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A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East

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After the attacks of 9/11 Americans asked, 'Why do they hate us so much?' The answer has been framed in terms of a range of 'clashes', none of which has addressed emotion, which is at the centre of the question. Emotion, and particularly humiliation, has begun to be addressed within the literature of IR. Numerous scholars have highlighted the pervasiveness of a discourse of humiliation in the Middle East and its relationship to the swelling ranks of recruits who are willing to act as human bombs. The purpose of this article is to examine the emotional dynamics of this relationship. The first section undertakes a conceptual analysis of humiliation and betrayal. The second section explores how these emotions have been given coherent meaning in the narrative of Islamists from the region. This is followed by an historical analysis of how this narrative has provided a framework for giving meaning to a range of national, regional and international interactions, particularly since 1967, and has contributed to the emergence of Islam as the basis for transnational identity in what had become a highly secular region. Section three examines flaws in the logic of both militant Islamists and the US-led 'War on Terrorism', arguing that both have exacerbated feelings of humiliation in the region rather than contributing to a restoration of dignity. The conclusion builds on the principle of human dignity to rethink the international approach to political violence.

KEY WORDS ♦ betrayal ♦ dignity ♦ emotion ♦ humiliation ♦ political violence

What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation (the Islamic world) has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed,

its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked, and no one hears and no one heeds (Osama bin Laden, 2001)

   Arabs and Muslims feel humiliated and despondent and devoid of the ability to redress the imbalance of US foreign policy and US public opinion, just as they feel humiliated, despondent, and unable to stop the violence against the Palestinians, which they see in part as the result of US support for Israel. (Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Jordan, 2003)

One question dominated post-9/11 America: Why do they hate us so much? Most of the answers provided by policy-makers and the US media were wrapped in layers of distortion and assumed the existence of a clash of one kind or another. Many relied on Samuel Huntington's (1996) thesis that the fundamental source of conflict is cultural, and that a 'clash of civilizations will dominate global politics'. Since the atrocities of 11 September 2001, a number of scholars and commentators have reacted strongly to his thesis, arguing that it is a static, self-fulfilling prophecy, which is essentialist, aggressively ethnocentric and portrays the world as if it is made up of closed and contained entities (Said, 2001; Hunt, 2002; Russett et.al., 2000). Some scholars have questioned the legitimacy and authority of anyone to speak on behalf of any civilization (Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger, 2006: 544). While President Bush refers to a war to 'save civilization itself', in the texts and speeches of Bin Laden and his radical Islamist followers, there is no mention of the term 'civilization' as a motive for the violent attitude toward the US.

   A second line of argument constitutes a clash between modernity and traditionalism (Friedman, 2000; Kaplan, 2000). From this perspective, the rigid traditionalism of Middle Eastern societies, and their resistance to the forces of modernity and globalization, breeds militant Islamism and violence against the 'West'. Insofar as traditionalism and modernity coexist the world over, this clash between two rigidly separate worlds is illusory. In any case, it is the social injustice and 'brutal economic inequality' of globalization that traditional societies reject (Besteman and Gusterson, 2005). As Halliday (2004) points out, modernity and globalization have themselves, arguably, led to radicalization, rather than the lack of these, insofar as the gap between rich and poor has widened, exacerbating the inequality of the non-Western world. This 'clash' overlaps with yet another in which the attacks on 11 September were a manifestation of the violent political potential inherent in Islam as distinct from the peaceful, civic orientation of Christianity (Jonsson, 2005; Fukuyama, 2001). Both of these clashes, as Mamdani (2004: 18) notes, rely on a distinction between modern and pre-modern cultures, and either equate pre-modern with not-yet modern and therefore lagging behind, or anti-modern and thus likely to produce fear and pre-emptive police or military action.

Policy-makers and scholars have focused primarily on explanations of Islamic radicalization that relate to cultural, economic, or political factors and, in their use of the 'clash' metaphor, have reinforced the picture of a binary conflict between two contained entities. None of the aforementioned 'clashes' account for the potential role of emotion, as implied by the question 'why do they hate us so much?', and expressed in the justifications of the actors themselves.

The role of emotion in international politics is relatively unexplored terrain. Fear is an emotion that has been implicit in the realist paradigm all along (see Booth and Wheeler, 2007). Trauma and emotion have since 11 September begun to find a place in the literature of International Relations (Edkins, 2003; Fierke, 2004; Ross, 2006).[1] Humiliation has also become a specific focus (Danchev, 2006; Saurette, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Lindner, 2006). Building on these studies, the following analysis explores why humiliation should provide such a powerful motivation for political violence in the Middle East; the place of humiliation within a cluster of emotions, including betrayal, dignity and compassion; and the mutually constitutive nature of humiliation on both sides of the clash.

Numerous scholars have highlighted the pervasiveness of a discourse of humiliation, and its relationship to the swelling ranks of recruits who are willing to act as human bombs (e.g. Cook and Allison, 2007: 4; Hafez, 2007: 142–4; Khasan, 2003: 1062; Moghadam, 2002: 27–8, 2006; Speckhard, 2005; Stern, 2003; Telhami, 2002, 2004). They have not, however, elaborated the dynamics, and particularly the emotional dynamics, of this relationship. Section one will present our approach to emotion and the relationship between humiliation and betrayal in particular. Section two will explore how Islamists have given coherent meaning to emotions of humiliation and betrayal, within a narrative of 'paradise lost', and, in the historical analysis that follows, how this has provided a framework for giving meaning to a range of national, regional and international interactions, particularly since 1967. Section three examines flaws in the logic of both the militant Islamists and the US-led 'War on Terrorism', arguing that both sides have exacerbated the sense of humiliation in the region, rather than contributing to a restoration of dignity. The conclusion explores a more consistent logic of dignity, building on both Islamic thought and accepted international principles.

