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Authoritarian Brazil

Origins, Policies, and Future

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7 The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil

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Though I am not a specialist in Brazilian politics, I have been encouraged to contribute to this volume because of the use Brazilianists have made of a model of authoritarianism that I developed originally for Spain.[1] The work of the Brazilianists has helped refine my original model, as well as contribute to the important theoretical task of constructing a typology of authoritarian regimes.[2] With some reservations, there seems to be a consensus among the contributors that in Brazil many aspects of the

I want to acknowledge the discussions I had with the other participants in the conference and to thank in particular Alfred Stepan and Cândido Mendes for their useful comments and suggestions during the revision of my paper.

1. The most complete statement of the model is found in Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*, ed. Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 251–83, 374–81. This first appeared in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 291–342. Specific aspects of the model are elaborated in my "From Falange to Movimiento-Organización: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936–1968," in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 128–203; and in my "Opposition In and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in *Regimes and Oppositions*, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 171–259. Also see Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, *Los empresarios ante el poder público: El liderazgo y los grupos de intereses en el empresariado español* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1966).

2. In addition to the essay by Schmitter in this volume, see Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a Modernizing Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 342–43, 345–48; Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 373–83, 387, 467–68. See also Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: The Politics of Profit-Sharing in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), for an application and elaboration of the model.

regime developed by Getúlio Vargas during the Estado Nôvo of 1937–45 persisted into the period of competitive politics from 1945 until the military assumed power in 1964. A more uneasy consensus seems to exist, as well, that no immediate return to competitive politics is in sight for Brazil. Concerning the degree and type of institutionalization achieved by Brazil's authoritarian regime and the capacity of the regime to become stable, consensus seems to falter. It is in regard to these latter points that I wish to raise some questions and offer some tentative answers.

The overthrow of a regime does not assure the consolidation, and even less the full institutionalization, of the successor regime.[3] In Brazil, since many of the partisans of the 1964 coup viewed the subsequent military rule as only an interim process whose goal was to prepare the way quickly for a return to democracy, the entire question of creating new authoritarian political institutions was, in particular, fraught with ambiguity and contradictions. Nonetheless, some might argue that after eight years of rule by the military under three military presidents, the regime can be considered consolidated. This assessment gains further plausibility in view of the limited capacity of the old political classes to present any effective opposition, and the failure of the new Left to move from small-scale terrorism to large-scale insurrection. Indeed, those whose attention centers on the socioeconomic policies of the Brazilian military governments might even argue that the regime is already institutionalized because it has demonstrated staying power and the capacity to formulate and execute programs.[4] Those who see the ideas of the Superior War

3. In contrast to the extensive theoretical literature on rebellions, insurgency, revolutions, and breakdowns of regimes, there are few studies of the process by which rulers proceed to consolidate power, once they have gained it. An exception is Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and Gerhardt Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des Totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933–34* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960). See also Otto Kirchneimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review* 59 (December 1965): 964–74.

4. The reader of this chapter might be surprised that a sociologist should focus less than other contributors on the class structure, interest groups, sectors of the economy, regional differences of economic and social development, social composition and ties of the armed forces. This is in part the result of an implicit division of labor among the contributors to avoid repetition. It is also a reflection of a theoretical orientation that emphasizes the more strictly political factors: the relative autonomy of the military in making their choices and the long-run implications of decisions they have made in response to their mentality (and *ressentiments*) that could not be explained in traditional sociological categories. It also reflects my concern in this essay with the process of institution building rather than with the formulation of specific policies. Furthermore, I have limited myself to an analysis of the alternatives open to the present rulers and particularly the officer corps. The constraints set by the social bases of the 1964 Revolution are taken as given and therefore not the object of our analysis.

College (Escola Superior de Guerra) as forming a coherent program, conceived even before the military assumed power, will tend to consider the regime even further down the road toward full institutionalization.

However, when we focus on the more strictly political actions of the successive military governments since 1964, such as the periodic issuance of drastic institutional acts, the making and breaking of constitutions, the constant changing of the rules of the game in regard to elections, and most importantly, the profound internal military struggles that marked the two succession crises, we sense a void in political institutionalization. It is true that, despite internal tensions, the military has been able to exercise power, but their hesitant efforts to "civilianize" their rule have had only limited success. Power has basically remained with the armed forces, except for economic policy making, which is shared between the military, selected technocrats, and, to a lesser extent, businessmen. Institutions outside of the armed forces have been created and disregarded constantly, leaving the military with ultimate power. Even those political figures selected by the military are thus dependent, almost day by day, on the internal consensus of the officer corps. When we examine the Brazilian national security doctrine, with its basically negative character and its ambivalent commitment to democracy, we must question its ultimate capacity to serve as the foundation for "legitimate" and stable authoritarian political institutions like those that have emerged in Spain under Franco.

All this leads me to suggest that the Brazilian case represents an authoritarian *situation* rather than an authoritarian *regime*. Furthermore, the nature of the regime that might eventually emerge is still largely undefined. That after eight years of rule there is an authoritarian situation, rather than an authoritarian regime, is evidence of the difficulties faced in the institutionalization of such regimes (difficulties compounded in the Brazilian case for reasons to be explored). It is also evidence that consolidation of power and even considerable success in specific policies do not in themselves ensure institutionalization and that the weakness of regimes is not determined only by the strength of the opposition. The Brazilian case in all these respects poses particularly

interesting and important problems for the comparative study of the dynamics of authoritarian regimes.

