AN

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

EDITED BY
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WITH
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GENEALOGY OF THE OTTOMAN DYNASTY



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CHRONOLOGY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY, 1260–1923

1261–1300	foundation of the *gazi* principalities of Menteşe, Aydın, Saruhan, Karesi and Osmanlı (Ottoman) in western Anatolia
c. 1290–1324	**Osman I**
1324–62	**Orhan**
1326	Ottoman conquest of Bursa
1331	Ottoman conquest of Nicaea (İznik)
1335	fall of the Mongol Empire in Iran
1354	Ottoman occupation of Ankara and Gallipoli
1361	Ottoman conquest of Adrianople
1362–89	**Murad I**
1363–65	Ottoman expansion in southern Bulgaria and Thrace
1371–73	Ottoman victory at Chermanon; Byzantium, the Balkan rulers recognize Ottoman suzerainty
1385	Ottoman conquest of Sofia
1389	Ottoman victory at Kossovo-Polje over the coalition of the Balkan states
1389–1402	**Bayezid I, Yıldırım**
1396	battle of Nicopolis
1402	battle of Ankara, collapse of Bayezid I's empire
1403–13	civil war among Bayezid's sons for sultanate
1413–21	**Mehmed I**
1421–44, 1446–51	**Murad II**

1423–30	Ottoman–Venetian war for Salonica
1425	Ottoman annexation of İzmir and the reconquest of western Anatolia
1439	Ottoman annexation of Serbia
1443	John Hunyadi invades the Balkans
1444	revival of Serbian Despotate, battle of Varna
1448	second battle of Kossovo-Polje
1444–46, 1451–81	**Mehmed II, Fatih**
1453	conquest of Constantinople; fall of Pera
1459	conquest of Serbia and the Morea
1461	conquest of the empire of Trabzon
1463–79	war with Venice
1468	conquest of Karaman
1473	battle of Başkent
1475	conquest of the Genoese colonies in the Crimea
1481–1512	**Bayezid II**
1485–91	war with the Mamluks of Egypt
1499–1503	war with Venice; conquest of Lepanto, Coron, and Modon
1512–20	**Selim I**
1514	Selim defeats Shah İsmail at Çaldıran
1516	conquest of Diyarbekir; annexation of eastern Anatolia; defeat of the Mamluks at Marj Dabık
1517	battle of Ridaniyya, conquest of Egypt; submission of the sharif of Mecca
1520–66	**Süleyman I, Kanuni**
1521	conquest of Belgrade
1522	conquest of Rhodes
1526	battle of Mohács; Hungary becomes a vassal
1529	siege of Vienna
1534	conquest of Tabriz and Baghdad
1537–40	war with Venice

1538	siege of Diu in India
1541	annexation of Hungary
1553–55	war with Iran
1565	siege of Malta
1566–74	**Selim II**
1569	French capitulations; first Ottoman expedition against Russia; siege of Astrakhan
1570	Uluç Ali captures Tunis; expedition to Cyprus; fall of Nicosia
1571	battle of Lepanto
1573	peace with Venice and the emperor
1574–95	**Murad III**
1578–90	war with Iran, annexation of Azerbaijan
1580	English capitulations
1589	Janissary revolt in İstanbul
1591–92	further Janissary uprisings
1593–1606	war with the Habsburgs
1595–1603	**Mehmed III**
1596	Celali rebellions in Anatolia
1603–39	Iranian Wars
1603–17	**Ahmed I**
1606	peace of Zsitva-Török with the Habsburgs
1609	suppression of the Celalis in Anatolia
1612	extension of capitulations to the Dutch
1613–35	rebellion of Ma'noğlu Fahreddin
1618	peace with Iran, Ottoman withdrawal from Azerbaijan
1618–22	**Osman II**
1621	invasion of Poland
1622	assassination of Osman II
1617–18, 1622–23	**Mustafa I**
1623–40	**Murad IV**
1624–28	rebellion in Asia Minor; anarchy in İstanbul

1632	Murad takes full control of the government
1635	siege of Erivan
1624–37	Cossack attacks on the Black Sea coast
1624–39	war with Iran, fall of Baghdad
1637	fall of Azov (Azak) to Cossacks
1638	Ottoman recovery of Baghdad
1640–48	**İbrahim I**
1640	recovery of Azov
1645–69	war with Venice; invasion of Crete; siege of Candia
1648–56	Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles
1648	deposition and assassination of the sultan
1648–87	**Mehmed IV**
1648–51	the child sultan's mother Kösem in control
1649–51	Janissary dominance in İstanbul and Celali pashas in the Asiatic provinces
1651–55	anarchy in İstanbul, Venetian blockade continues
1656	Köprülü Mehmed appointed grand vizier with dictatorial powers
1656–59	reestablishment of the central government's control over the Janissaries and in the provinces
1657	lifting of Venetian blockade
1658–59	reestablishment of Ottoman control over Transylvania and Wallachia
1661–76	Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed's grand vizierate
1663	war with the Habsburgs
1664	battle of Saint Gotthard, peace of Vasvar
1669	fall of Candia, peace with Venice
1672–76	war with Poland, annexation of Kaminiec with Podolia, treaty of Zuravno
1676–83	Kara Mustafa's grand vizierate
1677–81	rivalry over Ukraine with Russia
1681	French attack against Chios
1683	siege of Vienna

1684	Holy League against the Ottomans between the emperor, Polish king and Venice
1686	fall of Buda, Russia joins the coalition; Venetians in the Morea
1687	second battle of Mohács; army's rebellion; deposition of Mehmed IV
1687–91	**Süleyman II**
1688	fall of Belgrade
1689	Austrians at Kossovo; Russians attack the Crimea
1689–91	Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa's grand vizierate; tax reforms
1690	recovery of Belgrade from Austrians
1691–95	**Ahmed II**
1691	battle of Slankamen; death of Fazıl Mustafa
1695–1703	**Mustafa II**
1695	fall of Azov
1696	Ottoman counter-attack in Hungary
1697	Ottoman defeat at Zenta
1698–1702	Köprülü Hüseyin's grand vizierate
1699	treaty of Karlowitz
1700	peace with Russia
1703	army's rebellion; deposition of Mustafa II
1703–30	**Ahmed III**
1709	Charles XII, king of Sweden, takes refuge in Ottoman territory
1711	battle of Pruth, Ottoman victory over Peter I of Russia, insurrection at Cairo, realignment of Mamluks; Shihabi supremacy over Mount Lebanon
1713	peace treaty with Russia: Azov recovered, Charles XII returns to Sweden; introduction of Phanariote rule in principalities
1714–18	war with Venice, recovery of the Morea
1716	war with Austria
1717	fall of Belgrade
1718–30	Damad İbrahim Pasha's grand vizierate

1718	peace treaty of Passarowitz with Austria and Venice: Morea recovered, large parts of Serbia and Wallachia ceded to Austria
1723–27	war with Iran, Ottoman occupation of Azerbaijan and Hamadan
1730	Patrona Halil rebellion; deposition of Ahmed III; end of Tulip period
1730–36	Iran's counter-attack; loss of Azerbaijan and western Iran
1730–54	**Mahmud I**
1736–39	war with Russia and Austria
1739	peace treaty with Austria and Russia; recovery of Belgrade
1740	extension of French capitulations; Ottoman–Swedish alliance against Russia
1743–46	war with Iran under Nadir Shah
1754–57	**Osman III**
1757–74	**Mustafa III**
1768–74	war with the Russian Empire
1770	Russian fleet in the Aegean; Ottoman defeat on the Danube
1771	Russian invasion of the Crimea
1773	Ali Bey's rebellion in Egypt
1774–89	**Abdülhamid I**
1774	treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, independence of the Crimea and northern coasts of the Black Sea from the Ottoman Empire
1783	Russian annexation of the Crimean khanate
1787	war with Russia
1788	Sweden declares war against the Russian Empire
1789–1807	**Selim III**
1792	treaty of Jassy
1798	Napoleon invades Egypt
1804	Serbs revolt

1805–48	Mehmed Ali as ruler of Egypt
1807	Selim's reform program crushed by revolt
1807–08	**Mustafa IV**
1808–39	**Mahmud II**
1808	Document of Alliance
1811	Mehmed Ali massacres Mamluk remnant in Egypt
1812	treaty of Bucharest
1826	destruction of the Janissaries
1832	battle of Konya
1833	treaty of Hünkiar-İskelesi with Russia
1838	Anglo-Turkish Convention
1839	battle of Nezib
1839–61	**Abdülmecid I**
1839	Tanzimat begins with Imperial Rescript of Gülhane
1853–56	Crimean War
1856	Imperial Rescript
1856	treaty of Paris
1861–76	**Abdülaziz**
1875	*de facto* Ottoman bankruptcy
1876	first Ottoman Constitution
1876–1909	**Abdülhamid II**
1878	treaty of Berlin
1881	formation of Public Debt Administration
1885	occupation by Bulgaria of eastern Rumelia
1896–97	insurrection in Crete; war with Greece
1908	Young Turk Revolution and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876
1909–18	**Mehmed V**
1911	war with Italy
1912	Balkan War
1914	World War I begins
1918–22	**Mehmed VI**
1920	establishment of French mandate over Syria and Lebanon and British mandates over Iraq and Palestine
1923	proclamation of the Republic of Turkey

PREFACE

HALİL İNALCIK AND DONALD QUATAERT

These volumes are intended for students and, more generally, the informed reader. They are also addressed to the specialist who should find much new material of interest. The authors are specialists in their fields and of the respective time periods on which they have written. The work was first planned by Halil İnalcık, who then invited the best-known scholars to participate, including Mehmet Genç and Halil Sahillioğlu. Generally, the authors of each chronological section survey political events before proceeding to the study of economy and society.

Some subjects of inquiry were not included either because research materials were lacking or because of space considerations. In the latter case, the authors make references to existing literature to guide readers. Thus, to keep the manuscript within manageable limits, Halil İnalcık left the history of urban life and industry before 1600 for another occasion and provided readers with sufficient bibliography on the subject.

