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## THE REVERSE COATTAILS EFFECT: LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE 1989 BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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*I*ncreasingly, it is said that the main determinants of electoral outcomes are class, ethnicity, and religion and that local political organizations occupy only marginal roles in national elections. I assess the effects of local party organizations in the presidential election of 1989 in Brazil. Given the long hiatus in competitive politics, the absence of any parties linked to the country's previous democratic experience, and the weakness of citizen identification with political parties, Brazil should be a textbook example of the collapse of local political organizations. The presidential candidates, however, acted as if party endorsements mattered, and in the context of Brazilian politics, it was rational for municipal mayors to trade blocs of votes for future local benefits. Applying a series of increasingly complex models to the vote shares of the leading candidates, I show that all candidates did significantly better in municipalities where the mayor represented their party. I also show that spatial factors affect the tactics of local politicians, and I distinguish charismatic from purely organizational components of support.

**A**s democratization sweeps over formerly authoritarian regimes in the Third World and in the former Soviet bloc, elections move to the center of the political stage. For students of politics in these new regimes, the primacy of elections presents an intellectual challenge. What will be the main factors determining electoral outcomes? Will class, ethnicity, and religion—the usual determinants of electoral results in advanced industrial countries—have the same weight in the newly competitive nations? If the experience of many industrial and industrializing nations, especially in Latin America, foreshadows the political futures of the nations in transition, *local political organization* will join class, ethnicity and religion as determinants of national-level electoral contests. By the term *local political organization* I refer not to affective ties linking citizens with their communities but, instead, to the efforts of a community's political leaders to deliver blocs of votes to candidates the leadership prefers.<sup>1</sup> In Colombia, for example, two dominant parties have long relied on an extensive clientelist network to link local political machines to the national state (Buitrago and Dávila 1990). In Mexico and Venezuela, local bosses "mobilize their clienteles to support a political party in rallies, demonstrations, and elections in exchange for favors from higher government and party officials" (Coppedge 1993, 262). In Italy, "the key to Christian Democratic power in the major southern cities has been . . . control of the *municipio*" (Chubb 1982, 78). Local politicians in Japan gather votes for Diet candidates by persuading constituents that good relations with their Diet members are a prerequisite for the continuation of subsidies and grants-in-aid from the central government. Success at generating support for the Diet candidate yields financial aid for the local politician's own election campaign (Curtis 1971, 44–45).

How can we evaluate the potential of local political

organizations in the electoral processes of formerly authoritarian regimes? First, if local organizations are truly significant actors in national politics, they ought to affect electoral results in *supralocal* contests, for example, in presidential elections. Second, if local organizations exist apart from longstanding voter loyalties, the effects of the machine ought to be clear even where party identification is weak. Finally, if local organizations have staying power in competitive politics, they should matter even when politicians use modern marketing techniques to reach voters directly.

I shall focus on just such a case, the Brazilian presidential election of 1989. Consider the background of the election. The 1989 contest was the first national decision since 1960, and less than one-third of the electorate had ever voted in a national election.<sup>2</sup> None of the political parties contesting the 1989 election had been around in 1960, and most of the contending parties were less than two years old.<sup>3</sup> The Brazilian Democratic Movement party (PMDB),\* the nation's largest party, had ridden the initial success of its emergency economic program to overwhelming victories in the 1986 congressional and gubernatorial races, but the program collapsed soon after, and the popularity of the PMDB fell so drastically that half its congressional delegation deserted to form new parties or join old ones. In public opinion surveys, the percentage of the population agreeing that in its own vote choice, "the candidate's party is the decisive factor" had declined from 43% in 1982 to 24% in 1986 and to 18% in 1988 (Muszynski and Mendes 1990, 64).

As the election unfolded, the weakness of the parties seemed pathetic. Officially, the race included 22 candidates. Almost from the beginning of the campaign, the leader was Fernando Collor de Mello, a little-known governor from the politically and eco-

\* All party acronyms are listed in the Abbreviations.

nomically marginal state of Alagoas. Backed by the National Reconstruction party (PRN)—a party created solely for the election—Collor's campaign focused on his alleged achievements in rooting out Alagoas's *marajás*, the vastly overpaid "maharajas" of the civil service. His campaign team, for the first time in a Brazilian presidential election, made extensive and effective use of television.

The election took place in two rounds. In the first round Collor and the runner-up, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' party (PT), jointly received 48% of the vote. The parties backing these two candidates held less than 5% of all seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while two other candidates, whose parties held 61% of the seats, received only 5% of the vote. Though the losing parties of the first round had little sense of the true preferences of their partisans, they could not avoid endorsing one of the two finalists. After a campaign bitter enough to embarrass an American marketing consultant, Collor defeated Lula 53% to 47%. The new president remained in office until his impeachment and conviction on corruption charges in 1992.

Brazilian political analysts interpret the 1989 election as essentially plebiscitary: parties, in the conventional wisdom, failed in their attempts to mobilize or sway voters.<sup>4</sup> The presidential candidates disagreed with this interpretation, however, at least insofar as their campaign behavior reveals an underlying sense of the electoral process. In the months before the election every candidate worked at winning the endorsements of governors, senators, federal deputies, and local mayors. One of the country's leading newspapers, the *Folha de São Paulo*, provided frequent updates of its *adesômetro* (endorsement meter), a thermometer recording pledges of support announced by various national and local politicians. Newspapers in every state updated who-endorsed-whom stories. Candidates, in other words, thought politicians and their organizations still had the power to influence voters.

Were the presidential candidates simply fighting the last election? Were they failing to realize that the old politics of local bosses and local organizations no longer mattered? Or were the candidates right? Did local parties matter even when television had the power to catapult unknowns to national prominence?

In the context of Brazilian politics, the endorsement-seeking tactics of the presidential candidates, at least insofar as they focus on local officials, are perfectly rational, because the candidates know that municipal leaders have every reason to remain in the good graces of the future president. Municipalities (the basic unit of Brazilian government below the state level) desperately need the transfer payments that the central government makes available. In sanitation, school construction, social assistance, and roads, central government transfers are absolutely indispensable. Poor and rural municipalities are the most dependent, but even big cities need federal help. A very large share of these transfers—perhaps as much as 50%—is discretionary, and the central

government relies heavily on political criteria in signing the expenditure transfer agreements known as *convênios*.<sup>5</sup> In 1990–91, for example, municipalities in the home states of President Collor (Alagoas), the education minister (Rio Grande do Sul), and the health minister (Paraná) all received a significantly greater number of transfer agreements than municipalities in other states.<sup>6</sup> Thus any sensible local leader, needing central government money and knowing that political criteria traditionally determine the distribution of such monies, would try to deliver votes to some candidate.

Endorsement seeking in Brazil has a second rationale: politicians know that strong local machines have the tools to influence the choices of voters. Naturally a machine leans on its patronage employees for support. Government employees constitute between 5% and 10% of the economically active population in the whole country (far more in some municipalities), and voters whose livelihoods depend on local government will surely support their leaders.<sup>7</sup> Local leaders also influence voters well beyond the narrow circle of friends and dependents. The local machine might disrupt the rallies and meetings of the opposition. It can hinder the attempts of the opposition to distribute electoral advertisements or gifts to voters. The machine can influence local newspapers and radio and television stations to slant news so as to benefit its favorites. Indeed, radio and television licenses were themselves often granted as political rewards to influential local politicians. These activities constitute not vote fraud (which, by 1989, had become quite unlikely) but simply a continuation of ordinary local government political activity.

If the presidential candidates behaved rationally in seeking the endorsements of state and local leaders, the question remains: Was the outcome of the 1989 election "politics as usual"? In other words, did organization matter?

No research has been undertaken directly on this topic, principally, I believe, because appropriate data bases have been unavailable.<sup>8</sup> I have created such a data base, and in this essay I construct and evaluate a model assessing the ability of local party organizations to mobilize voters for the presidential election. The analysis suggests that party endorsements and the mobilizational commitments they represent did indeed matter. In fact, they had a powerful impact on the fortunes of all the major candidates in the Brazilian presidential election. Although Fernando Collor de Mello probably would have won even if local machines had remained truly neutral, the Collor phenomenon was almost certainly exceptional, and in a normal election local organization will remain critical. Rumors of the death of parties, in other words, have been greatly exaggerated.

I first present some background necessary to understand the election itself, then develop and test a series of models linking local organizational backing to candidate support in the two rounds of the election. These models successively increase in complexity and



realism. Finally, I extend the modeling exercise and consider the overall significance of the results.

## THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1989

Though the 1989 election was Brazil's first *popular* presidential competition since the military seized power in 1964, the outgoing president was a civilian, not a general. In 1984 Tancredo Neves had beaten the military's preferred candidate in a contest conducted wholly within an electoral college, a college composed of various elected and appointed officials. When Neves died soon after the election, his vice-president, conservative northeastern José Sarney, assumed the presidency. Though Sarney had his ups and downs, by the end of 1988 he was widely unpopular, and all contenders in the 1989 campaign attacked his presidency. Sarney's ministers endorsed various candidates, but the president backed no one, and his administration held to a position of official neutrality.

