

Actors in Global Governance

The complexity of global governance is a function not only of its many forms, but also of its many actors. To be sure, states are central actors in IGOs and in many other forms of global governance, but IGO bureaucracies, treaty secretariats, NGOs, multinational corporations (MNCs), scientific experts, civil society groups, international credit-rating agencies, think tanks, major foundations, networks, partnerships, private military and security companies, as well as transnational criminal and drug-trafficking networks are among the many nonstate actors (see Figure 1.1). As one pair of scholars put it, "In essence, global governance implies a multiactor perspective on world politics" (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 191). Still, "the novelty is not simply the increase in numbers but also the ability of non-state actors to take part in steering the political system" (Biermann and Pattberg 2012: 6). Thus, studying actors in global governance means examining the nature and degree of various actors' participation as well as their relative power and authority.

States

States continue to be key actors in global governance. States alone have sovereignty, which has historically given them authority not only over their own territory and people, but also over powers delegated to international institutions. To be sure, today's reality is that sovereignty is compromised by many states' own weaknesses, by globalization, the Internet, and social media, by conditionality on international aid, and by the influences of international norms and NSAs such as banks, global financial markets, and NGOs. Traditionally, states have been the primary sources of IGOs' funding and of military capabilities for multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement. They create international law and norms and determine their effectiveness through their compliance or failure to comply. States are also still a primary locus of people's identities.

Because the more than 190 states in the international system vary so dramatically, however, their relative importance in global governance

Figure 1.1 Actors in Global Governance

- States and their subnational and local jurisdictions
- IGOs and their bureaucracies
- NGOs
- Experts and epistemic communities
- Networks and partnerships
- Multinational corporations
- Private foundations

varies. Large, powerful states and smaller, less powerful states. Many major states now under way. The past are changing, making the

Historically, the United States after World War II to shape much of the international system, including the liberal international system, both its hard material power and its soft power to promote the principles of multilateralism. To promote liberal ideas, scholars have argued, the US role. IGOs offered a way to promote liberal notions of political order and economic interests as well as to provide support for such institutions was not possible if public commitment were general. The United States and many other countries. The prediction that the relatively large share of global power by the United States reinforced the programs of many IGOs.

Nonetheless, the history of US influence in international institutions is a mixed one, as shown by the League of Nations in 1921, of the UN Charter in 1948, of the UN Convention on the International Criminal Court in 1998. The United States has used its veto in the Security Council other four permanent members. The US dues to the UN from 1985 to 1991. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

To be sure, US hegemony was challenged by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Cold War in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The end of European colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s by the country's own quasi-imperialism in Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism and cost the United States legitimacy in international order that US hegemony had established.

Today, however, the United States is not alone. As one journalist commented, "The US has formidable strengths. . . . But its global dominance it enjoyed in the 1990s has collapsed in 1991 and the financial crisis" (Rachman 2011: 63).

Emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil challenge US and Western dominance.

varies. Large, powerful states are more likely to play greater roles than are smaller, less powerful states. With significant shifts in the relative power of major states now under way, however, patterns that have prevailed in the past are changing, making the future difficult to predict.

Historically, the United States used its dominant position after World War II to shape much of the structure and rules of the postwar international system, including the liberal international economic order. Because it used both its hard material power and its soft power of attraction and persuasion to promote the principles of multilateralism and compromise as well as to promote liberal ideas, scholars refer to US hegemony in characterizing the US role. IGOs offered a way to create structures compatible with American notions of political order and through which to promote US political and economic interests as well as ideas and values. Although domestic support for such institutions was not necessarily ensured, governmental and public commitment were generally strong both in the United States and many other countries. The predominance of Americans in many secretariats and the relatively large share of operating and program funding contributed by the United States reinforced US influence over the policies and programs of many IGOs.

Nonetheless, the history of the United States and international commitments is a mixed one, as shown by the rejection of membership in the League of Nations in 1921, of the proposed International Trade Organization in 1948, of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, and of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. Since 1972, the United States has used its veto in the UN Security Council more than any of the other four permanent members. The US Congress withheld full payment of US dues to the UN from 1985 to 2000 and has held up reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2010.

To be sure, US hegemony was challenged throughout the Cold War by the Soviet Union and its allies and by the rise of nationalism among states in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean that gained their independence from European colonial rule in the 1950s and 1960s. It has also been challenged by the country's own quasi-imperial overstretch and wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terror, which have drained resources and cost the United States legitimacy among friends and allies. Yet the international order that US hegemony created persists.

Today, however, the United States cannot shape global governance alone. As one journalist commented in 2011: "The United States still has formidable strengths. . . . But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. Those days are over" (Rachman 2011: 63).

Emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil increasingly challenge US and Western dominance. China's rise in particular raises questions

about the future. As the second largest economy in 2013 (and largest in late 2014 by the IMF's recalculation of gross domestic product [GDP]), a major donor to the World Bank, a major investor in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, it will inevitably be a key actor. China, however, as one scholar notes, is "a least-likely" case of compliance with international norms and rules given its history, cultural traditions, and power (Kent 2007). Yet, since 2010, it has shown increasing confidence and assertiveness due to its economic growth and the perception of US weakening. Russia, too, seeks to restore its position as a major player following the Soviet Union's dissolution and the collapse of Russia's economy in the 1990s, which diminished its power. India and Brazil are among the other assertive emerging powers. Together with China, they blocked continuation of the WTO Doha negotiations in 2008 on the issue of the right of developing countries to resist liberalization of trade in agricultural products. Both Brazil and India are active contenders for permanent seats on the UN Security Council. India has long refused to participate in treaties and other arrangements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that it regards as favoring the more powerful states. Likewise, Brazil has worked to build the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) as a trading bloc in South America and resisted US efforts to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas. China, India, and Brazil are now among the major contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are home to 40 percent of the world's population, and account for 20 percent of world GDP, 15 percent of world trade, and for two-thirds of world economic growth (Thakur 2014). They are challenging the liberal international economic order, including the dominant position of the US dollar and the World Bank's role in development funding, as they create a BRICS development bank based in Shanghai. A further challenge comes from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank created in 2014 with substantial initial funding from China.

Middle-power states have traditionally played a particularly important role in international institutions, often acting in concert in the UN and other IGOs, taking initiatives on arms control, human rights, and other issues. Argentina, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, and Sweden, for example, are known for their commitment to multilateralism, ability to forge compromises, and support for reform in the international system. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), together with the Netherlands, for example, have traditionally been major contributors to UN peacekeeping operations; they have met or exceeded development assistance targets; and they have provided about 10 percent of all UN leadership positions. Although they have exemplified Western values, "their effectiveness and reputation within the UN have rested on a perception . . . as being *different* from the rest of the West (or

North)" (Laatikainen 2006).

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North)” (Laatikainen 2006: 77). The essence of the role of middle powers lies in the importance of secondary players as both followers and leaders.

For the large number of less developed, small, and weak states, power and influence generally come only insofar as they are able to form coalitions that enlarge their voices and offer opportunities to set global agendas and link issues of importance to them. IGOs provide valuable arenas for this and also for international recognition and legitimacy. Through their collective efforts, small and developing countries have endeavored to shape the agendas, priorities, and programs of many IGOs with varying degrees of success. The Group of 77 (G-77) has been a major vehicle for developing countries to push their interests since the mid-1960s. Similarly, the thirty-nine member Alliance of Small Island States has been able to gain a voice on the issue of global climate change. Small states also often pick and choose the issues of highest priority around which to focus their limited resources. For example, Malta made its mark in the late 1960s by urging adoption of the norm of the seabed and other common areas as “the common heritage of mankind.” By analyzing the roles of small states in global governance, one can discover how skillful use of multilateral diplomacy and networks can alter the power equation, leading to outcomes that serve the interests of people, groups, and states that are not generally considered powerful.

Although states are still regarded as central to maintaining order in the world, since 1990 an increasing number of states have been sources of disorder due to their inability to perform most basic functions. Hence, problems emanating from weak, failing, and failed states have become twenty-first-century global governance challenges. They include spillover in the form of refugees from civil wars and conflicts as well as groups such as the Taliban that use neighboring states as sanctuaries; terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Mahgreb that exploit the weakness of states surrounding the Sahara; weak states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali that are unable to protect their own citizens; and states such as Somalia that are unable to control piracy emanating from their territory. State capability, however, also includes the ability to comply with international rules, to track infectious diseases, to limit sex, drug, and arms trafficking, and to promote human well-being so that people do not feel compelled to migrate elsewhere in search of a better life.

States themselves, however, may not act with one voice in global governance. Increasingly, provincial, state, and local governments, especially in democratic countries with federal forms of government, are involved in international economic negotiations, and in implementing environmental regulations and human rights initiatives, acting independently and occasionally at odds with their respective national governments. Mayors of

Figure 1.2 Classifying Types of IGOs

Geographic Scope	Examples
Global	UN WHO WTO
Regional	ASEAN AU EU
Subregional	ECOWAS GCC
Purpose	Examples
General	OAS UN
Specialized	ILO WHO WTO

was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international personality.”

