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THE CONCEPT OF UNITY AND MUSICAL ANALYSIS

Over the past fifteen years or so a number of prominent music theorists have questioned whether unity represents a valid assumption for musical analysis and arrived at a largely negative conclusion. This opposition to unity has primarily emerged, moreover, not in connection with twentieth-century music, where it might seem less surprising, but with that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This article, which is concerned solely with the latter repertoire, addresses three major questions raised by this development: Why has unity become theoretically suspect? What larger intellectual currents have contributed to a unity-denying disposition? And what are the analytical consequences? These consequences being my chief concern, I address five passages examined in recent literature: two by Mozart and one each by Haydn, Brahms and Beethoven (the last a complete movement). For each I present the argument against unity, then offer an alternative analysis designed to show that, once certain critical features of the music have been recognised, this argument dissolves. My analyses, which emphasise readily perceptible features, favour no particular method, with the focus shifting to whatever seems particularly relevant for the passage in question. In addition, since denial of musical unity seems to be linked to a fundamentally mistaken notion of what is normally assumed in claims for unity, I pause between the third and fourth analysis to examine some of the more general issues raised by the first two questions.

A few preliminary remarks on the opposition to unity are in order. Its first concentrated statement was Alan Street's 1989 article, 'Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: the Resistance to Musical Unity'. Street attacks 'the fundamental premise that unity must prevail in order to ensure the comprehensibility of human thought' as a misconception, stemming from the 'enduring critical orthodoxy' of treating the artwork as a natural organism, whose parts work in perfect co-operation to form a consistent and integrated whole. For Street, 'the championship of unity over diversity represents nothing less than a generalised state of false consciousness: illusion rather than reality' (Street 1989, pp. 77–8, 80). The 'unifying urge' is thus not only analytically ill-advised but morally suspect. It responds to an unhealthy wish to hide the messy truth of art behind a lie of consistency and perfection: 'to identify the wholeness and integrity of the interpretative image with that of the work itself' (*ibid.*, p. 102).

Since the appearance of Street's article, a number of more analytically focused essays, authored by a diverse group of theoretically inclined writers, have appeared that reflect his basic argument. The five considered here – Kofi Agawu, Daniel Chua, Joseph Dubiel, Kevin Korsyn and Jonathan Kramer – were chosen for their prominence as theorist/analysts and for the issues they raise.¹ The general position taken by these five finds echoes, however, beyond music theory, in the work of such leading musicologists as Carolyn Abbate, Rose Subotnick, Gary Tomlinson, Lawrence Kramer and Susan McClary. 'Anti-unitarianism' is no fashionable trend but a major development associated with a distinguished group of scholars; and it warrants serious consideration.

Mozart, Symphony in G minor, K. 550

My first example is bars 247–51 from the opening movement of Mozart's Symphony in G minor (bracketed in Ex. 1), discussed by Jonathan Kramer in

Ex. 1 Mozart, Symphony No. 40 in G minor, K. 550, first movement, bars 241–55

his wide-ranging article, 'Beyond Unity: Toward an Understanding of Musical Postmodernism' (Kramer 1993). Kramer, arguing against 'an almost religious belief in the power, utility, and necessity of musical unity' (*ibid.*, p. 11), cites Joseph Kerman in support: 'From the standpoint of the ruling ideology, analysis exists for the purpose of demonstrating organicism and organicism exists for the purpose of validating a certain body of works of art' (*ibid.*, p. 16).² This brings into play all the essential points from Street's essay: the organicist assumption of 'utmost connectedness', its ideological foundation, and its stranglehold on current analytical practice.

Kramer, noting that our 'mania for unity' inhibits our appreciation not only of non-teleological music (e.g. Tchaikovsky and Musorgsky) but of 'surprises' in mainstream works, describes these bars as 'having neither motivic precedent nor consequent', and thus 'not organically necessary to the unfolding of the piece'. They are, moreover, 'exciting' precisely 'because of their textual disunity rather than any sense of belonging organically'. Traditional analysis, privileging 'continuity over discontinuity, textural unity over diversity', bypasses these 'discontinuities' (*ibid.*).³

[illegible]

The disputed bars are thus clearly ‘motivated’; yet they are nevertheless distinguished by one striking feature: except for the single pair in the exposition’s corresponding moment, there are no previous *ascending* parallel sixths. (There are several semitone ascents without parallels – e.g. bars 15–16, 24–6, 100–101, 148, 156–9 – but none continues rising.) The passage’s upward thrust is, to that extent, admittedly ‘surprising’; but the surprise has a purpose: it leads climactically to the movement’s first strongly articulated tonic cadence at bar 254. (There are no tonic cadences in the exposition or development; and

Ex. 4 Mozart, Symphony No. 40 in G minor, K. 550, first movement, bars 211–16

the two in the reprise, bars 211 and 234, are decidedly secondary.) Contrary to Kramer's view, the 'global harmonic plan' thus justifies this special moment. (It also justifies the closely related, but even more intense rising-sixth segment shortly thereafter, in bars 281–5, leading to the movement's final cadence – a moment that is 'deflated', however, by the appearance of the beautiful closing version of the main theme.)

Ex. 5 Mozart, Symphony No. 40 in G minor, K. 550, first movement, voice-leading reduction, bars 211–16, 245–53

bars 211–16 bars 245–53

5 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 b7 - b6 - 6 - b6 - 6 - #6 - 6 - 5
 4 b5 b5 5 4 - #

Does some deeper truth lie beyond these connections that can be revealed by a unity-denying analysis? If so, Kramer does not say what it is.

Brahms, String Quartet in C Minor, Op. 51 No. 1

My second example, the opening of Brahms's C minor String Quartet, shown in Ex. 6, receives a detailed analysis in Kevin Korsyn's 'Brahms Research and Aesthetic Ideology' (Korsyn 1993a). While nominally reviewing a volume of Brahms essays, Korsyn focuses heavily on matters of unity, using the quartet as his principal exhibit. Drawing on an analysis by David Lewin from the volume reviewed, he examines the passage as part of 'a critique of ideology' in Brahms research and analysis. Korsyn believes that by idolising Brahms we oversimplify his music, according it a degree of consistency incommensurate with its conflicts and contradictions, which reflect the twilight contingency of musical language at the moment of its composition. Though the music has some cohesiveness, 'ideological motivations tempt us to make inflated, exaggerated claims for unity ... [which in Brahms is] always relative and provisional' (*ibid.*, p. 92). For Korsyn, Brahms emerges as a tortured postmodernist seeking a no-longer attainable balance between tradition and originality: 'What appears modern – or rather postmodern – in Brahms is his recruitment of a plurality of musical discourses' (*ibid.*, p. 90). Downplaying these, we 'privilege historical continuity' in the false belief that 'past and present can coexist without conflict' (*ibid.*, p. 93).

According to Korsyn, Lewin commits this error by smoothing out the inconsistencies in the quartet's opening to achieve a 'unified interpretation'. These inconsistencies result from the presence of two distinct historical models, which Lewin recognises but reconciles by stressing their 'dialectical synthesis'. Lewin's first model, which appears in bars 1–10, is a Beethovenian sentence: 'a motivic model is stated, progressively developed and "liquidated", leading to a cadence', a type especially characteristic of Beethoven sonata openings – the Piano Sonatas Op. 2 No. 1, Op. 53 ('Waldstein') and Op. 57 ('Appassionata') are cited. But at bar 9 a curious reversal occurs:

According to the Beethovenian paradigm, the climactic dominant of bars 7–8 should be followed by an immediate return to the opening motivic model, forcefully plunging on into a bridge section; and indeed Brahms's piece contains such a return, but here it is delayed until bar 23. During the intervening bars, Brahms temporarily relaxes the tension of the climactic dominant (bars 9–10), and then launches a lyrical section (bars 11–22) that explores the dominant in a complex and lengthy trope ... We observe here an abrupt shift of rhetorical mode, temporarily negating the peremptory demands of the Beethovenian sentence by indulging the lyrical luxuriance of Mozartean dominant prolongation ... (Lewin 1990, pp. 14–15)

By pointing out various connections that link the sections, Lewin allows the 'two radically different historical modes of musical rhetoric [to] interact as an essential feature of the compositional discourse' (Korsyn 1993a, p. 14). For Korsyn, this reflects music theory's 'ideological drift towards premature synthesis'. After 'assimilating music history into the analytical enterprise', Lewin settles for a 'reassuring narrative of historical continuity ... [that] seems to resolve the paradox' (*ibid.*, pp. 94–5).

Korsyn, however, wishes to probe 'other historical resonances in the quartet, ones which suggest a less reassuring relationship between past and present' (*ibid.*, p. 96). Instead of merely juxtaposing historical 'rhetorics', Brahms 'interrogates each mode to bring it into conflict with itself', thereby revealing its 'irreducible heterogeneity'; instead of 'resolving historical contradictions, [he] introduces them' (*ibid.*, pp. 96–7). Korsyn is wrong, however, in thinking that Brahms merely appropriates the Beethovenian model. Following Lewin, he sees conflict emerging only in bar 9; whereas comparison with the suggested models reveals more immediate differences. Beethoven's Sonata in F minor, Op. 2 No. 1, for instance, opens with a two-bar tonic unit, followed by a quasi-sequential variant on the dominant, two one-bar compressions, further dissolution and a half close, producing the paradigmatic $2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + 1$ (cadence). Brahms's phrase, on the other hand, opens with a $\frac{2}{3}$ -bar unit (!), followed by two one-bar units straddling bar lines (the original one-bar 'upbeat' compressed to a single beat), four $\frac{2}{3}$ -bar compressions (omitting the 'after-beat' of beat two in bar 2), producing a hemiola, plus a $1\frac{2}{3}$ -bar cadence, creating the vastly more complex $1\frac{2}{3} + 1 + 1 + \frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{3} + 1\frac{2}{3}$ (cadence). In addition, while Beethoven's functionally active bass rises stepwise to the dominant, Brahms's merely prolongs the tonic C, supporting first I and then VI, which is arpeggiated in bars 4–7 (conflicting with the hemiola), before suddenly lurching to V. (These phrase grouping are bracketed – ignoring quaver upbeats – in Ex. 6.)