The Logic of Emotion

The argument that follows rests on two assumptions about emotion. First, emotion is a rational measure of value. This claim is counterintuitive, given the tendency to view rationality and emotion as opposites. Martha Nussbaum (2001: 4) calls this opposition into question, arguing that emotions are

'appraisals or value judgements which ascribe to things and persons outside the person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing'. In this respect, emotions are an expression of our vulnerability to people and events that we don't control. Rather than the opposite of rationality, emotions involve a form of evaluative judgement that she refers to as *eudaimonistic judgement* (EJ). EJ involves thought of an object combined with thought of the object's salience or importance to one's own survival and flourishing. For instance, Nussbaum recounts the irretrievable sense of loss experienced at the sight of her mother's dead body, which was an expression of the value and importance she held in her life. The emotion also has a history, which includes traces of a range of other background emotions that give it specific content and cognitive specificity. In this argument, emotions express a relationship between feeling and value. Positive emotions such as happiness or joy relate to the presence of the valued subject or object and the ability to realize one's objectives and goals, while negative emotions related to humiliation or betrayal arise from a loss of dignity, value, safety or agency and a subsequent inability to flourish.

Second, emotion, while most often experienced at the individual level, is inherently social and relational. Constructivists in the tradition of Wittgenstein have situated the self in a common world of language, where expressions of pain or joy, or other expressions of our inner life, are radically dependent on customs, uses and institutions (Wittgenstein, 1958: para. 199). In this view, emotion finds expression only in a language and a culture, which is linked to a moral order and moral appraisal (Schweder and LeVine, 1994; Harre, 1986). The experience of emotion may be individual, but if it is expressed, it is expressed in relation to others, and in a language understandable to them. In this respect, the appraisal or value judgements discussed by Nussbaum are not purely cognitive. Individuals within a culture make appraisals and value judgements that draw on cultural knowledge. When ongoing suffering is the shared experience of a people, expressions of this pain may come to occupy a central place in the language and the practices of a culture (Fierke in Bell, 2006) and thereby find expression in the world of political action.

To examine emotions as socio-cultural phenomena is to detach them from their association, in the West, with a Cartesian distinction between mind and material world. We instead approach emotions as socially meaningful expressions, which depend on shared customs, uses and institutions. The meaning of humiliation and betrayal in the Middle East cannot be separated from a relational world and a past. The central question is how experiences are given emotional meaning and how this meaning legitimizes certain forms of action, and thereby shapes future interactions. The issue is less one of whether the agent of humiliation meant to do harm, but rather an analysis

of meaning in use and its sedimentation through a series of historical inter-actions over time. Emotions such as humiliation or betrayal are universal; they are, however, given meaning in culturally specific forms and in response to historically and contextually specific events. In what follows we develop the concepts of humiliation and betrayal, as well as highlighting the more contextually specific meanings attached to them.

Humiliation and Betrayal

The point of departure for understanding humiliation and betrayal is a prior equilibrium. Within this equilibrium, all humans have identity and a degree of agency measured in self-respect, trust in their social world and thereby a sense of safety. This is an analytical assumption rather than a statement of fact. Building on an accepted international principle, all human beings pos-sess dignity, which establishes a fundamental equivalence between them (UN GA, 1948: Article 1). While this category, like that of human rights, is often assumed to be a product of Western values, dignity has an important place in Islam, which shares a family resemblance with the international without being identical to it (Kamali, 2002). Both humiliation and betrayal involve a lowering or a loss in relation to this equilibrium, although in different ways.

As Saurette (2005: 12) argues, humiliation takes place within a relation-ship, where one party, who expects a higher status, is lowered in status and feels shame or a loss of self-respect. In this respect, the attacks on 11 September 2001 can be understood as a humiliation of the United States (Saurette, 2006). A few individuals managed, with the use of conventional airplanes, to strike at the military and economic heart of a superpower, exposing its vulnerability and, subsequently, lowering its status. While our focus is not the US, we do later discuss the US-led 'War on Terrorism' as an interaction with militant Islamists from the Middle East.

The association with being lowered in status or value may be one reason for the frequent association between humiliation and feminization (Dawson, 1994). In a gender hierarchy, if the masculine denotes higher status and value, to 'be lowered' is to be feminized. In this respect, an act takes place within a power relationship and a social world. Within this relationship, the humiliator may unmask the victim's pretensions of higher value or position to an audience, which enhances the disciplining power of the act. The humil-iation may be linked to a particular moral view of the world, where the act is justified by claims that the victim has deviated from a moral order and accepted standards.

Saurette (2005: 6) presents the example of a Sheriff in Arizona (USA) who used humiliating tactics with prisoners, such as making them wear pink underwear and socks while being viewed by the public on television. The

public feminization of criminals had the effect of humiliating them into obedience. There was also a large box of pink underwear at Abu Ghraib, used to dress naked prisoners, which was part of the 'humiliation' involved in getting prisoners to cooperate (Robinson, 2008: 45). Mark Danner (2004: 6) highlights the importance of the public nature of the humiliation at Abu Ghraib:

> … as the Red Cross report noted, the *public* nature of the humiliation is absolutely critical; thus the parading of naked bodies … the forcing together of naked prisoners in 'human pyramids'. And all of this was made to take place in full view not only of foreigners, men and women, but also of that ultimate third party: the ubiquitous digital camera with its inescapable flash, there to let the detainee know that the humiliation would not stop when the act itself did but would be preserved into the future in a way that the detainee would not be able to control.

In Arab culture, humiliation shares a family resemblance with shame. Shame is the most painful of emotions (Sarraj, 2002), and is exacerbated by its public exposure, and subsequent transformation into humiliation. In Arabic, *Dhul*, the word for humiliation means dropping to one's knees before someone stronger. A *dhalil* (humiliated person) is lowly and abject. In Arabic texts, the term is often followed by two other words '*Mahanah*' (degradation) and '*Esteslaam*' (surrender). As Morgan (2007) notes, the reaction of a shame-based culture to a humiliating experience is likely to be more fierce than in guilt-based cultures. For the former, public shaming and humiliation, as occurred in Abu Ghraib, cannot go unavenged.

The photos from Abu Ghraib were given meaning as a humiliation and a lowering of status, not only of the prisoners, but of the Arab world, as captured in an Arabic headline about Abu Ghraib, which stated that US soldiers were 'urinating on the wounds of Iraqis'.[2] As Hafez (2007: 143) notes, the photos of men and women enduring humiliating torture in Abu Ghraib have been used by insurgents in Iraq to personalize the suffering and heighten the sense of powerlessness and indignation that many Muslims feel. Telhami (2004) goes further, stating that they were photos of 'utter humiliation in a region where humiliation is the pervasive sentiment that allows militants to exploit potential recruits'.