International relations scholars have long viewed IGOs primarily as agents of their member states and focused on their structural attributes, decisionmaking processes, and programs. After all, IGOs are formed by states, and states grant IGOs responsibilities and authority to act. Yet, increasingly, IGOs have also been seen as actors in their own right, because their secretariat members play key but often invisible roles in persuading states to act, coordinating the efforts of different groups, providing the diplomatic skills to secure agreements, and ensuring the effectiveness of programs (Mathiason 2007). These include senior officials such as the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) and his or her under- and assistant secretaries-general as well as the UNSG’s special representatives (SRSGs); the directors-general of organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Human Rights (UNHCR and UNHCHR); the president of the World Bank; the executive director of the International Monetary Fund; and the president of the European Commission. These individuals “will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of

any other entity and an interest in promoting the well-being of the organization and its membership" (Duffield 2007: 13). Stories are legion about the roles secretariat officials have played in achieving international trade agreements, cease-fires in wars, governments' agreement to revise their development strategies to meet international guidelines, and organizational reforms.

Like other bureaucracies, IGO secretariats often do much more than their member states may have intended. Because many, but not all, IGO bureaucrats are international civil servants rather than individuals seconded to a secretariat from national governments, they tend to take their responsibilities seriously and work hard "to promote what they see as 'good policy' or to protect it from states that have competing interests" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). IGO bureaucracies also tend to develop their own organizational cultures—sometimes based on the professional backgrounds of many staff (e.g., public health, finance)—and this can influence how they define issues and what types of policy solutions they recommend. They must respond to new challenges and crises, provide policy options for member states, determine how to carry out vague mandates, reform themselves, and formulate new tasks and procedures. For example, the UN Secretariat created peacekeeping at the height of the Cold War, and later devised postconflict peacebuilding operations that include a wide variety of tasks from electoral assistance to police and court reform. IGOs have resources, including money, food, weapons, and expertise. Many IGO bureaucracies play important roles in analyzing and interpreting information, giving it meaning that can prompt action. To some extent, therefore, IGOs "help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global governance" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 7).

Thus, IGO bureaucracies are not just tools of states. They are also purposive actors that have power to influence world events. Their authority, and that of bureaucracies generally, "lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serving others" (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 21). The need to be seen in this way is crucial to the credibility of the UN Secretariat or the EU Commission, for example. Yet there is also significant evidence of IGOs doing something that "wasn't specifically tasked to them . . . [and] outside any reasonable notion of delegated discretion" (Oestreich 2012: 11). This theory of IGO agency and its implications is discussed further in Chapter 2.

To be sure, not all IGOs are alike, as we shall examine in subsequent chapters. Their authority and autonomy as actors in global governance vary significantly in kind and degree. Like domestic bureaucracies, international bureaucracies may use inaction as a way to avoid doing something they oppose. IGOs may also act against the interests and preferences of strong or weak states (and their secretaries-general may suffer retaliation as a result);

they may form partnerships with states to pursue or protect certain interests, or they may persuade states to change their behavior, such as by eliminating food subsidies, or turning over jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court.

In addition to IGO secretariats, there are a number of international treaties, particularly in the area of human rights, where there is no strong, central secretariat. The case of that of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, where others have just a few staff members, is illustrative. It includes generating and disseminating information, identifying solutions to environmental problems and identifying solutions, and providing ideas and expertise, and aiding states in implementing them (and Siebenhüner 2013: 149–152). The role of international secretariats of both IGOs and NGOs is also different from that with all bureaucracies. A major study of NGOs found that the type of problem is one of the most important factors (Bierman 2004).

Nongovernmental Organization

Like IGOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in global governance, playing a number of roles. Since the 1980s has been a major force in global governance at all levels, from global to local. Global governance is marked by various types of actors. NGOs are private voluntary organizations or associations that come together to address a common goal. Organizations are formed to advocate for human rights, peace, or environmental protection. They provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and development assistance. Some are independent (dubbed GONGOs). Scholars and practitioners often distinguish between profit groups (the vast majority) and nonprofit groups (the vast majority) and between "grassroots" NGOs and "elite" NGOs—separately, as discussed below.

NGOs are increasingly active in global governance, from local or grassroots to international politics. Many national-level groups, are now linked to counterpart groups in other countries, forming networks or federations. International nongovernmental organizations, like IGOs, may draw their members from a wide range of countries. They may have very specific functions or be generalist. They include international NGOs, along with transnational

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In addition to IGO secretariats, there are secretariats for a large number of international treaties, particularly in global environmental governance, where there is no strong, central IGO. The size of these secretariats varies; that of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is quite large; others have just a few staff members. Their roles as autonomous actors include generating and disseminating knowledge, framing the definitions of problems and identifying solutions, influencing negotiations through their ideas and expertise, and aiding states with treaty implementation (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013: 149–152). The autonomous influence of the international secretariats of both IGOs and treaty regimes varies widely, as it does with all bureaucracies. A major study of environmental bureaucracies has found that the type of problem is a key factor; people and procedures are two other important factors (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009: 149–152).

Nongovernmental Organizations

Like IGOs, nongovernmental organizations are key actors in global governance, playing a number of roles. The growth of NGOs and NGO networks since the 1980s has been a major factor in their increasing involvement in governance at all levels, from global to local. Increasingly, global governance is marked by various types of interactions between IGOs and NGOs.

NGOs are private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common purpose. Some organizations are formed to advocate a particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established to provide services such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn societies, or development assistance. Some are in reality government-organized groups (dubbed GONGOs). Scholars and analysts distinguish between not-for-profit groups (the vast majority) and for-profit corporations; it is also common to treat terrorist, criminal, and drug-trafficking groups—the “dark side” of NGOs—separately, as discussed further in Chapter 6.

NGOs are increasingly active today at all levels of human society and governance, from local or grassroots communities to national and international politics. Many national-level groups, often called interest or pressure groups, are now linked to counterpart groups in other countries through networks or federations. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), like IGOs, may draw their members from more than one country, and they may have very specific functions or be multifunctional. It is the big international NGOs, along with transnational advocacy networks (TANs) such as

the Coalition to Ban Landmines, that bring together many smaller NGOs that are among the most visible NGO actors in global governance. Their roles have been particularly important in expanding human rights and humanitarian and environmental law.

The estimates of numbers of NGOs vary enormously. The 2013–2014 *Yearbook of International Organizations* identifies over 8,500 nongovernmental organizations that have an international dimension in terms of either membership or commitment to conduct activities in several states. Exclusively national NGOs number in the millions. Many large international NGOs (INGOs) are transnational federations involving formal, long-term links among national groups. Examples include the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), the World Wildlife Fund, Transparency International (the leading NGO fighting corruption worldwide), Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.

The majority of the thousands of grassroots groups that exist in countries around the world are not part of formal networks, but may have informal links to large international human rights and development NGOs like Human Rights Watch and CARE, from which they obtain funding for local programs or training assistance. The links between grassroots and international NGOs are key to activities such as promoting population control, empowerment of women, health care, respect for human rights, and environmental protection. Because these relationships often involve large, Northern-dominated NGOs and Southern grassroots groups, there is a concern about the dependence they foster. Since the early 1990s, the Internet, e-mail, fax, and, more recently, various forms of social media have been valuable tools for NGO mobilization and autonomy, enabling them to access areas that governments and IGOs may be slow to reach.

NGOs are key sources of information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues, from the environment to human rights and corruption. They frequently are key actors in raising awareness of and helping to frame issues. Thus, landmines came to be seen as a humanitarian rather than an arms control issue, for example (Thakur and Maley 1999). They lobby for policy changes by states, IGOs, and corporations; along with civil society groups, they mount mass demonstrations around major international meetings such as Group of Seven (G-7) summits and the annual World Economic Forum in Davos. They contribute to international adjudication by submitting friend-of-the-court briefs to international criminal tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as to trade and investment tribunals (Charnovitz 2006: 353–354). Many NGOs have participated at least indirectly in UN-sponsored global conferences and international negotiations, raising issues and submitting documents. In some instances, they have contributed treaty language, such as with the Convention to Ban Landmines and the Rome Statute of the Inter-

national Criminal Court. They also influence states' and corporations' implementation of environmental regulations.

We explore the diversity and influence of other nonstate actors in Chapter 4.

Experts and Epistemic Networks

In a world whose problems seem increasingly complex, science, expertise, and knowledge are critical to understanding the science behind environmental change, ozone depletion, and climate change, and to evaluating policy options. Cost-effective alternatives to fossil fuels that do not emit carbon dioxide if there is to be any real changes and new rules. Thus, experts from universities, institutes, private industries, and governments have increasingly been drawn into international issues. For example, in the UN's World Commission on Environment and Development developed the System of National Accounts, which is standardizing how countries calculate their gross domestic product serve as a means of measuring economic growth (Weiss 2009: 42). The technical commission for Standardization (ISO), which is a global organization of experts. Often experts may be part of international conferences and meetings, sharing scientific knowledge, framing issues, and making recommendations. Since 1988, hundreds of scientists have participated on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change policy-neutral reports have provided the scientific basis for negotiations and sought to raise awareness of changes taking place and their implications. The term coined the phrase "epistemic communities" to describe knowledge-based experts.

Networks and Partnerships

Networks have become ubiquitous in international relations and Joseph Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of networks of governmental and nongovernmental actors. Subsequently, other scholars such as James Rosenau (1997), Kathryn Sikkink (2004), and others have explored the existence and influence of networks, power, roles, and policy impact.

