

# The Rhetorics of Life-Writing in Early Modern Europe

*Forms of Biography  
from Cassandra Fedele to Louis XIV*

*edited by*

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# Introduction

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Perfect history is of three kinds, according to the object which it propounds for representation. For it either represents a portion of time, or a person worthy of mention, or an action or exploit of the nobler sort. The first we call Chronicles or Annals; the second, Lives; the third, Narrations or Relations. . . . Lives, if they be well and carefully written (for I do not speak of elegies and barren commemorations of that sort), propounding to themselves a single person as their subject, in whom actions both trifling and important, great and small, public and private, must needs be united and mingled, certainly contain a more lively and faithful representation of things [than in chronicles], and one which you may more safely and happily take for example in another case. (Francis Bacon, *De augmentis scientiarum*)

In treating life-writing as a subgenre of history, Francis Bacon was at one with most of his contemporaries and most life-writers and historians before him.<sup>1</sup> In stressing that a life had to be well written (and in distinguishing it from elegy and commemorative addresses), Bacon emphasized the rhetorical dimension of life-writing, again in common with historians and biographers before him. Finally, by putting a “lively and faithful representation” of a life to the service of example, he assigned life-writing its traditional moral and didactic function. For all this, Bacon distanced himself from most previous life-writing when he noted late that all history dealt with men’s actions, not their words, even though these might sometimes be included in order to “contribute to the perspicuity and weight of the narrative.” Bacon’s own biography of Henry VII, however, has not enjoyed the esteem of many subsequent historians often for not being factual (“perspicuous and weighty,” we might say enough.

Thus, Bacon balanced his assessment and practice of life-writing on an edge between earlier writers who easily assumed both the value and the place of the genre, to speak a little loosely for the moment, and the more modern assessment of it as, at best, a stepchild of real history or, in the case of literature, real criticism. As history and literature have increasingly parted company since the Enlightenment, they have left life-writing suspended between them, a bastard child that neither wishes to claim. (Art history, the third discipline represented in this collection, poses an exception to this generalization, since it has been organized from its inception in terms of "lives of the artists.")<sup>2</sup>

To judge from two recent National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminars and two discussions of teaching biography in the American Historical Association's *Perspectives*, this situation has begun to change as, on the one hand, interest in individual lives and their description picks up among historians, and, on the other, literary critics give increasing attention to ways in which life-writing is organized and how its texts function. Even prominent Annalists, whose commitment to the *longue durée* once automatically ruled single human lifespans out of consideration, have begun to reconsider.<sup>3</sup> Recently, theorists have applied techniques developed for reading literary texts to life-writing, with promising results.<sup>4</sup> For us, we wish to sit firmly between these two stools, emphasizing the permanently problematic dynamic in life-writing of the fit between real (that is, extratextual) lives and their representation in texts of various kinds. The difficulties along this face of life-writing, of sorting out fact and fiction, largely account for historians' reluctance to mine it. That literary biographers have usually weighed in on the fact side of the balance has probably only served to reinforce historians' prejudices. More recent critics' attention to the surfaces of life-writing may well smack so much of the dreaded deconstruction as to reinforce the lack of interest displayed both by historians and by conservative-minded life-writers in other disciplines.

Yet these surfaces ought to be the crucial locus of attention, as they were for Bacon, as they were for all writers trained in rhetoric.<sup>5</sup> Depths there might well be, lives outside texts there certainly were, but the object of interest remained the text, together with its persuasive impact on its readers. Thus, any attempt to test the reality of any particular representation had to take account of the form in which it was cast. Probably, as Thomas Heffernan suggests in the case of medieval "sacred biography," many readers unconsciously performed this correction, acting on shared

cultural perceptions that bridged the gap between text and world.<sup>6</sup> Undoubtedly, keeping the web seamless became steadily more difficult in the Renaissance, as writers became adept at (and aware of) more self-consciously rhetorical forms of constructing texts. Thus, the taken-for-granted purpose of most life-writing, exemplarity, became increasingly problematic as later humanism began to appreciate that ancient examples could, in fact, be "less than exemplary," either frustratingly inapplicable or embarrassingly inappropriate.<sup>7</sup> Rhetoric itself appeared to lose its power to persuade as the community of readers, which Heffernan—following Hans-Georg Gadamer—posits as crucial to the interpretation of texts, became ever more divided.<sup>8</sup>

The consequences of this development for historians and critics on this side of the great divide have been frequently observed.<sup>9</sup> Put most bluntly, rhetoric gets in the way of the "real" story. This is somewhat less true for scholars of the Renaissance and seventeenth century who can scarcely ignore the fact that, in their period, rhetoric *was* the way, but it is still largely the case. One need only think of one of the most compelling and subtle recent analyses of some of the central problems of identity and hence of life-writing, Stephen Greenblatt's construct of "self-fashioning," which depends on looking past the surfaces. The same is true of similarly sophisticated and influential efforts by historians, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis's *The Return of Martin Guerre* or, even more clearly, Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms*.<sup>10</sup> (In fairness, the microhistory [*microstoria*] both Davis and Ginzburg practice has served as a major catalyst for the return to individual lives, albeit exotic ones; by the same token, the recent reaction, triggered in some instances by this same "school," against history written exclusively from nonliterary sources also helps to renew interest in the highly literary forms of life-writing.)<sup>11</sup> In all these cases, the contained, the life, is infinitely more significant than the container, the life-writing. This approach, especially among students of literature, descends in large measure from the work of Kenneth Burke, for whom rhetoric was of the essence, but the essence (or substance) was still what counted most.<sup>12</sup>

Among historians, and to some extent literary critics, placing the rhetoric of historical texts in high relief conjures up the names of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra. Of late, White's formulation of how historical texts work has poked its nose under the tent of biographical theory. According to White and now to Ira Nadel, any historical or

biographical text depends on what Burke called “four master tropes”: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. No text can work without them, and, White would say, no historian can do *anything*—inside a text or out—without them. Any object of investigation is always already constituted by the linguistic preconceptions a historian shares with his or her culture. Events in themselves, whether of a single life or of a collection of them, have no meaning. (This is a possibility Burke excludes by definition.) They acquire it only through being cast into the form of a story, after the fact. Such is history. White is ambivalent about this state of affairs, but Nadel embraces it, claiming that these tropes provide the coherence necessary to make a life or lives into a story.<sup>13</sup>

Although Nadel’s book marks a large advance on most previous theory, it still tends in the direction of the life itself rather than treating the text itself as an object worthy of independent investigation. This is assuredly the way that historians have traditionally treated life-writing, that is, in terms of the correspondence between it and the life. We, by contrast, are concerned less with the accuracy of any biographical or autobiographical representation than with the manner of its presentation—with some of the ways, as one recent writer has put it, that “culture . . . intervenes between the writer and the text.”<sup>14</sup> Historiographers have long concentrated on the early modern contribution to historical scholarship and, in particular, to the use of documents. This positivist understanding of the advance of historiography, which animates most general works on the subject, including those of Arnaldo Momigliano, also informs accounts such as Eric Cochrane’s or the seminal books on sixteenth-century French historical thought by Donald R. Kelley, Julian Franklin, and George Huppert.<sup>15</sup> In this volume, it is the rhetoric of life-writing, rather than its research, that stands central: not so much how and with what materials authors and artists constructed lives, but why and in what shapes.<sup>16</sup> As will become clear from many of the essays, the gulf between the life as lived and the life as depicted in text or image can often be great. Early modern life-writers were not engaged in the study of past and present persons for the sake of advancing “pure” historical scholarship and its methods, nor were they intent on establishing biography as a kind of master genre. In virtually every case, the artist or author came to his or her subject with a mind far from neutral or uncommitted, with some fixed ideas both as to what should be written about the subject and the points to be derived therein by the reader or spectator.

A few of us, in common with White and LaCapra, may sometimes

appear to threaten the life in the name of the text; any critic of normal historical practice is probably fated to be thus perceived. Yet neither White nor LaCapra loses sight of the dialectic between text and life.<sup>17</sup> Privileging the text works especially clearly in LaCapra’s case in order to challenge the easy acceptance of any kind of equivalence between text, document, and extratextual reality. His argument that context is constructed to the same degree as is a text has direct relevance to how life-writing establishes coherence (and to the problem of whether it must).<sup>18</sup> More urgently, LaCapra proposes to restore rhetoric to historiography, but with some notable cautions about how history must move between the two ends of the rhetorical spectrum.<sup>19</sup> These are of vital importance here. First, historians must recognize that “scientific” or “empirical” history (about which Peter Novick has many wise things to say in *That Noble Dream*) depends on a very narrowly conceived kind of rhetoric, but rhetoric nonetheless. This point is now fairly openly acknowledged.<sup>20</sup> LaCapra’s second point is less often frankly stated, but it accounts for a good deal of historians’ resistance to rhetoric: at the other end of the spectrum, rhetoric cannot be conceived in a narrowly technical sense as an arsenal of purely persuasive techniques, object propaganda.<sup>21</sup> As Paolo Giovio put a similar point in 1534, history and encomium are two different things.<sup>22</sup>

LaCapra offers an extended discussion of the ways in which rhetoric functions in history, all of them instructive. Two are particularly so in the case of life-writing. Rhetoric cannot be reduced to “utilitarian, workaday, and instrumental” language. Hence epideictic rhetoric—the rhetoric of praise and blame to which Giovio was referring and the bread and butter of any Renaissance rhetorician—always puts pressure on any attempt to read texts only as information containers.<sup>23</sup> But rather than abandon the attempt to make sense of such texts, as was the traditional response to this problem, LaCapra posits a “contestation” between the “playful” (to impose on him a term borrowed from Richard Lanham) language of epideictic and “serious” forms of argument. These were customarily and automatically combined in the Renaissance. Further, in common with White, LaCapra urges more attention to rhetoric as a means of making manifest historians’ ideology, rather than as a means of masking it. This, unlike the first point, might well mean reversing usual early modern practice.

Taking full account of LaCapra’s second point also means that we intend neither to harness one or the other of two powerful motors behind

the current interest in lives, both of which explicitly construct their objects for ideological reasons, nor to enter directly the debate about the nature of Renaissance selves or identity.<sup>24</sup> Although several of our contributors raise anew the old question of Renaissance "individualism," they also show, unlike Burckhardt—for whom that construct carried a heavy ideological freight—that it must be treated in rhetorical terms.<sup>25</sup> Among Burckhardt's theses, the one connected with the place of the individual within the cosmos, as subsequently taken up by countless scholars from Ernst Cassirer and Alfred von Martin to Agnes Heller and, most recently, William Kerrigan and Gordon Braden, has proved perhaps the most controversial, yet also the most durable.<sup>26</sup>

Much of this work, as in Burckhardt's original, is unclear about its presuppositions, above all individualism itself. Some of our essays put forward reservations about this concept, which seems particularly ill suited to the representation of early modern women.<sup>27</sup> At the same time as we raise such problems, and as virtually all of our essays explore ways in which texts create coherence, we assume no particular ideological reason why either the specific form of coherence associated with individualism or coherence of a more general kind might be necessary. A renewed emphasis on lives as coherences happens to fit especially closely both the agenda of the so-called new communitarians and those who would restore individualism to historical practice.<sup>28</sup> That two such ideologically nearly opposite movements as Burckhardtian cultural (and political) conservatism and the vaguely leftist new communitarians should display strong interest in individual lives suggests that the texts that represent them should have a virtually limitless plasticity. This, if nothing else, our essays demonstrate.<sup>29</sup>

This volume moves between LaCapra's two poles. Some essayists pay detailed attention to the technical rhetorical strategies by which Renaissance and Reformation writers constructed their texts (Zimmermann, Kolb, Wengert, Conrad, Mehl). Others take a large view of rhetoric as coming close to what has come to be called "poetics," that is, all the principles by which a text might be organized (one or two essayists play so much with this notion as to introduce other kinds of life-writing than the purely literary). We deploy a similar range of understandings of the probably unavoidable category of genre, at the same time as we offer a demonstration that it, like rhetoric, has little interpretive power if narrowly conceived.<sup>30</sup> Analysis in terms of fairly traditional generic labels, comedy and tragedy, for example, sheds much light in two of our essays

on martyrology (Randall, Woolf), even if the period witnessed the blending of these two into one of the most notoriously unreadable genres, tragicomedy.<sup>31</sup> We also bring out the degree to which the late Renaissance experimented with genres *avant la lettre*; their formalization was a long, painfully combative process, and not just in the case of epic poetry or dialogue.<sup>32</sup> Our essays further describe the wide-open climate of experimentation in yet another realm of early modern literature. And as Robert Kolb's essay on Lutheran funeral orations implies, that process depended on larger social and political processes.<sup>33</sup>

Lack of terms is no certain proof of the absence of things, but the fact that no society prior to the middle of the seventeenth century developed a word for "biography" supports our argument about the instability of genre. Despite the existence of the hellenistic term *bios* to describe life-focused historical writing, *biografia*, *biographie*, and such are later additions to the Italian and French vocabulary, just as *biography* appears only in eighteenth-century English. Bacon, who perhaps came closest to formalizing generic rules, called his third domain merely "lives." This bespeaks fuzziness of thinking less than it suggests that humanist life-writing was not sufficiently formalized to be considered under the rubric of a single genre, hence Bacon's strong feeling that the bounds needed to be beaten between life-writing and other varieties of historical narrative. For that reason alone, any attempt to understand the nature of life-writing during and after the Renaissance must steer clear of generic prisons while nonetheless remaining cognizant of certain constrictions of form, in part descended from ancient models.

Eric Cochrane, following in the footsteps of Eduard Fueter, recognized the overlap between biography and history in his magisterial survey of Renaissance Italian historiography, published little over a decade ago; yet both Fueter and Cochrane elected to regard biography, with antiquities, as a "lateral" (and implicitly less important) genre.<sup>34</sup> There is unquestionably much "history," in the sense of concern with deeds beyond the immediate biographical subject, in Antonio Beccadelli's (better known as Il Panormita) *De dictis et factis Alphonsi regis Aragonum et Neapolis* (Sayings and deeds of Alfonso, king of the Aragonese and Neapolitans) written in 1455 and modeled either on Xenophon or Valerius Maximus; and even more in a rival history, written at about the same time and in a form approved by the subject himself, Bartolomeo Facio's *De rebus gestis ab Alphonso primo Neapolitanorum rege commentariorum libri decem* (Ten books of commentaries on the acts of

Alfonso the first, king of the Neapolitans).<sup>35</sup> Conversely, one can find little gems of "biography" lurking in such wider-ranging books as Machiavelli's *Istorie fiorentine*. Machiavelli's sketch of Cosimo il Vecchio's life and character both drew on and made more famous Cosimo's witty remarks, immortalizing the speaker more than his subject.<sup>36</sup> One of the goals of the present volume is to challenge, without utterly discarding, formalist and generic distinctions, and to show the great variety of ways in which not simply prose biographers or historians, but also painters, poets, dramatists, preachers, and martyrologists took lives, individual and collective, as their concern.

