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The Theoretical Foundations of Global Governance

Why Theory Matters

Scholars use theories to describe, explain, and predict various aspects of international relations. Each is based on a set of key ideas about the nature and roles of individuals, conceptions of the state, sovereignty, and interactions among states and other actors, as well as conceptions about the international system.

The principal goal of theory is to simplify and clarify what matters most. Although scholars may disagree about what to include and what to leave out, they leave it to the consumers of theoretical work to decide whether the choices are reasonable and whether they help explain real-world events.

An important debate in international relations (IR) theory generally is whether one should focus on measuring and explaining human behavior and institutions objectively, through positivist or rationalist theory, or whether one should instead focus on interpreting the language and symbols of social interaction through constructivist or nonrationalist theory. This is especially relevant to global governance, since values, rules, and identities play an important role alongside more traditional factors such as economic and military capability and interests. Although the debate tends to polarize scholars, each approach and method provides a useful lens through which to study global governance (Fearon and Wendt 2002).

Rationalist theories identify links between antecedents, called independent variables, and outcomes, referred to as dependent variables. From theory, propositions are hypothesized and tested by observations in the real world. For example, functionalist theory proposes that international organizations tend to grow from a more narrow and technical focus to broader and more political undertakings. This insight can be tested against the development of European regionalism or the history of the creation of UN specialized agencies through careful tracing of processes, detailed case studies of

particular institutions, or perhaps a statistical test that covers multiple cases.

In contrast, constructivism and most critical theories are not testable in the same ways. Rather they are critiqued with reference to whether the propositions are internally logical or help to elucidate the true nature of international institutions. For example, since many social constructivists argue that actors' identities and interests are the product of debate and interaction, one could study the evolution of a legal principle, such as the prohibition against the use of force in international relations, to explore whether this dynamic occurs.

In this chapter, we briefly discuss five major theories—liberalism, realism, social constructivism, the English School, and critical theories—with particular attention to what each says about global governance and international cooperation.

Liberalism

Liberal theory in the classical tradition holds that human nature is basically good, social progress is possible, and human behavior is malleable and perfectible through institutions. Injustice, aggression, and war are, according to liberals, products of inadequate or corrupt social institutions and of misunderstanding among leaders. They are not inevitable, but rather can be eliminated through collective or multilateral action and institutional reform. The expansion of human freedom is a core liberal belief that can be achieved through democracy and market capitalism.

The roots of liberalism are found in the seventeenth-century Grotian tradition, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, nineteenth-century political and economic liberalism, and twentieth-century Wilsonian idealism. The Grotian tradition developed from the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), an early Dutch legal scholar. Just prior to the European states' challenge to universal religious authority in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), Grotius asserted that all international relations were subject to the rule of law—both the law of nations and the law of nature. He rejected the idea that states can do whatever they wish and that war is the supreme right of states. Grotius believed that states, like people, are basically rational and law-abiding.

The Enlightenment's contribution to liberalism rests on Greek ideas that individuals are rational human beings and have the capacity to improve their condition by creating a just society. If a just society is not attained, then the fault rests with inadequate institutions. The writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) reflect these core Enlightenment beliefs with their extensive treatment of the relationship between democracy and peace. Kant was among the first thinkers to articulate this connection and the possibility of

"perpetual peace" among democratic states. The liberal theory of democratic peace does not mean that democratic states would refrain from war in their relations with nondemocratic states, but Kant did argue that in a "pacific union," "free, democratic states would retain their sovereignty while working to avoid war.

Nineteenth-century liberalism linked the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and the growing faith in modernization through the scientific and industrial revolutions, to promoting democracy and free trade. Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham believed that free trade would create interdependencies that would raise the cost of war and reward fair cooperation and competition with peace, prosperity, and greater justice. This strand of liberalism forms the basis for economic liberalism, examined in Chapters 8 and 9. To stimulate individual (and therefore collective) economic growth and to maximize economic welfare, free markets must be allowed to develop and governments must permit free economic intercourse.

The beliefs of US president Woodrow Wilson, captured best in the "Fourteen Points," on which the Versailles Treaty (ending World War I) and the Covenant of the League of Nations were based, formed a core of twentieth-century liberalism. Wilson envisioned that creating a system of collective security, promoting self-determination of peoples, and eliminating power politics could prevent war. The League of Nations illustrated the importance that liberals place on international institutions for collective problem solving. Early-twentieth-century liberals were also strong advocates of international law, arbitration, and courts to promote cooperation and guarantee peace. Because of their faith in human reason and progress, they were often labeled "idealists." With the League of Nations' failure to prevent World War II and the Cold War, liberalism and idealism came under intense criticism from realist theorists.

For liberals, while individual human beings are key actors, states are the most important collective actors, but they are pluralistic not unitary actors. That is, moral and ethical principles, power relations among domestic and transnational groups, and changing international conditions shape states' interests and policies. There is no single definition of states' national interests; rather, states vary in their goals, and their interests change. Liberals also recognize the roles of nonstate actors and transnational and transgovernmental groups.

Liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will grow over time for two reasons. First, they view the international system as a context within which multiple interactions occur and where various actors "learn" from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and a fixed concept of state sovereignty. Power matters, but it is exercised within this framework of rules and institutions, which also makes international cooperation possible. Second, liberals

als expect mutual interests to increase with greater interdependence, knowledge, communication, and the spread of democratic values. This will promote greater cooperation and thereby peace, welfare, and justice.

Liberals view international organizations as arenas where states interact and cooperate to solve common problems. International law is viewed as one of the major instruments for framing and maintaining order in the international system, although it represents horizontal rather than hierarchical authority. As Louis Henkin (1979: 22) explains:

If one doubts the significance of this law, one need only imagine a world in which it were absent. . . . There would be no security of nations or stability of governments; territory and airspace would not be respected; vessels could navigate only at their constant peril; property—within or without any given territory—would be subject to arbitrary seizure; persons would have no protection of law or diplomacy; agreements would not be made or observed; diplomatic relations would end; international trade would cease; international organizations and arrangements would disappear.

For liberals, international organizations play a number of key roles, including contributing to habits of cooperation and serving as arenas for negotiating and developing coalitions. They are a primary means for mitigating the danger of war, promoting the development of shared norms, and enhancing international order. They carry out operational activities to help address substantive international problems, and may form parts of international regimes. They can be used by states as instruments of foreign policy or to constrain the behavior of others. Andrew Moravcsik (1997), for one, uses liberal theory to show the links between domestic politics within states and intergovernmental cooperation.

Finally, a new strain of liberal theory has developed since the 1990s that draws attention to the role of women in global governance as both an independent and dependent variable. Positivist feminist theorists argue that most of international relations theory, including liberal theory, has ignored the place of women. For international organization scholars, this means paying more attention to the role of women in international institutions as leaders, staffers, and lobbyists. Historically women have been poorly represented in the halls of power; they were virtually absent from the League of Nations and only recently have they held senior positions at the United Nations.

Liberal feminists also call for increased attention to developing organizational policies that affect women, especially the role of women in economic development, women as victims of crime and discrimination, and women in situations of armed conflict. For too long, these issues have been neglected.