### The Politics of Structure and Geography

Brazil is truly a federal system. States have been important actors in Brazilian politics since independence. Governors of economically significant states immediately become major players in national politics, and most congressional deputies reflect state and local interests. Such legislative localism is largely a product of Brazil's electoral system, its unique version of open-list proportional representation. In all open-list proportional representation systems, voters cast ballots for individual candidates. The *number* of seats a party receives is basically determined by a simple ratio: the sum of all votes cast for the party's candidates divided by the sum of all votes cast for candidates of all parties. The identity of the *holders* of the seats is then determined by ranking the candidates by the number of individual votes received. The Brazilian version of open-list proportional representation adds some features not found elsewhere: whole states serve as at-large congressional districts; state-level conventions select candidates; and, by law, parties cannot refuse to renominate incumbent deputies.<sup>9</sup>

The results of open-list proportional representation in Brazil are predictable: a proliferation of weak, ideologically incoherent parties; a focus on personalized politics; and a president usually bereft of solid legislative backing. Desperate to attract congressional support, Brazil's presidents parcel out cabinet positions to powerful state leaders in the hope that the latter will influence their states' delegations. Not surprisingly, these ministers manipulate projects and patronage jobs to advance their own political futures. President Sarney, for example, appointed Antonio Carlos Magalhães, former (and current) governor of Bahia, to be minister of communications. Magalhães funneled radio and television licenses to backers of

the president (many of them deputies) and to supporters of his own political ambitions.

The central government distributes pork primarily to municipalities and secondarily to states. As a tool for attracting *legislative* support, pork is rather blunt, because *real* legislative districts (i.e., the actual areas in which deputies campaign) are usually neither whole states nor single municipalities. In other words, deputies care little about statewide pork, because they would have to share credit with the rest of their delegation. And though most deputies focus their campaigning on small groups of municipalities, few of the resulting bailiwicks are so secure that they resemble U.S.-style single-member districts (Ames 1992). As a result, the president has to persuade mayors to persuade their deputies to repay presidential generosity. Sometimes it works, sometimes not, but the overall price, in terms of efficient allocations of government spending, must rise.<sup>10</sup>

*Region* is also crucial to the Brazilian equation. The Northeast, composed of nine very poor states, has long been dominated by conservative politicians and political bosses. Although in certain states clientelistic politics has noticeably declined, traditional styles of politics maintain their grip in much of the region, and large portions of the rural Northeast survive only as a result of federal transfers. Here politics is a business, sometimes the only prosperous business. Generally supportive of Brazil's political Right, the Northeast (along with the North and Center-West) benefits from the malapportionment of the national legislature.<sup>11</sup>

The South and Southeast regions, by contrast, include the bulk of Brazil's industry and most of its Left and Left-Center electoral strongholds. Deputies in the South and Southeast are no less pork-oriented than northeasterners—but their vote bases are competitive, rather than monolithic, and they are substantially more accountable to their electorates.

### Parties and Candidates

The results of the first round of balloting are shown in Table 1. My empirical analysis focuses on five of the first seven finishers: Fernando Collor de Mello, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, Leonel Brizola, Paulo Maluf, and Ulysses Guimarães.<sup>12</sup> I have eliminated Mário Covas, who finished fourth, because his Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) controlled very few municipalities. Afif Domingos of the Liberal party (PL) had a few more votes than Ulysses, but Afif was almost never an important player in the campaign, and his party was minuscule compared to the PMDB. Aureliano Chaves represented the Liberal Front party (PFL), a major party, but his campaign never got off the ground, and most PFL mayors abandoned his candidacy well before the first round of voting.<sup>13</sup>

In order to understand how local party organizations affected the 1989 election, readers unfamiliar with the Brazilian political scene need a brief introduction to the chief parties and their candidates.

TABLE 1

Results of Round One of 1989 Presidential Election

CANDIDATE AND PARTY	VOTES	PERCENTAGE
Collor, PRN	20,611,011	28.52
Lula, PT	11,622,673	16.08
Brizola, PDT	11,168,228	15.45
Mario Covas, PSDB	7,790,392	10.78
Maluf, PDS	5,986,575	8.28
Affif, PL	3,272,462	4.53
Ulysses, PMDB	3,204,932	4.43
Freire, PCB	769,123	1.06
Aureliano, PFL	600,838	.83
Caiado, PSD	488,846	.68
Camargo, PTB	379,286	.52
Total	72,280,909	91.16

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral: Coordenação Geral de Informática. Brasília, DF: Brasil.

Note: Eleven candidates, each with less than .52% of the vote, have been eliminated from this table. All the electoral data in this and subsequent tables come from the tribunal. Throughout the analysis, the percentage of votes cast for the candidate is the fraction of valid votes (i.e., votes for candidates minus blank and null votes).

*Ulysses Guimarães and the PMDB.* The Brazilian Democratic Movement party had originated as the Brazilian Democratic movement (MDB), the officially tolerated opposition party during the military regime. Increasingly independent and critical of the dictatorship, its legislative candidates began to mount a serious challenge in the election of 1974, especially in the more developed South and Southeast. In the 1970s and 1980s, the PMDB grew enormously, spreading from its original base to the whole country. With the legalization, in the 1980s, of multiparty politics, competitors on the left and right flanked the PMDB, and it lost most of its ideological coloration.<sup>14</sup> In 1984, the electoral college chose a PMDBista president, but Vice-President José Sarney, who assumed the presidency upon Tancredo Neves's death, was a northeasterner representing the much more conservative PFL. In 1989, the PMDB selected Ulysses Guimarães as its candidate for the presidency. As the official leader of the PMDB, Guimarães commanded wide respect, even reverence, for his struggle to reestablish Brazilian democracy. A 73-year-old Paulista, Guimarães was a skilled legislator, a moderate social democrat, and a lackluster television orator.

*Leonel Brizola and the Democratic Labor Party.* Leonel Brizola's political career is the stuff of legends.<sup>15</sup> A founder of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) in 1945, in the 1950s he had been federal deputy and governor of Rio Grande do Sul, a dynamic state in the South. Moving in 1962 to the state of Rio de Janeiro (then called Guanabara), Brizola became an active figure in an already well established PTB and gained a seat as federal deputy once again. In 1964, the military regime, angered by Brizola's radical activities and powerful populist speeches, forced him to leave the

country. He returned in 1979 as part of a general amnesty, and in 1982 Rio's voters elected him governor, this time on the ticket of the Democratic Labor party (PDT), a party he had formed when the electoral courts refused him the old PTB label. Brizola's national ambitions have always foundered on one huge obstacle: though he commands enormous popular support in Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, he has never been able to penetrate the state of São Paulo. In Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul Brizola received 50% and 61% of the votes, respectively, in the first round of the 1989 election. In São Paulo, a state with more than one-fifth of the Brazilian electorate, he received less than 1.5%.<sup>16</sup>

Labeling Brizola ideologically is difficult. His socialism is certainly less doctrinaire than Lula's, but Brizola's thinking—often labeled populist—contains both xenophobic and statist elements.

*Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers' Party.* Even in the cacophony of Brazilian politics, the PT stands apart (see Keck 1992; Sader and Silverstein 1991). As the largest ideologically militant party in Brazil, it represents traditional socialism. Riven by internal disputes, the party is nonetheless highly disciplined in the federal Chamber of Deputies. Not only does a significant fraction of PT deputies come from working-class organizations, but Lula, the party's head, began as an industrial worker and union organizer. Though supported by intellectuals, especially university professors, its working-class electoral base is substantial, particularly in industrial states like São Paulo. In her study of the 1989 election in the *paulista* municipality of Presidente Prudente, Kinzo found Lula to be the only candidate with a largely class-based appeal (1992, 59). As Keck points out, Lula's campaign called for a socialist transformation of Brazilian society, while stressing the need for national reconciliation and the formation of a national popular government (1992, 159).

*Paulo Maluf and the Democratic Social Party.* Its name notwithstanding, the Democratic Social party (PDS) is a right-wing party. Recall that the military regime had permitted the creation of an official opposition party, the MDB, which became the PMDB. The military also created a progovernment party, the National Renovating Alliance—ARENA. As the democratic transition unfolded, ARENA became the PDS. Its presidential candidate, Paulo Maluf, had been appointed governor of São Paulo by the military regime in 1979. A politician of legendary memory and deal-making skill, Maluf enjoyed considerable popularity in the city of São Paulo (which elected him mayor in 1992), and his PDS controlled hundreds of municipalities across the nation.

