and economic issues, but conceived these in religious and moral terms. Thus they spoke a great deal about *zakat* (alms) as a source of income for the movement and as an expression of the responsibility of the rich for the poor, but they had little to say about the conditions of urban workers and rural peasants, or about the problems of economic development and the use of capital. Following Rashid Rida they rejected Western feminism, favored the use of the veil, and opposed the social interaction of men and women. They opposed giving women equality in inheritance or the right to initiate divorce. In the classical sources they found nothing to contradict modern science and technology, but while they saw Islam as compatible with the modern world, they were not principally concerned with the modernization of society. What moved them was the defeat of Muslim countries by Europeans. Only a return to the purity and vigor of early Islam would enable Muslims to assimilate modern science and remedy their cultural and political situation. The reformers' journal castigated the social ills of modern societies,

including alcoholism, gambling, and all other immoral activities forbidden by religion.

The reform movement intended not only to define a new doctrine but also to create a social movement through which the new ideas could be passed on to the young. They organized conferences and discussion groups to propagate Muslim principles and Arabic culture. They sponsored a strong scout movement and founded schools that combined teaching of the Quran, Arabic, Algerian history, and patriotic songs, plus some French, arithmetic, and geography, to inculcate the concept of an Algerian fatherland. Most of these schools were elementary schools but students could move on to the mosque at Constantine or Zaytuna in Tunis for an advanced education. Only a small portion of the students actually earned an elementary certificate; few went on to higher education. The school movement reached its peak in 1954, when it had about 110 schools and 20,000 students. By then the schools were training militants for the nationalist movement and were important in creating a sense of an Algerian national identity.

In 1931, Ben Badis also founded the Association of Muslim 'Ulama' of Algeria to sponsor preaching, publications, and schools. The strengthening of the reform movement provoked resistance from the Sufis, who founded their own Association of 'Ulama' in 1932. In 1933, the French denied the use of mosques to reformist preachers and asserted control over journals published in Arabic as well as those published in French. French controls made the reformers the only outspoken indigenous opponents of French rule. Ben Badis defended religious liberty, and the right to teach Arabic and maintain a Muslim press. After 1935, the reform movement began to slide into a more overtly political role. A joint congress of the Association of Muslim 'Ulama' and the Fédération des elus indigènes was held in 1936, at which Ben Badis emerged as the leading spokesman of opposition to French assimilation.

Behind the reform was a political concept: though part of the French Empire, Algeria was an Arab Muslim entity. Arabism was meant not only to combat assimilation but also to resist French efforts to divide Arabs and Berbers. Muslims should govern

themselves; Ben Badis distinguished cultural from political nationality, and thus allowed for a conception of a Muslim community as universal in principle and yet divided into politically and culturally distinct regional or national groups. By distinguishing religion from political nationality, the reformers allowed for Algerian identity under French domination. In response to the declaration of Farhat ʿAbbas, Ben Badis affirmed that "this Muslim nation is not France, it is not possible for it to be France. It does not want to become France, and even if it wanted to, it could not." The religious reformers popularized the notion that religiously, linguistically, and culturally, Algerians were a distinct people whose ultimate destiny was political independence.

Reformism, then, adapted itself to local circumstances in both urban and rural areas to become the most energetic and widespread cultural force in Algeria. The reform movement had strong appeal to the petite bourgeoisie of the coastal towns such as Constantine, Oran, and Algiers, and to rural areas that felt the vacuum of authority and initiative left by the decline of tribal and Sufi elites. By the late 1930s, the reformers had pushed both the liberal bourgeois and the more radical worker movements to take on an Islamic aura and to legitimize themselves in Islamic terms. The death of Ben Badis in 1940 deprived the reform of its dynamism, but its contribution to the creation of an Algerian national identity was lasting.

The drive to independence and the Algerian revolution

By the mid-1930s, the cultural preparations had been made and the struggle for Algerian independence began in earnest. Algerian demands grew ever more insistent and French responses ever more contradictory. By 1936, the various Algerian elites had coalesced in an Algerian Muslim congress that made demands for reform – maintenance of Islamic civil law, improvement in instruction and education, equality in salary and other economic matters, universal suffrage, and representation in parliament – but not independence. The French were divided as to how to respond. Some favored a conciliatory, liberal policy, but French politics made it impossible to

carry this out consistently. Threatened by the new elites, the French turned to repression, closed down reformist schools and journals, and broke with the Muslim liberal bourgeoisie. For two generations the French had cultivated a small Muslim elite by holding forth the expectation that educated Muslims could become French citizens, but in 1938 the Blum–Viollette proposal to grant French citizenship to Algerians without requiring them to renounce Islamic civil law was abandoned. Liberals in Algeria lost their hope for French-sponsored reform and assimilation.

Throughout the World War II years moderate Algerian opinion backed France, but in 1943 Farhat ʿAbbas issued his Manifesto of the Algerian People, which called for an end to colonial rule and the formation of an Algerian constitution allowing for the participation of Muslims in the government of their own country. The manifesto further advocated the recognition of the Arabic language as equal to French, freedom of press and association, universal school instruction, and other liberal measures. In 1946, the new Union démocratique du manifeste algérien (UDMA) was founded as the voice of Algerian bourgeois opinion. This was followed by Messali's Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD). In 1947, the Algerians presented the French Assembly with a plan for an Algerian republic as part of a North African union federated with France.

The French government rejected these proposals and instead passed the Statut d'Algérie in September 1947. The Statut defined Algeria as a group of departments within the French Republic administered by a governor-general, though they were provided with an elected assembly and accorded limited financial and administrative autonomy. The Statut also provided for equality of citizenship and for recognition of the Islamic and Arab interests of the Algerian population. This plan not only fell short of Algerian proposals, but the French government manipulated Algerian elections to exclude the major Muslim parties and otherwise postponed the implementation of the reforms. The idea of gradual and nonviolent emancipation and the concept of an Algeria allied

with France completely lost its value in Algerian Muslim public opinion.

By the late 1940s, all of these movements had failed to make significant progress toward Algerian independence, and a new generation took the lead in throwing off French colonialism and establishing an independent Algerian state. Behind the maneuvering of the political elites, a new Algerian mass consciousness and political movement was in the making. In May 1945, Algerian demonstrations at Setif led to attacks on French colons and to terrible massacres of Muslims by the French. A more radical younger generation, from small towns and lower-middle-class families came to the fore. They had little opportunity for higher education and little contact with Europeans, but instead were stronger in their Arabic and Islamic identity. They bore a sharp sense of the misery of rural life and the injustice and indignity of French domination and a strong will to resist and to exercise power in the name of the Algerian nation. Within the MTLD an Organisation spéciale (OS), led by Ait Ahmed and Ahmed Ben Bella, gave the Algerian resistance a paramilitary capability. By 1949, the cadres of a military resistance were ready, but until 1954 the various Algerian liberal, radical, and revolutionary groups were unable to agree upon such action.

Finally, the OS organized the Front de libération nationale (FLN), and on November 1, 1954 launched the Algerian revolution with a nationwide campaign of guerrilla attacks. The revolutionaries organized Algeria into six provinces (*wilayat*); in Tunisia and Morocco they built up a strong army, the National Liberation Army (ALN), commanded eventually (1959) by Houari Boumédiènne. The FLN denounced the previous Algerian movements for their political failure and declared itself in favor of an independent, sovereign, democratic, and socialist Algerian state with Islamic principles – a state that could only be created by armed struggle. While the FLN was not officially Islamic, its supporters held strong Islamic sentiments and puritanical attitudes. The leaders of the revolution considered alcohol and tobacco to be symbols of betrayal. In the war itself, they were motivated by attachments to their *wilayat* and army units and by a strong sense of personal responsibility. The FLN

rapidly gained the political support of other movements, and by 1956 all groups had agreed on the goal of full Algerian independence.

At the congress of Summam in August 1956, the revolutionaries resolved that theirs was a struggle to destroy an anachronistic colonization but was not a war of religion; they proposed the formation of a social and democratic Algerian republic. From this point of view, the only issues to be negotiated with France were the transfer of administrative power and subsequent cooperation in economic, social, and cultural activities. In 1958, a Gouvernement provisionnel de la République algérienne (GPRA) was formed to win international recognition and was supported by Egypt and other Arab countries, the Communist states, and, to some degree, by American anticolonialist sentiment. This international support was crucial to its eventual victory.

In response, the French reaffirmed their permanent presence in Algeria. They won the military advantage, captured Ben Bella and his companions by hijacking an airplane in which they were traveling, and under the leadership of General Massu launched the battle for Algiers. This was an urban anti-guerrilla operation that led in the middle of 1957 to the destruction of the FLN apparatus in Algiers. The French also blocked the flow of weapons and manpower into the country from Tunisia and Morocco, and defeated the FLN in the Sahara. French tactics included massive military action and the resettlement of the Algerian population.

Though the French were winning the military victories, they could not sustain the war. On May 13, 1958, the French population of Algeria organized its own demonstrations, which toppled the government of Algeria, undermined the Fourth Republic, and, in June 1958, brought General Charles de Gaulle to power. De Gaulle, however, disappointed the expectations of the colons by proposing reconciliation between France and the FLN. He called for a referendum on a proposed new French constitution in which all residents of France and Algeria would have equal voting rights. After the referendum he proposed the Plan of Constantine for economic development, employment of Algerians, equalization of salaries, distribution of arable land to Algerian peasants, development of the

school system for two-thirds of school-age children, and the construction of 200,000 housing units. This was to be financed by petroleum and gas development. Then, in September 1959, de Gaulle spoke of a self-determined Algerian future, with Algerians given the right to choose between independence, autonomy in association with France, or assimilation. Thus the French government relinquished its determination to maintain Algeria as part of France. Direct negotiations with the FLN were begun in 1960, and in March 1962, at Evian, Algerian sovereignty was recognized, with France reserving bases for air and naval operations and for atomic testing. Future economic cooperation was agreed and French colons were allowed to choose between French and Algerian citizenship.

Thus, after bitter struggle, terrible destruction, and massive sacrifice of human life – in spite of enormous political and administrative resources, the presence of a large European population, and a passionate desire to assimilate its colony – France lost control of its Algerian empire. Both the right and the left in France believed that its existence as a nation depended on its empire, but, caught between leftist liberalism and rightist authoritarianism, French policy allowed Algerian dissent to crystallize and, by repressing its manifestations, prompted further resistance. The French position was further subverted by colons, who led the French government to excesses of policy and then themselves resisted central control. The divisions in France, the numerical predominance of the Algerian population, and the growth of national consciousness culminated in Algerian independence.

Independent Algeria

The problems of organizing a regime, defining an economic policy, and creating a cultural identity for the new state were enormous. The fabric of Algerian society had been ripped apart. There was no unified political elite and no clear ideological direction. The Algerian elite was assembled from among liberal bourgeois professionals, reformist *'ulama'*, petit bourgeois radicals, and revolutionary soldiers, and was divided among the FLN, the ALN, and GPRA, and other groups. After several generations of assimilated French,

reformist Muslim, and activist military leadership, the basic problem was the divisions within the political elite.

The outcome of the ensuing struggle for power was military dictatorship. Ben Bella (r. 1963–65) and the army eliminated the *wilaya* commanders and purged the FLN of his opponents. Only the Algerian Union of Workers (UGTA), a militant force in organizing railroad, post office, petroleum, municipal construction, and other workers, retained its autonomy. The other major political bodies – the National Union of Algerian Women, the National Liberation Front Youth Movement, and the National Union of Algerian Students – were poorly organized. Control of the party and the administration, however, was not enough to save Ben Bella from a coup in June 1965 led by General Houari Boumédiènne, who became president of the Republic. By 1967, the professional army officers had eliminated their rivals and taken control of the state. Military rule reached out to the larger society by creating supporting "clans" or clienteles, and Boumédiènne centralized the system for distributing rents, credit, and grants to his followers. In 1978, he was succeeded by another military leader, Chadli ben Jadid, who maintained the regime until rising political and religious opposition led to a crisis in 1989 that required the military to temporarily accept a multiparty system.

The new elites were divided in their ideological orientation. While Ben Bella led the cadres who favored the modernization of the country and the creation of a socialist economy, with French as the language of government and business, Boumédiènne became the chief spokesman for a Muslim and Arab identity and for close ties between Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Arab East. Reformist Islam was accepted as a legitimizing principle and its discourse infiltrated all political language. The new leaders wanted both to modernize Algeria and to deepen the religious–cultural basis of national identity. For many of the uprooted soldiers of the revolution, migrant workers returned from France, peasants residing in the towns, and mobile petite bourgeoisie, Arabism and Islam were the only common bases of social and national identity.

The state, moreover, sought to control the expression of Islam. It absorbed the independent Quran schools, controlled appointments

to religious offices, and sponsored Islamic propaganda. A Ministry of Religious Affairs was created to supervise schools, mosques, religious endowments, and the training of clerics. Nonetheless, the state did not entirely capture Islam. In the 1970s, there was an open debate between liberal Muslims, who held that Western science and administration could be beneficial to Muslims, and those Muslims following the more purist position of Ben Badis and the Muslim Brothers. While many devout Muslims were working within the political system, unofficial mosques and schools harbored an independent Muslim community life resisting state control. As in other Muslim countries, Islam in Algeria eluded state control and retained the capacity for articulating opposition to state policies.

Attitudes toward women became a test of cultural orientation. French rule and colonization had set a precedent for the education of women and their employment in public positions, but this had scarcely any effect on the masses. The revolution made some women militant fighters, but with independence, women generally remained veiled and stayed away from public places. European mores were seen as incompatible with Islamic traditions.

In economic policy, the Algerian state concentrated on the development of the urban and industrial sectors of the economy by using petroleum revenues to finance an industrial revolution. State-owned steel, textile, glass, and insurance companies were founded in 1967. Algeria nationalized its gas industry in 1971; investments were made in export-oriented petrochemicals, steel, electricity, fertilizer, chemical, and plastics.

Agriculture was subordinated to the needs of industry. Under the socialist–military regime, abandoned French estates were nationalized and consolidated into some 2,300 farms. But these were denied control over their own financing and marketing, and made dependent on government ministries. Little was done for the mass of the rural populace, which needed to rebuild the villages and required capital and technical assistance; nothing was done for 600,000 landless rural workers. While a small portion of the rural society was better off, the peasantry suffered from fragmentation of land ownership, absentee landlordism, *waqf* and communal

constraints on the ownership of land, sharecropping, and an inequitable distribution of income.

By 1971, demands for social justice and the need to ameliorate the impoverishment of the rural population necessitated a new agricultural policy. This was supposed to consist of a redistribution of land and livestock from large farms to smallholders, the organization of cooperatives, and the coordination of cooperatives into a larger marketing system. The results were not encouraging. Land redistribution was very limited. The reform program extended the state-controlled sector of the economy, but left the private sector with the continuing burden of an underemployed peasantry.

By the late 1970s, the failures of these policies were borne in upon the regime. A large percentage of Algeria's food supplies had to be imported. Industrial projects were often uneconomical and dependent upon foreign technicians. Housing and welfare were neglected; unemployment was high. President Chadli ben Jadid reversed the policies of the previous regime, slowed down industrial growth, tightened financial controls over industrial projects, increased consumption, and favored a greater participation of private entrepreneurs in the national economy. By and large, however, the Algerian government continued to govern through the army and a socialized economy. It encouraged the capital-intensive sectors of the economy that were under state control at the expense of the economic needs of the rural population. The revolution had ended in state capitalism.

The failure of government policies was brought home by the ever-growing strength of Muslim-led opposition. The banning of the Association of 'Ulama' in 1962 prompted the first efforts to organize Islamic teaching independently of the state. The Muslim Brothers had a strong influence. Numerous independent groups – some educational, some political, some fronting for the state, some potentially violent – emerged. In escalating violence during the early 1980s, religious extremists assaulted women in Western-style dress and demanded the formation of an Islamic republic. Frustration with economic conditions led to student demonstrations in 1982, which were suppressed by the police, bloody riots in 1985, and massive

demonstrations in 1988. When the government used the army to suppress the demonstrators the regime lost all legitimacy.

In 1989, a new constitution allowed for political parties other than the FLN and envisioned open elections. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of both reformist and radical Islamic groups, became the most important party. The FIS was led by two contrasting figures: ʿAbassi Madani, a cosmopolitan and flexible politician who espoused political pluralism; and ʿAli Belhadj, a purist Muslim with an Arab and Salafi cultural background, who called for the formation of an Islamic state, by violent means if necessary. The FIS adopted a nationalistic discourse in an attempt to replace the FLN as the governing party. The party not only advocated Muslim moral purity, it addressed economic issues such as employment, housing, and social and welfare services. In 1991, the party won victories in municipal and in national first-round elections. The military refused to accept the results. A coup d'état in January 1992 removed Chadli ben Jadid and voided the elections. In the 1990s, Algeria was dominated by a small military clique called the "eradicationists," who opposed any compromise with the FIS and waged full-scale war for control of the society in the name of secularism. Support for the army came from the Kabyle region, which opposed the Islamists and favored a Berber national identity.

The military–secular regime provoked a violent backlash, especially among Arabophone teachers, functionaries, and imams resentful of the dominance of Francophone elites. Some sections of the FIS formed the Islamic Salvation Army. Other resisters included al-Takfir wal Hijra (Excommunication and exile), consisting primarily of veterans of the anti-Soviet Afghan war, and the still more radical Armed Islamic Groups (GIA). While the Islamic Salvation Army forces aimed their attacks at the military and its supporters, the GIA operated by racketeering, savage terrorist attacks, and assaults upon civilians that did not seem to have any political purpose. Algeria dissolved into a civil war, perhaps more extreme and bitter than anything hitherto seen in the Muslim world, in which ordinary Algerians were slaughtered by both sides in their drive to win control of the population.

The indiscriminate violence led to war-weariness and to a gradual reaction against the Islamic movements and increasing support for the government. Liamine Zeroual came to power in January 1994, and was elected to the presidency in November 1995. He was able to win over moderate groups, such as the Movement for an Islamic Society (HAMAS), and middle-class bureaucrats and businessmen, and thus divide the Muslim opposition. His market-oriented approach to the economy was designed to gain foreign investment. Nonetheless, Algeria was in the process of de-industrializing; textile and food production diminished in the 1990s. Zeroual was succeeded by Abdelaziz Bouteflicka (r. 1999–present), on terms favoring continued military domination.

Bouteflicka consolidated a military and secular regime, and greatly reduced the violence by offering an amnesty to the banned FIS. The Civil Concord was approved in a national referendum in 2000 and a Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation passed by referendum in 2005. It gave amnesty to the Islamic opposition and an implicit pardon for security forces accused of abuses in fighting them. Some Islamist parties such as the Movement of Society for Peace have joined the governing coalition. Algeria continues to be ruled by a nominally secular military regime, but there are ongoing protests at the economic and sociopolitical conditions.

Tunisia

The colonial era

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Tunisia shared the problems of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt: a declining internal economy faced with rising European economic power. Before the establishment of the French protectorate in 1881, the principal reaction to European economic domination came from rulers and officials who attempted to modernize and rationalize the Tunisian regime. Ahmad Bey (r. 1837–55) founded a polytechnic school in 1838 and invited Europeans to train a new infantry corps. In 1857 Muhammad Bey (r. 1855–59) promulgated a constitution that

guaranteed security for the Tunisian population, equality in taxation, freedom of religion, and mixed European–Tunisian courts. A liberal constitution of 1861 created an oligarchic senate recruited by co-optation. These efforts at reform, however, could not be fully institutionalized, for there were never sufficiently numerous well-trained troops or administrators.

A last attempt at strengthening the state came while Khayr al-Din was chief minister, between 1873 and 1877. Taking Europe as his model, he believed that government should promote science, industry, agriculture, and commerce. Khayr al-Din made a special argument for equality between Europeans and Tunisians. In practice, he tried to limit public spending, eliminate tax-collecting abuses, and reform the administration of religious affairs. He helped to found the Sadiqi College in 1875 to train future government officials. He appointed new supervisors for Zaytuna Mosque. Under his leadership the government created new offices for the administration of charitable endowments and reorganized Islamic courts, especially to meet European demands for perceived equity. The reform program included the creation of a government printing press to produce textbooks for the Sadiqi students and to reproduce classic Islamic legal treatises.

Politically, the reform effort depended upon the support of the *'ulama'*. They were the educated graduates of the principal mosques, and served as teachers and magistrates. Until the foundation of the Sadiqi College and the founding of modern newspapers, they controlled all secondary education and monopolized political opinion. Their social connections reinforced their influence. They sent their sons into government service and were tied by marriage to official and merchant families, who commonly educated their children to be religious scholars. The *'ulama'* were also closely tied to the rural Sufis, who sent their children to Zaytuna and who shared the same religious principles. In Tunisia there was little tension between the *'ulama'* and Sufi branches of the religious establishment. The strong social influence of the religious leaders, however, was not accompanied by political power, for the beys insisted on loyalty and passivity in return for

appointments to office. In general, the *'ulama'* did not oppose the technical aspects of the reform program, such as the telegraph, but otherwise they dissociated themselves from it.

Reforms in Tunisia generally followed the patterns established in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, but they did not go far enough to consolidate the power of the state. Tunisia could not resist French economic and political pressures. In 1881, the French, who had occupied Algeria since 1830, used border disputes as a pretext to impose French domination. By 1884, they were in charge of the government bureaus for finance, post, education, telegraph, public works, and agriculture. They established a new judicial system for Europeans while keeping the Islamic courts for cases involving Tunisians. The French developed roads, ports, railroads, and mines. In rural areas they strengthened the local officials (*qa'ids*) and weakened independent tribes.

Most important was the opening of Tunisia to French colonization and the introduction of modern agriculture and education. The French encouraged colonization by selling collective lands and charitable endowments, bringing new land into cultivation, and guaranteeing title to European purchasers. The number of French colonists grew from 34,000 in 1906 to 144,000 in 1945. The French occupied approximately one-fifth of the cultivable land.

A French system of education was fostered by the Alliance Française and by the Catholic Church. Between 1885 and 1912, some 3,000 Tunisians studied in Paris. In 1898, the French tried to reform Zaytuna by adding modern subjects and pedagogical methods, but the *'ulama'* resisted this interference with the teaching of Islamic law. The Khalduniyya school was founded in 1896 to supplement the Zaytuna education with modern subjects. Nonetheless, some Tunisian *'ulama'* cooperated with French officials in the reform of public instruction, the administration of charitable endowments, and the management of Sadiqi College. Rural-born and socially mobile Malikis were more willing to cooperate with the French than were the better-established Hanafis.

Despite the relative political quiet, a new generation of Tunisian national leaders emerged, self-styled as "Young Tunisians." Some were educated in French schools, others in reformed Islamic schools. In 1888, graduates of Zaytuna and Sadiqi College created the weekly newspaper *al-Hadira* to comment on European and world events and to discuss political, economic, and literary issues. Fueled by eastern Arab influences, especially the teachings of al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh, and the Egyptian National Party, they advocated the modernization and Westernization of Tunisian society and a revival of Arabic culture. Inspired by Salafi values, they called for the reform of Muslim legal, educational, and trust administration. "Young Tunisians" also sponsored a reformed Quran school in which students were taught the Quran, Arabic, and the basics of arithmetic, geography, history, and French. This generation was deeply concerned with the reform of Islamic legal administration and Arabic literary education.

The first political expression of the "Young Tunisians" came in 1907 with the founding of the journal *Le Tunisien*. Under the impetus of the Russian revolution, Woodrow Wilson's principles of self-determination, the Wafd movement in Egypt, and the formation of a popularly elected parliament in Tripolitania, secular-minded liberals and Salafi reformers began to think in nationalist terms. Before 1920, the nationalists demanded equal opportunity and pay in administration and liberal freedoms of press and association. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Thaʿalibi (d. 1944), a leading Arab journalist and reformer, became the chief spokesman of the Destour (Constitution) Party. In the 1920s, workers returned from France formed the first Tunisian cooperative society and the first Tunisian trade union, the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers. But strikes were broken and the government jailed the leaders, closed down the newspapers, and suppressed political activity.

In the 1930s, a new generation of Tunisian nationalists came to the fore. For over a decade the Destour Party had been led by conservative families with a strong Muslim and Arab identity. Now more radical representatives of small and middling provincial cities, with a combined Arab and French education and secular socialist

ideas of Tunisian society, rose to challenge the old elites. The new leaders found support among townsmen and peasant migrants and an enlarged urban population. Led by Habib Bourguiba (born in Monastir in 1903 and educated in Paris in the 1920s) and Mahmud Materi, the new leaders promoted a more militant, organized, and ideologically coherent resistance to the French. At a Destour congress in 1932, Bourguiba demanded independence. In 1934, the radicals took over the Destour and created the neo-Destour party with Materi as president and Bourguiba as secretary-general. The new party called for a boycott of French products and for the establishment of a democratic parliamentary regime. While basically secular in orientation, the neo-Destour leaders had Muslim roots and appealed to Muslim sentiment by meeting in mosques and Sufi hospices.

The neo-Destour began the twenty-year struggle that culminated in Tunisian independence. The new party broke out of the limited social stratum of the original Destour and generated a mass movement. By taking over the old party they assured continuity and national cohesion. At first Tunisians had high hopes of the popular front government in France, but demonstrations in April 1938 led to violence. The French suppressed the demonstrations, dissolved the political parties, and imprisoned and then deported Bourguiba. While Bourguiba remained in forced exile, Munsif Bey (1942–43), the Tunisian head of state, continued the struggle. He advanced Tunisian demands for the formation of a new assembly, Arabic instruction in the schools, and expropriation by the state of large utilities and transport enterprises. In 1943, he tried to form a new ministry without the consent of the resident-general and was removed by the French, thus becoming a national hero. In 1949, a new group of Destouriens, including supporters of Munsif Bey, issued a declaration demanding self-government for Tunisia. Agricultural groups, students, feminists, and labor unions also supported the national demand. Bourguiba returned to lead the movement. Finally, defeated in Indo-China, under diplomatic pressure in the United Nations, and faced with rising violence in Tunis, the French agreed in the spring of 1955 to a settlement

recognizing Tunisian internal autonomy. A French–Tunisian protocol of March 1956 abolished the protectorate of 1881.

Independent Tunisia: from the 1950s to the present

The formation of an independent Tunisian government was followed by the rapid consolidation of Bourguiba's power. The 1957 constituent assembly stripped the bey of his title and his budget; Bourguiba was made head of state and ruled until 1987, when he was replaced by General Zine al-Abidine Ben ʿAli, who ruled until the revolution of 2011. A constitution of 1959 gave all power to the president. He stood at the apex of a new elite, drawn largely from the coastal regions, especially the cities of Monastir and Sus, who sought to modernize and secularize the Tunisian state. The new government progressively removed French officials and replaced them with party militants, though over 2,500 Frenchmen remained in Tunisian service.

The independent Tunisian regime followed a number of different economic strategies. In 1956 and 1957, the government purchased former French lands, and put endowed lands under government control, but opened the way for individual ownership of collective lands. These policies, however, failed to attract capital or meet Tunisia's investment goals, and in 1962, Tunisia adopted a socialist orientation. The state became the controller, patron, and provider for the economy. European-owned land was nationalized in 1964. A system of agricultural cooperatives and state-managed farms was set up. Heavy public investment and heavy borrowing from foreign sources was to be the basis of economic development. By 1969, this policy had also failed. Tunisia could not afford both to invest and meet the demands for employment and welfare at the same time. It turned to a more open economy, but the public sector nonetheless remained over 40 percent of the total economy. A general strike and riots in 1978 marked the loss of public confidence in the policies of the regime. Bourguiba's successor, Ben ʿAli, crushed the opposition.

Tunisia reverted to mixing the private, cooperative, and public sectors and encouraged foreign private investment.

Like Turkey, Tunisia pursued a complex policy of controlling the expression of Islam, and even deriving legitimacy from it, while committed at the same time to a drastic secularization of society. Bourguiba brought religious institutions under the direct control of the state and used Islamic rhetoric to justify secularist policies. The *'ulama'* were bureaucratized under the Administration of Religious Affairs and the government took control of religious endowments. Religious schools were taken over by the Ministry of National Education. The new regime created a secular judiciary; the personal status code adopted in 1956 forbade polygamy and made marriage and divorce civil matters. It also favored equal rights for women. In 1960, the fast of Ramadan was denounced as a barrier to production. To curb the possible use of mosques as rallying points for religious opposition, the 1988 Law on Mosques stipulated that only state-appointed personnel might lead activities in mosques, and that mosques must remain closed except during authorized religious ceremonies. The neo-Destour Party (renamed the Parti Socialiste Destourien) thus became the manager of a socialist economy, the sponsor of a massive school program, the supporter of the emancipation of women, the vehicle of mass political education, and the vanguard of secularization.

These modernizing and secularizing policies, however, did not fully take hold. In contrast to the governing elite, the rural and less developed regions of the south and southerners who migrated to the cities resisted the regime. Before independence, these same milieus were home to Marxists and Arab nationalists opposed to colonial rule. Since the 1960s, disillusioned by lack of economic opportunity and by lack of trust in the political elites, Tunisian students and intellectuals stressed their Arab and Muslim rather than their French–Tunisian identity. They also became more explicitly supportive of the Palestinians. Conservatives identified with Islamic values, symbolized by growing attendance at worship, the emergence of religious associations, and expressions of devotion to

religious leaders. Among older people and small-town dwellers there was also opposition to equal rights for women.

After 1979, Islamic circles, influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and the revolution in Iran, began to have political ambitions. The first "Islamist" or reformist political party was the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami or Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), founded in 1981 by Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The party called for the restoration of Arab and Islamic identity and culture, a humanitarian economy, and democratic political rights. The movement was hierarchically organized and appealed to a wide sector of Tunisian society including students, teachers, clerks, and others, especially from the south. The leaders were promptly imprisoned. However, in 1988, President Ben ʿAli tried a new tack, reaffirming the Islamic identity of Tunisia, and releasing many activists from prison. Ben ʿAli forged a national pact with the MTI which changed its name to an-Nahda (the Renaissance Party). Al-Ghannouchi accepted the legitimacy of republican politics and renounced violence. An-Nahda ran strongly in the 1989 elections. Ben ʿAli then banned Islamist political parties and jailed as many as 8,000 activists. Al-Ghannouchi was forced into exile.

Ben ʿAli governed by military and police repression until 2011, when the regime was brought down by mass demonstrations provoked by the self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, which became a symbol of the poverty and frustration of masses of educated but unemployed young people. Ben ʿAli was forced to leave the country and take refuge in Saudi Arabia. In elections to form a constituent assembly, an-Nahda, led by Rashid al-Ghannouchi, emerged as the leading party. The more radical Salafi groups that harass unveiled women and secular intellectuals, and Hizb al-Tahrir, which calls for an Islamic state, did poorly.

Tunisia's historical trajectory in many ways resembles that of Egypt. A highly statist Muslim society, it came under foreign rule in the late nineteenth century. New generations of educated Tunisians responded to the loss of independence by turning to Islamic reformism or to secular nationalism. Under the aegis of a secular nationalist elite, independence was achieved in 1956. Independent

Tunisia attempted to develop a mixed economy and a secular society. As in Egypt and Turkey, the failures of the secular regime promoted opposition voiced in terms of Muslim values and allegiances. With the outbreak of mass rebellions in 2011, Tunisia's secular–military government was defeated, and a moderate Islamic party returned to prominence. As in Turkey, an Islamic political party is taking part in a democratic system. And as in Turkey and Egypt, the opposition remains fearful of "Islamization."

Morocco

Under colonial rule

Morocco resembles Algeria, Upper Egypt, the Syrian desert regions, and eastern Anatolia in the strength of its pastoral and tribal populations, but unlike the others it was an independent state and not a dependency of the Ottoman Empire. The authority of the sultans was founded on a combination of caliphal and Sufi attributes, but the regime nonetheless found it difficult to make its authority felt in the countryside. The authority of the sultans was unquestioned, but their power was always challenged by tribal and Sufi chiefs. The intermediary political classes, such as the landed notables, who in other Middle Eastern societies favored centralized state controls, were relatively weak in Morocco.

European economic penetration in the late nineteenth century subverted the Moroccan state and led to the establishment of French and Spanish protectorates in 1912. The first French resident-general, Marshal Lyautey, ruled through the sultan and the local leaders (*qa'ids*). The government brought the tribes under control, intimidating them by military force and by cutting them off from their pasturelands. The tribes were disarmed and forced to pay taxes. The French installed military posts, and appointed officers to control the *qa'ids* who collected taxes, organized markets, and built roads, hospitals, and schools.

The French also brought the Moroccan elites under their control. The *'ulama'* and the courts were subordinated to a minister of

justice; in 1914, rules for procedures and maintenance of documents were promulgated. The French also created competing administrative tribunals, transferred penal justice to French courts, promoted Berber customary courts, and took other measures to restrict the jurisdiction of Islamic law. Most of the Sufi retreats accepted French authority, helped subordinate tribal regions to the central government, and kept the peace between migratory pastoral populations in the Atlas Mountains. The prestige of Sufis, however, diminished as they were replaced by government administrators and their political utility declined. For example, the Sherqawa, the Sufis of Boujad, lost their intermediary roles because disputes could be brought to the French and Sherqawa decisions could be appealed to French officials. They were no longer needed to protect commerce. After World War II, as new economic opportunities in commerce and real estate led rural people to migrate to the cities, the Sufi clientele further diminished.

Lyautey's social and educational policies were also intended to facilitate French control. The sons of notables were to be assimilated through new schools created in Fez and other places. In 1945, a Moroccan school of administration was created. Rural primary schools, technical schools, and Islamic colleges were founded in Rabat and Fez. French policy concentrated on the education of a small elite, and by the 1950s only 6 percent of the eligible age groups were in school. Though French educational efforts were intended to produce a generation of Moroccan collaborators, they seemed only to create a hostile intelligentsia.

Furthermore, the French viewed the Berbers as non-Arabs who could be separated from the general Moroccan population and allied to France; they attempted to create a French-educated Berber elite shielded from Arab and Islamic influences. In 1930, the French proposed a system of Berber courts operating under customary law (except that criminal justice was transferred to French courts), as a deterrent to the use of Islamic law and an encouragement of Berber culture. Muslims saw it as an effort to pave the way for the conversion of Berbers to Christianity and to divide the Moroccan people. Berber communities therefore resisted the French effort to

establish customary law courts and demanded the application of Islamic law. Berber students learned Arabic rather than French and adopted nationalist rather than separatist sympathies. Also, improved communications, migration to the towns, and the installation of Arabic-speaking administrative officers all worked to identify Berbers with Arab Islam. The concept of an independent Moroccan Berber society allied to France proved to be a myth.

Only the territories south of the Atlas remained outside direct French control and under the jurisdiction of subordinate chieftains. The great tribal magnates, the Mtouggi, the Gundafa, and the Glawis, controlled the agricultural surplus, the passes over the Atlas Mountains, and the profits of the caravan traffic. Before 1912, the great *qa'ids* were able to purchase modern weapons, hire mercenaries, and build fortresses to control their districts. They were all vulnerable, however, to factionalism and personal rivalries. The French, fearing that anarchy would result from any effort to defeat the Glawis, restored their predominance and left all territories south of Marrakesh in their hands. After World War II they used the Glawis to help resist the nationalist movement.

French economic policy strongly favored the interests of French colonists. Extensive properties hitherto controlled by the sultan and the tribes were made available for distribution. While the French held that roads and rivers, beaches, and forests were inalienable, all other properties could be bought and sold. In 1914, *makhzan* land was sold to European colonists, and lands assigned to tribes in payment of military service were confiscated. In 1919, collectively owned tribal properties were made into the private property of Europeans and tribal chiefs. European holdings grew enormously. In 1913, there were approximately 73,000 hectares cultivated by Europeans; by 1953, Europeans controlled approximately a million hectares of land. Though Europeans were barely more than 1 percent of the rural population, they controlled 10 percent of the crop land and almost 25 percent of orchards and vineyards. French taxation favored French over Moroccan interests. The tartib, a tax on revenue, was introduced in 1913, but rebates were given for European-type farming methods. European farmers were further

advantaged by producing citrus fruits, vegetables, wine, and wheat, which could be sold for export, while Moroccans concentrated on less remunerative crops. French investment in irrigation and dams also favored Europeans. Nonetheless, the French benefited Morocco by bringing peace to the countryside and opening new markets. They also helped Moroccan farmers by investing in irrigation and by introducing new seeds, crops, and breeds of livestock.

In industry the French favored phosphate mining and the development of flour mills, sugar refining, cement manufacture, and textile production. Moroccan workers flocked to the towns looking for employment, but wages were low and unions were proscribed by the government. French policy created a dual economy, with a European sector favored by the administration and a relatively neglected Moroccan sector.

As in Tunisia and Algeria, French domination seemed economically and politically secure, but it nonetheless generated the social and cultural conditions for the formation of an opposition movement. French rule helped to break down the traditional structure of Moroccan society. Changes in administration reduced the power of the tribal and religious chiefs. Seizure of Moroccan lands, recruitment of Moroccans into the French army, and new urban enterprises drew a substantial number of rural people to the towns and cities. The spread of European dress, movie theaters, and sports teams broke down local customs in favor of a more unified society. Large numbers of Moroccan workers in France also developed a Western lifestyle and political consciousness. Berber speakers were integrated into the Arab population as a result of mixing in the towns and by the spread of the Arabic language and Arab Islamic education. Thus the conditions were set for a revival of Moroccan political identity and for hostility to French rule.

Moroccan opposition received early expression in the rebellion of ʿAbd al-Karim (d. 1963) in the Spanish-occupied zone. ʿAbd al-Karim was an intellectual, a judge in his early career, a teacher, and the editor of a newspaper called *Telegrama*. He was familiar with Spanish culture and had numerous European contacts. His father, a tribal leader, had been involved with German mining interests and

the son had studied engineering in Spain. In 1923, ʿAbd al-Karim declared the Rif a republican state. The state was made up of a federation of independent tribes united by a nationalist ideology. ʿAbd al-Karim denied that he was religiously inclined but nonetheless advocated Salafi teachings and opposed saint worship. His independent republic expanded to the point where it brought France into the war on the side of Spain, resulting in his defeat in 1926. Despite this defeat, ʿAbd al-Karim remained a hero to young Moroccans who aspired to overthrow French rule.

More lasting Moroccan resistance to French rule came from the religious reform movement. From the 1920s to the 1960s, there was a subtle shift in the practice of Islam in Morocco. Both rural Sufis and urban *ʿulamaʾ* were discredited by French control. Moroccan religious concerns flowed into reformism. The Salafis stressed the purification of Islam, opposition to saint worship, and defense against Western cultural encroachment. As in Egypt, Algeria, and many other places in the Muslim world, foreign rule, centralization of state power, and Muslim awareness of the need for a higher degree of communal cooperation was channeled into reform. Moroccan reformers, in Fez, Rabat, Salé, and other towns, inspired by Muhammad ʿAbduh, founded schools to teach Arabic grammar, ethics, logic, Islamic history, and arithmetic, though not modern sciences.

Reformism took hold wherever the changes generated by French rule hurt the established bourgeoisie, propelling them toward national consciousness. Fez suffered a long depression from 1925 to 1940 as a result of European competition and the rise of Casablanca as a port and business center, but Fassis continued to think of themselves as the elite of Moroccan society and resisted French rule, sponsoring religious reform movements, trade union activities, secret cultural societies, and nationalist newspapers. Wounded in pocket and pride, Fassis were driven into political action.

In 1925 and 1926, political groups began to form around the students and educators in the new schools, and in 1927 an association of Muslim North African students was born. The French-promulgated Berber decree of 1930 united Moroccan sentiment

behind the reformers. Communal prayers were organized, a press campaign launched, and new cells of reformists and nationalists were founded. The Moroccan proto-nationalists published a review in French, called *Maghreb* in Paris and in Fez *L'Action du peuple*. In 1933, they proposed an annual festival in honor of the sultan as a demonstration of Moroccan national loyalty. A year later, a plan was presented to the sultan and the French administration calling for the removal of direct French rule, appointment of Moroccan ministers, and the formation of an elected national council. The plan also called for a single judicial system based on government courts and Islamic law. It called for the nationalization of the major industries, including mining, railroads, transport, electric power, and banks. This was the first political statement laying claim to Moroccan autonomy, if not to full independence from France. The French rejected the reform plan, and in 1936 and 1937 some of the nationalists moved to a new stage of resistance: popular demonstrations against French rule often in the name of defending Islam.

Here, as elsewhere, World War II severely damaged the French and allowed the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, created in 1943, to come to the fore. The new party absorbed former *'ulama'*, administrators, and other elite persons, creating a national elite. It organized demonstrations in honor of Sultan Muhammad V, who now committed himself to an autonomous Morocco. In a speech in Tangier in April 1947, he declared Morocco an Arab state attached to the Arab League and deliberately omitted the obligatory compliments to France. The crisis came in 1953, when the French attempted to force the sultan to agree to a dual sovereignty and suppress the Istiqlal Party. Thami al-Glawi (d. 1956) mustered large numbers of Berber tribesmen to converge on Fez, and the French forced the sultan to leave the country. Istiqlal leaders were also imprisoned or exiled.

The exile of the sultan made him a martyr and created a mass national sentiment. In his absence, many Moroccans ceased to attend the Friday prayers as a protest against an illegitimate regime. With the leading politicians in prison or exile, terrorism began in late 1953. By October 1955, al-Glawi had to yield and request the return

of the sultan. Muhammad, returned to his throne, declared that Morocco would become a constitutional monarchy, and that he would conduct negotiations with France leading to independence and to a treaty of alliance. Under the leadership of Pierre Mendés-France, the French accepted Moroccan independence and signed a formal accord on March 7, 1956.

The Moroccan independence movement was strikingly different from that of Tunisia or Algeria. While in Algeria resistance was substantially the work of new elites, in Morocco the sultan, the historical leader of the country, became the titular leader of the opposition and the embodiment of national identity. Thus he carried the old regime into the modern state. As in Tunisia and Algeria, Moroccan resistance was first associated with the Salafi reform movement, but while secular leaders took over in Tunisia and Algeria, Morocco was not easily secularized. Relatively few Moroccans had a French education.

Independent Morocco

With the restoration of independence, the sultan remained the dominant political figure. His authority continued to be grounded in a long historical tradition, and he retains his personal religious aura. Ceremonies such as the *bay'a* (oath of loyalty) and the sacrifice of *'id* reinforced the royal authority. The sultan claims the traditional title of Muslim caliphs, *amir al-mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful) and the power of *baraka*, to convey divine blessing into the world. Sultan Muhammad V (d. 1961) and his successors, Hassan (r. 1961–99) and Muhammad VI (r. 1999–), claimed the veneration traditionally accorded the Sufis by sponsoring saints' festivals. At the same time, the state took direct control of religious activities and Islamic discourse. Councils established in 1981 gave the government control of preaching and Muslim education. Also, the sultan judiciously appealed to the Western-educated intelligentsia and workers by using liberal and democratic rhetoric.

The protectorate left the sultan in an enhanced political and administrative position. The Moroccan regime fluctuated between

absolute monarchy and manipulative authoritarianism. The French had strengthened the bureaucracy and weakened independent rural chiefs. They left the sultan in control of the army, the police, the Department of the Interior, the banks, and the newspapers. Political parties were allowed only insofar as they accepted the system. The hopes of Istiqlal to share power were dashed, and in 1959 the party split into an Istiqlal wing and a new Union nationale des forces populaires (UNFP). Each party created its own trade union ally. In 1962, a new constitution and parliament were created, but parliament was dissolved in 1965.

Through the Ministry of the Interior, the sultan ran a national patronage system. He patronized a myriad of factions, interest groups, families, and tribes. He stood outside the political groupings as an arbitrator, and ruled by holding the balance of power among the different groups and by his control over the army, the Ministry of the Interior, and other key positions. He formed clienteles of professional, administrative, and business leaders, especially among the bourgeoisie of Fez, which provided cadres of officials, *'ulama'*, and merchants. Elites of rural background were important in the Ministries of the Interior, Education, and Justice. Many rural communities were brought into the system by Sufi leaders and other intermediaries. Leftist groups were weak, and the trade unions were dependent on the state. The students were easily managed. The tribes of the Rif and the middle and central Atlas, however, remained hostile to the regime, but the central government was nonetheless strongly in control of the countryside.

In foreign policy the struggle to win control of the Western Sahara aroused nationalist feelings and made the sultan ever more popular. The Western Sahara was a former Spanish colony, ceded to Morocco and Mauritania in 1976, but subject to rival claims. While Morocco claimed the territory for itself, the POLISARIO front, with Algerian support, claimed independence for a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The sultan, mobilizing mass support and Saudi financing, occupied the whole territory. A United Nations peace plan of 1988 called for a referendum in the territories, which has yet to be

held. Consequently, tensions remain high between Algeria and Morocco.

A segmented society built around personal ties to the sultan and fluid coalitions, the Moroccan political system maintained stability at the price of economic development. After independence, Morocco suffered from a flight of capital, though many French professional and technical workers remained. Development plans in the 1960s failed, in part, for lack of reforms in land ownership. An already poor economy fell into worse hardship in the 1980s. Forced to take IMF loans in 1983 due to a balance-of-trade deficit and rising foreign debt, Morocco was obliged to undertake a program of privatization. This led to a gradual stabilization of the economy and the deficit; but while the middle class prospered, the poor remained impoverished. Riots took place in various cities in 1981, 1984, 1990, and 1996. With a renewed downturn in the economy, workers and students again protested in 1997.

Opposition to the sultanate takes the form of militant Islam, which finds followers in the shanty towns, and in Tetouan, Tangiers, and other towns with local grievances. Young, uprooted people are less attached to the traditional marabouts than to a reformist, transnational Islam. The Islamic opposition movements, however, were too fragmented to defeat the sultan, and generally compromised with the regime and adopted gradualist goals within the system. Competing Salafi and Sufi tendencies could not undercut the authority of the sultan, who claimed both sources of legitimacy.

With the death of Sultan Hassan in 1999 and the succession of his son Muhammad VI, Morocco remains the most highly integrated of the North African Arab countries. The new sultan, Western educated, cosmopolitan, and outward looking, appeals to youth and has proposed reforms such as a literacy program for rural women, and legal changes to replace unilateral repudiation with court-granted divorce decrees and equal division of spousal property. The largest Islamic party, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), which resembles the Turkish AKP and the Tunisian an-Nahda, is reliably monarchist and concentrates on pragmatic reforms. The Justice and

Charity Group, however, opposes the sultanate and favors a republican form of government and an Islamic state. The secular opposition is divided among dozens of small parties.

In 2011, the sultan deftly handled the pressures of the Arab revolutions and forestalled mass protests by proposing new elections. The PJD emerged as the most prominent party in the new parliament, but it shares power with other allies of the sultan. Islam is so closely identified with the monarchy and the state that it constitutes the Moroccan national identity.

Libya

As in Tunisia and Algeria, Ottoman rule established the first state in the territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan, which make up modern Libya. The invasions of the seventh century helped to Arabize and Islamize the population, but did not establish a central regime. Almohad authority was nominal; the Mamluks of Egypt had alliances with tribes in Cyrenaica that allowed them to claim that they were suzerains of the country. This claim was inherited by the Ottomans, who conquered Egypt in 1517 and Tripoli in 1551. From 1551 until 1711, Tripoli was governed by Ottoman pashas and janissary soldiers. In 1711, Ahmad Qaramanli, a local janissary officer, seized power and founded a dynasty under Ottoman suzerainty, which lasted until 1835. Qaramanli power waned in the early nineteenth century as a result of the suppression of piracy and of growing British and French influence; the Ottomans again intervened in Libya and brought the dynasty to an end. Ottoman governors ruled Tripolitania and were suzerains of Cyrenaica until the Italian invasion of 1911 and Ottoman withdrawal in 1912.

From 1835 to 1911, the Ottomans made extensive changes in Tripolitania. By 1858 they had defeated local resistance, established their government throughout the region, and introduced Tanzimat reforms. The Ottoman governors encouraged the sedentarization of the bedouin, developed towns and agriculture, and helped revive the trans-Saharan trade, which flourished in Libya as the abolition of the slave traffic closed down Saharan routes going through Tunisia and

Algeria. Ottoman rule encouraged local education and the formation of an intelligentsia inspired by the political and cultural life of Istanbul. In this phase of Ottoman administration, Tripolitanian officials, intellectuals, and tribal and village shaykhs acquired a sense of common identity as part of a larger provincial, Ottoman, Arab, and Muslim universe.

Cyrenaica remained a separate province under Ottoman suzerainty, and went through a similar phase of development owing to Ottoman cooperation with the Sanusiyya brotherhood. The Sanusiyya was founded in 1837 by Muhammad b. ʿAli al-Sanusi (d. 1859), who was born in Algeria and educated in Fez and Mecca. Al-Sanusi, under the influence of reform currents, declared that his purpose was to return to the basic precepts of the Quran and hadith, and affirmed the right of believers to use independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) to deduce the principles by which a Muslim life should be conducted. The Sanusiyya wished to unite all of the Muslim brotherhoods and to contribute to the spread and revitalization of Islam.

His mission led al-Sanusi to Cyrenaica, where he established a number of Sufi retreats (*zawiyas*) before his death in 1859. The Sanusi retreats became centers of religious missions and teaching, but also of agricultural settlement and trade. The retreats, strung out along the trade routes linking Cyrenaica with Kufra and Wadai, helped organize caravans. The brotherhood progressively acquired a quasi-political authority among the bedouin of the region by negotiating cooperation in trade, mediating disputes, and providing urban services such as religious instruction, markets, charity, and political representation. By the end of the century, the Sanusi network of Sufi retreats had built up a large tribal coalition in the regions west of Egypt and the Sudan. Under Sanusi leadership this coalition resisted both French expansion in the region of Lake Chad and the Italian invasion of Libya.

After the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Italians considered Tripolitania part of their imperial sphere of influence. Ottoman resistance to Italian economic penetration provided a pretext for an Italian invasion in 1911. The Italians occupied the towns and forced

the Ottomans to concede their suzerainty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Only after World War I was Italy able to defeat local opposition in Tripolitania, and not until a protracted and destructive war that lasted from 1923 to 1932 were the Italians able to defeat the bedouin of Cyrenaica, seize the majority of their lands, and colonize the country. The Sanusi leaders were forced into exile and obliged to accept Italian suzerainty. In 1934, the Italians completed the conquest of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and joined the two provinces into modern Libya.

The Italians were defeated in World War II, and Libya came under the control of Britain and France, but the United Nations made it an independent country in 1951. The Sanusi leader, Amir Idris, became king, governing the country on the basis of his family's religious legitimacy and its services in the struggle against foreign rule. He ruled with the help of urban-based officials, with the support of the bedouin rallied through the Sanusi network of retreats, and with the assistance of client tribal chiefs. A younger generation of nationalist- and socialist-minded students, technicians, petroleum and dock workers, and army officers opposed the Sanusi regime as corrupt and dependent upon foreign support. They were inspired by the pan-Arab and socialist ideologies of Nasser and the Ba'th Party.

In 1969, Libya's own Free Officers movement, comprising middling officers and non-commissioned officers – schooled at the Baghdad Military Academy, but drawn from the poorer Libyan tribes – seized power. Led by Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, the officers set up a Revolutionary Command Council and rapidly established an all-powerful military regime. Foreign bases were dismantled. Foreign banks and businesses were nationalized. Political parties and labor unions were outlawed. In 1973, the revolution took a still more radical turn, with the arrest of officials, professionals, and potential political opponents, and the creation of popular committees to control government ministries, schools, and major enterprises. In 1977, Libya officially became the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Republic.

Qaddafi personally dominated the political process. Middle Eastern and North African Arab rulers usually governed through personal and client ties within the framework of state organizations. Qaddafi,

however, eliminated the state organizations and ruled directly through tribal and client ties. He ruled with the support of his own Qadhdhafa tribe and by means of the Revolutionary Committees and the security agencies, which all reported directly to him. By the late 1970s, the regime had taken control of all important economic functions, ruined the small middle class, and substantially redistributed the country's wealth. The political effect of populism was to abolish all independent centers of wealth and to create a system of checks on all public functionaries, thereby minimizing the prospect of opposition. Dissent was not tolerated. Capital punishments were authorized by Qaddafi himself. Whatever opposition remained was concentrated in the eastern provinces, the base of the former Sanusi rulers, and was expressed through political Islam.

Qaddafi is best known as the proponent of radical Arab and Islamic ideologies. His earliest revolutionary doctrine was a copy of Nasserite and Ba'thist ideologies and stressed Arab unity, and opposition to colonialism and Zionism. It asserted Libyan leadership in the quest for unity and in the struggle against Israel. In the course of his rule, Qaddafi negotiated unions between Libya and Egypt, Libya and Syria, and Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia, none of which came to fruition.

In the early 1970s, he added a new dimension to his theory, in which he proposed an Arabic–Islamic mission as a Third Universal Alternative to capitalism and communism. He proclaimed an extreme form of Islamic scripturalism in which the Quran – but not the teachings of the Prophet (sunna) – is taken as the only source of authority for the reconstruction of society. Islamic scripturalism linked with populism destroyed the authority of the *ulama*, Sufi shaykhs, bureaucrats, and technocrats, and made Qaddafi himself the central figure in this version of Islamic modernism. A Quranic morality forbidding gambling, alcohol, and other "Western" vices was enforced. In the international arena, the Third Universal Alternative called for jihad, or struggle, against imperialism and Zionism in the Middle East, Muslim Africa, and even in the Philippines. With his oil revenues Qaddafi sponsored paramilitary and terrorist groups

around the globe. In more extreme form, and with more emphatic international implications, it represented a version of the identification of socialism, Arabism, and Islam common throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

By the 1990s, however, Libya had become a mainstream North African state. A series of setbacks suffered by Qaddafi in the 1980s – including tribal opposition in Cyrenaica, falling oil prices, UN sanctions and a US embargo on oil-producing equipment and military sales to Libya as a punishment for its support of terrorist attacks – hurt the economy. Cuts in the military budget led to unrest in the army and an attempted coup in 1993. As Qaddafi retreated from his radical positions, political Islamist groups attacked military posts and government officials. Qaddafi held on to power by subsidizing the domestic economy, and cooperated with other North African states to counter the radical "Islamist" threat, but his regime sacrificed its ideological goals and became an unadorned dictatorship.

The Arab revolution broke out in Libya on February 17, 2011. The rebels captured eastern Libya while Qaddafi held on to Tripoli and the west. Qaddafi was finally dislodged with the help of NATO military intervention. With the death of Qaddafi, the National Transitional Council nominally took power on October 23, 2011, but in fact there is no effective central government. Qaddafi's relentless destruction of Libyan institutions has left a country of tribes, gangs, militias, and city-states.

Islam in state ideologies and opposition movements: the Middle East and North Africa

The North African Arab countries are grouped together in this book not only because of geography, but also due to similarities in their historical development. In each, colonial rule introduced elements of a modern economy and education, but the continuities in the structure of states and in the role of Islam are striking.

Morocco shows the greatest degree of historical continuity. French control, introduced only in 1912, seems to have had a limited impact on the Moroccan political system. The monarchy retained its Islamic legitimacy and its political centrality. The sultans kept both their personal charismatic and their Islamic institutional authority. They benefited by taking symbolic leadership of the Islamic reform movement and by leading resistance to the French. They increased their power through effective use of the bureaucracy consolidated by the French and skillful manipulation of political factions and interest groups. With independence, both the Moroccan state and society were defined in the combined terms of protectorate-influenced monarchy and Islam. Morocco, more than almost any other Muslim country, retains the impress of its historical identity.

Algeria, by contrast, is the most radically reorganized North African society. The French occupation destroyed Algerian society, and the elites who emerged after World War I were a narrow and fragile stratum divided among secularists with a strong French orientation, Muslim reformers, populist leaders, and military revolutionaries. The ferocity of the struggle for independence created a regime with strong revolutionary, socialist, and egalitarian tendencies. The war for independence also gave power to a military elite in an otherwise disorganized society. The Algerian regime neglected the agricultural population and instead promoted an "enclave" state based on military power and the control of petroleum and gas resources and the industries financed by them. It sought to bridge the gap between the elites and the masses by appeals to reformist Islam. With the destruction of the historical tribal and religious organizations, Islamic reformism – the religious language of nationalist as opposed to parochial identities and the language of disciplined worldly activity – became the basis of Algerian national identity.

In Libya, as in Algeria, the Ottoman Empire provided the rudiments of a state while Sufism was the basis for the organization of a predominantly bedouin population. In nineteenth-century Cyrenaica, Sufism was the preserve of the reformist Sanusi movement, which used its influence to organize trade, resist French and Italian colonization, and create a Libyan monarchy after World War II. The

Free Officer revolutionaries, who seized power in 1969, inherited neither a strong state, nor a secular concept of monarchy, nor an integrated society. In Libya there was virtually no historical basis for a national regime. Thus the Qaddafi regime tended to be pan-Arab, Islamic, and international-revolutionary in ideological orientation, finding support for a radical reconstruction of Libyan society in universalistic terms. The Qaddafi regime embodied a unique combination of personal power and universal pan-Arab and Islamic symbols, but ultimately ruled as a dictatorship.

Tunisia was a partial exception to the North African pattern of social fragmentation and strong Islamic identities based on the Islamic reformist movements of the late nineteenth century and the interwar years. A long history of centralized states set the foundations for Tunisian national identity. State-sponsored modernism originated in the pre-protectorate era. Islamic reformism was introduced by the Salafiyya during the Young Tunisian and Destour Party eras, but the leadership of independent Tunisia was, by and large, seized by a secular-oriented elite. While the older generation had an Islamic education, the younger generation was French–Arabic in education, and while the older generation represented a condominium of official and scholarly families, the younger one represented the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie of the coastal towns. The struggle for power between the two elites, combined with the struggle against the French, turned the Bourguiba generation to nationalism.

After independence, all the North African states entered a period of authoritarian rule, in many ways a carryover of colonial regimes. In each of the four countries, the central authority was built upon elites, clienteles, tribes and factions from particular classes, regions, tribes, or families. All of these states are governed behind the scenes by factions that are in turn manipulated by the ruler. In all these countries the state derived some of its legitimacy from its control of Islamic institutions. By the 1960s and 1970s, however, the North African governments failed to promote economic development, and kept themselves in power by turning to the police, the intelligence

services, and the military. In the 1980s, all North African states were faced with demonstrations, riots, and strikes.

The opposition was typically made up marginalized groups excluded from the post-independence modernization project, and their resentment was typically channeled into Islamic movements. None of the major movements was led by traditional religious leaders; all were headed by professionals and lay intellectuals. They denounced the traditional *'ulama'* for their support for oppressive governments. They called for the rejection of Western mores and the creation of Islamic states.

The Islamic opposition has three forms. One is nonpolitical, and sponsors educational, social, and cultural activities meant to Islamize society from the bottom up. Mass education, television, cassettes and radio, and an Islamic publishing industry make possible the resocialization of the people to Islam despite the educational policies of the states. These movements operate schools, clinics, and welfare programs. The second type calls for electoral, political participation as a way of taking power. The third is willing to resort to violence and terrorism. The principal movements – the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, Rashid al-Ghannouchi's an-Nahda Renaissance Party in Tunisia, and the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria – belong to the second category. They have been open to cooperation with the ruling regimes. With the rebellions of 2011, the moderate Islamic parties of Tunisia and Morocco have gained in power and influence.

Religion-based political movements may, ironically, be a consequence of state policies. The North African states derived much of their income from rents, royalties, and foreign sources, and created welfare states by the distribution of patronage to families, tribes, and ideological and political clients. Resentment of patronage and clientelism grew among masses of unemployed young people whose only experience was "hanging out," street culture, and marginalization. The Islamic movements gained mass support not only for religious reasons but also as a protest against government failure to provide adequate employment, housing, and education.

North Africa also has to be seen in the context of the larger Arab and Middle Eastern world. Throughout the Arab Middle East and North Africa, the ideology of states has been built upon varying combinations of nationalist, pan-Arab, and Islamic symbols. Such states as Syria, Iraq, and Tunisia stressed the secular–national and sometimes the socialist basis of state identity, despite constitutional recognition of the Islamic character of the state or latent appeals to the Muslim sentiments of the populace. The institutionally more fragile states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, also heavily emphasized their pan-Arab loyalties. In these states, the Ottoman heritage of state-controlled religious establishments and the social dominance of upwardly mobile military elites or of minority groups led to secular nationalism.

The Islamic element is pronounced in the official ideologies of Egypt, Algeria, and Libya. Since the turn of the twentieth century, Egypt has cultivated a strong nationalist, state-oriented self-concept with strong obeisance to Islam. The Arab and pan-Arab basis of Egyptian identity became more marked after World War II, but with its defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, Egypt returned to a more national state- and Islamic-centered concept of political identity. The religious loyalties of the populace and well-organized Islamic movements made Islamic symbols a recurring part of Egypt's official ideology. Algeria and Libya are instances of a still more integral association of nationalist, pan-Arab, and Islamic symbols. In Morocco, the continuity of the monarchy and its close identification with both the Salafi movement and Sufism make Islam central to both official ideology and national identity. In all these countries, Islam is particularly important in popular political identity and in the ideologies of both conservative and revolutionary regimes, just as it was in the past the basis of both Sufi-organized rural societies and anticolonial movements.

At the same time, Islam was an important factor in the opposition to these same regimes. Since the 1967 war with Israel, and especially since the 1979 revolution in Iran, Islam has become an ideology of political opposition and revolutionary aspirations. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, the Jamaʿat in Egypt and

Tunisia, and independent religious leaders everywhere maintain the historical role of Islam as a communal and religious system apart from, and in opposition to, the state. Thus, throughout the Arab East and Arab North Africa there are profound ambiguities in the uses of Islam as an element of political identity. State regimes are organized upon the basis of fluid combinations of national, pan-Arab, and Islamic identity; opposition movements are couched in terms of Islamic aspirations. Islam is an element both of state ideologies and of revolutionary utopias. It is the shared medium of political discourse grounded in the ambiguity of mass culture in which state, ethnic, national, and Islamic identities are imperfectly fused.

Chapter 52 Women in the Middle East: nineteenth to twenty-first centuries

Lena Salaymeh

This chapter will deal with issues of women and family, gender, and gender roles in the Middle East and North Africa (the Ottoman, Turkish, Arab, and Iranian regions). In other Islamic societies, such as sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the status of women, and their legal and cultural situations, are often very different. Yet it should be noted that many nineteenth-century trans-formations in women's status were global phenomena, and much of what is discussed in this chapter can be more broadly applied to women's global history.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought significant changes in the position of women throughout the world. Middle Eastern women were profoundly affected by the impact of European imperialism, by domestic political and economic reforms, by the entrance of the Middle East into new economic orbits, and by the introduction and circulation of new ideas about gender roles. The impact of these changes differed for women from different socioeconomic classes and different regions, but everywhere colonialism generated a crisis of confidence, a crisis of culture, and a crisis of daily practice in women's lives. This chapter will emphasize certain key themes including legal reforms, education, labor, and social and political activism. While we look primarily at legal and political institutions, neither Islamic law nor state law fully defines family relations or the norms that govern women's roles in society. Whatever state or religious law has to say about marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and other issues, custom, tradition, and communities profoundly shape the feelings and behaviors of individuals. In the real world, women also have to cope with the realities of financial resources, social status, educational

background, the social authority of men and family matriarchs, the strength of personalities, and other daily considerations.

Imperialism and Reform in the Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, although they were motivated by different goals, colonial officers and local/native "reformers" found themselves allied in agitating for changes in the lives of Middle Eastern women. As European powers extended their economic, military, and political control over the region, they imposed a host of ideas about the allegedly backward position of women in the Islamic world. Travelers, merchants, and colonial officials alike recorded their impressions and fantasies about such things as the harem, polygyny, and the veil. Colonial officials claimed that the region's political and economic "reform" would be complete only if women were rescued from the harem, unveiled, and given legal rights (including the right to monogamous marriages) that Western women purportedly enjoyed. European imperialism altered the region's political discourses by making Western ideals (but not necessarily realities) about women's roles a necessary component of political conversations.

   Drawing on their education, contacts with Europeans, and the policies of colonial administrations, a generation of Middle Eastern intellectuals, professionals, and civil servants discussed the role of women in the economic and political futures of their societies in implicit dialogue with Westerners. Most of these native reformers were men. Schools, student missions to Europe, and print journalism disseminated Western ideas. They preached that women's education would save them from idle and empty lives, preparing them for employment, and training them for harmonious marriages and the raising of children. Only through a modern education, they argued, could women fulfill their domestic roles as mothers and the educators of modern youth. They argued further that the freedom of women was essential for the freedom of the whole society and that women's emancipation – and the equality of men and women in

public roles – was necessary for the creation of modern nation-states. Some reformers favored the nuclear family as a necessary condition for a moral and modern society.

The cause of women was also part of an attempt to secularize Muslim societies, separate state and religion, reduce the domain of Islamic law, and repudiate established political authorities. The reformers wanted, by playing up the condition of women, to assert their own emancipation and modernity and to affirm the value of individuality expressed through personal achievement. A change in women's status would be a symbol of a change in the whole social order. Their opponents viewed their position as acquiescence to Western imperialism and Western stereotypes about the "backward East."

To replace the Ottoman Islamic identity with a new Turkish identity, Ziya Gokalp (d. 1924), a Turkish nationalist, presented women as the very soul of ancient Turkish society, which had been smothered by Islam. He advocated equality in education, employment, and family life, allowing women equal rights in divorce and inheritance. Ataturk (d. 1938) too promoted the emancipation of women as the condition for a new era of democracy and liberation. Through the education of women, Turkey would come to its true self without having to imitate the West. The Egyptian nationalist Qasim Amin (d. 1908) adopted the European trope that the education of women was the key to the reform of the nation; he argued that nations would progress or fail as a consequence of the position of women. In early twentieth-century Iran, male theorists viewed women as symbols of modernity rather than the beneficiaries of liberation. All of these political actors spoke about women without really speaking to women, treating them only as symbols of their political projects. Nationalist ideologies often exploited women through rhetoric, but failed to improve their conditions through concrete actions.

Changes in family law

The Ottoman Empire initiated practical reforms in family law and mores as part of the Tanzimat reform program, the reorganization and "modernization" of the empire. Ottoman reformers called for

monogamy in the royal household, the elimination of concubinage, and greater freedom for women in marriage and social activity. The demand for change was expressed in the transformation of the legal system and family law. In 1869, the Ottoman Empire adopted the Mecelle, partly based on Islamic legal principles, for civil and personal law. This code in fact limited the legal options available to women; for example, it codified Hanafi restrictions on women's divorce options, which were more stringent than those of other Islamic schools of law. In 1917, however, Ottoman family law included a broad array of legal opinions from majority, minority, and extinct legal schools, and was the first "modern" family law code. This code restricted polygyny (which was practiced in not more than 5 to 10 percent of households) and enlarged the conditions upon which women could obtain divorces. In the Republic of Turkey, it was replaced by secular reforms in the 1920s.

Nineteenth-century Egyptian legal reform followed Ottoman examples. The Egyptian Mixed Courts code (1875) fused the Code Napoléon and Islamic legal sources. In 1883, Egypt's National Courts were formed and relegated family law to "Islamic" courts. In 1897, the code for Islamic courts required written registration of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This was expanded by a 1911 law requiring official documents for all family law matters. The state's intervention in family matters generally strengthened the position of women since the courts were able to implement a variety of previously informal or unenforced restrictions on the powers of men.

Women's secular education

Reformers had substantial influence on the type of education provided to women, and impelled the establishment of more schools for girls and women. Historically, women's education had been provided by local trusts (*awqaf*), but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the education of women and girls changed from vocational or religious training to a more general education.

In the late nineteenth century, a number of local religious and ethnic communities, missionary movements, and foreign governments, such as those of the United States and France,

established schools for girls. For example, in Morocco, Alliance Israélite Universelle opened a girls' school in 1866; in Tunisia, a French primary school was established in 1900.

The Ottoman state, as part of its Tanzimat programs, slowly expanded the opportunities for the education of girls and women. A school for midwives opened in 1842. An Ottoman grammar school for girls was founded in 1858, and an art school and teacher-training school in 1870. By 1895, about one-third of girls were attending elementary schools. Between 1908 and 1919, numerous secondary schools were inaugurated. The first *lycée* for women was established in 1911 and schools for teachers, nurses, midwives, and secretaries expanded rapidly. The university was opened to Ottoman women in 1914, and female students agitated for inclusion in all of its departments. Under the auspices of the Turkish state, the University of Istanbul was made coeducational in 1921; primary education was made compulsory for both sexes in 1924.

In Egypt, starting in the 1830s, midwives were trained by the state, but most girls' schools were private or confessional (such as a Coptic school founded in 1853), until Isma'il Pasha (r. 1863–79) opened primary schools for girls and, in 1873, the first secondary school, al-Saniyya. At the same time, missionary and private schools opened all over Egypt. Despite meager state expenditures the system of public education continued to grow and to introduce Egyptian boys and girls to European-style curricula. By 1913, there were about 2,600 girls, about 12 percent of the students, in Egyptian primary schools. In 1929, women were allowed to enter the university. Upper-class Egyptians who were reluctant to send their daughters to school had them privately tutored by Westerners.

In Iran, upper- and middle-class women were frequently educated. As in Turkey and Egypt, missionary and foreign private schools began to educate the daughters of the elite from the turn of the century. The first public, secular school for girls was opened in 1918. When Reza Shah Pahlavi took the throne in 1925, he – like Ataturk – made reform of the status of women the project of a modernizing state.

Labor and social and political activism

In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the growth of European trade and the spread of a cash economy heightened the sexual divisions of labor. Traditionally, women did agricultural and craft work or animal husbandry, but the importation of European textiles destroyed many local industries, driving women from household work into mills, and carpet and lace-making factories. During World War I, due to the engagement of the Turkish male population in the war and their loss of life in battle, women began working in factories, banks, the postal service, municipal offices, and hospitals.

In other parts of the Middle East, the transition to a capitalist economy and the commercialization of agriculture disadvantaged lower- and middle-class women, who were drawn or driven into factory labor. In Lebanon, women worked in the silk industry; in Egypt, they worked in cigarette factories. In Cairo, women were dressmakers, nurses, government employees, and shop assistants. Wage labor reduced women to piecework, took them out of home or neighborhood workshops, and raised moral questions about their exposure to unrelated men. Upper-class women, however, continued to be involved in real estate. These women often inherited their properties from other women in their families, or were the administrators of properties held in trusts.

As the result of sociopolitical changes (especially educational reforms), more women began to speak on their own behalf and to articulate the needs and desires of "real" as opposed to "symbolic" women. Some women were content to live the idealized roles of wives and mothers, while others wanted to participate in anti-imperialist resistance. In 1835, women actively protested conscription in Egypt. Later, women joined the nationalist movements, working alongside men for emancipation from colonial rule, often expressing their feminist views in action without challenging patriarchal ideas or presenting a Western feminist agenda.

In Iran, women were active in the Tobacco Rebellions of 1890 and the constitutional revolution of 1905–11. Numerous women's

societies emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century to provide women with education and opportunities for social activism. In Iran, the National Ladies' Society of 1910, for example, participated in strikes and boycotts, calling for the ejection of foreigners. Only with the assumption of power by Reza Khan Pahlavi in 1925 were feminist agendas subsumed by the state.

In Egypt, separate women's political groups were formed in conjunction with the Wafd. In 1923, Egyptian women founded the Egyptian Feminist Union. In the 1920s, Women's Committees to Defend Palestine engaged in demonstrations, and women actively participated in the nationalist resistance to the British. Pan-Arabist feminists, inspired by anti-imperialist goals, chose to work with other Arab women in organizing conferences throughout the 1930s. An Eastern Women's Congress was hosted in Damascus in 1930 and in Tehran in 1932, as an attempt to create an "Eastern" feminist alliance that was independent of Western imperialist interests. All these women's organizations provided a forum for women's sociopolitical activism and leadership.

Women's newspapers emerged in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. *The Young Woman* was founded in Alexandria in 1892, and was followed in 1895 by the Turkish-language *Ladies' Own Gazette.* Women's educational and charitable organizations were founded in conjunction with publications. Middle-class women, often educated in *waqf* schools, also started social clubs and salons. In the Ottoman Empire, Fatma Aliye Hanem (d. 1936), daughter of a Tanzimat reformer, used the press to advance her ideas about women as wives, mothers, and Muslims, publishing a book on women as early as 1891. In Iran, women's organizations and periodicals advocated women's education, hosted debates on veiling, and promoted women's professional training. The Women's Freedom Society, founded in 1906, provided women with a forum in which to discuss such topics as the differences between women in Eastern and Western societies and the position of women in Iran. In the period between 1908 and 1916, a number of women's societies were formed in the Middle East, including the Society for the Elevation of Women and the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Women in

1908. Such organizations engaged in philanthropic activities and encouraged the advancement of women in Ottoman society. In Egypt, Huda Shaʿrawi (d. 1947) founded the Muhammad ʿAli Organization to provide schools, workshops, residences, and a dispensary for poor women. Shaʿrawi also founded a feminist journal in 1925, to which she contributed a variety of writings on women's issues.

Like their Western counterparts, many feminists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came from elite social classes and represented the values of those classes, rather than the majority of women. There were, of course, exceptions – such as Zaynab Fawwaz (d. 1914), who articulated a working-class feminist perspective.

Post–World War I nation-states

In the decades after World War I, newly independent states, such as Turkey and Iran, became the most powerful forces in changing the conditions of women. These were authoritarian states dedicated, if need be, to the forced modernization of their societies. Just as their imperialist predecessors had emphasized changes to laws affecting women as being necessary for the "civilizational advancement" of Muslim societies, nationalist elites advocated similar changes as essential for the nation's advancement. States and ruling elites used family issues to help consolidate their power, mobilize women for the labor force, undermine tribal communities, and create a symbolic identity for new nations. The companionate monogamous nuclear family was advanced by the state as an ideal, and came to be accepted in practice throughout the region. The nuclear family ideal generated a more intense set of obligations for women within the family, where they were supposed to become scientific managers of the household and to raise children for the new world. Nonetheless, citizenship and nationality, like religious identity, was usually conceptualized as passing through the male line. Turkey, Tunisia, and (most recently) Egypt are exceptions, granting mothers the ability to confer citizenship on their children.

Legal reforms begun in the Tanzimat era were continued and adopted in newly independent states. Generally, the conjugal family was strengthened against wider kinship ties by requiring a woman's personal consent to a marriage, legislating a minimum age to avoid child marriage and to minimize parental domination, removing male guardians, improving custody rights, and by providing court relief for abuse. Polygyny was restricted, but only Turkey, Tunisia, Israel, and the Soviet Union denied it to their Muslim populations. While modern laws primarily codified Islamic legal norms, they also imposed the power of the state by requiring court involvement or registration of all marriages and divorces.

Changes to family law in the twentieth century often occurred at the behest of political elites, and did not reflect the desires of the majority. The long history of Western intervention in the legal systems of Middle Eastern states made family law a battleground for political issues. Many people viewed Westernized "reforms" as a type of foreign intervention and considered rejection of Western legal norms a form of resistance. Marriage and divorce laws were not only the principal sites of contestation between social "conservatives" and "reformist/liberals," but expressed conflicts about imperialism, class, and identity.

Whereas in the era of imperialism education was reformed to introduce "secular" subjects, in the nationalist era it was used to inculcate nationalist ideas. In most countries, the trends toward emancipation of women from the household and toward increased education and employment primarily affected the urban upper and middle classes.

Turkey

In Turkey, the state elites considered educated women and the nuclear family essential for the birth of a modern, industrialized nation and a strong centralized state. Family laws of 1924 abolished polygyny. Women were given equal rights to divorce and formal equality in inheritance matters. The new laws required that divorce be subject to court rulings on specified conditions rather than a male

prerogative. The constitution guaranteed the right of women to equality in education and employment. Turkish women were given the right to vote in municipal elections in 1930 and in national elections in 1934. In 1935, women deputies were elected to the Turkish parliament.

The first constitution of the Turkish Republic put all educational institutions (whether Ottoman, foreign, or confessional) under the control of the Ministry of Education. Although there was virtually complete legal equality, only upper- and middle-class women in urban areas actually received secondary or higher education and were professionally employed. Turkish women made up a substantial percentage of the medical, legal, and other professional workforces. The position of lower-class women was also changed, but in less positive ways. Female migrants to the cities sometimes became laborers. Lower-class women in rural areas engaged in agriculture when men left home to work in Europe. In 1935, the literacy rate of Turkish women was 9.8 percent; by 2000, it was approximately 76 percent.

Iran

In Iran, Reza Shah similarly promulgated measures to modernize the status of women. Women began to enter into teaching, nursing, and factory work, and in the 1930s education and public entertainments were opened to women. Whereas veiling was forbidden and women of the urban upper and middle classes were adopting Western dress, rural and lower-class women continued to wear traditional clothing. Men retained important legal privileges in divorce and custody, but marriages had to be registered in court, and marriages to minors and temporary marriages were made more difficult. Independent women's organizations were replaced by a state-sponsored Women's Center. However, less was accomplished in fact than on paper. The reforms of the Pahlavi regime did not fully alter Iranian culture. The shah's abdication in 1941 reversed many of the changes made in the previous two decades.

In the 1950s and 1960s, women again benefited from the authoritarian Pahlavi regime. Women were given the right to vote.

New family laws were promulgated in 1967 and 1973. These discouraged polygyny and made it harder for men to obtain unilateral divorces. They gave women equal rights to institute divorce proceedings, though the criminal code still allowed a man to kill his adulterous wife, sister, or daughter in the name of family honor. Women, moreover, did not usually have the economic power to realize legal rights. While the presence of women in the civil service rose to 28 percent – mainly in teaching, nursing, and clerical jobs – laws regulating working conditions did not apply to small shops with fewer than ten employees and did not benefit poor working women. The lack of democratic institutions also impeded the formation of a genuine women's movement.

The Iranian revolution initially attracted widespread female support. Intellectuals identified "true Islam" with modernity, including progress, autonomy, freedom, education, and justice. Women who supported the Islamic revolution generally came from three groups: lower-class women who (like men) were interested in the betterment of material conditions; middle-class *Bazaari* families; and educated women hostile to foreign influences. Some women who participated in the revolutionary demonstrations believed that they were defying the West and that the revolution would lead to democracy. The revolution also appealed to nationalist and fascist ideas: subordination to the leader, dogmatism, lower-middle-class populism, and association of homeland with family and religion.

An Islamist program was implemented after the revolution, to the surprise of some of its supporters. Women were required to veil in the workplace. Men and women were segregated in schools. Public flogging and stoning were instituted for men and women accused of committing immoral acts. The minimum marriage age for women was lowered from eighteen to thirteen and restrictions on polygyny were removed. The family protection laws were rescinded, making it easy for men to repudiate a marriage and very difficult for women to do so. A woman could obtain a divorce only if her husband was economically incapable of supporting a wife, impotent, infertile, insane, abusive, or absent for more than six months. These

measures were part of a family policy meant to stabilize marriages and encourage the birth of children.

The government sponsored matchmaking and provided financial assistance to newlywed couples. Marriage was pronounced a "divine" institution, for God had given men economic power and women reproductive power. The state declared itself in favor of motherhood. Huge families were encouraged and were characterized as "Islamic." The new laws, however, proved to be counterproductive and led to an increase in divorces. In 1989, the Iranian government tried to strengthen the position of women by giving them broader rights to stipulate conditions for a divorce in marriage contracts and by requiring that all divorces be registered with the courts.

The war with Iraq created a need in the economy for skilled workers and opened labor opportunities for women. The rhetoric of motherhood – praising women who bore many children and encouraging large families to fill the military's ranks – intensified. The facilities for women's education were greatly improved, but women's participation in the workforce was still hindered by policy and social mores.

In public life, women maintained a right to vote, to be elected to parliament, and to hold cabinet positions, but they were excluded from the courts. After 1982, only certain university subjects were deemed proper for women: nursing, education, and theology. Women were excluded from vocational education in fields such as agriculture, veterinary medicine, geology, and engineering, though after 1990, when the state realized that there was a shortage of trained personnel, women were allowed to reenter technical professions. Conversely, men were barred from fashion design, gynecology, and nursing. These constraints were justified by an interest in separating men and women. Traditional Iranian culture – which emphasized women's physical weakness, gender segregation, and gender hierarchy – legitimized government policies.

These great efforts to restrict the activities of women promoted an energetic feminist reaction. Many educated women were repelled by

the Islamist program, but few would publicly defy or reject Islamic norms – it would be blasphemy and treason at the same time. Iranian women instead found private ways to express their dissent or advocated their own interpretations of Islamic norms. They found subtle language and gestures to protest against misogyny. They used the life of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, as a model for advocating women's empowerment.

Women writers, artists, and intellectuals created new journals to subtly push back against the demands of conservative clerics and increase the scope for women's self-expression. Some women writers invoke Islam and contest traditional interpretations as they try to enlarge the boundaries of acceptable public discourse. The journal of the Women's Society of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, *Payam-i Hajar* (Hagar's message), tried to steer a middle course between imitation of the West and conservative ideas about Islam and family. The journal gave Islamic arguments in support of women's rights and held that each individual also has the right to interpret the Quran. The journal *Zanan* advocated reinterpreting the Quran and called into question male clerical interpretations. According to *Zanan*, the ideal woman is not passive, but knows that she should be responsible and active in society. The journal called for the creation of a ministry of women's welfare, protested women's exclusion from the judiciary, criticized polygyny and temporary marriages, and favored prenuptial agreements (i.e., marriage contract stipulations) that may forbid a second wife and guarantee alimony in case of divorce. In 1991 and 1992, new laws allowed for such marriage contract stipulations and for greater rights for women in cases of divorce and custody. Women became more active in Islamist activities, with increasing numbers of female preachers, who lectured on the Quran and taught in mosques and private homes. Many Iranian feminists advocate a form of Islam that transcends the oppositions of secularism and Islam, Westernization and indigenous culture.

With the return of conservatives to power in Iran, more strict controls were placed on women's appearance and behavior in public, and many women's journals were closed. Other limitations on

women's roles in society come from socioeconomic class factors as well as government restrictions. Still, despite the authoritarian and conservative Iranian regime, Iranian women have made great advances in education, labor, and activism.

Egypt from the 1920s to the present

After World War I, in the period of the liberal republic, Egyptian feminists concentrated on reforming the legal structure of the family. In 1923, the minimum age for marriage was set at sixteen for women and eighteen for men. A mother's legal custody of her children was extended to age eleven for girls and nine for boys in 1929. In 1920 and 1929, Egypt adopted Maliki rules that provided women with greater opportunities to divorce than the Hanafi school, the official school of the Ottoman Empire. Egyptian feminists were not in favor of secular law as adopted in Turkey, and their goals for the restriction of polygamy and the regulation of men's prerogatives in divorce were not achieved.

Western concepts of private property also motivated reforms in property laws. Egypt passed inheritance laws in 1943 and 1946 that gave siblings of the deceased greater inheritance rights and permitted individuals to leave up to one-third of their estates to any heir they chose. Orphaned grandchildren were allowed to become designated legal heirs in their grandfathers' wills. Egypt's 1946 trust (*waqf*) law required all trusts to be registered in Islamic courts, invalidated certain customary stipulations used by trust executors to limit a beneficiary's rights, and limited the duration of trusts to two generations or sixty years. These changes in inheritance and trust laws were also motivated by a strengthening of the nuclear family. A more comprehensive Egyptian Civil Code was promulgated in 1949, based both on a variety of civil codes from other countries and Islamic legal traditions. ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (d. 1971), the most influential legal reformer in the Middle East in the twentieth century, led the way to the codification of Egyptian civil laws, fusing French and Egyptian legal norms. In 1956, the government integrated Egypt's Islamic courts into the National Courts.

After the military coup of 1952, the regime of President Nasser (1952–70) vastly expanded women's rights. In order to industrialize, modernize, and secularize Egypt, Nasser provided for women's suffrage, education, and employment. Women entered the professions, assisted by maternity leave and childcare. They were given the right to vote in 1956, and were elected to public office. Nonetheless, because there were no women in the military they were excluded from the highest positions of the state. President Sadat (r. 1971–80) further expanded women's participation in government, especially for upper-class women who had education, organizing skills, and experience in voluntary organizations. In 1979, Sadat introduced a quota system to allocate thirty parliamentary seats and 10 to 20 percent of seats on government councils for women, but his successor President Mubarak repealed Sadat's quota system in 1986. Women turned to the syndicates of lawyers, doctors, and engineers for representation.

President Sadat also introduced changes in family law. A decree in 1979 compelled the registration of divorces and expanded alimony payments. The new laws – often derisively called Jihan's Laws (after Sadat's wife) – required the agreement of the first wife for a second marriage, compensated women for nonconsensual divorces, and extended a mother's custody over children to ten years old for boys and fifteen for girls. The High Constitutional Court nullified most of these decrees in 1985.

In 2000, the government promulgated a new divorce law. The *khul'* law stipulated that a woman could divorce her husband by returning the bridal gift and renouncing all other financial compensation. Also, married women were given the right to travel without their husbands' written permission. The *khul'* law, however, brought into relief the limits placed by social and economic conditions on legal change; changes in law did not necessarily bring changes in social realities. There is still a stigma attached to women going to court to insist upon their legal rights. Women who advocate Western values may be criticized as traitors. A woman's family interests, connections to kin, and relations with children are all considerations in the exercise of legal rights. Older women – mothers and mothers-in-law – are

often a greater barrier to the assertion of legal rights than men. Moreover, the provisions in the law calling for mediation and reconciliation could be manipulated by an oppressive husband to force a wife to renounce her financial rights. Men are commonly unwilling to marry women who have previously initiated divorce through the law of *khulʿ*. Finally, going to court risked further complications such as losing property, dowry, maintenance payments from husbands for the care of children, and even loss of custody of children. The *khulʿ* law turned out to be mainly an option for wealthy women. Middle- and lower-class women could not afford to give up their dowries and other financial assets.