Core liberal beliefs in the roots of cooperation and roles of international institutions have been challenged since the 1970s by so-called neoliberal institutionalists. Their ideas form an important variant on liberal theory.

Neoliberal Institutionalism or Neoliberalism

In the 1970s, liberalism experienced a revival following the preeminence of realism during the Cold War. Increasing international interdependence and heightened awareness of the sensitivities and vulnerabilities that characterize interdependence were major factors boosting this revival. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's book *Power and Interdependence* (1977), which outlined how international institutions constituted an important response to conditions of complex interdependence, also had a major impact. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that "even if . . . anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions" (Grieco 1993: 117). They therefore take a more state-centric view of international relations and believe that states are rational actors in a generally anarchic world. States have incentives to cooperate because they seek to maximize absolute gains. As a result, cooperation is a common occurrence, not the rare exception. Through institutions, states can solve collective action problems.

Some neoliberal institutionalists, such as Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1986), have drawn on game theory and particularly the Prisoners' Dilemma game to illustrate how cooperation is in the individual state's self-interest. The Prisoners' Dilemma is the story of two prisoners, each being held and interrogated separately for an alleged crime. The interrogator tells each prisoner that if one of them confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses will go free and the one who keeps silent will get a long prison term. If both confess, both will get somewhat reduced prison terms. If neither confesses, both will receive short prison terms based on lack of evidence. In the first play, both prisoners will confess and each will serve a longer sentence than if they had cooperated and kept silent. The self-serving behavior of each player leads to bad outcomes for both players. If the game is repeated, however, the environment is changed, for instance, by allowing communication, the possibility of joint gains provides incentives to cooperate by remaining silent. Neoliberals have drawn a number of conclusions from studying Prisoners' Dilemma games. They have shown that if states use a tit-for-tat strategy of reciprocating each other's cooperation, they are likely to find this mutually beneficial over the long term, especially if the costs of verifying compliance and sanctioning cheaters are relatively low compared to the costs of joint action (Grieco 1993: 122).

They have also shown that the applicability of the Prisoners' Dilemma varies between economic and security issues when there are shared norms, and if issues are linked. Finally, use of the Prisoners' Dilemma has helped neoliberals demonstrate that although states may be independent actors, their policy choices tend to be interdependent.

The 1970s and early 1980s presented a puzzle for neoliberals. Given the major international economic dislocations resulting from the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements for international monetary relations, increasing third world debt, and the decline in US economic power relative to Europe and Japan, why did the post–World War II institutions for economic cooperation (such as the IMF and GATT) not collapse? Keohane's influential book After Hegemony (1984) answered this question by emphasizing the cooperation that states achieved through international institutions and the effects of institutions and practices on state behavior.

Thus, according to neoliberal institutionalists, states that have continuous interactions with each other choose to cooperate, because they realize that they will have future interactions with the same actors. Continuous interactions also serve as the motivation for states to create international institutions, which in turn moderate state behavior, provide a context for bargaining and mechanisms for reducing cheating by monitoring behavior, and facilitate transparency of the actions of all. International institutions provide focal points for coordination and serve to make state commitments more credible by specifying what is expected, thereby encouraging states to establish reputations for compliance. They are an efficient solution to problems of coordination because they provide information that aids decision-making and reduces the transaction costs for achieving agreement among large numbers of states (Keohane and Martin 1995). States benefit because institutions do things for members that cannot be accomplished unilaterally. Thus, institutions have important and independent effects on interstate interactions, both by providing information and by framing actions, but they do not necessarily affect states' underlying motivations.

Neoliberals recognize that not all efforts to cooperate will yield good results. Cooperation can aid the few at the expense of the many, and accentuate or mitigate injustice. Unlike earlier liberals, some neoliberals have been more willing to address issues of power. To explain the creation, for example, of the post–World War II network of international economic institutions and shared standards for liberalizing trade and capital flows, neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane (1984) and John Gerard Ruggie (1982) have focused on the role of the United States as a hegemonic state, the particular character of the order it created (embedded liberalism), and the joint gains it offered the Europeans and Japanese for cooperating.

Liberalism and neoliberalism have spawned several middle-level theories that provide additional dimensions for explaining international cooperative behavior. These include functionalism, regime theory, rational design, and collective goods theory.

Functionalism

Functionalism is rooted in the belief that governance arrangements arise out of the basic, or functional, needs of people and states. Thus, it explains the origin and development of many IGOs. Functionalists, however, assert that international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for political cooperation and eliminating war, whose causes (in their view) lie in ignorance, poverty, hunger, and disease.

As articulated by David Mitrany in A Working Peace System (1946: 7), the task of functionalism is "not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together." He foresaw "a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated" (14). Not all functionalists share this vision, but they do share a belief that it is possible to bypass political rivalries of states and build habits of cooperation in nonpolitical economic spheres. Increasing amounts of such cooperation will expand these cooperative interactions and build a base of common values, eventually spilling over into cooperation in political and military affairs. A key aspect of this process is the role of technical experts and the assumption that these experts will lose their close identification with their own states and develop new sets of allegiances to like-minded individuals around the globe. The form that specific functional organizations take is determined by the problem to be solved; form follows function.

Functionalism is applicable at both regional and global levels and has been important in explaining the evolution of the European Union as a process of integration. The "father of Europe," Jean Monnet, believed that nationalism could be weakened and war in Europe made unthinkable in the long run by taking practical steps toward economic integration that would ultimately advance European political union. The success of the European Coal and Steel Community, proposed by Monnet, led to the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community to manage peaceful uses of atomic energy and to the creation of the European Economic Community, with its common market and many facets of practical cooperation.

Functional theory fell short in its prediction that such cooperation would spill over in a deterministic fashion from the economic area into areas of national security. Although most analysts would credit European integration with making the region a "zone of peace," achieving common foreign and security policy has proved particularly difficult for EU mem-

bers. In fact, neofunctionalists theorized that the process and dynamics of cooperation are not automatic. At key points, political decisions are needed and these may or may not be taken (Haas 1964). The evolution of European integration has borne this out (see Chapter 5).

Functionalist theory also helps us understand the development of early IGOs such as the Universal Postal Union and Commission for Navigation on the Rhine River, as well as the specialized agencies of the UN system such as the World Health Organization, UN Children's Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, and International Labour Organization. These are discussed further in Chapter 3 and subsequent chapters.

Harold Jacobson, William Reisinger, and Todd Mathers (1986) tested key propositions of functionalism as an explanation for the phenomenon of IGO development and found that the overwhelming number of IGOs could be classified as functional. That is, they have specific mandates, links to economic issues, and limited memberships, often related to geographic region. The majority of those created since 1960 have been established by other IGOs and show increasing differentiation of functions. Yet this trend toward greater specialization "has not yet radically transformed this system, as functionalism hoped would happen" (157).

Functionalism fails to address a number of key questions. If the ultimate goal is elimination of war, and war is not caused just by economic deprivation, illiteracy, hunger, and disease, then how can the other causes of war be alleviated? How can political and nonpolitical issues be distinguished? Will habits of economic and social cooperation transfer to political areas? In fact, the European integration process since 1950 has shown the degree to which functionalists underestimated the strength of state sovereignty and national loyalties. Despite these limitations, functionalism has proven a useful theoretical approach for understanding IGOs and the cooperation many IGOs foster in economic and social issue areas.

