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The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment

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Democracy and democratization have long been heralded as resolutions to coercive governance, but there are at least two ways in which they can influence state repressive activity. In one, both killing and restriction are reduced (i.e., behavior is "pacified"); in another, killing is diminished while political restrictions are continued (i.e., behavior is "tamed"). Much research has explored the first possibility, but none has addressed the second. Examining 137 countries from 1976 to 1996, I find that democracy generally pacifies state repression and that democratization tends to increase both forms of repressive behavior—especially political restrictions, which provides support for the taming argument. However, the impact of both variables is occasionally minimal, when compared against domestic and international conflict. Therefore, while one may look to democracy as a resolution to repression, it is clear that individuals must also consider the overarching political context when assessing relationships.

Some governments restrict the rights of those under their territorial jurisdiction, some governments kill their citizens, some restrict and kill, and some do not engage in either behavior. What accounts for this variation? Many have argued that the answer lies in the degree to which the political system adopts some form of procedural democracy[1] (e.g., Russell, 1938 [1960]; Dahl, 1966, 1989; Goldstein, 1983; Rummel, 1997; Gurr, 2000; Tilly, 2000a, b). Here, a country's type of government directly influences the manner in which state's use power against citizens and when this structure is democratic in nature less repression would exist.[2] This I refer to as the promise of democratic pacification. The logic here is rather straightforward. Democracy, through its institutions: (1) eliminates the *desire* for repressive activity by opening up the political system to its members, (2) eliminates the *need* for repression by providing other mechanisms of influence, and (3) eliminates the *capacity* for repressive behavior by curtailing the freedom of coercive agents within society. The world over, this proposition has not only influenced everyday citizens, social movements, and revolutionaries who have spent enormous human resources to bring it to life, but it has also influenced NGOs, private corporations, and govern-

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[1] Here, Democracy is used in the Dahlian (1971, 1989) sense whereby one is considering the process by which individuals within a society can influence decision makers in some manner (e.g., through contestation and participation). The manner in which this can be achieved varies significantly. For example, one could highlight the occurrence of elections or they could highlight the limitations placed on executive authority.

[2] Some may refer to this as "liberalization" (i.e., the provision of certain protections for political and civil liberties [O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986: 7]). While the two labels essentially mean the same thing, the literatures are distinct from one another.

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ment leaders who have spent enormous financial resources and political wherewithal toward the same end.[3]

After 30 years worth of rigorous empirical analysis, the pacification argument appears quite successful. All quantitative studies investigating the subject have identified that political systems with democratic institutions have lower rates (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; King, 1998; Davenport, 1999) as well as lower levels of repressive behavior (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Fein, 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000). Consistent with the argument, two studies have also identified that democratization (i.e., regime change toward democracy) has a negative influence as well, respectively, decreasing rates (Davenport, 1999) and levels (Zanger, 2000) of repression. The implications of this work are clear: if one wants to decrease human rights violations, then they should democratize in some manner.

Despite the consistency in findings, however, questions remain. For example, no one has yet examined whether or not democracy and democratization "pacifies" state power—reducing both restrictions and killing (e.g., Russell, 1938 [1960])—or if they "tame" this behavior—reducing killing but having little or no effect on the use of restrictions (e.g., Dahl, 1966).[4] Usually research only considers one form of repression at a time or they combine techniques, but without simultaneously considering the presence of each form of repressive action researchers would not be able to identify the diverse ways in which coercion is applied and they might misunderstand what is taking place within different contexts because of how they operationalize the behavior of interest. The differences between the two strategies are significant because in the first scenario democracy "works" and absolutely. Here, non-coercive governance is facilitated, our concern with repression is ended and the extensive amount of resources that are spent on the development of specific institutions is wholly justified. In the latter scenario, democracy "works," but partially. Here, only a shift in coercive practices is facilitated, our concern with repression is not ended and the expense of resources is justified only with regard to decreasing the most egregious forms of state activity. Indeed, in this latter situation the promise of democracy is unfulfilled.

Within this article, I seek to shed some light on how democracy and democratization influence state-sponsored restriction and violence. Within a cross-national examination of 137 countries from 1976 to 1996, results are partially supportive of the pacification argument but with somewhat greater complexity and somewhat less explanatory power than anticipated. As found, when the level of constraint on executive discretion is significant (the measure of democracy used within this study), most combinations of repression are decreased but one is positively influenced—where restrictions are low but violence is high. Movement toward full constraint (i.e., democratization) leads to various combinations of restriction and killing but not at the highest values of the latter, indicating that repression is tamed. Research further discloses that the presence of domestic and international conflict generally increases the severity of repressive action and frequently outweighs the impact wielded by the two democracy variables. During the Third Wave,[5] therefore, placement at the democratic end of a political continuum essentially resolves the problem of human rights violation, but traversing the continuum toward democracy and confronting diverse forms of conflict proves to be hazardous for citizen's rights.

[3] For example, relevant NGOs include The National Endowment of Democracy, U.S. Aid and Development (USAID), and the Open Society Institute in the U.S.; The Westminster Foundation for Democracy in Britain; and the Hans Seidel Foundation in Germany. International government organizations include the Organization of American States and the World Bank.

[4] In fact, only in one instance have the two been examined together as distinct, alternative strategies that could be applied by authorities in their efforts to influence society (McCormick and Mitchell, 1997).

[5] This extends from 1974 to the present.

Below, the article begins with an assessment of why governments use repression. A discussion of the diverse strategies available to authorities for coercing citizens and the impact that democracy and democratization has on these alternatives follows. Within the next section, I address the data as well as the methodological technique employed for the analysis. I then move to a discussion of the empirical results. The conclusion summarizes the most important elements of the investigation and identifies some lucrative areas for future research.

Why Authorities Coerce

The literature on state repression[6] is generally unified in its characterization of why this behavior is used (e.g., Dahl, 1966; Dallin and Breslauer, 1970; Gurr, 1986; Duvall and Stohl, 1988; Karklins and Peterson, 1993; Simon, 1994; Lichbach, 1995). The model itself is simple. After considering various benefits and costs as well as how the political-economic context influences these factors, authorities decide whether they should use repressive behavior. If costs exceed benefits, then repression is not applied. If, alternatively, benefits exceed costs, then repression is employed. The costs to state authorities are clearly enough understood: when used, repression can provoke resistance, deplete human and material resources, and reduce political legitimacy at home as well as abroad. The benefits of this behavior are equally clear as well: when used, leaders can eliminate opposition, stay in power, and bolster perceived legitimacy as individuals come to understand that the state has the monopoly of force within society.