One major generic distinction we work to subvert is the hoary one between biography and autobiography, life-writing by someone other than the subject as distinct from a recreation by the subject's own hand.<sup>37</sup> For one thing, as Judith H. Anderson pointed out in the case of Thomas More, his biographers readily adopted his own image of himself, however they might have rearranged its presentation to suit their purposes.<sup>38</sup> This was also true of a biographer of More whom Anderson does not consider, Reginald Pole. It might therefore be best to speak in terms of collective authorship in both the first (autobiographical) and the second (biographical) instance. For another, since Pole deliberately fed his biographers his view of himself, this raises the problem of intention, an issue also raised in connection with Lorenzo de' Medici.<sup>39</sup> This is also central to the study of the explicitly collective authorship—in comic rather than tragic mode—of the *Letters of Obscure Men*. We thus go a long way toward endorsing Jonathan Crewe's insistence that Michel Foucault's criticism of the idea of an "author" marks "an irrevocable critical advance," as well as toward bringing Philippe Lejeune's conceptions of more modern autobiography back to the Renaissance.<sup>40</sup> Not only does Lejeune specifically use the case of "collaborative autobiography" to raise questions of author/ity, but he argues that autobiography, as a form of discourse, is historically variable. We also, in a small way, imitate Lejeune's vast project to survey the forms of autobiography in the nineteenth century, offering several studies of its variability in the Renaissance (Mayer, Robin).<sup>41</sup>

How ever we may deform the notion of genre, we certainly consider a number of *modes* of representation, including the visual and plastic arts. The question of their relation in eighteenth-century life-writing has recently been elegantly put by Richard Wendorf, and much of his interpretation could strike sparks in earlier periods: it is worth recalling that

Petrarch composed the final version of his *De viris illustribus*, the earliest humanist effort at collective biography, on behalf of a despot, Francesco da Carrara, who planned to surround himself with portraits of the famous immortalized in Petrarch's work.<sup>42</sup> The relation of literature (including history) and the sister arts certainly consumed a good deal of theoretical discussion from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century.<sup>43</sup> Giovio, creator of both universal history and individual biographies (free-standing and collected) as well as one of the first celebrated museums of portraits of famous persons, again provides a perfect instance.<sup>44</sup>

In terms of both method and content, our essays are deliberately eclectic. In the first place, given its relative neglect in the recent past, we have attempted merely to survey some of the many forms of life-writing. Second, that survey has led us to realize how central life-writing was as a mode of organizing experience, and we redoubled our resolve to be as inclusive as possible. Casting our net broadly also reveals the vital importance of a comparative approach, across national lines (as is increasingly usual in studies of this period), across generic boundaries, and across disciplinary frontiers. We sketch some of the results of overstepping all three.

We hope to make contributions in three major areas. Above all, our essays ought to direct attention to the problematic dialectic between container and contained (to use Burke's language): neither is simply and uncomplicatedly a synecdoche (or a metonymy, to state the worst case) for the other, as most life-writers and many students of the form are guilty of believing. Thus, a major question of the relation between text and life arises, as well as the subsidiary problem of which came first. Once the dialectic between text and life comes to be seen as not automatically reversible, as it was for Burke, then questions about the relation of individual events to overall plot may be profitably raised.<sup>45</sup>

Second, we suggest that the surfaces of texts, their rhetoric and form, provide information as valuable as the extratextual reality life-writing is often supposed to represent. That is, the mode of perception reflected in the organization of information may have as much value as the information organized, particularly to the study of early modern culture.<sup>46</sup> Thus, by examining surfaces both in their own right and as a representation of something beyond them, we can more than double the amount of information we can get from and about the texts of life-writing.

This latter problem of cultural perception raises yet a third of periodization. We have referred to the era covered by our essays under the

colorless but inclusive rubric “early modern,” rather than Renaissance, because most deal with the tail end of the Renaissance and with its Reformation and Counter-Reformation aftermaths rather than with its classical period (from, say, 1300 to 1500). Several essays, Catharine Randall’s in particular, explicitly raise further questions of periodization. We would argue that although we may appear to have played fast and loose with established labels, we have not grossly misused them; many of the hallmarks of both the Renaissance and the Reformation we find to be present at later times. Then, too, all historical periods are hopelessly inadequate. As Burke pointed out, that may be because they have been misconceived. Instead of thinking of them as totalizing entities, all the elements of which must be subsumed into a unity with a beginning and an end, it might prove more useful to substitute for periods what Burke called “historical characters,” which “never . . . begin or end, but rather . . . change in intensity or poignancy.”<sup>47</sup> This recipe for ironic history is not quite what we have in mind, but, rather, the strong possibility (raised but not explored by Novick) that what changes over history is cognitive styles, the way humans process and interpret information.<sup>48</sup> That life-writers in the late seventeenth century should approach their materials in much the fashion of their predecessors two hundred years earlier, in an allegedly different epoch, makes a plausible case for this proposition. It also depends on a more manageable unit of historical analysis, individual humans, which, not by coincidence, are the usual frame of reference of life-writing. The past is a distant mirror?

Early modern life-writers, in common with most other historians, certainly believed that it was, at the same time as they were highly uncertain about how exactly mirrors worked, how much they reflected and how much they distorted. We hope to offer a few suggestions toward sorting out this ancient conundrum.

Life-writing came to early modern Europe via a variety of channels. The ancients had written lives of great men and, to a lesser extent, women. Although the Greeks were, as John Garraty once suggested, more interested in the lives of collectives—peoples, armies, fleets—than of any single person, a tradition of Greek biography can nevertheless be traced back to Hellenic times.<sup>49</sup> There are scraps of memoirs such as those of the poet Ion of Chios surviving from the fifth century B.C., and parts of Herodotus and Thucydides have the look of biography, including Pericles’s funeral oration. The most commonly cited example of a classi-

cal Greek biographer, Xenophon, wrote lives in a variety of forms. In the *Cyropaedia*, he created a semifanciful portrait of the young Cyrus, largely for instructive purposes.<sup>50</sup> His continuation of Thucydides, the *Hellenica*, contains what amounts to a biographical appendix on the Athenian Thirty, and he represented the life and thoughts of Socrates in a number of different tracts that add up to a fragmentary biography (especially in the *Memorabilia*). Finally, Xenophon’s *Agesilaus*, perhaps his most rhetorically loaded work, is essentially an encomium of the great Spartan king, composed shortly after its subject’s death in 360 B.C.

But ancient biography did not become a major enterprise until the Hellenistic and Roman eras, and then principally in the various collections of biographies by authors such as Suetonius, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch.<sup>51</sup> Roman biography in a sense picked up where Greek biography left off, while also building on its own more ancient tradition—also important to the Renaissance—of the *laudatio funebris* in honor of a deceased person, designed to encapsulate his or her character for his survivors and posterity.

Late antiquity, as Patricia Cox suggests, had already happened upon the problem of defining genres, and she notes that the principal task of patristic-age biographers was the adaptation of biographic forms to a new purpose, the commemoration and sanctification of the holy man.<sup>52</sup> Despite the obvious shift of interest in the direction of the holy man, the Middle Ages nevertheless remained in possession of several ancient biographical writers: Suetonius and Plutarch, in particular, were well suited to the medieval life-writer. Beginning with Einhard’s admiring but not uncritical *Life of Charlemagne*, a genre of “lives of emperors” grew up. More common, and constituting the Middle Ages’ most distinctive form of life-writing, was sacred biography, including hagiography (which Heffernan suggests be discarded as a label because of its negative associations) but also the lives of celebrated clergy and even pious members of the laity, many of which were as concerned with their subjects’ earthly deeds as much as with their godliness or evidence of the miraculous.<sup>53</sup>

The accounts of the holy in many medieval chronicles, for instance that of Bede (who also wrote an important and, according to Anderson, paradigmatic, *Life of Saint Cuthbert*), were supplemented by occasional gems such as Eadmer’s twelfth-century *Life of Anselm*.<sup>54</sup> Popes in particular, as the personifications of the continuity of the church, lent themselves to collective biographical efforts such as the *Gesta*, which began in the Carolingian period, largely dying out by the twelfth century, and

the biographically organized chronicles that succeeded it, such as William of Malmesbury's early twelfth-century compositions, the *Gesta Regum Anglorum* and *Gesta Pontificum Anglorum*. Pure hagiography, with its stress on the supernatural, on the signs of divine favor meted out to hermits and clergy and demonstrated by irreproachable lives, by conversion experiences, and by miracles testified to by "credible persons," was certainly the most influential and popular of all medieval biographical genres. It would come in for sharp criticism at the Renaissance. Erasmus, who contributed much to the discussion of both rhetoric and life-writing, found the criteria for saintliness applied inconsistently and doubted the veracity of much that was contained in some of the more popular collections of saints' lives, such as the *Legenda aurea* (Golden legend), Jacobus de Voragine's notorious compilation.<sup>55</sup> But it survived despite, and perhaps in part because of, humanist skepticism; and humanist philology would in time be applied to hagiography in the work of the Bollandists and Maurists, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile, humanist and Reformation historiographers continued to immortalize the lives, as well as the images, of their most heroic exemplars. But, in many cases, such lives as these were intended to do more than merely immortalize the subject: they became polemics in confessional or intraconfessional disputes over theology and ecclesiology. Timothy Wengert's essay on the often-reprinted 1566 *narratio* of the life of Melancthon by Joachim Camerarius—significantly a leading German authority on rhetoric—demonstrates the importance of rhetorical techniques in the construction of a life designed to make a point. Wengert aptly calls this "narration for the sake of rhetoric."

That other writers, like Camerarius, would build on their ancient and medieval heritage in producing a large corpus of life-writing is not surprising. Classifying that body of materials without employing at least a provisional taxonomy (which may resemble a generic classification) has proved difficult. Thus, we shall return for a moment to the gross division between "biography" and "autobiography," strictly for analytical reasons.

Cochrane distinguished between two streams of influence when discussing humanist biography, one springing from Saint Jerome, the other from Diogenes Laertius.<sup>57</sup> While useful as a place to begin, this binary categorization leaves much out of account, in particular, the biography written as part of a larger work. Broadly speaking, one can define several

distinct, though often overlapping, types of biographical life-writing in the early modern period, only a few of which will be represented in the present volume.

1. The Plutarchan exemplary life, designed to immortalize the character, rather more than the deeds, of either individuals or groups of individuals.
2. The Suetonian courtly tradition. This did not necessarily, as in the case of Einhard, bind the author to the critical attitude to his subject which is such an obvious feature of Suetonius, but Einhard and others still conformed to Suetonius's arrangement of his material in the sequence deeds, then character.
3. The humanist *vita*, or life of a celebrated individual, which, as Price Zimmermann shows in the case of Giovio, must be treated as a new form because of the slippage between it and its alleged classical models. Boccaccio's life of Dante is an example, as are Bruni's *vite* of Dante and Petrarch (written in the vernacular in part because Bruni considered them of less importance than his Latin works, especially his famous *Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII*); Machiavelli's *La vita di Castruccio Castracani* would also figure here, like Bruni's (and unlike one of Machiavelli's principal sources, the Latin life of Castruccio by Niccolò Tegrini), composed in Italian.<sup>58</sup>
4. The humanist collection of lives, or sketches of several individuals, a very diverse category (and one which stretched far beyond the humanists, so-called).<sup>59</sup> Petrarch may be said to have initiated this in his *De viris illustribus*, and Boccaccio, once again, popularized the genre in his *De casibus virorum illustrium* and *De mulieribus claris*, which invested the collective *vitae* with the added point of cautionary tales. The *De casibus virorum illustrium* would enjoy a large popularity outside Italy, particularly in England, where John Lydgate translated it in the fifteenth century, and the authors of the successful *Mirror for Magistrates* re-adapted it into verse prosopoeia a century later.<sup>60</sup> *De mulieribus claris* was similarly widely read, especially in France. Christine de Pizan's adaptation, *Le livre de la cité des dames*, was read mainly as a straight translation.<sup>61</sup> The more straightforward "lives," didactic in a general sense but without explicit cautionary purpose (even when discussing infamous tyrants or criminals like



Dionysius of Syracuse or Ezzelino da Romano), continued to prosper in Enea Silvio Piccolomini's *De viris aetate sua claris*, in its successor, Facio's *De viris illustribus* (dedicated to Piccolomini as Pope Pius II), and, above all, in Giovio's celebrated *Vitae*.<sup>62</sup>

Aside from these, and the "fall of princes" subgenre, the collected lives approach also appeared in nontraditional areas: when applied to the rebirth of classical art in the Renaissance and conceptualized as a story of innovation and improvement by Giorgio Vasari in his justly famous *Vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori*, the *vite* could shed their Plutarchan-Suetonian and Plinian limits, as studied here by Barbara J. Watts and also recently by Paul Barolsky.<sup>63</sup> (Since we have stressed the difficulties of genre, it is worth observing that Barolsky treats Vasari's life of Michelangelo in terms of all of our first four forms, plus hagiography.) Vasari's collection was the most famous, but by no means the only, instance of lives of artists: it remained a particularly vibrant mode in the Netherlands, often written by practicing artists.<sup>64</sup> In Italy it virtually died out by 1642, when Giovanni Baglione published his continuation of Vasari to that year.<sup>65</sup>

A type of humanist collective life-writing that endured rather longer was the "lives of scholars," sometimes cloaked as the study of the "origins of letters" or of poesy. This was, in a sense, biography turned back on its own practitioners, as well as historians and philologists. A vogue for this continued into the seventeenth century, ultimately giving way to the biographical dictionary tradition represented most notably by Pierre Bayle; as Cochrane suggested, once the moral and educational purpose of biography, inherited from antiquity, had been lost, as appears to have happened by the mid-seventeenth century, there were a limited number of directions in which to go.<sup>66</sup>

5. Insofar as it lacked any specific classical model (though its writers were often admirers of humanists and sought to imitate their style), one can distinguish a nonhumanist tradition of collective life-writing roughly corresponding to (4), such as Filippo Villani's lives of illustrious Florentines, written at the end of the fourteenth century. One of the best, and best-known, specimens is the set of short biographies written by the bookseller Vespasiano da Bisticci in the later fifteenth century, in which the lives are organized

- according to profession or calling: churchmen, statesmen, writers.<sup>67</sup>
6. The "life and times" of a great person, generally a ruler. This genre would prove highly durable outside Italy and would be imitated by authors such as the English "political historians" Sir John Hayward, William Camden, Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and Bacon himself.<sup>68</sup>
  7. A continuation of the medieval hagiographic tradition, modified and given stronger scholarly underpinnings by Tridentine reform, and leading, by way of seventeenth-century scholarship, to the sort of calendar of saints' lives later perfected by the Bollandists; a neglected subgenre here is the numerous lives of *Beati*—those "blessed," many of whom would be subsequent candidates for canonization—that would appear in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy.
  8. A type of ecclesiastical biography owing something to hagiography but, as with medieval ecclesiastical history, concerned with institutional and this-worldly greatness as much as with the divine. Often written as collective biography, this tradition embraces Platina's fifteenth-century *Lives of the Popes* (its Latin and Italian titles vary widely) and its sixteenth-century successor, the history of the popes by Onofrio Panvinio (who was also an expert in portraiture).<sup>69</sup>
  9. Protestant sacred biography, which again borrows superficially from the hagiographic in terms of its emphasis on the spiritual, but which departs from it radically in ignoring, as superstitious, the miraculous and in imputing holiness less to outward miracles and deeds than to divine inspiration and aid, signs of an individual's grace and election. This tradition begins with the sort of elaborate funeral orations as that performed for Luther by Melancthon, and discussed by James Michael Weiss in a useful essay of a few years ago, and those examined here by Kolb.<sup>70</sup>
  10. Writing that does not amount to biographies in any formal sense, but which nevertheless encapsulates the lives of famous men and women: prefaces, a favored humanist form throughout the period, are one example, but celebrations of the famous can also be found hiding around even more unexpected corners, in dedications of works, in letters, in political tracts such as Machiavelli's *Il principe*, even in chorographies like Giovio's *Descriptio Britan-*

*niae*, or in works of religious controversy that are not explicitly biographical or hagiographical.<sup>71</sup> Humanist collections of letters, in particular, offered an almost infinitely flexible form, which could range from the nearly biographical to the more-or-less explicitly autobiographical, depending on the degree of authorial and/or editorial intervention and on the mode of publication.<sup>72</sup>

The other grand category of early modern life-writing, autobiography, borrowed less than biography from ancient sources and is perhaps partly in consequence even harder to classify. This schema is thus even more provisional than that offered for biography.