International Regimes

A second important middle-level theory within liberalism emerged from international law. In the 1970s, legal scholars began to use the concept of international regimes, introduced in Chapter 1. They recognized that international law consists not only of formal authoritative prohibitions, but also of more informal norms and rules of behavior that over time may become codified and sometimes institutionalized. By referring to the totality of these norms and rules of behavior as "regimes," these scholars emphasized the governance provided for specific issue areas. International relations scholars have found regime theory particularly useful for examining many aspects of governance. According to the most widely used definition, a regime includes "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and

decisionmaking procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1982: 1).

Regime theory has been shaped not only by liberalism and especially neoliberalism, but also by realism and neorealism. Some regime theorists focus on the role of power relations among states in shaping regimes, particularly the role of a hegemonic state such as the United States (or Great Britain in the nineteenth century). Others recognize how common interests aid states in enhancing transparency and reducing uncertainty in their environment. Regime theorists have also used constructivist approaches to focus on social relations and the ways in which the strong patterns of interaction often found in an international regime actually affect state interests (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 2000). Explaining how regimes are created and maintained, and how, why, and when they change, are key tasks for regime theorists.

Regime theory has shown how states create these frameworks to coordinate their actions with those of other states, if and when necessary for achieving their national interests. Regimes can provide information to participants and reduce uncertainty. Over time, coordination may lead to a partial convergence of interests and values among the parties in a regime.

Regime theorists have focused on IGO roles in the creation and maintenance of regimes, while being careful not to equate an IGO with the existence of a regime. By themselves, IGOs do not constitute a regime, but their characters may incorporate principles, norms, rules, decisionmaking processes, and functions that formalize these aspects of a regime. An IGO's decisionmaking processes may then be used by member states for further norm and rule creation, for rule enforcement and dispute settlement, for the provision of collective goods, and for supporting operational activities. Thus, IGOs are one way that habits of cooperation are sustained and expanded.

Identifying international regimes in different issue areas enables scholars to discuss the interaction not only between states and IGOs, but also between various IGOs, between IGOs and NGOs, and among noninstitutionalized rules and procedures that have developed over time. Regimes enable scholars to examine informal patterns and ad hoc groupings that enhance international cooperation. As Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger (2000: 3) succinctly summarize:

Regimes are deliberately constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue areas of international politics from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expectations about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes help states (and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security.

There is now a substantial body of literature explaining the formation, persistence, and decline of international regimes, as well as their specific properties and openness to change (Rittberger 1993; Young 1989). There is also a growing examination of issue areas where regimes have not developed. In the areas of global deforestation and small arms, the absence of regimes can be explained by the absence of recognized interdependence of issues or perceived need for collective action (Dimitrov et al. 2007). In recent years, some scholars have also begun to explore regime complexes in issue areas where multiple regimes overlap, often with conflicting norms, rules, and procedures, such as in food security and human mobility, as discussed in Chapter 9. Despite inherent ambiguities, the study of international regimes and regime theory has helped link international institutions and governance by establishing that governance and order are embedded in norms and involve more than just organizational structures.

Rational Design

During the 1990s there was considerable debate among regime theorists and other liberal international scholars regarding the reasons why certain types of organizations had particular distinguishing characteristics. A response came from those scholars versed in the rational choice approach to decisionmaking, a simplified and abstract description of players' goals and constraints to predict types of agreements. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal (2001) offer propositions linking different characteristics of organizations. For example, where the issue at stake involves distributing benefits and costs fairly, organizational membership is apt to be larger. When there are doubts about what other states will do in the future, organizational decisionmaking will tend to be centralized; it will be more decentralized when a few states are negotiating over a narrow range of issues. Likewise, compliance with rules will be easier to enforce if organizations are narrowly focused.

Rational design theorists applaud the theory's parsimony; it can explain many outcomes with a small number of independent variables—one of the goals of positivist theory. The theory holds up fairly well when tested against actual events. For example, participation in the nuclear nonproliferation regime requires states to accept inspections, a deliberate strategy to reduce uncertainty and defection. Rational design theory has also shown why institutions like the Marshall Plan and the European Common Market were heavily centralized but flexible (Oatley 2001).

Critics of rational design raise many questions, however. Who participated in the negotiations to create the institution? What was their status and rank? Was it not the product of preexisting rules and the powers that be (Ruane 2011: 51)? In the UN Security Council, for example, why does

France have veto power while Germany has no permanent seat? This is explained by the state of the world in 1945. During negotiations leading to the creation of a new institution, critics argue that it is nested in larger political structures and arrangements that are themselves the products of other decisions. It is not easy to know where to start and which decisions matter most or where the application of raw power matters most (Duffield 2003). In rational design, there is little accounting for historical contingencies, accidents, miscalculations, or future possibilities.

One recent variant of rational design incorporates elements of functionalism, in what Jonas Tallberg and colleagues (2013) call rational functionalism, to address the relationship between states, international organizations, and transnational actors. They argue that states and IGO bureaucracies are rational actors that make deliberate choices about nonstate actor access based on their assessments of what "functional benefits" those actors may be able to bring to the organization" (29).

Collective or Public Goods Theory

Still another approach within liberalism to explaining governance and cooperation has involved the application of collective or public goods theory. Biologist Garrett Hardin, in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968), tells the story of a group of herders who share a common grazing area. Each herder finds it economically rational to increase the size of his own herd, allowing him to sell more in the market and hence return more profits. Yet if all herders follow what is individually rational behavior, then the group loses; too many animals graze the land and the quality of the pasture deteriorates, which leads to decreased output for all. As each person rationally attempts to maximize his own gain, the collectivity suffers, and eventually all individuals suffer. What Hardin describes—the common grazing area—is a collective good available to all members of the group, regardless of individual contribution.

Collective or public goods may be tangible or intangible. In the global context, they include the "natural commons" such as the high seas, atmosphere, ozone shield, and polar regions. They also include "human-made global commons" (Kaul 2000: 300) such as universal norms and principles and the Internet, as well as "global conditions" ranging from peace and financial stability to environmental sustainability and freedom from poverty.

The use of collective goods involves activities and choices that are interdependent. Decisions by one state have effects for other states; that is, states can suffer unanticipated negative consequences as a result of the actions of others. For example, a decision by developed countries in the 1980s to continue the production and sale of chlorofluorocarbons would

have affected all countries through long-term depletion of the ozone layer. With collective goods, market mechanisms are inadequate and alternative forms of governance are needed. A central concern in collective or public goods theory, therefore, revolves around the question of who provides the public goods. Without some kind of collective action mechanisms, there is a risk that such goods will not be adequately provided. Once they are, however, the goods exist and all can enjoy them, which creates the problem of "free-riding."

Collective goods are easier to provide in small groups than in large groups. Mancur Olson, in *The Logic of Collective Action* (1968: 35), argues that "the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good." Free-riding and defection are harder to conceal and easier to punish if the group is small. With larger groups, the fraction of the group that benefits will decline and organizational costs will increase. Smaller groups can more effectively monitor each other and exert pressure, and collective pressure can be more effectively mobilized.

