

The European Union's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies

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Reader's Guide:

EU cooperation in foreign, security, and defence policy has developed quite rapidly since the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s. The first section of this chapter charts the first steps towards a common policy in this area. This is followed by a review of the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the gradual militarization of the EU. The subsequent section analyses the actors involved in the CFSP, focusing in particular on the role of the member states and the EU institutions in the development of the policy. The final section of the chapter evaluates the range of military and civilian CSDP missions that the EU has undertaken to date.

Introduction

The Common Foreign and Security Policy, with its Common Security and Defence Policy, is one of the most popular EU policies with European electorates. Since its inception in 1993, support for

the CFSP has ranged from 68 to 79 per cent, and in the last decade it has never fallen below 70 per cent (Eurobarometer, 2004, 2014). Despite this overwhelming public support, the CFSP has also been a controversial and contentious policy area, fraught with tensions.



First, there exists a tension between intergovernmentalist and integrationist states. Traditionally, **Westphalians** view international relations as a system of independent sovereign states, with foreign, security, and defence policy linked to state sovereignty. Close security and defence cooperation is often seen as undermining state independence and fundamental national interests. Thus, permanent and institutionalized EU cooperation through the CFSP and the CSDP is anathema to the EU states' real national interests. By contrast, the more integrationist states understand the development and institutionalization of the CFSP and CSDP as a natural extension of the EU's function as an international actor, combining its economic soft power with military means in order to shoulder its responsibilities on the international stage (Breuer and Kurowska, 2012).

Second, a further source of tension is the split between Atlanticist and Europeanist EU states. On the one side are EU states committed to a strong NATO and US presence in European security, who fear that the development of the CSDP might undermine NATO. On the other side are states like France that promote an independent European security and defence structure as an alternative to NATO, and as a way of balancing US international influence (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014).

Finally, there is a tension between more interventionist states, such as France and the UK, and those member states that have a tradition of non-intervention, such as Germany. With the development of the CSDP and the launch of CSDP missions in 2003, this tension has become central to the CFSP. It has become clear that a minority of member states has shouldered the responsibility and cost for the majority of the missions undertaken under the EU flag. Moreover, the EU member states differ in the importance they attach to the UN mandate for humanitarian or peacekeeping interventions. In particular, the post-neutral states, such as Sweden and Finland, together with Germany, have a tradition of strong attachment to UN primacy in peacekeeping. Other states, such as the UK, can conceive of humanitarian missions being undertaken even in the absence of a UN mandate (as in the 1998–99 Kosovo war). Despite these underlying tensions, the EU has rapidly developed agency in the area of foreign, security, and defence policy since the early 1990s. The following sections will look more closely at this development.

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

At the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) was well placed to play a leading role in the new world order. However, the forerunner to the CFSP, **European political cooperation (EPC)** was not up to the task of producing proactive European foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union also removed the need for a security 'buffer zone' between Russia and 'the West', which allowed neutral states Sweden, Finland, and Austria, to submit applications to join the EU. The new security situation in Europe, made a more developed form of foreign and security policy cooperation within the EU possible. Moreover, with the fall of communism, the US role in European security changed, and was followed by a gradual US withdrawal from the European theatre. Questions arose over NATO's future role in the European security architecture.

Previous attempts at establishing cooperation in security and defence in Europe were largely unsuccessful. For example, the **Western European Union (WEU)** established in the 1950s, outside of Community structures, had a very limited impact on European security. However, with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), agreed at Maastricht, entering into effect in 1993, the EU took its first steps towards cooperation in foreign, security, and defence issues.

The Treaty agreed at Maastricht provided the basis for the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It stated that the CFSP should cover 'all areas of foreign and security policy' and that, in time, the EU should work towards creating a common defence policy and eventually a common defence, if the member states so wish (Article J.4.1, title V, TEU). The Treaty outlined the main objectives of the CSDP to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union; to promote international cooperation and strengthen international security; and, finally, to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule-of-law, and respect for human rights. The Treaty also established the **three-pillar structure** of the EU in order to accommodate and safeguard the intergovernmental character of the CSDP. This second intergovernmental pillar placed the CFSP under control of the EU Council and

involved very little input from the other EU institutions. Moreover, the CFSP's decision-making framework was to rest on member state **unanimity**, giving each government the ability to veto any policy initiative or operation.

The Treaty envisaged two main sources of external relations policy in the EU. The first was the member states' own foreign and security policies pursued independently of CFSP; the second was cooperation through the CFSP framework, where member states should 'inform and consult each other', thus increasing the EU's international leverage. The EU Council would establish a **common position** that national governments would then have to accommodate in their external policies. For example, the EU's common position on anti-personnel landmines enabled the EU to play a crucial role in the process leading to the banning of their use (European Commission, 2005). Moreover, the Treaty enabled the EU to adopt **joint actions**, which required a unanimous vote in the Council. Joint actions are the basis for CFSP/CSDP missions, such as the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the first years of the CSDP, the policy seemed to achieve little. There was hardly any collaborative work of substance by the EU states. Moreover, common positions were often weak, reflecting a lowest-common-denominator style of politics. To a large extent, the Amsterdam European Council of