This is fundamentally non-Beethovenian. Though all sentences, compared with periods, are relatively developmental, emphasising motivic variation over complementary restatement, here the fragmentation begins almost immediately, without strong articulation of an initial unit, after which continuing rising fragments create further tension over the static bass, culminating in a hemiola-producing sequence. Equally striking, the fragmentation ends without a process of phased relaxation (comparable to bars 7–8 of Op. 2 No. 1, or bars 11–13 of Op. 53 and bars 14–16 of Op. 57). It is as if the developmental process, hurled forward by the hemiola, hits a wall at bar 7, from which the remarkably abrupt dominant cadence rebounds by ricochet, leaving the empty viola Gs 'stunned' by the collision. The weak, quasi-sequential extension that follows (bars 9–10) further undermines the dominant arrival, converting it into a mere way station *en route* to the subdominant. Bars 7–8 are thus already highly 'disruptive'. Yet they

are not 'unmotivated', but an effective response to the unmediated collision of bar 7 and justification for its weak echo in bars 9–10.

Brahms's rethinking of Beethoven's model is critical for understanding its 'Mozartian' extension in bars 11–22, which acquires clear purpose as a lyrical, 'comforting' answer to this unusual, remarkably intense opening. Moving slowly, in regular two-bar groups (as far as bar 19), yet with considerable contrapuntal complexity, it leads back from the sentence's subdominant deflection to the dominant, providing both tonal and formal ballast. Here is the phased relaxation that was previously denied. Despite the shift in 'rhetoric', motivic links are palpable (and are by no means all 'hidden', as are those emphasised by Lewin). A critical connection is that the extension continues the voice-leading of bars 1–10, joining the first phrase to form the movement's first larger progression. This is shown in Ex. 7 (with simplified registers), where the dominant in bar 7 is assigned secondary importance, commensurate with its abrupt and to that extent cadence-denying character.

Korsyn also interprets the delayed counter-statement of the opening sentence (bars 23ff) in the light of Brahms's failure to follow Beethoven's precedent: 'The impact of bars 9–10 depends ... upon our recognizing a gesture that Beethoven would have confined to a recapitulation' (*ibid.*, p. 97). That is, Brahms's tonal deflection leads away from the dominant, delaying the counter-statement. In the 'Waldstein' Sonata, by contrast, 'the sentence rhetoric ... leads to an immediate counter-statement in bar 14'; the delay is saved for the recapitulation, assuring 'the priority of the theme over the digression' (*ibid.*). Brahms's expositional delay 'dismantles Beethovenian hierarchy, dissolving the clear opposition of functions' (*ibid.*, p. 98).

Yet the notion that counter-statements immediately follow opening sentences in Beethoven, with delays reserved for the recapitulation as departures from a structurally 'prior' presentation, is at best problematic.

Ex. 7 Brahms, String Quartet in C minor, Op. 51 No. 1, first movement, voice-leading reduction, bars 1–19

bars 1 7 9 11 14 15 18 19

5 6 5 $b6$ 5 6 7 $b6$ 5 b

I ————— V

Consider the 'Waldstein'. Its opening sentence begins with a four-bar unit that is repeated sequentially, producing a $4 + 4$ grouping, analogous to the $2 + 2$ of Op. 2 No. 1. The third, balancing unit ($4 + 1$), however, instead of accelerating towards the dominant as in Op. 2 No. 1, prolongs the dominant throughout. Moreover, its *opening* here supplies the climactic goal of the initial tonal-registral development, after which the accumulated tension is calmed, as the music falls into the low register, closing with reduced dynamics and a fermata. Not unlike Brahms's 'Mozartian' passage, it provides a balancing, stabilising response to the first two sub-phrases: a phased relaxation that delays the counter-statement until well after the climactic arrival on V. To that extent, the counter-statement *is* delayed, so that the deflection in the recapitulation mentioned by Korsyn (bars 168–73) merely extends the delay.

A true counter-statement is, moreover, not even obligatory. In Op. 2 No. 1, for example, the restatement (not delayed) dissolves after only two bars. It also begins in the dominant minor, whereas in the reprise it is in the *tonic* (also dissolving), thus refuting the notion of 'expositional priority' – an odd one in any event, given the recapitulation's normal tendency to resolve expositional conflicts.

Since this is essentially all Korsyn says about Brahms, his analytical point remains purely negative: that by ignoring Beethoven's example, Brahms engenders irreconcilable conflicts. But why must Brahms docilely follow Beethoven's lead in order to avoid contradictions? (Is Mendelssohn's E major Fugue, Op. 35 flawed because it opens in Bach's footsteps but then gradually transforms itself into something quite different, making use of an extended *accelerando* and *crescendo* in the process?) That this position underlies a supposedly 'postmodernist' reading only compounds the oddity. Though Korsyn's analysis seems more concrete than Kramer's, it is in fact no more forthcoming. At the very moment we should discover what insight a non-synthesising view can provide, analysis is abandoned entirely. The author turns to literary theory – to Paul de Man and Mickael Bakhtin. Korsyn is especially drawn to the latter, in whose synthesis-resisting 'dialogism' he finds a 'model for rethinking the idea of unity', requiring that we 'surrender any naïve belief that our language is a privileged window on reality' (*ibid.*, p. 99). Yet Korsyn gives no hint as to how, or with what result, this idea might be analytically applied, whether to Brahms or anyone else. After six pages devoted exclusively to disputing Brahms's realisation of a dialectical synthesis, the composer and his quartet simply disappear.⁴

Haydn, String Quartet in D Minor, Op. 76 No. 2

The third example is the first movement of Haydn's D minor String Quartet, whose sudden 'plunge' to F minor at bar 32 is 'celebrated' by Joseph Dubiel

Ex. 8 Haydn, String Quartet in D minor, Op. 76 No. 2, first movement, bars 1–35

Allegro

The musical score is presented in four systems, each containing four staves (violin I, violin II, viola, and cello/bass). The key signature is D minor (three flats) and the time signature is 2/4. The tempo is marked 'Allegro'. The first system (bars 1-4) begins with a forte ('f') dynamic. The second system (bars 5-8) shifts to piano ('p'). The third system (bars 9-12) features mezzo-forte ('mf') and forte ('f') dynamics. The fourth system (bars 13-16) includes a trill ('tr') and forte ('f') markings. The notation includes various note values, rests, and articulation marks.

The musical score consists of four systems of staves, each with four staves (two treble and two bass). The key signature has one flat (B-flat). The score includes various musical notations such as notes, rests, beams, and slurs. Dynamic markings include *ff* (fortissimo), *cresc.* (crescendo), *f* (forte), *p* (piano), and *tr* (trill). Measure numbers 18, 22, 27, and 32 are indicated at the beginning of their respective systems.


for its complete lack of preparation: it is 'absolutely gratuitous – utterly uncalled-for', nothing less than 'a bolt from the blue' (Dubiel 1992, pp. 211, 215).⁵ (Ex. 8 gives the opening 35 bars.) One might mention first that there is 'stylistic preparation'. At the time this quartet was composed, keys were often treated as major-minor mixtures, with elements of both modes joined within the same phrase or (as here) juxtaposed in successive phrases. Far from abnormal, minor 'outbursts' are common in Haydn. One need go no further than the three subsequent movements of this quartet, all in D and all featuring abrupt juxtapositions of major and minor: the second alternates major and minor variations, the third sets a major trio against a minor minuet, and the fourth, in the minor, closes with a major coda.

In one sense, then, Dubiel's characterisation seems unobjectionable, if also unremarkable: unexpected moments typify classical-period music, which commonly surprises and delights through abrupt juxtapositions of apparently conflicting materials. But for Dubiel the moment's only reason for being seems to be its unexpectedness. When he asks, 'why *can't* this be a bolt from the blue?' (*ibid.*, p. 215), one must acknowledge that of course it *can* be. But that is of little analytical interest, since such unexpected bolts appear frequently. Nor does it differentiate this moment from any other possible alternatives of an equally surprising nature. A more interesting question is: 'Why this particular bolt at this particular moment'?


Dubiel asserts that attempts to 'look for preparation ... won't be very fruitful'. There is 'no previous play of parallel major and minor' to prepare the scalar shift from A $\sharp$ to A $\flat$, 'nor anything going on with the pitch-class A $\flat$ that would bring A $\flat$ up for apotheosis at measure 32'. He adds: 'if anyone likes G $\sharp$ in measures 4 and 29, I'd love to hear your story' (*ibid.*, p. 211). Well, briefly, here is one story. There are in fact several 'previous play[s] of parallel major and minor', as early as bar 10, when the third of the tonic D is raised three times in a tonicisation of iv, and again at bars 22 and 30 (see Ex. 9a). The last, appearing just before the passage in question, is preceded by a tonicisation of v, producing a descending sequence in the top voice (anticipated at bar 22) that encompasses Dubiel's G $\sharp$: g $\sharp^2$ -a 2 and f $\sharp^2$ -g 2 continuing to e 2 -f 2 at the cadence, overlapping with the minor outburst (Ex. 9b). The violin's g 2 -a $\flat^2$ in bar 32 sounds notably 'right' in response to this chain of rising semitones; and the larger f 2 -g 2 -a $\flat^2$ ascent fits neatly into the just saturated tonal space between e 2 and a 2 (Ex. 9c). (This last figure also anticipates in diminution the rising first-violin line heard on the downbeats of bars 32-4, the final note of which occurs simultaneously with the shift to D $\flat$ major in bars 34-8, itself prepared by the turn to F minor.) Finally, a related, more surface relationship is also relevant: the violin's first five semiquavers form a rhythmic diminution of a prominent motif first heard in bars 3 and 7, slightly elaborated in the latter, and again at bar 11, transposed to IV (both scoring and registration are very similar),

Ex. 9 Haydn, String Quartet in D minor, Op. 76 No. 2, first movement, linear-motivic connections leading to bar 32

a) bars 10–11



b) bars 29–32



c)



d) bars 3, 7, 11 and 32



without the elaboration but now with an upbeat as in bar 32 (Ex. 9d). Dubiel's moment may be a surprise, but it is hardly unprepared.