Analytically, networks can be defined as a set of actors. As actors, they may be defined as any set of actors that pursue

national Criminal Court. They also play important roles in monitoring states' and corporations' implementation of human rights norms and environmental regulations.

We explore the diversity and global governance activities of NGOs and other nonstate actors in Chapter 6, as well as in the issue chapters.

Experts and Epistemic Networks

In a world whose problems seem to grow steadily more complex, knowledge and expertise are critical to governance efforts. There is a need to understand the science behind environmental problems such as climate change, ozone depletion, and declining fish stocks in order to consider policy options. Cost-effective alternatives must be developed for fuels that emit carbon dioxide if there is to be political support for making policy changes and new rules. Thus, experts from governmental agencies, research institutes, private industries, and universities around the world have increasingly been drawn into international efforts to deal with various issues. For example, in the UN's early years, statisticians and economists developed the System of National Accounts, which provides the basis for standardizing how countries calculate GDP and other core statistics that serve as a means of measuring economic performance (Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009: 42). The technical committees of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), for example, are entirely composed of experts. Often experts may be part of transnational networks and participate in international conferences and negotiations, laying out the state of scientific knowledge, framing issues for debate, and proposing possible solutions. Since 1988, hundreds of scientists from around the world have participated on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whose policy-neutral reports have provided key inputs for global climate change negotiations and sought to raise awareness of the rapid climate-related changes taking place and their likely effects in the future. Scholars have coined the phrase "epistemic communities" to identify such networks of knowledge-based experts.

Networks and Partnerships

Networks have become ubiquitous since the 1970s, when Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971) first pointed out the importance of regular interactions of governmental and nongovernmental actors across national boundaries. Subsequently, other scholars, such as Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995), James Rosenau (1997), Kathryn Sikkink (2009), and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), have explored the existence of various types of networks, and their power, roles, and policy impact.

Analytically, networks can be examined as both actors and structures. As actors, they may be defined as an organizational form consciously created by any set of actors that pursue "repeated, enduring exchange relations

with one another . . . [yet] lack a legitimate organization authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange" (quoted in Kahler 2009: 5). Networks are distinguished by their voluntary nature, the central role of information and learning, their ability to generate trust among participants, and their lack of hierarchy (Sikkink 2009: 230). Networks' success depends on their ability to promote and sustain collective action, add new members, and adapt. Their effectiveness will also vary by issue area. As noted previously, TANs are one particular form of network active in global governance, for example in setting and monitoring human rights standards; illicit networks such as transnational criminal organizations are targets of governance efforts to control money laundering and other illegal activities; while transgovernmental networks allow government officials to share regulatory approaches, provide technical assistance, and harmonize approaches to problems.

Some networks also provide forms of governance. For example, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance was created in 1997 by major donor organizations to foster learning and provide better accountability and information on the performance of humanitarian organizations following problems that surfaced following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The network includes UN agencies, national donor agencies, and humanitarian NGOs; has established standardized categories of analysis and evaluation; and maintains an online evaluation reports database.

Partnerships have also become increasingly common as actors and particularly as forms of governance. Catia Gregoratti (2014: 311) notes, for example, how partnerships between the UN and businesses have "refashioned not only ideas of how development should be achieved and who should deliver it but also the institutional architecture of the UN itself." Such partnerships involve UN agencies and private corporations and have become widespread throughout the UN system, particularly in areas of development, health, women, and children. Their functions range from advocacy, developing standards of conduct, and business development in less developed countries (LDCs), to providing funding, goods, and services.

Multinational Corporations

MNCs are a particular form of nonstate actor organized to conduct for-profit business transactions and operations across the borders of three or more states. They are companies based in one state with affiliated branches or subsidiaries and activities in other states and can take many different forms, from Aflack selling insurance in Japan and Levis subcontracting jean production to Nepalese factories, to Royal Dutch Shell's operations in Nigeria and Goldman Sachs's global operations. By choosing where to invest or not to invest, MNCs shape the economic development opportuni-

ties of individual communities where for a long time little part to heavy Chinese investment rapid growth for example, which contributed to its rapid economic foreign direct investment going just 1.8 percent of the total, with rich countries (Essoungou 2011).

Since the 1970s, MNCs have functioning of the global economy resources far greater than those often direct role in influencing industries such as banking and leaders and managers to govern problems for states and local governments these larger corporate networks also changed the landscape of development today comes from bilateral, government-to-government the UN and other IGOs.

In short, MNCs are important have long raised a number of questions through new forms of international private, industry-developed mechanisms economic development in collaboration NGOs? How can less developed countries will not interfere in their domestic destroy their resources and environmental dependency? MNCs are particularly labor, and environmental issues significant. It was in recognition of the need and to engage MNCs as positive contributors Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated Rate Responsibility in 1999, which companies in more than 130 countries other in Chapter 9.

The various actors in global governance from one another. They play varying authority, and effectiveness. Sometimes scarce resources, international stan-

ties of individual communities, countries, and entire regions such as Africa, where for a long time little foreign investment took place. Now, thanks in part to heavy Chinese investment, many parts of Africa are experiencing rapid growth for example, where in the 1990s it was investment in China that contributed to its rapid economic growth. Still, the share of worldwide foreign direct investment going to less developed countries has remained just 1.8 percent of the total, with much of it going to a few oil- and mineral-rich countries (Essoungou 2011: 15).

Since the 1970s, MNCs have “profoundly altered the structure and functioning of the global economy” (Gilpin 2001: 290). They control resources far greater than those of many states and have taken an active and often direct role in influencing international environmental decisionmaking (Biermann and Pattberg 2012: 8). Globalization of markets and production in industries such as banking and automobiles has challenged corporate leaders and managers to govern these complex structures, and posed problems for states and local governments losing connection to and control of these larger corporate networks. Corporate choices about investment have also changed the landscape of development assistance. Far more funding for development today comes from private investment capital than from bilateral, government-to-government aid, or from multilateral aid through the UN and other IGOs.

In short, MNCs are important global governance actors whose activities have long raised a number of questions. How can they best be regulated—through new forms of international rules or codes of conduct, or through private, industry-developed mechanisms? How can they be mobilized for economic development in collaboration with international agencies and NGOs? How can less developed countries be assured that powerful MNCs will not interfere in their domestic affairs, challenge their sovereignty, destroy their resources and environment, and relegate them to permanent dependency? MNCs are particularly important actors in addressing trade, labor, and environmental issues such as ozone depletion and global warming. It was in recognition of the need both to regulate corporate behavior and to engage MNCs as positive contributors to global governance that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated the UN Global Compact on Corporate Responsibility in 1999, which now encompasses more than 10,000 companies in more than 130 countries, an innovation that is discussed further in Chapter 9.

* * *

The various actors in global governance cannot be analyzed in isolation from one another. They play varying roles, with varying degrees of power, authority, and effectiveness. Sometimes, they compete with each other for scarce resources, international standing, and legitimacy. At other times,

their activities complement one another. Increasingly, they are linked in complex networks and partnerships. Subsequent chapters will explore these roles and relationships further.

Processes of Global Governance: Multilateralism Matters

Multilateral negotiations are a key part of global governance, constituting “the diplomatic bargaining processes through which the international community confers political legitimacy or comes to accept . . . [generalized] principles” (Hampson 1995: 3). Understanding the nature of multilateral diplomacy, therefore, is essential to understanding how IGOs and informal groupings of states function, how nonstate actors have become involved in governance processes, and how different kinds of outcomes come about.

John Ruggie (1993a: 8) has stated: “At its core, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.” Thus relationships are defined by agreed-upon rules and principles, and perhaps by organizations. Participants expect that outcomes will yield “diffuse reciprocity” (Keohane 1984) or roughly reciprocal benefits over time. For example, the principle of nondiscrimination governing the global trade system—most-favored-nation status—prohibits countries from discriminating against imports from other countries that produce the same product. In collective security arrangements, participants must respond to an attack on one country as if it were an attack on all. By contrast, bilateralism is expected to provide specific reciprocity and roughly balanced (but not necessarily equal) exchanges by each party at all times. Kishore Mahbubani (2013: 248, 254–255), former Singaporean ambassador to the UN, describes how when he walks into a multilateral setting, he expects to encounter “three voices: reason, power, and charm. The voice of charm has been underestimated,” he says. “But neither reason nor charm can override the voice of power, which remains the single strongest factor in multilateral diplomacy and international relations.”

Complex Diplomacy

Prior to the twentieth century, there was very little multilateralism. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the nineteenth century was marked by the development of a number of public international unions and river commissions. The Concert of Europe provided a series of periodic gatherings of great (European) powers. Out of these evolved many of the norms for multilateral diplomacy. The twentieth century saw the accelerated trend from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy and institutions, especially formal organizations, and the growth of conference diplomacy focused on specific global issues.

What makes multilateralism at the end of the twentieth century now literally scores of participants? The number of participants has now literally scores of participants since 1945. The first look like cozy, intimate gatherings, but the complexity, as do various coalitions of numbers . . . introduce a qualitative change in international politics. The hallmark of the new groups or coalitions of state actors is the central issue for many IGOs today: global governance, since “security is no longer enough to permit the smooth functioning of global governing” (Heine 2013: 208). And, diplomats—those in “network diplomacy” with their own networks of diplomats, with diplomacy itself as a “game of management” (Heine 2013: 62).

