Justice and International Organization: Two Models of Global Governance

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R ecent events suggest that justice is a central yet neglected ele-
ment in the theory and practice of international organization. For
example, in March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) launched a war in Yugoslavia to curb the abuse of human rights
by Serbs in the Kosovo province, but without the approval of the United
Nations Security Council. This violated a sovereign state's territorial in-
tegrity, in addition to UN norms, but NATO leaders spoke of the right-
ful protection of the Albanian Kosovars.[1] NATO's subsequent inability
to uphold the basic rights and entitlements of all Kosovars, Albanian
and Serb, suggests its actions were fundamentally unjust, however
sound the original intent.

Not long after, thousands of protestors attempted to shut down the
meetings of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle and of the
World Bank in Washington, D.C. Protestors claimed these institutions
are unjust in their failure to take the interests, welfare, and basic rights
of "the people" seriously. Spokespersons for these multilateral economic
institutions were quick to defend the extent to which the benefits of
globalization could be harnessed in favor of social equity and, moreover,
could be pursued in tandem with human rights and the environment.[2]

These events reaffirm a widely known problem of international or-
ganization: an inherent tension between competing visions of what is
just (in any particular case) and the dominant norms and procedures that
constitute and decide upon the just or rightful within international soci-
ety. In this article, I claim that today's context of globalization renders
this tension more complicated, because the justice claims of nonstate
actors now increasingly clash with the largely statist basis of existing
authoritative practices and institutions. I also suggest that the success,
legitimacy, and effectiveness of international organization depends upon
striking an appropriate balance between openness to the (contentious)
justice claims of different political agents and the existence of (widely
accepted, entrenched, and legitimated) authoritative practices. Finally,

19

I suggest in conclusion that a normative key to striking this balance is substantial global political reform premised on cosmopolitan and democratic principles of political accountability across states and societies.

These arguments are oriented by E. H. Carr's 1939 polemic, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. Central to this classic work is the failure of (interwar) international organization. Carr's point is simply that international institutionalization must be (continually) reconstituted by authoritative practices that are open to the justice motives of actors whose (potentially rightful) interests are now marginalized or outside the status quo of international justice.[3] That is, international organization must be open to potential norm change and evolution based on the claims of current injustices. In reformulating Carr's analysis, I rely on normative international theory to juxtapose two contemporary models of global governance based on contrasting visions of justice: "statist" and "poststatist." The tension between remaining open to marginalized or "as-yet-unrecognized" justice claims and existing authoritative practices is something that implicitly separates these two approaches to international organization. Statist models of international or global governance are, I claim, too closed to the justice motives of political actors generally, and of nonstate actors in particular. This closure privileges existing international authoritative practices and the status quo of the Westphalian order. By contrast, advocates of poststatist global governance are far more open to justice demands and nonstate actors. However, the most prominent of these visionaries, such as James N. Rosenau, have yet to provide a normative account of the *just* authoritative practices that can positively transform, if not replace, existing authoritative practices of the sovereign states system.

The Justice Motive and Authoritative Practices

Carr uses realist analysis to explain the failings of the League of Nations and the limitations of international law and morality. However, Carr's realism offers us something unique—indeed, something that permits us to theorize the role of justice in international organization. Certainly Carr focuses on the pursuit by state leaders of their national interests rather than simply justice.[4] Typical of other realists, Carr emphasizes how a decentralized, anarchic order is inhospitable to universal goals.[5] But Carr does not aim to categorically undermine the ideal of international justice nor the potentials of international organization to promote this ideal. To the contrary, he questioned the extraordinarily limited capacity of existing international organization, namely the League,

to actually realize the claims to justice that its advocates espoused. Carr noted that the liberal ideology behind the League masked the hegemony of certain "status quo" oriented states.[6] As James L. Richardson notes, Carr's basic contribution is "the idea that international organization might become the bulwark of privilege, a way of preserving the established order by other means."[7]

Carr's brand of realism is attentive to the particularity of conflicting interests while being tempered by idealism, something he equates with the necessarily purposeful and constructive element of all political thought.[8] Carr prescribes that we ought to seriously question whether contemporary international organization contains sufficient, widely recognized, and inclusive mechanisms for at least dealing with (i.e., authoritatively accepting or rejecting) and thereby reconciling the justice claims of different actors.[9] Without attention to the claims of dissatisfied states, for example, international organization could never approximate the goals its advocates have claimed possible.[10] Carr's legacy thus takes us to the heart of the problem of at least recognizing, if not accommodating, the importance of claims to justice and complaints of injustice by states in a context supposedly lacking well-ordered, recognized authoritative practices by which to adjudicate conflict. Once this essentially normative problem is recognized, as Carr did, we go beyond realism.