This project was begun in 1985 and, inevitably, there were delays in its completion. Some sections were finished in late 1989 while others were prepared in Spring 1992. In some cases, new publications have appeared and are not discussed. For personal reasons, Mehmet Genç and Halil Sahillioğlu found it impossible to continue. And so, Bruce McGowan assumed sole responsibility for the eighteenth-century section and we invited Şevket Pamuk to write the monetary history. We are very grateful to Professors Genç and Sahillioğlu for allowing us to use their unpublished materials.

We have sought to respect the longevity and complexity of Ottoman history in our spellings of personal and place names and technical terms. Thus, we have used the spellings most appropriate to each particular time period and area. Otherwise, we have sought to use modern Turkish spelling whenever possible. We use the English terms for Arabic, Turkish

and Persian words that have come into English. In the text, we have sought to minimize the number of technical terms, but have had to use some to maintain accuracy. Hence, for example, *timar* is preferred to fief.

Halil İnalcık thanks his colleagues for agreeing to participate in this project. He is especially grateful to Donald Quataert for all his labours in helping to bring the project to fruition. In addition, he thanks C. Max Kortepeter for his generosity in taking considerable time to make stylistic suggestions.

Suraiya Faroqhi thanks Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, İdris Bostan, Linda Darling, Neşe Erim, Cornell Fleischer, Daniel Goffman, Ronald Jennings, Gülru Necipoğlu, Cemal Kafadar, Heath Lowry and Leslie Peirce. She wishes to thank Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert for commenting on the manuscript as well as Engin Akarlı, Halil Berktay, and Nükhet Sirman Eralp. And finally, for their help with historiographical issues, she thanks Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj, Chris Bayly, Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, Ariel Salzmann, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and İsenbike Togan.

Bruce McGowan wishes to thank, above all, Professor Mehmet Genç of Marmara University, who generously shared his expert advice on several historical concepts employed in Part III. The writer is well aware that the fit between this section and others is far from perfect. His own conception from the start was to provide a brief and interesting review of the literature which would be useful for students. The writer is, above all, grateful to have had access to the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago, the collections of the Oriental Studies Department of the University of Vienna, and the American Research Institute in Turkey.

Donald Quataert thanks Cem Behar, Alan Duben and Judith Tucker for providing manuscript versions of their research findings. He is especially grateful to Tom Dublin for his careful reading of an early draft. Thanks also to the Ottoman reading group of the Fernand Braudel Center and Faruk Tabak at Binghamton University as well as Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj for invaluable comments on various portions of the manuscript. Binghamton University has been very generous in providing the staff support, without which this volume could not have been completed. Marion Tillis has been the very model of efficiency in typing substantial versions of each of the four major contributions. Faruk Tabak has been invaluable for his editing and proofreading assistance.

Şevket Pamuk acknowledges the indispensable work of Halil Sahillioğlu over the last three decades as well as the extensive discussions in the summer of 1990. He also thanks Cüneyt Ölçer, Mehmet Genç, Zafer

Toprak, Yavuz Cezar, İsa Akbaş, Mehmet Arat, Linda Darling, Reşat Kasaba, Faruk Tabak, Oktar Türel and Halil İnalcık.

Halil İnalcık provided the chronology up to c. 1700 while Bruce McGowan and Donald Quataert respectively prepared most of the entries for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Halil İnalcık prepared the genealogical table, the lists of weights and measures and the glossary.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Auswärtiges Amt
A&P	Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, GB
AAH	*Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* (Budapest)
AAS	*Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem)
AE	Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Fr.
AHR	*American Historical Review*
AIESEE	*Association Internationale d'Études du Sud-Est Européen*, Bulletin
Annales, ESC	*Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*
AOr	*Acta Orientalia* (Budapest)
AO	*Archivum Ottomanicum* (The Hague)
AS	Annual Series, GB
ASI	*Archivio Storico Italiano*
Aus	Austria
B	*Belleten* (Ankara)
BAN	Bılgarska Akademia na Naukite, *Istoria na Bulgaria*
BBA	Başbakanlık Arşivi, now Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Turkey
BCF	*Bulletin consulaire français. Recueil des rapports commerciaux adressés au Ministère des affaires étrangères par les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de France à l'étranger*
BEO	Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası, BBA
Bel	Belediye, BBA
BF	*Byzantinische Forschungen*

Bl	*Belgeler* (Ankara)
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris
BN, MS	Bibliothèque National, Paris, MS fonds turc
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
BS	*Byzantinoslavica*
BSt	*Balkan Studies* (Thessaloniki)
BTTD	*Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* (İstanbul)
BuHI	*Berichte über Handel und Industrie*. Deutsches Reich (Germany)
CC	Correspondance commerciale, Fr
CED	*Coğrafya Enstitüsü Dergisi* (İstanbul)
Cev	Cevdet Tasnifi, BBA
CIEPO	*Comité International d'Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes* (İstanbul)
CMRS	*Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* (Paris)
CSP	*Calendar of State papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries of northern Italy: Venice*, 38 vols., London 1864–1947.
Dah	Dahiliye, BBA
DII	*Documenta Islamica Inedita* (Berlin)
DO	*Dumbarton Oaks* (Washington, D.C.)
EB	*Études Balkaniques* (Sofia)
EI²	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition
EcHR	*The Economic History Review*
EHR	*English Historical Review*
EUQ	*East European Quarterly*
FO	Foreign Office, GB
Fr	France
GB	Great Britain
GDAD	*Güney Doğu Araştırmaları Dergisi* (İstanbul)
Ger	Germany
HEMM	*Histoire économique du monde méditerranéen, 1450–1650, Mélanges en l'honneur de Fernand Braudel*, I–II, Toulouse 1973
HH	Hatt-ı Hümayun, BBA
HHSt A	Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Politiches Archiv (PA), Austria
HUS	*Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.)
İ	İradeler, BBA

IA	*İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul)
IFM	*İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*
IHR	*The International History Review* (Canada)
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
IJTS	*International Journal of Turkish Studies* (Madison)
ISN	*Istorija Srpskoga Naroda* (Belgrade, 1986)
JAH	*Journal of Asian History*
JAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JEEH	*The Journal of European Economic History*
JEH	*The Journal of Economic History*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JMH	*Journal of Modern History*
JOS	*Journal of Ottoman Studies (Osmanlı Araştırmaları)* (İstanbul)
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JSAH	*Journal of South Asian History*
JTS	*Journal of Turkish Studies*
Kepeci	Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi, BBA
k und k	*Berichte der k. u. k. Österr.-ung. Konsularämter über das Jahr . . .*, Austria
Mal	Maliye, BBA
MD	Maliyyeden Müdevver, BBA
MES	*Middle Eastern Studies*
MHR	*Mediterranean Historical Review* (London)
MM	Meclis-i Mahsus, BBA
MOG	*Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte* (Vienna)
MOI	*Mediterraneo e Oceano Indiano, 1970*: Atti del VI colloquio Internl. di storia marittima, 1962, Florence
MTM	*Milli Tetebbu'lar Mecmuası* (İstanbul)
MV	Meclis-i Valâ, BBA
PP	*Past and Present* (Oxford)
R	*Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* (Binghamton)
RC	*Rocznik Orientalistyczny* (Warsaw)
RCC	Rapports commerciaux des agents diplomatiques et consulaires de France
RCL	*La Revue commerciale du Levant, bulletin mensuel de la chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*, 1896–1912

RESEE	*Revue des Études du Sud-est Européennes* (Bucharest, 1924–42)
RH	*Revue Historique*
RHES	*Revue d'Histoire Économique et Social*
RIR	*Revista Istorica Romana*
RMMM	*Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* (Paris)
ROMM	*Revue de l'Occident Musulmane et de la Méditerranée* (Aix-en-Provence)
RRJTS	"Raiyyet Rüsumu, Essays presented to Halil İnalcık," *Journal of Turkish Studies*, X-XI, 1986
SB	*Studia Balkanica* (Sofia)
ŞD	Şura-yı Devlet, BBA
SF	*Südost-Forschungen*
SI	*Studia Islamica* (Paris)
SR	*Slavonic Review*
TA	*Türkologischer Anzeiger, Turkology Annual* (Vienna)
TAD	*Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* (Ankara)
TD	*Tarih Dergisi* (İstanbul)
TED	*Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* (İstanbul)
THİM	*Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* (İstanbul)
TİTA	*Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar, ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* (Ankara, Middle East Technical University)
TOEM	*Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*
TM	*Türkiyat Mecmuası* (İstanbul)
TSAB	*Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*
TTD	Tapu Tahrir Defterleri, BBA
TV	*Tarih Vesikaları* (İstanbul)
Ü	*Ülkü* (Ankara)
UPA	University Publications of America
USCR	Consular Reports of the United States
VD	*Vakıflar Dergisi* (Ankara)
VS	Vilayet Salnameleri
VSWG	*Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*
WI	*Die Welt des Islams*
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für der Kunde des Morgenlandes* (Vienna)
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift für der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*
ZstA	Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Potsdam, Auswärtiges Amt, Ger., former Democratic Republic



1 The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1512



2 The Ottoman Empire, c. 1550



3 Ottoman provinces and vassal states, 1609

4 The Ottoman Empire, 1683–c. 1800



5 Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, 1672–1913



6 Ottoman provinces, c. 1900

EMPIRE AND POPULATION

FORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Ottoman state came into existence around 1300 as a small frontier principality which devoted itself to the *gaza*, Holy War, on the frontiers of the Seljukid Sultanate in Asia Minor and of the Byzantine Empire. Its initial *gazi* frontier character influenced the state's historical existence for six centuries: its dynamic conquest policy, its basic military structure, and the predominance of the military class within an empire that successfully accommodated disparate religious, cultural, and ethnic elements. The society to which these elements gave rise followed in the tradition of earlier Islamic empires, but some of its most unique features were created by the Ottomans themselves.

The Ottoman crossing of the Dardanelles and settlement on European soil proved of crucial importance for the transformation of the Ottoman state from a rather insignificant frontier principality into an empire encompassing the Balkans and Asia Minor. Süleyman Pasha, son of the second Ottoman sultan, Orhan (1324–62), was responsible for the first Ottoman settlement in Europe. He first established himself on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1352 as the ally of John Cantacuzenus, pretender to the Byzantine throne. Two years later Süleyman seized the fortified city of Gallipoli and made it a strong base from which he initiated his conquests in Thrace. He soon attracted Turkish immigrants from Anatolia, landless peasants, nomads, and all kinds of uprooted people seeking a new life on the other side of the Straits. Thus the so-called Pasha *sancak*, which would embrace the entire Balkan peninsula, came into being.