In Brazil, even though fully competitive democracy (with freedom for all political actors and social groups) has now definitely been excluded through a variety of means, such as control of the press and the cancellation of the political rights of the most prominent politicians, the present government is still only in the constituent stage. What alternative models of authoritarian regimes are available to the present military leaders in Brazil, which ones have they considered, and what are the prospects of successful institutionalization of each of them? These are the basic questions.

Unfortunately, we are still far from an adequate typology of authoritarian regimes. For some answers to these questions we therefore have to turn to regimes found in certain countries, in order to see what parallels they suggest for Brazil. This explains the references in this volume to the "Mexicanization" or "Portugalization" of the Brazilian regime.[5] In addition, since my original model of an authoritarian regime was developed largely by contraposition to both competitive democracies and strictly defined totalitarian systems, the inquiry into the prerequisites for stable authoritarian regimes still demands much work.

As a first (far from satisfactory) approximation, we may say that authoritarian regimes are likely to emerge wherever the conditions for stable democratic or totalitarian systems are absent.[6] However, such a "residual" explanation does not tell us much about the conditions for their stable institutionalization and even less about the prerequisites for different types of authoritarian regimes.

In my original presentation of the model, I tried to distinguish between two main types of authoritarian regimes.[7] The first type is characterized by the *controlled mobilization* of a population that by and large had not previously been mobilized and is thus reasonably available. The second type is one characterized by the *deliberate demobilization* of a population that had previously been mobilized within a more competitive political situation, but in which the political institutions did not possess the capacity either to satisfy the demands created by mobilization or to guarantee stable processes of political and social change. Using this

5. See in particular the essay by Philippe C. Schmitter in this volume.

6. See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), in addition to the contributions of Harry Eckstein and S. M. Lipset, among others.

7. See Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," pp. 260–62.

frame of reference, the basic question the present rulers of Brazil have to face is whether they want and can create a mobilizational, authoritarian regime. If the answer to either part of this question is no, then the next question is whether a regime based on the demobilization of the population activated in the populist period before the 1964 coup is possible without excessive repression, and whether, if repression is necessary, it will assure stable rule.

I will now endeavor to examine in some detail the complex series of obstacles in Brazil to the institutionalization of either the mobilization-populist-fascist subtype of authoritarian regime, or the demobilization-bureaucratic-military subtype that Schmitter has in mind when he writes of the Portugalization of Brazil. In the comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes particular attention must be given to the immediate political circumstances surrounding the origin of the regime and the way in which these circumstances condition the evolution of the regime. Attention must also be paid to the way in which the country's social and political development, the international ideological climate of the time of the assumption of power, and the nature of the country's international links and dependencies combine to constrain or facilitate the legitimacy formulas and the political-party systems that are feasibly available to the builders of the authoritarian regime. It is in these areas that some clues must be sought for understanding the institutionalization of authoritarian structures.

The Formative Stage of Brazil's Authoritarian Regime: Brazil's Ambivalent Legacy

Let us start with the circumstances surrounding the creation of the current Brazilian regime. In contrast to some of the most stable authoritarian regimes in the world today, whether left-authoritarian or right-authoritarian, the present Brazilian rulers did not come to power in the course of a bitter civil war nor after a serious national crisis accompanied by foreign threats, such as occurred with Atatürk in Turkey or Nasser in Egypt. Nor did Brazil experience a prolonged period of widespread terror, as did Spain and Yugoslavia, terror that helped assure the allegiance of those who participated in the formative stages of the regime, based on their fears and/or shared guilt, whatever their subsequent disillusionment. In Brazil, in contrast, despite the mobilization of some conservative middle- and upper-class groups, the active support of some Catholic conservative masses, and the collaboration of some leading politicians, the birth of the regime was fundamentally the result of a successful coup by the army.

There is another important contrast between Brazil and many

of the fascist or semifascist regimes and even some of the leftist-nationalistic authoritarian regimes of the Third World In Brazil, a civilian political party aspiring to fully noncompetitive rule did not exist before the beginning of authoritarian rule by the military. This obviously limits the possibility of creating a single party composed primarily of committed civilians who could link the current military-technocratic regime with a political movement of richer symbolic content or provide the military with a more widely recruited political cadre. In the absence of such a party, when the military felt the need of politicians to work with them, they have had to recruit these politicians from among the remaining members of the old political parties, particularly from the ranks of the União Democrática Nacional (UDN) and the Partido Social Democrático (PSD). This situation creates a variety of problems for the regime's evolution. On the one hand, the bulk of the officers have a visceral dislike of the style and record of the old-school politicians. On the other hand, these politicians, though willing to cooperate in the official dominant party, Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), are more likely to feel at ease in a political system that is at least semicompetitive. They are not the kind of men that other authoritarian regimes have used to forge either a fairly disciplined bureaucratic-elitist cadre party, or a real or pseudo mass party.