Normative international political theory is distinct for its serious focus on international justice. As Chris Brown notes, normative theorists emphasize that states will act in accord not merely with the dictates of self-interest but also in accord with a state of justice: one "in which states receive what is their *due* or have the *right* to expect certain kinds of treatment."[11] But Carr's realism is premised on an idealist vision of developing mechanisms capable of what he termed "peaceful change," an essential component of which is whether international organization is open and well suited to addressing the demands of competing actors.[12] Contemporary normative international political theory has—for the most part tacitly—taken up Carr's legacy by considering the problem of justice.[13] David A. Welch and Terry Nardin have theorized two significant features in Carr's analysis: the justice motive and authoritative practices. However, the ensuing analysis shows that Welch and Nardin are much more closed than Carr to the material basis of justice claims by political agents that reside outside the extant framework of international law and its statist morality.

Welch's study of war contains findings that apply to international organization. He concludes that wars are frequently ignited by perceptions of justice and injustice.[14] However, he qualifies this claim by distinguishing between (1) justice as a *motive* and (2) justice as an *authoritative*

practice, grounded in the widely accepted and robust norms of international institutions.

The justice motive is "*the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits*" or "a reaction to a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits."[15] Welch claims that the justice motive is negative—a destabilizing force that must be contained and harnessed.[16] And this can happen only when the justice motive is channeled into the authoritative practices of international institutions that can effectively settle disputes on entitlements.

What is justice as an "authoritative practice"? For Welch, the justice motive explains something important about the reasons (state) actors behave in certain ways and thus why they might accept or reject the legitimacy of existing international organizations.[17] This explanation also potentially explains why states would seek the construction of institutions that can authoritatively settle disputes about rights. As liberal philosophers such as Kant have argued, rational actors will seek an authoritative institutional status quo to constrain others.[18]

The solution to the justice motive is international justice as a solid body of de facto or status quo practices. As Welch asserts, "Justice is a virtue of a particular type of order: namely, one which defines and protects entitlements to legitimate expectations and resolves conflicting claims through a procedure widely regarded as legitimate."[19] Welch concedes that the extent to which an international society can become as "well-ordered" as a domestic one is limited (by such factors as cultural pluralism). But there already exists within this more or less "anarchical society," to use Hedley Bull's phrase, a well-ordered layer of authoritative practices and international laws that can do the job.[20]

Nardin's path-breaking analysis of international justice is also theoretically significant to this issue.[21] Nardin holds that the essence of international governance is the idea that all purposes be kept out of things and that international organization be merely about the procedures that allow states with very different purposes to coexist. He sees evidence since the late eighteenth century that the theory and successful practice of international law is practical rather than purposive—that is, to use Welch's language, dedicated to authoritative rules rather than satisfying every state's particular justice motive.[22] As Nardin writes, the international legal status quo constitutes a "meta-state," constituted by "an association of political communities united through the authority of common rules governing their relations[,] but lacking the [purposive] institutions through which the laws of political community are ordinarily created or applied."[23] In other words, these authoritative practices create a form of governance without government.[24]

Nardin's analysis thus exhibits a bias that Brown notes pervades most normative international political theory: justice "is defined largely in formal or procedural terms; social justice is not a major focus."[25] To be fair, this does not mean that Nardin and Welch are opposed to social justice per se. It is, rather, that introducing material, substantive, or purposive ends into the realm of international organization is problematic. If international organization is not "limited to clarifying and strengthening the focus and procedures to be observed by states in their *external* relations, [and] to determining the requirements of these forms and procedures in particular situations," a destabilizing and disorderly Pandora's box will likely, as Nardin argues, be opened.[26]

The problem with the distinction in normative international political theory between justice as a motive ("purpose," in Nardin's language) and justice as an authoritative practice (that is purely "practical" in intent) is anticipated by Carr. Welch and Nardin fail to strike a balance between motives and authoritative practices in international organization in a way that could make such institutions effective and legitimate in the widest possible sense. This is because they reject too strongly justice motives and purposes and consequently endorse too strongly the status quo. The formal international justice this supports is conservative and also closed to the justice demands of actors who perceive themselves excluded or wronged. I will now situate the state-centric assumptions of thinkers like Welch and Nardin within a "statist" model of global governance and then juxtapose this model with a "poststatist" model that rightly emphasizes nonstate actors, internationalization, and globalization.