1997 simply confirmed the provisions of the Treaty agreed at Maastricht. However, it did introduce three significant changes to the CFSP. First, it established the procedure of '**constructive abstention**' that enabled less than a third of member states to **opt out** of a joint action without vetoing it for the others. This was later replaced by the '**enhanced cooperation**' provisions in the Lisbon Treaty (see 'CFSP institutions and actors'). Second, the revised treaty created new CSDP institutions in Brussels, such as the **High Representative (HR) for the CFSP**. The HR was to head the new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, and to act as the Secretary-General of the EU Council. While these initiatives served to bring external relations closer to Brussels, the member states were still able to maintain their pre-eminence over this policy field. Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Western European Union's (WEU)'s '**Petersberg tasks**' into the Treaty. These included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking. With the **Lisbon Treaty**, which came into force in 2009, the Petersberg tasks were further expanded to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilization tasks. The incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the EU was important as it laid down the treaty basis for the operative development of the European Security and Development Policy (ESDP) (see Box 17.1).

BOX 17.1 A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CFSP

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| 1949 | NATO is founded by the USA, Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Luxembourg. |
| 1954 | The Western European Union (WEU) is created as an attempt to encourage European security cooperation. The WEU is outside of Community structures. |
| 1970 | European political cooperation (EPC) is instituted and members agree to cooperate more fully on foreign policy matters. |
| 1992 | The WEU establishes the Petersberg tasks. |
| 1993 | The Maastricht Treaty enters into force. It establishes the CFSP as the successor to the EPC; the CFSP is established as the second fully intergovernmental pillar of the EU. |
| 1998 | In December, the St Malo summit between France and the UK results in the establishment of the ESDP. |
| 1999 | The Amsterdam Treaty enters into force in May. The Treaty moves the so-called Petersberg tasks into the EU. It establishes the post of High Representative (HR) for the CFSP. |
| | In June, the Cologne Council formulates the capabilities catalogue , an inventory of EU military capabilities. |
| | In December, the Helsinki headline goals are declared. They stipulate that the EU should be able to launch full range Petersberg tasks and assemble military forces of up to 60,000 by 2003. |
| 2002 | EU and NATO formalize the Berlin-plus arrangements that provide the EU with access to NATO assets. |

(continued)

BOX 17.1 A CHRONOLOGY OF THE CFSP (continued)

2003	In January, the ESDP launches the first civilian mission, a police mission to Bosnia Herzegovina. Later in the year, the EU launches its first military action to FYR Macedonia. In February, the Nice Treaty enters into force. It provides for the development of EU military capacities and the creation of political and military institutions. In December, the European Security Strategy is published.
2004	The European Defence Agency , focused on developing defence capabilities, is established.
2004–5	European public transport is attacked: Madrid in March 2004; and London in July 2005.
2007	EU battle groups are fully operational. These are 1,500 standby rapid reaction forces rotating every six months between EU framework states.
2008	In March, a deployment of 3,700 troops is sent into Chad and the Central African Republic. The CSDP anti-piracy mission Atalanta is launched.
2009	In December, the Treaty of Lisbon takes full effect; the CFSP is no longer a separate pillar . The new role of the President of the European Council is established and the role of CFSP HR is extended.
2009–11	The ESDP suffers mission fatigue linked to the institutional focus on the LT and the economic crisis.
2010	The CSDP instrument of Permanent Structured Cooperation is established.
2011	The EU lacks coherence in its response to the Libya crisis and the 'Arab Spring'. In June, the WEU is formally dissolved. In December, the European External Action Service (EEAS) becomes fully operational.
2013	The EU renews its engagement in CSDP missions, for example, in the Sahel region.
2015	In January, the Paris terrorist shootings take place.

KEY POINTS

- The **Maastricht Treaty** established the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- The **Amsterdam Treaty** brought the Petersberg tasks of humanitarian rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management into the EU.
- The Amsterdam Treaty also established a High Representative for the CFSP.
- The HR has played a crucial role in further developments of the CFSP.

From a European to a Common Security and Defence Policy

The activities of the early years of the CFSP were moderate and did not include defence policy. Against the backdrop of the Yugoslav civil wars and the EU's inability to respond effectively, the need for further policy development became clear. The Yugoslav experience provided the political will necessary in the member

states to increase the ambitions and capacities of the CFSP, leading to a gradual militarization of the Union.

The Saint Malo Process

In December 1998, a window of opportunity opened at a summit between France and the UK in St Malo, France, which would allow a European convergence on defence to begin. The cooperation of France and the UK, along with the acceptance of Germany, was seen as crucial for the development of an EU defence policy. France and the UK have traditionally been on opposite sides of the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide. However, in 1998, the Labour government under Tony Blair saw EU defence cooperation as a means and symbol of British reengagement and leadership in the Union after years of outsider status. Moreover, it represented a possibility to shape military and security policy in line with British interests (Dover, 2007) and a clean break from the traditional Conservative fear that defence cooperation within the EU would constitute a threat to NATO supremacy. For the French government under Jacques Chirac, Saint Malo was

unprecedented opportunity, fitting well with its traditional position of support for an independent European security architecture. As the least transatlantic of EU government and the keenest to see NATO collapse at the end of the Cold War, the French government was ready to embrace the British initiative (Newirth, 2014). The St Malo summit resulted in a declaration that stated that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.