Another alternative is to force nations or peoples to govern collective goods by establishing organizations with effective police powers that coerce states or individuals to act in a mutually beneficial manner. Such an organization could, for example, force people to limit the number of children they have in order to stop the population explosion. Elinor Ostrom (1990), however, suggests that the most effective management may be self-governance, with private agents acting as enforcers. Individuals or groups make binding contracts to commit themselves to cooperative strategies, and use the enforcers to monitor each other and report infractions.

Finally, public goods theory suggests that those confronted with a collective action problem could seek to restructure actors' preferences through rewards and punishments. For example, mechanisms could be established to offer positive incentives for states to refrain from destroying the polar regions and to tax or threaten to tax those who fail to cooperate.

Collective goods theory can be used to explain the role of international agreements, IGOs, as well as international regimes in producing (or underproducing) various goods. It can also be used to investigate the gaps in international efforts to deal with policy issues. Collective goods theory is especially useful for examining those global commons areas such as the high seas or ozone layer over which no state can claim sovereignty because these have been designated as the common heritage of humankind.

Thus, collective or public goods theorists, along with other liberal theorists, see international organizations, international law, and international regimes playing positive roles in facilitating cooperation and managing public goods. They believe, for example, that the UN has helped to check power politics, create some degree of shared interests in place of national

interests, and provide a forum for international cooperation. These views stand in opposition to those of realists, who are primarily interested in states' exercise of power and pursuit of national interests.

Realism

A product of a long philosophical and historical tradition, realism in its various forms is based on the assumption that individuals act rationally to protect their own interests. Within the international system, realists see states as the primary actors, entities that act in a unitary way in pursuit of their national interest, which is generally defined in terms of maximizing power and security relative to other states. States coexist in an anarchic international system characterized by the absence of an authoritative hierarchy. As a result, states must rely primarily on themselves to manage their own insecurity through acquiring more power relative to other states. Because each state is concerned with acquiring more power relative to other states, competition between states is keen and there is little basis for cooperation.

To most realists, in the absence of international authority there are few rules or norms that restrain states, although Hans Morgenthau, generally regarded as the father of modern realism, did include chapters on international morality, law, and government in his pathbreaking textbook *Politics Among Nations*. In his view (1967: 219–220): "The main function of these normative systems has been to keep aspirations for power within certain tolerable bounds. . . . [M]orality, mores, and law intervene in order to protect society against disruption and the individual against enslavement and extinction." Yet Morgenthau suggested that there had been a weakening of these moral limitations from earlier times, when there was a cohesive international society bound together through elite ties and common morality. Thus, international law and government, in his view, are largely weak and ineffective. For Morgenthau, international organizations are a tool of states to be used when desired; they can increase or decrease the power of states, but they do not affect the basic characteristics of the international system; because they reflect the distribution of power among states, they are no more than the sum of their member states. In fact, they are susceptible to great-power manipulation. Thus, international organizations have no independent effect on state behavior or world politics in general.

Most realist theorists do not claim that international cooperation is impossible, only that there are few incentives for states to enter into international arrangements. Since international institutions and agreements have no enforcement power, they have no authority and hence no real power (Gruber 2000). Realists do not acknowledge the importance or influence of nonstate actors such as NGOs and MNCs in international politics and governance, nor do they accept the idea of IGOs as independent actors. To most

realists, deterrence and balance of power have proven more effective in maintaining peace than have international institutions.

Neorealism or Structural Realism

Among the variants of realism, the most powerful is neorealism, or structural realism, which owes much to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). The core difference between traditional realists and neorealists lies in the emphasis placed on the structure of the international system for explaining world politics. The system's structure is determined by the ordering principle, namely the absence of overarching authority (anarchy), and the distribution of capabilities (power) among states. What matters are states' material capabilities; state identities and interests are largely given and fixed. Anarchy poses a severe constraint on state behavior. But how it is defined, and how much of a constraint it imposes on the possibilities for cooperation and international order, are matters of dispute and some confusion among both neorealists and neoliberals (Baldwin 1993). This has important implications for theorizing about global governance, since most definitions involve questions of government, authority, and governance in some way. Likewise, the way in which the power distribution shapes state behavior and provides order in international politics, either through balances of power or through a hierarchy of relations between states with unequal power, underscores that order is a product less of state actions, much less of international institutions, than of system structure.

In neorealist theory, the possibilities for international cooperation are logically slim, though not impossible. As Waltz (1979: 105) posits:

> When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.

In contrast to this neorealist emphasis on relative gains from cooperation, neoliberals stress that actors with common interests try to maximize their absolute gains (Stein 1982: 318). Relative gains may be more important in absolute gains (Stein 1982: 318). Relative gains may be more important in security matters than in economic issues, making cooperation more difficult to achieve, harder to maintain, and more dependent on states' power (Lipson 1984: 15–18). Since anarchy fuels insecurity, states are wary of becoming too dependent on others, preferring greater control and increased capabilities. Many neorealists do recognize the emergence of international regimes and institutions, but believe their importance has been exaggerated. Others

such as John Mearsheimer are not just skeptical about international institutions, but also outright disdainful. In his view, institutions are merely arenas for pursuing power relationships. They have "minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post–Cold War world" (1994–1995: 7). While not all neorealists would go as far as Mearsheimer, it is clear that many believe that international institutions do not have independent effects worth studying. Although there are many criticisms of neorealism's inability to explain system change and failure to incorporate variables other than the structure of the international system, it continues to have a strong influence on IR scholars. One middle-level theory derived from realism that has addressed issues of international cooperation more directly is strategic or rational choice.

Strategic or Rational Choice Theory

Strategic or rational choice theory has enjoyed wide usage in other fields of political science as well as in economics. It assumes that preferences are deduced from objective and material conditions of the state. Predicated on the view that markets are the most efficient mechanism of human behavior, strategic choice theorists often use the language of microeconomic theory to explain state choices. Yet they also acknowledge that market imperfections may arise. Information may be incomplete, or transaction costs may be too high. Then, organizations and institutions can play key roles. They may also act as constraints on choice.

Lloyd Gruber (2000) is intrigued by the fact that states find it rational to take part in international arrangements, even though they would prefer the original, precooperation status quo. He argues that states fear being left behind; they want to join the bandwagon, even when it is not directly in their best interest. States come to believe that the status quo—not participating in such agreements—is not an option, and thus they may be forced to conform to the rules of the game.

Key to rational or strategic choice theory is the assumption that state actions are based on rational calculations about subjective expected utility. Such calculations incorporate estimates of others' capabilities and likely intentions. From this perspective, then, Keohane (1993: 288) suggests, "international institutions exist largely because they facilitate self-interested cooperation by reducing uncertainty, thus stabilizing expectations." Hence an analysis of rational state action within Europe, for example, must take Europe's many international institutions into account.

Theories of Hegemonic Stability and Great-Power Concerts

Middle-level hegemonic stability theory is rooted in the realist tradition, but like international regime theory draws from other traditions. It was developed in the 1970s and 1980s to answer the question of how an open

world economy is created and maintained. The theory's answer is that these occur through the power and leadership of a dominant or hegemonic state that uses its position in a liberal international economy in particular ways. As Robert Gilpin (1987: 72) notes, "Hegemony without a liberal commitment to the market economy is more likely to lead to imperial systems and the imposition of political and economic restrictions on lesser powers."