Two Models of Global Governance

The ensuing analysis does not aim to add yet more connotations and denotations to the "global governance" literature but to suggest that future debate take more seriously the competing normative assumptions that abound—especially those about justice.[27] I substantiate my charge that Welch's and Nardin's assumptions lead to a statist model of global governance that is too conservative and closed with respect to the appropriate nature of international organization. I also outline an alternative poststatist model with which I juxtapose the postulates of Welch and Nardin. "Poststatists" such as Rosenau depict international organization in a way amenable to addressing the justice motives of a much wider plurality of actors. However, I point out the problems of not explicitly and definitively rooting justice claims within appropriate *global authoritative* practices.

A Statist Global Governance Model

Normative international political theorists such as Welch and Nardin
have not generally embraced the term "global governance." They in-
stead emphasize the *interstate* nature of international politics and of in-
ternational organization. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to include these
authors' works as representative of a particular model of global gover-
nance, for two reasons: (1) it is not that far a stretch from interstate to
global politics simply because Welch and Nardin view the key tenets of
international justice as having a universal scope and applicability; and
(2) like others interested in global governance, these authors—particu-
larly Nardin—are interested in how to sustain and govern just political
relations in a decentralized world order, and not merely how to balance
power like realists. As Nardin writes, when appropriately conceived, the
justice of international organization governs political relations among
states without legislative mechanisms: "The history of international re-
lations since 1815 is . . . in part a series of experiments in international
government."[28] Welch refers to the extant patchwork of regimes, legal
norms, and authoritative practices as sufficient for a kind of governance
without government.[29]

Global governance is not only dominated by sovereign states in this
model—these states are the near exclusive subjects and objects of jus-
tice, thus creating, I think, certain problems with this broad approach
to international organization. Welch and Nardin are *not* ignorant of
transnational forces and the growing interdependence of states and so-
cieties; nor do they deny the existence of nonstate actors, although they
certainly do not take pains to give a theoretical account of them. Quite
simply, these facts do not override the normative centrality of the state
nor, as they both approvingly cite, Bull's view that states are a "posi-
tive" and hopefully enduring element of world order.[30] It is this alleged
widespread de facto acceptance of states, above all else, that makes
them the "most competent" actors with respect to justice claims across
territorial boundaries.

One of Carr's more important claims is that the purpose and struc-
ture of international organization is always subject to being defined ac-
cording to a contestable status quo by the most powerful and the most
self-serving of actors. Carr's worry is that international organization,
and the authoritative practices that structure them, tend to lose legiti-
macy and hence the capacity for promoting peaceful change without a
large degree of openness to the justice demands of the less powerful.
Certainly Carr was thinking mainly of sovereign states (despite his fre-
quent quasi-Marxist references to class interests); but his critique of any

international organization that is a priori closed to justice motives is relevant in today's context of increasingly prominent nonstate actors. In making only states the appropriate subjects and objects of justice, the "statist" model risks being too closed to entitlement claims that are not enshrined in current authoritative practices. This applies not merely to states in international society but also to the justice demands of nonstate actors in addition to the humanitarian interests of those whose states have failed or are unable to maintain basic rights.

This lack of openness to justice claims stems from a general fear of disorder and instability in Welch's and Nardin's work. Welch is open to incorporating the justice motive of states into increasingly more nuanced, sophisticated, and inclusive authoritative practices and mechanisms. But in the meantime, the justice motive is viewed mostly as a disruptive feature of world politics. Welch also contends that any regrettable international situation or structure that produces a claim to injustice is practically irrelevant if it is not yet recognized as unjust by international legal practice. That is, strictly speaking, the claims of the afflicted can be considered neither just nor unjust "without the appropriate institutional background."[31] For this reason, Welch states that cosmopolitan claims for distributive justice or greater global equity are also misplaced and unrealistic. But this reconciles the relationship between normative theory and political practice in a conservative way: that which exists in practice rules out what is most justifiable according to a theory of justice. As Welch contends, the ultimate criterion by which to evaluate a theory of (international) justice is whether it is capable of "enjoying substantial de facto legitimacy across borders."[32] And, "to the extent that there is a legitimate conception of international justice at all, it is embodied and codified in international law."[33]