Greater numbers of players with diverse interests, with multiple rules, is a source of complexity. These all complicate the process of negotiation—of finding common ground, of finding cooperative action, norms, or rules. Major challenges for diplomats and other actors in global governance. For example, UN-sponsored conferences with 193 member countries, speaking many languages, including Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and others, with numerous private citizens interested in the process, and official sessions trying to influence the process.

Although the universe of multilateralism is actually a high degree of similarity in the types of decisionmaking processes, the question of how decisions get made in IGOs is a different matter.

How Do Decisions Get Made?

Historically, since IGOs are created by treaty, equality has dictated one-state, one-vote. In the twentieth century, all states would not accept the concept of equality. It is cited as one of the sources of failure of the League of Nations.

An alternative principle according to which the IMF and World Bank, for example, are based on financial contribution. In the EU’s

What makes multilateralism in the twenty-first century different from multilateralism at the end of World War II, then, is its complexity. There are now literally scores of participants. States alone have almost quadrupled in number since 1945. The first sessions of the UN General Assembly now look like cozy, intimate gatherings. Other types of actors add to the complexity, as do various coalitions of states. As one observer notes: "Large numbers . . . introduce a qualitatively different kind of diplomacy in international politics. The hallmark of this diplomacy is that it occurs between groups or coalitions of state actors" (Hampson 1995: 4). In addition, a central issue for many IGOs today is how to do a better job of incorporating NGOs, civil society groups, and other nonstate actors into processes of global governing, since "securing agreement of government officials is not enough to permit the smooth running of these institutions" (O'Brien et al. 2000: 208). And, diplomats—the representatives of states—need to engage in "network diplomacy" with this variety of players, not just with fellow diplomats, with diplomacy itself becoming an exercise in "complexity management" (Heine 2013: 62).

Greater numbers of players (and coalitions of players) mean multiple interests, with multiple rules, issues, and hierarchies that are constantly in flux. These all complicate the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation—of finding common ground for reaching agreements on collective action, norms, or rules. Managing complexity has become a key challenge for diplomats and other participants in multilateral settings. For example, UN-sponsored conferences have several thousand delegates from 193 member countries, speaking through interpreters in English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic. There are hundreds of NGOs and numerous private citizens interested in what happens and active around the official sessions trying to influence delegates.

Although the universe of multilateral diplomacy is complex, there is actually a high degree of similarity in the structures of most IGOs and in the types of decisionmaking processes used. Let us look at key patterns in how decisions get made in IGOs and other settings.

How Do Decisions Get Made?

Historically, since IGOs are created by states, the principle of sovereign equality has dictated one-state, one-vote decisionmaking. Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, all decisions had to be unanimous, as states would not accept the concept of majority decisionmaking. This is often cited as one of the sources of failure for the League of Nations.

An alternative principle accords greater weight to some states on the basis of population or wealth and results in weighted or qualified voting. In the IMF and World Bank, for example, votes are weighted according to financial contribution. In the EU's Council of Ministers, qualified majority

voting applies to issues where the EU has supranational authority over member states. The number of votes for each state is based on population; the number of votes required to pass legislation ensures that the largest states must have support of some smaller states; and neither the smaller states alone nor fewer than three large states can block action. Another form of qualified majority voting prevails in the UN Security Council, where the five permanent members each possess a veto and all must concur (or not object) for decisions to be taken.

Since the 1980s, much of the decisionmaking in the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and other bodies, as well as in global conferences, the WTO, and many other multilateral settings such as the various "Gs" (informal groupings of states such as the G-7 and G-20), has taken the form of consensus that does not require unanimity. It depends on states deciding not to block action and it often means that outcomes represent the least common denominator—that is, more general wording and fewer tough demands on states to act. "Pressure toward consensus," Courtney Smith (1999: 173) notes, "now dominates almost all multilateral efforts at global problem solving." The puzzle, he suggests, is "how an organization that is composed of 185 [*sic*] member states, influenced by numerous nongovernmental organizations, lobbied by multinational corporations, and serviced by an international secretariat reconciles all of these potentially diverse interests in search of a consensus on the most pressing issues of the day." Key variables in consensus building are leadership; small, formal negotiating groups; issue characteristics (including issue salience to different actors); various actor attributes such as economic or military power or ability to serve as brokers; the amount and quality of informal contacts among actors; and personal attributes of participants such as intelligence, tolerance, patience, reputation, negotiating skills, creativity, and linguistic versatility. Let us look briefly at two of these: leadership and actor strategies.

Leadership

Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can come from diverse sources: powerful and not-so-powerful states, a coalition of states, an NGO or coalition of NGOs, a skillful individual diplomat, or an IGO bureaucrat. Leadership can involve putting together a winning coalition to secure agreement on a new international trade agreement; it may involve the skill of negotiating a treaty text acceptable to industry, NGOs, and key governments. It may be the efforts of a coalition of NGOs and college students publicizing an issue such as sweatshops and pressuring companies to change their behavior. It may involve a government's (or any other actor's) willingness to act first—to commit monetary resources to a program or military forces for enforcement, to change trade laws, or to commit to significant carbon dioxide emissions reductions. Leadership in multilateral diplomacy can also come

from a prominent official such as the director-general, who prods

Historically, the United States used multilateralism after World War II to use its economic power to shape the international establishment of many IGOs. In the 1940s, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Trade Organization, the International Trade Regime Center, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization, were established to use IGOs as instruments of US policy and rules compatible with its interests. This approach as then-US senator Bob Dole described it was "instead of constraining" (Obama 2007).

As geopolitical shifts are underway, it itself stretched thin and has been challenged by the time that rising powers such as China and India are becoming multilateral institutions. As Brundage (2007) remains generally true that most global problems are most likely to be resolved or averted through the States plays a constructive role, "The result of the differences and privileges." The result of the leadership in global governance may be different altogether.

Actor Strategies

The nature of multilateral arenas and the positions of individual positions on an issue are what engage in efforts to discern the best positions. They must build personal trust that is essential to working together. Actors will take a stronger interest in proposals that come with specific proposals; some actors will have greater expertise than others on a given issue; individuals with little or no experience have long experience and great skill in an inherent part of multilateral diplomacy. It may matter more than those of others, in a given regional international system, in a given regime. Face-to-face interactions of the individuals (or groups) are what caucusing is all about in conferencing. It may take place at the delegates' dining room, at diplo-

from a prominent official such as the UN Secretary-General or the WTO's director-general, who prods various actors to do something.

Historically, the United States provided much of the leadership for multilateralism after World War II, using its position as the dominant, hegemonic power to shape the structure of the system, including through the establishment of many IGOs, such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the liberal international trade regime centered first in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later in the WTO. This enabled the United States to use IGOs as instruments of its national policies and to create institutions and rules compatible with its interests and values. The wisdom of this approach as then-US senator Barack Obama put it in 2007 was to recognize that "instead of constraining our power, these institutions magnified it" (Obama 2007).

As geopolitical shifts are taking place, the United States has found itself stretched thin and has been less willing and able to lead at the same time that rising powers such as the BRICS are insisting on greater voice in multilateral institutions. As Bruce Jentleson (2012: 141) notes, "While it remains generally true that most countries believe that global problems are most likely to be resolved or at least effectively managed if the United States plays a constructive role, there is much less deference to US preferences and privileges." The result is that, even more than in the past, leadership in global governance may come from disparate sources or be absent altogether.

Actor Strategies

The nature of multilateral arenas means that actors cannot just present their individual positions on an issue and then sit down. Delegates must actively engage in efforts to discern the flexibility or rigidity of their respective positions. They must build personal relationships in order to establish the trust that is essential to working together. Some states, NGOs, and other actors will take a stronger interest in particular topics than others; some will come with specific proposals; some will be represented by individuals with greater expertise than others on a topic; some will be represented by individuals with little or no experience in multilateral diplomacy while others have long experience and great skill in negotiating across cultures, which is an inherent part of multilateral diplomacy; and some actors' positions will matter more than those of others, because of their relative power in the international system, in a given region, or on a particular issue. The face-to-face interactions of the individuals representing participating states (and groups) are what caucusing is all about, even in an age of Skype and teleconferencing. It may take place at the back of the General Assembly hall, in the delegates' dining room, at diplomatic receptions, in the restrooms, or in

the corridors surrounding the official meeting place. In short, those actors that pursue well-thought-out strategies for taking advantage of multilateral arenas and diplomacy are more likely to be successful in securing their aims.

One actor strategy that is a hallmark of multilateral diplomacy is the formation of groups or coalitions of states. States can pool their votes, power, and resources to try to obtain a better outcome than they might by going it alone. Early in the UN's history, for example, regional groups formed to elect nonpermanent members of the Security Council and other bodies. The Cold War produced competing groups under the leadership of the Soviet Union and United States, plus the Non-Aligned Movement. Latin American, African, and Asian states formed the G-77 in 1964. As a result, group diplomacy is pervasive throughout much of the UN system as well as in regional organizations and the WTO.

Group members must negotiate among themselves to agree on a common position, maintain cohesion, prevent defections to rival coalitions, and choose representatives to bargain on their behalf. Small states or middle powers often play key roles in bridging the positions of different groups of states. For example, during the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations in the early 1990s, a group of countries called the Cairns Group, led by Canada, Australia, and Argentina, helped to resolve sharp disagreements between the United States and the European Union (EU) over agricultural trade. A variation on coalition building, especially for nonstate actors, is the creation of networks to expand their reach and link diverse groups with shared concerns and awareness that common goals cannot be achieved on their own. Networking has been used extensively by TANs for a variety of issues and problems, from promoting the rights of women and stopping the construction of large dams to addressing the governance challenges of HIV/AIDS.