Hegemonic stability theory is based on the premise that an open market economy is a collective or public good (Kindleberger 1973) that cannot be sustained without the actions of a dominant economy. When there is a predominant state with "control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods" (Keohane 1984: 32), it has the means to exercise leadership over other economies as well as to use its economic power for leverage over other states. If such a dominant power is committed to an open, liberal world economy based on nondiscrimination and free markets, it can use its position to guarantee provision of the collective good—an open trading system and stable monetary system. In so doing, it must perform several roles, including the creation of norms and rules, preventing cheating and free-riding, encouraging others to share the costs of maintaining the system, managing the monetary system, using its own dynamism as an engine of growth for the rest of the system, and responding to crises. As strategic choice theorists would argue, the hegemon may also be engaging in behavior that serves to perpetuate its power and position.

There are, to date, only two examples of such hegemonic leadership. The first occurred during the nineteenth century, when Great Britain used its dominant position to create an era of free trade among major economic powers. The second occurred after World War II, when the United States established the Bretton Woods system to promote international trade and investment. An important part of its role was the willingness to pay the costs to make its vision of a liberal economic order a reality.

Some have questioned whether a theory based on two cases is sufficient to explain why a dominant state would undertake a leadership role or be committed to liberal values. These depend, as Ruggie (1982) has noted, on the hegemon's "social purpose" and commitment to "embedded liberalism."

The persistence of international economic regimes in the face of the economic dislocations of the 1970s and 1980s led Keohane (1984), as noted earlier, to explore the consequences of declining hegemony. He found that, in a view compatible with the institutionalist position, cooperation may persist, even if the hegemon's power declines and it is not performing a leadership role. A residue of common interests and the norms of the regime help to maintain it, for "regimes are more readily maintained than established" (Kindleberger 1986: 8). Such views have contributed significantly to under-

standing the bases of states' choices and the role of power, especially hegemonic power, in the creation of international regimes.

The role of power, particularly the economic power of preeminent states, also plays a key role in Daniel Drezner's book *All Politics Is Global* (2007). Like other realists and hegemonic stability theorists before him, Drezner posits that preeminent states (those with the largest internal markets and least vulnerability to external shocks) are the dominant actors in the global economy, but unlike realists, Drezner links state preferences to the domestic economies. Similar to neoliberal institutionalists, he also argues that other actors—IGOs, NGOs, global civil society actors—influence the processes of governance. States make the ultimate choices, however, among the different forums and institutions of global governance. Drezner's studies show that most cooperation will occur when there is a concert among the great powers, which may then be institutionalized in groups of the like-minded or even in universal IGOs, but if there is no agreement, rival standards may deadlock IGOs. If interests of great powers and other states diverge, then club groups are convened or preeminent states shop for the most convenient venue.

Although most realists have little to say about the varieties of global governance, more recent work on hegemonic stability and great-power behavior evidences cross-fertilization among different theories. These approaches lead researchers to look at the role of dominant states in global governance outcomes, and how other actors affect governance processes. The benefits of cross-fertilization become equally as evident when we examine the contribution of constructivism to global governance.

Social Constructivism

Social constructivism has become increasingly important for studying global governance, particularly the role of norms and institutions. While there are many variants, all constructivists agree that the behavior of individuals, states, and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules, and cultural practices. They argue that what actors do, how they interrelate, and the way that others interpret their behavior create and can change the meaning of norms. The approach has strong roots in sociology and social theory.

At the core of constructivist approaches is a concern with identity and interests and how these can change—a belief that ideas, values, norms, and shared beliefs matter, that how individuals talk about the world shapes practices, and that humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas. Whereas realists treat states' interests and identity as given, constructivists believe they are socially constructed—that is, influenced by culture, norms, ideas, and domestic and international interactions. Thus, Germany

after World War II reoriented its identity to multilateralism, embedding itself in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European institutions with the encouragement of the United States. Russia, too, struggled to redefine its identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and is currently further redefining it. For constructivists, then, states do not have identities or national interests prior to interactions with others. As Alexander Wendt (1995: 81) explains, "the social construction of international politics is to analyze how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors' identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts."

Constructivists place a great deal of importance on institutions as embodied in norms, practices, and formal organizations. The most important institution in international society is sovereignty, since it determines the identity of states. Yet constructivists criticize those who see sovereignty as unchanging and point to various transformations in understandings of sovereignty since Westphalia. To illustrate how sovereignty determines the identity of states, however, one need only consider how failed states such as Somalia retain their statehood and continue to be members of IGOs.

Among the key norms affecting state behavior is multilateralism. In *Multilateralism Matters*, Ruggie (1993b) and others examine how the shared expectations surrounding this norm affect the behavior of states. Several other studies have examined the impact of norms and principled beliefs on international outcomes, including the evolution of the international human rights regime (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), the end of apartheid in South Africa (Klotz 1995), the spread of weapons taboos (Tannenwald 2007), and humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 2003).

In examining international organizations, constructivists seek to uncover the social content of organizations and the dominant norms that govern behavior and shape interests, and to decipher how these interests in turn influence actors. IOs then may serve as agents of social construction, as norm entrepreneurs trying to change social understandings (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). They can be teachers as well as creators of norms, socializing states to accept new values and political goals (Finnemore 1996b). The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for example, "taught" developing states the relevance of establishing science bureaucracies as a necessary component of being a modern state. The World Bank put the concept of poverty alleviation on international and national agendas in the late 1960s as it "sold" poverty alleviation to members through a mixture of persuasion and coercion, redefining in the process what states were supposed to do to ameliorate the situation.

For constructivists, then, IGOs in particular have real power. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005: 162) argue that IGOs "construct the

social world in which cooperation and choice take pl[ace] the interests that states and other actors come to h[ave] compatible with liberalism and a liberal global or[der] exercises of power." In addition, Barnett and Finn[emore] to the role of IGO bureaucracies that the authority of [the] and their secretariats "lies in their ability to present themsel[ves] sonal and neutral—as not exercising power but instead serving [the] (2004: 21). Yet, as the same authors explore in case studies, the percep[tion] of IGOs as servants of their member states may be deceiving.

Constructivists are also concerned with the potential of international organizations to socialize individual policymakers and states. Jeffrey Checkel (2005) explores the different mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role-playing, and normative suasion, that connect organizations to socializing outcomes. When the norms of the institution become deeply rooted and thus internalized, actors' identities can be transformed and interests changed. Most of this research focuses on the socializing effects of EU membership on candidate members.

Thus, to constructivists, international organizations are purposive actors with independent effects on international relations. They have been important to the processes of changing understandings and behavior with respect to poverty, humanitarianism, colonialism, slavery, and other problems. Although most constructivists have focused on positive outcomes such as decolonization, human rights norms, and poverty alleviation, others have made us mindful that international organizations may also be dysfunctional and act in ways contrary to the interests of their constituents. They may pursue particularistic goals, competing over turf, budgets, and staff. Such dysfunctional behavior may create a bureaucratic culture that tolerates inefficient practices, lack of accountability, and mission-defeating behaviors (Barnett and Finnemore 1999).