The underlying conservative and closed nature of this model of global governance is much more explicit in Nardin. For Nardin, all purposive conceptions of international justice and right, even among states, are rejected because they necessarily undo the very preconditions of world order. The lesson Nardin reads into the failure of the League of Nations is not, as Carr thought, the need to make international organization reasonably open to the justice demands of revisionist actors. On the contrary, "the arguments about the injustice of the Versailles settlement advanced after the First World War mark the beginning toward a conception of international justice as a matter of substantive benefits rather than legality, as having to do above all with the distribution of wealth, power, and other goods among states."[34] The lesson is thus that the introduction of any substantive purposes into such organization is to be resisted in favor of purely formal constraining mechanisms. Questions of

redistribution among cosmopolitan lines are thus also rejected—unless they can be handled "indirectly"—as out of hand and beyond the scope of accepted practice.[35]

The closure to justice claims within this model of global governance is problematic. This is particularly so not least because of the challenges to conventional configurations of power, authority, legality, and legitimacy currently wrought by internationalization and globalization processes.[36] Although Nardin is no doubt correct to insist there is "little evidence" that states will soon disappear,[37] this is no longer the theoretically interesting point for justice and international organization. What is interesting is the way in which state institutions, national societies, and markets are being transformed as a consequence of global pressures, and the way in which all actors—state and nonstate, regional, national and transnational, public and private—are framing their actions, policies, and goals to transcend the formal interstate realm that the statist model of global governance privileges. The "formal" similarity of external sovereignty cannot contain, as Nardin hopes, the justice motives of a far wider plurality of actors to which I have just alluded.[38]

In this context of internationalization and globalization, the development of authoritative practices is still an obvious goal, but the question of which justice motives ought to be excluded a priori should be left open. Remaining open and willing to theorize the informal and the legally unrecognized justice demands of nonstate actors allows us to deal with such phenomena as protests against the WTO and World Bank. As Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott have noted, "The voice of the NGO [nongovernmental organization] and GSM [global social movement] is the one serious voice that aspires, rhetorically at least, to the development of a 'justice-based' dialogue beyond the level of the sovereign state."[39]

There is little reason not to extend Welch's analysis of states and war to the recent discourse and activities of social movements vis-à-vis multilateral global trading regimes. For example, consider the words of Canadian social activist and global free trade opponent Maude Barlow at the recent "World Social Forum" in Porto Alegre, Brazil: "We should consider this a struggle or war against our governments."[40] To take nonstate actors like social movements seriously requires that we stop thinking of the so-called justice motive as merely a subjectivist desire of the self (i.e., to receive fair treatment). Such a nonstatist analysis needs to go beyond this bias to conceive how global social movements, for example, are demanding rightful treatment for those who cannot voice their own justice demands or those who are structurally excluded from the institutional policy processes of states and international institutions.

A statist and purely intergovernmentalist model of global governance would have us think that these demands must be ultimately channeled through domestic policy processes.[41] Yet an exclusively domestic policy approach to these issues is ethically problematic because of the erosion of democratic accountability by globalization processes.

Finally, Nardin acknowledges that there is a profound moral tension between the human rights demands introduced into the legal norms of international society since World War II and the Westphalian framework within which such norms are pursued. He maintains that human interests and humanitarian ends must ultimately be subordinated to the legal independence of states and thus are to be pursued only "indirectly."[42] Sovereignty and the duty of nonintervention are among the core authoritative practices of international governance as it has evolved in practice,[43] and therefore basic human rights and security must be met within certain given parameters.

Is there any way, then, to conceive of and respond to the justice demands of ostensibly persecuted collectivities such as the Albanian Kosovars? Under the statist model of global governance, the answer to this would seem to be that the basic rights of these people can only be upheld "indirectly," that is, within the parameters of sovereignty norms claimed by the authorities in Belgrade and—in the context of the UN Security Council—Moscow and Beijing. If states act outside of these norms, as NATO members did, then their actions cannot be justified by the settled norms of international society and thus cannot be just.[44]

The profound moral problems with the conduct and consequences of NATO's war over Kosovo cannot be overlooked. The central point here is that the statist model lends itself to ignoring the justice motives and claims of nonstate agents in favor of a too complacent stance on the rectitude of the extant rules of international order. If there were no easy answers to the moral dilemma of Kosovo, the difficult choices faced by state leaders and international organizations to act more "directly" in favor of basic rights cannot be dismissed merely as a misunderstanding of the formal, pluralistic nature of international society.