*Fernando Collor de Mello and the National Reconstruction Party.* The National Reconstruction party (PRN) was nothing more than a vehicle for Collor's ambitions. Raised in a traditional political family (his father had been governor and an uncle had been a federal

minister in the 1930s), Collor hailed from Alagoas, an economically and politically marginal state with a reputation for exceptionally corrupt politics (Mello 1992). The military appointed Collor mayor of Maceió, Alagoas's capital, and he subsequently won election as federal deputy and governor. Lula derisively referred to Collor as the "lap dog" of the military, but Collor ran for president as a populist reformer, criticizing the Sarney administration and trumpeting his own record in Alagoas as a corruption fighter. Collor was aided by his youth (he was barely forty at the time of the campaign) and his good looks. The PRN was his fifth political party. His career had already passed through ARENA, the PDS, the PMDB, and the Party of Youth. The PRN was not much of a party, however: at the time of the campaign, it controlled outright only three municipalities and had only 14 federal deputies.

### The Course of the Campaign

At the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, Lula and Brizola led all opinion polls, and the election shaped up as a battle between these two leftists. But around the end of March, Brazilians began to witness the *fenômeno Collor*—a surge in the polls that carried Fernando Collor de Mello past the field and ultimately to about 40% of the electorate, more than the other candidates combined.<sup>17</sup> Although Collor finally slipped to a bit below 30%, no one seriously challenged him, and in its last six months, the campaign was really about second-place. Lula finally squeezed in, victorious over Brizola by less than five hundred thousand votes.

With only a month between the first and second rounds of the election, the struggle for the endorsements of the losing parties soon reached fever pitch. A group of PMDB deputies quickly endorsed Lula, but Orestes Quêrcia, the governor of São Paulo and a fierce opponent of Lula, demanded that the party remain neutral. Other PMDB governors fell in behind Quêrcia, and the PT itself proclaimed that no politician associated with the discredited Sarney administration (read PMDB) could appear with its candidates. So the PMDB endorsed no one. The PSDB, by contrast, agonized for awhile, then granted "qualified" support (*apoio crítico*) to Lula. Lula also picked up some *unqualified* support: Brizola threw his PDT enthusiastically behind the man who had so narrowly kept him from the final round.

On the right, alliances were simpler. The PFL and PTB strongly endorsed Collor. Various minor right-wing parties soon followed suit. Maluf's PDS joined the Collor brigade, although a few PDSistas, especially in Brizola's stronghold of Rio Grande do Sul, went over to Lula. After two nationally televised debates and intense television advertising (the low-point coming during a Collor television program when Lula's ex-wife denounced him as a bad father and a racist), Collor defeated his PT rival, 53% to 47%.

### Mayors and Local Machines

Brazil's mayors had all assumed office in 1988. Previously, the military regime had imposed officials on large cities and on certain other municipalities it classed as "strategically important," so the 1988 election was the first since the military takeover in which all municipalities had the right to elect their own mayors and councils. Nineteen different parties elected mayors in 4,000-plus municipalities. The major parties (PT, PDT, PMDB, PSDB, PDS, PTB, and PFL) elected a total of 3,164 mayors. In 1,787 cases, the victor had no formal support from other parties; in 1,377 cases, a formal coalition of two or more parties supported the winner.<sup>18</sup>

Did mayors use their influence to boost the candidate of their party, or did they desert to someone else? Overwhelmingly, mayors remained loyal.<sup>19</sup> In the first round, mayors from the PT (Lula), PDT (Brizola), and PDS (Maluf) almost never deserted. Even though Ulysses Guimarães' candidacy was in desperate trouble months before the actual vote, few PMDB mayors abandoned him, at least publicly. Most mayoral desertions came from the PTB and PFL. No one, including the candidate himself, took the PTB's campaign seriously, and PFLista Aureliano Chaves's candidacy foundered from the very beginning. Of those PTB and PFL mayors who abandoned their candidates, the largest number publicly endorsed Fernando Collor de Mello.

The ability of a mayor to put the machine's muscle behind a candidate depended, in part, on the mayor's own freedom of action. If a coalition, rather than a single party, had backed the winning mayor, the members of the supporting parties would likely object to the mayor's helping a presidential candidate they did not support. Moreover, successful coalitions usually elected members of the municipal council as well, so that the mayor was likely to face council opposition to electioneering efforts. As a result, presidential candidates are likely to gain less in municipalities where a coalition supported the mayor, as compared to municipalities where the mayor won without allies.

### MODELS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT

Let us begin with a "stupid" model, that is, a model regressing the candidates' vote shares on dummy variables representing the party (or parties) in control of the municipality.<sup>20</sup> These dummies are scored 1 if the mayor or coalition came from a given party and 0 if the mayor or coalition came from some other party (including parties with no serious presidential candidate). The results, presented in Table 2, can be interpreted as *the number of percentage points a candidate gains in municipalities with mayors or mayoral coalitions of each party*.

The simple model is encouraging. Lula does well in PT municipalities and badly elsewhere (except in the



TABLE 2						
Least Squares Estimates of Presidential Support with Pure Endorsement Model						
PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	17.66**	30.95**	27.11**	4.88**	4.06**	54.38**
PT	12.39**	-8.89**	-23.00**	12.16**	-1.93**	-2.78
PDT	-5.82**	-11.39**	13.98**	3.24**	-.23	2.85*
PMDB	-.91	5.60**	-11.61**	2.88**	4.63**	-11.96**
PSDB	9.52**	-2.42	-17.77**	5.02**	-.26	-3.97
PDS	-3.61**	7.60**	-10.20**	6.03**	2.37**	-14.84**
PTB	-1.95	13.91**	-21.31**	6.91**	.32	-20.40**
PFL	.71	15.33**	-19.07**	2.41**	1.93**	-18.43**
Coalitions						
PT	-2.78**	-14.21**	-16.76**	16.55**	-2.83**	-6.63**
PDT	-.26	-1.06	-2.15	2.45**	.54	-1.80
PMDB	4.68**	7.69**	-15.49**	.74	3.44**	-9.57**
PSDB	15.95**	-13.03**	-18.55**	-1.80	-.56	11.81**
PDS	-2.57**	4.21**	-11.39**	6.02**	1.69**	-12.17**
PTB	3.10**	2.83*	-13.14**	5.34**	.12	-6.92**
PFL	5.87**	10.68**	-17.54**	.74	1.13*	-11.46**
R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.23	.17	.26	.11	.14
F	43.24	76.97	52.38	90.35	31.07	43.16
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,677.

\*p ≤ .05.

\*\*p ≤ .01.

few cases where the mayor was a PSDBista). Brizola gains only where his PDT ruled by itself, and Ulysses Guimarães gains the most in PMDB municipalities. In the second round, Lula loses badly everywhere except in the municipalities of the Left, but only in PDT municipalities does he really do well. Brizola, in other words, delivers votes to Lula in even larger numbers than the PT's own "machine." The only real anomaly is Maluf, who seems to do well everywhere, regardless of party. Maluf's results may well stem from his popularity in urban centers of the South, but we shall have to await elaboration of the model.

This model is "stupid," of course, because it leaves out socioeconomic and demographic factors. Even in a polity where few parties occupy well-defined ideological positions, candidates appeal to different social groups. Since these groups distribute themselves unevenly across municipalities, municipal-level results should differ even if party machines are nonexistent.

With their populist and statist appeals, Lula and Brizola clearly appealed to big-city voters, especially to working- and lower-class groups and to government employees (who concentrate in big cities). Collor's strength was greatest in small towns and rural areas, and, being a candidate with no party, he did well among newly arrived residents, immigrants who lack ties to old political machines. Maluf was a conservative candidate with considerable appeal in the capital city of São Paulo, while Ulysses Guimarães' candidacy lacked any clear, group-oriented content.

The only comprehensive source of Brazilian socio-

economic and demographic data is the census of 1980.<sup>21</sup> By 1989, the country had changed, especially through the shifting of population from rural to urban areas. I therefore substituted the size of the registered electorate, a datum collected in 1988, for the census measure of the percentage of the population living in urban areas.<sup>22</sup> Given the spatial distribution of Brazilian population and the absence of a distinction between cities and counties, measures of urbanization correlate closely with measures of total population, and the more recent population figures minimize any overweighting of rural areas.<sup>23</sup>

With electoral results aggregated at the municipal level, any inferences about the voting behavior of particular cohorts within these municipalities risk the dreaded "ecological fallacy." Here, however, the ecological fallacy is less troublesome, since I seek merely to account for the cross-municipality variance in voting patterns. My interest lies in political machines: to measure their effects, the social and demographic factors affecting municipal-level outcomes are held constant.

Table 3 presents the results of the "less stupid" model. The socioeconomic and demographic variables produce the expected effects. Lula and Brizola do better in larger municipalities. Lula, Brizola, and Maluf gain votes in areas with more industry. Collor does well in areas with more agriculture and more migrants. And leftists Lula and Brizola are more successful than "corruption fighter" Collor where government employees are more numerous.