Having settled on an acceptable theoretical framework, the bulk of quantitative research has concerned itself with refining the examination of specific explanatory variables. Three, in particular, have received the bulk of this attention and gained the most support.[7]

Dissent Provokes

The first explanatory factor consistently identified in the literature concerns mass protest (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 2000, 2004; Francisco, 1996; Krain, 1997; King, 1998; Moore, 1998; Davenport, Mueller, and Johnston, 2004). With regard to this variable, research finds that dissent provokes governments to respond to them with coercion. The theoretical model identified above is relevant to the extent that, in facing protest, the benefits of repression are increased as the government's position and popular perception of their capacity is strengthened by the reduction of the "domestic threat." Additionally, protest decreases the costs of repression by providing authorities with a legitimate mandate to sanction those under their territorial jurisdiction (e.g., see Goldstein, 1978; Franks, 1989). Within these contexts, states are able to frame their activity as "law and order" measures, which both domestic as well as foreign audiences are more likely to support. This situation is juxtaposed against those where repressive activities are not responding to "threats." Within "threatening" contexts, people view repression as more malicious and illegitimate in nature.

Repression Persists

The second explanatory factor of interest concerns the use of repressive activity in the past (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1996; Poe et al., 1999).

[6] One could refer to this work under different labels: for example, state terror, political repression, negative sanctions, human rights violations, protest policing, etc.

[7] While numerous other factors have been identified as relevant (e.g., trade dependence, ethnicity, and population [growth as well as density]), the ones highlighted here have been identified most consistently and they tend to have the most substantive influences relative to other factors.

Regarding this relationship, Gurr (1986:160) states that,

> (o)nce (specialized agencies of state coercion) are in operation, elites are likely to calculate that the relative costs of relying on coercion are lower…These strategic considerations tend to be reinforced by habituation; in other words, the development of elite norms that coercive control is not only necessary but also desirable. Moreover, a bureaucratic "law of the instrument" may prevail: The professional ethos of agencies of control centers on the use of coercion to restrain challenges to state authority. Their directors may therefore recommend violent "solutions" to suspected opposition, or use their position to initiate them, as a means of justifying the agencies' continued existence (thus providing a benefit to the agents as well as to those who rely upon them).

Once applied, therefore, repression persists.

Democracy Pacifies

The last explanatory factors consistently used and supported in the literature are the ones most relevant to the present study—democracy and democratization (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Fein, 1995; Richards, 1997; King, 1998; Davenport, 1999; Poe et al., 1999; Zanger, 2000). Although conceptualized in different ways (e.g., holding elections, executive constraints, the regulation of political participation and so forth), the impact of these variables on repressive activity is similar across researchers; by increasing the cost of repression while simultaneously decreasing the benefits the use of relevant behavior is diminished.

Regarding this influence, there are several points that are worthy of note. First, democracy and democratization are expected to alter the priorities of political leaders by making them (re)consider the implications of their actions for their tenure in office (the "vote the bastards out" argument [Rummel, 1997:ch. 9]). Within these contexts, governments carefully weigh the implications of their actions as they must be wary of damaging other interests which might intersect with their own or those of their associates and constituency. Second, democratic institutions change the expectations of citizens as well as authorities with regard to how superordinates treat constituents thus imposing another form of political cost. Democracy also alters the benefits of repression accrued to political leaders. By establishing a system by which power is constrained as well as rotated, the willingness of individuals to use coercion in order to stay in power diminishes. In a sense, leaders would not need to treat each day or year as if it might be their last, for (ideally) they could return later. Additionally, the role of those most directly engaged in repression is influenced as well (e.g., police, military personnel and the secret service). Within democratic systems, agents of repression would be less likely to engage or lobby for repression that could reduce their access to resources and prestige in the future. In fact, these agents are less able to function in these contexts without some form of civilian oversight or degree of accountability to non-repressive actors, compelling them to exert greater effort in justifying their action. In sum, democracy pacifies.

While useful for providing a general understanding of repressive behavior and for guiding the rigorous investigation of causal determinants, the existing literature tells us essentially nothing about the selection between different types of repression that are available to authorities and how democracy and democratization influences this selection.[8] I address this below.

[8] I accept that while many restrictions on political and civil liberties involve physical activity (e.g., mass arrests); they involve relatively little violence when compared to disappearances, torture and so forth.

To Kill and/or Not to Sanction

Most of the literature on repressive activity characterizes the world as one where all authorities use a certain amount of coercive behavior against those within their jurisdiction. In this world, the degree to which states restrict and kill their citizens serves as the only criterion of differentiation.[9] Interestingly, it is common to treat these two options as though they were equivalent.[10] Individuals who investigate the different repressive forms frequently cite one another and suggest that their research is linked to and guided by work within the other community (e.g., regarding violence see Poe and Tate [1994]; regarding restrictions see Davenport [1999]). Some even combine the two strategies within their investigations, making no distinctions at all (e.g., Freedom House's political liberties measure). Are state-sponsored restriction and killing equivalent? Do these two repressive strategies consistently move together in response to the same causal forces or do they exhibit distinct relationships? In order to better understand state coercive behavior as well as the argument of democratic pacification, within this article I disaggregate repression into violent (personal integrity violations) and non- or less-violent activities (restrictions of political/civil liberties), and use this division as the basis for investigating causal influences.[11] The key to such an inquiry is to consider the similarities and differences across the two forms of state power as well as the meaning of distinct combinations.

When one considers the topic, it is clear that some characteristics are similar between violent and non/less-violent repression. For instance, both send a signal to citizens that some behavior/thought is not permissible, both seek to establish some measure of behavioral quiescence within the populous, and both can be directed at dissident leaders, rank and file members or everyday citizens. Of course, there are several differences as well. For example, killing does not allow victims to modify their behavior because it eliminates them. By contrast, restrictions establish parameters within which individuals can modify behavior in an attempt to avoid sanctions in the future.[12] Another difference concerns the fact that killing citizens is a way of eliminating a part of society that is deemed unacceptable while compelling others into acquiescence or guided change. The act is thus aimed at the will of those remaining and then their capacity to act. When states restrict citizens, however, they are trying less to remove individuals/groups from society than mold them within it, demarcating where members can and cannot go as well as invariably who they can and cannot be. In other words, they are aiming first at capacity and then will.[13]

The differences identified above are important because they lead to distinct costs and benefits for political leaders and thus they lead to different expectations about when we would see restrictions, killing, both or neither. For example, with regard to state-sponsored violence, authorities benefit from the elimination of troublemakers within the nation-state and the fear that such elimination would provoke within the citizenry. At the same time, governments using this strategy might have to pay the cost of diminished political legitimacy and increased antagonism from the populace. With regard to the imposition of restrictions, authorities benefit from the diminished capacity of those who challenge them (as they have to navigate around curfews, bans and so forth). Simultaneously, however, political authorities using this strategy might have to pay the cost of managing the restrictions they

[9] Political and civil liberties and personal integrity violations have been the most consistently identified strategies of repression. This does not consider other techniques of governance: ignoring/tolerating or accommodating.

[10] For exceptions, see McCormick and Mitchell (1997) and Cingranelli and Richards (1999).

[11] The latter can involve violence but this is less consistently the case.

[12] Literature on state terror (e.g., Stohl and Lopez, 1983) makes this distinction, but never is it made outside of this context.

[13] Clearly, there is some variance here. The licensing of associations is different from the banning of a political organization. My classification system places these two together without highlighting any differences.

impose (the individuals involved in enacting and monitoring curfews and bans receive salaries).[14] Additionally, after taking action authorities may suffer from a loss in political legitimacy and the fact that the organizational capacity of challengers may return in the future.