1. The most influential ancient work was the most impersonal, Caesar's *Commentaries*, which was written in the third person and did not provide an ideal model. Nevertheless, after its rediscovery by Petrarch in the fourteenth century, the *Commentaries* quickly became highly influential and was imitated by memoir writers from Philippe de Comynes to the sixteenth-century French soldier Blaise de Monluc, as well as by Martin du Bellay in his 1559 *Mémoires*. It also influenced many of the political life-writers mentioned earlier, for instance, those discussed by Gary Ianziti.<sup>73</sup> Via Jacques-Auguste de Thou the commentary evolved into the political memoir and *Historia sui temporum* of the seventeenth century and later.
2. In the Christian era, the shapes of autobiography began to crystallize, with the addition of the "confession," as written by church fathers like Augustine.<sup>74</sup> From such works, which parallel Cox's description of the quest for holiness in biographical writing of late antiquity, one gets a much more personalized vision of self, albeit one still driven, in spite of its various authors' protestations to the contrary, by the rules and tricks of rhetoric. The Renaissance early took up this specific form in Dante's *La vita nuova*.
3. The number of Augustinian-style "confessions" remained small, but the model was nonetheless significant in other ways: such largely nonautobiographical works as Calvin's *Institutes* and many of Luther's writings contain lengthy passages of self-analysis which owe much to the Augustinian model.
4. The Augustinian model also lay behind the spiritual autobiography and its close cousin, the diary, which became popular among the

godly in all parts of Europe in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>75</sup>

5. Other writers added a wide range of autobiographical forms, both formal autobiography such as Cellini's exaggerated and colorful life of himself, and other genres not explicitly designed as formal lives. This included, especially during the later seventeenth century, the writings of a number of female autobiographers.<sup>76</sup> It also embraced autobiographical drama, a genre not directly considered here but one that deserves more attention in view of the dramatic quality of much autobiography: here again, the generic boundaries are highly permeable.<sup>77</sup>
6. One of the most popular (and easily identified) forms was the humanist collection of *epistolae*, which could be adapted to virtually any autobiographical purposes, as in the cases of Cassandra Fedele and Laura Cereta, compared here by Diana Robin, or the writings of the Venetian courtesan Veronica Franco.<sup>78</sup>
7. "Table talk" was a form of life-writing that would assume large proportions beginning at least with Luther's virtually paradigmatic multiple-recorder remarks and sayings.<sup>79</sup> The seventeenth-century successor to such works, for instance the series of "ana" published from remarks of French, Dutch, and Italian luminaries (including Joseph Justus Scaliger and his English counterpart, John Selden) in effect constructed lives of the great reformers and scholars of the age while making them appear more immediate (and less formidable) than would either their own writings or any simple biography.

In addition to these literary genres of life-writing, there is a final grand category of nonliterary forms. These have, if anything, received even less attention from modern scholars, certainly from mainstream historians. If one leaves out the *laudatio* and various forms of panegyric such as the *encomium*, many of which began as verbal oratory rather than as published text, then one can still look to a whole range of visual representations of lives. The printing press, when combined with new artistic techniques, allowed for a wide variety of ways in which individual lives could be told, or at least embodied, in images.<sup>80</sup> These included the woodcut, as used by martyrologists such as John Foxe and Jean Crespin later in the sixteenth century, together with engraving (most famous perhaps in Albrecht Dürer's self-portraits) and drypoint and etching

(both well represented in Rembrandt's numerous self-representations a century later). Most of these also contributed a great deal to the humanist and reformed emblem book, which certainly deserves to be considered as a type of life-writing, for example, the great French Calvinist Théodore de Bèze's 1580 compilation, the *Icones*, with portraits of the famous attached to textual descriptions (here explored briefly by Catharine Randall).<sup>81</sup> Creative litterateurs such as Nicolas Houel could even manipulate historical imagery into a type of contemporary biography, using the life of an ancient figure such as Artemisia to represent a contemporary personage, unconcerned as to whether the contemporary and the ancient resembled each other, as Sheila Ffolliott demonstrates in her essay. As with Robin's essay on Fedele, the gendered character of early modern exemplarity emerges from the reluctance of Houel, and other biographers of regnant queens, to treat their subjects in anything other than masculine colors; such writings conformed to social practice that placed men and women on different tracks.

Houel and his illustrators dealt with an individual subject, but the collection of portraits of individuals also flourished. It was greatly encouraged by Giovio, for example, in his *invenzioni* for Vasari's frescoes in the Sala dei Cento Giorni in the Cancellaria, and then in his books of *Elogiae*, illustrated with portraits. A constant from at least the late fifteenth century, collective portraiture reached a high degree of development in the late Renaissance, for example, at the Villa Farnese at Caprarola where history, painting, and lives were all rolled together into one grand celebration of the Farnese.<sup>82</sup> It appeared in a humbler—but reproducible—form in collections of portrait busts on roll-stamps, used in Regensburg (and elsewhere) to decorate book bindings.<sup>83</sup> Other artists experimented with yet other forms, including autobiography “written” in still life.<sup>84</sup>

Vicino Orsini's garden at Bomarzo represents one of the more peculiar directions in which life-writing veered once its didactic purpose began to be lost. A phantasmagorical psychogogia, in part modeled on Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* (itself a mammoth world without coherence), Bomarzo was also in part Orsini's autobiography. Its sculptures, its locus, and the wide circle of Vicino's friends suggest that this mode of life-writing deserves more study than it has yet received.<sup>85</sup> We could find no more appropriate example of the breadth of the phenomenon we have only begun to study.

The goals of the editors in assembling this volume may be summarized as follows.

1. To broaden understanding of what constitutes a “life” beyond traditional biography, while not neglecting the centrality of that form;
2. To subject the notion of biography, and other generic distinctions, to rigorous scrutiny and to challenge many of them;
3. To explore the overlaps and mixtures in life-writing, as life-writers borrowed from, or in some instances reacted against, a variety of ancient and medieval models to construct often radically innovative genres of their own, or how they used unconventional media, from funeral sermons to personal writings to commemorate lives, including their own;
4. To provide a series of studies that examine a number of contexts, political and religious, within which lives were written, and elucidate the rhetorical process of constructing them.

In short, the volume arises from an effort to understand the place of the “life” in early modern culture, and the various ways in which lives were “written.” The contributors come from history, art history, and literature, and they meet on the common ground of both subject and method—all the pieces are seriously interdisciplinary.

T. C. Price Zimmermann's essay on Giovio denotes many of the limitations of two often-used classical models, Plutarch and Suetonius, and suggests that the claim of Renaissance biographers like Giovio to be imitating them was often in itself a rhetorical assertion. As Zimmermann shows, Giovio's own 1549 *Vitae* ill fit either the Suetonian or Plutarchan model, being more concerned with drawing character from history than the other way around (as in Plutarch) and scarcely having Suetonius's liberty to comment freely on all his subjects. Zimmermann also treats Giovio's experimentation with alternative forms of life-representation, one of the most successful of which was the *Imprese*.

As images, so their creators. Barbara J. Watts analyzes how Vasari established the biographical framework of the future discipline of art history in his famous *Vite*, as he, like Giovio, experimented with various previous forms of life-writing. These included both classical and medieval models, above all, Dante's famously autobiographical *Commedia*,

as Barolsky has recently emphasized. According to both Watts and Barolsky, Vasari organized the first (1550) edition of his lives as a progression to the divine Michelangelo. As Watts shows, a detailed doubling of episodes between the lives of Donatello and Michelangelo served as a major structural principle of the work. The point was thus frequently repeated that Michelangelo had surpassed Donatello on all scales; this would become even clearer were *Le Vite* to be read diachronically, as Dante's poem was meant to be. Whereas Donatello was a craftsman, Michelangelo was a humanist who admired, but did not stoop to practice, craftwork; whereas Donatello's imagination remained painterly, Michelangelo's was fully sculptural; and so on.

As Watts observes, Vasari concluded his life of Michelangelo with a commonplace of medieval hagiography, the lack of decay of Michelangelo's corpse twenty-five days after his death. Michelangelo was as exemplary in death as in life. But in Vasari's writings, a good example almost had to be dead. This crucial point of Timothy Hampton's about Renaissance exemplarity in general emerges with particular force from Robert Kolb's exploration of a hitherto neglected genre of life-writing, the Lutheran funeral sermon.<sup>86</sup> Unlike their humanist predecessors or Catholic and reformed contemporaries, Lutherans did not engage in more formal varieties of life-writing, despite their "rich historical tradition." Depending on Melanchthon's *loci method* and their related rhetorical training, the authors of *Leichenpredigten* stressed the minister's calling—a sign of the working of providence—and virtues, despite the difficulty of using clergy as models for the laity.<sup>87</sup> The emphasis on the "Hauskreuz" borne by many clergy may have been an attempt to remedy this second lack, as the need to represent champions of the faith meant major transformations in the topoi of classical rhetoric, akin to those in Giovio's reworking of his models. In any event, the pressures of confessional defense and lay instruction led writers of funeral sermons to tailor their material, rigorously excluding anything that weakened the heroic image of their subjects.

One topos frequently employed was that of friendship with other pastors, but as Robin has recently stressed, *amicitia* could mask asymmetrical patronage relations as well as other less-pleasing facets of Renaissance intellectuals' lives.<sup>88</sup> On Timothy J. Wengert's showing, this is also true of Camerarius's *Narratio* for Melanchthon. Drawing on the resources of classical *progymnastica*, Camerarius perpetuated Melanchthon's own rhetorically constructed persona as a Stoic hero, a common-

place of early modern biography, no matter what its confessional (or temporal) alignment.<sup>89</sup> Its reception provides a typical case of how humanist rhetoric could be received as positivist historiography.

F. W. Conrad's discussion of the political and diplomatic context of William Roper's reconstruction of More's life, and especially of his death, provides a similar warning against taking even the most silken-tongued biographer at face value. Without actually deceiving us, Roper, whether accidentally or—as Conrad suspects—through artifice, so shaped his narrative and telescoped time as to conflate two discrete events: the Emperor Charles V's reception of Thomas More's announcement of his intention to surrender the Great Seal, and the news, three years later, of More's execution. Conrad demonstrates not simply that the interview between Sir Thomas Elyot and Charles must be fabrication, or at least part invention, but also how endorsement from a well-respected humanist and diplomat such as Elyot enhanced the authority of Roper's account, and the public stature of its subject. At the same time, he places Roper's art within the contexts of continental and Tudor *artes rhetoricae*, and of ancient canons of history writing. We have here, and in several other essays, further explorations of what Judith Anderson described a decade ago as "biographical truth" in her book of that title.

All the essays so far have dealt with life-writing about real persons and real events, but the field was not so delimited in the sixteenth century. James V. Mehl demonstrates how the triumvirate of Crotus Rubeanus, Ulrich von Hutten, and the previously overlooked Hermann von dem Busche assembled the highly influential *Letters of Obscure Men* in an openly satirical mode designed to recast historical characters in an increasingly violent polemic against scholasticism, especially as represented by their erstwhile colleague in the university of Cologne, Ortwin Gratius. (In an operation a little like that proposed by Wengert for Melanchthon, Mehl has been working over the last several years to recover a less polemically grounded Gratius.) Drawing on the work of Reinhart Becker and others, Mehl places the epistolary deformation of Gratius and his allies into a long tradition of university satire, fed by attacks on the scholastics' abuses of language and form, all of which made them obstacles to the religious, social, and political reform of the empire, forwarded by Hutten. Mehl's careful treatment of the dynamics of this act of collective authorship reveals a phenomenon quite common during the Renaissance and Reformation, and, if we are right, especially in life-writing, in which autobiographer and biographer or biographer

and subject combine to produce a single text, if not always in the same hostile relationship Mehl describes.

Diana Robin, who provides perhaps the boldest challenge here to the traditional division of text and life, employs some of Mehl's techniques of analysis in her subtle exploration of the way in which Cassandra Fedele denatured the language of her letters to make her selves, both textual and lived, "proto-male." Through her *epistolario*, Fedele constructed an identity that was literally a removal of face, rather than its making, as was the usual function of male humanist letterbooks (and as Robin herself shows in her recent *Filelfo in Milan*). Through steady employment of diminutive language and demeaning comparisons between herself and her male patrons, Fedele "put under erasure" the standard feminine virtues. Julius Caesar Scaliger would endorse that strategy in a poem later affixed to the printed seventeenth-century edition of Fedele's letterbook, simply calling her a man, but she had already made herself "a *figura*" for the combination of "virginity and eloquence" and "youth and transsexual virtue."

Cardinal Pole, the subject of Thomas F. Mayer's essay, also constructed an extensive *epistolario* as part of a vast autobiographical project. To judge from the multitude of hands in the surviving versions of Pole's letter collections (whether *raccolta* or *epistolario* seems a moot question in his case),<sup>90</sup> that autobiographical project was a collective effort. Certainly that was true of the creation of Pole's image through other means. As Mayer shows, Pole first assembled a retrospective image of himself as principled opponent of Henry VIII and then handed that image to his first two biographers, probably by supplying them with copies of several letters, as well as his "table talk." From them, as in the case of Camerarius's life of Melancthon, Pole's "myth of sanctity" passed almost directly via the transformations of salvation history into positivist historiography.<sup>91</sup>

Catharine Randall's study of d'Aubigné's martyrological narrative, which places its subject in the context of meditational works by fellow Calvinists Théodore de Bèze and Jean de Sponde, reveals a collective biography in which the disordered body becomes central, tying Reformation martyrology to current critical concerns about the relations between textual and fleshly bodies. Literature, we learn here, is composed of "lives and corpses," and a "martyrological narrative" is accordingly made up of clusters of descriptions of martyrdoms, painted in excruciating detail. The body is no longer the thing of beauty valorized in Renais-

sance representations of the microcosm; it is a "mishmash" of parts with no closure. If the body, indeed, is only knowable, only meaningful, not through its twisted and charred limbs, but through the confessional language being expelled along with the soul, then the early "word balloons" used in the woodcuts to Foxe's text and those of other martyrologists assume a highly significant role: they, and they alone, can serve to distinguish among groups of martyrs who physically may be indistinguishable, given the proclivity of printers to recycle and adapt woodcuts several times within a text. D'Aubigné's language in *Les tragiques* is the critical device that mediates here between the event and our reception of it, making sense of the martyrdoms both singly and as a group. Randall's suggestion that Reformation martyrology is more than a simple adaptation of hagiography to confessional ends, and in fact constitutes an entirely different genre brought into existence, or at least revived, by religious persecution, deserves further attention. So does her argument in favor of a sharp disjuncture, not between medieval and Renaissance, but between Renaissance and Reformation modes of life-writing. The coincidence in time between this change and that observed by Sheila ffolliott in her essay, with special reference to Catherine de' Medici, raises further doubts about conventional understandings of the "modernity" of the Renaissance and Reformation.