A Poststatist Model of Global Governance

"Governance without government" has been a feature of world politics for over 200 years. But what does shifting from the idea of international governance (that Nardin describes) to global governance mean? It means that international organization has been and continues to be affected and transformed by global processes. It also means that nonstate actors both within and across state boundaries can exercise some influence over how

global problems are resolved. Neither of these facts is new, but they have arguably accelerated and become more salient recently, thus giving credence to a variety of poststatist conceptions of international organization. Ideally, the justice motives of a variety of actors beyond the state, in addition to the concomitant need of recognized authoritative practices used to address conflicting entitlement claims, should be at the center of poststatist accounts of contemporary international organization. However, the moral dilemmas and the ethical reflections on how to deal with changes wrought by globalization processes are not always at the forefront of analysis.[45]

As noted, the statist model is relatively closed toward entitlement claims that are not consolidated into existing, authoritative practices. It is also especially closed to the justice motive as it emerges and operates within the sphere of nonstate actors. The justice claims of nonstate or (transnational) societal actors are left to national governments that are assumed legitimate and capable of overseeing which principles and procedures are applied in producing a just society.[46]

The dichotomy between the domestic and international spheres found in the statist model is challenged by, among others, Rosenau's work on global governance.[47] Though not typically viewed as a normative scholar or specialist in international ethics, Rosenau can be usefully and legitimately compared with Welch and Nardin. This is in large part because his recent work potentially overcomes the ethical shortcomings posed by the statist model by proposing to conceive of international organization from a new, poststatist "ontology."[48] Rather than "clinging to the notion that states and national governments are the essential underpinnings of the world's organization,"[49] Rosenau claims that the allocation of values is affected by a wider plurality of actors and political forces both within and beyond states.[50] Although states are important, international authority has shifted and is changing the role and position of formally sovereign, territorially exclusive units: "States and governments should be posited not as first among equals, but simply as significant actors in a world marked by an increasing diffusion of authority and a corresponding diminution of hierarchy."[51]

Unlike Nardin, for example, Rosenau's poststatist understanding of world order is not purely formal and closed to the purposive claims of (global) political agents. To the contrary, global governance is defined as the uncontrolled, open-ended, and wide-ranging pursuit of the different purposes, ends, and interests, including entitlement claims by political actors. International organization is thus "more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained,"[52] but is instead a "crazy-quilt"

pattern by which agents form a variety of mutually affecting commands, goals, directives, and policies.[53] "Global governance is [thus] the sum of myriad—literally millions of—control mechanisms driven by different histories, cultures, structures and processes."[54] Actors, sovereign and nonsovereign, are all trying to "satisfy their needs and wants"[55] through the widely available command mechanisms produced by globalization's pressures to integrate and fragment existing sovereign states. This understanding of global governance opens an important door to more adequate theorizing of justice in contemporary international organization; but it is one that Rosenau has yet to enter.

Rosenau's poststatist ontology allows us to entertain the justice motive in a much wider variety of actors and contexts than, say, Welch's account. From Rosenau's analysis we could, for example, view the protests in Seattle against the WTO as an expression of individual and collective subjects' perceptions of a disjuncture between the likely entitlements and material realities produced by a deepened global trading regime. If, as we learn from Carr, an important measure of the legitimacy and effectiveness of international organization is precisely its openness to justice demands, this poststatist framework is an improvement.[56] However, mere attentiveness to the (justice) demands of all actors is insufficient. The nature of this insufficiency points to two related problems within Rosenau's global governance.