The differences are also important because of what they communicate to us about what different strategic combinations attempt to achieve. For example, *Pacific* authorities would be those who neither restrict nor eliminate citizens. Here, government is trying to facilitate popular involvement in political and social life, staying out of the way as much as possible. A more *Tame* (or restrictive) repressive strategy would exist where restrictions on capacity are applied but where killing was limited or non-existent. Here, there is more of an attempt to restrain the parameters of political engagement—reducing the ease with which alternative ideas and behaviors can be expressed, while avoiding the most violent forms of state repression. A situation of *State Terror* would exist where there are limited restrictions on citizens and elimination is quite common. Here, there is an assault on those within society in an effort to remove the most threatening elements but there is little attempt made to restrain or guide political activity/thought with restrictions. Finally, a situation of *Overkill* exists where both restrictions and killing are significant. In this case, authorities have essentially declared war on the citizenry: they attempt to constrain the parameters of political engagement and they attempt to eliminate those deemed unlikely to play by the rules.

The Why and When of Pacification

The discussion has thus far questioned the equivalence of diverse forms of state repressive activity but it is also appropriate to question the equivalence of causal influences wielded by democracy and democratization (our primary explanatory factors of interest). Within existing literature the impact of the former has been the focus of analysis (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995); hardly any attention has been given to the latter (e.g., Davenport, 1999; Zanger, 2000). These two aspects of democracy should not be treated as if they were comparable to one another because they reference very different influences on political authorities. For example, levels of democracy identify the impact of relatively stable sets of institutional characteristics that exist over a particular period of time and space (e.g., Gurr, 1974; Sorenson, 1993:1483; Mitchell, Gates, Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 1998:234). To say that the level of democracy influences repression, therefore, we mean that a specific configuration of established institutions effects the application of government activity because of what institutions have been and what they have done. In contrast, democratization (or movements toward democracy) identifies a set of institutional characteristics that are being built over a particular period of time and space (e.g., Sorensen, 1993; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Hegre et al., 1998; Crescenzi, 1999). To speak of democratization influencing repression, therefore, we mean that during the process of building a set of institutions repression is effected because of what these authority patterns are becoming and what they are doing. The distinction is worthwhile to make because some research suggests that "being" and "becoming" democratic yield very different influences on repressive behavior (e.g., Goldstein, 1983).

Concerning "becoming" democratic, it has been argued that the move toward democracy accompanies: (1) a normative commitment made by new authorities to/with citizens about how they will and will not treat them, (2) the incorporation of

[14]This is not to say that those who kill citizens do not have to be paid, but rather to suggest that those who engage in sustained and labor-intensive repressive activities (like the imposition of martial law) are likely paid more frequently over time.

new mechanisms of social control which tend to emphasize communication and cooperation over coercion, as well as (3) a substantive shift in the influence of repressive agents within society (e.g., Rummel, 1997). In this context, we would expect democratization to decrease restriction as well as killing for this form of regime change represents an increased respect for human life and political freedom. It may be the case, however, that the various commitments made and mechanisms developed during the process of regime change are partial or unstable in nature, whereby democratic change would decrease killing, but would have no impact on the use of political restrictions. Earlier I referred to this as "taming." Within this repressive strategy, a certain respect for human life exists but at the same time, it acknowledges that authorities may still attempt to guide the population in a particular direction with certain forms of political restriction.

Concerning "being" democratic, the situation is quite different. In this context, much of the uncertainty and anxiety experienced in transitional societies is gone. Here, objectives have likely been met, normative commitments have been realized and the habits of tolerant government have been established. As a result, fully democratic states are expected to be the least repressive, i.e., they are expected to be completely "pacified" (e.g., Gurr, 1986; Franks, 1989; Rummel, 1997). Of course, one might also adopt a perspective that while killing is in many ways antithetical to democratic governance, restrictions are less so because they frequently invoke the law, legal institutions and some semblance of popular accountability, for example, curfews utilize public declarations, mass arrests involve legal ordinances, and so forth (Goldstein, 1978). From this, one could argue that while democracy reduces the amount of state-sponsored killing, it may not have much of an impact on the use of political restriction or it may keep these activities out of the most severe categories for it is partially consistent with this form of government.

Data and Method

To examine the impact of democracy and democratization on different combinations of repressive technique, I rely upon numerous databases and some conventional methods of analysis. Each is discussed below.

Measuring Repression

To operationalize human rights violations, I sought indicators of state-sponsored restriction and violence that provided global coverage over a relatively large amount of time, yearly observation, and reliability as well as validity. Although several measures were available, only two met all three of these criteria.

Concerning *restrictions*, I use the measure of civil liberties provided by *Freedom House* (Karatnycky, 1999), which is available from 1976 to the present. Although widely used,[15] the particularities of the measure receive little attention. This is important within the current study because the meaning of the different values within the measure is crucial to understand.

[15]The Freedom House measure has recently been used as an indicator of political democracy but it was initially used and essentially created to measure state repression and human rights (e.g., Goldstein, 1986: 620; Stohl, Carleton, Lopez, and Samuels, 1986: 599); indeed, the U.S. State Department used it to develop their own human rights status reports (Scoble and Wiseberg, 1981: 152) and Gastil (the creator of the measure) identifies that what they do at the organization is comparable to the work of other human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (Gastil cited in Scoble and Wiseberg, 1981: 162). According to Gastil, "civil rights are the rights of the individual against the state, rights to free expression, to a fair trial; they are what most of us mean by freedom" (Gastil, 1973: 5). The measure thus captures an outcome of a political process and allows one to evaluate whether or not a particular nation-state is "free" (i.e., not repressed in a negative rights manner). This does not capture the process by which one could achieve freedom, i.e., political democracy as conceived by Dahl, Schumpeter and others.

In order to answer a series of 13 questions,[16] "a broad range of international sources of information (are consulted), including both foreign and domestic news reports, NGO publications, think tank and academic analyses, and individual professional contacts" (Karatnycky, 1999:546). From this information, a 7-point indicator is developed. As designed, a score of "1" represents those countries that "come closest to the ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion" (Karatnycky, 1999: 551); Examples include: the U.S., Trinidad between 1987 and 1993, and Japan from 1976 to 1990. The score of "2" represents a situation where the country has "deficiencies in three of four aspects of civil liberties, but are still relatively free" (Karatnycky, 1999: 551); Examples include Costa Rica 1993–1996, Gambia 1976–1980, and Poland 1990–1996. "Countries…which have received a rating of 3, 4 and 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on other questions" (Karatnycky, 1999: 551); Respectively, examples include: Nigeria 1978–1983, Guatemala 1977–1978, and Hungary from 1977 to 1986. Finally, the score of "6" denotes a situation where there are few rights and a score of "7" denotes a situation where there is "virtually no freedom" (Karatnycky, 1999: 552). Respectively, examples include: Haiti 1976–1985 and Congo (Kinshasa) 1982–1988.