Through European Council meetings in Cologne (1998) and Helsinki (1999), the ESDP proposals were amended and adapted. Of particular note was the call at Cologne for a 'capabilities catalogue'—a pool of personnel, expertise, and military equipment pledged by member governments, to be used in EU-led military actions. The European Council also called for further coordination in European defence industries. However, this was to take place outside the EU until the creation of the European Defence Agency in 2004 (see 'CFSP institutions and actors'). Also important was the inclusion of 'headline goals' at the Helsinki Council. These agreed that by 2003, the EU would be able to deploy 60,000 troops, in 60 days, sustainable for up to a year (Merlingen, 2012). The aim of this initiative was to make the Saint Malo objectives operational, that is, more than just a 'paper policy'. However, this ambitious goal could not be achieved by 2003, and the framework was extended to 2010. Even with this later date, the member states have been unable to meet the Helsinki targets. This has in part been due to cuts to national defence budgets, and also to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which put pressure on resources.

The Nice Treaty Framework

Much of the detail of the **Nice Treaty**, and the ESDP within it, had in fact been concluded well before the new Treaty was formally agreed. The Nice European Council meeting of 2001 provided the blueprints for Brussels-based institutional structures to support the policy—namely, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which was to be assisted by a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, as well as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (see 'CFSP institutions and actors'). Moreover, the Treaty contained some elements of **supranationalism**. As **qualified**

majority voting (QMV) was introduced for decisions on internal matters—that is, institutional design or the adoption of joint actions. QMV was also to be used when the member states appointed special representatives. Despite these changes, the vast majority of foreign and security activity in the Union remained under the control of national governments.

While the military side of the ESDP was dealt with at Helsinki, the Gothenburg Council (2001), and the Swedish Presidency which oversaw it, was instrumental in putting the civilian capabilities of the ESDP on the agenda. The post-neutral states were keen to broaden the framework of the ESDP to include non-military security instruments and add post-conflict support to the EU's arsenal. The civilian measures included were police missions and capabilities, including tasks ranging from training local police officers to assisting military forces in restoring order; rule-of-law capabilities including judges, prosecutors, and other legal experts; and civilian administration missions, civilian protection, and humanitarian assistance. As with the military headline goals discussed earlier, the EU's civilian capability catalogue was to be assembled to allow civilian personnel to be deployed rapidly. To give the EU the capacity to undertake ESDP missions, it was necessary to ensure that the EU had access to NATO assets, such as planning, information, and surveillance. The 'Berlin Plus' arrangements to secure this access were agreed in 2002. These have enabled the EU to launch certain missions, for example, in the Balkans; though the EU has also undertaken autonomous missions without recourse to 'Berlin Plus', such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Operation Atalanta (known also as EUNAVFOR) in Somalia (see Box 17.6).

In 2003, the EU, under the auspices of Javier Solana, the then High Representative for the CFSP, published its first ever European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled 'A secure Europe in a better world' (see Box 17.2). The ESS was drafted against the backdrop of the events of 9/11, the subsequent war on terror, and the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The occupation of Iraq divided the EU and gave rise to intense speculation over the future of and potential demise of the ESDP. The EU member states were split along the traditional lines of Atlanticists–Europeanists, exacerbated by the post-neutral states' and Germany's refusal to undertake action without a UN mandate. The coordination of the various security concerns and strategies of the member states had previously seemed like an

BOX 17.2 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies five main threats to the security of the European Union: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. It presents the EU as a **comprehensive security actor** that combines a wide range of means to achieve its aims of a fairer, safer world characterized by multilateralism and governed by international law. The ESS declares that the EU has the resources, the responsibility, and the power to deal with the root causes of insecurity such as poverty and inequality. The ESS sets a rather high level of ambition for the EU and the CSDP, but stays at a fairly abstract level. It has been criticized for neither being concrete nor detailed enough to provide the EU with a strategic culture.

Five years after the publication of the ESS, in 2008, at the request of the European Council, the HR presented an implementation report: 'A report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy'. The report reinforces the text of the ESS, and adds three new threats to the previous five: cyber security, energy security, and climate change. With regard to

implementation, it states that this remains a work in progress, and agrees with the ESS that the EU has great and unique potential as a comprehensive security actor but it needs to be more active, coherent, and capable.

Since the presentation of these two documents, the EU's international context has changed drastically. In the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia is emerging as a security concern in the East, the rise of China has continued, the effects of the global economic crisis have been felt, and the power transition from US unipolarity towards a potentially more unstable multipolar world has been witnessed. These new circumstances also afford the EU an opportunity to take greater advantage of its comprehensive security approach and its wide range of civilian and military instruments (Howarth, 2014). There has been intense debate on the need for a new and updated security strategy that takes this into account. There was an expectation that the European Council would produce such a document in 2013. However, this expectation was not met.

impossible task. However, the HR's office negotiated and drafted the ESS in record time. It was approved unanimously by the member states in December 2003. This shared European Security Strategy was intended to demonstrate that the EU, despite disagreement over Iraq, was an international security agent with a coherent strategic vision and common ambitions on the world stage (Biscop and Andersson, 2008).