The proliferation of international forums means that states and nonstate actors can often choose where to take certain issues—an option called “forum shopping.” Although some issues logically belong only within the relevant specialized IGO, the increasing interrelatedness of many issues makes the neat compartmentalization of these IGOs often outdated. Thus, for example, a labor issue could be raised in the International Labour Organization (ILO), the WTO, or the EU. Health issues could be raised in the WHO, the World Bank, the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Health Security Initiative (of the Group of Eight [G-8]), or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

In general, states and nonstate actors will select forums where they believe they will get the best reception. Despite consensus that African states should resolve regional conflicts in an African organization, such as

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the African Union, some African
the UN, where they hope to g
regional bodies such as the EU. A
in different types of peace oper
Afghanistan, the Congo, and S
African Republic, they represent
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The Varieties of Global Governance

Global governance encompasses a
arrangements and activities that sta
resolve conflicts, serve common p
situations of interdependent choice
less formal groupings of states (B
BRICS; international rules, regulat
norms or “soft law”; international
structures in a specific issue area a
and conferences; private governanc
nerships such as the UN Global Co
Development (see Figure 1.3). The
plicating efforts to create neat categor
IGOs such as in the joint UN-AU p
Somalia. IGOs now subcontract man
areas of development and humanita
tions may be characterized as network
simply “interactions.” Where schola
regimes governing issues such as ma
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(Orsini, Morin, Young 2013: 29). Le
global governance.

Intergovernmental Organizations

IGOs provide the central core of firm
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265). Over the past century, more and
firm more and more tasks. They serv
collecting information and monitoring
Nations Environment Programme (UN
UNHCR), providing forums for interge
adjudicating disputes (the ICJ). They h
of cooperation through regular meeting

the African Union, some African states have preferred to take disputes to the UN, where they hope to gain more support for their cause. With regional bodies such as the EU, AU, and NATO gaining greater experience in different types of peace operations in different places ranging from Afghanistan, the Congo, and Somalia to Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic, they represent choices for states and new ways of partnering for the UN.

The Varieties of Global Governance

Global governance encompasses a variety of cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities that states and other actors create in an effort to resolve conflicts, serve common purposes, and overcome inefficiencies in situations of interdependent choice. These forms include IGOs and NGOs; less formal groupings of states (“Gs”), clubs, friends groups, and the BRICS; international rules, regulations, standards, and laws, as well as the norms or “soft law”; international regimes in which the rules, norms, and structures in a specific issue area are linked together; ad hoc arrangements and conferences; private governance arrangements; and public-private partnerships such as the UN Global Compact and Partnerships for Sustainable Development (see Figure 1.3). The varieties are rapidly proliferating, complicating efforts to create neat categories. IGOs are collaborating with other IGOs such as in the joint UN-AU peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia. IGOs now subcontract many projects to NGOs, particularly in the areas of development and humanitarian relief. Some of the many interactions may be characterized as networks, others as partnerships, and some as simply “interactions.” Where scholars in the past identified international regimes governing issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, now there are a number of “regime complexes”—“networks of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter” such as food security (Orsini, Morin, Young 2013: 29). Let us look briefly at these varieties of global governance.

Intergovernmental Organizations

IGOs provide the central core of formal multilateral machinery that constitutes the “architecture of global governance” (Cooper and Thakur 2014: 265). Over the past century, more and more IGOs have been created to perform more and more tasks. They serve many diverse functions, including collecting information and monitoring trends (as in the case of the United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]), delivering services and aid (the UNHCR), providing forums for intergovernmental bargaining (the EU) and adjudicating disputes (the ICJ). They have helped states form stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information-gathering and analy-

Figure 1.3 Varieties of Global Governance

- International structures and mechanisms (formal and informal)
IGOs: global, regional, other
NGOs
- International rules and laws
Multilateral agreements; customary practices; judicial decisions,
regulatory standards
- International norms or "soft law"
Framework agreements; select UN resolutions
- International regimes
- Ad hoc groups, arrangements, and global conferences
- Private and hybrid public-private governance

Figure 1.4 IGO Functions

- Informational: gathering, and
- Forum: providing place for ex
- Normative: defining standard
- Rule creation: drafting legally
- Rule supervision: monitoring,
- Operational: allocating resour
- Idea generation

sis, and dispute settlement, as well as operational activities (see Figure 1.4). They enhance individual and collective welfare. They have provided modes of governance in the evolution of the world economy since 1850 (Murphy 1994). They also "construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place" and "help define the interests that states and other actors come to hold" (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 162). A further function of IGOs and particularly of the UN has been the development of key ideas and concepts about security and economic and social development. As the authors of the final volume of the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) conclude, ideas are among the most significant contributions the UN has made to the world and to human progress. The UN has generated ideas, provided a forum for debate, given ideas legitimacy, promoted their adoption for policy, generated resources for implementing and monitoring progress, and has sometimes even served to bury ideas (Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009: 34–35).

Yet how IGOs serve their various functions varies across organizations. Organizations differ in membership. They vary by the scope of the subject and rules. They differ in the amount of resources available and by level and degree of bureaucratization as well as in their effectiveness.

Why do states join such organizations? Why do they choose to act and to cooperate through formal IGOs? Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998: 4–5) suggest that IGOs "allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization's ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states." Thus, states join to participate in a stable negotiating forum, permitting rapid reactions in times of crisis. They join IGOs to negotiate and implement agreements that reflect their

own interests and those of the la
vide mechanisms for dispute resolu
tralized organization in the imple
parting, they agree to shape intern
forge critical norms of behavior. Y
and varying degrees of independen
IGOs not only create opportu
exercise influence and impose con
and processes. IGOs affect mem
hence national agendas, and forc
issues. They subject states' behavi
sharing. They encourage the devel
and implementation processes to fi
tion. They embody or facilitate the
of behavior with which states must
efit from reciprocity. For example
admission to the WTO affected its
governmental reforms.

Most countries perceive that the
even when it is costly. South Africa
long years when it was repeatedly ca
Iraq did not withdraw from the UN
decade of stringent sanctions. China
terms of its entry into the internat
changes in laws and policies require
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despite the extensive and costly chang
Although the earliest IGOs were
there was a veritable explosion of IGO

Figure 1.4 IGO Functions

- Informational: gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data
- Forum: providing place for exchange of views and decisionmaking
- Normative: defining standards of behavior
- Rule creation: drafting legally binding treaties
- Rule supervision: monitoring compliance with rules, adjudicating disputes, taking enforcement measures
- Operational: allocating resources, providing technical assistance and relief, deploying forces
- Idea generation

own interests and those of the larger community. They participate to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution. They join to take advantage of centralized organization in the implementation of collective tasks. By participating, they agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge critical norms of behavior. Yet states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of independence of action.

IGOs not only create opportunities for their member states, but also exercise influence and impose constraints on their member states' policies and processes. IGOs affect member states by setting international and hence national agendas, and forcing governments to take positions on issues. They subject states' behavior to surveillance through information-sharing. They encourage the development of specialized decisionmaking and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participation. They embody or facilitate the creation of principles, norms, and rules of behavior with which states must align their policies if they wish to benefit from reciprocity. For example, as described in Chapter 8, China's admission to the WTO affected its national policies and required extensive governmental reforms.

Most countries perceive that there are benefits to participating in IGOs even when it is costly. South Africa never withdrew from the UN over the long years when it was repeatedly condemned for its policies of apartheid. Iraq did not withdraw from the UN when it was subjected to more than a decade of stringent sanctions. China spent fourteen years negotiating the terms of its entry into the international trade system and undertaking changes in laws and policies required to bring itself into compliance with WTO rules. Twelve countries joined the EU between 2004 and 2007, despite the extensive and costly changes required.

Although the earliest IGOs were established in the nineteenth century, there was a veritable explosion of IGOs in the twentieth century, as dis-

wars (especially World Wars I and II),
 cal innovation, and the growth of the
 nization in the 1950s and 1960s, pro-
 Os. Since the 1960s, there has also been
 iting other IGOs. One study found that
 with the number of states in the inter-
 es of IGOs low (Cupitt, Whitlock, and
 Os functioning in 1914, eighteen were
 twentieth century. The Cold War's end
 eaty Organization and the Council of
 oviet-bloc institutions. The creation of
 the League of Nations. The authorita-
 tional organizations, both IGOs and
 Associations (UIA), located in Brus-
 Organizations.

parallel many functions provided by
 be divided into service and advocacy
 t many levels to pressure or persuade
 orations, and other actors to improve
 tackle corruption, ban landmines, or
 civil war. The Geneva Conventions
 itarian law to the International Com-
 me IGOs, such as the International
 ism Organization, and the UN Joint
 NGO roles in their governance. As a
 vities previously controlled by gov-
 governments or IGOs are now often
 disaster relief, run refugee camps,
 e to contain the international spread
 nvironment. They are important forms
 ways they enable individuals to "act
 e, their "voluntary, local, and issue-
 ks they create] make them a useful
 ity and national and international
 Diehl 2006: 171). In this sense, they
 multiple levels of governance.