The English School

Emerging in the 1930s and rediscovered in the 1980s, the English School merges realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Its proponents argue that while the world is at its core a system of autonomous, sovereign states, these states are not always mutually antagonistic. Rather, they have developed a shared system of rules and procedures to deal with many issues. Much like drivers on a highway, they have come to agree on the "rules of the road," even though they do not necessarily trust each other to always comply with them.

Beginning with European states a few hundred years ago and gradually expanding to include all states, the end result can be called a "society"

(Bull 1977). The word is carefully chosen, since it falls somewhere between anarchy and community, even though some English School authors express doubts whether community is possible (Mayall 1982). Power plays a very important role in this society, but even the most powerful have accepted (however grudgingly) that there are limits to what they can do. States are ultimately linked and bound by a shared belief that international rules apply to all (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 51). The result is an orderly, albeit competitive, international environment.

For English School scholars, the "master," primary, or fundamental institutions include sovereignty, balance of power, international law, diplomacy, territoriality, and great-power management, but there is no firm definition (Buzan 2004; Wilson 2012). International organizations are intervening variables, defined, shaped, and constrained by the "master" institutions, especially international law. Law establishes the identity and role of the key players—in this case states—and establishes their rights and duties. Duties are paramount, since they constrain state behavior. These are found in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of Rome, and in such rules as the prohibition on the use of force and the right of self-defense. For some, international organizations like the UN might be able to lead states to adopt a more universalist approach, perhaps even including a "responsibility to protect" civilians in other states from gross violations of human rights law committed by their own governments. In this sense, English School scholars agree with constructivists that identities and rules are ever-evolving, although usually at a glacial pace.

Criticism of the English School comes primarily from realists who argue that the approach gives too much primacy to rules and norms and not enough to power. Others find problematic the absence of a clear definition of institutions and a confused picture of the relationship between institutions and practices (Wilson 2012).

Critical Theories

Critical theories comprise a diverse group of overarching theories of international relations that challenge conventional wisdom and provide alternative frameworks for understanding the world. Among the most prominent are Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, and their derivative, dependency theory. They challenge realism's focus on the primacy of power and the existing order, and liberalism's optimism about the benefits of expanding markets for peace and stability. Those rooted in Marxism share a historicism that drives questions of how the present international order came into being and what forces are at work to change it. Understanding how structural changes occur and the role of social forces is central.

Marxist and Neo-Marxist Theories

Although Marxism was discredited with the demise of the Soviet Union and the triumph of capitalism, it is still an important perspective for describing the hierarchy in the international system and the role of economics in determining that hierarchy. It still influences the thinking of many in the developing world whose colonial past and experience with capitalism are characterized by poverty and economic disadvantage. Marxist and neo-Marxist critical theories contribute important perspectives to understanding IR and global governance through the frameworks they provide for linking politics, economics, social forces, and structures of order.

Like realism and liberalism, Marxism comprises a set of core ideas that unite its variants. These include a grounding in historical analysis, the primacy of economic forces in explaining political and social phenomena, the central role of the production process, the particular character of capitalism as a global mode of production, and the importance of social or economic class in defining actors. The evolution of the production process also is a basis for explaining the relationship between production, social relations, and power. According to Karl Marx, a clash would inevitably occur between the capitalist class (the bourgeoisie) and the workers (the proletariat). From that class struggle would come a new social order. Interpreting this in the context of international relations, Robert Cox (1986: 220) noted: "Changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states and . . . [alter] the problematic of world order."

Marxist views of the structure of the global system, and hence of global governance, are rooted in these ideas about the relationships of class, the capitalist mode of production, and power. The hierarchical structure is a byproduct of the spread of global capitalism that privileges some states, organizations, groups, and individuals, and imposes significant constraints on others. Thus, developed countries have expanded economically (and in an earlier era politically, through imperialism), enabling them to sell goods and export surplus wealth that they could not absorb at home. Simultaneously, developing countries have become increasingly constrained and dependent on the actions of the developed.

Variants of Marxism emphasize the techniques of domination and suppression that arise from the uneven economic development inherent in the capitalist system. The influence of an Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), on critical theorists and some neoliberal institutionalists, however, has been considerable, given Gramsci's particular interpretation of hegemony as a relationship of consent to political and ideological leadership, not domination by force. Thus Cox (1992b: 140) argued that the foundation of hegemonic order "derives from the ways of doing and thinking

ing of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or states . . . [with] the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states."

These views have important implications for neo-Marxist theorizing about contemporary global governance. For example, in Craig Murphy's view (2000: 799), global governance is "a predictable institutional response not to the interests of a fully formed class, but to the overall logic of industrial capitalism." Cox (1986) and Stephen Gill (1994) have emphasized the importance of "globalizing elites" in the restructuring of the global political economy, and hence in global governance. These elites are found in the key economic institutions (the IMF, WTO, and World Bank), in finance ministries of G-7 countries, in the headquarters of MNCs, in private international relations councils (e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations and Trilateral Commission), and in major business schools. True, however, to a classical Marxist dialectical process, transnational social forces backing neoliberalism are increasingly challenged by those resisting globalization, as well as by environmental, feminist, and other social movements that in Murphy's view (2000) constitute a new locus for class analysis and a potential source of future change.

Marxists and neo-Marxists view international law and organizations as products of dominant states, dominant ideas, and the interests of the capitalist class. Some view them as instruments of capitalist domination imposed on others. The Gramscian view sees international organizations as a means to get others to consent to domination through shared ideas. Murphy (1994) argues that they have been instrumental in the development of the modern capitalist state by facilitating industrial change and the development of liberal ideology. Cox (1992a: 3) also sees them as being concerned with "longer-term questions of global structural change and . . . how international organizations . . . can help shape that change in a consensually desirable direction."

Marxists and neo-Marxists are almost uniformly normative in their orientation. They see capitalism as "bad," its structure and mode of production as exploitative. They have clear positions about what should be done to ameliorate inequities. Thus they are proponents of major structural change in international relations.

Dependency Theory

Dependency theorists, particularly those writing in the 1950s from Latin America, such as Raul Prebisch, Enzo Faletto, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Andre Gunder Frank, sought to understand why development was benefiting rich Northern countries, rather than the poorer South, and why that gap was widening. They hypothesized that the basic terms of trade were unequal between the developing and the developed world, partially as a

consequence of the history of colonialism and neocolonialism, and partly because multinational corporations and international banks based in developed countries were hamstringing dependent states. The latter organizations were seen as helping to establish and maintain dependency relations. They were also viewed as agents of penetration, not benign actors as liberals would characterize them, nor as marginal actors as realists believe. Dependency theorists argue that public and private international organizations are able to forge transnational relationships with elites in the developing countries (the "comprador class"), linking domestic elites in both exploiter and exploited countries in a symbiotic relationship.

Many dependency theorists argued that the solution was to disengage national economies from the international economy, to foster industrial growth in the South through import substitution, to protect internal markets from competition, and to seek major changes in international economic institutions. Only when countries in the South had reached a certain level of development could they participate fully in the international economy. These views had strong appeal and shaped the agenda of developing countries in the United Nations during the 1960s and 1970s. In essence, dependency theorists argued that development could not take place without fundamental changes in international economic relations in order to redress inequalities of power and wealth.