By the mid-2000s, the EU was increasingly concerned with capability development and rapid reaction forces. Out of this concern, the EU battlegroups (EUGB) concept was born as a development parallel to NATO's own similar initiative. The concept became fully operational in 2007. The battlegroups consist of 1,500 standby troops rotating every six months between the EU framework states. These standby forces are operational within the EU at all times and can be deployed without delay. The participation in the EUGB is voluntary and some member states, such as France, the UK, and Sweden, have felt more compelled than others to participate and provide headquarters and support capacities as framework nations. However, the EUGB concept has largely been a paper instrument as no battlegroup has ever been deployed in an EU mission. For the most part, the troops that have been on standby have in

fact been home for rest after return from active duty in Afghanistan.

The Lisbon Treaty

Following the failure of the **Constitutional Treaty (CT)**, new security and defence provisions were encapsulated in the **Lisbon Treaty (LT)**. The latter aimed to develop further the EU's involvement in security issues, and included some important changes to the CSDP and in particular to its institutional arrangements. Importantly, the LT changed the name of the *European Security and Defence Policy* to the *Common Security and Defence Policy* of the EU. This change might seem minor and just an issue of semantics; however, it has great symbolic value as it demonstrates an ambition for closer cooperation, and even integration. Furthermore, this latest treaty abolishes the EU's pillar system. The CFSP is still formally intergovernmental and EU Council decisions continue to be taken by unanimity. However, coupled with the institutional developments introduced in the Treaty, such as the new position of the Permanent President of the European Council, the extended powers of the High Representative, and the establishment of the European External Action Service (see 'CFSP institutions and actors'), the LT signals further 'Brusselization' of the CFSP. Moreover,

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KEY POINTS

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CFSP INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

The CFSP institutions and actors are the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy, the European External Action Service, and the Council of the European Union.

Lisbon Treaty incorporates two related and significant clauses guiding the CSDP. It includes the solidarity clause, which confirms that EU states are expected to act together when another member state is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster (Article 222 TFEU); and it also includes the mutual assistance clause that states that if an EU member state is the victim of armed aggression, other EU states have an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on self-defence'. This clause is binding for all EU states, but does not affect the neutrality of member states where relevant, and the member states' membership of NATO (Article 42 TFEU). The two clauses are relatively uncontroversial as EU assistance in case of terrorist attacks or natural disasters seems natural. Moreover, while the clauses seem to take the EU into a new mutual defence agreement, military capacities remain in the hands of the individual member states, leaving obligations voluntary and intergovernmental.

KEY POINTS

- The Saint Malo summit created a momentum towards a European Security and Defence Policy.
- In 2003, the EU undertook its first civilian and military CSDP missions and produced the European Security Strategy.
- Throughout the 2000s, the EU attempted to increase its military capabilities. A capabilities catalogue was produced, the Helsinki headline goals were set and extended to 2010, and the EU battlegroup concept was launched. Towards the end of the decade, the focus shifted towards the 'pooling and sharing' of resources. Increasing EU capabilities is still a work-in-progress.
- With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy became the Common Security and Defence Policy.

CFSP institutions and actors

'Brusselization', that is, intense institutional development, has taken place in the CFSP over the course of the 2000s. However, the member states remain the drivers of the CFSP and the CSDP. To a large extent, this influence is exerted through the European Council and the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

The European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)

The Lisbon Treaty considerably enhanced the European Council's role in shaping the EU's international agency. The European Council defines the strategic outlook for the EU and adopts common strategies. Moreover, it provides guidelines for the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on how to translate CFSP treaty provisions into CFSP policies. The Permanent President of the European Council (PP), established by the Lisbon Treaty, provides consistency and facilitates consensus between member states in the CFSP. The first PP appointment was preceded by a debate between member states that demonstrated their preference for the appointment of a low-profile person who would get the job done, rather than a high-profile European political personality who would compete for the international limelight with the member states' heads of government and state. The former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was proposed by the UK as a candidate, but was found to be too controversial after the war in Iraq. The European Council chose a consensus-builder, Herman Van Rompuy, instead (see Chapter 10).

Since 2002, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) has been the EU Council concerned with the CFSP/CSDP. The FAC is the principal decision-maker in the CSDP, and the national foreign ministers meet at least monthly under the chairpersonship of the High Representative (see Chapter 10). The FAC makes formal decisions on external action including on the CFSP/CSDP. So far, the attempted militarization of the EU has not yet meant the establishment of a Council of defence ministers, though the latter do participate in the FAC when they are needed. The FAC makes policy through positions and joint actions the basis for all CSDP missions. The responsibility for the implementation of joint actions falls mainly on the HR. In recent years, there has been a growth of informal FAC meetings. These tend to facilitate frank discussions and consensus-building between ministers. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty excluded the rotating Presidency (see Chapter 10) from the CFSP, thus limiting the agenda-setting and implementation powers of member states. As discussed, historically, Council meetings under the rotating Presidency have provided an opportunity for the Presidency country to influence the direction of the CSDP. For example, the Gothenburg summit in 2001 introduced the civilian aspects of the CSDP, very much as a result of the ambitions of the Swedish Presidency.