Concerning *violence*, I use the 5-point measure of personal integrity violation conceived by numerous scholars (e.g., Stohl and Carleton, 1985; Gibney, Dalton, Vockell, 1992), and later extended by Poe and Tate (1994) as well as Poe et al. (1999) for the years 1976 to 1996.[17] Known as the "Political Terror Scale," this indicator emerges from a systematic coding of Amnesty International and State Department country reports. As Poe et al. (1999:297) indicate,

> (t)he application of the criteria to information about the occurrence of political imprisonment, execution, disappearances, and torture yields ordered indices of personal integrity abuse or political terror… The coding categories and their criteria are:
> 1—Countries (within this category are) under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, torture is rare or exceptional…(and) political murders are extremely infrequent (Examples include: the U.S., Venezuela 1977 and 1981, and Senegal 1976–1981);
> 2—(Within this category) (t)here is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional…political murder is rare (Examples include: Mexico 1976 and 1983 as well as Gambia 1982);
> 3—(Within this category) (t)here is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted (Examples include: Cuba 1976, Cameroon 1979, and Poland 1976–1977);
> 4—(Within this category) (t)he practices of (Level 3) are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life…In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas (Examples include: El Salvador 1978–1992 and Rwanda 1990–1991); (and)
> 5—(Within this category) (t)he terrors of (Level 4) have been expanded to the whole population…The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals (Examples include: Haiti 1991, Sudan 1988, Rwanda 1994–1996 and China 1989).

[16]The Freedom House yearly review provides these questions (e.g., Karatnycky, 1999: 548–549).

[17]These data went to 1993 but through personal correspondence with the creators, I was able to obtain data through 1996.

TABLE 1. Alternative Strategies of Repression

	Political Terror Scale Dimension	
No/Low Killing	*Medium Levels of Killing*	*High Levels of Killing*
Civil liberties dimension		
No/low restrictions (1) Examples: US, France ($N = 659$)	(2) Examples: Chile 1990–1992, Angola 1976 ($N = 19$)	(3) Examples: South Africa 1995–1996, Philippines 1986 ($N = 45$)
Medium levels of restriction (4) Examples: Mexico 1976 and 1983, Bulgaria 1990–1992 ($N = 599$)	(5) Examples: Haiti 1979, Sudan 1979, South Korea 1977 ($N = 395$)	(6) Examples: Nicaragua 1979, India 1985 ($N = 234$)
High levels of restriction (7) Examples: Bulgaria 1979–1980, Ghana 1984–1988, Qatar 1992–1996 ($N = 300$)	(8) Examples: Cuba 1976, Burundi 1986, Cambodia 1978–1981 ($N = 269$)	(9) Examples: Guatemala 1980–1984, Rwanda 1994–1996, China 1989 ($N = 295$)

N = number of cases.

To construct my dependent variable, I overlay the two measures above[18] and divide them into nine categories.[19] Specifically, I identified low, medium and high values for each measure (provided by the creators themselves). Across these respective categories, the values for *Freedom House* were "1" and "2" for the lowest levels of restriction, "3", "4" and "5" for the moderate applications, and "6" and "7" for the highest levels. Across the same categories, the values for the Political Terror Scale were "1" and "2" for the lowest levels of violation, "3" for the moderate application, and "4" and "5" for the highest levels. I identify each combination below in Table 1.

While the table is self-explanatory, two points are worthy of note. First, the largest single number of nation-years is concentrated in the least repressive category (cell 1). Second, along the same row, I find the cells with the smallest number of nation-years exist within cells two and three. From this, one could conclude that during the 1976–1996 period, it was rarely the case that political restrictions were low and state-sponsored killing was moderate to high; it was frequently the case, however, that both were limited.

Measuring Regime Type

Equally as important as the indicator used for repression are the measures used for democracy and democratization. On this point, there has been much discussion about which indicator is most appropriate, as one must choose between: (1) those that are unidimensional or multidimensional in nature, (2) those where elements of participation and contestation are highlighted exclusively or simultaneously (e.g., see Inkeles, 1993; Alvarez and Cheibub, 1996; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002),[20] and (3) those that are nominal or ordinal (e.g., Adcock and Collier, 2000).

[18]Both of the measures identified above have been discussed numerous times with regard to their validity and reliability and thus I will not go into too much detail here (for Freedom House, see Bollen, 1986:85–86; Goldstein, 1986: 620; Stohl et al., 1986: 599; Munck and Verkuilen, 2000: 24; for the Political Terror Scale measure from Poe and Tate (1994), see Poe et al., 1998).

[19]One could argue that the two indicators overlap in certain respects. For example, Poe and Tate pay attention to political imprisonment and trial activity while *Freedom House* pays attention to similar items. Additionally, the authors of the *Freedom House* measure do note that they consider political violence at extremely high levels, albeit inconsistently. Despite potential similarities, the two indicators correlate at .54 and conceptually these areas of interest are distinct enough to draw meaningful distinctions.

[20]See Inkeles (1993) and Munck and Verkuilen (2001) for decent reviews.

While existing indicators are quite useful, I deviate from current practices by using a different indicator from those usually employed. In an effort to identify a characteristic of the political system that logically and explicitly alters the repressive decision calculus made by authorities and one that does not conflate characteristics of democracy with repression, I avoided the use of democratic indices and focused on one component of the governing apparatus. Specifically, I choose to employ the measure of "Executive Constraints" within the Polity IV database created by Ted Gurr and Associates (Gurr, 1974; Eckstein and Gurr, 1975; Gurr et al., 1989; Gurr, 1990). I feel the measure selected here more closely follows what existing theory as well as public policy suggests and one that allows me to more clearly, as well as parsimoniously, identify the conception of democracy that I am using (Collier and Levitsky, 1997).[21]

This indicator,

> (r)efers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups" (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000:21).

The measure clearly finds a home within literature on democratic theory with its interests on "checks and balances" and "veto points." Additionally, it clearly fits the criteria identified above: it directly alters the repressive decision calculus as the political authorities would be well aware of any limitations that existed on their office, and it is clearly distinct from state repression, as it does not concern the influence of specific state activity on citizens.[22] In addition to this, a measure of executive constraint is consistent with numerous other measures of democracy available in the literature.[23]

To operationalize this variable, Gurr developed a 7-point scale. The first value ("1") represents a situation of "unlimited authority" (e.g., Guatemala 1982–1984; Rwanda 1976–1992; Iran 1976–1978).[24] Here, "there are no regular limitations on the executive's actions" (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000:21). Evidence of this category exists where legislatures and other groups within society are unable to control

[21]When one reads existing literature, it is not clear what it was about democracy that alters the decision-making process and state behavior. Research suggests many things (e.g., holding fully contested elections with full suffrage and without fraud, establishing representative political parties, etc.). None, however, appear to pinpoint exactly what many democratic theorists, NGOs and activists have discussed with reference to modifying repression.

[22]While it seems plausible that groups could not make the authorities "accountable" without first being able to freely associate, this is not such a clear-cut situation. Just because a group is "free" to assemble does not mean that they have an interest in exerting or the capability to exert power over central authorities. Additionally, the military can serve as an accountability group and there is no necessity that this organization be "free" to assemble in order to exert such an influence. In short, civil liberties as measured by Freedom House are not a constraint on the executive as coded within the Polity database. In contrast, I can see that the measure for the "Regulation of Participation" overlaps with civil liberties.