International Rules and Law

m as public international law has
 k. Although the statute of the Inter-
 five sources of international law
 nce, the writings of legal scholars,

judicial decisions, and general principles of law), much of the growth has been in treaty law. Between 1951 and 1995, 3,666 new multilateral treaties were concluded (Ku 2001). At the conclusion of the twentieth century, according to Douglas Johnston (1997), there were a total of 82,000 publicized international agreements, including the Vienna Convention on Treaties, conventions on ozone, climate change, and whaling, law of the sea, humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions), human rights law, trade law, and intellectual property law, as well as arms control agreements. By far the largest number of new multilateral agreements deals with economic issues. Treaty-based law has been particularly valued, because the process of negotiation now involves all affected countries. Nonetheless, customary practice persists as an important source of new law, particularly because of the long time it takes to negotiate and bring into effect agreements involving large numbers of countries.

For purposes of global governance, one major limitation of public international law is that it applies only to states, except for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At present, only EU treaties can be used directly to bind individuals, multinational corporations, NGOs, paramilitary forces, terrorists, or international criminals. They can, however, establish norms that states are expected to observe and, where possible, enforce against nonstate actors.

Another problem in the eyes of many is the absence of international enforcement mechanisms and the role of self-interest in shaping states' decisions about whether or not to accept treaties and other forms of international rules. International law traditionally left states to use "self-help" to secure compliance. Both the UN Charter and EU treaties, however, provide enforcement mechanisms, primarily in the form of sanctions, although the threat of sanctions is not necessarily a strong motivator for states to comply with international rules.

Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995), instead, cite efficiency, interests, and norms as key factors, and treaty ambiguity and lack of capability as principal sources of noncompliance. States often value a reputation for law-abiding behavior and desire the benefits of reciprocity ("I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine"); they are generally inclined to comply with international law. Peer pressure from other states and domestic or transnational pressures from NGOs may induce compliance. For weaker and developing states, failure to comply can be a consequence of inadequate local expertise, resources, or governmental capacity to do what is required for compliance. In short, the "force" of international law often comes from the "felt need to coordinate activities . . . and to ensure stable and predictive patterns of behavior," and the reality is "imperfect, varied, and changing implementation and compliance," with many factors affecting the extent to which states meet legal commitments (Jacobson and Weiss 1995: 122).

International and regional organizations, too, incorporate different levels of legal commitments. The EU has its own legal system that lies between traditional national legal systems and international law, with the European Court of Justice to interpret it and enforce judgments against member states. The body of EU law includes the various EU treaties, regulations, and directives. The EU can be categorized as having a high level of legal obligation (i.e., states are legally bound by rules); relatively high levels of precision (rules are definite); and high levels of delegation (authority granted to third parties for implementation). These legal obligations do not refer to all areas of EU policies, however, as is discussed in Chapters 5, 8, and 11. Other IGOs and regional integration arrangements lie between the extremes of legalization, where actors combine and invoke varying degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation to create subtle blends of politics and law (Abbott et al. 2000).

International Norms or "Soft Law"

Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of norms in international relations. These are shared expectations or understandings regarding standards of appropriate behavior for various actors, particularly states. They range from the norm that states are obligated to carry out treaties they ratify (*pacta sunt servanda*) to the expectation that combatants will not target civilians. Norms vary in strength, and determining whether one exists involves ascertaining whether states perceive that a certain practice is obligatory or expected. Some norms are so internalized in states that they are difficult to recognize unless a violation occurs. Still others are weak, contested, or "emerging."

Many international legal conventions set forth nonbinding obligations for states that are in fact norms and sometimes referred to as "soft law." Examples include human rights and labor rights norms, the concept of the global commons applied to the high seas, outer space, and polar regions, as well as the concept of sustainable development. Generally, "the degree of formalization determines the strength of a rule, especially when it is made legally binding" (Duffield 2007: 10).

Soft law can take a number of forms when a formal agreement is not possible or desirable. In 2005, for example, the final document of the UN-sponsored World Summit endorsed the emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), which is seen as the soft-law basis for humanitarian interventions when states fail to protect peoples at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other major human rights violations. Other forms of soft law include codes of conduct, world conference declarations, and certain UN General Assembly resolutions.

In environmental law, an initial framework convention often sets forth norms and principles that states agree on, such as those for ozone depletion

and global climate change, but the understanding of the problem improves as technology provides new possibilities. depleting chemicals or carbon dioxide states, key corporations, and other binding steps to be taken. Protocol framework convention and form of example, was the first attempt to 1992 UN Framework Convention way seek to produce a successor ment—that establishes state obligations reduce emissions. Soft law is easy leaves open the possibility of negotiation can also be a means of linking international individuals and MNCs, such as social responsibility.

International Regimes and Regi

Scholars have used the concept of a regime where principles, norms, rules linked to one another in a particular exist, such as for nuclear weapons boundary air pollution, and food aid national actors recognize the existence of compelled to honor them. Because this they comply based on an acceptance underlying norms, and the validity of respect other states and actors also to ment procedures to resolve conflicts

International regimes encompass sets of actors that show both how acceptance of and compliance with a bureaucracy, budget, headquarters, (or established) within a given issue selves, do not constitute a regime. S that trigger widespread nuclear fallout that functions regardless of whether ment for decisionmaking and taking coupled with rules and norms. The n tion, however, includes the inspection the International Atomic Energy Agency the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive

and global climate change, but no concrete actions. As scientific understanding of the problem improves, the political environment changes, and technology provides new possible solutions (such as substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals or carbon dioxide-producing energy sources), leading states, key corporations, and other interested actors may agree on specific, binding steps to be taken. Protocols are used to supplement the initial framework convention and form the “hard” law. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was the first attempt to give effect to general principles in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Negotiations under way seek to produce a successor agreement in 2015—a hard-law agreement—that establishes state obligations to take urgently needed action to reduce emissions. Soft law is easier to negotiate and more flexible, and leaves open the possibility of negotiating hard law in the future. Soft law can also be a means of linking international law to private entities, including individuals and MNCs, such as through codes of practice of corporate social responsibility.

International Regimes and Regime Complexes

Scholars have used the concept of international regimes to understand governance where principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures are linked to one another in a particular issue area. Where international regimes exist, such as for nuclear weapons proliferation, whaling, European transboundary air pollution, and food aid, participating states and other international actors recognize the existence of certain obligations and feel compelled to honor them. Because this is “governance without government,” they comply based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules and underlying norms, and the validity of the decisionmaking procedures. They expect other states and actors also to comply and to utilize dispute settlement procedures to resolve conflicts.

International regimes encompass rules and norms, as well as the practices of actors that show both how their expectations converge and their acceptance of and compliance with rules. IGO decisionmaking procedures, bureaucracy, budget, headquarters, and legal personality may be required (or established) within a given issue area, but individual IGOs, by themselves, do not constitute a regime. Some issues, such as nuclear accidents that trigger widespread nuclear fallout, do not need a formal organization that functions regardless of whether there is an accident. Ad hoc arrangements for decisionmaking and taking action when an accident occurs can be coupled with rules and norms. The regime for nuclear weapons proliferation, however, includes the inspection machinery and safeguard systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which is

observed even though it is not yet fully in effect), the UN Security Council's enforcement powers, and the IAEA's technical assistance programs to non-nuclear weapon countries for developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In issue areas where regimes exist, they are key types of global governance.

Recently, scholars have identified a number of "regime complexes." These are "networks of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively." A key characteristic of regime complexes is the "divergence regarding the principles, norms, rules, or procedures of their elemental regimes" (Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013: 29). The food security regime complex, explored further in Chapter 9, is one example. Its three elemental regimes include the agriculture/food regime based around the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the WTO-based international trade regime, and the human rights regime and norms dealing with the right to food. Other examples include the human mobility, maritime piracy, and international forest regime complexes.

Groups, Arrangements, and Global Conferences

As multilateralism has become the dominant practice in international affairs, other less formal, institutionalized forms of global governance have emerged. These include various intergovernmental arrangements and groups ("Gs") that lack the legal formality of charters or treaties such as UN-sponsored global conferences, panels, forums, and commissions.

The first of the "Gs" was the G-77, formed by developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 1964 in conjunction with the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). For many years, it operated as a unified bloc constituting more than two-thirds of the UN's membership. It is still active today, but less cohesive, as member country interests have diverged.

The Group of Seven (G-7) began in the mid-1970s when summit meetings of governmental leaders were not yet common practice and major changes in international economic relations suggested the value of periodic, informal gatherings. These later evolved into a regular arrangement, including annual summits, but not a formal IGO. The G-7's agenda also grew well beyond macroeconomic policy coordination, as discussed further in Chapter 8. From 1992 to 2014, Russia joined the group for noneconomic discussions, thus creating the Group of Eight (G-8), which dealt with issues surrounding the Cold War's end, the rising threat of terrorism, and so on.