Dependency theorists share the view of other Marxist-derived theories that international organizations are generally the tools of capitalist classes and states. Multinational corporations are, likewise, instruments of capitalist exploitation and mechanisms of domination that perpetuate underdevelopment.

Even with the demise of the Soviet Union, Marxism and its variants did not disappear. Some aspects of these critical theories have resurfaced in the debates over globalization, particularly among opponents of globalization, including those who oppose corporate control over the economy and those who are trying to strengthen protection for workers, small farmers, poor people, and women. Stagnating economic and social conditions and the widening gap between rich and poor globally have also fueled renewed interest in the perspectives that critical theories offer.

Critical Feminism

Among the strains of critical theory are feminists who argue that studying gender involves more than just counting women in elite positions or cataloging programs targeting women. Rather, gender permeates all international structures. International relations, with its emphasis on states and international organizations engaged in diplomacy and war, denigrates the role of homes, families, and communities. Studying international relations

as exclusively the public domain means that a whole range of private human activity is simply ignored, even though it is at the heart of development, human rights, human security, and identity (Peterson 2003).

Critical feminists are especially interested in highlighting how contemporary international economic rules—as enforced by the wealthiest states, the IMF, private bond-rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, and private investors generally—create a unique burden on women. They argue that a neoliberal capitalist model of economic governance puts pressure on states to reduce social spending and reduce protections on local goods from foreign competition, with the immediate result that the poor are exposed to the ravages of global competition.

Critical theorists see women as particularly vulnerable to exploitation when the public sector fails to provide essential services or is adversely affected by globalization. They point to the fact that the overwhelming majority of trafficked persons are women. Women experience a double-exploitation due to the way the world economy is defined and managed. Even the "mainstreaming of women" in development programs, as advocated by liberal feminists, is too often overwhelmed, they argue, by the grand strategy of promoting economic liberalization and austerity (True 2011).

Critics, including other feminists, have challenged the misandrogynistic tone of some critical feminist writing, arguing that the exploitative structures they describe are not automatically the fault of men, but that both women and men are part of the problem and part of the solution. In particular, neoliberal economists emphasize the importance of market forces as a means of disciplining profligate states and promoting the efficient use of resources, both of which will benefit all citizens, including women. These are issues discussed in subsequent chapters.

Securitization Studies

A new approach to global governance is primarily a critique of the increasing role of security in public policy generally. It began with criticisms of the "military-industrial complex" in the 1940s, arguing that states were exaggerating security threats in order to feed the financial needs of those involved in producing weapons (Lasswell 1941).

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, there has been a sense on the part of many radical and constructivist scholars that governments and international organizations are defining almost every problem as a security issue, hence the term "securitization" (not to be confused with its use in finance and insurance). Although certain issues clearly have a security dimension, securitization scholars assert that states and international organizations seek to exercise increasing control over their political environment by proclaiming the issue as a matter of security. In so

doing, they remove the object from traditional political constraints and exert extraordinary powers in its defense (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998).

The most obvious use of this authority involves control by states over telecommunications. The US National Security Agency's monitoring of transnational cell phone and e-mail communication, as revealed in 2013, was justified by governmental authorities as necessary to protect national security. The same was true of Great Britain's ubiquitous use of closed-circuit television cameras justified in the name of national security. Border controls, likewise, have been tightened for security reasons, even though the vast majority of migration occurs for economic reasons. This critique is especially relevant to global governance and international organization with the emergence of the human security umbrella for discussing a myriad of issues.

Proclaiming an issue a matter of security demands a person with legal or moral authority and a capacity to act on the statement. Yet some may be skeptical of that claim or reject it altogether. In the case of the Iraq War, members of the United Nations were skeptical of the US claim that the world's security depended on removing the Saddam Hussein regime from power. The George W. Bush administration largely failed to paint the situation as an existential threat. Likewise, although governments and international organizations have portrayed the effort to limit human and drug trafficking in some parts of the world as a way to promote security, the rhetoric has not always been accepted by local authorities (Jackson 2006). Determining what is a threat to security also involves defining what it is that is threatened (the territory? the constitution? the leader?) and how societies should respond to such threats (buying bonds? volunteering for the military? debating?).

Theories of Organizational Interactions

Interstate relations are not the only interactions that are important for understanding international cooperation and global governance. Relevant middle-level theories that provide insights relevant to studying interactions both among the various global governance actors and within specific organizations can also be found in sociology and economics. These theories see organizations as making choices and interacting with their environments.

Interorganizational Processes

The proliferation of actors in global governance has made it imperative to study interorganizational relations. Sociologists have long contended that for all types of organizations, the most important part of the environment is their cooperative and conflictual relations with other organizations. Organi-

zational interdependence emerges from the shared need for resources (money, specialized skills, and markets), overlapping missions, or the desire to add new specialties at reduced cost. In response, organizations may innovate to exclude rivals or increase coordination and cooperation. Thus, interorganization theorists examine how and why organizations, often working within the same environment or on the same type of problems, may both clash and cooperate.

Interorganization theorists are also interested in the dependence of one organization on another. For example, the UN Security Council needs both resources and information to fulfill its mission, and such dependence limits its autonomy. Similarly, the regional development banks may depend on the World Bank for cofinancing large projects, for setting development priorities, and for technical expertise. In the 1980s, for example, the African Development Bank found itself subservient to the World Bank, having fewer economic resources and a less visible field presence, and being the last to be repaid. This dependence was reinforced by the attitude of the African countries themselves (Mingst 1987: 291).

Coordination problems between and among IGOs, such as those among economic and social agencies within the UN system, or among NGOs such as the humanitarian relief groups, form another group of interorganizational problems. Chapter 4 explores how the UN's Economic and Social Council was intended to play a central, coordinating role for the system but has lacked the resources and clout to do so effectively. Humanitarian crises in the 1990s and the problem of too many groups trying to help led to the creation of the UN's Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998 as the lead humanitarian agency coordinating efforts in the field.

Networks

Part of understanding how organizations interact is recognizing that they may interact not just with each other, but also within broader social networks. The concept of networks comes from sociology, but has been appropriated into thinking about global governance. Harold Jacobson was the first to identify the relevance of networks for the field, as reflected in the title of his pathbreaking textbook *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System* (1984). The sociological literature on networks examines the various links between organizations and individuals (both private and public), domestically and internationally. Often there is a linchpin organization in the network, an organization able to mobilize coalitions on particular issues or control the process of bargaining. Such organizations have seldom been delegated such authority, but are able to legitimize their actions with respect to the specific issue area (Jönsson 1986).

Various types of networks, as introduced in Cha[pter] throughout this book. Anne Marie Slaughter (2004) networks of government officials, judges, legislato[rs] up what she calls the "new world order." Miles K[ahler] networks as both structures and actors in global gove[rnance]. politics as "new forms of governance in international re[lations]. Ohanyan (2012: 372, 377) links network theory and sociolog[ical] tionalism in a theoretical approach for studying NGOs and their positi[on]. negative agency that she terms "network institutionalism." She argues that the network approach "is a useful bridge between the NGO studies and dominant IR theories that generally treat NGOs as inconsequential and marginal in world politics" (372). Network structure, she notes, matters in "shaping the extent of NGO autonomy and agency . . . [while] network institutionalism focuses on the network position of an NGO as an important variable that can explain the extent of NGO agency in world politics" (377).