[23]One may refer to my strategy as one of a "diminished subtype" (Collier and Levitsky, 1997) as I am trying to achieve analytic differentiation as well as avoid conceptual stretching. My claim to capture "democraticness" is thus modest to the extent that I leave several components unaddressed. One can group different components of the typical democracy measure into three general categories: (1) those factors relevant to how authorities use power and how this influences what people can do, "top-down" interactions (e.g., the discretionary capabilities of political leaders), those factors relevant to how systems of participation function, "horizontal" interactions (e.g., the right of political leaders to compete for support, eligibility for public office), and the actual behavior of the masses, "bottom-up" interactions (e.g., voting). The second and the third correspond to what Dahl (1971) as well as others refer to as "Contestation" and "Participation," respectively. The first represents a distinction that is somewhat lost in this conceptualization, but something that is essential for any reasonable definition of democracy—the limitation of central authority. Such a distinction was not missed by Dahl; he has long understood that the limitation of state coercive power was intricately connected with the development of democracy (1966:xvi, 1971:50, 1989:3; also see Held [1996]). Not only have important democratic theorists and historians paid attention to this factor, but most of the data sets have as well (e.g., see Munck and Verkuilen [2001]). Indeed, when one considers the distribution of factors across data sets, it is clear that top-down interactions dominate.

[24]In this situation, constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored, no legislative assembly exists, and decrees are repeatedly used as the means to govern.

important appointments to government or influence policy decisions. The second value represents an intermediate category (e.g., Poland 1981–1982), bridging the gap between value "1" (discussed above) and category "3" (e.g., Jordan 1989–1996), which represents situations where there is "slight to moderate limitation on executive authority" (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000:21). Value "4" constitutes another intermediary category (e.g., Poland 1989–1990) bridging the gap between "3" and category "5" (e.g., Sri Lanka 1978–1996), which represents a situation where substantial limitations exist. Evidence of this category exists where legislatures counteract directives made from executives or when other groups within the society are able to control important appointments to government as well as various policy decisions. Value "6" represents another intermediary category (e.g., Haiti 1990), between "5" and "7" (e.g., U.S. 1976–1996; Haiti 1996; Chile 1989–1996; Hungary 1990–1996), where accountability groups are able to completely counteract the executive or initiate decisions on their own. Instances of democratization are calculated by differencing this measure.[25]

Measuring Context

The analysis also controls for several variables consistently used within empirical analyses of state repression. First, I consider two indicators of *Protest,* drawing upon my earlier work (Davenport, 1995).[26] For these measures, the observation of several dissident events were obtained from Banks' (1998) *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*—strikes, guerrilla warfare, riots, and protest demonstrations, and variables were constructed: cumulative conflict (i.e., the sum total of all protest events for a given nation-year), which ranges from "0" to "49," and the "degree of violence" present within dissident activity (i.e., whether or not guerilla warfare and/or riots took place), which is coded dichotomously. I expect that political authorities are more seriously challenged and thus more likely to use repression when the amount of conflict is high and when challengers are using violence. Within these contexts, we are more likely to encounter the repressive strategies identified in cells 2 through 9 within Table 1.

In line with other research, I consider the influence of civil war and interstate conflict as measured within the Correlates of War database (Singer and Small, 1994). As the former represents the greatest military threat that can confront authorities domestically, I would expect it to increase the likelihood of the most repressive cells (5, 6, 8 and 9 in Table 1). By contrast, international war represents an international threat that can either: (1) undermine the capacity/willingness of the state to address domestic issues, keeping authorities pacific or tamed and away from more extreme applications of repression (increasing the likelihood of observing

[25]I clearly lose some information here with my admittedly minimalist conception of democracy. For example, while one can identify democratic states (i.e., those that have some restrictions on the executive) quite readily, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which citizens are engaged in the democratic process (e.g., how many vote). Many would not call a country that did not possess these two characteristics "democratic" at all. Again, I would respond that most of the literature relevant to the domestic democratic peace argument does not allow one to pinpoint what exactly it is about a democracy that elicits pacifying influences on governments. Explicitly, I have relied upon the insights of Dahl (1966, 1971, 1989) who consistently highlights the weakening of central authority—the first and most fundamental aspect of democratic governance. By highlighting the limitations of central authority I thus stay within the literature but return to a much neglected aspect of it as well as much of historical experience.

[26]Davenport (1995) also uses a variable referred to as "deviation" in protest behavior from the cultural norm (i.e., the degree to which dissent within a particular year deviated from the mean of the country's experience over the full time period under investigation) and one labeled conflict "variety" (the number of different strategies used by challengers). Both are problematic and not used within this analysis. As the deviance measure relies upon future behavior, it was determined that this was inappropriate. Additionally, the variety measure was highly correlated with both of the remaining variables (the relationship between violence and conflict variety [.78] and between cumulative conflict and conflict variety [.73]) and this made it extremely difficult to ascertain causal relationships. When included, the variety variable was never significant and it suppressed the significance of the others. When removed the results were changed.

cells 1, 2, and 4 in Table 1), or (2) it can increase the desire to control the domestic situation, compelling authorities to use various forms of repressive activity (increasing the likelihood of observing cells 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 in Table 1).

Finally, this study controls for the influence of economic development as measured by GNP per capita (also obtained from Poe et al., 1999). It is generally argued that more developed countries are the least repressive because they do not have to use this behavior in order to control their societies (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995). If this is true, then economic development should increase the likelihood of cells 1, 2, and 4 in Table 1 while decreasing the others. It may also be the case that given the cost of political restriction and the relative inexpensiveness of political killing economic development might increase the likelihood of cells 4 through 9.

Methodological Technique

While one may agree about the importance of identifying and investigating distinct combinations of repressive strategies as well as their causal determinants, exactly how one estimates such a model is a non-trivial matter.[27] For example, one can analyze categories where they sit along some continuum or one can analyze categories where they are unranked. To investigate the rigor of the pacification argument, I address both possibilities.

Some Things are Just Worse Than Others: Repressive Categories with Reason and Rhyme

Initially, I employ an ordered-logit model (Long, 1997) to investigate the impact of democracy and democratization on state repression. This type of methodological technique allows one to investigate a dependent variable where the categories are rank ordered (i.e., where certain forms of repression are worse than other forms). By what criteria can one arrange the categories identified earlier? One could argue that most individuals would prefer to be restricted (with the possibility of the action being later withdrawn and life continued) than killed (with no possibility of reversal and no life). Additionally, one could argue that violent actions are so undesirable that individuals would be willing to accept higher levels of civil liberty restriction before they would be willing to move up the scale on state violence. As a result, while complete pacification is the preferred situation (cell 1), the degree to which behavior is tamed serves as the criteria by which other activities are evaluated and ordered. Such a perspective would rank the categories identified in Table 1 as follows: 1 (the lowest value), followed by 4, 7, 2, 5, 8, 3, 6, and, finally, 9 (the highest value).