With the inclusion of socioeconomic and demographic variables, the effects of party machines

TABLE 3						
Estimates of Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables						
PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	31.28**	44.94**	11.17**	-7.39**	9.25**	49.37**
PT	14.83**	-2.69*	-16.31**	-.05	1.76**	-.22
PDT	-4.89**	-14.52**	21.85**	-1.47**	.13	10.03**
PMDB	-1.00	-3.29**	-1.64	1.10**	3.18**	-.82
PSDB	6.97**	-5.80*	-4.75	-.58	1.81	2.98
PDS	-2.22*	-1.95	-3.04	5.32**	-.07	-3.62*
PTB	-.06	5.60**	-9.56**	1.98*	-.81	-7.02**
PFL	.59	3.88**	-7.62**	1.60**	-.42	-5.10**
Coalitions						
PT	1.97	-11.38**	16.52**	-6.43**	1.33*	11.37**
PDT	-1.03	-5.42**	7.66**	-.95	.63	5.53**
PMDB	3.44**	-.47	-6.84**	.75	1.92**	-.76
PSDB	15.90**	-4.74**	-29.02**	-.41	1.61*	.79
PDS	-2.20**	-2.69**	-1.00	2.76**	.92*	-1.89*
PTB	2.00*	-1.62	-3.34*	1.28*	.26	.81
PFL	5.06**	1.45	-8.98**	.96	-.82	-1.50
Voters (millions)	4.04**	-7.86**	30.50**	-16.10**	.57	23.40**
Voters <sup>2</sup>	-.54**	1.57**	-5.80**	2.78**	-.09	-4.30**
% in manufacturing	7.85	-68.45**	48.32**	31.85**	-9.44**	49.82**
% government employees	19.06	-80.39**	121.50**	1.64	-45.14**	100.89**
% in agriculture	-.04**	.02**	.01**	.02**	.00**	-.05**
% migrants	.00	.04**	-.05**	.02**	-.03**	-.04**
Per capita income (\$1,000s)	-2.51**	-1.62**	-.53*	2.86**	-.51**	-.98**
R <sup>2</sup>	.26	.48	.35	.55	.26	.47
F	59.25	159.7	90.2	207.2	59.38	151.2
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001
Note: N = 3,611						
*p ≤ .05.						
**p ≤ .01.						

sharpen. Lula continues to do well in PT municipalities, and he no longer loses support when the PT enters into a coalition.<sup>24</sup> Collor now gains only in municipalities controlled by the PTB or PFL—the two parties whose candidates were so weak that mayors abandoned them in droves. Brizola, as before, gains only in PDT municipalities, but his gain is almost 50% higher with the socioeconomic and demographic variables included. Maluf’s support changes dramatically: in the more complex model, he gains major support only on the right, with by far the biggest gains coming from his own PDS-controlled municipalities. Ulysses Guimarães’ party support also sharpens: only in PMDB and PT municipalities does he gain, and the PMDB contribution is twice that of the PT. Finally, in the second round, Brizola’s PDT contributes heavily to Lula, Lula’s own PT helps not at all, and the right-wing parties consolidate around Collor.

What does this model lack? The answer, as any “Michigan” scholar knows, is partisan tendency. Suppose we operationalize partisan tendency purely as party identification. The PT, for example, commands loyalties rivaling many long-established European parties. Overall, however, few parties competing in 1989 had been around very long, and none of

the major parties had ever participated in a presidential election. As a result, party identification is not measurable in terms of loyalties spanning multiple elections. Still, despite Brazilian parties’ short histories, weak organizational structures, and ideological incoherence (at least as compared to European parties), voters may develop habitual attachments either to a particular party or to a general ideological direction.

Socioeconomic conditions and political organizations, both historic and current, create habitual attachments. At the moment of casting a ballot, the voter finds the party whose program is closest to his or her own preferences. Closeness, of course, is subjectively perceived, and both the past and present power of a municipality’s reigning political organizations mediate the voter’s perceptions. Can socioeconomic and organizational effects be separated? First, we should seek a general left–right ideological direction, rather than identification with a particular party, as a measure of partisan tendency. By including various parties, the capture of a general left or right tendency minimizes the effects of loyalties to any given organization or candidate. And even if the indicator is a bit broad, its inclusion can only reduce the effects of current party organization—in other



words, the estimator of party organization ultimately generated will be the minimum possible. Second, we should base our estimate of partisan tendency on municipalities where no single organization dominates, that is, on municipalities with considerable interparty fragmentation. In such competitive municipalities, voters are less subject to the coercion of a dominant machine.<sup>25</sup>

### Measuring Partisan Tendency

In the absence of survey responses, any measure of partisan tendency must rely on actual electoral outcomes—in this case on the congressional elections of 1978, 1982, and 1986. Voters cast their ballots for individual candidates (under the rules of open-list proportional representation). I aggregated, for each election, the votes of all the candidates from each party in each municipality. In other words, the analysis began with the total ARENA vote in each municipality for 1978, the total PMDB vote in each municipality for 1986, and so on. Then, selecting in each state just those municipalities with *interparty fragmentation greater than the state's median*, I regressed these party vote totals on the socioeconomic and demographic variables.<sup>26</sup> The coefficients from these equations then generated predicted party totals for all municipalities, fragmented and unfragmented, by state and by year. In effect, this technique assumes that in more fragmented, competitive municipalities dominant machines have less influence over voters' partisan tendencies. It also assumes that the socioeconomic and demographic variables would create the same partisan tendencies in dominated municipalities if a more competitive political environment let voters express themselves.

These *predicted* party votes were then aggregated into left and right tendencies. In 1978 and 1982 (elections in which the military regime allowed only two parties), the Left is the MDB and the PMDB, respectively, and the Right is ARENA and the PDS. In 1986, the Left is the PT plus the PDT and the Right is the PFL plus the PDS. Of course, some fuzziness remains: Is the MDB really on the left? Can the PMDB be called a left-wing party? Lacking a perfect resolution of these ambiguities, I chose to establish a range of estimates: a *minimum left–maximum right* estimator on one side and a *maximum left–minimum right* estimator on the other. The minimum left estimator utilized the smaller of the predicted 1978 MDB and 1982 PMDB votes; maximum left utilized the larger.<sup>27</sup> The maximum right estimator was the largest of the three predictions: 1978 ARENA, 1982 PDS, and 1986 PFL–PDS. Minimum right equalled the smallest of the three.

Given this range of partisan tendencies, Table 4 presents estimates of the model with the indicator of the *largest* possible Left, while Table 5 includes the indicator of the *smallest* possible Left.<sup>28</sup> The results show that partisan tendency matters just where it ought to matter. For Lula, Brizola, and Maluf—three candidates whom voters could locate ideologically—

the partisan-tendency coefficients are mostly in the expected directions, with high significance levels. Partisan tendency makes no difference either for Collor, who seemed all over the left–right space, or for Guimarães, whose position was essentially centrist. Although our partisan-tendency measures had consistently strong effects on the ideological candidates, some signs are inconsistent. With partisan left tendency estimated at its maximum, increases in left tendency led to more votes for Lula and Brizola in round 1 and for Lula in round 2—just what we expect. But with left tendency estimated at the minimum of its plausible range, increases led to big gains for Lula in round 1, a lower vote for Brizola, and—the real surprise—a sharply lower vote for Lula in round 2. Do these results make sense?

The key lies in Brizola's vote in round 1 and in Brizola's ability to deliver votes to Lula in round 2. Unlike Lula supporters, Brizolistas are mostly not strong left partisans. So when left tendency is estimated conservatively, increases help Lula but hurt Brizola. With left tendency estimated generously, further increases help both candidates, but the bigger gain goes to Lula. In the second round, Brizola delivers his nonideological voters to Lula, so Lula appears to be hurt by increases over the minimum left estimate.

If this explanation is correct, the model ought to be better behaved when reestimated without Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, Brizola's two strongholds. This is precisely what happens. With these two states removed, the effect of increasing left partisanship is now more consistent: increases in partisan left tendency from its maximum produce gains of about four points for Lula; increases from minimum partisan left tendency neither help nor hurt.