The power of humiliation lies in a public exposure, and acknowledgement by an audience that humiliation has taken place. Betrayal is a more private experience that silences and thereby obliterates the agency of the betrayed. While often used interchangeably with humiliation, betrayal is distinct. Like humiliation, betrayal is a relational concept and it is this relationality that is damaged in the act, when an expected trust or a sense of belonging to a family or a nation is threatened or turns out to be unreliable (Edkins in Bell, 2006). Child abuse is a betrayal by the parent, which results in a breakdown

of trust and security. The experience of Jews in the German concentration camps was a betrayal of trust by the state, whose role is to protect its citizens.

An act of betrayal can in fact serve to strengthen the power of a corresponding humiliation. In a context of war, the rape of women is often bound up with the humiliation of a nation, and its male combatants. As Slyomovics (Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, 2007: 35) notes: 'Rape as a military tactic succeeds in many societies because it targets more than woman; it threatens her male kin — father, brother, husband — who cannot protect her, their *sharaf* and '*ird*'.[3] While rape has recently been recognized as a war crime by the International Criminal Court, it has not in the past been viewed as a violation of individual human rights but 'as private aberrational acts, not proper subjects for an international public forum' (Bassiouni, 1996: 557–8). Rape is often surrounded by silence, both on the part of the victim, the victim's family and the perpetrator. The absence of witnesses, or at least witnesses who are willing to speak, and therefore any historical record, makes it difficult to substantiate that the act even occurred. This silence, and the shame it reinforces in the victim's mind, constitutes a betrayal, not only arising from a failure of protection but an absence of acknowledgement, which may be as traumatic as the rape itself.

Betrayal often involves silence and secrecy, and an attempt to wipe an act from the historical record. The difference between humiliation and betrayal is, in this respect, the difference between a public act of lowering the value of another and the private dehumanization and silencing that corresponds with betrayal. While the objects of humiliation retain a mock agency, if only in the acknowledgement of the Other's superior power (Margalit, 1996; Scarry, 1985), betrayal robs the victim of both agency and humanity. In the Arab Middle East, the word betrayal is often used in relation to the displacement of Palestinians from their land (see, e.g. Asali, 2004). While humiliating acts, for instance, at Israeli checkpoints, constitute the daily experience of Palestinians within the occupied territories, the larger betrayal is the ongoing attempt to eliminate the voice and historical record of the Palestinians (see Masalha, 2005; Rotberg, 2006; Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, 2007). Betrayal is also used in relation to the failure of the international community to come to the aid of Palestinians (see, e.g. *Al-Akhbar*, 2001) or the failure of Arab rulers in the region to protect their citizens.

Structures of Meaning in Use

War may involve attempts by each side to humiliate or lower the other. Soldiers bring the tools of physical warfare to the task of breaking the will of the other side and, as Goldstein (2001) points out, the attempt to dominate

and feminize the enemy may be part and parcel of the act. The outcome of victory and defeat completes this process, transforming the relationship from one of competition between relative equals to hierarchy, with the winner enhanced in their agency while the defeated suffer humiliation and a loss of identity. The rules of war have maintained a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, which highlights the protective role of the state vis-a-vis its citizens. When the state fails to protect, or becomes the agent of insecurity vis-a-vis its own population, this constitutes a betrayal. This emotional logic was evident in post-World War I Germany, where the humiliating conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which concluded the war, combined with feelings of betrayal toward the Weimar government. This sense of international humiliation and national betrayal constituted the background against which the Nazis and Hitler rose to power on the basis of a promise to make Germany great again (Fierke, 2004; Scheff and Rezinger, 1991).

In the German case, defeat was a lowering that related to a notion of German greatness that had been lost. Humiliation thus relates first and foremost to a structure of *meaning*, although one that is entangled with material and economic factors. This logic shares a family resemblance with the use of humiliation and betrayal in the contemporary Middle East, with some important differences. That the structure is socially constructed is even more obvious in this context where spatial divisions and designations have been imported from the West. The boundaries and structures of Middle Eastern states were imposed by European colonizers. The 'Middle East' itself is an artificial Western construct that was grafted onto the region.[4] The current political map has thus been historically *constructed* by Western powers, and this international, regional and national configuration is understood to be the source of ongoing humiliation and betrayal in the region. Against this background, Islamists have employed a narrative of 'paradise lost', of a past empire of glory, followed by a loss, and the possibility of restoring a transnational Muslim *Ummah*.

People in the Middle East have a very keen awareness and detailed knowledge of history (Lewis, 2006). Many in the region, particularly Islamists, trace the origin of much that is happening today in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon to events in the Middle Ages such as the Crusades, making a connection, for instance, between the destruction of Baghdad in 1258, at the hands of the Mongols, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Haqqani, 2003). This reading of history is part of the attempt by both moderate and militant Islamists to use the past to give moral and political meaning to the present (Sobhy, 2007; Appleby, 2002; Lapidus, 1992). Frequent references in the texts of militant Islamists to the US and other Western powers as the 'Crusaders' evokes the memory of a very old onslaught by Christianity on the Muslim world. This collective memory combines with that of the Muslim

Ummah's glorious past, as represented by the Umayyads, the Abbassid, and the Ottoman Caliphate, the restoration of which will, it is said, overcome feelings of humiliation (Hassan, 2004). As the Egyptian Dr Ayman al Zawahiri (Mansfield, 2006: 201), often considered to be the brains behind Al Qaida, stated:

> …the Crusader alliance led by the United States will not allow any Muslim force to reach power in the Arab countries … it is the hope of the Muslim nation to restore its fallen caliphate and regain its lost glory.

In the narratives of Islamists, the relationship to the US, the *international* dimension, is a contemporary expression of the historical humiliation, betrayal and subordination of people in the region. Colonial penetration by European powers, beginning with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, set the stage. The occupation of Egypt by a small French military force revealed to Arabs and Muslims both the power of Western states and the weakness of their Islamic protector, the Ottoman Caliphate. The French invasion also made Muslims realize that only another European power, namely the British, could get the French out of their lands (Lewis, 2001). During World War I, the British mobilized Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans on the basis of promises that were not fulfilled and thus were experienced as a betrayal. They were promised that they would receive independence and autonomy in return for cooperation. In the end the British stayed in the region for several decades.