Of course, while utilizing this approach one must be concerned with specific problems that plague the analysis of panel data. For example, in an effort to address the fact that observations are likely independent across countries but not within them, when models are estimated the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance is used.[28] This allows us to obtain robust standard errors. One small, but significant, addition to the ordered logit equation concerns the use of a lagged dependent variable.[29] Within this context, the previous existence of violent state repression

[27]Most of the research in this area employed some variant of OLS regression within their analyses (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995). In order to use a technique for estimation, however, one must carefully consider the type of data that one is analyzing. In certain circumstances, regression would not be appropriate. This I consider within the text below.

[28]Within Stata version 7, this is specified with the "robust" and "cluster" options under "OLOGIT."

[29]This variable is normally included for both theoretical as well as methodological reasons. Concerning the former, past repressive activity influences later repression as it alters habits, expectations and the like. Concerning the latter, it is believed that one must address the issue of temporal autocorrelation (which is frequently addressed within this work [e.g., Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995]).

influences latter activity. This follows from the existing literature but I do not use it consistently throughout my investigation (discussed below).

It's All Bad: Repression with No Rhyme and Surely No Reason

The appropriateness of the ordered logit model is conditional upon one accepting the argument that one can rank the various categories of repression identified in Table 1. This is somewhat unclear, however, for although we can all accept that we should begin in cell "1" (the least repressive category), it is not exactly clear where one should go from there. Should one consider no/low restriction and middle range values of killing (cell "2") as the next value on some scale or should one consider no/low killing and middle range values of restriction (cell "4") as the next repressive category? Which is worse; which is better? Additionally, rank ordering of the categories does not really allow one to examine the differences that might exist across diverse combinations of repression (e.g., exploring the difference between "taming" and "pacification"). It may be the case that certain independent variables explain cell 5 while others are better at explaining cell 8 or cell 1. One should allow for flexibility, especially in an area, which has not explored the particular combination of behaviors examined within this article.

To address these concerns, I employ the use of a multinomial logistic regression (e.g., Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Zang and Hoffman, 1993:194; Greene, 2000:ch. 19). This technique is utilized for there are nine outcomes that are possible with the dependent variable, which are mutually exclusive and unordered. Within the estimated model,[30] I utilized the repressive strategy where restrictions exist within the middle range and where no killing took place as the base category (cell 4 in Table 1).[31] Theory and history guided the selection of the comparison group. It appears that most states during the Third Wave restricted their citizens (to some degree) but not all engaged in campaigns to kill them.[32] Again, I use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance to obtain robust standard errors.

This methodological technique suffers from three limitations. At the outset, one must admit that the coefficients derived from multinomial logit models are difficult to interpret. In their raw form, coefficients are log-odds.[33] In an effort to overcome this difficulty, all coefficients have been converted into relative risk ratios (which provide the relative risk of an independent variable having an impact relative to the base category). Additionally, it is not possible to include a lagged dependent variable within this model because each of the values is estimated separately (i.e., each cell in Table 1).[34] As a result, in this model we are not able to consider the impact of

[30]The "MLOGIT" command in Stata version 7.0.

[31]It should be noted that when one interprets the results that the parameter estimate for a given independent variable identifies the influence of this factor on placement within a specific category for (or value of) the dependent variable. If, for example, a positive value for independent variable X is found for repressive category "1" (no/low restriction and no/low killing), then this means that the likelihood of being within this category is increased by this factor. If a negative value for independent variable X is found for repressive category "7" (no/low killing and high restriction), then this means that the likelihood of being within this category is decreased by this factor.

[32]This selection is unimportant for estimation purposes as the alternative estimations are simply linear transformations of the others (Liao, 1994).

[33]As stated by Whitten and Palmer (1996:235) "each parameter estimate is the predicted marginal impact of an independent variable on the log of the probability (log-odds) ratio of the *j*th category to the baseline category (which was set to zero so as to standardize the estimates)." "More specifically," they continue, "if in a (multinomial logit model the) coefficient is positive, then an increase in the independent variable results in an increase in the *relative* probability of the *j*th category to the baseline category" Whitten and Palmer (1996:235). Unfortunately, the substantive meaning of these coefficients is hard to interpret (Long 1997:155, 164–178) and thus I have adopted one of the standard ways of transforming the results.

[34]One could theoretically provide measures for each of the lagged dependent variables (e.g., identifying whether or not the last value was "4" or "7") but as the categories are assumed to be independent from one another, this would not be appropriate.

prior repressive activity. Finally, when using multinomial logit models one must avoid what is commonly referred to as "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (IIA), which when violated frequently requires the adoption of nested multinomial or multinomial probit (MNP). While remedies for this problem are unclear and some would argue unnecessary given the relative strengths of multinomial logit (e.g., Whitten and Palmer, 1996; Powers and Cox, 1997), I am able to estimate the magnitude of this problem with the estimation of a Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) provided within the IIA program developed by Weesie (1999).[35]

Empirical Results

When one considers the importance of democracy and democratization within the context of the ordered-logit model (i.e., where repressive categories are arrayed in accordance to the amount of violence present), we find that there is partial support for the pacification argument.[36] As found, increased levels of executive constraint reduce the likelihood of violent repressive activity. Being democratic thus diminishes the most severe form of human rights violation. In contrast, differing from the research of Davenport (1999) and Zanger (2000),[37] democratization has no influence whatsoever on violent repression. Becoming democratic is thus irrelevant for altering human rights practices conceived in this manner and it is only the arrival of a nation-state at the end of the democratic continuum that is important, not traveling toward this type of authority pattern (Table 2).

Other components of the explanatory model perform as expected and several exhibit larger effects on the dependent variable than that wielded by democracy. For example, economic development decreases the level of state violence while lagged repressive activity increases the use of this behavior. Additionally, results disclose that diverse manifestations of conflict increase repression.[38] Specifically,

[35]As stated by Weesie (1999):

> Hausman's test compares the maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) of β based on all data with MLEs of β that are based on data in which one alternative B is dropped, while cases in which B was actually selected are fully dropped. Under IIA, b(restricted) and b(overall) should be approximately equal, while IIA is violated if the two estimates of b are different. Formally, Hausman has shown that the test statistic
>
> $$H = (b\_r - b\_f)' inv(V\_r - V\_f)(b\_r - b\_f)$$
>
> is approximately chi-square distributed under Ho: IIA, where b and V denote the estimate and approximate variance matrix based on the full (f) and restricted (r) data.

[36]Examining correlations from this model, I find that none was above .60.

[37]These two authors only considered one form of state repression at a time. Specifically, Davenport considered negative sanctions (an events-based measure of restrictions on political and civil liberties), while Zanger considered a standards-based measure of personal integrity violations.