With underlying partisan tendency now included in the model, what happens to our party variables? The results confirm the overall importance of local organization. In the first round, every candidate, from the strongest to the weakest, received a big boost in municipalities headed by a mayor from the candidate's party. Collor, the candidate with no party, clearly managed to pick up support from PTB and PFL mayors; the failure of their standard-bearer had put PTB and PFL mayors in a desperate position. Maluf, too, got some support from PTB and PFL organizations, but Maluf relied primarily on his own PDS machine. Remarkably, Ulysses Guimarães kept a portion of his local PMDB support, even though his candidacy foundered six months before the election. Guimarães' supporters may have done little to help him (the PMDB coefficient is the smallest of any candidate's own party), but at least they rarely deserted to other candidates.<sup>29</sup>

Party organization affects the results in the second round as well, but here the situation becomes a bit more complicated. The PDS, PTB, and PFL all went massively for Collor. Brizola made good on his endorsement of Lula, delivering more votes in PDT (and PDT-in-coalition) municipalities than any other

TABLE 4						
Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables and Partisan Tendency: Left at Maximum of Plausible Range						
PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	29.94**	45.49**	10.24**	-6.55**	9.14**	48.09**
PT	14.86**	-2.71	-16.30**	-.07	1.78**	-.19
PDT	-4.98**	-14.49**	21.77**	-1.41*	.13	9.94**
PMDB	-1.09	-3.25	-1.72	1.17**	3.19**	-.91
PSDB	6.76**	-5.71*	-4.92	-.44	1.81	2.77
PDS	-2.47	-1.85	-3.24	5.48**	-.07	-3.86*
PTB	-.24	5.67**	-9.72**	2.11**	-.81	-7.19**
PFL	.47	3.93**	-7.73**	1.68**	-.41	-5.22**
Coalitions						
PT	2.47*	-11.58**	16.87**	-6.74**	1.37	11.84**
PDT	-1.83*	-5.09**	7.08**	-.44	.59	4.77**
PMDB	3.37**	-.44	-6.92	.80	1.93**	-.83
PSDB	15.76**	-4.68**	-29.13**	-.31	1.61*	.65
PDS	-2.26**	-2.66**	-1.06	2.80**	.93*	-1.95*
PTB	2.03*	-1.63	-3.33*	1.26*	.28	.85
PFL	5.00**	1.46	-9.05**	1.00	-.78	-1.55
Voters (millions)	3.54**	-7.66**	30.19**	15.74**	.53	22.89**
Voters <sup>2</sup>	-.49**	1.55**	-5.79**	2.74**	-.08	-4.24**
% in manufacturing	4.85	-67.21**	46.18**	33.76**	-9.68**	46.94**
% government employees	-15.07	-66.31*	97.08*	23.31	-47.82**	68.19*
% in agriculture	-.04**	.02**	.02**	.02**	.01**	-.04**
% migrants	-.00	.05**	-.05**	.03**	-.03**	-.05**
Per capita income (\$1,000s)	-2.50**	-1.62**	-5.26*	2.86**	-5.11**	-.98**
Maximum partisan left tendency	5.11**	-2.10	3.64*	-3.24**	.38	4.88**
R <sup>2</sup>	.27	.48	.35	.55	.26	.47
F	58.84	152.7	86.51	201.1	56.68	145.9
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,611.

\*p ≤ .05.

\*\*p ≤ .01.

party delivered. The PT, however, seems to have been unable to contribute any positive increment to its own candidate. Why does the PT appear so ineffective? Perhaps its weakness is not so surprising. The PT mayoralties were all big cities. Nowhere did the party have the kind of dominant organization typical of a small town or rural machine. Moreover, the PT's rise to power in local government was very recent. Indeed, until 1988, there were no PT mayors. The PT was bereft of the ties to newspapers and radio and television stations that other machines profited from financially and manipulated politically. Finally, the PT's experience in governing its cities had been rocky. Its ascendancy to power raised expectations that it could not meet, especially given the hostility of other national power holders. Overall, local PT organizations lacked the dominance, the mechanisms of control, and the interparty alliances typical of other parties.

Still, before writing off the PT as a possible mobilizer of local voters, let us return to the issue of Brizola, his concentrated vote, and his pro-Lula mobilization. In the reestimated model, with Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro removed, Lula gains about four percentage points in PT municipalities. He *loses*

about four-and-one-half percentage points in PDT municipalities. So outside the highly politicized, PDT-dominated states of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, the PT could deliver a few votes, after all. Moreover, Brizola's influence fell off sharply outside his traditional bases.

Did organizational power affect the overall outcome? At one level, this query is unanswerable: if local organization had not existed, candidates would have adopted alternative strategies. But it is possible to calculate the overall gains and losses each party produced for its candidate.<sup>30</sup> Without the party machines, Brizola would have lost to Lula by a bit more than the actual result. In the second round, Collor added to his advantage with the strength of his right-wing allies, but he would have edged Lula anyway. Thus one can say that in this particular election organizational effects did not change the outcome. But if local machines had not influenced blocs of voters, then preelection polls, especially in the second round, would have been closer. In that case, campaign funds might flow differently, candidates might adopt different tactics, and the ultimate results could look quite different.

TABLE 5						
Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables and Partisan Tendency: Left at Minimum of Plausible Range						
PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	29.16**	45.00**	15.32**	-8.43**	9.56**	50.64**
PT	13.40**	-2.66	-13.54**	-.75	2.00**	.63
PDT	-7.06**	-14.47**	26.06**	-2.52**	.48	11.33**
PMDB	-2.75**	-3.24**	1.74	.26	3.47**	.21
PSDB	5.74**	-5.77*	-2.37	-1.18	2.01	3.71
PDS	-3.27*	-1.92	-1.02	4.81**	.10	-2.99
PTB	-1.93	5.65**	-5.95**	1.08	-.51	-5.90**
PFL	-.75	3.91**	-5.01**	.95	-.19	-4.29**
Coalitions						
PT	-.48	-11.31**	21.29**	-7.62**	1.72*	12.84**
PDT	-1.84*	-5.40**	9.21**	-1.34**	.77	6.01**
PMDB	1.49*	-.42	-3.08*	-.18	2.23**	.39
PSDB	10.76**	-4.60**	-19.03**	-2.91**	2.41**	3.86*
PDS	-3.44**	-2.66**	1.39	2.16**	1.13**	-1.14
PTB	.92	-1.59	-1.28	.77	.44	1.45
PFL	3.56**	1.48	-6.11**	.23	-.54	-.60
Voters (millions)	5.32**	-7.90**	28.10**	15.44**	.38	22.60**
Voters <sup>2</sup>	-.64**	1.57**	-5.60**	2.73**	-.07	-4.20**
% in manufacturing	.34	-68.24**	62.94**	28.18**	-8.29**	54.31**
% government employees	15.59	-80.27**	128.33**	-.08	-44.67**	102.99**
% in agriculture	-.03**	.02**	.01	.02**	.00**	-.05**
% migrants	-.01**	.05**	-.00	.01**	-.03**	-.03**
Per capita income (\$1,000s)	-2.60**	-1.62**	-3.53	2.82**	-.49**	-.93**
Minimum partisan left tendency	13.79**	-.36	-26.79**	6.71**	-2.11	-8.23**
R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.48	.38	.56	.26	.47
F	66.08	152.4	98.76	205.7	57.27	146.9
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,611.

\*p ≤ .05.

\*\*p ≤ .01.

EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC ARGUMENT

I shall present two refinements of the final model, each strengthening the conclusion that party organization matters.<sup>31</sup> The first estimates the model for a subset of municipalities identified according to the size and preferences of their neighbors. This refinement demonstrates that the institutional basis of Brazilian electoral politics, especially the trajectory of political careers at the state level, affects the strategies of local politicians. The second refinement explores the organizational and affective bases of support of a single, unique politician, Leonel Brizola.

What Happens When Neighbors Disagree?

Remember that Brazil elects members of its state assemblies and its federal Chamber of Deputies through open-list proportional representation. At both levels, whole states are districts.<sup>32</sup> The most common entry into the federal legislature is service as a state deputy, and state deputies often begin in local politics, for example, as municipal council members or mayors.<sup>33</sup> Suppose a mayor or council member

wants to run for a legislative seat, and suppose the potential candidate can count on heavy support from the citizens of the municipality. Still, few individual municipalities are so big that their votes alone can assure victory, so aspiring statewide candidates from small communities need outside allies. Logically, they seek these allies in nearby municipalities. This search gives politicians from large communities broader influence, influence beyond their particular municipalities. The smaller the community from which a potential candidate hails, the more dangerous it is to alienate big neighbors.<sup>34</sup> If politicians from larger communities back a different presidential candidate, a small-town mayor may decide not to disrupt opponents' rallies, council members may choose to ignore (rather than follow) the mayor's political directives, and community leaders may reach "understandings" with outside political forces.