After a precarious period following Süleyman's sudden death in 1357, the conquest of Thrace was resumed with renewed vigor under the command of his brother, Murad, and in 1361 the important city of Adrianople

fell to Ottoman forces. The rapid conquest of Thrace caused consternation in Byzantium and in Europe because the European approaches to Constantinople had fallen so rapidly into Ottoman hands. During the period 1362–89, Murad I subdued the greater part of the Balkans north to the Danube and made Ottoman vassals of most of the local dynasts, thus creating an empire composed of vassal states. In 1389, in the battle of Kossovo-Polje, the attempt of the assembled Balkan dynasties to throw off Ottoman domination failed.

Losing his father on the battlefield, Sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) vigorously took up the reins of government and consolidated his holdings in Anatolia. In 1393, he returned to the Balkans to establish centralized control over the Slavic principalities and to expand further to the north. Bayezid's rivalry with Hungary in the lower Danubian territories and with Venice in the Morea, Albania, and the Aegean resulted in an Hungarian–Venetian alliance against the Ottomans. When Bayezid began his siege of Constantinople, Hungary and Venice succeeded in mobilizing the Crusaders to stop him. But Bayezid surprised and defeated the Crusaders at Nicopolis in 1396. Thus he firmly established Ottoman rule in the Balkans and also gained enormous prestige for himself throughout the Islamic world. Egypt and Syria now believed themselves to be free from Crusader attack. Furthermore, the Ottoman sultan did not hesitate to eliminate the Turkish dynasties of Anatolia in an attempt to incorporate into his empire all lands west of the Euphrates in Asia Minor. As Bayezid strove to expand his territory and to build a strongly centralized state on the model of the classical Islamic states, he unavoidably became embroiled with the native military class in Anatolia who looked to Timur in the east for salvation and protection.

Now Timur, claiming himself heir to the Mongol Empire in Iran, claimed overlordship in all of Anatolia, including the Ottoman state. When Bayezid challenged Timur, he suffered a crushing defeat at the battle of Ankara in 1402, and his empire collapsed. As a result, the Anatolian dynasties reestablished themselves and the vassal states in the Balkans (Byzantium, Wallachia, Serbia and Albania) regained their freedom from the Ottomans.

Civil strife among contending Ottoman princes between 1403 and 1413 slowed greatly the Ottoman recovery in spite of Timur's death in 1405. Nevertheless, stability quickly returned during the reigns of Mehmed I (1413–21) and Murad II (1421–51), because they could build upon the prior solid institutions of the Ottoman state. Those forces – the Janissary army, the *timar*-holding *sipahis*, the ulema and the bureaucrats – had a vested interest in the revival of the centralized state and, under able leadership, made fundamental contributions to the remarkable recovery of the centralized Ottoman state. The critical juncture arrived when the Ottomans repelled Hungarian Crusader attacks in the Balkans at the battles of Zlatića in 1443, Varna in 1444, and Kossovo in 1448. Clearly the Ottoman forces once again showed their capacity to conquer new territories and this time they planned to conquer the Byzantine capital itself. One should also note that after Timur's blow to the first Ottoman empire under Bayezid I, the center of gravity of the state shifted to the Balkans. From the Balkans, the Ottomans reestablished their domination in western and northern Anatolia prior to the accession of Mehmed II, the Conqueror of İstanbul (1451–81).

Organization of the conquests, the frontier versus the center

During this period of expansion, the administrative set-up largely conformed to the military organization, clearly aiming for a centralized system. *Sancak*s, or sub-provinces, were placed under military governors known as *sancak-begis*. These *sancak*s became a part of the province of Rumeli (an equivalent of Romania of the Byzantine era), which was in turn governed by a *beglerbegi*, a military commander in charge of all provincial forces, including special frontier units.

The frontier forces, led by *uç-begis* (*uç* = frontier) were the most active part of the Ottoman army. These *uç-begis* played a major part in the internal and external affairs of the empire during the period 1360–1453. These forces were organized under hereditary family leaders, with one *uç-begi* on the right wing in the direction of the Lower Danube and Wallachia, one on the left wing in the direction of Macedonia, and one in the center in the direction of Sofia and Belgrade. As the conquests proceeded, the frontier lines in these *uç-begis'* districts advanced further, from the Balkan range to the Danube, from Thrace to Macedonia and then to Albania and Bosnia, and from Philippopolis to Sofia and Niş.

During the interregnum after the defeat of 1402, effective power in the state passed into the hands of the frontier begs. However, starting with Murad II's (1421–51) assigning of his own men, mostly from among the palace servitors, to frontier commands, centralist policies increasingly became important until they came to predominate under Mehmed II (1451–81). Before the completion of this process, the

rivalry grew acute between the frontier forces under hereditary *uç-begis* and the cavalrymen holding *timars* in the hinterland. In fact, this rivalry helps to explain many of the tensions and upheavals during the period, including the Sheyh Bedreddin rebellion of 1416 which, until now, has not been interpreted against this background. Pretenders to the Ottoman throne also took refuge in the frontier zones, which were always centers of dissension against the central government.

Yet it was the frontier begs who played a crucial role in pushing the Ottoman borders forward during this same period. Under the pressure, many of the Balkan princes and lords readily accepted Ottoman overlordship to spare themselves from the continual raiding of the frontiersmen. Once the lands had become tribute-paying territories, their non-Muslim inhabitants assumed the status of *ahl al-zimma*, i.e., protected subjects of the Muslim state in accordance with Islamic Law.

The transformation from tributary status to total annexation and assimilation into the Ottoman system, that is, being registered as a *sancak*, varied in time with the particular circumstances of each territory. In general, however, the period of transition consisted of first tightening the bonds of vassalage by eliminating local dynasties and refractory elements, and then replacing all remnants of the pre-Ottoman administrative apparatus with the *timar* system, the basic building block of Ottoman provincial administration.

This policy of gradual absorption of occupied territories persisted, as a rule, well into the sixteenth century. The annexation of Hungary is a case in point. Only after an autonomous Hungary was proving unviable, in the face of the Habsburg threat, was the Danube basin turned into an Ottoman province under a *beglerbegi*. Only special conditions enabled certain territories, such as Wallachia and Moldavia, to persist as autonomous entities long past the sixteenth century.

The heritage of the early Ottoman frontiers can also be observed in the peculiar ethnic composition of the Balkans under Ottoman rule. The successive frontier zones in Thrace, eastern Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thessaly in the fourteenth century became zones where Turkish immigration and culture came to predominate, with such frontier centers as Plovdiv, Sofia, Babadağ, Silistre, Vidin, Skopje, Seres, Triccala and Argyrocastron. In these areas the dense settlement of Turkish peasants in the villages followed the same pattern as that of Turkish expansion in western Anatolia, with pioneering dervish hospices (*zaviyes*) and the sedentarization of semi-nomadic Yörük groups.

The conditions of Ottoman expansion in Europe

As indicated, the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans was carried out by stages in the half century 1352–1402. The conquest was facilitated by a number of factors. The Balkan peninsula at this time comprised a patchwork of small states divided among feudal lords or dynasts. The Ottomans exploited the rivalries among these local leaders in order to extend their own control, first as their allies and later as their protectors. Both Hungary in the north and Venice to the south and west also tried to take advantage of this political fragmentation, but since their rule would entail the domination of Catholicism, which regarded Orthodox Christians as schismatics, it was generally resisted by the Balkan population. As the protectors of the Orthodox Church, who accorded its clergy a place in their own state organization, the Ottomans emerged as a Balkan power from the earliest conquests, in spite of the Hungarian and Venetian efforts. Indeed, one can cite many instances of cooperation of local Orthodox priests with the Ottoman state.

In each Balkan state, the local aristocracy and palace generally followed a pro-Western policy. In return for military aid from the West, these privileged elements promised to recognize the supremacy of the Roman Catholic rite. This policy greatly alienated the populace from their feudal lords, and there was always a pro-Ottoman faction among the elite.

It was, however, the social conditions prevailing in the Balkans in the fourteenth century which made the Ottoman expansion possible. With the decline of central Byzantine authority, according to recent scholarship, the holders of large military and monastic estates in the provinces, who had increased their privileges and tax exemptions at the expense of Constantinople or various local regimes, became autonomous in their own regions. To support their tiny feudal states, they tightened their control over the land and peasantry and imposed heavy taxes and labor burdens upon them.

By reversing this tendency toward feudalization of the Balkans, the Ottomans established a strong centralized regime, similar to certain states of Western Europe in the fifteenth century. During this centralization process, the Ottomans restored to state proprietorship, or control, the bulk of the lands found in the hands of local lords or families and monasteries. In many cases, it is true, they reassigned part of these lands to their previous owners, but these local lords were now made Ottoman *timar*-holders under strict state control. To be sure, the Ottoman sultans brought about this change largely because they had created a strong

central military force, the Janissary corps, the first standing army in Europe. Under the direct command of the sultan, this corps increased from 1,000 in the 1360s to 5,000 under Bayezid I (1389–1402).

The reassertion of state control over agricultural lands brought with it substantial changes in the circumstances of the Balkan peasantry. Under the new regime, many corvées and other feudal obligations were simply abolished. Taxation and exemptions, the status of groups and individuals, and land titles were all regulated by laws issued by the central government in the name of the sultan. Their administration and execution was entrusted to the district kadis and begs. Under Bayezid I this centralized administration came into full force for the first time. A significant feature of Bayezid's policies was his reliance on the *kuls*, the palace servitors trained to be loyal and efficient instruments of the imperial administration.

Taxation and reaya

Under the Ottoman regime the population was divided into two main groups. The *askeri*, the military or administrative class, performed some public function as the delegates of the sultan and was thereby officially exempted from all taxation. The second group, the *reaya*, the merchants, artisans and peasants (literally "the flock"), pursued productive activities and therefore paid taxes.