The High Representative and the European External Action Service

With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the office of the High Representative (HR) was extended and renamed the 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'. The Lisbon Treaty established the HR as both chair of the FAC and vice-president of the Commission, with responsibility for EU external action. The job was to be 'double-hatted' in order to improve consistency in the EU's external policies between the EU Council and the Commission. This means that the HR sits in both institutions. It was also meant to streamline the management of the CFSP and help coordinate the diverse national interests of the EU states. Furthermore, the extended role of the HR was intended to improve the visibility of the CFSP and the EU around the world. The HR has a particularly important role in agenda-setting as he or she has the right to submit joint proposals with the Commission in all areas of external action.

The 'Brusselization' of the CFSP is further deepened by the creation under Article 27 TEU of the **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, which assists the HR. The EEAS became fully functional in December 2011. It manages the EU's response to crises and contains an intelligence function, much like a national foreign service. The workforce of the EEAS

consists of seconded staff from the member states, the Commission, and the EU Council Secretariat. Moreover, the EEAS acts as the diplomatic corps of the EU. It has 139 delegations or embassies around the world. These represent both the EU and its member states in third countries, in regions, and in international organizations. In the future, it is likely that some smaller EU states will merge their national representations with that of the EU, though the bigger EU states will likely want to keep their own embassies and international presence (Howarth, 2014).

The EEAS has a rather contradictory mandate, as has the HR. Their roles are to coordinate the diplomatic and foreign policies of the member states and at the same time produce new and common positions and policies. Moreover, they need to do this without infringing on the members' national interests and sensitivities. Against this background it has been hard for the EEAS and the HR to live up to expectations (see Box 17.3).

The Commission and the European Parliament

The Commission lives in the shadow of the European and EU Council in the CFSP area and has very limited powers and influence over the CFSP/CSDP. The

BOX 17.3 THE POLITICS OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE AND THE EEAS

When the office of HR was first established in 1999, the European Council appointed a well-connected, experienced, and high-profile figure to the post: the former NATO General-Secretary, Javier Solana. Solana and his office were a driving force in the development and institutionalization of the CSDP in the 2000s.

The Lisbon Treaty gave the office of the HR extensive powers over the CFSP. However, the member states seemed reluctant to allow the new HR the means to use these powers.

Considerations such as political affiliation, geographic origin, and lack of foreign policy experience and influence seemed important in appointing a new HR. The post fell to the UK and the first LT HR was a little-known British Labour politician, Catherine Ashton. In post, Ashton suffered a great deal of criticism.

Some question whether the HR job is 'doable'. The office of the High Representative is a potentially powerful job, with three functions merged into one: the continuing job of the HR; the performance of the duties of the External Affairs Commissioner;

and, finally, the fulfilling of the CFSP role previously filled by the rotating Presidency. This pivotal position brings with it opportunities to influence the future of the CFSP. However, the office also harbours inherent difficulties. There are tensions between the need to exert CFSP leadership and the need to mediate between member states. EU states are suspicious about HR leadership and often strive to limit the influence of the HR. Furthermore, there are tensions between the European Council and EU Council and the Commission over the ownership of the CFSP.

The first and most important task for the new HR was to sort out the EEAS mandate and remit, and to get the EEAS fully functional as soon as possible. This gave the HR an introverted focus (Howarth, 2014). History will tell how successful the Ashton period has been. In 2014, the European Council appointed a new HR, the former Italian Foreign Minister, Federica Mogherini. It is as yet too early to make any predictions as to how her term as HR will develop, but as of early 2015 she had already increased the visibility of the CFSP.

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implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the Commission in this regard are ambivalent. The Commission used to have the right to put forward CFSP policy proposals. However, the Commission can now only present proposals jointly with the HR. Moreover, the EEAS has taken over the EU delegations that used to sit under the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission has no influence in the military CSDP. However, in civilian CSDP policies and missions the Commission has more input, as these are included in the EU budget over which the Commission has a say. This being said, the Commission has ambitions to be an active agent in stabilization and reconstruction (Lavalée, 2013). These programmes managed by the Commission often take over on the ground when CSDP missions end. The engagement of the Commission is important for the EU to be able to deliver its comprehensive approach to security (see Box 17.4), drawing on the many instruments available to it.

The European Parliament (EP) has even more limited influence on the CFSP than the Commission, as it has no formal CFSP role. However, the Parliament is kept informed and consulted on CFSP issues. Furthermore, through its role in the EU budget process, the EP has a say in the budget allocated to civilian CSDP missions and policies. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has had indirect influence over the appointment of the High Representative, as the EP must consent to the appointment of the Commission, including the Vice-President (the HR). MEPs have also been very keen to engage in foreign policy issues. They were particularly active in debates and declarations during the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns, continually pushing their case for an enhanced parliamentary role in external relations.