At the same time, changing social mores are altering the character of marriage. In Islamic law, a man has to provide for all the expenses of his family and household; but nowadays women bear more of the expenses of weddings, setting up a household, and contributing to the family income.

Post–World War II Arab States

After World War II and the breakdown of the British and French empires, the Fertile Crescent and North African Arab states won their independence. The newly independent states soon embarked on reforms in family law, and changes in the position of women in society similar to Turkey, Egypt, and Iran. In legal and family matters, Arab Muslim countries reinterpreted Islamic law in order to accommodate contemporary needs rather than reject it altogether in favor of foreign legal systems. No Arab country followed the example of Turkey and completely eliminated Islamic law as the basis of modern civil law. (Tunisia is the closest approximation.) States implemented legal reforms, sometimes by legislation, sometimes by new procedural requirements, sometimes by picking and choosing among the provisions of the traditional law schools. The Ottoman family law code was replaced by national family law codes in Jordan (1951) and Syria (1953). Personal status codes followed throughout the region in quick succession: Tunisia (1956), Morocco (1958), and Iraq (1959).

In general, new laws regulated divorce to increase the power of women, and most countries curtailed the freedom of husbands to repudiate a marriage. In many cases, divorce was taken out of the hands of husbands by laws that require a court to issue a decree of dissolution of marriage. Only Iran (before the 1979 revolution) and South Yemen abolished unilateral repudiation, the prerogative of a husband to divorce his wife without her consent, completely. Syria's 1953 legal reforms made court permission a requirement for polygynous marriages. This same procedural requirement was adopted in Iraq, Morocco, and later Iran. These changes to divorce laws reflect nationalist interests (modeled after Western ideas) in maintaining a nuclear family, since instead of providing women with as much freedom as men to divorce, they only curtailed the ability of men to divorce.

Changes to family laws in North Africa closely resembled the changes in Egypt and the Levant. Tunisia's personal status codes prohibited polygyny in 1956, legalized adoption in 1958, and in 1981 expanded alimony payments. Tunisia required the consent of both potential spouses for a valid marriage. Algeria passed a family law in 1984 that was, on the one hand, primarily based on the Maliki school of Islamic law and thereby reaffirmed polygyny and limited women's rights to divorce (without fault of the man), but on the other hand allowed for flexibility in the selection of precedents from the Quran or hadith or any school of law. Following independence from France in 1956, the Moroccan Personal Status Law (known as al-Muduwana) was drafted based on the Maliki legal school as well as legislation from the 1956 Tunisian Code of Personal Status. Major amendments to Moroccan laws relating to marriage, guardianship, polygyny, and divorce were made in 1993 and 2000. In 2003, King Muhammad VI of Morocco permitted women to contract marriages without a guardian (in line with Hanafi opinions) and restricted men's ability to divorce. Morocco (and Lebanon) did not directly restrict polygyny, but made it possible for women to insert restrictive clauses into marriage contracts. The introduction of civil legal codes, however, met with little popular resistance, probably because for most people Islamic courts continued to handle domestic cases.

Saudi Arabia presents the most extreme case of sex segregation and the restriction of women's mobility in an Arab Muslim society. These restrictions were more rigorously applied in times of political stress such as the 1979 attack on the Mosque of Mecca and the Gulf Wars. Many Saudi women run their own businesses and are active in education and the media, where there are opportunities for advancement in women's departments, but most have primarily domestic roles. Indeed, many Saudi women have expressed a preference for domestic roles and resist what they see as Western intervention in their lives. In Saudi society, control of women substitutes for the breakdown of traditional families and small communities, and as a counterweight to the development of an administratively and technically developed society. Furthermore, in its struggles against secular, leftist, and moderate Islamist groups, the Saudi government actively supports and funds Wahhabi and Salafi Islam throughout the Islamic world, thereby propagating its own conception of the place of women in society. Its policies, however, are not traditional. The Wahhabi ideology – including asceticism and puritanism in public and concessions to Wahhabi clerics who demand a stricter lifestyle – are a relatively new form of ideological Islam. The Saudi government exploits women's issues as a means of staking its claim to being "Islamic."

Education, work, and social activism in the Arab countries

In post–World War II independent Arab countries, governments instituted compulsory education for both boys and girls, but women still lagged behind men in education and literacy. Among the working poor, education for girls was not considered a wise investment because working women, unlike working men, were not responsible for their families, and therefore unlikely to provide material support. Working families preferred to keep daughters in necessary household labor and childcare. There were also strong objections to integrated schools, though schools for girls were insufficient in number. However, in recent decades in such countries as Sudan, Iraq, and Egypt, there is a very high proportion of female students in

higher education and in scientific and technical professions, especially in teaching and nursing.

In Middle Eastern countries, women were educated and integrated into the labor force in varying degrees. While there had been important gains in the employment of women, women in Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, participated less in the workforce than women in other less-developed countries such as those of Latin America. In general, family and social attitudes and low educational attainment continued to depress the absorption of women into the workforce. However, recent studies have demonstrated that most work done by women in the region is "invisible," meaning that women work in family enterprises, agriculture, and other parts of the informal economy. For example, in Egypt in the 1980s, official statistics indicated that women were 11 percent of the labor force, but approximately 50 percent of rural women were actually involved in the informal urban economy and in unrecorded agricultural work. Women officially represent small percentages of the labor force (in Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia, 2 percent; in Iran and Jordan, 4–6 percent; in Syria and Morocco, 10 percent), but accounted for between 40 and 75 percent of unpaid labor.

Women continue to work in the informal sector at home, in local workshops, peddling, and other enterprises. In Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Tunisia, women are employed in industrial labor. Iraq under Saddam Husayn, for example, facilitated the employment of women by providing state-subsidized housing and childcare. Female workers were enrolled in unions and federations, but these organizations were closely controlled by the state. Women with professional skills in government, teaching, and medicine find employment in state bureaucracies in Egypt, Kuwait, and elsewhere. Educated Arab women have a long tradition of professional and government employment. The majority of women who work in Bahrain and Kuwait, for example, are educated to high school levels or higher. Most importantly, however, by the promotion of educational, health, and social welfare programs, the modern nation-state has undermined the traditional role of men as providers.

Women have become clients of the public sector; state employees have been substituted for the male members of the family as the principal source of important services. However, women in the Middle East – like their Western counterparts – continue to do the bulk of traditional family labor.

Women's social welfare organizations, many of which emerged in the late nineteenth century, provided upper-class women with opportunities to play important social roles. These organizations continued to foster women's social and political activism in the era of nationalism.

In politics, women were important in the revolutionary and nationalist struggles of Iran, Algeria, Yemen, and Palestine. These movements mobilized women to demonstrate, organize, make speeches, and even to fight, but the post-revolutionary period in several of these countries brought a reaction and a withdrawal of women from active politics. Nationalist movements in opposition tended to be supportive of feminist objectives; in power they viewed them as subversive. In general, women's roles were construed as auxiliary to men's and women were denied full rights of political participation. At some point in the twentieth century, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt all made women's organizations dependent upon the state and forbade autonomous activities – just as they exerted control over all political opposition parties.

In the case of Palestine, women have served both as symbols of the ideals of the community and as fighters in the struggle against Israel. Women played an active role in the Palestinian uprising of 1936–39, sometimes on the front lines, providing medical care, smuggling arms, sewing uniforms, and collecting funds. After 1948, women came under pressure to represent the moral and cultural values of the Palestinian past rather than playing an activist political role. Under the Palestinian National Authority, women were subsumed under men's groups, and both secular and Islamist groups co-opted or demoralized women's movements. However, the two *intifadas* (1987–93 and 2000–c. 2005), uprisings against Israel's military occupation, brought women fully into the public realm, relaxing traditional gender and familial roles. During both uprisings,

women engaged in the fighting, even as suicide bombers. At the same time, as men were killed, arrested, deported, or imprisoned, women had to act as heads of family, household, and community.

Changing social mores

Changes in the legal, educational, and work life of women in society are best understood in light of broader ongoing transformations in all aspects of contemporary Middle Eastern societies. Alongside state formation in the 1950s, the formation of modern bureaucracies, economic development, urbanization, and industrial organizations helped break down traditional families, promoted nuclear households, and favored the incorporation of women into the workforce. Modern societies gave women important roles in NGOs, charities, and syndicates. At the same time, the mass media generated new values, tastes, fashions, and fads, and above all the awareness of Western lifestyles. In line with global trends, women in the region increasingly valued individual autonomy, choice in marriage, independent households, and self-fulfillment through love and work.

To a limited extent, Arab family practices also changed in the twentieth century. Economic and industrial changes, as well as Western cultural influences, the spread of egalitarian concepts, and nationalist ambitions for a larger contribution from women to the general society, all operated to change the situation of women. In the Levant and other Arab regions, the extended family, once the ideal, was much diminished in practice. Marriages were less commonly arranged by parents, and the age of marriage for women was rising. There were still, however, strong preferences for endogamy and for marriages among cousins or within a neighborhood or village. Even where families were fully nucleated, there were strong social and residential ties to extended families. Polygyny, which generally did not exceed 10 percent of marriages, declined to less than 5 percent in most regions; it was mainly found in rural areas and among the well-to-do classes.

New levels of women's integration into public life through education, employment, and political participation were achieved in

the first half of the twentieth century. Yet barriers to change were formidable. Limited access to education, illiteracy, economic dependency, lack of employment opportunities, social segregation, and male hostility to the social or political involvement of women inhibited the new trends. In most Middle Eastern societies, the traditional concepts of male superiority and family honor remained potent and reflected the existing political structures. Correspondingly, the highest values assigned to women were related to fertility and motherhood, as women were imbued with the expectation of security, protection, and esteem in the family context – values that do, in fact, bring emotional and social gratification. Moreover, some women were uninterested in work outside the home, and preferred traditional roles. These factors reinforced the political and economic forces that inhibited further change.

How much did women actually benefit in practice from reform? In many cases, the state gave token rights, but actually deprived women of the economic and political means to realize them, and in some cases continued to enforce patriarchal laws and cultural values. Women were under nationalist states not so much liberated as subjected to another mode of regulation. Whether they could actually make use of legal and social changes depended very much on their social status, as well as immediate family and communal contexts. Often they would not claim their legal or social rights lest it hurt their overall position in the family or community.

Since there are no universally accepted models for women's roles in any society, there is no consensus on accepted values that legitimize one system of practice or another. Change therefore generated doubt, anxiety, and conflict: conflict between generations over the right to choose a spouse, between mothers-in-law and wives for the allegiance of sons and husbands, and between men and women over educational and employment opportunities. In many countries, men found themselves economically and socially oppressed, often humiliated by political helplessness, and wanted to be compensated by control over women, precisely at a moment when women were asserting their own rights to a fuller public life. Nationalist ideologies neither "liberated" women nor completely

revolutionized their opportunities in law, education, labor, or social activism.

Islamism and feminism

Islamist political activism emerged as a reaction to authoritarian national states and kingdoms. Islamists presented themselves as alternatives to autocratic rule. In the 1970s, an Islamic revival reinvigorated debates about the roles of women in society and the underlying issues of tradition versus modernity, secularization versus Islamization, state power versus communal autonomy, and Westernization versus cultural authenticity. Can there be indigenous projects of modernity that define new roles for women without being Western? Can there be an indigenous, even an Islamic, modernity? This debate is highly politicized, and all the positions reflect political, ideological, and religious agendas.

Critical debates have taken place between radical traditionalist interpreters of the Quran, moderate modernist interpreters of the Quran, and Muslim feminists, who all differ on questions of polygyny, veiling, economic rights, inheritance, and employment. Traditionalists generally argue that the Quranic texts are normative and specify eternally valid rules, but they differ in their judgments about the social roles of women. Radical traditionalists believe that the Quran requires women to remain in the home and have no public role; they should be subordinate to men in order to protect their modesty. Radical Islamist groups in Algeria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Morocco, Nigeria, and elsewhere have tried to ensure separateness by restricting the freedom of movement of women in public spaces unless they are fully covered. They condemn the employment of women outside the home, oppose political participation, and denounce contrary values as a sign of Westernization. They call for the application of their own interpretations of Islamic laws. In some countries, there has been a reversal of the legislation of earlier decades and a "re-Islamization" of law. In Algeria, for example, the legal code of 1984 recognized the rights of male guardians in

marriage arrangements, permitted polygyny, and gave husbands the right of unilateral divorce.

Moderate traditionalists, equally committed to the Quran and hadith, have more complex views about women's roles. They approve the twentieth-century idea of the nuclear family, and their call for a return of women to the home means in practice to a twentieth-century home defined by bourgeois marriage ideals. Since the core of the feminist and modernist project turns on the breakdown of the extended family and of the social lives of women that interfere with the concentration of husband and wife on each other and their children, these "traditionalists," in effect, accept the basic concept of modernity. The moderates tend to accept women's education, but have important differences about women's employment. Some see work outside the home as a source of temptation, but many recognize that two working persons are necessary for a middle-class lifestyle. They often accept women's employment with strictures about proper dress and conduct.

There is also a broad range of Muslim "feminist" opinion. Traditionalist Muslim feminists hold that the Quran greatly enhanced the position of women in society; they believe that Islam inculcates a high standard of sexual and marital morality, provides for the protection and security of women, and guarantees many legal and property rights. Such feminists accept a traditionalist–Islamic discourse on the differences between men and women and, while they endorse education and work roles for women, they are not interested in unveiling. Islamist feminists of this type also lean politically toward an Islamic state, rather than liberal secular regimes. Leading contemporary Islamist feminists include Heba Ra'ouf Ezzat, Dr. Ablah al-Kahlawi, and Dr. Suad Saleh. The negotiation of religious and cultural identity with feminism is a key concern of third wave and transnational feminisms around the world. In contrast, secular feminists – such as Dr. Nawal al-Saʿadawi (a psychiatrist and activist), Dr. Mona Hilmi (al-Saʿadawi's daughter), and Dr. Ayda Sayf al-Dawla (professor of psychiatry at Ayn Shams University) – advocate for "universal" women's rights.

Another Islamic feminist position is that Islam is in principle favorable to active roles for women in contemporary societies. These Islamist feminists argue that the Quran is descriptive of a given time and place, and that with changes in historical and social conditions, new adaptations are necessary. Quranic norms concerning women's status in the family have to be treated as ethical injunctions rather than legal requirements. They see the Quran as being supportive of the integration of women in society now that this has become essential to the fulfillment of family functions. More radical Muslim feminists attempt to reinterpret the Quran in a way favorable to the full equality of women. They use arguments based on the Quran and the reinterpretation of Islamic law to legitimize women's education and employment. They argue that early Islam enhanced the position of women in Arabian society and that a full and equal role for women is inherent in the true Islam. According to this brand of feminism, female segregation and subordination is the product of historical Middle Eastern patriarchal authority and male-based kinship groups. Middle Eastern Muslim societies do not from this point of view much differ from male-dominated Mediterranean European or Latin American societies.

A new kind of Islamist women's movement emerged in Egypt in the late twentieth century. Women studying Islamic ethics adopted Sufi concepts of spirituality. They discuss the problems of daily life and try to make ethical judgments on Islamic terms. These women are conservative in their social views and do not wish to disrupt historical male prerogatives, but they nonetheless take responsibility for their behavior and seek to shape their family life in accord with Islamic ethics. They consider themselves to be independent female actors without feminist or modernist goals.

Another type of Islamist feminism emerged in the 1980s in Turkey among provincial women who demanded education and work, but wore veils to facilitate their entry into the public world. Some Arab women similarly see the veil as a statement of the right to be present in public places. Throughout the Muslim world, the adoption of a veil, which is viewed as a sign of modesty and submissiveness to Islam, serves to legitimize and facilitate entry in the public sphere.

In particular, young female professional students in Egypt began to wear conservative clothing as part of a commitment to Islamic modesty that came precisely at a time when women were increasingly entering professional schools and public life. Between 1952 and 1976, the ratio of female to male students in the universities rose from 1:12 to 1:2. For women who were entering the public world dominated by men, the veil and profession of Islamic modesty were ways of recreating the traditional separation among young people who were – through education, travel and public transport, enjoyment of public entertainment, and political activities – thrown together. The adoption of Islamic dress implied unavailability, and for young women from conservative rural families served as a way of protecting family values and marriage possibilities. Thus, while the Islamic revival in Egypt had important political aspects, it was also a mechanism for the adjustment of Muslim students to the complexities of an urban environment.

Some Western critics and critical Muslim feminists, however, view Islam itself as reinforcing the subordination of women. They argue that the most profound teaching of Islam is the subordination of human beings to God and avoidance of any life experiences in politics, art, or love that compete with this ultimate religious demand. The Islamic concept of man as the slave or servant of God, the humble, unassuming devotee of the divine being, is the model for the relations between males and females. Islam, they say, requires male control over women because of the perceived threat of uncontrolled sexuality and because of the potential for women to create allegiances that compete with man's obligation to God. From this point of view, Islam is intrinsically hostile to the equality of women and to the development of a full love relationship between men and women. However, this perspective gives a misleading sense of the fixity of "Islam." This version of Islam represents the legal interpretations and moral attitudes of some religious elites, themselves products of their sociopolitical environments. Precisely what is at issue is the meaning of "Islam."

Western gaze and obsession with veiling

The question of the veil, or more accurately of women's clothing that covers both hair and the shape of the body, was a focal issue of debate during the Islamic revival. Westerners often presume that the veil is a symbol of the domination of Muslim women by men, but wearing the veil, a practice with pre-Islamic roots, was not and is not universal among Middle Eastern and Muslim women. It was commonly worn by urban and middle-class women, but not by working, peasant, or nomadic women. Indeed, upward social mobility and urbanization stimulated the wearing of the veil. Reflecting the diversity of Muslim women, the veil is worn in many different ways and carries different meanings for women of different social classes and in different social contexts. Today the hijab (head covering) is worn with infinite variations of cloth, color, methods of wrapping, and degrees of concealment to express the individuality of young women, their self-perceived place in the social environment, and the messages they want to convey to others. Indeed, the veil has itself become modern, asserting religious identity, making a political statement, and yet reflecting fashion awareness.

Wearing or not wearing the veil has been an important symbol, indeed an obsession, in the colonial era, in the era of secular national states, and now in the Islamic revival. Imperial governments and then secular nationalists called for the removal of the veil as a symbol of the emancipation of women from traditional restrictions. Muslim opponents of nation-states favor restoring "covering" as a symbol of a return to Islamic traditions. Yet "covering" has a paradoxical meaning and can imply both a return to tradition and the integration of women into the public life of contemporary societies. For some Islamists, veiling is at once a sign of modesty, unavailability, virtue, and commitment to indigenous values and a mechanism to facilitate women's education and work. Moreover, veiling is an ambiguous form of social communication. Some Muslims understand it as a shield, protecting women from men and society from the danger of temptation represented by women; but while it secludes and conceals women, some perceive veiling as creating mystery, attractiveness, and freedom of movement. Veiling

has an ambivalent significance in terms of purity and passion, autonomy and subordination, and dependence and independence. As veiling has become the subject of political struggle in Europe, many European Muslim women have become all the more determined to practice "covering."

Twenty-first-century revolutions

Important changes are occurring in family structures and women's roles in society. The average age of women at their first marriage has increased remarkably. Whereas in the United States the average age of a woman at first marriage is approximately twenty-three years old (and twenty-five for men), in Arab countries as a whole, it is approximately twenty-four for women (and twenty-nine for men). The gender gap in primary, secondary, and tertiary education continues to narrow. In Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, more women than men are enrolled at universities. Arab women represent 29 percent of official economic activity, but according to some estimates, more than 50 percent of women are employed in every Arab country. However, women generally earn less than men (as throughout the world), and are more likely to have informal work.

Arab women are also playing political roles. A majority of Arab countries have female cabinet ministers. However, their participation in national parliaments remains low. In 2005, women constituted 10 percent of parliaments in the Levant, 8 percent in North Africa, and 2 percent in the Gulf countries. Countries with quota systems have higher representations of women in national parliaments: 32 percent in Iraq, 23 percent in Tunisia, and 15 percent in Sudan.

Women were active in the Arab revolutions of 2011 and 2012. In many Arab countries, women and men joined in the struggle against autocratic rule. For example, in Cairo's Tahrir Square, women – veiled and unveiled – actively participated in the daily protests. In Yemen, women have been vocal in their opposition to the Salih regime and participated in protests throughout the country.

Islam and Secularism in Central and Southern Asia

Chapter 53   Muslims in Russia, the Caucasus, Inner Asia, and China

By the end of the nineteenth century, the already settled Muslim populations of Russia and China were increased by colonial expansion. Muslims in the Caucasus and Inner Asia were brought under Russian or Chinese rule. By contrast with the Portuguese, British, French, German, and Dutch empires, Russian and Chinese expansion took place on territories contiguous with the imperial homelands. The conquered territories were not regarded as foreign domains that would eventually win their independence, but as integral parts of the conquering empires. From the Russian and Chinese points of view the "colonial" problem was a "minority" problem. How best could Inner Asian and Caucasian peoples be governed and eventually assimilated into the body politic of imperial – and, later, Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese – societies? From the Muslim point of view the problem was how to define Muslim identity in the face of pressures to assimilate into foreign civilizations. In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union unexpectedly allowed for a new wave of state formation among the Muslim peoples of Inner Asia and redirected the quest for religio-ethnic identities.

The Caucasus and Inner Asia under Tsarist Rule

The first stages of Russian rule in the nineteenth century paralleled other colonial situations. The Russian conquests gave Muslim-populated regions a new territorial and administrative organization. Russia organized new states in the Caucasus. It dismantled the Muslim states of Inner Asia and divided the region into two large governorates – one for the Kazakh steppes and Turkmenistan, and one for the territories of Transoxania, Khwarizm, and Farghana that would henceforth be known as Central Asia or Russian Turkestan. In

this region, autonomous vassal states remained at Bukhara and Khiva.

The Russians were at first favorable to Muslim religious organizations. In territories under direct Russian rule, Catherine the Great in 1778 established the first Islamic religious administration at Ufa, for European and Siberian Muslims. Another "muftiat" was organized in the Crimea in 1794. In 1872, separate Sunni and Shiʿi boards were established in Transcaucasia. The Russian authorities appointed the Shiʿi *shaykh al-islam* and Sunni muftis, judges, and the heads of religious assemblies. The tsar's administration regulated the appointment of muftis to local mosques (leaving many of them vacant), paid their salaries, supervised their activities, and required them to be politically loyal. The regime also supervised Islamic publications. The tsarist policy was similar to that of the Muslim rulers of Bukhara and the Ottoman Empire, save that it was carried out under the auspices of a non-Islamic regime.

In autonomous Bukhara, a highly organized, state-supported religious establishment retained its economic and social cohesion under Russian suzerainty. Islamic education continued to be the preserve of the *maktabs* (elementary Quran schools) and the madrasas. The supervisors and teachers were appointed by the local rulers. The *shaykh al-islam* and the *qadis* were responsible for the supervision of the schools. Students and faculty received stipends from charitable endowments, and graduates usually went on to take positions as teachers, imams, muftis, and judges.

In farming and nomadic areas, however, *ʿulamaʾ* and religious schools were of secondary importance. Though *qadis* were appointed by the tribal chiefs (khans), they had only a limited impact on the application of Islamic law to inheritance, land, water, and family problems. Instead, independent Sufi holy men, called *ishans*, held the allegiance of the populace, and espoused a form of Islamic belief centered upon veneration of saints and saints' shrines, expressed in pilgrimages and festivals that combined Muslim and shamanistic practices. Sufis also served as caretakers of holy places, teachers, cemetery directors, intermediaries with dead saints, and practitioners of folk medicine. The *ishans* did not own land or water rights, but

earned their living by selling talismans and amulets and by receiving payments for religious performances.

In Turkmenistan, venerated Sufis acted as intermediaries among the warring tribes and between the khans and the tribes. Holy lineages (*evliads*) believed to descend from the Prophet and the first four caliphs also had a prominent place in Turkmen society. The descendants of Muhammad and of the caliphs ʿUthman and ʿAli by Muhammad's daughters, called *sayyids*, and the descendants of the caliphs Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, called *khwajas*, were believed to have inherited the religious powers of their holy ancestors. In fact, the lineages descended from intermediary Sufi masters. For example, Gezli Ata, the likely founder of the Ata lineage, was a fourteenth-century Sufi connected with the Yasavi order. In Turkmenistan, as in Egypt, Morocco, and many other places in the Muslim world, Sufi allegiance and Prophetic lineage were combined. These lineages were believed to possess shamanistic powers capable of driving out evil spirits, and their ceremonies were marked by trances and frenzies. Veneration for the holy lineages by ordinary Turkmens was similar to the pre-Islamic cults of ancestors.

Throughout the Caucasus and Inner Asia, the creation of a Russian imperial administration, the settlement of Russian garrisons, the opening of the region to Russian trade, and the introduction of Russian education and cultural policies led to profound changes. The implications of Russian rule, however, were different in each of the subregions they controlled, depending upon the local objectives of Russian policy and the nature of the local Muslim societies.

In the Kazakh regions, the Russians attempted to break up the old social structure and to implant a colonial society. The introduction of a market economy and taxation in cash undermined the Kazakh nobility by exposing it to both Russian rule and competition from Tatar merchants and clerks. Russian rule also opened the way for colonization. Improved security and the introduction of the scythe made it possible to cut hay for winter fodder, allowing nomads to survive on smaller territories. Russian laws turned communal lands and collective rights to hay and fodder into private properties. As nomadic populations were settled, Russian colonists began to occupy

"unused" fertile lands. Before 1868, the Russian government favored only the settlement of Cossacks or farmer-soldiers, but after the conquest of Turkestan Russia permitted peasant colonization as well. Between 1868 and 1880, some 4,000 Russian families settled in the Semirech'e, and additional Tatar and Uzbek colonists came from Turkestan. Until 1889, the Russian government attempted to restrain colonization, but after the construction of the trans-Siberian railroad and government support for the seizure of unoccupied or surplus Kazakh lands, there were great waves of Russian immigration. By 1912, more than 1.5 million Russians made up 40 percent of the population of the Kazakh steppes. In a continuing cycle, the ever-growing Russian population forced the Kazakhs into smaller spaces, and the contraction of the Kazakhs encouraged further Russian colonization. From the Russian point of view, colonization made it possible to convert the fertile steppe region from pastoral to agricultural uses, to secure it against possible revolts, and to reduce population pressure in western and central Russia. From the Kazakh point of view, it meant the destruction of their society.

In Turkmenistan, Russia pacified Turkmen feuds, encouraged private property of land, promoted a shift to sedentary life, and thus undermined the need for tribal solidarity and religious mediation. With sedentarization and the centralization of political power, even under infidel auspices, there was a shift from Sufi mediation to an organized leadership of the *'ulama'* type. Mosques, *qadi* courts, religious schools, and pilgrimage became more common. This was similar to the changes in Morocco and India, where the introduction of European rule reduced the authority of rural Sufis in favor of the *'ulama'*.

In Turkestan, by contrast, the Russians adopted a minimalist policy to assure military control and dominance in trade, and otherwise did little to interfere with local economies, social organization, education, or cultural life. Islamic and customary law courts continued to function. The Russian impact on the economy of Turkestan was the critical catalyst for the changes that were to follow. The Krasnovodsk Caspian–Samarqand (1881–88)–Tashkent (1898) Railroad, and the Tashkent–Orenburg line, completed in 1906, opened the way for the immigration of Russian administrators and skilled workers, and for the

construction of modern Russian cities adjacent to old Muslim ones. Tashkent, the capital of Turkestan, was provided with schools, museums, libraries, newspapers, an observatory, and other institutions – a model of Russian modernity in Inner Asia. Other towns in Russian Turkestan also acquired large Russian populations. Russian colonization in rural areas, by contrast with the Kazakh steppes, was limited by the fact that Turkestan was already densely occupied by a native peasant population.

Railroad construction also led to a tremendous increase in cotton production. With railroads, northern wheat could be brought from the Ukraine and western Siberia to allow for increased cotton production in Central Asia. Cotton acreage in Farghana rose from 14 percent of cultivated land in 1885 to 44 percent in 1915, displacing wheat, sorghum, alfalfa, and rice. In 1912, Turkestani cotton accounted for 63.6 percent of all Russian cotton supplies and was vital to the industrialization of Russia. Industrialization in Central Asia before 1917 was largely limited to cotton-processing industries in which all the skilled workers were Russians. Thus, Turkestan was treated as a colonial region whose raw materials were extracted for the benefit of the imperial power and whose industrialization was subordinate to export interests.

Furthermore, Russian land policies converted vast tracts into private property. In 1886, lands held in trusts were made the property of their tenants. In 1913, the tsar declared all occupied lands the property of tenant producers, and all grazing and unused lands state property. By 1913, about 50 percent of irrigated land in Turkestan had become the property of small owners. While the changes in land law made peasants proprietors, it also made them vulnerable to the money economy and to the vagaries of the world market. Peasants had to find capital for tools, oxen, and seed, as well as funds to tide over bad years in the cotton market. As a result many went into debt, lost their land to moneylenders, and reverted to the status of sharecroppers. The overall result of these changes in the land law was a re-concentration of ownership in the hands of a new class of landlords, merchants, usurers, and – occasionally – successful older gentry. Russian land policy in Turkestan led to the consolidation of a

new bourgeois landowning elite, but was not in the long run beneficial to the peasantry.

In the protectorate of Bukhara, Russian intervention had similar effects. The construction of railroads opened Bukhara up to Russian capital and linked it closely to the Russian economy. Permanent settlements of Russian railroad workers were founded in Bukhara, Tirmidh, and other towns, where Russian businesses and banks were opened. Russia displaced Iran and India as Bukhara's principal trading partner. Bukhara exported cotton, lambskins, wool, silk, hides, dried fruits, and carpets, and imported Russian textiles, metals, sugar, and chinaware. Carpet and silk production was henceforth restricted to the luxury trades. Russian capital also undermined the Bukharan peasantry. To survive in the world cotton market, Bukharan peasants had to take out loans at high rates of interest and sell the cotton crop in advance at low prices. Many would lose their land. While the bourgeoisie prospered in trade as an intermediary between the Russians and the native population, or as agents of Russian commercial firms, and acquired land, the artisans and peasants suffered.

The common people and the new bourgeoisie had different responses to Russian rule. By and large, the common people suffered passively. Despite the sedentarization and impoverishment of the nomads, there was virtually no military resistance in the Kazakh steppes between 1869 and 1916, and none in Transcaspia between 1881 and 1916. Only in Transoxania and Farghana was there scattered Sufi-led opposition and peasant banditry. There were riots in Tashkent in 1892, provoked by medical measures taken to resist a cholera epidemic that included inspection of women and restrictions on burials in Muslim cemeteries. In 1898, Ishan Muhammad al-Khalifa Kabir (d. 1898), called Ishan Madali, led about two thousand rebels to almost instant defeat. Madali had acquired a local reputation, first as a simpleton and then as a holy man. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1884, and returned to organize charities for the poor. With the help of his followers he built a school, a mosque, warehouses, kitchens, and a residence for his wives clustered in a big compound. Disgruntled *ulama* and former officeholders became part of his following. In 1898, his people

attacked several Russian garrisons, planning to evict the Russians and reestablish the Khokand khanate. They were quickly dispersed, and Madali was executed. Resistance in Turkestan, however, was not entirely quelled. Between 1906 and 1910, sporadic banditry in the countryside increased, as peasants who had been pushed off the land by usurers attacked Russian settlers.

World War I precipitated the first widespread Muslim rebellions. In 1916, at the height of the cotton-harvesting season, the Russians attempted to mobilize 240,000 Muslim workers to serve in labor battalions. The resistance was strongest in regions that had large numbers of Russian colonists and where there had been forced sedentarization and seizure of lands. Kazakhs attacked government buildings, schools, post offices, rail and telegraph lines, and Russian civilians; but Russian peasants retaliated by seizing the property of natives and forcing them to flee. There were terrible communal massacres on both sides. Kirgiz peoples rebelled, and many moved to China. The other Muslim regions were generally quiet.

Islamic reform and modernism: the *Jadid* movement

Rather than resist, in the Tatar and Kazakh regions the middle classes became the bearers of a new cultural and political consciousness. Russian rule promoted a native bourgeoisie, and Russian education favored, as in most colonial situations, the emergence of a small intelligentsia. Since the early nineteenth century the University of Kazan had been the principal center for the communication of Russian culture to Tatars and Kazakhs. After the middle of the century the Russians vastly expanded their educational effort. Nicholas Il'minskii created schools that would give Tatars a Russian and European education, imparted by native instructors using native languages. While some Tatars resisted this program because they feared Russification, and some Russians were concerned about an education that would encourage national languages and separatism, many Tatars welcomed the new education as a means of spreading modernism and of entering into

the life of the Russian state. Under the influence of Russia, and of new ideas from Turkey and Iran, this intelligentsia began to demand reform of Muslim practices, self-improvement, cultural enlightenment, and, eventually, political autonomy. Some stressed national development and others religious reform. After the turn of the century there would be advocates of socialism as well.

The most significant of the new cultural tendencies was the *usul-i jadid*, or New Method, a program of educational reform that gradually developed into a political movement. The *usul-i jadid* originated among wealthy and Europeanized Kazan and Crimean Tatars, often educated at the University of Kazan. Drawn from the bourgeois and merchant strata of society, it was a movement not of a displaced but of an educated, aspiring political elite that was both assimilated to Russian culture and sensitive to its own Turkish and Muslim heritage. The intelligentsia adopted *'ulama'* reformism by emphasis upon the Quran, sunna, and *ijtihad*, but also incorporated modernist ideas. Thus, the *jadid* movement in tsarist Russia was similar to modernist movements in other parts of the Muslim world such as the modernism of the Young Ottomans and Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India, that attempted to transform Islam into another version of modern technical and national civilizations.

The Tatar intellectual revival began early in the nineteenth century under the leadership of Abu Nasr al-Kursavi (d. 1814), a Tatar theologian and teacher in a madrasa in Bukhara, who proclaimed the primacy of reason over dogma. He was exiled, but his views were taken up by Shihab ai-Din Marjani (d. 1889), who called for independent judgment in religious matters, the abandonment of the fixed dogmas of the past, a new education based on the teaching of the Quran, hadith, and the history of Islam, and instruction in Russian language and modern science. His program was oriented toward a reform of Islamic belief and teaching and to the integration of Islam with Russian culture. Marjani thus represented a combination of the reformist and modernist orientations.

A principal contributor to the creation of a Muslim literature of modern ideas was 'Abd al-Qayyim Nasiri (d. 1904), the son of a village religious teacher, educated in the madrasas of Kazan and

Bukhara, learned in Arabic, Persian, and Chaghatay, who taught himself Russian and taught for a time in a Russian theological seminary. In 1871, he left the seminary and opened his own school. Based on his own pedagogical concepts, he taught Islamic subjects, Russian, arithmetic, geography, history, music, and drawing. Nasiri created his own texts, including a syntax for Tatars trying to learn Russian, and a Tatar–Russian dictionary. He also wrote about European sciences, trade, and industry. A folklorist who accumulated Tatar songs and legends, he preserved the knowledge of pre-Islamic beliefs. Though he was opposed to the conservative religious leaders and their concept of education, he was a devout Muslim and published studies of the life of the Prophet and stories of Muslim saints. In his lifetime he was largely ignored, but as an encyclopedic writer and popularizer he was a pioneer in fusing Islamic reform to Islamic modernism.

The most famous *jadid* leader was Isma'il Gasprinskii (d. 1914), a Crimean Tatar who had a European education and worked as a journalist in Istanbul and Paris. In 1883, he began to publish the newspaper *Tarjuman*, which became the principal expression of the *jadid* campaign for the modernization and unification of Muslim peoples. Gasprinskii became a proponent of the modernist rather than the reformist orientation. He argued that Muslims must borrow from the West to revitalize their intellectual and social life. While Islam could remain a philosophic and theological system, Muslims had to become part of modern technical civilization. To this end, he also tried to develop a standard Turkish literary language based on Ottoman to replace Arabic, Persian, and Chaghatay. Gasprinskii's ultimate objective was to transmit European culture to Muslim peoples and to unify them on the basis of a common language, a rational form of religion, and a shared modern civilization.

Gasprinskii was an active sponsor of *jadid* schools. By 1905, Kazan, Orenburg, Bagtchesaray, and Baku had become important centers of *jadid* education. The Volga and Crimean Tatar bourgeoisies carried the new concept to Tashkent and Bukhara, where it was taken up by local cotton merchants and moneylenders who had a Russian education or had been exposed to Russian ideas. In Tashkent, the new schools taught Russian language, arithmetic,

geography, history, literature, and other secular subjects in the mornings, and Islamic religion and local languages in the afternoons. A small number of schools sufficed to create a cadre of Muslim translators, teachers, and intellectuals. Most Muslims, however, found them unsatisfactory because of their poor teaching of Islamic subjects and the fear that their children would be weaned away from Islam. By 1917, Islamic education was still mostly in the hands of the *'ulama'*.

In Bukhara, stimulated by the Iranian revolution of 1906 and the Young Turk coup of 1908, new schools were founded that emphasized religion and provided supplementary studies of secular subjects. In 1910, a new society, the Union of Noble Bukhara, founded a journal and distributed literary materials. These Yeni Bukharlar (Young Bukharans) included intellectuals of merchant and religious scholarly background, many of whom were educated in Istanbul. They advocated a combination of Young Turk modernism, Tatar jadidism, and pan-Islamic, anti-Russian, and antifeudal sentiments.

The leading ideologue of the Bukharan reform was 'Abd al-Rauf Fitrat. He argued that the conservative *'ulama'* were responsible for the decline of Islamic civilization. The *'ulama'* had distorted the teaching of the Prophet, put Islam at the service of the privileged classes, and made it hostile to progress. He was equally opposed to popular religious practices and the worship of saints. The regeneration of the Muslim community would depend upon a new understanding of Islam that rejected ignorant leadership and blind fidelity. The rebirth of the Muslim community required a spiritual renovation of individuals, based on a reformed education, and a social and political revolution that would bring an end to foreign domination and a corrupt political elite. He was the first Bukharan thinker to emphasize political action and to propound an Islamic identity based on the concept of *vatan* (fatherland) and *millet* (nation).

Thus, cultural concerns led to politics. Within the *jadid* movement, and alongside it, Tatar intellectuals began to discuss political identity and to debate whether Tatars were Turks or a separate nation. Emigrés in Turkey took the pan-Turanian view that Tatar, Turkish, Mongolian, and Finno-Ugric peoples formed a single nation glorified

by the conquests of Attila, Chinggis Khan, and Timur. Tatars within Russia, however, generally held that they formed a distinct nation (*millet*), and aspired to assimilation into Russian society. They demanded individual equality of Muslims and Russians. Rashid Ibragimov advocated a Russian–Muslim federation on the Austro-Hungarian model. Socialist ideas also began to spread among Muslim intellectuals in Kazan, Kiev, Tiflis, and Orenburg.

In Kazakhstan, the intelligentsia adopted an ethnic nationalist concept of modernity. A small number of Kazakhs went to Russian schools and served in the Russian army and administration. Hostile to Tatar merchants and cultural influences, they were willing to collaborate with Russian educators. Il'minskii and his student Ibragim Altynsarin (d. 1889) helped introduce a Russian-type education in the Kazakh language and founded schools and a Kazakh teachers' college. After the first great wave of Russian colonization between 1896 and 1910, Kazakh intellectuals began to cultivate a separate national consciousness. Alash Orda (named after a mythic Kazakh horde) was founded in 1905. In 1907, the first newspapers were published. Kazakh intellectuals continued to favor European and modern education but opposed Russification and Russian colonization. Among the radicals the first murmurs of Kazakh liberation and political autonomy were heard.

The Russian revolutionary years of 1904–05, the formation in 1906 of a *duma*, or legislature, and temporary freedom of organization, press, and assembly stimulated a burst of Muslim newspapers, political parties, and congresses. In 1904, the Tatar students of the Muhammadiyya madrasa founded al-Islah (Reform) to press the concepts of cultural *jadid* into the struggle for political rights. In 1905, a Marxist–nationalist party, Berek (Unity), was organized by graduates of the teachers' school. Berek combined with al-Islah to create the Tangchylar (Morning star), which had a populist or socialist revolutionary orientation. Al-Islah followers created a Kazan branch of the Russian Social Democratic Party. Other Tatars founded the Tatar Social Democratic Group in 1907. A Crimean party, Milli Firqa (National party), was formed about the same time.

In Azarbayjan, Armenian and Russian influence combined with the conservatism of the Shi'i *'ulama'* led to a radical and antireligious intelligentsia. Hummet (Endeavor), founded in Baku in 1904, was affiliated with the Bolsheviks. Baku was the ideal location for a Muslim proletarian party since it had an industrial working class employed in the oil industry, a liberal Islamic tradition, and abundant contacts with radical political currents in the outside Muslim world.

In 1905, Kazan Tatars, Crimeans, and Azarbayjanis held an illegal all-Russian Muslim congress in Nizhnii Novgorod, which led to the founding of the Russian General Muslim Party (Ittifaq al-Muslimin). At three Muslim congresses in 1905 and 1906, Tatar leaders attempted to create a union of the Muslims of Russia to work for a constitutional monarchy; equality and cooperation between Russians and Muslims; freedom of Islamic education, press, and publications; and respect for private property. Despite the superficial unity of the congresses, the delegates were in fact deeply divided. Gasprinskii and older Tatar leaders opposed political action and wanted to concentrate on religious and cultural affairs. Muslims close to the Russian socialists opposed a religious party. The majority favored Muslim political action on a national–religious basis and a platform calling for civil rights, toleration of minorities, equality of peoples, and cultural autonomy, but not territorial independence.

By 1907, however, Russia's brief liberal period was succeeded by a conservative reaction, and the Muslim intelligentsia was politically isolated. Its efforts to ally with Russian liberals broke down, and it had no support from the Muslim masses. Despite the traumas suffered by Kazakh herdsmen displaced by Russian colonists, and Turkestan peasants impoverished by Russian land administration and cotton policies, most people continued to live in lineage and village communities under the authority of tribal and religious chiefs. On the eve of the 1917 revolution, the Muslim intelligentsia was minuscule in size, divided by religious, socialist, and nationalist ideologies, and without popular support.

The revolutionary era and the formation of the Soviet Union

The outbreak of the Russian revolution in 1917 provoked widespread struggles for power among Russians, and between Russians and Muslims. The Russian provisional government established in February 1917 gave way in October to a Soviet regime. Officially, Communist Party doctrine proclaimed the right of all colonized peoples to self-determination and assured them the right of secession, but the Communist Party found itself heir to regions inhabited by numerous Russians and to territories of great strategic and economic importance that it was loath to surrender. Russians in Inner Asia, regardless of political views, were committed to ethnic Russian dominance.

The Muslim intelligentsia and other regional leaders sought to take advantage of the breakdown of the Russian state. They debated whether their interests and the future of their societies would be better served by collaboration or by opposition to the revolutionary Communist Party, and whether their ultimate goal was cultural autonomy, territorial autonomy within a federated Russian state, or political independence. A series of Muslim congresses, held at Moscow and Kazan in May, July, and November 1917 declared the formation of an Idel–Ural Tatar state that was promptly dissolved by the Bolsheviks in 1918. In 1920, the Soviets organized a Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

From 1917 to 1920, Muslims of Bashkiria, Kazakhstan, Azarbayjan, and the Caucasus also tried to win their independence, but all were defeated and each region was taken over by an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In the Crimea the Democratic Tatar Republic, founded in 1917, came under Soviet control, and was reorganized in 1921 as the Soviet Republic of the Crimea.

In Turkestan, the revolution of February 1917 led to the formation of an entirely Russian provisional government. In response, Russian-educated Muslim intellectuals and Tatar merchants organized a congress of their own, which split into two groups. One formed an Islamic council, which represented the *jadid* orientation and was

committed to the formation of a modern state federated on an equal basis with the Russian state; the other organized an association of *'ulama'* which was primarily concerned with the supremacy of Islamic law. In October 1917, the Soviets rejected Muslim participation in the government, and in November Muslim leaders proclaimed an Autonomous Republic of Turkestan with its capital at Khokand – a republic based on Islamic law, to be federated with Russia. The Khokand government, in its brief lifetime, opened new schools, created a militia, returned land to the peasants, redistributed charitable endowments, and gave grain to the poor. In February 1918, it was overthrown by Russian forces. Turkestan was declared an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1919, concerned about the hostility of Muslims to the narrowly Russian regime, the Russians guaranteed religious freedom, and appointed a commissariat for Turkestani self-administration. *Jadid* leaders flocked to join the Communist Party, and tried to modify Russian policies to meet the needs of the Muslim population.

While *jadid* intelligentsia tried to penetrate the regime from within, bandit-like resistance took hold in the countryside. Embittered former Khokand military units, landowners, merchants, village and clan notables, tribal chiefs, Sufis, unemployed tenant farmers, and workers were behind the so-called *basmachi* (rural bandit) resistance in the name of the Shariʿa, the Prophet Muhammad, and the Islamic obligation of jihad. In 1921 and 1922, Enver Pasha, the former Ottoman minister of war, attempted to unify the resistance. Enver, however, was killed in August 1922, and the opportunity was lost. In the meantime the Russians realized that military measures would not suffice to suppress the *basmachis* and decided to make political concessions. Endowed (*waqf*) lands were restored, madrasas were reopened, and Islamic courts were allowed to sit. Requisitions of cotton and other crops were suspended. Weakened by their own internal divisions, subverted by Soviet concessions, and overwhelmed by Russian military power, the *basmachis* were defeated. Sporadic resistance flared again in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but by 1924 Turkestan was effectively under Soviet control.

Bukhara and Khiva went through similar experiences of Soviet–Muslim collaboration and eventual reorganization and absorption into

the Soviet state. The struggle in Bukhara began with the long-standing conflicts among the amir, the conservative Muslim administrative and religious elites, and the *jadid* reformers. The February revolution emboldened moderate jadidists to seek the formation of a salaried civil service, the separation of the treasury and the privy purse, and the removal of the chief *qadi*, who was a barrier to constructive reforms. The Young Bukharans demanded the establishment of a parliament, freedom of teaching and publication, and exclusion of reactionary ministers from the cabinet. Allied with the Tashkent Soviet, they tried to force the adoption of their program, but were defeated by a massive counterdemonstration led by conservative mullahs. However, in 1920 – with Russian military help – the Bukharan radicals established a Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, supported by wealthy merchant families. The new regime was declared a popular democracy committed to Islam and the Shari'a. It guaranteed rights of property, and freedom of association, publication, and religious conscience, while making promises of political reform, distribution of land, and enfranchisement of women.

The Russian–Bukharan coalition was soon superseded by full Communist rule. The consolidation of Soviet power began with the penetration of Russians and Tatars into the army, school system, customs services, militias, police, and administrative services. Trade treaties gave the Soviets a virtual monopoly on Bukharan commerce. In 1923, the Central Asiatic Economic Council was formed to integrate Bukharan territories into the monetary, transport, and communications networks of the Soviet Union. The Russian Communist Party accused the Bukharan party of bourgeois nationalist, pan-Islamic, and pan-Turkish tendencies. They arrested Bukharan government officials, purged the party, and organized a new proletarian party hostile to Islam and to bourgeois influences. Incorporation into the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic followed in 1924. Khiva had already been assimilated in 1923.

These events were a profound disappointment to Muslim intelligentsias who had expected that collaboration with the Bolshevik party would lead to equality with Russians and national liberation. Many fully assimilated former feudal nobles, rich merchants, reform *'ulama'*, and intellectuals had joined the Bolshevik party imagining

future cooperation between Muslims and Russians. Lenin's promises of self-determination, the diplomatic skills of Stalin, who held open the hope of a federal Russian system, and the hope that the Communists would give equality to Muslims brought them into the party. Some mistakenly identified the Russian revolution with Islamic reform.

Among the most important leaders to cooperate with the Communist regime was Mir Said Sultan Galiev (d. 1928?), a Volga Tatar. Sultan Galiev, and other Muslim communists, understood communism as a practical doctrine that explained how to organize an underground movement, agitate, educate the masses, gain political support, and articulate national rights. They set aside the Marxist emphasis upon class struggle and the centrality of the proletariat to argue that colonial peoples, regardless of internal divisions, were proletarian nations and that their principal task was to win their independence. National revolution had to precede class struggle. The revolution, in their view, would be led by peasants rather than workers and would center on the countryside rather than on the cities. National liberation would enable Muslim countries to bypass the capitalist stage of historical development and enter directly into socialism. Sultan Galiev, expressing the almost universal Tatar mistrust of Russians, held that a former capitalist oppressor nation, under socialism, would be a socialist oppressor nation. Emphasizing the national component of his political views, he believed that socialism and Islam were compatible and should be integrated into national Islamic societies.

To a degree, the national Muslim version of communism enabled Muslim leaders to resist Russian interference in local affairs and to oppose policies promoting class struggle on the grounds that Islam minimized class antagonism and that national liberation from colonial rule had priority. It also articulated the desire to expel Russian colonists and be free of Russian political control. Some Muslim nationalists also harbored ambitions to infiltrate the Communist Party, win control of education, and promote pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish ideals. In any case, the Muslim leaders had to collaborate with the Russian Communist Party, as they were deeply divided and lacked the organizational strength, military power, and direct contact with the masses to independently realize their cultural and ideological goals.

They were at odds with local chiefs, notables, and the conservative religious leaders.

The Russian Communist Party vigorously opposed the Muslim national orientation. Stalin's view – that there could be only one Communist Party in the Soviet Union, that class struggle was intrinsic and prior to national struggle, and that revolution would have to be pursued first in Europe rather than in Asia – prevailed. In 1923, the twelfth congress of the Russian Communist Party denounced the Georgian national Communists and demanded the subordination of regional parties to central interests. Sultan Galiev was vilified and expelled from the party as a danger to Soviet security in the border regions, and a promoter of local nationalisms. In 1928, he was sent to a prison camp and disappeared.

Thus, in regions where Soviet and Muslim nationalists had formed an alliance, Russians ousted their Muslim rivals and defeated armed resistance. While Muslim nationalist and reformist leaders in most Third World countries had generations to consolidate their position, mobilize mass support, achieve independence, and generate a national identity on their own terms, in the Soviet Union, Muslim leaders were quickly defeated. By 1920, the Soviets had established Tatar, Crimean, Kazakh, Turkestani, and Azarbayjani Soviet Socialist Republics, and two People's Republics in Khiva and Bukhara. The latter were changed into Soviet Socialist Republics in 1923 and 1924. In 1924, Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khwarizm were territorially regrouped and four Inner Asian republics – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia – were organized. They were founded on the basis of ethnic and linguistic similarities among the populations, but part of the plan was to divide the Muslims and forestall the development of a pan-Turkish national movement. The republics all belonged to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In principle, they were independent states federated for the purposes of defense, foreign policy, and economic management, but according to the Soviet constitution, Soviet law prevailed over local law and all territories were considered the sovereign domain of the Soviet Union. In practice, the republics were closely controlled by the Communist Party and the central state administration.

The system of "autonomous" national regimes was extended to other Muslim groups. According to Soviet classifications, Muslim nations (*natsii*, peoples who shared a common history, language, cultural identity, and political–territorial organization), comprising more than 300,000 members, included Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Azaris, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirgiz, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossets, Avers, Lezghins, Kabardes, and Karakalpaks. Other smaller groups, based on the unification of tribal people by shared language, but not having all of the characteristics of nations, were classified as nationalities (*narodnosti*). From 1936 to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the various nations and nationalities were organized into six Soviet Socialist Republics (Uzbekistan, Azarbayjan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizia) and eight Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, including Tataristan, Bashkiria, Dagestan, and other Caucasian units. There were also four smaller autonomous districts in the Caucasus. (See Map 34.)

Map 34.   Soviet and Chinese Inner Asia to 1990.

Soviet modernization

The pre–World War II era

The organization of a system of Soviet Socialist Republics intensified the efforts to modernize the consciousness and conditions of life of Inner Asian peoples and to integrate them into Soviet society. This was to be achieved by bureaucratic administration, economic development, and by direct efforts to subvert religious and family culture in order to promote Soviet-oriented "national" cultures instead.

The 1920s and 1930s were the crucial first phase in this process. In this period, the Soviets worked out a system of governmental and party controls. In 1922 and 1923, they began by removing the Muslim old guard and bourgeois nationalists in the Communist Parties of Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, and other regions, replacing them with more dedicated Russian and local "proletarian" cadres. By 1928, the Communist Parties of Tataristan and the Crimea had also been purged. All of the literary, cultural, and scientific institutions of the Volga region were brought under Soviet control. In the 1930s, the Communist Parties of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan, and the Crimea were systematically purged. By 1937 and 1938, the older generation of Muslim communists had been totally destroyed. Paying lip service to the rights of national minorities, the Soviets asserted the absolute primacy of the central party and government ministries. Stalin stated that "the right to self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship."

Communist Party purges required the creation of new politically loyal and technically proficient cadres. In Uzbekistan and other republics the Russians oscillated between efforts to promote native peoples in the interest of "affirmative action" and the employment of Russian experts. By the middle and late 1930s, however, the party decided on Russian experts and the use of Russian as a common language. The lack of an adequately educated local population and the desire of Europeans to command the government institutions

meant that, in varying degrees, Russian personnel came to dominate the government and party apparatuses of the Inner Asian republics.

Economic development in Inner Asia had to begin virtually from scratch. From 1914 to 1920, civil war, famine, brigandage, and government confiscations had taken a tremendous toll. Untold numbers of people died in the revolutionary years. Agricultural and manufacturing output fell to minuscule levels. To restore the economy to pre-revolutionary levels the Soviets abandoned their initial proposals for collective farming. They returned confiscated lands to their Muslim owners, and encouraged the replacement of draft animals, reconstruction of irrigation works, and other measures to repair the damages of the civil war period. The greatest efforts were made to increase cotton production, at the expense of rice and other crops. By 1928, the "New Economic Policy" had brought agricultural and industrial production to about 70 percent of 1913 levels.

With the mending of the Inner Asian economies the Soviets launched a program of land reform. In 1924, they decided to seize all large properties and the "excess" properties of middle and small landowners, whom they called "feudal and tribal survivals." They planned to redistribute the land among the poor and landless peasants. Their goals were to break the political backbone of rural elites, and to open the society to the more drastic reorganizations to follow. Land reform was carefully prepared by propaganda to undermine respect for traditional authority, encourage the peasants to drive out landowners, and promote class warfare. This was difficult because the economic and social gap between large and small owners was not in fact clearly demarcated and because of the close cultural and religious ties between the larger owners and the poorer peasants.

The great drive for collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization of the Inner Asian republics (and the whole of the Soviet Union) began in 1928. State farms and collectives were introduced that year. Between 1929 and 1934, a new trade union of agricultural and forestry workers was organized. In 1934, machine tractor stations were introduced to centralize state control over agricultural production and promote more efficient utilization of

mechanized resources. Peasants on collective farms were closely regimented. By 1937, collectivization was about 95 percent complete. Tajikistan, for example, was transformed from a subsistence area to a producer of cotton, grain, fruit, and livestock for export.

Kazakhstan was a special case. Here land reform began in 1921 and 1922 with the distribution of water rights among the poor settlers; in 1926 and 1927, some 2,000,000 acres were taken from wealthy landowners and given to the poor. This was followed in 1928 by a redistribution of herds, forced sedentarization that squeezed the nomads into livestock collectives and state farms. By 1932, the sedentarization of Kazakhs was considered complete, but the costs were enormous. The Kazakh population declined by some 900,000 in the 1930s owing to executions and emigration to China, and there was a catastrophic collapse in the size of animal herds.

Industrial development in the 1920s and 1930s was limited. From 1917 to 1922, civil war and nationalizations led to the collapse of the cotton-processing industry, but from 1928 to 1941 the Soviets introduced mechanized textile production and engineering industries, and increased the production of coal and electric power. Development in Kazakhstan was limited to the restoration of agricultural processing, and meat-packing, wool, and canning industries.

While economic development was limited, the Soviets achieved an educational miracle by providing mass education in Inner Asia to the same standards that prevailed throughout the Soviet Union. The scope and success of this effort is unrivaled in any colonial regime or any independent Muslim country. In 1930, primary education was made universal and compulsory, and a literacy campaign to educate adults between the ages of sixteen and thirty was launched. Local languages were used for instruction. In 1938, Russian was made a required subject. Until the 1940s, the main objective was to make the population literate and to promote the acceptance of Soviet society. After that, emphasis was placed upon occupational training.

The literacy campaign was accompanied by an intensive effort to promote national cultures as the vehicle for the inculcation of a socialist mentality. The Soviet regime had divided the Muslims into a

number of national states in an attempt to encourage national identities that could be integrated into the Soviet political order and to break down both subnational tribal loyalties and supranational religious or ethnic consciousness. An intense socialization and indoctrination program was carried out through schools, political meetings, theaters, clubs, newspapers, lectures, folk art, and parades. The Soviets attempted to blend regional culture into Soviet culture, using local history, languages, epics, folklore, and arts to carry the socialist message. The concept of nation, however, had scarcely any precedent in pre-Soviet Muslim political culture. Most Muslims considered themselves members of a particular tribe, town, or village; only the elites identified themselves with territorial states such as Khokand or Bukhara; only jadidists accepted the idea of a pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic political identity.

The most important changes were language and literature reforms. In 1926, the Soviets decided to eliminate Arabic script and introduce the Latin alphabet for all Turkic languages. The new alphabet had complex political implications. It cut Muslim peoples off from the literatures of the past, but it put Inner Asian Muslims in contact with Turkey, which also used the Latin alphabet. The Latin alphabet, however, made it difficult to learn Russian. Thus in 1939 and 1940, the Soviets introduced a new Cyrillic script, and attempted to modernize Inner Asian languages by promoting an ever-increasing use of Russian terms, some of which are international technical and scientific words modified to conform to Inner Asian phonemes and grammar.

The Soviets also made intensive efforts to modernize literature. In 1925, they called for the formation of national, as opposed to pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic, cultures. In 1934, they created a writers' union to define new criteria for writing and publication, and to oblige writers to follow the party line. The introduction of political controls over nationality literatures led to a tortuous struggle between writers and censors. In the 1920s and 1930s, minority nationality writers responded to Soviet pressures by generating a new form of Soviet socialist realism in local languages, but they also attempted to preserve the traditional and classical cultures. The purges of the late 1930s, however, destroyed the nationalist poets and intellectuals.

At the same time, the Soviet regime made strenuous efforts to undermine Islam. They considered religion a barrier to full assimilation into Soviet society. In the civil war period from 1918 to 1920, the Soviets attempted to destroy all of the public aspects of Islam, including Muslim judicial administration, religious properties, and schools. Scholars (*'ulama'*) and local religious leaders, however, resisted atheism and stirred popular resistance. The *basmachi* resistance and pressure from local elites finally forced the Soviets to restore Muslim schools, colleges, mosques, and endowments. A *makhama-ishari'a*, or Muslim Directorate, was established in Tashkent to supervise the administration of schools, the training of teachers, and the appointment of mosque functionaries. The Soviets had to concede that Islam had retained its hold on the beliefs and identity of the people.

The creation of the national republics in 1924 opened the way for a new Soviet effort at secularization, this time with lasting effect. In 1923, the separation of church and state was again proclaimed. Between 1923 and 1928, new laws were passed to deny religious organizations the right to exist as corporate bodies or own property, and to confiscate large religious endowments, abolish religious courts, and eliminate religious education. A government agency took complete control of charitable trusts, and by 1930 effectively legislated them out of existence. This was similar to what would happen in many Muslim countries. While Islamic courts continued for a time to apply Islamic law concerning polygamy, dowries, and legal procedures, portions of Islamic law that contradicted Soviet law were declared invalid, and Muslims were obliged to turn to Russian courts. In 1926, the Islamic law courts were reduced to voluntary agencies, and by 1927 they had virtually disappeared. Most Islamic schools were forced to close. These measures were accompanied by intense antireligious propaganda by the League of Militant Atheists, including attacks on belief in God, the Quran, prayer, and fasting. In 1929, Muslim religious leaders were arrested, and many were killed.

Between 1924 and 1926, a new family law was promulgated that provided for equality of women's rights in divorce and property. The new law made the legal age of marriage sixteen for females and

eighteen for males, abolished the payment of the bride's dower, prohibited polygamy and abduction, and gave women full rights to participate in the labor force. The practice of wearing a veil or *paranja*, which totally covers face and body, was denounced. Communal pressures, however, prevented women from changing traditional practices and asserting their legal rights. While stressing women's proper role in the labor force, by 1936 the Soviets conceded the importance of the "socialist" family and the roles of wife and mother. By this time, however, the whole institutional structure of Islamic worship, education, justice, and property had been destroyed. (See Map 34.)

Post–World War II

After World War II, the Soviet Union continued its program of political and economic assimilation of the Muslim populations. Powerful positions in both governmental and party organizations were staffed by Russians, or by Muslim functionaries with Russian (or other European) "doubles," but certain "representative" posts, such as First Communist Party Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, or membership in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, were reserved for Inner Asians. Russian domination was partly a question of political reliability and partly a problem of the recruitment of adequately trained native cadres.

There was a similar long-term continuity in policies of economic development. Under Soviet rule, the Central Asian states were exploited as colonies. Moscow extracted valuable raw materials including cotton, metals, and fuels from its still relatively underdeveloped Inner Asian regions, but in return it subsidized industrial and agricultural investments. During World War II, the Soviet government further built up Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the Urals in order to create an industrial base behind the battle lines. After World War II, industrialization in Inner Asia was concentrated in cotton and textile production, food processing, hydroelectric development, copper mining in Kazakhstan, and oil extraction in Baku. Substantial irrigation programs added millions of hectares to the arable land of Turkestan, but inadequate methods of agriculture,

and lack of fertilizer and machinery, inhibited the development of the cotton industries. By the end of the 1960s, the substitution of machines for hand labor in cotton harvesting made it possible to cultivate newly irrigated land and increased the productivity of labor. Premier Nikita Khrushchev's (r. 1953–64) uncultivated lands program in Kazakhstan completed the process of turning the region from nomadic pastoralism to agriculture. The Soviet government tolerated private initiative in food production, marketing, contracted services, and housing. Under Soviet rule, Central Asian countries achieved a higher standard of living than almost any other Asian Muslim country. By the 1950s, nourishment was adequate, and in the 1960s housing was improved. The Muslim population, which had declined in the bitter revolutionary and civil war years, began to grow rapidly. It rose from 24,000,000 in 1959 to 47,000,000 in 1970, growing four to five times as fast as the Slavic population, whose fertility was lower as a result of rising incomes, education, and urbanization.

The development of the Soviet education system led to an ever-increasing employment of Muslims in government, party, and technical positions, diminishing the role of Russians, Jews, and other Europeans. By 1975, Muslim technicians formed 57.6 percent of the workforce in Uzbekistan. Despite this rapid integration, however, Muslims neither aspired to social integration nor suffered from discrimination. They had a status structure of their own, looking down upon the lower classes of Russian settlers as uneducated people.

Soviet religious and cultural policies, however, were significantly modified after Stalin's death in 1953. The Soviet government became more tolerant of non-Russian cultures. After Leonid Brezhnev assumed power in 1964, official pronouncements emphasized the shared values of Soviet peoples, but not the assimilation of nationalities. National and ethnic differences were accepted as part of political reality. In practice, this meant that the minorities were accorded a measure of cultural autonomy in return for their acceptance of the primacy of the Russian language and culture.

During the war, the Soviet regime allowed Muslim religious leaders to rebuild Islamic organizations under state control in order to win their support for the war effort. In 1943 the Directorate of Muslim

Peoples (*muftiat*), was reestablished in Tashkent with jurisdiction over Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Separate departments of religious affairs were recognized at Baku for Azarbayjan, at Ufa for Russian and Siberian Tatars, and at Makhachkala (Dagestan) for the North Caucasus. Each of these boards was headed by an elected mufti, but the North Caucasus had two chiefs, a Sunni mufti and a Shi'i *shaykh al-islam*. Councils of *'ulama'* and mosque representatives were called to give legal decrees (*fatawa*) concerning religious and ritual matters, such as laws of marriage, divorce, and circumcision. Local mosques were administered by an elected administrative committee. Elected laymen took over the authority of the imams. They reported to the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, which had been established in 1944, and religious activity outside the control of these organizations was deemed illegal. (See Illustration 26.)

Illustration 26. *'Ulama'* study the Quran in Tashkent (Novosti Photo Library).

The Muslim Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan was the most important of the new boards, and its influence and authority extended throughout the Soviet Union. It managed a number of mosques and administered the only two Islamic colleges in the Soviet Union that trained students to be religious functionaries, the Mir-i Arab Madrasa

of Bukhara and the more advanced Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Institute in Tashkent. Apart from the two colleges there were no Islamic schools, no Islamic law courts, and no endowed charitable trusts.

The Tashkent board was an active publisher of religious materials. Its publications included collections of hadith, classical texts, and the only Muslim periodical published in the Soviet Union, *Muslims of the Soviet East*. This journal was published in English, French, Russian, Arabic, Persian, Dari, and Uzbek. It published historical and literary notes, reviews of religious texts, and advocated for the preservation of monuments. It gave religious advice on such questions as observance of Ramadan and the birthday of the Prophet, and visits to saints' shrines.

Despite the organization of an official Muslim administration, from 1954 to 1964 Khrushchev carried out an antireligious campaign. It involved the "deregistration" of Muslim clerics and the suppression of mosques. After Khrushchev's demise the Soviet regime adopted educational and persuasive methods, instead of administrative or police measures, to restrict religious activity. An elaborate antireligious propaganda campaign assailed Islam, including publications, films, radio broadcasts, and reports from research institutes. Soviet academic writers treated Islam as an archaic residue of an outmoded society. In the 1970s, there was a fresh anti-Islamic campaign in the Caucasus directed at Sufism. The campaign stressed the incompatibility of religion and modern science, and the superiority of Communist to Islamic morals.

In response, Muslim religious leaders attempted to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam, modernity, and socialism. They praised Soviet society for its economic achievements and published photographs of power plants next to those of mosques. They also defended the Soviet Union against Western critics, and strongly supported Soviet foreign policy with articles on fraternal delegations from Muslim countries, reports on disarmament and antinuclear conferences, and strong advocacy of the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. *'Ulama'* played an important part in Soviet foreign affairs by receiving delegations, making official visits abroad, and propagandizing for the advantages of Islam under socialism. Their very position required

them to support the Soviet system and to adapt Islam to the requirements of a socialist society. They were also sensitive to the needs of a secular, technically trained Muslim population for whom religious belief had to be justified and made meaningful in contemporary terms. Moreover, the Muslim religious leaders were themselves Soviet-educated citizens, participating in a Soviet society through part-time employment in the workforce and through marriage and family ties. Their own identity depended upon a blending of Soviet modernity and Islam.

Thus, the maintenance of an official religious establishment indicated a tacit collaboration between the government and the *'ulama'*. The government sponsored the Muslim administration in the hope of winning Muslim support, and for fear that disestablishment would reinforce underground Islamic movements. The leaders of official Islam lent their support to the Soviet regime in return for the survival of their positions and organizations.

The overall effect of Soviet policy was to consolidate a new sense of nationality, and a revival and re-creation of national cultures. Inner Asian oral literatures had survived in the forms of songs for weddings and funerals, tales, legends, and epic poems. Historical novels and poems dealing with the glories of the past, and literary and anthropological studies recognizing the Eastern heritage of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and other Asian peoples were published. Periodicals were published in Kazakh, Uzbek, Azeri, Tatar, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Tajik, Bashkir, and other languages. *Mirasism*, or "rediscovery of the pre-revolutionary national patrimony," became an important cultural trend. Despite this liberalization, a vast number of books printed in Turkish and Inner Asian languages had primarily a Russian and European content, and novels and other literary works were constrained by Soviet political supervision. While Uzbeks became politically loyal citizens of the Soviet Union, integral members of the administrative and technical workforce, fluent speakers of Russian, and European in public dress and manners, they still identified themselves as Uzbeks and condemned the effort to "pass" or assimilate completely into a Russian identity. Similarly, Kazakh intellectuals tried to reconcile political loyalty and ethnic identity, and to reinterpret their national past in ways consistent with their Soviet present.

With respect to Islam, urbanization and industrialization, higher levels of formal education, and the incorporation of women into the workforce tended to secularize Soviet Muslim populations. This secularization, especially among professionals and skilled workers, meant a declining attention to prayer, fasting, and other religious ceremonies. Still, even the educated intelligentsia remained strongly attached to their native languages, ethnic identities, and religious customs. They did not intermarry with Russians, and they resisted assimilation by practicing traditional customs in relation to women, Ramadan observances and festivals, and Muslim rituals in birth, circumcision, marriage, and burial ceremonies.

While some Muslim elites were co-opted by the Soviet system, the masses were not assimilated. Ordinary Muslims maintained a distrustful sense of separateness, an identity based on multiple and sometimes conflicting loyalties directed to clan and tribe, national republics, the universal Muslim community, and the Soviet federal regime. Alongside official or state-administered religion, there also flourished a "parallel Islam," or unofficial Muslim religious activity, which was especially strong in rural areas. Sufi brotherhoods were still important in the tribal regions of Turkmenistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, and the Caucasus. Pilgrimage to shrines and saints' graves played an important part in preserving an unofficial Muslim religious life. Among less-educated people animistic practices survived under the guise of Islam. Amulets were used to ward off spirits, exorcise demons, and heal injuries. The cult of ancestors, sometimes inherited from pre-Islamic sanctuaries, and shamanism continued to be practiced. Alongside the Sufis there were numerous healers, wandering shamans, and other holy men. In family affairs, pre-Islamic rituals marking the births of children survived, along with magical ceremonies on the occasions of marriages and funerals.

Thus, the Muslims of the Soviet Union experienced intensive economic and social modernization and the inculcation of new values through Soviet scholastic and political education. Traditional social structures were broken down, elites eliminated, and religious educational, legal, and ritual practices constrained or abolished. The religious establishment was made dependent upon the state.

Independent Sufi brotherhoods existed only as clandestine organizations and probably had a limited following, except in parts of the Caucasus. Even on the level of personal belief, Islam diminished, as the worldview of Muslim citizens of the Soviet Union came to be formed by Soviet political and scientific concepts.

Nonetheless, Muslim belief and identity remained important. Even politically assimilated Muslims – who considered themselves Soviet citizens, who were loyal to the state and accepted its socialist political and economic values, who spoke Russian, wore European dress and assumed European manners, and who possessed modern technical and administrative skills – retained Islam as their personal faith and social identity on the level of ethnic and family culture and self-image. Cultivated by language and ethnic consciousness, Islam continued to have a subjective hold on Soviet populations of Muslim background. In rural areas, among rural migrants to cities, and among older persons, Islamic belief remained in full force. Muslims held a modulated concept of political identity involving Soviet citizenship, minority nationality, and an Islamic heritage.

Post–Soviet Russia

With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, new political, economic, and cultural conditions would shape the lives of the former Soviet Muslim population. Three regional variations may be distinguished: the newly defined Russia, the Caucasus, and the now independent states of Inner Asia.

A substantial Muslim population continued to inhabit the Russian state. Muslims made up about 15 percent of Russia's population, concentrated in the Moscow region, the Volga region of Tataristan, the North Caucasus including Dagestan and Chechnya, and smaller populations in the Urals and Western Siberia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a rising ethnic, national, and religious self-awareness among Muslims, a return to traditional customs, a reconstruction of religious leadership, and the founding of numerous mosques and schools. The trend was encouraged by such international Salafi missions as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Saudi Arabia), the Saudi al-Haramayn organization, and the Ibrahim

al-Ibrahim charitable foundation. New Islamic parties including the Muslim Public Movement Nur (Light), the Union of the Muslims of Russia (UMR), the Tatar party Ittifak, and Dagestan's Islamic Democratic Party were founded in the 1990s. For most Muslims the revival was an expression of both ethnic identity and a sense of universal Muslim brotherhood in which religious, ethnic, and national identities were merged.

In response, the Russian government re-created the Soviet-era system of control over religion. Islam is officially recognized as one of Russia's four principal religions, along with Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism. The Islamic Spiritual Department oversees the appointment of Muslim leaders. The traditional Muslim leaders generally remained loyal to the government, but the new movements were usually in opposition. Muslims suffer from discrimination and lack of respect. Conversely, ethnic Russians fear the loss of traditional Russian identity. Mandatory classes in Orthodox Christianity have been introduced in Russian schools.

The Caucasus

The Caucasus region was never fully assimilated into the Soviet Union. Islam was first introduced to Azarbayjan and other areas south of the Caucasus by the Arab conquests of the seventh century. It was reinforced by Saljuq migrations in the eleventh century. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Golden Horde introduced Islam to the northern Caucasus, and the influence of the Crimean khans and the Ottoman Empire helped spread it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Naqshbandi Sufis appeared in Dagestan in the eighteenth century. Studying in Mecca and Medina, teaching in Damascus and Aleppo, local scholars were connected to the international community of *'ulama'* and Sufis. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, only part of the Caucasian population of about one-and-a-half million was Muslim, divided into some twenty different Turkish, Iranian, and Caucasian language groups. In many cases the elites were Muslim while the common people remained animists.

The Chechens were an important element of this population. In the nineteenth century, they understood themselves to be a people with a common language (*vainakh*, our people), but organized as clans (*gar*s) and tribes (*teip*). The *teip* were grouped into *tuqums*, tribal unions consisting of groups of villages. The head of each family was an absolute authority in his home, but a council of elders spoke for the *tuqum*. Islam entered the region from Dagestan, either by the conquests of local princes, or by the preaching of *qumyg* – shepherd-missionaries. In the early nineteenth century, the few local mullahs had very little influence and the legal system was based primarily on custom (*adat*) rather than Islamic law. For example, women could initiate divorce.

The Russians began to penetrate the region in the early eighteenth century. With the breakup of the Safavid Empire, they took control of northern Dagestan in 1723, and annexed Georgia in 1801–04. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a succession of Naqshbandi Imams led the resistance of free peasant landowners to the Russians, and the local lords allied with them. One of these, Shaykh Mansur (d. 1791), had visions of horsemen sent to him by the Prophet Muhammad, and proclaimed himself Imam. He wore a veil to conceal his radiant holiness, and forbade wine and tobacco. Four main principles inspired his movement: the return to a purified Islam, the struggle against non-Islamic religious practices, the rule of Islamic law, and holy war against the infidels. Mansur raised a coalition of free peasants and local notables, but, deserted by the nobles, was defeated in 1787. Despite this defeat, later Sufi preachers would make the Caucasus a bastion of Islamic resistance to the Russians. Shamil (active 1834–59) was the most famous leader of these efforts to create a state transcending tribal confederations. He tried to replace blood feuds with Islamic law and to implement Islamic laws on inheritance, marriage, divorce, and criminal offenses. He banned music, alcohol, and tobacco, and opened Quran schools. His warriors were his Sufi disciples (*murids*, the Safavi pattern). Shamil was defeated in 1859 by the Russians and by tribal antagonism.

Nonetheless, Sufism continued to flourish. In the conviction that holy places could facilitate communication with supernatural beings,

ward off evil spirits, and serve as guardian intermediaries between men and God, the graves of saints – and other holy places such as crossroads, hills, caves, and stones that commemorated battles fought against the Russians – were visited by pilgrims seeking cures, aid in pregnancy, and other kinds of worldly good fortune. Alongside the Naqshbandiyya, the Qadiriyya gained adherents and introduced their own *dhikr* (Sufi worship) based on loud recitation, dancing, music, and drumming. The two orders joined in a great revolt in 1877–78, but were crushed by the Russians.

During the Russian revolution the Muslims of the Caucasus again made a vigorous effort to expel the Russians and to establish an autonomous state. In 1917, a congress of *'ulama'* elected an Imam, who led resistance from 1920 to 1925. The Russians defeated this resistance, arrested the religious leaders, disarmed the people, and liquidated the Islamic courts. Nonetheless, there were new revolts between 1928 and 1936 and from 1940 to 1944. During World War II, the whole population of Chechen Ingushia was deported to Kazakhstan and Siberia, and the territory was jurisdictionally divided between the Russian and Georgian Soviet Republics. (Also in 1944, on the basis of allegations that the Tatars had collaborated with the Germans, the Russians deported the entire Tatar population of the Crimea to Inner Asia and incorporated the region into the Ukraine.)

At the end of the Soviet era, Caucasians remained closely attached to Islam, observed the fast of Ramadan, and made pilgrimages to the tombs of saints. There were still numerous Quran schools. Sufi teachers officiated over prayers and family rituals. The survival of the Sufi brotherhoods was partly due to the identification of the brotherhoods with families and clans (*teip*). Typically, villagers considered themselves both the members of a Sufi brotherhood and the descendants of a common ancestor.

From the 1970s, a religious revival took hold. Muslim missionaries came to Dagestani and Chechen villages, preaching the purification of Islam from innovation, reliance on Quran and sunna, and criticizing the Sufis for visits to saints' shrines, celebrating the Prophet's birthday (*mawlid*), and the use of talismans and charms. Toward the end of the 1980s, religious revival and political dissent was reinforced

by Wahhabi and Salafi influences coming from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian countries. In June 1990, a branch of the Islamic Renaissance party connected to the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) and the Jama'at-i Islami (Pakistan) was established in the Caucasus. A small cadre of foreign fighters and Arab-financed Muslim charities reinforced Chechen opposition to Russian control.

In Chechnya, the Islamic revival and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 blended into a long series of devastating wars for independence. In 1990, General Dudayev founded the Chechen National Congress, and in November 1991 declared Chechnya independent. In 1994, saying it had to defend its territorial integrity and protect itself against bandits, Russia attacked Chechnya and, in severe fighting, destroyed the capital, Grozny. Then, exhausted by heavy military losses and internal divisions, Russia agreed to give Chechnya de facto autonomy, though nominally within the framework of the Russian state. In 1996, Chechens declared the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, defined as an Islamic republic.

Most Chechens, however, viewed themselves either as secularists or as devotees of the Sufi orders. A generational split between Chechen activists raised in the Soviet era and those who grew up under Salafi influence in the war for independence emerged, and in 1999, a civil war broke out between the Salafi-oriented factions and Qadiri Sufi militias. In 1999, led by Shamil Basayev, the radicals attacked villages in neighboring Dagestan, and precipitated the second Russian–Chechnyan war. Provoked – or excused – by Chechen terrorism, Russia again invaded Chechnya in an effort to reintegrate it into the Russian state. In the propaganda of both sides, the second Chechen war was defined as a struggle between Russia and Islamic radicalism. The Russian government led by Vladimir Putin defined the war as another front in the international war against al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism.

The second Chechen war ended in complete Russian dominance and a new political strategy to control Chechnya. In March 2004, Russia made the local Kadyrov clan its surrogate in Chechnya. The Kadyrovs eliminated opposition forces, journalists, and human rights investigators, and centralized all social, welfare, and educational

functions in their clan apparatus. Only loyalists could take part in the government of Chechnya. In short, the Russian government established an undemocratic and non-Islamic regime.

Neighboring Dagestan by contrast remained within the Russian federation. The Soviet-era ruling apparatus remained in place. Muslims were divided into numerous competing forces, with two main religious tendencies. The official Spiritual Board of Dagestan sponsored mosques, schools, charities, publishing, holiday celebrations, and pilgrimage. The "Wahhabis" tried to Islamize social and ritual practices, and replace the Dagestan regime with an Islamic state. In 1998, three villages announced that they would secede and create an Islamic state, taking marriage, inheritance, and land disputes under their control. In September 1998, the Dagestani government agreed to end the harassment of the "Wahhabis," and the rebel villages agreed to respect the constitutions of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Dagestan. A multiethnic society with diffuse allegiances to Sufi Islam did not have the potential for a national struggle.

There are separatist movements in other parts of the Caucasus as well. Georgia has Muslim Abkhazian and Ossetian minorities who claim reunion with Russia or territorial independence. Both have partially achieved their objectives with Russian help.

Azarbayjan

Azarbayjan has been part of the Soviet Union since 1924. Soviet rule destroyed civil society and left the country in the hands of competing bureaucratic mafias with regional or clan bases. In 1989, Azari nationalists demanded independence, calling for a return to Azari Turkish culture and an end to the use of Cyrillic script. A nationalist uprising was put down by Russian troops in 1990, but Azarbayjan became independent upon the official demise of the Soviet Union.

Azarbayjan is beset by war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous district within the territory of Azarbayjan with an Armenian ethno-religious population. In 1988, Armenia claimed Nagorno-Karabakh, and in November 1990 Azarbayjan abrogated the

autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming the rights of a territorially sovereign state over its populations. War between Armenia and Azarbayjan followed. Azarbayjan was defeated, and after a succession of presidents, a military coup brought Haidar Aliyev to power in 1993, in effect a restoration of the old Communist Party elite and of Russian influence.

Aliyev is opposed by numerous parties and factions representing powerful bosses or warlords rather than ideological or political principles; the country faces grave problems in creating a coherent national identity in the face of ethnic differences, rivalries of family and regional bosses, factionalized political parties, economic dislocation, and Russian and other international manipulations. Azarbayjani economic and oil development is stymied by rivalries within the elite over who will control the deals, and by rivalries over the pipeline routes.

In cultural terms, the elites stress Turkish connections, but there are close ties to Iran as well. The breakup of the Soviet Union has allowed for the expression of Muslim desires for mosques and pilgrimages. While there are Muslim movements representing parties committed to an Islamic state and parties of moral reform, Islam seems to be of secondary importance in Azari politics.

Despite two centuries of Russian influence and the Soviet programs to promote education, legal rights, and employment for women, Azarbayjan maintains traditional and Muslim patterns of family culture. The Soviet Union encouraged literacy, high educational levels, and employment, though most women remained employed in agriculture or lower-skill jobs. While the Soviet Union ostensibly opened new opportunities for women, it did not provide the housing and childcare facilities that were needed to actualize their independence, and they had to go back to their extended families to find support. In the Soviet era too there was a tacit bargain with local elites that in return for their political support the Soviet Union would overlook continued male dominance in the family – their "honor" would be respected. In effect, a dual culture emerged: in public, Soviet; in private, Azari. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, women have lost what meager gains they had made and have to

depend upon kinship ties for protection. They are again expected to be moral exemplars, defer to men, and not to smoke, drink, or appear in public without a chaperon. They are used as symbols of national and ethnic identity and Muslim modesty. (See Map 35.)

Map 35. Ethnic populations in Inner Asia and Afghanistan.

Newly independent states in formerly Soviet Central Asia

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the formation of independent states led to an intensification of conflicts over political power, economic resources, and national, regional, and religious identities. By the time of President Mikhail Gorbachev (r. 1986–91), ethnic minorities were already protesting Soviet policy and authority. In 1988, there were antigovernment riots in Kazakhstan. In late 1991, the Central Asian states declared their independence, and on December 9, 1991, Soviet leaders meeting in Minsk officially declared an end to the Soviet Union and formed the new Commonwealth of Independent States, with promises of military and economic

cooperation among the now separate and sovereign members. The Central Asian states (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) are all governed by their former Communist Party bosses, now self-declared nationalists and secularists. All the new regimes are highly authoritarian, and are based on closely controlled political and police institutions. The ruling elites have tried to imitate Soviet policy and to co-opt the religious leaders. The Kazakhstan Religious Board, created in imitation of the Soviet Central Asian Religious Board, sponsors religious education, repairs mosques, and sends delegates on the pilgrimage. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have similar religious-administrative bodies.

In most of the newly independent Central Asian states national identities are contested and hard to consolidate. In each country there are conflicts between the majority and ethnic minorities. Tensions run high between the resident Russian populations and the non-Russian native populations. In each country the majority ethnic population would like its own language to be the national language, and have taken measures to declare Turkmen, or Uzbek, or Kazakh – as the case may be – the national language. Nationalist protests demanding the use of Kirgiz broke out in Kazakhstan in 1989. In Uzbekistan there was ethnic conflict in the Farghana Valley. Russians began to leave the region, but Uzbekistan was obliged to recognize a special status for Russians due to the large Russian population, the critical role played by Russians in the economy and administration, and the importance of their Russian ally.

In all these states, the formation of national identities is further complicated by the Islamic revival. The *glasnost* (openness and transparency) policy of Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev relaxed Soviet government controls. Pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish movements and *jadid*-type reformism flourished. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Salafis, supported by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Pakistan, were particularly active in building mosques and schools. Islamic political parties committed to the founding of an Islamic state have emerged in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The most popular radical Islamic movement in Central Asia during the 1990s was the nonviolent Hizb ut-Tahrir. It rejects nationalism, democracy, capitalism, and socialism as Western ideas alien to Islam, but is also

hostile to Sufism and Shi'ism. Hizb ut-Tahrir hopes to re-create a caliphate as in Ottoman times. The movement is well organized into small groups who meet in mosques, distribute pamphlets, and run Islamic study and prayer groups. It appeals most strongly to Uzbeks in several of the Central Asian states and to urban intelligentsia. Throughout the region there are efforts to reclaim Islam from state control and politicized movements through the creation of new mosques, private religious schools, and literature.