The Idea of Unity

In turning to a more general consideration of the concept of unity, one first needs to be clear about what is meant by unity in the context of musical analysis. It is not the sort of absolute unity proposed by certain idealistic philosophers, such as F. S. Bradley, according to whom everything is seamlessly integrated into the One, thus negating all relationships. Nor is it of the sort represented by Aristotelian unities of time, place and action. Rather, the unity asserted by music analysts acknowledges the coexistence of distinct and contrasting elements, but finds that, however differentiated these may be,

they work together to produce a common and coherent goal.⁶ Belief in such coherence obviously shapes one's perspective; but most analysts would argue that there are aspects of the music that render this perspective appropriate. When the analysts we are considering state that a certain musical event, or formal segment, lacks unity, they are in essence claiming that some aspect of the work is lacking in coherence. Under certain circumstances that may be justified, and even analytically supportable; but it does not seem to be what propels these analysts (excepting perhaps Daniel Chua, considered below). They do not fault the piece but the way we understand it.

Why has this negative attitude towards unity emerged in recent music theory? Since contemporary musical scholarship has in general been deeply influenced by developments in other fields, the answer must address a comprehensive recent epistemological transformation that has influenced attitudes about truth and knowledge. Though the underlying ideas, often characterised as 'postmodernist', are well known, they warrant examination here, for they have had a significant impact on attitudes about unity. I should note, however, that suspicion of unity in the arts has a long history, dating back at least to such early romantics as Friedrich Schlegel. It was prevalent in the earlier twentieth century in such art movements as Dada and Surrealism and in writers such as Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno. Since, for the most part, however, earlier thinkers did not stress disunity when addressing particular works of art, its full influence has become apparent only more recently.⁷

The most important idea underlying the opposition to unity is that all language is necessarily metaphorical. A distrust of language's ability to free itself from its own inherent limitations, traceable back to Nietzsche, has resurfaced as a central component of recent philosophical-critical thought. Jacques Derrida, for example, attacks what he calls 'the metaphysics of presence': the assumption that language, both written and spoken, embodies fixed and absolute meanings. Texts are products of particular historical forces and thus necessarily contingent, subject to the particular circumstances of their creation and interpretation. For Derrida, there is no absolute truth prior to language, uncontaminated by the variable and ambiguous meanings imposed by that medium. 'Truth' is trapped in language's 'free play of signifiers', enmeshed in an ongoing history of changing metaphorical associations that prevent it from transparently representing something already 'present'.

Transferred to music analysis, this eliminates the possibility of an objective account of music. Like all discourse, musical analysis cannot escape language's open-ended universe of plural meanings. Works of art are not simply there ('present') as independent objects, but are in constant transformation, linked to the shifting cultural and historical conditions that shape them and our understanding of them. Their meanings are 'worldly', in Edward Said's formulation: they are thus 'incapable of sustaining [themselves] in a hermetic

Alexandrian textural universe, having no connection with actuality' (Said 1979, p. 177).

Since this view has been particularly prominent in literary theory, it is not surprising that three of the four writers we have considered – Street, Kramer and Korsyn – draw heavily upon that field. Street and Korsyn both invoke Paul de Man in proposing a model of analytical discourse that regards language as essentially 'figural' or 'allegorical'. The following passage from de Man suggests what is at stake:

[In allegory] we have ... a relationship between signs in which the reference to their respective meanings has become of secondary importance. But this relationship between signs necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only in the *repetition* (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority ... Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity, or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. (de Man 1983, p. 207)

Street finds that such allegorical thinking represents 'a genuine, open-ended process of thought', responsive to the 'labyrinths of structural undecidability' linked to 'the artwork as an artificial construct in which meaning automatically depends on some form of continuous narrative or temporal enfolding'. Indeed, as 'a decisive break with the prevailing formalist orthodoxy', it offers 'the one authentic mode of theoretical understanding' (Street 1989, pp. 102–4).

Clearly this has profound implications for the concept of unity and its application to musical works. Unity no longer resides in the composition but is subjectively posited solely by the analyst, with no more value than any other judgement. A focus on unity, moreover, exaggerates the integrity of the whole, making us blind to inconsistencies and discontinuities that would emerge under less restrictive interpretative rubrics.

As one might expect, then, recent literary theorists and cultural historians have expressed strong reservations about unity. Consider the following comments by four prominent representatives. First, Roland Barthes, describing his analytical approach to Balzac's short story 'Sarrasine':

[T]he work of the commentary, once it is separated from any ideology of totality, consists precisely in manhandling the text, interrupting it ... if the text is subject to some form, this form is not unitary, architectonic, finite; it is the fragment, the shards, the broken or obliterated network. (Barthes 1974, pp. 15, 20)

Then Michel Foucault, commenting on the nature of texts:

The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configurations and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network ... The book is not simply the object that one holds in one's hands ... its unity is variable and relative. (Foucault 1972, p. 23)

And Pierre Macherey, on the ideological nature of all interpretation:

We should question the work as to what it does not and cannot say, in those silences for which it has been made. The concealed order of the work is thus less significant than its real determinate disorder (its disarray). The order which it professes is merely an imagined order, projected on to disorder, the fictive resolution of ideological conflicts, a resolution so precarious that it is obvious in the very letter of the text where incoherence and incompleteness burst forth. (Macherey 1978, p. 155)

Finally Mieke Bal, addressing the 'convention of unity' itself:

Reading with the preestablished assumptions that the work is a whole, that it is coherent and well-structured, has now come under attack as a critical strategy that stimulates strongly ideological interpretations, erases disturbing or incoherent details, and imposes on the text a romantic conception of organic growth not relevant to works outside the romantic tradition. The 'convention of unity' is a powerful ideological weapon because of the pressure it exerts on the reader to choose one interpretation over another rather than to read through the conflict of interpretations, because it presupposes a single-handed authorship and the authority that entails ..., and because it encourages projection of 'masterplots' that colonize or erase the marginal. (Bal 1990, p. 507)

Bal's reference to the 'romantic conception of organic growth' suggests that these thinkers mirror the music analysts we have considered in identifying unity with nineteenth-century notions of artistic organicism. Organicism, an idea that has persisted with remarkable tenacity down to the present (though often reformulated in more structuralist, mechanistic terms in the twentieth century), maintains that the artwork resembles a natural organism (biological or botanical): it responds to internal mechanisms that engender the whole through the generation of functionally distinct parts. The 'meaning' of each component is thus fully determined, linked with all others within a transcendent whole. The musical composition is at once unified yet differentiated, thus fulfilling a critical analytical requirement. And since it is self-sufficient, it is interpretable without reference to outside factors.

The organicist idea, initially ascribed to art in the eighteenth century, was closely associated with the emergence of 'absolute' music, where it seemed to find its most 'natural' artistic home: non-representational instrumental music offered an ideal analogue for the natural organicism. It proved especially seductive for music analysis, a discipline that – not coincidentally – emerged

simultaneously. The musical work, no longer taken to be symbolic of fixed rhetorical categories or immutable cosmic patterns (as in the Baroque and pre-Baroque), was reconceived in evolutionary terms, as a dynamic yet integrated system: developmental, goal-directed, and combining both unity and variety.⁸ The developmental composition was organicism's consummate artistic realisation. Of course, as with all metaphors, the organic analogy does not provide a perfect fit. The central role of repetition in music, for example, requires negotiating, though to me this problem hardly seems fatal.⁹ Pushed to an extreme, however, musical organicism can acquire a discomfiting literalist and deterministic character, viewing even the most varied details of a composition as not only contributing to cohesiveness but following a logic of necessity. The composition comes to be conceived as a sort of 'natural' object, as an actual – and presumably perfect – organism amenable to 'scientific' explanation. Each event is held to be part of an ineluctable process, 'caused' by the combined force of its predecessors and 'causing' those that follow.

In practice, at least, artistic organicism was understood throughout the nineteenth century in an essentially metaphorical sense; and though references to 'necessity' do occur, they do so casually or 'informally'.¹⁰ Thus no theorist seems to have believed that a scientific account of music, comparable to that for a living organism, could be given for music's evolutionary mechanisms (and it is these, not the more purely theoretical matter of music's acoustical foundation, that is analysis's primary concern). That is, one recognised, even if only implicitly, that a 'musical organism' is linked to human intentions and thus quite unlike a natural one. However much some analysts may have longed for a comprehensive explanation of music's mechanisms, none presumed to offer an account of its larger evolutionary course with any specificity.

This continued in the twentieth century and on to the present as well, with most analysts recognising organicism's metaphorical nature. While leaving it largely unstated, they have realised that a truly scientific explanation of music's temporal unfolding is more wished-for goal than achievable fact. By and large, organicists and their structuralist successors have thus operated with non-scientific assumptions and pursued non-scientific aims.¹¹ Rather than explain how music *must* go, responding to natural laws, they regard it merely *as if* it responds to such laws. In the belief that certain music produces an *effect* of developmental inevitability, even to the point of mimicking natural organisms, they try to explain why. But they know that music is no actual organism, but can at most simulate one. Indeed, I suspect that it would be difficult to find a single prominent theorist today who, if pressed, would accept an organicist position even approaching the literalist one.