The Political and Security Committee and its sub-committees

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) occupies a central position in the CFSP and the CSDP, and is the main channel for the EU member states to control the CFSP. The Committee consists of high-ranking national representatives, such as diplomats and ambassadors. It manages and directs a network of committees and working groups. Moreover, the PSC is the main advisor to the Foreign Affairs Council on CFSP. The Committee monitors and analyses the security context in which the EU operates, drafting common policies; and, once these have been adopted by the FAC, the Committee also oversees policy

implementation (Merlingen, 2012). The EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) help the High Representative and the PSC with advice on military missions and policies. The EUMC is the main military body of the EU and is composed of the national chiefs of staff. The EUMS coordinates the military instruments and personnel in CSDP missions. On the civilian side, the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CivCom) provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

The European Defence Agency

In the realm of defence cooperation, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is an important intergovernmental institution in the CFSP architecture. It was established in 2004 and its purpose is to help develop EU military capabilities and to identify operational requirements for CSDP missions; and then to stimulate measures and programmes to fill the gaps. The EDA is an intergovernmental body, which works to promote European armaments cooperation and coordination, and to strengthen the European defence industry. It identifies synergies between national defence producers, and aims to strengthen EU military capabilities. The UK government has an ambivalent relationship with the EDA, however, as it believes it impinges on national interests. After 2010, the UK government even contemplated withdrawal from the Agency. That being said, in November 2010, the UK and French governments decided to extend their collaborative work in defence. This negotiation resulted in an agreement to create more joint equipment programmes outside of the EDA. The two countries have since held bi-annual summits on defence with the ultimate aim of establishing a combined joint expeditionary force. This bi-lateral cooperation would seem to undermine the rationale that underpins the EDA.

The EDA is also important within the CSDP framework for **'pooling and sharing'**, and as an instrument for incentivizing EU member states to modernize and professionalize their armed forces. Despite the EU's combined armed forces coming second only to the USA in size and budget, its capacity to employ these forces in missions on the ground in a sustained and coherent manner is limited. Therefore, the EU, through the EDA and the CSDP framework, prioritize the **'pooling and sharing'** and the professionalization of member states armed forces (Biscop and Whitman, 2012).

The Lisbon Treaty also introduced the process of **permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)** (previously enhanced cooperation) which allows a sub-set of EU member states to engage in further defence cooperation, and thus can avoid the tyranny of the slowest. PESCO allows groups of a minimum of nine member states to enhance their defence cooperation. While the participation is voluntary, the mechanism sets up criteria for cooperation that the participating states must follow, with the EDA assessing the participating states' performance.

KEY POINTS

- In 2003, the CSDP became operational and the EU produced the European Security Strategy.
- The Lisbon Treaty created the post of Permanent President of the European Council and extended the remit of the High Representative
- The Lisbon Treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS), the foreign and diplomatic service of the EU.
- The Lisbon Treaty aimed to increase inter-institutional coherence in the EU's external policies, and to that end the High Representative has a double role as chair of the FAC and Vice-President of the Commission.

BOX 17.4 COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

The EU embraces a comprehensive security approach to external conflicts and crises. This entails a coherent and strategic use of all the EU's available tools and instruments in order to increase security and stability for the EU and the wider world. The comprehensive approach is based on a holistic view of peace and security that takes into account the root causes of insecurity, such as poverty, state failure, and lack of development and good governance, as well as the more immediate security issues and crises. The EU is particularly well placed to deal with both long-term root causes of insecurity and their immediate effects as it has a wide range of policies, tools, and instruments at its disposal covering diplomatic efforts, security, defence, trade policies, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid.

CSDP missions: policy in action

The first ever CSDP missions were launched in 2003, only four years after the establishment of the then ESDP (see Box 17.5). The first two missions were

employed in the Western Balkans: a civilian police mission—EUPM—to Bosnia Herzegovina; and a military CSDP mission—Operation Concordia—in the form of a peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The 357 troops deployed in Operation Concordia included participants from all EU member states except Ireland and Denmark.

When the CSDP became operational it was thought that the focus was going to be on the EU's close neighbourhood, on conflict management and state-building in the Western Balkans. However, that same year, the second military mission took place outside Europe, on the African continent: the autonomous Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Moreover, there was an expectation that the missions would be first and foremost military in character, as the EU quickly demonstrated a willingness and some autonomous capacity to undertake military operations. However, the majority of the to-date 33 CSDP missions (by March 2015) have been civilian, with a particular focus on security sector reform (SSR), and police and rule of law missions. SSR and police missions have become a characteristic of the EU's missions, as awareness of the importance of police capacities to combat criminal activities in peacekeeping and post-crisis situations has become clear.

Approximately one-third of the CSDP missions have so far either been military, or have had military components. Seven of these have seen the deployment of military troops on the ground in a peacekeeping or crisis management capacity in the Balkans and on the African continent. A further four missions to Africa have included military training and advisory missions to Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic (RAC). The EU has thus demonstrated that it can deploy a wide range of military missions from low-intensity operations military training in Mali, to high intensity battles against military insurgents in DR Congo.