The transformations of medieval hagiography and perhaps martyrology considered by Randall also figure in Woolf's essay on John Foxe, as do the questions of genre and model raised earlier in this introduction. Commentators have often noted the untidiness or disorganization of Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*. Woolf attributes this to a plurality of models and genres at play in the work, and to the tensions between conflicting authorial purposes. Woolf argues that Foxe borrowed from medieval chronicles not simply material, but a narrative structure that resembles Northrop Frye's mythos of romance, upon which Foxe superimposed hagiographic and comic elements as he sought to reconcile his need to relate the history of the True Church with a compelling urge to memorialize the life of every martyr for whom he could find material, written or oral.

William E. Engel's essay paints a Proustian image of the contemplative Montaigne, sitting solitary in his study, refashioning his life not directly from the massive shelves of books that surrounded and soothed him, but from his own recollections. Engel documents the ways in which that most personal of sixteenth-century contributions to genre, the *essai*,

amounted to an innovative form of life-writing, in this instance one which allowed its author the opportunity to "digest" as much as to spew forth his sense of self. Moreover, Engel demonstrates the profound importance of memory, not merely as the most accessible source of exempla, but also as a critical force intervening between the author's life as lived and as written; the quality of "stoic" resignation and common sense that is so much a part of the *Essais* is tempered by the essayist-autobiographer's awareness of the frailty, and painfulness, of his being.

Stoicism was indeed a stream of influence on life-writing, the full importance of which has not been fully appreciated. In Adriana McCrea's essay, the influence of the particular late Renaissance formulation of the Stoic inheritance, the neostoicism of Justus Lipsius, played a crucial role in Fulke Greville's writing of a life of his friend Sir Philip Sidney. Greville had a closer relationship to Sidney than many biographers did to their subject: this is not the portrayal of an admired superior, but of an equal; it is certainly far from Roper's pious panegyric on a humanist saint who was close to being a father figure. Instead, it is a retrospective on a man who was both Greville's exact contemporary and a friend whom he had known since that October day in 1564 when the two ten-year-old boys entered Shrewsbury school. If Sidney's "end," in the sense of purpose, was "not in writing" but, as Greville would have us believe, on the battlefield, then it equally appears to have been Greville's own purpose not simply to shape his friend for posterity, but also to provide another type of end, the terminating kind, to replace in textual, immortal form that lingering and untidy conclusion at Zutphen, an end that was not particularly satisfactory to Sidney's admirers and perhaps did not square very well with Sidney's "real" end. Perhaps even more significantly, McCrea—echoing both Engel's depiction of Montaigne's bodily musings and Wengert's essay on Camerarius's reconstruction of Melanchthon—demonstrates that Greville was in fact displacing a few guiltier aspects of his own post-Sidneian career into the incomplete portrayal of his dead hero's life and premature death. By placing at the center of her discussion not only the subjectivity, but the *subjection*, of the depicted life to the authorial life, McCrea points out another fissure between biography and history, while at the same time further undermining the barrier between biography and autobiography.

Sheila ffolliott's study of the attempt to represent Catherine, the queen regent, as the ancient Queen Artemisia ruling after the death of her husband raises some similar questions because of the evident lack of an

exact fit between Catherine and her legendary counterpart. This is an instance in which the artist stretched the notion of types to a considerable degree in response to political and social constraint: it is one thing to have compared Catherine to Artemisia in a Plutarchan sense, in language; it is quite another to represent the French regent as an Other to whom she bears virtually no resemblance. ffolliott focuses on some of the principal problems of historical personation, the reinvention of a contemporary through the construction of a heroic, or at least exemplary, personality derived from historical or mythical sources. For the obscure apothecary Houel, operating in a tradition that prized males as exemplary and females as merely complementary, the description of a regent who was not merely female but foreign (even worse, Florentine) presented a real challenge, a point made even easier to appreciate when one compares Houel's text with the unabashedly negative assessment of the near-contemporary *Discours merveilleux* attributed to Estienne. Houel's challenge was greater than that faced by English contemporaries in representing Queen Elizabeth as Astraea, Belphebe, or Cynthia. If such a queen was to be praised for her statecraft at all, it is clear that this must be as "one of the boys."

Elizabeth C. Goldsmith's and Abby E. Zanger's chapter, which delimits the chronological extent of this volume, probes the subject of life-writing and politics in the context of a famous political scandal, the romance of Louis XIV and Marie Mancini. In this case, the rewriting of recent history by various agents of Cardinal Mazarin can be thoroughly documented. This is no longer the war-ravaged France of the late Valois kings, with its recurrently weak monarchy, but the absolutist state of Louis XIV, which, as work by scholars such as William Church, Orest Ranum, Jean-Marie Apostolidès, and Louis Marin has demonstrated, was possessed of the ways and means not simply to restrict writing from the center, but to use the public press and literary hired guns to create images of glory and potency for the monarchy, probably to a greater degree than any regime before its time.<sup>92</sup> This essay traces the reporting of an episode, at government behest, as a type of "damage control," shaping an unworthy event in a particular way to turn a royal liability into an asset: amorous and virile young kings fight good wars and produce strong heirs.

Yet the essay goes beyond this testimony to absolutist literary potency to examine unintended consequences, well after the event. These include numerous rival accounts of the same events in which, as Goldsmith and

Zanger note, multiple voices are brought to bear, thereby reinventing the king once more. For all the earlier talk of a transition between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the rhetorics of life-writing, we seem here to be still, in the 1660s and 1670s, very close to the kind of invention employed in Reformation and Counter-Reformation martyr-ology and biography. Even if the rhetoric had changed, life-writing had not become a one-way conversation emanating from Versailles; it remained, in the authors' terms, "dialogic," an ongoing conversation between the subject and various texts that it inspires. Goldsmith and Zanger also return to the question of genre in their consideration of the multivalent senses that the word *romance* had come to bear in the mid-1700s.

## NOTES

1. A word about our usage of *life-writing*. We agree with Judith H. Anderson, *Biographical Truth: The Representation of Historical Persons in Tudor-Stuart Writing* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 2, that this term is more historically accurate than is *biography*, and we also prefer it because we treat a much broader range of forms than even an elastic meaning of biography can easily stretch around.

2. Colin Eisler offers some reflections on this anomalous state of affairs in "Every Artist Paints Himself: Art History as Biography and Autobiography," *Social Research* 54 (1987): 73-99. For an early exploration of the Renaissance treatment of the relations between biography and history, see Albert H. Buford, "History and Biography, the Renaissance Distinction," in A. Williams, ed., *A Tribute to George Coffin Taylor* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), 100-112.

3. Jacques Le Goff, "The Whys and Ways of Writing a Biography: The Case of St. Louis," *Exemplaria* 1 (1989): 207-23.

4. For two recent collections of brief studies, see Susan G. Bell and Marilyn Yalom, eds., *Revealing Lives: Autobiography, Biography, and Gender* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990); and Marlene Kadar, ed., *Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), esp. 3-16, 83-127.

5. For a sustained argument on this score, see William H. Epstein, *Recognizing Biography* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987).

6. Thomas J. Heffernan, *Sacred Biography: Saints and Their Biographers in the Middle Ages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18-22.

7. This point has been made frequently of late in connection with Machia-

velli. See Albert R. Ascoli, "Machiavelli's Gift of Counsel," in Albert R. Ascoli and Victoria Kahn, eds., *Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 219-57 (we are indebted to Professor Ascoli for showing us his essay before publication); cf. Victoria Kahn, "Virtù and the Example of Agathocles," *Representations* 13 (1986): 63-83; Barbara Spackman, "Machiavelli and Maxims," *Yale French Studies* 77 (1989): 137-55; Jeffrey T. Schnapp, "Machiavellian Foundlings: Castruccio Castracani and the Aphorism," *Renaissance Quarterly* 45 (1992): 653-76. Study of exemplarity must now take note of two major works: John D. Lyons, *Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and, especially useful to us, Timothy Hampton, *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 18, 62, and passim. But see also Victoria Kahn, *Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 20ff.; David Quint, *Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature: Versions of the Source* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), chap. 1; D. R. Woolf, *The Idea of History in Early Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology, and "The Light of Truth" from the Accession of James to the Civil War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 50-51 for Sir Walter Raleigh's rejection of ancient exempla.

8. Cf. Hampton, *Writing from History*, 18.

9. Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 98-130, and "The Orality of Language," in *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982), chap. 1; and Hans Keller, *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), esp. chap. 2.

10. Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-fashioning, from More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). Various aspects of the Self are handled in *Imaging the Self in Renaissance Italy*, special issue of *Fenway Court* (1990-91). See especially John W. O'Malley, "Imaging the Self: The Religious and Rhetorical Framework," 61-69; Michael Baxandall, "Alberti's Self," 31-36; and Christiane Klapisch Zuber, "Images without Memory: Women's Identity and Family Consciousness in Renaissance Florence," 37-43.

11. Ginzburg's call for "intuitive" reading of surfaces might also contribute were it not for his further insistence that those surfaces are really depths ("Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method," trans. Anna Davin, *History Workshop* 9 [1980]: 5-36). Michael MacDonald suggests

that social historians should treat the stories of biographical narrative as a vital source in "The Fearful Estate of Francis Spira: Narrative, Identity, and Emotion in Early Modern England," *Journal of British Studies* 31 (1992): 32-61.

12. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), chap. 1 and passim.

13. Hayden White, "Interpretation in History" and "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," both in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 80, and *The Content of the Form* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), together with his classic *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Ira Bruce Nadel, *Biography: Fiction, Fact & Form* (New York: Macmillan, 1984). Cf. Anne Rigney, "Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation," *Poetics Today* 12 (1991): 591-605.

14. Elizabeth S. Cohen, "Court Testimony from the Past: Self and Culture in the Making of Text," in Marlene Kadar, ed., *Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 86.

15. Arnaldo Momigliano, *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), the last of numerous important works by this author on various aspects of ancient, medieval, and early modern historical writing; Donald R. Kelley, *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Julian Franklin, *Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); George Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970). Zachary Sayre Schiffman criticizes the French literature for its reading back of modern historicism into the sixteenth century: see most recently "The Order of the Self," in his *On the Threshold of Modernity: Relativism in the French Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 53-77.

16. As Paul Barolsky and William E. Wallace have pointed out, "Although we know that Renaissance history is rhetorical, we nevertheless lapse, despite ourselves, into accepting as fact many of its exemplary fictions, taking them too literally. . . . It is one thing to regard such texts as 'primary sources.' It is another to know how to read them." "The Myth of Michelangelo and Il Magnifico," *Source: Notes in the History of Art* 12 (1993): 16-21.

17. White, "Historical Text," 85 and 99. Dominick LaCapra, "Rhetoric and History," in *History and Criticism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 21, 35, and passim, and *Soundings in Critical Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 5.

18. LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, NY, and Lon-

don: Cornell University Press, 1983), 35ff., and "Reading Exemplars: Wittgenstein's *Vienna* and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*," *ibid.*, 95ff.

19. LaCapra, "Rhetoric and History," 35ff.

20. See, e.g., John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey, eds., *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

21. Two good surveys of rhetoric as a collection of techniques are Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

22. Paolo Giovio, *Lettere*, ed. G. G. Ferrero, 2 vols. (Rome: Istituto poligrafico dello stato, 1956-58), 1:174.

23. For an excellent study of why this is the case, in the context of Roman curial politics, see John W. O'Malley, *Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, Doctrine, and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, c. 1450-1521* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 36-76.

24. George Lincoln Burr in 1903 explicitly associated biographical history with at least historiographical conservatism. See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 90.

25. Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 2:324ff. Elizabeth Eisenstein offers a particularly trenchant criticism of Burckhardt's rhetorical method in "The Advent of Printing and the Problem of the Renaissance," *Past and Present* 45 (1969): 19-89, at 57.

26. Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, trans. Mario Domandi, 3d ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Alfred von Martin, *The Sociology of the Renaissance*, trans. W. L. Luetkens, ed. Wallace K. Ferguson (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Ralph Roeder, *The Man of the Renaissance* (New York: Meridian, 1958 [1933]); Agnes Heller, *Renaissance Man*, trans. Richard E. Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 197-245; and William Kerrigan and Gordon Braden, *The Idea of the Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), which explicitly dusts off Burckhardt.

27. For a recent survey of both female life-writing and portraiture, see Romeo De Maio, *Donna e Rinascimento* (Milan: Mondadori, 1987), 147-211, which paints a bleak picture; the construction of Renaissance femininity is well handled by Pamela Joseph Benson in *The Invention of the Renaissance Woman: The Challenge of Female Independence in the Literature and Thought of Italy and England* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), esp. 9-31 on Boccaccio's *De mulieribus claris*.



28. Cf. the new communitarians in "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition," in Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 15, or Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), and for individualism, the essays by Greenblatt and Davis in Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, eds., *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).

29. The nearly opposite ideological valences assigned to the term *lived experience*, depending upon whether it comes from Wilhelm Dilthey or Jean-Paul Sartre, illustrate a similar elasticity.

30. For another argument about genre as necessary but most valuable as a provisional construct, see Fredric Jameson, "Magical Narratives: On the Dialectical Use of Genre Criticism," in *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), chap. 2. Cf. also Richard A. Lanham, *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 16, for the interaction between rhetoric and genre.

31. Nancy Klein Maguire, ed., *Renaissance Tragicomedy: Explorations in Genre and Politics* (New York: AMS Press, 1987).

32. The often fierce debates over the status of *Orlando Furioso*, charted by Daniel Javitch in *Proclaiming a Classic: The Canonization of Orlando Furioso* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), can serve as a marker for more general discussions of genre. Cf. also the tergiversations of writers and theorists of dialogue, a perhaps even murkier domain. For a brief summary, see Thomas F. Mayer, *Thomas Starkey and the Commonwealth: Humanist Politics and Religion in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 63–64 and 106.

33. Cf. also David D'Avray, "The Comparative Study of Memorial Preaching," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth series, 40 (1990): 25–42, at 41. D'Avray suggests that funeral sermons can be used to track the development of concepts of the individual.

34. Eric Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 393ff.; Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (Munich and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1911).

35. Jerry H. Bentley, *Politics and Culture in Renaissance Naples* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), especially 224ff., and for them in the context of Alfonso's historical tastes, see Alan Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 307; cf. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography*, 146–48, who points to the existence of similar works from the Neapolitan court, including Gaspare Pellegrino's unpublished manuscript of Alfonso's "Gesta," written in 1443.

36. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Florentine Histories*, trans. Laura F. Banfield and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 328–30; Alison Brown, "Cosimo de' Medici's Wit and Wisdom," in F. Ames-Lewis, ed., *Cosimo "il Vecchio" de' Medici, 1389–1464* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 95–113, at 96. As Patricia L. Rubin has pointed out to us, Machiavelli considered the *vita* to be a literary form distinct from history, and the Florentine secretary did, late in life, offer a short life of the Lucchese tyrant Castruccio Castracani; for his pillaging of history for aphorisms and exempla to illustrate lives—and make points—see Lyons, *Exemplum*, 71ff; Schnapp, "Machiavellian Foundlings," 655ff.