There was, however, one major exception in the twentieth century, and that was Heinrich Schenker. During his long and complex evolution, Schenker gradually adopted a literalist conception, coming to view musical 'master-

pieces' as subject to inevitable natural laws that are unconsciously followed by master composers. (The 'unconscious' stipulation allows him to dodge the matter of human involvement and choice, so problematic for any literalist, or other natural-science based, conception.) Schenker claimed that musical 'masterworks' possess absolute unity and perfection, and thus lend themselves to comprehensive explanation.¹² And due to his central position in recent music theory, especially in the United States, there is a widespread perception that many share his strong conception of musical unity – a fact that no doubt partly accounts for the opposition to unity among so many current theorists.¹³ Even at the height of Schenker's influence in the United States, however, I suspect that relatively few of his admirers fully ascribed to his absolutist conception; and virtually none do so now.

To the extent that this is the kind of unity under attack, then, those who reject it would seem to be aiming at a straw target. Yet it is precisely this determinist view that Street and the three analysts discussed clearly have in mind. Dubiel, for example, holds that most current analysts believe that music 'conforms to some canon of logical consecution', to 'the illusory requirement that to make sense an event must appear as a consequence of what comes before it' (Dubiel 1992, pp. 215–16). And he notes that for such an analyst the minor outburst in Haydn's Op. 76 No. 2 only '*seems* gratuitous when it happens, but is in fact necessary', as it provides something previously felt to be 'missing' (*ibid.*, pp. 211, 218). Similarly, Kramer describes the Mozart second-theme segment as 'organically unnecessary' because it has 'neither motivic precedent nor consequent' (Kramer 1993, p. 16); and Korsyn rejects organic unity for allowing us to accept the work 'as an apparently natural event' (Korsyn 1993a, p. 98). All three harbour a conception of musical unity linking it with 'necessity' and/or the notion of artworks as 'natural' objects.

There is, however, a weaker but more commonly held conception of unity that acknowledges music's dependence upon human agency, making no claim for 'natural' laws or musical 'causality'. Rather, it accepts unity as an analytical construct, and leaves open the possibility for multiple and contradictory interpretations. Music has no natural mechanisms; and there is thus no unmediated access to it, no perfect union between analyst and work. Nor are all works necessarily amenable to unity-oriented analysis.

This conception is consistent, moreover, with many of the claims of postmodern theory, including its insistence on the metaphorical nature of analytical discourse. The problem is not the theory, but the implications drawn from it: the almost exclusive focus on epistemological contingency leads to a misconception of the purpose and goals of musical analysis. Of course, it is true that analysis need not be concerned solely with how music is constructed; it can also address the ways it communicates, reflects aspects of the composer's life or historical context, relates to social or political issues, or whatever. There is no

reason, in other words, why analysis has to be purely ‘formalistic’ – though for some reason those on both sides of the ideological divide often seem to think there is. But analysis does differ from other modes of musical discourse in that its insights concerning these latter matters are derived from insights concerning the former, that is, they are analytically grounded. This does not mean that analysis cannot show that the unity of a work is fragile, projected with difficulty and resistant to easy interpretation. Moreover, there is music that communicates precisely because it *is* disunified (certain twentieth-century compositions come to mind – works written under quite different assumptions from those concerning us here); and analysis can effectively contribute to showing how this is so.

This brings us to a critical point. Analysis is based on the assumption that music ‘makes sense’, without which it makes no sense itself as a discipline.¹⁴ Its purpose is thus to show how music makes sense or, more rarely, how it fails to make sense. In the case of music that is ‘intentionally’ disunified, then, it tries to show that the disunity is itself meaningful – that is, connects with and supports other matters. What seems disunified at one level turns out to be unified at another. Simply to claim that a composition lacks unity, however, is only to say that it fails, leaving it indistinguishable from any others that fail. Though this is apparently not the intention of the analyses considered here, it seems to be their necessary consequence. Put differently, the mere claim that a composition lacks unity necessarily silences the analyst, as is confirmed by all three analysts considered here: once disunity is asserted – once Mozart’s passage is said to lack ‘motivic precedent or consequent’, that Haydn’s outburst is ‘gratuitous’, that Brahms’s quartet contains ‘historical contradictions’ – analytical commentary ceases, immediately and entirely.

Mozart, Piano Concerto in C Major, K. 503

We turn now to two analysts who, taking a somewhat more flexible tack, view disunity in a dialectical relation to unity. This brings us first to Mozart’s Piano Concerto in C major, K. 503, whose opening has been addressed by Kofi Agawu in his article ‘Mozart’s Art of Variation’ (Agawu 1996a). Beginning with unifying features, Agawu notes that various techniques of variation, lying ‘at the heart of Mozart’s musical language’, appear ‘across a variety of forms and genres’, linking seemingly contrasting material. He illustrates with a group of paired passages consisting of ‘an implied model and its variant’ (*ibid.*, p. 304), which are related by various surface features.¹⁵

After presenting these pairings, however, Agawu draws a surprising conclusion: Mozart’s ‘predominant emphasis on variation procedures’ encourages ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ listening. Further, the concerto’s first 32 bars

display a 'chainlike' process 'in which subsequent units retain or discard important features of preceding units', challenging 'the listener's capacity for synoptic comprehension' (*ibid.*, p. 310). A second, 'more dramatic demonstration of Mozart's aesthetic of fragmentation' is then characterised as a 'nonorganic . . . succession of individual segments' (*ibid.*, p. 311). Mozart's unity thus proves to be confined to relatively brief formal spans. Agawu adds, moreover, that values such as "coherence", "unity", and "significance" seem to have become tools for containing the lively process of use and reuse of material', leading him to question: 'But does not the tropism toward unity set the search off on the wrong foot? Is there not, instead, a play on unifying as well as disunifying tendencies, so that a summary vote for unity is unenlightening precisely because it is unfalsifiable' (*ibid.*, p. 312)?

Agawu spelled out this position more explicitly in his earlier book *Playing with Signs*. Following an analysis of the first movement of Beethoven's String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, he notes:

Few analysts have taken it upon themselves to prove that a piece of tonal music is unified; fewer still have attempted to demonstrate the absence of unity in a tonal piece. What one often finds, however, is the assumption, inherited from nineteenth-century organicist aesthetics, that masterworks of music are unified. Analysis adopts this as premise, and, with a curiously circular logic, proceeds to demonstrate that unity. (Agawu 1991, p. 126)¹⁶

But this seems unnecessarily rigid. First, why demand of unity the positivistic truth criterion of 'falsifiability' – a Draconian stipulation proposed for scientific knowledge by the philosopher Karl Popper that even scientists have largely rejected? Given that standard, what would analytical 'proof' possibly entail? (Imagine it applied to Agawu's own fluid criteria for relatedness in Mozart's 'art of variation'.) Agawu's complaint about circularity is also misplaced, since all useful analysis (his own included) must be based upon generalised assumptions; without what Wittgenstein calls a *Prinzip der Betrachtungsform*, a principle determining the form of one's observations, one does not know how to begin. To that extent, analysis – like all human endeavours – is necessarily 'circular'.

Yet only such an overly restrictive conception of unity can explain Agawu's contention that 'synoptic comprehension' is denied by Mozart's first 32 bars. In considering this segment, I should first note, however, that it should be viewed as part of a more encompassing three-part formal unit, bars 1–50, where even within the first two parts it represents only an overlapping fragment. The concerto opens with two paired eight-bar tutti phrases, slow in surface and harmonic rhythm, that cadence on V and I, forming an opening period, but one closing melodically on $\hat{3}$. Out of this emerges, in bars 17–18, an echo of the cadential figure of bars 15–16 (itself answering 7–8), consisting of two inversionally related

one-bar tags. These bars thus seem confirmational, and they round off the first formal subsection; nevertheless, their mode change (briefly anticipated in bar 6) and lighter scoring also point forward to the next phrase.

The latter (bars 19–26), eight-bars with a full tonic cadence at its close, is set off from what precedes it by a new motif featuring one-bar sequential repetitions and a rising stepwise contour, more active surface and harmonic rhythm, and a more differentiated texture. It is the first of three similar phrases featuring this new motif that together form the second subsection. The cadence at bar 26 overlaps with the closely related second phrase, intensifying the previous one-bar motivic imitations with added rising semiquaver figures, higher dynamics, heavier scoring and faster surface rhythm (bars 26–32). The harmonic goal, now the dominant, appears after only seven bars and is reached through a single applied V_3^6 chord (bar 32). Though this phrase closes Agawu's unit, it overlaps with a third phrase, now in the dominant, that is similarly constructed, but which is texturally inverted, further intensified by metrically displaced flute echoes of the principal motif (bars 32–6), and reaches its own dominant after only five bars, again through an applied V_3^6 but with still less textural and rhythmic differentiation. This V of V cadence is confirmed by a four-bar extension, however (bars 36–40), which articulates it as an intermediate goal closing the second subsection, its formal importance brought out by repeated quaver Ds alternating in horns and trumpets.

The third and final subsection begins at bar 41 with a new, intervallically expanded version of the second phrase's motif, now joined with a circle-of-fifths progression in accelerated harmonic rhythm, providing release after the previously sustained arrival (bars 41–6). No longer controlled by rising stepwise counterpoint, the phrase's half-bar canonic imitations, accompanied with continuous semiquavers, drive unimpeded to a full, section-defining cadence on the dominant, strongly articulated by rhythm and texture and confirmed by four-bar extension (bars 47–50).