Paradoxically, the relative ease and rapidity of the 1964 coup also created difficulties for the current rulers in Brazil. The fact that the coup was virtually unopposed makes the rationalization of "saving the country from communism and subversion" questionable. Samuel Huntington has noted that one of the characteristic forms of authoritarian rule is the "exclusionary one-party system" based on a clear identification of the "enemy." [8] The lack of a credible "enemy" in the Brazilian case makes such a basis for exclusion less clear. In any case, the destruction of much of the political class cannot be legitimated on the basis of their identification with the "subversive" government of ex-President Goulart. Many of the most prominent centrist or conservative politicians, such as Juscelino Kubitschek, Adhemar de Barros, and Carlos Lacerda, all of whom later had their political rights taken away, were strong supporters of the coup against Goulart.

This raises the crucial question of symbols. Among the many important factors in the analysis of the formative stages of an

8. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Huntington and Moore, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, p. 14.

authoritarian regime are the slogans, phrases, and symbols that accompany its birth. Whatever policies authoritarian regimes may later follow, it becomes difficult for them to overcome the image they have initially created. This image inevitably limits their freedom as they strive for political institutionalization at later stages. When the military assumed power in Brazil in 1964, some prominent officers articulated attachment to their "salvationist" mission to "clear up the mess" and restore democracy. Though many of the regime's later policies made carrying out such a mission increasingly unlikely, the constant restatement of the intention to restore competitive liberal democracy (whatever ambivalence these statements contained), was and still is a drawback for the legitimation of permanent authoritarian elitist rule. Only — and in this the hard-line wing of the military may be right — complete discontinuity with the initial leadership and ideas of 1964 and a displacement of the present ruling groups would open the door to an unabashed, self-confident authoritarian regime.[9] However, such a reversal would undoubtedly be viewed by many officers as endangering the already perilous unity of the military institution. Furthermore, the negative component that justified 1964 would not be sufficient almost a decade later to justify such a step toward pure authoritarian rule. A large part of the population and even significant sectors of the military would legitimately ask why now, if not then. Only a greatly stepped-up campaign by urban guerrillas might rationalize permanent authoritarian rule.

There are thus contradictions and obstacles inhibiting the early establishment of a fully elaborated authoritarian regime. However, after the salvationist claims are finally renounced, as they are likely to be, the question then becomes what types of symbols or institutions might serve to rationalize permanent authoritarian rule. We will first examine the question of alternative legitimacy formulas, particularly charismatic or corporatist formulas, and then turn to the possible subtypes of authoritarian political-party systems available to the Brazilian military regime.

9. This analysis is confirmed by the self-criticism of the "Castellistas" as reported by Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil*, p. 339. One of them said that Castello in his desire to preserve as much democracy as possible had "improved his place in history at the cost of sacrificing chances for more thoroughgoing changes in the old system," and that many civilian backers of 1964 "hold that the entire political class should have been dismantled in 1964 and the groups actively backing the coup utilized as the nucleus for a new political force."

The Need for a Legitimacy Formula

As Alfred Stepan has noted, the Brazilian doctrine of national security, developed in the military milieu as an intellectual elaboration of responses to insurgency and as a result of the new professionalism, is too limited to provide a legitimacy formula because of its essentially negative character.[10] To say that the military espouses anticommunism tells us too little about the kind of society the rulers want to create and the kind of social and economic policies they want to implement. It tells us even less about the kind of political institutions and legitimacy formulas they want to use. Certainly, some repressive policies can be derived from an anticommunist stance. Some manipulation of interest conflicts by controlling and changing the leadership of labor and peasant groups and even some technocratic social reform and economic development policies can be justified by a doctrine of anticommunism. The success of such a combination of policies based on repression and development can assure some stability in periods of prosperity, but it can never satisfy those who ask questions about legitimacy, except perhaps in purely subject political cultures, with traditional rulers in the most narrow Weberian sense of the term. In any society that has developed beyond this stage, as Brazil clearly has, questions about legitimacy will inevitably be asked. They will be asked by intellectuals and those under their influence, by those concerned with religious values, and ultimately by some of those who have to use coercion, like judges or army officers confronted with subversion or public disorder. Only praetorian guards or the lowest ranks of a police force do not ask such questions. Anyone in a position of responsibility, one who must die or kill to defend a regime, must ultimately ask questions about why he should do so and whether he should obey in a crisis situation.

The Availability of the Charismatic Legitimacy Formula

In the modern world, all legitimacy formulas refer in some way to the authority coming from the *demos,* the people. Who "the people" should be and how they should transfer their authority to the rulers are the great questions of politics. The number of answers is not unlimited, nor is it a matter of indifference which one is chosen. One "answer" that has had considerable psycho-

10. See his essay in this volume and his *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 172–87.

logical power to demand obedience is the establishment of an identity between the people and an extraordinary man who represents the people, who feels that he can speak for them, and who is accepted by the people as their leader in view of his unique quality. This is charismatic authority. Never mind that in many societies which are led by such a leader large minorities do not believe in the leader's charisma. The majority believe in his authority. More important, he too believes in his mission to lead.