The political situation in each of the major countries is profoundly unsettled. In Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev runs a dictatorial regime. On April 3, 2011, Nazarbayev was reelected for a five-year term. The regime steers carefully between the pressures of a substantial Russian population and the escalating demands of Kazakh nationalists. President Nazarbayev tries to keep good relations with Moscow, but promotes Kazakh cultural identity. The opposition parties – Azat (Freedom party), Semipalatinsk-Nevada (the antinuclear and Green party that opposed the continuation of the old Communist Party elite), and extremist Kazakh nationalist and Islamic parties (now mostly underground) – have been crushed. Islam still holds considerable appeal as the basis of an independent Kazakh identity. The state tries to control Muslim affairs through the Spiritual Association of Muslims of Kazakhstan, but the Qadi of Alma Ata, Radbek Nisanbai, attempted to lead a religious revival, translating the Quran into Kazakh, opening a seminary, printing a newspaper, and building numerous mosques. Islam appeals even more to non-Kazakh, especially Uzbek, minorities, who see it as a way to differentiate themselves from both Kazakhs and Russians.

Uzbekistan is ruled by President Islam Karimov, the former head of the Uzbek Communist Party, now called the National Democratic Party. Karimov runs an authoritarian regime, which imposes tight political and economic controls. As in many other post-Soviet states, there is an officially sponsored Islam. The Tashkent Islamic University trains imams and broadcasts a weekly television show. The official Muslim hierarchy is opposed by the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which may have several thousand fighters and calls for the formation of an Islamic state; the Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Saudi-supported Ahle sunna, which builds mosques and madrasas; and the

Islamic Democratic Party, which calls for the implementation of Islamic law. The Islamist political movements denounce popular Sufism as a Zionist and Turkish conspiracy against Islam. The government suppresses both Islamic political and Islamic social and moral reform movements. No opposition parties were allowed to participate in Uzbekistan's December 1999 parliamentary elections.

Tensions between the state and Muslim radicals are more violent in Uzbekistan than in many other Central Asian states. In March 2004, there were suicide bombings and gun battles in Tashkent. On May 13, 2005, Uzbek government forces killed hundreds of unarmed people who participated in a massive public protest in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan. This region is home to a number of radical Islamic movements that constitute more of a psychological than a military or political threat to the regime.

Kyrgyzstan is ruled by Askar Akaev, a former physicist who was elected as a liberal leader in 1991 on the basis of promises to privatize the economy. In July 1994, Akaev disbanded parliament, shut down the opposition press, assumed dictatorial powers, and in practice abandoned the program for privatization and market development. Kyrgyzstan's Uzbek population is drawn to political Islam. Muslim movements remain active in the principal cities of Beshkeh and Osh, building mosques and schools, but Islamic political parties were suppressed and Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned.

Turkmenistan was ruled by Saparmurat Niyazov (known as Turkmenbashi), a former Communist Party chief who declared his country's independence in August 1990. He was elected president of Turkmenistan in 1991 and ruled until his death in 2006. The Communist Party, renamed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, is the only political party. President Saparmurat promoted a personality cult and banned political parties, independent media, and the teaching of foreign languages. He expelled Christian and Hindu leaders. After the death of Saparmurat Niyazov, the new Turkmen government under Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov ended the cult of personality, but for all practical purposes continues a dictatorial regime.

In Turkmenistan the government oversees official Islam through a structure inherited from the Soviet period. Turkmenistan's Muslim Religious Board, together with that of Uzbekistan, constitutes the Muslim Religious Board of Mavarannahr. The Mavarannahr board is based in Tashkent and exerts considerable influence in appointments of religious leaders in Turkmenistan. The governing body of Islamic judges (Kaziat) is registered with the Turkmenistan Ministry of Justice, and a council of religious affairs monitors the activities of clergy. Since 1990, efforts have been made to regain some of the cultural heritage lost under Soviet rule. President Saparmurat Niyazov ordered that basic Islamic principles be taught in public schools. Many mosques and religious schools are supported by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey.

After becoming independent, Tajikistan disintegrated into a civil war lasting from 1992 to 1997. Rakhmon Nabiev, the former Communist Party governor of the country, tried to maintain the old Communist Party hierarchy and to consolidate his power by repressive measures, but Tajikistan was divided between Tajiks and a large Uzbek ethnic minority, and into numerous clans and factions. Rival regional and tribal elites, Afghan- and Iranian-sponsored factions, and Russian and Uzbek interventions broke down civil order. Nabiev was also opposed by the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), which called for the formation of an Islamic state. It won support as an expression of post-Soviet Tajik nationalism, but the party lost its appeal as war-weariness set in. The party was undermined when the Tajik government banned external funding of madrasas, an important source of IRP recruits. By the end of the war, Tajikistan was completely devastated. It is estimated that 100,000 people had been killed and 1.2 million made refugees. With the consolidation of the government and the defeat of the IRP, Tajikistan has become more secular, and traditional Sufism has regained popularity.

With independence the Central Asian regional economies broke down. Economic productivity had already begun to fall in the last years of the Soviet regime. Apart from nationality conflicts and Islamic militancy, regional stability is threatened by environmental devastation around the Aral Sea, endemic poverty, and poor

education. The Soviet government promoted cotton production, mining, and other resource extraction. Cotton production pushed out food crops and made the region dependent upon imported supplies. Pesticides and fertilizers polluted the land. Irrigation used up valuable water and contributed to the shrinking of the Aral Sea. Moreover, though the Central Asian territories produced much of the Soviet cotton, they produced little of the cloth. Hydroelectric power projects supplied both the region and European Russia with electricity, but Central Asian oil and gas reserves, apart from Kazakhstan, were neglected. Universal literacy was a great achievement, but social welfare and health services lagged behind the already poor Soviet standards. The Soviet legacy – combined with inflation, food shortages, high unemployment, mafia-like control of businesses, corruption, and political instability – contributed to an economic disaster. (See Map 36.)

Map 36. Oilfields and pipelines: the Middle East and Inner Asia.

In Central Asia oil and gas are the key to economic growth – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azarbayjan have promising reserves

– but political conflict has blocked the economic opportunities of all. The new states cannot export their oil or gas without going through the territory of other countries. Kazakhstan has an enormous potential for the development of the Tengiz gas- and oilfields, which cannot be fully realized until a new pipeline outlet is decided upon. Russia controls the pipeline routes that already cross its territory, and it taps supplies that Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could sell for higher prices in Europe. Russia favors a new pipeline route across its own territories to the Black Sea. China is building a pipeline that will connect to gas-fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. India, Pakistan, and the European Union (EU) are also eager to obtain gas from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan prefers new lines via Turkey and Iran. Turkey, however, backed by the United States, objects that the Black Sea routes require passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles which are already dangerously overcrowded, and favors the construction of new pipelines that would bring resources directly to the Mediterranean. The shortest export routes would cross Iran, but this is opposed by the United States for political reasons. In the meantime there is considerable uncertainty over the extent of Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves, and whether the required investments would be profitable. Political instability and numerous local conflicts deter foreign investors. (See)

Russia, Turkey, and Iran all maneuver to maintain or generate spheres of influence and to support factions and policies favorable to their own interests. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey has attempted to assert its leadership by promoting a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council, making extensive investments in the infrastructures in the new Central Asian Republics, student exchanges, television broadcasts, and by sending volunteer technical and professional experts. It has also taken part in the creation of a new Western alphabet for Central Asian Turkic languages. Nonetheless, Turkey's influence is relatively limited. Turkish initiatives in this area have been checked by Russia, which considers itself the patron power of the former Soviet states. The Russians have negotiated a mutual assistance treaty with Uzbekistan and other republics, and have intervened in disputes between Uzbekistan and

Tajikistan. Russia and Turkey remain rivals for the development of alternative pipeline routes for the export of regional oil and gas.

Iran also has an important role in Central Asia, and is a key player in the Caspian Sea region. It has close cultural ties with Persian-speaking Tajikistan. It has sponsored an Association of Persian Languages, a Caspian Sea Economic Organization, and has funded the IRP in Tajikistan. It has rail links and proposed oil and gas links to Turkmenistan.

The Muslims of China

China's Muslim population falls into two main groups. The Hui are those Muslims spread throughout the regions of Han population who in ethnicity and language are Chinese, but consider themselves a separate people. They are descended from Persian, Arab, Mongolian, and Turkish Muslims who settled in China at various times in the past. The other Muslims of China are Inner Asian peoples, including Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and other minority groups, most of whom speak Turkic languages and are not assimilated to a Chinese lifestyle.

The Hui identify themselves by a number of factors, some of which overlap, but none of which are held by every Hui community. The Hui commonly recognize the principle of Qing Zhen, which means "pure and true," and refers first of all to the avoidance of pork, and then to religious values, ethnic descent, and lifestyle. Hui have never been organized as a single body, and there are strong regional and local differences. In the northwest, in Ningxia province, the Hui stress their Islamic beliefs and orthodoxy. There is increasing strictness of practice, affiliation with the Khufiyya Sufi order, separation of men and women in the fields, madrasa education, and celebration of Muslim festivals. In some communities, mosque and graveyard are the centers of the community, and the mosque seems more important for social functions such as marriages and funerals than for worship. In Beijing's Oxen Street, Hui identity is indicated by choices of schooling, occupation, spouses, avoidance of pork, and eating in Hui restaurants. In the suburbs of Beijing, Hui see themselves in terms of

occupation, schooling, and above all endogamous marriages. People find spouses in their brigade and district and via a network of connections to other Hui communities. Hui women do not marry Han men. In the southeast, in Chendai, Islam scarcely plays any part in Hui identity, and the Hui stress their common descent from Arab Muslim ancestors and the veneration of ancient tombs, giving a lineage identity to people who are otherwise indistinguishable from local Hans. Among still other Hui, secular associations such as restaurants, schools, and clubs define group identity, and neither religion nor ancestry is given much weight. Government recognition and policies have helped forge Hui ethnic self-awareness.

The Inner Asian Muslim peoples were absorbed into the Chinese state in the late nineteenth century when the Chinese defeated Muslims in Yunnan, Shensi, and Kansu provinces, and Uighurs and Kazakhs in Xinjiang. (See Chapter 37.) In the Republican period (1911–49), China's relations with its Muslim minorities were based on the expectation that they would be totally assimilated and incorporated into Chinese society.

Xinjiang province, nonetheless, preserved a considerable autonomy, and was ruled by a succession of independent warlords. Yang Tseng-hsin became the first governor (1911–28) under the republican regime. To support his administration he mobilized both Chinese and Muslim soldiers to maintain a local balance of power, counteract Chinese secret societies, and forestall the possibility of Muslim forces being used to create an independent state. Yang gave the local chieftains autonomy, spared the province heavy economic burdens, and thus managed to maintain Chinese suzerainty and his personal control. In 1924, he signed a treaty with the Soviet Union that exchanged Chinese consulates in Soviet Central Asia for Soviet consulates in eastern Turkestan, and thus bolstered the autonomy of the region from central government control. Yang was assassinated in 1928, and in 1933 Xinjiang was taken over by Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Sheng also followed the policy of maintaining close ties with Russia and of rallying local non-Chinese support. He encouraged newspapers in local languages, stabilized the currency, and, with Russian investments, improved communications, built factories, and set up an oil refinery. The German invasion of Russia, however, cut

off Russian support and obliged Sheng to restore Xinjiang to the control of the Chinese government.

World War II and the defeat of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek allowed for Kazakh and Uighur rebellions in 1944. The Soviet Union helped to negotiate the return of the province to China in 1946, and the rebel groups agreed to subordination to China in return for local autonomy and a reformed administration. The nationalist Chinese regime, however, forfeited its opportunity to win local goodwill, the Muslims failed to unite to maintain their independence, and the Chinese Communists were able to absorb the province in 1949.

Under Communist rule, China's Muslim minorities have received a great deal of political attention because many are frontier populations, or live in resource-rich regions that contain a great part of China's minerals as well as its meat, milk, and wool supplies. They also make an entrepreneurial contribution to the Chinese economy, and could serve as an alternative base of political power. For reasons of defense and economy, as well as national pride, the Chinese government is eager to win their loyalty, but there have been frequent changes in Chinese policy.

The original Chinese goal was the integration of ethnic and national minorities into a Chinese proletarian culture, but the Chinese Communists repeatedly had to change the tactics used to achieve this goal. In the 1920s and 1930s, the party followed the Russian line in promising self-determination to minorities, but in 1938 Mao Zedong abandoned his support for self-determination in favor of a policy of autonomy within a unified Chinese state. Mao declared that minorities would receive equal rights with Chinese. Hui were taken into the party and the Red Army, and Muslims were promised that their religious interests would be protected. Upon coming to power the Chinese Communists in 1949 further concentrated on the integration of its minority regions. The Chinese government sponsored modern medical and educational services, and scientific agricultural and stock-breeding techniques. They ordered that Muslim customs be accepted in workplaces and government agencies. Muslim circumcision and marriage practices were permitted. A Chinese Islamic Association was founded in 1953, and a Chinese Institute of

Islamic Theology, which trained religious scholars, was founded in 1955. Leading Muslims were confirmed in regional political positions and autonomous political areas were set up in Xinjiang and other provinces.

By 1956, party leaders were convinced that it was time to move to a new stage of development and to speed up the socialization of the minorities. Muslim leaders were encouraged by the "Hundred Flowers" campaign to express their criticisms of the Communist Chinese regime. This revealed strong separatist tendencies, a desire to be unified with fellow Muslims inside the Soviet Union, hopes for an Islamic state, and criticisms of Chinese control. Muslims had grievances due to food shortages, confiscation of mosques, and the dissemination of Marxist education and propaganda. While they were not persecuted, Muslims felt a narrowing of the boundaries of their autonomy.

The Chinese reaction was harsh. In 1957, the Chinese Communists began more aggressive efforts to assimilate the minority populations under the banner of the Great Leap Forward. This included emphasis upon class struggle, the abolition of special customs, and limitations on regional autonomy. Local nationalisms were denounced as a form of ingratitude, and the Chinese decided to replace the traditional elites with cadres of an acceptable class background, to create cooperatives, and to socialize production. Minority languages, festivals, and customs were attacked. Pressure was put on the Hui to eat in common dining halls and intermarry with Chinese. Special Muslim restaurants and bathing facilities were closed. Women were obliged to put aside traditional clothing and go to work, and mosque properties were confiscated. Mixed-nationality communes were formed, and Han youth were sent to colonize minority areas. The Chinese Islamic Association was disbanded in 1958.

It was soon evident that the campaign for assimilation had gone too rapidly and had to be repudiated. The Great Leap Forward provoked military resistance in Ningxia province with the goal of establishing a Muslim republic. Kazakhs emigrated across the border into the Soviet Union. Also, the concern of the Chinese regime to protect its borders with the Soviet Union and to win the diplomatic support of Muslim

Middle Eastern, African, and Asian states hastened a return to accommodation of Muslim interests. Some communes were dissolved, the Hui were permitted independent dining halls, and the special characteristics of minority populations were deemed acceptable for the time being.

In 1966, however, the Cultural Revolution and the mobilization of the Red Guards reopened the struggle against the special privileges of minorities. The Red Guards demanded that mosques be closed, Quran study prohibited, and Muslim circumcision and marriage practices forbidden. Despite these pressures, by 1969 Hui schools were again functioning and religious festivals were being observed. A new constitution of 1970 recognized minority languages and customs, but did not give particularly warm assurances about their protection. While policy toward the minorities was moderated for tactical reasons, many party activists continued to favor assimilation. (See Illustration 27.)

Illustration 27. A mosque in Inner Mongolia (© Nik Wheeler/CORBIS).

With the death of Mao and the overthrow of the Gang of Four in 1976, the Chinese government reaffirmed the right of minorities to develop their own cultures within the framework of the Chinese state. Muslims were allowed to rebuild schools, operate restaurants, and pursue religious activities. In 1980, the Chinese Islamic Association held its first meeting since 1963. The state granted minority populations special considerations such as autonomous administrative districts and permission to have more than one child. At the same time, however, the Chinese government sought to suppress movements for independence in Xinjiang and Tibet, to pursue policies that would integrate Muslims into local administration, and tried to dilute Muslim power in the provinces by resettling large numbers of Chinese peasants in Muslim regions. The Chinese

government also threatened to destroy counterrevolutionaries operating under the cover of religion. Frequent changes of direction indicate that the Chinese leadership itself remains divided over what policies would lead ultimately to the incorporation of minorities into Chinese society.

Xinjiang, which harbors a substantial portion of the non-Hui Muslim population, remains a special case. Chinese Communist authority was established there in 1949, and separate administrative regimes were set up for Kazakhs and Uighurs. The Chinese formed the Ili-Kazakh Autonomous Chou and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Chou in 1955 for a population of some 3,500,000 people living in the Tarim basin and in the vicinity of Kashgar, Aksu, and Khotan. The Chinese destroyed the traditional elites, collectivized agriculture and herding, introduced new schools, and favored economic development. They invested in irrigation and reclamation projects and increased the output of wheat, cotton, corn, and rice. In Kazakh districts they developed coal, iron, and petroleum. The government also tried to settle the nomads by persuading them of the advantages of sedentary livestock herding. Large numbers of Chinese settlers were moved into the region with the completion of the Hami railroad in 1959. Today Han peoples constitute more than 40 percent of the total population.

The Chinese government maintains a two-pronged policy toward the region. Xinjiang is given priority in Chinese plans for economic development. China cultivates good trade relations with the surrounding Central Asian states in order to reduce tension within Xinjiang, and to create an incentive for neighboring states not to support dissidence. At the same time, Muslim leaders and dissidents within Xinjiang are suppressed. The Chinese government increased restrictions on the movement of Muslim scholars and students and increased control over Muslim schools. It has become increasingly difficult for Muslims to obtain passports for foreign studies or pilgrimage. The Commission on Religious and Ethnic Affairs and the Islamic Association monitor Muslim schools and scholars. Recently, restrictions of Muslim religious activity in Xinjiang were posted online and on banners. These include half-hour limits on sermons and the prohibition of prayer in public spaces and on teaching of the Quran in

private. Arabic may be studied only in designated government schools. Government employees are prohibited from visiting mosques.

Nonetheless, an Islamic educational revival and contacts with the outside world have stimulated Muslim self-awareness and regional separatism. China's Muslims have been exposed to currents of Muslim thought emanating from Saudi Arabia and Iran, as is evident in new Chinese mosque architecture, modes of dress for Muslim women, and relations with non-Muslims. Xinjiang province is the epicenter of Islamic radicalism and demands for regional autonomy. In the period 1990–95 the World Uighur Congress (WUC) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also called al-Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani (Turkistan Islamic Party – TIP), merged demands for Uighur autonomy with Islamic revival. Throughout the 1990s, there were reports of underground movements and assassinations and riots in Kashgar. There were attacks against the Chinese authorities, military, and Han citizens in the spring and summer of 2008, and reports of further violent incidents and Uighur–Han riots continuing to 2011. Terrorist incidents have occurred amidst ever-increasing Chinese repression and control.

Conclusion

Russian and Chinese control of Inner Asian peoples differed from that of European imperial regimes in other parts of the Muslim world. Their imperialism was a direct expansion of the Russian and Chinese states onto contiguous territories, and allowed for the migration and settlement of Russians and Chinese into the conquered territories without either the colonial or conquered peoples regarding the newcomers as temporary residents. In Soviet Inner Asia the presence of a large Russian population led to an unprecedented integration of the colonizing and the colonized societies. Probably no other Muslim region was as highly modernized. This did not mean a full equalization of Russians and Muslims. Muslim populations were subordinated to de facto Soviet Russian controls both in the government and the party apparatus. Independence, moreover, has not brought any political or economic advantages to the region. In

China, though some sectors of the Muslim population have been assimilated for centuries, the Hui did not lose their identity or become fully absorbed into Chinese society. Separatist tendencies remain strong among Inner Asian Muslims.

Chapter 54 The Indian subcontinent: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh

The contemporary history of Muslim peoples in the Indian subcontinent has its origins in the breakup of the Mughal Empire and the imposition of British rule in India. The change of regimes set in motion forces that would alter the religious practices and sociopolitical structures of the subcontinent's Muslim populations and lead eventually to the formation of three national states – two predominantly Muslim, and one in which there is a substantial Muslim minority. Historically, Afghanistan was a boundary territory, part of Central Asia and part of the Indian subcontinent. Its recent history is closely linked to that of Pakistan.

From the Mughal Empire to the partition of the Indian subcontinent

On the eve of its modern transformation, the Mughal Empire was a patrimonial regime, like the Ottoman and Safavid empires, that strongly emphasized its Persianate cosmopolitan and its Indian identities. Muslim religious life in the subcontinent was highly pluralistic and not under state control. The long century of Mughal decline, from 1730 to 1857, favored the consolidation of a provincial Muslim gentry. A shared literary culture, similar religious practices, and noble (*sharif*) status defined the Muslim communities, which were clustered around the mosques, schools, tombs, and gentry residences in the Muslim quarters and small towns (*qasbahs*) of North India.

For Muslims, the decline of the Mughal regime had both symbolic and practical costs. A Muslim regime defended the interests of its Muslim constituencies; its very existence was a charismatic guarantee of the well-being of Muslim communities. With the rising

power of the British, this assurance was lost, and the position of the Muslim gentry and officeholding elite was gravely threatened. In many regions, such as Bengal, Europeans replaced Muslims in the top political, financial, and judicial positions, even though Muslims kept their employment in subordinate posts. The Permanent Settlement (see Chapter 35) in Bengal helped transfer control over landed property from Muslims to Hindus. Soldiers who had once served sovereign regimes were reduced to being the strongmen of the East India Company or of some British magistrate or *zamindar* (local landowner and tax collector). In Bengal, Muslim peasants subjected to Hindu landlords were deprived of customary rights, and Muslim weavers suffered from the competition of Lancashire cloth. In the northwestern provinces, however, Muslim landlords were able to maintain their position relative to Hindus.

These early losses were compounded by general economic regression between 1830 and 1857. As the British consolidated their power they began to eliminate the incomes of the great *zamindars*. Nobles were deprived of taxes, mint revenues, tolls, and bazaar fees. The pensions paid to princely families were subdivided among numerous heirs and pledged to moneylenders. As aristocratic incomes declined, they could no longer afford luxury consumption, and had to dismiss soldiers, service people, and artisans. While some landowners and grain merchants continued to do well, and while some districts continued to flourish, many of the gentry, minor officials, petty merchants, artisans, and laborers fared badly. Furthermore, the new regime brought cultural as well as economic and political losses. At first the British sympathized with traditional Islamic education and the classical culture of India. By the 1830s, however, British missionaries had become more active, and British officials began to suppress religious practices that they viewed as barbaric. English became the language of administration and instruction. In 1835, the new school budgets reserved government funds for English instruction; in 1837, Persian was abolished as the official language of the Mughal court. Changes in the judicial system replaced Islamic law with new rules for evidence and new definitions of offenses and penalties.

Muslims progressively became aware that the tide of economic and political power was running against them. By the 1850s the need to come to terms with the loss of a Muslim state, the consequences of foreign rule, and the rising influence of Sikhs and Hindus had become acute. The failure of the Mughal Empire made Muslims question whether a Muslim way of life could survive in the subcontinent, and if so, what might be the practical and symbolic alternatives to the Mughal system. What political institutions would be needed? What attitude should they take toward British rule? What religious beliefs and practices would be meaningful? Should Muslims follow the Shari'a? Was it proper to venerate saints' shrines?

Three clusters of responses purported to answer these questions. Some stressed personal religion, and others political issues. The position of some religious groups such as the Barelwis and the *'ulama'* of Farangi Mahall was that little needed to be done but accept British rule and transmit the traditional beliefs and practices of Islam – including respect for Islamic law and the veneration of saints. The reformers, in the tradition of Shah Waliallah and the international movement of Muslim reform, refused collaboration with British rule and proposed strengthening Muslim religious life by improving the practice of Islam and preventing the veneration of shrines. The third response came from the former political elites. They aimed not at the revival of Islamic tradition but at the absorption of Western science and the creation of a modern Muslim political identity. This response was represented by Aligarh and the Muslim League, and led ultimately to the formation of Pakistan. The Indian Muslim response to foreign rule was characterized, not by a state policy of secularization (as in the Ottoman Empire), nor by the struggle between the state and the religious establishment (as in the Iranian case), but by a multisided struggle among Muslims, Hindus, and the British, over the cultural and political future of India. Out of these struggles would come new forms of Muslim political identity and religious practice.

Muslim Militancy from Plassey to 1857

While the Muslim political and lineage elites were slow to adapt to the decline of the Mughal state, Muslim religious leaders were galvanized into action. The Sufis and managers of shrines reaffirmed Muslim values. The Chisti order undertook internal reforms. The reformist *'ulama'* reaffirmed the need for strict adherence to the universal principles of Islam, striking a chord among Indian Muslims, who felt that the true cause of the Mughal defeat was moral and religious corruption and that Muslims had fallen from God's favor for their failure to observe Islam. Without the protection of the state, exposed to infidel rule, they felt that religious and communal self-discipline and active struggle were the only possible responses to their plight. Thus, in 1803, a son of Shah Waliallah, Shah 'Abd-'Aziz (d. 1824) issued a legal opinion declaring India *dar al-harb* ("the realm of war," a country in which holy war was legitimate). The unbelievers, he pointed out, administered taxation and criminal law at their discretion; India was no longer ruled by Islamic law. The proper response to British rule, he concluded, was holy war.

Shah 'Abd-'Aziz's disciple Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d. 1831) took up the cause. Sayyid Ahmad had begun his career as a missionary preacher in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Bengal. He made a three-year pilgrimage to Mecca from 1821 to 1824, and then returned to India, settling in the Northwest Frontier province. He sought to restore the "true Islam" by repudiating ordinary Indian Muslim mystical and ritual practices, shrine Sufism and Shi'ism, basing the true faith on the Quran and sunna alone. In the Northwest Frontier province he rallied the Yusufzai Pashtuns to throw off the yoke of foreign rule. The Pashtuns, hard pressed in the north by their Afghan enemies and in the south by the expanding Sikh state in the Punjab, were a disunited tribal society that Sayyid Ahmad sought to unify under a single leadership to defend their political interests and the holy cause. In 1827, he claimed the title of supreme religious leader (Imam), and led his people to war. Sayyid Ahmad, with a small group of followers, was killed at Balakot in 1831. The task of imposing unity and discipline on the Pashtuns was beyond reach. His religious legacy, however, remained in the form of the Tariqa-i Muhammadi (Way of Muhammad) movement, which, as we shall see, was to revitalize Indian Muslims

and give impetus to communal and religious reforms that survive to the present day.

Bengal was a second arena of Muslim reform and revival movements. Here the doctrinal position was similar, but the social and economic context was very different from that of reform movements in tribal societies. In West Bengal, Titu Mir began his career as a disciple of the Tariqa-i Muhammadi. He had been converted to the new movement in Mecca, and considered himself the deputy (*khalifa*) of Sayyid Ahmad. He preached the primacy of the Quran and hadith and opposed the ceremonies at Sufi shrines. In 1830, Titu Mir's reform became a political cause when the local *zamindars* and indigo planters tried to resist the spread of his teachings by imposing a tax on his peasant followers. In reaction, he and his followers defiled a Hindu temple. The authorities were called in, and Titu Mir was killed by the police in 1831.

The Fara'idi was a similar but unconnected movement under the leadership of Hajji Shari'atallah (d. 1840). Hajji Shari'atallah was born in Bengal, but lived for eighteen years in Mecca, absorbed in the study of Hanafi law. He was initiated into the Qadiri order and was influenced by Meccan reformist views. In 1818, he returned to Bengal to preach *tawba* (repentance) and fulfillment of *fara'id* (religious duties). Islam was to be practiced as prescribed in the Quran, the sunna of the Prophet, and the Hanafi codes of law. The Fara'idis were not in principle opposed to mysticism, but they rejected veneration of saints, seasonal festivals, celebration of the birthday of the Prophet and of saints' "birthdays" (actually their death date and entry into the other world), the *ta'ziya* procession in mourning for Husayn, and other practices that they regarded as Hindu, Buddhist, Shi'i, or Sufi perversions of the true faith.

Between 1818 and 1838, Fara'idis won a large following in the villages of East Bengal among peasants and workers, such as weavers and oil pressers who were oppressed by Hindu *zamindar*s and British indigo planters. At the death of Hajji Shari'atallah, his son, Dudu Mian, transformed the Fara'idi from a purely religious body into a movement of peasant resistance to Hindu and British exploitation. From 1838 to 1846, he organized a communal government; a *khalifa*

was appointed for each Faraʿidi village with responsibility to set up schools, teach the proper performance of Islamic rituals, dispense justice, and recruit armed gangs to defend peasant interests. Every ten villages were the responsibility of a higher official, who in turn reported to the leader of the movement. Thus, the first Muslim response to the imposition of British rule was characterized by the efforts of religious reformers to rally tribal and peasant populations to the defense of their interests and their religion.

From the Mutiny to World War I

The Mutiny of 1857 turned Muslim activism into new directions. The Mutiny began as an explosion of pent-up resentment against the accumulated insults of British rule. Hindu and Muslim recruits in British forces, the sepoys of Meerut, refused to use their newly issued Enfield rifles and cartridges because, it was rumored, the cartridges were greased with pigs' and cows' fat, an insult to men of either religion. The cartridges, however, were but a symbol of deeper cultural and political antagonisms. The Mutiny concerned not only Indian soldiers in the service of the British East India Company, but the Muslim and Hindu upper classes of central and northern India. For these classes the cost of British rule had grown heavier. The British continued to annex Indian principalities, and to threaten the old Indian aristocracy, both Hindu and Muslim, with replacement by British officials. British policies also led to heavy taxation and the confiscation of estates. Equally important was the threat to Indian cultural and social values. The British had introduced the English language, Western education, and British ideas about polygamy, slavery, and the freedom of women; they opposed *sati* (the self-immolation of a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband), the caste system, and other Hindu and Muslim religious practices; they interfered with the operation of Islamic law. These policies and the ever more widespread preaching of Christianity by English missionaries threatened the self-esteem, the hallowed lifestyles, and the economic and political interests of the hitherto privileged Indian elites. As the economic and cultural price of political inferiority bore down upon Mughal India, it took only the pig-fat incident to provoke a Hindu–Muslim revolt against British rule.

The revolt was bitterly suppressed and not easily forgotten. In its wake, the British reorganized the government of India. They formally abolished the Mughal Empire and the East India Company in favor of direct crown government, and proceeded to consolidate their Indian regime. They promulgated new legal codes, such as the Penal Code of 1860 and the Law of Criminal and Civil Procedure of 1861, and reorganized the system of judicial administration. Between 1871 and 1882, they created a new financial system, making the provinces responsible for their own revenues and expenditures. The army was reorganized with the proportion of English to Indian troops raised from one-fifth to one-half. A close-knit and professional officer corps was developed. In the half-century that followed the Mutiny, the British created the largest imperial bureaucracy in Indian history. In the same period, they began the economic modernization of India. Agricultural production was increased; trade expanded under free trade laws introduced between 1882 and 1894. The British introduced railroads, coal mining, and mechanized textile production.

The new policies rested upon a revised set of attitudes. The late nineteenth century was the heyday of imperialism expressed in confidence in the racial superiority of Europeans and in their God-given right to bring European order to less-developed peoples. The British exhibited an ever-increasing aloofness, superciliousness, and condescending attitude toward Indians. An unbridgeable gulf of political, racial, and caste supremacy divided British rulers from their Indian subjects. Still, some lessons had been learned from the Mutiny. The British came to understand the limits of political centralization, and to appreciate that British rule depended on the support and cooperation of Indian princes and landlords. They kept in existence some 560 Indian princely states, restored loyalist Hindu and Muslim *zamindars* to their lands, and began to organize Indian municipal advisory councils. The British also adopted a policy of nonintervention in religious matters and withdrew from efforts to reform Hindu caste or Muslim legal practices, but they continued to sponsor English education and to favor the Westernization of the Indian upper classes.

The British relationship with the Muslim population was particularly delicate. While many Britons were aware of how limited Muslim involvement in the Mutiny of 1857 had been, and how much it was a joint rebellion of the Muslim and Hindu upper classes, the British tended to stereotype the opposition in terms of Muslim resistance to British rule. They saw the Muslims as an entity, once the dominant elite of India, which was bound to be rebellious and therefore had to be suppressed. But the British also recognized Indian Muslims as a political interest group entitled to special educational and electoral privileges. Until the end of the century, they continued to favor the appointment of Muslims to minor and middling government positions. By dealing with Muslims as an entity with a collective claim to political power on the basis of religious identity, they helped generate Muslim solidarity. Having defined a Muslim interest in their own mind, the British helped confirm it in the minds of Indian Muslims.

The Muslim reaction to the events of 1857 was equally consequential. At the time, *qasbah* political and religious elites did not think of themselves as a single political body, but all of them recognized that jihad was a failure and that British rule was enduring. They agreed that their best interests lay in the cultivation of educational, religious, and cultural affairs, and in strengthening the Muslim community from within, but they were divided in practical matters. Some embraced the new regime in the hope of forming a British–Muslim condominium to govern India. Others maintained silent but deep anti-British and pan-Islamic sentiments; still others turned their backs on political issues altogether.

As the century moved on, three main strands may be distinguished in the post-Mutiny position of the *qasbah* elites. The first was the position of the conservative Sufi leaders, who recognized the futility of jihad and the need for adjustment to British rule. The Sufi leaders and heads of shrines (*sajjada nishins*) wanted to keep the loyalty of the Muslim masses through the veneration of saints and shrine festivals. However, Mughal decline had deprived the shrines of economic and political support; British rule had subverted their worldly political influence. To maintain their position many Sufis associated themselves with British rule, and had recourse to British courts to

settle land-tenure and succession disputes. The shrine keepers often delegated their religious functions to subordinates while they saw to their political interests. Other Sufis attempted to adapt theory and practice to their declining worldly authority, and stressed the purely contemplative and spiritual aspect of Sufism. They tried to preserve the inner meanings of Sufi tradition, and adopted more sober and Islamic law-oriented religious practices. Conservative *'ulama'* similarly attempted to maintain their traditional position; the scholars of the Farangi Mahall quarter of Lucknow and the Barelwis combined religious scholarship and Sufi shrines.

The second response in *'ulama'* circles was the resurgence of reformism. In North India, its most important expression in the post-Mutiny period was the founding in 1867 of the reform college of Deoband, by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi. Deoband's curriculum combined the study of the revealed sciences (Quran, hadith, and law) with rational subjects (logic, philosophy, and science). At the same time it was Sufi in orientation and affiliated with the Chisti order. Its Sufism, however, was closely integrated with hadith scholarship and the proper legal practice of Islam.

Deoband worked to organize the Muslim community, and trained its students for a public mission: to instruct the community in the true practice of Islam. Deobandis poured out legal opinions in Urdu vernacular on proper Islamic practice. Insofar as reformism promoted normative Islamic practices, the modern era has increased the facilities for standardization. The spread of printing made it possible for the first time to reach a mass audience. Publication, transportation, and communication facilities that reached ever-larger numbers of people made it possible for the *'ulama'* to teach the common people a high-culture version of Islam. Many students came from Afghanistan, Central Asia, Yemen, and Arabia. Within thirty years of its founding, its graduates had established some forty branch schools, making Deoband the center of the new *maslak* – a distinctive "way" in Indian Islam.

One of the crucial principles of the school was that it should be detached from the private, familial, and local affiliations of its teachers and supporters. Deoband, unlike previous colleges in India, was

organized as an independent institution, not as part of the household of the leading teachers, or as a function of the local mosque. Deliberately, it avoided the support of Muslim nobles and rich landowners as well as the traditional system of charitable endowments, instead seeking annual contributions from a wide public. Through its system of annual pledges and regular publications, Deoband cultivated widespread middle- and lower–middle-class support. By the reform and standardization of Islamic belief and practice, a program of public education, and a system of affiliated schools and public contributions, Deoband sought to unite Indian Muslims around the leadership of the *'ulama'* and the schools.

The Deoband program represented a careful balance between innovative responsiveness to the new era and allegiance to traditional Muslim ideas. Many of the features of the Deoband school – the school as a physical institution with a distinct building and central library, the fixed professional staff, the ordered curriculum of study, examinations, public awards, affiliated colleges, public contributions, and missionary activities – were suggested by British practices. Deoband was thus a response to new forms of bureaucratic organization, the introduction of new secular ideals, and the competition of new elites. At the same time, it was thoroughly Islamic in terms of education, worship, and withdrawal from politics. It embodied a concept of a Muslim community without a state as a community of religious practice under the leadership of the *'ulama'* whose primary institution was a system of schools. The Deobandi scholars had elected to preserve and reform the personal religious practice of Muslims at the cost of giving up the political aspect of Muslim communal organization.

In Bengal, the reform movement went back to the pre-Mutiny efforts of Titu Mir and the Fara'idi. Despite the impact of these earlier reform movements, most Bengali villages maintained an identity based on local dialects and a syncretic form of Muslim–Hindu folk culture. They were led by village mullahs, prayer leaders, and teachers who had little in common with the nobles. After 1870, however, reformism began to spread in the Bengali countryside. Though there was no focal educational institution like Deoband, public debates and

revivalist meetings fostered a heightened Muslim consciousness. *Anjumans* (religious associations) were formed to link town and countryside, urban and rural *'ulama'*, and to teach correct Islamic practice. Most importantly, numerous pamphlets were published to give advice on Muslim rituals, to counsel parents on how to raise children, and to censure gambling, drinking, and smoking. The typical pamphlet, called *Nasihat-nama* (Book of advice), tried to purge rural Islam of its basis in Bengali folk culture and to bring it into closer accord with urban high-culture Islam. The reform movement, however, weakened by the conflict between urban and rural values, had only a limited impact in rural Bengal. Instead, it would be the 1905–11 struggle over the partition of the province by the British that would invigorate Muslim political consciousness.

The third strand in the post-Mutiny Muslim adjustment to British rule was that of the landowning and officeholding interests. Though the British had replaced the Mughals, the political elite still thought that they could maintain their landed, official, and status interests; but it was obvious that these interests no longer depended on the traditional kinship networks and loyalties, but upon British laws and administrative regulations. British suspicion of Muslim ambitions had to be allayed, and Muslims had to adopt the English language and recognize the power of British military, economic, and administrative technologies.

The response of the Muslim political elites was formulated by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. He himself was descended from a prominent family of Mughal administrators, and throughout his life continued to be posted as an officer of the British administration. In his view the only adequate response to the realities of post-Mutiny India was to accept British rule. In Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view, British rule was lawful. Under British government Muslims could live in peace; Islamic law was in fact applied, and in any case, Muslims were dependent upon British favor. In the course of his long public life he opposed pan-Islamic sentiments and Muslim participation in the Indian National Congress, which was aimed at wresting political power from the British rather than collaborating with them.

His principal concern and that of his cohort was the need for Western-type education under Muslim auspices in order to train a new generation for political responsibility. Efforts at cultural and educational reform began with the founding of the National Mohammadan Association in 1856 and the Mohammadan Literary Society in 1863. This was followed by the Anjuman-i Islam of Bombay and the establishment of new religious schools in Dacca and Chittagong. Sayyid Ahmad Khan himself sponsored the translation of English scientific works into Urdu, founded the Ghazipur Scientific Society in 1864, and encouraged instruction in Urdu at CalcuttaUniversity. After a visit to England in 1869–70, he published the journal *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq* (Purification of morals) to educate Indian Muslims in the ways of modernism. The culmination of his efforts came in 1875 with the foundation of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which became the training ground for Muslim political leaders of the twentieth century.

The college at Aligarh was devoted to a combination of Islamic and English-language studies. Sayyid Ahmad Khan would have preferred a modernized version of Islam after his own fashion, but the school, for fear of scandal and loss of public support, maintained a more conservative position. Its real achievement, however, lay not in the curriculum or in the preparation of scholars, but in the social and moral values that it communicated to its students through the mechanisms of a new curriculum and a new form of school community. Aligarh was meant to be the Eton of India; its playing fields as much as its classrooms encouraged verbal skill, self-confidence, and manly solidarity and competition. It fostered the values of duty, loyalty, and leadership, exercised in games and in school clubs and societies, to produce young men capable of cooperation with each other in giving leadership to Indian Muslims in the context of British rule. In this way the old ruling elites fortified their claim to continued eminence under British rule, provided themselves with the educational and cultural style appropriate to the new era, and trained a new generation in the moral, political, and intellectual qualities needed for participation in the British Raj.

Not least, Sayyid Ahmad Khan favored the modernization of the Islamic religion so as to make it consistent with the modern technical, cultural, and political order. To adapt Muslims to British rule, he had to persuade them that Western scientific thought was not antithetical to Islam. To demonstrate this, he and his contemporaries undertook the reinterpretation of the Quran. The Quran was God's revelation, and the passages that seemed difficult to understand in a modern context had to be interpreted symbolically, allegorically, or analytically to uncover their true meaning, which would always be consistent with reason and never contrary to nature. Excising irrelevant details in favor of the main principles, stripping away the later accretions of Muslim tradition and exegesis and going back to fundamentals, Muslims have in the Quran, he argued, the source of a rational religion attuned to modern man's scientific interests.

While Sayyid Ahmad tried to persuade Muslims that the Quran allowed for scientific developments, he also attempted to convince Europeans that Islam was a reasonable religion, worthy of respect. He and his contemporaries attempted to explain the meaning of polygamy, slavery, and the place of non-Muslims and of women in Muslim societies in ways that would make Muslim social institutions acceptable to Westerners. He hoped to prepare the way for the collaboration of Muslims and non-Muslims in the government of India. Cultural and religious reform was tied to the educational and political tasks of maintaining the position of the Muslim elite in the British era.

Thus, in the course of the late nineteenth century, the *qasbah* elites of North India attempted to cope with their deteriorating social and political position and with the realities of British domination by developing new religious and cultural orientations. One wing of the *qasbah* elite stressed the importance of preserving the Islamic identity of Muslims, reform of religious practice, and the consolidation of larger-scale, more homogeneous Muslim communities on the bases of reformed Islam. A second wing stressed the importance of adopting the cultural style of their British overlords and thereby preserving a privileged position in the Indian state. For the time being both segments of the Muslim elite accepted the inevitability of British rule.

From cultural to political action

In the latter part of the century, however, the policies of loyalism and religious or modernist reform were challenged, and eventually overthrown. The ambiguities in the British attitude toward the Muslims, increasing Hindu self-assertion, and the beginnings of the Indian national independence movement drove Muslim political and religious leaders toward a more aggressive anti-British policy, and brought into the open profound differences among Muslims as to their conception of the Muslim community and the goals of Muslim political action.

The contradictory British attitude toward the Muslim elites was a major factor in the eventual subversion of the loyalist policies of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. The British considered that the Muslims, as former masters of India, harbored lingering ambitions to political power, and that they had therefore to be conciliated to win their favor but repressed lest they become too powerful. They accepted the idea that the former political elite was entitled to governmental appointments and to seats on councils in proportion to their political weight rather than their absolute numbers. At the same time the British tried to reduce the proportion of Muslims employed in government. British governors sometimes deliberately favored Hindu over Muslim appointees. The administrative position of Muslims, though still substantial, deteriorated steadily.

The introduction of municipal self-government and municipal councils by the Ripon Local Council Act of 1882 and the Indian Councils Act of 1892 was also detrimental to Muslims. The electoral system favored Hindus, who were the majority of the population, and made it possible for wealthy Hindu merchants and moneylenders to compete for office and to challenge the authority of the Muslim (and Hindu) landed and administrative families. While in the Eastern United Provinces and Oudh the old elite maintained its position, in the Western United Provinces and Doab the advantage went to aggressive Hindu newcomers.

Another factor that weakened the Muslim position was Hindu self-assertion. Hindu religious revivalism went back to the founding in

1828 of the Brahmo Samaj in Calcutta to promote theism and social reform among Hindus. In 1875, the Arya Samaj was founded to modernize Hinduism and make it a suitable faith for Western-educated Hindu merchants, officials, and intellectuals – a faith able to compete with Christianity. Among Hindus, as well as Muslims, modernizing reform was accompanied by traditionalist and orthodox revival, and was changed from an elite to a mass movement. The first cow-protection associations were founded in 1882; the first communal riots among Hindus and Muslims took place in 1893.

Of particular concern to educated Muslims was the campaign to make Hindi an official language. Hindu revivalism led to a literary renaissance, increasing numbers of newspapers with ever-wider circulation, and ultimately a Hindu crusade against the dominant place of Urdu in government affairs. Hindus campaigned to have Devanagari recognized as an official script for court and government use. The new script, they argued, would allow Hindus who did not know Persian to compete equally for government posts. The British were responsive to these demands. A British governor rejected a civil service candidates' list on the grounds that there were too many Muslims; Persian was removed from the curriculum of Allahabad University, and in 1900 the British accepted the use of Devanagari script for official purposes in the Northwest Frontier provinces and Oudh.

The beginning of the movement toward Indian national independence also brought into question the generation-old Muslim policy of loyalty to British rule. The Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, though open to Muslims, was formed by Brahmin lawyers, professionals, and middle-class intellectuals. It expressed resentment of British attitudes toward Indians, called for increased participation of Indians in the civil service and increased political representation, and opposed British economic policies that damaged Indian industries.

British policy in Bengal cast further doubt on the policy of collaboration. In 1905, the British, largely for administrative reasons, partitioned Bengal in a way that created an eastern province with a substantial Muslim majority; but under intense Hindu pressure Britain reversed the partition in 1911. In the eyes of many Muslims this

reversal utterly discredited collaboration, and lent force to the conviction that the British were basically hostile to Muslim interests.

The first Muslim response to these challenges was to continue the policies set down in the aftermath of the Mutiny. Sayyid Ahmad Khan reaffirmed his policy of collaboration and of using educational organizations as the spearhead of Muslim interests, but the younger generation of educated Muslim officials, lawyers, and journalists – especially those having difficulty finding suitable government employment – refused to accept the passivity of their elders. While the landowning and office-controlling elders pursued a policy of appeasement, the younger generation clamored for more direct political action. In 1900, the Urdu Defense Association was formed. In 1906, a delegation of Muslim leaders from Aligarh petitioned the British viceroy, Lord Minto, for a separate Muslim electorate, and he acknowledged the Muslim right to representation in government in proportion to their assumed political importance. In 1909, the Indian Councils Act allowed for partially separate electorates. For the British this was a convenient way to satisfy the Muslim claim to political privilege; it was also a way to confirm the division of Indians into Muslim and Hindu interests and to make the British the arbiter among hostile communities.

The most important expressions of the new Muslim militancy were the founding of the All-India Muslim League in 1906, and the beginnings of political journalism. In 1908, a young journalist, Abu'l-Kalam Azad (d. 1958), began to publish *al-Hilal* (The crescent). *Al-Hilal* preached that Muslims the world over were a single people by virtue of common religion, and that the Ottoman caliph was their leader. Moreover, it was the duty of Muslims to work for home rule in India, and to support the caliphate. Another journalist, Muhammad 'Ali, a graduate of Aligarh, preached a similar creed in his paper, *Comrade*.

The newfound militancy of the Muslim political elite was paralleled by revived political activism among the reformist *'ulama'* of Farangi Mahall and Deoband. Farangi Mahall was the name given to a prominent scholarly lineage, derived from the quarter of Lucknow which they had inhabited since the end of the seventeenth century.

The quarter was renowned as one of the oldest centers of Indian Islam, and the family of scholars had wide networks of disciples. The Farangi Mahalli maintained a moderate version of Orthodox–Sufi Islam, combining Quranic and legal studies with mysticism. They venerated the shrines of Sufi ancestors and kept up a festival calendar of "birthday" celebrations for the saints and the Prophet; they were careful, however, to emphasize that they did not worship the saints, but rather came to the tombs in order to be closer to God. While Deobandis and other reformers criticized their Sufi practices, the Farangi Mahalli believed that their synthesis of Islamic law and Sufism was a true representation of the life and teachings of the Prophet.

One crucial principle of the school was avoidance of contact with or dependence upon government. While the Farangis had accepted Mughal gifts in the seventeenth century, by the nineteenth they had withdrawn from politics to avoid contamination by the Shi'i rulers of Lucknow and their British overlords. This apolitical stance, however, changed in the late nineteenth century. Beneath the acquiescent surface of apolitical religious activities was a smoldering resentment of infidel rule. This resentment was expressed in terms of sympathy with Muslims all over the world who were struggling against British, European, and Christian imperialism. The leaders of the Farangi Mahall played a large role in the formation of Muslim associations to support the Ottoman Empire and to protect the holy places in Arabia. They were instrumental after World War I in launching the Khilafat movement and in the foundation of the Jami'at al-'Ulama'-i Hind (Association of the religious scholars of India).

Between 1876 and 1878, the years of the Russo-Turkish war and the Congress of Berlin, which witnessed the first British, as well as Russian, participation in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Indian Muslims agitated for a pro-Turkish policy. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani propagated the doctrine of pan-Islamic solidarity as the only way for Muslim peoples to throw off the yoke of European rule. In 1888, Muslim religious opposition to British rule took a new turn when the rector of Deoband issued a decree in favor of a Muslim alliance with the Congress Party to further the struggle against imperialism. The

'ulama' considered foreign rule to be a greater danger to Islam than domestic Hindu competition. These strong anticolonial, anti-British, and pro-Ottoman sensibilities were further stimulated in the years before World War I by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 to create spheres of influence in Iran, the Italian invasion of Tripolitania, the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco, and finally by the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912.

The Western-educated and the religious-educated leaders joined hands in open political action. In 1909, Mahmud al-Hasan, rector of Deoband, founded the Jami'at al-Ansar (Society of helpers [of the Prophet]), whose ultimate objective was an alliance of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan to expel the British from India. In 1912–13, Maulana 'Abd al-Bari, the head of Farangi Mahall, and Shaukat 'Ali, a brother of Muhammad 'Ali and graduate of Aligarh, founded the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba (Association of the servants of the Ka'ba) to oppose British rule and defend the Ottoman Empire. During the war Mahmud al-Hasan made the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he contacted Ottoman leaders and tried to promote the cause of a pan-Islamic caliphate. Maulana 'Ubaydallah Sindhi traveled to the Northwest Frontier provinces and Afghanistan to explore arms manufacturers, promote unrest among the tribal peoples, and eventually set up a provisional government of India in exile. During the war, hostility to the British mushroomed into pan-Islamic, pro-caliphal political agitation and conspiracies to weaken British rule and promote the international cause of Islam.

From elite to mass politics

These years were marked not only by the change from passivity to active political opposition, but also by a change from elite political and educational activities to efforts to rally mass Muslim support and to weld the disparate masses of Indian Muslims into a cohesive communal and political body. The Muslim elites had come to understand that in an era of rising Hindu political action they were too weak to win special privileges from a powerful British state. Mass support had become essential to advance their claims.

The very concept of a mass Muslim society in India had only the most tenuous basis: it was perhaps stronger in the minds of the British than of the Muslims. The British emphasized the free exercise of religion as a cardinal principle of a liberal society, and reinforced the collective identity of religious groups by giving them the right to elect their own representatives and to petition for the relief of grievances. They identified the Muslims as a religious community; then they provided the political machinery to translate that identity into concerted group action. By the Indian Councils Act of 1909, they confirmed the existence of two separate communal electorates, Hindu and Muslim, and thus gave legal and political substance to differences of language and religion.

Among Muslims the concept of a Muslim Indian society had some basis in a sense of communal solidarity, as well as in the cultural unity of the *qasbah* elites, who shared a Persian and Urdu literary education and a relatively standardized religious practice. Nevertheless, the problems of creating a mass Muslim identity were profound. Despite the partial successes of the reform movement in propagating a standardized Islamic religious practice, neither the elites nor the masses had a common identity. They were divided into innumerable families, quarters, factions, lineages, and castes. Regional and class interests also overrode a common Muslim identity. In the past, Muslim identity had often combined a universalistic sentiment with parochial loyalties, but in the late nineteenth century, there was no organizational basis or unifying symbols for a mass Indian Muslim movement. Nonetheless, Muslim elites, motivated by political necessity, in opposition to Hindu movements and in collaboration with British notions of politics, would attempt to bring into being a new political body: the Muslims of India.

The first sign of a new orientation to mass politics was the changing character of local demonstrations and riots. Through the nineteenth century, religious festivals had served to solidify local community consciousness and to mobilize Muslims. By the end of the century, the formation of Islamic educational and defense associations, and increasing public debate, gave national importance to local events. The Kanpur mosque episode of 1913 became the first symbol of

national Muslim politics. The British wished to move the mosque washing facilities in order to put in a new road. In other times, or administered by local leaders, this might have been inconsequential; but now it was seen as a threat to the safety of the mosque and, almost literally, to Islam. The desecration of the mosque crystallized feelings of mourning, martyrdom, and defeat among Muslims. Local committees were formed to defend the mosque; Delhi- or Lucknow-based Muslim leaders took up the Kanpur cause. The defense of the mosque condemned the policy of cooperation with the government, enshrined religious symbols as the basic way of articulating Muslim identity, and crystallized a larger-scale Indian Muslim consciousness.

The Kanpur riots were followed by Muslim riots in Calcutta in 1918, in Bombay in 1929, and again in Kanpur in 1931. These outbursts indicated that an overarching Muslim identity was taking form in the minds of the urban common people, but that this symbolic identity outstripped the political structures available to organize and articulate Muslim interests. Local leadership was highly factionalized, inadequately integrated into municipal institutions, and thus unable either to direct or control popular feeling. Islamic symbols could spark large-scale demonstrations, but the factionalism among Muslim leaders prevented an organized political movement.

The closest approach to mass Muslim political action came from the Khilafat movement. In 1919, Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress were about to launch the first great campaign of noncooperation in order to win Indian home rule and independence; Muslim leaders formed two new associations with similar goals. Muhammad ʿAli founded the Khilafat Conference to press for the restoration of the Ottoman Empire, and the *ʿulamaʾ* of Farangi Mahall and Deoband founded the Jamiʿat al-ʿUlamaʿ-i Hind to fight for Muslim religious interests and for the preservation of the caliphate. The primary strategy of the Khilafat movement was to ally with Congress to further their joint interest in overthrowing British rule, and Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi, embraced the cause of the caliphate. Muslims pledged themselves to noncooperation. For the first time, Hindus and Muslims participated in a broad-based national movement.

The joint movement soon collapsed. The Muslims were divided. Some concentrated on noncooperation; others made an abortive effort to move Indian Muslims to Afghanistan to form the basis for a jihad against British rule. Then, in 1923 and 1924, the newly independent Turkish state abolished the sultanate and caliphate, removing the external rationale of the movement. The alliance with Congress foundered. The collapse of Gandhi's authority and liberal–conservative divisions within Congress compromised its commitment to a joint Muslim–Hindu movement. Hindu and Muslim extremists revived the latent antagonism between the two communities, and communal riots ensued. By 1924, the noncooperation movement, the Khilafat movement, and Hindu–Muslim collaboration were finished.

Despite its defeat, the Khilafat movement had important consequences. It greatly enlarged the culture of newspaper reading, poetry recitation, and public debates that conveyed anti-British and shared Muslim feeling. It created cadres to escort leaders, enforce boycotts, and maintain order at public meetings. It brought secular and religious leaders together in a common cause. Most important, the Khilafat movement transformed Indian Muslim politics from the maneuvers of elites to the struggle of the masses for political identity. Mosques, schools, and the press disseminated an awareness of the commonality of Indian Muslims. Spontaneous riots showed the rallying power of Muslim symbols. The revival of reformist movements helped define a common Muslim identity based upon personal religious practice. Muslim devotionalism, the love of the Prophet, and the demand for women's education each became a marker of an embracing Indian Muslim identity.

After the failure of the Khilafat effort the great mass movements of the 1920s and 1930s were the Tabligh and Tanzim. In 1927, the Tablighi Islam movement was founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, a spiritual descendant of Shah Waliallah, a graduate of Deoband, and a member of the Sabiri branch of the Chisti order. Ilyas began his career as a scholar and Sufi teacher, but gave it up to reconvert the Mewatis, a peasant community living near Delhi, to the true practice of Islam based on the Quran and hadith, observance of Islamic law, and pious worship and meditation according to Chisti principles. He

avoided political involvement and held that only by the practice of Islam could Muslims demonstrate their stewardship of worldly affairs. His movement began with his preaching to villagers, and spread throughout North India by recruiting peasant disciples to preach his message in still other villages and towns. The Tanzim movement also flourished in North India as a call for the reform of personal religious practices and for the defense of an endangered Islam and of an abused Muslim minority. Like the Tabligh movement, it concentrated on the religious rather than the political aspects of the Muslim problem. It had dramatic religious and emotional appeal but no overall organization.

The Pakistan Movement

It was left to a third Muslim movement to emphasize political solidarity rather than religious practice, and create the first mass political movement based on Islamic identity. With the breakup of the Khilafat movement, separatist Muslim political demands were revived. In 1924, the Muslim League called for safeguards for the religious and civil rights of the Muslim populations, and for autonomy in Bengal, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier provinces. In response, the Nehru Report of 1928 favored a unified Indian state without separate electorates and without Muslim-majority provinces, though it conceded that Muslims should be provided with representation in excess of proportion to population. Muslims were only confirmed in their fears of Hindu domination. In 1929, Muhammad ʿAli Jinnah, speaking for the Muslim League, reiterated the demand for a federal Indian state, with autonomous Muslim provinces, separate electorates, and safeguards for Muslims in law, education, and religion. Jinnah made parties, elections, and legislatures another route to the moral unity of Indian Muslims.

British efforts to find a compromise were all rejected. The Simon Report of 1930 favored a federal government for India. The White Paper of 1932 upheld separate electorates but deprived Muslims of parliamentary majorities in Bengal and the Punjab. The Government of India Act of 1935 gave British guarantees for minority rights but enlarged the franchise to the advantage of Hindu majorities. All of

these were rejected as inadequate to the demands of one side or the other, and as unacceptable because these proposals assumed continued British rule of India. Much as the Muslims and Hindus disagreed, they were no longer willing to accept British rule as the solution to their conflicts.

The elections of 1937 marked the change of Muslim demands for separate electorates and constitutional guarantees to demands for a separate territorial nation. The elections resulted in defeat for the Muslim League. The Congress Party refused to share ministries and control of the government with Muslim League politicians. Gandhi and Nehru also attempted to appeal directly to the Muslim masses over the heads of the League politicians. Class interests, they believed, were stronger than communal ties. Congress only reinforced Muslim fears of Hindu domination, and stimulated Muslim support for the League. In 1938, to recoup the Muslim League position, Jinnah advanced the "two nations" theory, and made the first formal demand for a separate Muslim homeland, whose boundaries were not clearly defined but were understood to include the provinces of the Punjab, Northwest Frontier, and Bengal. In a 1940 resolution the Muslim League called for the formation of Pakistan.

The idea of a Muslim homeland went back only a decade – to a 1930 speech by Muhammad Iqbal calling for the amalgamation of the Punjab, Northwest Frontier province, Sind, and Baluchistan into a single Islamic state. Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) was the preeminent spokesman of Indian Muslims in the twentieth century. His philosophic integration of Sufi Islam with Western thought, his understanding of Islam in universal religious terms, his commitment to the reinterpretation of Islamic principles in light of contemporary conditions, and his passionate religious and moral poetry made him the spiritual leader of Muslim Indian modernism. In this famous speech Iqbal denied that Muslims and Hindus made a single Indian nation, and called for the formation of an Islamic state, based on (unspecified) Islamic principles, to be part of a multinational system of Islamic states. Iqbal's vision revived the basic idea of the Khilafat movement: regional Muslim populations as elements of a universal pan-Islamic community.

A group of Cambridge students, including Chaudhari Rahmat ʿAli, also advanced the idea of an independent Islamic state. In their conception, the new state would be a commonwealth of Indian Islamic states including regions that had majority Muslim populations, provinces ruled by Muslim princes, and areas sacred to Muslims – the conglomeration to be called Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan was a revolution in Muslim thought, for this concept of an Islamic nation did not have a specifically religious content. The Pakistan program was the project of secularized elites who were forced by disunity in the Muslim population and by competition with the Hindu majorities to call their political society "Islamic."

Muslim public opinion was not prepared for such a development. In the United Provinces, there was indeed a relatively cohesive Muslim elite and a strong sense of religious community. Here the Muslim League leaders were able to separate Islam as a symbol of political community from its traditional religious implications and to manipulate this symbol as the basis of a new political identity. In other regions, however, the process of communal political identification was not so far advanced. In the Punjab, Islamic ideological ties had developed in urban areas, but not in rural districts, where Sufi shrines and dependency on rural landlords remained the basic modes of social organization. Bengali Muslim consciousness was directed to the reform of religious practice and to agrarian social and political issues, but not to the kind of territorial polity favored by the Muslim League.

From 1938 to 1945, an energetic propaganda campaign was launched to rally Muslims to the newly defined cause. The middle classes – Muslim businessmen, landlords, government officials, professionals, and university students – were easily convinced. By 1945, the Muslim League had persuaded the religious leaders that whatever their local interests, a Muslim state, run by Muslims, to defend a Muslim way of life, was essential. The *ulamaʾ* were generally won over by their fear of Hindu competition, the perceived need for Muslim political power, and the powerful appeal of an "Islamic" state. Most important for the League cause was the support of the *sajjada nishin*s – the Sufi elite – in the important provinces of Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab. Under British rule they had been

confirmed in their ownership of land, protected from competing Hindu financial interests, and even granted additional lands. The Sufis were further allied to landowners from whom they received financial support. They married into their families, and had common interests. The League was also able to win peasant support because of their anger with Hindu landlords, suffering in the famine of 1943, and gratitude for the League's efforts to distribute relief supplies in the countryside. The League had succeeded in capturing symbolic attachment to Islam for the purposes of a national political movement. Yet behind the purely political use of the term there lay a profound and utopian hope, evoked by the very name "Islam," for a society in which a secure Muslim community could live in justice committed to the realization of Muslim social and personal ideals. Appealing to these deep yearnings, the Muslim League won an overwhelming victory in the elections of 1945.

Throughout the period from 1924 to 1947, the scholars of the Jami'at al-'Ulama'-i Hind continued to resist Muslim League leadership and to advance an alternative conception of the Muslim community in India. Though very much a minority view, this conception had a profound effect upon the ideology and political situation of the millions of Muslims who remained citizens of India after partition. Throughout its history the Jami'at supported the concept of a united India. It opposed British rule, called for holy war, and was prepared to enter into a joint struggle with the Congress Party. Their Saharanpur proposal of 1931 thus called for a federal state, autonomous provinces, and self-governing religious groups within the framework of a single state and constitution. According to some, the Muslim community would be headed by an *amir-i hind*, who would be a scholar of religious law and a delegate of the caliph. The amir would enforce Islamic law within the community, and would be selected by and bound to heed the advice of a consultative assembly of *'ulama'*. He would in effect be the head of an Islamic state within an Indian union. Muslims could be at once Muslims and members of the same nation with non-Muslims.

Thus the Jami'at opposed the Muslim League, which it saw as collaborating in a British plot to divide India's peoples and forestall

Indian independence. The *'ulama'* feared that a new state, even if called Muslim, would not in fact be accountable to the religious scholars or to the principles of Islam, and would be all the more dangerous because of its appeal to the sentiments of the populace. They also feared that the division of the subcontinent into separate states would compromise the substantial Muslim populations that were bound to remain in the majority Hindu state, and would inhibit Muslim missionary work among non-Muslim Indians. They believed that the best interests of Muslims would be served by maintaining the unity of the Indian Muslim population inside a single state, where weight of numbers would protect their religious and communal interests and enable them to influence state policies. In their view, a united Indian nation formed with Muslim cooperation would provide full safeguards for Islamic law and custom. The *'ulama'* of the Jami'at would rather have taken their chances in a unified Indian state than be left to the mercies of partition and secularization. They favored a powerful diaspora in India to a weak homeland in Pakistan.

In fact, the differences between the Muslim League and the Jami'at were smaller than they seemed. The concept of a communal society, whether formed in traditional religious terms or in modern political terms, had won over all segments of the Muslim elites. Both the League and the Jami'at called for a separate Muslim identity. Both agreed on the need for separate electorates, for decentralized and federal forms of government, for provincial autonomy, and for guarantees for Muslim religious interests. They differed only on the question of forming a national state for Muslims. For the Muslim League, the political security of Indian Muslims was the primary consideration, and questions of religious concepts and practices were secondary. Their concept of a Muslim nation was built upon the purely political aspect of Muslim identity, which, contrary to the history of the Muslim community, was now severed from its religious components. The Jami'at, by contrast, clung to fundamental Islamic religious ideas, but they were forced to give up the traditional idea of an Islamic state as the necessary protector of the Muslim community and the obligatory policeman of Islamic law. They were also forced to accept cooperation with non-Muslims, and indeed a state that would make Muslims a tolerated minority in a non-Muslim state. Under the

pressure of twentieth-century imperialism and nationalist reaction, traditional Islamic concepts were transformed to separate the religious and political dimensions of Muslim identity.

In the end, the tendency toward Muslim nationalism won out. The anxieties of the Muslim upper classes threatened with political extinction, British insistence on an electoral system that divided Indians into Muslim and Hindu communities, the revivalist movements among both Muslims and Hindus that raised religious consciousness and stressed the antagonism between the two communities, and rising Muslim religious self-awareness – these forces consolidated a consciousness of Muslim-ness based on abstract symbols, such as the very name "Islam." This symbolic consciousness overcame Muslim attachments to the larger Indian society. Past efforts to reconcile Muslim and Hindu interests and to create a joint Indian political movement had been frustrated by the barrier of deep mutual incomprehension and suspicion. Muslim leaders felt that the Hindus would exploit their dominant numerical position to subordinate Muslims, and Hindu leaders felt that the Muslims were angling for an opportunity to reassert Muslim supremacy. In the course of the 1920s and 1930s, every effort to form a united Hindu–Muslim political front was defeated by incompatible demands and fears that could not be allayed. In these circumstances the Muslim position evolved from a demand for protection of communal rights to the demand for a separate territorial state, regardless of the consequences for the Muslims or the peoples of the subcontinent.

After the elections of 1945, the movement toward a Muslim national state was irresistible: if there were no partition, there would be civil war. In the end there were both. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan came into being, and on August 15 India became an independent state. The new nations were born in the throes of one of the most terrible civil and communal wars of modern history. Millions of people were forced to leave their homes; Hindus fled Pakistan, Muslims left Hindu areas. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in communal riots. The two nations promptly went to war over Kashmir, which was seized by India on the grounds that its ruler was Hindu, despite the claim that by virtue of its Muslim population, Kashmir should be part of Pakistan. The partition of the subcontinent thus paralleled the

emergence of numerous Balkan, Arab, and Turkish states in the Middle East. In each case the violence unleashed by the transmutation of religious into political–national consciousness destroyed the civilization shared among peoples of different religious persuasions. (See Map 37.)

Map 37.   India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

The Muslims of post-Partition India

In 1947, some 50 million Muslims – today more than 177 million – became a permanent minority in India, forming one of the largest Muslim national communities in the world. Partition gravely reduced the socioeconomic standing of Muslims in India. The economic elite was virtually wiped out by the abolition of the rights of *zamindars* and other gentry to incomes from land, and by the migration to Pakistan of large numbers of Urdu-speaking professionals and intellectuals, who could no longer hope to compete for positions in education or government service once Hindi was made the national language. While a new middle class of entrepreneurs, merchants, artisans, and

rich peasants developed in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in medium-sized cities, the vast majority of Indian Muslims are landless laborers, marginal farmers, workers, and shopkeepers. More than half of the Muslim urban population is below the poverty line, as compared with 35 percent of the Hindus. The literacy rate for Muslims is about 67.5 percent, less than the national average of 74 percent. While government programs aid lower-caste Hindus, Indian Muslims remain backward in terms of economic welfare and education. Muslim leaders demand "affirmative action" policies on behalf of their constituents. (See Illustration 28.)

Illustration 28. Families celebrate the end of Ramadan at the Jamiʿ Masjid of Delhi. Courtesy of Thomas Metcalf.

The Indian constitution defines the status of Muslims both as a community and as individuals in their relations with the state. As a community, Muslims, as well as Hindus and Christians, are entitled to adjudicate family and personal issues in state courts on the basis of their communal religious laws. Under the leadership of Abu'l Kalam Azad and the Jamiʿat al-ʿUlamaʿ-i Hind, most Indian Muslims considered themselves at once Muslim and Indian, a religious minority in a secular state that is culturally and religiously neutral. Many Muslims moved toward a shared national culture with Hindus. After 1948, the so-called Congress of Muslims rejected the two-nation theory and called for a much more comprehensive assimilation of Muslims into a common secular national society. After 1970 even the Jamaʿat-i Islami in India, under the influence of Deoband, turned its efforts away from the formation of a Muslim state toward education, social uplift, and acceptance of secularism and democracy as the defining traits of an Indian state protective of minority interests. Other Muslims pragmatically sought class, corporate, and interest-group alliances with non-Muslims, and many successful businessmen tried to avoid ideological or communal issues.

The rise of an Indian Muslim middle-class elite, however, has strengthened communal identity through the funding of schools, colleges, and mosques. In the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi influences, the creation of madrasas, and the growing influence of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Tablighi Jamaʿat stimulated Muslim self-assertion. The Tablighi Jamaʿat, a pietist and missionary movement to recall Muslims to the true teachings and practices of Islam, is the most important religious movement among Muslims. It has a strong appeal to educated and professional Muslims, including doctoral and engineering students, who volunteer each year to go on a preaching pilgrimage throughout the country.

Despite cooperation with Congress and the promotion of Indian Muslims into important national positions, the Muslims of India consider themselves embattled. As a minority, Muslims feel entitled to the protection of their religious beliefs and communal practices, reject the idea of a uniform national civil code, and claim autonomy in matters regulated by Islamic law, such as family, women's status,

education, and endowments for pious purposes. They also seek to protect the use of the Urdu language. They point to the low rates of their participation in education and in government jobs, and demand special employment and other economic opportunities, and proportional representation in legislatures and government bureaucracies.

Except on the official level, Hindu–Muslim communal hostilities remain intense. Many Hindus, however, see Muslims as potential terrorists after numerous attacks on public transport, the Indian parliament, Mumbai hotels, and the insurgency in Kashmir. They identify Indian Muslims with Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and think of Indian Muslims as an intrinsically disloyal population. They see Muslim demands as an insistence upon special privileges, an assertion of social superiority, and a refusal to be integrated into the general society. Behind this refusal, they believe, is an unwillingness to accept the role of citizens within the Indian national state and a lingering hope for a return to Muslim domination.

Since the 1970s the growing strength of Hindu revivalism has made the situation of Indian Muslims increasingly difficult. The Hindu revival goes back to Gandhi, who redefined Hindu identity to include the previously excluded castes, or untouchables, vastly enlarging the number of so-called Hindus, making them the great majority of the Indian population, and setting the foundation for the present claim that India is a Hindu nation, and the demand that it be declared a Hindu state. Hindu religious nationalism is stimulated by bitter intra-Hindu caste and class rivalries, and a determined effort by leaders of lesser social status to undermine Brahmin authority. Hindu extremists reject India's Muslims as a subversive, inassimilable element of the society, and government support for the Muslim minority is denounced as a betrayal of Hindu interests. To contain rising Hindu demands, the Congress Party began in the 1970s to make rhetorical and then policy concessions to Hindu sentiment. In the late 1970s, the Indian government hardened its position on Kashmir to avoid appearing soft on a Muslim issue. In the late 1980s, the government television networks sponsored serialized presentations of the great Hindu epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*.

Two celebrated issues intensified both Hindu and Muslim communal feeling and undermined the secular center. One was a court decision in the Shah Bano case (1985), which upheld the payment of maintenance allowance to a divorced Muslim woman beyond the terms specified in Islamic law. Muslim religious leaders, defending communal interests at the expense of those of women, vociferously protested against the state's intervention in a matter of Islamic law. In response, the Congress Party passed the Muslim Women's Act of 1986, in effect overturning the court's decision, and affirming that Islamic personal law applies in matters of family, inheritance, and charitable trusts. The Hindu radical party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made this a mobilizing issue for its campaign to assert the Hindu identity of India.

The Ayodhya mosque episode escalated communal agitation to a frenzy. Ayodhya is the site of a sixteenth-century mosque named after the Mughal conqueror Babur, but radical Hindus, claiming that the site is the birthplace of Ram, the hero of the *Ramayana*, demanded that the mosque be torn down and replaced with a *mandir* (stele) dedicated to Ram. In 1989, the BJP took part in a foundation-laying ceremony for the new temple. Three years later, in the presence of the leading Hindu party politicians, Hindu "volunteers" destroyed the mosque; this precipitated attacks on Muslims and communal riots all over India. Further terrible violence between Muslims and Hindus took place in Gujarat in 2002. Muslim terrorists attacked Hindu and international targets in Mumbai in 2009 and 2011. Communal violence feeds on itself. It promotes the formation of Muslim "ghettos" and an increasing segregation of Muslims and Hindus.

The Indian Muslim population remains religiously and politically diverse. Shiʿis constitute a quarter to a third of the total Muslim population. Sunni scholars, teachers in madrasas, muftis, and imams of mosques as well as the keepers of the Sufi shrines, are nominally united in the All India ʿUlemaʾ and Mashaik board. But the principal Muslim religious movements – the Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-i Hadith, Talighi Jamaʿat, and others – continue to represent and to mobilize a broad spectrum of religious commitments.

Pakistan

Pakistan was founded on the idea that the Muslims of India formed a nation and were entitled to a territorial homeland of their own. Pakistan was made up of the territories of Sind, Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier province, and parts of the Punjab and Bengal, divided into two great territorial blocks separated by a thousand miles of intervening India. In the western part of Pakistan, more than half of the people were Punjabis, but some 20 percent were Sindhis, 13 percent Pashtuns, and 3–4 percent Baluchis. Bengal, in the east, was virtually a nation within the nation. The western region was without industrial infrastructure; the eastern region was cut off from Calcutta, its main port and processing center for jute and other agricultural products.

The crucial problem for Pakistan was to create institutions and a national identity to suit the reality of the new political boundaries and to create an acceptable and stable regime for a populace divided by sharp ethnic, linguistic, ideological, and even religious differences. Pakistani elites advocated an Islamic nationalism. As in Turkey, a secularized political elite descended from the former imperial elite took control of the political destinies of the country, but unlike Turkey, where the elites were avowedly secular, the competition of Muslims with the Hindu population of India, and the deep particularistic, ethnic, tribal, and local divisions among Muslims, made Islam the only meaningful symbol for the unity of Pakistan. Even so, appeals to Islam have not been able to suppress the contradictions among a variety of Muslim identities, regional and ethnic loyalties, and class antagonisms. The critical problems for Pakistan have been to define the role of Islam in Pakistani society, the role of the military in the Pakistani state, and to deal with the most powerful separatist tendencies: Bengali nationalism, and Pashtun (Pathan) aspirations for an independent state including parts of Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan.

Pakistan came into being with at least two different concepts of what it meant to be an Islamic state. The political elite considered Islam a communal, political, and national identity stripped of its religious content. Yet a large segment of the populace, led by the

'ulama' and other religious leaders, expected a state whose constitution, institutions, and routines of daily life would be governed by Islamic norms. The Jama'at-i Islami, led by Abul 'Ala Mawdudi, a Muslim reformer, fundamentalist, and political organizer, called for the formation of a truly Islamic state with Islamic government, banking, and economic institutions. Mawdudi appealed for a return to the Quran and sunna and the use of rational judgment in religious matters so as to apply the principles of Islam to a modern society. The Jama'at demanded that governing officials be advised by religious councils and that non-Muslims be barred from high political posts. The assembly called to devise a constitution established a Board of Islamic Teaching, which recommended that the state be governed by pious Muslim leaders in accordance with the advice of the *'ulama'*. The struggle over the role of Islam led to a long series of constitutional compromises. A constitution of 1956 declared Pakistan an Islamic state and made all parliamentary legislation subject to review by an Islamic Research Institute. In 1958, this constitution was abolished and a Republic of Pakistan declared, but in 1963 the Islamic provisions of 1956 were by and large restored.

The history of Pakistan from its founding to the present is a history of successive phases of the intertwined problems of civilian versus military government, and the role of Islam and Islamic parties in Pakistani society. Pakistan has alternated civilian and military governments, and there have been both government alliances and conflicts with a variety of Islamic political parties and religious movements. At the outset, the most pressing problem was the formation of a central government. While Congress inherited both the identity and administration of British India, Pakistan had to create an army as well as an administrative and revenue-extracting apparatus to govern the new country. This was undertaken in the face of communal violence and war with India over control of Kashmir.

While the debates over the constitution went on, the real government of Pakistan was a Punjabi elite of soldiers, administrators, and landowners. After ten years of chaotic civilian rule, the army, led by General Ayyub Khan, took control of the country from 1958 to 1969. Under the Ayyub regime, Pakistan continued to

be ruled by its Punjabi elite. The government was highly centralized and strongly supported by landlords, business interests, officials, and also by the Sufi leaders. However, defeat in war with India in 1965 and demonstrations and riots in 1969 led to the succession of General Yahya Khan. Under military rule, the resentment of Bengali East Pakistan over the military, bureaucratic, and economic predominance of West Pakistan, and the neglect of Bengali culture and literature, promoted demands for autonomy. In Bengal, the elections of 1970 brought the Awami League to power. The Pakistan government tried to suppress Bengali opposition. The result was civil war, Indian intervention, and in 1971, the declaration of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh. (See Illustration 29.)

Illustration 29.   Pakistani soldiers (Hagar Shour/Camera Press).

From 1970 to 1977, (west) Pakistan had a civilian government under the leadership of Zulfiqar ʿAli Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The PPP advocated a program compounded of agricultural and industrial reforms and the promulgation of a new constitution, which defined Pakistan as an Islamic socialist republic. The president and prime minister were to be Muslims, and all laws

were to be in conformity with Islam as determined by a council of *'ulama'*. As Pakistan became increasingly dependent on oil-rich Arab states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor, Bhutto made further concessions to Islamic morality, such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling. However, to maintain itself in power, the PPP succumbed to the influence of administrative and landlord groups, roused popular opposition, resorted to rigged elections, and was defeated in July 1977 by mass demonstrations and the intervention of the army.

The new military regime, led by General Zia ul-Haq (1977–88) also attempted to base its authority on a strong pro-Islamic stance supported by an Islamic activist, urban population. The principal Islamic parties were the Jamaʿat-i Islami, dedicated to the formation of an Islamic state, the Jamiʿat-i ʿUlamaʾ-i Islam, affiliated with the reformist Deoband movement, and the Jamiʿat-i ʿUlamaʾ-i Pakistan, founded in 1948 and affiliated with the Barelwis. The Daʿwat-i Islam, founded by Muhammmad Tahir al-Qadiri, a missionary and social service movement, founded schools, libraries, and publications to promote unity among Muslims and the practice of Islam according to the teachings of the Prophet. The conflicts among the various Islamic parties, the ethnic tensions among Punjabi, Pashtun, and Sindhi interests, and the divisions between Sunnis and Shiʿis were not resolved by the reassertion of Islamic values.

Under the influence of these parties, the Zia government reintroduced traditional Islamic punishments, prohibited gambling and alcohol consumption, and created a new judicial review system. While Islamic reform movements are usually concerned with the moral behavior of individuals, in Pakistan the emphasis was placed upon a total Islamic system, or *nizam-i mustafa*, which implies an Islamic government and economy. Pakistani planners sought to eliminate the payment and receipt of interest by the creation of profit-sharing institutions such as the National Investment Trust; the House Building Finance Corporation, which lent money to builders and took a share of the profits from rental incomes; the Small Business Finance Corporation, which bought food and leased goods; and other similar institutions. Profit- and loss-sharing accounts were established

at the nationalized banks. In their first year of operation, these banks showed a return of between 8 and 15 percent, and thus proved profitable at least in the short run, though they face the problems of limited capital and severe competition from institutions that use interest calculations. (See Illustration 29.)

The role of women became a significant issue. On one side were those who favored limiting women to the household sphere, and on the other those who wished to preserve women's opportunities for education and freedoms in public life. Proposed changes in family law that gave women additional rights in divorce and inheritance, and proposed modifications in the law of evidence, which make two women the equivalent of a single male witness, have been hotly debated.

With the death of General Zia ul-Haq in a helicopter accident in August 1988, the political situation became ever more tenuous. Civilian government was restored. Two major parties competed for power. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the former prime minister and the leader of the PPP, a secular party with its base of support in Sind, was opposed by the Islamic Democratic Alliance, based on Zia's Pakistan Muslim League, led by Nawaz Sharif, and supported by the Punjabi military and civil bureaucracy. The military–Islamic alliance ruled from 1990 to 1993 and 1997 to 1999. The PPP governed in the interim.

This was not a genuinely democratic system. Until 1997, the president was entitled by the constitution to dismiss an elected prime minister and parliament without any political accountability, and did so five times. Furthermore, there were allegations that drug money was used to finance political parties and Inter-Service (military) Intelligence Agency (ISI) operations. Factional conflict among Punjabi and Sindhi landlords, sectarian street battles among Sunnis and Shi'is, and between Sindhi- and Urdu-speaking *muhajirs* (emigrants from India), and massacres in Karachi and Lahore made the major cities ungovernable.

In 1999, the military, led by General Pervez Musharraf, took power in its own name. The military controlled not only the means of violence, but an important stake in the economy. Two army

conglomerates, the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust, controlled a third of the country's heavy manufacturing industries. The military owned billions of dollars' worth of banks, insurance companies, industries, hotels, shopping malls, and farms. Musharraf set about consolidating military rule and his own position as both head of the army and president (2001) by forging a tight coalition among the military, the Pakistani Muslim League and other Islamist parties, and co-opted politicians and large landowners. Parliamentary elections were held in October 2002. The military's favored Pakistan Muslim League won seventy-seven seats. A six-party alliance of Islamic fundamentalist parties, the United Action Front (MMA), won forty-five seats, and control of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the first time that Islamic parties had won control of a provincial government.

The seemingly invincible coalition of the military and often radical Islamic parties was undermined between 2007 and 2009 by an unpredictable chain of events. First was the intervention of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, which repeatedly ruled against police abuses, abuse and discrimination against women, and corrupt economic schemes (often with military participation). Notably the court demanded the release of hundreds of "disappeared," secretly arrested, prisoners of the ISI. Musharraf placed Chaudhry under house arrest. Middle-class opinion, led by lawyers who boycotted the courts, forced his reinstatement.

Under these pressures, Musharraf reversed course and came to an agreement with Benazir Bhutto and the PPP. Musharraf was reelected on October 6, 2007 to a second term as president. In November he declared a state of emergency and martial law, arrested the judges, and seized control of TV and radio stations. Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, amid charges that Musharraf was complicit in her murder. In reaction to her death, the PPP, led by her husband ʿAli Zardari, won a landslide victory in the February 2008 elections. Zardari was president until the end of his term in 2013. Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League returned as the civilian opposition. The radical Islamic parties were greatly reduced in power. In August 2008, the two dominant parties forced Musharraf to resign the presidency and go into self-imposed

exile in London. In 2013, he attempted to return to Pakistan, and was arrested and charged with complicity in Bhutto's murder. Pakistan continues to be ruled by a weak civilian government constantly under pressure from the threat of another military coup.

Foreign policy

The interpenetration of state interests and religio-national identity issues also shapes Pakistan's foreign policy. In two critical areas – Kashmir and Afghanistan – Pakistan has supported militant Islamic groups with important repercussions within Pakistan itself.

The mountain valley of Kashmir is bitterly contested by India and Pakistan. Kashmir, though largely Muslim in population, was turned over to India in 1947 by the ruling maharaja, Hari Singh. India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir, and in January 1949 a United Nations–brokered cease-fire left two-thirds of the province in Indian and one-third in Pakistani control. From 1947 to 1953, Indian Kashmir was allowed considerable internal autonomy under the leadership of Shaykh Muhammad ʿAbdallah and the National Conference, but in 1953 the Indian government arrested Shaykh ʿAbdallah and gradually brought the province under closer rule. From 1975 to 1984, Kashmir was again permitted free elections and was ruled by Shaykh ʿAbdallah and his son Faruq ʿAbdallah. By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, calling for an independent and secular Kashmir.

As the military struggle went on, Muslim–Hindu antagonism rose; Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the

struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance. The dispute over Kashmir led to India–Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1999, and provoked chronic frontier skirmishing and further threats of war. In 1998, nuclear weapons were tested by both India and Pakistan. In 2002, India mobilized a massive army to force Pakistan to retreat from its support of the Kashmiri resistance.

Pakistan claims Kashmir because it is a contiguous territory with a Muslim population. India believes that control of Kashmir is essential as a demonstration of the viability of a religiously mixed society and as an assertion of Indian pride against the threat of further partition. Kashmiris, who once supported regional independence, have moved from secularism to Islamism, and from desire for autonomy toward incorporation into Pakistan.

A second crucial area of Pakistani foreign concerns is Afghanistan (see section on Afghanistan). In the 1970s, Pakistan became increasingly involved in Afghanistan, first in order to offset the influence of the Soviet Union, and then, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, to resist Soviet expansion. Pakistan also wanted to protect itself against Iranian and Shi'i influences in western and northern Afghanistan, to outflank India in the struggle for Kashmir, and to offset the influence of the Pashtunistan movement. This was a nationalist movement among the Pashtun tribal populations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to create a new state carved out of the territories of the two existing states. Pakistan's ISI gave its support primarily to Islamist parties. Pakistan favored the religious parties in part because they made no territorial demands, as opposed to the ethnic nationalist Pashtun movement. With the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Union Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, the Haqqani gang, and other radical Islamist groups.