The Ottoman system imposed more simplified and initially lighter taxes on the *reaya* than the former Byzantine–Balkan system.

The state also exempted from the extraordinary (wartime) levies, the *avarız*, certain groups of *reaya* who rendered some special service, such as guarding mountain passes and fortresses or contributing special supplies to the palace or army. These groups, known as *muaf ve müsellem* to signify their exempted status, made up a kind of intermediary class between the *askeris* and the *reaya*.

All these groups – the *askeris*, the *reaya* and the *muaf ve müsellem* – were recorded in special registers on the basis of surveys made at regular intervals throughout the empire. However, a certain degree of mobility existed among these groups, making the Ottoman system much less strict than the rigid compartmentalization of a caste system. Indeed, there were recognized ways for *reaya*, both Christian and Muslim, to become military. The *devshirme*, the levy of Christian children, furnished one such opportunity for Christians to join the military class. Also, to ease the effects of their conquest, the Ottomans

in the early period often incorporated into their own system pre-Ottoman military groups called *proniar*, *voynuk* (*voynik*), *martolos*, etc. For Muslim *reaya*, it was possible to be enrolled in the military by a special decree of the sultan if, as volunteers on the frontiers, they accomplished some outstanding act of courage.

Nonetheless, the general principle was adhered to that each individual should remain in his own status group so that equilibrium in the state and society could be maintained. It seems that the Ottoman system found its logic in the fact that the state had been established through the efforts of a small professional military group, a kind of warband gathered around its military leader, Osman Ghazi. The dynasty preserved this central position as a keystone of the entire socio-political structure.

As a productive but dependent class, the *reaya*, Christian or Muslim, was obliged to submit to *askeri* leadership and to pay taxes. The ruler, in accordance with ancient tradition, was described as the shepherd protecting his flock, the *reaya*, and leading them in the righteous path. This concept in practice found expression in the many protective measures by which the sultan tried to show his concern for the condition of the *reaya*. As will be noted below, the whole political apparatus was based on this principle; and the Ottoman sultans endeavored to indicate to the masses that the sultan was their ultimate protector against all manner of local abuses and injustices.

The foundation of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Mehmed II (1451–81)

To Mehmed II fell the responsibility of completing the centralist and absolutist Ottoman system in Anatolia and the Balkans (see Map 1). By taking Constantinople, Mehmed the Conqueror felt that he was the most powerful sovereign in the Islamic world, and he thus challenged the Islamic empires in Iran and Egypt. He also acquired in his own person, immense, unprecedented authority which he used to create the prototype of Ottoman padishah, an absolute monarch in the tradition of ancient Persian kings or Turkish khans.

Claiming that the conquest of the imperial capital entitled him to restore the furthest boundaries of the Eastern Roman Empire, Mehmed II embarked upon a series of expeditions that, in a quarter of a century, resulted in the annexation of Serbia (1459), the Morea (1459), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463–64), Euboea (1470), and northern Albania (1478–79) in the Balkans; and the territories of the Candarids in Kastamonu-Sinop

(1461) and of the Karamanids in central Anatolia (1468). The southern shores of the Crimea were annexed and the Crimean Khanate was brought under Ottoman suzerainty in 1475. Mehmed's efforts to take Belgrade (1456), gateway to Central Europe, the island of Rhodes (1480) and Italy (1480), failed. Nonetheless, his conquests had made the Ottoman Empire a territorially compact unit between the Danube and the Euphrates, thus reviving Bayezid I's domain, although on a far more substantial foundation. This same expanse of territory endured as the heartland of the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century. For this rapid expansion of the empire, the effective use of artillery and the augmentation of the Janissaries from five to ten thousand men must receive much credit. But one should not underestimate the policy of reconciliation (*istimalet*) which Ottoman sultans practiced in newly conquered territories.

In order to resolve the most important problem of all pre-modern empires, notably the formation of a central treasury large enough to finance imperial policies, Mehmed resorted to a number of harsh, innovative financial measures. Its fiscal policies are at the heart of the widespread, and even violent, discontent that marked the end of Mehmed's reign.

İstanbul, the new capital, became the symbol of Mehmed's ambition for a universal empire. Throughout his reign he made every effort to transform İstanbul into a political and religious metropolis, as it had once been in the days of the great Roman emperors. He styled himself caesar and the ruler of the two continents and two seas. He soon forcibly repopulated the dilapidated and neglected city with Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Jewish colonies from various parts of the empire. He also extended his official recognition and accorded high honor to the Greek Patriarchate of İstanbul and later on his successors invited the Armenian Patriarch to take up residence in the city. On the other hand, he reconfirmed the commercial privileges of the Italian maritime states.

In an effort to revive economic prosperity in İstanbul, he built commercial centers – a large covered bazaar in the "old city," and lesser bazaars in the port area (Tahtakale) and in the middle of the city (Fatih). While the population of Constantinople was estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000 just before the conquest, according to a census taken in 1478, it held 14,803 families, perhaps a total of over 70,000 people. İstanbul was to grow rapidly under Mehmed's successors, and one century after the conquest it was the largest city in the Middle East and Europe with a population of at least 400,000. The rise of the Ottoman capital cities,

Bursa, Edirne (Adrianople), and İstanbul, as populous and thriving commercial centers had profound effects on the new economic structure of the Middle East and the Balkans. Even after the rise of İstanbul, Bursa continued to be the main emporium for Iranian silk bound for Italy, and a local silk industry developed there supplying brocades and other silk fabrics to the Ottoman palace and to other markets in the Middle East and Europe.

As a result of the violent reaction against the Conqueror's financial policies, the government of his successor, Bayezid II (1481–1512), assumed a most reconciliatory stance. For example, it restored to their former possessors, whether pious foundations or private landowners, most of the lands confiscated and distributed as *timar* by Mehmed II. The generally peaceful and benevolent reign of Bayezid II witnessed significant internal development. It was particularly under Bayezid that İstanbul was firmly established as an economically viable city. The great expansion of the central treasury enabled the state to reinforce the army and navy, increase the number of Janissaries equipped with handguns, and to construct, with the supervision of Genoese engineers, warships of a size never before seen on the Mediterranean.

Ottoman sea power and imperialism

Following in the tradition of the sea *gazis* or corsairs of western Anatolia, dating back to the early fourteenth century, the Ottoman navy under Bayezid I had already challenged the Venetians from its fortified staging point on Gallipoli. Later, under Mehmed II, the navy played a crucial part in establishing Ottoman domination over the Aegean and Black Seas; and contributed to the war effort against the Mamluks (1485–91) by attacking Syrian coasts. Most remarkable of all, the Ottomans effectively challenged the Venetians on the open sea in the Venetian War (1499–1503).

The contemporary historian, Ibn Kemal, emphasized that the Ottomans had surpassed in power all preceding Muslim sultanates because, among other things, they had turned their state into a formidable sea power in the Mediterranean. In fact, during this first era of Ottoman naval ascendancy, the Turkish sea *gazis* appeared in the western Mediterranean to aid the Muslims of Spain who had appealed to Bayezid II for help. The Mamluks, too, requested Ottoman supplies and experts to rebuild their navy at Suez after their defeat at the hands of the Portuguese in 1509.

The rise of Ottoman sea power in the Mediterranean had far-reaching consequences not only in the extension of Ottoman rule to the Arab lands from Syria and Egypt to Morocco, but also in their expulsion of the Portuguese from the Red Sea. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the ground work for the spectacular rise to world power under Selim I (1512–20) and Süleyman (1520–66) was laid in the reign of Bayezid II.

The caliphate

Until Sultan Mehmed II a kind of solidarity had generally been maintained between the Ottomans and Mamluks in the face of the crusading West and the threat from the Timurids in the east. Rivalry first manifested itself over the questions of suzerainty for the Turcoman principalities in the border zone, the Karamanids, the Zülkadirids and, later, the Ramazanids.

Prior to the Ottoman challenge, the Mamluks had been considered the leading Sunni Muslim power because they had defeated the Mongols, had become the protectors of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina and also maintained the descendents of the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo. Careful in their propaganda to distinguish the Arabs from their "Mamluk oppressors," the Ottomans, under their energetic Sultan Selim I (1512–20), decided to end Mamluk rule in the Arab lands.

The Ottomans quickly established their rule in Syria and Egypt following Selim's victories over the Mamluks at Marj Dabık on August 24, 1516, and Ridaniyya on January 22, 1517. The sharif of Mecca, at that moment under the threat of a Portuguese invasion, hastened to recognize Selim's authority over the Hejaz.

A legend, apparently fabricated in the eighteenth century, tells us that Al-Mutawakkil, a descendent of the Abbasids, handed over his rights as caliph to Selim I in an official ceremony. In fact, Selim was quite content at that time to take only the title of protector (or servant) of Mecca and Medina. Although Süleyman I later on styled himself "caliph of all the Muslims in the world," he meant by this to emphasize his role as protector of the Muslim world. Thus, the new Ottoman concept of the caliphate was actually an extension of the original Ottoman concept of leadership in the Holy War (*gaza*). In line with his policy of world leadership, Süleyman tried to demonstrate his role as protector of Muslims all over the world. In 1538 he dispatched a fleet to oust the Portuguese from Diu in India. Upon the appeals of the sultan of Atjeh in Sumatra, he sent technical aid, and he planned an expedition to expel the Muscovites from the Lower Volga in order to open trade and pilgrimage routes for the Muslims of Central Asia.

After the seventeenth century, however, the Ottoman sultans no longer had the capability to project their power for the sake of Muslims. Instead, they increasingly emphasized their legal rights as caliphs by making reference to the definitions of the caliphate which had been formulated by religious authorities of the tenth century. This emphasis on legality would lead, in the nineteenth century, to a Pan-Islamist movement under Abdülhamid II (1876–1909).

The traditional idea of *gaza*, combat against the infidel, was recast by the Ottomans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to support Ottoman expansion in the east at the expense of their Muslim neighbors. When the Ottomans decided to take action against their Muslim rivals – the dynasts of Anatolia, then the Akkoyunlus, and finally the Safavids in Iran – they accused them of obstructing the Ottomans in the latter's performance of their essential duty, the Holy War against Western Christendom. The Ottomans found additional justification against the Shiite Safavids when the Ottoman ulema readily gave approval for war against "the heretics."