The political danger of disagreeing with large neighbors ought to weaken endorsement effects. How can this hypothesis be tested? First, ascertain, for each municipality, which contiguous neighbors were governed by parties backing opposing candidates.<sup>35</sup> Next, calculate each municipality's opposition neighbors, that is, the total contiguous popula-



TABLE 6

Small Local Machine Surrounded by Large Neighbors Backing Other Candidates

PARAMETER	LULA (PT)		COLLOR (PRN)		BRIZOLA (PDT)		MALUF (PDS)		ULYSSES (PMDB)		LULA (2) (PT)	
	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>	ALL	S.O. <sup>a</sup>
Intercept	29.94	31.39	45.49	42.50	10.24	17.45	-6.55	-10.50	9.1	9.81	48.0	53.96
PT	14.86	8.75	-2.71	-.13	-16.30	-9.98	-.07	-2.29	1.7	1.80	-.1	-3.19
PDT	-4.98	-3.71	-14.49	-15.85	21.77	24.79	-1.41	-1.13	.1	.47	9.9	12.96
PMDB	-1.09	-2.66	-3.25	-.62	-1.72	-.74	1.17	1.22	3.1	1.87	-.9	-2.85
PSDB	6.76	5.06	-5.71	-4.20	-4.92	-3.57	-.44	-1.01	1.8	1.48	2.7	1.56
PDS	-2.47	-2.07	-1.85	-1.94	-3.24	-1.67	5.48	4.45	-.0	.19	-3.8	-2.54
PTB	-.24	-.78	5.67	3.91	-9.72	-6.87	2.11	1.69	-.8	-.51	-7.1	-5.58
PFL	.47	-.80	3.93	.90	-7.73	-4.06	1.68	2.25	-.4	.02	-5.2	-3.50
Coalitions												
PT	2.47	-1.17	-11.58	-5.13	16.87	33.17	-6.74	-15.82	1.3	2.95	11.8	12.90
PDT	-1.83	-2.05	-5.09	-.38	7.08	-.43	-.44	.97	.5	1.30	4.7	-1.26
PMDB	3.37	-2.11	-.44	-1.51	-6.92	2.06	.80	.88	1.9	.18	-.8	.28
PSDB	15.76	16.54	-4.68	6.19	-29.13	-32.23	-.31	-5.80	1.6	3.29	.6	-5.91
PDS	-2.26	-2.96	-2.66	-3.61	-1.06	-.03	2.80	3.62	.9	1.09	-1.9	-.31
PTB	2.03	-.82	-1.63	-2.00	-3.33	1.87	1.26	.24	.2	.42	.8	1.33
PFL	5.00	5.59	1.46	2.76	-9.05	-8.91	1.00	.16	-.7	-.05	-1.5	-1.72
Voters (millions)	3.54	1.51	-7.66	-21.50	30.19	37.04	15.74	-9.41	.5	-2.24	22.8	31.86
Voters <sup>2</sup>	-.49	-.21	1.55	5.37	-5.79	-6.80	2.74	.78	-.0	.63	-4.2	-6.53
% manufacturing	4.85	7.89	-67.21	-45.05	46.18	16.10	33.76	37.76	-9.6	-13.26	46.9	21.75
% government employees	-15.07	15.02	-66.31	37.06	97.08	-47.94	23.31	30.44	-47.8	-56.74	68.1	-31.85
% agriculture	-.04	-.04	.02	.04	.02	-.01	.02	.03	.0	.00	-.0	-.07
% migrants	-.00	.00	.05	.06	-.05	-.06	.03	.03	-.0	-.03	-.0	-.06
Per capita income (\$1,000s)	-2.50	-2.83	-1.62	-1.75	-5.26	-.98	2.86	3.43	-5.1	-.59	-9.7	-1.33
Maximum partisan left tendency	5.11	5.87	-2.10	-4.74	3.64	3.95	-3.24	-3.18	.3	1.50	4.8	7.12
R <sup>2</sup>	.27	.31	.48	.53	.35	.45	.55	.47	.26	.24	.47	.58
F	58.84	3677	152.7	90.70	86.51	66.8	201.1	72.28	56.68	25.14	145.9	112
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.00

Note: Left is at maximum of plausible range. N = 3,611 for "all," 1,807 for small outliers.  
<sup>a</sup>Small outliers.

tion whose mayors backed opposing candidates minus the total contiguous population whose mayors supported the same candidate. Then find the ratio of opposition neighbors to the local population. Finally, estimate the endorsement model on what I call *small outliers*, that is, municipalities with neighboring opponent-to-local population ratios above the national mean. Table 6 compares these results to the overall model.

The estimates in Table 6 support the argument. In small-outlier PTB and PFL municipalities, Collor's first-round gains decline (though remaining statistically significant). Maluf's PDS support and Guimarães' PMDB backing also fall. In the second round, small-outlier PT municipalities give Lula less support; similar municipalities of the opposing PDS, PTB, and PFL provide Lula more backing than he gets in the country as a whole. Only one party runs against the trend: the PDT offers strong support to Brizola in round 1 and to Lula in round 2 *even when big neighbors are hostile*. Actually, this exception strengthens the case. As we saw earlier, the PDT, especially in Rio de

Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, is not merely a local machine. In these areas of PDT domination, the party has strong state-level leadership, and it serves as an electoral vehicle for a charismatic candidate commanding loyal grassroots support. Politicians may adjust their behavior to future political prospects, but ordinary voters do not.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the small-outlier hypothesis applies to machine-based candidates, not those with durable grassroots support. Politicians in strong local machines seek to ingratiate themselves with presidential hopefuls, but they also look to their immediate political futures, futures that, in Brazil, are inevitably determined at the state level.

**Organization Versus Charisma in Support for Brizola**

*Charisma* is a term social scientists and journalists often toss around without careful definition, but even by the most demanding criteria, Leonel Brizola qualifies as charismatic. Still, how can a charismatic

presidential candidate receive 1.5% of the vote in the state of São Paulo and 50.5% in the state of Rio de Janeiro? Of course, Rio and São Paulo differ, but both are industrial, heavily urban, and located in the highly developed Southeast. Brizola had no difficulty, moreover, reaching Paulista voters: his television access in the two states was exactly equal. And he had already managed, without losing his original base, to transfer his appeal from his first home in Rio Grande do Sul to Rio de Janeiro. Why was São Paulo so hard to crack?

Perhaps the problem lay purely in organization. The PTB, Brizola's party before the military dictatorship, had tried for almost 20 years, with little success, to gain a foothold in São Paulo.<sup>37</sup> The modern PDT itself had few Paulista deputies and controlled few municipalities. But weak local organization can be no more than a partial explanation, because in Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro Brizola did well even where *opposition* parties controlled local municipalities.

Suppose we approach the Brizola riddle by examining his support spatially, moving from the centers of strong Brizola states to municipalities near the borders of these states, then to municipalities on each side of the border, then to municipalities near the borders of opposition states, and finally to the centers of opposition states. If Brizolismo is purely an organizational phenomenon, the drop-off at the border of his core states should be quite abrupt. A gradual decline, on the other hand, would suggest support built on social networks and on affective ties between Brizola and voters, because such networks and ties cut across state boundaries.

What is the appropriate measure for assessing Brizola's support? Given that the municipalities in each spatial group have different expected (predicted) levels of Brizola vote, levels that depend on each group's socioeconomic and demographic conditions, partisan tendencies, and local political control, actual Brizola vote percentage would be inappropriate. Rather, the test should be the size of the *difference between Brizola's actual percentage and the model's predicted percentage*.<sup>38</sup> In other words, an initial way to assess the argument is to compare these residual values for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.

Let us begin with Rio de Janeiro and its neighbors. Excluding the contiguous border municipalities of the two states, the differences between Rio and São Paulo average 40 percentage points. Brizola's vote in Rio municipalities bordering São Paulo falls off, thus suggesting a gradual decline in Brizola support, but this is misleading. The shape of the two states is such that very few municipalities actually touch, and a large number of former Paulistas live inside the state of Rio in these few border municipalities. In fact, Brizola's support drops off very rapidly upon crossing the border. A comparison of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais leads to a similar conclusion. The contiguous municipalities of the two states differ by 20

percentage points, and the municipalities one row from the border are 43 points apart. So far, then, the story seems to be one of organizational strength and weakness.


Tracing Brizola's vote from Rio Grande do Sul to Santa Catarina reveals a different picture, one of more gradual decline. Brizola's vote drops off very little from the center of Rio Grande do Sul to its border with Santa Catarina. On the Catarinense side of the border, his support is a bit lower but still substantial, and he holds that level in municipalities one row back from the border.

Figures 1 and 2 illuminate the difference by showing the actual municipalities involved in each case. Figure 1 demonstrates that Brizola's strength in Santa Catarina is not distributed evenly along the entire border with Rio Grande do Sul; rather, it concentrates in the west and along the east coast.<sup>39</sup> And observing that Brizola's strength continues past western Santa Catarina into southwestern Paraná, a pattern of *migration* emerges. Over the last 40 years, one stream of migrants from Rio Grande do Sul went up the eastern edge of Santa Catarina toward São Paulo. Another, numerically much more important, went across western Santa Catarina into Paraná, then into Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, and into the Amazon. Some migrants stopped in Santa Catarina; others trekked as far as Paraná. Because their social ties remain with Rio Grande do Sul, they are fertile ground for PDT organizational efforts. Figure 2, by contrast, shows what happens in the absence of a long-lasting population exodus. Because people flow back and forth across the border, Brizola shows some strength in the nearest municipalities. But beyond these neighbors, his support quickly drops to very low levels.<sup>40</sup>

Obviously this is just a preliminary test of a complex hypothesis. Still, the analysis highlights the limits of charisma. Brizola is undeniably a charismatic politician, and the rules of the Brazilian electoral campaign gave him television and radio access to voters everywhere. But he scored well only where his political organization had been in place long before the 1989 campaign. In such areas, the PDT's ties with voters bound them to Brizola even after they migrated. But where Brizola's organization had historically foundered, his considerable personal magnetism failed to attract even minimal support.