[38]Some may question the validity of using state repression as a dependent variable without also considering the fact that this variable is an explanatory variable for political dissent. To this, I would respond in four ways. First, this practice of investigating one-way relationships follows the majority of scholarship in this area of research. For better or worse, the analysis of relationships moving in both directions has been rare. Second, when one considers the available research there is actually greater support for the relationship estimated within this paper than the alternative. For 30 years now, across measures, time periods, contexts and methodologies, research has found in every single examination that protest increases repression (e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Poe and Tate, 1994;Davenport, 1995, 1999; Poe et al. 1999)—indeed, this is one of the most stable, yet least discussed, findings within the subfield of conflict studies. In contrast, research concerning the impact of repression on protest (over the same time as well as across measures, times, contexts, and methodologies) has found every kind of relationship, including no relationship (e.g., Zimmerman, 1983:118–128; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). Existing research has identified linear relationships, u-shaped relationships, as well as inverted-u relationships. Some identify that the relationship varies according to context (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, 1993), the amount of lags being considered (Rasler, 1996), and even the type of protest being examined (Moore, 1998). Still others speculate that there are even more complex relationships that exist between repression and conflict, which have not yet been examined (e.g., Jackson, Russett, Snidal, and Sylvan, 1978). Third, employing a technique employed by Moore (1998), which lags

TABLE 2. Ordered Logit Results for Ranked Repression Variable (Observations = 2268)

Executive Constraint	– .41(.04)**
Changed Constraint	.00 (.08)
Cumulative Conflict	.03 (.02)
Violent Conflict	.56 (.13)**
War	.30 (.27)
Civil War	1.11 (.22)**
Economic Development	– .00 (.00)**
Lagged Repression	.93 (.04)**
Cut 1	– .97 (.26)
Cut 2	1.65 (.23)
Cut 3	2.79 (.21)
Cut 4	2.86 (.22)
Cut 5	4.59 (.30)
Cut 6	6.05 (.34)
Cut 7	6.16 (.34)
Cut 8	7.63 (.44)
Log-Likelihood = –2686.92	
Pseudo R^2 = .37	

*significant at .05 level; **significant at .01 level; standard errors in parentheses; "Cuts" refer to ancillary parameters, which exist for each value of the dependent variable.

violent dissent and civil war increase the likelihood that the most severe forms of rights violation would be used. Democracy might have an effect, therefore, but this depends upon what challengers within the state are doing and how authorities have decided to respond to them in the past.

When we move to consider the findings from the multinomial logistic regression (provided in Table 3), we find general support for the results identified in the previous analysis.[39] At the same time, however, we also find some important differences. To facilitate clear understanding, the models correspond to the categories provided in Table 1.

Within the least repressive context (model 1 in Table 3; cell 1 in Table 1), the level of executive constraint is found to increase the likelihood that this strategy would be applied and quite powerfully as gauged by the relative risk ratio (4.02). In other words, we find that power is "pacified" by the level of democracy. At the same time,

conflict by one year (eliminating the simultaneity problem), I find that the results are not substantively altered (these are available from the author upon request). Fourth, and finally, accepting an extreme position that I cannot investigate state repression with protest in the model and that other relationships might be influenced by the inclusion of these variables, I drop the variables that measure conflict, reestimate the model and find that there is (again) no substantive alteration in findings (these are also available from the author upon request).

The finding about war in particular presents us with a significant degree of complexity in that this variable was also significant in the least repressive category as well as several others of varying severity. Evidently, the influence of this factor is highly variable and requires more consideration than is given here. For example, it may be that the duration of the conflict, the degree of overall military engagement or some other factor may be more important to consider.

[39]The Hausman test for the assumption "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" revealed that there were no problems with the model. I made this conclusion after consulting Long and Freese (2001:188–191). It should be noted that one could only place but so much faith in the results of these diagnostics. As Long and Freese (2001:191) state, "(o)ur experience with these tests (the Hausman as well as Small-Hsiao) is that they often give inconsistent results and provide little guidance to violations of the IIA assumption…Perhaps as a result of the practical limitations of these tests, McFadden (1973) suggested that IIA implies that the multinomial…logit models should only be used in cases where the outcome categories "can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighed independently in the eyes of each decision maker." I make exactly this assumption, believing that political authorities are more than capable of distinguishing between restricting and killing their citizens—doing so on a continuous basis.

TABLE 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Unranked Repression Variable (Observations = 2268)

	Model 1	*Model 3*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*
Executive constraint	1.39 (.18)**[4.02]	1.08 (.37)**[2.96]	−.18 (.06)** [.83]	.01 (.10)	−.83 (.17)** [.43]	−.76 (.19)** [.46]	−.63 (.14)** [.53]
Changed constraint	−.31 (.12)* [.73]	−.70 (.24)** [.49]	.24 (.10)* [1.28]	.22 (.13)	.29 (.20)	.28 (.14)* [1.33]	.31 (.16)
Cumulative conflict	−.01 (.03)	−.31* (.15) [.73]	.09 (.02)** [1.10]	.06 (.03)* [1.06]	−.32 (.14)* [.72]	.02 (.09)	.04 (.08)
Violent conflict	−.56 (.33)	−.63 (.94)	.65 (.24)* [1.92]	1.39 (.36)** [4.04]	.23 (.36)	.36 (.33)	1.15 (.33)** [3.18]
War	1.42 (.85)	−4.73 (1.18)** [.00]	.92 (.49)	−.24 (1.24)	1.30 (.87)	1.64 (.88)	3.02 (.90)**[20.68]
Civil war	−30.56 (.81)** [.00]	2.46 (1.43)	2.35 (.83)**[10.54]	4.54 (.70)**[93.98]	2.32 (.92)* [10.22]	3.58 (.85)**[35.92]	4.60 (.81)**[99.83]
Economic development	.00 (.00)**[1.00]	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)** [.99]	−.00 (.00)** [.99]	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)** [.99]	−.00 (.00)** [.99]
Constant	−8.23 (1.09)**	−9.09 (2.23)**	−.07 (.25)	−2.35 (.46)**	1.53 (.43)**	1.03 (.50)*	−.29 (.46)

Pseudo R^2 = .34; Log-Likelihood = −2815.16.
*significant at .05 level; **significant at .01 level (two-tailed tests were applied; standard errors in parantheses).
[] = relative risk ratios; models corresponds to cells in Table 1.
Note: Fourth repressive category in Table 1 is the comparison group; the second repressive category had an insufficient number of observations to facilitate analysis.

we find that increases in executive constraint decrease the likelihood of this repressive strategy. In other words, when movements toward this aspect of democratization take place, we find that the likelihood of pacific state behavior decreases. The differences between being and becoming democratic are quite significant.

Some aspects of the explanatory model for this repressive strategy are comparable to the previous analysis. For example, civil war decreases this form of repression while economic development increases the likelihood of this strategy. Other aspects of the explanatory model are quite different. For example, violent conflict has no influence on the probability of achieving this category.

When one considers repressive contexts where no/low restrictions are applied but where killing occurs at high levels (model 3 in Table 3), again we find that both measures of executive constraint are statistically significant in their effect on state repression and in the same manner. Here, executive constraint increases this combination of activities and, according to the relative risk ratio, it is the most important explanatory variable within the model. While appearing to identify a certain type of repressive pacification as restrictions are low, this deviates from expectations, as the use of violence within this context is quite severe. In contrast, increased movements toward constraint tend to decrease the likelihood of this repressive strategy. Here, we find that moving toward democracy reduces the lopsided application of state coercive power (a variant of the taming argument).