Ottomans and the West

The strong autocratic military state of the Ottomans provided the means by which the Islamic world first resisted and then passed to the offensive against the West. The struggle began on a large scale when the Ottomans, taking advantage of the divisiveness arising from the appearance of Protestantism and national monarchies in Europe, launched a series of sustained attacks against the Habsburgs in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. This resulted in the occupation of Hungary (1526–41), the first siege of Vienna in 1529, and the naval victory at Preveza in 1538. During the period 1528–78, the Ottomans pursued an active diplomacy in Europe, everywhere supporting forces opposed to the Papacy and the Habsburgs, such as the Calvinists in France, Hungary and the Netherlands, the Moriscos in Spain and the rising national monarchies in France and England. In addition to concerted military expeditions, the Ottomans expressed their support by granting commercial privileges to friendly nations (France in 1569, England in 1580, and the Netherlands in 1612). In the long run, these commercial rights gave a powerful boost to those Western economies supported by the Ottomans.

Another pillar of Ottoman diplomacy at this time was to avoid a two-front war. In particular, the empire wanted to avoid a war with Iran when engaged in Europe. This goal was thwarted in 1603 when Shah Abbas (1588–1629) declared war and took back all of the Ottoman conquests in Azerbaijan while the Ottomans were engaged in a long and ruinous war with the Habsburgs (1593–1606). The treaty of Zsitva-Török with the Habsburgs in 1606 is justly regarded as a reversal in the tide of Ottoman fortunes and the beginning of decline. The Ottoman failure meant that a traditional Asiatic culture, even when it had borrowed war technology from the West, was doomed before the rise of modern Europe. It is to be noted that the Ottoman decline was as much the outcome of Western Europe's modern economic system as of superior European military technology. The Ottoman economy and monetary system collapsed in the 1600s mainly because of the aggressive mercantilistic economies of the Western nations that replaced the Venetians in the Levant.

The time of troubles at the end of the sixteenth century – the decline

As factors paving the way for the crisis of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries we can cite the influence of increase in population, Europe's new military technology and the monetary and financial crisis.

Violence had already erupted in Anatolia in the middle of the sixteenth century, notably during the episodes involving the princes Mustafa and Bayezid. Thousands of unemployed Anatolian peasants flocked to the rival princes as mercenaries in hopes of earning military class status under the banner of their victorious prince. Timariot-*sipahis* who had lost their *timars* or whose *timars* had become devalued constituted one of the chief elements of the unrest. In addition, thousands of young peasants, eager to share in the prerogatives of the religious class, filled the religious colleges in towns in Anatolia, but devoted much of their energies to pillaging and despoiling these towns and the countryside. The Balkans had helped to siphon off a good part of the Anatolian population when the frontier zones afforded young men intent on embracing a military career ample opportunity to demonstrate their valor as *gönüllüs* (volunteers). However, in the second half of the sixteenth century, Ottoman expansion in Europe came to a standstill and the organization of *akıncıs*, frontier raiders, collapsed.

In Anatolia, meanwhile, population pressure on the arid Anatolian plateau continued. This pressure has been studied on the basis of Ottoman population surveys, but its precise scale can never be calculated.

After 1578, the wars with Iran stimulated large numbers of young men of *reaya* origin to enroll in the armies. In a sense the wars with Iran and Austria at the end of the sixteenth century were in part a consequence of the growth in population, since it set in motion a variety of social, political and financial pressures within the empire.

In the vast conquered regions of the Caucasus, thousands of *reaya* from Anatolia functioned as timariots or as guardians of fortresses. But, and it is this that Ottoman observers of the decline decry so bitterly, this very mobility irrevocably compromised the guiding principle of the Ottoman system, that of the separation of the *reaya* from the military.

With respect to other causes of decline, Ottoman writers of the period stress the reduced autonomy of the imperial divan and its bureaus, particularly in the wake of the battle waged against the Grand Vizier Sokollu by power groups newly arrived in İstanbul upon Selim II's accession (1566). The traditional independence of the administration, in better times the guarantor of state interests, was restricted by the palace courtiers and other irresponsible people. Thus began the corruption and disintegration of the laws and statutes of the empire, one of the most far-reaching consequences of which was the large-scale transfer of *miri* (state lands) from state control into *mülk* (private proprietorship lands) and *vakf* (pious foundation) status. Also at this time the religious class, ulema, tended to interfere more and more in the administration and in the laws promulgated by the crown. Questions relating to sultanic laws and administrative regulations became increasingly subject to the *fetva*, the official opinion of the Sheyhülislam, head of ulema, in accordance with religious authority. This clerical influence reinforced Sunnite conservatism and severely curtailed the government's freedom of action in response to changing conditions.

The Ottoman writers of that period, then, attribute the decline primarily to the corruption of institutions that had achieved their apogee under the rule of Süleyman the Lawgiver. Unquestionably there is a good bit of truth in all this and modern historians for the most part are in agreement with it. But the Ottoman writers failed to discern all of the contributing causes and to appreciate the true significance of the changes that were occurring in their own time.

Earlier we touched on the problem of over-population while underlining the difficulty of determining with any clarity its consequences. We now turn to a consideration of the military and financial systems, which bear directly on the issue.

The wars with Iran which began in 1578 and lasted intermittently until 1639 should be regarded as one of the principal causes of the decline of

the Ottoman Empire. The invasion and occupation of Azerbaijan and Shirvan in the years 1578–90 were highly destructive, not only for the Turkish military structure but also for the Ottoman finances. The occupation troops stationed in these lands constantly had to be reprovisioned from Anatolia. Then, in 1603, the Iranian counter-offensive threw the Ottoman soldiery stationed there completely back into Anatolia.

During the wars against Austria from 1593 to 1606, the need to send into battle infantry troops equipped with firearms resulted in a significant increase in the number of Janissaries (7,886 in 1527 and 37,627 in 1610) and, in Anatolia, in the enrollment of large numbers of *sekban* mercenaries (mostly of peasant origin) – all with firearms. During interludes of peace when their services were not required, these mercenaries, lacking salaries and employment, roamed the countryside exacting tribute from the Anatolian population. *Sipahis*, dispossessed of their *timars*, or no longer able to make a living off them, were among those who joined the armed groups. Known as Celali, these packs of bandits so terrorized the countryside that they were a chief cause of rural depopulation and of the ruin of Anatolian agriculture. As a result, the state was paralyzed just when the Iranians mounted their counter-offensive between 1603 and 1610. At the same time Macedonia and northern Bulgaria experienced similar disorders in which Christian bands took an important part.

The same scenario repeated itself more than once during the wars of the seventeenth century, but particularly between 1683 and 1699. The Ottomans were unable to do without the service of the *sekbans* and the other variously named armed mercenaries in wartime. To pay them, and the inflated number of Janissaries as well, the central treasury had to search for new sources of revenue. The fact that the Ottomans had been obliged since Lepanto in 1571 to maintain a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean as a counterweight to the allied fleet only added to the financial strain.

After 1590 the treasury suffered huge deficits. In the same period the increase in the *avarız* (emergency levies) and the *cizye* (non-Muslim poll-tax) and in the abuses committed during their collection aggravated the discontent of the *reaya*. The *avarız* became a tax payable in cash on a regular, annual basis, and its rate continued to rise over the years (40 aspers in 1582, 240 in 1600, 535 in 1681). The *cizye*, which amounted to 40 aspers per person in 1574, climbed to 70 in 1592, 150 in 1596, 240 in 1630, and 280 in 1691.

A factor with devastating effects for Ottoman financial stability was the depreciation of silver coin, the principal cause of which was the flow

of cheap silver from Europe after 1580. Ottoman markets were flooded with European silver and with counterfeit currency. Since the taxes and impositions attached to the *timar* were not raised, their nominal value remained unchanged although their real value had actually fallen sharply. Not surprisingly, the *sipahis* and other timariots tried to make up for their loss in income by inventing new taxes or demanding higher rates on the old from the already hard-pressed *reaya*. The numerous uprisings of the Janissaries during this time also relate directly to their reduced real income and the instability of the currency.

As a result of these upheavals, the Ottoman Empire of the seventeenth century was no longer the vital empire it had been in the sixteenth. The *timar* system, born of conditions peculiar to the Middle Ages, was irretrievably shattered. It had been supplanted by a gun-bearing army of mercenaries and a central treasury shifting to taxes paid in cash. The Ottoman asper was replaced by European currency; and the economy entered the orbit of the European mercantilists.

THE EMPIRE'S POPULATION AND POPULATION MOVEMENTS

Population

The most reliable figures on the Ottoman population of the fifteenth century come from the tax surveys (see below, pp. 133–39) and *cizye*, poll-tax registers.[1] Regarding non-Muslims the poll-tax registers from the Hegira years of 893 to 896 (December 17, 1487 to October 5, 1491) give the data in Table 1:1. The total *cizye* revenue for the year 1489 is 32,407,330 *akça* for all groups. The figures comprise *hanes* (households) and widows who inherited their husbands' land. *Hane* does not mean all the people living under one roof but married couples with an independent source of income. Thus, a married son living in his parents' house but with an independent source of income constitutes one *hane*. A household is an economically independent family.

It is, however, not possible on the basis of these figures even to approximate the total non-Muslim population for this period. The non-Muslims subject to the poll-tax were those adult males over 12 or 15 years old capable of sustaining themselves through economic activity. But in rural areas in general the head of the peasant household (*hane*) was responsible for all taxable persons and paid one *cizye* for the household. Also, poll-tax surveys excluded non-Muslims exempt from this tax, namely clerics,

Table 1:1. The poll-tax paying non-Muslim population, 1488–91

	Households			
	1488	1489	1490	1491
The Balkans				
Regular *cizye*-paying households	639,119	646,550	621,508	639,387
Groups subject to lower *cizye* rates (Eflaks and miners in the Bosnia, Serbia and Salonica region)	19,079	34,902		34,970
Total	658,198	681,452		674,357
Anatolia	—	—	32,628	—

Source: Barkan (1964).

slaves, destitute people, the retinue of military personnel and sometimes members of Christian militia.