The size and scope of EU missions and operations vary widely, from very small scale civilian and training missions employing a dozen personnel, to larger scale military missions such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina that in 2004 included 7,000 peace keeping troops. The length a mission can also vary substantially from missions covering a few months, to decade long missions such as the ongoing border assistance mission—EUBAM—to Ukraine and Moldova, which was launched in 2005. Decisions on the scope, length, and size of a mission are provided for in the mission mandate decided by the Foreign

BOX 17.5 CSDP MISSIONS

Europe

Western Balkans	
FR Macedonia	Operation Concordia (M) Peacekeeping (2003) Operation Proxima (C) Police (2003–2005) EUPAT (C) Police (2005–2006)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUPM (C) Police (2003–2012) EUFOR Althea (M) Peacekeeping (since 2004)
Kosovo	EULEX Kosovo (C) Police/Rule-of-Law (since 2008)
Caucasus	
Georgia	EUJUST THEMIS (C) Rule-of-Law (2004–2005) EUMM Georgia (C) Monitoring mission (since 2008)
Ukraine/Moldova	EUBAM Ukraine and Moldova (C) Border assistance (since 2005) EUAM Ukraine (C) Advisory Security Sector Reform (since 2014)

Middle East

Palestine	EUBAM Rafah (C) Border assistance (since 2005) EUPOL COPPS (C) Police (since 2006)
Iraq	EUJUST LEX Iraq (C) Rule-of-Law (2005–2013)

Africa

DR Congo	Operation Artemis (M) Autonomous peacekeeping (2003) EUPOL Kinshasa (C) Police (2005–2007) EUFOR DR Congo (M) Autonomous peacekeeping (2006) EUSEC DR Congo (C) Security Sector Reform (since 2005) EUPOL DR Congo (C) Police (since 2007)
Horn of Africa	Atalanta/EUNAVFOR Somalia (M) Autonomous maritime operation (since 2008) EUTM Somalia (M) Military training (since 2010) EUCAP Nestor Horn of Africa (C) Maritime training/Capacity building (since 2012)
Sudan	EU support to African Union mission: Amis II—Dafur (C/M) Advisory mission (2005–2006) EUAVSEC South Sudan (C) Aviation security (2012–2014)
Sahel region	EUCAP Sahel, Niger (C) Civilian training/Capacity building (since 2012) EUTM Mali (M) Military training (since 2013) EUCAP Sahel, Mali (C) Training internal security forces (since 2014)
Central African Republic (RCA)/Chad	EUFOR Chad/RCA (M) Autonomous peacekeeping (2008–2009) EUFOR RAC (M) Military stabilization (2014–2015) EUMAM RCA (M) Military advisory (since 2015)
Guinea-Bissau	EU SSR (C) Security Sector Reform (2008–2010)
Libya	EUBAM Libya (C) Border assistance (since 2013)

Asia

Aceh	AMM Aceh, Indonesia (C) Monitoring mission (2005–2006)
Afghanistan	Afghanistan—EUPOL Afghanistan (C) Police (since 2007)

Source: the EEAS.

Affairs Council, but a mission's mandate can be expanded over time. For example, in EUNAVFOR, the mandate was expanded three times between 2008 and December 2016.

While the geographical focus of the CSDP missions has been on Europe, including the Caucasus, and on the African continent, the EU has also undertaken missions outside these areas: for example, in the form of a police mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, the EU has sent civilian missions to the Middle East, a rule of law mission in Iraq, and two ongoing police and border missions to the Palestine territories.

The first six years of the CSDP were surprisingly hectic and the EU launched three-quarters of its missions in this period. This rather intense activity was followed by a period of 'mission fatigue' especially with regard to military missions. This coincided with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Since then, however, there has been a re-ignition of the EU's enthusiasm for CSDP operations, in particular in regard to Africa. Since 2010, nine missions have been launched and of these eight were in Africa, mainly in the Sahel region, in the Horn of Africa, and in the Central African Republic. The only operation taking place outside the African continent was EUAM Ukraine, an advisory security sector reform mission launched in 2014.

The EU's military missions have to some extent acquired the role of a rapid reaction force that is sent into

a crisis, and that will then be relieved by a larger UN or African Union force. This was the case with the CSDP mission to Chad/RAC in 2008, where 3,700 troops were sent to protect refugee camps until a larger UN force took over in 2009. The pattern was repeated in 2014 in the same area when the EU sent a military mission to the Central African Republic (CAR) to stabilize the crisis until an African Union force could take over. It is worth noting that despite the development of EU battlegroups in 2007, all military CSDP missions have consisted of ad hoc assembled troops volunteered by EU member states; so far the battlegroups have not been called into use.

There are some important differences between civilian and military CSDP missions with regard to how they are financed and staffed. Civilian missions are covered by the EU budget, which means that the financial burden for a mission is shared among the member states. It also often means delays in deployment as a mission request passes through the EU's budgetary system. Furthermore, in civilian missions further delays can be caused by staffing problems. This is because civilian personnel, such as police officers and judges, cannot be ordered out on deployment as can military staff. They have to volunteer and get leave from their employers. By contrast, in military missions, most of the financial burden for military assets and personnel falls on the participating member states rather than on the EU as a whole.