The construction of 'Western' states — the *national* dimension — began with the secret Sykes–Picot agreement in 1916, which carved up the most ethnically complex and historic portions of the region into British and French zones of colonial influence. As, Bin Laden stated in 2003, '… our wounds have yet to heal from the Crusader wars of the last century against the Islamic world, or from the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 … which brought about the dissection of the Islamic world into fragments' (Lawrence, 2005: 187). The artificial, arbitrary and conflict-laden borders of today's Middle East are largely based on this secret agreement. Iraq, for instance, which is presently being torn apart by sectarian conflict, is a concrete example of an Arab country designed by a handful of British officers (Hudson, 1977). This experience of humiliation at the hands of Western powers was compounded by the betrayal of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The decision to establish a homeland for Jews in the region was made without involving or informing actors in the region.

The establishment of Israel in 1948, which was heavily supported by the West, constituted a new *regional* dynamic. Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab states rejected the 1947 UN plan to partition Palestine and viewed the General Assembly vote as an 'international betrayal' (Beinan and

Hajjar, 2000). The dispossession and expulsion of Palestinians, which corresponded with the establishment of Israel, has been the primary focus for expressions of humiliation and betrayal, around which all other such feelings revolve (al Zawahiri in Mansfield, 2006: 211), and the central loss identified by Islamists. As Osama Bin Laden (Lawrence, 2005) stated in his piece, 'Betrayal of Palestine':

> We ask [God Almighty] … to establish an order of guidance for our *Umma* … in which justice is done and truth is spoken, in which the banner of *jihad* is raised up high to restore to our *umma* to its pride and honor, and in which the banner of God's unity is raised once again over every stolen Islamic land, from Palestine to al-Andalus and other Islamic lands that were lost because of the betrayals of rulers and the feebleness of Muslims.

The Crusades, the memory of a glorious empire, the subsequent construction of secular nation-states and the 'Middle East', and the various international agreements, from Sykes–Picot to the Balfour Declaration to the UN Partition Plan for Palestine, are the historical markers in the narrative of Islamists. This narrative constructs a 'paradise lost' and the potential for its restoration.

Unlike post-war Germany, the object of humiliation in the Middle East is not a state but rather categories of people, i.e. Arabs and Muslims, who have often, throughout history, been constituted by the 'West' as 'Orientals', assumed to possess not only feminine qualities of irrationality and emotionalism (Said, 1978), but a propensity to evil and violence. Contemporary narratives of humiliation and betrayal revolve around the United States, the main international actor at present, and Israel, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the US-supported Arab regimes, most of them oil producers and police states that rely heavily on a draconian security apparatus to stay in power. It is non-state actors, i.e. militant Islamists, who are claiming that they can restore dignity to Muslims in the Middle East. The historical analysis in the following section demonstrates how emotions of humiliation and betrayal have increasingly, since 1967, been given meaning within the Islamist narrative, which has contributed to the re-Islamization of what had been a highly secular region.

Arab Humiliation after 1967 and the Rise of Islamism

In the period following the end of World War I, the Middle East was controlled by colonial forces, which remained the case until the end of World War II, after which decolonization began. With the formal 'Westphalianization' of the Arab world, states in the region did not have the necessary fusion of solidarity and authority to become de facto sovereign. As

economically and politically fragile entities, Middle Eastern states were caught in a strong web of 'multilateral great power' (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002), pulled apart by the tension between imposed modern structures and traditional indigenous ones, and suffering from serious problems of legitimacy and weak institution-building. In this respect, the seeds of violence and instability were there from the beginning.

With the onset of the Cold War, and as many Middle Eastern states gravitated toward the Eastern bloc, the secular nation-state and pan-Arabism provided the model for political organization and the hope of a better future. Egypt's victory in the Suez Crisis, in 1956, led by Nassar, was a landmark event that reinforced this potential. With the nationalization of the Canal, Nassar, a secular Arab leader, stood firmly against the UK, France and Israel, and thus re-established a sense of dignity and confidence (Aburish, 2004). This was first and foremost a victory for secular pan-Arabism, which silenced the Islamic movements. The political realm was dominated by secularism, while Islam was confined to the Mosque. This remained the case until the 1967 War.

The 1967 War was considered by Arab writers to be the mother of defeats, which, according to Al-Ansari (2001) 'created wounds which remain open and deep in the subconscious.' In this war the tiny state of Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, Jordan and also occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank. This humiliating defeat portended the demise of pan-Arab nationalism, the de-legitimization of the secular Arab regimes and the birth of political Islam (Tibi, 1998; Esposito, 1994). The defeat represented a humiliation, or a lowering of self-respect, for *Arabs* generally because it demonstrated the inability of the secular Arab state to protect its citizens and fulfil their aspirations (Khasan, 1997).

The occupation of East Jerusalem, including one of the most holy Muslim shrines, was a powerful symbol of the humiliation of Muslims, which had a resonance across the Arab world, even in those states that were not directly involved in the war. The consequent revival of Islamism brought with it a challenge to the Western concept of nation-state. Islamists believe that sovereignty is the exclusive province of God, which means a division of the world into the 'Abode of Islam', which is non-territorial, and the non-Islamic community. As the concept of Muslim *Ummah* was revived, every part of the secular ideology began to be questioned. When secular socialist ideology dominated, and the Islamic movement was marginalized, the focus of resistance had been primarily on the regimes and domestic in nature. With the revival of a notion of the Muslim *Ummah*, radical Islamists began to articulate the need to restore dignity, and for resistance that transcended the nation-state (Qutb, 1964).[5] As militant Islamists emerged, regimes in the region began to suppress them and they were tortured and jailed.[6]

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 was the first Islamic revolution and established the first theocratic Islamic state. Iran had the fifth strongest army in the world, and was heavily supported by the US, yet the Shah was toppled under the banner of Islam. The message contained within this revolution: Islam can achieve what pan-Arabism cannot. This coincided with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, which provided a laboratory for radical jihadists to put transnational militant Islamism into practice. And they won. Islam had defeated both a major power supported by the West, that is, Iran, and the Soviet Union. On the back of these successes Islam was presented as the solution to the Middle East's problems.[7]

The rise of Islamism was reinforced by multiple betrayals. The first was the sight of Anwar Sadat, a secular Arab leader, shaking hands with Menachem Begin in 1978 as the Camp David Peace Accords were signed. The negotiations focused exclusively on return of the Sinai to Egypt, ignoring Palestine, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Sadat's focus on national interest, in defiance of the *Ummah*, represented a betrayal (Akins, 1991). In allying with Israel, and relying on US support, Sadat legitimized the Israeli occupation of Arab and Muslim land and condoned the Israeli humiliation of Palestinians (Cole, 2005). Sadat's assassination by fundamentalists in 1981, was followed, according to al Zawahiri (Mansfield, 2006: 73) by a 'treadmill of torture and repression … It detained women, committed sexual assaults, and called men feminine names, starved prisoners, gave them bad food, cut off water, and prevented visits to humiliate the detainees.'