By the date of our survey, the Ottoman territory comprised the Balkan lands north to the rivers Danube and Sava, excluding northern Bosnia and Croatia which were under Hungarian control, and Dalmatia, under the Venetians, including some fortresses and islands in the Greek and Aegean archipelago.[2] The total of the registered non-Muslim households subject to a poll-tax amounted to about 674,000 in the Balkans and about 32,000 in Anatolia in 1491. Assuming after Barkan that the exempted population consisted of 6 percent of the total population with an average household of five individuals, there was a non-Muslim population of about four million in the Ottoman Balkans in the 1490s.

As for Anatolia, the Ottoman territory by 1490 was delimited by a line approximately from Trabzon to the bay of Antalya, leaving out all of eastern Asia Minor. In this region, with a total of 27,131 Christian households, the Trabzon–Rize region, conquered from the Comneni in 1461, was the only one with a compact Christian population by 1490.[3] By contrast, in western Anatolia, which was invaded by the Turcomans much earlier, at the turn of the thirteenth century, the non-Muslim population subject to the poll-tax numbered only 2,605 households, and those in the rest of Anatolia 2,856 (see Table 1:2), most of whom were Greeks and Armenians together with small Jewish communities in the cities.

In the period 1520–35, the taxable Christian households in the five Anatolian provinces numbered 63,300 or 7 percent of the total population, while it had been c. 32,000 around 1490. The increase might have

Table 1:2. Non-Muslim population in Anatolia, 1489

	Households		
	hane	*bive*	
Saruhan	480	94	Mostly Greeks
Aydın	570	172	
Menteşe	168	51	
Teke	236	33	
Hamid	491	112	
Germiyan	167	31	
Ankara	728	46	Mostly Armenians
Kiangiri (Çankırı)	504	34	
Kastamonu–Sinop	1,253	282	Mostly Greeks
Bigacık	9	—	Greeks
Total	4,606	855	

Source: Barkan (1964).

resulted from a population growth which was a general trend for the period 1490–1535 and less efficient registration, or from immigration from the east. The entire number of Balkan converts to Islam numbered 94 households in the Hegira year 893, and 255 for the years 893–96.[4] The Christian boys levied for the Janissary corps and the palace servitors who would later join the military class after training are not included in this figure.[5] In the period 1520–35 there were in Anatolia only 271 taxable Jewish households and in the province of Diyarbekir 288.

In other words, by the end of the fifteenth century Anatolia to the west of the Euphrates was predominantly a Muslim country settled by immigrant Muslim Turks, or converted native populations. There was no question that widespread islamization had occurred. This was mostly a result of a socio-cultural process during the three centuries of Turkish Seljukid rule.[6] Judging from the Ottoman population and tax registers of the second half of the fifteenth century, western Anatolia had by then been mostly settled by Turcomans.[7]

We do not have data for the Muslim population of Anatolia before the period 1520–35. In this period, according to the calculations of Ö.L. Barkan the taxable Muslim households for the same area in 1490 numbered 832,395.[8] Added to this figure are the military households exempt from taxation which constituted a small group, mostly living in the towns. Through the same surveys, the population growth in the five Asiatic provinces are shown in Table 1:3.[9] By 1580, multiplied by five, the population of these five provinces was 6,802,370 as against 4,636,050

Table I:3. Population growth in Anatolia

	Households		
	1520–30	1570–80	Growth %
Anatolia (western Asia Minor)	474,447	672,512	41.7
Karaman (central Asia Minor)	146,644	268,028	82.8
Zülkadriye (Kırşehir–Maraş area)	69,481	113,028	62.6
Rum-i Kadim (Amasya–Tokat area)	106,062	189,643	79.0
Rum-i Hadis (Trabzon–Malatya area)	75,976	117,263	54.0
Total	872,610	1,360,474	

Source: Barkan (1970), p. 169.

around 1490. Here the growth rate varies from 41 to 82 percent according to the particular region.

In reality, households in the towns consisted of three to four individuals and were smaller than those in the countryside.[10] Barkan's coefficient of five for each *hane* or household is discussed by L. Erder,[11] in light of modern demographic theory. Ottoman *hane*, Erder points out, is often purely a fiscal convenience and is not geographically constant. Taking the male population above the age of puberty which is recorded in certain types of Ottoman tax and population registers and using the theory of the relationship of population growth rates and the changing age composition of a population, Erder finds all multipliers are confined to a relatively narrow range of between 3 and 4.

In any case, Barkan suggests that the Ottoman Empire joined the spectacular population growth in the Christian western Mediterranean by an average increase of 59.9 percent in the period 1520–80, which Braudel sees as reasonable.[12] The increase, Barkan adds, was as high as 83.6 percent in large cities. Based on the increase in the number of households, the conclusion must be reliable except for possible small discrepancies in the figures due to the deficiency of successive surveys. In any case, the average household cannot be less than two persons, which gives a population of 1,664,790. Every time we added one person to the household the difference would be a population of about 800,000 higher. So, calculations of population on the basis of taxable households are quite hypothetical. But we are more certain in calculating population increases since our sources use the *hane* household all the time. By 1535, Syria and Palestine, as well as the provinces of Diyarbekir (southeast Asia Minor) and Zülkadriye had been annexed to Ottoman territory. By 1535, the total number of taxable Muslim households in the Asiatic provinces, including Cilicia and the Arab provinces of Syria and Palestine and the

Table I:4. *Sancak* population increase in the *liva* (sub-province) of Damascus

Year	No. of villages	No. of Muslim taxable households	Annual revenue in millions of *akça*
1521	844	38,672	12.6
1548	1016	63,035	13.6
1569	1,129	57,897	15.8

Source: Barkan (1957).

military personnel, numbered 1,067,355 households, or about 5,300,000 individuals if we apply the same coefficient of five. When Christians and Jews were added it came to 1,146,697 or 5,733,485.

In sum, Barkan suggests,[13] for the period 1520–35, a population of 12 or 12.5 million in the Ottoman Empire including the population not entered in the tax registers in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Braudel proposes a maximum of 22 million for the greatest extent of the empire by the end of the sixteenth century. For the end of the century,[14] however, Barkan surmises a drastically larger population of 30–35 million; he estimates a natural growth of 60 percent and adds also the population of the territories annexed after 1535 (Syrmia, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovakia in Europe; northern Abyssinia, Hejaz, Yemen, Iraq, Al-Hasa, and the North African coasts).[15] Evidently, Barkan's figure must be exaggerated.[16] In our calculations we have to consider also the particular conditions of the Ottoman conquest. In general, there was a regression in prosperity and population in the newly conquered lands by the Ottomans as documented in Syria, southeast Asia Minor[17] and Hungary.[18] But when Ottoman rule was firmly established and order and security came back, recovery and development followed and the population increased (Table I:4).

Population pressure

The growing Turcoman nomadic migration into the frontier zone in western Anatolia was one of the principal causes of the westward drive of the Turks in the period 1260–1400. Population pressure, interpreted as economic shrinkage and growing poverty, as a result of the increasing discrepancy between the population and economic resources,[19] is also taken up by several Ottomanists as a major issue to explain the crisis and structural changes in the Ottoman Empire experienced in the period

1580–1620.[20] Several indices were used to determine whether or not real population pressure occurred in that period.

In order to test the hypothesis on population pressure during the sixteenth century in Anatolia, Michael Cook examined demographic and economic data from Ottoman surveys.[21] Earlier studies (in particular those of Akdağ, Braudel and Güçer) had to rely on the contraction in wheat exports, rising prices, shortages and famines in the empire as the main indicators of population pressure. Cook examines the question by investigating the ratio of population to economic resources and whether the ratio changed considerably over a given period of time in selected areas. Studying such related phenomena as unavailability of marginal land, a rise in land prices, an increase in the number of landless peasants and emigration he concluded that "the population growth was more rapid than the extension of cultivation." He also discussed "a demographic saturation under the sixteenth century conditions." Cook suggests figures for the ratio between the population growth and the extension of cultivation as 17 to 12 in the period 1475–1575 using an index with a base level of 10 in 1475. It should be noted that the average peasant household landholding had fallen from half a *çift* to a third or even a quarter of a *çift* by the end of the period, in the areas examined. Reduction in size of the family farm is undoubtedly a sign of crisis for the rural population as well as for the *çift-hane* system (see below, pp. 153–54) as a whole. Cook also draws attention to the fact that food prices rose faster than wages but no statistical evidence is offered. More intensive exploitation of the soil or a shift to more profitable crops are also suggested as indicators of population pressure.[22] Faroqhi concurs with Michael Cook in observing the discrepancy between the population increase and grain production growth. Faroqhi and Erder examined population changes in the areas of Şebin-Karahisar and Kocaeli in two periods.[23] In both cases the authors observe that "some decline of population occurred towards the end of the sixteenth century" and assert that "this was in fact a generalized phenomenon."

For population estimates and changes some unexpected developments have also to be considered. For example, for the sharp increase in total population in the Karahisar area, the exodus of the Christian population from eastern Anatolia as a result of the Celali depredations might be another explanation. Faroqhi also suggests that, despite legal prohibition, there was a trend to subdivide the *çift* units during the sixteenth century and this may be one of the results of the population increase (Table 1:5).

Table 1:5. Population density estimates of the Ottoman Empire and European countries, 1600 (persons per square mile)

Country	Density
Italy	97
France	86
Low Countries	112
Britain	56
Turkey in Europe (the Balkans north to the Danube and Drava Rivers)	41
Turkey in Asia (approximately Turkey today, excluding Thrace)	20

Source: McGowan (1982), p. 174 n. 3.

Population movements

From the beginning, Ottoman society was made up of immigrants, uprooted people, pastoralists in search of pastures, jobless soldiers or landless peasant youths seeking their fortunes and a new life on the frontier. Early popular Ottoman chroniclers say: "These Ottomans sympathize with uprooted strangers (*garibs*)."[24] Evidently Ottomans believed that prosperity and expansion of the state revenues were primarily dependent on human energy and skills. It will be seen that *timar*-holders or *vakf* trustees encouraged people to come and settle on their territory since the most important component of means of production was labor in this rural economy with limitless marginal land available for agriculture.