BOX 17.6 EUNAVFOR: FIGHTING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA

Operation Atalanta, or EUNAVFOR Somalia, is an ongoing (until 2016), autonomous, military, anti-piracy CSDP mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. It was launched in December 2008 and forms part of a comprehensive EU security strategy for the Horn of Africa (HoA). This is based on the Council's 'A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa'. The strategy for the HoA aims to tackle both current symptoms and root causes for the insecurity, instability and piracy in the region. Operation Atalanta is one of three CSDP missions in the HoA. The other two are EUCAP Nestor, a maritime capacity building mission that also works to strengthen the rule of law in the region, and EUTM Somalia, a military training mission. The three missions have been coordinated since 2012 by the special representative for the HoA. EUNAVFOR Atalanta is the first naval CSDP mission outside of Europe, deploying up to 2,000 personnel. The two other missions are much smaller in size and scope, together involving less than 200 staff. The aim of EUNAVFOR's vessels is to secure the strategically important

trade routes from Europe to the Asia-Pacific area; 20 per cent of the world's trade passes through the area covered by EUNAVFOR, an area one and a half times the size of the European continent. It aims in particular to protect the World Food Programme's (WFP) shipments of food aid to Somali refugees, and similar transports for the African Union.

The EU has proclaimed its mission a great success and given it a 100 per cent success rate in the protection of WFP shipments. Moreover, after peaking in 2011, the number of piracy incidents has decreased massively, from 174 attacks with 25 pirated, to two in 2014, with none of them successful. Despite being hailed as a success by the EU, there have also been criticisms of EUNAVFOR. These have mostly concerned issues outside the remit of the mission's mandate, such as the EU's inability to stabilize Somalia, its failure to end piracy for good, and its lack of CSDP protection for the most vulnerable vessels (Howarth, 2014).

Normally, there is only a small EU budget for IT and communication costs. The financial cost of participating in military missions can be prohibitive for some member states and influences their decision to make troops available.

How can we judge the success or failure of the CSDP missions? These work in very complex theatres, often with multiple actors involved. It is therefore difficult to discern and isolate EU influence and achievement. As all EU missions are by invitation by the host country, and/or with the backing of a UN mandate, they tend not to be controversial and it could be said that the EU avoids the most difficult conflict situations. However, the demand for EU CSDP missions vastly exceeds the CSDP's capacity and the number of missions launched. This demonstrates that there is a perception that the EU can and should do something to help. According to the EEAS and the EU, and judged on the mission mandates, the EU missions have been successful in achieving their goals. However, the EU missions have been criticized for the often

narrow mandates and limited ambitions. Moreover, they are said to have 'built-in success' in their mandate. If we instead look at the need and ambition to deal with root causes of insecurity and instability, the EU's activities leave something to be desired. That being said, the EU's policing missions have generally been judged to be a success.

KEY POINTS

- In 2003, the EU undertook the first civilian and military CSDP missions.
- Two-thirds of CSDP missions have been civilian and one-third have been military.
- The EU has focused geographically on Europe and Africa, but has also undertaken missions in Asia and the Middle East.
- The EU embraces a comprehensive approach to security including all available instruments.

Conclusion

Opinions on the impact and importance of the CFSP and CSDP differ, and there are uncertainties over the future development of the policy. Will it return to lowest-common-denomination (intergovernmentalist) politics or even to European inter-state security competition, as some **neo-realist** observers predict (Mearsheimer, 2010); or will the coordination and integration of the member states' foreign, security, and defence policies continue to deepen? The post-2008 economic crisis has provided a strong incentive for deeper cooperation and coordination, as shortage of resources and cuts to defence budgets have made the efficiency benefits from pooling and sharing more attractive. Do the CFSP and CSDP, despite their shortcomings, represent an impressive institutional, normative, and identity-building policy, constructing the EU as an international security actor with peace-keeping missions on the ground? Moreover, following a **constructivist** approach (see Chapter 6), can the EU be understood as changing the nature of international relations since it represents a new form of international power?

There has been much debate on how to best classify the EU as international security actor. An

underlying assumption in this debate is the idea that the EU is unique as it is neither a state nor a traditional international organization; yet neither is it a fully fledged supranational entity. It has therefore been labelled as an 'unidentified (or unidentifiable) international object' (Elgström and Smith, 2006). In other words, the EU does not fit easily into the traditional Westphalian ideas of the primacy of sovereign nation states as the privileged actors on an anarchical international arena. Moreover it has been argued that the uniqueness of the EU lies in its character as a normative power supported by military means (Manners, 2008). The **Normative Power Europe** (NPE) argument understands the EU as normative in two ways. It is normative by virtue of its hybrid character, and as such it sets new standards for how an international actor can and should be (Manners and Whitman, 2003). Moreover, it is normative in its outlook as its foreign and security policy is driven by principles, such as universal human rights, democracy, and international law. Depending on the theoretical outlook adopted, and the future development of the CFSP in practice, these are questions that will be debated well into the future.