First, remaining open to the diverse plurality of all political actors should not lead us to think that all actors have equal power, legitimacy, and moral authority to make claims. As Carr, among others, would remind us, power differentials permeate international politics and existing institutionalization. Rosenau's vision of global governance frequently resembles a reformulated, globalized, liberal-pluralism that overlooks if not masks hegemonic practices that exclude the less powerful. Rosenau claims that a "disaggregated, decentralized world" is one in which "there is no basis for presuming a pecking order" nor any reason to presume that (some) states have a greater or lesser capability to control political outcomes than, say, bond-rating agencies.[57] But global governance is not simply an uncontrolled, open-ended process, but something that is patterned by institutions and norms that support certain social forces and exclude others. Moreover, these patterns are still structured greatly by state power. As Devetak and Higgott note, states "are not mere passive actors in the face of globalization and justice."[58]

Second, and more crucially, the enduring lesson of normative international political theory is that recognizing the justice motive is not enough—there needs to be authoritative practices to *settle* entitlement claims. In other words, Rosenau's account of global governance does

not provide much on the development of morally capable institutions—
that is, ones amenable to the plethora of justice claims in a poststatist
world order. To be clear, it is not that Rosenau fails to envisage future
global institutionalization at all.[59] Rather, he fails to consider the moral
problems engendered by globalization without the necessary develop-
ment of global authoritative practices. Without such practices, the inter-
national disorder that Welch and Nardin fear, and that Rosenau ac-
knowledges, will also become globalized.[60]

Conclusion

A persistent practical and moral problem of international organization
has been the discrepancy between the perception of unfulfilled entitle-
ment claims and legitimate authoritative practices among states and so-
cieties. The problem has become more challenging because of inter-
nationalization and globalization pressures, in addition to the growing
presence of nonstate actors. The war in Kosovo and the crisis of legiti-
macy that increasingly plagues global economic institutions like the
WTO are evidence of the way justice motives can lead to conflict and in-
stability. In this context, Carr's intellectual legacy is worth recalling: that
it is crucial to remain open to the justice claims of a wide variety of ac-
tors in the quest for peaceful change through international organization.

By contrasting the prevailing statist and poststatist models of global
governance, I have argued that both have shortcomings in light of the
evolving problem of justice in international organization. The statist and
formal authoritative practices of existing international organizations do
not prosecute effectively their intended functions if they are too closed
to the demands of aggrieved nonstate actors. To some degree, then, the
statist model fails on its own normative terms because the present array
of justice claims threaten disorder and violent transitions that poten-
tially undermine the society of states.[61] Yet the prevailing poststatist ap-
proach to global governance articulated by Rosenau is too sanguine
about the resulting diminution of political authority. Although his model
is open to the claims of nonstate actors, there is also a need for global
authoritative practices to recognize and settle these claims in a just fash-
ion. Without this, it is the most powerful nonstate actors, such as multi-
national corporations, that will surely prevail in redefining the norms
and practices of future international organization. To the extent that this
is already happening, Craig Murphy is surely right to claim that global
governance is both "poorly done and poorly understood."[62]

Remaining open to justice claims yet being committed to finding authoritative institutions within global governance is not simple. In striking a balance between these two elements of justice, cosmopolitan political theorists have made recent progress. David Held and others have proposed cosmopolitan and democratic global governance institutions.[63] The reforms advocated by Held et al. aim to create democratic practices for key international organizations such as the UN that conceivably respond to the entitlement claims of various global political agents. Although long-term and ambitious, the cosmopolitan democracy agenda recognizes the need to view international organization in terms of justice and legitimate governance in an era of globalization. Additionally, cosmopolitan democracy advocates have made proposals with an eye to establishing controls on globalization processes that have led not just to an erosion of state autonomy, but to the growing global inequalities that will only undermine the promise of peaceful change—the primary moral task of international organization. ⊕

Notes

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1. For an example, see the remarks of Canada's minister of foreign affairs at the time of the campaign in "Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda," Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations, Princeton University, 7 April 1999, p. 2.

2. "Seattle Comes to Washington," *The Economist,* 15 April 2000; "Clueless in Seattle," *The Economist,* 4 December 1999, p. 17; "The Battle in Seattle," *The Economist,* 27 November 1999. See also Robert O'Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams, eds., *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also the exchange, "Seattle: December '99" between Mary Kaldor, Jan Aart Scholte, Fred Halliday, and Stephen Gill in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2000): 103–140.

3. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (Edinburgh: R & R Clark, 1942).

4. Ibid., p. 185.

5. Ibid., pp. 139, 220.

6. Ibid., pp. 69, 94, 100–101, 104–105.

7. James L. Richardson, "Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 1 (1997): 17.

8. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* pp. 13–15, and see chap. 6, "The Limitations of Realism."