Fig. 1 offers a diagrammatic outline of the section's phrase structure, harmonic progression and orchestration (the latter's growth in bars 17–36 incorporates rhythmic, textural and dynamic intensifications as well). Each formal 'phase' (substituted here for 'subsection,' to emphasise the overall continuity) has its own motivic content, indicated by letters (A, B and C). Phase I (bars 1–18) has the two paired opening tutti phrases (I–V, V–I) plus brief tag; phase II (bars 19–40) consists of the three following phrases, all similar in construction but increasingly shorter and texturally intensified, cadencing on V of V followed by confirmation; while phase III (bars 41–50) has only a single phrase, derived from the preceding but rhythmically more flowing and textually enriched, leading to a final dominant cadence and confirmation. Phases I and III are both tutti, the first texturally simple, the last complex, and are both tonally stable; and they are separated by phase II, which

Fig. 1 Mozart, Piano Concerto in C major, K.503, first movement, formal layout of bars 1–50

	Phase I			Phase II				Phase III		
Phrase	A	A'	Tag	B1	B2	B3	Ext.	C	Ext.	
Prog.	I — V	I — I	I	I — I	I — V	V — V/V	V/V	V/V — V	V	
Orch.	Tutti —————		Less —————	—————>	More —>	More —>	Tutti —————	—————		
Bars	1 — 8	9 — 16	17–18	19–26	26 — 32	32 — 36	36–40	41 — 46	47–50	

is modulatory and developmental, and which begins with smaller forces (anticipated in the tag ending phase I) and builds back to tutti, reattained in the final cadential bar and its extension (anticipating phase III). Significantly, the first two phases both end with brief segments that point towards the next phrase, and both are ‘open-ended’, the first melodically, the second harmonically. Form, phrase structure, texture and tonality thus all unite to present a coherent, forward-directed trajectory spanning the complete 50 bars, each part making its own contribution. There is nothing ‘chainlike’ about this: any alteration of the order of phrases would produce musical nonsense.

Beethoven, String Quartet in A Minor, Op. 132

The final example, to which more space is devoted, is the complete first movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, analysed by Daniel Chua in the chapter ‘Unity and Disunity’ from his book on Beethoven’s *Galitzin* Quartets (Chua 1995, pp. 54–104). Although Chua sees the movement as ‘an impure mixture of seemingly immiscible elements – unity and disunity together’, he finds that in late Beethoven ‘the unity is an esoteric one’, placing ‘disunity ... at the forefront’ (*ibid.*, pp. 83, 74). Where this leads him can be gleaned from a sampling of his critical observations: ‘the former logic of [Beethoven’s] motivic process is destroyed’; ‘what had formerly been a process for dynamic transformation becomes an agent for recondite expression and the creation of chaos’; the music brings about the ‘destruction of aesthetic wholeness’; ‘pure irrationality ... suppresses the glimmers of structural sense’; and there are ‘gestures [that] are the epitome of madness’ (*ibid.*, pp. 73, 74, 76, 88, 96). By any standard (even allowing for hyperbole), this is a remarkable indictment.

For Chua, the movement’s unity derives from a breathtakingly intricate network of motivic correspondences that permeate all aspects of the score, from smallest detail to largest structure: ‘in every dimension and on every level, the significance of the motif seemingly manufactures, with ineluctable logic, a structural unity’ (*ibid.*, p. 74). His most exaggerated claim concerns how the

Ex. 10 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, Chua's 'structural motifs' (Chua 1995, Ex. 3.16)

Indeed, Chua's analytical graphs, both individually and collectively, seem so outrageously arcane that one can only ask: why bother to force the music into such far-fetched motivic straightjackets? The explanation soon becomes evident:

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Ex. 11 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, Chua's 'motivic reduction' (Chua 1995, Ex. 3.17)

bar 1 10 30 39 48 50 76 89 91 92 102 104 113 121 141 146 151 193 218 225 234 238

exposition development recapitulation I development recapitulation II Coda

I IV V VI

structuralists. But this motivic object, crystallized through analysis, is not an iconic representation of unity. The arcane contrapuntal texture of the thematic disguises of variation, far from clarifying motivic procedures, actually cloud their identity – the material becomes opaque, gnarled, difficult, and complex. What has formerly been a process for dynamic transformation becomes an agent for recondite expression and the creation of chaos. (*Ibid.*, p. 74)

An act of violence is committed against unity itself. Take another look at the motivic graphs earlier in this chapter [Chua refers here to two of his own previous graphs]; these calligraphic patterns promote an ideology of identity which disguises all the violence. (*Ibid.*, p. 81)

... Is it not strange that they deal only with pitches? They assume unity on the evidence of one parameter alone, despite the fact that the other parameters are deployed to destroy the very patterns of unity which the graphs emphasize. Even the simplest connection is fraught with difficulties. To force this first motif



into a state, one has to leap two octaves, switch from bass function to melodic decoration, bridge two phrases, suppress rhythmic and textual contrasts, discard the dynamic extremes, ignore the 'holes' in the bass, and omit ornamental 'filling'. (*Ibid.*, p. 81)

The very fact that everything seems to be subservient to the self-regulating motivic design points to a kind of insane reason ... The absurdities of the expressive extremes, the abnormality of the form, the tensions, the contrasts, the juxtapositions, everything that creates chaos is actually complicit in, if not a function of, a rationality that has overstepped itself. (*Ibid.*, p. 103)

Thus Chua's bizarre critical method becomes clear: 1) propose absurd motivic connections; 2) characterise these as hyper-rational and abjectly one-sided; 3) attribute them to Beethoven himself; and 4) label the composer 'insane' for conceiving them and his music 'chaotic' for failing to project them clearly. In a word, punish Beethoven for your own analytical misdeeds.

But Beethoven, Chua needs reminding, did not construct his movement only motivically, but brought together all musical elements as part of a larger conception. Since that, however, requires consideration of the overall form, it demands a much broader perspective. Though a formal analysis of the

Fig. 2 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement

a) formal layout, complete movement

INTRO.	EXPOSITION					DEVL.	LINK	CODA
	Th. A	V Prol.		Th. B	Close			
1-10	I	11-29	30-40	40-47	48-56	57-74	75-120	
		I	V/VI		VI			
	II	121-40	141-51	151-8	159-67	168-89		190-94
		V	V/III		III			
	III	195-214		214-22	223-31			
		I		V/I	I			
	Coda (IV)	232-46						247-64
		I						I

b) formal correspondences between first and second expositions

	Th. A	Th. A	Insert	V Prol.	Th. B	Close	
Exp. I	11-22 I	23-9		30-47 V/VI	48-56 VI	57-60	61-74
Exp. II	121-32 V		133-40	141-58 V/III	159-67 III	168-71	172-5 176-89

movement is a major undertaking, some remarks in that direction seem necessary to counter Chua's views. With that in mind, we can begin with Fig. 2a, which displays the movement's overall sectional layout and key areas, and which is arranged so that corresponding bar-groups are vertically aligned. Following an initial introduction there are three expositions (labelled I, II and III) and a coda opening like a fourth exposition (and thus labelled IV in parenthesis), but which ends like a normal coda; in addition, a development separates the first and second expositions, and a brief link separates the second and third. Since the three expositions and coda opening correspond closely, they are grouped together in a rectangle.

Since the second exposition is almost identical to the first, but transposed so that it begins on V, Fig. 2b provides a more detailed comparison, with their exactly corresponding bars placed in rectangles. Note that these correspondences are exact, whereas those in Fig. 2a are not always so. The correspondences in Fig. 2b, however, are purely *formal* – that is, they encompass basic harmonic motion, melodic content and phrase structure, but not surface rhythm and textural layout, which vary considerably. Expositions I and II both begin with identical statements of Theme A, after which Exposition I has a seven-bar return of A (bars 23–9), replaced in II by a transition of the same length (bars 134–40) that retains A's thematic material and ends exactly where Exposition I's

repeat of A ends: at V of the contrasting key. Thereafter, the two expositions completely correspond except for one four-bar insert in II, bars 172–5, which merely repeats the previous four bars.


While Expositions I and II thus mirror one another, Exposition III differs in remaining in one key (the tonic) throughout (see again Fig. 2a). The end of its single statement of Theme A is thus reworked so that it returns to the original dominant (bars 209–14, replacing 19–22). Subsequently, III closely follows I and II, except that, reflecting the lack of modulation, it picks up again halfway through the dominant prolongation rather than at its beginning (bar 214, corresponding to bars 40 and 151, not 30 and 141). It consequently treats this moment as V, not, as in Expositions I and II, as a temporary departure from V. This involves changing the prolongation's continuation (now one bar longer), though the motivic content remains virtually identical. The closing section is omitted, however: the end of Theme B (bar 231, corresponding to 56 and 167) here leads directly to the coda.

Exposition III nevertheless mirrors the first two in proceeding directly from Theme A to a dominant prolongation and then to Theme B. The latter's final cadence is also avoided each time, leading in Expositions I and II to an extension directed towards an aborted closing cadence (bars 74 and 189), but in III directly to the coda. The coda opens with Theme A, sounding like another exposition, but then moves immediately to an independent closing section, which breaks the expositional pattern.

The tonal areas projected by these four bracketed units – i and VI in the first Exposition, v and III in the second, and i alone (eventually I) in the third plus coda – forms a symmetrical configuration around a central tonic axis, as shown in Fig. 3 (the arrows indicate chronological succession). The tonic (A), which opens Exposition I and both opens and closes Exposition III plus coda, forms the central axis along with its dominant (E), which opens Exposition II; the submediant (F), the tonal goal of Exposition I, and mediant (C), the goal of Exposition II, are positioned on either side of the axis, a major third above and below the tonic. (Note also the chronologically successive falling thirds: A–F, E–C, C–A.) These symmetrical key correspondences complement the thematic ones bracketed in Figs 2a and b.