The Ottomans always welcomed refugees. Tens of thousands of Jews expelled from Spain, Portugal and Italy came and founded prosperous communities in towns under the protection of the Ottoman sultans during and after 1492. Groups of Moriscos expelled from Andalusia in the sixteenth century were settled in the heart of Galata.[25]

Old Believers from Russia survived to the twentieth century in northwest Anatolia. In the last centuries of the empire, hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from Russian invasions of the Balkans, Circassia and Crimea were welcomed and settled by the Ottoman government in Anatolia.[26]

Although usually circuiting in their *yurt*, which is an area with well-defined summer and winter pasturelands, the pastoral nomads, particularly numerous in the large area stretching from the desert of northern Syria and Iraq to western Anatolia, sometimes migrated en masse in search of better pastures when the central government's authority weakened or when they were pushed by more powerful nomad groups. Thus, a continuing stream of nomads, mostly Turcomans, but also Kurds

and Arabs, moving from east to west, reached western Anatolia, the Aegean Islands and the Balkans throughout Ottoman history.

On the other hand, the state's deportation policy, political and social upheavals such as the Celali depredations and sometimes population pressure in a particular region played a major role in the shifts of population in the empire. Migrations of pastoral nomads were always particularly conspicuous in the process.

As was true in the Byzantine and Iranian empires, the Ottomans, too, applied the policy of forced deportation of population in an effort to get rid of a rebellious ethnic group or to colonize a particular area important for the state. We find, for example, the rebellious Çepni Turcomans from the Black Sea region of Canik settled in Albania in the early fifteenth century, Tatars from the Tokat–Amasya region, in the Maritsa valley, and Turcomans of Saruhan (western Anatolia) in the vicinity of Skopje by the 1390s. A large-scale colonization occurred under Mehmed II when he deported en masse peasants from newly conquered lands of Serbia and the Morea, and Turcoman nomads to the villages around İstanbul which had lost their Greek population during the siege of Constantinople. In 1455, he also deported all of the Jewish communities in the Balkan towns to repopulate and stimulate economic activities in his new capital of İstanbul.[27] He caused Greeks to settle in İstanbul also from his successive conquests in the Morea, the Aegean Islands, Trabzon, and certain central Anatolian towns. Armenians from central Anatolia, the two Phocaeas and Caffa, as well as Muslims from Anatolia were brought to İstanbul in the years 1459–75. Selim I brought to İstanbul about 200 households of craftsmen from Tabriz and 500 from Cairo.

A massive population shift occurred as a result of the upheaval which the Celali bands caused in Anatolia in the period 1596–1610.[28] In the contemporary sources the exodus to other provinces as far afield as Rumeli, the Crimea and Syria was labeled "the great flight." Then, the government took drastic measures to ensure the return of these peasants to their abandoned villages in Anatolia.[29]

In 1613 in the wake of the Celali disorders the clans making up the Boz-Ulus Turcomans in eastern Asia Minor began to shift to central Anatolia as far as Kütahya, causing great harm to the cultivated lands on their way.[30] During the seventeenth century, the migration from central Arabia of the Arab tribal confederations of the Shammar and the Anazeh to the northern Syrian desert appears to have caused a mass migration of the Turcoman and Kurdish clans to the central and western provinces of Asia Minor. We find then Boz-Ulus Turcomans in the Ankara, Aydın and Amasya–Tokat areas.[31]



7 Turcoman İl or Ulus confederations in Asia Minor
Source: Sümer (1949–50), pp. 437–532; *idem* (1967), pp. 199–362

The Turcoman nomadic populations and their economy

The Seljukids of Anatolia representing a centralized bureaucratic state supported the peasantry and the commercial interests against the Turcoman pastoral population. Pushed by the state to marginal lands, the Turcomans were concentrated on the frontier zones and mountain pasturelands of the ranges of the Taurus mountains to the south and the Pontic mountains from Bolu to Trabzon in the north. On the dry central Anatolian plateau from Konya to Ankara there was another Turcoman pastoral concentration (see Map 7). Actually, because of the necessity of the seasonal transhumance between summer and winter pastures, *yaylak* and *kışlak*, the Turcomans took their herds in winter to the lowlands in the valleys of the major river beds in southern and western Anatolia.[32] Ignoring the borders they penetrated deep into the western Anatolia valleys, which were under the control of the Byzantines,[33] from the eleventh century until the time when they conquered and settled these valleys under the *gazi* leaders.[34]

Known as Türkmen, Yörük, or later Kızılbaş,[35] Turkish nomads made up about 15 percent of the population in the Anadolu province in the 1520s (this province stretched to a line between Sinop and Antalya Bay in the west). If we add the *yaya* and *müsellem*, military groups of nomadic origin, the percentage goes up to 27. In fact, the great Yörük concentrations were found in the sub-provinces of Ankara, Kütahya, Menteşe, Aydın, Saruhan, Teke, and Hamid. These seven *sancak*s combined had a nomadic population of about 80,000 households[36] (see Table 1:6).

A great number of Turcoman tribes had been there since the first Turkish invasion of Anatolia in the last decades of the eleventh century.[37] Later, a constant stream of nomads, mostly Turcoman, continued to increase the nomadic population in the region.

While the general population growth in western Anatolia from the period 1520–35 to 1570–80 is calculated to be 42 percent, the growth of the nomadic population is 52 percent, a fact explicable by immigration from the east rather than natural growth.[38] Turcoman westward mass migration gained momentum when the Ottomans established a bridgehead in the Balkans in 1352. When Turcoman overseas raids were blocked at İzmir by western Crusaders,[39] that is in 1348, Turcoman migration took a new direction and an exodus began from the Denizli–Aydın–Saruhan region to the Dardanelles, and thence into Thrace and eastern Balkans during the early Ottoman conquests. Ottoman surveys show that this Turcoman mass migration and settlement had a revolutionary

Table 1:6. Nomad households (*hane*) of western Anatolia (Anadolu *beglerbegiliği*) according to the Ottoman survey registers of the periods 1520–35 and 1570–80

Sancak	1520–35	1570–80
Alaiye	227	455
Ankara	9,484	23,911
Aydın	6,692	3,693
Biga	99	2,066
Bolu	461	2,003
Hamid	4,978	11,814
Hüdavendigar	1,600	2,055
Karahisar-Sahib	2,385	1,729
Karesi	—	2,445
Kastamonu	1,248	1,457
Kiangiri (Çankırı)	?	976
Kocaeli	?	?
Kütahya	15,164	23,935
Menteşe	19,219	16,912
Saruhan	6,640	15,072
Sultanönü	255	2,095
Teke	8,816	5,601
Total	77,268	116,219

Source: Barkan (1957), p. 30.

effect on the demography of the eastern Balkans and Thrace. Along with the Ottoman policy of transferring disorderly nomadic groups into the Balkans in order to turkify and secure new conquests, a large-scale voluntary immigration took place during the fourteenth century in the same regions. A detailed map based on Ottoman surveys by Barkan demonstrates this dramatic change in the ethnic composition of the population.[40] As occurred earlier in western Anatolia that was not, to use Speros Vryonis Jr.'s words, "a typical military conquest . . . but an ethnic migration of nomadic peoples of substantial numerical proportions."[41] In the eastern Balkans between the Black Sea and a line of the Mesta and Yantra rivers, Turkish settlements formed the majority of the population both nomadic and sedentary at the beginning of the sixteenth century (Table 1:7).

The Ottoman administration re-organized the pastoral tribes of eastern Anatolia into two large confederations: the Turcomans into Boz-Ulus and the Kurds into Kara-Ulus. Disputes often broke out between the two *ulus*.

By that time the majority of the Turks had already converted to a sedentary life in the towns and villages. Even then, Turcomans were still

Table 1:7. The militia of yörük origin in the Balkans, 1560

Under *subaşı* (commander)	Number of *subaşı*	*eşkünci* (soldiers)	*yamak* (assistants)
Salonica (Macedonia, Thessaly)	13	3,000	9,000 (600 *ocak*)
Vize (northern Thrace)	4	525	1,575
Yanbolu (Upper Tunca river)	?	?	?
Naldöken (Eski-Zagra, Filibe)	42	1,715	7,548
Ofçabolu (İştip-Üsküp)	1	485	2,218
Kocacık (Yanbolu, Varna, Shumen)	?	900	2,700
Tanrıdağ (western Thrace, Thessaly)	47 (in 1591)	2,125	14,710
Kesriye (Castoria area)	?	?	?

Source: Gökbilgin (1957).

densely populated on the eastern Balkan range between Aytos (Aydos) and Stara Zagora, and on the Rhodopes between Batak, Haskovo and Komotini. Another Yörük concentration existed in the mountain area north of Salonica. The Dobruja steppe in the north of Varna and Shumen was almost thoroughly occupied by the Yörüks. By contrast in the western Balkans there were only sporadic Yörük groups in the area west of the Mesta and Yantra rivers. They lived on the heights north of Skopje and on the Karatova mountain south of Küstendil. On the other hand, massive Yörük nomad groups were settled in the Maritsa valley between Haskovo and Pazarjık, who were located there in villages and towns by the turn of the fifteenth century. According to the early sixteenth-century Ottoman registers, nomads of the Muslim faith in the Balkans were as shown in Table 1:8.

During their seasonal transhumance between the winter pastureland in the Berriye steppe in northern Iraq, and the Bingöl mountains in the north between the Murad and Euphrates rivers the Boz-Ulus tribes had to pay various dues to several local Kurdish lords (Table 1:8a). The Ottoman administration abolished these dues and replaced them by a single tax consisting of one sheep for every herd of 300 to be levied for the state treasury at the fording of the Murad river.[42] In İçili, in the heart of the Taurus mountains, Yörüks made up the majority of the population[43] and there was a constant emigration to the surrounding provinces where they were engaged in agriculture in the sixteenth century. They migrated

Table 1:8. Muslim nomads in the Balkans

	Households
Yörüks	14,435
Yörüks (militarily organized)	23,000
Müsellems (of Yörük origin)	12,105
Total	49,540

Table 1:8a. Tribal confederations in eastern Anatolia

	Households	Sheep	Total tax to be paid (in *akça*)
Boz-Ulus (Turcomans)	7,325	1,998,246	c. 2 million
Kara-Ulus (Kurds)	?	?	c. 1 million
Şam (Damascus) Turcomans	?	?	100,000
Other scattered clans in the province of Diyarbekir	273		14,806

Source: Barkan (1943), pp. 143–44.

to the coastal plains in winter.[44] By 1530 many of them became sedentary or were engaged in field agriculture or viticulture as a supplementary activity.