Two groups that have assumed increasing importance in global governance are the Group of 20 (G-20) and the BRICS. Like the G-7/8, they

are not formal IGOs. The G-20 policy discussions among the advanced and emerging markets, including the EU, with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Today, the G-20 members represent two-thirds of world trade, and two-thirds of world GDP. The G-20 convened the first summit meeting in 2008–2009 global financial crisis level and like the G-7/8. The 2008–2009 crisis also prompted the G-20 to convene their own first summit in 2009. The G-20 has sought to exert more influence over the global economy than the dominance of the United States. So far, the G-20 has met in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Although the BRICS have not met yet, they are world economically in coming years. The BRICS have similar goals, and even interests, leading to a BRICS+20 impact (Cooper and Thakur 2010). Chapter 8.

Beginning in the 1970s the UN has held a series of global conferences and, more recently, summits on issues such as environment, food supply, population, children, and desertification. There were two major conferences in the 1970s and another in the 1990s. The UN has made an effort to scale back since 2000. The UN has revived multilateral diplomacy, with NGOs and interested individuals trying to influence the process. It is disappointing because their outcomes are often a lack of agreement among the large number of participants, however, actually have a formal status.

Conferences like the Summit of the Americas (Rio, 1992), and the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) have been important global policy issues. Cumulatively, the UN has been instrumental in understanding of the linkages among issues such as human rights, equal rights (especially for women), and local communities. They are discussed in Chapter 8.

Private Governance

Private governance is a growing phenomenon that has received much attention. Although the concept of private governance involves authoritative entities that states have not acted, or have chosen not to act, states have themselves been ineffective in some areas.

fully in effect), the UN Security Council, IAEA's technical assistance programs to developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and so on. If such regimes exist, they are key types of global

defined a number of "regime complexes." These are more international regimes that relate to a specific area of overlapping membership; and generate interactions recognized as potentially manageable. A key characteristic is "divergence regarding the principles, objectives, and elemental regimes" (Orsini, Morin, 2008). Regime complexes include the agriculture regime, the Food and Agriculture Organization trade regime, and the human rights regime. Other examples include the environment, and international forest regime

Global Conferences

The dominant practice in international relations has been formalized forms of global governance have been intergovernmental arrangements and the promulgation of charters or treaties such as the G-7, G-8, G-20, and so on.

The G-7, formed by developing countries of the 1970s in conjunction with the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, was a unified bloc constituting more than 75 percent of the world's population. It is still active today, but less cohesive and more divergent.

In the mid-1970s when summit meetings were not yet common practice and major powers suggested the value of periodic meetings, the G-7 was transformed into a regular arrangement, including the G-7+5. The G-7's agenda also grew well beyond economic issues, as discussed further in Chapter 4. The G-8, which dealt with issues such as the threat of terrorism, and so on.

The increasing importance in global governance of the BRICS. Like the G-7/8, they

are not formal IGOs. The G-20 originated in 1999 as a forum for economic policy discussions among the finance ministers and central bank governors of advanced and emerging market countries. It includes nineteen states and the EU, with the World Bank and IMF participating on an ex officio basis. Today, the G-20 members represent 90 percent of world GDP, 80 percent of world trade, and two-thirds of world population. Little known until the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, when US president George W. Bush convened the first summit meeting, it now convenes annually at the summit level and like the G-7/8 does not have a permanent secretariat. The 2008–2009 crisis also prompted Brazil, Russia, India, and China to convene their own first summit in Moscow in 2009 to explore how they could exert more influence over the global financial system and reduce the dominance of the United States. South Africa became the capital "S" in BRICS in 2011. Although the BRICS hold the potential to outstrip the rest of the world economically in coming years, as a group they lack unifying values, goals, and even interests, leading to skepticism about their potential impact (Cooper and Thakur 2013). Both groups are discussed further in Chapter 8.

Beginning in the 1970s the United Nations convened many global conferences and, more recently, summits on topics ranging from the environment, food supply, population, and women's rights to water supplies, children, and desertification. There was a large cluster of these conferences in the 1970s and another in the 1990s, with a lull in the 1980s and a deliberate effort to scale back since 2000. These conferences have spawned complex multilateral diplomacy, with NGOs, scientific experts, corporations, and interested individuals trying to influence outcomes, but often have been disappointing because their outcomes represent the least common denominator of agreement among the large number of participants, of whom only states, however, actually have a formal say.

Conferences like the Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the Earth Summit (Rio, 1992), and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) have been important global political processes for addressing interdependence issues. Cumulatively, the conferences have also bolstered understanding of the linkages among issues such as environmental protection, equal rights (especially for women), poverty elimination, and participation of local communities. They are discussed further in Chapter 4.

Private Governance

Private governance is a growing phenomenon, yet one that only recently has received much attention. Although the meaning of the term is disputed, private governance involves authoritative decisionmaking in areas where states have not acted, or have chosen not to exercise authority, or where states have themselves been ineffective in the exercise of authority. Exam-

ples include international accounting standards; the private bond-rating agencies, such as Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's Ratings Group, whose rules can shape government actions through the threatened drop in a country's rating; International Chamber of Commerce rules and actions; private industry governance, such as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Manufacturing Principles and the Forest Stewardship Council, through which major corporations and advocacy groups collaborate; and labor standards within a single multinational firm such as Nike or Ford. The International Organization on Standardization, a nongovernmental organization that sets voluntary standards for many industries, has set almost 20,000 standards since its founding in 1927. In 2013, two groups of retail companies—one US, the other European—agreed on joint inspection standards for garment factories in Bangladesh as part of an effort to improve workplace safety there following the Rana Plaza building collapse in April 2013, in which more than 1,100 workers died. This private governance initiative, put together with the assistance of the International Labour Organization, provides for inspections and assistance in paying for needed safety upgrades (Greenhouse 2013: B3).

Private authorities are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. "What is evident, though," Debora Spar (1999: 48) says, "is that private entities will play an ever-increasing role in the development and management of electronic interaction. . . . They will assume quasi-governmental functions in many instances, regulating activity in their particular spheres through a combination of formal and informal rules, administrative and technical means."

Public-Private Partnerships

Since the late 1980s, the variety of public-private partnerships involving the UN and most of its specialized agencies, funds, and programs, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), has mushroomed with the recognition that such partnerships can contribute to achieving internationally agreed development goals. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Global Compact initiative, noted earlier, was an important milestone, as was the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, which called for the creation of partnerships for sustainable development, several hundred of which have now been created. Such partnerships have become a major source of funding and have influenced ideas of how development should be achieved and who should deliver it, as well as the architecture of the UN itself (Gregoratti 2014: 311). Some are large, institutionalized, multistakeholder arrangements; others are more temporary with fewer actors. Not all are about donating money, as they may also involve mobilizing corporate knowledge, personnel, and expertise to achieve policy objectives.

Although the new varieties of global governance have a wide scope, effectiveness, and durability, those that do not involve states have less legitimacy. We explore this issue in

The Politics and Effectiveness

The politics of global governance is the "politics of power and knowledge" in the world (Mazmanian 2013). It involves the global structures, processes, and institutions that shape the chances of actors around the world. It involves the politics of global governance, then, although power relationships among states and actions of a host of nonstate actors are central to the politics of global governance, whose voice gets heard, whose interests do certain institutions and actions depend on the authority and legitimacy of global governance. And, as with all types of governance, the goal is to deliver public goods and to make a difference.

Power: Who Gets What? Who Gets to

At one time, the politics of global governance was dominated by US power and hegemony. To be sure, US power has continued to influence, many pieces of global governance, and the liberal international economic order and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The United States is the sole superpower; its economy dominated the world and seemed to be spreading everywhere. In Iraq in 2003, US power and influence were demonstrated. Even before then, the unilateral US administration were leading small, multilateral initiatives without US participation, let alone the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and mining antipersonnel landmines. Today, the United States is no longer at the center of global governance as it once was, and that there are "more states" on a wider range of issues than ever before. As discussed earlier, that emerging powers such as Brazil, as well as smaller states such as China, and that nonstate actors, networks, and global governance actors, make for a world where the politics of governance is pluralized. An important question is: How are these actors and responsibilities. Thus, it may be

Although the new varieties of forms of global governance vary in scope, effectiveness, and durability, as discussed in subsequent chapters, those that do not involve states have begun to raise troubling questions of legitimacy. We explore this issue in Chapter 12.

The Politics and Effectiveness of Global Governance

The politics of global governance reflects “struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge” in the world (Murphy 2000: 798) as well as over “the global structures, processes, and institutions that shape the fates and life chances of actors around the world” (Barnett and Duval 2005: 7–8). Thus, although power relationships among states still matter, so do the resources and actions of a host of nonstate actors. Among the central issues in the politics of global governance, then, are who gets to participate in decision-making, whose voice gets heard, who gets excluded at what price, and whose interests do certain institutions privilege. Power matters as do the authority and legitimacy of global governance arrangements that increasingly depend on the accountability and transparency of multilateral institutions. And, as with all types of governance, effectiveness, or the ability to deliver public goods and to make a difference, matters.

Power: Who Gets What? Who Benefits? Who Loses?