As radical Islamists were being suppressed and tortured, many regimes in the region were in bed with the West. During this period the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF emerged on the agenda, reinforcing the economic hardship in the region (Lubeck, 1999). Economic hardship, combined with political disempowerment, torture, jailing and persecution, which focused on the Islamists, emerged side by side with a wealthy, Westernized and corrupt elite. Several secular socialist regimes, such as that of Nassar's in Egypt, were replaced by Western-oriented regimes, lacking a popular political base and reinforced by military power. In this context, Islamists began to take over the role of providing social services, which would otherwise be provided by the state. From the loss of dignity that came with living in shanty towns, deprived of basic social infrastructure and political rights, including freedom of speech, and everyday humiliation by bureaucracies and security forces, a popular image of a corrupt Westernized elite, which was suppressing Islamists, developed among the masses (Roy, 1998). A sense of betrayal further emerged given not only the failure of the state to provide protection to its population but an increasing perception that the state was a source of insecurity.

With the consolidation of nation-states in the region, the weakness of pan-Arabism became clear and Arab states began to chart their own national

course. A series of bitter inter-Arab conflicts over borders, fanned by the gap between rich and poor Arab states, dealt a further blow to the collective Arab mission (Dawisha, 2002). Of perhaps most importance, the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict, and the incapacity of Arab regimes to respond to Israeli human rights violations in Palestine and elsewhere, revealed their inability to protect Arabs. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia was promoting Wahabism, an ultra-conservative form of Islam, and the spread of Wahabi teachings in Saudi financed religious schools across the Muslim world, with unintended consequences. While these acts were meant to reinforce their own internal and external base of legitimacy, in practice they spread the most radical form of Islam, and institutions for its propagation, throughout the region (Furtig, 2006). This was largely a response to accusations from Islamic Iran that Saudi Arabia was a corrupt Westernized regime that did not have a right to the guardianship of holy shrines, such as Medina and Mecca.

The Saudis, claiming to be the protectors of Islam, called on the Americans, in response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, to push the Iraqis back. This invitation to the Americans to enter what was viewed by Muslims as the land of the two holy places was presented by militant Islamists, including Bin Laden (1996) as a betrayal. The blatant disregard for Arab life expressed by further events, from the Gulf War to the decade of sanctions against Iraq, and the failure of Arab regimes to offer help and assistance to the Iraqi people in demanding an end to the sanctions, represented a further betrayal. The disregard for Arab deaths was revealed in Madeleine Albright's statement, in her 1996 CBS interview, that the death of over half a million Iraqi children, due to the sanctions, was a price worth paying.[8]

At the international level, the US veto in the Security Council has consistently prevented passage of any resolutions condemning Israeli acts toward the Palestinians and Lebanese, including those calling for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, or condemnation of the invasion of Lebanon, the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, or Jenin. Since 1972 the US has vetoed 42 UN resolutions that were critical of Israeli actions despite the widespread international support for these statements. The hypocrisy of US and European support for authoritarian regimes in the region, despite Western values of democracy, and the imposition of sanctions on Iraq and Iran, have also been a source of anger.

While, during the Cold War, US involvement in the region was limited by the potential Soviet response, with the end of the Cold War many American military bases were established in the Middle East, which exposed the region to the geopolitical interests of the US at every level. The emergence of the 'Al Jazeera factor' brought images of Iraqi children starving, Palestinian homes being bull-dozed and the death and destruction of Iraq into people's living rooms. The media in the Middle East had been heavily censored by the

regimes; the satellite transmission of Al Jazeera brought images to an Arab audience that they could not see on their national TVs. The ongoing historical experience of humiliation *became* a humiliation in a way it had not been as Arabs began to see a lowering of their own value, expressed in the suffering of Arabs throughout the Middle East (Lynch, 2006: 177). As Moghadam (2006: 722) notes, 'humiliation is frequently absorbed through images … [on] television channels, such as Al-Jazeera, where pictures of Palestinians and Iraqis demoralized by superior Western armies are transmitted on a daily basis'.

Interactions at all levels in the Middle East, that is, the national, the regional and the international, have been experienced in terms of humiliation and betrayal. On the one hand, Islamists shaped a narrative around these emotions, giving coherent meaning to the failure of secular nationalism and the widespread suffering of populations. On the other hand, the sedimentation of these emotions over time, through the ongoing experience of suffering in the region, has created the conditions in which transnational militant Islamism has had increasing appeal and legitimacy. This is not a psychologically reductionist argument about the Arab mind, as is often made (Patai, 2002). There is nothing per se about the Arab or Islamic psyche or culture that necessarily breeds terrorism. Rather, the historical memory of greatness within an Islamic empire, combined with the ongoing humiliation, or lowering of value, and betrayal by regimes in the region of their promise to protect, has provided the seedbed for Islamism to re-emerge as the basis for a transnational identity. Through a series of ongoing social interactions and a process of construction, what had been a highly secularized and Westernized region, both at the level of individuals and societies, is increasingly becoming Islamized.