Despite the widespread and often loose use of this term by social scientists, such authority appears rarely and only under very special circumstances. It cannot be produced "on order." The military organization, particularly (as in the Brazilian case) when bureaucratic seniority rules are adhered to and when achievement of the highest office requires corporate consensus of the officer corps, is not the best breeding ground for charismatic rule. Normally it is only after an international or civil war that something like charismatic authority appears within the regular channels of the army. Certainly, none of the presidents of post-1964 Brazil fit the role of charismatic leader, and probably none of them aspired to it. The officer corps, in fact, seems hostile to and fearful of the emergence of a "caudillo."

Even when charismatic authority cannot serve as a long-term and sufficient basis to institutionalize an authoritarian regime, it can serve to give it a lease on life and provide the leader with the opportunity to create an institutional framework out of other materials. This has probably been the role of Cárdenas in Mexico, and possibly that of Nasser in Egypt and Franco in Spain. Brazil, on the other hand, because of the circumstances surrounding the military's assumption of power and the bureaucratic nature of the military organization, has no charismatic leader in the making. Indeed, any officer with clear political skills and potential for populist charismatic appeal is vetoed by the military organization. Thus any use of the charismatic formula to help institutionalize and legitimate authoritarian rule is very unlikely in the Brazilian case.

The Corporatist, Nonparty Legitimacy Formula

Another option that might give a more democratic base to such an authoritarian regime is to reject "individualistic" democracy and substitute for it some form of corporatist organic representation. Organic democracy "in theory" offers a legitimate alternative to competitive-party democracy to assure the participation of people in their government. In practice, as Max Weber noted, it serves to exclude from political participation large numbers of

people or whole sections of the society and to manipulate the composition of representative assemblies.[11] This would be fully congruent with the idea of limited pluralism that is a key characteristic of the authoritarian-regime model and the realities of Brazilian politics since 1964. Furthermore, as the articles by Skidmore and particularly Schmitter in this volume demonstrate, corporatist institutions, ideologies, and policy-making processes have a certain tradition in Brazil.[12] If the current regime decided to go further in this corporatist direction, the Portugalization of Brazil would certainly be achieved with such a formula. As in Portugal, corporatist ideology and institutions would be combined with republican institutions like a directly elected national parliament. This formula would avoid the appearance of a complete break with Brazil's long history of commitment (despite lapses) to the form of direct and liberal democracy.

There are, however, some difficulties with this solution. The link established in the public mind between corporatism and fascism (whatever misunderstanding of many fascist regimes, particularly of the Nazi case, this involves), gives such a solution dubious attractiveness. It could, however, be argued that corporatism has been more important for Catholic conservative social doctrine than for fascism, and therefore would be congruent with the sentiments of those segments of Brazilian society identified with a conservative church. Certainly, if Brazil were to move in this direction, some of the ideologies of corporatist institutions would come from conservative clerical and lay groups. However, the traditional weakness of lay Catholicism in Brazil as well as the development since the late 1950s of progressive and even radical Catholic lay movements are obstacles to such a development. Even if these obstacles did not exist, international Catholicism has undergone significant changes since the late 1920s and 1930s, when corporatist authoritarian regimes of Europe were instituted as a new alternative to liberal, individualist democracies. The ideas of the early social encyclicals, quoted by Salazar in Portugal, Dollfuss in Austria, and important segments of the Franco regime, are still available, but their legitimacy within the Catholic tradition has been seriously weakened by Vatican II. Not only have large sections of Belgian, German, Dutch, and French Catholicism abandoned such ideas, but so have recent popes, whereas in the past many of the popes could be interpreted as preferring, if not prescribing, such a corporatist approach to

11. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), 1: 297–99.

12. Also see Schmitter's *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil.*

politics. The Brazilian church is today divided over the position it should take concerning the authoritarian military regime. A militant minority would like to see the church systematically confront and oppose the regime, and they appeal to the "prophetic mission" of the church. On the opposite wing is a militant group of Catholic conservatives who actively urge the military to impose a corporatist state. A large part of the institutional church, however, is uneasily but passively acquiescing to the authoritarian regime — partly because of financial dependency, partly because of the church's historic caution in regard to major church-state conflicts.

In light of this political, ideological, and theological division within the contemporary Brazilian church, it seems reasonable to argue that the Brazilian military regime will not be able to persuade the church hierarchy to take an enthusiastic, unified, and active role in the construction of a corporatist state. Another limitation of a corporatist solution is its lack of appeal to intellectuals and even to those military officers who may feel that Brazil, as a potential world power, should be offering new political formulas. Corporatism, furthermore, would not provide Brazil with an appealing image abroad.

A further difficulty with a corporatist solution in Brazil is that it would be difficult (though not impossible) to harmonize it with the federal structure of the country or the traditional role of state governors. Over the long run, it might be useful to have some kind of party system for election of the state governors, and it might be too severe a break with tradition to have the governors elected by corporatist chambers. To have them permanently appointed by the central government would be an even greater break, although the centralizing tendencies and the weakening of the federal tradition have gone very far in recent years.