The remaining three sections – introduction, development and link – preserve this tonal symmetry. The introduction is in A minor, 'melting' into

Fig. 3 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, symmetrical tonal layout



Exposition I after a two-bar cadenza-like figure weakly closing on i^6 (bar 10). The development, joining Expositions I and II, moves quickly from F major, closing Exposition I, to C major, prolonged in bars 84–100, then immediately slips to E minor, prolonged for its remainder (bars 101–18), and which then opens Exposition II. The five-bar link joining Expositions II and III projects no key, merely reinterpreting the return of Exposition II's closing vii^7 of C as vii^7 of A, which opens Exposition III. Thus the only prolonged keys in these sections – A in the introduction, C and E in the development – are included in Fig. 3's symmetrical system.¹⁷

Beethoven's symmetrical key configuration interacts with another remarkable formal feature: excepting the 10 bars preceding Exposition I, the 46 bars between Expositions I and II, the 5 bars between II and III, and the 18 bars at the end, the movement consists entirely of the three expositions plus an exposition-mimicking coda opening. Closely related expository music, always presented in the same order, thus accounts – from the end of the introduction to the coda's Theme A statement – for 185 of 236 bars, lending the music a distinct variational quality. This is not to deny the movement's definite sonata-like features: the three expositions seem 'normal' in that each has two thematic groups separated by a transition, in contrasting keys in the first two and not in the third; and a development precedes the first reprise. Yet sonata conventions are severely compromised. Exposition II differs from a recapitulation in that it sequences Exposition I and completely avoids the tonic; and Exposition III is unlike a recapitulation in that its entire melodic content is anticipated in the immediately preceding Exposition II. (That is why I prefer replacing the term 'recapitulation' with the more neutral 'exposition'.)

Be that as it may, the unusually close formal correspondences, especially among expositions and coda, hardly suggest an 'irrational' structure; if anything, they may seem too obvious. A mitigating factor, however, is that the musical surface is consistently varied. In addition, the internal design of Theme A's five statements are consistently varied. These statements, displayed in Ex. 12, again with strictly corresponding bars aligned, are worth considering in detail. The example includes all bars of Theme A to the point at the end of each statement where strict formal correspondence ceases (thus the closing bar numbers for these statements differ slightly from those in Fig. 2a). Except for minor space-saving simplifications in bars 236–8, all pitches and rhythms are included (without dynamics and bowing).

Though Theme A is the only part of the exposition that changes significantly, it too consists of textural variations on an extraordinarily limited amount of material. A central role is played by the four-bar phrase first heard at bars 13–16, bracketed and labelled X, which appears once in all five statements. It contains a pair of balanced two-bar sub-phrases, a and b, the first cadencing on V and the second on I, resembling a brief non-parallel

period (though it ends on the third scale degree). In its first four appearances, however, unit X is followed by fragmented sequential repetitions, which make it sound like the opening unit of a larger formal sentence. In A1 and A3, which are formally identical, the sequential continuation proceeds for six bars, moving through the Neapolitan to an elaborated $\frac{6}{4}-\frac{5}{3}$ half close (bars 17–22, 127–32), which in A1 leads to A2 and in A3 is sequenced, directed towards the V/III prolongation. In A2 it continues for only three bars, again reaching the Neapolitan though now leading to the V/VI prolongation, and in A4 for only two, but still reaching the Neapolitan (last beat of bar 208) before moving back towards V. The sequential continuation in A5 is discussed below.

These five X units, located throughout the movement, form the ‘heart’ of Theme A – its relatively fixed and stable core, followed only by these sequential extensions. But X’s significance is equally evident in what precedes it. A1 and A3 open with X’s first half, unit a, which, since it is followed by a complete X, sounds like a false start. A2, the only statement immediately following another A, uniquely opens with X itself. A4, like A1 and A3, begins with the half-unit a, but continues with a sequence of a, also ending on V: a’. This is followed by a four-bar unit, X’, which, like X, has two sub-phrases ending on V and I, the first being identical to X (a) but the second sequencing the first upwards instead of answering it (labelled ab, since it combines a’s motif with b’s progression). (The two X’ sub-phrases retain the sequential relationship and octave displacement of the two preceding y and y’ half-units.) A5 uniquely begins with X’, again followed by X.

Up to their ‘sequential continuations’, then, all A statements consist entirely of different arrangements of two basic two-bar units: a – along with its close variant a’ – and b (in one instance ab). Moreover, all eighteen of these units end on V or I and, except for those in A3, are all in the tonic. Despite this remarkable tonal-thematic confinement, statements A1–4 nevertheless project a pronounced ‘floating’ quality: Expositions I, II and III all begin with dominant-directed ‘false starts’, which emerge without marked tonal articulation out of the preceding introductory material; and even the relatively enclosed X and X’ units are weakly set off due to constant rhythmic-formal overlapping and contrapuntal variation. In addition, no A statement reaches an emphatic conclusion, which means that the first groups of all three expositions both begin and end in transit.

Theme B opens each second group with an identical, transpositionally symmetrical period: two balancing four-bar phrases (following a one-bar introductory ‘vamp’), the second an essentially literal transposition of the first, answering the latter’s overall I–V harmonic motion with IV–I.¹⁸ Each time the final tonic bar is withheld, however, the eighth bar essentially repeating the seventh, prolonging its dominant. In Expositions I and II this leads to an extension directed toward the (aborted) exposition-closing cadence (bars 74 and

Ex. 12 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, five Theme A statements, aligned to show formal correspondences

The image displays a musical score for the first movement of Beethoven's String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132. It focuses on five statements of Theme A, labeled A1 through A5, which are aligned to show their formal correspondences. The score is divided into sections: I (measures 11-22), II (measures 121-133), III (measures 195-208), and Coda (IV) (measures 232-239). Each section contains a statement of Theme A, with A1 and A2 in the first section, A3 in the second, A4 in the third, and A5 in the fourth. The score includes various musical notations such as notes, rests, and dynamics, along with section markers I, II, III, and Coda (IV). The tempo is marked 'Allegro' and the key signature is A minor. The score is written for four staves, likely representing the four strings of the quartet.

189), while in Exposition III it leads directly to the Coda. Theme B thus fails to reach closure as well. This means that all formal segments (arguably even the introduction) emerge from what precedes them (though Theme B could be considered a partial exception) and, excepting the coda, merge into what follows.

Though the movement's opening four-note motif, so stressed by Chua, plays a significant part in this plan, its role is 'regulative', not 'constitutive'. The dominant-tonic orientation of Theme A, combined with its one-bar harmonic rhythm, allows each of its formal units to combine with this motif: the four-bar units (X and X') with complete statements, the two-bar units (the a and a' units not included in X or X') with half statements. (In the a units opening A1 and A3, bars 11–12 and 121–2, the first pitch of the half-motif appears at the end of the previous bar.) When two of these two-bar units appear in succession (which means that both end on the dominant), a varied four-note version results (for instance bars 195–8, where each half is also united with its inversion).

All X and X' units appear with complete four-note motifs except for the final X, in A5. The preceding X' unit, which opens A5, is also unique in that here the motif is registrally scattered. Chua's criticism of these bars, accompanied by the graph given in Ex. 13, is revealing and warrants quotation:

Beethoven lays down this dialectical method [i.e. 'simultaneously constructing and de(con)structing the score', 'setting parameters against one another'], placing the motif in long notes against the melody of the Allegro. But this juxtaposition is hardly perceptible, for the counterpoint is distorted by radical processes of variation; although the motif is rhythmically and texturally intact, its identity is severely mangled by extreme registral dislocations as the pitches dart from stave to stave ... An act of violence is committed against unity itself. (Chua 1995, pp. 80–81)

Evidently overcome by motivic concerns, Chua ignores the fact that this four-bar unit has, along with the closely related unit X, already appeared five times, always combined with the four-note motif. Even if one somehow fails to perceive the motif as such the sixth time it is heard in conjunction with the same phrase (and with its pitches now attacked as the lowest notes), its continuing influence should be unmistakable. There is, moreover, a reason for its fragmentation here: by isolating the dominant and tonic roots in the bass (bars 233 and 235), it anticipates the harmonic bass of the immediately following climactic X (bars 232–5), heard for the first time in homophonic texture and without the motif. (In addition, X's 'echoing' tremolo figure helps prepare the homophonic texture.)

Despite its unprecedented full-blown texture, the final X still fails to achieve immediate tonal completion. As in A1, its extension reaches $V_4^6-5_3$, which again dissolves into a return of unit a (cf. bars 246–8 and 21–4), hinting that there may be a sixth statement of Theme A. A motivic dissolution then leads,

Ex. 13 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, bars 232–5 (Chua 1995, Ex. 3.22)

however, to another build-up, which finally achieves a tonic arrival (bars 254–8), confirmed for the last seven bars.

Chua, while recognising the difficulty of forcing the movement into a standard formal pattern, nevertheless opts for a sonata form with development and two recapitulations, one ‘false’, one ‘real’. Typically, he then faults Beethoven for this plan: ‘the “E minor recapitulation” is too long to be a false one, the “A minor recapitulation” too short to be a real one; and the stunted development section hardly deserves the name’. The design is ‘weird ... because the motif is there, stubbornly reshaping sonata form’ (*ibid.*, p. 67). But the movement is ‘weird’ only if measured by inappropriate standards. The unusual proportions stem from the equally unusual variational layout. The development, for example, is short because it serves to connect two almost identical expositions (within transposition); and the link connecting Expositions II and III can be shorter still, since it joins more closely related tonal areas (C major and A minor, as opposed to F major and E minor). The latter’s brevity also contributes to the general formal tightening that begins once Exposition II is over.

The movement’s many close formal correspondences, however, suggest a different design: a ‘circular’ form unfolding in four progressively compressed cyclic variations: Exposition I (model), Exposition II (its transposition), Exposition III (truncated after Theme B), and the coda opening (expositional material truncated after Theme A). The correspondences are remarkably

regular, the only major departure being Exposition III's missing closing section and the coda's more radical abbreviation. The former places Theme A (A5), opening the Coda, immediately after Theme B. Conjoined for the first time, and in the same key, the two reveal a striking connection indicated in Ex. 14: the falling thirds in the antecedent of Theme B (bars 224–7), presented sequentially up a fourth in its consequent (bars 228–31), are carried to a still higher register in the two sequential half phrases of A5's opening X' unit (bars 232–5), contributing to the intensification preceding the forte, homophonic presentation of the final X. The latter continues a process initiated in A4 (Exposition III), where unit X already appeared *forte* – for the first time – and with enriched texture (bars 203–6), underscoring A5's role as the culmination of a set of five cyclic A statements. Perhaps more than anything else, these statements, leading to a final climactic version, determine the movement's larger dynamic shape and explain the increasing formal compression from the end of Exposition II to A5 of the Coda. Since this cyclic process is consummated in A5, with Theme B appropriated to lead to its climactic presentation, there is no need to continue with a 'fourth exposition': A5 proceeds directly to the close of the coda (which, as noted, also still preserves a suggestion of cyclicity by hinting at a sixth A statement).