The 9/11 bombers originated, not from 'Axis of Evil' countries or countries perceived to be hostile to Washington, e.g. Syria, but from US-supported governments in the region. Fifteen of the hijackers were Saudis; two were from the United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon,[9] one from Morocco. They were led by an Egyptian, Mohammed Atta, and aided from Germany by the Moroccan el Motassadeq. Zarqawi, the former al Qaida leader in Iraq, was Jordanian. In the narratives of militant Islamists, the historical experience of humiliation and betrayal are the product of a national, regional and international construction, imposed by the West on Arabs and Muslims and lowering their status within it. The US-supported regimes stand at the intersection of the three levels. Washington is generally viewed in the region as the primary agent of international humiliation, through its unconditional support of Israel and the sanctions regime against Iraq, as well as the more recent invasion. While all of the Arab regimes are authoritarian, they are not all supporters of the US. Those regimes who publicly denounce the United States and Israel express some of the regional and international

frustrations of their population and thereby gain legitimacy. In this respect, the government delivers a similar message to that of the Islamists, which relieves some of the domestic tension. By contrast, within US-supported regimes, the sense of humiliation is compounded by a betrayal. On the one hand, the population is silenced and the government fails to speak on its behalf or protect it. On the other hand, the government is perceived to be an instrument of US foreign policy, which is reinforced by the presence of US military bases in these countries. It is the combination of humiliation and betrayal that constitutes the deadly brew of transnational militant Islamism.

Flawed Logics

The ascendancy of militant Islam and the Islamization of identity in the Middle East have been a reaction to the inability of secularism to address the widespread experience of suffering in the region. Islam provided a framework for reviving a historical memory of greatness and for articulating the possibility that dignity might be restored. Having said this, the militant Islamists, who have no real theological grounding, hijacked the discourse of humiliation, in promoting jihad, and perverted a central premise of Islam: to kill one person is to kill all of humanity (Koran 5.32).

Jihad means struggle, which may be internal or external. The most difficult of these is the jihad within. To change one's self is a struggle. Islamists have shifted focus to jihad against the West. Further, jihad used to be announced by decree of a religious figure or 'commander of the faithfuls' (the Ruler), who was the only one with authority to announce its legitimacy. In the absence of such a leader, or an institution equivalent to the Vatican (or the Caliphate), militants stepped in to articulate the meaning of jihad in this context. This hijacking built on emotions that already had a powerful resonance in the region, that is, humiliation and betrayal, and linked these to a logic of restoring dignity.

In the discourse of militant Islamists, dignity is the opposite of humiliation. A distinction is made between the humiliation wrought by Allah (God) and that by more earthly powers. Allah humiliates those who disobey. Consistent with Saurette's (2005) argument, Allah's humiliation is linked to a moral order, and connected with rightful punishment for acting against that order. In this discourse, Al Qaida claims to have obeyed Allah by ending the *Ummah*'s 'humiliation and degradation, by launching painful strikes and victorious operations', including the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, among others (in Kepel, 2004: 128–9). Jihad, in this discourse, is the only way to restore lost dignity. Even before 9/11, Bin Laden was praised by a radical Muslim preacher, Omar Bakri, for 'breathing new life and dignity into the body of the Ummah' (Israeli, 2003: 198).

A Hamas activist, who rejected the idea that hunger or 'hatred of humanity' drive suicide bombers, similarly argued that the primary factor is the loss of 'dignity' (*karama*) that comes with living under Israeli occupation (Collins, 2004: 181). The humiliation–dignity relationship informs the underlying logic of suicide bombing, which has increasingly shaped the actions and decisions of a swelling pool of recruits in the region (Speckhard, 2005; Hafez, 2007). This logic is flawed in many respects.

First, while Al Qaida tapped into this discourse of emotion by humiliating the United States, this did not translate into unquestioning support of the organization or its tactics. In fact, support for Al Qaida has since waned. Attacks that targeted tourist sites in Jordan, Morocco or Egypt primarily killed innocent Muslims and damaged the economic life of many poor families in the region. In this respect, far from restoring dignity, Al Qaida's acts have only reinforced the problem, resulting in greater repression by the regimes and creating the conditions for Muslims to be discriminated against in the West. The War on Terrorism expanded the powers of Middle Eastern regimes to violate human rights, including those of moderate non-violent Islamists. Legal political opposition has been categorized as terrorism by these regimes. Instead of regaining dignity, the acts of militant Islamists have brought more oppression and humiliation both from regimes in the region and the United States. In this respect, Al Qaida's acts have been a further betrayal of Muslim and Arab populations insofar as they have visited greater fear and insecurity on them. As Mohammed Essam Derbala (Gerges, 2005: 201–3), an imprisoned leader of al Jama 'a Islamiyah, states, 'Al Qaida's policy helped crusading and anti-Muslim forces in America and the West to advocate a total war against Islam.' Moderate Islam would support conventional warfare to restore dignity but would not under any conditions support the killing of innocent civilians.

Second, far from uniting the *Ummah*, militant Islamists have exacerbated divisions within the Muslim world. This became evident when, after ignoring Saddam's brutal treatment of Iraqi citizens, they mobilized the insurgency in Iraq in response to the toppling of the dictator. Rather than uniting Shias and Sunnis, Al Qaida appeared to be taking one side in a sectarian conflict. Third, while exacerbating divisions within the Islamic world, the acts of Al Qaida on 9/11 served the interests of the West by uniting them in the 'War on Terrorism' and the invasion of Afghanistan. While carefully avoiding a language that targets Islamism generally, US measures, from Guantanamo to rendition flights to increased surveillance to Abu Ghraib, have been directed at the Arab and Islamic population in practice. In this respect, 11 September 2001 created a common agenda for the West that had been lacking after the collapse of communism.

The 'War on Terrorism'

This should not be understood as an argument that Al Qaida will simply undermine itself, and therefore these emotional dynamics can be ignored. Rather, the United States' response to 11 September 2001 has created new wounds and reinforced the sense of humiliation to the extent that Islamists across the board are becoming more radical. While Al Qaida has divided the Muslim world, and united the West, the US 'War on Terrorism' has divided the West, and united Arabs and Muslims. The United States experienced widespread global sympathy in response to the atrocities of 9/11. The divisions began with George Bush's State of the Union speech in 2001, in which he declared that 'you are either with us or against us'.

The US invasion of Afghanistan was widely accepted as an act of self-defence in response to 9/11. The invasion of Iraq proved to be far more divisive, as Donald Rumsfeld introduced a distinction between 'old' and 'new' Europe in its opposition to or support for the war. Within Western nation-states, governments were toppled, for instance, in Spain and Italy, as European publics became more vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of governmental support for the Iraq invasion. Public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic has since become increasingly divided. The prolonged captivity of prisoners in Guantanamo without due process, the exposure of the Abu Ghraib photos and extraordinary rendition flights, not to mention the daily diet of death in Iraq, have all had their toll. The human rights abuses contradict the core values of the Western world, which provided the justification for the Bush administration's policy of spreading democracy to the Middle East. These various actions constitute a betrayal of the principles that define Western values.