The combination of these national and international factors, plus the military's attachment to their "salvationist mission" to reestablish United States–style democracy, helps explain why the military rulers have not openly decided to use corporatist structures and ideologies to institutionalize the authoritarian regime or to give it an ideological façade to date.

As we have argued before, the initial circumstances surrounding the founding of the regime influences the feasibility of subsequent steps. In the Brazilian case, the fact that the military governments have already created new electoral and political party laws, as well as a new constitution, means that the subsequent creation of corporatist institutions would entail a break with their own recent past and would alienate even more those who

collaborated in experiments such as the creation of the government party, ARENA, and the half-controlled opposition parties such as the MDB.

One-Party Alternatives — Fascist and Populist

Thus the two nonparty legitimacy formulas — charismatic and corporatist — do not seem to be readily available to Brazil's current rulers. This section will explore the possible party-system solutions.

A single-party system at first impression would seem to be the simplest solution. It is important to repeat here that the present regime was not created by a coalition between the military and civilian political parties or politicians committed to the idea of a single party. In this, Brazil in 1964 was quite different from Spain in 1936. Obviously, many authoritarian regimes have used their power to create single parties even when such parties have been far from satisfactory for the long-run institutionalization of these regimes. In the Brazilian case the difficulties are compounded by a number of international and national circumstances.

The antirevolutionary, and largely antipopulist, initial thrust of the Revolution was supported by the upper and middle classes. Its appeal to symbols of order and tradition would inevitably tend to associate a resultant single party with fascism, an ideology and system of the past, viewed negatively by most people, probably even by many of the same people who support the regime on social or economic grounds. Single parties are far from being out of favor in the world, but a fascist single party is certainly not fashionable. The cultural acceptance of the United States' liberal political forms by many of the Brazilian elites also makes a single party that would inevitably be labeled as fascist undesirable.

What of the populist single-party option? In contrast to other military coups and regimes, whatever policies the Brazilians may pursue, they will have great difficulty avoiding the label "rightist." Military organizations that take power today in traditional societies, in which competitive or semicompetitive regimes are perceived as having failed by significant segments of society, have a chance to create a single party. But their rhetoric must be leftist; they must speak of socialism, of agrarian reform, sometimes of secularization, and above all, of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and (best of all) anti-Americanism. Some of these themes are not out of the question in Brazil. In fact, some members of the military might feel closer to them than corporatist formulas or to the

defense of a dynamic capitalism linked to the Western capitalist world economy.

A coup by some segment of the army attempting to turn the country toward such a left-authoritarian regime cannot be excluded, but it would have to overcome resistance both within and outside the military. Many within the military would fear it because it would risk dividing the military institution. Just as importantly, the economic policies of recent years, which many credit with contributing to the very high growth rates since 1968, would have to be abandoned. The successor policies would come into conflict with strong vested interests that would not tolerate such policy reversals passively. The recent success of Brazilian capitalism — national, mixed national, international, public and private — and the complexity of the financial, industrial, and commercial structure of São Paulo and Rio, as Stepan notes, is one among many factors accounting for the differences between the attitude of the Brazilian military and the more populist Peruvian officers toward the socioeconomic system.[13] To reverse the ongoing Brazilian economic system would require a broader impetus than a faction of left-authoritarian officers in the army could provide.

A populist authoritarian regime with a single party created by the army in coalition with some intellectuals, searching for support among labor and seeking legitimacy by assuming an anti-United States stand in world affairs, with ties to the Soviet Union is not out of the question. Many factors would stand in the way of such a project, however. Not only the capitalist structure of Brazilian society, the conservative middle-class segments of Brazilian Catholicism, public and private pressures from the United States, but historical developments in recent years stand in the way. The fact that the populist appeal had already been made and to some degree organized prior to 1964 by politicians now in exile or deprived of their political rights, or dishonored and persecuted by the army, makes it difficult to shift to such an appeal without endangering very seriously the unity of the armed forces. In addition, it is doubtful that men who have experienced such defamation would collaborate with a segment of the army, even should some of the officers try to plot with them. After the last eight years it is very questionable whether the intellectuals, the students, and the Catholic Left would unite with a sector of the army in the building of an authoritarian regime with a left-oriented single party to which they would provide ideas but only

13. See Stepan's essay in this volume.

a minority of leadership. Too many have undergone a process of radicalization and put their hopes in more revolutionary solutions, whatever the chances of success, or have become cynical if not outright hostile toward the military in general.

Populism is not a flag that the present rulers, or a segment of them, can appropriate easily, even though it is certain that they will do their best to appropriate some of its issues and some of its rhetoric in the coming years. The Brazilian military is far from institutionalizing the regime on the basis of a large-scale, manipulated single mass party like the one Nasser created in Egypt. The Peruvian military, on the other hand, given the anti-United States, antioligarchical "signs" under which their rule was born, and the social and economic structure of the country, as well as the more limited success of populist mobilization before the takeover, have some or perhaps many chances to do so. Their Brazilian peers have more limited and dangerous options.

The Hegemonic or Predominant-Party Alternatives

If a fascist-type single-party regime or a socialist-populist single-party regime is not an entirely feasible alternative for the military in Brazil (as well as being of dubious appeal to the technocrats working with them and of even less appeal to some of the old-time politicians that they have co-opted), it would seem that some kind of multiparty system with a hegemonic party would be the most realistic option.[14] In a sense, the hesitant efforts of "constitutionalization" and "civilianization" have been moves in this direction.