Even the non-cyclic segments, located outside the rectangle of Fig. 2a, alternating with the exposition sections until the climactic A5 appears immediately after Theme B, contribute to the cyclic character. The cadenza-like passage closing the introduction (bars 9–10), merging into A1 (Exposition I), returns compressed at bars 22–23.1, where it merges into A2, and again, transposed, at the end of the development (bars 119–20), merging into A3 (Exposition II); while its top voice motif (F–E) returns to close the link (bars 193–4), merging into A4 (Exposition III). Thus all three expositions, and all A statements (including even the aborted sixth one in the coda, bar 247ff), grow analogously – cyclically – out of the preceding music.¹⁹

At the same time, the sectional alterations do create a more diversified structure than a more purely cyclic form would provide. Indeed, the movement is perhaps best understood as an amalgamation of cyclic and non-cyclic elements, with particular emphasis on the former. The cyclic features, in addition to helping explain the various sonata-form distortions, bring out the

Ex. 14 Beethoven, String Quartet in A minor, Op. 132, first movement, linear connections, bars 224–35



movement's unbroken continuity: no full cadence, in fact, appears in *any* key until the final tonic seven bars from the end.²⁰ At the same time, a one-sided cyclic interpretation suppresses important dramatic qualities. But one thing is evident: the movement's formal construction is remarkably tight, the degree of structural correspondence far exceeding that of a 'normal' classical form; it is anything but 'chaotic'.

Conclusion

The five analysts we have considered can be grouped into three categories according to their reasons for asserting disunity. For Kramer, Korsyn and Dubiel, disunity results from the unexpectedness and apparent unrelatedness of particular phrases or gestures; for Agawu it stems not from details but the larger phrase connections; while for Chua it seems to ensue simply from a flawed analysis. But all five, swayed by the subjectivity of human knowledge, draw a common false conclusion: that the compositions they consider contain unbridgeable conflicts and inconsistencies, defying rational explication.

Through alternative analyses I have attempted to uncover unifying elements that suggest they are wrong. I do not believe, however, that these elements reside 'objectively' in the compositions, or that they represent 'natural' attributes, but only that they are demonstrably linked to perceptible features of the music. Nor do these elements tell the 'whole story'; other matters, having to do with entirely different considerations, illuminate important aspects of the music as well. Moreover, my claims for unity do not deny the significance of 'unexpected moments'. Unity does not mean absolute determination, any more than the unexpected detail means absolute disunity. Indeed, the full effect of a work often depends upon 'strange events'; but equally, those events owe a significant part of their charm to their ultimate 'connectedness'. I am also aware that, however much these unifying elements may aid our understanding, they do not completely account for what is remarkable, unique or surprising in a work; they only demonstrate that those qualities need not be associated with disunity.

Of course my unifying analyses reflect a predisposition to find unity; but *all* analyses reflect predispositions of some kind or other. But there is no reason why a unity-oriented analysis need be blind to different kinds and degrees of unity. In the Brahms's String Quartet in C minor, for example, the historical mediation between the two opening phrases unquestionably preserves a degree of tension consistent with the work's relative 'modernity': the two modes of discourse are not inseparably blended, only meaningfully related. One might say, adopting a current fashion, that Brahms has created a space in which the two modes can interact coherently while retaining a complex relationship. A unity-defying analysis, however, can offer nothing to explain why Brahms's


particular 'contradictory' juxtaposition is there at all – why, for example, his 'Mozartian' segment seems 'right' after the opening 'sentence', or what impact the opening has on later events. That requires showing connections, not disconnections.²¹

Indeed, a question raised by all five of these commentators is whether disunity can be positively analysed at all. If it is simply a matter of showing that conflicts inevitably accompany unity, the difficulty disappears; but that is a matter of complexity, not disunity. On the other hand, identification of anything 'special' about the disunity necessarily leads beyond the latter's purview. This explains why none of the five analysts (excepting perhaps Chua, who presents something of a special case) can draw analytical conclusions from the claim of disunity, or even suggest what such an analysis might entail. Once disunity is asserted, they have nothing more to say of an analytical nature. Unity is certainly not the only thing worth analysing, but, in this music at least, the alternative is not disunity but a different analytical perspective altogether.

This brings out a curious aspect of the anti-unity position: it rests upon the sort of binary opposition that Derrida and other recent thinkers oppose. A valued term is given 'metaphysical presence' by juxtaposition with a devalued opposite: Derrida's 'science' v. 'magic' becomes 'unity' v. 'disunity', with unity as the denigrated term. Another curiosity is that suspicion of synthesis and totalisation is here evidently wedded to a universalist commitment to anti-unitarianism as applicable to any music.

It is thus therapeutic to note that prominent postmodernists and deconstructionists, when they undertake analyses of particular works, do not necessarily wash their analytical hands. Foucault, for example, examining Flaubert's *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*, a text he believes defies all conventional genres and forms, ultimately focuses his analysis not on the work's disruptions but on the connections that, despite these, hold it together. After describing an apparently disunified layout – a succession of radically contrasting visionary scenes arranged in six stages, traversing which the reader 'encounters five distinct levels of five different orders of language' and 'five series of characters, figures, landscapes, and forms' – he then shifts gears. This structure is 'modified' by, and 'actually finds its confirmation and completion in', two additional motions: a 'retrogressive encasement', which connects the sixth stage back to the earlier ones; and a wreath-like movement that 'links the characters in a series of knots ... so that their identities are gradually merged and their different perceptions blended into a single dazzling sight'. It is this final, unifying vision, this 'dazzling sight', that gives meaning to the whole, as graphed by Foucault in a synthesising image (Foucault 1977, pp. 97–8), shown here in Fig. 4.

Similarly, though Barthes characterises his method in analysing Balzac's 'Sarrasine' as a 'manhandling' of the text, which is 'ceaselessly ... broken,

Fig. 4 Foucault's formal diagram for Flaubert's *The Temptation of Saint Anthony*

interrupted without any regard for its natural divisions' so as to 'den[y] ... its naturalness', he never doubts the story's unity. On the contrary, he uncovers a complex matrix of associations discernible only to a 'second reading', one exploring pluralities rather than 'given' content (Barthes 1974, pp. 15–16). Far from simply denying old unities, Barthes seeks new ones, and does so with astounding fervour for some 200 pages.

One should do no less for Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven and Brahms.

NOTES

1. Other recent literature includes Martin Scherzinger, 'The Finale of Mahler's Seventh Symphony: a Deconstructive Reading' (Scherzinger 1996); Adam Krims, 'Disciplining Deconstruction (for Musical Analysis)' (Krims 1998); Fred Everett Maus, 'Concepts of Musical Unity' (Maus 1999); and James Parsons '“Pour the Sweet Milk of Concord into Hell”: Theories of Unity and Disunity in Late Beethoven' (Parsons 1999).
2. Kerman's well-known maxim originally appeared in Kerman 1980, p. 320.
3. Kramer acknowledges an unpublished paper by Brian Hyer as influencing his view of the passage.
4. Korsyn also ignores an important historical point: that Beethoven's music is itself radically discontinuous, full of surprises, uncertainties and conflicts. Its 'classicism' stems not from seamless continuity, but from reconciliation of discontinuities. A typical Beethoven sonata movement is thus no less disjunct than Brahms's Quartet (indeed, usually more so), and its language no more synthesising. Whatever the differences between Brahms and Beethoven – and they are extensive – they have nothing to do with 'disunifying rhetoric'. (Aspects of the larger form of Brahms's movement are briefly touched upon in n. 21.)
5. Dubiel is the only analyst considered who does not explicitly refer to 'unity' or 'disunity'; his argument, however, fits neatly into the anti-unitarian mould.

6. Despite the fact that analytical unity assumes variety, one sometimes hears complaints that analysts focusing on unity ignore surface differentiation. It is no doubt true that those interested in unity tend to play down diversity, but there is no reason why this must be so. Far from being incompatible, analytical unity and variety depend upon one other, even if emphasis on one tends to obscure the other. Recently Wye J. Allanbrook, in examining works by Mozart and Haydn, has argued that analysts should focus more upon 'surface appearances' rather than 'hidden unities' (Allanbrook 2002). But since her goal is analysis rather than simple description, she too must reach beyond the 'given' surface to embrace generalising analytical categories. In her case this means 'topics', which are – even if they are historically sanctioned – conceptual abstractions (and are arguably much further from the work's actual surface than say a Schenkerian reduction). As a consequence, Allenbrook too ends up subsuming individual events under generalising features, which is precisely what analysis must do. The question is not one of surface versus depth, but of how revealing particular analytical abstractions are taken to be.
7. Even Adorno, that most 'negative' of thinkers, dialectically transformed the idea of disunity into a positive analytical tool. Since one of the analysts I consider later, Daniel Chua, was avowedly influenced by Adorno, it is worth noting that his famous dictum that 'the totality as truth is always a lie' is more nuanced and historically conditioned than is usually acknowledged. Adorno notes, and in general admires, for example, the logic and seamless integration of Beethoven's middle period. And even when reflecting upon Beethoven's late-style resistance to total synthesis, the focus is not so much on disunity as on the greatly increased tension and complexity of relationship between part and whole.