Paradoxically, Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir and Afghanistan has empowered Islamic insurgency within Pakistan itself. The Pashtun tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have long resisted central government control, and now do so in the name of Islam. Pakistan is at war with an indigenous "Taliban" with ties to the Afghani Taliban. In 2005, the Pakistani government waged military campaigns

in the tribal regions. When they failed, Pakistan in 2005 signed a peace deal with Baitullah Mehsud, the head of the Waziri tribe, known to be a close ally of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and agreed to withdraw its army. The agreement allowed Mehsud to form the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a union of Pakistani militant groups. This group conducted numerous suicide attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians from 2008 to 2010.

In other incidents, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, Movement for the enforcement of Islamic law) took over much of the Swat Valley from 2007 to 2009. Also in 2007, thousands of madrasa students and armed radicals took over the Red Mosque in Islamabad. The radicals were eventually driven out by the army, resulting in many deaths. In response there were hundreds of suicide bombings and other assaults in the NWFP. Elsewhere in Pakistan, violence was directed against religious minorities including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shiʿis, and against secularist politicians who sought to resist the implementation of radical Islamic policies.

The military, the government, and the public understood that these events represent a break in the Islamist–military alliance that was governing Pakistan, and an outbreak of civil war. The ISI plays an ambiguous part in these events as both the opponent and the sponsor of militant Islamic groups, and the Pakistani government, its military, the ISI – or factions within them – are likely pursuing different policies. Pakistan's multiple policies pose a complex and perhaps an insoluble problem for the United States. Officially Pakistan is an American ally in the fight against Islamic extremism, but Pakistan has different strategic goals and at least indirectly supports the very forces that the Unites States wants to defeat. Moreover, Pakistani public opinion bitterly resents American demands, conflicts between American and Pakistani forces, and US military operations inside Pakistan including drone attacks, and the killing of Osama bin Laden.

In sum, the instability in Pakistan is tied into three interconnected issues: military vs. civilian power; Islamic vs. secular authority; and the struggles for power in the NWFP and Afghanistan. As long as the military sees itself as the critical institution in a state that has to be

defended against India, and carries out an Islamic military policy in Afghanistan, it will be opposed to democracy in Pakistan.

Afghanistan

In current affairs, Afghanistan is closely linked to Pakistan, but throughout history it was located in the interstices between the great empires of West, Central, and South Asia. A poor, mountainous, and inaccessible country, it was never conquered as a whole by any of the surrounding empires. Most (85 percent) of the population is involved in raising wheat, cotton, fruit, sheep, goats, and cattle. The most lucrative crop is poppies, from which heroin and opium are made. Afghanistan's population of some 30 million includes seven major ethnic groups: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Turkmens, and Baluchis. Pashtuns predominate in the south and east, Tajiks in the northeast and west, Hazaras in the center, Uzbeks in the northwest, Turkmens in the north, and Baluchis in the south. Pashtuns are approximately 40 percent of the total population. Tajiks are the second-biggest ethnic group, followed by Uzbeks and Hazaras. Ethnic groups, however, are not political bodies and do not necessarily share common interests. Half the population speaks Pashto, and Farsi is the common language of the non-Pashtun population. Farsi and Islam are the only common cultural elements. The population is intensely parochial, tribal, and sectarian. The primary loyalty of most Afghans is to small local communities.

Afghanistan was and is ruled by the tribal khans, whose power varied greatly. In some cases they were the landowners as well as chiefs, and the rest of the tribesmen were serfs or tenants; in others power was more equally distributed. Some tribes dominated subordinate ethnic groups, who supplied labor. Within the tribes, the dominant value was consensus and cooperation, expressed through the *jirga*, a larger-scale convocation of tribal elders, but in general Afghan society was highly conflicted due to blood feuds, intra- and inter-tribal rivalries, and the antagonisms of tribes of different ethnic, language, and religious orientations.

The most important conflicts were those between tribes and would-be central states. To survive, central rulers had to mobilize tribal support, manipulate tribes against each other, and motivate them to attack external enemies. As a central government consolidated, it set up military outposts, built roads, and established communications, such as the telegraph, followed by tax collectors and schoolteachers. As a central government weakened, the tribes refused payment of taxes, raided outposts, attacked small towns for arms and loot, and disseminated religious propaganda against the central government. Islam played a great social role. Mullahs had great influence in matters such as property and honor. They were men of knowledge and wealth, and power brokers in political affairs. Sufi *pirs* (holy men) formed extensive networks, including prominent political and social leaders, which were the basis of their fund-raising and political influence.

Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Mongols, and Timurids in succession have all been rulers of Afghanistan. Mughals, Uzbeks, and Safavids partitioned it in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, rising Pashtun tribes pushed out the Safavids and fought the Mughals. Then began a long and often-repeated effort to create a centralized state in which the most important Pashtun tribes, the Durranis and the Ghilzais, played the leading roles. A Durrani chieftain, Ahmed Shah Sadozai, created a small suzerainty over the tribes of Afghanistan and northern India, including the Punjab, Multan, and Kashmir (1747–73). After the death of his son Timur, Sadozai's rivals partitioned his domains. Dost Muhammad (1835–63), founder of the Muhammadzai dynasty, reestablished a central government. After his victory over the Sikhs in 1837, he called himself *amir al-mu'minin*, Commander of the Faithful, the historical title of Muslim rulers. (See Illustration 30.)

Illustration 30.   The Mosque of Mazar-i Sharif, Afghanistan.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the adjoining empires – British and Russian – became rivals for control of Afghanistan. The British saw it as the key to the defense of their Indian empire, and invaded in 1839–42. They found this strategy too costly, and attempted instead to force the amirs to pacify the Pashtuns and prevent raids into India. Russian conquests in Central Asia led the British to a more "forward" policy and another invasion in 1878–80. The British wanted an Afghanistan strong enough to be a barrier against Russia but not so strong as to threaten India. Again they had to resort to supporting the Afghan amirs as the best vehicle for controlling the tribes. In the 1880s, Britain and Russia came to terms over boundaries. In 1885, the Lumsden Commission negotiated a

northern border with Russia, and in 1893 the Durand Agreement defined the borders with British India. In 1907, a British–Russian treaty ratified Afghanistan's position as a buffer state.

The dominant themes of Afghan history have been the same for over a century: centralization of state power vs. tribal autonomy; and modernization, especially of the position of women, in the face of conservative and religious opposition. The Afghan elite included the royal family, the army, landowners, some capitalists, religious and tribal leaders, and the Western-educated intelligentsia. Tribal leaders were often assigned governorships as well as military and other leading roles. The government offices were generally run by family and clientele groups. Historically, Islam was not crucial in the formation of the Afghan monarchies. The state derived its legitimacy and power from the support of the tribal – especially Pashtun – aristocracies. Mullahs were generally subordinate to the tribal chiefs and landlords, though the monarchies tried to cultivate the support of high-ranking mullahs by appointments to offices, endowments, and using them as policy advisors.

The long process of "modernization" began with Amir ʿAbdur Rahman (1880–1901) who, with British help, promoted his own version of Tanzimat. He undertook to unify the country and consolidate royal authority. He conquered Hazaras, Shiʿis, and *kafirs* (non-Muslims), and then claimed to rule by divine right, and not by tribal delegation. ʿAbdur Rahman created the first modernized state apparatus. He built up the army and administration, and military workshops and industries. Centralized military forces rather than tribal levies were used to defeat local resistance. The government was organized into functional departments. The mullahs were co-opted by patronage, appointments to offices, and the endowment of charitable trusts, and were made to serve in government offices and administer state courts. Under Amir Habibullah (1901–19) professional schools were founded to train army officers, administrators, and teachers, producing the first members of a modernist and nationalist intelligentsia.

Amir Amanullah (1919–29) carried the Tanzimat into social and economic reforms. He introduced a new legal, judicial, and

administrative framework, and in 1928–29, returning from a visit to Europe, proposed more radical reforms, such as the unveiling of women, the wearing of Western dress at court, the abolition of slavery, and secular education. Amanullah planned to give women virtually equal rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and diminish the role of the mullahs in law and education. These proposals provoked open rebellion by tribal leaders, and by Mujaddadi Naqshbandi religious chieftains, who denounced him as an infidel ruler. The rebels forced him out of power, and a Pashtun general, Nadir, became shah.

Nadir was succeeded by Zahir Shah (1933–73), whose uncle, Prince Da'ud, held effective power from 1953 to 1979. Zahir Shah promulgated a new constitution, and stressed its Islamic identity, but struggled to get control over the religious leaders. He also stimulated economic growth, strengthened the army, and expanded education. In the 1950s, the new sectors of the economy – transport, roads, irrigation, and power – were developed by the government. The largest project was a vast scheme to irrigate the Helmand Valley. The United States and the Soviet Union, each unwilling to see the other dominate the country, provided considerable foreign aid. Afghanistan saw its first political parties and free press in the last decade of Zahir's reign. Reforms on behalf of women resumed in 1959. Women in Kabul went to school and work, unveiled. The position of mullahs, Sufi *pirs*, and *sayyids* was weakened by the centralization of the state, the introduction of secular education and courts, and the rise of a modernist discourse. For educated people Islam became one ideology among many, but the countryside remained conservative.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War and the international balance of power became crucial to the fate of Afghanistan. The Pashtunistan movement, calling for unification of all Pashtuns including those living in Pakistan, alienated Afghanistan from Pakistan and the United States, and forced Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union. The Soviets became the principal suppliers of economic aid and education for the young Afghan elite, and built up strong support in the military, government services, and among intellectuals. In 1973, with the financial and political assistance of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Prince Da'ud engineered a coup designed to reduce Soviet

influence in Afghanistan. With the support of the army and the communist Parcham Party, he removed Zahir Shah from power, and instituted a presidency and a republican state. The Soviet Union, however, responded with a counter-coup d'état led by the Khalq, the mainly Pashtun faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, aided by Marxists seeded throughout the army and the bureaucracy. This regime sought to run Afghanistan through a Leninist party. It proposed land and social reforms, especially enhancing the rights of women. Without popular support or ideological acceptance, it depended almost entirely upon the Soviet Union.

In the 1970s, a resistance movement backed by the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia sprang up. The United States was eager to back an Afghan resistance, even an Islamist one, in order to harass the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia was pursuing a pro-Sunni policy that it hoped would create an alliance of conservative Islamic states and radical military activists to offset Iranian influence. Pakistan wanted to use Afghan Sunnism as part of a drive to protect itself against the rise of Iranian and Shiʿi influence in Afghanistan, to outflank India in the struggle for Kashmir, to offset the influence of the Pashtunistan movement, and to win influence in Central Asia. The support of the anti-Soviet allies was funneled, primarily to Islamist parties, of whom many were also smugglers of heroin. By 1984, it was estimated that 70 percent of the world's high-grade heroin was produced in or smuggled through Pakistan.

The Soviet Union, unwilling to see a foreign-backed Afghan regime on its borders, and perhaps with its own ambitions to advance toward the Persian Gulf, intervened to save its puppet. The Russians removed the Khalq leader, Hafizullah Amin, and installed Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction. Russian forces invaded the country. Thus began a war that lasted until the Russian withdrawal in 1989, and a civil war that continued through 2001. The anti-Soviet resistance was basically organized on ethnic lines. Pashtuns loathed the idea of non-Pashtun leadership. Hazara Shiʿis were divided between traditionalists and Islamists. There were separate Uzbek and Turkmen parties. Field commanders operated on their own without full coordination with the political parties. The resistance was locally

based, and further divided by region, clienteles, parties, tribes, the ambitions of chieftains, and Muslim ideologies, and was unable to form a unified front.

Islam played a new and unprecedented role in the anti-Russian war. In the 1960s and 1970s, a new type of Muslim intelligentsia, the counterpart of the new generation of secular and Marxist intelligentsia, came to the fore. The modern-educated Islamist intellectuals were more political and ideological than the traditional Muslim religious leaders. They formed study-circles influenced by the Society of Muslim Brothers and the Jamaʿat-i Islami. Islamist groups created a Muslim student union, won control of the Kabul University campus in 1969, and united with *ʿulamaʾ* in 1973 to form a nationwide organization.

After the communist coup, the Islamists became active in opposition, and demanded the implementation of the Shariʿa as the civil law of Afghanistan. One of the most important Islamist groups was the Hizb-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, and supported by detribalized middle-class students. Hizb-i-Islami was a highly authoritarian and ideologically purist party; its goal was to create an Islamic state. A second movement was the Jamiʿat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, which had strong support in the north and northeast among Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Tajiks. There were also several traditionalist parties based upon older *ʿulamaʾ* and Sufi networks. The Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya played an important role in the resistance. Various Shiʿi parties were backed by Iran.

The war was a disaster for all participants. Its destructiveness was extreme. Millions of Afghans were killed, and millions more forced into exile. Military defeat and the demoralizing repercussions of the war forced a Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and eventually compromised the Soviet Union itself.

With the defeat of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was plunged into anarchic factional fighting. The Soviets left a Marxist regime under General Najiballah, but this collapsed in April 1992. After the demise of Najiballah, an Uzbek–Tajik–Mujahidin coalition took control under the nominal presidency of Rabbani, but the rifts among Islamists and

secularists, Islamist factions, Islamists and traditionalists, ethnic and regional factions, and warlords and militias made it impossible to govern. The United States abandoned Afghanistan. The secret US program to aid the *mujahidin* and US relief and reconstruction aid were terminated in 1992, leaving tens of thousands of armed Afghans and their families without support. Afghan farmers could best earn a living by growing poppies for opium and heroin production.

The Taliban entered the Afghan wars as both a religiously inspired and a drug-dealing movement. Of the competing forces, they came closest to conquering and unifying the whole of Afghanistan. They were religious students in rural schools and madrasas of the Northwest Frontier province. Supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and by various Islamist parties, but allied with drug smugglers and trucking companies, they were increasingly heavily armed. In 1994, their leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, took control of Qandahar. The movement then received the support of the Jamiʿat-i ʿUlamaʾ-i Islam in Pakistan, which sent its students to join the Afghan volunteers. The Taliban took Kabul in 1996. They suppressed the northern warlords, the non-Pashtun, and the Shiʿi parts of the population, barred women from schools and workplaces, and imposed an extreme Islamic discipline. They destroyed all the Buddhist monuments in the country and required Hindus to wear identifying yellow badges. In the 1990s, the Taliban managed to control much but not all of the country through its network of mullahs reaching even to remote villages.

The Taliban was reinforced by non-Afghani volunteers for jihad and, from 1996, by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. Al-Qaeda camps were established throughout Afghanistan. In 1997, the Taliban started taxing and regulating the poppy trade. They collected 10 percent ʿ*ushr* and 20 percent *zakat* in the southern parts of the country.

The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 opened a new phase of warfare. The United States resolved to overthrow the Taliban regime and to prevent the use of Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism. The United States bombed the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from the air and supported the forces of the Northern

Alliance on the ground. By the end of 2001, the Taliban regime was defeated. In June 2002, the *loya jirga*, the assemblage of Afghan notables, elected Hamid Karzai president of the Afghan Transitional Administration. Karzai had supported the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan and had served as deputy foreign minister in the government of Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani in 1992. During the 2001 US bombing campaign he helped mobilize Pashtun tribes to defeat the Taliban. A new constitution was adopted in January 2004, and the first presidential election was held in October.

The principal US concern in Afghanistan was the consolidation of a centralized state. The United States viewed this as an assurance against terrorist activities or the political chaos that would allow such activities to flourish. Nonetheless, the agreement to make Hamid Karzai the head of state worked against the US objective. It recognized the traditional Pashtun claim to executive power, but it ignored the divisions among rival Pashtun clans into pro- and anti-Karzai factions, and the distribution of government ministries among the different ethnic factions. There is no central government apparatus at the local level.

Furthermore, Karzai's policies have discredited the central government. He opposed the creation of political parties, which had the effect of channeling parliament into Pashtun and non-Pashtun blocs, promoting the suspicion that he did not represent a national government so much as a family network. The presidential election of 2009 was widely perceived as fraudulent. Instead of centralizing power, the defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda brought local warlords to power. The warlords appropriate local revenues and support their own military and administrative forces. Regional, ethnic, tribal, religious, criminal, and other patronage networks have taken over the country. In these circumstances, the Taliban insurgency has revived.

The motives for American involvement in this struggle are unclear. US involvement is ostensibly meant to prevent the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In 2009, the United States increased its forces in Afghanistan from 68,000 to over 100,000. The United States also considers Pakistan an ally in the struggle against al-Qaeda and the

Taliban. It wants Pakistani bases for American drones to operate in Pakistan. It wants Pakistan to suppress the Haqqani network as well as other Taliban and the remnants of al-Qaeda in Waziristan, and to dismantle the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which were behind terrorist attacks in Kashmir and the November 2008 attack in Mumbai. In turn the United States provides substantial military and economic aid. However, given the death of Osama bin Laden, the small numbers of al-Qaeda activists in Afghanistan, and the many other al-Qaeda bases, it is not clear that the United States actually has a stake in a centralized Afghan government or whether this is even attainable. In the meantime, despite a decade of warfare, the Taliban have only grown in number. Accordingly, the United States is withdrawing its forces.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh, formerly a province of Pakistan, broke away in 1971. Its independence was won at the cost of a civil war, the mass migration of some ten million Bengali Hindus to India, and the intervention of India on the side of an independent Bangladesh. Having won its independence, Bangladesh continued to echo the problems of Pakistan. Its politics have been marked by ferocious competition, boycotts of parliament by the opposition parties, military coups and assassinations, and conflict over the connections between the state and Islam. The two major parties have contrasting religiocultural orientations. The Awami League leans toward secularism, though it endorsed the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs that supports mosques and community prayer grounds. The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is allied with the Jamaʿat-i Islami, whose ultimate goal is an Islamic state. As in Pakistan, the military adopted Islam to legitimize its rule.

In breaking away from Pakistan, the Awami League under the leadership of Shaykh Mujib Rahman attempted to establish a one-party authoritarian regime. In order to assert its separate identity, Bangladesh first declared itself a secular, socialist, national state. The ruling Awami League banned all Islamic political parties and movements. However, the mass of the population identifies itself as

Bengali Muslim, and the secular leaning of the state was promptly reversed. Mujib Rahman was overthrown by a military coup and assassinated. General Zia Rahman (r. 1975–81) took power, and created the BNP as an antisocialist, free-market movement. The party had the support of business and military elites, declared itself supportive of Islam, and added a proviso to the constitution affirming "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah." In May 1981, General Zia was assassinated by rebellious soldiers, and power was seized by General Husayn Muhammad Ershad. Under General Ershad (r. 1982–90) Islam was declared the state religion, Islamic parties were permitted to function in national politics, and large subsidies were given to religious schools. The change helped legitimize the separate existence of a Bengali state from Indian Bengal, and won the financial support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and private Arab philanthropies and NGOs. In 1990, the Ershad regime was driven from power and the government was taken over by General Zia's widow, Khaleda Zia, and the BNP. Since then, control of the government has alternated between the BNP and the Awami League, led by Shaykh Hasina, the daughter of Mujib Rahman.

Islam in Bangladesh is practiced in all its forms. The majority of Bangladesh Muslims are Sunnis, mainly of the Hanafi school of law. The Islamist movements, whose goal is to create a truly Islamic society, include the Deobandis; Ahl-i Hadith and Tablighi Jamaʿat; and the Jamaʿat-i Islami, which is popular among students, academics, government officials, and the military, and calls for an Islamic state and the implementation of Shariʿa. A still more radical – indeed, terrorist – organization, a wing of the Ahl-i Hadith, supported by veterans of the Afghan war, holds that a true Islamic state can only be established after the violent overthrow of the present government. Jihadist organizations such as the Harkatul Jihad al-Islam (HUJIB) and Jagrato Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMB) threaten to seize state power through unconstitutional or violent means. There are also numerous Sufi brotherhoods and relatively small Shiʿi and Ahmadi communities. In 2011, the parliament adopted an Islamic constitution strongly opposed by Hindus, leftists, and secularists.

Conclusion

The formation of the four Muslim societies of the Indian subcontinent can be understood in terms of the complex legacy of a Mughal state whose legitimacy was defined in Muslim, cosmopolitan, and Indian terms, and of a number of Muslim religious communities and elites that were independent of the state. The pluralistic structure of Mughal society allowed for alternatives to Muslim identity expressed in tribal, caste, occupational, or ethnic terms. When this society faced the great shocks of European domination in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its pluralistic political and religious elites were divided over whether to define their interests in terms of ethnic, national, or religious identity; and, when they chose religious terms, whether to emphasize the communal–political or the personal–ethical aspects of Islam.

In the subcontinent the complexity of the Muslim institutional and cultural heritage has allowed for numerous variations of contemporary Islamic identities and relations between Islam and states. The Islamic movements in Afghanistan show the most complex and convoluted interlacing of parochial, national, and religious identities. For example, the Hizb-i-Islami was a sectarian revivalist movement, and a political action party, perhaps even a religio-political gang, composed of middle-class students, from one ethnic sector of Afghan society (the Pashtun), which fought to win power in a national Afghan state while defining its goal as the establishment of an Islamic state. Jamiʿat-i-Islami was similarly a religious and political action party, but largely built on ethnic Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen cadres, fighting for national power in the name of universalistic Islamic principles.

In India, Muslims face the dilemma of how to live a Muslim life without the protection or prospect of an Islamic regime. The Muslims of India have tended to remain socially and religiously conservative. Indian Muslim religious leaders stress individual religious commitment, and present Islam in devotional rather than political terms. They resist Indian state efforts to modify legal and educational institutions as an unwarranted interference with religious rights. In Bangladesh, political identity oscillates between the poles of

nationalist and religious symbols without defining Islamic social and religious practices. In Pakistan, by contrast, the state is officially Islamic and emphasizes Islam as the basis of national identity. The state bears responsibility for the integration of Islam with a modern state and economy, and promotes radical policies and departures from traditional Islamic practice.

Chapter 55 Islam in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Muslim peoples of Southeast Asia were not yet part of a unified culture or empire, but were divided into many ethnic and linguistic populations and numerous states. Holland and Britain were in the process of consolidating their empires. The consolidation of Dutch control over Java (see Chapter 38) opened the way for the expansion of Dutch rule to other parts of the East Indies. On Java, in the wake of the defeated rebellion of Dipanegara, the Dutch governor, Graaf van Den Bosch, centralized political and economic control. The Dutch government was based on the support of the indigenous elites, but they no longer had independent political power and turned more and more to culture and ritual to distinguish their class. A Dutch controller supervised the local princes, or regents, whose position was made hereditary but was reduced in actual effectiveness. In the course of the century, the regents were reduced from independent princes to salaried local officials. They were deprived of their share of tax revenues. In 1867, their lands were confiscated, and in 1882 they were denied the labor and personal services once owed them by the peasants.

Between 1824 and 1858, the Dutch acquired much of Sumatra. Dutch expansion was motivated by interest in coffee, sugar, tobacco, pepper, and spice production and, after 1870, in tin and rubber. Dutch conservatives opposed the costs of military actions, but officials, soldiers, and traders favored a larger empire. Commercial and military expansion brought the Dutch into direct conflict with Aceh for control of the pepper ports of northern and western Sumatra. After two campaigns in 1871 and 1874, the Dutch declared the annexation of Aceh and the abolition of the sultanate, and demanded the unconditional surrender of the local district lords, the *uleebalangs*. The *'ulama'*, however, continued guerrilla resistance. In the end,

Dutch control of the trade of north Sumatra, aggressive military action, and a religious policy that called for the suppression of militant Muslim opposition but the acceptance of pacific Muslim religious interests enabled the Dutch to divide the *uleebalangs* from the *'ulama'*, suppress guerrilla resistance, and dominate Aceh by 1908.

Dutch control was also extended to the outer islands. South and central Celebes, the Moluccas, Borneo, and other places were absorbed into the Dutch Empire. The Dutch either made vassals of the local chiefs or pushed them aside altogether. By 1911, they had complete control of the Indies. For the first time in history, one empire ruled over the island archipelago. Thus the Dutch laid the foundation for the modern nation-state of Indonesia.

Dutch rule and economic development in the Indies

Under Dutch rule, the economy of Java was organized under "the culture (as in agriculture) system." This was a form of taxation that required the peasants to devote one-fifth of their land to government-assigned crops – usually sugar, indigo, coffee, tea, tobacco, cinnamon, and cotton – and to deliver the produce as a tribute in kind, in lieu of other rents or taxes. In addition, they were required to contribute their labor to build irrigation canals, roads, and bridges, clear wastelands, and otherwise build up the economic infrastructure of the island. Though the system was supposed to assure the peasants a fixed obligation, they were in fact subject to further extortion, rents, and corvées. The goods delivered under the culture system were sold to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and were shipped to Europe in Dutch cargo ships. Imports to Java also came primarily from Holland. The culture system benefited not only the Dutch in Holland and the government of the Indies but also European officials and investors, local landowners, and Arab and Chinese entrepreneurs.

In Java the culture system led to the cycle of development called "agricultural involution." The primary crops, sugar for export and rice for subsistence, were complementary. They could be grown in

adjacent fields or alternated in the same fields when seasonally appropriate, and be maintained by the same system of terracing and irrigation. This complementarity made it possible to provide at once for exports, government revenues, and food production. Moreover, since both sugar and rice output could be increased by ever more intensive investments of labor, a cycle of development was entrained in which increased food production could sustain a larger population that could in turn increase both food and sugar production and thereby sustain further population increases. As population rose and rice production reached its limits, the system could be kept going by growing maize, soybeans, and other foods grown on lands unsuitable for rice and sugar. Java entered a cycle of growth that led to ever-higher populations and more intensive agricultural exploitation – a cycle that increased Dutch revenues from sugar output but also kept the native population at a subsistence level. As the population of Java rose from approximately 7 million in 1850 to 28.4 million in 1900, there was no rise in the per capita standard of living.

This system, however was eventually undermined by the Dutch themselves. In Holland, the revolution of 1848 brought to power a new merchant class with a liberal capitalist ideology, and led to the formation of a parliamentary government that in 1864 assumed control of the Indies budget. Also, in the course of the 1850s and 1860s, the publication of Dekker's *Max Havelaar*, and sugar-contract scandals, discredited the culture system and brought a demand for a new colonial administration based on liberal principles. The liberals wanted to abolish state controls in favor of free enterprise and eliminate the system of forced deliveries in favor of direct taxation.

In the course of the 1860s, state cultivation of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, indigo, tea, cinnamon, and tobacco was abolished. The Agrarian Law of 1870 mandated the establishment of a free market in place of the traditional system of consignments. To bolster private enterprise, state lands were leased on a long-term basis; new laws permitted leasing of smallholdings and of village lands to capitalist entrepreneurs. Corvée labor was abolished and wage labor implemented in 1882. The new policy stimulated capitalist forms of development, the expansion of the sugar industry, irrigation, and railroad construction. By the end of the nineteenth century, control of

the Javanese economy had substantially shifted from Dutch government officers to capitalist entrepreneurs. While peasants were freed from the compulsory delivery of crops, they were burdened with taxes and other payments.

Whereas in Java the capitalist economy could be superimposed upon and integrated with a peasant society, in Sumatra the introduction of a capitalist economy led to still more profound social changes. In the early nineteenth century, Sumatra was an important source of agricultural and forest commodities for export, and a market for textiles, hardware, and other foreign goods. Dutch control led to the introduction of tobacco, palm, tea, and rubber plantations, and tin-mining enterprises. While tobacco and food crops could be intertwined because tobacco was believed to require a long fallow period and because food crops were cultivated by very simple methods, rubber, palm, tea, and similar plantations were incompatible with growing rice and corn, and peasants were driven off the land. The plantation and mining economy in Sumatra (and Malaya) created a laboring proletariat. Capitalist development also created a smallholder class of farmers who changed from slash-and-burn agriculture to fixed gardening operations, producing part of the rubber and coffee crop for export. Economic development led to an extensive commercialization of the Sumatran economy, and stimulated the creation of new towns, schools, newspapers, and even a network of village banks called the People's Credit System.

In the outer islands, and in Malaya, the expansion of private land ownership broke down the values that regulated the communal economy. While the Javanese village collectivity was protected by the peculiarities of wet rice ecology, in the outer islands traditional collective and family controls over land were weakened.

The involution of agriculture in Java, and the growth of a capitalist and commercial economy on the outer islands, led at the turn of the twentieth century to an important redirection of Dutch administrative policy. Despite the premises of liberal theory, the expansion of capitalist agriculture and industrial enterprises required state intervention. Even though Dutch capitalists and settlers were opposed to central government controls, they favored military

expansion and investments in police, schools, irrigation, railroads, agricultural experimentation, and other services. Also, Dutch surveys of 1888 and 1891 uncovered abuses such as extortion, arbitrary demands on peasant labor services, and excessive appropriation of land by village officials. By 1900 it was clear that the liberal capitalist policy had favored individual capitalists, but had harmed native welfare, reduced government revenues, and injured Dutch manufacturers' interests in a prosperous Indonesian economy.

Humanitarians, liberals, and missionaries joined in the call for economic reform, protection of native interests, and the education and employment of Javanese officials in government service. Liberals held that it was Holland's duty to take responsibility for the welfare of the native population and even to repay Indonesia for centuries of economic exploitation. Some imagined that Dutch rule would be built upon cooperation between Dutch and local peoples; others called for the assimilation of Indonesians into European culture and the creation of a unified Dutch–Indonesian elite to govern the country. The critics of government policy called for a revolution in the government of the Indies, and for the creation of a welfare state with Indonesian participation. This was called the Ethical Policy. Though well intentioned, it was entirely Euro-centered, and presupposed Dutch domination. The Ethical Policy was a Dutch version of the white man's burden.

After 1900, a combination of capitalist needs and humanitarian concerns reversed the laissez-faire policy of the previous generation in favor of state stimulation and management of economic development. Throughout Java and the outer islands, the Ethical Policy meant a more direct involvement of Dutch officials in the daily routines of Indonesian communities, and a tremendous expansion of the civil service. State enterprises were to build up the agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources of the country. Railroads, roads, and shipping lines were to be developed; irrigation was to be extended. The state worked tin and coal mines, laid out rubber plantations, and established agricultural credit banks. It contributed agricultural, medical, and veterinary specialists. Native welfare was promoted through education, public health, and the protection of peasants and workers from capitalist exploitation.

The new policy also entailed the centralization of Dutch political control over the whole of the archipelago, and the formation, in 1914, of a single government for all of the Indies. Mixed European and Indonesian local councils were formed; in 1916, the Dutch introduced a new representative assembly, the Volksraad. This was an advisory assembly that included both elected and appointed Dutch and native representatives. In 1922, a new fundamental law gave the government of the Indies greater autonomy from Holland and made the Volksraad a legislative body for the colonial region. However, these new freedoms were offset by an increase in the proportion of European representatives.

The Dutch were especially active in the creation of new schools. In the early nineteenth century, Indonesian aristocrats were educated in the homes of Dutch settlers; the first Dutch school to train Indonesians for civil service jobs was founded in 1848. By 1851, there were schools for clerks and health officers. Then, between 1902 and 1908, numerous technical schools were established to train Indonesian officials. An agricultural school was opened in 1903; medical and veterinary schools were in place by 1907; a law school was opened in 1908. By 1914, Western-type education was extended to the high school and elementary school levels, where Indonesians were introduced to a curriculum that included the study of Dutch, English, science, mathematics, and drawing. In the 1920s, schools for law, engineering, and specialized administrative jobs were introduced.

Finally, Dutch administrators introduced new law codes. A code for foreign "orientals" was introduced in 1848, and a criminal code for native Indonesians in 1872. Between 1904 and 1927, the Dutch attempted to bring customary law into accord with European norms, and to establish a unified system of legal administration. However, after 1927, Dutch policy reverted to a dualistic law system that maintained the customary Indonesian legal systems alongside European codes and procedures. The Dutch gave Indonesia a legal system compounded of customary law (*adat*), Muslim, and Dutch statute law.

After centuries in which the Dutch had merely skimmed the profits of the Indies without touching the underlying structure of society, in the early twentieth century they launched the modern transformation of Indonesia. Dutch rule and the consolidation of a capitalist economy diminished the power and wealth of both the old elites and the cultivators. Government administration and trade promoted new forces in society. These included functionaries and technicians in the ever-growing state bureaucracies, and merchants and businessmen empowered by an expanding economy. These social and economic changes were the basis of both Islamic and secular nationalist ideologies and political movements.

Southeast Asian responses to Dutch Rule

Islamic traditionalism and revolt

Foreign rule provoked a great variety of responses. The traditional *'ulama'* and Sufis, the former political elites, the new strata of Indonesian administrators and intellectuals, Muslim reformers, non-Indonesian Chinese, Hadhramauti, and Indian immigrants, and eventually radical military leaders rose to lay competing claim to the future of Southeast Asian societies. Secular nationalist, communist, Islamic traditionalist, and Islamic reformist and other movements were pitted against Dutch and British rule, and against each other, in the struggle to define Southeast Asian societies in the twentieth century.

The earliest reactions to consolidated Dutch rule and the decline of the aristocracies came from Muslim milieus. Ever since the consolidation of Mataram in the early seventeenth century, the Javanese elites had been divided into two groups – the *priyayi*, conditioned by Javanese values, who governed, and the *kiyayi*, who represented the Islamic religion and community loyalty. They were mosque officials, religious teachers, guardians of holy sites, and students at religious high schools (*pesantrens*). With the absorption of the *priyayi* aristocracy into the Dutch colonial administration, the *kiyayi* became the only independent representatives of Javanese

society. The changing balance of power allowed for a resurgence of *'ulama'* challenges to the authority of the *priyayi* elites.

Muslim institutions included two types of schools. The traditional *pesantrens* taught the Quran and Arabic prayers by rote, but did not necessarily teach the Arabic language. Many inculcated belief in supernatural powers and hidden forces. Dispersed through the countryside, these *pesantrens* were connected by webs of intermarriage among the religious scholars, and by close and lasting bonds between students and teachers. In addition to the traditional schools there were schools committed to legal reform emphasizing the ritual aspects of Islam and participation in the Sufi orders. From the 1850s, the Naqshbandiyya and the hybrid Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya gave increasing emphasis to observing Islam's five pillars. The Naqshbandiyya tended to attract the elites, and the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya the common people.

On Java, religious teachers became the leaders of peasant rebellions. Throughout the nineteenth century local *kiyayis* appealed to the sentiments of jihad and Islamic justice to generate peasant uprisings against oppression. In Banten, deprived noble families, religious leaders, village elders and chiefs, and abused peasants rebelled in the name of the old sultanate or in the name of Islam. There were repeated insurrections from 1820 to 1888. In the 1840s and 1850s, Banten was swept by a religious revival. This included increased observance of Muslim rituals and pilgrimage, the establishment of schools, and enrollment in the religious brotherhoods. The orders preached a reformed version of Islam with insistence upon strict observance of Quranic rules, and combined religious revivalism with strong hostility to foreign rule. Equally important were expectations of the coming of the Mahdi. Many outraged rebels believed that they were on the verge of a messianic era in which the Christian rulers would be defeated and the messiah enthroned. Letters were circulated purporting to bear signs of the end of the world and the last days. Wandering preachers stimulated the fervor. Many *kiyayis* came to be venerated as miracle workers who could foretell the future and heal the sick. In 1845, peasant rebels put on white clothes to indicate that they were fighting a holy war, and peasant gangs attacked Dutch officials and Javanese administrators.

Between 1880 and 1888, the Qadiri order enlisted the independent *kiyayis* into a unified movement linked through religious boarding schools and the Sufi orders. Religious hopes turned upon the conviction that the territory of Islam would be freed from foreign subjugation and that an independent Muslim state would come into being.

Elsewhere in the Indies, the Padri movement in Minangkabau, the Banjermasin war of 1859, and the Aceh wars of 1871–1908 all involved *'ulama'*-led peasant resistance to the Dutch and the local political elites.

The Dutch attempted to counter the Muslim-led rebellions by alliances with the local *priyayi* and customary chiefs, and by curtailing the pilgrimage, which they recognized as a principal stimulus to Indonesian resistance. The massive Banten revolts and the protracted Aceh wars, however, forced a reexamination of Dutch policy. Upon the recommendation of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), the Dutch orientalist, anthropologist, and advisor on colonial policy, the Dutch distinguished Islam as a religion from Islamic political militancy. They decided to allow greater freedom to make the pilgrimage to Muslims who accepted Dutch rule. At the same time they maintained their surveillance. Anti-Dutch political action was ruthlessly suppressed. Thus, while Islamic religious opposition did not shake Dutch rule, Islam became more deeply rooted in Indonesian rural society.

The *priyayi*, the merchant elites, nationalism, and Islamic modernism

While Islamic *kiyayi* and peasant resistance was rooted in the traditional structures of Indonesian society, Indonesian nationalism and Islamic modernism had their origins in the late nineteenth-century reactions of the *priyayi* aristocracy and the merchant elites to the consolidation of Dutch rule.

The first *priyayi* response to the stripping away of royal authority and aristocratic privileges was a backward-looking revival of local court cultures. Then, to compensate for the loss of political autonomy,

the old nobility began to serve in the colonial administration. In addition, Dutch policy brought into being a new lower stratum of *priyayi*. On Java, Dutch policies required medical, engineering, legal, and teaching professionals, and technically trained civil servants in the forestry, mining, agricultural, railway, telegraph, and health administrations. The new professionals and administrators were drawn from the lesser-ranking *priyayi* families, the scions of the newly rich in Minangkabau and the outer islands, the children of provincial chieftains, and Ambonese and Mindanau Christians. These newly educated professionals and administrators interposed themselves between the old aristocracy and the peasantry, and competed with the village *'ulama'* and headmen. Even though they benefited from policies that attempted to integrate Indonesians into Western culture and Dutch administration, the new administrators were opposed to European domination. They clamored for increased educational opportunities and for more political power.

On the outer islands, the merchants of Sumatra, Singapore, and Malaya, tied to a Muslim system of international economic and cultural exchanges, also opposed Dutch rule as a threat to both their commercial and religious interests. They opposed Dutch restrictions on Muslim trade and pilgrimage, and the competition of Christian missionaries.

These new and frustrated strata were the basis of an ideological and political renaissance in the early twentieth century. Inspired by the Russo-Japanese War and by the Indian and Chinese nationalist movements, and threatened at home by Chinese political competition, Western-educated Indonesians and Muslims banded together to promote Indonesian cultural and political awareness. Out of these several milieus came new programs for secular nationalism, socialism, and Islamic revival, each of which aspired to an independent and modern form of Indonesian and Malayan civilization.

The Priyayi *and Secular Nationalism.*

Priyayi bureaucrats, professionals, and intellectuals favored secular and nationalist culture and identity. By embracing both the Javanese cultural past and the European cultural present they hoped to arrive

at an authentic contemporary ethnic identity, distinct from that of the Dutch and the Chinese. Schools were critical to this cultural goal. Some were founded by the Dutch, some by *priyayi*, to teach practical subjects such as surveying, arithmetic, and geography along with Javanese language, literature, and script. By 1861, there were 44 government schools in Java with 1,931 pupils. By 1900, the numbers of students had grown to 50,000.

The new nationalism in 1908 found its first organizational expression on Java with the formation of Budi Utomo. The founders of Budi Utomo (Noble endeavor) looked to Hinduism and Buddhism as the sources of Javanese culture, and to modern Dutch education as the key to reviving Javanese civilization. At first loyal to Dutch rule, by 1917 Budi Utomo was calling for Indonesian autonomy and a parliamentary regime.

Budi Utomo was soon followed by the Indische Partij, formed in 1911 by Efi Douwes-Deckker to represent the "Indos" of mixed European and Indonesian descent and to present their claim for equality with Europeans. This was the first party to claim political independence for a united Indonesia. Taman Siswa (Garden of learning), founded in 1922, was devoted to an educational program to restore Javanese arts and culture. The association founded some 250 schools and tried to create a national community of students and teachers to promote the maturation of the Indonesian nation and its aspirations to independence.

At the same time, a Malay national identity was being formed by a Malay-language vernacular press. Until 1855, all newspapers and periodicals were written in Dutch. With the growth of commerce and advertising, the press adopted the widely understood bazaar form of Malay. The Jawi Peranakan, the offspring of Malabari Indian traders and Malay women, were among the leaders of the Malay language revival and of an incipient Malay national consciousness. They worked as clerks, interpreters, schoolteachers, and merchants, and ranked after the Arab community in prestige and authority. In 1876, they published the first Malay newspaper, *Jawi Peranakan* (Javanese by birth), and sponsored the publication of Malay romances, poetry and tales, and translations of Arabic religious literature. *Wazir Indie*,

aimed at Malay officers of the Indies government, appeared in Batavia in 1878. The Amsterdam-based *Bintang Hindia* called on Indonesians to imitate the Chinese and the Arabs to develop a secular modernity. In Singapore, several Malay-language journals, owned or operated by indigenous Muslims, also promoted a concept of nationhood based on an ethno-linguistic community that excluded Chinese or Indian inhabitants of the region from its program. A society for linguistic knowledge worked out Malay equivalents for English terms and absorbed Arabic words into Malay usage. Out of these efforts came a shared language and a new Malay consciousness, transcending specific localities.

Islamic Reformism and Islamic Modernism.

In parallel with these ethnic–national movements, new forms of Islamic religious, social, and political action were born in the major ports of Sumatra, Java, and Malaya. Indonesian and Malay Islamic revivalism and Islamic modernism were the product of a new Javanese and Malay middle class. The culture system and the growing export economies of Java and Sumatra created new transport, metalworking, bricklaying, shipbuilding, fishing, agricultural processing, and other industries. In the coastal towns, the Javanese and Sumatran middle class linked up with Arab trading communities. The ranks of government officials and teachers increased. The new middle classes leaned toward a lifestyle suitable both for the well-to-do and to the devoutly Muslim. They observed the pillars of Islam, eschewed opium and gambling, and educated and disciplined their children.

The pilgrimage, extended stays in the Arabian holy places, studies in Cairo, and contacts with Hadhramauti immigrants brought Malay and Indonesian Muslims into contact with Islamic reformist and modernist teachings, heightened their consciousness of Muslim identity, intensified their commitment to proper Muslim worship and behavior, and made them aware of Muslim worldwide opposition to European colonialism. Returned pilgrims took a prominent place in their communities as merchants, landowners, and moneylenders, promoted reformed Sufi orders, and challenged the authority of the

rural *kiyayi*. They were the standard bearers of Islamic reform and modernism.

There were two principal strands of reformism. Legal-oriented reformism emphasized the religious obligations of daily life. Sufi-oriented reformism, promoted by the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya, integrated legal and ritual practice with mysticism. The reformers opposed the established schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*madhhabs*), and popular Sufi practices such as celebrations of the death days of saints, and customary marriage, funeral, and holy-day ceremonies. They brought into public debate such religious questions as whether the correct procedure in prayer was to recite the *niya* (intention) aloud or silently, and whether savings banks and cooperatives were legitimate. They denounced the practices of both the traditional *'ulama'* and of the village *penghulus* (customary chiefs).

The most extreme reformist, indeed fundamentalist, movement, called the Rifa'iyya, was founded by Haji Ahmad Rifa'i. He rejected both the traditional schools of law and mystical practices, and called for the purification of Islam from folk-cultural accretions. Only the original Islam as revealed in the Quran and the example of the Prophet could be the basis of true belief and practice. His followers withdrew from society, built separate mosques, avoided association with other Muslims, and rejected the authority of officials who served under the colonial regime. The reformers were called *putihan* (white-robed) or *santri* (holy men).

Islamic modernism grew up alongside and intertwined with Islamic reformism. The growth of the middle classes, the pilgrimage, and contacts with indigenous and immigrant Arab Muslims introduced Indonesian Muslims to the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. They resembled the reformists in their call for a return to Quran and sunna, but they were also imbued with the conviction that Islam was a rational religion that should be integrated with modernity. They stood for a flexible interpretation of Islamic law stressing its applicability to contemporary conditions, giving priority to considerations of public interest and welfare, and wide scope for independent judgment in the application of the law (*ijtihad*).

Singapore, a melting-pot of Southeast Asian peoples, became the principal center of both Islamic reformism and modernism. Indonesians on pilgrimage passed through it because Dutch restrictions made British-ruled Singapore a more convenient port. Singapore also had a large Malay population, immigrants from Minangkabau, Javanese laborers in transit, and large Arab and Indian Muslim communities. The Arab settlement was especially important. Many Arabs worked in Singapore as brokers arranging the pilgrimage traffic. Shaykhs and *sayyids* from Hadhramaut had great prestige, and were respected for their religious probity. They were a commercial elite, owned land and houses, invested in plantations and trade, and controlled the batik, tobacco, and spice trades. They built mosques, organized festivals, and cultivated Arabic and Muslim cultural sophistication. They contributed to the development of a cosmopolitan Muslim religious consciousness no longer tied to particular localities. In Singapore, Islam was no longer the religion of village communities, but of mobile individuals united in an international association. From Singapore, reformist and modernist Islam spread throughout Southeast Asia by trade, pilgrimage, and by the movement of students, teachers, and Sufis.

Minangkabau was another center for revitalized Islamic religious and social action. Minangkabau's history of Islamic reform began early in the nineteenth century with the Padri movement, which attempted to bring custom into accord with Shari'a. That struggle ended in Dutch rule, but reformist Sufis, especially of the Naqshbandi order, continued to denounce customary practices and to insist on the reform of Islam.

The Malay Peninsula was also a theater of modernist developments. The modernist view was represented by the Kaum Muda, or Young Group, who were determined to revitalize education. The Young Group was in bitter competition with the "Old Group" (Kaum Tua) traditionalists, the defenders of the old-style boarding schools predominantly located in rural areas. A leader in the movement was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib (1855–1916), who had studied in Mecca, been introduced to the ideas of Muhammad 'Abduh, and returned to raise a new generation of Sumatran and Malayan

scholars who in turn founded new schools, publications, and religious missions. Shaykh Muhammad Tahir (1867–1957), who had also studied in Mecca and absorbed the ideas of Muhammad ʿAbduh, founded the newspaper *al-Imam*, published in Singapore from 1906 to 1908. *Al-Imam* tried to awaken Muslims to the need for education. Tahir taught that the decline of Islam was due to neglect of the divine law and that submission to the Quran and hadith would uplift the lives of individual Muslims and help bring about a renaissance in the Muslim community. *Al-Imam* stressed the importance of using reason in religious matters and challenged customary beliefs and practices. Even though the Kaum Muda favored the modernization of customary law along Western and secular lines, on the question of women's dress they were often more conservative than the traditionalists.

Education was the primary concern of the Kaum Muda. In the 1910s and 1920s, it established madrasas in Singapore, West Sumatra, and south-central Java. In the 1920s, Penang became the center of reformist thought, owing to the work of Sayyid Shaykh al-Hadi, who founded the Madrasa al-Mashhor in 1919 and the Jelutong Press in 1927 to publish books on the subject of the emancipation of women and other reform issues. By the 1920s, there were thirty-nine such schools and 17,000 students in Sumatra. The new madrasas combined a religious curriculum with a program of studies in history, geography, mathematics, and other secular subjects, organized in graded classes, provided with textbooks, and taught by salaried instructors. Madrasas introduced the Roman alphabet rather than the modified Arabic script known as *jawi*. They also provided education for girls, and sponsored scout clubs, student newspapers, and sports.

On Java, reformism and modernism blended together in the foundation of several educational, missionary, and, ultimately, political movements. The most important of these was Muhammadiyya, founded in 1912 by Hajji Ahmad Dahlan for the reform of the practice of Islam and the betterment of the Muslim community. Dahlan was the son of a religious official, a pilgrim to Mecca, a mosque officer, and a trader in batik. His movement appealed to poor and middling traders. Muhammadiyya advocated a pious life based on the duties described in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, but rejected the medieval Muslim legal and philosophical systems and the authority of

Muslim saints in favor of *ijtihad*, or individual reasoning in religious matters. Muhammadiyya discouraged elaborate birth, circumcision, wedding, and funeral rituals, and opposed the veneration of shrines, but not Sufism as such. It stressed the importance of ethics, controlling base desires, and the deepening of wisdom and moral understanding. Muhammadiyya taught that personal virtue had to be expressed in social action.

Muhammadiyya's primary project was the creation of modern-type religious schools. While the *pesantren* were devoted to recitation of sacred scriptures and mystical formulae, the Muhammadiyya schools taught Islamic religious principles, the Arabic language, Dutch, and secular subjects. They introduced a graded program of study, rationalized methods of instruction, and emphasized comprehension and reasoning rather than memorization. Muhammadiyya made effective use of Western-inspired styles of association, management, and fund raising. By 1929, the movement had founded countless village schools, teacher-training colleges, and many libraries, clinics, orphanages, hospitals, and poorhouses. A women's movement and youth and scouting groups were attached to Muhammadiyya. The ultimate goal of the Muhammadiyya-related societies was *tabligh*, or evangelical teaching of the reformed Islamic faith.

A later Islamic reformist movement, Persatuan Islam, founded in West Java in 1923 by merchants led by Hajji Zamzam and Hajji Muhammad Yunus, held similar views. In addition, Persatuan Islam also denounced the wayang puppet theater because it represented Hindu culture and encouraged the freedom of women. Persatuan Islam was also opposed to secular nationalism as a form of idolatry of the nation. In its view, only by a return to true Islamic principles could the political power and the freedom of Indonesian and other Muslim peoples be restored. The movement founded colleges to train missionaries. A journal and numerous tracts were published in standard Indonesian, and study-groups were formed to educate Muslims.

A crucial step toward the construction of a united Indonesian movement was the informal union in 1918 of the Sumatran Kaum Muda and the Javanese Muhammadiyya. Between 1918 and 1923,

further efforts were made to unify the various Kaum Muda groups and channel them into political action. Radical intellectuals penetrated the Sumatran student movement to preach against capitalism and imperialism, oppose government taxes and forest policy, and call for independence both from the feudal authority of local notables and from the imperial rule of the Dutch. The Sumatran student groups appealed to petty traders and to smallholding peasants, and eventually provoked scattered rebellions that were put down by the Dutch in 1926 and early 1927. Thus, the Islamic movement began with a religious and reformist orientation focused on correct belief and practice of Islam, and through educational and social action cultivated a political consciousness in opposition to Dutch rule and the authority of the traditional aristocracies.

The conservative reaction

The formation of movements that emphasized religious reform, educational modernism, and political action provoked a countermovement among the traditional *'ulama'*. In 1921, the Union of 'Ulama' of Minangkabau was formed, followed in 1926 by the Nahdatul 'Ulama' (Union of *'ulama'*, NU) of Java. Nahdatul 'Ulama' was built around a network of religious notables centered on the *pesantren* of Jombang in East Java. NU rejected the reformist emphasis upon the Quran and sunna in favor of the traditional practice of Islam. It reaffirmed that Islamic law, the traditional schools of law, and Sufi practices were at the core of their spirituality. However, NU adopted the organizational techniques of Muslim reformist and nationalist movements. The *kiyayi*, who in the nineteenth century had organized resistance to Dutch rule and *priyayi* administration through the Sufi *tariqat*, in the twentieth century entered the struggle over the future of Indonesian society as a political party.

The differences between the old and new forms of Islam were manifold. The traditionalists viewed the world as unchanging; the reformers saw it as ever changing. The traditionalists viewed religion as a mystical and magical disposition of mind. Traditional religion was oriented to ritual, to states of feeling, and to passive acceptance of

reality. Prayer, fasting, and recitation were intended to create inner peace and bring about harmony between the believer and the truth. By contrast, the reformers stressed active mastery of the self, and defined religion in terms of individual responsibility for moral and social reform. Their religion was inner-directed, ethical, and intellectual. Whereas traditional religion maintained its commitment to a concept of the harmony of the individual with his community, the community with the state, and the state with the universe, reformist religion sought to create a Muslim utopia. To achieve these goals, the reformers adopted Western organizational and educational methods, accepted scientific ideas and the use of vernacular languages, and waged a vigorous campaign in the press. Scout movements, schools, orphanages, and hospitals were essential in making Islam an active force in society.

As these parallel Muslim tendencies developed, Javanese Muslims were increasingly divided into contending camps – some traditionalist, some reformist, some modernist. Javanese society was polarizing among the *priyayi* elite, a new middle class with either an Islamic or a secular national identity, and a peasantry still committed to traditional beliefs and ceremonies. The divisions came from the core of educational experiences: young *putihan* (reformers) learned to read Arabic and the Quran, but not Javanese script; government schools educated children who could read Javanese but not Arabic script.

Religious positions also contributed to defining Indonesian and Malayan views about the Dutch. Muslim clerics in official positions and anti-modernist *'ulama'* were often allied with customary chiefs (*uleebalangs*) in supporting colonial rule. Reciprocally, insofar as the Dutch supported customary chiefs and customary law they were allied with the traditionalists. However, in 1937, NU joined Muhammadiyya to form the Majisul Islamil Alaa Indonesia, or Higher Islamic Council of Indonesia. Religious leaders had come to see that they needed a united front against secular nationalism.

Islamic and secular nationalist political parties: 1900–1950

The cultural and educational awakening was followed by the creation of political parties. A combination of Islamic and political appeals made Sarekat Islam the first mass Indonesian political party. It was founded in 1912 by Hajji Samanhudi and ʻUmar Saʻid Tjokroaminoto in response to Chinese commercial competition and Christian missionary activities in Central Java. Sarekat Islam linked up with Muhammadiyya and the reformist movements of Sumatra. The Sarekat Islam congress of 1917 declared that Islam required Indonesians to exert themselves in the faith and to avoid resignation to poverty. It made demands for the improvement of agriculture, government subsidies for education, the abolition of feudal privileges, and the extension of electoral rights to Indonesians. Middle-class urban people, *ʻulama'*, and peasants all supported the movement. Many peasants believed that Sarekat Islam was a harbinger of the coming of the *ratu adil* (the just prince) and the Mahdi.

In the next fifteen years, however, Sarekat Islam broke up over differences of ideology and political orientation. In the 1920s, it adopted a militant Islamic, anti-communist, and anti-Dutch orientation, but the rise of a socialist wing polarized the party. In 1923, the leftists were forced out, and with them Sarekat Islam lost the mass of its followers. It lost the peasantry when it was challenged by NU. By the late 1920s, the pan-Islamic idea had failed, and Sarekat Islam turned to a nationalist line, changing its name to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. This political position led to a falling out with Muhammadiyya, which was primarily concerned with educational and missionary activities.

Other Muslim parties resumed the political struggle. Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia, founded in 1930, campaigned against imperialism and capitalism, and called for Indonesian independence as an essential condition for both Islamic reform and economic prosperity. The Partai Islam Indonesia also combined Muslim, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist slogans. This party called for reform of Islam, independence from Holland, the formation of a unified

Indonesian parliamentary state, and state control of vital economic enterprises. Indonesian Muslim parties formulated new demands for a parliamentary regime that would include a ministry of Islamic affairs and in which two-thirds of the ministers would be Muslims. However, by the 1930s, the Muslim movements remained divided among activist, reformist, and conservative religious wings. A single mass movement was still not possible, but the parallel activities of the various Muslim groups generated widespread support and created a broad base for their ultimate claim to form an independent and Muslim Indonesian state.

With the weakening of the Muslim political movements, the initiative shifted to the nationalists. The nationalist movement developed in two wings – one representing the interests of workers and radical intelligentsia; the other representing Western-educated *priyayi* civil service and professional milieus. Both wings stressed secular values and the combination of Indonesian heritage with international and Western ideals.

The labor union movement was established soon after the turn of the century. In 1905, a government railroad workers' union was founded, followed by unions of tramway workers, customs officers, teachers, pawnshop employees, public works, and treasury officials. Radical young *priyayi* built coalitions with workers and peasants. Radical leadership was supplied by the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging, founded in 1914, which introduced socialism and communism into Indonesian politics. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was established in 1920. In 1924, the party called for the separation of religion and state, and opposed public funds for the support of religious activities. In 1925 and 1926, the communists provoked a series of strikes in Semarang and revolts in Jakarta and other parts of Java and Sumatra. These revolts were crushed, and the PKI was declared illegal and forced underground.

With the founding of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in 1927, Sukarno became the leading proponent of Indonesian unity, independence from Holland, and the separation of state and religion. He wrote extensively on the question of Islam and the state, and urged a program resembling Ataturk's Turkey, in which Islam would

be permitted as a personal religion but would not influence a secular national state. In 1939, the federation of Indonesian political parties, GAPI, was formed to give cohesion to the nationalist movement.

From 1900 to approximately 1920, Dutch policy indirectly favored the rise of the nationalist and Islamic movements. The Dutch supported education; Indonesians were employed in administration; political parties were legalized; freedom of the press was allowed. Then, in response to the growing nationalist and Muslim opposition, the Dutch retreated from the Ethical Policy and turned to renewed centralization of power and repression. They tried to hamper the Muslim movements by establishing state control of education through the so-called guru ordinances of 1905 and 1925, which required that Muslim instruction be licensed by the regents. A law of 1932 required government permission for non-state schools. *Priyayi* were given control over the legal administration of marriages, to the chagrin of Muslims. Christian missionaries were supported by state subsidies for travel and schools. In 1935, the Dutch proscribed political parties; in 1940, they banned political meetings.

World War II and the Japanese occupation (1942–45), however, gave tremendous encouragement to the Muslims. The Japanese occupation of the Indies undermined the old aristocracy and rapidly brought the Muslim movements under Japanese control. While they suspended many of the political parties, they allowed Muhammadiyya and Nahdatul 'Ulama' to function. They established a religious affairs and propaganda office to take control of all Muslim education above the primary level. They also formed Muslim militias with a flag featuring a crescent and rising sun to signify the identification of jihad with Japan's war against the West. Special training courses for intellectuals and *kiyayis* were established. In November 1943, the Japanese founded Masjumi to unify and coordinate all of the Muslim movements. Under the aegis of Masjumi they created a religious bureaucracy staffed by Muslims to connect the central administration with the villages. The formation of labor and military battalions generated new military and religious leaders from proletarian backgrounds.

Thus, the Japanese gave the Muslims important advantages in the forthcoming struggle to determine the political and cultural principles of an independent Indonesian state. A coalition of middle-class merchants, rich peasants, and village *'ulama'* had been mobilized to cooperate with the Japanese. The administrative and military functions assigned to the Muslims greatly enhanced their political power and enlarged the clientele for later political action.

Having destroyed the Dutch, the Japanese were in turn defeated in 1945. On August 17, 1945, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian independence, but with British help the Dutch attempted to regain control of the Indies. The struggle to make independence a reality took more than five years. Only in August 1950, under Indonesian military and United Nations political pressures, were the Dutch finally obliged to recognize an independent republic.

The Indonesian Republic

At the time of the formation of the independent Indonesian Republic, there was no nation-wide Indonesian society. Indonesians were organized into separate political, religious, and ethnic movements and communities called *aliran*. The *aliran* were built around conflicting versions of religious truth (mystic synthesis, modernist, reformed Sufi, orthodox legal, and messianic forms of Islam), and secular ideologies (nationalism, socialism, communism). Each movement had its own schools, social activities, and political organizations. In the villages, the parties organized charities, youth, sports and women's groups, and social clubs. From the local point of view, nationalist, communist, and Muslim parties were more than ideologies. They were a form of community built on networks of shared belief, common education, and social solidarity that channeled everything from entertainment to education to political action into a single movement.

In many respects, the Muslim and nationalist movements were following a pattern already established by Dutch rule. Dutch administration had defined urban neighborhoods and rural villages as collective units for taxation and policing, and by the nineteenth century the Dutch and other European elites formed a distinct ethnic

community. The Chinese were treated as a separate entity. Without distinction, new immigrants and Indonesian-born Chinese were considered "Chinese," a foreign community, excluded from the military and bureaucratic apparatus that conferred political power, but useful as a wealthy capitalist class. The imperial power also set a precedent for the organization of political parties, schools, and public services along religious, Catholic and Protestant, lines – the so-called "pillarization." In Indonesia, these structures made it impossible to integrate the national society, and generated competition that would leave control of the state in the hands of a Dutch political and military class.

At the outset the government of the new republic was formed by a coalition of Muslim and nationalist parties including Masjumi, NU, PNI, and PKI. The demands of the Muslim political parties for the constitution and institutions of the new republic were only partially met. They first demanded the formation of a *negara islam* (an Islamic state). To Muslim conservatives this meant that most ministers would be Muslims and that a parliament of *kiyayis* would be formed to review legislation and pronounce on its conformity to Islamic law. To Muslim reformers it meant a general proclamation of the principle that the state was in accord with Islamic law. The nationalists, however, were in favor of the *pançasila*, or five principles, which were belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice. The nationalist program pointedly omitted any direct reference to Islam, and emphasized secular concepts instead. In the constitution of the republic, the *pançasila* was enshrined as the symbol of the new order.

To satisfy Muslim interests, the constitution provided for the formation of a Ministry of Religion to administer Muslim marriages and divorces, endowments, mosques, and the pilgrimage. Its Bureau of Religious Education managed government-sponsored religious schools; the Bureau of Religious Propaganda distributed books and pamphlets and otherwise promoted Islamic missionary efforts. The Bureau of Religious Justice regulated Shariʿa courts. The new ministry was a vast bureaucratic apparatus that linked the central government to the villages and provided an important source of patronage and influence for the Islamic political parties. It satisfied

Muslim interests in having state support for Islam and encouraged hopes for the eventual realization of an Islamic state.

On the outer islands, however, various Muslim groups refused to accept the compromise, and determined to fight for the immediate realization of an Islamic state. During World War II Sumatra had gone through a revolution that destroyed the power of the feudal chiefs in Aceh, Minangkabau, and the East Coast residency. In Aceh the *'ulama'* defeated the local *uleebalang* aristocracy and consolidated their own political position. Muslim groups in the Celebes and Kalimantan also insisted on the immediate formation of an Islamic state. In some of these cases, the concern for an Islamic state may have been a front to win the autonomy of outer islands from the central government in Java.

The most important of these rebel Islamic movements was Dar ul-Islam, founded by a former Sarekat Islam activist named Kartosuwirjo. In 1940, he founded the Suffah Institute as a propaganda and training center to produce cadres for Muslim missionary work and for the Muslim military unit Hizballah, organized by the Japanese under Masjumi auspices. In 1945, he was put in charge of Masjumi military units in western Java. He fought against the Dutch in 1947. In 1948, he refused to accept the Renville Agreement truce between Indonesian and Dutch forces, and appointed himself the Imam of an Islamic provisional government, Negara Islam Indonesia. He declared his Islamic state to be based upon the Quran. It was in constitutional form a republic with an elected parliament. The Imam, elected by the parliament, was the head of state. The new state proclaimed that it would guarantee equality before the law, the right to a decent standard of living, and freedom of worship, speech, and assembly for all citizens. All important civil and military positions were reserved for Muslims. Armed struggle against the Dutch and later against the Indonesian Republic continued until it was finally suppressed in 1962.

The defeat of Dar ul-Islam transferred the struggle over identity to the political sphere. The unresolved political struggles among Masjumi, PNI, the communists, NU, and Muhammadiyya led to a national election in 1955, which proved to be a critical moment in

Indonesian history. It consolidated the *aliran* as the basic form of Indonesian ideological and social organization. The election results were also a decisive check to the campaign for the formation of an Islamic state. In Java the Muslim vote was split among the Muslim traditionalist, modernist-reformist, and Communist parties. On the outer islands, in the strong Muslim areas of Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and North Sulawesi, the vote was substantially Muslim but was divided between the reformers and the conservatives. In the national tally, the combined Muslim parties polled only 42.5 percent of the vote, and fell short of the majority essential to form a parliamentary Islamic state. Though Indonesia was overwhelmingly Muslim, the Muslim parties were a political minority.

Sukarno and a secular Indonesia: 1955–1965

With the defeat of Muslim aspirations, control of the state was taken over by President Sukarno and the army. In 1957, Sukarno attempted to bypass the parliamentary system by creating a Guided Democracy. Army officers on Sumatra and Sulawesi and leaders of Masjumi opposed the Sukarno program and formed a revolutionary government. This government was defeated, and in July 1959 Sukarno dissolved the constituent assembly and declared a presidential regime. Major sectors of the economy were nationalized, and the army took control of important industries. Authoritarian controls were set up over political parties, labor unions, and newspapers. Masjumi was disbanded in 1960, and its leaders arrested and imprisoned. The new regime was buttressed by an ideological program called Nasakom, in which Sukarno attempted to synthesize nationalism, religion, and communism as the symbols of a highly centralized regime and centrally planned economy.

Nahdatul 'Ulama', however, maintained close ties with Sukarno. While Masjumi represented outer-island reformist, urban, and commercial interests, NU represented a Javanese peasant constituency. It was willing to accept Sukarno's authority, with its strong overtones of traditional Javanese statecraft, and suspend the ultimate goal of an Islamic state in return for control over the Ministry of Religion and for the protection of its political position in the

Javanese countryside. While Masjumi was broken because of its ideological demands, NU retained political and tactical flexibility.

The Sukarno regime soon broke down. Sukarno alienated the intellectual and artistic elites by the suppression of cultural and political expression. He brought the country to virtual economic ruin as a result of staggering foreign debts. The regime also gave the communists an important political position. The communists threatened the army's control of the corporations nationalized in 1957 and 1958, and embarrassed it in its relations with its main supplier, the United States. They initiated a land-reform program in 1963, and then attempted by direct action to expropriate the estates of large landowners. The communist challenge, however, provoked an alliance between the conservative Muslim parties and the army. In 1964 and 1965, there were battles between communists and Muslim youth gangs belonging to the Islamic Students' Association and NU. In late 1965, an attempted communist coup triggered a massive civil war in East and Central Java and the slaughter of an estimated half a million communists.

The Suharto regime: state and Islam, 1965–1998

With the defeat of the communists, General Suharto established a new military regime. He came to power on the basis of a coalition of Indonesian army officers, Protestant and Catholic minorities, the secular professional and bureaucratic middle class, the Westernized academic intelligentsia, and some Islamic community organizations. Army officers held the key positions as ministers, local officials, heads of state-run businesses, members of parliament, and leaders of the regime's political party, Golkar. Golkar drew support from former communist, PNI, and Masjumi activists. The military had important business interests as well. They were involved in the allocation of contracts, forestry, and import–export licenses. They were allied to businessmen and could promote business interests in government regulation and labor disputes.

Gradually, however, from the late 1970s to the 1990s, Suharto, now president, diminished the role of the military in the government and the economy in favor of technocrats, business leaders, and Golkar politicians who were part of his nationwide network of relatives, clients, protégés, and loyalists. With the help of advisors educated in the United States, he adopted a free-enterprise program of development that benefited Chinese-run conglomerates rather than Muslim businessmen. He personally controlled the government and the economy.

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Suharto regime also exploited the rivalries among the Islamic parties, especially Nahdatul 'Ulama' and Muhammadiyya, to maintain authoritarian rule. Suharto kept close control over Muslim parties. Graduates of Indonesia's Islamic schools were excluded from the new political class. In 1968, President Suharto permitted the formation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia on condition that all former Masjumi leaders were excluded from the executive of the new party. In 1969, the government also established its own center for Indonesian Islamic *da'wa*, or missionary activities, to take away the fire of the independent Muslim missions. In 1973, four Islamic parties were fused into the United Development Party (PPP), which was denied a Muslim name and was closely regulated by the government.

Not only were Muslim political ambitions checked, but Muslim identities were challenged by nationalist secular ideologies. The *pançasila* principles were again advanced as an Indonesian and Javanese alternative to Islam. Under the banner of secularism the state began to encroach upon Islamic law. A marriage reform bill of 1974 proposed secular inheritance and adoption laws in competition with Islamic law. Further challenges came from Kebatinan, or Javanese mystical groups. Kebatinan supporters tried to identify Javanese mysticism with the *pançasila*, and to create a new national religion. Equally important was the potential for Christian proselytizing. The government allowed Catholics and the World Council of Churches to build schools and hospitals, even though Indonesian law forbade missionary activities among Hindus, Buddhists, or Muslims. Many Muslims responded to political and

cultural pressures by accommodating to the secularization of state and society. The exclusion of Islamic groups from political power legitimized the drift away from Muslim identity. Muslim politicians were willing to put aside ideological objectives and operate in a pluralistic political system as one group among many. For these politicians, who had wide business, regional, or professional contacts, Islam was only one element of identity. Nahdatul 'Ulama' cooperated with the government through the Ministry of Religion and through *'ulama'* councils in Aceh, West Java, and West Sumatra. NU congresses accepted that *pançasila*, without reference to Islam, were the basic principles of Indonesian society. The Indonesian Students' Association's (HMI) 1971 charter accepted the secularization of society and the concept of Islam as a personal religion. Its main spokesman was Nurcholish Majid, who saw Islam as a private belief system rather than a communal and political one, and stressed cooperation with non-Islamic groups. He argued that worldly matters are not regulated by divine law.

Despite these political and cultural setbacks, the basic strength of the Muslim movements remained considerable. At the local level, the *'ulama'* retained their prominence. In West Java and Sumatra, the *kiyayi* exerted a substantial influence upon family, agricultural, and other village affairs. Through *'ulama'* and school networks, regional councils, national religious parties, and the Ministry of Religion, the *kiyayi* were able to influence the government. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education promoted Muslim education and publications. The ministry devised a comprehensive Islamic school program including six-year elementary, four-year intermediate, and four-year senior high school education. Religious instruction was added to the curriculum of all government schools. Since 1960, religion has been a compulsory subject at college and university levels.

Another factor in Islamic strength was the continuing vitality of the reformist and modernist movements. Muhammadiyya claimed an active membership numbering in the millions. Though the major Muslim movements avoided politics, they continued to work for an Islamic society by moral, religious, and social action. Some promoted *da'wa*, or preaching; others worked for Muslim social welfare, and

some technocrats worked within the government for a development-oriented Islam. Muhammadiyya continued to provide a personal ideal of rational, efficient, and puritanical behavior, a concept of community, and a model of an ongoing Islamic society. In 1967, the Dewan daʿwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian council for Islamic propagation, DDII) was sponsored by Muhammadiyya and former members of Masjumi to distribute literature, preach to public meetings, organize mosque and library construction, and sponsor irrigation and forestry projects.

Moreover, by the 1970s an Islamic revival was under way and Islam reemerged as a rallying point for opposition to a regime perceived as dominated by secular nationalists, Christians, and Chinese businessmen. In the outer islands, frustrated by the high degree of centralization of power on Java, Muslims intensified their demand for the formation of an Islamic state. The Congress of ʿUlamaʾ of Aceh was formed to see that Muslims worshiped properly and maintained Islamic precepts in family and business matters. Their goal was to convert nominal Muslims into dedicated and active participants in a Muslim community. For Muslims with this orientation, political activity declined in favor of an upsurge of prayer, fasting, and other religious practices. (See Illustration 31.)

Illustration 31.   Dawn prayer to celebrate the end of Ramadan, Jogyakarta, Indonesia (Hutchinson Library).

The 1970s also saw the growth of the Salman movement on campuses, led by Imaduddin Abdulrahim, promoting a student life strict in prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, but easy in dress and amusements. At state universities, campus mosques, prayer and religious discussion groups, and Islamic dress for women became increasingly popular. Books, magazines, and other publications proliferated, including many translations of books on Islam from Arabic and English. Anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and anti-American books and pamphlets detailed the corruption of American society and the evils of American power.

The Salafi movement, sponsored and supported by Saudi Arabia, became important in the 1980s, stimulated by students who returned from Saudi Arabia to start Salafi madrasas. In the 1990s, the Salafi base broadened from a few small communities to a strong presence

on university campuses and in mosques and schools around the country. Islamic dress for women and long beards for men became still more common. The DDII carried out missionary work and helped recruit volunteers to fight in Afghanistan. Salafi political parties were also founded in 1998 and 1999. Other radical Muslim movements flourished. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejected nationalism and called for the restoration of a universal caliphate. In August 2000, the founding meeting of the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin was held in Yogjakarta to work for the implementation of Shariʿa and the establishment of an Islamic state.

Student interest in Islam spread through the educated middle classes, who now saw in Islam a response to urban anomie and secularist corruption. They carried their convictions into the country's bureaucratic, educational, and economic institutions. Islamic influence in public life was reinforced by the breakdown of the historical distinctions of abangan (traditionalist) and *santri* (reformist), NU and Muhammadiyya. Muslims were moving toward a broad consensus on Islamic values, and ever more toward a sociopolitical opposition.

From the late 1970s, the Suharto regime began to respond to the rising middle-class commitment to Islam. The Ministry of Religion built mosques, schools, and prayer halls, and strengthened the Islamic Institute Colleges. The government banned Christian missionary activity. Permission was given to women to wear the *jilbab* (head covering). Islamic think tanks, and research and conference centers were opened. In 1987, the government relaxed its control over Muslim missionary preachers. In 1990, Suharto himself made the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, after which he reversed previous policy, and under the leadership of his close associate, B. J. Habibie, created the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (AIMI) to promote the Islamization of Indonesia. Thus, the late phase of the Suharto regime reinforced Islamic political parties, schools, courts, banks, and other Islamic institutions. Though still under close political control, Islam was now declared integral to Indonesian national identity.

The Muslim elites and their followers were divided by this strategy. An ever-larger university-educated Muslim bourgeoisie – businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, military officers – aspiring to the lifestyle of wealthy Chinese businessmen and the power of Christian professionals and military officers were drawn to support the government. NU made its way back into influence. Committed to a national ideal in which Islam is a moral influence rather than to a totalistic state program, it was rewarded for its cooperation by many tokens of protection and patronage. However, many Muslim leaders opposed the new organization and saw the AIMI as a strategy to co-opt the Islamic movements in order to assure Suharto's reelection in 1998. This effort at co-optation failed when in 1998 Dr. Amin Rais, the head of Muhammadiyya, declared that the Islamic movements would no longer tolerate the corrupt Suharto regime. Given these divisions, Islam ceased to be a plausible category for political mobilization and the leadership of workers, peasants, and the urban poor.

The increasing cachet of Islam (in Malaysia as well as Indonesia) was expressed in Islamic-themed bourgeois and popular cultures. Islamic magazines and newspapers, films, television and radio, audio and video disks diffused stories, music, and songs with Islam-related content. Ramadan foods at McDonalds, sermon-laden soap operas, and musical styles conveyed a pop Islamic culture. The music of *orkes gambus*, an Arab genre originating in the Hadhramaut region of Yemen, has come to signify an Islamic Indonesian identity. Nasyid, also an Arab vocal genre, is the music of a fashionable and commercial Islamic pop culture, especially in Malaysia. It appeals to a largely female audience, but bears an explicit religious message. Pop singers and rock bands praise Allah and the Prophet and urge an Islamic moral code. The songs advocate chastity before and faithfulness in marriage, condemn gambling and drinking, and teach that faith in Allah will enable the believer to endure and overcome life's vicissitudes. Nasyid also bears the political messages in the form of jihadi themes and militant rhythms. It is the music of boy bands that appeals to girls wearing hijab and tight jeans. It fuses global pop, Western commercialism, and Islamic spirituality.

Another example of the fusion of Western commercialism and Islamic themes is the magazine *Cantiq*. An American-style women's magazine, it features trendy clothes and articles on sexuality, beauty tips, career advice, family psychology, and stories about drug addiction, eating disorders, learning disabilities, and marriage problems. At the same time, it conveys a conservative view of gender relations by emphasizing the primacy of women's sexual and domestic roles. This is a cultural style that attempts to integrate pop, politics, and piety, and Islam and Western-style commercialism. In this context, the veil or head covering stands not only for Islamic piety but also for Indonesian identity, commercial fashion, and urban middle-class status. This cultural fusion is sometimes called "Islamic Lite" or "Market Islam."

Indonesian Islam: 1998 to the present

The collapse of the Indonesian economy in 1997 brought an end to the Suharto regime. Throughout Southeast Asia, excessive foreign debt led to a collapse of stock markets and the value of local currencies, withdrawal of investments, decline of consumption, and growing unemployment. The collapse impoverished vast numbers of Indonesians and exposed the corruption and self-serving economic policies of the government. After demonstrations and riots, Suharto resigned in May 1998.

On the one hand, the political system was opened to competition, diversity, and instability. New political parties were formed. Free elections were held and governments peacefully changed hands. Civil society organizations and independent media flourished. On the other hand, the weakening of the central government opened the way for separatist movements in the outer islands. There were secessionist movements in Aceh, ethnic warfare in Irian Jaya and Kalimantan, Muslim–Christian riots in Ambon, and many other signs of the disintegration of state power and of the cohesion of Indonesian society. After bloody suppression, with United Nations assistance East Timor won its independence.

The collapse of state power and of the Suharto regime marked a retreat of Islamic influence in government. The succession to the presidency of Habibie (1998–2001), a client of Suharto, seemed to represent a victory for "Islam" or the Islamic movements, but his power was checked by General Wiranto, the minister of defense and commander in chief of the armed forces, and by his lack of support from Golkar. Habibie was succeeded by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), the former head of NU. In the elections of June 1999, however, the Islamic vote was splintered among numerous parties and factions, and non-Islamic parties made a powerful showing. Wahid was succeeded by Megawati Sukarnoputri (r. 2001–04), the daughter of Sukarno. Her government was based on the secular political parties and the military, and gave protection to the non-Muslim populations. The Megawati administration marked the defeat of the Islamist project in national politics. She was succeeded as president by General S. B. Yudhoyono (r. 2004–13).

In the post-Suharto order NU and Muhammadiyya took moderate positions to downplay the interethnic and interreligious conflicts within Indonesia and redefined the call for an Islamic state in terms of justice and prosperity. Thus, they echoed the positions of the Turkish AKP, the Tunisian an-Nahda, and other moderate Muslim parties competing in electoral politics. In the 2004 national elections, the combined vote of secular parties was about 60 percent and the combined vote of Islamic parties about 40 percent of the total.

The frustrations of the thwarted Muslim movements, the ambiguities of their place in society, and their seeming victory and rapid defeat led to a final effort by Muslim radicals to gain political power by violence. Indonesia has a long history of attacks on Chinese businesses, Christian churches, and government buildings, often provoked by perceived insults to Islam. From 1995 to 1998, students, vigilante mobs, anti-vice militias, and armed paramilitary youths, under the banner of Islam, covertly orchestrated by politicians, police and military officers, businessmen and gangsters, attacked the property of non-Muslims. Then, from 1998 to 2001, there were pogroms against individuals and communities, and finally, from 2000 to 2004, jihad.

The new jihads were not sporadic, popular outbursts like the earlier riots and pogroms. Jihad now meant planned and coordinated paramilitary assaults by small groups of heavily armed, trained, full-time fighters. The jihads were organized by groups such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah, affiliated with al-Irsyad, Persatuan Islam, and Dewan daʿwah Islamiyah Indonesia, parties known for their puritanism, anti-Christian, anti-secular, and anti-Semitic rhetoric, and their strong connections to Salafi and Wahhabi currents in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and to the global jihad of al-Qaeda. Laskar Jihad was created in early 2000 to send volunteers to fight against the Christians in the Moluccas. In 2000–01, Christian neighborhoods and villages in Maluku and Poso were attacked. From 2000 through 2004 such groups as the Army of Allah and the Islamic Youth Front attacked bars, cafes, nightclubs, hotels, and brothels, places that symbolized Western influences, immorality, and corruption. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington, the Indonesian government came under great American pressure to suppress radical Muslim groups, but sporadic violence by radical Islamists continues to the present. (See Map 38.)

Map 38. The Indian Ocean

British Malaya and independent Malaysia

At the same time that the Dutch were consolidating their Southeast Asian empire, the British were building an empire in Malaya. Having taken control of the Malacca Straits and the port of Singapore in 1819, they agreed with Siam in 1826 to divide Malaya into British and Siamese spheres of influence. From 1824 to 1867, they attempted to maintain their trading position without extending political or territorial controls. Nonetheless, the economic development of the region generated strong pressures for further British intervention. As Malaya's tin mines were opened to exploitation, large numbers of Chinese and Indian laborers flocked into the country. After a time Malays constituted little more than half of the total population, the Chinese 35 percent, and Indians about 10 percent. Malays controlled the government and regarded the Chinese, entrenched in the economy, as an alien, threatening intrusion, but the Malay states

were too weak and too dispersed among local district chieftains to cope with this complex situation. Chinese and British companies based in Singapore clamored for a strong government to secure their trading interests. The British colonial office also wanted British intervention because it feared Dutch expansion on Sumatra and the French occupation of Indo-China. Finally, in 1874 the British intervened in local wars and negotiated the so-called Pangkor engagement, by which the sultanate of Perak accepted a British resident, whose advice had to be asked on all revenue and finance questions, though not on matters of religion and local custom.

This was the beginning of colonial control. From 1877 to 1889, the British residents helped create a centralized government in Perak, including a civil service, a police force, a court system, roads, railways, and new taxes. At the same time the British took several of the smaller Malay states under their protection. In 1896, they brought Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan into a federation of Malay states. In 1909, the federation established a council of British officers and sultans to deal with the problems of tin and rubber development and the immigration of large numbers of Chinese and Indian workers. By World War I, the federated Malay states and the various unfederated Malay states, including Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Johore, were each subordinate to a British advisor. The Straits settlements, Singapore, and Malacca were crown colonies.

The British Malayan empire was built upon a capitalist economy concentrating upon agricultural and extractive industries. Sugar was introduced in the 1830s, coffee in the 1880s, and rubber at the end of the century. Pineapples and oil palms became important in the first decade of the twentieth century. Tin mining was important in Perak and Selangor; gold and iron were also mined. The mining industry was generally owned by Chinese and worked by Chinese labor. Penang and Singapore became the main ports for the export of Malayan tin and the importation of Chinese and other foreign laborers. By 1910, Malaya, like India, was exporting raw materials to Britain and Europe.

These developments had profound effects upon the organization of religious life and the relationship between Malay states and Muslim communities. In the traditional era, the sultans were the foremost religious and political functionaries, and symbolized the Islamic character of Malayan society. They had, however, a very limited role in the actual administration of Muslim law, education, and worship. The village *'ulama'* were the principal representatives of Islam. They maintained worship, taught Islamic lore, presided over ceremonies of marriage and death, arbitrated disputes, healed the sick, controlled communal property, and collected Islamic taxes. Their influence was consolidated by intermarriages among *'ulama'* and wealthy landlord families. Despite the occasional appointment of a *qadi* to the central administration, the *'ulama'* were basically individual functionaries independent of state control. Though they belonged to the Shafiʿi law school, and often to a mystic order, there was no central religious organization. The Sufi orders may have facilitated some standardization of religious views and education, but they did not actually create a collective body of religious teachers.

British domination drastically changed this system. When British residents centralized government, they deprived Malay sultans of their authority in all matters except those bearing on religion and custom. The sultans, therefore, tried to strengthen their influence in these areas, and extend state control over village religious life. As early as 1880, the state appointed a judge in Perak. Between 1884 and 1904, Raja Muda Sulayman, the ruler of Selangor, codified marriage and divorce laws, appointed judges, and enacted Muslim penalties in civil and criminal matters. In Kelantan there was a similar reorganization of Islamic religious life. Between 1888 and 1894, an official, styled *maha menteri*, established state control over local imams, insisted on the universal observance of Islamic law, and required Muslims to attend the Friday prayers. The government began to take a portion of the charity taxes, and a constabulary was created to enforce religious norms. The mufti was made a salaried member of the government, head of the Muslim court system, and was given control of village mosques and revenues.

In 1915, the Majlis Ugama (Religious council) was created to take full authority over religious courts and village mosques. The Majlis also took control of three-fifths of the *zakat* revenues and four-fifths of the head tax ordinarily collected by village religious leaders. In later years the Majlis sponsored education in English, Arabic, and Malay, prepared texts and translations, and otherwise provided state leadership for the reform of Islamic religious life. Throughout the Malay Peninsula, the creation of *qadis*, councils, and Islamic law committees brought Islamic legal, educational, ritual, and financial affairs under state control. State control gave a strong conservative bias to Islamic affairs and proved to be a factor for political stability until the 1950s.

British imperial policies and the development of the Malayan economy also promoted the Kaum Muda, or reformist and modernist Muslim movement. The rise of the Kaum Muda was a grave challenge to both state and village Muslim elites. Traveled merchants and students returned to challenge the authority of local imams and Sufis and the state administration of Islam. In the late 1920s, journals produced by students in Cairo broached the issues of pan-Islamic and pan-Malayan unity and anticolonialism. In the 1930s, the Kaum Muda became politically militant; the very name came to imply nationalist opposition to foreign rule. In response to this challenge several Malay states censored or banned publications and forbade the teaching of Islam without the permission of the sultans.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the initiative passed to secular nationalists. Some of the English-educated scions of the dominant Malay aristocracy, motivated by fear of rising Chinese influence, formed Malay associations that called upon the sultans and the British to protect Malay privileges against Chinese competition. Others, however, began to speak against British rule and against the established aristocracy. The graduates of the Sultan Idris Training College, often of lower-class origin, strongly influenced by left-wing Indian nationalism, formed the Kesatu Melayu Muda in 1938 as the vehicle of their anti-British and anti-aristocratic program.

Nonetheless, the nationalist movement was relatively little developed in this period, in part because the Malay aristocracy was

reasonably content with and dependent upon British rule, and in part because the 1920s were relatively prosperous. The availability of jobs for educated Malays in the civil service inhibited the formation of nationalist parties. The hostilities among Malays, Chinese, and Indians made it difficult to crystallize a Malayan national movement conceived in territorial rather than in communal terms, and the absence of basic economic and political changes affecting the mass of the population made it impossible to generate mass support for opposition to British and aristocratic Malay rule. Thus, opposition was limited to very small groups of modernist Muslims and modern-educated Malays.