The only other variables found significant within this model concern cumulative and interstate conflict, which negatively influence this category. Against expectations, we find that diverse aspects of conflict decrease the likelihood that states use this strategy of political repression. Unable to confront domestic and international contention, results disclose that this form of repression is withdrawn.

From the results, authorities reduce their application of restrictions and killing to moderate levels when executive constraint is high (model 5 in Table 3). This supports the general argument identified above, as the impact of democracy is negative. Again "being" democratic pacifies state power by reducing the likelihood of this form of repressive behavior. In contrast, the results refute the argument that democratization improves human rights. Movement up the democracy scale increases the degree to which this form of state repression is used.

Observing the relative risk ratios, however, it is clear that outweighing the importance of these variables are other variables within the model—specifically those concerning domestic conflict. According to relative risk ratios, diverse forms of conflict (civil war and dissent) have the greatest impact on this category, positively influencing its occurrence. Similar to findings above, the other explanatory variables in the model perform as expected. For instance, economic development decreased the use of moderate restriction and killing.

When states use extreme levels of killing and moderate levels of political restriction (model 6 in Table 3), there are no indicators concerning democracy that are statistically significant. Within this model, I do find that economic development diminishes this form of repression. Similar to earlier results, we also find that violent dissident behavior and interstate as well as civil war increase the likelihood that this combination of repressive activity would be applied (the last having by far the largest impact on the dependent variable).

Situations where governments severely restrict citizens but where they vary the use of state-sponsored killing (e.g., models 7–9) provide us with a diverse pattern of causal relationships. When restriction levels were high but killing was low, executive constraint had a negative influence but at a relatively low impact (gauged by the relative risk ratio). Cumulative conflict again decreases the occurrence of this category, revealing that this form of domestic unrest compels authorities to withdraw from this combination of repressive behavior. When high levels of restrictions and moderate levels of killing are applied, executive constraint reveals a negative influence on the likelihood of attaining this category. In contrast, movements toward

constraint tend to increase the likelihood of such a repressive application. Economic development decreases this form of repression while civil war significantly increases it (once more achieving the highest relative risk ratio). Finally, when restrictions and killing are at their highest level, executive constraint and economic development once again yield negative influences. Results also disclose, however, that the influence of these two variables is less than that of violent dissent as well as interstate and civil war.

Conclusion

I began this research with a desire to investigate the impact of democracy and democratization on diverse combinations of state-sponsored restriction and killing. Conventional wisdom, social science thought, and Western public policy would lead us to believe that these type of authority patterns "pacify" governments (reducing all forms of coercion) but it is also possible that they would "tame" this behavior (decreasing violence but not restrictions). Within this study, I have attempted to initiate a rigorous investigation of this topic by analyzing 137 countries over 20 years.

During the 1976–1996 period, results disclose that state repression was generally "pacified" when executive power was constrained. The only exception here existed where political restrictions were minimal but political killing was extensive. In this case, the level of democracy increased state repression. Considering this finding, I would immediately reemphasize that the number of cases here is somewhat small and thus while suggestive the finding does not completely undermine the pacification argument. It does reveal, however, a potential weakness: democracy can reduce both restrictions and killing but if one dimension is increased, it would likely to be the more violent one. In contrast, some combination of restriction and killing was generally applied when executive constraints were being developed (i.e., during democratization). In this case, values of restriction ranged from moderate to high levels but values of killing were stable at moderate values. This is consistent with the taming argument.

The analysis was also important for it revealed significant amounts of variation in the response of governments to domestic challenges. As found, rising levels of protest shifted repressive strategies away from exclusive reliance upon one form of repression and toward the application of both; specifically, this increased the use of moderate values of restriction and violence or moderate values of restriction and high values of killing. Violent dissident activity compelled not only the two repressive combinations identified above but also the strategy where both restrictions and violence were at their highest values (what I referred to earlier as *Overkill*). Civil war increased the application of all combinations of repression outside of the lowest categories. Under assault, authorities consistently engaged in various forms of large-scale restriction and killing.

The results reported here are important for they shed light on much of the literature and popular thinking about democracy, democratization, and their impact on state power. On the one hand, they point out that one aspect of democratic institutions fosters less repressive activity. Indeed, based on this analysis, if one were interested in reducing both restrictions and killing they could begin with the reduction in executive discretion (Rummel, 1997). On the other hand, the results also compel us to look more closely into the subject. Several areas seem worthy of additional consideration.

First, the findings compel us to ask what it means to achieve full democracy when the path toward this end (democratization) is covered in bloodshed and curfews. Indeed, this relationship appears to contradict the very meaning of the phrase "pacific" and points out that paying attention to contemporaneous influences of democracy and democratization on state repressive behavior (at time t alone) may be the wrong way to conceptualize the subject. Perhaps it is less important what

governments do or do not do with regard to applying repression in isolation, than what governments do in conjunction with what remains left of the civil society during and after such behavior has taken place (at time t but also at time $t + 1,\ldots,$ time $t + n$). Just because violence and restrictions decrease at the point of democratic "arrival" does not mean that citizen's rights have improved. The mid-range and long-term consequences of prior human rights abuse deserve examination to understand their impact on political life.

The findings also compel us to ascertain how one goes about reaching the end of pacific governance as peacefully as possible (Tilly, 2000b). This is one of the major subthemes of the pacification argument: the point that there are certain pathways to freedom that states should traverse which are less contentious than others. However, are there pacific trajectories? Do all forms of democratization lead to repression (as found in this study)? Are there common sequences that result in pacific governance or are there as many paths as there are nations? Does the existence of high-restriction, high-violent repression (category 9 in Table 1) during one year preclude the possibility of other repressive strategies being used in subsequent years and for how long are these options foreclosed? All of these questions need answering.

Third, two of the more important factors in recent literature that were ignored within this study concerns the impact of globalization and the most recent experiences with democratization. With reference to the first point, it may be the case that governments are extremely receptive to external influence and thus the models estimated here, which tended to ignore these influences, would be of little use in understanding repression during this period. This suggests that the analysis be reestimated including measures of spatial diffusion and the influence of international NGOs (for instance). With reference to the second point, Huntington (1991:ch. 4) argues that the "Third Wave" is characterized by much less dissident violence and greater elite facilitation relative to earlier waves (what he labeled a "Third Wave Syndrome"). Does the rarity of dissident violence during this period explain why states used extremely high levels of violence against their citizens when confronted with this behavior? In waves with greater contention, were such responses less severe? These issues are also worthy of attention.

Finally, although selected for their explicit connection with state repressive behavior, it may be the case that executive constraints only take us but so far with regard to understanding democratic pacification. In order to make state power even more pacific (accounting for greater amounts of variance within estimated models), we may have to move beyond this one aspect of political institutions, exploring what other components of democracy are most effective at fulfilling the promise put forward by theorists, activists and everyday citizens. Perhaps there is something about executive constraints in conjunction with other factors (e.g., electoral participation, political parties, and mass attitudes toward tolerance) that facilitates less repressive governance. This last issue is perhaps the one that is most important to address within later research. Indeed, for many, this may be the only question worthy of any attention at all.

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