9. Ibid., pp. 244–245.

10. Ibid., p. 272.

11. Chris Brown, "Review Article: Theories of International Justice," *British Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 1: 276. In contrast to some realist and most contemporary liberal-institutionalist or neoliberal scholars, Terry Nardin expresses a core precept of recent normative international theory: international society is "constituted by the actions of thinking agents, who must take each other into account in making decisions, whose decisions are accounted for in terms of intentions and reasons rather than dispositions and causes, and whose acts are understood as being shaped and guided by rules of conduct rather than laws of behaviour" (*Law, Morality and the Relations of States* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983], p. 32).

12. See Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* chap. 13.

13. Normative international relations theory constitutes a broad and diverse body of literature. In this section, my concern is primarily with the work of, as Chris Brown labels them, "international political theorists"—people like Stanley Hoffmann, Hedley Bull, and (examined in greater detail here) Terry Nardin. As Brown notes, these writers share with mainstream international relations theory "a central concern with the state, but couple this with a concern that inter-state relations be understood as potentially governed by relations of justice" (p. 280).

14. David A. Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 20.

15. Ibid., p. 19 (emphasis in original).

16. Ibid., p. 210.

17. As he states, the "justice motive is an explanatory concept" (ibid., p. 187).

18. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 102–105; see Pierre Laberge, "Kant on Justice and the Law of Nations," in David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, eds., *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 83–102.

19. Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War,* p. 193.

20. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977). See also Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Daedelus,* 108 (1979): 111–123.

21. Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States.*

22. Ibid., p. 19.

23. Ibid., p. 20.

24. On this theme, see James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

25. Brown, "Review Article: Theories of International Justice," p. 274.

26. Ibid., p. 90 (emphasis added).

27. See the Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1–6; James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," *Global Governance* 1, no. 1 (1995): 13–43; Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "What Is Global Governance?" *Global Governance* 1, no. 3 (1995): 367–372; and the contributions to Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).

28. Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 85. See also K. J. Holsti, "Governance Without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century European International Politics," in Rosenau and Czempiel, *Governance Without Government*, pp. 30–57.

29. See Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War*, pp. 212–214.

30. See Bull, "The State's Positive Role"; Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 47; Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War*, p. 211.

31. Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War*, p. 199.

32. Ibid., p. 205.

33. Ibid., p. 208.

34. Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 255.

35. Ibid., p. 261.

36. As Robert W. Cox notes, "Internationalization refers to changes affecting states and should be differentiated from globalization, which is a broader concept that refers to the whole range of activities and practices involving state and nonstate actors that tend toward a more integrated global system" ("An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century," *Global Governance* 3, no. 1 [1997]: 106).

37. Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 47.

38. Ibid., p. 52.

39. Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, "Justice Unbound? Globalization, States, and the Transformation of the Social Bond," *International Affairs* 75, no. 3 (1999): 485.

40. Mark MacKinnon, "Activists Study How to Stop Free Trade Pact," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 27 January 2001, p. A19.

41. See Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553.

42. Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 239.

43. Ibid., p. 270.

44. Welch (*Justice and the Genesis of War*, p. 197) claims that international justice can be coherent only with reference to recognized norms by which to justify claims.

45. See Devetak and Higgott, "Justice Unbound?"

46. This bias also exists in John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

47. See James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

48. See James N. Rosenau, "Towards an Ontology for Global Governance," in Hewson and Sinclair, *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, pp. 281–301; and Rosenau, "Governance for the Twenty-First Century."

49. Rosenau, "Towards an Ontology," p. 287.

50. Rosenau, "Governance for the Twenty-First Century," pp. 13–14.

51. Rosenau, "Towards an Ontology," p. 292.

52. Rosenau, "Governance for the Twenty-First Century," p. 13.

53. Ibid., p. 14.

54. Ibid., p. 15.

55. Ibid., p. 16.

56. See, in particular, Rosenau's remarks on identity and legitimacy, in Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, pp. 446–449.

57. Rosenau, "Towards an Ontology," p. 297.

58. Devetak and Higgott, "Justice Unbound?" p. 485.

59. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," pp. 13–14, 18.

60. Ibid., p. 18.

61. I acknowledge an anonymous reviewer's helpful comments on this point.

62. Craig N. Murphy, "Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood," *International Affairs* 76, no. 4 (2000): 780–803.

63. See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds., *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, eds., *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).