## CONCLUSION

Most scholars and journalists, I suspect, wrote about Brazil's presidential election from the perspective of their own places of residence, that is, from very large cities. In such cities, electronic media are a principal means of political communication, and political organizations are far less dominant than their counterparts in small cities or rural areas. But all over Brazil, local political organizations are alive and well. They survive because politicians, faced with the institutional structure of Brazilian politics, find it necessary



and feasible to trade blocs of votes for pork barrel and patronage.


True, the candidates with the strongest organizations failed to advance to the second round in the Brazilian election. But they would have been enormously weaker without the support organization provided. The issue is not whether Brizola would have edged Lula or whether Lula could have beaten Collor. This election was clearly an anomaly: Collor was the first presidential candidate to utilize the electronic media extensively. In the future, all serious candidates will be “telegenic,” and all will make sophisticated use of radio and television. No one, as a result, will have Collor’s overwhelming advantages. In consequence, party organization is likely to become crucial just because it creates advantages that candidates cannot overcome during the short life of a campaign itself. Brizola’s utter failure to penetrate São Paulo demonstrates, even for charismatic candidates, the centrality of organization.

More than 40 years ago V. O. Key (1949) explored the spatial nature of local, state, and national political organization in the American South. Though data-processing techniques have advanced enormously since Key’s pioneering work, few scholars have followed his lead, either in the United States or elsewhere. What contribution did the big-city machines

of the United States make to presidential vote totals in the early part of the century? How does Mexico’s Revolutionary Institutional party channel votes to the “official” candidate? Did local organization matter in pre-1973 Chile, where open-list proportional representation coexisted with ideologically coherent parties?

The failure of scholars and journalists to recognize the importance of local organization in Brazil’s presidential election also has a methodological aspect, one that raises warning flags for analysts of elections in other newly competitive polities. With the rise of the political marketing industry, the price of survey research has declined, and survey techniques in Brazil and other Third World countries have advanced. Scholars would be wise, nevertheless, to temper their attraction to survey data. Although public opinion research tells us a great deal about the motivations of individual voters, surveys sample from broad geographic areas. As a result, survey data inevitably mask such locality-specific effects as party organization. Because political context matters, analysis of aggregate data must remain an important part of public opinion research. Brazil can hardly be the only country where the political landscape shelters both the electronic media and local political organizations.





ABBREVIATIONS

ARENA	National Renovating Alliance
MDB	Brazilian Democratic movement
PCB	Brazilian Communist party (Roberto Friere)
PDS	Democratic Social party (Paulo Maluf)
PDT	Democratic Labor party (Leonel Brizola)
PFL	Liberal Front party (Aureliano Chaves)
PL	Liberal party (Afif Domingos)
PMDB	Brazilian Democratic Movement party (Ulysses Guimarães)
PRN	National Reconstruction party (Fernando Collor de Mello)
PSD	Social Democratic party (Ronaldo Caiado)
PSDB	Brazilian Social Democratic party (Mário Covas)
PT	Workers' party (Luís Inácio Lula da Silva)
PTB	Brazilian Labor party (Affonso Camargo)

Notes

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1. For a provocative discussion of the importance of spatial attachments in American politics and of the role of political institutions in fostering such attachments, see Salisbury 1993.

2. Increases in participation do not necessarily increase party volatility. But in Brazil even experienced voters have low levels of party loyalty, so new voters enter the electoral process in a context of weaker socialization into parties. On party volatility in Latin America, see Coppedge 1992.

3. The PTB did contest both elections, but the 1989 version of the party was similar to the 1960 version in name only.

4. See, e.g., Geddes and Neto 1992; Kinzo 1992; Lamounier 1989, 1990; Lima 1993; Marchal, Théry, and Waniez 1992; Nêumanne 1989; Silva 1993; Singer 1990; A. Souza 1992; Straubhaar, Olsen, and Nunes 1993. Singer's view is typical: "Collor's election [placed him] outside the parties, with a rhetoric of confrontation against the elites and with a strong base of support among the masses whose availability always characterizes Latin American populism. . . . [There was] direct linkage between leader and mass, without any necessary party channel" (1991, 18). Singer based the analysis on surveys taken in the poor areas of the city of São Paulo. Amaury de Souza refers to "plebiscitary renewal" and to the "volatility of the electoral support of parties and public" (1992, 181). The weekly news magazine *Veja* said that the electorate demonstrated that "it votes for who it wants, when it wants, without the opinion of any political boss having any

influence over its choice" ("O voto no raio x," *Veja*, 29 November 1989, p. 62). Lamounier (1989) points to four aspects, in addition to television, of the Collor appeal: Collor's anti-Sarney campaign, his campaign against politicians in general, his ability to use his small party efficiently while internal disputes wracked the big parties, and his support from business as the "lesser evil" as compared to Lula or Brizola. Lima (1993) focusing specifically on the role of television in the campaign, discusses the soap operas airing on Brazil's biggest network, TV Globo. These *novelas*, "either directly or indirectly portrayed Brazil as a kingdom of political corruption run by professional politicians and politics as a contaminated social space" (p. 105).

5. In addition, administrations can refuse to transfer money committed by previous agreements, even international agreements. President Sarney, for example, blocked an emergency loan that the World Bank had slated to help Rio de Janeiro deal with the effects of a flood.

6. I estimated a logistic regression in which the dependent variable was the existence of an education or health transfer agreement with the central government between April 1990 and July 1991—roughly, the first 15 months of the Collor administration. Transfers were more likely to go to municipalities that were larger in population, more urban, and poorer. But for an Alagoas municipality, the probability of receiving a transfer jumped an additional 123%; for a Bahian municipality with a PFL mayor, the probability jumped 105%; for a Paraná municipality, the probability jumped 84%; and for a municipality in Rio Grande do Sul, the probability jumped 160%. The qualification "with a PFL mayor" reflects the ability of Bahia's powerful governor, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, to channel central government money to municipalities of his party.

7. In his study of Presidente Prudente, a cattle-raising town in western São Paulo state, Lamounier argues that in an undiversified economic structure of this type, "employment opportunities will frequently depend on favors and personal loyalties. . . . Such a structure would be very unresponsive to oppositionist appeals such as those in contemporary Brazilian party disputes" (1978, 4).

8. Brazilianists have given a great deal of attention, however, to parties, elections, clientelism, regionalism, populism, and related topics. The classic treatment of local-level clientelism is Leal 1949. Empirical works on parties and elections include Fleischer 1981, vol. 1; Lamounier 1989; Lamounier and Meneguello 1986; Mainwaring 1992/93, Santos 1979; Sables 1982; Soares 1973; A. Souza 1992; and M. Souza 1976. On regionalism, see Lavareda 1978; Schwartzman 1975; and A. Souza 1985. On populism, see Weffort 1978. Research focusing on the 1989 election includes Singer's (1990) study of Collor support in São Paulo city, Kinzo's (1992) analysis of Presidente Prudente (a municipality in São Paulo state), and Fleischer's (1989) work on the effects of the 1988 municipal election.

9. Chile (pre-1973) and Finland are other examples of open-list proportional representation, but in both cases, national party leaders select candidates. Chile's congressional districts, in addition, were arbitrary constructs: they corresponded to no unit of government, and they cut across province lines. See Ames 1992.

10. When the water supply in one São Paulo municipality failed, President Sarney promised to release central government funds if the deputy based in that area voted to give the president a term of five (rather than four) years. The deputy refused, and the president held up the money. But when Sarney left the country for a foreign visit, the interim president, Paulista Ulysses Guimarães, immediately signed the papers. The money flowed.

11. During the Constitutional Assembly of 1987–88, a large billboard greeted deputies and senators (who jointly constituted the Assembly) leaving the airport in Brasília. The sign read simply, "CO + NO + NE = 259"; that is, the delegations from the Center–West, North and Northeast together held 259 votes, a majority of the Assembly. Purely by population,

they would merit less than 30%. Most of the advantage falls to states in the Center–West and North.

12. I shall refer to the candidates in a modified form of common Brazilian usage. Sometimes common usage implies a family name, sometimes a given name, sometimes a nom de guerre. The names in Table 1 are exactly as they appear in official electoral results.

13. Aureliano Chaves's PFL was a splinter of the PDS and was formed to support Tancredo Neves's successful run for the presidency against the official candidate in the electoral college vote in late 1984. Concentrated mainly in the Northeast, the PFL is ideologically indistinguishable from the PDS (which in 1993 merged with the Christian Democratic party to form the Renovating Progressive party), though its hundreds of mayors are perhaps a bit more oriented to pork-barrel politics. Chaves had been vice-president under the last military president, João Figueiredo, and minister of mines and energy in the Sarney government. Tests of the various models on Chaves's vote percentage show small but statistically significant gains in municipalities with PFL mayors.