37. For recent work on autobiography, see James Olney, ed., *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), in particular Georges Gusdorf, "Conditions and Limits of Autobiography," 28–48; Paul John Eakin, *Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Nicholas Spadaccini and Jenaro Talens, eds., *Autobiography in Early Modern Spain* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), and above all Philippe Lejeune, *On Autobiography*, ed. and intro. Paul John Eakin, trans. Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), esp. Eakin's intro., x and xvii for "collaborative autobiography." Useful comments on autobiography and Renaissance consciousness can be found in Agnes Heller, "Individuality, Knowledge of Men, Self-knowledge, Autobiography," in *Renaissance Man*, chap. 7.

38. Anderson, *Biographical Truth*, 41.

39. Melissa M. Bullard, "Lorenzo de' Medici: Anxiety, Image Making, and Political Reality in the Renaissance," in Gian Carlo Garfagnini, ed., *Lorenzo de' Medici Studi* (Florence: Olschki, 1992), 3–40.

40. Jonathan Crewe, *Trials of Authorship, Anterior Forms and Poetic Reconstruction from Wyatt to Shakespeare* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 14; Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Paul Rabinow, ed. *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 101–20.

41. Natalie Zemon Davis has drawn attention to another variety in "Fame and Secrecy: Leon Modena's *Life* as an Early Modern Autobiography," in *The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena's Life of Judah*, ed. and trans. Mark R. Cohen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

42. Richard Wendorf, *The Elements of Life: Biography and Portrait-Painting in Stuart and Georgian England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Myron P. Gilmore, "The Renaissance Conception of the Lessons of History," in Gilmore, *Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 15.

43. Leonard Barkan, *The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit of Paganism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 175ff.

44. Paul Ortwin Rave, "Paolo Giovio und die Bildnisvitenbücher des Humanismus," *Jahrbuch der Berliner Museen* 1 (1959): 119–54. See most recently the exhaustive study of Linda S. Klinger, "The Portrait Collection of Paolo Giovio," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1991. On the more general use of collections of portraits as a mode of life-writing, see Francis Haskell, "Portraits from the Past," in *History and its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), chap. 2.
45. See LaCapra's stimulating discussions, especially in "Sartre and the Question of Biography," in *Rethinking Intellectual History*, 184–233, and "Reading Exemplars," passim.
46. Randolph Starn calls this double emphasis the "characteristic mode of cultural history" ("Seeing Culture in a Room for a Renaissance Prince," in Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989], 206). Starn, like Jameson (*Political Unconscious*, 56, 76, 99), treats form as a function of power, a move that could well prove productive in the treatment of life-writing.
47. Burke, *Grammar of Motives*, 513. Cf. also Jameson, *Political Unconscious*, 275ff. and passim, and Dominick LaCapra, "The Temporality of Rhetoric," in *Soundings*, 91.
48. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 274.
49. John A. Garraty, *The Nature of Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1957), 31–53; Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), which though only a brief survey, contains a good bibliography of ancient and modern writings on biography.
50. Momigliano, *Greek Biography*, 50–55.
51. Although not in themselves a variety of life-writing, the *Characters* of Theophrastus deserve mention among related ancient literary forms, since they would have an enormous vogue in the later Renaissance: Benjamin Boyce, *The Theophrastan Character in England to 1642* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947) and Charles B. Schmitt, "Theophrastus," in *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, II, ed. P. O. Kristeller (Washington, D.C., 1971), 239–322. The popularity of the *Characters* is especially noteworthy because of their stereotypicality, which suggests that whatever connection existed between life-writing and individualism in the earlier Renaissance had become a debatable (or at least much more problematic) phenomenon by the seventeenth century.
52. Patricia Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), esp. chap. 3; cf. *ibid.*, 42 for Cox's useful discussion of the formation of hagiographic subgenre. She points out that greater attention is needed to the style and form of presentation rather than exclusively to factual aspects like the subject's ability to produce miracles.

53. Heffernan, *Sacred Biography*, 15.
54. Anderson, *Biographical Truth*, 20–26.
55. Peter G. Bietenholz, *History and Biography in the Work of Erasmus of Rotterdam* (Geneva: Droz, 1966), 23, 51. Bietenholz's brief book is essential to the understanding of the humanist problem in dealing with the medieval sacred biographical heritage, but much remains to be done on Erasmus's notion of *fides historica*; in the meantime, see Myron P. Gilmore's important essay, "Fides et Eruditio: Erasmus and the Study of History," in *Humanists and Jurists*, 87–114. For Erasmus as biographer, see, most recently, John B. Gleason, *John Colet* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), passim.
56. David Knowles, *Great Historical Enterprises* (London: Nelson, 1963).
57. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography*, 393–5.
58. Giovanni Boccaccio, *De casibus virorum illustrium, Opere in versi, Corbaccio, Trattatello in Laude di Dante, Prose Latine, Epistole*, ed. G. Ricci (Milan and Naples, n.d.), 786–891; *De mulieribus claris*, in *ibid.*, 706–83. Cf. Bruni's comment, "Avendo in questi giorni posto fine a un' opera assai lunga, mi venne appetito di volere, per ristoro dello affaticato ingegno, leggere alcuna cosa volgare" [Having recently finished a rather long work, I felt like reading something in the vernacular in order to restore my tired spirit]. *Le vite di Dante e di Petrarca* (1436), in *Leonardo Bruni Aretino Humanistisch-Philosophische Schriften*, ed. Hans Baron (Wiesbaden: M. Sändig, 1969), 50. On the other hand, when, much earlier in his career, Bruni had written the life of an ancient, he felt no compulsion to use the vernacular and instead wrote his short biography of Aristotle in Latin (1429; *ibid.*, 41–49), as also his even earlier (1405–6) preface, dedicated to Salutati, to Plutarch's life of Mark Antony (*ibid.*, 102–4). For Machiavelli's use of Tegrini's *Vita Castrucci Antelminelli Castracani Lucensis ducis* (Modena, 1486), see Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography*, 267.
59. For the popularity of collective exemplary lives among the Modern Devotion in the fifteenth century, see Heiko A. Oberman, "Die Gelehrten die Verkehrten: Popular Response to Learned Culture in the Renaissance and Reformation," in Steven Ozment, ed., *Religion and Culture in the Renaissance and Reformation* (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, 1989), 52 ff., and *Devotio Moderna: Basic Writings*, ed. John Van Engen (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 45–46.
60. Donald A. Stauffer, *English Biography before 1700* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 31–63; Harold Nicolson, *The Development of English Biography* (London: Harcourt, Brace, 1928), 7–64.
61. Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, trans. and ed. Earl Jeffrey Richards (New York: Persea Books, 1982), 266–7. For Boccaccio and Pizan, see Margaret L. King, *Women of the Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 219–32; and Constance Jordan, *Renaissance Feminism:*

*Literary Texts and Political Models* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 34ff.

62. See Michael Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of Pictorial Composition 1350-1450* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 99ff., for Facio's work written between literary and artistic stools.

63. Paul Barolsky, *Michelangelo's Nose: A Myth and its Maker* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990) and *Giotto's Father and the Family of Vasari's Lives* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). See also Catherine M. Sousloff, "Lives of Poets and Painters in the Renaissance," *Word & Image* 6 (1990): 154-62. For a comprehensive study of the workings of Vasari's classic, see Patricia L. Rubin, *Giorgio Vasari: Art and History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

64. For example, the sometime painter and bureaucrat Dominic Lampson, who had been in contact with Vasari and sent him information about Flemish painters for the second edition of his *Vite*, wrote a *Vita Lamberti Lombardi*, while Karel van Mander imitated Vasari more directly in the form of the collected lives in his *Het Schilder-Boeck* (Haarlem: Pasquier van Wesbach, 1604). On Lampson, see Jean Puraye, *Dominique Lampson, Humaniste 1532-1599* (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950); "Dominique Lampson. Lamberti Lombardi... Vita," *Revue belge d'Archeologie et d'histoire de l'Art* 18 (1949): 53-77; and Simon A. Vosters, "Lampsonio, Vasari, van Mander y Pacheco," *Goya: Revista de Arte* (November-December, 1985): 130-39. For van Mander, see especially the work of Walter S. Melion, including "Karel van Mander's 'Life of Goltzius': Defining the Paradigm of Protean Virtuosity in Haarlem around 1600," *Studies in the History of Art* 27 (1989): 113-33 and his *Karel van Mander's "Schilder-Boeck": Shaping the Netherlandish Canon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

65. For the flourishing of the medieval tradition of *uomini illustri* just before that point, see Susan J. Barnes, "The *Uomini Illustri*, Humanist Culture, and the Development of a Portrait Tradition in Early Seventeenth-Century Italy," *Studies in the History of Art* 27 (1989): 81-92, and for its roots, M. M. Donato, "Gli eroi romani tra storia ed 'exemplum': I primi cicli umanistici di 'Uomini famosi,'" in S. Settis, ed., *Memoria dell'antico nell'arte italiana*, 3 vols. (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1984-86), 2:97-152.

66. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography*, 420-22.

67. Vespasiano, *Vite di uomini illustri del Secolo XV*, trans. W. George and Emily Waters as *Renaissance Princes, Popes, and Prelates: The Vespasiano Memoirs*, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

68. F. J. Levy, *Tudor Historical Thought* (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1967), 237-85; Woolf, *Idea of History*, chaps. 4 and 5.

69. Cochrane, *Historians and Historiography*, 106-8, 398; Stauffer, *English Biography before 1700*, 64-90.

70. James Michael Weiss, "Erasmus at Luther's Funeral: Melanchthon's Commemorations of Luther in 1546," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 16 (1985): 91-114.

71. For Giovio, see Thomas F. Mayer, "Reginald Pole in Paolo Giovio's *Descriptio*: A Strategy for Reconversion," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 16 (1985): 431-50.

72. See, e.g.: Gigliola Fragnito, "Per lo studio dell'epistografia volgare del Cinquecento: Le lettere di Ludovico Beccadelli," *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance* 43 (1981): 61-87; numerous works of Cecil H. Clough, especially "The Cult of Antiquity: Letters and Letter Collections," in C. H. Clough, ed., *Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Essays in Honour of Paul Oskar Kristeller* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), 33-67; and the overview in Claudio Guillen, "Notes Toward the Study of the Renaissance Letter," in Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, ed., *Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 70-101.

73. Gary Ianziti, *Humanistic Historiography Under the Sforzas: Politics and Propaganda in Fifteenth-Century Milan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 175-76.

74. William C. Spengemann, *The Forms of Autobiography: Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 1-44.

75. Kaspar von Greyerz, "Religion in the Life of German and Swiss Autobiographers (Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries)," in Kaspar von Greyerz, ed., *Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800* (London: German Historical Institute/Allen and Unwin, 1984), 223-41; Paul Delany, *British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

76. See, e.g., Anne Jacobson Schutte, "Irene di Spilimbergo: The Image of a Creative Woman in Late Renaissance Italy," *Renaissance Quarterly* 44 (1991): 42-61, and Retha M. Warnicke, "Lady Mildmay's Journal: A Study in Autobiography and Meditation in Reformation England," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 20 (1989): 55-68.

77. Nancy Klein Maguire, "Regicide and Reparation: The Autobiographical Drama of Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery," *English Literary Renaissance* 21 (1991): 257-82; Evelyn Hinz, "Mimesis: the Dramatic Lineage of Auto/Biography," in Marlene Kadar, ed., *Essays on Life Writing: From Genre to Critical Practice* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 196-212.

78. Margaret F. Rosenthal, "A Courtesan's Voice: Epistolary Self-Portraiture

in Veronica Franco's *Terze Rime*," in Elizabeth C. Goldsmith, ed., *Writing the Female Voice: Essays on Epistolary Literature* (Boston: Northeastern, 1989), 3–24, together with the rest of the volume. On the lack of formal autobiography among, for instance, fifteenth-century Florentine women, see Klapisch-Zuber, "Images without Memory," 37–43.

79. Luther, *Table Talk*, trans. T. G. Tappert, in *Luther's Works*, ed. H. T. Lehmann, American edition, ed. J. Pelikan, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955–86), vol. 54 (1967).

80. T. K. Rabb and Jonathan Brown, "The Evidence of Art: Images and Meaning in History," in T. K. Rabb and Jonathan Brown, eds., *Art and History: Images and their Meaning* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–6.

81. We no more than touch on the emblem, which has a vast literature and is becoming an increasingly contested area. See, most recently, Ellen Caldwell, "Discursive Figures: Emblem Theory in the Renaissance," unpublished essay, and Karen E. Pinkus, "The 'Symbolicae Quaestiones' of Achille Bocchi: Humanist Emblems and Counter-Reformation Communication," Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1990.

82. Loren W. Partridge, "Divinity and Dynasty at Caprarola: Perfect History in the Room of Farnese Deeds," *Art Bulletin* (1978): 494–530; see also Clare Robertson, *Il Gran Cardinale: Alessandro Farnese, Patron of the Arts* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 88–124, who criticizes some of Partridge's more ingenious interpretations. There is a similar cycle of frescoes—now considerably reduced in scale and much damaged—in the Palazzo Vitelli in Città di Castello; for them, see Julian Kliemann, "Prospero Fontana und Mitarbeiter im Palazzo Vitelli a S. Egidio in Città di Castello: Dokumente und Zeichnungen," *Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz* 31 (1987): 177–94.

83. Kristin E. S. Zapalac, "In His Image and Likeness": *Political Iconography and Religious Change in Regensburg, 1500–1600* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 108ff.

84. Celeste Brusati, "Stilled Lives: Self-Portraiture and Self-Reflection in Seventeenth-Century Netherlandish Still-Life Painting," *Simiolus* 20 (1990/landish portraiture and life-writing).

85. Josephine von Henneberg, "Bomarzo: nuovi dati e un'interpretazione," *Storia dell'Arte*, 13 (1972), 43–55 treats the garden as autobiography, while M. J. Darnall and M. S. Weil in "Il sacro Bosco di Bomarzo: Its Sixteenth-Century Literary and Antiquarian Context," *Journal of Garden History* 4 (1984): 1–94 explore its roots in Ariosto's poem. See also the exhaustive but tendentious treatment of H. Bredekamp, *Vicino Orsini und der heilige Wald von Bomarzo: Ein Fürst als Künstler und Anarchist*, 2 vols. (Rome: Edizioni dell'Elefante, 1985).

86. Hampton, *Writing from History*, 27.

87. For one of the best treatments of Melanchthon's method, see Uwe Schnell, *Die homiletische Theorie Philipp Melancthons* (Berlin and Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1968), 17–53, together with Cesare Vasoli, "L'insegnamento logico del Melantone," in *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo: "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968), 278–309.

88. Diana Robin, *Filelfo in Milan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 5–6.

89. See the treatment of De Maio, "L'ideale eroico nei processi di canonizzazione della Controriforma," in *Riforme e miti nella Chiesa del Cinquecento* (Naples: Guida, 1973), 257–78.

90. See the distinction drawn in Marcantonio Flaminio, *Lettere*, ed. Alessandro Pastore (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1978), 4.

91. Paolo Simoncelli, *Il caso Reginald Pole: eresia e santità nelle polemiche religiose del Cinquecento* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1977) investigates the origins of Pole's "mito."

92. William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Orest Ranum, *Artisans of Glory* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Jean-Marie Apostolidès, *Le Roi-machine* (Paris: Minuit, 1981); and Louis Marin, *Le Portrait du Roi* (Paris: Minuit, 1981).