It seems probable that the present rulers find this a much more feasible alternative, and one less divisive for the armed forces. The Mexican solution comes immediately to mind. Here I must stress that I do not accept the argument that in Mexico the minor parties are completely free to organize and that the country is thus democratic. Nor do I find compelling the theoretical model of internal party democracy through the sector structure, which was initially formulated by Robert Scott.[15] I see Mexico rather as having an authoritarian hegemonic party

14. We use "hegemonic party" in the sense given to it by Giovanni Sartori "The Typology of Political Systems — Proposals for Improvement," in Allardt and Rokkan, *Mass Politics*, pp. 322–52 and 382–88; in particular see pp. 326–31, where he discusses the distinction between predominant party, hegemonic party, single party, and their subtypes. See also his forthcoming book, *Parties and Party Systems*.

15. Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

system which has some of the formal structures that make it appear to approximate a competitive democracy or at least give the appearance of moving toward a polyarchy. Though I define the Mexican system as authoritarian, I acknowledge that most participants see the hegemonic party, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), as legitimate and popular. If Brazil could create such a party, while reducing other parties to irrelevant opposition roles (if not to manipulated allies of the hegemonic party) and outlawing subversive parties, this solution would undoubtedly be welcomed by much of the Brazilian military. It would also be welcomed by the United States as a face-saving solution that would be preferable to either the straightforward single-party solution or the corporatist path toward Portugalization. The great question is, can it be done?

Certainly the manipulation of electoral laws can go very far in assuring the emergence of a de facto hegemonic party, but given the recent history of Brazil and its level of development, the successful transformation of ARENA into a Brazilian PRI will be very difficult. The semicompetitive period of Brazilian politics has left a heritage of leadership identifications that interferes with the creation of such a party by the present ruling group. As the state elections in recent years have shown, there is more of a tradition in favor of a competitive party system than would be desirable for the inauguration of such a pseudo-democratic, authoritarian formula. The passage of time, together with continuous economic prosperity, some appealing structural reforms, and effective patronage might make it possible to forge such a government party and limit and exclude other parties. At present, however, the memory of a more open party system, the potential appeal of some of the political figures of the past, the links established between the old parties and some interest groups like the trade unions make the task of creating a broadly popular hegemonic party much more difficult. One of the greatest difficulties is likely to be the unwillingness of powerful factions within the armed forces to give an official, controlled government party sufficient autonomy and a large enough share in power. Past military intimidation of Congress, interventions in the nominating process, and withdrawal of political rights from ARENA leaders who show any independence have frustrated many of those willing to cooperate in such an experiment.

Past military pressure from one or another segment of the army has resulted in the withdrawal of political rights from a large number of politicians who had, in essence, been very willing to cooperate with the regime. This has limited the range

of politicians still available to build a civilian-led hegemonic party. In addition, the loss of power within the military of those officers who appeared to be most eager to search for a nonmilitary social base (e.g. Passarinho and most noticeably Albuquerque Lima, who during the struggle over the succession to Costa e Silva attempted to make himself known to the country) points to another limiting factor in any attempt to forge a broad civilian base for a hegemonic party.

The major trouble for the Brazilian ruling circles is that the Revolution of 1964 was not the Mexican revolution. Its heroes are villains for those who admire the Mexican revolutionaries. Its myths and symbols are the opposite of those of the Mexican revolution of 1910, and no similarity in actual government output can correct these birth defects. No achievements in economic development, stability, or even in any possible future selective redistribution policies can compensate for them. A Brazilian sympathetic to such pseudodemocratic but actually authoritarian solutions might ask why he should expect the reaction to a hegemonic party to be so different in Mexico and Brazil. It is necessary to stress once more that the political problems of authoritarian regimes, given their ambiguous status in the struggle for the minds of people in the twentieth century, are not exclusively nationally determined. The opinion of foreign intellectuals, scholars, and journalists are an important reality with which they have to contend. The birth of the Brazilian regime antagonized intellectuals at home and abroad. Revolutionary violence by peasants is very different from police terror that is tolerated if not encouraged by the government. Rightist symbols do not have the same legitimacy for most intellectuals as those of the Left. In addition to such difficulties, which we should never underestimate, there are practical ones. The creation through power of a predominant or hegemonic party of the Mexican type is not easy for a group of officers with a basically bureaucratic mentality, nor for technocrats with a commitment to apolitical, rational economic and social policy making. It is perhaps feasible if there were a charismatic leader working with them, but no such leader exists yet in Brazil, and for reasons stated previously his appearance is not likely. Such a process of party creation also would require a "civilianization" of segments of the army so that they could assume more strictly political functions. The performance of these functions, however, would tend to split the military, for they still perceive such acts as "politicking" or "demagoguery."