The years following World War II brought profound changes to Malayan political life, not as a result of nationalist opposition, but due to the formation of an independent Malayan state. Independent Malaya had its origins in 1946 with British proposals bypassing the sultanates, setting up a central government for the whole of the region, and giving immigrant Chinese and Indian communities access to political power. These proposals were bitterly opposed by the Malay aristocracy, who in 1946 formed the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). The strong resistance led the British to modify their proposals in 1948 in favor of a Federation of Malaya, which preserved the separate existence of the several Malay states and guaranteed the supremacy of Malay interests.

This federation, however, was attacked by the Malayan Communist Party, largely supported by Chinese workers. The Malayan Communist Party had organized anti-Japanese resistance in the 1940s; after the war, it launched a guerrilla movement against the new federation and continued British influence. In reaction the United Malay National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian Association formed an alliance. In 1957, an independent Malayan state was formed by Malay officials, Chinese merchants, and Indian intellectuals under the leadership of Tunku ʿAbd al-Rahman. Under the new constitution, the dominance of Malays in education and the state bureaucracy and of non-Malays in the economy was confirmed. Islam was declared the official religion of Malaya, but freedom of worship was guaranteed. A ten-year grace period was given before Malay was to replace English, Chinese, and

Tamil in state schools. In 1963, the federation of Malaya was reorganized to include North Borneo and Singapore (though Singapore withdrew in 1965), and the extended federation was officially renamed Malaysia.

The Malaysian state and Islam in a multiethnic society

In independent Malaysia, the ruling United Malay National Organization was a secular party stressing the ethnic dimension of Malay Muslim identity. Malays received preferential treatment in the distribution of scholarships, business licenses, and positions in public service, but ethnic Chinese and Indians were also included in the ruling coalition. In the federation period religion was a local concern, and most Malay states maintained a department of religious affairs involved in mosque construction, enforcement of moral and criminal codes, and the collection of alms taxes. Teaching heretical doctrines was punishable, and laws were passed to penalize individuals for failure to attend Friday prayers or keep the fasts. Schools were required to give Muslim religious instruction if attended by a minimum number of Muslim students.

The first Islamic opposition party to promote the Muslim dimension of Malay identity emerged in Kelantan and Trengganu. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) became the chief spokesman for Muslim communal hostility to the Chinese and Indians, and the first to call for an Islamic state to implement Islamic law. In Kelantan, the PMIP rallied strong support from a coalition of village imams and religious leaders who were resisting centralized administration and the loss of tax authority, and young nationalist radicals and small peasant landowners who were hurt by increasing rents, falling prices, and the threat of losing their land. For these peasants and local elites, the PMIP's Islamic orientation symbolized not only economic concerns but anxiety over losing a way of life that depended upon a combination of ownership of land and Muslim religious authority. The appeal to Islam legitimized the struggle to protect the peasant way of life by invoking a moral vision of a society grounded in justice – justice identified with peasant and village interests. The rhetoric of the

PMIP thus fused class interests with higher moral and social concerns.

The PMIP's success was telling. In 1959, it defeated the Alliance coalition in Kelantan and Trengganu, and unleashed an intense struggle over national identity. In response to the growth of the PMIP, the UMNO attempted to recruit Muslim religious leaders and pledged itself to promote Islamic interests. Young Malay leaders, reinforced by the growing participation of Malays in education and the civil service, began to demand a larger role in the national economy, and raised the question of whether Malayan society would be Muslim or pluralistic in ideological orientation. This weakened the UMNO coalitions with Chinese and Indian groups. In the 1969 elections the PMIP gained in strength. Chinese radicals demanded equality for Chinese. The balance of power broke down into communal riots.

To cope with this situation, an emergency regime was installed. It attempted to meet Malay economic demands, reinforce a nationalist concept of Malay identity, and yet to maintain some balance among the communities. In the 1970s, a new economic policy, focused on the expansion of government investment financed by foreign capital and export earnings from petroleum, rubber, timber, and palm oil aimed at promoting Malay involvement in the economy. Its goal was 30 percent Malay ownership and employment in Malaysian businesses, and the formation of a state-capitalist Malay economic elite. To counter the PMIP, reorganized under the new name of Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the UMNO proposed a more generalized form of Islam called Islam Hadhari, a doctrine emphasizing hard work, honesty, tolerance, and a balanced approach to living, and attempted to develop its own network of Islamic schools. The 2001 attacks in the United States pressured the UMNO government to suspend funding for hundreds of non-state and non-UMNO madrasas.

Despite these repeated efforts to diffuse Islamic influence, the forces promoting an Islamic identity have been gaining strength since the 1970s. Increasing urbanization and migration to cities, and above all the growth of the student population, promoted Muslim consciousness. The decline of the PAS as the leading Islamic party

opened the way for the rise of *da'wa* (missionary and educational movements). White-collar workers, teachers, and students, usually of secular educational background, became increasingly conscious of the corruption of their society and the need for Muslim reforms. Attending lectures, adopting Muslim dress, and calling for a return to the guidance of the Quran and personal morality, they denounced the West as the principal source of evil. In place of the traditional rural leadership the new movements were led by Muslim Malays who were urban based, university educated, and sometimes foreign educated. They appealed to urban workers, students, and lower-level professionals. Islamic training camps, seminars, and discussion groups, and agitation over events in Palestine, Lebanon, and Afghanistan promoted the new consciousness. The adherents of the *da'wa* movements were identified by dress: loose-fitting robes, veils, and sometimes turbans. They opposed the traditional *adat*, or local custom and customary law, spirit cults, shamanism, and communal feasts. *Da'wa* in Malaysia was part of the global movement to define a standardized Islam.

The role of women in society is hotly debated. The UMNO calls for the integration of women in employment and a modest form of dress. The PAS wants to limit women to the nurturing professions – teaching, nursing, and social work – and calls for purdah. A women's movement called Sisters in Islam argues that the Quran has been misinterpreted, and tries to defend gender equality on Islamic grounds.

The Islamic revival spawned three major groups. The Malay Muslim Youth League (ABIM), founded in 1971, led by Anwar Ibrahim, was dedicated to the Islamization of the individual, the family, the *umma*, and the state, and the education of a God-fearing Malaysian youth. The Tabligh, a preaching movement, appealed to well-educated people. Darul Arqam sponsored cooperatives, workshops, clinics, and schools, and the promotion of personal independence through agriculture and small-scale manufacturing. Darul Arqam was dedicated to living by Quranic and Arab customs, including the segregation of the sexes. It represented an egalitarian and utopian program, but was forced out of Malaysia by charges that it was an

authoritarian cult. These activist groups, fundamentalist in religious orientation and reformist in political affairs, threatened to upset the delicate balances of the Malaysian state.

The government of Prime Minister Mahathir b. Muhammad (r. 1981–2003) responded to these movements by a combination of repression and co-optation. It arrested individuals as provocateurs of interethnic strife and regulated publications. At the same time, the state treated Islam as a kind of civil religion. Mahathir created a morals police, declared Malaysia to have an Islamic economy, and founded an Islamic bank, insurance, and other companies. The government increased support for Muslim schools and broadcasting, created an Islamic university, and raised the status of Muslim judges to be equal to those of the civil courts. It sponsored its own madrasas or *pondoks* in competition with those sponsored by the PAS. The state also lent its support to a purely secular Malay nationalist movement, Bumiputera (Indigenous sons of the earth), which cultivated an ethnic Malay consciousness committed to technical and economic modernization. Government policy stressed both Muslim religious and Malay ethnic cultural orientations.

The regime also brought a high level of prosperity to the country, shifting Malaysia from an economy of tin, rubber, and palm-oil extraction to the production of microchips and industrial products. Malaysia developed an extensive infrastructure of highways, airports, dams, and mass transit. In foreign policy, Mahathir gave strong support to Arab interests, the PLO, and the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union. Malaysia cultivated business ties to Uzbekistan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, but was circumspect in dealing with Iran, Libya, and Syria.

In 1998, however, Prime Minister Mahathir's credibility was damaged by the removal of Anwar Ibrahim from office and his prosecution for sodomy. This high-handed suppression of his rival provoked protests against Mahathir's economic policies, business cronyism, corrupt contracts, and the lack of an independent judiciary. Mahathir was succeeded by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (r. 2003–09). The UMNO continued its policies of co-opting Islam.

Thus, the Malaysian state is trying to find its own mode of Islamic correctness that keeps a balance among the demands for an Islamic state, the pressures of the international economy, and the needs of a multiethnic society. The Islamists have forced the government to take increasingly pro-Islamist positions, and have greatly raised the tensions with rural Malays still committed to folk Islam and non-Muslim, non-Malay ethnic groups, especially the Chinese. The regime hovers between the need to cultivate Malay support and the need to maintain the collaboration of the Chinese. The more it stresses Islam, the more it threatens the non-Malay populations.

Still the Islamists face major barriers to the formation of an Islamic state. While radical groups calling for the complete Islamization of state and society remain very strong, the state threatens to absorb the *da'wa* movements. As Islamic discourse is adopted by politicians, *'ulama'*, Muslim activists, and others, it becomes more widely diffused as the basis of Malay political identity, but less specific as a political program. Moreover, substantial Chinese and Indian populations, Western secular ideas of constitutionalism and democracy, state patronage of ethnic Malays, and the free-enterprise capitalist-based structure of the economy give great institutional depth to a pluralistic society.

The Philippines

Muslims make up about 4–7 percent of the Philippine population, but are concentrated in the southern islands. Mindanao is the principal center of Muslim population. Despite numerous wars, the Spanish failed to conquer the southern sultanates. The Spanish were not able to give an overarching identity to the region, and Muslims were neither Hispanized nor unified in opposition. Muslims were divided into three major and ten minor ethno-linguistic groups. They are ruled by local datus (feudal lords) and their clienteles.

In 1899, after the Spanish–American War, the United States took control of the islands. The American administration introduced the idea of a trans-ethnic Muslim identity. Najeeb M. Saleeby argued for a unification of the Muslim populations to transcend the feudal,

chieftain-led structure of the society, and to facilitate colonial administration and community development. His views influenced Lawrence Kuder, superintendent of schools in the Muslim regions of Lanao, Sulu, and Cotabato, who wanted to create a Western-educated Muslim elite of civil servants, lawyers, and politicians to represent their people in the Philippine state. A new generation, regardless of local languages, was taught an ethnic identity: that of Muslim Filipinos.

When the Philippines became independent in 1946, the state was dominated by a Christian majority prejudiced against its non-Hispanicized Muslim population. It encouraged a large-scale immigration of Christians into the southern islands. The first local resistance came from the younger intelligentsia, educated in Manila and abroad, allied to local merchants and smugglers. They were divided into two wings. One stressed the creation of a common reformed Islamic identity, and the construction of Muslim communities around mosques, schools, and pilgrimage. Saudi, Egyptian, and Libyan money flowed in to promote Islamic learning. Missionaries from al-Azhar established madrasas. The second was a nationalist separatist movement fighting for regional autonomy that appropriated the name Moro from the Spanish colonial discourse, but with a new positive meaning, to refer to the Muslim population in an ethnic sense of the term Muslim. The Philippine-Muslim National League was announced in 1968; resistance escalated with ethnic riots in Cotabato in 1970, and after the declaration of martial law in 1972, became armed secessionism led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded by Nur Misuari in 1971. The self-declared nationalist movement called for a Muslim homeland (Bangsamoro). This was a rebellion against both the state and the traditional nobility. *Datus* and the older-generation elites generally opposed the rebels, and allied themselves with the Manila government. A peace settlement in 1977 calling for an autonomous region was never implemented, and an on-and-off war for regional autonomy in the name of a Muslim population against a repressive Philippine state continues to the present.

The subsequent history of the Moro movements was marked by deep divisions within the Philippine Muslim population. Separatism reemerged in the 1980s in the form of an unarmed Islamic movement

led by Muslim clerics calling for religious reform and political autonomy. The *'ulama'* defined a society based on political autonomy, judicial equality, and reformed Islamic practice. Then, in 1984, in implied opposition to the older nationalist MNLF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), led by Hashim Salamat, was formed to fight for both regional independence and the formation of an Islamic state. In January 1987, the MNLF accepted the Philippine government's offer of semi-autonomy of the regions in dispute; the MILF, however, refused to accept this offer and continued its insurgency. In 1991, a new movement, called the Abu Sayyaf group, with funding from private Saudi sources, engaged in armed raids and kidnapping to raise money in the name of the Muslim cause. The MNLF made a new peace with the Philippine government in 1996. Nur Misuari became governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The MILF signed a cease-fire in 1997; in 2000, this agreement was repudiated by the Philippine army. Since then there have been repeated sporadic outbreaks of violence and no resolution to the conflicts.

Most Filipino Muslims have still other views. They backed the Muslim resistance movement because they saw in it protection against the army, but did not identify themselves as part of a Moro Muslim nation. Nor did they practice Islam in the fashion of the reformed clerics. They believe in magic, amulets, and spirits; celebrate the traditional wedding, mortuary, and remembrance feasts; and resist the demands of the reformed *'ulama'* that they practice Islam in accord with Middle Eastern customs. They are Muslims, but refuse the cultural and ethnic identity constructed for them by the elites. Within Moro society there are debates among traditional and reformed Muslims, religious and political leaders, as well as between regional Muslims and the Christian-controlled Philippine state.

Conclusion

The structures of contemporary Southeast Asian societies represent a coming together of the historical institutional and cultural patterns of the region and the influences generated by Dutch, British, and American colonial rule. In the nineteenth century, the Dutch and the

British introduced radical economic and political changes. These changes, in the long run, generated a conflict between Southeast Asian secular and Muslim identities. In the Indies, Dutch economic and trade policies stimulated Muslim merchants to create the Islamic reformist and modernist movements. Dutch educational and administrative measures were also conducive to the formation of *priyayi*-led nationalist and communist movements. These positions reflected the historical division between those people who saw the world in Javanese and Indonesian cultural terms and those who viewed it in Muslim terms. The twentieth-century history of Indonesia was the history of the revived struggle of Islam against other forms of Indonesian culture. In the last half-century, Sukarno and Suharto held back the demand for an Islamic state; and the contemporary Islamic revival has not succeeded in founding one.

In Malaysia, as in Indonesia, *da'wa* movements have raised Muslim consciousness. The state has made important concessions to the Muslim interests and Muslim identity of the Malay majority, but also tries to defuse political pressures and to accommodate its Chinese and Indian minorities, secular Malay nationalists, and the capitalist structure of the economy.

In the Philippines, trans-ethnic Muslim identity is not the expression of a historical culture, but is a modern phenomenon, resulting from American rule and educational policies, and a reaction against an abusive Philippine state. Strongly influenced by Islamic reformism from abroad, the Moro movements wage a struggle for an independent Islamic state.

Islam in Twentieth-Century Africa

Chapter 56 Islam in West Africa

By the end of the nineteenth century, Islam had spread in Sudanic, savannah, and forest West Africa by virtue of a combination of forces. Migrant trading communities and missionary teachers had formed scattered Muslim communities. In parts of the Sudan and East Africa, these communities converted local rulers and helped establish Muslim states. In other cases, Muslim *'ulama'* and holy men waged jihad to form new states. At the very end of the century, European invaders defeated and broke up existing states and imposed their own regimes. Muslim state formation was checked and Muslim peoples became subject to European-generated political and economic pressures.

Colonialism and independence: African states and Islam

The French and the British empires largely determined the political configuration of modern African societies. By 1900, the French Empire comprised a vast region including the Atlantic coastal territories of Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Dahomey. Between 1899 and 1922, the interior was organized into the large colonies of French Sudan, Niger, and Mauritania. Upper Volta was formed in 1919, but in 1932 it was divided among the Ivory Coast, Niger, and the Sudan, and then reconstituted in 1947. The French Central African empire included Muslim populations in Chad. The British organized protectorates for Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and the northern and southern regions of Nigeria. The Nigerian protectorates were united as the colony and protectorate of Nigeria in 1914.

In both British and French territories, the populations were ruled through intermediary local chiefs supervised by foreign officials. This was implemented in different ways. The French favored highly

centralized and authoritarian controls. In Senegambia and the Sudanic regions they dissolved the larger states and paramount chieftainships, displaced the older aristocracies, and favored local-level district chiefs who were easy to subordinate to the central administration. These local chiefs were not men of traditional importance, but rather newcomers promoted by the French to collect taxes, organize corvée, and administer the French judicial code.

The British accepted a much larger scale of native administration than the French, and guaranteed the authority of the dominant elites. In northern Nigeria they bypassed the Sokoto caliphate, and made the amirs, advised by British residents or divisional officers, responsible for administration, tax collection, and justice. British officers supervised the amirs but did not intervene between them and their subjects. In addition, the British rationalized local administration, replaced feudal tenures by government functionaries, established a territorial system of native courts, and greatly strengthened the Muslim judiciary. They protected the region from the direct impact of European rule by laws that forbade Europeans to purchase land and Christian missionaries to enter predominantly Muslim areas.

Throughout West Africa, the establishment of colonial regimes led to profound economic and social changes. The principal interest of the colonial powers was to stimulate exports of cash crops such as peanuts from Senegal, timber from the Ivory Coast, and palm oil from Dahomey. The French collected taxes in cash to force increases in agricultural production, and used forced labor on banana, cocoa, and coffee plantations. The British developed cocoa, timber, rubber, manganese, aluminum, and gold exports from the Gold Coast. Nigeria, which exported palm oil, cocoa, rubber, and peanuts, had high gross export earnings but a low per capita income. Railroads were built to link the interior with international markets. The French built railways from St. Louis to Dakar and from Dakar to Bamako, linking the Niger River and the Atlantic. Railroads in Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria tied the producing regions of the interior to the ports, but did not link the interior territories with each other. The railroads destroyed the trans-Saharan traffic. Henceforth international trade would move by rail to the coast rather than by camel across the desert.

Trade was controlled in the interests of the European companies. Currency, banking, navigation, customs, and legal arrangements ensured the domination of a few large colonial banks, shipping lines, and other firms. French restrictions on the domestic economies of their African colonies made prices in French West Africa higher than world levels, and French West Africa ran a consistently unfavorable balance of trade. Africans were ruined by European competition, and eliminated from the export business. Arabs, Greeks, and Indians migrated to the French colonies, and often took local retail trade out of African hands. Until the 1930s, neither the British nor the French invested in the colonies, but expected them to pay the costs of their administration. Only in reaction to the Depression did the colonial powers begin to regard it as in their interest to finance economic development, and not until after World War II did the British and the French invest more heavily.

Political and economic change in the West African colonies was accompanied, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, by the formation of new economic classes and social and political groups. Changing patterns of trade and administration brought Africans to capitals and port towns. Changes in the economy broke down lineage bonds, brought individuals into large-scale market arrangements, promoted mobility, and generated a demand for individual, as opposed to collectively shared, wealth. Economic changes promoted seasonal or migrant labor and wage employment, and encouraged the growth of urban centers with their relative freedom from traditional authority and concepts. Out of these uprooted populations new elites and new communities came into being.

In the cities an African bourgeoisie emerged. Western education equipped a small cadre to serve as doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists, interpreters, and officials. Education, however, was very limited. In the French Empire, only about 3 percent of African students were able to go to school. In Nigeria, in the decade before 1942 some 300,000 students went to primary schools, but only 2,000 to secondary schools. Almost all of these schools were in the south, and a large proportion were Christian missionary schools. With a few

exceptions Christian missionaries and Western schools were excluded from Muslim northern Nigeria.

Colonial administration and education also generated a second-level elite of mechanics, transport workers, bricklayers, clerks, cash-crop farmers, and others. Clerks and schoolteachers had a particularly close acquaintance with the workings of a modern administration and economy, and were important as liaisons between the subelites and higher-level government officials, and as spokesmen in tribal, trade union, and political movements. These new elites asserted themselves through a myriad of associations. Tribal, ethnic, mutual-aid, trade union, and debating societies, and, ultimately, political clubs were the product of migration and urbanization and the basis for the emergence of political parties. Student and youth associations were particularly important for the ultimate formation of African nationalist movements.

The Depression and World War II gave the new elites an opportunity to press their demands. The war fatally damaged the power and moral authority of the European states, and allowed African leaders to claim self-determination and political independence. The French fought a long rearguard action to moderate African demands and to maintain the subordination of the colonies. At the Brazzaville conference in 1944, they acknowledged their obligation to invest in African economic development, to build bridges, ports, and agricultural facilities, and to improve health services and education. The conference also adopted a new political goal. In place of the French concept of the assimilation of individual Africans to French citizenship, it proposed an association of African societies within a French union, and the formation of territorial assemblies that would be entitled to send representatives to the French parliament.

Territorial assemblies led to political parties. Some of these were personal factions, or coalitions of smaller associations, but some were mass parties with wide bases of support. The most important was the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), formed in 1946 as an anti-imperial congress-type movement, uniting professional elites, trade union leaders, and youth organizations

under the leadership of Félix Houphouet-Boigny. Under French rule the RDA was the principal party in the Ivory Coast, Sudan, Niger, and Guinea. In Senegal it was displaced by the African branch of the French Socialist Party and the Bloc démocratique sénégalais (BDS), founded in 1949, led by Léopold Senghor and renamed Union progressiste sénégalaise in 1951. In 1958, General de Gaulle proposed a referendum that offered African states a choice between immediate independence and self-government within the French community. Most of the West African states, obliged by economic dependence, voted to remain attached to France. Only Guinea voted for immediate independence without linkage to France. By 1960, however, France had conceded independence to the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

In 1957, Ghana, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party, was the first British dependency to achieve independence. The former British possessions of Sierra Leone and Gambia became independent in 1961 and 1965.

In Nigeria, the independence movement began after World War I. The British had favored the traditional elites and excluded the small Western-educated elite from the higher branches of government administration. Encouraged by their education to believe that they would ultimately control the society, the new elites became anticolonial nationalists and claimed the right to speak for the masses. On behalf of the subelites of clerks, technicians, traders, and landowning farmers, they demanded equality in wages with European workers, equality in participation in the colonial administration, and ultimately, independence. In the 1930s, trade unions, worker associations, occupational and professional groups, and kinship and tribal unions were formed in great numbers and became channels for political agitation. The combined pressures of nationalist leaders and students, and a British change of heart about colonial rule, led in 1946 to the first Nigerian constitution. The Richards Constitution provided for a Nigerian legislative council and four provincial units – the Lagos Colony and the Western, Eastern, and Northern provinces – each with an assembly recruited from the existing native authorities. This constitution promoted regional and ethnic rivalries over the distribution of authority among Yorubas and Ibos, northern Muslims

and southerners, and between the dominant and minority groups in each region. The Muslim north in particular feared subordination within a Nigerian state dominated by the south. The federation as a whole finally became independent in 1960.

In the newly independent states, territorial boundaries, administrative structures, dominant elites, and ideological conceptions were all the products of the colonial era. Most Sudanic and West African peoples were and are ruled by narrow, often military, elites, in the name of interests and ideologies that did not, with some exceptions, reflect the values and identities of the masses. The new elites were commonly non-Muslims and were primarily concerned with political and economic modernization. They accepted Islam as a "personal religion" on a par with Christianity and not necessarily as relevant to the political order.

Paradoxically, while European rule promoted secular elites, it also aided the peaceful spread of Islam. Colonial administration indirectly favored the spread of Islam by creating peace and order and by stimulating trade. Europeans broke down the traditional structures of society, introduced new educational and social ideas, opened markets, attracted migrant Africans to growing cities, and thereby indirectly promoted Islam as a form of authority and as an expression of cohesion among displaced peoples. The colonial powers also regarded Muslims as culturally and educationally more advanced than non-Muslim Africans, and appointed Muslim chiefs and clerks as administrators in non-Muslim areas. They subsidized Muslim religious teachers, who were allowed to pursue their missionary, community organizing, and instructional activity. In some cases, the colonial authorities helped organize Islamic law courts.

In both the colonial and independence periods there were significant conversions to Islam among pagan peoples. Between 1900 and 1960, the Muslim population of West Africa approximately doubled, and continues to grow substantially. In the region of Mali, 3 percent of the Bambaras were Muslims in 1912. French pacification opened new trading opportunities and led to widespread conversion, until by the 1960s 70 percent of the Bambaras were Muslims. Mali is today over 90 percent Muslim. In northern Nigeria, where the British

recognized Islam as the religion of the state, Hausas converted in large numbers. For example, the Bauchi emirate, which was 50 percent Muslim in 1920, was 75 percent Muslim in 1952. Ilorin was 43 percent Muslim in 1931 and 63 percent Muslim in 1952. Islam was spread south by Hausa migrants and by the large-scale conversion of Yorubas. According to the Nigerian census of 1963, over 40 percent of the population of Lagos and the western region was Muslim. By 2010, Nigeria as a whole was almost half Muslim.

Islam also made new converts in the Guinean and coastal regions. In Upper Volta at the end of the nineteenth century there were only some 30,000 Muslims, but by 1959 there were 800,000, approximately 20 percent of the population. Today Muslims make up about 60 percent of the population of Burkina Faso. In the Ivory Coast, the Muslims formed 7 percent of the populace in 1921, 22 percent in 1960, and 33 percent in 1970; at present they are about 37 percent. Sierra Leone was about 35 percent Muslim in 1960 and is about 70 percent Muslim today. Muslims are over 90 percent of the populations of Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Somalia; more than 70 percent of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Sudan; about half of the populations of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Nigeria, and approximately a third of the populations of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, and Tanzania. (See Table 18.)

Table 18. *Muslim population by countries: The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, January 2011*

Middle East		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Bahrain	655,000	81.2
Egypt	80,024,000	94.7

Middle East		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Iraq	31,108,000	98.9
Israel	1,287,000	17.7
Jordan	6,397,000	98.8
Kuwait	2,636,000	86.4
Lebanon	2,542,000	59.7
Oman	2,547,000	87.7
Palestine	4,298,000	97.5
Qatar	1,168,000	77.5
Saudi Arabia	25,493,000	97.1
Syria	20,895,000	92.8
Turkey	74,660,000	98.6
United Arab Emirates	3,577,000	76
Yemen	24,023,000	99

Total:
281,310,000

North Africa

Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Algeria	34,780,000	98.2
Libya	6,325,000	96.6
Morocco	32,381,000	99.9
Tunisia	10,349,000	99.8

Total: 83,835,000

Russia, China, and Central Asia

Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Afghanistan	29,047,000	99.8
Azarbayjan	8,795,000	98.4
China	23,308,000	1.8
Iran	74,819,000	99.6
Georgia	442,000	10.5
Kazakhstan	8,887,000	56.4
Kyrgyzstan	4,927,000	88.8

Russia, China, and Central Asia		
Country	*Estimated 2010 Muslim Population*	*Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim*
Russia	16,379,000	11.7
Tajikistan	7,006,000	99
Turkmenistan	4,830,000	93.3
Uzbekistan	26,833,000	96.5

Total:
205,273,000

Indian subcontinent		
Country	*Estimated 2010 Muslim Population*	*Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim*
Afghanistan	29,047,000	99.8
Bangladesh	148,607,000	90.4
India	177,286,000	14.6
Maldives	309,000	98.4
Pakistan	178,097,000	96.4
Sri Lanka	1,725,000	8.5

Total:
506,024,000

Southeast Asia		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Australia	399,000	1.9
Brunei	211000	51.9
Burma/Myanmar	1,900,000	3.8
Cambodia	240,000	1.6
Indonesia	204,847,000	88.1
Malaysia	17,139,000	61.4
Philippines	4,737,000	5.1
Singapore	721,000	14.9
Thailand	3,952,000	5.8
Vietnam	160,000	0.2

Total:
234,306,000

Sub-Saharan Africa		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Angola	195,000	1

Sub-Saharan Africa		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Benin	2,259,000	24.5
Botswana	8,000	0.4
Burkina Faso	9,600,000	58.9
Cameroon	3,598,000	18
Central African Republic	403,000	8.9
Chad	6,404,000	55.7
Comoros	679,000	98.3
Congo	969,000	1.4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	60,000	1.6
Equatorial Guinea	28,000	4.1
Eritrea	1,909,000	36.5
Ethiopia	28,721,000	33.8
Gabon	145,000	9.7
Gambia	1,669,000	95.3

Sub-Saharan Africa		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Ghana	3,906,000	16.1
Guinea	8,693,000	84.2
Guinea-Bissau	705,000	42.8
Ivory Coast	7,960,000	36.9
Kenya	2,868,000	7
Lesotho	1,000	<0.1
Liberia	523,000	12.8
Madagascar	220,000	1.1
Malawi	2,011,000	12.8
Mali	12,316,000	92.4
Mauritania	3,338,000	99.2
Mauritius	216,000	16.6
Mozambique	5,340,000	22.8
Namibia	9,000	0.4
Niger	15,627,000	98.3
Nigeria	75,728,000	47.9

Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Senegal	12,333,000	95.9
Sierra Leone	4,171,000	71.5
Somalia	9,231,000	98.6
South Africa	737,000	1.5
Sudan	30,855,000	71.4
Swaziland	2,000	0.2
Tanzania	13,450,000	29.9
Togo	827,000	12.2
Uganda	4,060,000	12
Western Sahara	528,000	99.6
Zambia	59,000	0.4
Zimbabwe	109,000	0.9

Total: 272,470,000

Europe and North America

Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Albania	2,601,000	82.1
Belgium	638,000	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,564,000	41.6
Bulgaria	1,002,000	13.4
Canada	940000	4.6
Croatia	56,000	1.3
Denmark	226,000	4.1
Finland	42,000	0.8
France	4,704,000	7.5
Germany	4,119,000	5
Greece	527,000	4.7
Hungary	25,000	0.3
Iceland	1,000	0.1
Ireland	43,000	0.9

Europe and North America		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Italy	1,583,000	2.6
Kosovo	2,104,000	91.7
Macedonia	713,000	34.9
Montenegro	116,000	18.5
Netherlands	914,000	5.5
Norway	144,000	3
Poland	20,000	0.1
Portugal	65,000	0.6
Serbia	280,000	3.7
Spain	1,021,000	2.3
Sweden	451,000	4.9
Switzerland	433,000	5.7
United Kingdom	2,869,000	4.6
United States	2,595,000	0.8

Europe and North America		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Total: 29,796,000		

South America		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Argentina	1,000,000	2.5
Bolivia	2,000	<0.1
Brazil	204,000	0.1
Chile	4,000	<0.1
Colombia	14,000	<0.1
Ecuador	2,000	<0.1
French Guiana	2,000	0.9
Guyana	55,000	7.2
Paraguay	1,000	<0.1
Peru	1,000	<0.1

South America		
Country	Estimated 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim
Suriname	84,000	15.9
Uruguay	1,000	<0.1
Venezuela	95,000	0.3
Total: 1,465,000		
World Total 1,614,479,000		

Colonial rule not only favored the spread of Islam, but also created the conditions that shaped the social character, religious practices, and communal identity of Muslims. European rule forced the Muslims to abandon their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political aspirations and to accept foreign domination. While Muslim resistance to colonial expansion in the nineteenth century was militant, after the consolidation of the European empires there was little armed resistance. Mahdists in Nigeria, Tuaregs in Niger, and Sufi-led warriors in Mauritania and Somalia were the only major exceptions. In many cases Muslims not only accepted but also collaborated with foreign or secular rulers. Muslim leaders, such as the amirs of northern Nigeria or the Sufis of Senegal, became the foremost participants in colonial and post-independence regimes. Muslim religious leaders commonly preached acceptance of these regimes and helped recruit manpower for European armies, collect taxes, and even suppress Muslim dissidents. As in India, they saw themselves as an elite, the natural allies and the likely beneficiaries of cooperation with the state. Whereas in North Africa, the Arab Middle

East, India, and Indonesia, Islamic associations were transformed into political movements, this did not happen in Sudanic, savannah, and forest West Africa.

Muslim opposition to foreign rule was generally expressed indirectly through schools, reform movements, and Sufi-led brotherhoods. Educational associations were formed among urban and "modernized" Muslims. Muslim ethnic groups such as the Hausas and Yorubas were organized to protect Muslim identity. The Bamidele movement in Ibadan (Nigeria), for example, insisted on preserving Arabic usage, Muslim dress, and reformed Islamic practices. Many Muslims simply refused cooperation and withdrew from contact with Europeans.

The Hamalliyya is an interesting example of how opposition to foreign rule was expressed by symbolic means. The Hamalliyya, founded by Shaykh Hamallah (1883–1943), was a Sufi brotherhood based in Nioro. It was an offshoot of the Tijaniyya, but it condemned the parent order for having corrupted the true teachings of the founder. Shaykh Hamallah himself lived in seclusion, taught only in his own mosque, and never solicited gifts, though he accepted contributions from people who visited him. His followers held up his humility and gentleness against the greed and pride of the regular Tijaniyya. The movement taught the social equality of all castes, and appealed strongly to runaway slaves, youth, and people without tribal or social standing.

His very withdrawal, however, had political implications. Shaykh Hamallah refused to speak of political matters or to publicly acknowledge French authority. His followers took his refusal to imply opposition to French rule. The French, ruling through a small number of administrators who had little understanding of African languages or peoples, and dependent upon clerks, interpreters, informers, and spies, harbored an almost paranoid suspicion of what the natives were doing, and put Muslim religious leaders under close surveillance. Outraged at the refusal of Shaykh Hamallah to give them political recognition, they deported him. In response he began to use an abbreviated prayer, and his followers turned to pray in the

direction of his internment rather than Mecca. This symbolized the absence of a legitimate government.

In the 1940s, the Hamalliyya divided into two wings. One refused to recognize the local religious authorities and was constantly involved in hostilities with the regular Tijaniyya. A second wing, led by Tyerno Bokar Salif Tall (d. 1940), stressed the intellectual and mystical teachings of the master, egalitarianism, and rejection of foreign rule. Only after Hamallah's death did his followers begin to organize politically and to clash with the French.

Thus, by the end of the colonial era Britain and France had promoted, albeit inadvertently, the spread of Islam and Muslim religio-communal organizations. Historically there were two main forms of Muslim community: legal schools, which were *'ulama'*-defined and led communities; and Sufi *tariqat*, which often incorporated African traditions of magic, divination, and talismans to protect and heal. After independence, however, African Muslims also embraced Islamic reformism (usually called Wahhabism in this context). The reformists repudiate the traditional concepts and practices of Islam. They deny the authority of the traditional law schools and claim to go back to the Quran and sunna as the sole sources of Islamic law and belief. They denounce Sufism as a form of idolatry and polytheism. Disillusionment with Sufism because of its collaboration with colonial authorities fueled the reformist tendency.

The "Wahhabi" tendencies were often brought in by students returning from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt supported reformism with money for mosques, madrasas, and scholarships. The Saudis created the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-ʿAlam al-Islami) in 1962, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in 1973, and several international Islamic universities. Libya created an Association and Faculty for Call to Islam (Daʿwa al-Islamiyya), gave scholarships to African students, sent missionaries to African countries, and sponsored conferences. Iran had a similar program. Sudan built an International University of Africa and a University of the Quran. The West African reformist movements also included the Indian-influenced Tabligh Jamaʿat in Gambia, and the Yan Ízala movement in Niger and Nigeria. Mosques, madrasas,

cultural centers, and clinics were built in Senegal, Niger, and Nigeria. Pilgrimage, scholarships, financial assistance, endowments, and conferences reached people without a Western education. From the 1970s, increasing numbers of African students went to study in Middle Eastern countries.

Reformist movements were not localized in particular countries, but spread rapidly over the trade routes of West Africa, with branches in Kankan, Bo, Buake, and other towns in Mali, Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and the Niger region, especially where there were no strong Tijani or Qadiri communities.

The reformist movements created social complexes typically including a mosque, school, and clinic, and sometimes an orphanage and a library. Their primary activity was instruction in Arabic, Islamic rituals, and Quran. Reformist schools often combined religious with secular, especially English or French, education. In Ghana, most religious schools were English/Arabic schools, combining state-run academies and private Quranic schools.

The reformist movements appealed to different social milieus. They reflected growing urbanization and the need for moral order, group solidarity, and social controls in changing societies. The local leaders of these movements were often Western-educated teachers, civil servants, and businessmen who bypassed traditional religious leaders. Reformism appealed particularly to students and young people. The pressures of city life under colonial rule brought out a conflict of interest between well-established elders, who appropriated family wealth, and younger family members and workers, who turned in protest to modernist and educational reform movements. Through Islamic education, young people could overcome ethnic and class structures. Knowledge of Arabic conferred cultural capital. Reform madrasas and English or French/Arabic schools generated a new Arabophone elite. Throughout Africa, student movements provided solidarity and political clout.

At the same time, these movements appealed to middle- and upper-class professionals, small and middling traders, and petty functionaries. In Ghana, the Ahle Sunna included such educated

professionals as lawyers, university professors, and school headmasters, who dressed in Western suits and had liberal attitudes toward women, law, and education. In Niger, these movements appealed to upwardly mobile traders and merchants. Their connection to reform differentiated them from the older established Westernized merchants and from the common Hausa social and religious traditions. The reformist religious orientation gave them social status. It helped promote the accumulation of wealth by minimizing the time, energy, and money devoted to Sufi rituals and communities, and defined a cultural modernity based neither on Western nor traditional Hausa norms. In Mali, reformism defined new solidarity groups among educated, married, and elite women, an alternative to traditional forms of female sociability and mutual assistance. Finally, in Nigeria and elsewhere, reformism was also the ideology of social protest, the rebellion of the urban poor, the lumpenproletariat, and people pushed to the margin of a developing economy. Perhaps the common factor was the appeal of a non-traditional but non-Western "modernity."

These movements were closely tied to the politics of each country. In the 1950s and 1960s, the rise of the reform movement was closely associated with the African Democratic Assembly (RDA) political party in Sudan, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. The reformers supported anticolonial movements and the struggles for independence. The reformers and RDA both opposed French colonial rule, forced labor, and other forms of taxation. They opposed the conservative rural chiefs and religious leaders, and were supported by modernizing commercial groups. They shared principles of social justice and equality that could be expressed in either secular or Muslim terms. The RDA politicians often used Muslim vocabulary and readings from the Quran to appeal for Muslim support. Thus, the cultivation of reformist Islamic religious principles was a way of raising political consciousness and linking it to nationalism, and loyalty to the new states.

The cultural political impact of the Wahhabi-influenced movements was profound. They stressed the priority of Islam over ethnic and other parochial loyalties. Although reformism led to conflicts with other Muslims, disputes over the control of local mosques, and often

to the formation of separate mosques in each town, Wahhabism taught pride in Islamic culture and helped Africans refute European claims of black inferiority. Reformism merged Islamic, African, and black identities. In the 1980s, "Islamism" became more important. While reformism was dedicated to the purification of the life of the individual, Islamism was aimed at the formation of an Islamic state. The Islamists created social welfare movements to replace ineffective states in the provision of schools, mosques, and social and health services. Islamic universities were created in Senegal and Nigeria.

However, many self-professed Muslims stand apart from schools of Islamic law, Sufi brotherhoods, and reformist movements. For these Muslims Islam is a communal identity that entails solidarity and goodness without regard to specific rituals and beliefs. Many young people identify with Islam as a global society and share the political concerns of Muslims worldwide. There are also Muslim proponents of democracy, social justice, and the coexistence of Islam with other religions in the quietist African Islamic tradition associated with al-Hajj Salim Suware.

As we examine several African Muslim societies, we will see major variations in the structure of national and Muslim political and communal organization, and in Muslim adaptation to the larger African civilization. Some African states, such as Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, and Niger have large Muslim majorities. In these countries, Islam is an accepted part of daily life, and national conflicts are focused on political, economic, and social issues including the relation of Muslim communities to the political regime. Ethnic or communal conflicts are not necessarily expressed in religious form. Religious disputes among Muslims focus on competing versions of Islam. Where Muslims are approximately a third to two-thirds of the total population, and the remainder is Christian and African animist – as in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Ethiopia – there is conflict and even civil war often defined in religious terms. Where Muslims are a smaller minority the primary issues are their integration into national politics, security, economic and social opportunities, and internal forms of organization and worship. (See Map 39.)

Map 39. Northern and Sudanic Africa, c. 1980.

West African Muslim-majority countries

Mali

In Mali, Islamic reformist movements have bolstered the association of Islam with national identity. During the French colonial period, Islamic reformism was introduced by students who had gone to al-Azhar and Cairo Universities, where they had come into contact with the Muslim Brothers and other neo-Islamic movements. Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina was also an important source of reformed religious ideas. One of these pilgrims, al-Hajj ʿAbdallah Mahmud, returned to Bamako imbued with reform ideas. He called on his fellow Muslims to study the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, to adhere to the Maliki school of law and ascetic forms of Sufism, and to eschew saint worship and animistic religious practices. He attacked the local *mallams* for cultic rituals and for collaboration with colonial rulers. Al-Hajj ʿAbdallah founded a school in 1949, and organized the

Subbanu al-Muslimin (Society of young Muslims) in 1951. The graduates were generally reformist in the Salafi sense, in favor of the implementation of the Islamic law, and hostile to the old-fashioned *'ulama'* and the traditional marabouts. (See Illustration 32.)

Illustration 32.   The Friday Mosque at Mopti, Mali (Marii Shamir).

The reformist movement was anticolonial and promoted an Islamic rather than an ethnic identity. Its primary function was the education of children to prevent them from assimilating French values. While a colonial-sponsored education in French symbolized dependency, an Arabic-Islamic education signified opposition to Westernization. It also served to refute European prejudices about the inferiority of Africans and imbued a sense of the supremacy of Islamic civilization and the glory of the ancient Mali Empire. The Islamists argue that Islam expresses the inherent nature of Africa, in opposition to the imperialism of the West.

Mali became an independent republic in 1960, and Modibo Keïta was elected the first president. Keïta established a one-party state defined by socialist principles and a political orientation to the Soviet bloc. He nationalized economic resources. Keïta at first suppressed

the reformist associations, but the growth of Arabic and Islamic education, closer ties to the Arab states, and grants from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait helped reverse earlier policies. Madrasa education expanded enormously in the 1970s, and by the 1980s madrasas had been accepted as a major branch of the national education system. The 1990s witnessed a great increase in the number of Islamic associations. Between 2001 and 2004, Saudi Arabians opened sixteen mosques in Timbuktu. The *da'wa* movement gained adherents among former slaves and unemployed youth.

In 1991, antigovernment protests led to a coup, a transitional regime, and a new constitution. The Malian constitution, adopted in 1992, defines Mali as a secular state, and bans religiously defined political parties. The state elites were by and large secular and Francophone. To contain the Islamic movements the government formed the High Islamic Council (Haut conseil islamique) in 2002, and numerous positions in the Ministries of Education, Justice, Interior, Religious Affairs, and Foreign Service were given to Arabic speakers. Islam has become, in effect, the national religion of Mali.

However, as of 2012, the northern provinces are increasingly in the control of Tuareg rebels, belonging to an extreme Salafi movement called Ansar Dine. They took over Timbuktu, and destroyed tombs and old mosques, drove women from the streets, and summarily punished residents for presumed "non-Islamic" behavior. A French force pushed them out, but they are active in the desert regions. The Ansar Dine raise the specter of cooperation with Saharan branches of al-Qaeda or other Islamist radicals.

Mauritania

Among West African states, Mauritania shows the closest integration of state, national, and ethnic identities. Its population is wholly Muslim, and the state identifies itself as Islamic. Mauritania is thus closest to Somalia or northern Sudan in the blending of popular Arab and Muslim identity and closest to Algeria and Libya in the integration of state and Islamic identity.

Historically, Mauritanian society was highly stratified in a hierarchy of tribal groups. The Hassani Arabs, descendants of the Bani Hassan conquerors, were the warriors. They raided, plundered, and collected tributes. The Zawaya (religious) tribes were the descendants of the Sanhaja and the religious elites; they managed learning, trade, agriculture, and animal herding. These groups dominated tributary artisans, freedmen, and slaves. The Mauritanian population was also divided between the Arabophone tribes in the north and the black, Senegalese-related African population in the south, which had its own system of stratification. Since the eighteenth century, Sufi fraternities have been the principal expression of Muslim social organization. Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti and Shaykh Sidiya al-Kabir of Boutilimit were the founding fathers of Mauritanian Islam, though the Tijaniyya became important in the nineteenth century.

Modern Mauritania was born out of French rule. A French protectorate was declared in 1904, but between 1902 and 1934 there were frequent rebellions. These were all suppressed, and eventually most of the Muslim religious leaders accepted collaboration with the French to protect their religious and economic interests. The French considered the Hassani tribes to be the political elite, paid them subsidies, and institutionalized their authority as intermediaries between the French government and the general populace, but they also suppressed their traditional raiding activities, obliging the Hassanis to take up stock raising and commerce. Thus they deprived the Zawaya tribes of their traditional functions of political mediation, economic negotiation, and the organization of production. While believing that they were preserving the traditional order of society, the French broke down the symbiosis among the Mauritanian tribes.

In 1946, the French separated Mauritania from Senegal and attempted to create a new political structure for the country. A local assembly was created in 1947, and Mauritanian political parties – the Entente mouritanienne, formed in 1948, the Union progressiste mouritanienne (UPM), and the Association de la jeunesse mouritanienne (1951–52) – came into being. The parties represented a split in Mauritanian society between the traditional elites and the modern type of politician. A major issue in the 1950s was how to

preserve Mauritanian identity while avoiding absorption into the Arab Moroccan north or the Senegalese and Sudanese south.

Mauritania became independent in 1960, under the leadership of Mukhtar Ould Daddah, the leader of the UPM, a cousin of Shaykh Sidiya, and a former collaborator with the French. His was an authoritarian, presidential, and one-party regime. In 1964, his renamed Mauritanian People's Party was made the only legitimate party. This was essentially an Arab regime that gave little political power to black African Halpular- and Sarkole-speaking agriculturalists and other southern ethnic groups. The ruling party was drawn mainly from the Zawaya tribes. In the new structure some nontribal associations were introduced, such as trade unions, women's organizations, and schools. Changing patterns of economic activity allowed a new class of entrepreneurs to rise in influence. In any governmental or business transaction, family connections remained a critical factor. Merchants, bureaucrats, and tribal leaders were often related.

In 1978, the regime was overthrown by a military coup that brought Colonel Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya to power. He converted his regime to civilian rule in 1992 with a new constitution and multiparty elections. This regime lasted until 2005, when it was overthrown by a military coup.

There were and are three central issues in the politics of independent Mauritania. First is its relations with neighboring Morocco and Algeria. Mauritania was involved in a long struggle over control of the territory of Western Sahara. In 1976, Mauritania and Morocco attempted to annex the territory but were forced to withdraw by the resistance of the POLISARIO, a movement for an independent region strongly supported by Algeria. Mauritania withdrew in 1979, and since then has attempted to take a neutral position between Moroccan and Algerian claims. A United Nations referendum to ascertain the wishes of the Sahrawi Arab population has yet to be held.

Second is the social and political conflict between black and Arabophone Mauritanians. Mauritanian society discriminates against its black population in government employment and in economic and

educational opportunities. Black African protests against political exclusion, organized by the Forces de libération africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM), founded in 1983, led to the expulsion of blacks from the bureaucracy, the military, and the universities. Many were forced out of the country. Intercommunal violence broke out in 1989–90 on the Mauritania–Senegal border, partly as a result of a conflict between Mauritanian herders and Senegalese farmers over grazing rights. Masses of villagers fled to Senegal and Mali in 1989–90. The Mauritanian government also expelled thousands of black Mauritanians, including professionals, intellectuals, civil servants, and suspected opposition leaders. The rise of Arab nationalism in North Africa and the Middle East further prompted demands for the Arabization of law and language. In 1991, a constitutional provision made Arabic, not widely spoken French, the national language.

The third critical issue is the role of Islam in Mauritanian society. Though Islam is the common religion it does not in a practical sense unify the country. At first, a coalition of traditional religious leaders and government authorities resisted militant Islamic movements. Islamic political parties were outlawed. The 1980s, however, were marked by the rise of Salafi-type movements. The Tablighi Jama'at, Muslim Brothers, "Wahhabis," and others banded together in the Islamic Political Movement in Mauritania. Islamic NGOs – the International Islamic Relief Organization, funded by the Muslim World League, the Africa Muslim Agency, financed by Kuwait, the International African Relief Agency, financed by Sudan, and the Emirate Aid Agency, financed by the UAE – became active in the country, joined by a raft of Mauritanian organizations often linked to the state or to transnational movements. Oil-rich nations sponsored mosque construction. The madrasas graduated a great number of students trained in Maliki jurisprudence.

The government then promoted Islam to reinforce its authority. In 1985, Islam was declared the religion of the state and the Shari'a the only valid source of law. In 1991, an Islamic High Council was created. The Association of 'Ulama' of Mauritania and the Ministry for Islamic Orientation included both leading *'ulama'* and leaders of the *tariqat*. This implied state supervision of Islam, and state controls

over mosques and schools. By the mid 1990s, however, the government was wary of Islamic activism and in 1994 expelled Pakistani, Algerian, Tunisian, and other foreign preachers, and tried to suppress Mauritanian Islamist activists whom it accused of ties to international terrorist networks. The government campaign to subdue the Islamists culminated in 2003 with the banning of Islamic NGOs and other associations. At the end of the Ould Taya government, a Mauritanian military outpost was attacked by a radical jihadist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, operating in the Sahara, and Ould Taya began to cooperate with US anti-terrorism operations. In August 2005, Ould Taya was deposed in a new coup. Since then Mauritania has had a succession of military coups and unstable regimes.

Senegal

Senegal is also an overwhelmingly Muslim society, but the state has a very different relationship with Islam. The Senegalese state was organized in accordance with European political institutions and led by a non-Muslim elite, but the bulk of the population was organized in Sufi brotherhoods. Senegal is held together by the collaboration of state and Sufi elites, and thus re-creates the classic pattern of relations between Islamic states and Muslim communal organizations.

The Senegalese pattern of relations between state and Islamic communities had its origins in the late nineteenth century, when the Islamic jihads and French conquest transformed the traditional bases of Senegalese society. In the wars of the late nineteenth century, the *tyeddo* slave military elite and the ruling pagan families were eliminated – though many old families maintained their position by producing Sufi masters or by marrying into Muslim families. Soldiers, peasants, and artisans dependent on the former chiefs, as well as liberated slaves, turned for leadership to Muslim holy men. A changing economy, which made peanut production rather than slave owning the basis of social power, assisted the transition. A large portion of the Wolofs, the principal language group in Senegal, accepted Islam. For example, by 1913 close to half of western

Saloum and three-quarters of lower Saloum were Muslim. By 1960, about half of the Serers had also converted to Islam. Today Senegal is over 90 percent Muslim.

French rule also helped promote the spread of Islam. The French saw the Muslims as advanced in civilization, productive in economic life, and skilled in administration. They used Muslim clerks and chiefs as intermediaries and allowed them to administer Muslim law. Under French rule, Muslim holy men traveled from place to place teaching, founding schools, and building communities. The French, however, also feared the Muslims as potential political rivals, and attempted to keep them under control. A law of 1903 required schoolteachers to be licensed and to be capable of teaching French. In 1908, the French forbade the circulation of Arabic newspapers. In 1911, French was made mandatory for use in Muslim courts, and Muslim holy men were forbidden from collecting alms.

These policies, however, were never consistently applied, and after World War I the French switched to a policy of selective support for and manipulation of Muslim leaders. The Muslim elites adapted to French rule by giving up political militancy in favor of worship, education, and economic enterprise. The Sufis helped the French keep the peace, raise troops, collect taxes, and encourage agricultural production. They created new brotherhoods. The Fadiliyya were organized by Sa'ad Bouh (1850–1917), the Qadiriyya by al-Hajj Malik Sy, and the Tijaniyya by Ibrahim Niass (1900–75), the scion of a Senegalese Tijani family, who founded his own branch of the order and claimed in the 1930s to be the "savior of the age." His message was particularly attractive to Muslims attempting to adjust to migration and urban settlement.

The most important and well-known of the Senegalese brotherhoods is the Muridiyya, founded in 1886 by Ahmad Bamba (1850–1927), a holy man of Wolof and Tukulor descent, whose reputation was based on asceticism, piety, and lack of self-interest. He recognized that war against the French was futile, and urged his followers to turn from war to work. This reclusive and peaceful mystic was supported by Shaykh Ibra Fall (1858–1930), a former warrior who gave his allegiance to Ahmad in 1886, and recruited his military

followers into the Murid movement. Ibra Fall's submission marked the acceptance by the *tyeddo* military aristocracy of colonial domination and of Muslim leadership as the necessary condition for the survival of Wolof society. The complementarity of marabout and warrior, of spiritual and worldly power, helped make the new order persuasive to numerous Senegalese. Ahmad Bamba was for a long time feared by the French as having territorial and political aspirations. He was exiled between 1895 and 1902, and again until 1907, but in 1912 the French accepted him as a spiritual and economic leader, and allowed him to return to Diourbel.

The Murids integrated themselves into the French-dominated regime. Successive leaders came to their positions with French support, and became clients of the French government. The primary activity of the order was to move labor teams into new lands along the edges of the deserts, organize agricultural colonies, and reclaim them for peanut cultivation. The leaders of the order owned the fields and peasants worked on them either in teams or on a weekly contributory basis. The order attracted landless, unemployed young men who often served an apprenticeship from the ages of nine to twenty-five in *daira*, or farming groups. By 1912, the order had 68,000 followers, and by 1960 some 400,000; by that time, one of every three Wolofs and one of every eight Senegalese was a member. Work was a form of withdrawal from politics, and at the same time a form of adaptation to modern life. By turning to economic activity, a defeated people found new dignity.

In religious terms the Murids gave themselves – body, soul, and property – to the master, who then protected them and interceded for them before God. The order stressed total obedience and regular payments of labor. Beneath him were some 300–400 shaykhs, who arbitrated disputes, but did not usually teach or officiate in prayers. Their position depended upon public recognition as being persons with magical powers. The order was extremely hierarchical, with lesser leaders owing allegiance to the higher.

Traditional Islamic practices were not emphasized. Though Ramadan was observed, ordinary prayers and fasts were not scrupulously attended. Wolofs in general know little about theological

or mystical teachings of Islam, do not follow the Muslim law of divorce, and continue to employ a system of justice emphasizing family responsibility in marriage and property matters. The Fall branch of the Murids is ostentatiously unorthodox and nonconformist. The descendants of Ibra Fall do not observe prayer or other Islamic rituals, but believe that through work, charms, and magical practices, they may attain religious blessing.

At the same time that Senegalese society was being organized by Sufi brotherhoods, an urban non-Muslim, French-educated, professional and political elite took the lead in the struggle for independence. Senegal has a history of politically sophisticated elites going back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when the French extended citizenship to the residents of St. Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque. Senegalese elites participated in French administration and worked for European businesses.

Senegal became independent in 1960. It is a relatively unified African society because the Wolof language is spoken by about 80 percent of the people and because most Senegalese are Muslims. It is a secular state, and its institutions – the constitution, republican government, civil code, administration, education, and the judiciary – all come from French models. National administration is centralized and hierarchical. The government has strong ambitions to educate, develop, and control society in the interest of its eventual secularization. Political discourse is replete with symbols of Islam, but the *état laïc* is universally accepted. The elites are defined by the use of French.

From 1960, Senegal was ruled by Léopold Senghor, the head of the Union progressiste sénégalaise (UPS), who dominated the country until he retired in 1980. By 1964, he had eliminated his rivals, and in 1966 he declared Senegal a one-party socialist state. From 1976 to 1980, possibly anticipating his retirement, Senghor permitted the creation of a multiparty system and national elections. The Socialist Party, the successor of the UPS, continued to win the overwhelming majority of votes. After Senghor's retirement, for the first time, a Muslim, Abdu Diouf, was elected president, and remained in office until 2000.

Behind its institutional facade Senegal was organized into Sufi brotherhoods under the authority of their marabouts, who both resisted state power and facilitated governmental control. Though rivals for authority, state officials and marabouts cooperate. The marabouts legitimize the regime, and serve as auxiliaries in administration. The state sponsors projects that are of economic benefit to the marabouts, and provides them with honor and resources. These resources, and their ability to get jobs and mediate with the government, help the marabouts build a following of people who look to them for employment, medical assistance, spiritual counsel, and help in family and social relations. Popular support enables the marabouts to both shape state policy and to subtly challenge state authority.

While officials and Sufis collaborate, there are tensions between them. The farming practices of the Murids were criticized for overcultivation of peanuts, neglect of rotation with other crops, deforestation, and exhaustion of the soil. The government attempted to create peasant cooperatives in order to improve agricultural techniques and to win control of the peanut industry. The Murids, however, continued to open up new territories without regard to soil conservation, the use of machinery, or modern agricultural methods. Recently, they have moved from peanut production into urban trade, and control small shops, electrical contracting, haulage, rice distribution, and other markets. When the state adopted a new civil code in 1972, the marabouts simply refused to implement it. They also manipulated the dates of festivals to show symbolically that the state does not control them. Marabouts, unlike Islamists, do not contest the power of the state, but limit it through the creation of a religiously defined "civil society."

In each locality, the Sufi *daira* is the neighborhood or workplace unit of organization. It organizes festivals and collects monies. The festivals are the critical demonstrations of numbers and strength. Individuals get the benefit of social insurance–type help, and may use the economic connections of the marabout to earn a living. In practice, however, the brotherhoods do not really control their members. While everyone has a marabout, loyalty is not exclusive.

Commerce and marriage are not kept within the *tariqa*. People send their children to Quran schools at their convenience, regardless of their marabout. The marabouts instruct their followers on how to vote, but many disciples ignore this or abstain from voting. Marabouts have to be careful of the sentiments of their followers when dealing in politics.

While the Sufi model remains fundamental to the structure of Senegalese Islamic society, urbanization in Senegal led to the growth of a middle class, including professionals, bureaucrats, and teachers, who questioned the magical authority of the rural leaders. In the towns there has been a resurgence of interest in the Arabic language and in the Islamic beliefs that stress regular prayer, pilgrimage, ethical deportment, and intellectual interests coupled with the repression of religious emotion. Dyula traders, other migrants from the countryside to the towns, and returned students from the Middle East created the Muslim Cultural Union in 1953, which sponsored Arabic and Muslim school instruction and opposed colonialism, capitalism, and the power of the rural Sufis. A Muslim Association of African Students was founded in 1954, and a movement for the teaching of Arabic in Senegal in 1957. The National Federation of Muslim Cultural Associations, founded in 1962, lobbies for educational improvements and expansion of the teaching of Arabic and the Quran. In the 1970s, the growth of Arabic economic and cultural influences stimulated calls for an Islamic constitution. Since the 1980s, reformist (or "Islamist") groups have become increasingly important. Young intellectuals and university groups are the standard-bearers of international Islam.

Reformist groups are typically opposed to Sufi Islam, but in Senegal they have also stimulated important organizational and leadership changes within the Sufi communities. The distinction between traditional Sufi and Islamist groups is becoming blurred. A traditional Sufi brotherhood, the Mustarshidin, became one of the first orders to openly engage in Senegalese politics. The Mustarshidin, founded in 1980 by Shaykh Tidiane Sy, combines brotherhood in its organization, reformism in its teachings, and Islamism in its denunciations of corruption and the West, and has mobilized alienated youth to oppose the government. Hizb al-Tarqiyya, which

began as a Murid student organization, has criticized the idea of hereditary leadership. There is a tendency toward mutual borrowings between Sufis and Islamists, and growing respect for intellectuals with an Arabic and religious education. Muslim activists are pushing for the adoption of Shariʿa as Senegalese family law. Senegalese public opinion was vociferously opposed to the US intervention in Iraq as an attack on fellow Muslims.

One unexpected variant of Islamic reformism was the emergence of Shiʿism promoted by Iran. Shiʿism, like reformism, promotes literacy and undermines the authority of the marabouts. It serves to reinforce a "modern" Sufi intellectualizing sensibility. Shiʿism serves symbolically to point out the failures of the Senegalese state and society, French and Western cultures, and Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism. It allows its adherents to be at the same time anti-French, anti-secular, and anti-Arab.

In the 1990s, the overtones of Islamization grew louder in Senegalese political life. In the 2000 elections all the candidates courted the support of the marabouts. Abdoulaye Wade, the victor and president of Senegal until 2012, made a point of his allegiance to the Murid order by visiting its holy city, Touba, and kneeling before the Sufi "caliph" to receive his blessing. His government mandated religious instruction, whether Muslim or Christian, in state schools.

In Senegal the situation of women is ambiguous. Islam gave women family and inheritance rights they had not previously possessed, but the diffusion of the Sufi brotherhoods also led to the removal of women from positions of authority. Western influences helped Senegalese girls attain some degree of education, though to a much smaller extent than boys. Women have been allowed to vote since 1956. By 1993, women made up about 15 percent of the legislature and the civil service. A Senegalese law of 1972 bans marriages under the age of sixteen, prohibits unilateral repudiation by the male, and provides that spouses must agree at the time of marriage whether the marriage is to be polygamous or monogamous. State law, however, is not enforced by the marabouts, who are the controlling local authorities. Muslim radicals who favor the formation of an Islamic state generally call for the veiling, seclusion, and

withdrawal of women from public life. For the first time, veiled women have become a common sight.

All in all, the reformers and the Islamists have been co-opted into the Senegalese system. The Senegalese respect Arabic as a sacred language, but do not consider it as part of their national identity, and the reformers have had to ally themselves either with the government or with the Sufi elites. Thus far, despite a Muslim president and the strength of Muslim identity, the country is too divided among religious brotherhoods, urban and rural peoples, and traditionalists and modernists to generate a broad movement to turn Senegal into a Muslim state.

Nigeria: a Divided society

Northern Nigeria Until Independence.

By contrast with Mauritania and Senegal, the unification of northern and southern Nigeria under British rule created a religiously pluralistic society. In northern Nigeria, Islam had been the religion of the state elites since the fifteenth century. The nineteenth-century Sokoto caliphate brought it to a large proportion of the population. The Sokoto amirs were responsible for the implementation of justice. They appointed *mallams* to lead the prayers, preside over festivals, and advise them on Muslim law. Unofficially, they arbitrated local disputes.

British rule consolidated the northern Muslim society. In 1931, the British set up a conference of amirs and chiefs of northern Nigeria. The amirs were eager to have English rather than Arabic taught in the schools, and sent their own children to the few schools that were available. There were no modern secondary schools until Katsina College was founded in 1922. English was made a compulsory subject in middle schools in 1930–31, and Arabic became part of the curriculum in 1932. Quranic instruction was provided by government-paid *mallams*. The Kano Law School had a fully Islamic curriculum. By the 1940s, the British had changed their policy and sought to provide the modern kind of education given in the south, but by the time of independence only a minuscule number of northerners had been exposed to Western and secular values.

British rule, while politically conservative, stimulated important economic and social changes. The introduction of roads and railroads, and the promotion of export crops such as peanuts and cotton, brought the northern Nigerian peasantry into the international market economy. Vulnerable to changing world prices and excessive debt, many peasants lost their land and were forced to migrate to the cities.

This was one reason for the conversion of many Hausa peasants to Islam. The overall rate of conversion is not known, but studies of individual and communal experiences show that many converts were attracted by commercial opportunities. Successful trade depended on networks of relatives, friends, creditors, and customers. Traders therefore converted to Islam when their business enterprises had outgrown local markets and required the support of the larger-scale Muslim networks. Converts often moved from village to city levels of trade, and broke off ties with their village kin and the land. When a pagan Hausa converted he appeared before a Muslim judge and went through a ceremonial ablution. He was then given a gown, a turban, and a jug to hold the ablution water. This transition was fraught with dangers, which were conceptualized in terms of fear of evil charms and attack by spirits. Converts attempted to safeguard themselves by giving alms, having discussions with *mallams*, and taking medicines. Women ceased farm work, entered into seclusion, and became the financial responsibility of their husbands, though many earned an income from crafts or trade. Though they became Muslims, Hausa converts often continued to believe in spirits, which they equated with the jinn mentioned in the Quran.

The development of a commercial economy had important implications for the development of northern Nigeria's principal city, Kano. At the turn of the century, about 77 percent of the population of Kano city was Hausa, but in rural areas the population was about two-thirds Hausa and one-third Fulani. There was an Arab minority. The populace was thus divided along linguistic, ethnic, and class lines. The class structure consisted of a ruling-class Fulani elite, rich Hausa merchants, senior civil servants, middle-class traders, and the common people or *talakawata*. Occupational groups were organized

into communities, which were a combination of labor unions, welfare societies, and family councils. Throughout the nineteenth century, religious activity was under the aegis of separate Hausa, Fulani, and Arab clans.

Since the 1920s, there has been a dramatic increase in population as a result of the introduction of a railroad, peanuts as a cash crop, and international air travel – developments that made Kano the principal market for northern Nigeria, and the center of a flourishing merchant class. By 1950, Kano was almost completely Muslim, although non-Muslims from other parts of Nigeria dominated modern industries and government administration.

The integration of this populace took place on the basis of a shared Hausa language and shared Muslim religious affiliations. Common economic interests drew together Hausa merchants and Fulani administrators, and Hausa and Fulani craftspeople in similar trades. The revival of Sufi brotherhoods also served to bring Hausas, Fulanis, and Arabs into trans-ethnic religious associations, marking the change from a fragmented to a more integrated local identity.

The most important vehicle of these changes was the spread of the reformed Tijani order in the 1930s. The Tijaniyya were introduced into northern Nigeria in the nineteenth century by al-Hajj ʿUmar, who married the daughter of Muhammad Bello. (See Chapter 41.) Muhammad Salga became the imam of the first Tijani mosque in Kano. The allegiance of his following was later given to Ibrahim Niass, a Wolof residing in Kaolack (Senegal), who was regarded as the *khalifa*, the seal of saints, and the *mujaddid*, or reformer, of the century. Some of his followers believed that he was also the Mahdi or messiah. They believed that Ibrahim had succeeded al-Hajj ʿUmar, the reformer of the thirteenth Muslim century, and ʿUthman don Fodio, the reformer of the twelfth. The reformed order was further reinforced by the formation of the Youth of Islam and the Society of Young Muslims as the expression of younger-generation activists. By the 1960s, about 60 percent of the *mallams* of Kano belonged to the reformed Tijaniyya.

Kano in turn became the base for the further expansion of the reformed order to other northern Nigerian cities such as Katsina and

Kaduna and to rural areas. Throughout Nigeria and West Africa the order organized religious ceremonies, such as the recitation of *dhikr* and the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet. It sponsored numerous schools and contributed to a revival of Arabic and Muslim education in opposition to Western schools. The Tijaniyya network made it possible for traders and travelers to find housing, jobs, and other assistance. Ibrahim had a strong following among women because of his reputation for *baraka*, the power to confer God's blessings. The Qadiriyya similarly became a mass organization, including Hausas as well as Arab and Fulani scholars, emphasizing collective prayers and celebrations.

The transnational affiliations of the Sufi brotherhoods, pilgrimages to Mecca, and studies in Cairo linked Kano to the outside Muslim world. By the time of independence, northern Nigerian identity and that of Kano in particular had several interrelated levels. On one level, there were still the remnants of the nineteenth-century concepts of community. The Fulani elite had perpetuated its power, and Fulani, Hausa, and other ethnic identities remained strong among the common people. At the same time, there was a tendency to redefine social identity in Muslim terms. The amirs highlighted their Islamic functions; the Sufi brotherhoods and political parties stressed the Muslim aspirations of the merchants and the common people.

Building on the Sufi brotherhoods, the northern elites wanted to unify northern Nigeria and make Muslims dominant in the country as a whole. In 1948, they formed the Nigerian People's Congress to represent the interests of the northern political establishment. Ahmadu Bello was the principal leader of this effort. He promoted an informal governing network of politicians, military officers, bureaucrats, bankers, intellectuals, and businessmen, the so-called Kaduna Mafia, who supported administrative, judicial, and educational reforms. In the 1960s, he tried to mobilize popular support by founding a new "trans-Sufi" movement under the name Usmaniyya (a reference to ʿUthman [Usman] don Fodio). Outside support came from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. After Bello's assassination in 1966, the movement splintered, and was ultimately paralyzed.

In competition, younger members of aristocratic families, newly prosperous merchants, and others founded the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU, 1947–50). The NEPU was led by *mallams* with both Western and Arabic education. Aminu Kano, who had studied Quran interpretation, wrote Hausa plays criticizing the abuses of the ruling elite. His criticism was directed not only against Britain but also against the native establishment. The party rallied teachers, clerks, servants, petty traders, craftsmen, workers, and lesser *'ulama'* to oppose colonial rule. Just as Muslim brotherhoods became the expression of the middle classes, new Islamic political movements emerged to consolidate petit-bourgeois and lower-class opposition to the state and merchant elites. In northern Nigeria, state, merchant, and populist opposition were all committed to Muslim symbols, interpreted in varying ways.

Southern Nigeria.

While Islam was the pervasive idiom of social organization and political conflict in northern Nigeria, in southern Nigeria it did not define the society as a whole, but was the religion of specific minorities. In southern Nigeria, the first Yoruba converts were made by Muslim traders from Bornu, Songhay, and Hausaland. In the nineteenth century, liberated slaves from Sierra Leone and Brazil established colonies in Lagos, and Muslims from the north settled in Ilorin, Ibadan, and other towns on the basis of ethnic or other local affiliations.

Lagos, which had for more than a century been the center of important Muslim communities, became a British colony in 1861. The British helped to resolve disputes among Muslims, and acquired a reputation for being impartial in internal Muslim affairs. British officials even patronized mosques. The British also posed a great challenge to Muslims by introducing Western and Christian education. Christian schools had great appeal, as Western education was a key to commercial and professional career advancement, but many Muslims were afraid it would subvert family beliefs. Muslims therefore formed their own educational societies. The Egbe Killa Society of Lagos was founded in the 1880s. The Ahmadiyya, a missionary association from

India, began proselytizing during World War I. The Ansar ud-Deen was founded in 1923. By 1960, it had some 50,000 members, teacher-training colleges, high schools, and primary schools. Other associations were founded to serve the need for the education of women. Thus Lagos became a center of Islamic modernism.

Ibadan, before Nigerian independence, had two Muslim communities, one Yoruba and one Hausa. The Yoruba Muslim community was organized under the authority of a chief imam. A council of ten scholars, who inherited their positions and were supported by contributions, ran the mosques and community affairs. The Yoruba Muslims supported a Quran school and a higher Muslim academy, but they did not live in exclusive neighborhoods, and had close social relationships with non-Muslim Yoruba, including the sharing of churches, mosques, and ceremonies.

Alongside the Yoruba there was also a Hausa Muslim community. The Hausas had come to Ibadan as migrant traders, teachers, beggars, porters, and workers. They were primarily engaged in long-distance trade, in which they imported peanut oil, dried meat, fish, milk, and cattle from the north, and exported kola nuts, sugar, iron, salt, and manufactured goods from the south. The trade was conducted in a traditional framework: without banks, insurance companies, civil courts, or even legal documents. Success depended upon the trust developed within a close-knit minority community. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Hausa businessmen living in Ibadan inhabited a quarter of their own, consisting of migrant northerners and their wives and prostitutes. The British and the majority Yoruba had favored the formation of such a quarter under the control of a Hausa chief as a way of regulating a restless migrant community that included not only peddlers and merchants, but beggars, thieves, and other troublemakers.

The chief of the quarter played an indispensable part in the life of the Ibadan community. He acted as judge, officiated at marriages, mediated inheritance and custody disputes, appointed headmen for occupational subgroups, maintained public services, and policed the activity of strangers. He was an essential reference for creditworthiness, and for the legitimization of land and property

ownership. Every man owed the chief direct personal allegiance, which was signified by kneeling down in front of his office. There were also subchiefs to regulate the cattle market, the butchers, and the guilds of beggars. The beggars were organized into three subgroups under a chief of the blind, a chief of the lame, and a chief of the lepers. Begging was a regular occupation, to which no stigma was attached. Each beggar was assigned a workplace, and paid his Friday earnings to the chief.

Landlords had a crucial economic function; they were hotel and rooming-house keepers for itinerant workers. They acted as intermediaries for their guests, arranging deals, advancing capital, holding deposits, and advising on business conditions. A wealthy landlord had a clientele of workers – including his sons, foster-sons, and others – who carried on the business of his firm. He helped generate the personal contacts that facilitated trade.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, this society of chiefs and landlords was subverted by the rise of the nationalist movements. Faced with competition from the Yoruba and the rise of Nigerian nationalism, the Hausas had to identify their own group interest in ways that would both exclude the Yoruba and be consistent with the new emphasis on national solidarity. Thus between 1950 and 1952, after an inspiring visit by Ibrahim Niass, virtually the whole of the Hausa community joined the Tijaniyya.

The new religious awareness changed the nature of authority within the Hausa community. Members of the Tijaniyya looked to their ritual masters for protection against evil spirits, and consulted them on matters of family, business, and daily behavior. The *mallams* were teachers of correct Muslim practice. They were believed to have the purity of heart that was essential to mystical power, and to know the right religious and magical formulae to achieve practical results. They provided for education, advised the chiefs and merchants as to whether it was propitious to undertake particular activities. Anxious landlords, particularly sensitive to changing market conditions, looked to the *mallams* for social and moral support. The chiefs and the landlords signified their acceptance of this new religious authority by making the pilgrimage to Mecca and earning the title *hajji*. They

became more sensitive to public pressures, especially those due to the practice of "public scandalizing," or denunciation of individuals for unacceptable behavior. Thus, Hausa community organization, authority, and identity were restructured in Muslim terms.

Independent Nigeria.

The formation of a Nigerian national state in 1960 brought north and south into the same political framework. Owing to intense ethnic, religious, and regional differences, however, a true union of north and south was not achieved. The crucial problem was the antagonism between the Muslim north, the Yoruba west, and the Ibo east. Though the north had political predominance, the south had the oil and the bulk of the nation's administrative cadres. In 1966, the rising power of the north, and resistance to central government authority in the west, prompted the military, led by General Ironsi, succeeded by General Gowon, to seize power. The Ibo east, however, refused incorporation into the new regime, and proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. A bitter civil war was fought until the defeat of the eastern provinces in 1970.

Between 1966 and 1979, a succession of military governments sought to reintegrate the country. In the 1970s, the northern Muslim elites were allied with non-Muslim southerners. The close economic ties between the Hausa north and the Yoruba south, the economic interdependency of Kano and Lagos for transportation and the marketing of agricultural products, and federal subsidies laid the foundation for interregional cooperation. The media also emphasized national Nigerian identity, as opposed to religious and regional ties. In 1979, General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976–79) returned the country to a civilian government, and in the elections of 1979 the National Party of Nigeria, representing the Muslim elites of the north, prevailed. Al-Hajji Shehu Shagari became the president of Nigeria's second republic. The north, having accepted integration into the national political system, became the predominant power. Their only opponent was the People's Revolutionary Party, which had the support of workers, craftsmen, and traders in Kano and Kaduna. In 1984, another coup inaugurated a period of military rule that lasted until

1999, when former General Obasanjo was elected to the presidency of another civilian government.

The military regimes of this era were noteworthy for their corruption, exploitation of the country's oil resources for private gain, and widespread lawlessness throughout the country. Despite this instability, the post-1966 military regimes strengthened the Nigerian state. The exploitation of Nigeria's oil reserves gave the federal government vastly increased revenues. The federal state also had major investments in the petrochemical, gas, fertilizer, cement, automobile, paper, and sugar industries, and the government took a major role in the regulation of the banks and the economy. State policies favored the formation of a Nigerian economic elite. A decree of 1972 reserved large areas of the economy for native Nigerians, and prohibited foreign firms to operate without a minimum level of Nigerian participation. Government banks began to allocate a substantial proportion of their loans to Nigerian businessmen and civil servants, who were able to become entrepreneurs. Clientage relations between capitalists and clerks, artisans, and agents sometimes enabled the common people to prosper.

The political context profoundly altered the role of Islam in northern Nigeria and in the nation as a whole. With the formation of a military regime in 1966, the political power of the northern amirs was reduced, and their ceremonial and religious functions became correspondingly more important. They became patrons of Muslim religious groups, helped to sponsor the translation of the Quran into Hausa, and diffused Islamic reform attitudes in order to integrate Arabic- and Hausa-speaking Muslims. Internal differences among Muslims were deemphasized in favor of a shared Islamic identity. New reformist movements closely allied to the northern elites – representing the more universalist, scripturalist, and radical versions of contemporary Islam – arose to challenge the predominance of the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya. Muslim and Arabic education sponsored by the reformers helped produce a new Muslim counter-elite. Most madrasa graduates became teachers of Islam, and a few became *qadis*. Their goal was to establish a Shariʻa society. Regarding women as intellectually and morally inferior, they resisted women's education, and called for their seclusion in the household.

In the 1960s, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, Grand Qadi of northern Nigeria from 1960 to 1966, became the leader of this tendency. Gumi, originally a protégé of Ahmadu Bello, attacked the Sufi brotherhoods as a form of *bid'a*, or illicit innovation, criticized common practices such as the veneration of saints and conspicuous consumption at marriages and festivals, promoted a modern Muslim education, and worked to integrate the Shari'a into all secular jurisdictions including the constitution of Nigeria. Gumi, however, favored the education of women and female suffrage, in part because he saw this as a way of increasing the voting and political power of the Muslim north in national politics. His followers founded the Yan Ízala in 1978, an acronym for the Association for the Removal of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna. The movement had financial support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It spread by intensive preaching, and cassette and radio propaganda. The reformist program appealed to a modernizing, educated, but anti-Western milieu of functionaries, businessmen, intellectuals, and students. Yan Ízala and reformism shaded into Islamism, a program to create an Islamic state. Yan Ízala militants were involved in violent clashes with supporters of the Sufi brotherhoods. The violent elements also saw themselves as at war with a Judeo-Christian Western world. An important politicizing moment for Nigerian Muslims was the promulgation of the Universal Primary Education scheme in the 1970s, which was perceived as increasing the influence of Western Christian rather than Islamic values. The Islamic Society of Nigeria, known as the Shi'ites, under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, also worked for the creation of an Islamic state governed by Shari'a.

The 1980s brought increased Muslim militancy. The northern states encouraged Islam in the media and the schools. The Council of 'Ulama', founded in 1986, called for recognition of Fridays and Islamic festivals as national holidays, a less Western-oriented foreign policy, termination of diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Israel, and Nigerian membership in the international Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) also advocated the introduction of an Islamic calendar, a national Islamic law court of appeal, and other Islam-

related policies. Eventually three judges versed in Islamic law were appointed to the Federal Court of Appeals, though a separate Islamic court was not established. Under Muslim influence the national education system provided for the teaching of Islam and the Hausa language. By 1990, Islam pervaded daily life. Most people knew Arabic prayers and the five pillars of Islam. Public meetings began and ended with Muslim prayer. Religious courts made the basic tenets of Maliki law widely known. Muslim radicals in the north came to see themselves as an embattled minority threatened by non-Muslim predominance in the south and by Western influences, and at the same time as bearers of a holy mission to restore the Sokoto caliphate, and to make the north a Muslim holy land from which all non-Muslims were to be eliminated.

By 2000, ethnic and religious militias had effectively taken control of the north. Sani Yerima, governor of the northwestern state of Zamfara, declared the adoption of Shariʿa. The Kano state assembly followed. By November 2001, twelve northern states had adopted Islamic law. This was contrary to the Nigerian constitution, but Shariʿa had enormous popular appeal for Muslims, who trusted Islamic law courts to give justice. Christians, however, claimed that Islamic law would infringe on their rights to practice their faith and to drink alcohol, and would create legal punishments such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning not permitted in Nigerian law. President Obasanjo opposed the movement toward Shariʿa, but in practice the federal government accepted the declarations. The northern states were slipping out of federal control. Local elites were using the Shariʿa issue against the central state.

Nigerian society was also increasingly polarized between Muslims and Christians, who each promoted parallel mythologies of oppression by the other. Ethnic and religious conflict was exacerbated by mass poverty. In 1987, the Muslim Students' Society and the Fellowship of Christian Students in Kaduna fought street battles over a presumed insult to the Quran. Fighting spread to the entire state of Kaduna. Churches and mosques were destroyed. Relations between Muslims and Christians became even more volatile after the end of military rule in May 1999, and the decision of

the northern states to implement Islamic law. There were murderous and destructive Muslim–Christian riots in Kaduna in 2000.

While Islam was becoming a national religion it was also becoming the religion of lower- and middle-class opposition to the dominant elites. In the 1950s, the NEPU opposed the emirate system and the aristocracy in the name of the middle-class intelligentsia, the common people, and Islamic values. With the consolidation of state economic and political elites in the 1970s, Islam was revived as the banner of the opposition. Iran's revolution inspired a radical Islamic movement in the name of Shiʿism, though it was not religiously connected to historical Shiʿism. Most of the activists were students of Quran schools. For them, "Shiʿism" was not a belief system but an implied return to the pristine values of Islam.

In Kano a new movement was launched by Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine, who claimed to have had divine revelations superseding those of the Prophet Muhammad. Laborers, factory workers, petty traders, and craftsmen – many of whom were itinerant Quran students and downwardly mobile *mallams* – found in Islamic values an outlet for their concerns about wage exploitation, inflation, and a declining standard of living for the common people. Poor migrants from rural areas looking for work in the dry season and homeless and unemployed Quran students displaced from construction jobs and burdened by rising food and housing costs threw themselves into the Yan Tatsine movement. A millenarian outburst led to riots throughout northern Nigeria from 1980 to 1985. Religiously inspired riots occurred in and around Kano in 1980, Kaduna in 1982, Bulum-Ketu in 1982, Jimeta in 1984, and Gombe in 1985.

The *mallams* were particularly important, for they provided interpretive leadership for fellow workers. In working-class milieus, the *mallams* and the students taught the Quran, behaved in the exemplary Hausa Muslim manner, cultivated courtesy, modesty, patience, and honesty, and advocated social solidarity and Muslim justice. Universal primary education, however, had undermined traditional modes of Islamic learning and lessened the need for *mallams*. The *mallams*, once a respected social category, were redefined by the newly wealthy elites as an embarrassing,

dangerous, and immoral class. Reciprocally, the *mallams* articulated the resentment of the poor at low wages, the excesses of consumption by the rich, and political oppression. They condemned the corruption of the religious and secular elites and the upper classes' consumption of Western goods. They used traditional Islamic values to express the demands of the lower classes for justice.

The Boko Haram outbreaks from 2009 to the present derive from these precedents. Muhammad Yusuf, the Boko Haram leader, was involved in the Shi'i movement of the 1970s and 1980s, and followed in the path of the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985. Boko Haram incited a wave of riots in July 2009 across the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno, and has repeatedly been involved in anti-Christian violence since then. It refers to itself as "The People of Sunna, Call, and Jihad" and demands strict adherence to Islam, and the adoption or imposition of Islamic law throughout Nigeria. The activists include university students, civil servants, and vagabonds. There is speculation that the Boko Haram riots are backed by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, Tablighi clerics from Pakistan, and Wahhabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda training camps, and suggestions that it is funded by northern religious leaders and businessmen. It is a radical Islamic protest in an impoverished and unjust Nigerian society.

Nigerian women continue to live in a very conservative setting. In northern Nigeria seclusion of women is the norm. Men and women do not mix socially. Girls tend to marry between the ages of eleven and fourteen, and most of them work at home in food preparation, sewing, knitting, and similar activities. Generally, women require their husbands' permission to undertake outside educational or economic activities. Still, there is scope for autonomy. Women were enfranchised in 1976. Since 1977, the Agency for Mass Education provides adult-education classes for women. Learned women teach privately, and a few teach at the Women's Arabic Teachers' College in Kano, founded in 1978. In 1979, the People's Redemption Party, which came to power in Kano and Kaduna, supported universal primary education, including for girls, and had two women appointed to government posts. There are also feminist organizations, including the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria, which

support the establishment of Shariʿa law and defend women's rights in inheritance, child custody, and education as defined in Islamic law.

Just as Islam symbolized the fusion of Hausa and Fulani ethnicity and the complex interweaving of local Kano, northern regional, and Nigerian national identity, it symbolized the class conflict between the dispossessed and the elites. All parties found in Islam the symbols and the organizational basis for the struggle for political power. As in other Muslim countries, Islam in northern Nigeria has become a universal idiom, an encompassing basis for social identity with sufficient internal differentiation to articulate conflicting interests in a complex society.

Chad.

Chad is also the locus of high Muslim–Christian tensions and conflict, in part due to the demographic differences of north and south. The south is agricultural and Christian and animist in religion, but the north is a region of cattle raisers and traders and is Muslim. NGOs and aid organizations are divided between Christian and Muslim sponsorship. In recent decades, the state and the military have been taken over by northern Muslims.

Muslims in other West African states

In other parts of West Africa, Muslims are minorities and have not shaped the governing regimes. Most West African states were and are ruled by one-party systems, military regimes, and similar concentrated governments, while Muslim communal life was built around schools and scholars, clerical lineages such as the Jakhanke and the Saghanughu, Sufi brotherhoods, and minority ethnic groups. During the French colonial period, Wahhabi influences reached French West Africa, and had profound practical and symbolic implications.

Ghana.

In Ghana, Kumasi provides an example of the traditional type of Muslim community and the challenges posed by Islamic reformism. In

the nineteenth century, Kumasi already had a strong Muslim presence, which provided the Ashanti rulers with scribes, ambassadors, political advisors, soldiers, and religious magicians. The Muslims had considerable influence because of the value attached to their amulets, and they intermarried with the Ashanti elite. In addition to the local Muslims there were Hausa and Mossi traders who brought cattle, leather, and cloth to Kumasi in return for gold dust, salt, and kola nuts.