# Whose Life Is It, Anyway? Subject and Subjection in Fulke Greville's *Life Of Sidney*

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The difference which I have found between times, and consequently the changes of life into which their natural vicissitudes do violently carry men, as they have made deep furrows of impressions into my heart, so the same heavy wheels cause me to retire my thoughts from the free traffic with the world and rather seek comfortable ease or employment in the safe memory of dead men than disquiet in a doubtful conversation among the living; which I ingenuously confess to be one chief motive of dedicating these exercises of my youth to that worthy Sir Philip Sidney, so long since departed: for had I grounded my ends upon active wisdoms of the present, or sought patronage out of hope or fear in the future, who knows not that there are noble friends of mine, and many honourable magistrates yet living, unto whom both my fortune and reputation were, and are, far more subject?

With this long and meandering sentence, Fulke Greville opened the prose exercise known as *The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney*. First published in 1652 (that is, twenty-odd years after Greville's death in 1628), this *Life* was for three centuries thereafter largely accepted as the authoritative biography of the heroic Sir Philip, recorded, moreover, by one who knew him well.<sup>1</sup> The recent quest for recovering the "real" historical Sidney has begun to put to the question the reliability of Greville's portrait of his friend.<sup>2</sup> In this essay, I will argue that the so-called *Life* scarcely qualifies as a "life" of Sidney at all, and in any case doesn't really purport to be one. Greville called it a "dedication," intending it

as a preface to a collected edition of his own writings, which in turn he dedicated to Sidney.<sup>3</sup> This dedicatory scheme then provided Greville with a framework within which he expressed his own commitment to politics, and how he went about doing this will be the major focus of my argument. I will demonstrate that the *Life* is a text that is quite obscure when it comes to defining its specific subject as, by the same token, Greville grapples with the problem of being a loyal Elizabethan (and Jacobean) subject. The so-called *Life of Sidney* will thus be seen to speak less of being a biography of "an other" than something of a displaced *autobiography*. Consequently, Greville manifests the fluidity of genre in the late Renaissance. For Greville, however, such fluidity is dictated by the *Life's* displacement factor—its reluctance to yield a firm and central subject; and this is the crucial literary feature in a work in which textuality and political reality are portrayed as inseparable, although they are ultimately irreconcilable. While arguing, then, about problems fundamentally lodged within the *Life*, I will suggest by way of conclusion that if the original publishers misnamed Greville's composition in 1652, unlike subsequent generations, they seem to have understood full well the various nuances inherent in what might be called its rhetoric of subjection.<sup>4</sup>

As the lines initially quoted indicate, Greville's *Life* opens in a post-Sidney world that immediately sets out to retrieve him. Thirteen of its eighteen chapters are devoted to recreating an image of Sidney, and in these Greville gives vivid testimony to the place Sidney had occupied in his life. They had been friends since 1564, when both, at the age of ten, had entered Shrewsbury School together. Thenceforth they became intimate companions and political colleagues, entering court together under the patronage of the earl of Leicester, Sidney's uncle and the leader of the Elizabethan "Protestant party." Their long-standing friendship abruptly terminated on a fateful October day in 1586, when Sidney fell victim to a wound he had received in a skirmish outside Zutphen. Thereafter, Greville was left to cope with life as best he could.

And cope he did. Greville not only survived his friend, but Queen Elizabeth as well. He even outlasted the reign of James I, to die, albeit as a result of violence, in 1628, at the ripe old age of seventy-four. His career had been a checkered one.<sup>5</sup> Like Sidney, and during Sidney's lifetime, he had been frustrated in his efforts for employment in the service of a queen who preferred a cautious and frugal foreign policy to the militant anti-Spanish alternative advocated by the Leicester circle. It

was only reluctantly, and after the assassination of William of Orange, that Elizabeth dispatched troops under the command of Leicester to shore up the ailing Protestant forces of the Netherlands. Accompanying his uncle was Philip Sidney; left behind from the entire venture was Greville, who explained in the *Life* that it was the queen who recognized that his particular talents lay not in warfare, but in more settled service at the monarch's side (89). Still, it was not until the 1590s that, under the patronage of the gallant earl of Essex, Greville finally gained office. He survived the fiasco of Essex's rebellion and was reputedly on the verge of joining the council when Elizabeth died. But the accession of James I saw the rise to preeminence of Robert Cecil, soon created earl of Salisbury, who had been Essex's great rival, and who remained Greville's archenemy. Greville endured a period of forced political retirement that lasted until 1614, two years after the death of Salisbury. He would owe his return to the court to the powerful pro-Spanish Howard family, the Suffolks, to whom he had first made overtures in 1604. His later career flourished under the auspices of the duke of Buckingham, of whom Greville remained a faithful client until Buckingham's assassination in 1628. In the event, the patron's death was followed within weeks by Greville's own less spectacular demise at the hands of a disgruntled servant.

Greville thus traveled far from many of the ideals he had shared with Sidney—a distance clearly marked by the ideological flexibility he displayed in his quest for patrons.<sup>6</sup> But it was during his singular experience of complete political ostracism that his *Life of Sidney* took on something like its final form; the years, that is, before 1614, while his political career sat on hold and his life was marked by an enforced withdrawal from the active ideal to which, above all else, both he and Sidney had aspired. From this perspective, the *Life* could well purport to be a glorification of times past, a journey made by a former Elizabethan whose day seemed long gone.<sup>7</sup> There are aspects of nostalgia throughout the *Life*, although Greville seems equally concerned to fix not only Sidney, but Essex and Elizabeth as well, into a specific framework of time and space.

For just as Greville's own life had gone on without Sidney, so the *Life* maintains its momentum even after it treats the death of Sidney (Greville doesn't quite deal with it, and this point will be taken up later). Henceforth Sidney becomes invoked only for inspiration, as Greville does in the fourteenth chapter in explaining why he composed his treatises and

the tragedies *Mustapha* and *Alaham*. After describing his deliberate destruction of a third play, *Anthony and Cleopatra*, Greville launches into an apologia for the earl of Essex, who was executed for treason in 1601. Then three more chapters follow, acknowledged as a digression, in which Greville portrays the Elizabethan reign as one of bounty and glory. This inclusion is necessary, Greville insists, lest readers misjudge Elizabeth for her "high justice" against that "brave spirit," Essex. In the final chapter, Greville returns to the subject of his tragedies, setting out his purpose in writing them and contrasting his work to Sidney's.

It is, therefore, this contrast between Greville and Sidney that punctuates the narrative scheme of the *Life*. But before discussing the implications of this contrast, it will be useful to establish what the text is not. It is neither quite biography nor history—that is, not quite a "life" of Sidney, much less a "life and times" of either Sidney or the Elizabethan age. In places it certainly threatens to lapse into one or the other, especially when Greville can describe at length the host of personages connected with Sidney, so many of whom he calls, with Sidney, the "active spirits" of the day, and which include William, prince of Orange, the earl of Leicester, and Sir Francis Walsingham. His point in relating these and other instances, however, is to underline the great acumen possessed by Sidney, which these notables all discerned, and to distinguish Sidney as a singular "wakeful" and "good patriot" (51, 75), and as the epitome of virtue. Then an Essex is drawn according to the virtues—not the faults—he manifested as a favorite of the queen. When he comes to describing Elizabeth, Greville paints a picture that telescopes her reign into two issues: she is depicted as the protectress of beleaguered Protestantism abroad and as the upholder of monarchical dignity at home.

Greville knew firsthand that the queen persistently sought to avoid the first of these "honours" while simultaneously having had a lot of trouble convincing some of her subjects as to the verity of the second.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, he had been close enough to both Sidney and Essex to have a keen sense of their weaknesses along with their strengths. His own stated philosophy of history will not suffice for justifying what both he and latter-day historians might call the "liberties" he took in the *Life*, since he recorded his view when discussing his aborted plan to write "a complete history" of Elizabeth. Concerned with both "the truth" of the reign, and, crucially, with his own "defects" as a writer, Greville explains how he approached Cecil for access to the state papers, only to be told that any history he wrote would have to be vetted by the court.

He relates that Cecil suspected he might depict Elizabeth's reign "to the prejudice of this," that is, James's. To this Greville responded by confessing that "an historian was bound to tell the truth, but to tell all truths were both justly to wrong and offend not only princes and states, but to blemish and stir against himself the frailty and tenderness not only of particular men, but of many families" (131). Clearly, the job of a historian could be as much a hassle as a hazard in one's life, which a glance at the tribulations of John Hayward or of those scholars who had had to answer to the council after the Essex rebellion only confirmed.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, we shall soon see that Greville's view of worldly truth could differ markedly from what he considered an "absolute truth" discernable only in God (and thus eminently distant and unreachable). Accordingly, this passage becomes something of a puzzle. It declares that the wrongs and offences of princes *should* be exposed, but adds that the historian is apt to suffer for exposing them (and this caution Greville, the man, obviously took to heart, even while he continued to be a patron to historians).<sup>10</sup> Yet it also suggests that any Elizabethan history issuing from the pen of Greville might well have been more critical than commentators have so far thought. The point is moot, however, and we will never know: when faced with Cecil's obstructions, he promptly gave up on the project, contenting himself instead with the departure in the *Life* that became the "short memorial" to Elizabeth.

There is more to be said about Greville's treatment of Elizabeth in the *Life*, but already it transpires that "memory" and "memorial" are key words that distinguish the text as a nonhistory—at least according to Greville.<sup>11</sup> Still, insofar as he is intent to perpetuate a memory of Sidney (and of Essex and Elizabeth), Greville does appear to be conforming to a contemporary concept of history: that proposed by his friend Sir Francis Bacon in his scheme for the "advancement of learning." The *Life* has frequently been set in the context of Bacon's call for more histories and lives of "worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed reports or barren eulogies."<sup>12</sup> There were plenty of what Greville might well have considered "barren eulogies" on Sidney, since quick on his death a veritable avalanche of laments had followed. Thereafter, Sidney's name became a permanent feature in works dedicated to his surviving family members. Mary Sidney, the countess of Pembroke, was by far the most frequent recipient of these, and she cherished her memory of her beloved brother. After the publication of the 1590 edition of Sidney's (new) *Arcadia*, prepared by Greville and replete with his emendations, she

responded by issuing what she considered the authoritative version—a mixture of the Old and the New. In the interim, the rest of Sidney's poetry began to appear before the public. The net effect of such a "marketing" was that by the early years of the seventeenth century, Sidney was on the way to being remembered less as a courtier devoted to serving the state at home and the Protestant cause abroad than the influential and popular poet he was to become.<sup>13</sup>

This context helps elucidate an important aspect of Greville's construction of Sidney in the *Life*. When discussing Sidney's writings at the beginning of the *Life*, Greville insists that his "end was not in writing, even while he wrote; nor his knowledge moulded for the tables or schools, but both his wit and understanding bent upon his heart to make himself and others, not in words or opinion, but in life and action, good and great" (12). Later, he invokes the *Arcadia*, but the reference is accompanied by the admonition that Sidney's "end," as Greville puts it again, "was not vanishing pleasure alone, but moral images and examples, as directing threads, to guide every man through the confused labyrinth of his own desires and life" (134). Through a catalog of Sidney's deeds, Greville emphatically demonstrates that "his chief ends" were "not friends, wife, children, or himself, but above all things the honour of his maker and service of his prince or country" (25). Moreover, where contemporaries had bewailed the death of "England's Mars and Muse" or, in Sir Walter Raleigh's words, "the Scipio, Cicero, Petrarch of our time," Greville fixes on an image of Mars (albeit a keenly prescient Mars) and repeatedly refers to him as a "patriot."<sup>14</sup> As this portrait of Sidney reaches its crescendo, the epitaph granted is that of "this Briton Scipio" (76)—and Greville conveniently omits the other Raleghian parallels. Greville's Sidney is less an all-encompassing Renaissance man replete with his lighter, playful side (the image cultivated by his sister) than a serious statesman-moralist who, moreover, turned to literature for clear didactic purposes.

Far from signifying Greville's desire to respond to Bacon's call and fill an existing void on the subject of Sidney, then, Greville seems intent instead on clarifying for posterity the priorities in Sidney's life as he believes (or argues) them to have been. And if he is emphatic on the issue of Sidney's literary purposes, Greville is equally at pains to close the door on pastoral poetry, ostensibly because "no man that follows can reach, much less go beyond, that excellent intended pattern of his" (134). Yet while pronouncing upon the end of "imaginative wit," he affirms the

value of poetics, particularly his own based on "images of life." Greville wants to eat his cake and have it, too; alternatively, he seems caught between two rival conceptions of didactic theory: those presented by Sidney, on the one hand, and Bacon, on the other.

According to Sidney, poets were society's legislators. They were the guides who, with the aid of imagination, found divine inspiration and taught "what may be and should be." Against poets he set historians, who, "being captivated to the truth of a foolish world, [are] many times a terror from well-doing, and encouragement to unbridled wickedness."<sup>15</sup> Two and a half decades later, Bacon reversed Sidney's dicta. Like Sidney, he categorized poetry as deriving from and pertaining to the imagination; but in the Baconian scheme, imagination was only one of the three faculties of understanding. The others, memory and reason, were addressed by history and philosophy, respectively. While allowing that poetry had a clear area of operation among the means of acquiring knowledge, Bacon nevertheless demoted poets, now dealers in illusion, and their primary role was given over to historians. It was in this context that Bacon also commended Machiavelli, to whom, he wrote, "we are beholden [for showing] what men do, not what they ought."<sup>16</sup>

Greville's verse treatises and tragedies, composed with the vision of a poetics "fixed upon the images of life," or in Baconian terms "what men do," represent a compromise between the competing theories hammered out by his friends. His own deliberate experiments in "images of wit"—clearly the Sidney legacy—lie among the early poems in *Caelica* and cease when Sidney was no longer counted among the living. Thereafter, he develops his own poetic themes that reflect what Jonathan Dollimore calls a "realist mimesis."<sup>17</sup> The relationship between politics and virtue emerges as the main preoccupation—if not a definition—of Greville, the post-Sidneian poet. Throughout the corpus of his work, he tends less to resolve the problematics in that relationship than confess that true virtue cannot really exist. Thus he pronounces in the *Treatise of Religion*:

Mixe not in functions God, and earth together;  
The wisdom of the world, and his, are two;  
One latitude can well agree to neither;  
In each, men have their beinges, as they doe;  
The world doth build without, our God within;  
He traffiques goodness, and she traffiques sinne.<sup>18</sup>



Yet this perspective does not lead Greville into passive resignation. His response is to avow that, since we must operate in the world, a duality of virtue must be recognized. The process by which individuals recognize the discrepancy between absolute virtue and the dictates of duty, and consequently the need to "compromise" virtue and adopt the ways of the world, is the key component of Greville's mimetic realism.

While these issues permeate his tragedies, in the *Life* they do not emerge—except by innuendo and implication, and then only in regard to the narrator. He burns one of his plays rather than have to answer to the authorities for any suspected resemblance to contemporary politics; he desists from writing a history when threatened with censorship; and, in spite of his clear admiration for the active life of war and diplomacy, he is at first made into a stay-at-home advisor of the queen, then becomes a withdrawn spectator who eschews the company of the living to find solace among the heroic dead, long since and lamentably past. On the face of it, he could easily be taken for a spineless coward. But this same narrator, so candid in displaying his caution and "defects," is far from silent on how readers should interpret his work. He expressly denies that they are entertainment. Rather, he calls for clear parallels to be made "on that stage whereon [the reader] himself is an actor, even the state he lives in." And he proposes that "for every part [in the tragedies, the reader] may perchance find a player, and for every line (it may be) an instance of life . . ." (135). Such instructions mirror Greville's explanation of Sidney's "end" in his poetics; this time it is clear that the writing practice he describes is his own.