14. In work in progress, I have implemented a factor analysis of votes in the 1987–88 Constitutional Assembly. Both the right-wing and left-wing parties fall out as well-organized factions, but the PMDB rarely votes as a bloc.

15. For a good treatment of Brizola's career, see Bandeira 1979. On the old PTB, the best work is Benevides 1989. Amaury de Souza (1985) analyzes Brizola's victorious 1982 campaign for the governorship of the State of Rio.

16. Brizola would have overtaken Lula and gone to the second round if he had picked up another half-million votes, that is, if his São Paulo total had represented just 4.2% of the state's votes.

17. The figures are percentages of those who actually voted minus about .6% who voted null or blank. About 12% of those eligible to vote failed to appear at the polls.

18. The major parties also participated in coalitions successfully backing a member of a minor party. In fewer than two hundred cases, a minor party won with no coalitional support. Some successful parties, such as the Municipal party, ran no candidates above the local level. They will be ignored.

19. I searched for mayoral endorsements in at least one newspaper from the capital city of every state in Brazil during the last four months before the election. These desertions became the basis of a "true preference" variable, which is the party of the mayor, adjusted to subtract desertions to, and add desertions from, other parties. The whole empirical analysis was then redone with this new variable. As expected, coefficients of the party endorsement variables are a bit stronger. In the interests of simplicity, I present only the "pure party" version of the analysis. This version is preferable, because the reporting of desertions by the newspapers may be systematically biased toward, for example, larger communities.

20. The models presented here become more complex, but they never include dummy variables for individual states. Though such dummies were tried, they seemed generally inappropriate even though they raised R-squareds. First, Brazil's political institutions ought to have the same effects everywhere, so the model should attain reasonable levels of explanatory success without dummies. Second, I could find no theoretically consistent explanation for the differences in the dummies' coefficients. Finally, I tried some state-by-state regressions, but the differences seemed more likely the results of the differing numbers of municipalities than differences in state politics.

21. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) implemented the census. Officials at Prodasen, the data-processing agency of the Federal Senate, made the data available in machine-readable form. The IBGE did not undertake the 1990 census until 1991–92; few results are currently available.

22. The registered electorate is a good proxy for the adult population, because voting in Brazil is obligatory, with fines for those who fail to vote and cannot demonstrate an imped-



iment such as illness. Registration is required for all literates over 18 and less than 70; it is optional for illiterates, those between 16 and 18, and those over 70.

23. The models include both the number of voters and its square, because for some candidates a curvilinear relationship seemed likely. In other words, up to a certain point their vote shares would increase with population, but above that population level vote shares would level off or decline.

24. Lula still does well in the eight municipalities controlled by the PSDB. Most were located outside São Paulo, the home state of PSDB candidate Covas.

25. Although the analogy is imperfect, the coercive effects of a dominant machine may resemble those of censorship under a dictatorship. For an analysis of Brazilian public opinion under military-imposed censorship, see Geddes and Zaller 1989.

26. These regressions were implemented state by state; that is, a regression was run separately in each state on all municipalities above the state's median interparty fragmentation. The variables included measures of total population, educational attainment, size of tertiary economy, agricultural population, migration, income distribution, and per capita income. The R-squareds varied from 2% to 77%, with the differences mostly a function of the number of municipalities in the state-by-state regressions. Using F-tests, all are significant except 1982 for São Paulo and 1986 for Minas Gerais. Interparty fragmentation equalled 1 minus the sum of the squares of the total vote garnered by each party. Levels of interparty fragmentation were substantially higher in the states of the South and Southeast.

27. The two Left estimators exclude the 1986 election, because in most municipalities the PT and PDT simply had no organization or candidates.

28. The choice of mayor is really endogenous; that is, it is affected by partisan tendency, and the model as specified ignores that relationship. Correctly specifying the relationship would be very difficult, and it is unlikely that the results would differ.

29. This result confirms my personal observation during the campaign. Ulysses Guimarães commanded enormous loyalty and respect for his role in restoring Brazilian democracy. Some of his followers held out hope that his standing in the polls would recover, but even those who knew the game was lost refused to declare for other candidates. His accidental death in November 1992 brought forth an outpouring of genuine mourning rare among politicians.

30. For continuous variables, take the mean value of the variable times the coefficient; for the dummy variables, multiply the number of municipalities with a particular party or coalition times the coefficient.

31. I also estimated the model for a *regional* partition of municipalities. If parties in the Northeast (a region known for its poverty, greater clientelism, and machine dominance) contribute significantly more to their candidates than parties elsewhere, the results presented earlier may simply mistake a regional phenomenon for a national one. If, on the other hand, estimates of party effects in the Northeast are similar to those in the country as a whole, then it is more likely that we have identified a strategic response of both local politicians and local voters to the incentives they face.

In fact, regression results show that party organizations in the Northeast performed, with predictable deviations, much like those in the rest of the country. Lula's PT, Brizola's PDT, and Maluf's PDS all helped their candidates *less* in the Northeast than in the country as a whole. In the first round, Collor did about twice as well in northeastern PTB or PFL municipalities as in all of Brazil, and Ulysses Guimarães almost doubled his overall PMDB total in the Northeast. In the second round, Lula improved his vote percentage in PT municipalities of the Northeast, but the PT controlled so few municipalities that the additions are unimportant. In northeastern PDT municipalities, Lula saw his second-round gains drop to less than half those in PDT municipalities nationwide. And Lula lost heavily in PDS, PTB, and PFL municipalities located in the Northeast.

Why are these results plausible? Consider Lula, Brizola, and Maluf. The increments in the vote of Lula and Brizola in PT and PDT municipalities of the South and Southeast reflect both organizational strength and fierce, long-standing partisanship. Outside the South and Southeast, these parties lack the cumulative power of working-class and industrial contexts and their traditional militancy. Thus the Northeast is pure organization, almost without grassroots militancy. Maluf's relative decline in the Northeast is actually not statistically significant, but his identification as a Paulista candidate might have led to weakness. Maluf's national percentage in round 1 was 8.28%; in São Paulo he received 22.56%. So Maluf loses not just in the Northeast but everywhere outside his home. The gains in the Northeast by Collor and Ulysses Guimarães (and Lula's losses to Collor in the second round) reflect mostly organizational strength, though Collor's status as a northeasterner probably helped. Though Ulysses Guimarães was a Paulista, his party endorsement coefficient was much worse in São Paulo than in the Northeast.

In general, then, parties relying on grassroots support faltered in the "backward" Northeast; and parties relying on machine domination did better. In no case, however, does removal of the Northeast states from the estimation erase the significance of the party coefficients in the South and Southeast. Thus local party machines support candidates at about the same rate in the "modern" areas of the country as in the supposedly tradition-bound, "clientelistic" regions.

32. To those unfamiliar with Brazilian politics, this may seem bizarre, so it is worth putting another way. State assemblies really have no districts at all: everyone is elected at large.

33. In the last four legislatures, 32% of federal deputies had been state deputies immediately before moving to Brasília. Another 13% had just concluded terms as mayors or municipal council members, while 21% held state-level bureaucratic positions. Career paths vary widely, however, across states. In states like Bahia, where bureaucratic control over federal largesse has long been a route to political power, purely local politicians are rare. In the South and Southeast, especially in states like Minas Gerais, politicians tend to have strong local roots, so the most common career trajectory follows a single sequence: council, mayor, state deputy, federal deputy. See Ames 1992.

34. For an extensive treatment of these issues, see Ames 1992.

35. This is, of course, no small task for a country in which many states have hundreds of municipalities. I have developed computerized municipal-level maps of all Brazilian states. These maps, coupled with programs developed by the statistics department of the University of Washington, Seattle, generated a 1-0 nearest-neighbor matrix for each state. With these matrices, a program could be created to produce a data set in which the voting population of each municipality's contiguous neighbors was output to the same observation.

36. The same argument could be made for Lula and the PT; that is, his personal appeal should prevent declines in small-outlier PT municipalities. The actual decline that did occur is probably a statistical artifact: since most PT municipalities were large cities, very few fit into the small-outlier category.

37. The Paulista PTB, Benevides points out, had always been "electorally weak, politically disorganized, and ideologically inconsequential," and it served the interests of the PTB leaderships in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul that it should remain so (1989, 9; see also 18-22).

38. The discussion uses the minimum left partisan tendency, but the results are essentially the same with partisan tendency at maximum left level.

39. In the municipalities along Santa Catarina's western border with Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola averaged 47.4%, and in coastal municipalities, he reached 37.5%. On the central part of the border, however, he averaged only 20%.

40. Note that both São Paulo and Minas Gerais extend much further away from the border than the municipalities



shown in the figure. Brizola's strength in these distant regions is extremely low.

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