Adorno does not even characterise Mahler's music as disunified. While he asserts that his music refuses to accept the 'dishonesty' of 'the system and its seamless unity', 'a unity ... no longer dictated to it', or to obey a 'model of discursive logic', he also asserts that the work 'reveals its own logic'. Despite 'extreme contrast', Mahler's 'concern for the whole' results in a 'firm, identical core' that, though 'difficult to pin down', 'nevertheless exists'. Mahler, in other words, rejects conventional unity but not unity as such. This view is apparent in Adorno's famous discussion of the fanfare 'breakthrough' in the first movement of the First Symphony, an explosive 'rupture' that 'originates from beyond the music's intrinsic movement, intervening from outside', and which thus 'rebels against the illusion of the successful work'. Typically, Adorno focuses first on the disintegrative implications: 'The recapitulation to which it leads cannot restore the balance demanded by sonata form. It shrinks to a hasty epilogue', 'a coda without thematic development of its own'. But also typically, he then adds: this 'abbreviation ... is prepared by the exposition, which dispenses with multiplicity of forms and the traditional thematic dualism and thus needs no complex restitution' (Adorno 1991, pp. 64, 123, 72, 34, 49–50, 5–6).

Equally telling, *lack* of unity, or a too-easy unity, serves Adorno as a negative criterion. Thus he attacks Wagner, in whose music 'the category of the "interesting", as opposed to the logicity of the musical language, has become dominant', for 'the bankruptcy of ... [his] aesthetics of immediate unity'. His leitmotifs have 'a commodity function, rather like that of an advertisement'; they 'come into being when something purely external, something that has fallen out

of the framework of a spiritual totality, is appropriated by meanings and made to represent them, a process in which signifiers and signified are interchangeable'. The music is fragmented 'into allegorical leitmotifs juxtaposed like discrete objects', 'resist[ing] the claims ... of a totalizing musical form' (Adorno 1984, pp. 43–1, 46, 31, 45, 48).

8. The dynamic basis of the organic model has occasionally been disputed, for example by Mark Evan Bonds in his *Wordless Rhetoric*: 'the preferred metaphor of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries [i.e. organism] has been more spatial in perspective, in that it considers the work and its constituent units as a simultaneously integrated whole' (Bonds 1991, p. 4). Yet Bonds himself later dismantles this very point: 'the metaphor of the organism preserves an essential component of the earlier metaphor of the oration. The process of growth shares with the process of elaboration the basic premise of internal motivation, with one thought or part leading or growing into the next' (*ibid.*, p. 143). A similar confusion seems to inform Ruth Solie's view that 'the metaphor of organic, developmental growth is ... quite a different thing from organic unity' (Solie 1980, pp. 152–3), since from a truly organic perspective there can be no separation between the unity of the whole and that of its unfolding. The two are complementary; you cannot have one without the other. As long as what is at issue is compositional process, not the psychology of creation, the distinction between 'temporal and logical priority' disappears.
9. The aesthetician Peter Kivy, however, takes an opposing view in his interesting comments on musical organicism in Kivy 1993.
10. For example, in their *Kompositionslehren*, both A. B. Marx and Hugo Riemann mention necessity in passing. Marx states that 'each of our [musical] forms is based on reason, and in this, its foundation, has an artistic necessity' (Marx 1841, p. 6) ('... jeder unsrer Formen auf Vernunft beruht and in dieser ihrer Grundlage eine kunstlerische Notwendigkeit hat'). And Riemann, following a rejection of Marx's concept of *Gang* (since 'all musical structures are derived from the normal basis of a fully symmetrically constructed eight-bar phrase'), goes on to distinguish thematic from non-thematic material as follows: 'The inner necessity with which thematic structures develop out of one another in the imagination, differentiate themselves from one another and group themselves in larger proportions, depends precisely on such clear distinctions between what is essential and what is filler, what is tightly formed and what more loosely constructed, between the actual musical event and the moments of perceptual waiting inserted between their principle phases.' (Riemann 1902, p. 425) ('Die innere Notwendigkeit, mit welcher sich die Thematischen Bildungen in der Phantasie auseinander entwickeln, gegeneinander differenzieren and in grosseren Proportionen sich gruppieren, beruht eben auf solchen deutlichen Unterschieden des Wesentlichen und des Beiwerks, des fest Geformten und des loser Gefugten, des eigentlichen musikalischen Geschehens und der zwischen dessen Hauptphasen sich einschaltenden Momente beschaulichen Verweilens.') In both cases it seems clear that the word is not intended literally.
11. This is equally true of explanations linked to other scientifically inclined disciplines, such as information theory, cognitive studies or generative grammar.

12. References to organicism, natural law and necessity are found throughout Schenker's later work. Of particular note here are two aphorisms that appear together in the Introduction to *Free Composition*: 'All that is organic, every relatedness belongs to God and remains His gift, even when man creates the work and perceives that it is organic. The whole of foreground, which men call chaos, God derives from His cosmos, the background. The eternal harmony of his eternal Being is grounded in this relationship.' (Schenker 1979, p. xxiii) The complex evolution of Schenker's view of organicism has been treated in three key articles: William Pastille's 'Schenker, Anti-Organicist' (Pastille 1984), which argues that the early Schenker rejected the organicist model; Allen Keiler's 'The Origins of Schenker's Thought: How Man is Musical' (Keiler 1989), largely a polemic against Pastille; and Kevin Korsyn's 'Schenker's Organicism Reexamined' (Korsyn 1993b), which attempts to mediate between the two, but ultimately sides with Pastille. While this is not the place to examine the problematic evolution of Schenker's position on organicism and musical necessity, I am working on an article that looks at this and other matters within the framework of Schenker's aesthetic views and their relation to the evolving technical features of his mature theory.
13. This mirrors similar reactions in non-musical fields against such scientifically oriented structuralists as Claude Levi-Straus and Noam Chomsky, who perceived a universal unity underlying the varied surfaces of myths and languages.
14. Dubiel, whose article is entitled 'Senses of Sensemaking', acknowledges this in characterising his two different kinds of analytical approaches as different kinds of 'sensemaking'. As noted, the first sense 'conform[s] to some canon of logical succession', while the second maintains that 'a sequence makes sense if we can *make something* of each event in it at the point . . . when it happens with sufficient depth and specificity'. One could hardly argue with either if they were not taken so literally. Dubiel, however, undermines the possibility of a less literal interpretation of the first, when he says of the second: 'I am not concerned here to characterize "depth" and "specificity" except through the suggestion that the identity of each event be in some way affected by its occurring when it does in the sequence – but only to remove the illusory requirement that to "make sense" an event must appear as a consequence of what comes before it.' He thus not only (rightly) dismisses 'logical determinism', but rules out all connection – deterministic or otherwise – between his 'gratuitous' event and what precedes it (Dubiel 1992, pp. 215–16).
15. These are, for the most part, relatively unremarkable. The only real exception is Agawu's Ex. 9, which associates bars 1–16 with bars 170–77 (and 345–52), a strained connection that, to the extent it exists at all, seems trivial.
16. See also Agawu 1996b, especially p. 125.
17. Kofi Agawu's analysis of this movement, briefly mentioned in discussing his Mozart analysis, offers a very different reading of the tonal structure (Agawu 1991, pp. 118–21). Whereas I find only four keys (A, E, F and C), prolonged over extended stretches, he finds a series of five diatonic fifth cycles, whose

'defectiveness' (since some fifths are missing) 'underscore[s] the significance of instability, lack of completion, and perhaps even lack of unity' (*ibid.*, p. 121). Here again Beethoven fails to conform to an analytical construct imposed upon his music (Agawu: 'there is no enactment of the ideal'). But Agawu's fifths are 'defective' in another sense: they are drawn from mutually contradictory levels. Agawu maintains the opening A of the first cycle, for example, through its reappearance in bar 40, despite the fact that there is an emphatic move away from A at bars 31–9 to C, unambiguously prolonged as V of F major, the second group's key. The A in bar 40 is actually an abrupt, temporary departure from this C, to which it quickly returns at bar 44, also by downward fifths. To compound the problem, the descending fifths connecting it back to C, though subordinate to the larger C prolongation (bars 31–47) *are* included. And without them, Agawu's entire initial cycle virtually disappears: only A, C and F remain. (Hierarchical confusion is exacerbated in the third cycle when the G of bars 142–50 of Exposition II, corresponding to the previously omitted C of bars 31–9, *is* included, despite the fact that the passage is essentially identical – within transposition – to the previous one.)

18. I discuss a number of examples of this unusual and paradoxically unstable type of symmetrical period in Morgan 1998.
19. The development's closing segment brings back so much material, first from the introduction (bars 103–6), then from Theme A (bars 107–20), that one might think Exposition II should begin earlier. But attention to exact correspondences indicates that the A material in bars 107–20 is structurally unlike the expositional A statements. Tonal and motivic return are thus out of phase with the formal return, producing an ambiguity typical of the movement. For discussion of an even more emphatic instance – the *Tristan* Prelude – of circular form, in which each section's close merges into the next section's opening, see Morgan 2000).
20. At a stretch, one might consider the openings of Theme B statements as weak, overlapping full cadences; otherwise the closest approximations are the intermediate tonic arrivals at the ends of the X and X' units in Theme A.
21. It might be noted that the 'rhetoric' of the quartet's opening has a quasi-motivic influence. The 'bottom-dropping-out' quality of bars 7–10 for example, returns at bar 32 when the counter-statement's forceful closing cadence (mimicking that of bars 7–10, but without tonal deflection or ricochet) overlaps with the quiet, registrally restricted accompaniment of the second theme. An even more telling echo is heard at the development's climax, when the loud, registrally extended A major $\frac{6}{3}$ chord projected in bars 129–32 is followed by a semitone drop to Ab major $\frac{6}{3}$, with instantaneous reduction of texture, register and dynamics. At this moment of profound uncertainty, when the music seems to have lost its way, the violins begin repeating fragments of the main theme (eventually augmented) so that the opening phrase gradually re-emerges, opening the recapitulation. This not only further undermines the tonic character of the opening but reverses the original conflict: instead of being interrupted by an abrupt drop in intensity, the initial sentence emerges out of one.

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