At one time, the politics of global governance seemed to be about US power and hegemony. To be sure, US power and preferences shaped, and continue to influence, many pieces of global governance, including the UN and the liberal international economic system. Following the Cold War’s end and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the sole superpower; its economy drove globalization, and democracy seemed to be spreading everywhere. Yet, especially since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US power and influence in the world have declined substantially. Even before then, the unilateralist policies of the George W. Bush administration were leading small, middle-power, and larger states to take initiatives without US participation, let alone leadership, such as with the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, and the convention banning antipersonnel landmines. Today, there are many indicators that the United States is no longer at the center of global politics in the same way it once was, and that there are “more states with more relations with one another on a wider range of issues than ever before” (Jentleson 2012: 135). As discussed earlier, that emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as smaller states such as Qatar, are taking on bigger roles, and that nonstate actors, networks, and private authorities are becoming key governance actors, make for a world in which the politics of different issues and of governance is pluralized. And there are more IGOs taking on duties and responsibilities. Thus, it may be surprising that many of the def-

initions of global governance “mask the presence of power” (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 6).

Global governance arrangements exist because states and other actors create them and imbue them with power, authority, and legitimacy and deem them valuable for performing certain tasks and serving certain needs and interests. Yet IGOs are not just passive structures and agents of states. As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005: 162) argue, they have power “both because of their form (as rational-legal bureaucracies) and because of their (liberal) goals” as well as the authority that derives from goals that are “widely viewed as desirable and legitimate.” They can exercise “compulsory power” through the use of material resources such as debt relief, food, money, guns, and sanctions, as well as normative resources such as naming and shaming, spreading global values and norms, or inculcating “best practices.” IGO secretariats’ ability to set agendas of meetings and conferences, to structure options for Security Council debates, and to classify and organize information whether on types of economies, what is a genocide, or who is a refugee all constitute “institutional power.” A third type of IGO power, “productive power,” is that of determining the existence of a problem such as internally displaced persons (as differentiated from refugees who cross national borders), defining it, proposing solutions, and persuading other actors to accept those solutions (Barnett and Finnemore 2005).

As for the power of nonstate actors, that also can be derived from various material resources as well as symbolic and normative resources. Transnational advocacy groups, civil society organizations, and NGOs of all stripes have shown the many ways in which they can marshal the resources inherent in naming and shaming to pressure multinational corporations as well as governments of targeted states to change their behavior.

Power, whether in global or local governance, is intimately linked to authority and to legitimacy. IGOs can exercise power in large part because they are generally recognized to have legitimate authority, just as states whose governments are recognized as legitimate are recognized by other states and accepted as members of IGOs. Understanding the nature and types of authority and legitimacy in global governance is part of the puzzle.

Authority and Legitimacy: Who Governs and On What Basis?

Historically, states were the only entities thought to have authority in international politics, due to their sovereignty, and the only authority IGOs had was assumed to be that delegated by states and, hence, was subject to withdrawal. In recent years, however, more attention has focused on the issues of authority and legitimacy. There is gradual recognition of the varied bases of authority and legitimacy in global governance.

In their book *Who Governs* (2010b: 9–10) define authority as a social relation. Authority is thus a social relation in a vacuum. Authority is created informally, of others.” David Lake primarily rests on the collective “right to rule” and is “always contextually, capacity for enforcement assumed to be essential for the institution. Finnemore has emphasized that enforcement essential indicator is others’ compliance.”

Five bases of authority in IGOs, Finnemore, and Sell (2010c) are: institutional and capacity-based. The first is deinstitution, whether an IGO such as Moody’s. The second is the primary authority from member states for a third derives from the need for specialized knowledge about them. Authority, the institution will staff see the world and define issues and the very culture of the institution authority—reflects the fact that many to serve or protect a set of principles women’s rights, disarmament, or environmental ability to accomplish set tasks a further basis of authority.

Yet why do the powerful and non-nance decide to cooperate? Why do coercion or change their behavior with group or accept the authority of agency? The decision to comply with rests on legitimacy: “the belief by an actor to be obeyed” (Hurd 2007: 30). Such a belief because “the decision whether to comply because fear of retribution or by a calculation internal sense of rightness and obligation.”

A key aspect of legitimacy in the international community, whose system actions helps to validate its members, in UN, for example, are perceived as legitimated and function according to certain one-state, one-vote. The UN Security Council in the international system imbued

In their book *Who Governs the Globe*, Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010b: 9–10) define authority as “the ability to induce deference in others. Authority is thus a social relationship, not a commodity; it does not exist in a vacuum. Authority is created by the recognition, even if only tacit or informal, of others.” David Lake (2010: 592, 597) adds that authority “ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the governor’s right to rule” and is “always contested and . . . negotiated.” Although, traditionally, capacity for enforcement (particularly with force) has been assumed to be essential for the exercise of authority, more recent thinking has emphasized that enforcement can take a variety of forms and that the essential indicator is others’ compliance.

Five bases of authority in global governance articulated by Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010c) are: institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based. The first is derived from the rules and purposes of an institution, whether an IGO such as the IMF or a credit-rating agency such as Moody’s. The second is the primary basis of IGO authority: delegated authority from member states for certain tasks such as peacekeeping. The third derives from the need for certain tasks to be done by those with specialized knowledge about them. And, while expertise may make an IGO authoritative, the institution will also be shaped by that expertise in how staff see the world and define issues, what policy options are considered, and the very culture of the institution. The fourth base—principled or moral authority—reflects the fact that many IGOs and NGOs are created precisely to serve or protect a set of principles, morals, or values such as peace, women’s rights, disarmament, or environmental protection. Finally, demonstrated ability to accomplish set tasks such as alleviating extreme poverty is a further basis of authority.

Yet why do the powerful and not-so-powerful actors in global governance decide to cooperate? Why do actors obey rules in the absence of coercion or change their behavior when shamed by a transnational advocacy group or accept the authority of the ICJ or a private credit-rating agency? The decision to comply with rules, norms, and law fundamentally rests on legitimacy: “the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 2007: 30). Such a belief affects behavior, Ian Hurd adds, because “the decision whether to comply is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution or by a calculation of self-interest but instead by an internal sense of rightness and obligation.”

A key aspect of legitimacy in the international system is membership in the international community, whose system of multilateral, reciprocal interactions helps to validate its members, institutions, and rules. IGOs, like the UN, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of right process, such as one-state, one-vote. The UN Security Council’s legitimacy as the core institution in the international system imbued with authority to authorize the use

of force derives from the widespread acceptance of that role, as we will examine in Chapter 4.

As political theorists have long noted, flags and rituals are important symbols of legitimate authority. Thus, when peacekeeping forces wear UN blue helmets, they symbolize the international community's desire to preserve a cease-fire in hostilities and, since their coercive power is severely limited, it is their token presence that often (but not always) induces states and other actors to comply. When the Security Council refused to approve the US military operation in Iraq in 2003, it denied the United States the symbols of legitimacy and affected how the mission was regarded by much of the world. The very first such symbol of legitimate international authority was the red cross (and later the red crescent)—the emblem adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross after its founding in 1863 as the first emergency humanitarian organization. As Thomas Franck (1990: 205) states, "It is because states constitute a community that legitimacy has the power to influence their conduct." Today, we could add that it is because there is a growing sense of common humanity and of an international community or global village that legitimacy is such an important variable in global governance.

Legitimacy is also increasingly tied to whether nonstate actors and civil society have a voice and can participate in global governance. Steve Charnovitz (2006: 366) asserts, "Intergovernmental consultation with NGOs can enhance the legitimacy of international decision-making, but it is the consultation itself that makes the contribution, not the quantity of NGO support obtained." In Chapters 4 and 6, we explore the issue of NGO participation.

We borrow from Ronnie Lipschutz (1997: 83) a useful set of questions to bear in mind regarding the politics of governance: "Who rules? Whose rules? What rules? What kind of rules? At what level? In what form? Who decides? On what basis?" And, who benefits? Answers to these questions will emerge in subsequent chapters, but first we examine two critical challenges for global governance: accountability and effectiveness.

Accountability

As a result of the diffusion of domestic democratic norms into the international arena, global governance actors, including IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, experts, and private governors, have faced growing demands for greater accountability and transparency. Some of these demands come from NGOs and civil society groups; others come from democratic governments, major donors, and major borrowers. There is no single, widely accepted definition of accountability, however. At its core is the idea of account-giving—reporting, measuring, justifying, and explaining actions. For some, account-

ability involves a set of standards. How responsive and respectful are they? For others, accountability involves obligations to stakeholders (Koppell 2011: 4–5).

The question is, therefore, whether various global governance actors are only to their member states, for example, or to development aid recipients? Trying to satisfy neither. Tamar Gutner (2010) set up by the IMF reduced the ability of whom are NGOs accountable? Charnovitz argues that advocacy groups are held primarily by the domestic laws that regulate members can simply leave the organization private governance arrangements? actors and certainly most IGOs have been vulnerable to what some scholars call "governance disorder" (Schillemans and Bovens 2011: 4–5).

Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane argue that accountability mechanisms that operate in world and fiscal accountability to peer and national governments. They add, however, that international accountability is ensuring transparency in deliberations, decisions, and actions. Grigorescu (2007: 626) asserts that "in order to determine if government representatives and officials are acting in the public's interest"; without transparency, "it is difficult to hold them accountable for their actions." Transparency is also important for assessing an institution's performance, and hence mechanism for holding them accountable. (Koppell 2011: 59).

For IGOs, issues of accountability and transparency are often raised at whether conferences and meetings are more like private clubs. The UN Security Council, World Bank, WTO, and IMF, for example, have a long history of secrecy. There is also an active debate over whether international institutions, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Some institutions may have established mechanisms for accountability, such as the World Bank's Inspection Panel and the World Bank's Oversight Services. In other situations, an