If the military government could associate itself with nationalistic-populistic policies it would aid the process of building a hegemonic party. Some attempt in this direction will undoubtedly be made, but the stage of Brazilian development makes this more difficult than it was in Mexico in the 1930s or, as we have noted, even in Peru today. Some of the more successful authoritarian regimes, such as those that came to power in Turkey after the fall of the Sultan, in Egypt after the overthrow of King Farouk, or in Mexico after the revolution against Porfirio Díaz, *created* for the first time in their society nationalist symbols and populist structures. These regimes inherited a great ideological and institutional space in which they could build. In Brazil, however, the first step of the current military government was to disinherit the nationalist leaders and to repress the already growing populist mobilizational structures of the trade unions, the peasant leagues, and the ideologically inspired literacy campaigns. Thus, even if the military government were later to successfully implement nationalist-populist policies, it would be doubtful that these policies would win for them the legitimacy and support they won for their executors in Egypt, Mexico, or Turkey.

Consideration of these factors leads me to conclude that it will be a very difficult task to create a broadly popular hegemonic or predominant party in Brazil. These same factors will also make the creation of the "preferred mix" of the minor parties even more difficult if we keep in mind that the goal is to achieve at least the façade of competitive politics. Thus even a pseudo-predominant party must allow other parties a relatively free existence, while assuring itself dominance by a combination of success in economic policies, manipulation of electoral laws, gerrymandering, indirect pressures, and co-optation or corruption of emerging leaders of other parties. In a country where a variety of parties had already achieved a certain maturity, the creation of a credible predominant party by such Machiavellian methods is not easy. The alternative would obviously be the creation of a hegemonic party that by legal, rather than by de facto, obstacles would allow other parties a subsidiary role. The model of hegemonic parties in pseudo-multiparty systems like those in communist countries in Eastern Europe ideally requires in the last analysis a historical, ideological justification of the hegemonic party that is difficult to provide in the Brazilian case. In the absence of such justification, considerable legal and/or illegal limits would have to be placed on the many opposition parties that potentially could emerge spontaneously. If the existence of such parties is to win the regime any legitimacy, the level of obvious coercive restriction against the parties must not

be too high. However, given the degree of political freedom and politicization that prevailed in Brazil before 1964 and the degree of the country's development, an extremely high level of coercion apparently would be necessary in order to create and maintain the docile, manipulated, semiopposition parties that the hegemonic party formula calls for.

In any case, even were the domestic conditions for the creation of a hegemonic or predominant party system more favorable than we think, in Brazil the symbolic ideological birth defects of the system would still persist. While radicals in the world have no difficulty in calling the PRI in Mexico fascist, a populist hegemonic or even predominant ARENA would be labeled fascist by a much broader spectrum of opinion, thus destroying its function of legitimizing the system. ARENA's basic policies of dynamic capitalism — partly private, partly public — rapid economic development with stability, and the maintenance of good relations with the United States would not differ much from those of the PRI, but this fact would not cause many to change their minds.

Authoritarian Regimes in the Contemporary World

Ultimately, authoritarian regimes, despite their pragmatism, their lack of ideological rigidity, the similarities across a wide spectrum of systems in terms of their institutionalization and uses of power, are very dependent on their symbolic identification when they face the problems of political institutionalization. Politics is not simply a question of policies and administration, but of appealing to politically interested segments of society. Millions of passive supporters and obedient citizens are insufficient, as are, also, numerous groups who see a coincidence of their interests with those of their rulers and are thus willing to abdicate political power for the sake of minding their own affairs — whether these affairs be business, personal social mobility, or welfare policies for certain groups. I agree with Philippe Schmitter's intriguing observation that in this respect the authoritarian-regime model is very similar to the Bonapartist model of Marx.[16] Authoritarian regimes normally flounder about because they lack an appealing ideological stance. In the contemporary world large segments of society still believe, rightly or wrongly, in the desirability of an open, competitive, democratic political system or in the desirability of an ideologically driven, possibly totalitarian society whose elites provide some sense of historical mission

16. See Schmitter's essay in this volume.

to the nation, and thereby satisfy some of the more politically involved citizens. In this setting an authoritarian regime has serious weaknesses. Ultimately all authoritarian regimes face this legitimacy pull toward the polyarchical model, with political freedom for relatively full participation, or toward the committed, ideological single-party model. To resist those two pulls is possible de facto, but none of the authoritarian institutionalization attempts we find around the world have been fully satisfactory. The fact that the United States, Japan, England, the Soviet Union, and China are the models for those two polar alternatives and at the same time are the greatest powers of the day, makes the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes, notwithstanding the considerable achievements of some of these regimes, all the more difficult. There is ultimately no authoritarian regime in the world comparable in economic, technological, intellectual, or social weight to the major democratic countries or the major mobilizational one-party systems. The most important and successful authoritarian regimes, in the past Turkey, and now Mexico, Egypt, Spain, or Yugoslavia, are only imperfect models for those who want to bring their nation to the height of their times, to use Ortega's expression.