Nomads and the economy

It is misleading to follow uncritically the judgments of the sedentary people, particularly the bureaucrats of the central administration, regarding the nomads.[45] In fact, Turcoman nomads constituted an integral part of the sedentary society and fulfilled certain functions without which the society could not survive.

The Ottoman state, recognizing this fact, took measures to accommodate the nomads in its imperial system.[46] Each clan was given a *yurt*, consisting of summer and winter pasturelands the limits of which were determined and were entered in the imperial registers. In this *yurt* area, along with animal husbandry, Turcomans were also engaged, though marginally, in agriculture. They reclaimed land in forests or swamps to grow wheat, cotton and rice for their own needs or for the market. Most of the land, for example, in the river valleys in western Anatolia and in lower Cilicia were malaria-stricken swamps left uncultivated. Coming for their winter encampment Turcoman nomads reclaimed part of this land for such cash crops as cotton and rice[47] (see below, p. 162). When they left for summer pastures they stationed watchmen and came back

for the harvest. Such temporary settlements turned into small villages over time (pp. 167–71). Ottoman surveys show that in certain western Anatolian lowlands Turcomans grew cotton which was sold to Italians at the ports of Ephesus (Ayasoluk), Palatia (Balat) or on the island of Chios. The total value of the raw cotton purchased by the Genoese there reached the enormous amount of more than half a million gold ducats in the 1450s.[48] Pegolotti (toward 1340) mentions such export items as wheat, rice, wax, hemp, gallnuts, alum, opium, madder-root, valonia and "Turkish silk."[49] In the trade agreements made between the Turcoman emirs and the Italian mercantile states particular reference is made to wheat, dried fruits, horses, oxen, sheep, slaves, wax, hides and alum as export items and to wine, soap, and textiles as imports. Elizabeth Zachariadou's studies[50] based on Latin sources shed light on the economic recovery of western Anatolia under the Turkish emirates, thus modifying the gloomy picture of the complete destruction and decline of the region under Turcoman rule. Over time, under the tolerant emirs, a symbiosis between the Turcomans and the Greek population appears to have been established.

Along with wheat and cotton, the export of carpets became the subject of an international trade and made a tremendous impact on the Turcoman economy and society in western Anatolia.[51] In the 1330s, Ibn Battuta,[52] speaking of Aksaray near Konya, says: "There are manufactured there the rugs of sheep wool called after the place, which have no equal in any country and are exported from there to Syria, Egypt, Iraq, India, China and the lands of the Turks." Later on particularly the Uşak–Gördes–Kula basin in the upper Gediz river became an internationally known center of carpet manufacturing. This unique development was associated with various factors. Geography of the region with the high pasturelands on the surrounding mountains densely settled by the Turcoman pastoralists supplied wool in abundance and cheap as well as skilled labor. Best quality madder and alum for dyeing, the fast running streams for washing the raw wool and finishing the carpets and the Gediz river for transport to the sea offered the ideal conditions. Over time prosperous towns emerged in the basin which were all inhabited by the Turcomans, who spent two or three months each summer on the surrounding mountains.[53]

We have to bear in mind that animal husbandry supplied the foodstuffs and basic raw materials such as wool and hides for urban industries and had a vital economic significance in preindustrial societies in the east as well as in Europe. It is no surprise that wool and hides always came on

top of the lists of exports to Europe from Ottoman Anatolia and the Balkans from the fourteenth to the twentieth century (see pp. 263–65).

Another fact about the Anatolian pastoralists is that they monopolized land transportation of the empire not only in the private sector but also in state enterprises. The camel is the most important animal for the Yörüks. Camels were used to carry baggage under difficult circumstances, but the Yörüks also employed them in the transport business and to make money. Considering the importance of the camel, they did not slaughter them for food, and they called them a "major capital" item. Some pastoralists even became capitalists, hiring shepherds to tend their flocks and engaging themselves in long-distance transportation or in the trade of livestock.

In 1555, the Imperial Ambassador Busbecq's remark[54] that the Ottoman Empire came into being thanks to rice and camels reveals to us an important point (rice was the basic food in campaigns because of its durability). The Turcomans bred hybrids using the Arabian dromedary and Bactrian types, which were suited to the Anatolian cold and rainy climate and rugged terrain. Tavernier observed that new breeds employed in the caravan traffic between Tabriz and İstanbul were larger in size and carried more load than the dromedary.[55] They pulled themselves out of mud without difficulty. Anatolia's huge camel population disappeared only in the twentieth century when the railroad network was completed.

The camel was used in the transport of all kinds of heavy equipment, such as arms and ammunition and provisions for the army, as well as for bulky and heavy commercial goods. The camel had a carrying capacity of about 250 kg, twice as much as a horse or a mule, and relatively little cost was involved. The Ottoman army was able to move from the Euphrates to the Danube in one season with all of its heavy equipment and arms. Without the camel, transport costs would have been prohibitive for carrying wheat, flour and barley for provisioning the army and the isolated fortresses. It was no coincidence that in 1399 Bayezid I took away as part of his booty ten thousand camels from the Antalya region. The camel drivers in this area and in western Anatolia were either Turcoman or "immigrant Arabs."[56] In short, the Ottoman armies depended on the camel-driving nomads for their transport and logistic services. It was again for this reason that the Ottomans lacked hard surfaced roads. Although the palace maintained a relatively small number of camels for the transport of the sultan's baggage, they would hire tens of thousands of camels and nomadic drivers for the army during a campaign.

When, under certain conditions, Yörüks were obliged to take up a sedentary life they could do so without much difficulty within a short adjustment period (pp. 170–71). In their pastoral life they often practiced agriculture as a supplement to their economy. Yörük villages are recognizable by being smaller and more primitive than the surrounding larger villages as observed in Deli-Orman and Dobruja or central Anatolia.[57] The Ottoman tax and population surveys of the fifteenth century show that western Anatolia by then had a predominantly sedentary population of Turkoman origin, and thanks to its integration into European trade through its exports of wheat, cotton, raisins, figs, alum, carpets, wool and hides, the area became one of the most prosperous provinces of the empire.

It has been argued[58] that in the sixteenth century rapid growth in the peasant population caused a general expansion of arable lands at the expense of pasturelands, so that the Yörüks had to retire progressively to marginal lands on the higher altitudes. The increasing number of the settlements of agriculturists in forest areas is primarily explained by the same factor. In the sixteenth century, in eastern Anatolia the struggle between the pastoralists and the peasantry became a serious question for the government. When the region, particularly the Erzurum–Pasin corridor, became the passageway of the Ottoman armies, the peasant population abandoned the land and scattered. Then, pastoralists from the south came to use the land as summer pasture. As the government assigned the land as *timar* to *sipahis*, these men brought peasants back and tried to turn the land back to cultivation.[59] Thereupon the pastoralists were forbidden to come and graze their herds. Frustrated by the sultan's order, the nomads threatened to leave the country altogether and go to Azerbaijan under the shah of Iran.[60] In fact, there occurred a continuous flight of the Turcoman clans to Azerbaijan in the sixteenth century.

Seasonal migration of the tribes, mostly of Kızılbaş Turcomans, in search of pastures on both sides of the Ottoman–Iranian border, was one of the main causes of conflict between the Ottomans and Safavids. Because the herdsmen disregarded the political borders, a similar situation existed between Poland and the Ottoman Empire in the same century (see pp. 285–91). In general, western Yörüks in central Anatolia from the Sivas area to the Mediterranean and from the Sakarya valley to the Aydın province, taking advantage of the more favorable climatic conditions, were engaged in agriculture as supplementary to animal husbandry, while tribes in northern Syria and eastern Anatolia were more

completely dependent on pastoralism.[61] In general, in order to increase their *timar* incomes, *sipahis* were particularly anxious to convert the pastures reserved for the pastoral nomads into cultivated lands. One of the excuses they employed was the claim that the nomads had abandoned the pasture.[62] In short, the theory of arable land's expansion at the expense of pastureland was a fact of sixteenth-century Anatolia.

Since shifting nomads from one area to another did not usually disrupt tax revenues, a situation which was unavoidable with the peasants, the state employed Turcomans on a wide range of public works. It used them as auxiliary troops in the Balkans (Table 1:7), or deported them from Anatolia and settled them in Rumeli in strategically important places along the roads, in the mountain passes, etc. The nomad labor force, in return for tax exemption, was widely exploited in various state enterprises such as mining, rice growing, or training horses for the state. The state also assigned particular groups of nomads to supply regularly the palace or army with certain provisions, such as butter, and bows and arrows.

In their delicate economy, nomads were more susceptible than sedentary populations to adverse factors. An epidemic could wipe out their herds, thus reducing them to utter poverty. Under such conditions, they resorted to brigandage or enrolled in the imperial army as mercenaries for a small salary. Being segmented, unprivileged groups in the Ottoman society, they joined every movement against the established order. Being inaccessible in their mountains, rebellion became endemic with the Yörüks on the Taurus range and among the Albanian tribes in the Balkans. In eastern Asia Minor, where the pastoral economy prevailed, the Ottoman administration tried to compromise with the tribes by respecting tribal autonomy under hereditary chieftains. The taxes, nominal in amount, were collected and delivered by the chieftain, and, in return for privileges, the obligation of military service under hereditary chieftains was required.

Muslim and Christian mountain peoples presented certain common features. As a rule, the imperial administration divided the traditional large tribes into independent clans under chiefs officially recognized and controlled. Although their *yurt* area and the tracks followed in their seasonal transhumance between summer and winter pastures were defined in official registers, conflicts with peasants and administrative authorities were not infrequent. The pastoralists hated the bureaucratic restrictions, the registration and the taxes and, whenever the central authority grew weak, they became restless and out of control.