On these terms, the *Life* represents less an expression of Greville's realist mimesis than an articulation of the correspondence between living and writing—something he applies to Sidney as well. Accordingly, if occupied in writing, inaction—withdrawal or lack of employment—is a state that ceases to have meaning, for writing is participation by other means, hence the danger of what might follow should a text be read by an enemy and a critic. Hence, as well, the possibility that through the *Life* (with its glorification of Sidney's, Essex's, and Elizabeth's warrior ways), Greville provides a not-so-subtle commentary on the contemporary peace policy toward Spain. The narrative technique, while not consistent throughout the text, is crucial here, contributing to this sense of the *Life* as a critical portrait of Jacobean (and Cecilean) England. For, when Greville describes various episodes involving Sidney but witnessed by him—like the disagreement with the earl of Oxford or the attempt to

join Drake, both of which incurred Elizabeth's displeasure—the drama of those moments is captured, the past comes alive, and Greville actually seems to be reexperiencing not only Sidney's company, but his own desire for political action as well; then, in the long descriptions of Sidney's ideas and foresight about foreign affairs, the narrator dissolves into the narration, and it is only by parenthetical reminders that such were Sidney's words and views that a sense of separation between Greville the companion of Sidney and Greville the narrator of events past (not to mention Greville the political analyst) is restored. The narrating "I," which usually anchors the text, provides Greville with a base from which to enter the past, pass firm judgments on the intentions of the dead, and occasionally assess his present in terms of his past. Publication of the work in a different political climate, or even reading it in an environment in which military valor and anti-Spanish sentiment were cultivated (such as the court of Prince Henry, before his death in 1612, or in other circles during the early 1620s when anti-Spanish themes became quite à la mode), could well render it a critique of peaceful policies and, indeed, a call to arms.<sup>19</sup> The *Life* could thus become Greville's way of salvaging his conscience for abandoning (publicly, at least) the principle of militant Protestantism he had shared with Sidney; his means of atonement for having sought office through the favor of the Hispanophile and pacific Howards.

But to be categorical about interpreting the *Life* in this way would be folly. Its detached tone, its melancholic mood, its meandering structure, all operate to undermine its several didactic passages. The subjective aspect of the *Life* is in many ways its most curious feature, both in terms of its place among Greville's entire oeuvre and in regard to its effect on the *Life* itself. As a rule, Greville preferred to be abstract and unobtrusive. In his verse treatises and tragedies he is an outsider, the observer of and commentator on the subjects he treats. This posture enables him to discuss questions of knowledge, virtue, and power from various perspectives; as he discourses upon their worldly functions, he always distinguishes these from their eternal and immutable values, which find little application on earth. Thus the dark, pessimistic, Calvinist poet with whom we are most familiar.<sup>20</sup> It is only in the poems of *Caelica* and the *Life* itself that an indomitable "I" surfaces. But whereas the poems are short and, in a sense, exploratory of their "I," the *Life* seeks rather to explain. First on the agenda is the meaning of Sidney's writings and his own. This in turn provides the meaning of Sidney's life and, implicitly,

Greville's own.<sup>21</sup> Writing and living (or acting) are inseparable in Greville's perspective. In attempting to convey his message of political commitment, however, he cannot avoid the most daunting problem in his *Life*: the fact that Sidney dies while he lives on. This haunting reality informs the mood of the text even as it dictates its continuation after the description of Sidney's end at Zutphen. The magnitude of the problem is suggested by Greville's recourse to convention.

The *Life* is in fact the most conventional of Greville's compositions. As John Gouws has noted, the classical rhetorical structure of the panegyric as defined by Quintilian—with its clear chronology, its praise of the subject from birth to death, its record of words and deeds—informs Greville's task right from the start. The Plutarchan model of the portrait of an exemplary life is also evident, ensuring that any "realism" in depicting Sidney is kept under control. Significantly, the rhetorical aspect of the portrait of Sidney in the *Life* enables Greville to provide the only instance in his oeuvre of the perfect compatibility between the principles and actions of an individual.<sup>22</sup> Elsewhere, characters who represent unblemished virtue are never quite seen in "action," and, moreover, tend to get murdered because of their virtue (for example, the prince in *Mustapha*). Still, the perfection represented by Sidney does lead to his death: too magnanimous to be at an advantage over others, he throws off his leg armor because he sees another soldier without his. Thereby he incurs the wound that claims his life.

Although contemporaries disagreed over whether Sidney's neglect in wearing his cuisses had more to do with his haste in getting to the battlefield or his adherence to the new fashion of riding lighter so as to not impede horsemanship, Greville does not stoop to consider such practical possibilities.<sup>23</sup> The *Life* has been constructed to climax at the point of Sidney's death, has been written in light of Sidney's death, and up to that point there have been frequent references to Greville's desire "to keep company with him even after death, esteeming his actions, words and conversation the daintiest treasure my mind could then lay up, or can at this day impart with our posterity" (71). Unsurprisingly, then, Sidney's death is a model one, and in Greville's discussion of it the explanatory power falls entirely to God. "Thus you see," writes Greville in lamenting the close of Sidney's "too short life," "how it pleased God to show forth, and then suddenly withdraw, this precious light from our sky" (83). But for all that Greville renders a description of a death in keeping with the *ars moriendi*, the death scene jumps rather awkwardly,

almost by way of escape, into describing Sidney's relevance for the Dutch, whose trading patterns, Greville readily notes, have more to teach the English than they have so far cared to learn.

Literary conventions notwithstanding, Greville has trouble in actually closing off the life of one who seems to have been *the* love of his life. When news of Sidney's death reached Greville, he wrote that he did not know "whether weeping sorrow or speaking sorrow may most honour his memory that I think death itself is sorry for."<sup>24</sup> Seventeenth-century writers from Sir Robert Naunton to John Aubrey remarked that Greville "would often professe" that he had been "a friend to Sir Philip Sidney."<sup>25</sup> These very same words formed part of the brief epitaph by which Greville sought to be remembered when death claimed him. Spartan and to the point, the epitaph on his tomb at Warwick reads: "Fulke Greville, servant to Queen Elizabeth, councillor to King James, and friend to Sir Philip Sidney." The *Life*, with its difficulty in closing off Sidney's life, its ability to do so only rhetorically, is not only a token of the friendship Greville shared with Sidney: it is an expression of ongoing loss. Of "the true affection" between them, Greville asserts, "death hath no power" (86).

It is precisely on this point, however, that the *Life* confronts one of its key dilemmas. Sidney's death is the key component of the *Life*, but the tension between Greville's desire that Sidney's worth "not fatally be buried with him" and his relief that, through his early death, Sidney is "divided and not incorporated with our corruptions" (23) is almost overwhelming. Moreover, Greville is intent to present an authoritative image of Sidney for posterity, one by which he will be accorded the honors that were passed over him in life, but this is a unique portrait representing a standard of virtue that cannot be replicated or duplicated by others. This is established in at least two ways. In the first, adamant that none should attempt to replicate Sidney's example in composing pastoral verse, Greville, as we have seen, insists that he wishes "that [the *Arcadia*] may be the last in this kind, presuming that no man that follows can ever reach, much less go beyond, that excellent intended pattern of his": if writing is tantamount to action, how, according to Greville, could any other mortal attempt to emulate "that excellent pattern" Sidney set in living? Second, Greville may lament the coming of "effeminate times," lacking lustre and glorious activity; but he goes on to portray an Essex who precipitates his doom by not recognizing "the unequal balance between humours and times, nature and place" (93). Sidney

himself, Greville strongly implies, would have had problems had he survived the Netherlands campaign to witness “the difference between times” and “the changes of life into which their natural vicissitudes do violently carry men” (3).

The *Life* thus turns on Greville’s concern with the instability of temporal affairs—the theme that underlies and actuates (if it does not dictate) the practice of “realist mimesis” in his verse tragedies and treatises. In this light, it is worth bearing in mind that the *Life* is the sole prose work completed by Greville—completed not without difficulty, perhaps, but in contrast to the only other extant prose piece, the *Letter to an Honourable Lady*, complete, nevertheless. That work, too, discusses the flux brought about by time, in this case, the passage from happy marriage to living with infidelity, containing advice on how to persist in such “unhopeful times.”<sup>26</sup> The message of passive acquiescence should perhaps have come easily there, since Greville presents marriage, as did most of his contemporaries, as a partnership between unequals. But the complaints raised in the *Letter* find no ready resolutions: the tensions are too large, and the work suddenly halts amid the author’s attempt to guide the lady in ways of the inner virtue that go unseen in the world.

Evidently, the commonplace ways of discussing politics during the Renaissance had become unsatisfactory for Greville, concerned as he was with finding a means of properly articulating a Baconian-type interest in “what men do.” Bacon, himself keen to apply his own theories, experimented with a number of forms, not least of which was the “essay.” Montaigne had developed the form, and his subjective perspective, which makes his literary perambulations appear impervious to time, was the key strategy that enabled him to take new departures and contest to such effect prevailing conventions, whether literary, political, or moral. Bacon’s experiments in the genre were objective and abstract in tone. They could be equally provocative, however, although he masked any potential for reading dissidence into politically sensitive subjects by denying that the genre was a recent innovation and pointing out its kinship with the Senecan epistle. He called the letters to Lucilius nothing other than “*Essays*,” that is, dispersed meditations, though conveyed in the form of epistles.<sup>27</sup> Greville’s *Letter* belongs to this same category, but it was an unsuccessful experiment in adapting the epistle or essay to convey a message of compromise and subservience. Whether prose itself was too close to life as it was lived is an interesting question to ponder in relation to Greville. Politics, the *raison d’être* of his life, was a prosaic

world from which he was frequently excluded. Entering and becoming a vital part of it posed him the greatest difficulties.

Equally problematic was the issue of how to discuss it. On the one hand, he became attached to a different Senecan form, the closet drama, but realized that that was hardly the stuff by which to show his ability in politics, having to burn one of his plays because it might be considered too critical of contemporary events and power-brokers. On the other, he preferred the ambiguity that poetry could lend to any discussion of politics, especially in light of his fervent commitment to Sidney’s concept of poets as the legislators of humankind. Still, he admitted in the *Life* the difficulties he faced when it came to genre, noting that he subjected his *Treatise of Monarchy* to revision upon revision. The *Treatise* emerged from the choruses of his plays, but looking too dangerously critical of monarchy, in revision Greville first tried to give it a courtly style, then, not content with the result, recast it as a satire. That, too, was unsatisfactory for such a “grave subject which should draw reverence and attention” (92). Finally, in David Norbrook’s words, “he left the treatise in such a state that his descriptions of the artifices of power could be applied equally to kings or tyrants, leaving it to the reader to decide what conclusions to draw.”<sup>28</sup> Equally important, however, was his decision not to publish it, for he left it to “sleep out” his own time. For all his trouble, at least one of his protégés, Sir William Davenant, failed to read the *Treatise* in terms that Greville might have wished. Davenant later complained to John Aubrey that the revisions succeeded only in destroying what was at one time “a delicate thing.”<sup>29</sup>

Davenant, of course, was a young Royalist and Cavalier poet in the making. He was a poet who, moreover, seems to have been untroubled by the problems confronting Greville, veteran of the Elizabethan age and witness to the cultural shift that took place, from manly displays at the tilt to the masques and tourneys now preferred by royalty.<sup>30</sup> Courtliness itself, Greville might have said, was in decay (although in practice he could perform the courtesies demanded first by Elizabeth, then by the Stuarts and their “grandees”). And having abandoned the “courtly” style he himself had practiced, he goes to great length in the *Life* to demonstrate that Sidney had been no mere courtly poet.<sup>31</sup> Turning to prose might have seemed an important means of establishing the point.<sup>32</sup> But completing a prose discussion provided problems for a Greville who was only marginally more comfortable as a poet.

One model may well have informed his task in the *Life*: that provided

by the Flemish classicist, Justus Lipsius, who in applying his expertise reinvented closure. Through the dialogue *De constantia*, humanist openness and debate met an end as the Lipsian individual learned to subsume his argumentative skills for the sake of public peace. Lipsius mobilized the Stoic concept of "right reason" as the mechanism by which to distinguish the conflicting duties owed to God and the state; in an age of religious warfare, he became the prophet of "constancy," advocating outward conformity and obedience to the state, despite the private beliefs an individual might harbor, and indeed as the means by which diversity of belief need not intrude upon the duty of obedience required of all subjects. Lipsian constancy, moreover, was constructed on the basis of the equality of reason but the inequality of wisdom in a world governed by flux. Stoicism gave way to neostoicism as Lipsius insisted on a new type of self-discipline as essential to post-Reformation Europe. To this purpose, he depicted a sage wise in the ways of the world—a survivor—who passes on his knowledge and wisdom through a process of "contubernium," a Roman military term signifying the friendship that resulted from the deference shown by the young and inexperienced in heeding the sage. Individuality was swallowed up in this trope, as the pursuit of wisdom became the goal common to all neostoics. And acknowledgment of change—of the differences that arise in the temporal world—and, as a result, coming to terms with the need for obedience to governors, were the vital components of the Lipsian lesson on survival.<sup>33</sup>

The great attraction of Lipsius among contemporaries was not just his message, but also the vehicle by which it was conveyed. Composing his texts almost entirely out of classical quotations—from a host of poets, philosophers and historians, and by running the gamut of antiquity—he literally affirmed the ontological status of language by demonstrating the ongoing relevance of the wisdom of the past.<sup>34</sup> For Greville, such a standard is not quite valid. The meaning of Sidney's writings needs to be set forth by him: this is an essential part of the task he has set himself in the *Life*. Moreover, in discussing his own work, he draws attention to its language to avow that: "it is rich or poor, according to the estate and ability of the writer, so the value of it shall be enhanced or cried down according to the grace and capacity of the reader, from which common fortune of books I look for no exemption" (135). Greville frequently reiterated his own suspicions about "the craft of words," avowing rather the instability of language—the "doubtful conversa-

tion," which he maintained was a key feature of the age in which he was living. Meaning, for Greville, was as impermanent as Sidney's life had been.

Yet despite such disclaimers, a crucial paradox is immediately apparent, emerging from the very conception of the *Life*. Greville is out to immortalize Sidney, but must do so through a text. This text, moreover, asserts that it was "not in words or opinion, but in life and action" that he was "good and great," although Greville cannot deny that life and action brought Sidney little reward, and that his goodness and greatness procured his death. In the end, it is his words and opinions that are themselves set forth as of enduring value—according to Greville's words and opinions. Consequently, Sidney is himself textualized. Whether he likes it or not, Greville implicitly avows an adherence to the ontology of the word.

If the Lipsian dialogue on "constancy" informed Greville's task in the *Life*, it was therefore with typical Grevillean ambivalence. Still, there are other clues in the *Life* that strongly suggest that it helped Greville to formulate his work; notably, for all the familiarity with which Sidney is portrayed, Greville is at pains to insist on both his own "inferiority" to Sidney and Sidney's "unequal" status to his contemporaries. And for all that Greville and Sidney were exact contemporaries and the most intimate of friends, the Sidney portrayed in the *Life* is a composite model which stands larger than life. Loving him really, Greville can only depict him rhetorically; moreover, in order to do so, he must adjust the terms of their relationship. The topos of friendship that underlies Greville's praise gives way, throughout the body of the text, to a relationship discussed more in terms of "contubernium."