In essence, despite their variety, all the authoritarian solutions are dependent through symbiosis, mimicry, or transformation on the three basic great models of political systems — the liberal competitive democratic model, in any of its varieties; the communist, ideological single-party or hegemonic model; and the now defeated, but in the past appealing, fascist, nationalist pseudoconservative single-party rival. With great reservations, one might add the corporatist model. This fourth alternative has never been very appealing to intellectuals, and on a world scale has not succeeded to the same extent as the other three, perhaps because it is much more closely tied to the pragmatic bargaining or balancing of material interests rather than to ideas of a just and ideal society. As the group theory of politics has tried to show, largely successfully, elements of such corporatist politics are present in liberal, democratic systems and increasingly in complex communist single-party regimes, particularly Yugoslavia. In all of them, however, corporatism is, in reality, in conflict with the idea of some clearly perceived common good. Authoritarian-corporatist political regimes have a strong component of reality and pragmatism that makes them work, but the search for ultimate meaning, purpose, legitimacy, and justice demands something beyond the adjustment of interests conflicts through bargaining. That is the ultimate difference between systems with

and without political parties. Parties, while representing interests, also stand for a certain type of social order, or at least make that claim.

In political systems which do not have either political parties that grow more or less spontaneously from the demands and aspirations of the people or a vanguard party that mobilizes the society the decisive actions will be taken by the bureaucratic elite controlling the state apparatus. This is so whether the bureaucratic elite is largely from a military, civil servant, technocratic, or managerial background. Almost by definition, such bureaucratic systems entail the rule of the state over the society. The state establishes the permissible limits of freedom and spontaneity in the society and attempts to control the ground rules by which groups can interact with the state. Such authoritarian rule works in many parts of the world. However, nowhere does it seem to have attained the degree of institutionalization achieved by systems characterized by competitive democratic parties or even by large-scale ideological mass parties. Ultimately, authoritarian regimes are condemned to constant experiments with other alternatives, to processes of institutionalization incorporating elements, symbols, and mechanisms, developed in those other political forms considered in line with modern historical development. The success in this process depends, as we have continuously stressed, on historical situations, on specific national constraining factors, on international situations, and on specific policies. All this leads to a strange combination between freedom of choice for the group wanting to institutionalize such a regime and constant limits to its choices. This situation introduces complex elements of unpredictability, uncertainty, ambivalence, and thereby lack of appeal.

Within these limitations, the authoritarian solutions linking leftist symbols, and to a lesser degree policies, with leftist allies on the international scene are today at an advantage over those justly or unjustly perceived as being on the right. This has not always been so. In the past, the great fascist powers gave to those creating authoritarian regimes — that were often not, strictly speaking, fascist — an aura of legitimacy similar to that which socialism gives to those who are not, in the strict sense, socialist, in the Third World today. A link of identification, dependency, or whatever relationship we might posit with the United States makes the successful institutionalization of authoritarian regimes even more difficult. The United States, despite the economic or military support it provides to many authoritarian regimes, often, on an ideological level, implicitly or explicitly contributes

to the delegitimization of such regimes. Key members of the Congress, the press, or even the executive branch question the regimes' attempts to institutionalize themselves along authoritarian lines. This introduces ambivalence because the leaders of the authoritarian regime often feel compelled to pay at least lip service to democratic procedures by promising the eventual return to free elections and polyarchical competitive democratic institutions. Thus, like the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie that Marx was describing in his *Eighteenth Brumaire,* the United States often creates the condition for authoritarian rule elsewhere, but at the same time contributes to its moral erosion.

In addition, the United States, and to a lesser extent the European democratic societies, by their emphasis on the free choice of individuals in political, religious, aesthetic, ethical, sexual, even consumer values and styles, are a threat to the very idea of a society in which one or another elite knows better than the individual choosing in isolation what a good society should be like. This accounts for the paradox that conservative, religious, anticommunist authoritarians — whether they be army officers, bureaucrats, technocrats, or managers — often admire Soviet-type societies and feel disgusted with the United States and other Western polyarchic democratic societies with which they are closely tied by an infinite number of relations of interdependence. In the present world context, and particularly in Latin America, this paradox is a strong incentive for anti-American, pseudo-left, authoritarian solutions appealing to those who at another moment might be the allies of the United States.

This line of argument leads us to conclude that the institutionalization of an authoritarian regime by groups within the present ruling circle of Brazil, independently of their success in economic and even social policies, is unlikely to be fully successful without a turn to nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-American rhetoric, if not actual policies.

Ultimately, the present ruling group faces serious stress whatever road to institutionalization it chooses. Without a charismatic leader making decisions, without a deep and bitter crisis comparable to a civil war in the recent past, the unifying element behind any of the choices made by the authoritarian leaders will be weak.

Even though in my analysis I have expressed grave doubts about the viability of all the various alternatives by which the current rulers in Brazil might seek to institutionalize an authoritarian regime, this does not imply the fall of the present authoritarian situation and the return to open competitive politics

or the turn toward full totalitarianism. A possibility that cannot be excluded is a constant and indecisive experimenting with various alternatives, and a sequence of military coups or quasi-coups. At best this might mean that successive governments administer the society and the economy, but postpone almost indefinitely any serious and consistent political institutionalization. Pragmatically speaking, such a process, combining administration, manipulation, arbitrary decisions, false starts, and frequent changes in personnel, might be successful as long as the economy goes well. It could assure the continuity of the present situation, while leaving a frightful political vacuum for the future.