Transnational advocacy networks have become increasingly important to global governance, as discussed in Chapter 6. Such networks share "the centrality of values or principled ideas, the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment by nongovernmental actors of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns." They are "bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). These networks also try to set the terms of international and domestic debate, to influence international and state-level policy outcomes, and to alter the behavior of states, international organizations, and other interested parties. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is one prominent example of a transnational advocacy network from the late 1990s. The human rights, environmental, and women's movements further illustrate the phenomenon. Network analysis encompasses both international and domestic actors and processes, and examines how individuals and groups are linked and what strategies they use to promote their goals.

Principal-Agent Interactions

Economists' work on the theory of the firm has been expanded by those studying US government bureaucracies, and more recently has been adapted to the study of IGOs and NGOs. Principal-agent theorists posit that principals (in politics, decisionmakers) delegate authority to an agent (e.g., a bureaucracy), empowering the agent to act on behalf of the principals. Principals delegate such authority for a number of reasons: to benefit from the agent's specialized knowledge, enhance certitude, resolve disputes, or enhance their own credibility. Yet principals need to be careful of agent

autonomy—that is, of the agents taking independent actions that the principals do not want taken. Much of the principal-agent literature discusses ways in which principals control agents (establishing rules, monitoring and reporting, inserting checks and balances) and ways in which agents can become independent, autonomous actors.

Scholars of international organizations (both IGOs and NGOs) have turned to principal-agent theory to examine how states as collective principals delegate authority and control to IGOs and the ways that the agents (both IGOs and NGOs) can exert autonomy (Hawkins et al. 2006; Oestreich 2012). The theory has been used to show how agents interpret mandates, reinterpret rules, expand permeability to third parties, and create barriers to principals' monitoring. Much of this literature to date has focused on a few IGOs, including the IMF, World Bank, and EU.

In using principal-agent theory, some writers have found that NGOs may be crucial intermediaries between states and IGOs, but not independent actors that change preferences (Lake and McCubbins 2006: 341, 368). Other writers suggest the ways that NGOs have agency—the ability to choose among different courses of action, learn from experience, and effect change, which may be both independent from states and also dysfunctional (Cooley and Ron 2002).

Like social constructivists, then, principal-agent theorists are concerned with examining the degree of independence and autonomy of international organizations. Although social constructivists explain autonomy by reference to authoritative bureaucracies, principal-agent theorists find that principals limit their agents and that agents act rationally and strategically to try to expand their authority.

Intraorganizational Processes

Another group of middle-level theories focuses on what happens within organizations themselves. Two have particular relevance for the study of global governance actors: theories of organizational culture, and theories of organizational adaptation and learning.

Organizational culture. Over time, organizations tend to develop cultures of their own, independent from and different than the cultures of their individual members. During the 1970s, sociologists and anthropologists began to study these cultures rather than seeing organizations only as technical, rational, impersonal mechanisms. During the 1980s, it became popular to think of organizations as autonomous sites of power, with their own particular cultures, norms, and values. Thus, organizations might become agents themselves, not just structures through which actors operate. Organization theorists, therefore, created typologies of organizational cultures and showed how these can change over time (Hawkins 1997). Some IR scholars

have borrowed the notion of organizational culture, suggesting that bureaucracies develop cultures that influence state preferences. This counters the realist view that preferences are exogenously determined.

International organization scholars, particularly constructivists, have also seized upon the notion of organizational culture, believing that "the rules, rituals, and beliefs that are embedded in the organization (and its subunits) . . . [have] important consequences for the way individuals who inhabit that organization make sense of the world" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 719). For example, the practice of UN peacekeeping includes sets of rules designed to maximize the probability of success. Those rules, including requirements of consent and impartiality, were embedded in the peacekeeping culture of the UN and have provided one explanation why the UN Secretariat misperceived the unfolding genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The World Bank has also been shown to have a distinctive organizational culture, since over half of its professional staff have graduate degrees in economics or finance from US or British institutions (Weaver 2008: 77). Organizational cultures, then, explain some organizational behaviors, although those cultures are subject to slow change.

Organizational adaptation and learning. Organization theorists have also been particularly interested in examining how organizations evolve. Ernst Haas (1990) delineates two such processes. In the first, organizations adapt by adding new activities to their agendas without actually examining or changing underlying bases of the organization and its values. The organization muddles through and change occurs incrementally. Such was the case when the UN took on added peacekeeping tasks in the early 1990s, including election monitoring, humanitarian aid delivery, and protection of populations threatened by ethnic cleansing and genocide. Only with the failures in Somalia and Bosnia did the UN Secretariat and UN member states look seriously at the lessons to be learned from the incremental, unplanned changes.

The second kind of change process is based on the premise that organizations can, in fact, learn. With learning, members or staff question earlier beliefs and develop new processes. Thus, learning involves redefinition of organizational purposes, reconceptualization of problems, articulation of new ends, and organizational change based upon new, underlying consensual knowledge. Such has been the case with the evolution of World Bank programs from an initial emphasis on infrastructure projects to poverty alleviation and good governance, discussed in Chapter 9, as well as with the evolution of UN peacekeeping, as discussed in Chapter 7. Other examples abound.

Organizational theories from both sociology and economics enable us to probe deeper within specific institutions of global governance by helping

us understand both the interorganizational and intraorganizational processes. Increasingly, scholars are using multiple theoretical perspectives, enhancing our knowledge in new ways.

IR Theory and Global Governance

One of the unanswered puzzles is that despite the fact that multilateral diplomacy and institutions became dominant forms of interaction in the twentieth century, multilateralism is generally neglected in IR theory (Caporaso 1993: 51). As we have seen, neoliberals and neorealists, in particular, have attempted to explain cooperation and the conditions under which cooperation becomes multilateral and institutionalized through international regimes. Constructivist approaches that look at processes of persuasion, discussion, and argumentation contribute further to our understandings. Constructivists have also contributed to our knowledge about how norms, ideas, and beliefs affect outcomes. Critical theories provide perspectives on contemporary structures of global governance; they and neorealist theory share a concern for the role of power and powerful actors. Liberalism and its middle-level derivatives, however, form the foundation for much global governance theorizing.

Subsequent chapters utilize these various theories when appropriate. In Chapters 3 and 5, functionalism explains much of the history of specialized organizations and the EU. In Chapters 7 through 11, specific international regimes are examined, along with their major principles, rules, and decisionmaking processes. In Chapter 7, realist theory helps us understand the difficulties that international institutions have in addressing threats to peace and security. Chapters 8 and 9 consider how hegemonic stability, great-power concert theories, and critical perspectives have affected efforts to address economic issues. In Chapter 10, liberal theory and constructivism contribute to understanding the evolution of human rights norms. In Chapter 11, collective goods theory forms a central focus for international efforts to address environmental problems. Throughout the book, middle-level interorganizational and intraorganizational theories help us understand how different organizations function and the connections among different actors and their roles.

Suggested Further Reading

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