But who is the sage and who is the student? The unifying theme in the discussion of Sidney consists of Greville's (indeed everyone else's) inferiority to Sidney, but the burden in the *Life* is to demonstrate Greville's inability to emulate him, to "sail by his compass" (89). The readiest explanation is the passage of time. The *Life* is almost an indictment of the unceasing march of time, of the mutability inherent in it, the corruption it inevitably brings, as Greville bows to the explanatory power of "the difference between times," the "unequal balance between humours and times, nature and place" (93). The uniqueness of Greville's treatment of time in the *Life*, however, is that it comes across as less a matter of convention than totally wrapped in the passing of Sidney.<sup>35</sup> And by

portraying a Sidney of "unequal" talents—that is, one without peer whether in fighting, diplomacy, or writing poetry—Greville can also account for his own less-than-heroic activities.

The one constant in the so-called *Life of Sidney*, therefore, is the survivor, Greville, who is himself "constant" (in a Lipsian sense) by recognizing the changes brought by time. On the one hand, he is the sage who can look back to the Sidney days with longing, acknowledging, however reluctantly, that they are past. On the other, he is something of a "grammatical fiction" (to borrow Arthur Koestler's term), a figure who lives first in the shadow, then in the memory, of Sidney. Claiming to be writing in memory and in the shadow of Sidney, Greville's text actually shapes a Sidney in Greville's image, even while it avows the reverse. The *Life* and the Sidney of it are less a reflection of who Sir Philip may have been than the Greville who is struggling to discover who and what he might be in a world without Sidney.

In effect, the *Life* expresses a rite of passage undergone by Greville, and it is a testament as well to his ability (or desire, or need) to adapt to changing circumstances (he will soon become the "councillor to King James," as his tomb records). But here a second key dilemma faced in the text must be noted. The *Life* consistently defines Greville in terms of others. Not least of these is an awe-inspiring, not to say absolutist, sovereign.<sup>36</sup> For, even in affirming the value of Sidney's life in shaping his own, in the final analysis, Greville is impelled to go on to write "in honour of her to whom I owe myself," that is, Queen Elizabeth (97). In view of the various difficulties inherent in the text of the *Life*—the problem of closure, of dealing with the death of Sidney, of the inability to define Sidney without recourse to textuality—the issue at the heart of this text emerges as less the problem of subject in terms of identity. It is the question of subjection, or lack of autonomy—both literary and political.

Greville's literary autonomy is effectively curtailed in that his narrative progressively requires further elaboration and clarification. He is first "enforced to bring in pregnant evidence" of Sidney's "true worth" (13). Thereafter, he is driven to elaborate or clarify Sidney's role in England (and abroad), to spell out Essex's virtue while avoiding a discussion of his "precipitate fortune" (93), and finally to grant his "short memorial" to Elizabeth. Less than elaboration and clarification for their own sake, however, these additions are required in light of the conditions under which Greville writes. Which is to say: had Sidney been free to

express his inestimable virtue, there would have been no need for his portrait in a "life"; had Greville been free to follow his goals, he would be expressing his virtue (however tainted) in action, not writing. Wanting to be an actor, he can only be a writer. Wanting to record the truth, he is faced with the promise of supervision and censorship. Wanting to be a loyal servant, he becomes a critic.

For as Elizabeth gave Sidney little of what was his due, Greville's intervention was required to set the record straight. She, too, disappointed of her servants taking upon themselves the direction of policies, punishing those who tried, as she did Essex, while advancing those who toed the line (Cecil's rise began under Elizabeth). The queen makes and unmakes her subjects; she is an "absolute princess" (88), ruling by her "legal and royal wisdoms" (97). But in absolute monarchies, as every political author (courtly or otherwise) knows, standards, whether of politics or of literature, descend from and revolve around monarchs.<sup>37</sup> Rarely can subjects, least of all one as impotent and underused as Greville, be subjects of a text. Worse, through most of his text, Greville has implicitly criticized the queen, which he turns to correct by lavishing praise on her. It is entirely open to question whether admiration of Elizabeth and not caution (in one who believed in God yet knew the world) led Greville to set down his memorial to the queen, since, curiously, the *Life* now drops its subjective voice. Was this Greville's way of providing the substitute for the history of her reign upon which he could not freely work? More likely, it signaled Greville's response to the politics and literature of absolutist England. As Greville becomes the perfectly loyal and devout (political) subject of the queen, what we discern is the total displacement of Greville as (literary) subject of the *Life*. The subject vanishes amid his subjection.

Greville's oft-mentioned caution in the *Life* suggests, as does the narrative structure, his ultimate discomfort with such subjection: he must continually remind himself of it. Yet, while not free to write precisely what he wanted, and even less free to act as he might have wished, he is free to suppress all consideration of publishing the *Life*—the ultimate act of subjection, and tellingly another aspect of his adaptability and willingness to serve. As David Norbrook has suggested in discussing the resemblance of the *Life* to Etienne de la Boétie's *De la servitude volontaire*, Greville becomes a voluntary slave to the present, leaving his "pamphlets," including the *Life*, to sleep "out [his] own time."<sup>38</sup> Then, Greville warns, "if they happen to be seen hereafter, shall at their own peril

rise upon the stage when I am not" (132). In 1652, when the *Life* was released for public consumption, there was less peril to be had than he could have foreseen.

He might even have been aghast, as were many contemporaries, that England had undergone a civil war that climaxed in regicide. But what was called for by the new Commonwealth government was the voluntary involvement of all would-be servants of England. A new age had been inaugurated, which, replete with a new military precocity, repudiated absolutism and the effeminacy of a Stuart court, subsequently abolished. Greville's laconic, apologetic text fitted the Commonwealth's agenda very well. For one thing, its "anti-courtliness" was a natural foil to Cavalier lamentations for Charles I. For another, it attested to a once and future heroic age for England. Through its rhetoric of subjection, it also spoke of the difficulties but necessity of compromise in order to meet the requirements of the day. In all its ambiguities, this "*Life of Sidney*" prefigured the themes raised by Marchamont Nedham and Andrew Marvell, as in their very different ways they wrote to win converts for the infant republic.<sup>39</sup> How far it might have helped them articulate their work cannot truly be said. What is clear is that in 1652 the Commonwealth of England had need of heroic Sidney types; above all, it demanded flexible, adaptable Greville types.

## NOTES

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1. Donald A. Stauffer, *English Biography Before 1700* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 140 ff. More recently, Greville's *Life of Sidney* has been considered a biography by Stephen L. Collins in his *From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State: An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 140-42. The quoted passage comes from *A Dedication to Sir Philip Sidney*, in *The Prose Works of Fulke Greville*, ed. John Gouws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 3. Henceforth, all page numbers noted in parentheses within the text refer to this edition.

2. Greville's depiction of Sidney is questioned in various essays of the commemorative volume, Jan van Dorsten, Dominic Baker-Smith, and Arthur F. Kinney, eds., *Sir Philip Sidney: 1586 and the Creation of a Legend* (Leiden: Publications of the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1986); see also Katherine Duncan-Jones, *Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1991).

3. See John Gouws, "Introduction," in *A Dedication to Sir Philip Sidney*, in *The Prose Works of Fulke Greville*, ed. John Gouws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 3.

4. My own approach to Greville's "rhetoric of subjection," and to the "subject/subjection" of my title, offers less ambivalence than might be argued. I have nevertheless profited from Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8 (1982): 777-95; the works of Stephen Greenblatt, especially *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Richard Helgerson, *Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton and the Literary System* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); and Louis Adrian Montrose, "The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text," in Patricia Parker and David Quint, eds., *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 303-40.

5. For Greville's life and career, see Ronald Rebholz, *The Life of Fulke Greville, First Lord Brooke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

6. Greville's ideological flexibility is noted by F. J. Levy, "The Courtier as Philosophic Poet," *Modern Language Quarterly* 33 (1972): 433-48.

7. A nostalgic interpretation of the *Life* is given by Rebholz, *Life of Greville*, 205-13; cf. Joan Rees, *Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, 1554-1628: A Critical Interpretation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 65-75.

8. Compare Greville's description of Elizabeth in *Life*, chaps. 15-17, with that offered earlier, when he notes the queen's reluctance to involve England in the Wars of Religion. I shall argue that Greville's awareness of the means criticisms of the monarch prompts the final chapters; for an analysis of the means by which Elizabeth maintained her authority, see Christopher Haigh, *Elizabeth I* (London: Longmans, 1988). More recently, part of the reign has been examined by Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

9. Greville's remarks here bear on the problem of counsel as well as the dangers of writing history, the two being neither mutually exclusive nor separately conceived. For an incisive study of the literature of counsel and its inherent dangers, see Daniel Javitch, *Poetry and Courtliness in Renaissance England* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). For Hayward and others, see F. J. Levy, "Hayward, Daniel, and the Beginnings of Politic History in England," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 50 (1987): 1-34; and for the control of history

by the authorities, see D. R. Woolf, "The Power of the Past: History, Ritual and Political Authority in Renaissance England," in Paul A. Fideler and T. F. Mayer, eds., *Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth: Deep Structure, Discourse and Disguise* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 19–49.

10. See Kevin Sharpe, "The Foundations of the Chairs of History at Oxford and Cambridge: An Episode in Jacobean Politics," in his *Politics and Ideas in Early Stuart England: Essays and Studies* (London: Pinter Press, 1989), 207–29.

11. Greville's deliberate use of such terms points up the problem of taxonomy in the Renaissance, for which see the editors' introduction in this volume. See also Nancy S. Struever, *The Language of History in the Renaissance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); D. R. Woolf, *The Idea of History in Early Stuart England* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); and Donald R. Kelley, "The Theory of History," in Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 746–61.

12. Francis Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning*, in *Works of Francis Bacon*, 7 vols., ed. James Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1857–59), 3:337–38.

13. See Michael Brennan, *Literary Patronage in the Renaissance: The Pembroke Family* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), chap. 4; Rees, *Fulke Greville*, 55; and W. A. Ringler, "Sir Philip Sidney: The Myth and the Man," in Jan van Dorsten, Dominic Baker-Smith, and Arthur F. Kinney, eds., *Sir Philip Sidney: 1586 and the Creation of a Legend* (Leiden: Publications of the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1986), 11–13.

14. Charles Fitzgeffrey, *Sir Francis Drake* (London: J. Broome, 1596), sig. B4<sup>v</sup>; Sir Walter Raleigh, "An Epitaph Upon . . . Sir Philip Sidney Knight," in R. S., ed., *Phoenix Nest* (London: I. Jackson, 1593), sig. C1<sup>v</sup>.

15. Sidney, *A Defence of Poetry*, ed. Jan van Dorsten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 26, 37–38.

16. Bacon, *Works*, 3:343ff., 430.

17. Jonathan Dollimore, *Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 78–81, 120–33.

18. *Fulke Greville: The Remains, Being Poems of Monarchy and Religion*, ed. G. A. Wilkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 227, stanza 98.

19. The political contexts of these periods are discussed by J. W. Williamson, *The Myth of the Conqueror, Prince Henry Stuart* (New York: AMS Press, 1978); Roy Strong, *Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1986); Graham Parry, *The Golden Age Restor'd* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981), esp. 64–94; and Thomas Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

20. Cf. Richard Waswo, *The Fatal Mirror: Themes and Techniques in the Poetry of Fulke Greville* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972). Greville could with profit be subjected to an analysis such as Greenblatt's "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," in Patricia Parker and David Quint, eds., *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 210–24.

21. I have profited from the theories of autobiography discussed by William L. Howarth, "Some Principles of Autobiography," in James Olney, ed., *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 84–114; and by James Olney, "The Ontology of Autobiography," *ibid.*, 236–67, esp. 239.

22. See the general introduction in *Prose*, ed. Gouws; and John Gouws, "Fact and Anecdote in Fulke Greville's Account of Sidney's Last Days," in Jan van Dorsten, Dominic Baker-Smith, and Arthur F. Kinney, eds., *Sir Philip Sidney: 1586 and the Creation of a Legend* (Leiden: Publications of the Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1986), 62–82.

23. Gouws, "Fact and Anecdote," 68–69.

24. Greville to Archibald Douglas, 1586, as quoted in Rebholz, *Life of Greville*, 68.

25. Naunton, *Fragmenta Regalia*, quoted in *Poems and Dramas of Fulke Greville*, ed. Geoffrey Bullough, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1939), 1:7; *Aubrey's Brief Lives*, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (London: Secker and Warburg, 1949), 8.

26. *Letter to an Honourable Lady*, in *Prose*, ed. Gouws, p. 158.

27. For Montaigne, see David Lewis Schaefer, *The Political Philosophy of Montaigne* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); for Bacon, *Life and Letters of Francis Bacon*, 7 vols., ed. James Spedding (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1862–74), 4:340, and F. J. Levy, "Francis Bacon and the Style of Politics," *English Literary Renaissance* 16 (1986): 101–22.

28. David Norbrook, *Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 170.

29. *Aubrey's Brief Lives*, ed. Dick, 86.

30. On Davenant, see Martin Butler, "Early Stuart Court Culture: Compliment or Criticism?" *Historical Journal* 32 (1989): 425–35, and idem, "Politics and the Masque: *Salmacida Spolia*," in Thomas Healey and Jonathan Sawday, eds., *Literature and the English Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 59–74. For courtly entertainment under the Tudors and Stuarts, see Sydney Anglo, *Spectacle, Pageantry and Early Tudor Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Alan Young, *Tudor and Jacobean Tournaments* (London: George Philip and Son, 1987); Steven Orgel, *The Illusion of Power* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Parry, *Golden Age Restor'd*;

and R. Malcolm Smuts, *Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987).

31. Greville's style is discussed by Norbrook, *Poetry and Politics*, 171-73; but see also Lauro Martines, *Society and History in English Renaissance Verse* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 86-92.

32. Cf. Samuel Daniel's retreat to prose, discussed in D. R. Woolf, "Community, Law and State: Samuel Daniel's Historical Thought Revisited," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49 (1988): 61-83.

33. Lipsius's role in the emergence of a new order in the early modern period is the subject of Gerhard Oestreich's *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, ed. B. Oestreich and H. G. Koenigsberger, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Mark Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 14-30, focuses on Lipsius and his appropriation of the Roman concept of "contubernium." The rest of the following is developed in my book-in-progress, tentatively entitled *Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).

34. Cf. Anthony Grafton, "Portrait of Justus Lipsius," *American Scholar* 56 (1986/76): 382-90.

35. Cf. the direction of Donne's *Anniversary* poems, where lamentations for Elizabeth Drury lead to considerations on time but end in consolation. Cf. John L. Mahoney, "Donne and Greville: Two Christian Attitudes Toward the Renaissance Idea of Mutability and Decay," *College Language Association Journal* 5 (1962): 203-12.

36. Orthodoxy now has it that absolutism—in England, at least—was perceived as not necessarily a bad thing: see J. W. Daly, "The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England," *Historical Journal* 21 (1978): 227-50.

37. See Jonathan Goldberg, "Authorities," in *James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne, and Their Contemporaries* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), chap. 1; and for some of the ways by which authors subtly circumvented such "politics of literature," see Annabel Patterson, *Censorship and Interpretation: Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

38. Norbrook, *Poetry and Politics*, 160-66.

39. See my "Reason's Muse: Andrew Marvell, R. Fletcher, and the Politics of Poetry in the Engagement Debate," *Albion* 23 (1991): 655-80.