In 1896, the British conquered the Ashanti Empire, and in 1900–01 declared a protectorate over northern Ghana. They developed the gold mines and cocoa plantations on the Gold Coast, opened the way to unrestricted northern immigration to the south, and attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from northern Ghana, Hausaland, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, and Mali. Many of the migrants were not originally Muslims, but soon adopted Islam and the Hausa language. This populace was concentrated in the Zongo or Muslim quarter of Kumasi. Ethnic differences were perpetuated through lineages, which appointed their own headmen. The headmen were vital because they helped the sick and poor, provided food and lodging, took care of orphans, supervised inheritances, performed marriages and burials, and adjudicated disputes on the basis of Islamic and customary law. The British recognized the community headmen, allowed them to organize courts, and appointed a *sarkin*, or chief, of the Zongo.

With independence, the Muslim community was restructured. In 1957, Kwame Nkrumah removed the headmen from office and created a direct link between the government and the communities by the appointment, under the authority of the minister of the interior, of a man named Mutawakilu as Sarkin Zongo. The Muslim Council was created as an instrument of government control. With the removal of Nkrumah in 1966, the Muslim communities again set up their own headmen.

Since 1966, the community structure of the Zongo has evolved to emphasize its common Muslim identity. Ethnic ties were strong among first-generation immigrants, but second- and third-generation residents identify with the wider Islamic community rather than with

more parochial groups. Neighborhood, school, and youth groups are formed on a multiethnic basis. The Hausa version of Islam has become standard. Marriage and naming ceremonies tend to follow the Hausa pattern. Festivals, funerals, ceremonial days, and worship in the common mosque also serve to reinforce a transethnic solidarity. In time the old ethnic-lineage headmen were challenged by modernizing movements led by a younger generation of urban-born, educated leaders. In Ghana these movements included the Ahmadiyya, the Ghana Muslim Mission, the Islamic Research and Reformation Center, the Islamic Solidarity Association of West Africa, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Ghana, and the Ghana Muslim Representative Council – all of which sponsored English/Arabic schools at the elementary level and missionary activities. There is considerable tension between the Ahmadiyya and other Muslim groups, and between the minority of Muslims and the Christian majority.

Ivory Coast.

In the Ivory Coast, the Dyula (see Chapter 40) were the established Muslim community. They lived in the Koko quarter of Korhogo, and made their living in weaving and trade. They were organized in *kabila*, or wards, which were patrilineal descent groups. The Dyula were divided into moieties. The *mory* were the clans who strictly observed Islam, and were the learned custodians and transmitters of Arabic texts. The *tun tigi* were the clans that participated in Muslim festivals but did not strictly observe Islamic laws – the people of warfare and politics, but not of religious knowledge. The scholars held that Islam was separate from politics, and supported the existing regimes; all other Dyula were free to belong to any faction or party. The Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya founded branches among the Dyula, but they were not organized corporate groups. Membership was voluntary, and the recruits were usually older men seeking recognition for religious merit.

As people of different ethnic groups converted to Islam, it ceased to be an ethnic-minority religion, and became the religion of large numbers of people throughout the nation. To be Muslim was

redefined, no longer in terms of belonging to Dyula *mory* and *tun tigi* lineages, but in terms of observance of Islamic law. The *tun tigi* clans came under pressure to upgrade their observance; sermons replaced dancing as the typical Muslim ceremony.

This change was fostered by Wahhabism, which was introduced into the Ivory Coast in the late 1940s. The movement spread along the trade routes and established itself in the principal towns, especially Abidjan, and the earliest converts were *nouveaux riches* merchants, shippers, entrepreneurs, and their dependent workers. Wahhabis tended to be pro-Arab and anticolonial, and were involved in the struggles for national independence. The reformers stressed the universality of Islam rather than traditional kinship and ethnic loyalties. Wahhabi preachers denounced magic, saint worship, and the traditional special rituals for life-cycle events. Though the Wahhabis had begun as a movement of the well-to-do, they progressively became a movement of lower-class recent converts, to whom their universalism and indifference to race, caste, and social origin appealed. A large proportion were Guinean migrants. By the 1990s, the radicalism and sectarianism of the Wahhabis had diminished, and they began to pray with other Muslims. At least externally, there was a return to Muslim unity.

With the growing strength of Islam, Houphouet-Boigny, political leader and president of Ivory Coast from 1959 until his death in 1993, created an Islamic Superior Council to integrate Muslims into the government. Imams supported him for reelection in 1990. His death in 1993, however, opened a period of complex regional, ethnic, and religious struggles in Ivorian politics. In some respects these appear to be struggles between the Muslim north and the predominantly Christian and animist south. While Ivory Coast is about 35 percent Christian and 27 percent Muslim, a substantial part of the northern population is made up of immigrants from neighboring African countries. About 70 percent of the northern immigrant population is Muslim. There have been riots, assaults upon Muslims, and the burning of mosques in Abidjan.

However, a close examination of the country's politics shows that the apparent religious conflict reflects a more complex interaction of

regionalism, ethnicity, and religion in Ivorian politics. The conflicts cannot be understood simply as a conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south. Both sectors of the country have substantially mixed populations. Only parts of northern Ivory Coast are "largely Muslim." The south contains sizable populations of animists and Muslims as well as Christians. The central issue is the doctrine of "Ivoiritée," the policy of Houphouet-Boigny, that defines citizenship as the prerogative of southern Ivorians and attempts to deprive the northerners of political rights. As immigrants from neighboring countries have moved in, Ivorian nativists resist the influx by seeking to exclude foreigners – and their children – from citizenship. Most of the immigrants are Muslims, but non-Muslim immigrants face the same discrimination.

The regime of Laurent Gbagbo (1999–2011) continued the policy of "Ivoiritée." Gbagbo came to power in a contested election in which the northern party, under the leadership of Alassane Ouattara, was prevented from running for the presidency or parliament. The effort to concentrate political power coupled with economic stagnation led to a revolt by soldiers recruited from the northern ethnic minorities. Northern Mandes troops rebelled in 2002, followed by the Movement for Social Justice (MJP), made up essentially of the Goi people of the northwest, and the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI), ethnically related to the Mandes. In the elections of 2010 the Akan peoples of southeastern Ivory Coast voted heavily for Laurent Gbagbo, but Ouattara won the elections as a result of a coalition of northerners with Christians and animists in the Baoule region of the south. Ivory Coast is not, carefully considered, solely a region of Christian–Muslim conflict.

In Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta, Islam is strengthened by the construction of mosques, preaching on national television, official recognition of Muslim festivals, and support from the Arab world. Madrasa education, which began just after World War II, appeals to the lower classes, excluded from political power, and now serves half of the Muslim population, though only tiny minorities reach the secondary level. The Arabist and Islamist movement serves as a counterculture to the European style of modernity, and also a way of

integrating the disparate ethnic groups that make up the Muslim population of the country.

Niger is the center of traditional *'ulama'*- and Sufi-led communities, and since the 1990s is also home to the militant reformist Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of the sunna, or *izala*, which defines Muslims either as *yan tariqa*, people of the brotherhoods, or *yan izala*, people of reform. Many young people, however, while fervently "Muslim" in identity, are indifferent to the historic sectarian, factional, and ritual differences among Muslims. They think of Islam in terms of submission to God, unity, and mutual support, and identify with the political plight of Muslims around the world.

In Cameroon, Islamic renewal is expressed in communal identity rather than specific forms of religious practice or political goals. There is strong political and social support for a Western type of modernity, and a younger educated Muslim elite bypasses the traditional *'ulama'* and Sufi leadership to create its own system of schools and social service agencies.

South Africa.

There are three main groups of Muslims in South Africa, who make up less than 2 percent of the population. The first group, called Cape Malays, came from the Southeast Asian islands after the Dutch East India Company established itself in the Cape in 1652. These were Amboyan Mardyckers, who were brought to protect the Dutch settlement against the indigenous San and Khoi. The Dutch also brought Muslim slaves and convicts from Africa and Asia. Under the Dutch, Muslims could not worship publicly, which meant that they relied on Sufi traditions and practiced Islam mainly at home. Only in 1798, under British rule, was the first mosque permitted. More mosques were established in the nineteenth century, usually around an individual imam. In one case, Malay Muslims were awarded land for a mosque after assisting the British in fighting the Xhosa in the east. However, in general, Muslims in the Cape maintained an oppositional relationship with the state. In the twentieth century, they suffered from the apartheid laws, and most Muslims were relocated

from the city center and the business areas of Cape Town to the suburbs. New mosques were built in the residential areas. Various efforts to unify Muslims under a single umbrella organization, such as the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), which was formed in 1945, failed. The MJC wanted to make Shariʿa the law of the Muslim community, but this was resisted by the independent imams.

The Muslims in the Transvaal (now Gauteng) came during the British era, primarily from India, as indentured laborers, traders, merchants, and hawkers. The earliest mosque in Transvaal was built in Pretoria in 1887. Most of the religious leaders were brought from India, and in general they were very conservative. The ʿ*alim*, or scholar, of each mosque decided religious issues, but committees of influential traders and hawkers controlled the relationship of the mosques to the state authorities. There are also many Muslims in KwaZulu-Natal, whose ancestors came from India to work on the sugar plantations. After 1860, Muslim laborers came from Malawi and Zanzibar. There are some local converts.

In present-day independent South Africa Muslims are assured of religious rights. Muslims can demand rescheduling in schools or offices to attend religious services. New organizations, such as the Muslim Youth Movement, the Call of Islam, and Qiblah, have been formed.

Chapter 57 Islam in East Africa

The East African states are here grouped together for geographical convenience, but the experience of each country was in fact very different. The history of the Sudan resembles that of North Africa and the Middle Eastern Arab countries. For a century and a half, the Sudan has been consolidating a modern state. The northern part of the country has an Arabic-speaking population, a Muslim identity, and strong Islamic movements, but the southern part encompasses a non-Muslim African population that resists assimilation on Arab, Muslim, and central-state terms. In 2011, the south became an independent state. Somalia resembles Mauritania in that tribal, Muslim, and Arab identity have become part of Somali national identity. Ethiopia also has a long history of state consolidation, but this has taken place under Christian rather than Muslim auspices. In Ethiopia, the Muslims have resisted incorporation into a non-Muslim state, but until recently their resistance was expressed in secular rather than religious terms. The histories of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and other East African countries, by contrast, follow a West African pattern in which the dominant consideration in the twentieth century has been the formation of colonial regimes and their replacement by secular national states. In these countries, Islam is the basis of local communal and social organization but not of state power or national identity.

Sudan

By the nineteenth century, many parts of the modern state of Sudan already had a long history of Muslim sultanates, substantial Muslim populations, and developed Muslim religious institutions. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the process of territorial unification and consolidation of state power proceeded relentlessly. It began with the Egyptian conquest of the Sudan by Muhammad ʿAli,

nominally the Ottoman governor of Egypt, but already an independent ruler, who conquered the Funj sultanate in 1820, and founded Khartoum as a new capital in 1830. Later Egyptian rulers expanded their territory to include the Upper Nile and equatorial provinces in 1871, Bahr al-Ghazal in 1873, and Darfur in 1874.

The new Egyptian regime set out to administer the Sudan in accordance with the Tanzimat, or modernization program, already being applied in Egypt. A local army was recruited from the southern population, and the country was divided into administrative districts whose officials collected taxes from village headmen. The Egyptians organized a state trading monopoly, and slave raiding became a state business. When the state trading monopolies were ended in the reign of Muhammad Sa'id (1854–63), Europeans flocked to the Sudan to take over the gum arabic, ostrich feather, and ivory trade. In 1863, Isma'il Pasha formed the Sudan – later the Egyptian – Trading and Commission Company to build and operate the railroads, steamships, and telegraph. A prosperous economy was the basis of large state revenues and the centralization of administration.

Egypt also attempted to subordinate the Muslim religious elites. The Egyptians canceled the special financial privileges of the local *faqis*, and suppressed some of the Sufi *tariqat*. Instead they encouraged an *'ulama'* establishment primarily staffed by Egyptians, though it incorporated local Sudanese students who were graduates of al-Azhar. The Egyptian religio-legal administration applied Hanafi law even though most of the local religious leaders were Malikis. The Egyptians also created a court (*majlis mahalli*) in the major towns and a court of appeals (*majlis alahdan*) in Khartoum.

The weakening of local holy men and tribal chiefs by a foreign regime led to the spread of the reformed *tariqat*, inspired by pilgrims returning from Mecca and Medina. The Sammaniyya order was introduced by Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayyib b. al-Bashir, who returned around 1800. The reform teaching of Ahmad b. Idris al-Fasi (d. 1837) was introduced into the Sudan by Muhammad al-Majdhub (1796–1833), a descendant of an established holy family, who remade the order according to new principles. The Khatmiyya was introduced

through the teaching of Muhammad ʿUthman al-Mirghani (1793–1853). These brotherhoods were committed to formal Islamic law and hostile to the traditional veneration of the *faqis* as miracle workers and holy men. The *tariqat* quickly became politically important. The Khatmiyya established a nationwide organization and cooperated with the Egyptian regime. The Sammaniyya also established a widespread network, but held aloof from the rulers and took the side of the local population. The Majdhubiyya offered militant resistance. Thus, despite Egyptian efforts to impose a state form of Islamic administration, Sufism remained the basis of local opposition to Egyptian rule.

A half-century of Egyptian rule eventually provoked violent resistance to oppressive officials. Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad (1848–85), a pious member of the Sammaniyya order, declared himself the Mahdi, the expected savior, and called for a restoration of the true Islam. By divine inspiration he gave instructions on such matters as the seclusion of women and distribution of land, and attempted to modify customary Sudanese religious practices in accordance with the teachings of Islamic law. He was opposed to the wearing of amulets, consumption of tobacco and alcohol, the wailing of women at funerals, music in religious processions, and the visiting of saints' tombs. In imitation of the migration of the Prophet, he and his followers retreated to the mountains of Kordofan, called themselves the Ansar (Helpers of the Prophet), and created a revolutionary state with an army, treasury, and legal administration. The early supporters of the Mahdist revolt included pious disciples, Baqqara nomads who made up the bulk of the army, and various tribes. (See Illustration 33.)

Illustration 33. The tomb of the Mahdi, Omdurman, Sudan (Hutchinson Library).

In 1885, the Mahdists defeated the British General Gordon and took Khartoum. The Mahdi died soon after, and ʿAbdallah b. Muhammad, his *khalifa*, or designated lieutenant, assumed the task of building a state. His succession marked the transformation of the charismatic revolutionary movement into a conventional regime. The Mahdists, who began by rebelling against Egyptian rule, continued the movement toward the centralization of state power. The new ruler concentrated on building up military power, adopting the Turko-Egyptian fiscal system, and restoring the government's authority over rural areas. In practice, this meant a return to the bureaucracy and corruption of the past. The Mahdists also sought to reform

Islamic practice in accordance with international standards, and suppressed local *faqis* and local forms of the veneration of saints. In reaction, a Muslim *faqi* in Darfur named Abu Jummayza attempted to revive the influence of the local *faqis* and tribal peoples against the encroachment of the state and the international reformist religious brotherhoods.

The Mahdist state also had to deal with expanding Italian, French, and British power. In 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian army defeated them at the Battle of Omdurman. The conquest led to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1955), or joint Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty. Egypt financed the army and the administration of the country, but left a British governor-general in full military and civil control. Under Lord Kitchener and his successor, Sir Reginald Wingate (1900–16), the British defeated the remaining opposition, and in 1916 incorporated the Darfur province into the Sudan. They set up a provincial administration with British officials at the head and Egyptians and Sudanese in the lower offices. However, in spite of their defeat the Mahdists retained wide support. They had helped overcome tribal particularism, and would later be an important base for the development of Sudanese nationalism and a Sudanese state.

To govern Sudan, the British reverted to the religious policy of the previous Egyptian regime. In the north they attempted to rebuild the *'ulama'* establishment by creating a board of *'ulama'* in 1901. They financed mosques and pilgrimages, and encouraged the application of Muslim law in Muslim courts, staffed by Egyptian judges and some Sudanese trained at al-Azhar. Sudanese legal scholars graduated from Gordon College and from the Institute of Learning in Omdurman (founded in 1912). While favorable to the *'ulama'*, the Condominium government was hostile to Sufism.

The principal Sufi movements, the Khatmiyya and the Mahdist (also called Ansar), supported British rule, partly because of their rivalries with each other. At the same time, a secular nationalist movement was born. The Sudan Union Society was formed in 1920, calling for self-determination; the White Flag League, supported by army officers, followed; and there were nationalist demonstrations in 1924. Disturbed by the increasing influence of the religious leaders

and the nationalist ferment, in 1924 the British adopted a new administrative policy, increasing their reliance on tribal and rural chiefs. They reduced the size of the bureaucracy in order to avoid educating and employing an urban intelligentsia, and encouraged English education in the south to foster regional separatism. By 1936, however, they realized that indirect rule could not work because there was not a strong enough tribal organization in rural areas. They returned to the urban intelligentsia, and thus increased the opportunities for national and religious resistance. In 1938, the Graduates General Congress was formed to give Sudanese officials a voice in administration, and by 1943 it had been taken over by the Mahdists. The first political party, the Ashiqqa, an offshoot of the Khatmiyya, was formed in 1943. In 1944, the leader of the Mahdists, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Rahman, the son of the Mahdi, formed the Umma Party, which favored independence but was nonetheless friendly with the British. Thus, as the problem of Islamic localism receded and the problem of national independence became central, the Islamic religious movements became the basis of nationalist political parties. The Muslim religious leaders were the only ones who could mobilize mass support.

The path to independence, however, was tortuous. Britain was reluctant to concede its colonial powers, but in 1947 proposed the formation of a national legislative assembly and executive council, reserving a veto for the British governor-general. Southern leaders were doubtful about their place in a national union but accepted the idea at the Juba Conference of 1947. Northern Sudanese religious and nationalist groups were bitterly divided over the further question of union with Egypt. The National Union Party (NUP), representing the Khatmiyya and the urban and riverine areas, feared a Mahdist restoration and favored an Egyptian alliance. The Ansar or Mahdists favored immediate independence and opposed a union of Egypt and the Sudan. The elections of 1953 showed that the country was divided. The NUP dominated the Sudanese parliament, but the Umma Party (Mahdists) was strong in the Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, and southern provinces. The Umma made it clear by massive public demonstrations that the pursuit of union with Egypt would lead to civil war. In turn, the NUP became disillusioned with President

Nasser and suspicious of Egyptian intentions. In January 1954, the British transferred power to the Sudanese, and in 1956 Sudan became officially independent.

Independent Sudan

In 1956, Sudan became officially independent, but could not establish a stable national regime. There were deep conflicts between the movements committed to an Arabic Islamic concept and those committed either to a secular or pluralistic ethnic concept of Sudanese nationhood. In the main this pitted the Arab Muslim north against the non-Muslim south. About 40 percent of the Sudanese, largely in the north, were Arab Muslims. Southern peoples, mainly Christian or adherents of traditional African religions, were more than half the population. In western Sudan, the population was Muslim, but not Arab. Northerners virtually excluded southerners from pre-independence politics and from the negotiations with Egypt and Britain. The conflict between the unitary Arabic Islamic concept of the Sudan and a pluralistic African concept continued until the division of the country into North and South Sudan in 2011.

Among Arab Muslims there were conflicting ideas about the role of Islam in the new nation-state. The reformist Islamist movements, of which the most important was the Muslim Brothers, led by Hasan al-Turabi, especially strong in the universities and among the urban intelligentsia, favored the imposition, by force if necessary, of a unified national program based on Shari'a regardless of ethnic or other religious affiliation. The army, a political force itself, supported by ideologically driven Islamist movements, considered itself the embodiment of national unity, defined that unity in terms of Arab/Islamic identities, and attempted to impose that identity on the rest of the country. The military has always depended on an Islamic political party to define and legitimize its rule.

The Sufi brotherhoods and the political parties built upon them, the Ansar/Mahdists and the Khatmiyya, and many smaller Sufi brotherhoods played an ambivalent role. They were part of the Islamic elite, but they also accepted ethnic and religious differences,

and at times cooperated with the liberal intelligentsia. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, prime minister from 1966 to 1967 and 1986 to 1989 and the leader of the Mahdiyya, favored the formation of an Islamic state, but had no precise model except that it should be in tune with modernity, promote social justice, and respect democracy and human rights. Because of their rivalries and their profoundly different conceptions of an Islamic state, the three major religio-political movements, Ansar, Khatmiyya, and Muslim Brothers, could not actually enact an Islamic constitution until 1998.

Secular movements, including the Communist Party, Arab socialist admirers of Egypt's President Nasser, and professional groups, favored a separation of state and religion. With the exception of the short-lived military regime of the Free Officers that governed in the name of Arab socialism between 1969 and 1972, the secular groups have not been able to control the state.

Military rule

Since independence, Sudan has had a rapid succession of governments. The military governed the country for thirty-four of the fifty-five years between 1956 and 2011, and continues to do so. There were three military regimes: from 1958 to 1964, 1969 to 1985, and from 1989 to the present. These fell into a similar pattern: a military coup d'état followed by the repression of the opposition, efforts to Islamize the country and to make Shariʿa the national law, leading to political strife and violent resistance, especially in the south and west. The military regimes twice gave way to civilian governments that modified but did not basically change the political direction of the country.

The parliamentary regime formed in 1954 was soon overtaken by the first military coup led by General Ibrahim ʿAbbud. In 1958, a council of the armed forces seized control of the government, abolished the political parties and the trade unions, and with the blessing of the Khatmiyya and the tolerance of the Ansar, Arabized the administration and the schools, expelled foreign missionaries, and set out to impose central control and an Arabic Islamic identity

on the southern regions. The regime provoked guerrilla resistance in the south, and the formation of the South African National Union (SANU) as the standard bearer of southern autonomy. Communist and Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations and railroad strikes took place in the north. In 1964, ʿAbbud was forced to resign and was replaced by a civilian coalition government. The coalition was composed of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), founded by the Muslim Brothers in October 1964, with Hasan al-Turabi as secretary general, allied with the Ansar and the Khatmiyya. A 1968 draft constitution made Islam the official religion, and Arabic the official language of the state. In 1969, this civilian government was removed by another military coup, led by Jaʿfar al-Numayri.

Numayri would govern Sudan until 1985, but with numerous changes of policy and ideology. He dissolved the parliament, formed a revolutionary command council, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. He first defined the regime as a Free Officers' coup on the Egyptian model of Nasser: Arab nationalist, secular, and socialist. Numayri favored state-led economic development, and won communist and trade union support. Then, between 1970 and 1972, he consolidated his power, disbanded the Communists, crushed the Khatmiyya and Ansar parties, and pursued a policy of secularism and integration of north and south. By the Addis Ababa accord of 1972, Numayri recognized the right of southern peoples to their own languages and religions. He allowed the Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatorial, and Upper Nile provinces to become a self-governing region, though the national government maintained control of defense, foreign policy, and currency. For a time the Numayri regime was Western oriented, maintained good relations with Egypt, and sponsored large-scale agricultural development along the Nile.

Later in the 1970s, however, Numayri shifted to an Islamic orientation. The transformation coincided with the discrediting of Nasserite nationalism after the 1967 war with Israel, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamʿat in Egypt, aid from Saudi Arabia, and finally the Iranian revolution. Nuwayri reconciled with the Ansar, and started to patronize the smaller Sufi *tariqat* with gifts of free

transport for gatherings, pilgrimage expenses, and the construction of *zawiyas*.

Fatefully, he turned to the Muslim Brothers, led by Hasan al-Turabi, for political support. Turabi was an exceptionally skillful politician who from the outset appreciated the importance of the state as an instrument of Islamization. In his early writings he advocated a government committed to the divine law. Only Islam, he believed, would mobilize the masses. He called for a democratic and presidential system of government, and a state that would manage the key sectors of the economy while respecting private property. The state, in control of the media, would be the educator of Muslims. Beyond each state there would be an international Islamic order.

Under al-Turabi, the Sudanese Muslim Brothers became a powerful social and political force. He founded the National Islamic Front (NIF), and sponsored schools, clinics, and mosques. He organized scout groups, girls' schools, and social agencies such as the Islamic Da'wa Organization and the Islamic African Relief Agency. He also built up an Islamic banking system, and profited from remittances from workers abroad. From the mid-1980s, Turabi built a network of adherents in the military, the legislature, the student movements, and the professions. His followers indoctrinated senior army officers in courses on Islamic ideology, and student loyalists were urged to join the officers' corps. Turabi was appointed attorney general, and many of his colleagues took positions in the judiciary, the educational and financial systems, and in the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU).

The Numayri–Turabi regime implemented an Islamist agenda including the prohibition of usury, gambling, and the consumption of alcohol, and in 1983 integrated Islamic law into national law. Numayri merged civil and Islamic courts, reinstituted the *hudud*, or Islamic punishments, strengthened Islamic courts, Islamized banking, made the *zakat* a state tax, and declared himself the infallible imam. A signal demonstration of Numayri's authoritarian Islam was the trial and execution of Mahmood Muhammad Taha. On January 5, 1985, Taha was arrested for distributing pamphlets calling for an end to Shari'a law in Sudan. Taha believed that Islam in its original,

uncorrupted form was expressed in the Meccan verses of the Quran and gave women and non-Muslims equal status. He organized a small group of followers called the Republican Brothers. Brought to trial on January 7, he refused to participate. The trial lasted two hours, and on the basis of his confessed opposition to Sudan's interpretation of Islamic law, he was sentenced to death and immediately executed.

In 1982, Numayri carried the Islamic campaign to the south. Islamic law did not apply to the non-Muslim south, but the Association of Southern Muslims, funded by Kuwait and the Gulf Emirates, and boosted by the mass influx of Muslim refugees from Uganda, was set up to establish Islamic schools in the south. Regional administration was subdivided to reduce its power and soften up the region for Islamization. Numayri in effect abrogated the Addis Ababa accord. In response, the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was founded in 1983. Its goal was a socialist and democratic state that respected freedom of religion. Its method was war. Led by John Garang, the SPLM attacked government oil and agricultural projects, infrastructure, and strategic towns.

Numayri was overthrown in 1985 as a result of economic crises, the failure of Islamic experiments, and southern rebellions. In the crisis the Muslim Brotherhood lost control of the student movements. Students, professionals, trade unionists, the Ansar, the Khatmiyya, and the army joined in the uprising.

For four years there was a moderate coalition government led by Sayyid Sadiq al-Mahdi, the grandson of the Mahdi. The new regime also insisted on Islamic law as the basis of law and the unitary idea of the Sudanese nation, but in practice stopped enforcing *hudud*. In 1989, the government suspended the application of Islamic legal norms in anticipation of a constitutional conference. To no avail: a bloodless coup d'état led by Colonel 'Umar al-Bashir established a new military government. Until October 1993, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was officially the supreme political authority, but the country was in fact governed by the Council of Forty, a secret group of Islamist militants, chaired by Turabi.

After 1993, Sudan was transformed into an Islamic authoritarian single-party state. Bashir appointed himself president of the country and disbanded the RCC. His regime suspended political parties, and curtailed the power of the Ansar and the Khatmiyya. The civil service and the unions were purged of non-Islamists, who were replaced with NIF cadres. The NIF increased its control over the banks, the building industry, transport, and the media. Opposition leaders were imprisoned. All criticism by intellectuals, professors, and professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and journalists was suppressed, and a regime of control and indoctrination was implemented.

The Islamists tried to use the state power to create an Islamic society, and reintroduced Islamic legal and penal codes. Islamic laws were enforced by regime police. Arabic instead of English was mandated in the schools. Everywhere signs displayed Quranic verses. Government policy toward women changed drastically. When Sudan became independent, women were valued for their potential contribution to the development of the country as civil servants, doctors, and teachers. The NIF government, however, rejected women's emancipation as an imitation of Western values, and women were removed from senior positions. In the NIF view women may work, but not if their jobs threaten the power of men. Health, welfare, and childcare are considered suitable areas of employment for women. Women's organizations were banned. The government proscribed the teaching of art and music, forbade men and women from dancing together, and segregated the sexes in public places. Women were flogged for violating the Islamic dress code. Islamization was based on military power and top-down change. As the head of an intrusive and oppressive ideologically driven regime, Turabi embodied an ideological goal, but also a factional and personal drive for power.

In international affairs, Turabi saw himself as the vanguard of a world Islamic revolution. Sudan was opened to Afghan Arab *mujahidin* and to Osama bin Laden, and supported Muslim parties in the Somali, Bosnian, and other civil wars. Sudan assisted Egyptian terrorists in an attempt to assassinate Egyptian president Husni

Mubarak. This led to a United Nations condemnation and to a US bombing attack on presumed al-Qaeda facilities. The influence of the radical ideologues gave way to more pragmatic leaders, and to a decline in Turabi's influence. In 1998, a new constitution declared the restoration of the multiparty system.

In 1999 and 2000, Bashir and Turabi came into conflict. Turabi tried to legislate limits on Bashir's powers, and in a coup within the coup Bashir declared a state of emergency, dissolved parliament, and imprisoned Turabi. Bashir called a conference to reunite the Islamic movement, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sufi orders, and the neo-fundamentalist group Ansar al-Sunna. It was decided to allow each state within Sudan to determine its own legal system, whether Islamic or secular. For the first time, radical Muslim voices called for the separation of north and south to permit an uncompromising Islamic state in the north, and to create an opportunity to preach among non-Muslims in the south.

Civil war

Sudan has been mired in civil wars since it became independent. Although the state was inherited from the colonial era, there is not a political society capable of defining its ideology or identity. The Arab Muslim north insisted on imposing itself upon the rest of the country. The south, however, is largely Christian and African animist, and the west is Muslim but not Arab. These regions favored a territorially defined pluralistic concept of national identity.

The first Sudanese civil war between north and south lasted seventeen years, from 1955 to 1972, followed by further ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts. Numayri's efforts to promote Islamic education in the south led to the second civil war in 1983 and the formation of the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The Bashir–Turabi regime took an uncompromising position toward the south, and again insisted upon Arabizing and Islamizing the non-Muslim populations. Southerners, represented in part by the SPLM, called for a pluralistic state with protection for the rights of minorities. The Sudanese opposition, largely in exile, under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance, also favored an

ethnically and religiously pluralistic society. A bitter civil war of genocidal proportions was fought, with tactics that included starving the civilian populations and forcing them to migrate. The discovery of oil raised the stakes in the conflict. Oil mined in the south was carried to the north by a pipeline opened in 2001, but northern forces tried to drive southerners from the land and to depopulate the oilfield regions, resulting in terrible devastation and loss of life.

After years of stagnation and decline, the growth in exports of oil and agricultural products to China and Japan, remittances from workers abroad, and investments from Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, and Asia revived the Sudanese economy. In 2000, intensive negotiations with the SPLM were reopened, and a comprehensive peace treaty was signed in Nairobi in 2005. The north gave up the effort to establish Arab hegemony and Islamic unity, and accepted the autonomy of the southern regions. Following a referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan seceded on July 9, 2011 with the consent of President al-Bashir. Nonetheless, war over disputed border territories has resumed between the now independent states. The Nuer peoples living in Sudan have also rebelled.

Alongside the protracted and disastrous conflict in the southern Sudan, there was guerrilla warfare in the Red Sea and Equatorial regions, and a genocidal civil war in Darfur. Darfur was the object of a struggle among Libya, Chad, and Sudan for control of the western Chad basin. In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebelled in protest at discrimination against non-Arab Muslims. The Sudanese government used its own forces and local Arab tribes, called *janjawid*, to drive out the African populations, an attempt at ethnic cleansing. UN intervention and humanitarian services have failed to protect the Darfuri population. A great part of the rural population now lives in shantytowns.

Somalia

Somalia is reminiscent of Mauritania in that the state overlies an Arab Muslim tribal society. Though strictly speaking the tribes are not

ethnic Arabs, they trace their descent to Muhammad. The Somali people form a single cultural and linguistic nation, but are divided into two lineage groups – the Somali and the Sab – who are further subdivided by a complex segmentary system into numerous confederacies, subconfederacies, tribes, and tribal sections. The tribe is the most common political organization; its chief is both warrior and rainmaker, and is believed to have religious and magical powers. The Somalis were also adherents of three main Sufi brotherhoods: the Qadiriyya, the Ahmadiyya, and the Salihiyya. The Qadiriyya was introduced into Harar as early as the fifteenth century. One of its branches, the Uwaysiyya, is active throughout East Africa. The Ahmadiyya was founded by Ahmad b. Idris al-Fasi (1760–1837) and was brought to Somalia by ʿAli Maye Durogba. The Salihiyya was founded by Muhammad b. Salih in 1887.

Among northern Somalians, who tended to be pastoralists, the Sufis were considered client tribes, and were supplied with land to cultivate. They were adopted into the lineages of the dominant tribes, who regarded their ancestors as Sufi saints. In these cases the Sufi communities were commonly established on the boundaries between tribal groups where they could serve as mediators.

In the southern parts of Somaliland, where there was more farming and less pastoralism, tribal structure was weaker. Since lineage was less important, Sufis played a larger role in giving cohesion to the agricultural society and had a relatively more secure political position vis-à-vis the tribes. They served the tribes as teachers and judges, administering Muslim law in matrimonial, property, and contract matters. They also acted as mediators and arbitrators. When a local Sufi saint died, his tomb often became a venerated place, the object of pilgrimages, and was sanctified by his reputation for channeling the power of God's blessing (*baraka*). Besides the Sufi brotherhoods and the shrines, there were innumerable holy men, who provided religious services and were the objects of veneration. The religious leaders were bridges between otherwise competing tribes, and allowed some degree of unification across clan and tribal lines.

Somalia began to acquire the shape of a modern state in 1891, when it was divided between Britain and Italy. The Italian

protectorate was administered in a highly bureaucratic way, and favored the development of irrigation, railroads, roads, and schools. The first Somali opposition to colonial rule came from the Salihiyya led by Muhammad b. ʿAbdallah (Abdille Hassan), who returned from Mecca to preach the purification of Islam. He declared war against Christians and against British rule, but in 1908 concluded a temporary peace that allowed him to run a small quasi-autonomous state within Somalia. The British finally defeated his movement in 1920. This was followed by the formation of the Somaliland National Society in 1935, which was devoted to modern education, overcoming Somali particularisms, and unifying the population. A Somali Officials' Union was formed in 1937 and a Somali Youth League in 1943. With the outbreak of World War II, however, the British conquered Italian Somaliland, and assumed control over the whole of what was to be the future Somali state. In 1950, Somaliland was returned to Italy as a United Nations Trusteeship. The northern and southern regions were unified in 1960, when Somaliland became an independent country. The new government rapidly integrated the former British and Italian sectors.

With the formation of the Somali state, clan-based political parties were organized. The Somaliland National Society was based on the Isaq group, and the United Somali Party was based on the Dir and the Darod. The Somali government tried to integrate all of the major factions and local kinship units into the national state. Despite the hostilities among them, all major groups considered themselves as belonging to the larger Somali nation. The fluidity of the tribal structure allowed for flexible political bargaining and coalition making. Thus segmentation was not only a divisive force but also a force for unification. The development of a new script for the Somali language also helped create a symbolic focus for national identity.

In 1966, General Siyad Barre staged a coup d'état, and the army took control of the government. He proclaimed Somalia's commitment to scientific socialism and turned to the Soviet Union for support. The government considered itself both socialist and Muslim. It attempted to suppress lineage and tribal affiliations, and appealed for national cooperation. A cult was created around the person of the

head of state. Vigorous efforts were made to promote literacy, and to resettle the nomads on state farms or collectives. In 1975, many Muslim religious leaders were executed. Women were given equal legal rights with men. However, lineage loyalties endured. In opposition to the clan system and in favor of Muslim unity, small groups, inspired by the Wahhabis and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, emerged in the early 1970s.

The most difficult political issue for Somalia was its claim to territory occupied by Somalian peoples in Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. These claims were resisted by the neighboring states, and the Organization of African States was loath to recognize any demands for border changes. With the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution, Somalian guerrillas in Eritrea, Bale, and the Ogaden tried to wrest these provinces from Ethiopian control (1977–78, 1982). In the struggle that followed, the Soviet Union abandoned Somalia in favor of Ethiopia, and Ethiopia – with Russian and Cuban support – was able to resist the Somalian attack. Then, in 1991, Siyad Barre was overthrown by clan militias. The war with Ethiopia intensified the Islamic identity of Somalia.

In the former territory of the British protectorate, a Somaliland government was reconstituted. Parliamentary elections were held in 2002, 2003, and 2005. Its constitution stipulates that Islam is the national religion; Islamists in the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, are integrated into the clan-based power structure. Somaliland, however, is not recognized by any other country.

The rest of Somalia has disintegrated into clan warfare. Even the so-called Islamic movements are often based on clan allegiances. They are feared by other countries as a source of militant opposition, invasion, piracy, and terrorism. There is an internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government but it controls only very small parts of the country. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of much of southern part of Somalia and imposed Shariʿa. Ethiopian and African Union troops with US air support drove out the ICU, but in 2009 another Islamist movement, al-Shabab, took control of part of the south. In late 2011, Ethiopia and Kenya intervened against al-Shabab. Thus far, American, United Nations, and Ethiopian

interventions have failed to re-unify, or even stabilize, Somalia. As the fighting goes on Somalia suffers from repeated severe famines.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

In Ethiopia Muslims are a minority, and their history has been shaped by a long-established Ethiopian Christian state. Today the Muslim population is about a third of the total. Muslim and Christian groups have been in conflict for centuries. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the territorial expansion of Islam and the rising power of Muslim principalities threatened to undermine Christian control of Ethiopia, but in 1831 Teodros came to the Ethiopian throne with a program of reuniting the Christians. Teodros was succeeded by Menelik II (1867–1913), the ruler of Shoa, who in 1889 became King of Kings. A consolidated Christian Ethiopian kingdom set out to absorb the Muslim minorities in Harar, Sidamo, Arussi, Bale, and Eritrea. A century-long project of imperial centralization consolidated Christian control of the country. The revived Ethiopian kingdom also managed to check the threat of European colonialism. In 1885, the Italians occupied Massawa on the Red Sea coast, and in 1896 concluded the treaty of Uccialli, which Italy regarded as a protectorate, although Menelik maintained his independence.

   After Menelik's death in 1913, there was a long interregnum until Haile Selassie ascended the throne in 1930 and resumed the effort to centralize the Ethiopian state. He attempted to bypass the power of the nobility by building up cadres of educated commoners. His work was interrupted by the Italian invasion of 1934 and 1935, which forced the emperor to flee and led to the creation of an Italian East African empire, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. In 1941, the British helped organize an Ethiopian resistance and returned Haile Selassie to the throne. The process of centralization resumed as Selassie defeated provincial rivals, subordinated the clergy, curbed the power of the church, and deprived the nobility of its position as a military and tax-collecting elite. Despite this centralization, local ruling families commonly remained powerful.

As in many Third World countries, political centralization led to social change, and social change to political revolution. Selassie brought to power a new class of officials drawn out of the old nobility. In the 1950s, these cadres were superseded by a younger generation of army officers, secondary school and university graduates, labor union leaders, and others. The post-1950 elites were impatient with the corruption of the older generation. In 1974, a mutiny of soldiers, followed by widespread strikes and riots, led to the formation of a new regime run by the Coordinating Committee of the Army, or Derg, which dismantled the imperial government and deposed the emperor. In 1975, the Derg was taken over by radicals who announced a Marxist–Leninist ideology, nationalization of property, land reform, and the abolition of the lineage system in the north and of tenancy in the south. In 1978, with Soviet and Cuban help, Mengistu Haile Mariam founded the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

When it first came to power the Derg seemed favorable to Muslims. However, even though the 1931 constitution established equal rights and allowed Muslims to acquire land, hold official positions, and receive official recognition for Muslim festivals, Muslims were in fact excluded from public positions. The Derg abolished the privileged status of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, nationalized church property, and declared the equality of religions. It permitted the public celebration of Islamic holidays, and the construction of mosques and schools. However, as the Derg adopted a more radical Marxist ideology it became hostile to both Christianity and Islam, and indeed to religion as such as a form of historical backwardness.

The radical turn was followed by widespread revolts. Landowners and the nobility opposed the regime. Muslim ethnic groups attacked the regime. Somalia attacked Ethiopia to regain control of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, but was defeated by Ethiopian and Cuban forces. In 1989, the Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front and other ethnically based opposition movements formed the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and overthrew the Marxist regime. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the

regime of the Derg could not survive. The EPRDF has been in power since 1991. It favors organized religion, and has co-opted religious leaders. The Ethiopian Patriarchate and the Supreme Islamic Affairs Council in Addis Ababa are controlled by supporters of the regime. In 1994, the Muhammadan Courts Act recognized Muslim jurisprudence and the validity of Islamic law for personal, family, and inheritance law.

By contrast, in many parts of Ethiopia Christians and Muslims socialize, attend each other's festivals, venerate the same saints and shrines, whether Christian or Muslim, and intermarry. The Wallo region, in particular, has a deep tradition of tolerance and acceptance of diversity. Paradoxically, however, the government's openness to religion favors the operation of transnational Evangelical–Pentecostal Christian and revivalist Islamic movements, supported by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Iran, and Pakistan, which are hostile to religious syncretism.

Eritrea, which is about 37 percent Muslim, became the main focus of continuing conflict. Its borders were first defined by the Italians, and the Muslim population, consisting mainly of Tigray tribes, began to acquire political consciousness in the 1940s. In 1952, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia on the basis of regional autonomy, but in 1957 Arabic and Tigriniya were abolished as official languages. In 1962, Eritrea was formally annexed by Ethiopia. This led to the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), composed of students, workers, intellectuals, and local soldiers supported by tribal and religious leaders. In 1970, factions with a more radical ideological bent formed the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). On the basis of radical ideology rather than Muslim identity, both Muslim and Christian Eritreans rebelled against the domination of the Amharic Ethiopian elite. The EPLF called for a national democratic revolution, a people's war, and the revolutionary transformation of society. A referendum of 1993 established the independence of Eritrea under the leadership of Isayas Afework, the head of the EPLF. A fierce border war with Ethiopia was fought from 1998 to 2000.

Swahili East Africa

By the nineteenth century, the East African coast was the home of a Swahili Muslim civilization. This was concentrated in the coastal towns and on the offshore islands, and consisted primarily of Swahili-speaking peoples and enclaves of Indian Muslims who formed their own communities (*jamatbandis*). The principal center of Muslim culture was Zanzibar, which had been conquered by Imam Sayyid Saʿid b. Sultan, the ruler of Oman (1804–56), and was the capital of the only Muslim state in the region. Zanzibar had *qadis* and muftis, most of them south Arabian in origin. Zanzibar and Lamu had madrasas and served as centers of higher education. In the interior, the Somalis had been converted to Islam, but otherwise there were only occasional Muslim enclaves along the trade routes leading to the Lake region and the Congo. The Muslims of the interior were mainly Bantu speakers under Swahili influence.

At the end of the nineteenth century, European protectorates were established over Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, and other territories, and gave new direction to the political history of the region. As in parts of West Africa, colonial regimes gave rise to secular national states in which Muslims were substantial minorities. Also as in West Africa, colonial administration, white settler colonization, and Christian missionary influence actually hastened the diffusion of Islam. Trade brought interior peoples to the coastal towns, where they converted to Islam and from where they returned to proselytize in their home countries. European administration also favored the spread of Islam because the British and the Germans employed Muslims as government officials, policemen, soldiers, and schoolteachers. During World War I the Germans, who were allied with the Ottoman Empire, acted as patrons of Muslim interests. The spread of Islam was facilitated by the need for a common identity for diverse peoples, and by the use of Swahili as a common language.

In the colonial period, the large Muslim minorities of East Africa were organized into Sufi-led brotherhoods. The Shadhiliyya, led by Muhammad Maʿruf (1853–1905), established missionary centers along the coast and introduced reformed Islamic practice. The

Qadiriyya, represented by the sub-order of the Uwaysiyya, founded by Shaykh 'Umar Uways al-Barawi (1847–1909), was based in Zanzibar but carried on missionary activity in Tanganyika and Kenya and as far as the eastern Congo. The Uwaysiyya were active among Swahili- and Bantu-speaking peoples, winning Muslims to the brotherhood and converting pagans to Islam. They also led Muslim anti-German resistance in southern Tanganyika. Shaykh Uways became famous for his polemic with the Salihiyya brotherhood over the question of whether it was legitimate to visit saints' tombs and whether deceased saints could be mediators between men and God. Uways took a conservative yet tolerant view of these practices in opposition to reformist teachings. For these views he was assassinated in 1909.

Zanzibar

The situation of Muslims differed in each colonial territory. Zanzibar was dominated by its Arab population, which owned most of the arable land, filled the civil service, and controlled the government and police, forming a closed aristocratic society. An Indo-Pakistani community controlled trade. The indigenous African majority were mainly craftsmen, fishermen, and workers, and called themselves Shirazis. They were divided into numerous tribal groups. Migrants from mainland East Africa were concentrated in Zanzibar Town, and also developed a strong sense of political unity. The Arabs resisted any attempts by the Africans to raise their status or political influence. Zanzibar was the center of the 'Alawiyya, Shadhiliyya, and Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhoods. It had a strong tradition of *'ulama'* scholarship, but *ziyarat* (visits to saints' tombs), *mawlids* (celebration of the "birthdays" of saints), and festivals were common.

While the British intended to rule through the established sultanate and the Arab elites, they nonetheless promoted far-reaching changes in the structure of society. They reduced the power of the sultan and destroyed the economic base of the Arab elites by the abolition of slavery. The Arabs lost control of the plantations to Indian moneylenders and merchants. At the same time, to maintain the clove plantations, slaves were made into semi-servile peasants

owing labor service, and Nyamwezi workers were imported. The freeing of the slaves allowed a new African elite and community to take shape, and Africans began to own land. In the 1930s, political associations for Arabs, Indians, Shirazis, and migrant mainland Africans were formed.

World War II brought a movement toward independence and open political struggle among the different segments of Zanzibari society. The island Arab and African populations were politicized by the return of soldiers from the war and the news of events in Egypt and Palestine. The dockworkers' strike of 1948 also had a mobilizing effect. The Zanzibar National Party, founded in 1956, became the principal proponent of the Arab interest, and the Arab minority – united on the basis of shared language and culture, Muslim piety, ethnic pride, and former political dominance – attempted to expel the British and to create an Arab Islamic state. The Afro-Shirazi Union, founded in 1957, became the spokesman of both native peasants and migrant mainland workers.

With the creation of a party-political system in the 1950s, Arab parties won the 1961 and the 1963 elections, but the Arab position weakened because it was no longer based on a military and landowning elite but on a younger generation of civil servants, journalists, and politicians. The Arab regime was attacked immediately after independence in December 1963 by African revolutionaries who seized the government, nationalized the land and the major businesses, opened ties with Eastern-bloc countries, and decimated the Arab community. The coup led to the merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964. Zanzibar as a province of Tanzania maintains an Islamic but not an Arab identity. Quran schools and an Islamic institute perpetuate Muslim and Arabic-language instruction. Madrasa instruction is being strengthened as a result of Islamic reformist influences.

Tanzania

Tanganyika was given its first territorial government by Germany, which declared it a protectorate in 1885. German rule was established in the face of intense local resistance. The Bushiri revolt,

led by slave traders, attempted to protect their interests against German taxation and control. The Yao peoples of the Makonde plateau resisted German rule until 1889. The Unyanyembe of Tabora fought the Germans until 1893; the Hehe kingdom battled with the Germans for control of the trade routes until 1898. With the defeat of the Hehe kingdom the Germans were able to begin systematic administration and taxation. They established a government consisting of a central governor and twenty-two provincial districts with their own police and judicial services. *Akidas*, or officials of Arab and Swahili origin, were appointed where there were no local chiefs. The Germans experimented with plantations producing coffee, sisal, rubber, and cotton. Africans were forced to grow cash crops so that they could pay taxes. In some districts German settlement was encouraged, and the whites used forced African labor. Economic exploitation led to new rebellions. The Maji Maji revolt in southeastern Tanganyika began in 1905 and attracted widespread support. It was savagely repressed, but later German governors tried to mitigate African hostility by forbidding corporal punishment and by instituting education and health reforms.

After defeating the Germans in World War I, in 1919 the British took control of most of Tanganyika as a League of Nations mandate. Rwanda and Burundi were given to Belgium, and Kiyunga was annexed to Mozambique, then a Portuguese colony. The British also encountered active African resistance, though in more peaceful form. British agricultural and educational policies helped form a new elite. African welfare organizations were formed by civil servants, rich peasants, and educated youths in rivalry with traditional chiefs. In the 1920s and 1930s, they evolved into nationalist political organizations. The Tanganyika African Association (founded in the 1920s), supported by farmers concerned about state agriculture and marketing policies, was in 1954 renamed the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and reorganized, on the model of Ghana's Convention People's Party, as a national political coalition. It took the lead in creating a mass movement to win self-government on the basis of Tanganyikan unity, ignoring ethnic, racial, and religious divisions. The TANU won national elections in 1958 and 1959, and Tanganyika became independent in 1961. The Zanzibar Archipelago

received its independence in December 1963 and joined Tanganyika in 1964, as a result of a coup staged by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). The new state was re-named Tanzania. In 1977, the ASP and TANU were combined to create the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM).

Under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika, and then Tanzania, adopted the concept of a national society dedicated to the welfare and dignity of its citizens, embodying the values of equality, democracy, decentralized administration, socialism, and full communal participation. The doctrinal concept was summed up in the term *ujamaa*, or community. However, there was constant tension between these ideals and the tendency of the TANU to centralize administration and remove established elites, both Muslim and non-Muslim, from positions of power. Then, by the Arusha Declaration of 1967, Nyerere reaffirmed his vision of a democratic political society. The Arusha Declaration turned Tanzania into an ideologically socialist country. Nyerere attempted to curtail the bureaucratic elite and to encourage labor-intensive agricultural development and independence of foreign loans and influence. New programs of village development were undertaken in the 1970s, but the results were meager.

When Nyerere retired in 1985, the failures of his policies were evident. His experiment in nation building was undermined by economic stagnation, unemployment, and growing communal antagonisms among Asian Shiʿis, Omani Arabs, Shirazis, and Africans. A new government under ʿAli Hassan Mwiniyi, the former president of Zanzibar, reversed Nyerere's policies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and rising Western pressures Tanzania privatized its economy, but it remains a one-party state dominated by the CCM.

Muslims make up about 30 percent of the country's population. Though the British cut Tanganyika off from the official Islamic establishment of Zanzibar, Sufi Islam spread throughout the region as a form of native reaction to foreign rule. The *tariqat* became the principal Muslim organizing institutions. In 1934, the Muslim Association of Tanganyika (MAT) was formed, and through it Sufi leaders became active supporters of the TANU. In 1957, an All-

Muslim National Union of Tanganyika was founded to give expression to purely Muslim interests, but the majority of the Muslim population continued to back the national party.

The case of Shaykh Ramiya of Bangamoyo is illustrative of both the local role of Sufism and its integration into national politics. Shaykh Ramiya was a former slave who became a merchant and landowner, pursued religious studies, and won great local respect. He collaborated with the British and was appointed a *liwali*, or district officer. From his combined economic, religious, and political position, Shaykh Ramiya established a branch of the Qadiriyya order. Most of his followers were Africans who benefited from the social solidarity of the brotherhood and from their allegiance to a powerful patron. In 1938, his son and successor, Shaykh Muhammad, declared that the Prophet was not an Arab but a man of all races – an expression of the African identity of this Muslim community. Shaykh Muhammad encouraged his followers to join the national political party, and himself became a local representative. After independence Nyerere appointed him *hakim*, or local governor. Shaykh Muhammad was thus an African Muslim religious leader who displaced the political power of older Shirazi lineages and became part of the Tanzanian political elite. By organizing his followers into a religious brotherhood, he linked local communal structures to the national regime. The Tanzanian state showed its recognition of Muslim political support by appointments to the Ministry of Justice and to local judgeships.

In the post-independence one-party state of Tanzania (and of Kenya and other African countries), the state prohibited political parties based on religion. Instead they established state-run Muslim associations to deal with educational, religious, and social matters and to link Muslims and the state. In the 1960s, the Tanzanian government created the Supreme Council of Tanzanian Muslims, closely related to the governing party. The Council distributed material benefits and gave Muslim leaders access to the governing elite.

With the collapse of the Nyerere regime, competition revived among Muslims over the definition of Muslim identity and influence in Muslim community affairs. Sufi shaykhs who had supported the

TANU were discredited, and the influence of Arab-trained reformist teachers and organizations grew considerably. Wealthy Muslim families, such as the Karimjee, and the Aga Khan Development Network have funded hospitals and schools, and promoted business and economic development.

Muslims, however, perceive the country as dominated by Christians, who make up an increasing proportion of the government and economic elites. Tensions between Muslims and Christians have been growing as a consequence of the spread of more militant reformist movements among Muslims and of Pentecostal churches among Christians.

Kenya

While Tanganyika developed as an African society, Kenya became a white settler society. It was acquired by the British East Africa Company in 1888, made a separate protectorate in 1904, and declared a crown colony in 1918. Between 1900 and 1919, the country was subjugated by force and organized for European settlement. Whites from South Africa, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada were settled in the highland territories, and Africans were moved into native reserves. From 1923 to 1952, the British pursued a policy of segregated development to secure the best lands and mineral resources for white exploitation. It also favored whites in medical, educational, and economic services.

Despite discrimination, an African elite emerged from British missionary schools and military service, and formed the East African Association, the Cavirondo Taxpayers' and Welfare Association, and, in 1944, the Kenya African Union under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. Africans demanded adequate employment, educational opportunities, and access to land. In 1952, the Mau Mau revolt, a guerrilla war against whites and white rule, broke out. The struggle led in 1959 to the removal of internal racial and territorial boundaries and to the formation in 1963 of an independent Kenyan state under the leadership of the Kenya Africa National Union Party. Kenyatta died in 1978, and was succeeded by Vice President Daniel arap Moi. His regime left Kenya burdened with foreign debt and human rights

abuses. He was constitutionally barred from another turn in office. Democratic elections were held in 2002 and 2007.

The Muslim population of Kenya is about 7 percent of the total, but it is also very diverse, representing numerous African, Asian, and Arab communities. In the coastal regions, the Muslim population is closely related to Zanzibar. The interior population includes Kikuyu, Masai, and Maru peoples, who converted to Islam after World War I as a result of trading contacts with the coast. The influence of Muslims is limited because of their relatively small numbers, their concentration on the coast in Swahili-speaking areas, and the absence of Sufi brotherhoods as a base of recruitment and political network formation.

The Kenyan government plays a large role in Muslim-related matters. Since 1895, Kenya has had a triple court system consisting of common courts, native courts, and Islamic courts with jurisdiction in cases where both parties are Muslim. Islamic court jurisdiction is now limited to family matters. The government also appoints Kenya's chief *qadi* (judge) to deal with Islamic inheritance, marriage, divorce, and religious endowment issues. The Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya, founded in 1973, is the official agency for Islamic affairs and the only one recognized by the government to represent Kenyan Muslims and to represent Kenya in its relations with outside Islamic organizations. Like its counterpart in Tanzania, it serves as a two-way channel both to promote Islamic interests and to contain them within the state framework. Its leaders emphasize the loyalty of Muslims to Kenya and to the ruling party.

As in many parts of Africa (and the rest of the world), Islamic revivalism is leading to increased religious observance, the construction of mosques and schools, a proliferation of publications, media, and public debates dealing with religious matters, and the wearing of Islamic dress. Students returning from Saudi Arabia oppose local practices such as funeral orations and celebration of *mawlids*. Apart from official agencies, there are numerous Muslim associations, such as the Kenya Muslim Welfare Society, which promote Islamic missionary work (*daʿwa*), and build mosques, schools, and clinics. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran help support

these movements. In 1992, Muslim youth created the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), and staged violent demonstrations to demand more educational facilities and employment opportunities.

Islamic radicalism is also increasing. Kenyan radical imams, close to Sudan and Somalia, call for the implementation of Shariʻa, preach against the Kenyan government and its ties to the United States and Israel, and sometimes call for jihad. On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda-connected cells blew up the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Since then, the Horn of Africa, and Kenya in particular, have become a locus of US counterterrorism activities, and the Kenyan government has intervened militarily against the Islamic movements in Somalia. In 2013, al-Shabab terrorists attacked a shopping center in Nairobi. At the same time, Kenya has increased funding for moderate Islamic movements. Increased Muslim representation in the Kenyan parliament suggests an effort to counteract Muslim radicalism and identification with the global *umma*, and to further incorporate the Muslim population into political society.

Uganda

In Uganda, the colonial state also set the terms for independence. Buganda became a British protectorate in 1893, and the Uganda agreement of 1900 brought the whole country under British rule. By 1914, the British had brought the remaining local chiefs under their control. In the struggle for power the British were closely allied with the Protestants, and encouraged the spread of Christianity as a barrier to Islam. A Ugandan education system was set up, divided along religious lines. Catholics and Protestants were favored by government grants of land, and Muslims were discriminated against in appointments to office and in government support of mosques and schools. Unlike in Kenya, the British kept white settlers out of the region and favored a peasant economy based on cotton and coffee production. A small urban population, largely foreign in origin, included Indians, Europeans, and Arabs who had come to trade.

African protest developed early. In the 1920s the Young Baganda Association called for African participation in government. A Uganda

African Farmers' Association was organized to protect African peasants' interests against Indian and European merchants. The development of nationalism and militant resistance to the British, however, was limited, since in Uganda Africans did not suffer from large-scale alienation of land and were buffered from foreign interference by the British system of indirect rule. Nonetheless, in 1952 the Uganda National Congress called for independence. The Protestant elites and the kabaka of Buganda, the most prominent local ruler, emerged as the most powerful forces in the country. In 1960, the Uganda People's Congress was formed to represent the interests of other chieftains and population groups. The 1962 elections brought Mutesa II, the hereditary ruler of Buganda, to power, but in the next few years the Uganda People's Congress consolidated its grip on the civil service, subverted the trade unions, and built up the army.

In 1966, using the army, Milton Obote seized power, abrogated the 1962 constitution, and assumed the office of executive president. While Uganda still had a civilian administration from 1966 to 1971, it was in fact under military rule. In January 1971, a military coup d'état brought General Idi Amin to power. Idi Amin's power was built on the support of Nubian forces in the Ugandan army. Originally from the Sudan, they came to consider themselves a tribal group – superior to, separate from, and resentful of the rest of the population.

While British administrative policy in Uganda was inimical to Islam, Islam still spread as the result of the influence of Arab traders, Sudanese soldiers, and Swahili contacts. By 1930, there were approximately 122,000 Muslims. Mbogo, former kabaka of Buganda, became the chief patron of the Muslim community. He had relatively little success, however, in promoting Muslim interests, and failed to acquire government land for the support of mosques. After he died in 1921, the Muslims split into two sects, the Kibuli and the Butambla, which were divided over competition for leadership and over the doctrinal question of whether it was necessary to say the noon prayers in addition to the congregational prayers on Friday. Also at issue was the authority of marriage registrars and teachers. The sectarian split inhibited the reform of Muslim education and the

overall development of the Muslim community. By World War II, strong efforts were being made to settle the dispute. In 1944, the Ugandan Muslim Education Association was founded to overcome factionalism and unify educational programs. The parties were reconciled in 1948.

With the development of the independence movement in the 1950s, Muslims were accorded a larger role in government, but by 1965 they still had little political influence. Some Muslims served as intermediaries between the state and the Muslim population, but these politicians did not have any deep legitimacy in the Muslim community. Thus the state could not control the Muslims any more than the Muslims could influence the state. In general, the state acted as arbitrator in disputes among Muslim groups and as patron for Muslim demands such as funds for education, appointment of ministers, and symbolic recognition.

Muslims enjoyed government support under the regime of Idi Amin (1971–79), who was himself a Muslim. The Uganda Muslim Students' Association and the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council were formed as vehicles for the organization of the Muslim community under state tutelage. Amin carried on a pro-Arabic and pro-Islamic policy, and recruited support from Kakwa and Nubian ethnic groups. Property seized from expelled Asians was given to the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. When Idi Amin was ousted, many Muslims fled the country, and many mosques and schools were destroyed. Since 1986, the regime of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and the Uganda Patriotic Movement has stabilized the internal politics of the country. Muslims are about 12 percent of the population.

In the 1960s, other former colonial territories in East Africa such as Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and the Congo also emerged as independent states. Muslim minorities had been established under the influence of Arab and Swahili traders, East African missionaries, and post–World War II Pakistani merchants. In these countries, the Muslim populations are small, poor, ill educated, and play little role in national politics.

The Shiʻi communities

The East African Muslim population also includes small but important communities of Indian origin, including Ismaʻilis, Bohras, *ithna ʻashari* Shiʻis, and Ahmadis. Indian Muslims were first attracted to Zanzibar by Sayyid Saʻid b. Sultan (1804–56), who appointed Indians as customs collectors and financial advisors, and encouraged them to trade. The British similarly encouraged trade and the migration of Indians from Gujarat and other Indian provinces. Indians commonly came to work as laborers or shop assistants, learned Swahili, saved a little money, opened their own shops, returned to India to marry, and brought back relatives to help in their businesses. With the opening of the interior by British and German railroads, many Ismaʻilis migrated inland.

Between 1900 and the 1960s, the Ismaʻilis became a highly developed community. The community today maintains clinics, sports clubs, libraries, meeting halls, hospitals, schools, and other facilities. It holds collective investments in insurance, agriculture, and housing projects. The Aga Khan governs the community through a hierarchy of councils. In principle, his authority is absolute and his approval is required for all appointments, but the Ismaʻili community and its agencies are actually run by a small elite. A new generation of educated doctors, engineers, and professionals is gradually replacing the older commercial aristocracy. A constitution of 1954 created agencies for secular and religious affairs, education, health, property, alms and tax collection, and industrial development. The constitution also dealt with family and marriage matters. As revised in 1964, it explicitly prohibited polygamy, set a minimum marriage age of sixteen years for females and eighteen for males, and granted substantial equality to women in divorce. Matters such as guardianship and adoption were adjusted to correspond with territorial law in East Africa. Ismaʻili women, secularly educated, are free from purdah.

The Bohra Shiʻis are highly active in trade. They include metalworkers, watchmakers, and merchants. The Bohra community is organized in a hierarchical way. The high chief for all of East Africa

resides in Mombasa; local *amils* supervise the mullahs, who teach in the schools and perform local religious services. Between 1951 and 1955, a new congregation was formed, called the Daʿudi Bohra Jamat Corporation, which consists of all males over eighteen years old, and elects a managing council that administers community property, including mosques, assembly houses, schools, clubs, clinics, and real estate. The community is supported by endowments, gifts, and taxes on the membership.

The *ithna ʿashari* Shiʿi community also has a strong organization. Local congregations are organized as *jamats*, each with an executive council, a board of trustees, and committees to administer the various communal properties and activities. There is a supreme council for East Africa representing the local *jamats*. The Ahmadis, a Muslim sect founded in northern India at the end of the nineteenth century, also have a small but active following in East Africa, and are deeply engaged in missionary activity. They are the first to have translated the Quran into Swahili. While the Asian communities are highly modernized, they are also close-knit and sectarian, and have not been integrated into the general African society.

Thus, the Muslim communities in East Africa are divided by ethnic origins, religious belief, and sectarian organization. Throughout East Africa, excluding Sudan and Somalia, Muslims are a political minority. They do not control state power. Nor do East African regimes identify themselves as Islamic. As a political minority, Muslims concentrate on religious matters and have formed numerous associations for educational and welfare purposes.

Chapter 58 Universal Islam and African diversity

Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslims in Africa expanded their activities as traders, missionaries, and warriors. In the Sudanic region, Islamic regimes were consolidated and new populations converted to Islam. From the Sudan, Muslims penetrated the Guinean forest and coastal territories of West Africa. Large numbers of people in Nigeria and Senegal were Islamized. In East Africa Gallas, Somalis, and other peoples were converted to Islam.

Between 1882 and 1900, the militant expansion of Islam was brought to a halt by European conquests. The establishment of colonial rule, however, did not stop the spread of Islam by peaceful means. In fact, colonial rule facilitated the diffusion of Islam by providing political security and expanded commercial opportunities, and by stimulating urbanization, the education of intelligentsias, and the migration of merchants and workers.

The rapid diffusion of Islam had important consequences for Islamic beliefs, communal organization, and the relation of Muslims to states and national societies. While the principal goal of many nineteenth-century Islamic movements was to establish Islamic states and a comprehensive Islamic society, colonial rule led instead to the consolidation of secular national states. Only where there are substantial Arab populations or claims to Arab identity – as in Mauritania, northern Sudan, and Somalia – is national identity expressed in Islamic terms. Only Sudan has declared itself an Islamic state. In Nigeria, Muslim identity has been integrated into the national political system, and Islamic communal organizations and concepts of justice play an important role in the internal struggle for political and social power. Elsewhere, secular elites treat their Muslim populations, however large or small, as communal constituencies. All African Muslim populations are organized as

communal groups seeking state protection and patronage for their economic, educational, and foreign policy interests.

Muslim communities are organized in various ways. The traditional forms of *'ulama'* and law-school organization are found only in Sudan. Elsewhere, Sufi brotherhoods are the principal form of Muslim association. In Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, they serve on a local basis to integrate diverse ethnic populations, as in Kano, or diverse tribes, as in Somalia. They also serve to organize their members for worship and spiritual comfort, for economic competition, as in the case of the Muridiyya of Senegal or the Hausa of Ibadan, or for political administration as in the case of the Tijaniyya of Nigeria, the Qadiriyya in Tanzania, the Khatmiyya in the Sudan, and the Sanusiyya in Libya.

Apart from the organized brotherhoods, Sufi families, lineages, and individual holy men also play an important social role. In Somalia, Sufi lineages serve as a link between tribal groups. In Guinea and coastal West Africa, educated missionary families are the basis of Muslim settlements and Islamic education. In many parts of Guinean West Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania, Muslim communities are built around individual holy men and revered local shrines.

In African cities and towns, there has been an extraordinary proliferation of Islamic associations, fraternities, and clubs. Some are the expression of minority groups, such as the Isma'ili or Bohra communities in East Africa, which form *jamatbandis* for religious, welfare, educational, and economic activities. Other associations are the expression of ethnic minorities, such as northern migrants in southern Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Such associations, however, are not separated from, but merged into family, tribal, and ethnic groups. For the Dyula communities and Muslim-led missionary settlements in West Africa, Islam is part and parcel of a familial, occupational, and linguistic identity that distinguishes Muslim merchant groups from the peoples among whom they have settled. Similarly, Islam is coupled with Hausa ethnicity to define Muslim communities in southern Nigeria. Among Arab peoples of Mauritania, Somalia, and the Sudan, Islam is fused with tribal, ethnic, and

linguistic traits. To be Arab Somali or Zawaya Berber is by definition to be a Muslim. In these cases, too, Islam is fused not only with ethnicity but with nationality insofar as the Mauritanian, Senegalese, Somali, and Sudanese political societies consider themselves Islamic.

Not all Islamic urban associations, however, are based on ethnicity. Many are small clubs built around the leadership of a particular teacher who organizes study groups, discussions, and communal activities that may be as serious as managing a school or as casual as cafe conversation. The most striking type of urban associations are the modernist groups devoted to Islamic reform and education. The Wahhabiyya in Sudanic Africa and various Nigerian modernist groups are the principal examples, but such associations are found throughout the region and form the backbone of Muslim efforts to combine modern education with religious commitments. In recent decades, the influence of so-called Wahhabiyya or reformist associations, often with the financial and logistical backing of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, has grown enormously. These associations work, depending upon the context, for the reform of social and religious practices, and for the creation of Islamic states. In many areas where Muslims are minorities, as in Uganda or the Congo, educational associations have become the principal form of Muslim communal organization.

Muslim communal structures, then, range from traditional forms of local kinship and village groups, to Sufi lineages, brotherhoods, educational associations, and modernist reformist congregations. Islamic communal organization both reinforces minority ethnic identity and serves to link together different tribal and ethnic groups. It serves political purposes varying from collaboration with state authorities to passive withdrawal, passive resistance, active engagement, and even revolutionary action. Islamic belief and identity is highly adaptive to social context, and particularly responsive to the realities of political power.

Thus, we find several principal styles of Islamic belief and worship. Standard Islamic law-based Muslim practice has had an important effect in criminal law and in dealing with problems of injury and

death. It tends to reinforce patriarchal and patrilineal family organization and inheritance. Because it favors individual over communal interests, Islamic law is often preferred by new converts who wish to extract themselves and their wealth from family control since it is possible to gain an advantage in commercial or property matters by applying Islamic rather than customary law. However, where there is a strong corporate interest in land or livestock, as among the Somali, the Fulani, and others, Islamic law considerations tend to be ignored.

Islamic law has a strong influence on marriage practices. It defines marriage as a voluntary contract between individuals and assigns basic responsibilities to each. It also simplifies divorce for men. The Muslim marriage gift, or *mahr*, has been adopted by various African peoples as a gift, or promise of a gift, payable directly to the wife upon divorce or the death of the husband. It supplements the ordinary payment of a bride price to the bride's kin and guardians. Despite Islamic law, however, widow inheritance and replacement by sisters continue to be important wherever marriage is primarily conceived as an alliance among kinship groups. The spread of Islamic norms and laws, then, depends upon local social structures, and the interests of individuals and contending parties.

Reformist Islam is another important version of Islamic belief and practice. Shariʿa-oriented Islam seeks to transform African social ideals and behavior, and stands altogether outside the African tradition. Relying wholly on the Quran and sunna and hostile to African spirit worship and belief in amulets, the reformers bring to Africa an international standard Muslim belief and practice. Reformist movements have become increasingly vocal with the growth of education in the Arab world, the creation of new Muslim intelligentsias, the founding and expansion of madrasas, and the diffusion of religio-educational associations. Reformism, however, sometimes blends into modernism. The educational associations of Freetown, Lagos, and Dakar are committed to the adaptation of Muslim identity to modern and Western civilization, and to the integration of Muslims into secularized national African societies.

Alternatively, Islam sometimes blends with traditional African belief systems, and rationalizes existing beliefs rather than changing them. African Muslims tend to adopt the Islamic calendar, festivals, and rituals to celebrate births, circumcisions, marriages, and deaths. While Islam in principle emphasizes the absoluteness of God, Muslims accept belief in a variety of subsidiary spiritual powers, divination, magic, witchcraft, and sorcery. Spirit cults – such as the Holey of the Songhay, the Bori cult of the Hausa, and the Zar cult in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan – have special appeal. They supply catharsis and spiritual consolation for women in particular. Islamic belief is used to sanction magical practices directed toward the cure of disease and the search for prosperity. Pagan ceremonies and artistic representations also serve to provide emotional comfort. Muslim religious leaders recognize the necessity of balancing strict religious principles with people's need for magical support.

Finally, there are the sectarian forms of Islam: those minority groups of Muslims committed to particular doctrines. These include the Asian Ismaʿili, Bohra, and other minority communities. From a pan-African perspective, Islam is not a single religion but a constellation of religious communities that share, however remotely, a sense of common identity.

While Muslims have accepted non-Islamic states as the political background for their communal organizations, in recent decades the relationships between Muslim communities and states have become problematic. Since the 1970s, Muslims in Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere have demanded that the state systematically promote Muslim education, apply Islamic law, and assume a Muslim identity. Guinea, for example, which was ruled by Sékou Touré and the Parti démocratique and had a long history of efforts to modernize the country and improve the position of women, began to organize Muslim festivals and invoke the militant Islamic legacy of Futa Jallon. In Nigeria and Senegal, there is considerable tension between states and Muslim communal leaders, who demand that the state represent an Islamic ideal. In the Sudan, Numayri and Turabi attempted to impose an Islamic identity on the southern parts

of the country. In Ethiopia and Chad, Muslim minorities are fighting for political autonomy or control of the state.

The diversity of sub-Saharan African Islam implies a great range of political and social behavior. While Muslim believers in the nineteenth century strove primarily to create Islamic states in Sudanic and West Africa, only where Muslim populations were relatively homogeneous (and Arab), as in Sudan, Mauritania, or Somalia, do avowedly Islamic states exist today. Whereas Islam in principle is committed to a comprehensive political order, the traditional Islamic ideal has been adapted to political actuality. Muslim communities in Africa are in the main associations for worship, education, and welfare. In theory, Islam is a religion that shatters all lesser loyalties, but in Africa it is an integral part of Hausa, Berber-Somali, Arab, Mossi, Dyula, and other linguistic and ethnic affiliations. Although in principle Islam is a universal religion based on a revealed scripture, in Africa, as in many other parts of the world, it takes on a great variety of local forms. Everywhere, however, there is a growing pressure to assert the universalistic dimensions of Islam against African particularisms.

Islam in the West

Chapter 59 Muslims in Europe and America

The Muslim populations of Europe and America are extremely diverse, and it is mainly for geographical convenience that we consider them in one chapter. They are diverse in origins, in living conditions, in customs, and in their concepts of their political and social identities. Indeed, most people of Muslim family or cultural background are likely to consider their ethnicity or nationality, place of origin, or even class to be more important than their religion. In considering them primarily as Muslims we take the perspective of this book, but not necessarily their own point of view.

There are two principal sources for the Muslim population of the United States: African-American converts to Islam; and immigrants from all over the world. A small number of Muslims emigrated to the United States around the time of World War I, but the majority of the Muslim populations of the United States and Canada arrived in recent decades.

In Europe there are two distinct Muslim population groups. The Muslims of the Balkans originated in the Turkish migrations and conquests of the fourteenth and later centuries, and in the indigenous peoples who converted to Islam in Ottoman times. The Muslims of Western Europe are for the most part recent immigrants. After World War II, Pakistanis, Indians, and to a lesser extent Arabs came to Britain; North Africans and smaller numbers of West Africans, Turks, and Iranians to France; and Turks to Germany. They were either refugees from the breakup of former colonial empires or temporary workers.

The environment for immigrants is very different in the United States and Europe. The United States has a long history of the reception and assimilation of immigrants, and a long history of racism and exclusion of African Americans from full participation in American society. In Europe, there is a deeply rooted resistance to

immigrants, especially in countries with an ethnic or folk identity. In recent years, economic and political insecurity has generated public hostility to immigrants and to Islam on both continents.

Muslims in the United States

The first Muslims in America were African slaves transported to the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These slaves were sometimes "de-Islamized" by being designated Moors. After the Civil War many African Muslims adopted syncretic Muslim–Christian beliefs, and claimed respect and equality as the heirs of a high civilization, the foundation of later claims by African Americans to Islam as their national religion. The next wave of Muslim immigrants came after the turn of the twentieth century. Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians were propelled by missionaries and drawn by economic opportunity to the New World. Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, and others also came for economic opportunity. The earliest Muslim communities in the United States were founded in the Midwest, notably in Chicago, Detroit, and Dearborn, Michigan. Generally single men and unskilled workers, they tended to intermarry and assimilate. In the period between the World Wars, the immigrant communities began to think of themselves as permanent residents rather than sojourners. In the cultural context of that era in which America was self-defined as a white, Protestant, and progressive country, immigrants defined themselves in ethnic terms as Caucasians – i.e., white people – and not as Muslims; but they did create Muslim communal and benevolent institutions. American laws of 1921 and 1924 cut off the flow of immigrants.

The political and cultural context for Muslim communities in the United States was profoundly changed by World War II. The war required the mobilization of all America's varied peoples, and the redefinition of national culture from a white and Christian to a multiracial society united by a civic religion built around the values of freedom and equality. Some American Muslims took this as an opportunity to present Islam as yet another monotheistic faith consistent with American values, In the post–World War II war era,

American engagement in Muslim-majority countries created a new role for Muslim Americans as mediators between the New and Old Worlds. To signify the new era, the first mosque designed in the international Muslim architectural vocabulary was built in Washington, D.C. in 1954.

The Immigration Act of 1947 allowed for increased numbers of immigrants. A new wave of Muslim students and professionals came to the United States. They tended to intermarry, and downplay or lose their Muslim identity. The Immigration Act of 1965 finally abolished the earlier quota system, opening the way to the large contemporary influx of Asians and Africans. Political crises sent waves of immigrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, and Kuwait to the United States. Shi'is, including small numbers of Bohras and Nizaris, came from India, Iraq, and Iran. Muslim refugees would later come from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, and the Sudan. These immigrants tended to be well-educated professionals such as doctors, engineers, and educators, independent businessmen, and students. They created substantial community facilities such as mosques, schools, cultural centers, and bookstores. The immigration of professionals and businesspeople led to the refreshment of Muslim identities, the building of new community organizations, and a revival of Islamic religious practice.

The population of Muslims in America is estimated at about 3 million: 30 percent African American, 33 percent Arab, 29 percent South Asian, 5 percent Turkish, and 3 percent Iranian. Metropolitan Detroit has large Arab populations, including both Muslims and Christians; Lebanese Muslims are a big community in Dearborn Michigan. The partition of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Middle East wars, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the war in Bosnia sent successive waves of refugees to Chicago. New York's Muslim population lives mostly in Queens and Brooklyn. A pre–World War I generation of Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian Muslims has been joined by Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Albanians, Egyptians, and Indonesians.

Los Angeles is home to Arabs, Pakistanis, and Iranians. There are mosques for ethnic and national communities: for example, separate

Shi'i mosques for Lebanese, Pakistanis, East Africans, Iraqis, and Iranians. There are substantial Muslim populations in San Francisco's Bay Area as well, including Arabs, Iranians, Turks, and Afghans. San Diego has a relatively small immigrant Muslim population, segmented among Kurds, Somalis, Afghans, Arabs, and South Asians. Albanian Muslims have two religious institutions: mosques, where weekly prayers, celebrations of the *'ids* (festivals), marriages, and funerals take place; and Bektashi *tekkes*, with branches in Chicago, New York, Detroit, and elsewhere, which serve for worship, personal prayers, and social support.

The United States is historically a country of immigration with the expectation of permanent settlement and assimilation into American society. Assimilation has historically entailed the loss of native languages, a downplaying of ethnic differences in public, and a devaluation of immigrant cultures. This has been counterbalanced by the acceptance of religious identity in the private sphere. Citizenship is defined as a civil and political condition in culturally and ethnically neutral terms. Persons become citizens by being born in the United States, or after five years of residence, with a green card given mainly to family members of citizens, people with offers of employment, and political refugees. A resident becomes "naturalized" after taking a test to demonstrate knowledge of the English language and American civic institutions. Children born in the United States are citizens regardless of the immigration status of their parents.

In the United States, religious beliefs and practices, and the organization of worship and social services for religious communities, are regarded as private matters. Unlike the situation in many European countries, the state has no preference regarding religious beliefs, practices, or communities. Public opinion, however, is divided. Immigrants are expected to assume the responsibilities of citizenship, without prejudice to private religious or home life, but there has been and continues to be strong racially and religiously based resentment of foreigners.

Early Muslim communities debated whether it was possible at all to live in non-Muslim countries and whether they were bound to

abandon their faith, but from the 1980s Muslims recognized that they were permanent residents. They used the US model of voluntary religious associations to support "Saturday" schools, Quran study, and scout groups. In the 1980s and 1990s, the tendency toward the assimilation of individuals was replaced by increasing multiculturalism, both in the assertion of a distinctive Muslim identity and the demand that it be recognized as a community identity. This occurred at the same time that other communities – African Americans, Latinos, and women's groups – were struggling for collective recognition and political and institutional accommodation.

American converts

Converts are another element of the US Muslim population. They include people attracted to Sufism through the movements of Idris Shah, Hazrat Inayat Khan, Subud, and the Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, and through extensions of the traditional Middle Eastern Sufi orders such as the Nimatullahi and the Naqshbandi. African Americans make up a substantial part of the converted population; they have turned to offshoots of Islam to escape the stigmatized identity forced upon them by white Americans. Islam appeals to African Americans as an alternative to white Christian culture, for its egalitarianism, and for its links to a universal community.

The migration of large numbers of southern African Americans to the north opened the way to the organization of black Muslim nationalist movements. Black Muslims combined Islamic teachings, Masonic rituals, and African-American spirituality, to define a non-Christian, non-white religion. Generally, they promoted values that opened the way into the American middle class. The Moorish Science Temple of America, founded in 1913, was the first African-American group to define itself in Muslim terms. Noble Drew Ali was its founder. He held that the afflictions of blacks were due to oppression by whites, and that black people would have to discard slave names, recover their Muslim and Asiatic identity, and return to their true culture and religion.

The Moorish Science Temple was followed by the Nation of Islam (NOI), founded by Wallace D. Fard, in 1930. He sought to restore the

pride of African Americans by teaching that they were God's chosen people – the descendants of the tribe of Shabazz, an Asiatic people, God's original people, and the founders of civilization – kidnapped and enslaved in America. Blacks, he taught, were superior to whites because they were God's own creation, while whites were the creatures of an inferior demon. Master Fard was regarded by his followers as God incarnate. Elijah Poole, renamed Elijah Muhammad, was his prophet. In 1932, Master Fard disappeared, and Elijah Muhammad took over the leadership of the NOI; he further developed the mythology that identifies blacks as God's chosen people of strength and goodness and whites as morally degenerate. Elijah Muhammad enforced a pure lifestyle, and encouraged black-owned businesses. The movement was intended to restore a culture destroyed by Westernization, and to create a separate black nation.

In 1964, Malcolm X broke with the NOI and established his own Muslim Mosque Inc. Malcolm X, who started life as a petty gangster, converted to Islam while in prison – a man rescued by faith from a debased life – and went on to become a fiery preacher of black separatism and hatred of whites. In a pilgrimage to Mecca, however, the hospitality and acceptance of white Muslims led him to believe that the true Islam transcended race and included both whites and blacks. On February 25, 1965, he was assassinated in New York; three NOI members were convicted of his murder.

With his death, the NOI split into two wings. The majority, the followers of Warith Deen Muhammad, son of Elijah, abandoned the separatist concept and moved toward integration into global Islam, acceptance of whites, and a return to emphasis upon the African connections of blacks. The name of the movement was changed to the American Muslim Mission and then to the American Society of Muslims. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 may have played a part in the greater integration of African Americans and the conversion of the NOI from a separatist national movement to Sunni Islam.

Louis Farrakhan took over the leadership of the NOI in 1981. He declared himself the prophet of the Messiah Elijah. Farrakhan emphasized black supremacy, nationalist separatism, and hostility to

whites and Jews. The movement brought discipline into the lives of its members, including a strict dress code for women, and forbade alcohol, drugs, and gambling. The Fruit of Islam was its paramilitary force. Farrakhan eventually moved toward a more standard Islam, and adopted Friday prayers and Ramadan. In February 2000, he participated in a joint rally with Warith Deen Muhammad and declared himself in favor of the unity of Muslims. While the NOI moved externally toward mainstream Islam, its theologians still distinguished between the external and the internal Quran, and defended their religious differences. Farrakhan tried both to assert a separatist legacy and to ally with traditional Muslims.

The NOI is widely respected, especially among African Americans, for its programs of individual rehabilitation and the stabilization of communities, but is very controversial for its strong anti-white and anti-Semitic positions. The African-American establishment views Islamic separatism and Islamic nationalism as romantic and utopian, and favors assimilation and integration. There is also tension with Afrocentric secular nationalists who are hostile to Islam and look to an African and Nilotic heritage for American blacks. Similarly, there are high tensions between American-born black Muslims and immigrant Muslims. American Muslims tend to come from evangelical backgrounds, and are more individualistic in their interpretation of scriptures, while immigrants tend to be more ethnic and collectivist in orientation. American Muslims accuse the immigrants of racism and argue that they confuse true Islam with ethnic customs, and immigrant Muslims reject American black nationalism and separatism.

Other African-American organizations such as the Islamic Mission of America and Dar ul-Islam continued the separatist mission to rescue black people from racism, poverty, and discrimination. There were also offshoots of the NOI that mixed Islam, black nationalism, and other American religious traditions. The Allah's Nation of the Five Percenters was a break-off group from the NOI, founded by Charles "Pudding" 13X, who was killed in 1969. This sect mixed Islamic symbolism, black supremacy, and popular culture, and communicated with young African Americans through rap music. The

Five Percenters considered themselves the last of the truly righteous. They taught a mystical theology based on interpretations of letters and numbers in sacred texts. The group reached its high point in the 1960s and 1970s. African-American Muslims thus include black nationalist separatists, religious separatists who are Sunni Muslims but not nationalists, and assimilationists such as Warith Deen Muhammad.

Muslim identity issues in the United States

Two trends are noteworthy. The first is the trend to assimilate, and even to disappear into the broader American society. Many people of Muslim family and social origins do not identify themselves as Muslims. The majority of Muslims (perhaps as many as 70 to 80 percent) are not actively involved in mosques or other religious institutions. Immigrants who came before World War II, such as Turks and Kurds in Detroit, have been absorbed into the American mainstream. The large scale of post-1960s immigration allowed immigrants to settle in communities that defined themselves in terms of national, ethnic, or even regional and village origins, and to maintain political and religious loyalties to families, communities, and governments in their home countries. The strongest tendency is to be ever more Muslim in order to compensate for living in a new environment. Some Muslim religious leaders have assumed the position of spokespersons for all Muslims in the interest of promoting Islamic worship, social observances, and political objectives.