At the same time, the actions of the United States have mobilized the insurgency and united Muslims and Arabs. US actions have brought together the traditional secular left in the Middle East and Islamists generally, who, as the earlier argument revealed, have traditionally been divided. These acts have undermined the fragile remnants of national identity, and reinforced a notion of Islamism transcending national borders. After the Israeli bombardment of Lebanese cities and towns in 2006, Hezbullah emerged victorious simply by virtue of its survival and the damage done to the mighty Israeli army. In this context, parallels began to be drawn between Nassar, a secular leader who had restored dignity in the 1956 Suez War, and Nasrallah, a Shite cleric, a parallel which would have been unimaginable at an earlier point in time (Ezzat, 2006). Even Islamists outside the Arab world have identified themselves with defence of the *Ummah*, as evidenced in the Bali bombings, which were undertaken by Indonesian Muslims.

The public display of a range of images since the Iraq war has served as a point of identification across divisions within the Muslim and Arab Middle

East, and garnered support for the insurgency. The humiliating image of Saddam's mouth being examined publicly by American medical personnel, or images of the former dictator washing his underwear, transformed what had been hatred for the brutal dictator into a unifying symbol of Western humiliation of the Arab world (Al-Roz, 2005). This reversal culminated with Saddam's execution on the morning of the Feast of Sacrifice, one of two major Islamic feasts, which communicated that Saddam was a sacrificial lamb. Although undertaken by a predominantly Shia court, the act aroused significant anger across sectarian lines, both inside and outside Iraq (Boustany, 2007). The treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo weakened the position of moderates and intellectuals, who have always supported the Western ideal of democracy and freedom, and strengthened the radical Islamists (Saikal, 2006). It further united people in the region against their own regimes, some of which were the receivers of extraordinary rendition, as well as the United States. As the images of Abu Ghraib divided the West, they united the Arab world in their feeling of humiliation at the public exposure of torture and the indignity with which the prisoners were treated.

A Consistent Logic of Dignity

What united the West after 9/11 was the humiliation of the United States by al Qaida. What unites Muslims in the post-9/11 geopolitical climate is a collective feeling of humiliation. What divided the West was the public exposure of humiliating acts directed at Arabs and Muslims, as this is a violation of core Western values of dignity and human rights. What divides Arabs and Muslims is the attempt by Al Qaida to regain dignity through the murder of innocent lives. In this respect, the current clash is driven neither by opposition to Western values of democracy, human rights and freedom (Khouri, 2004), nor by civilizational, cultural, ideological or religious motives, but by the US violation of Western values and principles, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the violation of militant Islamist groups of the core values respecting human life as advocated by Islam.

Both sides are reinforcing the sense of humiliation in the Middle East and the big losers have been the Arab and Muslim populations there and in the West, as well as Western populations who are confronted with an increased threat of terrorist attack and a restriction on their civil liberties. Formulating the problem in this way links it to a concept of human dignity, with roots in international law (UN Charter, 1945; UN GA, 1948), and a somewhat different meaning in East and West, but in both cases defined in opposition to degrading and humiliating treatment. The previous sections have presented humiliation and betrayal as a particular type of traumatic interaction where emotions are an expression of a loss of value and agency, and a relational

pattern that has been constitutive of ongoing conflict and war in the Middle East. This framework establishes a unique perspective for understanding the political violence that has emerged as a result.

If negative emotions of humiliation and betrayal relate to a loss of value, a loss of trust, and a loss of agency, then it follows logically that the desired end is to restore that which has been lost, that is, dignity. The historical sketch reveals a tendency to assume that the restoration of dignity can be achieved by violence, and indeed this is the logic that has been packaged by Al Qaida. While revealing flaws in this logic, we raise a question about what it means to restore dignity.

One place to start is with a more moderate Islamic understanding of dignity. Mahammad Kamali (2002), a Malaysian Professor of Law, provides an enlightening analysis of the place of the word in Islamic thought. While Shariah law upholds and sanctifies measures that are devised to protect human dignity, Allah (God) is said to reward self-restraint and patience in the face of evil and adversity, strongly discouraging extremism and excess in all matters. He (2002: 68) quotes the prophet: 'Avoid extremism, for people have been led to destruction because of extremism.' Dignity is further tied to compassion in so far as the cry of the oppressed must be heard and attended to (Kamali, 2002: 77) as dignity is absent when there is crushing poverty and degradation (Kamali, 2002: 95). While 'evil' may, in his argument, require an exception to self-restraint and patience, emphasis is placed on speaking out, not violence. Quoting from a *hadith*:

> 'Let no one humiliate themselves.' Upon hearing this, the Companions asked: 'How does one do that, O Messenger of God?' Then the Prophet said: 'When someone sees an occasion in which he should speak out for the sake of God but he does not, then God Most High will tell him on the Day of Judgement: what stopped you from speaking on that issue? And when the person answers: the fear of people, then God says: you should have feared Me and put Me above fearing others.' (as cited in Kamali, 2002: 42)

Much like Western just war theory, most Islamic scholars would argue that the use of violence should only be defensive (Abu-Nimer, 2003: 35). Islam is very clear regarding the prohibition, in times of military engagement, on destroying civilian life, advising military commanders and soldiers on the battlefield to be fair, avoid excessive violence and incline toward peace (Kamali, 2002: 22). It is also very clear regarding the prohibition on suicide (Kamali, 2002: 24).

Like international human rights, dignity (*Karamah*) in Islam is an absolute and a natural right for every human being. The word *Karamah* is derived *from* karam (generosity). In this sense, dignity is connected with the capacity to give rather than receive. In Arab culture, *Karamah* is a fundamentally social concept (Gabriel, 2007) and a 'highly charged emotional

frame through which the individual determines the worthiness of his or her life' (Ayish, 2003).