Muslim religious leaders have taken a variety of positions on the place of Muslims in the United States. Some believe that there is no permanent place for Muslims in America, and counsel return to their homelands to work toward an Islamic state. They see their presence in the United States as a *hijra*, an emigration, like that of the Prophet to Medina, to reorganize before returning to create Islamic societies in their home countries. Others see themselves in the United States permanently, with the eventual goal of converting America to Islam. *Daʿwa* movements, aimed at the reconversion of Muslims to the true practice of Islam, or the dissemination of the faith and conversion of non-Muslims, include the Tablighi Jamaʿat, the Salafiyya sponsored

by Saudi Arabia, and the Shi'i Kho'i foundation. This view sometimes leads to the position that Muslims should live in separate enclaves without assimilation into the broader society. Isma'il Faruqi was an important spokesman for promoting Muslim intellectual institutions, and saw Muslims as bringing morality and salvation to the United States.

The most common view is that America can be a legitimate homeland. The early twentieth-century theologian and reformer Rashid Rida is cited as an authority for the idea that Muslims should remain in non-Muslim lands to practice Islam and possibly convert their peoples. If Muslims can practice their religion, the new country may be considered part of the *dar al-islam*. In such circumstances, Muslims should not harm the host state; they may earn interest in bank accounts and be employed in government jobs. Other Muslims call for an energetic participation in American social and political life, stressing common monotheistic values. Fazlur Rahman was a leading proponent of a modernist Islam and amicable relations among peoples of different faiths. Sayyid Hosein Nasr has promoted Sufism as a route to an Islamic identity within North American society. Accommodationists want to practice an Islam adapted to the American way of life.

Among self-identified Muslims there are Sunnis and Shi'is, members of many different Sufi orders, and many orthodox believers, skeptics, practicing, non-practicing, and secularized individuals. Reformism, Salafism, and transnational Sunni Islam draw ever more support, especially from youths, as a form of religious identity that binds people to the highest and most universal principles of Islam, and to the fellowship of Muslims worldwide. These movements deemphasize ethnic and parochial differences. Sunni universalism fits well with the American emphasis upon separation of church and state, and American acceptance of religious differences among otherwise assimilated populations. The Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) appeals to American converts emphasizing Shari'a and sunna-based practices, conservative forms of Sufism, and opposition to Wahhabism.

Both Muslims and non-Muslims are attracted to various forms of Sufism, either by its Islamic heritage or the ever-recurrent American interest in Eastern wisdom, not necessarily attached to the historical forms of Islam. In 1910, Hazrat Inayat Khan founded the Sufi Order in the West devoted to love, peace, and universal brotherhood. A later wave of Sufi activity in the United States coincided with the countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Some Sufi groups, such as the Halveti-Jerrahi Order of America, originated in the Muslim world and became established in the United States. The Bawa Muhaiyaddeen Fellowship and Mosque, founded by Muhammad Raheem Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, who came from Sri Lanka in 1971, and the Naqshbandi–Haqqani order in North America, founded in 1991, appeal to non-Muslims, converts, and immigrant Muslims who want a religious environment that is culturally heterogeneous, non-Wahhabi, but traditional and morally conservative.

Regardless of ethnic background or religious orientation, immigrant Muslims have special problems adjusting to American life. Participation in the military, differing marriage and divorce laws, and banking and business practices pose difficulties. Muslims are also challenged by the absence of provision for Muslim holidays in American work and school calendars. There are intense debates over questions such as: Can Muslims be part of American society without losing their identity? Will Americans accept Islam as a positive force in a multicultural society?

Education is an absorbing issue. Some Muslims in America work for the improvement of public schools, and try to educate public-school teachers about Islam. They think it is important to send their children to public schools in order to prepare them to cope with life in America, and permit their children to have friends outside the Muslim community. Others send their children for supplementary evening and weekend schooling. In the 1990s, there was a large growth in the number of Islamic "Saturday" schools, motivated by the fear that children would abandon their Muslim heritage. Some parents have chosen Islamic schools that provide separate schooling for their children, and do not allow them to socialize outside the community.

There are now a few Islamic colleges and graduate schools in the United States intended to train community leaders.

The most pressing family problem is the autonomy of children and the fear that they will be corrupted by the temptations of American life. Conservative immigrant communities try to preserve parental control over multigenerational families. Parents participate in the choice of spouses for their children, and arranged marriages are frequent. Girls are often raised in the home, restricted in outside activities, and commonly forbidden to date. Young men, who must have an education to earn a living, are given more leeway. Spouses are often found in the home country. A survey in the 1970s showed a strong tendency among young people to accept parental authority, restricted dating, and arranged marriages. This has to do with the fact that economic and status ambitions among already middle-class and professional people do not create strong pressures to leave the confines of the family and the community.

There are big differences, however, between immigrant and native Muslim American communities in their views about the status and behavior of women. Though it is widely agreed that women should dress modestly, and that they should have free choice in social demeanor and not be dictated to by their men, immigrant communities tend to be more traditional and restrictive of women's activities. A survey of women's attitudes in Dearborn showed that men, often brothers and other male relations as well as fathers, took a patriarchal attitude toward women, insisting on female modesty and restricting work opportunities away from home. Yemenis hold similar attitudes. Among Palestinian Americans, young men are expected to become educated and to do well in business and other professions. They often assimilate to the general society and find American wives. Palestinian-American women, however, tend to be more closely controlled. They have to maintain the family honor, and are raised to marry men from the homeland. Palestinian men, often strongly ideological, are suspicious that Palestinian-American women are too Americanized, too assertive, and too lacking in Palestinian consciousness to serve for the perpetuation of national

identity. This creates a marriage problem for Palestinian-American women.

Female converts to Islam distinguish between Islamic principles and foreign cultural ideals in the treatment of women. While they try to adjust to the expectations of their husbands' families and home culture, most converted Muslim American women believe that women should have careers, though on terms that will not interfere with their family roles. Though women are almost never allowed to pray with men or serve as imams, some mosques seat men and women in parallel facing the *mihrab* (the niche indicating the direction of Mecca), separated by a curtain. In some mosques, women sit in the rear; in some, on a balcony; and some broadcast the services by video link to a separate room.

The head covering is important as an indicator of gender relations among Muslims, but wearing a head cover also declares the community's intention to preserve its identity, and tests the tolerance of the wider society for Muslim customs. State courts in the United States have tended to consider a distinctive head dress a threat of proselytism, or a threat to the separation of church and state, or a challenge to secular education, and have favored state regulation rather than individual choices.

The design and construction of mosques is particularly fraught. Muslims began by creating mosques in storefronts, offices, homes, and former churches, which they "Islamized" by providing facilities for ablutions, marking the direction of prayer, and decorating with Arabic calligraphy. The first newly built dedicated mosque in America was the Islamic Center in Washington, D.C., opened in 1957, and since then thousands of mosques have been built and countless other buildings converted for use as mosques. Most are in New York and California, and some are in Michigan, Illinois, and Texas. Mosques generally include schools, community and conference rooms, libraries, and recreational centers. Immigrant communities tend to favor mosques that replicate traditional home country or generalized traditional images, such as those in the Islamic Center in Washington. In New Mexico, Indiana, and Oklahoma there are innovative mosques that attempt to fit into the local environment,

without iconic references to traditional architecture, and buildings that are designed to fulfill Islamic requirements for multiethnic congregations without showing a preference for any single ethnic group. These differences reflect the diversity of identities among Muslims in America.

The problems that face Muslim communities raise the question of leadership. In the United States, imams are not only called upon to lead prayers and give legal advice, but like rabbis and ministers are asked to provide pastoral care, organize community activities, run schools, arbitrate disputes, and promote an understanding of Islam in the outside world. Hitherto most muftis and imams have been imported from the Old World because they are very knowledgeable about religion, but these imams are not familiar with American circumstances. They also pose problems because of the influence of foreign contributors who tie American Muslims to the religious, ideological, and political interests of the donors. There is a critical need for American imams and *fiqh* (legal) counselors trained in both classical religious studies and in social sciences and humanities. The Fiqh Council of America now deals with questions about dress, marriages, divorce, and other issues.

Prosperity and freedom attracted Muslims to America, but they are often alienated by prejudice, discrimination, suspicion, and the negative attitudes of Americans toward Islam. Since the 1990s, the position of American Muslims has become distinctly less comfortable as the result of a growing perception of an Islamic threat to American security. The controversy over Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* generated a polarization between respect for religious and ideological differences and a sense of threat to fundamental values. Many Muslims saw it as an assault on their faith and integrity; non-Muslims in Europe and America saw Muslim anger as threatening freedom of speech and liberal pluralism. Subsequent political events – the Gulf War of 1991, the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – exacerbated the tensions, and provided an important turning-point for the place of Muslims in the United States. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism replaced

communism as the greatest perceived danger to America. There are widespread American fears that Muslims want to establish Islamic law as American law, or even a caliphate to rule the world. Politicians, evangelical religious leaders, ministers, so-called security experts, anti-immigration spokespersons, former government officials and military officers, academic/political neo-cons who believe in an inevitable clash of civilizations, talk-show hosts, pundits, and many writers propound a conspiracy theory: Islamic radicals are infiltrating America, displacing the constitution, and subverting democracy. They promote a tendency toward seeing Muslims as violent and dangerous. Muslims, and even people merely suspected of being Muslims, have been subjected to investigations, harassment in airports, and hate crimes. While the US government tried to maintain the inclusion of Muslims under the American umbrella of religious diversity, popular opinion became increasingly prejudiced against Muslims. Muslims for their part were alienated by US support for Israel and for dictatorial and oppressive Middle Eastern governments. While many Americans have attempted to reassure them of their welcome, Muslims find the present atmosphere hostile to Islam. Muslims are the most recent victims in a long history of American xenophobia.

In response to such problems, Muslims have attempted to create public affairs organizations to promote understanding of Islam, counter anti-Islamic propaganda, protect the civil rights of Muslims, and promote the interests of American Muslims in the larger society. The Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1980) was one of the earliest political lobbies. The American Muslim Political Coordination Council is the umbrella term for groups trying to make Muslim weight felt in politics. The Islamic Society of North America provides nationwide educational materials, libraries, workshops, a housing and marriage bureau, trust funds, and publications, but it mainly serves immigrant communities and is viewed by black Muslims as uninterested in their needs. Other such organizations include the Muslim Public Affairs Council (1986), the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim Women's League, and the Council on American–Islamic Relations (founded 1994).

Most important was the burgeoning of mosques and local organizations to provide community and social service support to Muslims and liaison with local non-Muslim communities and jurisdictions. Some of the community groups have international affiliations. These include the Muslim Students' Association, committed to a utopian concept of Islam as a single global religion affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Federation of Islamic Organizations is an umbrella movement for mosques and communities sponsored by Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Circle of North American is affiliated with the Jama'at-i Islami. Both modernist and Sufi-oriented Muslims, however, resist having the Islamist Salafist groups speak for them. They defend the diversity of Islam. The absence of a single recognized authority or of hierarchy makes it difficult to unify Muslim communities and to define an Islamic identity transcending ethnic groups and sectarian differences.

Canada

Canada is similar to the United States, but is more liberal in its policies and attitudes toward immigrants. It has a larger immigrant population in proportion to total population than most Western countries. The proportion of foreign born in Canada is twice that of the United States. By 2010, there were over 900,000 Muslims in Canada, most of whom come from Iran and Pakistan. The majority of Muslims are Sunni, but there are also significant numbers of Shi'is, Isma'ilis, and Ahmadis. There are strong antagonisms between Sunni, Saudi-oriented Muslims and Iranian Shi'is. Among Shi'is there are pro- and anti-Iranian government factions, and Persian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Pakistani ethnic divisions. There is a substantial well-educated middle class among Canadian Muslims, but also high levels of unemployment.

Canada tends toward multiculturalism. The state supports religious institutions that also function to provide community services such as job-search assistance, a food bank for the poor and needy, Islamic funeral and burial services, and family and marriage counseling. In effect, the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration strengthens the

hand of conservative Muslim religious leaders who want to maintain boundaries between Muslims and others, consolidate communities under their leadership, and define Muslim identities as exclusive of secular engagements.

Immigration brings profound changes in family life and the relations between men and women. In the course of migration, men commonly experience a decline in professional status. Doctors, lawyers, engineers, civil servants, teachers, and others often have to take small business, sales, clerical, or craft positions. With the stresses of social and cultural change men often want to follow traditional norms that reinforce their authority. Women and children, on the other hand, see new opportunities for advancement and self-expression. An important issue that divides Canadian Muslim men and women is the application of Islamic family law in courts of arbitration.

As in the United States, 9/11 brought new tensions to Canadian political life. Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act give the government especially strong powers over noncitizens. These laws led to surveillance, closure of bank accounts, and the interrogation and arrest of individuals who were considered potential terrorists. However, the laws have been modified to give greater protection to civil rights, and the government seeks input from Muslim community leaders.

Eastern Europe

The Muslim population of Eastern Europe includes both people who continue to practice Islam and people who consider themselves Muslim by ancestry, culture, and ethnicity rather than religious belief. There are approximately 8,500,000 Muslims in the Balkans. Some 82 percent of the population of Albania, 42 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 35 percent of Macedonia (mostly Albanians), 20 percent of the former Yugoslavia (including Albanians in Kosovo and Serbo-Croatian-speaking Slavs in the Sandjak), 13 percent of Bulgaria, and small minorities in Romania (Tatars) and Greece are

Muslims. Turkish Muslims are found in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, and Romania.

In this region, the present situation of Muslims derives from the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Orthodox Christian nationalisms in Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria in the nineteenth century. Muslims lost their political protection, and large numbers migrated to the Ottoman Empire or Turkey after the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, after the Balkan wars of 1912–14, and again after World War I. In the post–World War I settlement, Muslims from Greece were moved to Turkey and Orthodox Christians living in Anatolia were transferred to Greece. Still, large concentrations of Muslims remained as minorities in countries whose majorities considered the state to be Christian.

Bosnia and Yugoslavia

After centuries of Ottoman rule, Bosnia was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878. The Austrians organized Bosnian Muslims under the authority of a ra'is al-'ulama', paid his salary, and created an advisory committee that assumed control of charitable endowments (*awqaf*). In 1909, the Muslim administrative apparatus became independent. The Bosnian elites kept the Ottoman language as a sign of high status and of Muslim identity. At the same time, the expansion of secular education and the formation of reading and political clubs developed a new intelligentsia. From both religious and secular intellectuals came a Bosnian concept of ethnic identity, partly religious, partly national, that distinguished Bosnian from Serbian and Croatian identities. The common people resisted the efforts of both Serbs and Croats to "nationalize" them. They spoke Bosnian and wrote it either in Arabic or in Cyrillic script.

With the founding of Yugoslavia in 1918 – a union of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia – Bosnians formed the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, which demanded autonomy and the maintenance of Muslim educational and judicial institutions, but after 1929 King Aleksander pursued a policy of Serbianization. The province was then absorbed by Croatia

during World War II. Caught in the fighting between Croats and Serbs, tens of thousands of Bosnians were killed during the war. After World War II, many of the Balkan states were taken over by Communist parties. Communist Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania tried to suppress Islam in order to create homogeneous and ideologically devoted populations. In Bosnia, the Communists banned the Sufi orders in 1952, closed down Muslim schools and mosques, and took control of the income of *awqaf*. In 1966, however, President Tito adopted a tolerant nationalities policy, and recognized Bosnians as a separate and equal nationality within the Yugoslav state. This permitted a Muslim revival. Sufi *tekkes* reopened and mosques and schools were built, though this did not change the basically secular character of Bosnian Muslim identity.

After the death of Tito in 1980 and the collapse of the Communist government in 1990, ethno-religious conflict in Yugoslavia resumed. In 1991, Macedonia declared its independence, followed by Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only Montenegro and Serbia remained in the Yugoslav federation. Serbia and Croatia went to war. The Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, called for an independent, secular, multinational Bosnian state. The declaration of Bosnian independence led Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina to declare their own Serbian republic, make war on the Muslims, and attempt, by ethnic cleansing, to drive them out of the region. The war was marked by horrifying episodes of torture, rape, and the mass murder of Bosnian Muslims. In July 1995, some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were massacred at Srebenica by Serbian forces. The Serbian assault was also directed against mosques and historic buildings in an effort to eradicate all signs of Bosnian identity. The United Nations attempted to intervene, but its peacekeeping forces were ineffectual. Eventually a Croatian–Bosnian alliance, with NATO air support, brought an end to the war. By the Dayton Accords of November 1995, Bosnia was divided into two states, one Muslim and Croatian, the other Serbian. First NATO and now European Union forces occupy the province in an effort to create political stability and allow the several nationality groups to live together.

The war intensified the identification of Bosnian Muslims with Islam. The breakup of Communist rule, international support from Muslim countries, and UN and NATO support for minority rights helped consolidate Muslim identities. A Muslim vocabulary using such concepts as jihad and *shahid* (martyr) became part of Bosnian discourse. Muslim teaching and practice resumed, and today Sarajevo has become an important center of Muslim publishing.

Albania and Albanians

In Albania, nationality is not equated with Islam, but about 55 percent of the total population is Sunni, and 15 percent is Bektashi. The Ghegs who populate the north are divided between Sunnis and Catholics, and the Tosks in the south between Bektashis and Greek Orthodox. From 1967 to 1990, all religious activities were banned, but were restored in 1990 by President Ramiz Alia. With considerable help from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and Malaysia – and support from Albanians abroad – mosques, madrasas, Sufi *tekkes* and shrines, and libraries were rebuilt, but attendance is still sparse. Bektashis received some help from Iran. The Islamic cultural and religious revival has prompted some Kosovo Albanians to espouse an Islamic nationalist identity, but most Albanians maintain an ethnic nationalist identity. Nationalists demand the creation of a greater Albanian state encompassing the Albanian populations of Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

In the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia Albanians made up 85 percent of the population, and schools, courts, and media were all Albanian. Kosovo Albanians never accepted the Yugoslav state, and maintained their separate identity and territorial claims. Kosovo-Albanian identity was also defined in ethnic rather than in religious terms. The 1974 Yugoslav constitution recognized Kosovo as an autonomous region. While Albanians had cultural autonomy, nationalist ambitions for independence or for the creation of a greater Albania still smoldered. The 1980s saw an intensification of Albanian–Serbian conflict for control of Kosovo.

In 1989, however, Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, stripped Kosovo of its autonomy. Police repression and the dismissal of Albanians from media and other important positions followed. The Serbs attempted to colonize the region and force Albanians to emigrate. In response Albanians created an underground government, led by Ibrahim Rogova, which demanded independence; more radical elements organized the Kosovo Liberation Army. As the fighting escalated, and repeated diplomatic efforts to pacify the region failed, Serbian assaults finally led to NATO intervention. From March to June 1999, the United States and its allies bombed Serbia, while Serbian forces made a last effort to drive out the Albanian population. NATO eventually forced Serbia to accept a NATO occupation. In 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. The international community is divided over recognition of Kosovo as a state.

Macedonia is the most recent of the Balkan states to undergo interethnic and religious strife. Formerly an autonomous part of the Yugoslav Republic, Macedonia became independent in 1991. Muslims make up about 30 percent of the population, including Albanians (about 20–25 percent), and Turks (about 4–5 percent). Other Macedonian Muslims, who are ethnically and linguistically Slavs, called Pomaks or Torbeshi, and Roma (Gypsies), tend to identify themselves either as Turks or Albanians. Albanian demands for cultural autonomy, recognition of Albanian as a national language alongside Serbian, and partner status in a state defined as a condominium of ethnic groups met with stern resistance from Slavic–Macedonian nationalists. In 2001, NATO intervened to pacify the country and to enforce an agreement in which Albanian rebels accepted the authority of the state in return for recognition of minority cultural rights. The conflict in Macedonia is expressed in nationalist rather than religious terms.

Bulgaria

Muslims in Bulgaria number about 1 million, or 13 percent of the population, most of whom are Turks, with substantial numbers of Roma and Pomaks. Muslims in Bulgaria have gone through waves

of discrimination and persecution. After Bulgaria became independent in 1878, its new leaders were determined to Westernize the country and wipe out the Ottoman heritage; many Muslims left for the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and 1912–13. When the Communist Party came to power in 1944, it tried to suppress religious identity in favor of secular and socialist identities. From the late 1950s to 1985, Islamic religious and cultural practices, Turkish Muslim names, and public use of the Turkish language were forbidden. The Communists tried to promote assimilation by the education of a Turkish secular elite. Repression led to migrations in 1950–51, and to the mass emigration of half a million people in 1989.

The breakup of the Communist regime was an opportunity to reconsolidate both the religious and ethnic forms of Muslim identity. After 1989 the Pomaks, who generally identify themselves as Bulgarians, maintained their separateness by keeping strong kinship and work ties, and by reviving Islamic instruction and practices. Their distinct identity is also protected by the fact that they are concentrated in remote villages, and have generally (apart from construction work) avoided occupations such as peddling or trading, which separate the men from their families. Economic hardship is now the greatest danger to these communities.

Balkan Muslims look to Turkey for political protection. Turkey sees itself as a kindred state because of religion and the remembrances of Ottoman history. Turkey intervened militarily, seizing part of Cyprus, in the name of protecting the Muslim–Turkish community and preventing the unification of Cyprus with Greece, but in general it has limited its interventions. Turkish foreign policy makers are aware of the danger of a polarization of the Balkans into Christian and Muslim alliances.

Muslims in Western Europe

While in Eastern Europe Islam is a deeply rooted indigenous presence, before the mid-twentieth century only a trickle of Muslims came to live in Western Europe. Muslim seamen, traders, and slaves found a home in Britain as early as the seventeenth century. A wave

of Muslim immigration from Yemen and Somalia to Britain followed the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Indian soldiers in the British armed forces settled in Liverpool and London. In the nineteenth century, Bosnians came to Vienna and Turks to Paris as diplomats and students. Algerian workers came to Marseilles before World War I, and during and after the war France brought in Algerian recruits, and later allowed a mosque in Paris and a Muslim cemetery in Bobigny. In the interwar period students from colonized countries made their way to colonial capitals.

An intensive migration of Muslims to Western Europe began in the 1950s and 1960s, partly because of the breakup of colonial empires, but largely due to European economic prosperity and the recruitment of laborers. These were mostly unskilled or low-skilled workers in agriculture and construction who came without families. After 1973, a Europe-wide recession led to efforts to stop labor migration, but European governments permitted families to join workers already in Europe. From the 1980s, the predominant sources of immigrants were illegal migrants seeking work and political refugees seeking asylum. In a period of economic stagnation, these immigrants had great difficulty integrating into the labor force, though some of them benefited from periodic efforts to regularize the status of illegal residents. Immigrants in the 1990s, however, included professionals, typically in the computer and software industries. In Europe, immigration has not historically been thought to lead to integration into the national populations, but over time it has become evident that Muslim immigrants are not temporary workers, but permanent residents.

The critical influences on the place of immigrants in European countries are the citizenship policies of the host countries, the institutional mechanisms for the incorporation of immigrants into the larger society, and the attitudes of the already settled populations. In many countries, immigrants may become citizens after a period of residence, demonstrated knowledge of the language and civic traditions, and good character. In Britain and France, immigrants may become citizens after five years of residence, and in Germany after eight years. Historically Germany required German ethnic

ancestry for citizenship, but since 2000 a resident may become a citizen after eight years in the country. In practice, citizenship is most easily attained in Britain. France demands a high degree of assimilation. German law gives officials wide discretion to restrict citizenship in the national interest. In Spain, Italy, and Greece, Muslims are largely blocked from gaining citizenship. The United States, Britain, and France permit dual citizenship to naturalized citizens who are citizens of another country by virtue of ancestral ties, but German law requires a person born in Germany to choose one or the other citizenship by the age of twenty-three.

In each country, the institutions regulating relations between governments and religious bodies have strong implications for the treatment of Muslims. Britain has a long tradition of state recognition and support for Anglicanism, and extends this support to Catholics, other Protestants, Jews, and Muslims. It supports Muslim schools and allows Muslims to modify school uniforms to accommodate their preferences. France is resolutely laicist. In the French view religion belongs entirely in the private sphere. Since 1989, however, France has removed restrictions on the formation of associations by foreigners, gives tax relief for cultural groups, and tries to promote "moderate" forms of Islam. Germany is a hybrid case. In principle, state and church are separate, but the state levies taxes for religious purposes and state schools provide religious instruction. The state extends these benefits to some Muslim schools, as well as welfare and cultural organizations.

Many countries, such as Denmark, Finland, Norway, England, Greece, and Sweden until recently, have an official church incorporated within the state structures. In Austria, Germany, the Alsace region of France, Wales, Scotland, and England, the privileges of state recognition extend to all recognized churches. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal (and, in part, Germany) the relations between the state and the Catholic Church are governed by a concordat. Separation of church and state is the rule in France, the Irish republic, Belgium, and Holland. However, in all countries state policies may become less important to Muslims in view of the tendencies to limit the competence of the state in religious affairs,

define religious belief as a private matter, assure freedom of religious organization and worship, and protect individual rights.

Official policies and attitudes toward the acceptance of foreign cultures are equally varied. The "multiculturalist" societies, such as Britain, Germany, and Sweden, hover between cultural pluralism and multiculturalism – between acceptance of a variety of communities in the private sphere and their validation in the public sphere. In Britain and Germany, the authorities deal with the immigrant population through the mediation of mosque officials and formal associations. This policy defines the immigrant population in religious terms as "Muslim" and empowers imams and other religious rather than lay leaders. It tends to perpetuate immigrant languages, cultures, and lifestyles. France, by contrast, maintains the ideal of a secular, civic society of individuals, and resists multiculturalism in favor of individualism. In France immigrants may become "French" on condition of complete linguistic assimilation and acceptance of French *laïcité*. Germany is divided between liberals who accept immigrants and rightists who protest against the state's immigration, employment, and welfare policies.

Apart from citizenship and equal rights, immigration raises questions about religious customs and laws. Legal issues are especially complicated. Muslim immigrants brought with them not just one legal system, but the various different systems found within each home country: Islamic law, customary law, modern legislation, and current administrative practice. In family disputes, conflicts arise over whether real-life practice, or Islamic law, or the legal code of the country of origin, or that of the country of residence should apply. Custody and inheritance disputes also arise from mixed marriages. Muslim immigrants also want mosques, schools, acceptance of halal meat, headscarves for girls, and recognition of Muslim family law. Immigrants have to deal with differing traditions regarding women's dress, education, and employment.

Where immigrants are citizens they form associations to lobby for nondiscrimination in employment, and for their religious identity to be recognized as legitimate in the public sphere. Civic associations in Britain and trade unions and anti–racial-discrimination movements in

France are the routes to a place in society. In Germany, the principal vehicles of incorporation are unions, vocational institutes and schools, and the educational policies of some of the more liberal German federal states, such as Berlin and Bremen. Governments in Britain, Belgium, and France have established associations and councils to organize and represent the immigrant communities. Such groups fall short of comprehensive inclusion or representation of Muslims, and have been hampered by internal fragmentation as well as institutional and political resistance in the host societies.

Muslims in Europe are also organized by governments, political parties, and movements in the home countries that have branches in Europe. Saudi Arabia and Libya, for example, sent imams, and sponsored mosques and community projects. The Diyanet, or Turkish Ministry of Religion, sought both to promote and supervise Turkish Muslim religious and educational activities in Germany.

Most Muslims try to live normal lives away from the tumult of politics and identity issues.

Immigrant identities in Europe

The central issue for Muslims is how they will define themselves in the European context. Will they maintain a separate communal and legal life and demand recognition as autonomous communities? Will they support a more radical, adversarial political Islam? Will they become part of a multicultural society? Will they be assimilated as individuals? These questions are difficult to answer. Though there are case studies, there is little or no statistical data on identity preferences or on Muslim opinion about public issues broken down by socioeconomic class and generation. Some Muslims favor multiculturalism and government recognition and support for minority communities. Opponents argue that such policies will isolate the minorities rather than incorporate them into the larger society. They argue in favor of recognition of diversity, but policies that favor the assimilation of individuals. In this complex situation both immigrant and host societies are ambivalent.

In Europe, Muslim identities take a number of forms. In the first immigrant generation the predominant tendency was to maintain close cultural, social, religious, and political ties with home countries. Immigrants maintained their ethnic identity by preserving home-country languages, customs, and religious rituals. Pakistanis in Britain kept up marriage, trade, and religious networks with their home communities, and sponsored Barelwi and Deobandi mosques, often with the local chapters representing a village or neighborhood in the old country. Turks and Kurds in Germany maintained their loyalties to the Diyanet, Milli Gorus, Sulaymancis, Nurcis, and other movements representing the Turkish government, opposition parties, or Sufi brotherhoods in Turkey. Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians in France typically organized mosques by national groups, with overt or covert home government or political party affiliations. They tended to think in terms of collective solidarity rather than individual mobility, and fell back on traditional ethnic or national cultures to cope with their new environment.

In subsequent generations, migrants and their children had more varied options. Some migrants have assimilated to the public domain of their host countries, but remain Muslims by personal identity, though they may not follow Islamic rituals or keep a communal affiliation. Others, though assimilated in the public domain, consider themselves pious Muslims and practice Islamic rituals. Practicing Muslims have several options. One option is to practice Islamic rituals and attend mosques but avoid political involvement. Tablighi Jamaʿat, a missionary movement founded in India and active in Europe and the United States, represents this position. Its first mission to Britain took place in 1946; to the United States in 1952; and to France in 1962. Following the migrations of South Asian Muslims, the Tablighis have established mosques in London, Paris, Brussels, and Toronto. In the 1980s, they held a world congress in Dewsbury, England. Tablighis, who leave their routine lives to travel on missions, believe in the absolute superiority of Islam over Western civilization, eschew materialism and consumer culture, and avoid political involvements. Missionaries and militants proselytizing for Islam consider it a universal religion apart from parochial cultures;

they separate Islam from specific ethnic communities and religion from culture, but also claim the right of *ijtihad* (authoritative religious judgment) for individuals, which can serve as a mechanism for adjustment to life in Europe.

Another option is to practice Islam in a communal context. Some Muslims have formed separatist enclaves within Europe and America, utopian small communities withdrawn from the general society, which require separate facilities such as schools and the recognition of their collective organization and legal systems. Their goal is the preservation of distinct identities in multicultural societies. Other Muslims in Europe consider their sojourn a temporary exile, and remain focused on the struggle for improvement in their home countries. Some undertake missionary work and use their residence as a base for converting Europeans to Islam.

Still other assimilated Muslims may reinterpret Islamic values and behaviors to synthesize Islam and European values, creating a new hybrid Western–Islamic identity: a Euro-Islam, a liberal form of Islam accommodating European secular, individualistic, and civic values. These Muslims define a middle course between ghettoization and assimilation by formulating a syncretic, diaspora version of Islamic culture. Islam for such people is a privatized religion of individuals who choose their own level of observance and identifications, without a necessary connection to *umma*, *jamaʿa*, or state.

A powerful recent trend is the evolution of ethnic Muslim identities into a universalistic Muslim identity based on worldwide commonalities in Islamic belief. The second generations of immigrant families often reject the ethnic or national Islamic customs of their parents. As Muslims of different backgrounds interact, traditions are reconsidered and common Islamic norms rediscovered. Neo-Islamic movements break ties to home countries and to parochial cultures. The universalistic Islamic identity has paradoxical implications. While it creates a worldwide sense of Muslim affiliation, it is in fact a stripped-down version of Islam with little historical or cultural content. Furthermore, despite its transnational character, it serves to facilitate integration into new host societies because it bypasses foreign ethnic and national

loyalties and fits the prevailing Euro-American concept of religious identity in multireligious national societies. Yet Muslims also use the transnational, cosmopolitan, global Muslim identity to break away from European values. This choice is often the preference of intellectuals and students and the outlet of marginalized, excluded elements of the immigrant population who combat discrimination or problems of delinquency, drugs, unemployment, violence, and the failure of public services by building an alternative Islam.

Finally, there are neo-Islamists who emphasize political goals rather than pious practices as a path to the restoration of the unity and power of Muslim peoples. Pan-Islamic social and political solidarity, hostility to the West, and commitment to jihad or even to terrorism, also stem from Islam as a form of political protest. The weakness of schools, political parties, and unions among immigrants gives greater scope to religion to define a radical collective identity.

Immigrant status by country

Britain

After World War II, emigration to Britain was opened to citizens of the British Commonwealth, and in the 1950s immigrants began to arrive as laborers. The main sources of labor from outside the British Isles were the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. Large numbers of Pakistanis started arriving at the end of the 1950s. In anticipation of restrictions imposed in 1962, there was a massive immigration of Pakistanis, Gujaratis, Kashmiris, Punjabis, Turkish Cypriots, Malaysians, Moroccans, Yemenis, and West Africans. In 1968, the emphasis in immigration policy shifted to family reunification and a new wave of South Asians came from East Africa. There are now about 3 million Muslims in the United Kingdom. Most live in London, Birmingham, and Bradford in Yorkshire.

Muslim immigrants were generally economically disadvantaged, and had poor education and high rates of unemployment. In the late 1970s and 1980s, they were faced with attacks by racist thugs. Muslim protest riots broke out in London, Liverpool, Birmingham, and

other cities, and Muslims organized to protect themselves and their interests. They formed local communal organizations to deal with school, mosque, food, and burial issues. For example, the Bradford Council of Mosques is a coordinating body created to give a common voice to the various Muslim communities. It negotiates with school authorities for the special needs of Muslim students. There are various national organizations such as the Union of Muslim Organizations and the Council of Mosques, but Muslims in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe, are not unified and generally do not recognize comprehensive allegiances.

The first engagement in public issues came in the 1980s, with demands for schools for Muslim youth. While considering education highly desirable to pave the way for a better livelihood, Muslim parents were dissatisfied with the secularism of British schools, and saw their cultural neutrality and social diversity as a challenge to Muslim convictions. They feared the exposure of their children to racist attitudes and the mixing of the sexes. They wanted to establish Muslim schools, classified as voluntary schools under religious control but subsidized by state funds, similar to Church of England, Catholic, and Jewish schools. In places where Muslims are a local majority, they tried to bypass the local authorities and receive direct subsidies from the central government, as allowed in the Educational Reform Act. Muslims also called for laws to meet their religious and educational needs, and protect them against discrimination. Some demanded the application of Muslim family law in Britain.

The Rushdie affair was a crystallizing moment for British Muslims. The publication of *The Satanic Verses*, with its implied insults to the Prophet Muhammad, united Muslims in anger, and generated demands for protection under British blasphemy laws and for the withdrawal of the book from circulation. Led by the Bradford Council of Mosques, Muslims staged a ritual book-burning ceremony, and were joined by Muslims the world over in their protest. Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran condemned Rushdie to death. The struggle led to the formation of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), an alliance of Muslim organizations that became the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. British public opinion

reacted to these expressions of outrage by defending freedom of speech. Muslims were perceived as having anti-British, antiliberal, and antimodern views. Muslims and other Britons did not understand each other's positions or grasp the depth of each other's anger over the Rushdie affair. Nonetheless, publishers and media outlets began to take Muslim sensitivities into account. (See Illustration 34.)

Illustration 34.   An anti-Rushdie demonstration, London (© Richard Wood/CORBIS).

   In the 1990s, Muslims in Britain entered politics and won increasing recognition in British public life. Three Muslims were appointed to the House of Lords. The Church of England came to see itself as promoting consensual religious values. The curriculum in required religious education classes includes an extensive treatment not only of Christianity, but also of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism. In 1998, Muslims won the same rights to state-funded schools as Christians and Jews. Britain accommodates Muslim as it does Christian and Jewish religious practices. It allows girls to wear headscarves so long as they conform to the color requirements of school uniforms, and increasing numbers of Bangladeshi and Pakistani young women receive a higher education. Muslim chaplains were appointed in hospitals and prisons. There is an active

Muslim press. Despite these gains, the sense of alienation remains very strong, as do antagonisms between Muslims and other Britons.

Since the 1980s, Muslims in Britain have tended to reaffirm the religious dimensions of their identity. Participation in Friday prayers, observance of Ramadan, and consumption of halal meat have become ever more common. Yet much or most religious affiliation is still based on ethnic and national communities. Especially among first-generation migrants, religion is subsumed as part of ethnic identity. There are Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Arab, Turkish, and Shiʿi mosques. Bangladeshis worship at the Brick Lane Mosque, which is Barelwi, in the tradition of Indian folk religion and Sufism; social and community needs are handled by the Bangladesh Welfare Association. Pakistanis attend the East London Mosque, which is Deobandi in the tradition of Indian reform and opposition to Sufi and folk practices, and receives support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It is allied with the Muslim Youth Organization, which provides social outreach. Pakistanis also have their own food and clothing stores, television and radio programs, as well as mosques and schools. They are devoted to the shrines and the Sufi *pirs*, or shrine keepers, in their villages and towns of origin. Alternatively, they will visit a succession of shrines in both Britain and Pakistan seeking protective amulets or healing from a variety of local and visiting Pakistani *pirs*. Sufi networks link members of different kinship, regional, and caste groups. Most of the major *tariqat*, including the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, Chistiyya, ʿAlawiyya, and Tijaniyya, have branches in Britain. The Tablighi Jamaʿat, affiliated with the Deobandi mosques, helps create an international identity for mobile Muslims. It urges Muslims in their new countries to be responsible citizens.

Young British Muslims, coming from tight-knit Pakistani communities, yet living in and adapting to a Western society that is doubtful of and even hostile to them, are ambivalent about their mixed identities. Emphasis upon the universal principles of Islam and the global identity of Muslims allows young British Muslims to reject narrow ethnic cultures, to separate from their parents, and to participate in a larger community. Religion enlarges their horizons without betraying their origins. Islam is defined by reading and

discussing Quran and hadith, participation in mosque prayers, observance of Ramadan, avoiding alcohol or pork, eating only halal foods, and social behavior that eschews nightclubs, and restricts or renounces dating the opposite sex. Many look to Islamic law-based mediation and judicial advice. While some young men do not practice Islam, they nonetheless affirm Islam as their identity and a total life system. They see it as a source of guidance, morality, discipline, and compassion. Many women believe that Islam, properly understood, is favorable to them.

The ideal of a British-based but transnational Islam with its roots in the universal teachings of the Quran and sunna rather than the ethnic loyalties of their parents' generation, draws many educated and mobile young British Muslims to revivalist movements such as the Jama'at-i Islami, the Tablighi Jama'at, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, which promote a universalistic version of Islam, often Salafi, with emphasis on the fundamental texts of the Quran and the teaching of the Prophet. In response, some Sufi brotherhoods have also turned away from the preservation of ethnic and national cultures toward the development of a British and contemporary version of Islam. For example, Haqqani Naqshbandiyya have developed a global network based on the teachings of the Quran and sunna that rivals the purist Wahhabi and Salafi movements. In recent years, new organizations have appeared urging participation in British democratic processes and the reconciliation of Islamic identity and Muslim spirituality with British citizenship. The leading exemplar of this movement is Tariq Ramadan. By contrast, some Muslim radicals withdraw from British society and attempt to fight against it by terrorist tactics.

Alternatively, instead of affiliating with Islam, many young people think of themselves as British Pakistanis or British Asians. While young British Pakistanis are closely bound to their parents' authority and culture, they widen their horizons by subtle adjustments. There is growing resistance to intra-family marriages, especially since these often involve arranged marriages with partners still in Pakistan. Outside the home, people speak English. Asian rap is popular. Bhangra music – a fusion of Punjabi and Western styles – symbolizes this movement toward a broader identity. Turning to

Asian identity and/or to Islam opens a larger world without compromising ties to family and community.

At the same time, British Asian identity is a form of protest against British Islamophobia and discrimination. Just as British journalists, commentators, and politicians denounce Islam as incompatible with European values, British Asian bands and rap point up the intolerance of Britons toward Muslims and the unjustified assumptions of cultural superiority.

France

Seven out of ten immigrants in France come from a country that used to be part of the French colonial empire. As a result of colonial recruitment, Algerian soldiers and workers first came to France at the time of World War I. In 1962, after the Algerian war of independence, Algerian supporters of the French, called Harkis, were evacuated to France. Then, labor immigration brought large numbers of Tunisians and Moroccans as well as Algerians. In the 1970s, Turks and black Africans from Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal increased the Muslim presence in France to approximately 4.7 million, mostly concentrated in the industrial towns of Marseilles, Lyon, Paris, and Lille. These included Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Turks, Senegalese, Malians, and other West Africans, and *beurs*, or people born to Muslim families in France. Only after 1974 did North African and sub-Saharan immigrants begin to think of themselves as permanent residents. By the 1980s, there was a tendency for Maghribis born in France to assimilate to French public identity, but until the 1990s, Turks, Malays, and Pakistanis held on to the dream of returning to their home countries.

French attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are governed by two deep cultural themes. One is an imperialist attitude that sees Islam as a subversive enemy. This was developed as part of the French struggle to maintain its colonial empire and defend the French Republic. The second is the tradition of *laïcité*, the separation of church and state that makes public religious observances and identities seem threatening to the unity of the nation and the authority of the Republic. In 1905, French law deprived the Catholic

Church of official status and ended all forms of state aid. The dominant attitude holds that no religion may receive state recognition or state financial aid, and that the state is neutral in all matters pertaining to religion.

Immigrants to France tended at first to define themselves in ethnic and national terms, but in 1989 the state permitted immigrant groups to form cultural associations that were entitled to tax benefits. There was an immediate explosion of prayer rooms, mosques, and communal associations. These included the Tabligh, the Mosque of Paris, the Association of Muslim Students (affiliated with the Society of Muslim Brothers), the Union of Islamic Organizations, and the National Federation of Muslims (Moroccan). Many of the new associations were linked to governments and political parties in their countries of origin, including the Algerian FIS, Tunisian an-Nahda, the sultanate of Morocco, and the Turkish Diyanet. West Africans tend to be affiliated with Sufi brotherhoods, and Turks with the Naqshbandis. There was some pressure to create a national association of all Muslims. Government efforts to structure the Muslim communities afford the paradox of ethnic minorities organized as a religious community by a secular state.

Education was the critical issue for Muslims. The state school system is firmly secular, and France has a long tradition of using education to socialize children to the lay values of the French Republic. Thus, in France mosques rather than public schools provide supplementary Arabic and religious instruction.

The wearing of headscarves in schools has become the focus of a continuing struggle over the place of Muslims in French society. In 1989, the principal of a French high school in the town of Creil asked Muslim girls to remove headscarves. The laïcist conceptual framework did not allow for the expression of religious views in the public sphere. The opponents of headscarves argued that the believer's private identity should not take priority over the citizen's identity. The girls refused and were expelled. The Council of State at first allowed each school to make its own policy, but then reversed its ruling, and ordered girls be allowed to go to class with headscarves. This created a public furor. French secularists defended the

ideological commitments of the school system. Muslims defended their religious liberty. The debate radicalized Muslim self-awareness, and more and more girls came to school in headscarves. French public opinion began to fear this as a political statement of sympathy with Algerian fundamentalists, or as a sign of the oppression of women, and a barrier to integration. A right-wing anti-immigrant movement led by Jean-Marie Le Pen made striking gains in local elections. In March 2004, a new law banned conspicuous religious signs from state schools. In November 2005, there were riots in the Muslim "ghettos" all over France. In 2011, the struggle over headscarves was reenacted over the wearing of the burqa (all-enveloping outer garment) and niqab (face veil) in public. French law now prohibits clothes that obscure the entire face.

Muslims in France are in the process of losing their old cultures, and of developing a variety of new identities. Groups that are socially and economically assimilated tend toward Gallicization and integration, while retaining religious practices on an individual basis. Some studies found that many immigrants were becoming socially and professionally integrated, experienced a high degree of intermarriage, wanted to be seen as individuals, and had little sense of community with other Muslims or Arabs and no interest in creating a reformulated Arab identity. Second- and third-generation Maghribis who go to French schools develop values different from those of their families. Surveys in the 1990s showed that 70 percent of Muslims interviewed expected to be integrated into French society and to practice Islam as a private religion. About 25 percent of the total were completely secular, and did not have any Islamic identity in public.

For many Muslims in France, however, Islamic identity remains important. An October 2001 poll in Le Monde found that 16 percent of respondents identified themselves as being of Muslim origin; 36 percent said they were non-practicing believers; and 42 percent practicing believers. About 25–30 percent wanted public visibility of Islam and were in favor of minarets, festivals, Ramadan, and halal food. The number of those who observe Ramadan has been rising. Non-practicing Muslims tend to come from the technical or

administrative middle class. Practicing Muslims include persons with both the least and the most education. Many Muslims seem to have concluded that integration without giving up Islam is possible. As French citizens they demand equality and acceptance in society on the basis of French values rather than in terms of their religious community.

A forceful counter-trend emerged in the 1990s: a neo-Islamic identity, community separatism, and withdrawal from French society. Islamism as a political alternative is most likely to gain in areas of failed integration. Unemployment, especially among young Muslims, is more than double the national average. Excluded, unemployed, and segregated Arab and black youths are developing their own subculture in Islamic form. Students, workers, and youths link up across ethnic lines in a new pan-Muslim identity. In this subculture, brothers want to control sisters (girls tend to be more readily assimilated) and to replace failed parents. Typically they insist that women wear a conservative style of Muslim dress. Control of women has become essential to their cultural identity. Both Muslim and French government elites are trying to find communal interlocutors and to shape this identity, but it is hard for them to cope with the lack of organization and the spirit of revolt. Neo-Islamic demands are a gesture of refusal, a counterrejection of an exclusive French society.

The new Islamist identity in France has other meanings. It is in part an effort to find an alternative to Western values and identities. In part the revival is promoted by the emergence of a transnational, global Muslim sense of affiliation, and by such international movements as the Tabligh, which preaches a pietist and devotionalist form of Islam, and the Muslim Brothers, who promote a politically activist form of Islam. It is also a form of political mobilization for Maghribis who do not accept their nationality of origin as their basic identification and thereby refuse the right of home-country political authorities to speak for them.

In France, as elsewhere in Europe and in the United States, the place of Muslims is tied to questions of security. In the 1990s, the outbreak of civil war in Algeria led to bombings in Paris. The events of 9/11, terrorist attacks in Britain and Spain, and urban riots in

France have added to the tensions between French Muslims and non-Muslims. These tensions are exacerbated by anxiety over stagnant economies, which leads to anti-immigration and racist sentiments and political parties orchestrating this sentiment.

Germany

Most foreign guest workers in Germany came from Turkey in the 1960s. They were recruited as part of a deliberate joint government–industry initiative, and by the collaboration of German and Turkish authorities. Immigrant Turks and Kurds settled in the industrial belt from Cologne to Essen, and in Hamburg, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Frankfurt. Numerous Iranian, North African Arab, and Yugoslav refugees came at later dates. Many of them came as part of negotiated arrangements with the governments of their countries of origin. Germany provided limited social benefits for Turkish workers. After 1974, Germany stopped the influx of new workers but permitted the reunification of families, and thus set the basis for permanent immigrant residence. In 2000, German legislation finally removed the requirement of German ethnicity for citizenship, but requires that new citizens renounce foreign citizenship. There are approximately 4 million Muslims in a total population of about 80 million. The great majority are Turks, but there are also about half a million southeast Europeans, 600,000 Arabs from the Middle East and North Africa, and others from Iran, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Immigrants tend to suffer from very high levels of unemployment and to lag in education.

The organization of the Turkish community was facilitated by laws that recognize religious associations as corporations with rights to administer instruction and be represented in institutions such as hospitals, the army, prisons, and the media. In effect the state treats religious associations as subcontractors for welfare matters. It collects taxes to pay for religious activities, and distributes tax revenues to churches, nurseries, hospitals, and other charities. Muslims, however, are not fully incorporated into the system. While the state has funded Muslim social welfare and cultural organizations and an Islamic school, Muslim groups have not yet been recognized

as public law corporations qualified for inclusion in the church tax system.

Education remains a critical problem for Muslim communities. Germany requires religious instruction in public schools, and the German federal states (*Länder*) are responsible for providing teachers and instruction. Religious groups supply the curriculum, but state education authorities have to approve standards for teachers and classroom syllabuses. Out of concerns for hostile political activism, German school authorities have resisted the implementation of programs for Muslims. German officials have also resisted setting up independent Muslim schools similar to church schools. German judges have raised questions as to whether Muslim education represents a genuine religious tradition or is a form of political or ideological indoctrination. Muslim demands for prayer in the schools, and for the separation of the sexes in biology classes, also meet with resistance because they are suspected of serving political rather than strictly religious ends, and because of the implied gender inequality.

The headscarf is a relatively minor issue in Germany. Some states forbid teachers to wear it; Berlin permits students to wear headscarves without restrictions.

Turkish immigrants belong to a great variety of associations that operate more freely in Germany than in Turkey. These associations include the Turkish state Diyanet, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs, which promotes a Turkish Muslim identity and forms of Islam compatible with Turkish state secularism. In order to prevent the assimilation of Turks and to maintain their loyalty to the fatherland, the Diyanet sponsors mosques and school instruction, appoints imams, and distributes religious publications. Only imams approved by the Diyanet are officially accepted in Germany. Since the Diyanet encourages a secularist tendency in education, many parents prefer to send their children to mosque schools.

Nonstate movements based in Turkey compete for influence among Turkish immigrants. These include the Sulaymancis, whose agenda is defined as spreading the Muslim truth. This is

accomplished through exemplary conduct, religious education, books, and political organization. Milli Gorus promotes the idea of an Islamic state, and wants Turkey to adopt Islamic law. It sponsors language and computer courses, sports organizations, youth and women's groups, and training in meditation. It claims 200,000 members. The Kalifatsstaat (Caliphal state) movement led by Metin Kaplan has about 1,300 members, and advocates the formation of an Islamic government in Turkey unified with the rest of Muslim world. Though the tactics are different, the common purpose of these Turkish Muslim movements is the Islamization of society in Turkey. They represent communities in exile oriented to the politics of the home country rather than Germany.

Other Muslim movements in Germany include the Nurcis, the Naqshbandi Turkish Islamic Centers, the Society of Muslim Brothers, and representatives of the Algerian FIS and GIA, Hizballah, HAMAS, Shi'i missions, the Muslim World League, the Ahmadiyya, and many Sufi brotherhoods. These movements are a response to secularism and nationalism, to religious pluralism and to the relativistic attitudes that apply in multicultural societies. Some 30 percent of Turks in Germany are 'Alawis, many affiliated with the Bektashi brotherhood. These groups offer religious services, pilgrimage, education, help with German bureaucracy, and courses in everything from Arabic to computers. Efforts to create a unified Muslim organization have thus far failed.

A case study of Muslims in Augsburg shows that Muslims who do keep a religious identity and affiliations to religious communities have a variety of religious and political orientations. Some movements, such as the Nurcis, cultivate a reformed type of Sufi mysticism. The Nurcis believe that consciousness-raising has to precede politics, and stress the importance of adhering to principles and avoiding compromises. They make no effort to raise mass support, appeal mainly to intellectuals, and foster strong ties between teachers and disciples. The Tabligh, which represents a worldly, socially active religiosity, attempts to inculcate disciplined observance of Muslim rituals and norms of behavior. These movements have a cadre structure and a hierarchically organized

inner group, distinguished from ordinary adherents and sympathizers. All the groups in Augsburg struggle for their causes in Turkey, but show less concern for the immediate problems of Muslims in Germany.

While pursuing public demands, Muslims in Germany have adopted different versions of Islamic identity. Many Muslims are personally devout and observant, but for many others being "Muslim" denotes a cultural affiliation without implying religiosity. Furthermore, Islam is not necessarily the primary factor in their self-identification. "Muslims" may give priority to Turkish, Kurdish, and other ethnic and national affiliations. Immigrant youths are marginalized in German society, but seem to be moving toward a cultural synthesis of their own. Since 2000, hybrid ethno-national (Turkish–German), even ethno-local (Turkish–Stuttgarter) identities have emerged among second-generation Muslims. Neither Germans nor Turks, they combine headscarves and jeans, but Muslim women often cultivate piety and modesty rather than accepting the more liberal mores of the majority society.

German society remains strongly divided over the place of immigrants. Foreign workers were first welcomed for their economic contribution, but as early as the 1970s they began to be perceived as a threat to job security and a drain on state welfare resources. Liberal Germans defend the rights of immigrants to security and cultural identity, but many Germans refuse to accept people who are not ethnic Germans as true citizens. A strong rightist movement protests against immigration as well as employment and welfare benefits for migrants. These tensions rose markedly in the 1990s with the stresses accompanying German reunification. A neo-Nazi current, especially in underemployed and still depressed eastern Germany, has led to violent attacks upon and murders of immigrants. Though punished severely in the courts and threatened with political suppression, anti-immigrant violence remains a critical problem.

Sweden, the Netherlands, and Spain

Other European countries also present individual variations in the adaptations of Muslim immigrants and host countries to each other.

Sweden has a Muslim population of Turks, Arabs, and Pakistanis. About half the people of Muslim origin in Sweden are not religious minded, and about 35 percent are moderately observant. Sweden subsidizes religious schools in parallel with its support for the state church, but refuses to recognize any official relationship with home countries. Muslims, however, demand recognition of the rights of ethnic and religious communities as groups, which they see as the only way to preserve their values and culture. Deeply grounded in Protestant values, Swedes assume that immigrants could be assimilated as individuals. Collective rights run counter to French Enlightenment and British liberal notions of a society of individuals with universally valid, equal rights.

In Switzerland, there are about 430,000 Muslims in a population of some 7.5 million people. Close to 90 percent of these are from Kosovo and Turkey. Turks lean toward ethnic-heritage forms of Islam, and affiliate with movements such as the Diyanet, Milli Gorus, Sulaymancis, and Nurcis that are based in Turkey. Arabs lean toward universalistic Islam. The Muslim Brothers and Saudi mosques in Geneva promote a "born-again" individualistic Muslim identity to be combined with participation in Swiss public life. In Switzerland, there is widespread anxiety about Islam and its presumed fundamentalist tendencies, which has undermined the country's reputation for religious tolerance. In a 2009 national referendum, the Swiss voted to ban the construction of minarets.

In the Netherlands, Muslim immigration goes back to the 1960s. Recruitment of workers and family unification plans promoted by the Dutch government in bilateral agreements with Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yugoslavia brought Muslim workers and their families into the country. There are about 900,000 people of Muslim origins, about 6 per cent of the total population, half of whom were born in the Netherlands. Turks are the largest group (400,000), followed by Moroccans (335,000), and small numbers of Southeast Asians, Pakistanis, Iraqis, and Iranians. Here too, Muslims represent a great diversity of orientations. Several Turkish Islamic associations, several Moroccan associations and Sufi orders, and the Tabligh movement are active in the Netherlands. Instruction in mosque

schools is very popular, and by 1990 Muslims were able to open state-subsidized schools in parallel with those of other religious groups.

The Dutch government has moved from a concept of immigrants as temporary guest workers to one that sees them as ethnic minorities, and in principle its policies aim at promoting multiculturalism, equality before the law, and overcoming social and economic deprivation. Dutch policy allows governmental support for religious private schools, radio and television broadcasting, and community organizations. Under the latter rubric there are even subsidies for mosques. In actuality, Dutch officialdom tries to closely control Muslim affairs, and has not effectively integrated Muslims into the national population. The Dutch authorities have curbed the recruitment of imams from abroad for fear that they discourage the integration of Muslims. A plan of 1998 called for the creation of training institutes for imams in Holland, but Muslims are trying to create private universities to accomplish this on their own terms.

Most Muslims in Spain come from Morocco, but there are also Muslim immigrants from Algeria, Pakistan, and some sub-Saharan African states. The total Muslim population is about a million, roughly 2.3 percent of the Spanish population. By an agreement of 1992, Muslims have legal rights to receive instruction in Islam in public schools, set up their own schools, have Muslim marriages recognized in civil law, tax relief for religious activities, and a recognized legal status for religious leaders. Still, the Spanish authorities are reluctant to make provision for places of worship and ceremonies, and for adequate educational facilities. Opposition to the construction of mosques or other visible signs of a Muslim presence is intense. Spain still considers itself a Christian country founded on the defeat and expulsion of the Moors. The Muslim presence is not compatible with this national narrative.

In Italy there are about 1,600,000 Muslim immigrants, primarily from Morocco, Albania, and various African countries. The Italian state does not seem ready to confront the numerous political, social, and cultural problems in matters of worship, schools, charities, and communal organizations raised by the Muslim presence.

The anti-immigrant reaction

In general, the host societies have had great difficulty finding a modus vivendi with their immigrant populations. Since the late 1970s, there have been strong reactions against the presence of immigrants. Right-wing parties have emerged in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries, protesting against immigration, the employment of immigrants, and social and financial support for immigrant communities. Many Europeans see immigrants as they saw colonial subjects – as lower peoples who have to be assimilated by education – and assume that their civilization will be defined only on European terms. International events such as the rise to power of Qaddafi in Libya and Khomeini in Iran, terrorist episodes, and the Taliban in Afghanistan have raised anti-Muslim feeling. The Salman Rushdie affair led many to believe that Islamic values were incompatible with European liberalism. These tensions seemed to diminish in the late 1990s, probably due to a combination of relative prosperity, strong repression of criminal attacks upon immigrants and of racist political parties (as in Germany), and perhaps a gradual reconciliation with the reality of a permanent Muslim presence in Europe.

The new century, however, brought a negative turn of events. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States in 2001, the bombing of the Atocha rail station in Madrid in 2004, and the attacks on the London underground trains and buses in 2005 have increased resentment and hostility toward Muslims in both the United States and Europe. In Europe, there is increasing support for right-wing anti-immigrant parties, and a widespread perception that the housing, labor, and educational problems of Muslims are due to their identity as Muslims rather than their condition as poor and unassimilated workers. Public opinion polls show that majorities in Germany and Spain are not only suspicious of potential terrorists but see a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern liberal society. Law-enforcement and security agencies have been strengthened and given increased powers to monitor, search, and prosecute suspected terrorists. Increasing xenophobia and enhanced police powers degrade civil

rights. Racist criminals have attacked Muslims in Germany and Britain. Though unspoken, there is also strong resistance on ethnic and religious grounds to Turkey's bid to become part of the European Union.

The rise of xenophobia was especially marked in the Netherlands where anti-immigrant feeling reached a feverish pitch after the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh, with the collaboration of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born secular activist, produced a film denouncing the treatment of women in the Islamic world. In 2004, he was assassinated by a Dutch Moroccan Muslim. Hirsi Ali left for the United States in 2006 in fear for her safety. There were numerous revenge assaults against Muslims, arson attacks on mosques, and demands for the suspension of non-Western immigration. Geert Wilders, a right-wing Dutch politician, the head of the anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant Dutch Freedom Party, is the leader of opposition to Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands.

In Denmark, anti-Muslim feeling was inflamed by the publication of a series of twelve caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005 and 2006 in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, which were republished by the European news media. Taken by Muslims to be blasphemous and insulting, the cartoons provoked worldwide Muslim riots, attacks on churches and embassies, and government protests. Many Europeans, however, interpreted these outbursts as lack of respect for diversity of opinion and free speech, and reacted with a surge of skepticism as to whether it is desirable or even possible to integrate Muslims into European societies.

The issue of Muslim identities has been greatly complicated by the reactions to the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), to 9/11, and to terrorist threats. Muslims feel burdened by discrimination and socioeconomic disabilities, and pressure to assimilate and give up their Muslim identity. In both Europe and North America, a balance among religious freedom, the civil and cultural rights of religious minorities, equality before the law, and economic and political security have yet to be achieved.

Conclusion Secularized Islam and Islamic Revival

For nearly five thousand years Middle Eastern and Islamic societies have been based upon the constellation of lineage, tribal, religious, and political institutions first evident in the ancient cities of Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC. This configuration of institutions was the basis of pre-Islamic Middle Eastern societies and was the template upon which Middle Eastern Islamic societies were constructed. In Mecca 1,400 years ago the Prophet Muhammad received the revelations that would infuse the ancient patterns of society with new meaning. The new religion was institutionalized in Arabian tribal communities. After the Arab conquest of the Middle East, it was embedded in the ruling political institutions such as the caliphates and sultanates, and in Islamic religious communities such as Sunni schools of law, Sufi brotherhoods, and Shiʿi sects. It was also embedded in both literary culture and popular concepts and mores. The institutionalization of Islam gave rise to a new civilization.

The religious basis of this new civilization was faith in Islam as revealed in scripture and law, as understood in theology, and as practiced in mysticism. Islam provided a concept of the universe, ethical rules, legal norms for daily behavior, ritual prescriptions for mediating the relation between human beings and God, mystical methods of self-cultivation, and symbols of self-identity. In fact, Islam embodied not one but several religious ideals. Sunni Sufis cultivated ethical and spiritual living within the world. The Shiʿis looked to the imams for guidance and salvation. By veneration of saints, Muslims sought to win divine blessing through the intercession of holy men. Gnostic philosophers and mystics sought escape from worldly actualities through rational and spiritual concepts of religious salvation.

Conquering tribesmen, traveling merchants, and wandering Sufis brought Islam to peoples outside the Middle East. The diffusion of Islam and the conversion of new peoples brought Islamic societies into being in Inner Asia, India, Southeast Asia, Turkey, the Balkans, North, West, and East Africa, and other regions. These societies were formed by the integration of local pre-Islamic civilizations with the universal aspects of Islam to create a new family of human communities. The religious way of life and identity borne by the *'ulama'*, the scholars, and the Sufis again became articulated in parochial associations such as lineage, tribal, village, and urban communities, and in states. By the seventeenth century Islamic societies were fully institutionalized throughout much of Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Each had a distinctive gestalt, but each was intelligible as a variation upon an earlier Middle Eastern pattern of concepts and institutions.

Whatever the variations, Islam was never the sole organizing principle of pre-modern Islamic societies. Each inherited and maintained cultural identities, social organizations, political institutions, and economies defined in non-Islamic terms. The military and bureaucratic institutions, systems of taxation, and cultural legitimizations of "Muslim" states always had a non-Islamic dimension inherited from the pre-Islamic culture of each region. Nor were social organization, ethnic identity, or elite leadership of parochial communities Islamic. The economies of Muslim peoples were almost never organized in Islamic terms except for certain modifying ethical concepts such as opposition to usury and demands for fairness, justice, and charity. In all Islamic societies the prevailing culture was a mixture of Islamic concepts and symbols and non-Islamic institutions and identities. However important, Islam always remained but one aspect of complex societies.

The institutional and cultural features of pre-modern Islamic Societies

A central feature of these societies was the structure of state and religious organizations. It is commonly said that in Islamic societies

state and religion are unified and that Islam is a total way of life, which defines political as well as social and familial matters. This is the Muslim view embodied in the ideal of the Prophet and the early caliphs, who were rulers and teachers, repositories of both temporal and religious authority, and whose mission was to lead the community in war and morality. This ideal inspired the efforts of reformist, revivalist, and "caliphal" movements to create an integrated Islamic state and society. Such movements were common in lineage communities, in which adherence to Islam led to tribal unification, conquest, and the formation of new empires, as in the case of the Fatimid, Almoravid, and Almohad movements in North Africa, the Safavid movement in Iran, and others. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reformist movements with similar intentions led to conquests and state formation in such cases as the Sokoto caliphate in what is now Nigeria and the Mahdist state in the Sudan. In different terms, the ideal is invoked by contemporary neo-Islamic movements.

Most Islamic societies did not and do not conform to this ideal, and were and are built around separate state and religious institutions. By the eighth and ninth centuries, the early caliphate was already evolving into an imperial and secular political regime, while Muslim populations were being formed into a multitude of religiously defined communal groups. These included schools of law, reformist movements, Sufi lineages, brotherhoods, shrine communities, Shiʿi sects, and ethnic associations. Such groups were or became independent of states; most withdrew from participation in government, and were primarily concerned with solidarity, worship, education, law, personal morality, and upholding the public symbols of Islam. The separation on an institutional level of state institutions and religious associations became the norm for the late ʿAbbasid caliphate, the Saljuq and Mamluk sultanates, the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires, and other Islamic regimes.

This separation, however, was neither clear-cut nor complete. While the separation was well defined on an institutional level and in terms of organizations, personnel, and ethos, in cultural concept there was a deep ambiguity about both states and religio-communal

associations. On the one hand, Islamic states were considered instruments of worldly secular power and were legitimized in terms of patrimonial claims to superior ancestry, state-patronized artistic and literary cultures, and appeals to universal cosmological or philosophical concepts. Their culture derived from the pre-Islamic and non-Islamic substrates of the societies they ruled. On the other hand, these states also had an Islamic religious value derived from historical continuity with the early caliphate, or based on their role as defenders, patrons, and supporters of Islamic worship, education, law, and jihad. Such states also had an inherent sacred value, for in many Islamic societies the state was conceived as the direct expression of God's will for the ordering of human affairs. Its religious worth was derived both from service to Islam and directly from divine decree.

Similarly, Islamic religious associations, though basically committed to small communal and individual religious pursuits, throughout their history were involved in politics. While Muslim religious leaders were in fact committed to an apolitical form of religiosity, in concept they could not imagine their associations as entirely independent of an all-embracing Islamic political order. In concept an Islamic state was necessary for a complete Islamic way of life.

Conceptual ambiguities were translated into a variety of institutional patterns in the relationship between states and religious associations. In the Ottoman and Safavid empires, the states themselves controlled Islamic judicial, educational, and social functions. The Ottoman and Safavid monarchies were strongly supported by an '*ulama*' bureaucracy. In these empires, Islamic religious associations became virtual departments of state, though in Iran the religious elites were eventually able to assert their autonomy. In Mughal India, or Mataram Java, Muslim religious leaders, associations, and activities were largely autonomous, and often critical of state policies and state-patronized culture.

Thus in the pre-modern era there were two alternative concepts of Islamic society. One was the "caliphate," which integrated the state and the community, the realms of politics and religion, into an

inseparable whole. The second was the "sultanate," or secular state, which ruled over the quasi-independent religious associations that were the true bearers of Muslim religious life. In one image the state was the all-encompassing expression of an Islamic society; in the other, an Islamic society was divided into separate state and religious institutions. The relationship between Muslim communities and states was variable and ambiguous. The former were sometimes subordinate and committed, sometimes independent and hostile. Sometimes they accepted the inherent legitimacy of ruling regimes; sometimes they rejected them as antithetical to a truly Islamic society. Most often they regarded states with detachment. While accepting the necessity of political order, they disdained political involvement, and withdrew into communal and personal religious affairs. While accepting political realities, they were nostalgic for the better days of the true caliphate and yearned for the era of justice. The legacy of pre-modern societies to the modern era, then, was not a defined structure of state and society, but a spectrum of variation and an inherent ambiguity about the relations between the two.

The nineteenth- and twentieth-century transformation of Islamic Societies

This legacy was transmitted through nineteenth-century changes into the twentieth-century structure of Islamic societies. In response to the impact of European imperialism and commercial domination, Muslim political and religious elites proposed alternative concepts for the reconstruction of their societies, each a variation upon past orientations toward the relationship of state and religion. The political elites transformed into intelligentsias, adopted first Islamic modernist, then secular nationalist, and sometimes socialist conceptions of national transformation, and became committed to secular or even Western concepts of state and society. In one sense, these concepts were a profound departure from the historical political culture, but in another they were consistent with aspects of the historical culture that accorded the state an inherent legitimacy regardless of its

relationship to Islam. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state intelligentsias did not so much change their fundamental position as shift from traditional to modern expressions of political identity. The adoption of Western ideologies and of Western political methods was for the political elites a continuation of the tradition in which domination was symbolized in non-Muslim cosmopolitan terms.

The response of the religious elites to the breakdown of the Islamic state system and to European domination was Islamic reformism. With the decline of Islamic states, the rise of European influence, and a changing balance of forces in Islamic societies, reformism gave lineage, village, and tribal communities new opportunities to resist state control, and helped village, artisan, and merchant milieus undergoing economic and commercial change to define new identities.

The reformist movements adopted the ambiguous attitude of the historical religious associations toward political actualities. Some of them tended to be apolitical and to concentrate on educational and religious practices. This was true of movements backed by the commercial middle classes such as Deoband, Tanzim, and Tabligh in India, and Muhammadiyya in Indonesia. Some movements, however, turned the energies generated by religious reform into political efforts to construct Islamic states. This was true in tribal milieus and anticolonial movements such as the Sanusiyya and the West African jihads. Independence movements and the formation of national identities in Algeria and Tunisia were also based upon reformist identities.

Nations, nationalism, and Islam

The struggles against colonial domination, and the conflicts among the various Muslim elites, each bearing within itself a variant version of the historical Islamic political culture, gave shape to modern Islamic societies. Most Islamic societies became independent states after World War I or World War II. The dominant trend in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century was the consolidation of national states under the auspices of the political intelligentsias and

the legitimization of states in secular terms. Some derived from the transformation of earlier regimes such as the Ottoman Empire, the Iranian monarchy, and the Tunisian, Moroccan, Egyptian, and other sultanates. Some were due to the construction of new territorial entities such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Senegal, where colonial rulers commonly crushed feudal, tribal, and religious opposition, and brought varied territories under state control. The former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China absorbed Muslim populations into large non-Muslim empires. The new states were commonly based on military elites, as in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, and many smaller African states. In almost all cases, the central state was strengthened by its control over the economy. Military elites, as in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, generated a state capitalism or socialism in the interests of the new dominant class. In Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Indonesia, and Nigeria, the elites were supported by state-controlled petroleum revenues.

In all these states, a critical issue was the relationship between states and Islamic organizations, and the role of Islam in defining the national identity. While some states such as Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and post-revolutionary Iran were avowedly Islamic, most of the states that became independent after World War I and World War II, such as Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, and Indonesia, were authoritarian military regimes that took a secular national, and sometimes a socialist, ideological orientation. In these countries, Islamic institutions and organizations were either repressed or co-opted or both. Government bureaucracies supervised, regulated, and contained Islamic organizations. Governments took charge of mosques, the training of imams, Islamic schools, and charitable endowments. Government ministries in Egypt, Indonesia, Tanzania, and the Soviet Union co-opted Muslim leaders and used them as intermediaries to control Muslim populations. In general, Islam was disestablished, and law and education passed out of religious hands into state control or were left as parallel but secondary systems of private adjudication and instruction. Sufism as a system of organizing tribal peoples for

political purposes virtually disappeared. Centralization of state power also destroyed or neutralized tribal communities in places such as Turkey, Iran, Inner Asia, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria.

This transformation of relations between state and society was accompanied by new nationalist, liberal, and socialist ideologies and symbols of legitimization. In part this was due to the fact that the elites who took the lead in the struggle for independence were disposed – by experience of colonial rule, education, and acquaintance with Europe, and by the struggle against older feudal and religious elites – to define their concept of an independent society in national and ethnic rather than traditional imperial or religious terms. Even modernist and reformist Muslim leaders, as in the Ottoman Empire or Algeria, blended their hopes for Islamic reform with the realities of political struggle to give them a national definition. In areas where movements toward independence were cut off, as in Inner Asia, Muslim modernism was redirected toward the cultivation of ethnic and national identity and to integration into state-dominated societies. Furthermore, by maintaining a non-Islamic identity, political elites tried to distance themselves from the embrace of Islamic religious authority. By regulating state affairs in accordance with secular norms and symbolizing them in secular terms, the state elites shielded themselves from Islamic religious precepts. Thus, the ideological orientation of modern Islamic states also derived from the historical practice of Islamic imperial regimes in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa, which were legitimized, in part, by non-Islamic concepts and symbols.

The change to a nationalist consciousness became important in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a rhetorical and polemical tactic to assert the claims of a new intelligentsia. For cosmopolitan, mobile, educated persons who had been taken out of the matrix of small, family-centered communities and launched into the world of cities, international contacts, foreign languages, and global political concerns, and for people for whom the colonial political societies could only offer positions of subordination to a foreign elite, nationalism became a homeland of the mind. The national idea expressed the opposition of a new elite both to the

imperial and religious elites of their own societies and to their colonial rulers. Nationalism was an irresistible argument against colonial masters precisely because Europeans accepted it as the basis of political society. National symbols also made it easier to bring non-Muslim minorities into the anticolonial struggle, and implied a claim to superiority and leadership over the masses. On the basis of their secular, national vision, the intelligentsias claimed a right to rule as the enlightened exemplars of modernity.

With independence, nationalism was diffused from the elites to the masses. In pre-modern Islamic societies, political and social identities had been formed on several levels. Each individual had at once political loyalties to a governing elite, a local familial, lineage, tribal, or village membership, and an Islamic religious identity. Linguistic and ethnic consciousnesses were usually subsidiary features of social self-awareness. Modern nationalisms, however, emphasized the hitherto subordinate factors. In the case of Turks, Arabs, Iranians, Malays, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Bengalis, Pashtuns, and others, contemporary identity was rebuilt upon a fusion of historical lineage, ethnic, linguistic, and Islamic symbols, recast in linguistic–ethnic and nationalist terms. Nationalism served to replace loyalties to parochial family, village, and religious associations, and committed peoples to a broader concept of political identity. The masses too began to see themselves in ethnic and nationalist political terms.

State formation was itself a source of national consciousness. Strong Tunisian, Egyptian, Algerian, Bengali, and Indonesian identities have all been shaped by nation-states. In theory, national states may seem contrary to the universalism of Islam, but in fact they were easily accepted. Indeed, the breakup of the early caliphate constituted a precedent for and legitimization of separate Islamic states. To many Muslims who were born and educated in (and who derived their security and livelihoods from) the new states, they seemed a fitting framework for educational and missionary activity on behalf of Islam. While Islam is not in principle territorial, national states commonly define the boundaries of Muslim identities.

Despite the tendencies toward secularization, national movements in Islamic countries always retained an important and subtle intermixture of Islam. The Islamic orientations of nineteenth-century Sufism and Islamic modernism were absorbed into nationalist movements. Young Ottoman modernists gave way to Young Turk nationalists. Aligarh modernists and the Muslim League, led by the scions of the former Muslim elites of the Indian subcontinent, turned to the formation of a national state. The Egyptian disciples of Muhammad ʿAbduh began as early as the 1890s to think in national terms. Damascus notable families changed from an Islamic reformist expression of regional anti-Ottomanism to Arab nationalism after World War I. The Destour in Tunisia, originally inspired by Salafi reformism, yielded to neo-Destour secularism in the 1930s. Islamic reformism also became the basis for anticolonial movements and the formation of national states in Libya, Algeria, and Morocco. Islamic reformism helped create national political movements by calling for allegiance on the basis of Islamic principles that transcended purely local identifications. By turning Muslims from local sects, shrines, and mediators to the abstract principles of the faith, reformism set the foundations for the unification of large populations in national political struggles. Reformism provided the cultural standards and educational and egalitarian sentiments that served, like nationalism, as the basis of modern political regimes.

Moreover, much of the emotional power of nationalism in the Islamic world comes from the capacity of national movements to absorb Islamic identities. For example, what makes Turks Turkish in the minds of many is Islam. Turkey's leaders brought the Republic into being determined to transform it into an ethnically defined secular society, and resolutely denied Islam a role in the constitution of the state, but the Turkish people continued to identify with it. In practice, most Turks maintained a dual identity, both Turkish and Muslim, or understood their Turkish nationality as an expression of their Islamic identification. Algerian nationality is understood to mean a combination of Arab ethnicity and Islamic religion. Palestinians show an interlocking of national and religious identities. The PLO defined the Palestinian state as a secular national state and included

Christian Palestinians, but for many decades the allegiance of Palestinians to a Palestinian national entity was cultivated in terms of Islamic symbols and affiliations. Conversely, HAMAS, which defines itself as an Islamic movement and its goal as an Islamic state, is also a Palestinian national movement opposed to the PLO and Israel. Islam and Palestinian national identity are not quite interchangeable, but they are not separable either. Then there are Malay-Muslim, Bosnian-Muslim, and other ethnic- and language-based, hyphenated Muslim identities. Conversely, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan define themselves as Islamic states, but their citizens are Iranians, Moroccans, and so on.

Indonesia illustrates another variation in the conjunction of national and Muslim identities. Here the anticolonial struggle was carried on by parallel secular national and Islamic movements. The *priyayi*, the landed aristocracy of the Indonesian National Party advocated a secular Indonesian state, while the '*ulama*' and Muslim intellectuals formed Sarekat Islam and Nahdatul 'Ulama', two political parties calling for an Islamic state. The result was an unresolved crisis over how to integrate the national secular and Islamic components of Indonesian identity. The secular and Islamic anticolonial parties joined forces in the struggle against the Dutch and won independence in 1947, but in post-independence Indonesia they fought each other for power until the elections of 1955 showed that the Islamic parties collectively could not win a majority. Under Sukarno Indonesia was defined as a secular state according to the *pançasila*, or five principles: belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice. (These five principles employ universalist humanistic, as opposed to universalist religious, ideas as the bases of national identity.) Yet even under the officially secular rule of Sukarno and Suharto, Islam was favored by state ministries, and Islamic reformist and educational movements were tolerated. Politically contested, the role of Islam in the constitution of the state is still not fully resolved.

Thus, national identity in Islamic countries was neither rigorously secular nor exclusively religious. Nationality involved concepts of citizenship, ethnicity, and religion in an ambiguous connection to

each other so that it was possible for different people to share the same nationality on the basis of one or another of these factors or some combination of them, or to modify their concept of identity in response to changing political situations.

In the first decades after independence, the new states profoundly affected the organization, practice, and conception of Islam. In increasingly secularized societies there were strong tendencies for Islam to become less a religion of customary collective practice and more one of individual quest and commitment. As religion played a smaller role in the public world or in explaining nature, it played a larger role in meeting ethical and psychological needs. Islam as private belief and as social identity was becoming dissociated from the communal and political institutions in which such belief and identity had once been embedded. In Indonesia, Turkey, the former Soviet Union, and other highly secularized societies, Islam was becoming a religion of personal beliefs without political implications. Conversely, in other cases it became a form of personal or ethnic identity without a religious meaning. Many people were "Muslims" without being believers. They were Muslim by virtue of ancestry and family, or affiliation with a nationality group, or as a consequence of individual choice without implying personal piety.

The secularization of Islamic states also had important implications for Islamic religious associations. It often reinforced their already inherent tendency to concentrate on communal and individual religious needs rather than political goals. While older forms of tribal and Sufi organizations disappeared in West Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia, ethnic associations, modernist religious congregations, and clubs multiplied to meet the need for collective worship, education, charity, and for simple sociability and discussion. In many cases the local cells were independent, but in some they were linked up in larger movements, such as the Tijaniyya in West Africa. Some of these were reformist or Salafi movements, such as Muhammadiyya in Indonesia, intended to inculcate the correct practice of Islam, provide for community welfare, and foster solidarity among Muslims. These associations had a strong appeal to students, intellectuals, technicians, professionals, and merchants.

Some were *daʿwa*, or missionary movements, such as Tablighi Islam, which worked to convert non-Muslims to Islam, and nominal Muslims to the correct practice of Islam. These movements sponsored educational and social welfare activities, including schools, clinics, cooperatives, and businesses.

Many of these reformist and modernist associations played an important role in the adaptation of Muslim populations to national states and economies. Reformist principles favored delayed emotional gratification and stressed self-control and obedience to abstract rules and authorities as the basis of religious fulfillment. They directed pent-up emotions into a sense of individual responsibility to remake the world in accordance with Islam. They facilitated the transfer of popular loyalties from tribal and parochial communities and from saintly religious authority to national regimes. They were also congruent with modern industrial societies because of their egalitarianism and emphasis upon universal education, and with urbanized societies, for they favored disciplined behavior. Islamic reform movements were not merely an accommodation to the secularization of Islamic societies but a creative adaptation to the development of a more complex and highly integrated type of social system. Though reformism disposed believers to worldly activity, it was not necessarily a Muslim equivalent of the Protestant ethic. The doctrinal basis of radical Protestantism – the evil nature of human beings and predestination – is not found among Muslims; the psychological tension over the sinfulness of human beings is muted. (See Tables 18, 19, and 20.)

The Islamic revival

Thus, up until the 1970s, the outcome of post–World War II state formation was generally a threefold structure of society. This included a secularized state, nonpolitical Islamic religious associations, and opposition Islamic political movements that favored the reconstruction of an integrated Islamic state and society. Contemporary nationality was built on a Muslim substrate, and Muslim identity was translated into ethnic and national loyalties.

However, since the 1970s the further development of Islamic states and societies has been shaped by an Islamic revival. The revival began as a reaction against authoritarian and military regimes, to failures in economic development and to the perceived lack of cultural authenticity. The revival was also a counterattack against European and American values such as individualism, materialistic consumerism, the independence of women, sexual liberty, religious and moral relativism, and pop culture. The revival movements are motivated by the fear that Western influences will undermine the authority of fathers, religious teachers, and rulers, and subvert Islamic beliefs, cultures, and identities.

Culturally, religiously, socially, and politically, these movements are extremely diverse. The term "Islamic revival" is an umbrella designation for a very wide variety of movements, some intolerant and exclusivist, some pluralistic; some favorable to science, some antiscientific; some primarily devotional and some primarily political; some democratic, some authoritarian; some pacific, some violent. The religious and cultural revival includes schools of philosophical and religious thought, movements to promote personal piety and prayer, and educational movements dedicated to the reinforcement of Islamic practice, belief, and identities.

There are three principal sociocultural versions of Islamic revivalist movements. Islamic liberalism advocates for contemporary universal political, social, and human rights values that are found within the Islamic tradition. Neo-Sufism rededicates itself to the tradition of Islamic spirituality and self-transcendence. Reformist, Salafi, and Wahhabi movements teach obedience to Islamic law in both social relationships and ritual matters, and promote a religious fundamentalism based on the Quran and the legacy of the Prophet. These movements call upon individuals to commit themselves to a truly Islamic way of life and promote the community activities and services that underpin individual choices. All three have a strong emphasis on individual election, choice, and responsibility.

In addition, in many milieus Islamic identity is reaffirmed without specific doctrinal or ritual commitments. Emigrés and students living outside their homelands often adopt Islam as a communal, familial,

or political identity without the traditional religious or ritual activities and social behavior. They are Muslims by virtue of their political sympathy for embattled Muslims everywhere, and often by their shared hostility to the United States as an oppressor of Muslim peoples.

In bourgeois milieus in Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other places, Islamic identity and piety are emphasized but are expressed in consumer cultures that are variations on Western, global, and cosmopolitan lifestyles. Home furnishings, fashionable dress, films, videos, and music signify the development of a middle class celebrating Islam not only as a religious identity but also as an urbane, cosmopolitan, and wealthy way of life.

Muslim youths also try to integrate their Islamic identity with elements of global pop, rock, and youth behavior. Young American Muslims living in Brooklyn consider themselves Muslim first and then Americans, but they "hang out" together in cafés and club rooms rather than in mosques and schools. Young Malians, so-called Rasta Sufis, celebrate religious occasions such as the *mawlids*, or birthdays of the Prophet and saints, with soccer tournaments, martial arts displays, juggling, and wearing the same fashionable hairstyles and clothes as other young Malians who are not self-identified as Muslims. In Niger, young men listen to hip-hop but identify with the global *umma*. In Holland, second-generation Moroccan immigrants sing Shaabi music and listen to Maroc-hop as an expression of their affiliation to North Africa and as a protest against anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant discrimination in Holland. So-called British Asian bands and music reject the hypocrisy and intolerance of a so-called "liberal society." In Turkey, radio, TV, magazines, films, cartoons, and comic strips cater to a pious Muslim youth. Muslim youth culture in Indonesia and Malaysia also tries to integrate Islamic identity and global popular culture. Girls listen to Muslim boy bands, read Islamic girls' magazines, and often wear a head covering and *halal* (religiously permitted) makeup. They try to adhere to their religion, but also to flirt and have fun.

Alongside the cultural–communal movements there are also political movements, sometimes called "Islamist." These vary in

character from democratic political parties to violent movements seeking to overthrow existing regimes. Some of the "Islamist" movements are broad-spectrum organizations whose activities cover the range from prayer to politics. They may be national or international. Perhaps the principal division is between those reformist movements that accept and operate within an existing political system and those that believe it necessary to overthrow existing regimes. The former expect that they will ultimately transform their societies by the cumulative effect of educational and missionary activities. The others believe that control of the state is the key to a truly Islamic society.

Religious revival

Liberal Islam is important in Iran, Egypt, Europe, and the United States. It is a form of Islamic modernism characterized by its stress upon the need for independent thought on religious matters, *ijtihad*, and the integration of Islam and modern societies. The liberal approach accepts that there is necessarily a variety of ways to interpret Quranic texts. Where the Shariʿa is silent, liberal thinkers see a divine intention to leave space for the discretion of Muslims. Among its leading spokesmen are Muhammad Arkoun in Paris and Abdol Karim Soroush in Iran. Both wish to reconcile the eternal truths of the revelation with the changing conditions of the world. Arkoun thinks of Islam as a personal religion, and does not believe that Muslims should be subjected to communal controls, or that public affairs should be subordinated to Islamic norms. In Soroush's view, religion is eternal, but the human understanding of it changes with circumstances. He argues against the identification of Islamic teachings with Shariʿa. Legalistic literalism is not the core of Islam: mystical love is its essence. He also condemns the reduction of Islam to political and identity purposes. Soroush favors an Islamic democracy for Iran. The liberal thinkers argue that the norms of modern government, and universal human values such as rationality, justice, freedom, and civil rights, are not inherently matters of religion but are compatible with religious truth. Modern Islam must integrate the truths of religion with the values of contemporary societies.

In political matters, liberal Muslims have favored Islamic democratic Muslim parties that seek electoral power. They justified demands for political participation in the name of the Islamic principles of *shura* (consultation) and *'ijma* (consensus). Liberal Muslim thinkers have also favored the education and political participation of women. In the face of repressive domestic or colonial regimes, however, many Muslim liberals have accepted armed struggle as a necessity. Thus, HAMAS, Hizballah, and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) were considered legitimate. The Taliban, however, represented the antithesis of liberal Islamic values, because of their oppression of minorities and women.

A second type of contemporary Islamic movement may be called neo-Sufi. Many are a continuation of traditional Sufism, but others, founded by charismatic teachers, promote an altogether contemporary "new age" kind of spirituality and individual self-realization. Some older Sufi brotherhoods have recently been restructured. They include the Nurci, Sulaymanci, and Fethullahci in Turkey; Muhammadiyya–Shadhiliyya in Egypt; and Ahl-i Haqq in Iran. Many older groups have extended their branches to Europe and the United States. The Naqshbandiyya–Haqqaniyya, for example, is now based in Chicago.

More widespread are the movements that promote Islam as a comprehensive blueprint for a modern way of life, an alternative to nationalism, Western liberalism, and democracy, and to capitalism, socialism, or communism. The earliest of these, the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Jama'at-i Islami in Pakistan, go back respectively to the 1930s and 1940s. They derive from Islam a position on every issue of private and public concern – such as women, education, economy, social structure, and government – to demonstrate that all modern needs can be met by Islam. Disillusionment with secularism and the quest for indigenous rather than foreign values propel these efforts to define a post-modern concept of Muslim societies. These movements also call for the formation of Islamic states. They may carry on both missionary and educational work, and they may also use violence.

Reformist or neofundamentalist movements, such as the Wahhabis and Salafis, seek a return to the earliest teachings of Islam. They carry eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reformism to an extreme, and have little traditional scriptural, legal, theological, or mystical content. The neofundamentalists advocate the teaching of Arabic and the Quran, and strictness in the observance of Islamic law and rituals. They see Islam as an objective and explicit code of behavior specified in innumerable juridical opinions, lectures, books, videos, and websites to help Muslims follow the rules and behave correctly. They stress the absolute unity of God (*tawhid*), and oppose the veneration of any other being as divine. They reject the traditional schools of law and theology, and denounce local customs derived from Sufi practice and tradition. They condemn other Islamic movements as infidel (*takfir*). They are opposed to national, sectarian, and local versions of Islam. They denounce identification with other polities such as nation, tribe, race, and political parties. They reject Western values, including democratic and human rights, as an inadequate substitute for the inherent values of Islam.

Legal reform is a critical issue. In many countries, state courts had taken over many aspects of law that had previously been administered by the religious courts. The neofundamentalists deplore the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century tendency of "Muslim" states to diminish the role of Islamic law, and reject the adoption of Western legal codes by Islamic countries as a form of lingering colonialism. They demand instead that the constitutions and legal systems of Islamic countries be based on "Shariʿa," the word for Islamic law that bears the implication that it is divine law. Some states, including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, have reinstated Islamic criminal punishments (*hudud*) as a statement of their rejection of Western law. After the 1979 revolution, the Iranian constitution made Islamic law the highest source of legal authority, and made jurists an integral part of the government. The Iranian Council of Guardians may overrule parliamentary legislation and prevent candidates from participating in political elections based on its own determination of Islamic law. In response to popular demands, the Egyptian constitution was

amended in 1980 to identify Shariʻa as "the" (rather than "a") primary source of Egyptian legislation. Pakistan declared Islamic law more authoritative than its own constitution in 1991. The recent demands for basing all political and social life on Shariʻa often reflect the opposition of popular Islamic movements to undemocratic and secular regimes, economic hardship, the absence of opportunity, and to foreign influences. Typically, however, demands for the enforcement of "Shariʻa" are simply demands for a return to traditional family and criminal law. The call for Shariʻa is still more important as a symbolic than a pragmatic demand. It is a cry for the replacement of the current world by a just utopia.

Reformist movements have constructed great numbers of mosques, schools, and community facilities. Islamic religious organizations less and less take the form of schools of law or Sufi brotherhoods, but are based upon study and scout groups, women's auxiliaries, athletic clubs, economic enterprises, political parties, and paramilitary units. They sponsor meetings, publications, and conferences, and they have generated ever-growing numbers of graduates of madrasas and other Islamic schools who make up the cadres for teaching, missionary work, and political leadership. A new elite has emerged, a counter-elite to both Western- and traditionally educated Muslim leaders. While they may derive from previous reform tendencies, the neofundamentalist movements are often led by preachers who are not themselves *ʻulamaʼ* or Sufis.

Higher education is an important vehicle for the diffusion of Islamic revivalism from student and intellectual circles to a wider public. In 1983, Turkey made religious instruction part of the school curriculum. To increase the supply of teachers, graduates of Imam-Hatip seminaries were admitted to the universities. They could then apply for teaching and civil service positions, thus greatly increasing the presence of Islamic-educated or religious-minded persons in Turkish administration. In late 1980s and early 1990s Egypt, the number of schools affiliated with al-Azhar greatly increased. Registered madrasas in Pakistan increased by thousands. Graduates in religious studies bring their training to schools, administration, law, and other sectors of the economy and society.

Since the 1970s, such educational, missionary, and revivalist movements have become ever more important in West Africa. The Wahhabiyya movement is widespread in Mali, Guinea, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana, and Burkina Faso. In Nigeria, it is represented by the Yan Ízala. In South Asia we find the Daʿwat-i Islam in Pakistan and the Ahl-i Hadith in India. Similar views are held by the Jamʿat al-Islamiyya in Egypt, Muhammadiyya in Indonesia, the Malay Muslim Youth League, and other groups. With the breakup of the Soviet Union the "Wahhabis" have become active in the newly independent states of Inner Asia and in Chechnya where they have founded village-scale Islamic republics under the rule of Shariʿa. In Jordan, the Salafi movement espouses a return to the Quran and sunna as the sole sources of Islam, operates informal study groups, classes, and lectures in homes and mosques, and distributes publications and cassettes through its bookshops. In Egypt the Society of Muslim Brothers is built around a structure of formal organizations – charitable, professional, and social – culminating in a political party. Many of these movements are sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Sudan, Libya, and other Islamic states have also contributed. Iran supports Shiʿi activities.

The Islamic reformist and neofundamentalist movements appeal to new and varied clienteles. Throughout West Africa they appeal to merchants and professionals. In Kano in Nigeria, they attract peasant migrants who organize under the leadership of rural religious teachers to press their economic interests as laborers. In Malaysia, small-scale peasant landowners organized under the banner of Islam to resist the pressures that were depriving them of ownership of land. In Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, these movements appeal to the traditional artisan and merchant classes, and to the lower level of Islamic-educated teachers and clerks who were threatened by competition from new enterprises and with displacement by Western-educated elites. They also appeal to the new intelligentsia of socially mobile but economically insecure students, intellectuals, technicians, middling bureaucrats, and professionals. In Egypt, Islamic movements are also strong among

students of medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and other highly professional clienteles. In Turkey, Islamic student groups and parties are strongest in the technical faculties, whereas socialist groups predominate in the arts faculties. In Iran, student leadership was crucial in the internal revival before the revolution. Though separated by their education from traditional communities, they were not part of the political elites. In Indonesia, students and graduates who have migrated from their homes to big cities find a new identity in Salafism and jihad. These strata turn to Islam to symbolize their anxieties, and their hostilities to the powers – domestic and foreign – that thwart them and their dreams of a perfect future.

The Islamic revival movements also reach out to Muslims uprooted from traditional cultures. Within Islamic countries there have been mass migrations from villages and towns to cities, generating the need to create new communities and a meaningful belief system. Students, workers, and refugees have emigrated to the Arabian Peninsula and to Europe. In the words of Olivier Roy, these are "de-territorialized" peoples who look to the neofundamentalist or neo-Sufi movements, as opposed to the traditional legal schools and Sufi brotherhoods, for religious comfort and communal solidarity.

The new movements free people from old communities and allow them to enter new ones. They free individuals from "traditional" authorities and societies – from parents, elders, families, tribes, and ethnic solidarities, castes, and classes – as well as from traditional schools of law and Sufi brotherhoods. Thus they appeal to uprooted peoples and disenfranchised youth. In these new expressions, Islam in many ways becomes a self-selected identity. As the product of uprooting, economic globalization and Westernization, there is a modern ring to the individualism of these movements and their consistency with mobile, free-market, and capitalist societies.

Transnational Islam

The Islamic revival has also helped create a worldwide consciousness of shared belief and identities. The concept of a universal *umma*, or community of Muslims, has been strengthened by the breakdown of traditional communities, and by a high degree

of geographical mobility. Common political concerns, such as the position of Muslim minorities, or the conflicts involving Muslims in Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere, generate Muslim identifications transcending political boundaries. The increasing integration of societies as a result of enhanced communications, media, travel, and migration makes meaningful the concept of a single Islam practiced everywhere in similar ways, an Islam that transcends national and ethnic customs. The hajj (pilgrimage) remains the primary example of this identity, and there is an ever more widely shared Islamist revival call for a return to the Shariʿa.

This sentiment is reinforced by a proliferation of organized transnational movements. These include publication and propaganda organizations such as the Rabitat al-ʿAlam al-Islami (Muslim World League); or the Jamiʿiyyat al-Daʿwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call Society) promoting the study of the Quran; missionary (*daʿwa*) societies, such as the Tablighi Islam; networks of madrasas teaching Salafi and Wahhabi doctrine; and Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, and Naqshbandiyya. Islamic banks, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Institute for Muslim Minority Affairs, emigrant communities with international ties, and other such organizations are part of the global phenomenon. However, many movements that operate internationally are actually sponsored extensions of national states. For example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which has worldwide outreach and sponsors relief efforts, and the Islamic Development Bank are agencies of national governments. The Muslim World League is Saudi sponsored; the Islamic Call Society is Libyan.

Muslims do not have to share the same physical space or the same cultural traditions to feel their commonality. The internet is an important locus of universalistic Muslim identities. On the net one can find recordings of Quran, demonstrations of prayer, pilgrimage or other ceremonies, information about rituals, texts, translations, commentaries, and lectures. Much of this is the product of conservative or traditional authorities. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran,

and many other countries energetically promote their versions of and contributions to Islam.

Online both Salafi fundamentalists and Sufis offer their interpretations of Islam. Individual clerics teach their views. The site of one notable, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, gives advice on family, marriage, the education of children, and women's issues. Al-Qaradawi, already an established scholar, tries to negotiate among competing Islamic positions and appeal to a broad spectrum of views including Islamists, traditional *'ulama'*, and Western-educated Muslims. He argues that there can be more than one valid position on important issues, and that no particular position is necessarily synonymous with Islam. He criticizes the Islamists for their lack of serious intellectual positions; the *'ulama'* for their failure to make tradition meaningful in contemporary circumstances; and liberals for their uncritical admiration of Western ideas.

The internet also promotes non-traditional, "post-modern" religious authorities, including young scholars and professionals with academic degrees such as in medicine and engineering, who challenge the traditional *'ulama'*. For example, Amr Khaled, an Egyptian-born accountant-turned-preacher who does not have a traditional Islamic education, advocates both piety and personal success in the everyday world. Individuals with no formal religious education or training engage in discussion, debate, counseling, and problem solving for social, family, and psychological issues, working out their own interpretations of the "Islamic" position on everyday concerns. The net also allows for "Islamic" consumerism and the marketing of cell phones and computer software customized for Muslim users as in ring tones, calls to prayer, and calendars. Political movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, HAMAS and Hizballah, and Muslim jihadists in Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia also use the internet to promote their causes. It enables Palestinian youths to communicate with each other in an occupied and fragmented territory.

On the net, Muslims can find fellow believers and sympathizers anywhere in the world. They can find authoritative advice on questions of religious and moral behavior. They can find political allies. Individuals thus escape the confines of parochial communities and enter the worldwide brotherhood of Islam, the *umma*. For Muslim migrants, uprooted workers, students, and rootless young people, the internet provides instruction and fellowship. Globalization has strengthened tendencies toward the rejection of traditional authorities, and toward individual constructions of beliefs, social and ritual practices, and identity. The global *umma*, in which English is the dominant language, has become especially important to young Muslims in Africa, Europe, and the United States. This is globalization from below. Without centralized leadership, it is the product of innumerable independent actors.

Islamic banks are an important aspect of global Islamic interactions. They allow for investments and transfers of money to and from any part of the world. Islamic banks are based on the principle that Islamic law condemns the taking of interest, and are structured as joint stock companies. Depositors do not receive a fixed rate of interest, but rather participate in the investment profits of the bank. Borrowers share equity ownership with the banks rather than paying interest. However, in competition with standard banks, Islamic banks are becoming increasingly pragmatic. In place of a stipulated rate of interest, investments take into account the value of money over time, and many loans are made on the basis of a predetermined return. Many banks employ Western fund managers under the supervision of a board of Islamic scholars, and invest in international markets. Some Western banks have set up Islamic branches. Islamic banking is a global phenomenon, but more and more it has the appearance of a marketing scheme to sell financial services to a self-identified Muslim public.

There are, however, weighty limitations upon universalistic Islam. Global Muslim identity does not imply organized group action. Even though Muslims recognize a global affiliation, the real heart of Muslim religious life lies in local associations for worship, discussion, mutual aid, education, charity, and other communal activities. Most

Islamic political groups are embedded in national states. Islamic universalism and national state particularisms are not necessarily opposed, but can be joined together.

"Islamism" and political action

Islamic political movements are the most visible aspects of the revival. In their most subtle form Islamic political movements (sometimes called Islamist movements or Islamism) represent a change of emphasis from the secular ethnic to the religious aspects of national identities. In the last two decades, many governments relaxed demands for secularism, and attempted to co-opt the loyalties of Muslims by becoming patrons, supporters, and protectors of Islam. Indonesia in the last decade of Suharto's rule accepted the Islamic sentiments of the populace, and tried to identify the regime as a patron of Islam. Pakistani regimes have rededicated themselves to the formation of an "Islamic system." The Taliban made Afghanistan an Islamic state. Mauritania declared that Shari'a was the only valid source of law. In Nigeria, Muslim demands led to the declaration of Shari'a as the law of the northern federal states. In Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, governmental elites have reaffirmed their personal commitments and have made Islamic movements part of the political process.

At the same time, Islamist political movements identified more closely with nation-state political interests. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, an international movement, operates increasingly within the framework of established states. In the Gulf War of 1991, instead of a universal Islamic political position, each branch took a position consistent with its national state interests. The Kuwaiti branch approved the US military intervention while the Jordanian branch opposed it.

Furthermore, many Islamic political parties accept national democratic political processes, and compete, or are willing to compete if permitted, for influence and votes within the existing political system. In 1991, the Algerian military voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algerian elections, and ten years later

massive demonstrations called not for an Islamic state, but for freedom and democracy. In Turkey, the Refah (Welfare) Party and its successors, the Justice and Virtue Party (AKP), an-Nahda (the Renaissance Party) in Tunisia, the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Jordan, the Jamaʿat-i Islami in Pakistan, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia, the United Development Party (PPP) in Indonesia, and others have become parliamentary movements defending national political and economic interests, forming coalitions, advocating democratic elections, and in some cases defending civil society against authoritarian secular states. In some cases, "Islamic" parties were the vehicles for the incorporation of excluded groups into national politics. Amal and Hizballah brought the Lebanese Shiʿis into national politics, as Islah in Yemen did for northern tribes. Islamic parties often gain popular support because they are the only credible alternative to dictatorial military regimes. Even for the supporters of a fully secular democracy there may be no realistic alternative to the moderate Islamic parties.

By their resistance to authoritarian states, Islamic parties helped to popularize the concepts of democracy, civil society, and human rights. Many Muslims believe that the traditional concepts of individual interpretation of the law (*ijtihad*), consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ʿijma*), and legal principles such as the general welfare (*maslaha*) provide the bases for an indigenous Muslim version of democracy.

In many countries, however, Islamic political movements have led to violent internal struggles for power. Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Algeria have been through bitter civil wars. In other cases, small factions attempted assassinations, coups d'état, or violence against tourists, minorities, and others in their efforts to disrupt the regimes. Jihadist or militant Islam has been stimulated by the return of veterans from the Afghan war against Russian occupation. These veterans believe in *takfir* – declaring Muslim enemies apostates – and in the use of violence to seize power. In Egypt, the Mubarak government suppressed decades-long violent efforts to seize and Islamize the state. In Algeria, the military suppressed the violent opposition of the FIS and GIA. In Indonesia the collapse of the

Suharto regime opened the way for the formation of a plethora of small radical Islamist organizations that supported separatist movements in the outer islands, battled with Christians, attempted to enforce Islamic morality, and called for the formation of an Islamic state. These groups include Laskar Jihad, the Army of Allah, and the Islamic Youth Front. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Renaissance Party tried to destabilize the governments.

In many subnational cases, Islamic movements became important as they merged with other political currents, such as ethnic, tribal, or sectarian movements. Ethnic or tribal conflict is endemic among Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns, Somali clans, and Yemeni tribes who take on Islamic coloration.

Militant Islamic movements also commonly appeared in anticolonial struggles. In Afghanistan, numerous Muslim groups fought a long and successful war against the Soviet Union, but then fought each other, and were eventually crushed by the Taliban. Chechnya also has numerous resistance movements to Russian rule. In Kashmir Hizb ul-Mujahidin and other groups have waged a terrorist war against Indian control. In the Philippines the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf group continue a battle for regional autonomy. Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fight against Israel. There is active resistance to the Chinese in Xinjiang.

Many states are, or have been, destabilized by Sunni–Shiʿi sectarian conflicts. Shiʿi self-assertion and Sunni repression have become a key feature of Muslim world politics. Salafism, based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is vehemently anti-Shiʿi. There have been rebellions and civil wars based on sectarian conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Furthermore, in states with divided Muslim and non-Muslim populations there has been an upsurge of political struggle, riots and demonstrations, and even civil war. This is the case in Lebanon and Nigeria, where there has been Muslim–Christian fighting, and the Sudan, where the Muslim and Arab North has fought for decades to dominate the Christian and animist South. Tensions are high in Chad

and Ethiopia, both divided between Muslim and Christian populations.

Political Islam is an important development of the late twentieth century, but it also reflects longerterm structures in Islamic history. Ever since the ninth century, there has been a de facto separation of state and religion in Islamic societies. Historically, the state was regarded as a secular institution, an instrument for the exercise of power, yet intended and required to protect, cultivate, and foster the Islamic way of life. The modern state inherits this position. While its secular self-definition is inherently appropriate to the political and economic functions of the state, nationalist ideologies – a compelling discourse for political elites, anticolonial movements, state formation, and the legitimization of states – have proved to be weak in transcendental appeal, and leave Muslim populations uneasy about their political loyalties. Many Muslims yearn for an ideal world in which the state, as well as the small community, is built around Islamic principles – a yearning for an integral Islamic universe. The primary goals of Islamic movements are moral and social, but control of the state turns out to be an ideal – if not, in practice, an essential – part of their program.

Thus, the Islamic revival reanimates the tradition that integrates religion and politics. That tradition has now become the discourse of urban working- and middle-class populations as well as of rural lineage and tribal communities. In the past, states and empires were legitimized in religious terms and were supposed to defend the religious interests of Muslims and uphold religious law, but religious leaders distanced themselves from politics. By contrast, the neo-Islamic movements channel religious belief and solidarity into politics. In the contemporary era, religious feeling becomes the basis of total commitment to political causes. The merger of religion and politics is a classical Islamic ideal; in the recent era, they have again been brought together. The utopian aspirations of the Islamic movements evoke the Muslim ideal of the caliphate, but in many respects they are an altogether novel adaptation of Islamic concepts to modern conditions.

Transnational politics: military and terrorist organizations

Paradoxically, violent transnational Islam has its origin in the co-optation, defeat, or suppression of national Islamist movements. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Islamic opposition movements were either defeated or integrated into national political systems, sometimes in the form of political parties, sometimes by the creation of Islamic–nationalist ideologies, and sometimes by the declaration of Islamic states. The Islamist movements have been brought into the political systems of Turkey, Tunisia, Yemen, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria, violent Islamic opposition, while not eliminated, was politically crushed.

Co-opted or defeated, many Muslim radicals left their home countries to fight for Muslim causes elsewhere. The transnational militants were typically disaffected Saudis, Egyptians, and Algerians. The Afghan war against the Soviet Union attracted mobile transnationals who then moved on from one jihad to another. The non-Afghan "Afghanis" joined forces with radical Pakistani, Malaysian, Indonesian, and Central Asian movements and with other radical groups in the Philippines, Chechnya, Algeria, Yemen, and Bosnia. The US war in Iraq similarly attracted Muslim militants from other countries. They were uprooted people who had few connections to any community apart from radical mosques.

Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden a new militant international organization, al-Qaeda, was formed in the late 1980s: first to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan: then to fight corrupt, Westernized Arab autocrats; and finally to fight against the United States, their principal international patron. His movement is called the World Islamic Front for the Struggle against Christians and Jews. Broadly speaking, its goal is to overthrow enemy governments and establish an Islamic regime (or regimes) for their populations. In political terms, it calls for the removal of American forces from Saudi Arabia, protection for the people of Iraq from American and allied invasion, help for the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel, and support for Islamist movements worldwide. Al-Qaeda was involved in

the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the attack on the USS *Cole* in Aden harbor in 2000, and the airplane attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of September 11, 2001. At the same time, al-Qaeda and its affiliates supported terrorist attacks against symbols of Western influence or a Western lifestyle such as nightclubs, hotels, and cultural centers in Indonesia, India, and other countries.

Bin Laden's role, however, was not clearly defined. Most likely he did not have an operational role, but was rather an inspiration and a hero to Islamist militants, a spokesman for their grievances, the principal theorist of Islamic jihad, and an organizer of terrorist training. He played an important role in sponsoring and financing – and possibly coordinating – jihad groups. He was sheltered by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and was in turn a major military and financial supporter of their regime until the defeat of that government in December 2001 by the United States and the Northern Alliance, a coalition of Afghan forces. In 2011, US navy commandos killed bin Laden in his home in Pakistan.

Terrorism has an ambiguous status in the contemporary Islamic world. Most Muslims repudiate the terrorist attacks launched in their name, but radical action is often tacitly accepted because it expresses widespread grievances with American policy. The radicals also share the beliefs of the broader political–communal movements that sponsor schools, mosques, clinics, social services, relief organizations, and charities. Missionary, teaching, and charitable activities and the promotion of Salafi or Wahhabi Islam is backed worldwide by Saudi and Gulf state financing and by Arab teachers, missionaries, and organizers from the Middle East. Though it is denounced as un-Islamic, terrorist violence is an extremist expression of this broader movement to promote Islamic belief and practice and the expansion of the domain of Islam.

In some respects, the emergence of extremist political Islam is the outcome of the historical processes of the last century. Islam used to be one element of the multilayered sense of self held by most Muslims. It was joined to family, village, patronage network, clan,

tribe, language group, religious sect, and state. Complex cross-cutting identities were a moderating factor in political behavior. However, the destruction of small communities, the decline of *'ulama'* and Sufi authority, the emergence of radical religious intelligentsias, and the global forces of media and migration have for many people polarized the choice of identities to one between Islam and national or ethnic identity. (See Map 40.)

Map 40. Muslim population by percentage of total population.

Table 19. *Countries with more than 100,000 Shi'i Muslims: Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009*

Country	Estimated 2009 Shi'i Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shi'i
Iran	66–70 million	90–95%

Country	Estimated 2009 Shi'i Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shi'i
Pakistan	17–26 million	10–15%
India	16–24 million	10–15%
Iraq	19–22 million	65–70%
Turkey	7–11 million	10–15%
Yemen	8–10 million	35–40%
Azarbayjan	5–7 million	65–75%
Afghanistan	3–4 million	10–15%
Syria	3–4 million	15–20%
Saudi Arabia	2–4 million	10–15%
Nigeria	<4 million	<5%
Lebanon	1–2 million	45–55%
Tanzania	<2 million	<10%
Kuwait	500,000–700,000	20–25%
Germany	400,000–600,000	10–15%
Bahrain	400,000–500,000	65–75%

Country	Estimated 2009 Shi'i Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shi'i
Tajikistan	~400,000	<7%
United Arab Emirates	300,000–400,000	<10%
United States	200,000–400,000	10–15%
Oman	100,000–300,000	5–10%
United Kingdom	100,000–300,000	10–15%
Bulgaria	~100,000	10–15%
Qatar	~100,000	~10%
World Total	154–200 million	100%

Contemporary patterns in the relations between states and Islamic Societies

Most of the late twentieth-century and contemporary Islamic revival was and is apolitical, but it nonetheless created a climate of opinion that supported self-defined Islamic states and pressured many other governments to show increasing deference to and support for Islam. Since the 1970s, the relations of states and societies fall into several patterns. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, and Afghanistan declared themselves Islamic states. Senegal, Malaysia,

Mali, Mauritania, and Bangladesh have secular regimes but acknowledge an Islamic national identity. Highly secularized states such as Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, Malaysia, and Indonesia maintain their secular political identity, but share power with Islamic political parties, defining a new integration of Islamic and national identities. Throughout the Arab world, states are defined in terms of fluid combinations of nation-state, pan-Arab, and Islamic identity. In these states, the opposition defines itself as Islamic. Islam is thus part of both state ideologies and revolutionary utopias; a shared political discourse grounded in mass cultures in which state, ethnic, national, and Islamic identities are imperfectly fused. Whether the emphasis is upon Islam or upon the ethnic and secular nation-state, the recent trend is toward the formation of Islamic–national identities. Finally, there are large Muslim populations in pluralistic secular states in which Muslims are a minority. Here we shall review a few selected cases to explore the variations in the relations between state and religious identities and their connection to historical institutions and cultures.

Table 20. *Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims Living as Minorities: Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009*

Country	*Estimated 2009 Muslim Population*	*Percentage of Population that is Muslim*
India	160,945,000	13.4%
Ethiopia	28,063,000	33.9%
China	21,667,000	1.6%
Russia	16,482,000	11.7%

Country	Estimated 2009 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim
Tanzania	13,218,000	30.2%
Ivory Coast	7,745,000	36.7%
Mozambique	5,224,000	22.8%
Philippines	4,654,000	5.1%
Germany*	4,026,000	~5%
Uganda	3,958,000	12.1%

* The percentage of the Muslim population in Germany is rounded to the nearest integer.

Islamic and neo-Islamic states

Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and Morocco are governed by conservative monarchies that predate the modern era. In the eighteenth century, the family of Ibn Sa'ud created a coalition of Arabian tribes and legitimized their authority by the sponsorship of Wahhabi ideas. Although the Saudi state disintegrated in the nineteenth century, it was reconstructed and expanded in the twentieth on similar social and ideological lines. Religious legitimization was reinforced by the Saudi seizure of Mecca and Medina in 1926, and the assumption of the custodianship of the holy places.

Despite the extraordinary economic transformation of the country, the Saudi state continues to be governed as the property of the ruling family. Saudi Arabia is at once a tribal patrimonial estate, the

center of an international religious movement (Wahhabism), and a nation-state. Huge oil revenues have allowed the Saudis to make clients of their own population through benefits and subsidies, and to patronize Muslim religious activities all over the world. To maintain its authority, the royal family publicly professes a conservative form of Islam, conceding control of public morals to the *mutawwi'in*, or morals police, and control of education and information to the *'ulama'*. Saudi society has been little influenced by the waves of nationalism and secularism that bore heavily upon other Arab countries, or by the current Arab rebellions. There is, however, regional, tribal, student, and Shi'i opposition, and a radical neo-Wahhabism that is independent of and critical of the state. Muslim radicals criticize the regime for its corrupt lifestyle, and for allowing American bases on Saudi soil. Militants first attacked the sacred precincts of Mecca in 1979, and since then there have been sporadic bombings and assassinations. Saudi Arabia renews emphasis upon Islam to legitimize the ruling family while its opponents appeal to the same Islam to overthrow it.

Morocco.

Morocco, like Saudi Arabia, continues to be defined as an Islamic society on the basis of the continuity of the monarchy from the precolonial era to the present. As early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the sultans of Morocco were venerated for their descent from the Prophet and their Sufi achievements. For centuries they maintained a weakly centralized state against the powerful tribal–Sufi coalitions that dominated the countryside. In the nineteenth century, European commercial penetration – followed by French occupation – led to the imposition of a foreign protectorate in 1912. Morocco, however, bypassed the development of a secular intelligentsia and the transformations of regime and economy that broke the historical continuity of other North African and Muslim societies. Moroccan resistance to French rule and the Moroccan struggle for independence were led by the sons of established bourgeois families, and by the 1940s the sultan himself had become the titular head of the national movement. To his traditional Sufi

charisma the sultan added the role of patron of Islam and the nation. With independence in 1956, Islam, nationality, and monarchy became fully identified. This modified traditional Islamic state co-opts and deflects Islamic opposition.

Pakistan.

Pakistan is a multiethnic and multireligious nation-state carved out of the Indian British Empire in 1947 in the name of Islam and the Muslim peoples of the subcontinent. It was the first of the modern nation-states to accept an Islamic identity. Muslim religious leaders wanted to construct an Islamic society based on the reformist principles that helped to create a sentiment of Muslim identity throughout the subcontinent. However, the Muslim but secularized elite of landowners, officeholders, politicians, and journalists defined their demands for independence in terms of a separate Islamic nation. Only Islam could rally the fragmented Muslim population of the subcontinent, with the its deep ethnic, tribal, and local differences, to confront both British and Hindu opposition.

Despite its Islamic identity, Pakistan was divided by profound ethnic and regional differences. Created out of diverse territories including Punjabis, Bengalis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Baluchis, and others, the main problem of the state was to create a national identity to match the reality of new political boundaries. In 1970, with the creation of the new state of Bangladesh, Bengali separatism prevailed over national unity.

Furthermore, Pakistan had come into being with widely divergent concepts of what was meant by an Islamic state. The political elite considered Islam a national identity, but a large segment of the populace, led by the *'ulama'* and other religious leaders, believed that the state should actually be governed by Islamic law. To maintain legitimacy, successive Pakistani regimes have declared their commitment to Islam. In the early 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto declared Pakistan an Islamic socialist republic. His successor, General Zia ul-Haq, called for the creation of a total Islamic system, *nizam-i mustafa*. His successor, General Pervez

Musharraf (r. 1999–2008), continued the Islamic policy and forged a coalition among the military, the Pakistani Muslim League, and other Islamist parties. In foreign policy, he supported the Taliban in Afghanistan and Muslim jihadists in Kashmir. Pakistan's involvements in Kashmir and Afghanistan, however, led to Islamic insurgency and an indigenous "Taliban" within Pakistan itself. Islamist violence was also directed against religious minorities including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi'is, and against secular politicians. In Pakistan no coherent national identity has emerged, but the state continues, as in 1947, to appeal to Islam to overcome the pluralistic heritage of the subcontinent.

Iran.

Iran was a national state that took an Islamic identity in 1979 after the revolutionary victory of the *'ulama'* over the Pahlavi regime. The historical weakness of the state and the autonomy of religious, tribal, and other local communities made it possible to organize revolutionary movements under Islamic auspices. At the end of the nineteenth century, the *'ulama'* and other intelligentsias organized mass protests against the tobacco monopoly granted to British financiers, and in 1905–11 created a short-lived parliamentary regime. From 1925 to 1979, the Pahlavi shahs established a regime in the name of secular modernity and Persian nationalism, and for a time brought the *'ulama'* under state control. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, *'ulama'*, intellectuals, students, and politicians fostered the revival of an Islamic religious and political consciousness. From Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini became the main spokesman of a mass movement that brought down the shah's regime. The revolution abolished the monarchy and established an Islamic government in Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran from 1980 to the present is ruled by a double regime: an elected president and parliament; and a clerical elite, now headed by Ayatollah Khamenei, that maintains authoritarian control of the state through the institutions of the Council of Guardians and the Office of the Superior Interests of the Islamic Republic. The *'ulama'* control the military, the intelligence

services, the morals police, gangs of "vigilantes," and important sectors of the economy. Close controls are exerted over the appearance and activities of women. Nonetheless, in Islamic guise Iran remains a national state. There is considerable continuity with the regime of the Pahlavi shahs. The Islamic Republic is driven by a strong sense of Iranian state interests, especially in foreign policy, and by strengthened bureaucratic and military institutions. In many ways, the state seems less an expression of Islam than of authoritarian nationalism; an Islamic variant of a modern national state.

Afghanistan.

While the Islamic states of Pakistan and Iran are expressions of a national state structure, Afghanistan as an Islamic state gave a contemporary turn to a profound history of ethnic and tribal divisions. In 1979, communist intellectuals formed a pro-Soviet government. It was opposed by rival Muslim intellectuals whose goal was the establishment of an Islamic state. The opposition included Pashtun warriors affiliated with the Hizb-i-Islami, and Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks organized in the Jamiʿat-i Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, and by jihadists from the Arab world and elsewhere, the Islamic resistance defeated the Soviet-backed government and drove the Soviets from the country. They then fell to civil war among themselves, until eventually the Taliban, students from the religious schools of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, supported by Pakistan and the al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden, won control of most of the country. The Taliban declared an Islamic state and enforced a severe form of Islam.

The official name of the country is the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," but Afghanistan is not a unified country. In late 2001, al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan, and protected by the Taliban, attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The United States went to war with Afghanistan, helped overthrow the Taliban, and supported the formation of new central government under the presidency of Hamid Karzai. In reality, political power is parceled out

among innumerable warlords and regional, ethnic, tribal, religious, and criminal gangs. In these circumstances, the Taliban insurgency has revived.

Secularized states with Islamic identities

Mauritania.

Among West African states, Mauritania shows the closest integration of state, national, and religious identities. The population of Mauritania is wholly Muslim, but is divided between the Arabic-speaking tribes in the north and the black, Senegalese-related African population in the south. The dominant Arab Muslim population is similar in identity to those of Algeria, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. Sufi fraternities are the basis of Muslim communal organization. French colonial rule set the foundation for the contemporary Mauritanian state. Mauritania became independent in 1960 under an Arab regime that deprived black African ethnic groups of political power.

In the 1980s, the rise of the Salafi movements, including the Tablighi Jama'at, Muslim Brothers, and Wahhabis, supported by oil-rich Arabian countries, led the government in 1985 to declare Islam the state religion and Shari'a the only valid source of law. An Islamic High Council, an Association of 'Ulama' of Mauritania, and a Ministry for Islamic Orientation were created to implement state promotion and supervision of Islam. The rise of Arab nationalism throughout North Africa and the Middle East also prompted demands for the Arabization of law and language. In 1991, a constitutional provision made Arabic the national language. By the mid-1990s, however, the government was disillusioned with Islamic activism and in 2003 banned Islamic NGOs. In 2005, a Mauritanian military outpost was attacked by a radical jihadist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, and Mauritania began to cooperate with US anti-terrorism operations. The relations between Islamic movements and the state are fraught with tension, but Mauritanian identity seems rooted in Islam.

Mali.

Mali became an independent secular republic in 1960, governed by Modibo Keïta as a one-party socialist state. In Mali, as in Mauritania, Islamic reformist movements helped integrate Islam into national identity. Islamic reformism was introduced in the early part of the twentieth century by pilgrims to Mecca and Medina and students in Cairo. In 1951, al-Hajj ʿAbdallah Mahmud organized the Subbanu al-Muslimin (Society of young Muslims). The reformist movement was anticolonial and promoted an Islamic rather than an ethnic identity. With the help of grants from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, madrasa education expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1992, however, antigovernment protests led to a coup, and a new constitution that defines Mali as a secular state and bans religiously defined political parties. The High Islamic Council (Haut conseil islamique) was created in 2002 to give the state control of Islam. Islam has become, in effect, the national religion of Mali.

In 2011 and 2012, both the regime and its versions of Islam were challenged by the rise of Tuareg rebellions and the extreme Taliban-like assault of the Ansar Dine on traditional Malian religion and social mores.

Senegal.

Senegal has a secular regime that governs in conjunction with the religious elites. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Muslim communities fought to win control of the Senegambian region, establish Islamic states, and convert the populace to Islam. Senegal was the scene of the great jihads of Futa Toro, al-Hajj ʿUmar, Ma Ba, and others. These last Senegalese echoes of the "caliphal" tradition of a unified Islamic state and society were overthrown by the French conquest at the end of the nineteenth century.

The French created an entirely new political structure: a Senegalese territorial state in which the Muslim communities were reorganized as Sufi brotherhoods. The Tijaniyya, the Muridiyya, and other Sufi *tariqat* provided social leadership, spiritual meaning, and

organized economic activity. When Senegal became independent in 1960, the state was taken over by a Western-educated political elite that resumed a collaborative relationship with the religious notables.

Thus, the modern structure of Senegalese society is based on historical cooperation among state and religious elites. The populace has retained a Muslim identity. Only recently has there been minority pressure for the Islamization of the state, coming from urban professionals, bureaucrats, and teachers who affirm an Arab Islamic identity. The revivalist demands, however, do not shake the political system, and the Islamist movements have had either to transform themselves into Sufi orders or ally with the government.

Secularized states and Islamic opposition

In this group, secular states and Islamic movements were and are engaged in a struggle for power. In some cases, the conflict remains intense. In others, secular states have incorporated Islamic political parties and/or have fused Islamic identities with national identity. The relationships between states and Muslim communities vary from case to case.

Turkey.

The Turkish Republic inherited the Ottoman tradition of centralized government and military leadership, a long history of nineteenth-century reform and modernization, and an intelligentsia of army officers, administrators, engineers, technical experts, and intellectuals. In the Ottoman era, the religious elites were subordinate functionaries of the state; the commercial classes were not sufficiently developed to be a rival for political power. Whatever the opinion of the *'ulama'*, and whatever the shock to the feelings of masses of Turkish Muslims, the voice of the Westernized political establishment was the only one heard at the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey's economic development generated a still more differentiated social structure, including new groups of businessmen, factory managers, rural landowners,

prosperous peasants, engineers, industrial workers, and intellectuals: the basis for the formation of a parliamentary government after World War II. Nonetheless, the army remained an important political force, and intervened in 1960, 1970, and from 1980 to 1983 to take temporary control of the state in periods of economic and social crisis.

The Republican regime also attempted to submerge the traditional religious organizations, break the attachment of ordinary people to Islam, and win them over to a Western and secular style of life. However, outside of Istanbul the cultural changes imposed from the top had relatively slight penetration. While the state was secular, the Turkish populace continued to identify itself as Muslim. In the 1960s and 1970s, movements and parties committed to the re-Islamization of state and society grew stronger. The Said Nursi movement, Naqshbandi Sufis, and the National Salvation Party, which favored the reestablishment of an Islamic state, grew increasingly active. In the 1980s and 1990s, the state again tried to institutionalize Islam via the control of courts, charitable endowments, and the education of imams. In 2002, the Islamic-oriented Justice and Virtue Party (AKP), led by Tayyip Erdogan, became the governing party and remains in power until the present.

The military and the secular nationalists see AKP rule as the harbinger of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution and a threat to the existence of a secular Turkish republic. The Islamic party, however, presents itself as a democratic coalition of provincial peasant landowners, small-town businessmen, pious Muslims, and Kurds opposed to the unfair distribution of resources and power in contemporary Turkey. It calls not for Islamization, but for a democratic government and society in which religious identity is integrated into the national polity. The Erdogan government has also created openings for the integration of Kurds. It remains to be seen whether Turkey is evolving from Kemalist secular nationalism into a new and more pluralistic balance among its secular, religious, regional, and ethnic minority populations.

Egypt.

The basic structures of Egyptian society also derived from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Ottoman model, but differed in the degree to which Islam remained part of the Egyptian political process. Egypt came under direct British rule in 1882. In 1922, native Egyptian landowners, officials, journalists, and lawyers won partial autonomy and established a constitutional monarchy based on liberal principles. The liberal regime, however, failed to win full independence. Nor could the Egyptian elites, who lacked the military capability and authority of the Turks, carry through the kind of drastic secularization achieved in Turkey. In the 1930s and 1940s, the authority of the political elites was challenged by the Society of Muslim Brothers, which advocated a government based on Islamic law and the adoption of Islam as an ideological and political alternative to liberalism or communism. Since the 1930s, Egypt has been divided between secular governments and opposition Islamic movements.

The failed monarchy and liberal regime was overthrown in 1952 by the Free Officers' coup led by Naguib and Nasser. Sadat and Mubarak succeeded as the heads of a military, authoritarian regime ruling by corrupt and oppressive means. The military ran its own business enterprises, while government policies favored crony businessmen.

The opposition came from Islamist groups. The 1967 defeat in the war with Israel, the failure to resolve the Palestinian problem, and the failure to develop economically brought a revival of both Islamic reformist and jihadist movements. The Society of Muslim Brothers reestablished itself as a dominant influence in universities and professional associations, and became the leading opposition party in parliament. In the 1990s, al-Jamaʿat al-Islamiyya waged a terrorist campaign, assassinating government officials, military officers, secular intellectuals, and tourists. The government eventually crushed the militants. Since 2002, al-Jamaʿat al-Islamiyya has accepted the state and presents itself as a conservative Salafi movement. There was a substantial shift of public opinion toward the Islamic dimension of Egyptian identity.

In the 1990s, leftist, liberal, and Muslim opponents of the regime began to collaborate. After 2004, labor strikes and demonstrations fed a growing resistance, and were the prelude to the Egyptian revolution on January 25, 2011. Massive demonstrations forced Mubarak to resign. In subsequent parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood won about 40 percent of the votes and the Salafis about 25 percent, and in the June 2012 presidential elections, Muhammad Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, won the presidential election. However, in 2013 the army intervened to overthrow the government and imprison President Morsi and other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt seems to have reverted to military-authoritarian rule.

Tunisia.

Tunisia also has an Ottoman heritage. In the nineteenth century, it had a strong central state and a state-controlled *'ulama'* establishment. It was under French rule from 1881 to 1956. In 1956, the Destour, a secular nationalist party, led by Bourguiba, came to power. The common people of Tunisia, however, like those of Turkey, retained an Islamic identity. In reaction to the failures of the state and a lagging economy, this allowed for an Islamic revival in the 1970s. An Islamic party led by Rashid al-Ghannouchi, renamed an-Nahda (the Renaissance party) in 1988, ran strongly in the 1989 elections on a platform affirming the Islamic, humanitarian, and democratic identity of Tunisia. The party was promptly banned by the government, and its leader was forced into exile. With the collapse of the Tunisian regime and the elections of 2011 an-Nahda is again the leading political party, but it has agreed with the secular opposition to hold new elections.

Algeria.

Algeria, under French occupation from 1830, became independent in 1962. The soldiers who won Algerian independence established a highly centralized military–bureaucratic regime and a socialized economy. In a society shattered by colonialism and war, the political

elite appealed to the enduring aspects of the Algerian heritage: Arabism and Islam. The state ministries tried to control schools, mosques, charitable endowments, and the training of clerics, but unofficial mosques and schools eluded state control. Popular frustration with a deteriorating economy prompted demonstrations and riots throughout the 1980s, until the government was forced to recognize political parties and to hold elections. The victor in the 1990 elections for local offices was the Islamic Salvation Party (FIS), a coalition of Muslim parties, but the military refused to accept the results or to hold further elections. A vicious and destructive civil war was waged between the military regime and the Islamist opposition.

President Abdelaziz Bouteflicka (r. 1999 to present) consolidated a military and secular regime and offered an amnesty to the banned FIS. The Civil Concord (2000) and the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (2005) ratified the amnesty by referendum. Some Islamist parties such as the Movement of Society for Peace have joined the governing coalition. The army remains in power; the Islamic opposition, defeated, remains latent. Islamic national identity has not prevented a deep divide between the state and the opposition, each invoking the name of Islam.

Islamic national societies in Southeast Asia

Indonesia and Malaysia became independent under the aegis of secular national regimes, but these regimes were coupled with competing Islamic movements and have gradually developed overlapping concepts of secular national and Islamic national identities.

Indonesia.

The Southeast Asian combination of secular state and Islamic challenge had its origins in the historical structures of Indonesian societies as modified by the Dutch. The Southeast Asian states were legitimized in non-Muslim cultural terms, and under Dutch tutelage, the Indonesian landowning and administrative elites, the *priyayi*, received a modern education and adopted secular concepts. They

combined the non-Muslim aspects of *priyayi* culture with a Western orientation to become leaders of the nationalist movements.

At the same time, in the Indonesian outer islands, Singapore, and the Malayan ports, economic change stimulated the rise of merchant groups and independent landowners who expressed their cultural and political interests in terms of reformed and modernized Islam. In Indonesia, this led toward religious and educational reform as typified by the Muhammadiyya movement, and also to political action as exemplified by Sarekat Islam. In response to the modernist movement, the rural *'ulama'* organized their own political parties to defend village Islamic culture. Each of these movements built up a national following of ideologically defined, socially cohesive, and competing communities.

The Indonesian movements waged a successful war to free Indonesia from Dutch rule, and then a post-independence struggle to define the identity of the independent Indonesian state. The nationalist and Communist politicians, supported by the army, sought to define the Indonesian nation in accord with the secular and universalistic *pançasila* principles. The various Islamic movements wished to have Indonesia declared an Islamic state. After a decade of political turmoil, a secular-oriented military elite led by General Suharto took power in 1965, and either co-opted or contained the Islamic parties. The conservative Nahdatul 'Ulama' party took control of the Ministry of Religion. Most reformist Muslim associations accepted the dominance of the military secular state and defined Islam as a communal religion and a personal belief system rather than a political movement, but they continued their educational and preaching campaigns to imbue Indonesia with an Islamic identity. In the late 1970s and 1980s, a rising middle class espoused an Islamic identity, and the government gave way to demands for schools and mosques, conference centers and think tanks. The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, however, left a political vacuum, and in successive elections the Islamic vote was divided among numerous contenders. Control of the state was returned to military, secular, and Christian elites.

In response to the frustration of Muslim ambitions, Muslim rioters, mobs, and youth gangs attacked non-Muslim properties and communities. From 2000 to 2004, the initiative was taken by heavily armed, full-time fighters including the Army of Allah, the Islamic Youth Front, Laskar Jihad, and Jemaah Islamiyah. They attacked bars, cafés, hotels, brothels, and Christian churches, neighborhoods, and villages. This was a self-proclaimed "jihad" against Christians, secularists, and Jews. The jihadists were connected to Salafi and Wahhabi currents in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and to al-Qaeda. However, the largest Islamic movements, NU and Muhammadiyya, following the examples of the Turkish AKP, the Tunisian an-Nahda, and other moderate Islamic parties, redefined the call for an Islamic state in terms of justice and prosperity. In the 2004 national elections, the secular parties won 60 percent of the vote, and the Islamic parties 40 percent. Indonesia continues to be a secular state ruling a majority Muslim population.

Malaysia.

Malaysia has also evolved toward overlapping and competing Islamic and ethnic identities. It is divided between a majority Malay Muslim population and substantial Chinese and Indian minorities. Since independence the government and the ruling United Malay National Organization have tried to maintain a secular identity, giving preferential assistance to ethnic Malays but incorporating the minority communities into the political system. The Muslim dimension of Malay identity became ever more important, however, with the victories of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party in the provinces of Kelantan and Trengganu and the eventual incorporation of its successor, the Islamic Party of Malaysia, into the national front in 1972.

At the same time, the migration of the rural population to the cities, and a growing student and middle-class urban population, led to an increased Islamic consciousness. The dissemination of Islamic education and propaganda, and the rise of missionary and revival movements, forced the government to treat Islam as a kind of civil religion. Under Prime Minister Mahathir (r. 1981–2003), Malaysia

increased government support for Islamic education at all levels, developed Islamic financial institutions, raised the status of Islamic law courts, and defended Muslim interests in its foreign policy. At the same time the state also lent its support to a purely secular Malay nationalist movement, Bumiputera (Indigenous sons of the earth). Government policy stressed both Muslim religious and Malay ethnic cultural orientations.

Islam has become a salient dimension of Malay identity and Malaysian state policies, but the Islamists face major barriers to the formation of an Islamic state. Substantial Chinese and Indian populations, Western secular ideas of constitutionalism and democracy, state patronage of ethnic Malays, and the free-enterprise, capitalist-based structure of the economy give great institutional depth to a pluralistic society.

Muslims as political minorities

Finally, there are large Muslim communities in pluralistic secular societies in which Muslims are demographic and political minorities. In most countries, the basic problem for minority Muslim communities is how to maintain their identity. In India, Muslims form a minority of some 175,000,000 in a total population of about 1,200,000,000. Despite some efforts toward assimilation or alliances with the Hindu majority, Indian Muslims have responded in the main by consolidating a separate communal identity stressing the maintenance of Islamic law and religious practices, the endowment of Muslim schools, and the defense of Urdu. In the 1980s and 1990s, Saudi influences, and the growth of movements such as Tabligh and Ahl-i Hadith, stimulated Muslim self-assertion. Islamic parties have been formed to defend Muslim political interests, and Muslims bargain with the major political parties to gain support for employment, schooling, and cultural affairs. Muslims remain, however, a disadvantaged group in education and incomes. A Hindu revival has generated demands for a Hindu state. Hindu extremists call for the rejection of the Muslims as an unassimilable minority. India is polarized by religio-national identities.

In the People's Republic of China, the Muslim population falls into two main categories. The Hui have for centuries been fully assimilated into the larger Han Chinese society, to the extent of being physically and in public manners indistinguishable from Han Chinese. Yet the Hui maintain a separate religious identity supported by family rituals, clubs, and associations. By contrast, the Uighurs of Xinjiang and other Muslim areas conquered in the nineteenth century maintain non-Chinese ethnic and communal identities. Since the 1980s, the state has tried to win support in minority regions by providing various benefits, and to reduce the influence of minority groups by the settlement of Han Chinese. Nonetheless, underground resistance, violent protests and demands for regional separatism are endemic in Xinjiang province.

Nigeria is a particularly complex example. The northern emirates conquered by the Sokoto caliphate took an Islamic identity in the nineteenth century. The commercialization of the northern economy and its links to international markets assisted the spread of Islam as a religion of traders, merchants, workers, and other mobile people. In the 1930s and 1940s, Sufi brotherhoods helped integrate the various northern Nigerian ethnic and occupational groups into a more embracing society. The British, however, made the old Sokoto region part of a larger Nigerian state. With the coming of independence in 1960, the northern Muslim regions joined a national state in which Muslims were barely half the population.

Northern elites accept Nigerian nationality in order to share southern oil resources and control of the central government. At the same time, they insist on their Muslim identity to justify regional autonomy and to implement Islamic law and social norms. The oil boom of the 1970s stimulated an Islamic revival, and the 1980s and 1990s witnessed increased Muslim observance of Islamic norms for prayer, education, and social behavior, and increasing demands that Islamic law, Muslim festivals, and Muslim foreign policy interests be recognized by the national state. Since 1999, numerous northern states have adopted Islamic law.

While the elites stress Nigerian identity, the common people and student groups adopt Islam as a banner of resistance to military rule and economic injustice. Muslim radicals see themselves as an embattled minority threatened by non-Muslim predominance in the south and by Western influences, and at the same time as bearers of a holy mission to restore the Sokoto caliphate, and to make the north a Muslim holy land. Since the 1980s, and especially since the end of military rule in May 1999, there have been riots and street fighting between Muslim and Christian mobs throughout the northern provinces. In recent years, the Boko Haram movement has repeatedly attacked Christian churches and communities in northern Nigeria. It seeks to enforce a strict and punitive version of Islam, and the imposition of Shariʿa throughout Nigeria. In northern Nigeria, Islam is used both to legitimize the state and to motivate the opposition. Islam provides the symbols to express the conflicting interests of both the elites and the dispossessed.

Concluding remarks

In the formation of the modern Islamic world there have been two contradictory trends: the trend toward global integration, which favors universalistic Islam; and the trend toward the consolidation of national states, which favors the parochialization or localization of Islam. Universalistic Muslim concepts, norms, and practices have been on the rise ever since the eighteenth-century reform movements called upon Muslims to abandon local practices and to conform to the common texts of Islam: the Quran, selected hadith, and the principle of Shariʿa. Local cultic practices were denounced as un-Islamic, and the traditional legal, theological, and philosophic scholarship in all their rich detail were less widely pursued. Islam was defined more and more by abstract symbols and slogans common to all Muslims, and by ever more widespread acceptance of the Shariʿa as the necessary law for a Muslim life. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, hostility to the veneration of shrines and popular Sufi ceremonies was the basis of religious authority and political action; in the twentieth century, it was hostility to Western

political power and cultural norms. Today universal Islam is also built on shared political concerns such as the position of Muslim minorities, or the conflicts involving Muslims in Afghanistan, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere. The universalistic identity is reinforced by a proliferation of organized transnational movements including publication and propaganda organizations, missionary (*da'wa*) societies, Sufi brotherhoods, banks, youth associations, emigrant communities with international ties, and others. There are international political action groups calling for the formation of a caliphate or Islamic states, and informal networks committed to violent action.

A profound legacy of cultural expectations, carried from generation to generation, supports these universalistic tendencies. The deepest of these is the image of the Prophet as an active leader who not only calls people to believe in his teachings, but to create a society that fulfills the laws, ethics, and rituals of Islam in daily practice. Out of the legacy of the Prophet comes a profound impulse toward social activism and personal responsibility. Historically, Muslims have expected that righteous leaders would periodically rise to guide and direct the community, and that individual holy men would be the bearers of worldly transformation, sweep away corruption, command the good and forbid the evil, return the community to the teachings of the Prophet, and restore the glory of Islam. The tradition of self-anointed charismatic leaders has been inherited in the contemporary world by self-declared wagers of jihad, purifiers of Islam, the leaders of radical Islamic movements. Cultural preferences for individual moral and religious self-assertion, charismatic authority, devotion of disciples to masters, and small-group loyalties so critical in historical Sufism are translated today into radical organizations. Traditional Islamic vocabularies, such as the concepts of the caliphate and jihad, still define the political goals of contemporary movements.

These trends toward the more universalistic expressions of Islam are also the product of an ever-growing tendency toward globalization in the world economy, with its attendant technologies and systems of communications and transport. The steamship, the airplane, the radio, the cassette recording, the internet, and social

media are the instruments of worldwide Muslim cohesiveness. Trade, the hajj, emigration, and other population movements have created a more interlocking Muslim world. So too the shared experiences of the breakdown of old Islamic empires, incorporation into European empires, and the subsequent anticolonial movements have helped create a global Muslim self-awareness and a pressure for shared ways of expressing Islamic identity. In this respect, while transnational movements are not new to the Islamic world, the scope and variety of these movements is growing.

However, the precedents and forces that favor the embedding of Islam in particularistic settings are equally strong. Muslims are at one and the same time Muslims and members of families, tribes, ethnic groups, and nation-states. Their religious identity gives Muslims universal affiliations; the secular aspects of their identities root them in particular communities; the combination leads to such phenomena as tribal, ethnic, or national forms of Islam. The absorption of Muslims in particularistic contexts derives from within Islamic culture itself – from the inherent ambiguity as to whether Islam is a religion of individuals or a political society. The historical apolitical culture of Islam and the structures created by national states work together to favor a modern model of international apolitical Islamic missionary work and nonpolitical forms of Islam in domestic politics. Thus, historical precedents and contemporary practice generate both universal and particularistic, local and global, national and transnational Islamic movements.

These reflections suggest that the structures of lineage, religious, and state institutions derived from the ancient Near East and Islamic religious culture are enduring, though modified, templates for the contemporary evolution of Islamic societies. The ambiguities of secularization and Islamization and the conflict between secular and Islamic concepts of political and moral order reveal a profound continuity in the institutional structures of Islamic societies. In some cases, contemporary Islamic states and Islamic religious movements are simply the direct continuations of past ones. The Iranian mullahs have been part of an organized institution since the sixteenth century. Morocco and Saudi Arabia have regimes founded

respectively in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Salafi reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have contributed to the creation of national identity and national states in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The contemporary patterns of relations between states and religious institutions in Turkey, the Arab world, North Africa, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Senegal, and other countries are recognizable variations upon the historical relationships between state and religious institutions in those societies.

In contemporary societies, however, the tripartite structure of state, religious, and local communal institutions has been transformed by the destruction of independent lineage and tribal communities and the increasing integration of territorial populations into national states. The identity of Muslim peoples is being redefined in reformist, nationalist, or Islamic national terms. Still, the opposition of state and religious institutions and identities remains salient. While the political elite preserves the syncretism between cosmopolitan and Islamic forms of culture, the Islamic revival evokes the heritage of personal religious identity and communal responsibility. This conflict reflects a similar nineteenth-century struggle between secularized and religious elites, and echoes the eighteenth-century pre-modern structures of Muslim societies. It may be traced back as far as the ninth-century differentiation of state from religious institutions within the early Islamic empire, which in turn was based on a still more ancient distinction between political and religious life characteristic of almost all Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies since ancient times. Even the earliest civilization of Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC had differentiated temple and state institutions.

Today these ancient templates are being transformed by two fundamental forces. First is the increasing reach of the global economy, which leads not only to economic integration but to the breakdown of cultural barriers and the diffusion of global lifestyles. In the history of these societies, I have played down the material, technological, economic, and ecological factors, and have considered them as embedded in pre-modern state, *'ulama'*, Sufi, and tribal institutions and collectivities, and in the formation of

contemporary social classes, ideologies, and states. I have not treated material and economic change as causal historical forces. My basic position has been, as indicated in the preface, that ancient agricultural, artisanal, and commercial technologies and economies had already shaped the institutional structures of human societies before the advent of the Islamic era, and that despite the rise and fall of human fortunes the basic "modes of production and exchange" in Islamic countries did not fundamentally change until European colonialism and industrial capitalism made themselves felt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

However, even if we give priority to such institutional and cultural considerations, the course of nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments inevitably raises the question as to whether the forces of technology and economy associated with the development of industrial capitalism, an integrated world economy, and the diffusion of new global cultures, including the cultures of consu-merism and of democratic rights, will not in the end break down historical political and religious institutions. In Turkey, for example, changes in industrial development, and the emergence of a pro-letariat and new strata of bourgeois entrepreneurs, seems to have undermined the historical structures of state and religious organization. In the former Soviet Union, radical political and cultural change transformed Islam, for many Muslims, into a religion of private belief and national identities. Similar forces are operative everywhere from Europe and America to Indonesia.

New Islamic discourses also threaten to transform the historical identity of Islamic societies from within. Everywhere the forces of secularization and of neo-Islamic integration represent important departures from historical templates. Political Islam sometimes strips away of the panoply of religious beliefs, practices, and symbols that have historically structured Muslim life. Similarly, the Muslim youth cultures of Europe, Africa, and other parts of the world abandon traditional beliefs and practices in favor of a diffuse generalized sense of Muslim affiliation. In many respects, the new Islamism would be hardly recognizable to past generations. With these changes it has become open to question whether the Islamic

institutional and cultural heritage may not in some cases be giving way to modern political, technological, and economic forces, and in others to new forms of Islam. Will Muslim peoples continue to constitute Islamic societies as known to history?

Glossary

'abd: a slave; property rights in a person, regulated by law and Quranic ethics. In Muslim countries slaves were commonly employed as household servants and soldiers; *see also mamluk*.

adab: habit, upbringing, behavior, refinement of manners, literary cultivation, urbanity; the ideal behavior of a scribe or spiritual cultivation of a Sufi.

adat: in Indonesia and Malaysia, custom or customary law as opposed to Islamic law.

'adl: justice; in law, the quality required to be a legal witness; in religion, the state of personal perfection of one who fulfills God's teaching; in philosophy, the harmony among the faculties of the soul.

agha: Turkish word for elder brother, chief, or master; in Ottoman usage, the title of a high-ranking military official; in Algeria, the head of the janissary corps.

ahl: people who occupy a tent; family or community.

ahl al-bayt: people of the house, family of the Prophet.

ahl al-dhimma: the people of the covenant; Jews, Christians, and others accepted as subjects under Muslim rule and entitled to legal protection in

return for payment of taxes; also called *ahl al-kitab*, or people of the book.

ahl al-hadith: partisans of hadith as a principal source of Muslim law and morals; a term for the supporters of the Hanbali school of law.

ahl i-hadith: a community in India and Pakistan that professes to follow only the Quran and hadith as sources of Muslim law and does not accept the traditional schools of law.

akhi: a member of fourteenth-century Anatolian groups of young men who held to the ideals of *futuwwa* (q.v.); generally urban, artisan, and middle class.

akhlaq: ethics; Greek ethics conveyed into Islamic thought by the translation of Aristotle and Galen and incorporated into the writings of Miskawayh, al-Ghazali, and others.

'Alids: descendants of the Prophet's cousin 'Ali; the family that claims to be the heirs of the Prophet's religious and political legacy and the rightful heads of the Muslim community.

'alim (pl. *'ulama'*): a learned man, particularly in Muslim legal and religious studies; occurs in varying forms such as *mallam, mullah*, etc.

aliran: Indonesian community movements, based on religious or ideological positions, that sponsored schools, social activities, and political parties.

amin: trustworthy; title for the holder of an official position such as the head of a guild.

amir:	the title of a military commander, governor, or prince; commonly transliterated "emir"; equivalent of the Turkish *bey* or *beg*.
amir al-mu'minin:	the commander of the faithful, the proper title of the caliph or successor to the Prophet.
amir al-umara':	the supreme commander; title used for the military rulers who took over ʿAbbasid government.
amsar:	*see misr*.
anjuman:	an assembly; refers to religious, educational, and political associations of Muslims, especially in Iran, India, Pakistan, and Turkey.
ansar:	"helpers" of Muhammad at Medina; later used as designation for members of Muslim religious and political associations.
ʿaql:	reason, reasoning, intelligence; the rational faculty as opposed to the lower faculties of body and soul.
ʿasabiyya:	the spirit of kinship or faction; the tribal solidarity that enables a small pastoral community to conquer city dwellers and create new empires; the political solidarity of ruling elites.
ashraf:	people who trace their lineage to the Prophet or his companions; in India, the noble classes; *see also sharif*.
ʿashura':	supererogatory fast day on the tenth of Muharram, the first month in the Muslim

	calendar; commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn.
atabeg:	the tutor of a Saljuq prince, his principal military advisor; later, independent governors.
awqaf:	charitable foundations, endowed for religious purposes; *see also waqf*.
aʿyan:	local notables; in late Ottoman times, holders of officially recognized political power.
ayatollah:	a miraculous sign of God, the highest-ranking scholar of law in the Twelver Shiʿi religious hierarchy.
ʿayyarun:	vagabonds; tenth- to twelfth-century urban gangs who subscribed to *futuwwa* (q.v.) ideals and often appeared as military opponents of state regimes.
baba:	Turkish for father, old man, Sufi leader.
baqaʾ:	survival in God, the divinely granted attribute of the mystic, who experiences the unity of God but returns to the world of daily activity.
baraka:	blessing; the divine power emanating from a holy man.
barid:	the courier, information, and spy service.
batin:	the inner, esoteric meaning of a text.
bayʿa:	a contract; oath of allegiance recognizing the authority of a caliph.
bayram:	*see ʿid*.

Bazaaris:	merchants, shopkeepers, peddlers, and artisans working in the old-fashioned economy.
beg:	*see bey*.
bey:	a Turkish title for army officer, official, or ruler of a small principality; also transliterated *beg*; *see also amir*.
Bohras:	a Muslim community in India, mainly Isma'ilis. Most are merchants but many are Sunnis and peasants.
caliph:	*see khalifa*.
da'i:	"summoner"; propagandist or missionary for Shi'i movements; usually the lowest-ranking figure in a Shi'i hierarchy.
dar al-harb:	the land of war, territory not under Islamic law and subject to conquest by Muslims; contrasts with *dar al-Islam*.
dar al-Islam:	the lands in which Islamic law prevails.
dargah:	the royal court or residence; shrine and tomb of a Sufi master.
da'wa:	the summons to acknowledge religious truth and join a religious community; missionary movement; used in the variant form *da'wah* in Southeast Asia.
da'wah:	*see da'wa*.

dawla: a dynasty; by extension, a government or state.

devshirme: an Ottoman levy of Christian youths to be trained as janissaries and court officers.

dhikr: reminding the self; continuous and rhythmic repetition of the name of God, a Sufi form of prayer that varies with the different Sufi orders.

dhimmi: the contract of hospitality and protection for peoples of the revealed religions; *see also ahl al-dhimma*.

dihqan: a landowner, village chief, the local notables of the late Sasanian and early Muslim empires.

diwan: a collection of poetry or prose; a register, the name applied to government bureaus that keep tax, military, and other records.

evliad: used in Inner Asia to refer to the Sufis descended from the Prophet and the early caliphs.

falasifa: wise men, philosophers, the Muslim proponents of Greek philosophy.

fana': in Sufi usage, annihilation of the self, the state that precedes the experience of the unity of God.

faqi: a poverty-stricken mendicant who lives only for God; in East Africa, a scholar of the Quran and Muslim law or a Sufi mystic and magician; *see also Sufi*.

faqih (pl. *fuqaha'*):	a scholar of Islamic law, jurist; *see also 'alim*.
fata:	(pl. *fityan*): a young man, member of a group or gang devoted to the ideals of *futuwwa* (q.v.).
fatawa:	*see fatwa*.
fatwa:	(pl. *fatawa*): an opinion on Islamic law given by a *mufti* (q.v.); collected legal opinions form a corpus that modifies the application of the early codes of Islamic law.
fay':	Muslim communally owned property.
fiqh:	understanding, jurisprudence, Islamic law.
firman:	a command, edict of a ruler.
fitra:	the inherent original state of the soul before it is vested in the body.
fityan:	*see fata*.
fuqaha':	*see faqih*.
futuwwa:	virtues or qualities of young men, including bravery and nobility; the ideology of fraternities and young men's street gangs; *see also 'ayyarun, akhi*.
ghadir khumm:	a Shi'i day of celebration for Muhammad's adoption of 'Ali as his successor.
ghazal:	a love song; an Arabic poetic form that passes with variations into Persian, Turkish, and Urdu poetry.
ghazi:	a frontier warrior for the faith.

ghulam:	a young male slave in military or palace service; *see also ʿabd, mamluk.*
ghulat:	Shiʿis who hold "extreme" views of the spiritual qualities of the imam.
hadith:	a report of the sayings or deeds of the Prophet transmitted by his companions; collections of *hadith* are second in authority to the Quran as a source of Muslim belief and practice.
hajib:	a chamberlain, chief of palace administration, and sometimes head of government.
hajj:	the annual pilgrimage to Mecca required of every Muslim at least once in his lifetime.
hal:	a Sufi term for a spiritual state received by the grace of God; opposed to *maqam*, a station on the way toward mystical union achieved by the Sufi's own effort.
halal:	that which is permitted in Islamic law, commonly used in referring to food.
hanif:	an Arabian believer in the unity of God before the revelation of Islam.
haqiqa:	in Sufism, truth or reality that is experienced through union with God; ultimate reality.
haram:	the portion of a house reserved for the women, from which males are excluded.
hijab:	headscarf or head covering worn by Muslim women to express piety and modesty, but

	may also signify communal or political identity, and vary in accord with fashion.
hijra:	the emigration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina in 622, the base year of the Muslim era.
hikma:	the wisdom attained through philosophy, science, or occult knowledge.
hila	(pl. *hiyal*): legal stratagem.
hilm:	forbearance, moderation, tranquility in the face of passion.
himaya:	the commendation or protection given by nomads to settlers, landlords to peasants, or the powerful to the weak, in return for payment; the protection of European consuls for local clients.
hiyal:	*see hila*.
hujja:	proof; the person through whom God's presence becomes accessible; a rank in the hierarchy of Shiʿi missionaries; *see also daʿi*.
ʿibada (pl. *ʿibadat*):	obedience to ritual religious practices, including ablutions, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and so on.
ʿibadat:	*see ʿibada*.
ʿid:	the Muslim festivals; *ʿid al-fitr*, the breaking of the fast of Ramadan, and *ʿid al-adha*, the sacrificial festival of the tenth of Dhu al-hijja; in Turkish called *bayram*.

ijaza:	a certificate given by a teacher to a student certifying his capacity to transmit a particular text.
ijma':	the consensus of legal scholars or of the community as a whole; a basis of Muslim law.
ijtihad:	"exerting oneself" in Islamic law; reasoning by analogy, free from received opinions, in order to reinterpret Islamic law; *see also mujtahid*.
'ilm:	knowledge, especially of religious truths; the knowledge that guides behavior.
iltizam:	a form of tax farm in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.
imam:	the supreme leader of the Muslim community; the successor to the Prophet, used commonly by the Shi'is for 'Ali and his descendants.
imama:	the legal theory of collective organization.
imambaras:	shrines devoted to Hasan and Husayn.
imamzada:	a descendant of a Shi'i imam; the shrines of sanctified descendants of 'Ali revered by pilgrims, who believe they have miraculous qualities.
iman:	faith, fidelity, belief.
imaret:	in Ottoman usage, an endowed complex of religious and charitable facilities, commonly

	including a place for prayer, a college, a library, and soup kitchens.
insilimen:	a term used in the Sahara for religious scholars and venerated holy lineages; *see also zawaya*.
iqtaʿ:	a grant of the rights to collect taxes from land conceded in return for development or administrative and military service; *see also jagir, timar*.
ishan:	an honorific used in Inner Asia as the equivalent of a Sufi *shaykh* or spiritual leader.
islah:	reform, purification, and revitalization of the Muslim community based on a return to the first principles of the Quran and hadith; *see also tajdid*.
islam, Islam:	submission, unconditional surrender to God, the name of the religion of Muslims, the institutions and cultural style of states and societies formed by the Islamic religion.
Ismaʿilis:	a branch of the Shiʿis who look to the leadership of Ismaʿil, a son of Jaʿfar, and his descendants; this branch includes the Fatimids; later divided into several branches, including the Nizariyya, who spread from Syria and Iran into India; subcommunities include the Khojas, Bohras, and others.
isnad:	a chain of authorities, the series of transmitters of *hadith* (q.v.) whose names guarantee their validity.

israʾiliyyat:	narratives in the Quran and Arabic literature derived from Jewish sources.
ithna ʿashari:	the branch of the Shiʿis who believe in the twelve imams descended from ʿAli, the last of whom disappeared and went into hiding in 873 and will return as the messiah; the branch of Shiʿism to which the majority of the populace of Iran adheres.
jagir:	an assignment of revenues in Mughal India in lieu of payment of salary; *see also iqtaʿ, timar*.
jamaʿa (pl. *jamaʿat*):	an Islamic congregation, party, or movement.
jamatbandi:	community associations, in Africa.
jamiʿ:	a mosque for Friday prayers.
janissary:	a member of the Ottoman infantry corps, the elite regiments of the Ottoman regime.
jihad:	the religious duty to struggle on behalf of Islam; applies to the struggle for goodness within the person, the defense of the Muslim community, and war waged on behalf of Islam.
jinn:	spirit beings, composed of vapors or flames, who are imperceptible but malevolent influences.
jizya:	the poll tax levied on non-Muslims in a Muslim-ruled society.
Kaʿba:	the central sanctuary of Islam, located in Mecca; the principal object of the *hajj*.

kafir:	an unbeliever, one who is ungrateful to God for his gifts.
kalam:	theology, the subject that attempts to give rational proofs for religious beliefs; deals with such problems as the divine unity, attributes, human free will, and self-determination.
kanun:	state-promulgated administrative regulations or codes of law, usually dealing with financial and criminal matters; in contemporary usage, all codes of law promulgated by governments.
karamoko:	a West African title for scholar and teacher; *see also ʿalim*.
kasb:	economic gain; in theology, the technical term for acquisition of responsibility and of reward or punishment for good or bad deeds.
kashf:	lifting of the veils, the realization or vision of God as ultimate reality.
khalifa:	the successor of the Prophet and head of the Muslim community; the caliph; in Sufism, the disciple of the master authorized to transmit prayers, initiate new members, and act as a deputy or head of the Sufi order.
khan:	a Turkish title, originally the ruler of state but then applied to subordinate chiefs and nobles; also a caravansary.
khanaqa:	a building for Sufi activities where the *shaykh* may live, instruct his disciples, and carry on Sufi worship; *see also ribat, tekke, zawiya*.

kharaj:	the tax on land.
Kharijism:	early religio-political movements whose followers held that the caliph should be elected by the community.
kharja:	*see muwashshah*.
khatam:	the keeper of the seal.
khatib:	the official preacher who presents the Friday sermon; in principle, the representative of the ruler.
khirqa:	the patched cloak worn by Sufis and passed from master to initiate as a symbol of the communication of the blessings inherited from the Prophet.
Khojas:	a sect of Nizari Ismaʿilis in India.
khulʾ:	a wife-initiated divorce that requires the consent of the husband or a judicial decree.
khutba:	the Friday sermon.
khwaja:	a title variously used by merchants, scholars, and officials; in modern Turkish, *hoja*, a professional man of religion.
kiyayi:	the Indonesian term for religious leaders, scholars, and teachers, equivalent to *ʿulamaʾ*.
madhahib:	*see madhhab*. *madhhab* (pl. *madhahib*): a Muslim school of law; the four principal schools are the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi, and Hanbali schools.

madrasa:	a college whose primary function is the teaching of law and related religious subjects.
mahalla:	a town quarter.
Mahdi:	the "guided" one; the person who will appear on the last day and establish Islam and the reign of justice.
mahr:	in Muslim law, the gift that the bridegroom gives the bride, which becomes her personal property.
majlis:	a gathering, assembly, or council.
makhzan:	the Moroccan central government administration; royal court, army, and provincial officials.
maktab:	an elementary school for teaching children recitation of the Quran and the basics of reading and writing.
mallam:	the term used in West Africa for a religious scholar; *see also ʿalim*.
mamluk:	a slave or freedman in military service.
maqam:	a station on the Sufi path to unity with God acquired by the Sufiʿs own efforts.
maqsura:	the enclosed space in the mosque reserved for the ruler.
marjaʿ-i taqlid:	the source of imitation; in Iran, just and learned scholars of law qualified to give authoritative legal opinions; the common

	people are obliged to accept them as absolute religious authorities.
masjid:	a mosque or place of prostration and prayer; a center for Muslim communal affairs.
masnavi:	an epic poem in Persian and related literatures.
maʿsum:	a person who possesses infallibility, freedom from committing sins.
mawali:	*see mawla*.
mawla (pl. *mawali*):	a client or freedman, servant; the word also applies to the patron or master.
mawlid:	the celebration of the birth of the Prophet; also applies to celebrations at saints' shrines.
mazalim:	a royal administrative court for the adjudication of governmental problems, to which subjects could bring petitions or appeals.
mihna:	an inquisition, in particular the inquisition of the Caliph al-Ma'mun.
mihrab:	the ornamented niche in the wall of a mosque that indicates the direction of prayer.
millet:	religion or religious communities; in contemporary usage, nation.
minaret:	the tower of a mosque from which the call to prayer is proclaimed.

minbar:	the high seat or chair in a mosque from which the preacher delivers the sermon.
mi'raj:	the ascent of the Prophet to heaven in Jerusalem after the miraculous night journey from Medina.
mirs:	the descendants of the Prophet.
misr (pl. *amsar*):	the military camps and garrisons constructed in the early Islamic conquests; administrative capitals for the conquered provinces.
mobad:	a Zoroastrian clergyman.
mu'amalat:	Islamic laws pertaining to social relations.
mufti:	an expert in Islamic law qualified to give authoritative legal opinions.
muhajirun:	the emigrants who accompanied the Prophet on the *hijra* (q.v.) from Mecca to Medina.
muhtasib:	an official who supervises fair market practices and public morals.
mujaddid:	"the renewer"; the scholar or holy man who comes once every century to restore the true knowledge and practice of Islam.
mujtahid:	a person qualified to exercise *ijtihad* (q.v.) and give authoritative opinions on Islamic law.
mullah:	a learned man; often used in the Indian subcontinent; the equivalent of *'alim* (q.v.).
muqarnas:	the stalactite decoration of ceilings.

murid:	student, disciple, devotee of a Sufi master; name of a Sufi brotherhood in Senegal.
murshid:	a guide; a Sufi master and teacher; *see also Sufi*.
muwashshah:	a love poem; a form of Arabic verse popular in Spain, commonly ending in a *kharja*, or refrain of Romance origin.
nafs:	the soul; the animal faculties as opposed to the rational or angelic faculties.
naqib:	a syndic or headman.
naqib al-ashraf:	the syndic or headman of the groups of descendants of the Prophet found in many Muslim countries.
nasiha:	faithful advice to a ruler; exhortation to do good.
nass:	in Shiʿi usage, the explicit designation of a successor to the imamate, which confers on him knowledge and power appropriate to the office.
niya:	intention, the necessary state of mind for the validity of religious actions.
padishah:	a nineteenth-century title for the Ottoman sultans.
pançasila:	the five principles of Indonesian independence.
penghulu:	a headman, used in Indonesia as a title of a village administrator.

pesantren:	in Indonesia, a school or seminary for Muslim students.
pir:	a title for a Sufi *shaykh*.
pirzada:	the descendant of a *pir* or saint, or the manager of his tomb.
priyayi:	the governing and scribal class; the elite of pre-modern Indonesian society.
purdah:	the clothing and physical separation of women that prevents them from being seen by men.
qadi:	a judge; the caliph's designated representative to adjudicate disputes on the basis of Islamic law.
qa'id:	a tribal, district, or military chief; a term widely used in North Africa.
qalb:	in Sufism, the heart, the soul, the seat of conscience and knowledge.
qanat:	an underground irrigation canal, commonly used in Iran.
qasaba:	a fortified castle, residence of government officials; a chief town; in India, *qasbah*.
qasbah:	*see qasaba*.
qasida:	the classical Arabic ode that often eulogizes the tribe of the poet or a great man; the Persian *qasida* is a lyric poem.
qawm:	lineage, tribe, religious community, nation.

qibla:	the direction of the *Kaʿba* (q.v.) in Mecca, which Muslims face during prayers.
Quran:	Muslim scripture, the book containing the revelations of God to Muhammad.
qurraʾ:	Quran reciters, similar to the public poetry reciters.
qutb:	the pivot around which something revolves; the head of the invisible hierarchy of saints on whom the order of the universe depends.
raʾis (pl. *ruʾasaʾ*):	a person of high rank, a headman or chief.
Ramadan:	the ninth month of the Islamic year, observed as a month of fasting and prayer; one of the five pillars of Islam.
Rashidun:	the rightly guided; a title applied to the first four caliphs.
raʾy:	legal opinions and the reasoning used to derive them.
ribat:	a frontier fortress and residence for Muslim warriors and mystics.
ruʾasaʾ:	*see raʾis*.
ruh:	the soul, sometimes the equivalent of *qalb* (q.v.).
rustaq:	an administrative district comprising a town and subordinate villages.
sabr:	steadfastness, patience, endurance in fulfillment of religious obligations.

sadaqa:	voluntary alms, sometimes a synonym for *zakat* (q.v.).
sajjada nishin:	"one who sits on the prayer carpet"; the successor to the leadership of a *khanaqa* (q.v.) or the custodian of a Sufi shrine.
salah:	Muslim ritual prayer performed five times daily; in Persian called *namaz*.
samaʿ:	Sufi musical session intended to inculcate states of ecstasy.
santri:	in Indonesia, a student of Islam; a devout and correct Muslim.
sarkin:	a Hausa title for headman, ruler.
sawafi:	the crown estates seized by the Umayyad dynasty from former Sasanian royal and noble landowners.
sayyid:	a prince, lord, chief; a descendant of Husayn, the son of ʿAli.
shahada:	"witnessing"; the Muslim profession of faith.
Shah-en-shah:	the king of kings; a Persian title of the emperor.
shahid:	a witness, martyr.
Shariʿa:	the path to be followed; Muslim law, the totality of the Islamic way of life; divine law, but subject to human interpretation and to historical variations.
sharif (pl. *ashraf* or *shurafaʾ*):	a noble; a descendant of the Prophet.

shaykh:	an elder, head, chief, respected man of religion, Sufi leader, teacher.
shaykh al-Islam:	a chief jurisconsult or *mufti* (q.v.); the head of the religious establishment in the Ottoman Empire.
Shiʿis:	the group of Muslims who regard ʿAli and his heirs as the only legitimate successors to the Prophet, divided into sects according to allegiance to different lines of ʿAlid descent.
shirk:	polytheism, associating other beings with God, the ultimate blasphemy.
shura:	a council; specifically the council established by the Caliph ʿUmar to choose his successor.
shurafaʾ:	*see sharif.*
shurta:	the governor's police.
silsila:	the sequence of Sufi masters reaching back to the Prophet through whom a particular Sufi acquires his knowledge.
sipahi:	a cavalry soldier in the Ottoman Empire; appears in India as *sepoy*.
sira:	biographical narratives of the Prophet.
Sufi:	a Muslim mystic; named after the early ascetics who wore garments of coarse wool; *see also ishan, murshid, pir, shaykh*.
sultan:	"power," authority; the title of a Muslim monarch.

sunna:	"the trodden path," custom; the practice of the Prophet and the early community, which becomes for all Muslims an authoritative example of the correct way to live a Muslim life.
Sunnis:	those who accept the *sunna* (q.v.) and the historical succession of caliphs, as opposed to the *'Alids* (q.v.); the majority of the Muslim community.
sura:	a group of Quranic verses collected in a single chapter.
tafsir:	commentary and interpretation, the exegesis of the Quran.
tajdid:	renewal; applied to the post-eighteenth-century movement to revive the true practice of Islam based on the Quran and hadith; *see also islah*.
takfir:	to denounce a fellow Muslim as an apostate or infidel; a polemical tactic of extremist Islamic groups.
talakawata:	a Hausa term for the peasants and working poor.
talji'a:	commendation; *see also himaya*.
Tanzimat:	reorganization; the name for the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century.
taqlid:	"imitation"; the principle of following the established doctrines of the Muslim schools of law; the opposite of *ijtihad* (q.v.).

tariqa:	a way, the Sufi path; the system of beliefs and training transmitted by particular schools of Sufis; a brotherhood of Sufis.
tasdiq:	faith, affirmation of the truth of God's existence.
tawakkul:	trust in God.
tawba:	repentance, turning to God.
tawhid:	unity, the oneness of God's being and the unity of the mystic with the divine being.
ta'wil:	allegorical exegesis of the Quran.
ta'ziya:	the lamentation for a martyr; the mourning for Husayn displayed in processions and mystery plays in the month of Muharram; also refers to models of Husayn's tomb at Karbala kept in *imamzadas* (q.v.).
tekke:	the Turkish name for a Sufi residence; *see also khanaqa*.
timar:	the Turkish and Ottoman term for a grant of tax revenues to support a military retainer of the sultan.
tyeddo:	the name of the warrior slave elite in Senegambia.
'ulama':	the collective term for the scholars, especially scholars of law, or learned men of Islam; *see also 'alim*.
uleebalang:	an intermediary administrative official in the Malayan sultanates.

umma:	people or community; the whole of the brotherhood of Muslims.
'ushr:	the tenth of the produce levied on Muslim-owned lands.
usul-i jadid:	Islamic reformist and modernist movements in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian Empire.
uymaq:	in Iran and Inner Asia, a chieftaincy under the authority of a headman supported by military retainers and allied lineages.
Wafd:	an Egyptian liberal nationalist political party influential in the formation of a constitutional monarchy in the 1920s and 1930s.
wahdat al-shuhud:	unity of witness.
wahdat al-wujud:	unity of being, existential monism.
wali:	a protector, a benefactor, a companion, a governor; a friend of God, a saint or a Sufi whose tomb is visited for its blessing; the legal guardian of a minor, woman, or incapacitated person.
waqf (pl. *awqaf*):	an endowment; an irrevocable grant of the income of property set aside in perpetuity for a religious or charitable purpose.
watan:	country, motherland.
wazir:	"a helper"; the chief secretary of a ruler; head of the bureaucracy; prime minister.
wilayat:	a legal competence; power delegated to a governor or *wali* (q.v.); in Ottoman usage, a

	term for an administrative district.
wird:	a litany or patterned devotion chanted by Sufis.
yasa:	Mongol law.
zahir:	the external, literal meaning of a text, as opposed to *batin* (q.v.), its inner significance.
zakat:	a legal alms tax raised from Muslims.
zamindar:	landowner; under the Mughals, a person with a right to collect revenues from the land.
zanadiqa:	people who held dualistic or other heretical beliefs.
zawaya:	Berber North African religious lineages.
zawiya:	a building that functions as a Sufi residence, place of prayer, school, and the tomb of a saint; *see also khanaqa*.
ziyara:	a visit to the tomb of a saint or holy man to pray for intercession before God.

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Annotated bibliography from *A History of Islamic Societies*, second edition

Although this book is extensively revised, it is to a significant degree based on the second edition of *A History of Islamic Societies*. The following section reproduces the relevant portions of the bibliography from the second edition of *A History of Islamic Societies* to give the interested reader further suggestions for in-depth study, and to honor the earlier scholarship on which this book is based.

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography is intended as a guide to further reading and includes the most important translations and scholarly works. Most of the citations are to English-language works, but important materials in French, German, and other languages are suggested. Readers will find further bibliographical references in many of the cited works. J. D. Pearson, *Index Islamicus*, Cambridge, 1958–, covers the periodical literature of all Islamic regions from 1906 to the present and book literature from 1976 to the present.

The following abbreviations are used in the bibliography:

AIEO	*Annales de l'institut des études orientales*
BEO	*Bulletin d'études orientales*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies CMRS Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*
IJAHS	*International Journal of African Historical Studies*
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
JAH	*Journal of African History*

JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
REI	*Revue des études islamiques*
ROMM	*Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*
RSO	*Revista degli studi orientali*
SI	*Studia Islamica*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der deutschen morganländischen Gesellschaft*

PART I

Introduction

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