While universal, dignity rests on an acceptance of difference (Abu-Nimer, 2003: 58). On the one hand, all people belong to a single community. On the other, the Koran (49:13) notes that the division of the world into nations and tribes was also intended as God's will so that 'you may know one another (not that ye may despise each other)'. No regime can take dignity away from an individual and, in this respect, the Islamic concept is compatible with the Western doctrine of human rights and dignity. Kamali suggests that dignity rests on one's own sense of value and an ability to exercise not only self-restraint, but agency in speaking out in the face of injustice. Dignity and compassion are inseparable.

In the discourse of the Arab Middle East, the loss and attempt to regain dignity are interwoven with the expression of feelings of having been, historically and in the present, humiliated and betrayed. In the flawed logic of militant Islam, as represented by Al Qaida, restoring dignity is linked to an intention to humiliate the West, as Arabs have been humiliated in the past (Abu Gheith, 2002). In the flawed logic of the 'War on Terrorism', practices of waterboarding and other human rights abuses, are, according to President Bush, compatible with human dignity.[10]

Human dignity has been repeatedly invoked by both sides in the current conflict, that is, both militant Islamists and the Bush administration draw on the concept to justify violent action.[11] The concept, as used at the international level and within moderate Islam, raises questions about this justification. There is a debate within Islam regarding the extent to which violence is necessary in the pursuit of justice. There is a minority that highlights the basis in Islam, both theological and in historical practice, for non-violent resistance (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Sachedina, 2000). These scholars tend to accept the hypothesis, articulated by Burns (1996: 165) that 'there is no theological reason that an Islamic society could not take a lead in developing non-violence today, and there is every reason that some of them should'. One recent example of relative non-violence was the first Intifada of Palestinian youth. In that context, 'children of the stone' maintained a sense of dignity in the face of beatings from Israeli soldiers, imprisonment and torture. Their agency involved speaking out and the re-narration of their identity as empowered agents, which included a rejection of the older generation's discourse of humiliation (Collins, 2004). Other historical campaigns by oppressed peoples have made a more explicit association between dignity and non-violent resistance.

The restoration of dignity through non-violent practice requires a further emotion of compassion. Compassion, within Nussbaum's (2001) framework, relates to the pain one experiences in observing another suffer, a stance

that the person is not to blame for the suffering that has befallen them, and an *eudaimonistic judgement* (EJ) that the person is significant in the observer's scheme of goals and projects. These elements of compassion are already present in the logic of dignity that has formed at the international level. International human rights law is specific about the prohibition on humiliating and degrading treatment.[12] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 1) states that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights'. However, it is Western governments, who consider themselves to be the bearers of these values, that have led the post-9/11 challenge to fundamental human rights commitments in the name of addressing terrorism (Dunne, 2006: 270).

A more consistent logic of dignity requires an acknowledgement that emotions of humiliation and betrayal contribute to the reproduction of violence and a recognition on the part of the powerful that it is in their own *self-interest* to approach the problem from a different angle. This self-interest resides in the significance of the Middle East to the West's objectives and goals, and not least the interest in reducing the threat of terrorism and thereby protecting Western lives. It further requires that questions be raised about the role of an Orientalist discourse in shaping attitudes to actors in the region, a discourse that stands in opposition to the international discourse of human dignity and constitutes blame for the suffering of Arabs and Muslims. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007: 78–110), for instance, point to a dichotomy between 'Virtuous Israelis' and 'Evil Arabs' that underpins the moral rationale for US support of Israel. Finally, it requires an ability to hear Arab and Muslim voices and acknowledge their suffering as well as Western ones (Butler, 2004).

While writers across the political and cultural spectrum in the Middle East acknowledge the role of humiliation and betrayal in Arab culture and politics, these are less a product of the Arab mindset than the meaning given to an ongoing historical experience of suffering. More extreme actors, such as Al Qaida, have hijacked these sentiments, building on a particular interpretation of Islam. This logic justifies acts of violence toward the US in particular, and the West more generally. In reinforcing this logic, through its own actions, the West has contributed to the consolidation of a unified Muslim identity which otherwise would not exist. If a sense of powerlessness and a loss of autonomy are central to the problem of humiliation and betrayal, then it is essential that policy responses be sensitive to the cultural meaning and dynamics of these emotions and empower rather than dis-empower. The loss of dignity cannot be separated from material conditions that have impoverished and institutions that have brutalized populations. Restoring dignity thus means creating space for a legitimate political voice and economic agency.

Notes

1. See also Crawford (2000). Richard Ned Lebow (2006) is developing a paradigm of international politics based on the Greek concept of the spirit.
2. See the cover of Lindner (2006).
3. *Ird* is an honor code for women. *Sharaf*, on the other hand, is an honor code for men, which involves the protection of *Ird* and land. See Zeid (1965).
4. The term was coined by Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US naval officer in 1902, but was more widely used during World War II when the British created a Minister of State for the Middle East.
5. While Qutb's book was published before 1967, and was circulating within the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt, it spread more widely in the region after 1967.
6. Militant Islam assumes the use of violent means. Radical Islam, by contrast, is not by definition violent, but refers to an ultraconservative and fundamentalist version of political Islam.
7. The main slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood is 'Islam is the Solution'.
8. The interview was conducted by Lesley Stahl on CBS News, 60 Minutes, 12 May 1996. The half million figure was based on a UNICEF report. Bin Laden's later texts refers to the 'killing' of more than a million Iraqi children (Lawrence, 2005: 137).
9. Lebanon is in a somewhat different category given the existence of a pro-US prime minister and anti-US groups such as Hizballah who are a part of the government.
10. In a BBC interview, President Bush was asked whether the US could still occupy the moral high ground, given the use of waterboarding and other human rights abuses, he responded: 'Absolutely. We believe in human rights and human dignity. …And we're willing to take the lead. We're willing to ask nations to do hard things…. And — yeah, no question in my mind, it's a nation that's a force for good' (MacAskill, 2008). In this logic, waterboarding and human dignity go hand in hand.
11. Human dignity has a prominent place in the 'US National Security Strategy,' http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15421.htm
12. See the 1949 Geneva Convention (GC) 1, Article 4, 1:C; GC2, Article 3, 1:C; GC3, Article 3, 1:C; GC4, Article 3, 1:C; 1977 Geneva Protocol (GP) I, Article II, 1 and 4; GP I, Section 2, Article 44, subsection 4, paragraph 4; GPII, Part 2, Article 4, Section 2E.

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